L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Madhuri Ghosh & Anr vs Debobroto Dutta & Anr

3. The brief facts necessary to decide this appeal are as follows.

4. By a registered Will dated 21st January, 2000, one Ajit Kumar Ghosh bequeathed House No.77, Ram Bagh, Allahabad to his wife and elder daughter jointly. He went on to state in the aforesaid Will that after the death of his wife and his elder daughter, various other lineal descendants would become owners of specified parts of the immovable property, namely, House No.77. Since the bone of contention revolves around the correct construction of this Will, paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Will are set out herein:

7. The answer given to the aforesaid two questions was that in fact only a life interest was created by the Will dated 21st January, 2000 in favour of the plaintiffs and that therefore, the second appeal would have to be allowed and the trial Court decree reinstated.

11. It will be noticed on a reading of paragraph 2 of the said Will that the testator has chosen his language very carefully. He makes it clear that after his death house No.77 shall “vest” on my wife Smt. Madhuri Ghosh and my elder daughter Sunanda Ghosh jointly. With this declaration he goes on to further state that after the death of his wife, the said daughter shall become the “exclusive” owner of the said house No.77 and that if his daughter was to predecease his wife, then his wife shall become the “exclusive” owner. A reading of this paragraph therefore, leaves no manner of doubt that what is granted jointly in favour of the widow and the elder daughter is an absolute right to the property namely, house No.77. There are no words of limitation used in this paragraph and we, therefore, find it very difficult to agree with the High Court in its conclusion that what is bequeathed by paragraph 2 is only a limited interest in favour of the widow and the elder daughter.

14. Needless to add, it is settled law that the fact that clause 4 has been declared by us to be of no effect would not impact the bequest made under clause 2, and the rest of the Will, therefore, would have to be given effect to. In view of the aforesaid, we do not deem it necessary to go into the other questions raised by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel, namely, the absence of pleading and the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The appeal is, accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside.

Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

November 9, 2016.
Niyaz Ahmed vs Aslam Hossain And Anr

It appears that the Trial Court, by its order dated 13th September, 2005, stayed further proceeding of Title Suit No.48 of 2003 till the disposal of Title Suit No.163 of 2001. Thereafter, on 19th November, 2005, suo motu, the aforesaid order of stay was vacated. When the appellant made a prayer for time to move the High Court challenging the said order, the same was refused and on 1st December, 2005, ex- parte decree was passed, which has been confirmed by the lower appellate court as well as by the High Court. Hence, this appeal by special leave. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that both the suits ought to have been tried together and Trial Court was not justified in passing the order of stay on 13th September, 2005, suo-motu vacating the same on 19th November, 2005, and other consequential orders. ....2/-

Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The aforesaid orders passed by the Trial Court on 13th September, 2005 and 19th November, 2005 and ex-parte decree passed in Title Suit No.48 of 2003 and orders confirming the same passed by the lower appellate court as well as by the High Court are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Trial Court to dispose of both the suits together. We have been told that Title Suit No.163 of 2001 is pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) whereas Title Suit No.48 of 2003 is pending before Civil Judge (Junior Division). The concerned District Judge is directed to club both the suits so that both of them may be tried together. Let hearing of the suits be expedited.
Arumaraj Devadhas vs K. Sundaram Nadar (D) By Lrs. & Ors

2. The first defendant (Karunakaran Nadar) sold the suit property (an extent of 14 cents in Survey No.1817 from out of several properties allotted to him at a family partition) to the second defendant (Solomon Nadar) under a registered Sale Deed dated 1.8.1946. The second defendant executed a Deed of Possessory Mortgage dated 16.1.1947 in favour of one Syeed Kannu. Plaintiff alleged that the said mortgage was not redeemed and Syeed Kannu became the absolute owner thereof, and on his death the suit land was inherited by his son Mohammed Ali. The said Mohammed Ali sold the suit property to the plaintiff (Sundaram Nadar) under registered Sale Deed dated 23.12.1978. Plaintiff, thus, claims to be the owner in possession of the suit property. As the defendants were attempting to interfere with his possession and raise a cloud over his title, he filed the said suit.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff filed a second appeal. The High Court allowed the second appeal. It found that the three reasons given by the first appellate court to hold that the Sale Deed dated 1.8.1946 was sham and nominal were erroneous and the Sale Deed dated 1.8.1946 was valid and binding; and if so, the title of the plaintiff was made out and the third defendant could not claim any title on the basis 6 of documents executed by first defendant subsequent to the sale dated 1.8.1946. The Second Appeal was, therefore, allowed and the judgment of the trial court was restored. The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal.

