L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Arup Bhuyan vs State Of Assam

The facts have already been set out in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same here except wherever necessary.

In the instant case, the prosecution case mainly relies on the alleged confessional statement of the appellant made before the Superintendent of Police, which is an :2: extra-judicial confession and there is absence of corroborative material. Therefore, we are of the opinion that it will not be safe to convict the accused on the basis of alleged confessional statement.

We respectfully agree with the above decisions, and are :4: of the opinion that they apply to India too, as our fundamental rights are similar to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution.

Hence, the conviction of the appellant under Section 3(5) of the TADA is also not sustainable.

The impugned judgment of the Designated Court, Assam at Guwahati dated 28.03.2007 passed in TADA Sessions Case No. 13 of 1991 is set aside and the Appeal stands allowed.

By Order dated 29.10.2007 this Court had directed that the appellant be released on bail on his furnishing adequate security to the satisfaction of the trial court. Security furnished by the appellant in pursuance of Order dated 29.10.2007 shall stand discharged.

FEBRUARY 03, 2011. :5:
Fertililzers & Chemicals Travancore ... vs Regional Director Esic & Ors

3. It appears that a demand notice was sent against the appellant company under Section 45A of the Act in respect of the employers contribution under the Act. The appellant challenged the said demand notice by filing a petition under 2 Section 75 of the Act before the Employees Insurance Court, Alleppey. The Employees Insurance Court in its order dated 4.2.1993 made the following observations:-

4. Aggrieved against the said order dated 4.2.1993 of the Employees Insurance Court, both the appellant herein as 4 well as the Employees State Insurance Corporation filed appeals before the High Court under Section 82 of the Act. The appeal filed by the respondent-ESIC has been allowed and the appeal filed by the appellant herein has been dismissed. Hence, the appellant is before us by way of the present appeal by special leave.

15. In our opinion, the Employees Insurance Court should have itself made a proper investigation of the facts after getting evidence from the parties, including the workmen concerned, and after impleading them as party in the petition, it should have determined the question as to 8 whether the persons concerned were the employees of the appellant or not.

16. For the reasons stated above, we set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court as well as the order dated 4.2.1993 passed by the Employees Insurance Court and remand the matter to the Insurance Court for deciding the same afresh after impleading some of the workmen, if not all of them, or their trade union in a representative capacity. Needless to say, the Employees Insurance Court will grant an opportunity to all the parties, including the alleged workmen, to lead documentary evidence or oral evidence and thereafter proceed in accordance with law.

17. We make it clear that nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy involved. All questions of law and fact are left open for the parties to be raised before the Insurance Court.

Appeals allowed. No order as to the costs.

AUGUST 20, 2009
K Subramani vs K Damodara Naidu

The respondent herein/complainant and the appellant/accused were working as lecturers in a Government College at Bangalore. The case of the complainant is that the accused borrowed a loan of Rs.14 lakhs in cash on 1.12.1997 from him to start granite business, promising to repay the same with 3% interest per month on demand and issued post-dated cheque dated 30.11.2000 for sum of Rs.29,12,000/- which included principal and interest and few days prior to presentation of the cheque on its due date to bank for encashment, the accused requested him not to present the cheque and took extension of time of another three years for repayment and finally issued a cheque dated 16.08.2005 for a sum of Rs.73,83,552/- which included principal and interest. The complainant presented the cheque on 19.8.2005 for encashment to his banker and it was dishonored with an endorsement ‘fund insufficient’ and the complainant issued legal notice on 12.9.2005 demanding repayment within 15 days from the date of its receipt thereof and accused sent reply but failed to comply with the demand and the complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, against the accused.

In the trial the complainant examined himself as PW1 and examined CWs1 and 2 on his side and marked documents Exh. P1 to P23. The accused examined himself as DW1 and marked documents Exhs. D1 to D5. The trial court held that the complainant had no source of income to lend a sum of Rs.14 lakhs to the accused and he failed to prove that there is legally recoverable debt payable by the accused to him and that in discharge of said liability he issued the cheque and accordingly acquitted the accused for the alleged offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act. Aggrieved by the same the complainant preferred appeal in the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.368 of 2009, and the High Court heard the appeal along with 9 other appeals by framing two legal issues which are as under:

In the result this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment insofar as the appellant is concerned is set aside and the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is restored.

