L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
M/S Avk Traders vs Kerala State Civil Sup. Corp. Ltd

6. The High Court also took the view that there is no question of altering and amending the plaintiff firm as a proprietary concern as that would alter the nature and character of the suit, which cannot be permitted. Further, it was also held by the Court that no further dilation over that aspect is called for in the case other than pointing out that the indefeasible rights of the legal heirs of a deceased partner in a suit filed by a firm are insulated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order XXX of the Code. The High Court, however, did not interfere with the order of the Subordinate Court allowing the application for recalling PW1 for further examination. With regard to the prayers of the Respondent Corporation for raising additional issues, the High Court took the view that the same should have been allowed. Consequently, the prayer made by the Respondent Corporation for framing additional issues was allowed. Aggrieved by the above-mentioned order, this appeal has been preferred by the Appellant.

10. We are of the view that the legal consequences pointed out by the High Court might apply in a case where one of the several partners dies in the suit instituted in the name of the partnership firm as compared to when one of the two partners of the partnership dies. Further, the High Court failed to notice that if the partnership firm succeeds in the suit, the decree so granted would not be executable, and hence a nullity. In such circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court interfering with the order of the Subordinate Court allowing the application for amendment and permission to prosecute the suit as prayed for. Ordered accordingly.
State Bank Of India vs Vijay Kumar

3. The background facts which are almost undisputed are as follows:

1. 28.12.2003 Rs.90,000 Cash deposited with the Respondent bank

2. 2.1.04 Rs.20,000 Cash deposited with the Respondent bank

3. 5.1.04 Rs.10,000 Cash deposited with the Respondent bank

4. 25.4.04 Rs.3,80,000 Cash deposited with the Respondent bank

5. 12.7.04 Rs.5,00,000 Vide bank draft deposited with the Recovery officer.

Total Rs.10,00,000

8. Additionally, we find that the respondent had paid Rs.45,000/- as interest for the defaulted period. Interestingly, pursuant to the direction of the High Court the appellant-bank had charged interest of Rs.29,353/-. There into arrangements with third party for selling the property but the payment in respect of the sale was to be made directly to the bank.

9. It is noted that Bank at no point of time before the final payment was made appears to have indicated that settlement failed because of failure to stick to the time schedule.

10. Above being the position, we do not find this to be a fit case where jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 is to be exercised. The appeal is dismissed.
Varinder Singh vs State Of Punjab & Anr

The appellant had gone as a visitor to the Central Jail, Ferozepur on 17.09.2009. There, on being searched, a mobile phone was recovered from his turban and a charger was recovered from his shoes. An FIR dated 24.09.2009 was filed at the Police Station Ferozepur, under Sections 42 and 45 (12) of the Prisons Act, 1894 (in short “the Act”). The Chief Judicial Magistrate of Ferozepur charged him on 01.05.2010 under Sections 42 and 45 of the Act. The appellant approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by way of a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, praying that the FIR be quashed. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana by way of impugned judgment and final order dated 19.07.2013 dismissed the petition, and inter alia held that “….the accused is at liberty to take all pleas available to him during the trial”.

4. The High Court in its impugned order has interpreted Section 42 of the Act, and held that whoever communicates or attempts to communicate with any prisoner is liable for punishment. It said that the appellant herein was entering the jail with a mobile phone and its charger, apparently to enable communication with a prisoner. It was held that “ After presentation of challan, charges have already been framed against the petitioner. In these circumstances, at this stage, no ground for quashing of the FIR in question is made out.”

16. In view of the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. The FIR dated 24.09.2009 and the proceedings against the appellant are quashed. There will be no order as to costs.
Vineshkumar Mavjibhai Parmar vs Dethali Gopalak Vividh Karyakari ...

3. The facts leading to the present litigation:

7. Elections to the SIRPUR market committee fell due in the year 2015. A voters list (under Rule 7 of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Market Rules, 1965) came to be prepared consisting the names of the members of the managing committee of the above-mentioned 8 cooperative societies (alongwith other societies) operating within the market area of the SIRPUR market committee.

