L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Marathwada Agricultural University & ... vs Marathwada Krishi Vidyapith,M.S.K.S. ...

1. The present appeals are directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. Several Writ Petitions were disposed of by the High Court. These writ petitions were filed either by the Unions of the workers of the Marathwada Agricultural University (hereinafter referred to as the 'University') or by the employees of the University against the State of Maharashtra and against the University. The primary grievance was that qualification, nature of work, duties and responsibilities of the work of labourers who were daily rated labourers are same as that of permanent labourers employed by the University. Even then the daily rated workers were getting far less wages than the emoluments which were being paid to permanent labourers. It was also submitted that the Maharashtra Mumbai Wages Commission constituted under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 had fixed the rate of wages depending upon the zones in the Marathwada region. But the University paid these daily rated workers far less.

2. The High Court held that denial of the appropriate wages to the daily-rated workers amounted to exploitation of labour. The Government cannot take advantage of its dominant position by forcing them to work as casual labourers on starvation wages. Therefore, it was directed that the daily rated workers were to be paid wages with effect from 1st May, 1988 at the rate of basic pay i.e. at the minimum of the pay scale plus dearness allowance divided by 26.

8. The committee shall consist of Smt. M.H. Pandit, Joint Secretary, Finance Department, Mantralaya, Mumbai, as a representative for the State Government and Shri Udhav, Joint Secretary of the Krishi Vidyapeeth Kamgar Karamchari Union and the University shall nominate two persons who have expertise in financial matters. The committee in essence would be an equivalance committee. The report shall be given to the State Government within a period of four months from date of constitution of the committee.

9. The State Government then shall take necessary action on the basis of the recommendation, after obtaining the view of the University and after giving all concerned parties an opportunity of stating their views. The order of the High Court shall not be given effect to in view of the directions as contained above.

10. The appeals are allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Union Of India And Another vs Kunisetty Satyanarayana

The respondent was initially appointed as a Clerk in the Postal Department of the Union of India on 30.11.1965 on the basis of the marks obtained by him in the SSLC Examination. The SSLC certificate of the respondent indicated that he belongs to the 'Konda Kapu' community which is admittedly a Scheduled Tribe community in the State of Andhra Pradesh.

Thereafter the respondent appeared for a departmental test for promotion to the post of Upper Division Clerk against a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribe community, and the respondent was promoted as an Upper Division Clerk in Scheduled Tribe category. His promotion order specifically stated that he has been promoted as an Upper Division Clerk under Scheduled Tribe category vide promotion order dated 27.12.1976. Thereafter, in 1987, he was further promoted to the next higher post, i.e. LSG cadre, again on a post reserved for Scheduled Tribe category.

On 28.11.1994, a show-cause notice was issued to the respondent to show cause as to whether he obtained employment on forged caste certificate. In reply to the said show-cause notice, the respondent admitted that he does not belong to 'Konda Kapu' community, but he belongs to 'Kapu' community which is not a Scheduled Tribe community. The respondent in reply to the show-cause notice also stated that it was wrongly mentioned in the SSC register that he belongs to 'Konda Kapu' community on the basis of a declaration given by his illiterate father who got the respondent admitted in school when he was 11 years old.

Aggrieved against that order, the respondent filed an appeal before the State Government which was disposed of on 17.2.2001 holding that the respondent does not belong to Scheduled Tribe community and he cannot be considered as such, and the Postal Department may take appropriate disciplinary action against the respondent.

Instead of replying to the aforesaid Charge Memo, the respondent filed an OA before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad which was disposed of vide order 15.3.2004 with the direction to the applicant to submit his reply to the Charge Memo dated 23.12.2003 and on submission of the said reply the Disciplinary Authority should consider the same. Instead of filing any reply the respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court which has been allowed, and hence this appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment of the High Court is not correct and the same is set aside. We fully agree with the view taken by the Central Administrative Tribunal vide its order dated 15.3.2004. The respondent is now directed to submit his reply to the Charge Memo dated 23.12.2003 within three weeks from today and the authority concerned should decide the same expeditiously in accordance with law, and thereafter take appropriate legal action in pursuance of the said decision, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the respondent.

The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. vs Kamachi Industries Ltd.

3. Brief facts which led to filing of this appeal are as under:-

5. The respondent on 07.10.2016 invoked arbitration clause. The appellant did not agree for the appointment of the 2 arbitrator. Hence, the respondent filed petition being OP No.398 of 2018 under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’) before the Madras High Court on 24.01.2018 for appointment of sole arbitrator. The appellant contested the petition challenging the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court on the ground that the parties have agreed that Seat of arbitration be Bhubaneswar and therefore, only the Orissa High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint the arbitrator. The Madras High Court vide impugned order appointed a former judge of the Madras High Court as the sole arbitrator by holding that mere designation of “Seat” by parties does not oust the jurisdiction of other courts other than at the Seat of arbitration. The High Court held that in absence of any express clause excluding jurisdiction of other courts, both the Madras High Court and the Orissa High Court will have jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings. Challenging the impugned order, the appellant has preferred this appeal.

