L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Commissioner Of Customs & Central ... vs Phil Corporation Ltd

2. M/s Phil Corporation Ltd., the respondent assessee manufactures processed cashew nuts, peanuts, almonds etc. by dry roasting, oil roasting, salting, seasoning and packs them in different containers and clears these items under its brand name. Admittedly, the respondent assessee did not register with the Central Excise Authorities and cleared these goods without payment of excise duty.

5. Against the said order of the Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Goa, the respondent assessee filed an appeal before the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, West Regional Bench at Mumbai. The Tribunal vide its impugned order dated 24.10.2001 allowed the appeal of the respondent assessee and held that the goods cleared by the respondent assessee are not assessable to duty.

33. As a result, the appeal of the appellant is allowed and the impugned judgment of the tribunal is accordingly set aside and the judgment of the Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise, Goa is restored.

34. Consequently, Civil Appeal Nos.7325-7326/01 filed by M/s Coco Dry Fruits (India) Ltd. against the Revenue are accordingly dismissed, upholding the order dated 24.8.2001 passed by the tribunal dismissing the appeals of M/s Coco Dry Fruits (India) Ltd.

35. Accordingly, Civil Appeal Nos. 7242-7243/02 filed by M/s Coco Dry Fruits (India) Ltd. against the Revenue are dismissed, upholding the order dated 10.12.2002 passed by the tribunal dismissing the appeals of M/s Coco Dry Fruits (India) Ltd., but for adjudication the question of penalty and interest, these appeals are remanded to the Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi.

36. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs.
Uttranchal Forest Development ... vs M.C. Joshi

By reason of an award dated 28.4.2003, the Labour Court opining that the appellant herein contravened the provisions of Section 6N of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 directed the reinstatement of the respondent with 50% of back wages with effect from 9.9.1997. Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, a writ petition was filed by the appellant herein which was allowed in part by reason of the impugned judgment reducing the back wages to 25%.

We are therefore, of the opinion that keeping in view the nature and period of services rendered by the respondent herein as also the period during which he had worked and the fact that he had raised an industrial dispute after six years, interest of justice would be met if the impugned judgments are substituted by an award of compensation for a sum of Rs. 75,000/- in favour of the respondent.

We direct accordingly. This appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent.

In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall however, be no order as to costs.
State Of Rajasthan vs Shanti

Allegation was that on 18/1/1999 the Station House Officer, Police Station Pilibanga received secret information that the respondent Shanti and her son Darshan alongwith her husband Shankar Lal were habitually indulging in the sale and purchase of opium and the respondent Smt. Shanti was expected to come with opium near a particular place. The police officer reached the place and found that the respondent was carrying a bag in her hand. She was stopped and searched. The bag was found to carry about 10 kgs. of opium. On the information given by her, another 20 kgs. were seized from near her residential house. Accused Shankar Lal was also arrested in connection with the second recovery of 20 kgs. of opium. Charge-sheet was filed after investigation. As the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held. The trial Court found that there was violation of the provisions of Section 42 (2), 50, 55 and 57 of the NDPS Act and acquitted the accused. Questioning the acquittal, the High Court was moved by the State. The High Court did not find any substance in the appeal filed by the State and dismissed it.

So far as the present appeal is concerned, it has to be noted that the special leave petition was dismissed against the respondent No.2 i.e. Shankar Lal and notice was issued qua the present respondent.

The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
Renikuntla Rajamma (D) By Lr vs K.Sarwanamma

2. The plaintiff-respondent in this appeal filed O.S. No.979 of 1989 for a declaration to the effect that revocation deed dated 5th March, 1986 executed by the defendant-appellant purporting to revoke a gift deed earlier executed by her was null and void. The plaintiff’s case as set out in the plaint was that the gift deed executed by the defendant-appellant was valid in the eyes of law and had been accepted by the plaintiff when the donee-defendant had reserved to herself during for life, the right to enjoy the benefits arising from the suit property. The purported revocation of the gift in favour of the plaintiff-respondent in terms of the revocation deed was, on that basis, assailed and a declaration about its being invalid and void ab initio prayed for.

