L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
State Of H.P.& Ors vs Ashwani Kumar & Ors

2. The facts in nutshell are that Dev Raj, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents herein, was holding land measuring 2400 kanals 9 marlas in village Kalroohi and Mubarikpur as owner. He was issued notice in form C-V in which area measuring 1767 Kanals 9 Marlas was proposed to be declared as surplus under the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972. Instead of filing objection, the landowner filed a writ petition in which High Court directed that the determination of surplus area be made by the Collector. On 22.7.1976, the Collector, Una District passed an order holding that the land owned by wife of late Dev Raj namely, Smt. Kala Devi, and Yash Pal, Dharam Pal, Ram Pal sons of Dev Raj be excluded from the holding of landowner Dev Raj and all the members of the family holding land continue to enjoy rights therein to the extent of the determined permissible area. Thereafter, while deciding reference in revision, the Financial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh remanded the case to the Collector for decision afresh in accordance with law after affording due opportunity to the respondents. After remand, the Collector Land Ceiling, Una passed order holding that Dev Raj and that of his family with Ram Paul being adult son on the appointed day i.e.24.1.1971, the landowner is entitled for two units of land as permissible area.

However, the said principle will be applicable where the meaning of the Statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretation than one. In the instant case, the provision of the Act/Statute is very clear and, therefore, principle of stare decisis is of no help to the respondents.

23. Apart from that it appears that the instant case arose out of certain proceedings initiated as far back as in 1974, and travelled up to this Court. The Full Bench judgment came only in the year 1976 and, therefore, in our considered opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis should not apply in the facts of the present case.

24. Considering the entire facts of the case and the relevant provisions of the Act, we are of the definite opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is contrary to law, facts on record, and the findings recorded therein cannot be sustained.

25. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the High Court.
State Of Rajasthan vs Ganeshi Lal

2. Background facts are almost undisputed and are as follows:

3. The claim was resisted by the present appellant on the ground that the Law department is not an industry.

*** *** *** "Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches.

My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it."

16. As noted above, the accepted concept of an industry cannot be applied to the Law department of the Government.

17. That being so, the view expressed by the Labour Court and the High Court is indefensible. However, it appears that the respondent has been reinstated to the post he was holding at the time of termination. In view of this fact, even though we have held that the orders passed are clearly unsustainable. We leave it to the appellant to consider whether the respondent can be continued, in view of the fact that he worked for some years.

18. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent without any order as to costs.
Krishna Devi vs Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr

Similarly, the appointment of appellant in the accompanying appeal as the Retail Outlet Dealer on the basis of her placement at No. 2 in merit list is equally strange. The site where she has statedly installed the outlet is 40 kilometers away from the area, which was advertised for appointment of dealership.

Prime-facie, the merit list appears to have been prepared for the reasons other than the merit.

Operation of the order passed by learned Single Judge shall remain stayed. Resultantly, neither respondent No. 1 nor the appellant in the accompanying appeal shall be allowed to operate the retail outlet. Fresh advertisement, if any, by the Corporation, shall be subject to final outcome of these appeals.
Gopal Nagar Cooperative House Building ... vs Mohd. Aslam @ Abu Bakar And Etc

(5) Even when those applications were pending, the respondents filed O.S. No.2980 of 2007 challenging the sale deed dated 20 th May, 1980 and prayed for setting aside the same. In the said suit - O.S. No.2980 of 2007, the first respondent filed I.A. No.1208 of 2013 seeking extension of time to comply with the conditional order and the said application was dismissed by 25 th October, 2013. Subsequently, as no evidence was adduced in O.S. No.2980 of 2007 the same came to be dismissed. Challenging the orders passed in I.A.NO(s).232/2007 and 3 233/2007, the first respondent filed C.R.P. No.462 of 2009 and C.R.P. No.803 of 2009 before the High Court and the same was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court on the ground that the trial court had not given detailed reasons. (6) On remand, the Third Additional Judge by a well reasoned order dated 29th October, 2015 and 2nd November, 2015 once again set aside the preliminary and final decree dated 14 th November, 2005 and 17th April, 2007 respectively. Subsequently, the appellant-Society has also filed written statement in the partition suit i.e. O.S.No.21/2004.

(4) Having learnt of the ex-parte decrees, on 22nd May, 2007 the appellant-Society filed I.A.NO(s).232/2007 and 233/2007 to set aside the preliminary and final decrees. By order dated 29th August, 2008, the Third Addl. Judge allowed both the applications-I.A.NO(s).232/2007 and 233/2007, by observing that the ex-parte decree was obtained by keeping the appellant in the dark.

