L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Committee Of Management Kanya Junior ... vs Sachiv, U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad ...

The appellant institution, namely Kanya Junior High School Bal Vidya Mandir, was established and administered by the Jain community which has been recognized as a minority community. In this School education is imparted up from Nursery to standard VIII. An enquiry was conducted and after receiving the enquiry report from the Enquiry Officer, meeting of the Managing Committee was called on 9.11.2001 which was attended by all the members of the Managing Committee. The enquiry report and reply to the show cause notice were considered. The charges levelled against respondent no. 3 were unanimously proved. In the interest of the institution and its good reputation, respondent no. 3 was removed from the service of the school. The order of termination dated 10.11.2001 reads as under:

This annual increment had been stopped w.e.f. 1st January, 2001 and the above said Basic Education Officer had been transferred from this District in June, 2001. During this period of 6 months, you never made any application regarding stopping of this annual increment, reasons of which are best known to you.

The learned Single Judge accepted the preliminary objection regarding availability of alternate remedy and declined to interfere with the termination order dated 10.11.2001 and dismissed the Writ Petition.

5. Director of Education, U.P. Peerpur House, Tilak Marg, Lucknow.

The appeal filed by respondent no. 3 was dismissed by an order dated 13.11.2002.

In this appeal it is not necessary for us to decide as to whether a special appeal lay before the Division Bench of the High Court against the impugned order of the Single Judge.

We deem it appropriate to refer to some of the decided cases.

Consequently, the impugned judgment of the Learned Single Judge is set aside.

This appeal is accordingly allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
Shreyans Industries Ltd.,Punjab vs Commr.Of Income Tax-I,Ludhiana

During the previous year relevant to the Assessment Year 1996-1997, appellant applied to the Pollution Control Board and the Forest Department to allow it to discharge its effluent water from its Mill to Village Tallewal. The Department of Environment & Forest agreed to provide forest land for open drain to be constructed by the assessee (user agency) for carrying its effluent to Tallewal drain subject to certain conditions. One of the conditions was that the appellant will transfer 4.063 hectare non-forest land in favour of the Forest Department. That was done.

Suffice it to state that since the High Court has not formulated a correct substantial question of law and since the High Court is required to take into account all the above mentioned facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law.

Accordingly, the Income Tax Appeal No. 277 of 2004 shall stand restored to the file of the High Court and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
Tgn Kumar vs State Of Kerala & Ors

3. Being aggrieved with the order granting a general exemption to the accused from personal appearance before the Trial Court, the complainant has filed this appeal.

(2005) 4 SCC 173 7 We respectfully concur with the above guidelines and while re-affirming the same, we would add that the order of the Magistrate should be such which does not result in unnecessary harassment to the accused and at the same time does not cause any prejudice to the complainant. The Court must ensure that the exemption from personal appearance granted to an accused is not abused to delay the trial.

18.In light of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed, and the impugned order containing general directions to the lower courts is set aside. However, we direct that if the accused moves the trial court with an application under Section 205 of the Code for exemption from personal attendance within four weeks of the receipt of a copy of this judgment, the exemption granted to her by the High Court shall continue to be in force till her application is disposed of by the trial court.

JANUARY 14, 2011.

ARS 1
Sumtibai & Others vs Paras Finance Co. Mankanwar W/O ...

4. The appellants are the legal representatives of late Kapoor Chand. A suit was filed by the respondent herein against Kapoor Chand for specific performance of a contract for sale. It was alleged that Kapoor Chand had entered into an agreement to sell the property in dispute to the plaintiff- respondent, M/s. Paras Finance Co. In that agreement Kapoor Chand stated that the property in dispute was his self acquired property. During the pendency of the suit Kapoor Chand died and his wife, sons etc. applied to be brought on record as legal representatives. After they were impleaded they filed an application under Order 22 Rule 4(2) read with Order 1 Rule 10 CPC praying inter alia, that they should be permitted to file additional written statement and also be allowed to take such pleas which are available to them. The trial court rejected this application against which a revision was filed by the appellant which was also dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal by special leave.

The appellants shall be allowed to file additional written statement and thereafter the suit should proceed expeditiously in accordance with law.

17. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Ajmera Hng.Corp.& Anr.Etc.Etc vs Commissioner Of Income Tax

The Ajmera Group of firms, consisting of mainly 4 firms and their partners are engaged in the business of land development and building/construction. For the sake of convenience, facts relating to the main firm viz. M/s. Ajmera Housing Corporation, Bombay (hereinafter referred to as "the assessee"), in which other firms and partners have stakes, are being noticed. These are:

Accordingly, the Settlement Commission asked the Commissioner to submit a further report, as required under Rule 8 of the 1987 Rules. The Commissioner in his elaborate report dated 30th August, 1995, while observing that the income disclosed by the assessee should not 5 be treated as true and correct, reported that the total unaccounted income of the assessee was to the tune of Rs.187.09 crores. A yearwise summary of unaccounted receipts and investments made by the assessee, compiled on the basis of the seized books of account and documents, was submitted with the report. It appears that on 20th October, 1997, the Commissioner sent to the Settlement Commission a general note on reconciliation of various annexures to the earlier report, submitted on 30th August, 1995.

