L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
S.E.B.I vs Magnum Equity Services Ltd. & Ors

2 Magnum Capital Services (hereinafter referred to as the Firm) was a registered partnership firm, comprising of seven partners, carrying on business as a stock broker; and was a member of the National Stock Exchange (NSE). All the seven partners moved a conjoint application for registration of a company under the Companies Act, 1956, during the pendency of which one of the partners exited from the Firm. The company was incorporated on 22.5.1995 consisting of the remaining six partners, in the name and style of Magnum Equity Services Limited (hereinafter referred to as Magnum). There has not even been a semblance of a debate that the six partners had less than 40 per cent shareholding in the firm and/or that they do not hold forty per cent of the equity of Magnum. All the remaining erstwhile partners became the Whole-time Directors of Magnum. In pursuance to an application filed by the Firm, NSE transferred the membership card of the Firm to Magnum on 25.4.1996. Thus Magnum became a member of NSE with effect from 25.4.1996. Subsequently, the Company applied to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) for registration as a stock broker, which request was granted on 29.5.1997. After being registered as a stock broker, Magnum commenced its broking business. In December 1997, three Directors resigned from Magnum and transferred their shares to the remaining Directors and their family members. We must again hasten to clarify, that it is not the Appellant’s case that the equity holding of the three continuing Whole-time Directors had fallen below the 40 per cent criterion. Magnum also claimed the benefit of the fee which the Firm had paid earlier to SEBI. This claim was made on the ground that the earlier business carried on by the Firm had been transferred to Magnum and as a result there was continuity of that business. SEBI rejected this claim vide Order dated 12.6.2007 on the predication that only three out of the seven partners of the firm continued as its Whole-time Directors for the mandatory period of three years, which was in contravention of the conditions laid down in Paragraph I(4) of Schedule III of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Stock Brokers and Sub-brokers) Regulations, 1992 (Regulations for brevity). For the facility of reference, Paragraph I(4) is reproduced below:

15 We thus find no merit in these Appeals and accordingly dismiss the same. There will be no orders as to costs.
Sarbananda Sonowal vs Union Of India (Uoi)

3. This Court opined that there was absolutely no reason why the illegal migrants coming into the State of Assam should be treated differently from those who had migrated to the other parts of the country having regard to the provisions of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964 (for short "the 1964 Order").

4. Subsequent to the said decision, instead of implementing the directions therein, the Central Government in exercise of its power under Section 3 of the 1946 Act made an Order known as "the Foreigners (Tribunal) Amendment Order, 2006" (for short "the 2006 Order"), which was published in the Official Gazette dated 10th February, 2006. On 10th February, 2006, the Central Government amended the 1964 Order principally making the same Page 5520 inapplicable to the State of Assam. Clause 2 of the said Order reads thus:

8. The factual position that obtains is that as on 31st December, 2005, 14,947 cases were pending before the Foreigners Tribunals functioning in Assam and 29,429 persons who came to Assam between 1st January, 1966 and 24th March, 1971 were identified as foreigners. As far as the Tribunals set up under the IMDT Act were concerned, as on 12th July, 2005, 88,770 cases were pending and 12,846 persons who came into Assam after 25th March, 1971 were declared as illegal migrants.

(i) if such opinion contains a finding with respect to such other requirement, decide the question in conformity with such finding;

36. For the aforementioned reasons also, in our opinion, the impugned subordinate legislation cannot be sustained as it does not the test of the reasoning in Sonowal I. Page 5536

39. We therefore allow these Writ Petitions and quash the 2006 order and the Foreigners (Tribunal) Amendment Order 2006 and direct the respondents to forthwith implement the directions issued by this Court in Sonowal I. No time limit for implementation was fixed in Sonowal I with the hope that the Central Government would implement the directions within a reasonable time. But now that it has not been done and we do not find adequate reasons for justifying the non- implementation of the directions issued in Sonowal I, we direct that the directions issued to the Union of India to constitute sufficient number of Tribunals under the 1964 Order to effectively deal with the cases of foreigners who have illegally come from Bangladesh or are residing in Assam, be implemented with a period of four months from this date.