4. In the first appeal preferred against the said judgment and decree, the first Additional District Judge, Warangal affirmed the view taken by the trial Court and held that the plaintiff had satisfactorily proved the execution of a valid gift in his favour and that the revocation of a validly made gift deed was legally impermissible. The First Appellate Court also held that the gift deed was not a sham document, as alleged by the defendant and that its purported cancellation/revocation was totally ineffective. The defendant’s case that she had apprehended grabbing of the property by Sankaraiah forcing her to make a sham gift deed was held not established especially when Sankaraiah had died three years prior to the execution of the revocation deed by the defendant. If the gift deed was executed by the donor to save the property from the covetous eyes of Sankaraiah, as alleged by the defendant, there was no reason why the defendant should have waited for three years after the death of Sankaraiah before revoking the same reasoned the Court. The first Appellate Court also affirmed the finding of the trial Court that the donee had accepted the gift made in his favour. The appeal filed by the defendant (appellant herein) was on those findings dismissed.

5. Concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below did not deter the appellants from preferring Civil Second Appeal No.809 of 2003 in which the appellants made an attempt to assail the said findings. The High Court, however, declined to interfere with the judgments and orders impugned before it and dismissed the second appeal of the appellant holding that the case set up by the defendant that the gift was vitiated by undue influence or fraud had been thoroughly disproved at the trial. The present appeal is the last ditch attempt by the defendants to assail the findings recorded against them.

20. The High Court was in that view perfectly justified in refusing to interfere with the decree passed in favour of the donee. This appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.
Awani Kumar Upadhyay vs Hon.High Court Of Jud.At Allahabad &Ors

is posted as Additional District and Sessions Judge, Moradabad and, according to him, he is having unblemished service career and has successfully completed 30 years of service.

c) It is the claim of the appellant that in the Second Appeal No. 1444 of 2000, he has not rendered any judgment as trial Court Judge or as the first Appellate Court Judge. According to him, a suit bearing No. 418 of 1997 was filed by Shri Lajja Ram against the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow and another and the said suit was decided by one learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ghaziabad presided over by Shri Chaturbhuj by a judgment and order dated 02.05.1997. Aggrieved by the said judgment, a first appeal was filed being First Appeal No. 105 of 1997 in the Court of Shri A.K. Aggarwal, second Additional Dist. & Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad. The first Appellate Court framed 12 additional issues and on those additional issues, the matter was remanded to the Court of the appellant as he was working as Civil Judge, Senior Division, Ghaziabad. Thereafter, in compliance with the order of the first Appellate Court, after recording the evidence of the parties, the appellant recorded the evidence of the parties and gave his findings on 31.05.1999.

Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges, hence it provides appeals and revisions. Inasmuch as the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under psychological pressure and they do not have the facilities which are available in the higher courts, we are of the view that the remarks/observations and strictures are to be avoided particularly if the officer has no occasion to put-forth his reasonings. Further, if the passage complained of is wholly irrelevant and unjustifiable and its retention on the records will cause serious harm to the persons to whom it refers and its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or order, request for expunging those remarks are to be allowed. We, once again, reiterate that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against judicial officers and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof.

14) Under these circumstances, the adverse remarks passed in the impugned judgment and the final orders dated 01.03.2012 and 23.04.2012 insofar as the appellant is concerned are set aside. Since these appeals are confined only for expunging the strictures, the same are allowed as pointed above. No costs.

FEBRUARY 13, 2013.
Commissioner Of Custom, New Delhi vs M/S Brooks International & Ors

2. The basic issue is when the market value of goods under export is much less than the amount of drawback claimed, whether such goods can be confiscated for violation of the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (in short the 'Act'). In the matters relating to CA No.4559-4561 of 2002, the respondent had sent a consignment to the export shed of ICD, TKD, New Delhi for exporting the same under claim for duty drawback. On the basis of intelligence, Directorate of Revenue, Intelligence (in short 'DRI') detained the consignment. It was, prima facie, noted that the goods did not appear as per description, quantity and value disclosed in the bills. The consignments of the respondents were examined on different dates by DRI.

4. The Commissioner of Customs directed confiscation of all the goods under Section 113(d) and (i) of the Act and allowed to redeem of the same on payment of fine of Rs.10,00,000/-, disallowed the export of readymade garments and claim of drawback. No penal action was invoked as DRI contemplated to seek separate adjudication in respect of the penal clause provided under the Act. Appeals were preferred before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal (in short 'CEGAT') which allowed the appeals holding that there was no power of confiscation and there was no material placed to record to suggest that the goods did not correspond to any material entry made in the bills and the correctness of the FOB and description of the goods specified in the bills had not been disputed.

section (1), the price referred to in that sub-section in respect of imported goods shall be determined in accordance with the rules made in this behalf.

9. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.

C.A. Nos. 140-143 of 2004

10. The factual position is almost identical to those involved in C.A. Nos. 4559-4561 OF 2002 except that in the instant case the appellant had filed an application for review which was rejected.

11. Following the view expressed in the connected civil appeals we allow these appeals and remit the matter to CEGAT for fresh consideration. It is to be noted that CEGAT is presently known as Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal.

12. Appeals are allowed.
Subhash Malhari Muneshwar . vs Arvind Anandrao Kadam (Dead) Through ...

2. The case of the appellants-plaintiff(s) is that an amount of Rs.3,000/- was borrowed from the respondent and in security the property was mortgaged under Exhibit P-33 (15.02.1975) with condition that if the amount is paid on or before 15.03.1980, the property can be redeemed. The appellants–plaintiff(s) filed the suit for redemption of the mortgage alleging that the document (Exhibit P-33) was a mortgage by conditional sale and not a sale with condition for reconveyance.

3. The Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that the document Exhibit P-33 was not a mortgage with conditional sale; but a sale deed with condition for repurchase. The first Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court holding that the Exhibit P-33 is a mortgage by conditional sale as defined under Section 58(c) of Transfer of Property Act and not a sale with condition to repurchase. The High Court in Second Appeal, reversed the judgment of the First Appellate Court by holding that Exhibit P-33 was a sale with condition to repurchase and not a mortgage by conditional sale.

10. Admittedly pursuant to Exhibit P-33 possession was handed over to the respondent(s) vesting on them the absolute right to enjoy the property. Exhibit P-33 does not show that the amount of Rs.3,000/- was taken as a debt or loan; nor does the document show that the income from the land was to be appropriated towards the interest by the respondent(s). We do not find any ground warranting interference with impugned judgment. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.

11. The parties are to bear their respective costs.

12. We place on record the valuable assistance rendered by learned amicus, Mr. Akshat Shrivastava appearing on behalf of the respondent(s).
Mithu Kalita vs State Of Assam

3. According to the prosecution, on 29th January, 1994, the informant Madanlal (P.W.6) and his father Dhulji, the deceased, were sleeping in a room adjoining their field and his nephew P.W.1 Rameshwar was sleeping outside. According to the prosecution, at 12:15 in the night the appellants herein came on a motor cycle and threatened Rameshwar who was sleeping outside. Appellant no.2 also named Rameshwar was armed with knife, whereas other appellants were armed with lathis. P.W.1 Rameshwar raised an alarm and on hearing the same, the informant P.W.6 Madan Lal and deceased Dhulji came out of the room and all the appellants started beating them. Madan Lal got knife injury on the head and lathi injuries on hands and legs. It is the specific allegation of the prosecution that appellant No.2 Rameshwar stabbed Dhulji with knife which hit him in the chest and lathi injuries were inflicted on the head. In the occurrence, according to the prosecution, P.W.1 Rameshwar got injuries in his left arm 3 and knee and Dhulji died on account of the injuries sustained by him.

compliance of the provisions of Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Not only that the witnesses claim of identification of the accused persons was also doubted. If all 9 these considerations are taken collectively, there is no escape from the conclusion that the view taken by the trial court is one of the possible views. Injuries to a witness do indicate his presence at the time of incident, but from that it does not flow that his evidence is to be accepted automatically. From what we have observed above it cannot be said that view taken by the trial court is perverse and therefore, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court erred in interfering with the order of acquittal.

11. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. Appellants are in jail, they be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in any other case.

................................................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] .................................................J [CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD] NEW DELHI JULY 29, 2010.

Vide our separate reasoned order, we have allowed this appeal. As per the counsel, the appellants are stated to be in jail. The appellants shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case.

The reasoned order to follow.

......................J [HARJIT SINGH BEDI] ......................J [C.K. PRASAD] NEW DELHI JULY 29, 2010.
Inderjit Singh vs State Of Punjab Tr.Collector & Anr

The appellant was an Ahlmad in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), at Barnala in Punjab. On 14.06.1996 at about 7.30 p.m., when some of the Judicial Officers made a surprise inspection of the Court premises, they found the appellant, one Chowkidar and a constable at the premises. They found that these persons were drinking alcohol within the court premises. The matter was reported to the District Judge and thereafter an inquiry was conducted and the appellant was found guilty and his services were terminated. The appellant challenged the same by way of Writ Petition before the High Court and the same was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, he is before this Court by way of this appeal.

The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No costs.

