L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Buudhu Singh vs State Of Jharkhand

1. Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2007 has been filed by accused Buddhu Singh while Criminal Appeal No. 1116 of 2007 has been filed by his father Ledwa Singh and brother Balchand Singh. The trial court found them guilty under Section 302 IPC and sentenced each one of them to imprisonment for life. The High Court also affirmed the conviction and sentenced awarded by the trial court.

2. The prosecution case is that the deceased Sugendra Singh was suspected to be practising witchcraft and he was aggrieved against the accused persons for not giving to him the feast which he was professionally supposed to be paid on account of getting cured of accused Balchand Singh 2 from some serious illness. The incident seems to have taken suddenly without there being any previous history to it.

4. The prosecution pressed in service the evidence of three eye witnesses namely; PW 2 Feku Kharia, PW6 - Karia Singh and PW7 Tijo Devi. PWs 2 and 6 turned hostile and refused to support the prosecution. PW7, being the mother of the deceased, however, supported the prosecution case.

9. Considering the overall material, we are of the view that there is hardly anything on record which can be said against the accused Ledwa Singh and Balchand Singh though the common intention on their part could be attributed since they had done the over act of grappling with and pinning down the deceased. Now, seeing his father and brother had been grappling with the deceased, the accused Buddhu Singh dealt an axe blow which could not 4 be said to be intended towards the head. It could have landed anywhere. However, it landed on the head of the deceased. Therefore, the element of intention is ruled out. Again the defence raised on behalf of the accused that there could not have been the intention to commit the murder of the deceased is justified by the fact that the accused Buddhu Singh did not repeat the assault. Under the circumstances, we feel that the prosecution has been able to establish the guilt of the accused persons under Section 304 Part II I.P.C.

10. We, accordingly, modify the finding of the High Court and convert the conviction of the accused from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and sentence each of them to the period already undergone. Accused Buddhu Singh is stated to be in jail for the last five years whereas other accused persons namely; Ledwa Sngh and Balchand Singh are stated to be in jail for the last ten years. They be released from the jail forthwith unless they are required in any other case.

11. The appeals are partially allowed.
Union Of India & Ors vs Vishav Priya Singh

2. For the sake of facility we may reproduce Paragraph Nos.2 to 7 of the judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 25.01.2008 which cull out the factual matrix in each of the petitions before it. Said Paragraph Nos.2 to 7 are as under:-

5. CWP 2433/2003 has been filed by Ex. Hav Dharambir Kanker who had been promoted to the rank of Havaldar in the Corps of the Military Police. After sixteen years he was posted to 4th Corps Provost Unit at Tezpur in Assam. By Charge-sheet dated 9.6.2000 the Petitioner was accused of making sundry accusations against a person subject to the Army Act. On 22.6.2000 the SCM sentenced the Petitioner (a) to be reduced to -the ranks and (b) to be dismissed from service.

6. The factual aspects of the matters which were dealt with by the High Court of Rajasthan, as found in its judgment relating to the present appellants, were as under:-

(5) The limit referred to in sub-section (4) shall be one year if the officer holding the summary court-martial is of the rank of lieutenant colonel and upwards, and three months if such officer is below that rank.[2]”

26. The third category however raises some concern. There could be two sub categories under this. In the first, the commission of offence itself may come to knowledge, though the offence was committed in the parent unit, after the accused was sent on attachment. Secondly, which is the normal course adopted in the matters under consideration, an accused may be sent on attachment to another unit only for being tried by SCM by the CO of that other unit. The commission of an act constituting an offence being connected with the erstwhile unit and having no connection with the unit where he is later sent on attachment, normally the former of the units in question would be appropriate. But the matter need not be considered and decided purely from the perspective of such connection or nexus with the former or the erstwhile unit.