Only if the agreement of the parties is construed to provide for the “seat”/“place” of arbitration being in India — would Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 be applicable. If the agreement is held to provide for a “seat”/“place” outside India, Part I would be inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the arbitration law of the seat, even if the agreement purports to provide that the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall govern the arbitration proceedings.”

(e) of the Act.

16. Where the contract specifies the jurisdiction of the court at a particular place, only such court will have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter and parties intended to exclude all other courts. In the present case, the parties have agreed that the “venue” of arbitration shall be at Bhubaneswar. Considering the agreement of the parties having Bhubaneswar as the venue of arbitration, the intention of the parties is to exclude all other courts. As held in Swastik, non-use of words like “exclusive jurisdiction”, “only”, “exclusive”, “alone” is not decisive and does not make any material difference.

17. When the parties have agreed to have the “venue” of arbitration at Bhubaneswar, the Madras High Court erred in assuming the jurisdiction under Section 11(6) of the Act. Since only Orissa High Court will have the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed under Section 11(6) of the Act, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.

18. In the result, the impugned order of the Madras High Court in OP No.398 of 2018 dated 02.11.2018 is set aside and this appeal is allowed. The parties are at liberty to approach the Orissa High Court seeking for appointment of the arbitrator.

July 25, 2019 18
Anjali Kapoor vs Rajiv Baijal

2)The facts of case in brief are: - the respondent/Rajiv Baijal, had got married to the appellant's daughter/Meghana on 16.01.1998 and lived together in Pune (Maharashtra). Smt. Meghana went to Indore to the 1 appellant's residence for delivery of the child. She was admitted in Noble Hospital, Indore and gave birth to a female child on 20.05.2001, but she did not survive to see the new born baby. As the child was born premature, she was kept in incubator in the hospital for nearly 45 days. After discharge from the hospital, the infant was brought to the residence of the appellant, and she was named Anagh. Add to the agony, just in a span of two months, appellant lost her husband also on 29.07.2001.

3)The Respondent herein filed an application under Guardian and Wards Act before the Family Court, inter-alia asserting that being the father of the child Anagh, he is her natural guardian and therefore, entitled to the custody of the child. In support of the claim made, the respondent had asserted before the Family Court that Anagh was not properly looked after by the appellant and it was perilous for the child to continue in the custody of the appellant. The respondent had also contended that after the child was brought to the residence of the appellant he was repeatedly requesting the appellant and her family members to hand over the custody of the child to him, since the appellant is unable to take care of the welfare of the minor child.

5)The Family Court, Indore in its order dated 18.3.2004, has observed that, it cannot be concluded that the respondent although has borrowed money from several persons, will not be in a position to bring up her daughter and bear her educational expense. The Court has also taken note of the fact that the child/Anagh is taken care of by appellant's brother-in-law, who has two grown-up children, and therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent will not be in a position to take care of the welfare of the child. Therefore, giving priority to the welfare of minor child, it is advisable to give custody of minor child - Anagh to the respondent, where she will be looked after well by respondent and his 3 family members. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant had carried the matter to the High Court, by filing Misc. Appeal No.750 of 2004.

6)The High Court in its judgment has held, that there are no compelling reasons on the basis whereof the custody of the child should be denied to her father/respondent. Respondent has been making efforts right from the infancy of the child for guardianship of the child which was strongly resisted by his mother-in-law. The Court has also taken note of the fact that, the appellant has lost her husband and has, therefore, suffered a great financial set back. Therefore, for better upbringing and welfare of the child, her custody should be entrusted to her father. Aggrieved by the said judgment, appellant is before us.

22)In view of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. We permit the appellant to have the custody of the child till she attains the age of majority. No order as to costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs Jaswant Kumar

2. The respondent herein was appointed as a Constable with the Central Reserve Police Force on the 2nd of April, 1991 and was posted on polling duty in District Poonch, Jammu in the year 2002. During his duty guarding ballot boxes, he suffered an injury in an encounter with terrorists and as a result of a ricochetting bullet, received a splinter injury to the right eye. In the Court of Inquiry that followed regarding the incident, the respondent was applauded for his courage, intelligence and earnestness and was, accordingly, given some special benefits as well. The respondent subsequently filed a petition before the High Court of Delhi claiming two reliefs:

4. The present appeal has been filed by the Union of India impugning the judgment aforesaid.

7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Rajnarayan Sharma vs Sirnam Sharma

6. Per contra, the sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit D-2), executed by Bansi(Banshi) in favour of Raghunath (original first defendant), and the sale deed dated 21.9.1989 (exhibit D-1), executed by the first defendant in favour of the appellant herein are not questioned by anybody including the plaintiffs till date. The sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit D-2) depicts that the possession of the suit land was handed over by Bansi(Banshi) to Raghunath, i.e., the predecessor-in-interest of respondent nos. 3 to 5 herein. On receiving consideration of Rs.15,000/-, the possession of the suit land was handed over to Raghunath on the spot. On 13.5.1985, by the order of 7 Sub-Divisional Officer, Gohad, the revenue records were mutated on the application of original vendor Bansi(Banshi). Subsequently thereafter the names of defendant no.1- Raghunath on the basis of sale deed dated 16.7.1984 (exhibit D-2) and subsequent purchaser Rajnarayan Sharma (the appellant herein) on the basis of sale deed dated 21.9.1989 (exhibit D-1) were mutated in the revenue records. Even after the second sale deed dated 21.9.1989, the name of Rajnarayan Sharma was entered into the revenue records as in possession over the suit land and he is cultivating the land in question.

8. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed, the finding recorded by the High Court that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property and they cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law stands set aside, and the suit No. 8-A/87 is dismissed in toto. No order as to costs.

SEPTEMBER 12 , 2017.

The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs, in terms of the signed Non-Reportable judgment.

Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
M/S Grasim Industries Ltd vs Union Of India

Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. CCE, Chandigarh-I, 2002 (141) ELT 490 (Tri. Delhi). Being aggrieved by the portion of the Order of the Commissioner (Appeals), pertaining to confirmation of demand of duty along with equal amount of penalty of ` 4,75,781 on the metal scrap and waste generated during repair of machinery, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, vide its Order dated 09.08.2005, allowed the appeal and set aside the demand of duty and penalty confirmed by the said portion of the Order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that metal scrap and waste cleared by the assessee does not arise out of any manufacturing activity and, thereby, not excisable to any excise duty in view of the decision of the Tribunal in CCE v.

Birla Corpn. Ltd., 2005 (181) ELT 263. The Revenue, aggrieved by this Order, filed an appeal under Section 35G of the Act before the High Court of Rajasthan. The High Court, vide its Judgment and Order dated 31.07.2008, 4 allowed the appeal, set aside the Order of the Tribunal and restored the Order of the Commissioner (Appeals) on the ground that the generation of scrap amounts to manufacture as it is incidental or ancillary to the manufacture of spare or replaceable part. The spare or replaceable part comes into existence as distinct product during the repairing of the parts of the cement plant. Also, the generation of scrap need not be in the process of manufacture of the excisable end product such as cement. Being aggrieved, the assessee has filed this appeal under Section 35L of the Act against the judgment and order of the High Court.

16) In view of the above, we cannot sustain the Judgment and Order of the High Court dated 31.07.2008.

17) In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned Judgment and the Order of the High Court is set aside and the Order dated 09.08.2005 of the Tribunal is restored.

Costs are made easy.
Shish Ram vs Union Of India And Ors

2. The facts very briefly are that the appellant was enrolled in the Army on 28.01.1963. As per the terms of his enrolment, he was to put in not less than ten years in Army Service and if required, a further period in Reserve Service which would be sufficient to complete a total period of twenty years of service. After he completed more than ten years of Army Service, he was transferred to the reserve establishment with effect from 24.07.1974. While in the reserve establishment, he was required to attend reservist training held from time to time. He attended the biennial reservist training for the year 1976. An intimation dated 20.01.1978 was sent to him to attend the biennial reservist training from 05.06.1978 to 02.07.1978 but he failed to attend the reservist training. He was given another chance and was advised to attend the reservist training with the next batch from 19.06.1978 by an intimation dated 16.05.1978 and yet he did not attend the reservist training. On coming to learn that the appellant was employed as a driver in the Delhi Transport Corporation, letters were sent to the appellant as well as the Depot Manager of the Delhi Transport Corporation for furnishing the required exemption certificate exempting him from the training during 1978, but there was no response to the letters. Consequently, the appellant was declared as a deserter with effect from 19.06.1978 and was eventually dismissed from service with effect from 20.10.1981.

3. The appellant filed Writ Petition (C) 1294 of 1997 which was disposed of by the High Court with a direction to the authorities to consider the representation of the appellant with liberty to the appellant to file a fresh writ petition in case he is aggrieved. After the representation of the appellant was rejected, the appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.2728 of 1997 which was also disposed of by the High Court on 28.04.2000 granting permission to the appellant to withdraw the writ petition and to challenge the order of dismissal. Thereafter, the appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.5580 of 2000 challenging the order of dismissal and claiming pension and by the impugned judgment the High Court has dismissed the writ petition.

