L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Sunitidevi Singhania Hospital Trust ... vs Union Of India & Anr

Appellant No.1 which is a Charitable Tust runs a hospital on no profit basis. It imported certain equipments invoking the Notification 64/88-Cus. dated 1.3.1988 issued by the Government of India in terms whereof exemption from payment of custom duty was granted in respect thereof subject to an obligation that it would reserve 10% of the beds for patients from families having a income of less than Rs.500/- per month and provision for free treatment of at least 40% of the outdoor patients shall be made.

An investigation was carried out in the year 1999 as to whether the appellant No.1 had fulfilled all such conditions or not. The matter went before the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Bench at Mumbai. The appeal of the appellant before the Tribunal was heard along with the cases of M/s Miraj Medical Centre W. Hospital and M/s Balabhai Nanavati Hospital.

9. The factual position being distinct and different from the main matter heard by this Hon'ble Tribunal, the Hon'ble Tribunal ought to have appreciated the difference in the facts and ordered accordingly. The non-appreciation and/ or improper appreciation of facts has resulted in an error apparent on the face of the record in the Order dated 19.1.2006.

For the aforementioned purpose the provisions of limitation specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 129 B of the Customs Act would not be attracted. We, however, do not mean to lay down a law that such an application can be filed at any time. If such an application is filed within a reasonable time and if the Court or Tribunal finds that the contention raised before it by the applicant is prima-facie correct, in order to do justice, which is being above law, nothing fetters the judges hands from considering the matter on merit.

We may place on record that for all intent and purport, this Court had granted liberty to the appellants to take recourse to the remedies suggested by its counsel as the word 'accordingly' has been used before the words 'the appeal is dismissed as withdrawn'.

For the reasons aforementioned, we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India set aside the impugned judgment with a direction to the Tribunal to hear out the appellants afresh on merit on the said application.

The appeal is allowed. There shall,however, be no order as to costs.

...............J. [S.B. SINHA] .................J [ CYRIAC JOSEPH ] New Delhi, November 17, 2008.
Ni Pra Channabasava Deshikendra ... vs C.P. Kaveramma & Ors

3. The appeal filed by the appellant was allowed and the order of the Learned Single Judge was set aside and the order of the learned Tribunal granting occupancy rights in favour of the appellant was restored. The respondents’ Writ Appeal was dismissed. It is relevant to note that the said order of the Division Bench was not challenged further by the respondents and, thereby, grant of occupancy rights in favour of the appellant was confirmed. Subsequently, Form No.2 - Certificate was also issued in favour of the appellant on 15.4.2000 representing the Mutt.

15. We are convinced that in the light of our above conclusions, it will have to be held that the continued possession of the respondents after the grant of occupancy rights in favour of the appellant in the order dated 11.2.1993, should be construed as unauthorized and there was every right in the appellant to invoke the protection of the Land Reforms Act for the purpose of working out its remedy by taking recourse to law for implementing the order dated 11.2.1993.

17. Applying the above said principle, we are also convinced that the appellant by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 can seek for passing a justiciable order.

18. Having regard to our above conclusion based on the earlier order dated 13.2.2009 and the limited scope of consideration directed to be made, while remitting the matter back to the Division Bench, the present order of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. We also hold that the Tehsildar, had every jurisdiction to deal with application of the appellant for working out its remedy based on the grant of occupancy rights in its favour in the proceeding dated 11.2.1993, which has become final and conclusive. Since it was extensively pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 1.2.2005, as well as in the present impugned order highlighting the malpractices indulged in by the Tehsildar, while passing the order directing possession in favour of the appellant and while upholding the order of the learned Single Judge referred to above, the order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored. We, however, make it clear that the only issue which can be examined by the Tehsildar can be with regard to the claim of the appellant for restoring possession based on the grant of occupancy rights in its favour, by the proceeding dated 11.2.1993. It is further made clear that this order of remand to the Tehsildar, shall not entitle the respondents to raise any issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar, in particular, based on the mortgages of the year 1955 and 1967.

19. The appeals stand allowed with the above directions. In light of the fact that the issue is pending for nearly two decades, we direct the Tehsildar to hear the parties and after giving due opportunity to put forth their submissions, pass final orders in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

May 06, 2013
Chhabildas vs The State Of Maharashtra Through Its ...

5. On 12th December, 2007, the State Government confirmed the aforesaid purchase notice and stated that proceedings for acquisition 1 `Twelve months’ was substituted in place of `six months’ by Act 16 of 2009. 9 of land shall be initiated within one year i.e. before 12 th December, 2008 as per Section 49(7) of the Act.