8. In view of the pendency of the liquidation proceedings, objections for the inclusion of the names of the members of the managing committees of the 8 cooperative societies were raised. Objections were upheld by the proceedings dated 26.2.2015 of the Additional Registrar and Co-operation Officer (Market), Patan, directing the deletion of the names of the members of the managing committee of the above-mentioned 8 cooperative societies[4]. Operative portion of the order dated 26.2.2015 w.r.t. one of the 8 societies reads;

10. We are informed that the facts relating to the other 7 societies are substantially similar.

According to the appellants, permitting the members of the managing committees of CREDIT SOCIETIES which are in the process of being wound up, to participate in the election process and elect agriculturist members to the market committees, would be inconsistent with the spirit of the MARKETS ACT, in view of the declaration contained in Section 108(2)[5] of the SOCIETIES ACT.

26. We now deal with the submission that the society ceased to be a CREDIT SOCIETY in view of the pendency of the winding up proceedings.

31. Credit Societies against which there is an ‘interim order’ of winding up are temporarily debarred from dispensing agricultural credit, by virtue of the operation of law. The embargo imposed by such interim order may or may not fructify into a final order of winding up. (We have already discussed this aspect of the matter at para 21 supra). On the face of such possibility of the society resuming its activity of “dispensing agricultural credit” - to debar its managing committee members from discharging their statutory obligation under the MARKETS ACT would be productive of public mischief. Such an interpretation of the statute must be avoided.

32. For the above reasons, we do not see any merit in the appeals. Therefore, the appeals are dismissed.

November 16, 2016

(ii) has ceased working, or

(iii) possesses shares of members deposits not exceeding five hundred rupees, or

[4] We take the facts of the first respondent society in Civil Appeal No. 3891/2015 as representative facts of the 8 appeals.

(2) Where an interim order is made the officers of the society shall hand over to the liquidator the custody and control of all the property, effects and actionable claims to which the society is or appears to be entitled, and of all books, records and other documents pertaining to the business of the society and, shall have no access to any of them.
Commissioner Of Central Excise, Jaipur vs Dugar Tetenal India Limited

2. The Assessee is engaged in the manufacture of photographic chemicals. During the period from March, 1988 to February, 1992 assessee cleared its products under the brand name "Tetenal" without payment of duty, claiming the benefit of exemption under Notification No. 175/86-CE dated 1.3.86. From the result of investigation conducted by the officers of Central Excise, it was found that the brand name "Tetenal" belonged to M/s Tetenal Vertribs GmBH, Germany and that the assessee was not eligible for the benefit of exemption Notification as they had cleared their product affixed with the brand name of another person. It further appeared to the department that the assessee had mis-stated and suppressed facts with intent to evade payment of duty on the goods. The department, therefore, by show cause notice dated 24.6.1992 called upon the assessee to pay central excise duty of Rs.32,25,465/- on the goods cleared during the aforesaid period and also to show cause why penalty should not be imposed on them.

3. The Collector vide his order dated 5.11.1992 dropped the proceedings. The Revenue filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal by its order dated 21.3.2000 held that the assessee was not entitled to the benefit of the Notification and consequently remanded the matter to the adjudicating authority for fresh decision on the question whether the demand of duty was within the time prescribed under the Act.

5. The assessee being aggrieved filed an appeal against the aforesaid order before the Tribunal. Apart from raising the issue of applicability of the Notification and limitation, the assessee further contended that the selling price of the goods was the cum-duty price and they were entitled to deduct the duty element from the sale price for the purpose of determination of assessable value of the goods in terms of Section 4(4) (d) (ii) of the Act. Tribunal by its impugned order held that the demand of duty is not barred by time. That the extended period of limitation was invokable in the present case. Against this portion of the order the assessee has filed the appeal. The Tribunal however set aside the quantum of duty and directed the adjudicating authority to re-determine the assessable value of the goods after examining the assessee's claim under section 4(4) (d) (ii) of the Act on its merits and in the light of the Tribunal's order in the case of Shri Chakra Tyres Ltd. V. CCE, Madras, 1999 (32) RLT-1. Against this portion of the order, the Revenue is in appeal. Tribunal had set aside the order imposing penalty but the same has not been challenged by the Revenue.

