L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Rajkishore Purohit vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

2. The conviction of respondent no.2, under Section 302/34 IPC, by the Sessions Judge, Sagar, in Sessions Trial No. 369 of 1997, has been reversed by the High Court in appeal, acquitting him. The appellant, brother of the deceased, assails the acquittal.

3. Lokman Khatik, accused no.3, was peeved with the meeting being held for his removal from the post of Mayor. 

4. Accused no.2 was convicted under Section 302, IPC to Life imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for one year under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act. He is stated to have served out his sentence. Respondent no.2 and the other accused were convicted to Life imprisonment under Section 302/34 IPC.

5. The High Court, in the appeal preferred by respondent no.2, acquitted him, on the reasoning that no overt act of assault was attributed to him, neither was he armed, much less gave any exhortation. His mere presence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction, attributing common intention. It was further reasoned 2 that respondent no. 2 may have had no knowledge that accused no.2 was carrying a revolver.

14. Though this Court, in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under 7 Article 136 of the Constitution, may not interfere with an order of acquittal, reversing a conviction, yet if it finds that the High Court has completely erred in appreciation of evidence, has applied the wrong principles to negate common intention, and has based its conclusions on speculative reasoning, beyond the defence of the accused himself, justice will demand that the acquittal is reversed. We, therefore, set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and restore the order of conviction of respondent no.2 under Section 302/34 IPC passed by the Sessions Judge. Respondent no.2 has remained in custody only for 3 years, 10 months and 7 days. He is directed to surrender forthwith for serving out the remaining period of his sentence.

15. The appeal is allowed.

AUGUST 01, 2017.
Samundra Devi & Ors vs Narendra Kaur & Ors

3. One Shiv Shakti Singh while proceeding in a car on 9.4.1998 met with an accident having been hit by a truck bearing registration No.MP- 09-KA-6899. The said truck was owned by the first respondent herein and was being driven at the relevant time by the second respondent. The said truck was insured with the respondnt No.3. As a result of the injuries sustained in the said accident, Shiv Shakti Singh died. The car was also damaged.

9. The appeal was, thus, allowed, directing :

20. In view of our findings aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

August 1, 2008
Roger Shashoua vs Mukesh Sharma

Though innumerable facts have been graphically stated in the petitions seeking leave to appeal as well as in the written note of submissions, yet regard being had to the centrality of the controversy, we shall refer to the facts which are absolutely necessary for adjudication of the lis in question. It may be stated that the High Court has narrated the facts in detail on various aspects, for it was deciding a writ petition and a petition preferred under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) together and it was required to advert to the “seat of arbitration and venue of arbitration” to determine the maintainability of the petition in Digitally signed by GULSHAN KUMAR ARORA Date: 2017.07.04 the Courts of India. That apart, the High Court was obliged to dwell 15:36:22 IST Reason:

60. The other ground of attack is that the appellants had themselves approached the courts in India and, therefore, by their own conduct applicability of Part I has been accepted by the appellants and the right to raise the issue of jurisdiction has been waived. 43

64. In view of the aforesaid, there cannot be any trace of doubt that any filing of an application by the appellant in the courts in India can clothe such courts with jurisdiction unless the law vests the same in them.

“17.6 GOVERNING LAW This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of India.”

71. We respectfully concur with the said view, for there is no reason to differ. Apart from that, we have already held that the agreement in question having been interpreted in a particular manner by the English courts and the said interpretation having gained acceptation by this Court, the inescapable conclusion is that the courts in India 50 have no jurisdiction.

72. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we allow the appeals and set aside the judgment of the High Court of Delhi that has held that courts in India have jurisdiction, and has also determined that Guatam Budh Nagar has no jurisdiction and the petition under Section 34 has to be filed before the Delhi High Court. Once the courts in India have no jurisdiction, the aforesaid conclusions are to be nullified and we so do. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

.............................J. [Dipak Misra] ...........................J. [R. Banumathi] New Delhi July 04, 2017 51 ITEM NO.1501 COURT NO.2 SECTION XIV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal No(s). 2841-2843/2017 ROGER SHASHOUA & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS MUKESH SHARMA & ORS. Respondent(s) Date : 04-07-2017 These appeals were called on for judgment today.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra pronounced the judgment of the Bench consisting of His Lordship and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
Dr. Professor Rajendra Chaudhary vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