8. The High Court has focussed on the crucial issue and concluded that the findings of the first appellate court that the Deed dated 1.8.1946 is sham and nominal, was an unwarranted inference without any basis. Consequently, it rightly interfered with the said finding. 11 We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. Appeal is dismissed.
M/S. Wheels India Ltd vs Shanker Lal & Anr

Leave granted. Heard both sides. The appellant in these appeals are M/s. Wheels India Ltd. and the respondents, namely, Shanker Lal and Om Prakash are employees of the appellant. Notice was ordered in these matters on 16.8.2005. During the pendency of the proceedings in this Court, both the respondents-workmen in these appeals have amicably settled the disputes with the Management. The settlement and the receipts issued by the respective workmen were placed before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, District Panchayat Premises, Court Road, Moradabad. The various issues and the terms arrived at the settlement are as under:

6 That after the said payment, the relationship of employer and employee between the parties shall cease and that no other dues of the management, towards the workman area payable. 7 That in accordance to this settlement all the disputes between the pareties have been fully and finally settled and that no other dispute remains between the parties.

8 That all the parties are ready to sign on the settlement paper under the U.P.I.D. Act before the conciliation Officer so that it is applicable on both the sides according to law.

Sd/- B.K.SINGH Asstt.Labour Commissioner Moradabad Area, Moradabad Even though show cause notice was sent to the workmen in both the matters, they have not entered appearance either in person or through their counsel. Now as the settlement has already been reached between the parties and that the workmen have received all the amounts by Cheques, we are of the opinion that there is no need to keep the matter pending on the file any further. We, therefore, while recording the settlement arrived at between the parties, dispose of the above appeals in terms of and as per settlement. Both the settlements will form part of the judgment and decree. No costs.
Union Of India & Ors vs Rajesh Kumar Gond

4. The respondent is a Junior Hindi Translator working in the office of Director General of Commercial Intelligence & Statistics under the Commerce Ministry and he sought parity of pay with the Junior Translators who were working in the Central Secretariat Official Language Service (CSOLS). The Home Ministry had issued Office Memorandum dated 9.2.2003, upgrading the pay-scales of Junior Hindi Translators from Rs.5000-1050-8000 to Rs.5500-175-9000, which were made applicable from 11.2.2003. The respondent sought the same pay- scale but it was denied to him. It is, therefore, that he filed an application in the Central Administrative Tribunal on the basis of 'equal pay for equal work'. The application filed by the respondent was opposed by the petitioners by filing a counter, wherein amongst other things, in paragraph 9 they stated that the Fifth Central Pay Commission had recommended that the pay-scales of Junior Hindi Translators for the Central Secretariat (CSOLS) may be applied to all subordinate offices subject to their functional requirement. However, no material whatsoever was placed before the Tribunal to show as to how the functional requirement of the concerned job in the Commerce Ministry was different from that in the Central Secretariat. Both the posts required the work of translation to be done and, therefore, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was no reason to deny parity in pay. The Tribunal relied upon the judgment of a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and Ors., (1982) 1 SCC 618, which is a judgment granting equal pay to the drivers in Delhi Police Force as available to those in the Central Government and Delhi Administration. The petitioners herein challenged the order of the Tribunal by approaching the Calcutta High Court which dismissed the writ petition and therefore, this special leave petition.

7. This special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.

S.L.P.(C) No.37255/2012:

However, having noted that no functional difference was shown in their work, we cannot find any fault with the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court for the reasons stated in the earlier special leave petition. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1119 OF 2013:
Lok Prahari, Thr. Its General Secretary ... vs Union Of India

(b) to secretarial staff consisting of a Private Secretary, a Personal Assistant and a Peon, and office expenses the total expenditure on which shall not exceed twelve thousand rupees per annum;

(iii) the   impugned   provisions   are   irrational24  and   arbitrary because  the  grant  of  pension  to all ex­MPs  without   taking into   consideration   their   respective   tenure   and   economic conditions goes against public interest25; and

23.   Further   if   we   were   to   accept   the   argument   that   those Constitutional functionaries who are entitled to pension by the text of the Constitution form a distinct class exclusively entitled to the payment   of   pension   the   result   would   be   that   the   CAG,   the Chairman   and   Deputy   Chairman   of   the   Parliament   or   State Legislature,   and   Ministers   of   the   Centre   and   State   would   be disentitled to pension.