There is also nothing to show that the sale price was not cum-duty. "

15. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in either of the appeals and accordingly dismiss the same leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
Sudesh Kumar vs State Of Uttarakhand

accused in this Court against his conviction for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 394 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was held that the contention of the accused that he was 15= years of age at the time of occurrence was a complete after thought and refused to grant the benefit on that basis.

The case of the prosecution in brief is that one Jagdish Prasad was wholesale beedi merchant and carried on his business in the name and style of M/s. Madrasee Basant Beedi in Vikasnagar, District Dehradun. Jagdish Prasad used to go to collect his dues from the retailers on every 15th day. On 7.3.1981, he went to Purola, Badkot for realization of his dues. Along with other persons, he was travelling in the car which was being driven by the driver Gyanendra Singh. While returning to Vikasnagar from Purola, they had stopped at the curve of Katta Pather and alighted from the car. Four miscreants came on scooter and parked the said scooter in front of the motor car. Two miscreants were armed with revolvers and the remaining two had khukhries with them. All of them surrounded Jagdish Prasad and ordered him to hand over money bag to them. They also threatened him to shoot and kill him if he made any protest. Jagdish Prasad quietly handed over the money bag containing about Rs. 25,000/-. He also gave his wrist watch and a golden ring. Another occupant of the car was compelled to give cash of Rs.230/- and the driver gave cash of Rs.600/- to them. One person sitting in the car was forced to give his three wrist watches. The miscreants snatched away the keys of the car from its driver. One of the miscreants ran away on the scooter along with the money bag, while the remaining three boarded the car and fled away. On appreciation of the evidence brought on record, the Additional District & Sessions Judge found the accused persons guilty and imposed the punishment which was confirmed by the High Court as mentioned hereinabove. The accused appellant- Sudesh Kumar has preferred this appeal against the order of conviction and sentence.

6. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

That being the case, even if the date of birth of the accused is held to be 28.6.1962 as alleged by him in the petition, on the date of delivery of judgment of conviction and sentence on 26.7.1985 by the Additional District & Sessions Judge he was more than 21 years of age and thus was not entitled to the benefit under Section 6 of the Act.
Vijay Kumar Kulhar vs Rajasthan State Road Transport Corp

4. Basic and material facts for deciding the said appeals are mentioned herein below:

5. On 22.8.1983, the bus belonging to Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'RSRTC') was plying between Ramgarh to Jhunjhunu. At the relevant point of time, it was being driven by PW-5 Ghosh Mohammad. When the said bus reached near the crusher machine, after Jhunjhunu Bus Stand, a truck bearing registration No. RJP 4120 loaded with stones overtook the bus from right hand side and hit it, with the result driver of the bus lost its control and it dashed against the stone bridge.

7. On notices being issued by the Tribunal, appellant herein, driver and owner of the truck appeared C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)Nos.3889-3890/08 3 and filed written statement denying the allegations made in the claim petition filed by RSRTC. According to him, the bus had dashed against the bridge not because of his fault but on account of rash and negligent driving of the bus by its driver PW 5 Ghosh Mohammad.

24. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the opinion that appeals have no merits and are C.A. @ S.L.P.(C)Nos.3889-3890/08 8 accordingly hereby dismissed but with no orders as to cost.