1. The controversy in the above Appeals is regarding reservations to be applied for appointment by direct recruitment to the posts of Professor in Medical Colleges in the State of Uttar Pradesh and enhancement of the maximum age limit from 45 years to 65 years. There was no direct recruitment to the posts of Professors in 12 Government Medical Colleges (Allopathy) for 12 years prior to 2015. An advertisement was issued on 21.12.2015 by the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission seeking [1] applications for appointment by direct recruitment to 47 substantive vacant posts of Professors in various Allopathic Medical Colleges. The said advertisement was subject matter of challenge in a Writ Petition filed in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. Apart from other grounds, the main point raised by the Writ Petitioners was that no posts were reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Class candidates. The enhancement of the upper age limit, from 45 years to 65 years, was also questioned in the Writ Petition on the ground that it was in violation of Uttar Pradesh State Medical Colleges’ Teachers Services (Second Amendment) Rules, 2005 (for short, ‘Service Rules’). Another advertisement was issued on 24.10.2017 revising the eligibility criteria pertaining to educational qualifications.

2. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions by rejecting the submissions relating to the reservations and enhancement of the upper age limit. Hence, these Appeals.

14. For the aforementioned reasons, the Appeals are dismissed.

….......................J. [HEMANT GUPTA] New Delhi, August 28, 2019 [15]
Ram Prakash Gupta vs Rajiv Kumar Gupta & Ors

3) The brief facts are as under:

4) Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court, the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court dismissed the appeal recording that since there cannot be a partial rejection of suit, hence the entire suit has to be dismissed. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present appeal has been filed by the appellant before this Court.

21) In the light of our above discussion, we set aside the order of the trial Court dated 20.2.2006 passed by the Civil Judge, Delhi in Suit No. 318/2003 and the judgment dated 27.4.2006 passed by the High Court of Delhi in R.F.A. No. 188 of 2006. In the result, the civil appeal is allowed and the Civil Judge is directed to restore the suit to its original file and dispose of the same on merits preferably within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this judgment. It is made clear that except on the question of limitation, we have not gone into the merits of the claim made by both parties. No costs.
Camlin Ltd vs Commnr. Of Central Excise, Mumbai

3. The issues in these appeals are regarding the classification of the "writing inks" being manufactured and captively consumed by the assessee and consequent demand of duty thereon. The inks with their constituents are:-

9. The aforesaid contentions of the assessee which were taken in appeal were accepted by the Commissioner (Appeals) vide his Order dated 28th of 6 March, 1999. After referring to the numerous dictionaries to ascertain the meaning of various terms, it was held that: -

11. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent- Department filed an Appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal partly set aside the aforesaid Order by relying on HSN and held that two inks out of nine manufactured by the assessee being "marker inks and camiligraph (rapidograph) ink" will be assessed to duty under CSH 3215.90.

22. The Tribunal took an extreme example of paint being used as graffiti. The essential function of paint is to provide a protective covering for building structures and use in graffiti is incidental. While markers are described as pens by the Notification of the Department itself and marker inks are used in the said pens - writing instruments, therefore, should be classified as writing inks.

24. We agree with the findings recorded by the Tribunal insofar as the inks other than marker inks are concerned and confirm the same. Insofar as, marker inks are concerned, we are of the opinion that the marker inks would fall under CSH 3215.10 as the same are used in marker pens which are exempt from the payment of excise duty.

26. In our considered view, the Tribunal erred in relying upon the HSN for the purpose of marker inks in classifying them under Chapter Sub-Heading 3215.90 of the said Tariff. The Tribunal failed to appreciate that the entries under the HSN and the entries under the said Tariff are completely different. As mentioned above, it is settled law that when the entries in the HSN and the said Tariff are not aligned, reliance cannot be placed upon HSN for the purpose of classification of goods under the said Tariff. One of the factors on which the Tribunal based its conclusion is the entries in the HSN. The said conclusion in the Order of the Tribunal is, therefore, vitiated and, accordingly, set aside. We agree with the findings recorded by the Commissioner (Appeals).

27. For the reasons stated above, we dismiss the appeals filed by the Revenue and accept the appeals 16 filed by the assessee. The Order of the Tribunal is confirmed insofar as inks other than marker inks are concerned. Whereas the Order of the Tribunal insofar as it has come to the conclusion that marker inks are exigible to pay duty would fall under Chapter Sub-Heading 3215.90, is set aside. The marker inks would be classifiable under CSH 3215.10. Parties to bear their own costs in all the appeals.
State Of U.P vs Mutahir Mian

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court directing acquittal of the respondent who faced trial for alleged commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short `the Act'). The learned Sessions Judge, Rampur in S.T. No.30 of 1980 found him guilty and convicted him for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life.