6. Hearing in the case commenced before the Settlement Commission on 6th October, 1998 and various hearings took place thereafter, but some time in the year 1999 the assessee made a further disclosure of undisclosed income of Rs.2.76 crores, apparently during the course of hearing, as no application/letter to that effect is on record. Hearings concluded on 14th October, 1998.

10. The details referred to in item 11 shall be given in the Annexure to this application."

35. For all the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in these appeals, which are dismissed accordingly. The Commissioner will be entitled to costs, quantified at Rs.50,000/-.

AUGUST 20, 2010.
Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) vs State Of Gujarat

5. Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows:

8. As is evident from the rival stands one thing is clear that the parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail are different. There is no dispute to this position. But the question is if the trial Court while granting bail acts on irrelevant materials or takes into account irrelevant materials whether bail can be cancelled. Though it was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the aspects to be dealt with while considering the application for cancellation of bail and on appeal against the grant of bail, it was fairly accepted that there is no scope of filing an appeal against the order of grant of bail. Under the scheme of the Code the application for cancellation of bail can be filed before the Court granting the bail if it is a Court of Sessions, or the High Court.

15. We have only highlighted the above aspects to show that irrelevant materials have been taken into account and/or relevant materials have been kept out of consideration. That being so, the order of granting bail to the appellant was certainly vulnerable. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference. The appeal is dismissed. However, it is made clear that whatever observations have been made are only to decide the question of grant of bail and shall not be treated to be expression of any opinion on merits. The case relating to acceptability or otherwise of the evidence is the subject matter for the trial Court.
Kesho Ram (Dead) By L.Rs vs Hem Raj

1. The facts of the appeal are as under:

2. Civil Revision No. 22 of 1975 arising out of a civil suit was allowed on 8th June, 1976 by the High Court. Review Application No. 5 of 1976 was filed for re-calling the order dated 8th June, 1976. This application was allowed ex-parte on 8th September, 1987 as the counsel for the appellant, Mr. K.D. Raina did not appear to defend the case. As a result of the order dated 8th September, 1987, the order dated 8th June, 1976 was re-called, and the revision petition was 2 dismissed thereby upholding the order of the trial court that the suit had abated. The appellant herein thereafter filed CMP No.266 of 1987 for setting aside the ex-parte order dated 8th September, 1987. In these proceedings, it was pleaded that Mr. K.D. Raina, Advocate had failed to appear in Court as he was not in regular practice and his absence was not wilful. An affidavit of Mr. Raina was also attached with the application. The learned Judge did not accept the plea and affidavit of Mr. Raina and dismissed CMP No. 266 of 1987 on 11th November 1988 leading to this Letters Patent Appeal against the aforementioned order. When this matter came up before the Division Bench, a difference of opinion arose between the two Judges, with one accepting Mr. Raina's affidavit and the other rejecting the same. It was in this situation that the matter was referred to a third Judge on the following points:

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties very carefully. We find substance in Mr. Singhvi's argument based on Order 47 Rule 7(2) but as of today, the prime issue before us is with regard to the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal. A bare perusal of clause 12 reveals that an appeal against an order in revision is not maintainable. We are, therefore, of the opinion that all the observations/findings recorded by the Letters Patent Bench were nonest being completely unauthorized in law. We have therefore no hesitation in dismissing the present appeal as well. We, however, give liberty to the appellant to challenge the order dated 8th September, 1987 in appropriate legal proceedings with a further direction that it shall be open to the appellant, should an appeal be filed, to move an application for condonation of delay which would be considered with sympathy. We, however, dismiss the appeal. No costs.
Secretary, U.P. Public Service ... vs Uday Kumar Upadhyaya & Ors

Briefly stated, the facts are as follows.

Sometimes in the year 1983, an advertisement was issued for filling up posts of 301 Naib Tehsildar. Result was declared on 22/9/1988. In the said result, 297 candidates were recommended and appointed. Subsequently, 40 recommended candidates did not join their post within the stipulated time and 6 appointees resigned. Thus, 46 posts became vacant. For the 46 subsequent vacancies, the department again recommended 46 candidates from the waiting listed. The break-up of 46 candidates are as follows: 32 general candidates, 6 OBC and 8 .....2.