(11) In the result, the impugned order of the High Court in C.R.P. NO.1214 of 2016 and C.R.P. NO.1231 of 2016 are set aside and appeals arising out of SLP(C)No(s).34745 and 34746 of 2016 are allowed. Appeal arising out of SLP(C)No.34747 of 2016 which pertains to C.R.P.No.820 of 2014 is dismissed with the following directions:
M/S Thakker Shipping P.Ltd vs Commr.Of Customs(General)

3. The facts leading to the present appeal are these. A container was intercepted by M & P Wing of Commissioner of Customs (Preventive), Mumbai on 11.01.2001. It was found to contain assorted electrical and electronic goods of foreign origin. The said goods were imported by M/s Qureshi International and the cargo was cleared from Nhava Sheva. The clearance of the goods was handled by M/s Thakker Shipping P. Ltd., the appellant, referred to as the Custom House Agent (‘CHA’ for short). On physical verification, the value of seized cargo was estimated at Rs. 77,10,000/- as local market value as against the declared value of Rs. 10,03,690/-. The importer could not be interrogated. On search of premises of CHA, the books relating to import export clearance were not found for verification. In the statement of Vijay Thakker, proprietor of the CHA, recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short, ‘the Act’), he accepted that he attended the import clearance work and introduced the importer to the overseas suppliers and bankers for financial assistance; the bill of entry for the clearance of subject goods had been filed without proper description and correct value and he failed to inform the Customs Officers about the subject goods, despite having attended the examination of 5% goods prior to the clearance. Accordingly, the inquiry officer recorded his findings.

4. Initially, the appellant’s CHA licence was placed under suspension pending inquiry under Regulation 23 of Custom House Agent Licencing Regulations, 2004 but the suspension order was set aside by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (for short, ‘Tribunal’) and CHA licence was restored. The inquiry under Regulation 23, however, proceeded against the CHA on diverse charges. The Commissioner of Customs (General) Mumbai by his order in original dated 21.07.2004 dropped the proceedings under Regulation 23 by rejecting the findings of the inquiry officer.

6. The Commissioner, accordingly, made an application under Section 129D(4) of the Act before the Tribunal. As the said application could not be made within the prescribed period and was delayed by 10 days, an application for condonation of delay was filed with a prayer for condonation. The Tribunal on 28.11.2005, however, rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the appeal by the following brief order:

20. In light of the above discussion, we hold that it is competent for the Tribunal to invoke Section 129A(5) where an application under Section 129D(4) has not been made within the prescribed time and condone the delay in making such application if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period.

21. In view of the above, the appeal must fail and it fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Purushotham vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

2. These four appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.31690 of 2011, SLP (C) No.31695 of 2011, SLP (C) No.33184 of 2011 and SLP (C) No.33319 of 2011, impugn the judgment of a Division Bench of Karnataka High Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 5428 of 2006 (BDA-PIL), and Writ Petition No. 5173 of 2006 (GM-RES/PIL), whereby the High Court has declared the allotment of civic amenity site no. 2 to Bharat Petroleum Corporation (respondent No. 3) for establishment of a petrol pump, null and void. The writ petitions have been allowed. The allotment dated 4th August, 2005 made in favour of respondent No. 3 has been set aside.

3. The facts as narrated in C.A. No. 10747 of 2013 arising out of SLP (C) No. 31690 of 2011 are as under:-

• Thereafter, on 7th October, 2005, the lease deed was duly executed between BDA and respondent No.3 for a period of 30 years. Dealership licence was granted in favour of wife of the appellant by respondent No.3 on 4th February, 2006.

19. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals and the same are hereby dismissed.

November 29, 2013.
Union Of India & Ors vs Surinder Singh Rathore

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

and Rs.7,425/-on account of invalid gratuity and death cum retirement gratuity respectively. But prayer of the respondent for grant of disability pension was rejected on the ground that the disease from which the respondent suffered was neither attributable to nor aggravated by the military service. This information was based on the information of the Release Medical Board as per the provisions of Rule 173 of the Pension Regulations for the Army (in short 'Pension Regulations') read with Rule 2 of Appendix II and Regulation 423 of Medical Service of Armed Force Regulation 1983.

An appeal was preferred by the respondent which was forwarded to the Ministry of Defence. The appeal was rejected upholding the view of CCDA (Pension) as communicated to the respondent. Thereafter a writ petition was filed before the High Court which was numbered as Writ Petition No. 2597 of 1996. By order dated 16th February, 2005, the said Writ Petition was decided directing the present appellants to grant the respondent disability pension on the ground that the controversy was squarely covered by an earlier decision rendered by the High Court in SB Civil Writ No. 1083 of 2001. Order of learned Single Judge was challenged by filing a Civil Special appeal. By order dated 2.1.2006, the appeal was rejected. The present appeal by special leave has been filed by the appellants.

8. The above position was again highlighted in Union of India & Ors.v. Keshar Singh ( 2007(5) SCR 408).

10. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs.
Union Of India (Uoi) vs Millenium Mumbai Broadcast Pvt. Ltd.

5. The Appellant, by an order dated 20.5.2003, revoked the licence stating:

(iii) 16.1 A Bank Guarantee, equivalent to the first year Licence Fee valid for 10 years from any Scheduled Bank in the prescribed form shall be submitted along with this Agreement by the Licensee. The Licensee shall keep the bank guarantee renewed till the expiry of the licence period.

Page 2365

{See Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das Administrator of the Specified Undertaking of the Unit Trust of India and Anr. v. Garware Polyester Ltd. 2005 (10) SCC 682.} We, therefore, with respect, entirely agree with the Tribunal.

23. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal.

24. This appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
Vasant Ganpat Padave(D) By Lrs. vs Anant Mahadev Sawant (Dead) Thru Lrs. .

Respondent 1 filed reply and opposed the said application. Respondent 2 allowed the application of the appellants by order dated 9-9-2011. Respondent 2 held that predecessors of the appellants were tenants prior to 1956-1957. Proceedings under Section 32-G for declaring the appellants as purchasers were initiated during the lifetime of the landlady and the same were suspended on 8-1-1964 during the lifetime of the landlady being a widow. Respondent 2 fixed the purchase price and directed the appellants to 2 deposit the same to enable issue of sale certificate in favour of the appellants. Aggrieved against the order dated 9-9- 2011, Respondent 1 filed an appeal under Section 74 of the 1948 Act before Respondent 3, Sub-Divisional Officer, Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. Respondent 3 allowed the appeal vide its order dated 8-1-2013. Respondent 3 held that the appellant ought to have issued notice under Section 32-F within the time as prescribed and no notice having been issued within the time as prescribed, the appellants have lost right of purchase.

5. The appellants, aggrieved by the order of the Sub- Divisional Officer, filed a revision application before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. There were other revisions filed by several other tenants who were aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by a common order dated 20-4-2013 dismissed the revisions and confirmed the order of the Sub- Divisional Officer. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that applicants were under legal obligation to give intimation expressing their desire to purchase within time stipulated under Section 32-F, which having not been given, no right of purchase is available to applicants. Aggrieved against the judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, writ petitions were filed by the appellants and several other similarly situated tenants. All the writ petitions were dismissed by common judgment dated 1-8-2014 [Arjun Hari Kamble v. Anant Mahadev Sawant, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4931] of the High Court, against which judgment, these appeals have been filed.”

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

50. The questions referred to us are now answered as follows:

We, therefore, allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 1st August, 2014. As a result, the tenant’s intimation of purchase of 2008 will now be taken on record by the authorities under the Act, who may now proceed under the Act to determine purchase price and its payment consequent upon which the postponed right of the tenant in this case to own the land will then come into being upon the statutory conditions being met. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
M.G.Ravala Manikyam & Ors vs M.Mada Naik

2. The legal heirs of the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance are the appellants in this appeal by special leave. The respondent had entered into an agreement of sale dated 25.12.1986 in favour of one M.R. Gopal of whom the appellants are the legal heirs. As the respondent refused to execute the sale deed in pursuance of the said agreement, a suit for specific performance was filed on 19.4.1988. The suit was decreed by the trial Court on 31.7.2001 directing the defendant in the suit to execute the sale deed. The appeal filed by the defendant was allowed in part by the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 14.8.2009. The decree for specific performance was set aside. The High Court directed the defendant to refund the earnest money of Rs.60,000/- and also pay damages of Rs.5,00,000/-. The said order is challenged by the legal heirs of the plaintiffs.

4. Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
Lillu @ Rajesh & Anr vs State Of Haryana

1. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 243-DB of 2002, by way of which the High Court has affirmed the judgment and order dated 4.3.2002 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jind in Sessions Case No. 37 of 2001, by way of which the appellant no. 1 has been convicted under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `IPC’) and awarded the sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of making payment, to further undergo imprisonment for two years. Further he has been convicted under Section 506 IPC and awarded the sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment. Both the sentences have been directed to run concurrently. The other co-accused, namely, Manoj, Satish @ Sitta and Kuldeep have been convicted separately under sections 376, 506, 366 and 363 IPC. Kuldeep Singh alone has been found guilty under Section 376 (2) (g) IPC, and has been awarded sentence of life imprisonment. Out of these four convicts, Kuldeep Singh and Manoj did not prefer any appeal against the High Court’s judgment, while appellant nos.1 and 2 preferred the present appeal. Appellant no.2 had died during the pendency of this appeal in jail, therefore, we are concerned only with the case of appellant no.1 i. e. Lillu @ Rajesh.

13. Thus, in view of the above, undoubtedly, the two finger test and its interpretation violates the right of rape survivors to privacy, physical and mental integrity and dignity. Thus, this test, even if the report is affirmative, cannot ipso facto, be given rise to presumption of consent.

14. In view of the above, the facts and circumstances of the case do not present special features warranting any interference by this Court. The appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.

April 09, 2013.
Rajni Rani & Anr vs Khairati Lal & Ors

After the counter-claim was filed, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed an application for dismissal of the counter-claim on the foundation that the same did not merit consideration as it was barred by Order 2, Rule 2 of C.P.C. It was set forth in the application that a suit for declaration was earlier filed by the present appellants along with others against the defendants and a decree was passed in their favour on 21.9.2002 whereby it was held that the present appellants and some of the respondents were entitled to 1/4th share each. The judgment and decree passed in the said suit was assailed in appeal and the appellate court modified the judgment and decree dated 21.9.2002 vide judgment dated 15.2.2003 holding that each one of them was entitled to 1/9th share and the said modification was done on the ground that the property was ancestral in nature and the sisters had their shares. After disposal of the appeal, one of the sisters filed a declaratory suit to the effect that she is the owner in possession of land in respect of 1/9th share in the suit land and in the said suit a counter- claim was filed by defendant Nos. 12 to 14 stating that they had become owners in possession of the suit property on the basis of a properly registered Will dated 18.5.1995 executed by Jeth Ram. In the application it was set forth that the counter-claim had been filed in collusion with the plaintiff as the plea of claiming any status under the Will dated 18.5.1995 was never raised in the earlier suit. It was urged that the plea having not been raised in the earlier suit, it could not have been raised by way of a counter-claim in the second suit being barred by the principles of Order 2, Rule 2 of C.P.C.

18. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the High Court is set aside. However, as we are annulling the order on the ground that revision was not maintainable, liberty is granted to the respondents to prefer an appeal before the appropriate forum as required under law. We may hasten to add that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. There shall be no order as to costs.

October 14, 2014
Kammana Sambamurthy (D) By Lrs vs Kalipatnapu Atchutamma & Ors

The original contesting parties are dead. They are now represented by their legal representatives. This is not unusual when litigation goes on for more than 25 years.

3. On February 19, 1984, the vendor entered into an agreement of sale (for short, `the agreement') with the vendee in respect of a tiled house consisting of six rooms, verandah, three mulgis upstair portion consisting of one room, hall and verandah inclusive of entire area pertaining to the house along with the entire vacant site situate in door no. 9.118 bearing assessment 116 at village Payakaraopet, District Visakhapatnam (for short, `the property') for a consideration of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The vendee 2 paid Rs. 10,000/- in advance and the remaining consideration of Rs. 90,000/- was agreed to be paid at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed. The vendor in the agreement represented that he was absolute owner of the property. The agreement reads as follows :

owner should an outsider or stranger to the family;

3. Such transferee much sue for partition and separate possession of the undivided share transferred to him by the co-owner concerned;

28. The other point argued by Mr. A.T.M. Sampath is that the decree granted by the High Court would result in hardship since the vendor and vendor's wife are dead and their 10 daughters are residing in the property. We are afraid these facts hardly constitute hardship justifying denial of decree for specific performance to the extent of vendor's half share in the property.

30. In view of the above, we agree that the decision of the High Court is right and, consequently, both the appeals must be dismissed and are dismissed with no order as to costs. 28

(R.M. Lodha) NEW DELHI, OCTOBER 8, 2010 29