The prosecution version, as unfolded during trial is as follows. On 04.11.1979 at about 9.30 A.M. when the informant Zahidullah along with his brother Sajidullah (hereinafter reeferred to as `deceased') and Shakirullah were returning via triangular crossing at Majar Khurmewali, they were accosted at that crossing by accused Mutahir Mian, who challenged them by saying "Bahadur Aa rahe hain". On this the deceased questioned him. Immediately thereon, he was stabbed thrice by the accused. His brother Zahidullah, in order to save his brother from any further assault, attacked the accused with a knife, resulting in several injuries on the person of accused. Finding the condition of the injured grave, leaving him in the custody of his brother-in-law Yakub Khan and younger brother Shakirullah with the instruction to carry him to the hospital, Zahidullah immediately proceeded to the police station for reporting the matter. The report was got scribed from Rajendra Prakash Saxena (PW-9) and the same was lodged by him at the police station Kotwali, Rampur, at about 10.15 A.M. The FIR was marked as Ext.Ka.1. The chick report is Ext. Ka-3 and copy of the G.D entry was marked as Ext.Ka.4. The investigation of the case was taken over by S.I. Iqtadar Hussain Rizvi (PW-8). -3-

We find nothing infirm in the conclusions of the High Court to warrant interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
Collector Of Ganjam & Anr vs Ramesh Chander Pandhi

3. Facts leading to initiation of the aforesaid case is that on 21.12.2004 while the Marketing Inspector, Jaganathprasad Block, while following the Sub-Collector, Bhanjanagar during tour to Jaganathprasad Block, found one bus bearing registration No.OIG-185 parked at the Bus Stand and kerosene oil was being poured in the oil tank of the bus. Looking at them, both the driver and the conductor of the vehicle fled away. He drained out the kerosene oil from the oil tank of the bus which contained 42 liters of kerosene, and prepared the sample list by taking 2 liters out of the seized kerosene oil for its chemical examination. The bus as well as kerosene were seized and a proceeding bearing EME No.37 of 2004 was initiated against the respondent and another under Section 6-A of the Act. The proceeding was initiated for contravention of Clause 8 of Orissa Kerosene Control Order, 1962 read with Clause 3 of Kerosene Control (Restriction on use and Fixation of Ceiling Price), 1993. In the said proceeding, the respondent who is the owner of the bus filed an application for release of the vehicle.

While deciding the aforesaid application, the Collector concluded the proceeding under Section 6-A of the Act and directed confiscation of the vehicle. However, the Collector in view of the provisions contained in Section 6-A of the Act directed the respondent to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/-.

(emphasis added)

11. The appeal is allowed.
State Of Uttaranchal vs Alok Sharma & Ors

The State of Uttar Pradesh, however, issued a letter to the Managing Director of Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd on 30.12.1995. While informing that approval has been granted by the Governor for winding up of the aforementioned companies, it was stated:

9. The case of Vijay Kumar Joshi, respondent No. 1 in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 8239 of 2005 was decided first wherein having regard to the fact that he was appointed prior to the cut-off date, his writ petition was allowed by an order dated 03.11.2004. Following the said judgment, other writ petitions were also allowed by an order dated 6.06.2005, noticing:

25. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained, which are set aside accordingly. However, if any amount has been paid to the respondents, the same shall not be recovered from them.

26. So far as Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 6451 of 2005 and Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 8239 of 2005 are concerned, although limited notice having been issued confining the case to back wages, but keeping in view the order passed in the other cases, we are of the opinion that the said order shall be recalled and leave on all points should be granted. Respondents being placed similarly should not, in our opinion, be treated differently. This order is being passed in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. However, we make clear that if any amount has been paid to the said respondents, the same should not be recovered. The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.