The Writ Petitions are thus allowed with costs. Counsel's fees assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
Roopendra Singh vs State Of Tripura & Anr

Leave granted in both the matters.

II Criminal Appeals arising out of SLP(Crl) Nos.8316-17 of 2012

10. Section 372 Cr.P.C. has conferred upon a victim a substantive and independent right to maintain an appeal against acquittal. The widow of the deceased in the present matter comes within the definition of “victim” as incorporated in Section 2(wa). Merely because leave to appeal was not granted to the State to prefer an appeal against acquittal, the appeal preferred by the victim Informant ought not to have been rejected by the High Court summarily. We, therefore, set aside the order dated 28.06.2012 passed by the High Court rejecting Criminal Appeal preferred by the appellant and remit the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration. It will be open to the High Court to consider the matter for grant of leave to appeal to the appellant in the light of paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision of this Court in Satya Pal Singh.

11. These appeals are thus allowed in the aforesaid terms.
Rakhial Gram Panchayat vs Jagatsinh Adesinh Jhala

The respondent was appointed as an Octroi Clerk by the Gram Panchayat, Rakhial, i.e., the appellant before this Court, on 31.3.1977, on temporary basis, inter alia, for a lump sum salary of Rs.200/- per month. In addition to the above, he was not entitled even to dearness allowance or any other allowance(s). In terms of the order of appointment, the respondent actually assumed his duties with effect from 1.4.1977.

The pleadings of the case reveal, that for a short period, the work of collecting octroi, which had originally been vested in the Gram Panchayat, came to be executed through a contractor. The respondent was accordingly required to serve under a contractor, in continuation of his order of appointment dated 31.3.1977. The respondent originally declined to do so. But subsequently, assumed his duties on 10.6.1986 under the Gram Panchayat. Thereafter, the service of the respondent was dispensed with with effect from 30.6.1986.

Even though, the challenge raised by the respondent has a chequered history, it is relevant to mention, that the respondent succeeded in Letters Patent Appeal No. 933 of 1995, when a Division Bench of the High Court on 29.7.2004 accepted, that the resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat dated 30.6.1986, for dispensing with the service of the respondent, was not in consonance with law. The High Court accordingly set aside the above resolution. The respondent was, therefore, ordered to be reinstated, against the post of an Octroi Clerk. By the order passed by the High Court, the respondent was deemed to be treated as having continuously rendered service against the post of Octroi Clerk, with effect from the date his services were dispensed with. He was also held entitled to full back wages, besides other consequential benefits, for the intervening period. The review petition filed by the appellant came to be dismissed by the High Court, vide an order dated 14.09.2004.

Keeping in all that mind, we are of the view, that the ends of justice would be met, if a quantified lump sum amount is paid to the respondent as back wages. We are satisfied in quantifying the above amount at Rs.1,00,000/-(Rupees one lakh only). The above amount shall be released to the respondent within three months, from the date a certified copy of this order, is furnished to the Gram Panchayat.

The appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

Date : 23/07/2015 This appeal was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :
Ran Singh And Anr vs State Of Haryana And Anr

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

(Underlined for emphasis) The High Court noted that police had earlier registered a case and had sent cancellation report and thereafter the complaint was filed by Kurra Ram who appeared as PW-1, as his son Rajesh appeared as PW-2 and Saroj as PW-3.

12. Above being the position, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits so far as husband Jaswant is concerned.

13. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Williams vs Lourdusamy & Anr

7. Appellant thereafter filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, which was marked as O.S. No. 182 of 1989. Both the respondents herein were impleaded their as parties therein. First respondent herein also filed a suit for specific performance of contract against the appellant as also the respondent No. 2. The said suit was registered as O.S. No. 93 of 1990.

Following the principle of law as enunciated in the aforementioned decision, we are of the opinion that the principle of res-judicata is not attracted to the facts of the case.

15. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. Appeal is allowed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs R. Bhusal

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

7. In the fitness of things, the High Court should re-hear the matter. We mate it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the acceptability of the plea raised by the respondent in the writ petition. If the High Court so feels, it may permit the parties to place futther materials in respect of their respective stand. Learned Counsel for the appellant submits that by virtue of interim order the respondent is continuing in service. Keeping that in view, we request the High Court to explore the possibility of disposing of the writ petition within a period of four months from the date of receipt of our order.

8. The appeal is accordingly disposed of No costs.
Shri Mundri Lal vs Smt. Sushila Rani & Anr

4. A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the appellant asking him to quit and vacate the said tenanted premises. As he did not comply with the said demand, respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant on the premise that Section 2(2) of the Act was applicable stating:-

17. Indisputably, new assessment was made in the year 1978. Respondent had brought on record, the vast difference in the amount of tax payable before and after reconstruction.

23. This Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in the fact situation obtaining therein stating:-

30. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only).
State Of Orissa & Ors vs Prasana Kumar Sahoo

Respondent herein was appointed by the Union of India in the Census Organisation. His appointment was temporary in nature. He used to be appointed from time to time keeping in view exigencies of work. The State of Orissa issued a circular letter on or about 21.3.1995 relaxing upper age limit of the retrenched census employees for appointment under the State. The said circular letter related to 147 retrenched employees of the census organization. Principally relaxation of age for appointment in the State Service was contemplated thereby stating;

Although a large number of employees were said to have been appointed pursuant to the said policy decision, respondent herein was again appointed in the census organization on or about 7.2.2001. Apprehending that his services may be terminated, he approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal and by an interim order dated 17.4.2001, a direction was issued that his services should not be terminated without the leave of the Tribunal.

As despite the said interim order, his services were allegedly terminated on 1.6.2001, he filed an application for contempt, whereupon a contempt proceedings was initiated. By reason of an Order dated 28.1.2002, the State Government was directed to appoint the respondent to any unfilled vacancy of Junior Clerks on a temporary basis and subject to the final order of the Tribunal.

A Writ Petition filed before the High Court by the appellant against the said Order of the Tribunal has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.

We have noticed hereinbefore that the High Court had set aside the Order of the Tribunal directing the petitioner to re-instate the respondent in service. Observations made therein did not constitute a binding direction. The Tribunal passed an order to that effect, but the same had been in question before the High Court.

Furthermore, a direction to grant relaxation in respect of the age must also receive strict compliance of other conditions specified therein.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The Appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Commissioner Of Income-Tax ... vs M/S Baby Marine Exports, Kollam

The respondent-assessee, M/s Baby Marine Exports, Kollam is engaged in the business of selling marine products both in domestic market and also exporting it. The assessee is exporting directly to the buyers and also through export houses.

The respondent assessee aggrieved by the said order filed an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

The order of the Tribunal, which has been upheld by the High Court in the impugned judgment, is based on proper construction of Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The appeal filed by the appellant being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed.

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.281-284 & 286 OF 2006 These appeals stand disposed of in terms of our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 6146 of 2005. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to all the appeals to meet their respective costs.
Britannia Industries Ltd. vs Bombay Agricultural Produce Mkt.C..

illegal and utra vires to the extent that it 16:04:58 IST Reason: adds the above items to the Schedule of the Act.

3. During the pendency of the writ petition, before the High Court, the appellant gave up the challenge in respect of “cashew nuts” and other “dry fruits”.

13. We fully agree with the conclusion of the High Court that “edible oil”, “Vanaspati” and “sugar” would fall within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) of the Marketing Act – agricultural produce. We do not find any good ground warranting interference with the findings of the High Court that “edible oil”, “Vanaspati” and “sugar” are agricultural produce within the meaning of Section 2(1)

19. We make it clear that the direction of the High Court in approaching the concerned Authority is restricted only to sugar. 2o. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.
Sheo Kumar Shrivastava vs State Of Bihar

The appellant was convicted by the trial Court under Section 161 Indian Penal Code, Section 5(2) read with Section 5(i)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay fine of Rupees one thousand; in default, to undergo further imprisonment for a period of six months. On appeal being preferred, the High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone as it was stated that the appellant had remained in custody for a period of about one month. The allegation against the appellant was that while working as Head Assistant in the office of Superintending Engineer, Rural Engineering Organization, Boring Canal Road, Patna, he demanded rupees nine hundred from the complainant, namely, Braj Bihari Mishra (PW-14) as consideration for getting his name registered as contractor. Thereupon, PW-14 lodged a complaint with the D.I.G., Vigilance and a trap was laid leading to the recovery of rupees nine hundred from the pocket of the appellant's shirt. However, the trap party ....2/-