J. [DEEPAK VERMA] New Delhi.

July 27, 2009.
Mahindra Nath Das vs Union Of India & Ors

3. The appellant was prosecuted for an offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) on the allegation that he had killed Rajen Das, Secretary of Assam Motor Workers Union on 24.12.1990. He was convicted by Sessions Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the trial Court’) in Sessions Case No. 80(K) of 1990 vide judgment dated 11.11.1997 and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

5. The appellant challenged the judgments of the trial Court in Appeal Nos. 254(J) of 1997 and 2(J) of 1998. Both the appeals were dismissed by the High Court vide judgments dated 3.2.1998 and 12.12.1998 and the sentence of death awarded in Sessions Case No. 114(K) of 1996 was confirmed.

7. Soon after the judgment of this Court, the appellant submitted a petition to the President under Article 72 of the Constitution and prayed for commutation of the sentence of death into life imprisonment. A similar petition was filed by him under Article 161 of the Constitution. The Governor of Assam rejected his petition vide order dated 7.4.2000. The mercy petition addressed to the President was forwarded by the Government of Assam to the Ministry of Home Affairs sometime in June, 2000. After a lot of correspondence with the State Government, the Ministry of Home Affairs prepared a note suggesting that the petition filed by the appellant may be rejected. On 20.6.2001, the then Home Minister recommended to the President that the mercy petition of the appellant should be rejected.

As per that note, the mercy petitions of Sushil Murmu, Santosh Yadav and Molai Ram were rejected. As regards Mahendra Nath Das, R. Govindasamy, Piara Singh, Satnam Singh, Sarabjit Singh and Gurdev Singh, the President opined that their mercy petitions be accepted.

The sentence was confirmed by the High Court and the special leave petition was dismissed by this Court. After rejection of the review petition, he filed mercy petitions before the Governor and the President of India, which were also rejected. The writ petition filed by his brother Lal Singh was dismissed along with Triveniben’s case. Thereafter, he filed another mercy petition before the Governor of Haryana in November, 1988. The matter remained pending for next two years. Finally, he sent a letter from Alipore Central Jail, Calcutta to the Registry of this Court for commutation of the sentence of death into life imprisonment. This Court took cognizance of the fact that the petitioner was in jail since 1972 and substituted the sentence of imprisonment for life in place of the sentence of death.

9. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we deem it fit to and accordingly substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life in place of the petitioner's death sentence. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.”

24. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside. The rejection of the appellant’s mercy petition is declared illegal and quashed and the sentence of death awarded to him by the trial Court, which has been confirmed by the High Court and this Court is commuted into life imprisonment.

May 1, 2013
M/S Indus Airways Pvt. Ltd And Ors vs M/S Magnum Aviation Pvt Ltd And Anr

3. The brief facts are these: On 19.02.2007 and 26.02.2007, the purchasers placed two purchase orders for supply of certain aircraft parts with respondent No.1, M/s. Magnum Aviation Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘supplier’). In respect of these purchase orders, the purchasers also issued two post-dated cheques dated 15.03.2007 for a sum of Rs.34,57,164/- and 20.03.2007 for a sum of Rs.15,91,820/-. The said cheques were issued by way of advance payment for the purchase orders. One of the terms and conditions of the contract was that the entire payment would be given to the supplier in advance. The supplier says that the advance payment was made by the purchasers as it had to procure the parts from abroad.

7. On 22.05.2007, the concerned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance of the alleged offence and issued summons to the purchasers.

21. The view taken by Delhi High Court is plainly wrong and does not deserve acceptance.

22. Criminal Appeal is, accordingly, allowed; the impugned judgment of Delhi High Court is set aside; and the order of the Sessions Judge is restored.

[2006 Cri. L.J. 4330 (Kerala)]
P. Venugopal vs Union Of India (Uoi)

2. The writ petitioner was admittedly the Director of All India Institute of Medical Sciences (in short the "AIIMS") immediately prior to the commencement of the added provisions and by virtue of the legislative command contained in the added provision he had been made to demit his office as Director of the said Institute from the date of coming into force of this added provision.

23. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the writ Petition being W.P.[C] No. 10687/2006 on 7th of July, 2006, inter alia, observed that "the petitioner has not been given any notice and according to him his tenure of five years could not be curtailed on the grounds which are not justifiable..." and then proceeded to injunct the respondent against premature termination of the term of the writ petitioner. The learned Single Judge reiterated and re-emphasized the prohibition against the respondent by subsequent order dated 18th of October, 2006 (See Pages 89-118 of Vol.1) Page 2329

32. In view of our discussion made hereinabove and for the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that this writ petition is covered by the decisions of this Court in the case of D.S. Reddy and L.P. Agarwal and the impugned proviso to Section 11A of the AIIMS Act is, therefore, hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the proviso is ultra vires and unconstitutional and accordingly it is struck down. The writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is allowed. In view of our order passed in the writ petition, the writ petitioner shall serve the nation for some more period, i.e., upto 2nd of July, 2008. We direct the AIIMS Authorities to restore the writ petitioner in his office as Director of AIIMS till his period comes to an end on 2nd of July, 2008. The writ petitioner is also entitled to his pay and other emoluments as he was getting before premature termination of his office from the date of his order of termination. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, there will be no order as to costs.
Samadhan Dhudaka Koli vs State Of Maharashtra

2. Janabai, the deceased, was the wife of appellant. They were married in the year 1985. They were having two daughters. She suffered a burn injury during the night between 03.09.1991 and 04.09.1991. She was sleeping at her house. However, the place where appellant was sleeping is in dispute. According to the First Information Report, the appellant was sleeping with the deceased and two daughters whereas in the first dying declaration made by the deceased, he is said to have been sleeping in a nearby school.

3. Indisputably, she suffered burn injuries. Upon hearing the screams for help, some persons from the locality gathered. They tried to extinguish the fire. She was thereafter removed in a bullock cart to a hospital of one Dr. Warke. From the said hospital she was taken to Municipal Hospital at Bhusawal as her condition became precarious. On or about 4.9.1991, she 3 gave a dying declaration before a police constable, Savda, which reads as under:

4. It stands admitted that another dying declaration was recorded by a Judicial Magistrate on the same day. The said dying declaration, however, for reasons best known to the State was not produced. An application for bringing the said dying declaration on record was filed on behalf of the appellant, which was rejected by the learned Sessions Judge. The High Court has also affirmed the said view. We would advert to the said question a little later.

She, in the said dying declaration, attributed the act of commission of the said offence on her husband, the appellant herein, stating:

Special Judicial Magistrate was given primacy as it was noticed that he had taken all the precautions and in fact when the dying declaration was recorded a medical officer was present.

19. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained; it is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. Appellant is in custody. He is directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless wanted in connection with any other case.

December 18, 2008
T. Vengama Naidu vs T. Dora Swamy Naidu & Ors

4. We have gone through the FIR ourselves. In the FIR the complainant had complained that he was the absolute owner of the vacant site in Sy.No.479/2 situated at Tirupathi in Ward No.18 of Santhi Nagar Residential area jointly along with one Dammalapati Nagulu Naid. He had executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the first respondent. However, since the first respondent was seen misusing the General Power of Attorney, the appellant- complainant cancelled the said General Power of Attorney on 26.6.1997 by issuing a legal notice. It is alleged that the first respondent had filed a false complaint against the appellant herein alleging the offences punishable under Sections 447, 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code wherein the respondent no.2 was shown as one of the witnesses. It is alleged that inspite of cancellation of General Power of Attorney in 1997, the first respondent executed a registered sale deed dated 16.6.2000 in favour of the second respondent. The other accused, namely, respondent nos.3 to 6, who are not parties before us, were shown as the witnesses therein. It was, therefore alleged that both the accused persons were well aware that the first respondent did not own the said land and could not have executed such a document and thereby had cheated the complainant. The respondent no.1 had also dishonestly executed sale deed without any authority and had also made a false document.

8. This appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside.