L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Harendra Jha vs Ministry Of Law Th:Secretary

3. It appears from the cause title of the petition that the petitioner perhaps is aggrieved by the Order dated 8.3.08 passed in Writ Petition No.......... Diary No. 33998 of 2007 by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court. The order dated 8.3.2008 reads as follows:

For the reasons stated above, the Petition filed by the petitioner-in-person bearing D. No. 33998/07, is hereby lodged under Rule 5 of Order XVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.

The petitioner-in-person may be informed accordingly.

Sd/-

(T. Sivadasan) Registrar (Judicial) 08.03.08"

The petitioner in person may be informed accordingly.

Sd/-

There is no quarrel with this legal preposition but we fail to comprehend how this case can in any manner help the petitioner.

7. In this petition, we cannot give any direction. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition and the Writ Petition being devoid of any merit are accordingly dismissed.

August 26, 2008.
M/S. Marsons Fan Industries vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

JUDGMENT O R D E R CIVIL APPEAL NO.1925 OF 2002 The appellant is a small scale industry. It commenced manufacturing electric fans falling under the erstwhile Tariff Item No.33 prior to coming into force of Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, after obtaining central excise licence. Rotors and stators falling under Tariff Item 30D which are essential components required for the manufacture of electric fans, were also manufactured by the appellant and captively used. The appellant, from time to time, also received orders for doing diverse specific specialised processing work on job work basis on customers' raw materials like winding, die casting, coil setting etc. which did not transform the customers' raw materials into rotors and stators as commercially known and the customers undertook various further processes in their own factories to manufacture rotors and stators and used the same in the manufacture of their fans. For the period January 1983 to March 1984, the Collector vide its order dated 31st May 1988 held that the rotors and stators were complete and were manufactured by the appellant and C.A.No.1925/02 .... (Contd.)

C.A.No.1925/02 .... (Contd.)

Keeping in view the fact that the Department has accepted the decision dated 21st July 1989 pertaining to the assessee itself on the similar goods, we accept this appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal and hold that the rotors and stators which were cleared by the appellant were not finished goods and were, therefore, not exigible to the levy of excise duty for the relevant period.

For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed.
Mithilesh vs State Of Nct

The appellant was running a small kirana shop at 96-A, MIG Flats, Opposite G.T.B. Hospital, G.T.B. Enclave, Shahdara, Delhi. On 11.3.1993, some officials from the Food Adulteration Department visited his shop which was being run under the name and style “M/s Mithlesh General Store”. They lifted a sample of red chilly powder (Lal Mirch) from an open container of 2 kg. capacity from the shop of the appellant. The sample was weighed on scale in a brown sheet and divided into three parts. The entire sample collected was of 450 gms. It was sent for examination by Public Analyst. The report dated 7.4.1993 was submitted by the Public Analyst which, inter alia, affirmed that sample adulterated because it contained salt as an adulterant. Relevant portion of the report is as under:

Aggrieved, the appellant preferred the appeal against such judgment which was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi vide order dated 30.7.2002. The appellant thereafter filed Revision Petition in the High Court of Delhi. This Criminal Revision Petition has also been dismissed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 4.11.2009 thereby maintaining the conviction. However, in so far as the quantum of sentence is concerned, the High Court has reduced the same from RI of one year to a period of three months RI, which is the minimum sentence. The reasons for reducing the sentence has been given by the High Court in paragraph 25 of its judgment.
Deo Kumar Singh vs C.B.P. Sinha

By the impugned order, Bihar State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, `the State Commission'] dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant in which he claimed compensation of Rupees ten lakhs by alleging that on account of negligence of the respondent wrong blood group came to be mentioned in the report of the laboratory and, as a result of that, his wife had to suffer two abortions. When the matter was taken in appeal, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission [for short, `the National Commission'], held that there was total failure on the part of the respondent in exercising adequate care in analyzing the blood which made his wife to go for abortions. Accordingly the National Commission awarded compensation of Rupees twenty five thousand together with interest @ 9% per annum. Feeling dissatisfied, the appellant has filed this appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in-part, the impugned order is modified and the respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rupees one lakh by way of compensation together with interest at the rate of nine per cent per annum form the date of passing of the order by the National Commission, i.e., 11th December, 2007, till payment is made. The respondent is directed to pay the entire amount to the appellant within a period of four months from today.
New Okhla Industrial Devt.Auth vs Harkishan (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors

This appeal has a chequered history. Matter pertains to the acquisition of the land of the respondents, which was acquired way back in the year 1990. Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') proposing to acquire the land of the respondents, as well as some other persons, was issued on January 05, 1991. It was followed by declaration under Section 6 issued on January 07, 1992. Even award, thereafter, was pronounced on August 17, 1996. The acquisition proceedings were challenged by the respondents by filing writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed by the High Court, and the appeal there against was dismissed by this Court also on July 15, 1998. In this first round of litigation, while dismissing the appeal, this Court left open a little window for the respondents herein by permitting them to make a representation to the State Government under Section 48(1) of the Act. The respondents, thus, made a representation for release of the land, which was considered by the State Government. The State Government, however rejected the same vide orders dated December 03, 1999. Second round of litigation started when this rejection was again challenged by the respondents by filing writ petitions. This time again attempts of the respondents failed as the writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court and those orders were affirmed by this Court vide judgment dated March 12, 2003, reported as Ved Prakash & Ors. v. Ministry of Industry, Lucknow & Anr.[1].

A perusal of this judgment would show that focus of this Court was on the validity of Office Order dated December 03, 1999 passed by the State Government vide which representations of the respondents and others under Section 48(1) of the Act had been dismissed and after examining the matter at length, this Court concluded that there was no infirmity in the order of the State Government rejecting the representations on the ground that it was not feasible to release the lands of the respondents and others from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Act. The court referred to its earlier judgment dated July 15, 1998 wherein challenge to the acquisition laid by the respondents was repelled but an opportunity was given to the respondents to make a representation under Section 48(1) of the Act. Extensively quoting from the earlier judgment, the Court found that all the aspects which the State Government was supposed to consider, as per the directions given in the earlier judgment, were duly dealt with and considered by the State Government and there was no reason to interfere with the same. We would also like to reproduce some of the discussion contained in the said judgment:

No costs.

JANUARY 27, 2017
Kashmir Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

2. The Act was applicable to the entire territories of the undivided State of Punjab including PEPSU. By reason of the provisions of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956, the State of Himachal Pradesh was constituted, having been carved out from the State of Punjab.

5. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") was constituted. Appellant was appointed as a member of the Commission in terms of a notification dated 4.07.1989. He was elected the President 3 thereof. Along with him one S. Dara Singh and S. Raghbir Singh were also appointed as members of the Commission.

6. A new Board was constituted on 21.11.1996. While the Commission was functioning with the said members, the State of Punjab issued a notification on 6.01.1999 whereby and whereunder all the members including the appellant were removed and in their places S. Man Mohan Singh, S. Amrik Singh and S. Ajwant Singh Mann were appointed.

7. A writ petition was filed thereagainst in January, 1999. During pendency of the said writ petition, the State of Punjab issued two more notifications on or about 12.01.1999. By reason of the first notification issued under Sections 70 and 71 of the Act, the notification dated 6.01.1999 was rescinded and by reason of the second notification, the Commission was reconstituted.

the Sri Akal Takht Sahib, Amritsar, the Sri Takhat Keshgarh Sahib, Anandpur, the Sri 10 Takhat Patna Sahib, Patna the Sri Takht Hazur Sahib, Nanded; and

39. The dichotomy is created in view of the words "time to time" and the limited power of the State to dissolve the Commission. 25

45. We are not unmindful of the opinion of the learned Chief Justice of the High Court that the term shall come to an end when no dispute would remain pending before the Commission.

56. It may be true that the Court shall not interfere with the judicial authority. It should be allowed to function independently and impartially, but at the same time it cannot be allowed to continue in perpetuity. A balance, thus, must be struck.

58. The State of Punjab, in this appeal, also opposes the appellant's contention.

We cannot, thus, agree with the contention of Mr. Patwalia.

68. Articles 245 or 246 or for that matter, Articles 73 and 172 of the Constitution of India will have no application.

70. For the reasons aforementioned, Civil Appeal Nos. 7024 of 2002 and 8171-8172 of 2003 are dismissed and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 20803 of 2002 as also Civil Appeal Nos. 5546 of 2003, 8169-8170 of 2003 and 3162-3165 of 2004 are allowed. No costs.

May 12, 2008
Arunima Baruah vs Union Of India & Ors

Appellant filed a suit in the District Court on 28.03.2001. An application was filed for grant of injunction. On or about 9.04.2001, only a notice to the defendant was issued but no order of ad-interim injunction was passed. She filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court on 10.04.2001. Admittedly, in the said writ petition, the fact in regard to pendency of the said suit was not disclosed. However, before the writ petition came up for preliminary hearing, she filed an application for withdrawal of the suit on 12.04.2001. The said application allegedly could not be moved because of the strike resorted to by the lawyers. The writ petition came up for preliminary hearing on 18.04.2001. A notice was issued therein. Her application to withdraw the suit dated 12.04.2001 came up for consideration before the Civil Court and upon a statement made by her, the same was permitted to be withdrawn by an order dated 30.04.2001. The writ petition, however, was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court by an order dated 29.11.2002, opining:

An intra-court appeal preferred thereagainst has been dismissed by the impugned judgment stating:

For the reasons aforementioned, while we uphold the judgment of the High Court, are of the opinion that in the event the appellant files a fresh writ application, the same may be considered on its own merits. The appeal is dismissed with the aforementioned observations. No costs.
Mukul Saikia & Ors vs State Of Assam & Ors

3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are as follows:-

10. The private respondents, in their counter affidavit filed before this Court have stated that total number of notified vacancies of CDPOs were only 27, yet a select list dated 17.07.2000 was published by the APSC wherein as many as 64 candidates were recommended. In order of merit, 27 10 selectees were appointed out of whom 17 were appointed in the general quota and 10 from the reserved category as per the rules. The names of the appellants appeared below 27 candidates who have been appointed; therefore, the appellants have no legal right to claim appointment against the excess quota of the advertised vacancies. The Secretary to the Government of Assam, Personnel (B) Department by circular bearing No. 98/4 dated 18.12.1998 had requested the APSC to recommend the candidates equal to the number of vacancies notified in the advertisement. The contesting respondents stated that in the year 1996-97, there were total number of 45 vacant posts of CDPOs and allied cadre in the Department of Social Welfare including the backlog vacancies and as per Service Order, 1994, 60 per cent of the vacancies are required to be filled up by way of direct recruitment and the remaining 40 per cent by means of promotion of suitable departmental candidates. Accordingly, only 27 (60 per cent) vacancies of CDPOs were available at the time of issuing the advertisement notice dated 19.08.1997 for which selection was made by the APSC and on the basis of merit, 27 vacancies 11 were filled up by the State Government after complying with the provisions of the rules including the reservation in favour of SCs/STs/OBCs. The remaining 18 vacancies being 40 per cent of total 45 vacancies were to be filled up by eligible departmental candidates. In addition thereto, 10 more vacancies were also available to be filled up by way of promotion thereby making 28 total number of vacancies. The State Government regularized the services of private respondents against 18 vacancies in the cadre of CDPOs which were meant to be filled up by way of promotion from departmental candidates and as such, the appellants who had applied against direct quota have no legitimate right to be selected and appointed against promotees quota.

21. For the above-stated reasons, the appeal fails and it is accordingly, dismissed.

In the facts and circumstances, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
Shailendra Bhardwaj & Ors vs Chandra Pal & Anr

4. The suit property was valued and the cost of the property was fixed at Rs.30,00,000/- and the Court fee of Rs.200/- was paid under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fee Act. The question arose before the trial Court whether the plaintiff had properly valued the suit and the court fee paid. The trial Court took the view that the plaintiff should have paid the court fee as per Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act. The matter was taken up before the High Court. The High Court concurred with the views taken by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal on 15.12.2011, against which this appeal has been preferred.

12. For the reasons abovementioned, the appeal lacks in merits and the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
Lokesh Singh vs State Of U.P. & Anr

3. As per the prosecution version Virendra Singh lodged information at the police station that on 21.9.2006 at about 10 A.M. when his younger brother Chandra Pal Singh (hereinafter referred to as the `deceased'), Manager of Lucknow Public School had arrived on the gate of the college, some unknown persons had shot him by making indiscriminating firing and then he was taken to the hospital. The doctors declared that he had been brought dead. During investigation it was found that the respondent No.2 and another person named S.B. Singh had entered into criminal conspiracy to commit murder of the deceased and said S.B. Singh had arranged two shooters Ranvir Singh and Anant Kumar Verma who caused the death of the deceased. In order to show the complicity of respondent No.2 reference was made to the statement of one Munna Katiyar who claimed to have overheard the conversations of respondent No.2 and S.B. Singh before the incident relating to the plan to murder of the deceased. This was disclosed to the investigating officer on 9.12.2006. The police acted upon the information and transpired that the amount fixed for doing the killing (in common parlance known as `supari amount') was Rs.10 lakhs and a sum of Rs.5,87,000/- was paid to S.B. Singh through demand 2 draft under a camouflage as if the payment was being made towards consideration of purchase of construction materials as S. B. Singh happens to be the proprietor of the concern dealing with the sale and purchase of construction materials. It was pointed out by the prosecution that the phone records clearly indicated a link between the respondent No.2 and the killers. It was also pointed out that the document which was produced to show that the payment was made for purchase of construction materials was fake. Prayer for bail was rejected by order dated 7.2.2007 by learned Sessions Judge, (in charge) Lucknow. An application was filed before the High Court. By the impugned order High Court granted bail to the respondent No.2.

14. Above being the position, we are of the view that the High Court was not justified in granting bail to respondent No.2. The order granting bail is set aside. The respondent No.2 who was released on bail shall surrender to custody forthwith. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of the case.

15. Appeal is allowed.
Yogeshwar Prasad & Ors vs National Inst.,Edu.Planning & ...

Brief facts which are relevant to dispose of these appeals are recapitulated as under:

According to this regulation, the appellants were also entitled to the pay scale which was extended to their counterparts in the Central Government but the appellants were not given the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900. They were compelled to approach the High Court for the relief.

The appellants, aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court, preferred these appeals. It may be pertinent to mention that the respondent-Institute was pursuing the case of the appellants with the Central Government for higher pay scale. The respondent- Institute in fact sent a letter to the Secretary, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Government of India, New Delhi on December 19, 1994 praying that the appellants herein be given the revised pay scales of Rs.1640-2900. The letter reads as under :

In our considered view, the appellants are entitled to get the benefit of pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 which their counterparts were getting in the Central Government during the relevant period. In case this amount has not been paid, the same may be paid to the appellants by the Institute within three months from today. Civil Appeal No.209 of 2007:

started representing before the concerned authorities for grant of the revised scale of Rs.1640-2900 to them.

The Indian Council of Agricultural Research issued an order on 7.6.1995 conveying the sanction by the competent authority of the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 to its Assistants/Stenographers.

The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research issued an order on 9.6.1995 conveying the sanction by the competent authority of the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 to its Assistants/ Stenographers.

The aforesaid writ petition filed by the appellants was allowed by a single Judge of the Delhi High Court with a direction that the appellants be paid the revised pay scale of Rs.1640-2900, with effect from 1.1.1986. The respondent Institute gave the pay scale of Rs.1640-2900 to the appellants.

The Union of India preferred a Letters Patent Appeal (for short 'L.P.A.') bearing LPA No.92 of 1999, against the aforesaid order dated 16.10.1998.

The appellants filed a review application before the Delhi High Court being Review Petition No.2000 of 2002. The Respondent- Union of India filed a counter affidavit in the aforesaid Review Petition No.2000/2002. The appellants then filed a rejoinder affidavit in the aforesaid Review Petition No.2000/2002. The Review Petition was also dismissed. The appellants have now approached this Court.

In the result, the impugned judgment is set aside and Civil Appeals Nos.288-289 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No.209 of 2007 are allowed and disposed of. However, the benefit of this order would be confined to the appellants in Civil Appeals Nos.288- 289 of 2005 and Civil Appeal No.209 of 2007.

In the facts and circumstances of these cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.

21ST OCTOBER, 2010
Ramvilas vs State Of M.P

7), Jagdish (PW-13) and Noor Khan (PW-9) came to the house of Narmada Prasad (PW-3) and informed him that the accused-appellants were assaulting his brother-Bansilal. Narmada Prasad (PW-3) immediately rushed to the spot alongwith them and near ‘otla’ of Hardul Baba, he noticed that all the appellants armed with lethal weapons had surrounded his brother-Bansilal. Appellants Chhotelal, Kailash and Suresh were armed with spears, appellant- Ramvilas was armed with pistol, whereas appellants Ramsingh and Gorelal were carrying lathis with them. When Bansilal tried to escape, appellant- Ramvilas fired a shot from his pistol and when Bansilal fell down, appellants Chhotelal and Kailash attacked him with spear on his scalp and forehead. When Narmada Prasad (PW-3) tried to intervene, appellant-Kailash attacked Narmada Prasad with spear and caused injury below his right eye. Then Uma Bai (PW-5) sister of the deceased and Sona Bai-mother of the deceased tried to save Bansilal, the appellants Kailash and Ram Singh also attacked them. Appellant-Ramvilas intimidated and threatened the persons present there and said that if anybody would intervene, he would be shot dead. The appellants gave repeated blows to Bansilal by spear and lathis and then fled away. Injured Bansilal was immediately taken to the hospital where he was declared dead. On the complaint lodged by Narmada Prasad (PW-

3. Upon consideration of the evidence, the trial court convicted the appellant-Ramvilas and other accused under Sections 302 read with Section 149, 324, 323 read with Section 149 and 148 IPC and sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment and further imposed sentence of imprisonment for other offences. On appeal, the High Court confirmed the conviction of the appellants and also the sentence of imprisonment imposed on each of them. These appeals assail the correctness of the impugned judgment. On application filed onbehalf of the appellants, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn qua the appellants Suresh (A1), Kailash (A2) and Ram Singh (A4) by the Chamber Judge Order dated 18.02.2013.

9. These appeals are dismissed.

August 18, 2015