November 13, 2014 ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.11 SECTION IIB S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No. …..../2014 arising from SLP (Crl.) No(s). 6197/2014 K SUBRAMANI Appellant(s) VERSUS K DAMODARA NAIDU Respondent(s) Date : 13/11/2014 This petition was called on for JUDGMENT today.

For Petitioner(s) Mrs. Vaijayanthi Girish,Adv.

Leave granted.

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.

(Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
Bir Wati . vs Union Of India Through Land ...

2) The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. They, however, need mention in brief to appreciate the short controversy involved in the appeal.

5) The land belonging to Jugal Kishore was also acquired in these acquisition proceedings along with other lands. Jugal Kishore, unfortunately, expired pending these proceedings leaving behind his legal representatives (appellants herein). So far as the present appellants are concerned, they were not aware of the passing of the award because they were neither present when the award was passed and nor were served with the notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act and nor did they receive any notice in the name of Late Jugal Kishore.

7) The Additional District Judge, by order dated 21.4.2005 dismissed the reference as barred by time. Since the reference was dismissed as being barred by limitation, the merits of the case were not gone into. The appellants carried the matter in appeal to the High Court under Section 54 of the Act. The High Court, by impugned judgment, dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Additional District Judge. In the opinion of the High Court also, the reference made by the appellants was barred by limitation as prescribed under 4 Section 18 and was thus rightly dismissed by the Civil Court. Against this order, the appellants (landowners) felt aggrieved and filed the appeal by way of special leave petition in this Court.

secondly, one of the appellants also expired during pendency of this appeal as reported; and thirdly, all the appellants are illiterates and unaware of the proceedings in question for years even after passing of the award and are also unaware of the legal and 8 procedural requirements prescribed in the Act. It is due to these reasons, we are of the view that the appellants are entitled for indulgence.

15) In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that this is a fit case to allow the appellants to make an application to the concerned Collector under Section 28-A of the Act within three months from the date of receipt of this judgment i.e. on or before 17.12.2017 praying therein for payment of compensation to them in the light of the enhanced compensation, if already found awarded to other landowners in these very acquisition proceedings by the reference Court.

17) Let the Collector entertain the application, if made by the appellants within three months from the date of the order under Section 28-A of the Act and hold an inquiry as contemplated under Section 28-A of the Act for determining the compensation, if found payable to the appellants under the Act. However, the appellants would not in such a case be entitled to claim any interest of any nature due to delay on their part. The Collector shall decide the application once made by the appellants within three months and release the payment of compensation as directed hereinabove in favour of appellants after making proper verification about their family relations with the original claimant etc.

18) With these directions, the appeal stands disposed of finally with no order as cost.

August 17, 2017 11
Balbir Kaur & Anr vs New India Assurance Co.Ltd.& Ors

4. The Tribunal upon considering the materials brought on record by the parties awarded a sum of Rs. 7,96,000/- to the appellants. Respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal thereagainst before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court set aside the award passed by the Tribunal opining that as the cover note of the insurance had been issued on 15.03.1996 but the same was to take effect from 19.03.1996 and the accident having taken place on 18.03.1996, the insurer was not liable therefor.

14. Respondent No. 3, however, owner of the vehicle has not questioned that part of the order passed by the High Court. He, therefore, accepted the judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, liability to pay the awarded amount by him is not in question.

16. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent. No costs.

April 15, 2009
Jai Prakash Singh vs State Of Bihar & Anr.Etc

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that :

B. As per the post-mortem report, the deceased received 5 bullet injuries on his person and he died because of the same. The said respondents had applied for anticipatory bail, however, their applications stood rejected by the learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 11.8.2011 observing that in the investigation, a strong motive had been found against the said respondents and there were certain affidavits of eye-witnesses to the effect that the said respondents were the assailants.

C. Aggrieved, the said respondents filed Miscellaneous Criminal Petitions for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the Patna High Court. The said applications have been allowed passing the impugned orders granting them anticipatory bail on the grounds that the FIR itself made it evident that there was some previous dispute between the parties which led to a quarrel and the accused had fair antecedents.

viii. While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two factors namely, no prejudice should be caused to the free, fair and full investigation and there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified detention of the accused; ix. The court to consider reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; x. Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.