25. The appellants have relied upon the decision in Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj & Others v. Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly,29 to argue that the activity of MPs is not an “occupation” contemplated by   Article   19(1)(g)   of   the   Constitution   of   India   and,   therefore,   no pension can be paid to ex­MPs or their ASSOCIATES.

27. The expression “allowances” of MPs occurring under Entry 73 of List­I of the Seventh Schedule,30 in our opinion, is wide enough to cover the payment of “pension” and the other benefits covered by the   impugned   provisions   to   MPs   or   ex­MPs.     Even   otherwise   the authority of Parliament under Entry 97 of List­I31 is wide enough to cover the impugned legislation as held by Common Cause.

29. Dr. Ambedkar, while debating the need to provide pensionary benefit to the President of India, threw some light on the question:

32. An   I.A.   was   filed   in   this   appeal,   which   is   required   to   be disposed   of.   It   was   from   Respondent   No.   5,   the   Election Commission of India, which has sought to be deleted from the array of parties.   It is stated that neither is any relief sought from them nor is any directive prayed for from Respondent No.5 in this appeal, as this is a purely constitutional challenge.

I.A.   is   allowed.     Respondent   No.   5   stands   deleted   from   the array of parties.

(1985) Supp SCC 189.

33. In view of the foregoing, the appeal stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.

(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL) New Delhi;

April 16, 2018.
Commnr. Of Central Excise, Raipur vs M/S. Hira Cement

The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The assessee is one M/s. Hira Cement. It carries on business of manufacture of cement in the town of Raipur. It is a small-scale industry (SSI) being a proprietory concern of one Shri Suresh Agrawal. Another industry, known as M/s. Hira Industries Limited, is also a manufacturer of cement having a factory in the town of Jagdalpur which is situated at a distance of about 300 kms. from Raipur. Hira Industries Limited was incorporated and registered under the Companies Act on or about 20th October, 1983 whereas the Respondent herein was set up in the year 1988. Hira Industries Limited is not a SSI unit. The unit of the Respondent was earlier known as Bajrang Bali Cement whereas that of Hira Industries Limited was known as Jai Bajrang Cement Ltd. The capacity of production of the Respondent's cement industry is about 60 tonnes per day whereas that of Hira Industries Limited is 150 tonnes per day.

Brand name of the both the firms are different. These are not further substantiated during the course of investigation and facts brought on the record.

As we intend to remit the matter back to the Tribunal, we should not make any observation at this juncture which would affect the merit of the matter one way or the other. We may also be misunderstood. Suffice it to say that having regard to the definition of the brand name as contained in Explanation IX to the notification dated 28.2.1993, the matter requires fresh consideration by the Tribunal upon taking into consideration the fact of the matter. If, however, the Tribunal comes to the conclusion or is of the opinion that further investigation in facts may be necessary, it may pass such order or orders as it may think fit and proper.

This appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for consideration of the matter afresh in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. No costs.
M/S Pragati Silicons Pvt. Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, Delhi

2. Between 1986 and 1994, the classification lists filed by the appellant claimed the classification of name plates under headings 87.08 and 87.14 and the same were approved by the Department from time to time. On 02-08-1994, a show cause notice was issued by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Ambala proposing to re-classify the name plates under heading 39.26 as articles of plastics. The notice was however subsequently dropped and an order-in- original dated 08-11-1994 was passed stating that the appropriate classification of the name plates was under

4. The Tribunal rejected the appeal of the appellant primarily by recording the following findings:

2.- Throughout the Nomenclature, the expression "parts of general use" means:

Finally, Heading 83.10 is entitled "SIGN PLATES, NAME PLATES, ADDRESS PLATES AND SIMILAR PLATES., OF BASE METAL." and includes various kinds of name plates in further sub-headings.

CONCLUSION

32. In conclusion, since plastic name plates are `parts and accessories' of motor vehicles and since they are not excluded from the Section XVII, the appropriate classification is under headings 87.08 and 87.14.

33. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Hemaji Waghaji Jat vs Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan & Ors

2. Brief facts of the case which are necessary to dispose of this appeal are as under:-

29. The applicant company aggrieved by the said judgment filed an appeal and the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court decision. The Grahams then appealed to the House of 19 Lords, which, allowed their appeal and restored the order of the High Court.