April 15, 2009
Anil Kumar Goel vs Kishan Chand Kaura

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the application filed in terms of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Cr.P.C.). Appellant had filed a petition for quashing the complaint filed by the respondent in terms of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short the Act) In the complaint it was averred that a cheque was issued by the appellant on 31.3.1998 which was dishonoured by the bank when presented on 11.4.1998. Notice dated 27.4.1998 was duly served on the appellant. Since the accused appellant assured that the cheque will be honoured if it is presented again, the cheque was presented but was again dishonoured on 30.9.1998 for which notice dated 13.10.1998 was again served on the appellant. But no payment was made. Appellant filed an application in terms of Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Cr.P.C.) before the trial court for discharge. It was averred that the application was clearly barred by time and therefore the said application ought to be dismissed at the outset. The motion was opposed by the respondent. The learned Judicial Magistrate dismissed the application stating that in view of the judgment in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Others [2004 (7) SCC 338], the trial court cannot review or reconsider the order issuing process; once process has been issued pursuant to an order passed in a complaint case. Appellant filed a petition in terms of Section 482 Cr.P.C. which as noticed above was dismissed. It is to be noted that the only stand of the appellant before the High Court was that even if the position as stated by the respondent is accepted to be correct, in view of Section 142 B of the Act, a complaint was not to be entertained. High Court dismissed the application on the ground that proviso of Section 142 (b) of the Act was inserted vide Act 55 of 2002 which empowered the court to extend the period of limitation on sufficient cause being shown. Therefore, the petition was to be dismissed.

11. The appeal is allowed.
Kumar Gonsusab & Ors vs Sri Mohammed Miyan & Ors

3. Mohd. Ismail Urf Badshah-Plaintiff No.1 (since deceased) and Mohammed Miyan Urf Baban- Plaintiff No.2 instituted a suit for permanent injunction against Smt. Hamedabegum 2 (Defendant No. 1/Appellant No.3) wife of Mohd Yusuf Maniyar and against Kumar Gonsusab (Defendant No. 2/Appellant No.1) and Kumar Shafi Mohd (Defendant No. 3/Appellant No.2) restraining the appellants from executing a sale deed relating to the suit property on the ground of right of pre-emption, to purchase 6 acres 31 guntas being R.S.No.164/3B situated at Mishrikoti village of Kalghatagi taluk, Dharwad in the State of Karnataka (hereinafter referred to as the `suit property') and for other incidental reliefs. Be it mentioned at this stage, that the original Plaintiff No.1, namely, Mohd. Ismail Urf Badshah died during the pendency of the proceeding and his heirs and legal representatives were brought on record. In this judgment, the plaintiffs are described as respondents and the defendants are described as appellants.

emptee, to defeat the law of pre-emption by any legitimate means, which is not fraud on the part of either the vendor or the vendee and a person is entitled to steer clear of the law of pre-emption by all lawful means.

13.Such being the position, we are, therefore, of the view that the right of pre-emption was not available to the respondents in view of the discussions made herein above.

14.For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court in the second appeal is set aside and consequent thereupon the suit of the respondents is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

.........................J. [Tarun Chatterjee] New Delhi; .........................J. August 19, 2008. [P.Sathasivam] 18
European Investment Ltd vs Triumph I.National Finance India ...

By an order dated 5th March, 2004 passed in Contempt Petition No.88 of 2002, the learned Single Judge held respondent Nos.1-4 herein guilty of contempt of court on the premise that they willfully violated the undertaking given to the Court on 29th January, 2002 in Summary Suit No.3846 of 2001 and willfully disobeyed the order passed thereon and sentenced them to pay fine of Rupees two thousand and directed them to pay entire dues within a period of twelve weeks, failing which they were required to undergo civil imprisonment for a period of two months. Against the said order, when the matter was taken in appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court, while entertaining the appeal, passed an interim order dated 10 th May, 2004, which was modified by the impugned order dated 20th July, 2005 and a direction was issued that interim order dated 10th May, 2004 shall remain operative subject to the certain conditions. Against the said order, the present appeal has been filed.

The civil appeal is, accordingly, allowed and impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. We may, however, observe that this order shall not in any manner affect the case of the respondents in appeal.
Vijaykumar Baldev Mishra @ Sharma vs State Of Maharashtra

3. The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act") stated initially in Section 1(4) thereof that the said Act will remain in operation for a period of two years from 24.5.1987, but thereafter by amendments from time to time the period of two years was extended to four years, then six years and lastly for eight years.

11. Since this point has not been raised in the appeal I am not giving any final opinion in the matter, but the point, to my mind, is of such a vital and wide constitutional importance that I thought it fit to express my opinion on the same, so that this opinion can be considered in other cases where prosecutions under TADA are going on or where convictions have been made in relation to the offences under Section 3 alleged to have been committed before 24.5.1995.

12. As regards those who have already undergone the entire sentence for which they were convicted under TADA obviously nothing can be done, but regarding those who have undergone only part of the sentence or regarding those who are facing prosecution or investigation under TADA such prosecution or investigation are liable to be quashed in view of the opinion expressed above.

13. It is of course made clear that the above opinion has nothing to do with Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which deals with ex post facto laws.

14. With the above observation the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The appellant is directed to be released forthwith unless required in some other case.