6. Within the aforesaid period, the Commissioner, Jalgaon, submitted a proposal for acquisition of the aforesaid land to the Collector, Jalgaon on 26th September, 2008. This was followed by a letter dated 28th January, 2009 issued by the Collector, appointing the SDO, Jalgaon, to complete the acquisition process as laid down by the Act. Since nothing further transpired, the owner of the land wrote a letter to the Commissioner, Jalgaon on 15 th January, 2014, stating that since no action has taken place in furtherance of the acquisition proposal, the said proposal has lapsed and that, therefore, the land should be returned to the owner. On 28 th March, 2014, the Assistant Director, Town Planning, Jalgaon Municipal Corporation, wrote back to the owner stating that the land acquisition proposal by the Municipal Corporation “is in process” and stated that, as Section 49(7) was satisfied on the facts of the present case, there was no lapse. A writ petition dated 2 nd May, 2014 was then filed by the owner before the Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court, which came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 5 th 10 December, 2014, stating that Section 127 of the Act alone deals with lapsing of reservation, and that as the purchase notice was issued under Section 49, the said Section would apply only when a person needs to develop his land immediately. In the present case, the Appellant failed to make out any such urgent need and since the Municipal Corporation had already moved the State Government for acquisition of the Appellant’s land, the writ petition was dismissed.

24. On a conspectus of the above authorities, the following position in law emerges:

This being the case, we read the judgment as having allowed a lapse to take place, in view of the inordinately long delay of over 20 years, 29 by really doing complete justice on the facts of that case under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

February 6, 2018.
Ashutosh Chaturvedi vs Prano Devi @ Parani Devi & Ors

An application for passing an interim order was filed in the said suit whereupon an order of status quo was passed on 1.6.1990. During the pendency of the said suit, two deeds of sale were executed in favour of third parties on 8.6.1990 and 18.6.1990.

4. The interim order passed by the learned Trial Judge was affirmed by an order dated 9.11.1990. Three Miscellaneous Appeals were filed thereagainst by the respondents. The matters were said to be pending before the District Judge for a long time. However, on or about 11.6.2003, the appellant herein moved an application for amendment to add a new relief in one of the plaints claiming preferential right in respect of the suid property on the premise that the plaintiff was a co-sharer of the lands in suit to the following effect :

15. The only remedy which was, thus, available to the appellant might be to file a suit. But as the same itself being barred by limitation, we are of the opinion that the Court would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to allow the amendment of the plaint.

16. There is, thus, no infirmity in the impugned judgment. Appeal is dismissed. No costs.
Kanpur Electricity Supply Co. Ltd vs Shamim Mirza

4. The appellant-company was constituted by the U.P. State Government under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and was charged with several duties, as enumerated under Section 18 of the said Act, in relation to generation, transmission and distribution of electricity within the State. The appellant opened various cash centres in different divisions and sub-divisions for collection of electricity bills and for the said purpose, invited tenders for installation of Bradma Machines on contract basis. One such contract was awarded to M/s Vivek and Associates in the year 1995. Under the agreed terms and conditions, the machines were to be operated by the said concern, through its employees, 2 for which it was to be paid Rs.175/- per day, per machine. The contract is stated to have continued till the year 1997.

5. Both the respondent-workmen raised an industrial dispute, alleging that their services had been illegally terminated by the appellant. Accordingly, the State Government referred, under Section 4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short `the Act'), the following dispute i.e. I.D. No.70 of 1997 for adjudication:

20.In the light of the aforenoted factual matrix and the evidence on record, we are of the opinion that the courts below were justified in holding that both the workmen have established their claim of having worked with the appellant 15 for more than 240 days as their employees. We find no reason whatsoever to interfere with the impugned judgments to that extent.

25.Consequently, for the aforesaid reasons, both the appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. 18 .......................................J. (C.K. THAKKER) .......................................J. (D.K. JAIN) NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 7, 2008.
Mamta & Ors vs National Insurance Co.Ltd. & Ors

One Radheyshyam Sharma, the predecessor in interest of the appellants herein, died in an accident which took place on 22.10.2003. He was an agriculturist. He was aged 22 years on the date of accident.

We, however, agree with the High Court that as some medical bills were not in the name of the deceased, the medical expenses incurred by the claimants to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- have not been proved. We, therefore, uphold the order of the High Court that the claim towards medical expenses should be confined to Rs. 40,000/-. In that view of the matter, the claimants are held to be entitled to a sum of Rs. 6,62,880/- towards compensation plus they may also be entitled to the interest as awarded by the Tribunal.

To the aforementioned extent, this appeal is allowed. No costs.

.......................J (S.B. SINHA) .......................J (DEEPAK VERMA) NEW DELHI, JULY 29, 2009.
Airport Authority Of India vs Rajiv Ratan Pandey & Ors

3. Rajeev Ratan Pandey, Senior Manager, Engineering (Civil), Respondent No. 1, vide order dated May 15, 2009, came to be transferred from Lucknow (Northern region) to Calicut (Southern region) by the appellant. The Respondent No. 1 challenged the order of transfer by filing a writ petition before the High Court on the grounds, viz., that the order of transfer has been issued against the transfer policy inasmuch as it provides that the inter-regional transfers shall not be made before the incumbent completes at least five year tenure in that region; that the official shall not normally be transferred within region second time unless all others in that cadre have done one turn of out of region transfer; that except in cases where operational/administrative reasons warrant, transfers shall normally be avoided and transfer when made shall be in accordance with the seniority at the station in the region. He made a representation to the Competent Authority on May 25, 2009 for cancellation of his transfer. On May 28, 2009, the Respondent No. 1 was relieved from his posting at Lucknow. His representation came to be rejected by the 2 Authority on June 2, 2009. In the writ petition initially no interim order of stay was granted. It transpires from the record that on June 9, 2009 he sent a letter to the Director, Airport Authority, Calicut that he was under medical treatment and the doctor has advised him some rest. He informed the said Authority that he would join duties at Calicut Airport as soon as he got well. He did not join his duties at Calicut Airport and on July 3, 2009 filed a supplementary affidavit before the High Court alleging therein for the first time that the transfer order was actuated with mala- fides. On that day itself, i.e., July 3, 2009, the Division Bench passed an ad-interim order staying the operation of the transfer order dated May 15, 2009.

6. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated July 3, 2009 is set aside. No order as to costs.

........................J (Tarun Chatterjee) ........................J (R. M. Lodha) New Delhi August 17, 2009.
D.K. Ganesh Babu vs P.T. Manokaran & Ors

The petitioners shall surrender before the court referred to above for executing the bond and furnishing sureties within two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order, falling which, this order shall stand cancelled."

In view of what has been stated above some of the directions, given by learned Single Judge, as quoted above, are not in line with what has been stated in Adri Dharan Das's case (supra). Accordingly we modify the directions. Since the respondents have already surrendered and have been granted bail in terms of the High Court's directions, they shall surrender before the concerned court and shall move for bail in terms of Section 439 of the Code within four weeks from today. On that being done the case shall be considered in its proper perspective uninfluenced by the fact we have disapproved stipulation of conditions by the High Court. The concerned court shall deal with the matter appropriately. It is brought to our notice that the husband of the deceased has already been released on bail after his surrender. The effect and/or relevance of that order shall be duly considered by the concerned court while dealing with the application for bail to be filed within stipulated time.

The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
Leela Bai vs Seema Chouhan

6. The deceased was required to drive the public bus daily, ferrying passengers from Indore to Burhanpur and back from Burhanpur to Indore. The travelling time in one direction was approximately 5 hours, according to PW­2. The bus ferried passengers from Burhanpur at 6:30 AM and reached Indore at about 11:00 AM. The return journey would commence from Indore at 3:00 PM and terminate at Burhanpur on or after 7:30PM. According to PW­2, because of the nature of their duty, 3 the deceased and the conductor of the bus, were required to remain with the bus twenty­four hours. The appellants also deposed that because of the nature of his duty, the deceased at times, would not come home for as long as a week.

12. The appellants are held to have wrongly been denied compensation under the Act. The impugned orders are accordingly set aside. The Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, Labour Court, Khandwa has already determined the salary of the deceased at the time of death as Rs.4,275/­ per 7 month and which is upheld. The compensation payable to the appellants shall be calculated on the aforesaid basis under Section 4 along with default penalty under Section 4A and costs to be awarded under Section 26 of the Act. The quantum of compensation shall be finally computed after hearing the parties within one month from the date of receipt and/or production of a copy of this order before the Commissioner. Respondent no.2 shall pay the determined amount to the appellants within three weeks from the date of such computation by the Tribunal. 8

13. The appeal is allowed.
Ranhku Dutta @ R.K.Dutta vs State Of Assam

The material facts of the facts are these.