123. The arrest should be the last option and it should be restricted to those exceptional cases where arresting the accused is imperative in the facts and circumstances of that case.

22. The impugned judgments and orders dated 19.9.2011 and 25.10.2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Crl. Misc. Nos.28318 and 33546 of 2011 are, thus, set aside. The anticipatory bail granted to the said respondents is cancelled. Needless to say that in case the said respondents apply for regular bail, the same would be considered in accordance with law. With the aforesaid observations, appeals stand disposed of.
Shriram Scientific & ... vs V.K.Dhingra

During the pendency of the eviction petition, the petitioner filed Suit No. 131 of 2006 for recovery of rupees four lakhs thirty five thousand from the respondent along with pre-suit, pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 24 per cent per annum on the successive monthly amount becoming due from 1.8.2003 until the date of payment. The respondent filed an application under Section 10 read with Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the proceedings of the suit till the disposal of eviction petition No. E-42 of 1993 pending before the court of Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. The trial Court dismissed ...2/-

the application, but on a petition filed under Section 227 of the Constitution, the High Court reversed the order of the trial Court and stayed the proceedings of the suit till the disposal of the eviction petition.

Accordingly, the civil appeal is allowed, impugned order is set aside and Suit No.131 of 2006 is restored to its original file. The trial Court shall now decide the suit in accordance with law.
Avinash Dhavaji Naik vs State Of Maharashtra

4. The Land Acquisition Collector made its award. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, the appellants filed applications before the Collector for reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act pursuant whereto reference was made to the Court of District Judge in the year 1986.

7. Both the parties preferred appeals and cross-appeals thereagainst. By reason of the impugned judgment, whereas the appeal preferred by the appellants had been dismissed, the cross appeals preferred by the State in Civil Appeal Nos. 4260-4261 of 2002 and in Civil Appeal Nos. 4264-4265 of 2002 was allowed holding that compensation determined at the rate of Rs. 5 per sq. m. was justified. However, in Civil Appeal Nos. 4264-4265 of 2002 where the Trial Court awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 10 per 4 sq. m., it was reduced to Rs. 7/- per sq. m. by reason of the impugned judgment.

14. Although the lands in question were agricultural in nature, they were being used for making a town like Bombay. A new port known as Nhava Sheva Port had come into being which is a few kilometers away from the village. The roads were being constructed. The road to Nhava Shiva Port from Bombay is a District Board Road which is within 7 Kms. from the village in question. A copy of the new Bombay Development Plan has been 8 placed before us to point out construction of the National Highway, i.e., Bombay-Pune road as also the other District Board roads.

19. Applying the aforementioned legal principles to the fact of the present case, we are of the opinion that if the belting system is taken recourse to, compensation at the rate of Rs. 10/- per sq. m. would sub-serve the ends of justice.

24. However, if not the judgment dated 21.06.2007, the judgment dated 26.02.1993, in our opinion, can be put to use at least for a limited purpose, viz., option of belting method and grant of compensation on the basis of the proximity of the National Highway and the other.

25. Keeping in view the aforementioned principles in mind, we have arrived at the aforementioned figure of Rs. 10 per sq. m.

26. The appeals are allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

April 15, 2009
State Of A.P vs Gourishetty Mahesh & Ors

3) Brief facts:

Against the order of confiscation, an appeal being Crl. A. No. 4843/2003/CPE/D4 was filed before the Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise, A.P. The Commissioner upheld the confiscation order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Karimnagar. Aggrieved by the said order, the owner of the Jaggery filed W.P. No. 11647 of 2004 along with W.P.M.P. No. 14808 of 2004 before the High Court for the release of the seized goods. By an interim order dated 09.07.2007 in W.P.M.P. No. 14808 of 2004, the seized black Jaggery was released on furnishing Bank Guarantee by the petitioner therein to the value of the seized goods to the satisfaction of the Dy. Commissioner Prohibition & Excise, Karimnagar (second respondent therein) but the same could not be done as the jaggery was already disposed of. On 27.01.2006, the High Court passed an order in Crl. Pet. No. 4362 of 2002 allowing the criminal petition quashing the proceedings 4 against the respondents/accused in Crime No. 288/2002-