28. We may gainfully refer to Regulation 9 of the DSR at this stage. Under this regulation the CO could be either:-

35. Since the High Court of Delhi had allowed Writ Petitions on the short ground of competence of a CO of a Unit other than the one to which the accused belonged, without going into the merits of the matters before it, while setting aside the view in respect of that point and allowing the appeals preferred by Union of India, namely Civil Appeal Nos.8360 of 2010, 8830-8835 of 2010 and 8838 of 2010, we remit the matters back to the High Court. The concerned Writ Petitions stand restored on the file of the High Court for consideration on merits.

37. Similarly, Civil Appeal CAD Nos.13803 and 18038 of 2015 where the major offences were held not to have been proved on facts also deserve to be dismissed. With the issue regarding competence of the CO having been answered hereinabove, nothing survives in the matters and these appeals are dismissed.

38. No order as to costs.

……………………………..CJI, (T.S. Thakur) ……………………………..J. (Uday Umesh Lalit) New Delhi July 05, 2016
Commissioner Of Customs, Chennai vs M/S Pentamedia Graphics Ltd

Respondent being aggrieved filed an appeal before the Customs Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"). The Tribunal by the impugned order has accepted the appeal; set aside the orders impugned before it and held the assessee to be entitled to the exemption under the amended notification. It has been held by the Tribunal that the deletion of the words "but does not include software required for operation of any machine performing a specific function other than data processing, and incorporating or working in conjunction with an automatic data processing machine" from the earlier notification are very relevant and has increased the scope of the kind of softwares which can now be imported duty free under the amended notification. That under the amended notification, any kind of data which is capable of being manipulated by means of automatic data processing machine would be covered by the term 'information technology software'.

Thus according to Prof. S. Raman, who is an expert on the subject, Motion Capture Animation files on data are computer software recorded in a machine readable form and capable of being manipulated, though by themselves the files cannot be used as independent entities.

Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary refers to "software" as anything that is not hardware and is used with hardware. Encyclopedia Britannica refers to "software" to designate non- hardware items, namely internal programmes or routines and programming aids. Thus the programming aids are also known as software and thus the goods in question would fall within the meaning of the word "software". The goods under import are admittedly data recorded on tapes. Under the existing Notification No. 20/99 any kind of data in a machine readable form and capable of being manipulated by means of an automatic data processing machine would be covered by the term "Information Technology Software".

For the reasons stated above, the goods under import are computer software recorded in a machine readable form and capable of being manipulated by means of an automatic data processing machine. We do not find any infirmity in the impugned order of the Tribunal.

For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. Parties shall bear their own costs.
Joshna Gouda vs Brundaban Gouda & Anr

3. The factual background of the litigation is as follows:-

6. The question of admissibility of the exhibits 5, 5A and 7 was raised in the writ petition but rejected on the ground that the said documents were admitted in evidence without any objection before the Trial Court. However, 3 the learned judge opined that mere proof of the above-mentioned exhibits does not mean that the content of the said exhibits was also proved.

12. Exts. A to H are documents produced by the appellant herein in support of her claim that her actual date of birth is 7.7.1985 but not 20.6.1986, as contended by the first respondent. Exts. A and H are voters lists of the year 2007 and 2008 respectively. The Division Bench observed that both the documents were prepared later in point of time to the filing of the nomination papers in the election in question and also they do not reflect 5 the date of birth of the appellant herein. Similarly, Ext. D is a horoscope alleged to be that of the appellant herein. The Division Bench opined that the said document was rightly not relied upon. Ext. E is a certificate of date of birth issued under the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act showing the date of birth of the appellant as 7.7.1985 but such an entry came to be made pursuant to an application made by the appellant herein subsequent to the nominations in the election in question. The High Court refused to place any reliance on the said document on the ground that it was issued by an executive magistrate, who according to the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to issue the same.

Since the first respondent failed to discharge the burden cast upon him, the election petition must fail.

An admission must be clear and unambiguous in order that such an admission should relieve the opponent of the burden of proof of the fact said to have been admitted.

19. For all the above mentioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the judgment under appeal cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. In view of our conclusion, the second question regarding the declaration in favour of the first respondent does not survive.