29TH JANUARY, 2010
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd vs Tata Projects Ltd

Heard Mr. Gourab Banerji, Senior Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Gopal Jain, Senior Advocate for the respondent. The appellant was required to set up some plant or boiler units. For completing that work, appellant issued a notice inviting tender for engaging a sub-contractor to erect, test and commission two 120 MW boilers (Unit II and Unit III) on behalf of the appellant. The value of the contract awarded in favour of the respondent was Rs.6,99,40,000/-. Pursuant to disputes and differences, an Arbitral Tribunal consisting of three arbitrators came to be constituted. The Arbitral Tribunal awarded Rs.69.22 lac on various heads and Rs.25.39 lac on account of interest. The appellant instituted proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, ‘the Act’). That proceeding bearing A.P. No.213 of 2006 was finally decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Calcutta on 04.01.2013. The objections of the appellant were allowed in part in respect of only three counts relating to over-run charges, crane hire charges and interest. The respondent filed an appeal being A.P.O. No.60 of 2013. The Division Bench, by the order under appeal dated 12.06.2013, allowed the appeal in part in respect of charges, namely, crane hire charges and interest. In the present appeal only those two issues have been raised on behalf of the appellant. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant, the Division Bench has wrongly reversed the order of learned Single Judge on the issue of crane hire charges inasmuch as the claim of the appellant asking for payment of crane hire charges by the respondent for Unit III was based upon clause 12.2.2 of the Work Order read with clauses 2.8.11, 3.38.3 and 3.38.14 of the Agreement/Tender Document. In respect of second issue relating to interest, learned senior counsel has confined the claim of the appellant only against grant of pre-Award interest on the basis of clause 1.15.5 of the Tender Document/Agreement.

6. In the light of aforesaid discussion, we are constrained to hold that the order under appeal ought not to have approved grant of any pre-Award interest.

3.38.3 The operation of all BHEL equipment (except 250 T Crane) will be in the scope of the contractor. BHEL will provide free of cost (including operator and consumables) one number 250 T Crane only upto the Drum Lifting Milestone of Unit II only. However the Fuel for operating this 250 T Crane shall have to be arranged by the contractor.

September 01, 2014.
Commr.Of Central Excise-I,Hyderabad vs M/S Charminar Non-Wovens Ltd

4. The case of the respondent is that it is manufacturer of blankets, carpets and floor coverings falling under Chapter 63 and 57 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (hereinafter "the said Act") and its products known as "Charms Jute Floor Coverings", is classifiable under chapter sub-heading No. 5705.00 (before 26.7.1996) and then under chapter sub-heading No. 5703.20.

11. In view of the aforesaid settled law, this Court does not find any merit in the appeal filed by the Revenue. The Revenue's appeal is thus dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.
Bhartiya Seva Samaj Trust Tr.Pres.& Anr vs Yogeshbhai Ambalal Patel & Anr

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

4. On the contrary, the respondent No.1 appeared in person as a Caveator and has submitted that he had applied in pursuance of an advertisement wherein the eligibility i.e. qualification was shown as B.Sc.;B.Ed/B.A.;B.Ed. The vacancies had been advertised in local newspaper having wide circulation. Most of the teachers in the School run by the appellant had been appointed though they possessed the same qualification i.e., B.Sc.;B.Ed./B.A.;B.Ed. A large number of candidates had applied for the post alongwith respondent no.1 possessing the same qualification and they had been selected. None of them has been removed. The respondent No.1 had been given hostile discrimination as the teachers having the same qualification duly appointed alongwith respondent No.1 are still working in the appellant’s School. Respondent No.1 had been chosen to be removed for extraneous reasons and had been deprived of his legitimate dues. His selection was made by the Committee consisting of the representatives of the appellant Trust as well as Government officials after being fully satisfied regarding the eligibility of the respondent No.1. The appellant Trust cannot be permitted either to make discrimination amongst employees or to take the benefit of its own mistake and that too at such a belated stage. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed.

Every generation looks up to the next generation with the hope that they shall build up a nation better than the present. Therefore, education which empowers the future generation should always be the main concern for any nation.

Hence, we see that education is an issue, which has been treated at length in our Constitution. It is a well accepted fact that democracy cannot be flawless; but, we can strive to minimize these flaws with proper education.

Democracy depends for its very life on a high standard of general, vocational and professional education. Dissemination of learning with search for new knowledge with discipline all round must be maintained at all costs.

18. In view of the above, education and particularly that of elementary/basic education has to be qualitative and for that the trained teachers are required. The Legislature in its wisdom after consultation with the expert body fixes the eligibility for a particular discipline taught in a school. Thus, the eligibility so fixed require very strict compliance and any appointment made in contravention thereof must be held to be void.

23. After going through the material on record and considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent No.1-in-person, we do not find any cogent reason whatsoever to interfere with the aforesaid findings of fact.

24. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.