6) It is not in dispute that on 12.09.2002 at about 4 p.m. on information, the Excise officials of Prohibition and Excise Station, Huzurabad, Karimnagar District proceeded to Molangur cross road, stopped a van bearing No. AP-15- U 3123 and seized 5,040 kgs of black Jaggery in 106 gunny bags from the van under the cover of panchanama. 5 Among the other accused A-1 is the clerk of A-4 and A2 and A3 are driver and cleaner of the van and A-4 is doing business in jaggery and other kirana (grocery) items. It is the case of the prosecution that after seizure of the vehicle, the sample of substance had been sent to the Prohibition and Excise Laboratory for testing. The Govt. Chemical Examiner gave the Laboratory Analysis Report (Annexure P-12) which reads as under:-

14) In the light of the above principles and the materials placed by the prosecution, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the FIR in Crime No. 288/2002- 03 of Excise and Prohibition Station, Hazurabad, Karimnagar District, accordingly the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case except holding that interference by the High Court at the threshold is not warranted. We further make it clear that it is for the prosecution to establish its charge beyond reasonable doubt. With these observations, the State appeal is allowed.

JULY 15, 2010.
Baliraj Singh vs State Of M.P

The facts, limited for the purpose of dealing with this appeal, as divulged by the prosecution case are that on 6th January, 1992, Hira Singh Gond (Complainant—PW 7) lodged an FIR at Bahri Police Station, Sidhi District stating that his brother Mangal Singh had gone to the fields to answer nature’s call, when Baliraj Singh (A1 & Appellant herein) and Baijnath Singh (A2) attacked him (Mangal Singh) with lathis causing instantaneous death of Mangal Singh. Accordingly police registered Crime No. 5/92 against the accused, body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination, lathis allegedly used in the crime were seized at the instance of the accused and charges were framed against them under Section 302/34, IPC to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

Aggrieved by the order of the trial court, both the accused filed criminal appeal before the High Court. However, during the pendency of appeal before the High Court, Baijnath Singh (A2) had died, therefore his sentence got abated. The High Court also found the statements of eyewitnesses to be cogent and trustworthy, therefore concurred with the judgment of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal of the appellant-accused. Hence the present appeal by way of special leave.

For the foregoing reasons, we cannot hold the accused—appellant guilty of the offence in the present case. The conviction against appellant as recorded by the trial court and upheld by the High Court is therefore set aside and he is acquitted of the charges. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence.

The appeal stands allowed accordingly.

..................................J (N. V. Ramana) .................................J (Prafulla C. Pant) New Delhi Dated: April 25, 2017 ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.10 SECTION IIA (For Judgment) S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Criminal Appeal No(s). 333/2013 BALIRAJ SINGH Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Respondent(s) Date : 25/04/2017 This appeal was called on for pronouncement of judgment today.

For Appellant(s) Mr. C. S. N. Mohan Rao,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Mishra Saurabh,Adv.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Prafulla C. Pant.

We cannot hold the accused-appellant guilty of the offence in the present case. The conviction against appellant as recorded by the trial court and upheld by the High Court is therefore set aside and he is acquitted of the charges. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in connection with any other offence.

This appeal stands allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
Murtaza Jahan @ Mussarrat Jhan Begum vs Mohan Chandra Tamta & Ors

One of the grounds raised in this appeal is that although the name of the appellant is Mussarrat Jhan Begum and she is a resident of District Rampur; when Anwar Ali expired during pendency of the Second Appeal he was sought to be substituted by one lady named Murtaza Jahan and her address was shown as resident of District Almora. The appellant, therefore, was not heard by the High Court. The fact that a wrong address was shown, however, is disputed.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment should be set aside and the matter be remitted to the High Court for consideration of the Second Appeal afresh. It would, however, be open to the High Court to formulate such substantial questions of law which in its opinion arise for consideration and proceed to hear out the same in the presence of the appellant herein. The parties may appear before the High Court on 20.10.2008.

A copy of this order may be sent to the Registrar, High Court of Uttrakhand so that the Second Appeal bearing No. 670/2001 be listed before an appropriate Bench on that date.

The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order.

The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned observations.