8. Regarding pension and gratuity claimed by the appellant, Regulation 113 (a) of the Pension Regulations, 1961 is quoted hereinbelow:

Regulation 113(a) is clear that an individual, who is dismissed under the provisions of the Army Act, is ineligible for pension or gratuity in respect of all previous service. As the appellant had been dismissed from the service under the provisions of the Army Act, he was not eligible for pension and gratuity and the High Court was right in rejecting the claim of the appellant for pension in the impugned judgment.

9. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal and we, accordingly, dismiss the same with no order as to costs.
Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C vs New India Assurance Co.Ltd & Anr

2. The facts giving rise to Civil Appeal No.5293 of 2010 reflect that the accident in question was caused by the bus which was driven under the control of KSRTC. The bus was owned by respondent no.2, T.M. Ganeshan, insured by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Admittedly, an agreement dated 28.2.2002 was entered into between the KSRTC and owner respondent no.2. The MACT, Tumkur, Karnataka on 25.6.2007 allowed the claim petition preferred by the claimants and awarded a sum of Rs.4,09,000/- with interest @ 6% p.a.

3. In view of the agreement between KSRTC and the owner of the bus, the liability was fastened upon the owner and the insurer of the vehicle jointly and severally to make the payment of compensation, not on KSRTC. Aggrieved thereby, the insurer preferred an appeal before the High Court of Karnataka. The same has been allowed by the impugned judgment and order dated 20.2.2009. The High Court has allowed the appeal filed by the insurer and held that the liability to make the payment of compensation is that of KSRTC alone. Aggrieved thereby, the KSRTC has come up in the appeal before us.

34. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold that registered owner, insurer as well as KSRTC would be liable to make the payment of compensation jointly and severally to the claimants and the KSRTC in terms of the lease agreement entered into with the registered owner would be entitled to recover the amount paid to the claimants from the owner as stipulated in the agreement or from the insurer.

35. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. Parties to bear their own costs.

........................................CJI.
Regional Mangaer, Centaral Bank Of ... vs Madhulika Guru Prasad Dahir And Ors

3.The employee was appointed to the post of Clerk in the appellant-Bank with effect from 18th March, 1981, against a post reserved for "Scheduled Tribes", as she had claimed to be belonging to "Thakur Scheduled Tribe", on the basis of a caste certificate issued on 4th December, 1979. In March, 1991, she was promoted as Junior Officer. It appears that pursuant to the instructions issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs on 23rd March, 1990, directing all the public sector banks/financial institutions to get the caste certificates of the existing employees, belonging to various scheduled tribes, verified, the caste certificate filed by the employee was referred to the Committee for Scrutiny and Verification of Tribe Claims, Nagpur (for short the Scrutiny Committee), respondent No.2 herein.

4.The Scrutiny Committee granted an opportunity of hearing to the employee on 11th October, 1999; made its own inquiries and found that the employee was not originally belonging to "Thakur Scheduled Tribe" but had obtained the Scheduled Tribe certificate from the issuing authority to take advantage of various concessions given to the tribal communities. The Scrutiny Committee discovered that the employee had studied in Jeevan Shikshan Vidyalaya, Nagpur and by blotting out the original caste "Rajput Dahayat" as mentioned in the school leaving certificate, noted down the caste as "Thakur", and thus, took admission in college on the basis of caste certificate "Thakur", which caste also got mentioned in the college leaving certificate of the employee. In the absence of any documentary evidence adduced by the employee to prove her claim, the Scrutiny Committee relied on the affinity test and found that the employee did not show any affinity towards "Thakur Scheduled Tribe". Accordingly, vide its order dated 2nd May, 2000, the Scrutiny Committee cancelled the caste certificate dated 4th December, 1979, issued to the employee. 3

6.Pursuant thereto, the Scrutiny Committee, reconsidered the caste claim of the employee. Concurring with its earlier findings, vide order dated 29th May, 2003, the Committee again rejected the claim of the employee and cancelled the caste certificate dated 4th December, 1979. Consequently, by order dated 28th June, 2003, the services of the employee were terminated by the appellant on the ground that her tribe claim had been invalidated. Aggrieved, the employee preferred a writ petition challenging both the said orders.

18.In view of the aforegoing discussion, the impugned judgment and order quashing the order of termination of service of the employee and directing her reinstatement cannot be sustained. The order of termination based on the report of the Scrutiny Committee does not suffer from any infirmity and the High Court should not have interfered with the same.

19.Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court dated 6th April, 2005 is set aside but with no order as to costs.

JULY 25, 2008.