There has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1."

55. The question of the application of Article 41 was referred for the Grand Chamber Hearing of the ECHR. This case sets the field of adverse possession and its interface with the right to peaceful enjoyment in all its complexity.

56. Therefore it will have to be kept in mind the courts around the world are taking an unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights."

33. Consequently, the appeal being devoid of any merit is accordingly dismissed with costs, which is quantified at Rs.25,000/-.

35. We fail to comprehend why the law should place premium on dishonesty by legitimizing possession of a rank trespasser and compelling the owner to loose its possession only because of his inaction in taking back the possession within limitation.

36. In our considered view, there is an urgent need of fresh look regarding the law on adverse possession. We recommend the Union of India to seriously consider and make suitable changes in the law of adverse possession. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice, Department of Legal Affairs, Government of India for taking appropriate steps in accordance with law.
Ningappa Yallappa Hosamani & Ors vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

1. Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction of appellants 3, 4 and 5 (accused No.3-Sri Giriyappa @ Gireppa, A-4 Sri Yallappa S/o Arujunappa Yaraddi, A-5 Sri Vithal S/o Kalakappa) before it. The compensation of Rs.50,000/- awarded to Girijabai (PW-4) was reduced to Rs.20,000/-. The present appeal is by A1, A6 and A7.

12. Above being the position, we find no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.
Raghavendra Sharma vs State Of M.P

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

On receipt of the information about the death of Maya, Mahesh Prasad (P.W. 1) who is the husband of the sister of the deceased along with Sushila (P.W.8) and Narendra Kumar Sharma (P.W.2) went to village Salkhani. Seeing dead body of Maya they perceived her death to be suspicious and hence gave report to the Chourai Police Station. On receipt thereof, inquest report (Ex. P/3) was prepared in presence of the witnesses and vomited material along with the earth were seized. Dr. Panchamlal (P.W. 5) who was called by the appellant on 22.5.1986 declared her dead.

While preparing the inquest report it was found that there were red and blue spots on the face and chest of the deceased and thin blood coming out from the nostrils and as such the death was found to be suspicious and accordingly the dead body of Maya was sent for post-mortem examination. The Post mortem was conducted by a team of doctors consisting of Dr. V.E.Chako (P.W.7) and Dr. K.D. Khan and they submitted the post-mortem report (Ex.P/12) signed by both of them. According to the post-mortem report and the evidence of Dr. Chako (P.W.7), Maya's death was "asphyxiat as a result of suffocation".

The High Court analysed the stand taken by the appellant and came to hold that the conclusions of the trial court were justified. Accordingly the appeal as noted above has been dismissed.

5 In the present appeal the stand taken before the High Court with reference to evidence of PW 3 was reiterated.

4. Please clarify that the mode of death is whether homicidal, suicidal or accidental."
Ex-Constable Ramvir Singh vs Union Of India & Ors

3. Appellant, at all material times, was working as a constable in the Border Security Force. At the relevant time, he was posted at 24 Bn. BSF at 2 Jodhpur. His duty, inter alia, was collection of official dak from Central Diary, FHQ BSF, New Delhi through SHQ BSF Amritsar. He was sent to SHQ BSF Amritsar along with one `Kalipada Mandal'. He had been given an authority letter with an electricity bill. He was directed to collect bank draft prepared in respect of the said bill by PAD well in advance, otherwise to report to the Unit immediately. The Dak was collected from the Central Diary. They reached at their destination on 31.7.2000; collected the Dak from Central Diary, FHQ BSF New Delhi on 3.8.2000. Appellant informed the Second-in-Command on phone on 3.8.2000 that some unit drafts were to be collected from PAD. As 5th and 6th August, 2000 were holidays, appellant was directed to report back forthwith by boarding the evening train from Amritsar on 3.8.2000 as he had official Dak in his possession. He did not do so although he had already collected the official Dak.

4. He pleaded guilty to both the charges. He was dismissed from service. A statutory petition filed by him under Section 117 of the Act was rejected by the Director General of Border Security Force by an order dated 28.6.2001. Legality and/ or validity of the said order came to be questioned by the appellant by filing a Writ Petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh which was marked as Criminal Writ Petition No. 872 of 2003.

20. However, it is well known that except the cases where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, the Superior Courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment.

22. We, therefore, do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

December 18, 2008