SC candidates. All of them were appointed. It appears that the respondents herein preferred a writ petition in February 1992 claiming their appointment from the waiting list. In paragraph 28 of the writ petition, allegation has been made that the respondents 1 to 3, the appellants herein, have committed illegality in giving appointment to the 12 persons who have not even appeared in the examination and they were not in the merit list and as such their appointment is wholly illegal and is liable to be cancelled. Counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the appellants rebutting the said contention. Be that as it may. The allegation in paragraph 28 of the writ petition was as vague as anything. The name of none of the 12 persons, who were alleged to have been appointed despite the fact that they did not appear in the examination, has been mentioned, save and except, making bald statement. They were not made parties. Also it is not the case of the respondents that they were high in the waiting list and ignoring their candidature, the persons, who were below them in the waiting list, have been appointed.

In the result, this appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court is set aside. No costs.
Gurcharan Singh vs Directorate Of Revenue Intelligence

4. One A.K. Saxena figured as accused No.5 therein. He was a Customs Officer. He floated various firms in false and fictitious names. Duty drawback amount was claimed for alleged export of readymade garments by the said firms under certain assumed names to the extent of Rs.1,04,62,596/- Appellant herein alongwith others Pawan Kumar, Govind Jha, Radhey Lal made statements under Section 8 of the Act corroborating the allegations made against them that they had conspired with each other in regard to export of inferior quality of readymade garments which had been over- invoiced.

5. Cognizance of the said offence was taken by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 16th April, 2003. An application for discharge was filed inter alia by the appellant herein which was dismissed by the learned trial judge by his order dated 1st October, 2003.

We are not unmindful of the proposition of law that a penal statute must receive strict construction.

20. Applying the said principle to the fact of the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that the High Court has not committed any error whatsoever in passing the impugned judgment.

21. For the aforesaid reasons we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
A.Srimannarayana vs Dasari Santakumari & Anr

4. Relevant facts are taken from Special Leave Petition (C) No.26043 of 2010.

5. The appellant and respondent No.2, who are doctors, conducted an operation on the left leg of the husband of the complainant. Sometime after the operation, the patient died on 13.07.2008. Respondent No. 1, wife of the deceased, filed a complaint against the appellant and respondent No.2, before the District Consumer Forum. We may notice here that respondent No.2 is the appellant in Civil Appeal No………………………of 2013 arising out of SLP(C) No.1495 of 2011. The complaint was duly registered and notice was issued to the appellant and respondent No.2. Against the issuance of the notice, the appellant filed a revision petition before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Hyderabad on the ground that the complaint could not have been registered by the District Forum without seeking an opinion of an expert in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Martin F. D’Souza Vs. Mohd. Ishfaq (2009) 3 SCC 1. In this revision petition, respondent No.2 filed IA No.2240 of 2009 praying for stay of proceedings before the District Consumer Forum. The State Commission rejected the revision petition by granting liberty to the appellant to file the necessary application before the District Forum to refer the matter to an expert. He did not file any application before the District Forum, but challenged the aforesaid order of the State Commission by filing revision petition No. 2032 of 2010 before the National Commission. The revision petition has been dismissed by the National Commission by relying upon the subsequent judgment of this Court in V. Kishan Rao Vs. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital & Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 513, wherein this Court has declared that the judgment rendered in Martin F. D’Souza (supra) is per incuriam. Hence the present special leave petitions challenging the aforesaid order of the National Commission dated 15.07.2010.

11. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the conclusions recorded by the National Commission in the impugned order does not call for any interference. The civil appeals are dismissed.

January 09, 2013.
Maruti Nivrutti Navale vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr

3) Brief facts:

(c) Accordingly, two separate Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were executed on 10.05.2008. Both the memorandums were duly notarized and registered. On 13.05.2008, in order to realize the object, the Trust leased out the said property to the Society for a period of 2 years and 11 months commencing from 15.04.2008 and expiring on 09.03.2011 by way of an interim arrangement for an amount of Rs. 1/- towards lease fee for the entire duration of the lease granted. This deed was duly registered with the office of sub-Registrar, Mulshi (Paud) at S.No. 3701/2008.

6) Inasmuch as the Additional Sessions Judge, Pune in the order dated 29.08.2011 and the High Court in the impugned order dated 19.09.2011 adverted to all the factual details relating to the appellant-accused and the Respondent No. 1-State and Respondent No. 2-Complainant, there is no need to traverse the same once again except certain aspects which are essential for the disposal of the present appeal. According to the Complainant/respondent No.2 herein – Pawan Gandhi Charity Trust had been established in the memory of his son and the Trust had a land on which a building was constructed for running a school. The appellant claims to be the founder President and Managing Trustee of the said Society and the Trust had a land bearing Survey No. 154/6/1 admeasuring 57 acres on which building in the area of 650 sq. mts. was constructed. An English Medium School was started in the building in 2005 known as Loyala School. In March, 2008, it was offered to lease out the said school building for a period of 87 years and also to sell other property of the Trust to the Society. Based on the negotiations, two separate Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) dated 10.05.2008 were signed between the parties.