20. Appeal is allowed.

January 31, 2012.
Sugreev Kumar vs The State Of Punjab

3.4 In his cross-examination, the appellant deposed that Krishan Dev, Vikas, Sonu, Rajan, Mukesh @ Jungli, Devinder @ Veeru, Surinder Mahal and Pirthi Raj were declared innocent after investigation by the police, but volunteered to state that they were wrongly declared innocent. 3.5 Pending further cross-examination of the appellant, an application under Section 319 CrPC was filed by the prosecution to summon the aforesaid 8 persons to face trial on the basis of the testimony of the appellant (PW-1), wherein, he had asserted that all of them were present at the crime scene; 3 and had assaulted and injured the appellant, his family members and associates on exhortation by Krishan Dev, which resulted in the demise of his father and brother. Hence, it was submitted that there was sufficient material on record to summon all the aforesaid persons to face the trial in this case.

4. In its impugned order dated 24.07.2014, the Trial Court referred to certain inconsistencies in the testimony of the appellant as compared to his statement under Section 161 CrPC and the FIR; and found no case for summoning 7 of the aforesaid persons but considered it just and proper to summon Sonu son of Jaipal, who had allegedly fired three shots from his firearm, which hit the appellant.

5. Against the order aforesaid, the appellant filed a criminal revision petition, being CRR No. 2626 of 2014, before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh which was dismissed by the impugned order dated 02.07.2018. It is mentioned in paragraph 4 of the order impugned that the learned counsel for the petitioner had confined the relief only qua the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, Krishan Dev and Vikas son of Krishan Dev. The High Court upheld the order of the Trial Court while observing as under:

15. The other application moved by the prosecution after leading of further evidence in the matter has been rejected by the Trial Court essentially with reference to the impugned orders dated 24.07.2014 and 02.07.2018, which are the subject matter of challenge in this appeal.

16. In the totality of the circumstances of this case, rather than dilating further on the evidence, suffice it would be to observe for the present purpose that the prayer of the prosecution for proceeding against other accused persons, having not been examined in the proper prospective and with due regard to the applicable principles, deserves to be restored for reconsideration of the Trial Court.

17. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed in part, to the extent and in the manner that the impugned orders are set aside and the applications made by 10 the prosecution under Section 319 CrPC are restored for reconsideration of the Trial Court. In the interest of justice, it is made clear that we have not pronounced on the merits of the case either way and it would be expected of the Trial Court to reconsider the prayer of prosecution for proceeding against the proposed accused persons totally uninfluenced by any observation herein regarding facts of the case but with due regard to the evidence on record and to the law applicable.
Friends Of Victoria Memorial vs Howrah Ganatantrik Nagarik Samity & Ors

3. The facts very briefly are that during the British rule, Victoria Memorial Hall was built in the memory of Queen Victoria in Central Kolkata. After independence, this monument continues to be known for its beautiful architecture and green surroundings. To the north of the Victoria Memorial Hall is a huge stretch of land known as ‘the Maidan’ which is covered by green grass and interspersed with a large number of trees, bushes and shrubs. To protect and preserve the Victoria Memorial Hall and its green surroundings, a public interest litigation (Writ Petition No. 7987(W) of 2002) was filed in the Calcutta High Court by the respondent nos. 1 to 5.

6. We are, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned orders of the High Court and accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions with no order as to costs.
Harshendra Kumar D vs Rebatilata Koley Etc

4. In the month of December, 2004, the complainants filed 18 complaints under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act. For the sake of brevity and convenience, we shall refer to the complaint no. 14512 of 2004. In the complaint, besides the Company, the appellant was arraigned as accused No. 3. It was alleged in the complaint that the Managing Director and the two Directors (including the appellant) were responsible for day-to-day affairs of the Company and that it was on their assurance that the complainant issued demand draft in favour of the Company and when the products of the Company were not received by the complainant, she contacted the accused persons and told them that she could not continue business with them and asked for return of her money. Accordingly, for and on behalf of the Company, in discharge of the existing liability, an account payee cheque was issued but the cheque was returned by the complainant's banker on presentation with the endorsement `insufficient fund'. The complainant then sent legal notice asking the accused persons to pay the amount of cheque within 15 days from 3 the date of the receipt of the notice but despite service of notice, no payment has been made.