-2- That FIR was lodged on 6.11.1993 by one Ajit Kumar Sarma, Office-in-Charge of Bihpuria Police Station against several persons including the appellant. Of the four accused persons, no charges were framed against Moni Pathak. In so far as Bhaben Gogoi @ Bikram was concerned, he was acquitted by the designated court and Indreswar Hazarika @ Babul Handique died during the pendency of the proceedings before the designated court. Only Rangku Dutta @ Ranjan Kumar Dutta was convicted and is the appellant before us.

The FIR which has been lodged on 6.11.1993 runs as follows:-

-9- We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid statement of law by the learned author.

Therefore, the entire proceeding right from the reigstering of the FIR, filing of the charge-sheet and the subsequent trial is vitiated by a legal infirmity and there is a total miscarriage of justice in holding the trial, ignoring the vital requirement of law. We have, therefore, no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgment of the Designated Court.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The appellant who is in jail must be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.
K.M. Shivakumar vs H.V. Vijayaraghavan And Anr

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO. 911 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.7565/2007] WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 912 OF 2008 [Arising out of SLP(C) No.7567/2007] Leave granted.

Allegedly, pursuant to or in furtherance of the said order, number of representations and objections were filed by the said H.V. Vijayaraghavan and another person for dropping the land acquisition proceedings. On the plea that the said representations and objections had not been disposed of, a contempt petition was filed. The High Court issued notice against respondent No.8 K.M. Shivakumar in the contempt petition, who is the petitioner in SLP(C) No.7565/2007. The High Court, however, opined that charges should be framed as against K.M. Shivakumar. It is stated at the Bar that during the pendency of the contempt application, however, the said purported representations and objections of H.V. Vijayaraghavan and others were disposed of on 2.2.2007 by Special Land Acquisition Officer.

As an application for withdrawal of the contempt proceedings is pending consideration before the High Court, we do not intend to make any other observation thereon but we are of the opinion that disposal of these two applications would not stand in the way of the Company to bring on record the records of High Court in pending proceedings, all the additional facts which are purported to have arisen after the filing of this contempt petition.

Any order passed by the State Government purportedly to have been passed acting in terms of the order of the High Court shall be open to challenge by the Company or any other person having an interest in the matter.

To the aforementioned effect, it will be open to the Company to bring the same to the notice of the High Court even in the contempt proceedings. We are sure that the High Court shall take all the aspects of the matter into consideration before passing appropriate order.

In the event the High Court does not permit H.V. Vijayaraghavan, respondent No.1 herein, to withdraw the contempt petition, it goes without saying that he would be at liberty to raise all contentions in the contempt proceedings. Liberty to mention is granted in the event any occasion arises therefor.

For the views we have taken, it is not necessary to keep these matters pending before this Court. Both these appeals are disposed of with the aforementioned directions and observations. No costs.
Yashwith Construction P. Ltd vs Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr

2. On a dispute having arisen, the Managing Director of the respondent company appointed an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration clause. The arbitrator resigned. Thereupon the Managing Director of the respondent company, in view of the mandate in the arbitration agreement promptly appointed another arbitrator. At that stage, the petitioner approached the Chief Justice of the High Court under Section 11 sub- Section 5 read with Section 15(2) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short "the Act"), praying that the Chief Justice may appoint a substitute arbitrator to resolve the disputes between the parties. The Chief Justice found that the appointment of the second arbitrator by the Managing Director, after the resignation of the first arbitrator, was valid in law since it was permissible under the contract and the right to make such an appointment was saved by Section 15(2) of the Act. The argument that Section 15(2) of the Act referred to statutory rules providing for appointment of Arbitrators and not to a contractual provision for such appointment was rejected by the learned Chief Justice. It was held by him that no occasion arose for him to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act in the case. Thus, the application was dismissed leaving the parties to pursue their claims before the arbitrator appointed by the Managing Director in terms of arbitration agreement between the parties.

6. In this view of the matter, we see no reason to grant leave to appeal or issue notice on this petition for special leave to appeal. The petition is dismissed.
M/S. Canara Nidhi Limited vs M. Shashikala

4. Brief facts which led to filing of these appeals are as under:-

20. In the result, the impugned judgment dated 12.09.2014 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition Nos.18374-75 of 2010 (GM-RES) is set aside and these appeals are allowed. The order of the District Judge dismissing the application filed under Section 151 CPC in AS 17 No.1 of 2008 is affirmed. The learned District Judge shall take up AS No.1 of 2008 and dispose of the same expeditiously in accordance with law. No costs.

September 23, 2019 18