14) In the light of the above discussion and in view of the mandate prescribed in Section 438 of the Code, we fully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court in rejecting the relief of anticipatory bail. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

15) In view of our order dismissing the appeal, the interim protection granted by this Court on 23.09.2011 shall stand vacated and the appellant is granted two weeks time from today to surrender and seek regular bail. It is also made clear that the conclusion arrived at by the courts below including the present order relates only to eligibility or otherwise of the relief of anticipatory bail and the trial Court is free to decide the bail application de hors to the above observation and in accordance with law.

SEPTEMBER 7, 2012.
Umesh Singh vs High Court Of Allahabad & Anr

The appellant had joined the U.P.Higher Judicial Service as a direct recruit on 14.12.1998 and was posted as VII Addl.District & Sessions Judge, Deoria. The appellant, while working as Additional Sessions Judge at Bareilly, declined bail to an accused, who was suspected to be in possession of some stolen ornaments and jewellery. The accused was arrested by the police while she was trying to sell the stolen property. The learned Sessions Judge was of the view that the accused might have been possessing stolen articles and the bail was rejected. This order was challenged by the accused before the High Court. The learned single Judge of the High Court granted bail to the accused and directed that notice be issued to the Sessions Judge as to why he had declined bail to the accused and that which offence was committed by the accused and thereafter notice was issued to the appellant 2 herein as to why 3 disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him. The appellant submitted his explanation in reply. Thereafter the learned single Judge observed that no case was made out against the accused and the rejection of the bail was unjustified and ordered that adverse remark of warning be entered in the character roll of the appellant for passing careless orders on the bail application. This order is under challenge before this Court.

The order of the learned single Judge is set aside as the same affects the career of the appellant. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

...............CJI.

11TH JULY, 2008.
Anu Bhandari vs Pradip Bhandari

The terms of settlement have been stated in detail in Interlocutory Application No. 19210 of 2018, based on which the parties have sought 2 for divorce by mutual consent. The Interlocutory Application No. 19210 of 2018 shall form part of this Judgment.

7. The following cases are disposed of in terms of the Settlement:-

The Consumer Case No.580 of 2014 filed by Ms. Anu Bhandari pending before the Chandigarh District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum-I, UT Chandigarh is dismissed.

10. The appellant and respondent are directed to strictly abide by the terms of settlement. They are also restrained from instituting any fresh litigation in respect of the subject matter without leave of this Court.

12. The Tehsildar concerned is directed to effect the required transfer and change the mutation in respect of the property referred to in the order in favour of Anu Bhandari, Bhuvi Bhandari and Master Vibhu Bhandari. It is made clear that the share of Mr. Pradip Bhandari will be equally divided among the three. This shall be done immediately.

13. We are informed that an amount of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) is lying in the form of Demand Draft in the name of Ms. Anu Bhandari with Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh in Case No. 301 of 2013 dated 14.06.2013. We direct the Court concerned to return the Demand Draft to Mr. Pradip Bhandari forthwith. Mr. Pradip Bhandari is directed to pay an amount of Rs.50,000/- to Ms. Anu Bhandari within a week thereafter.

16. The Civil Appeals are accordingly disposed of.

17. There shall be no order as to costs.

MARCH 5, 2018.
Securities & Exchange Bd.Of India vs Burren Energy India Ltd.& Anr

2. The relevant facts are not in dispute. The first respondent herein – Burren Energy India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Burren”) was incorporated in December, 2004 under the laws of England and Wales with its registered office in London. Burren was formed to acquire the entire of the equity share capital of one Unocal Bharat Limited (hereinafter referred to as “UBL”), incorporated in Mauritius in July, 1996. The shares of the aforesaid UBL were acquired in September, 1996 by one Unocal International Corporation (for short “UIC”) incorporated in California in USA.

3. Admittedly, UBL did not carry out any business activity but, at the relevant time, held 26.01% of the issued share capital of Hindustan Oil Exploration Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “the target company”).

13. On the view that we have taken we will have to hold that the learned Tribunal was incorrect in reaching its impugned conclusions and in reversing the order of the Adjudicating Officer. Consequently the order of the learned Tribunal is set aside and that of the Adjudicating Officer is restored. The penalty awarded by the Adjudicating Officer by order dated 25th August, 2006 shall be deposited in the manner directed within two months from today.

14. The appeal consequently is allowed in the above terms.

(N.V. RAMANA) NEW DELHI DECEMBER 2, 2016