6. The appellant challenged the proceedings initiated by the complainants against him by filing 18 revision applications under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, `Code') before the Calcutta High Court. In these revision applications, notices were issued to the complainants. On behalf of the appellant, the principal contention canvassed was that the appellant was appointed as Director of the Company on August 27, 2003. He resigned from the directorship on March 2, 2004 which was accepted by the Board of Directors on that day itself with immediate effect. The factum of his resignation is also recorded in Form No. 32 filed by the Company with the Registrar of Companies on March 4, 2004. The 18 cheques which were issued on behalf of the Company to the complainants were issued after his resignation. The dishonour of these cheques through the complainants' bankers' was also subsequent to his resignation. In other words, it was submitted by the counsel for the appellant before High Court that at 4 the time when the cheques were issued or when the cheques were dishonoured, the appellant had no concern or connection with the Company.

23. These appeals are, accordingly, allowed. The judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated September 6, 2007 and the summons issued by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta to the appellant are set aside. The complaints as against the appellant stand quashed.

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 8, 2011.
Ram Swaroop vs State Of Rajasthan

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

5. The High Court did not find any merit in the appeal of the accused appellant and dismissed the same.

11. The trial court and the High Court have analysed in great detail the evidence of PWs. 3 & 4, which clearly bring out the accusations against the accused appellant. There are certain minor variations which do not in any way corrode the credibility of the prosecution version. The trial court and the High Court were, therefore, justified in placing reliance on their evidence and holding the accused appellant guilty. We do not find any merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

12. We record our appreciation for the able manner in which Mr. Radha Shyam Jena, Learned Amicus Curie highlighted various points.
Shankar Jaiswara vs State Of West Bengal

3. The prosecution story, briefly stated, is that on 14.1.1997 at about 11 or 11.30 p.m. Bhola Jaiswara (PW-1) heard a row from outside his bedroom. He heard the appellant Shankar Jaiswara was shouting and hurling abuse and in the process started knocking at the door of the house of Mohan Jaiswara (PW-3). Apprehending trouble, Bhola Jaiswara (PW-1) came out and requested the appellant to leave the place. The appellant became agitated and started moving towards the main road where he found Tarak Jaiswara (deceased) who was taking his meal while sitting in his rickshaw. Bhola (PW-1) also followed the appellant. The appellant Shankar Jaiswara started abusing Tarak Jaiswara (deceased) in obscene and filthy language. When the deceased Tarak requested the appellant to leave him alone the appellant became furious and started stabbing Tarak with a sharp edged weapon. Deceased Tarak fell in the rickshaw. He was profusely bleeding. Bhola (PW-1) took the victim who is none other than his own brother to North Suburban Hospital in the same rickshaw where the hospital authorities having regard to the grievous nature of injuries advised him to take the victim to the R.G. Kar Hospital. The victim was accordingly taken to the R.G. Kar Hospital where he was pronounced dead. While on his way back from the hospital Bhola (PW-1) found some police personnel in the vicinity of occurrence and he narrated the incident to the police. Based on the statement of Bhola (PW-1) the Police Station Cossipore issued first information report and registered a P.S. Case No. 11 of 1997 under Section 302 IPC against the appellant.

4. After completion of the investigation, the police filed charge sheet under Section 302 IPC against the accused appellant. The prosecution in all examined 19 witnesses (PW-1 to PW-19) and got marked 20 documents in evidence. The prosecution also produced material exhibits which were marked as mat. Ext. I to XIII. The statement of the accused appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in which he took the stand that he was innocent of the charge leveled against him.

5. The learned Sessions Judge upon appreciation of evidence available on record found the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and the same has received its affirmation at the hands of the High Court.

32. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.