For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside and is acquitted of the charges.
Managing Director, Tnstc vs Sripriya And Ors

3. One Sathyabalan (hereinafter referred to as the deceased') was the driver of the appellant-Corporation and was traveling in the corporation bus. The vehicle met with an accident, the driver of the bus tried to avoid collision with a lorry, dashed against the bridge. The wall of the bridge broke and the bys capsized and fell into the river and the deceased who was sitting in the front seat got buried in the sand and died. The respondent i.e. the widow of the deceased, his minor daughter and his parents filed a claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Maylladutturai, (hereinafter referred to as the 'Tribunal') claming compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/-. In the claim petition, it was indicated that the monthly salary of the deceased was Rs. 6,040/- and he had agricultural income and was aged about 37 years.

4. The appellant-Corporation took the stand that the accident was purely an act of God. There was no negligence which can be attributed to the driver of the bus The Tribunal allowed the claim petition by the present respondents and awarded a sum of Rs. 7,72,000/- with 9% interest from the date of petition till payment. Aggrieved by the compensation awarded the appellant-Corporation filed an appeal before the Madras High Court. The same was dismissed as noted above by the impugned judgment. It is to be noted that the tribunal had adopted a multiplier of 16 on annual income of Rs. 6,000/- and after deduction of 1/3 for personal expenses worked out the entitlement of the claimants.

15. Pursuant to the directions of this Court by Order dated 4.3.2005, it is stated that a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- was deposited with the Tribunal .The balance amount on the basis of the judgment shall be deposited within a period of eight weeks. Out of the total amount a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- shall be kept as fixed deposit in respect of respondent No. 1. Further a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- shall be kept in fixed deposit in the name of minor, respondent No.2 - Sarojini. Fixed deposit of Rs.50,000/- Each shall be made in the names of respondent No. 3, Lakshmi and respondent No.4-Duraisingam. The balance amount shall be paid to respondent No.1 widow of the deceased Sripriya. The fixed deposits shall be initially for a period of five years in the name of respondent Nos. 1,3,and 4. The fixed deposit in the name of respondent No.2 will be for a similar period but it shall be renewed from time to time till she attains majority.

16. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Jabar Singh vs Dinesh & Anr

3. The relevant facts very briefly are that on 11.07.2004 one Bhomaram lodged a complaint in Pratap Nagar Police Station, Jodhpur, against the Respondent No.1 and others alleging the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "the IPC") along with other offences under the IPC. A criminal case was registered and after investigation, the police filed chargesheet against inter alia the Respondent No.1 and the case was transferred by the Sessions Judge to the Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases, Jodhpur, for trial. Before the charges could be framed in the case, an application was filed on behalf of Respondent No.1 under Section 49 of the Act, stating therein that the date of birth of Respondent No.1 was 05.10.1988 and, therefore, on 11.07.2004, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the Respondent No.1 was less than 18 years of age and he was, thus, a juvenile and has to be tried separately from the other accused under the Act. The State of Rajasthan, in its reply, stated inter alia that the Respondent No. 1 did not disclose that he was a juvenile at any time during the investigation of the case or during the trial of other criminal 3 cases for which he was being tried and that he has taken this plea for the first time to avoid the trial for the heinous crime and that the application of Respondent No.1 should be rejected. The Respondent No.1 examined witnesses and produced documents in support of his claim that he was a juvenile. The State of Rajasthan did not produce any evidence. The trial court, after hearing the parties and considering the evidence, rejected the application of the Respondent No.1 by order dated 14.02.2006. Aggrieved, the Respondent No.1 filed S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 166 of 2006 before the High Court and by the impugned order dated 18.08.2006, the High Court allowed the Revision Petition, set aside the order dated 14.02.2006 passed by the trial court and remitted the matter to the trial court for trial of the Respondent No.1 treating him to be a juvenile on the date of commission of the alleged offence in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

14. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated 18.08.2006 of the High Court in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 166 of 2006 and remit the matter to the trial court for trial of Respondent No.1 in accordance with law treating him not to be a juvenile at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.