L-NLProc/TathyaNyaya-and-FactLegalLlama-NyayaScrape-Datasets huggingface dataset:
Satwati Deswal vs State Of Haryana & Ors

4. In our view, this appeal must succeed on a very short point.

8. Apart from that, on a cursory look of the statutory provision of the Constitution of the Parishad Working Committees, it would be clear that before imposing any major penalty against an employee, namely, an order of termination of service, an inquiry must be held in the manner specified in the statutory rules by which the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of allegations on which an inquiry shall be proposed and opportunity must be given to the employee to submit a written statement stating therein whether he/she desires to be heard in person and no order of termination also can be passed without the approval of the Managing Committee. On this count alone, therefore, the High Court was, in our view, in grave error in dismissing the writ petition of the writ petitioner.

9. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of termination passed against the appellant is quashed and the writ petition stands allowed. However, it would be open to the authorities, if so desire, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for her termination from service and if such disciplinary proceedings 6 are initiated, the authorities shall give proper opportunity of hearing and permit the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective stands and after giving such opportunity, the disciplinary authorities thereafter shall give hearing to the appellant and then pass a final order on the question of termination of service of the appellant in compliance with the concerned statutory rules applicable to the appellant.

10. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside and the order of termination passed against the appellant is quashed. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Nawaz vs The State Rep. By Inspector Of Police

2. The brief facts of the case are as under:­ Accused No. 1 – Smt. Ragila had an illicit relationship with Accused No. 2 – Shri Nawaz. The accused No. 1 is the wife of the deceased.

3. The deceased used to suspect the fidelity of Accused No. 1 as well as his daughter’s integrity. He was of the opinion that Accused No. 2 Nawaz not only had an illicit relationship with Accused No. 1 but also with the elder daughter of the deceased.

4. On the date of the incident at about 9.00 a.m., the deceased quarrelled with Accused No.1 and called her a ‘prostitute’. He also told her that Accused No. 1 has converted the daughter into a prostitute as well. At that point of time, Accused No. 2 came from the first floor and asked the deceased not to quarrel with Accused No. 1 and her daughters. Since the deceased did not stop, Accused No. 2 slapped the face of the deceased. Immediately, thereafter, both the accused throttled the deceased with the help of a towel and burnt the dead body to try to conceal the offence. Subsequently, they transported the dead body in a Maruti Car owned by PW 15 and abandoned the body elsewhere. 2

13. The deceased provoked the accused No.1 by uttering the word ‘prostitute’. In our society, no lady would like to hear such a word from her husband. Most importantly, she would not be ready to hear such a word against her daughters. The incident is a result of a sudden and grave provocation by the deceased. Since the body came to be transported by the accused to a different place in order to hide the offence, the accused are rightly convicted for offence under Section 201 of IPC.

(B) The appeals are accordingly allowed in part.

........................J (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR) ........................J (DINESH MAHESHWARI) NEW DELHI;

22ND JANUARY, 2019.
Jai Singh vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.

3. Being aggrieved by the said orders of termination, the appellants submitted representations, which were considered by the Deputy Inspector (General) of Police, CRPF. By a communication dated 5th April, 1995, representations filed by the appellants were disposed of. In the said order it was stated that the appellants were engaged as auxiliary constable with CRPF purely on ad-hoc basis on daily wages and that they were not found suitable for absorption on regular basis in CRPF on disbandment of Auxiliary Battalion due to misconduct and attitude as reported by the Commandant of the 124 Auxiliary Battalion.

For the aforesaid reasons, the said representations were found to be devoid of merit and were rejected.

4. Being aggrieved by the same an appeal was also preferred which also came to be disposed of by order dated 4th June, 1994. This order states that the appellants were engaged in 124 Auxiliary Battalion CRPF on daily wage basis and services of such persons could be terminated at any time without assigning any reason. It was observed that Auxiliary Battalion stood disbanded on 31st March, 1994 and only those constables who were fit in all respects were engaged and as the appellants did not fall in the said category, their services were terminated. Consequently, their appeals were rejected.

5. The High Court on consideration of the rival submissions held that conduct for which the appellants were not found suitable for regularization cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be becoming of members of a disciplined force. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. It was held that the act of the respondents before it finding out the suitability of the appellants did not amount to imposition of any punishment and, therefore, no enquiry was required to be initiated. The writ petitioners were at the relevant point of time members of the CRPF, a disciplined force and higher degree of discipline was called for. The employer passed a simple order of termination as permitted by the terms of appointment and/or permitted by the rules. The indiscipline to which reference was made to find the appellants unsuitable was not the foundation of the order of termination, but at the most the motive for it.

As noted above, the writ petitions were dismissed.

11. In the background of facts as noticed by the High Court the order of termination cannot be faulted. The High Court had rightly declined to interfere. We find no reason to take a different view. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
Jagadeesh & Anr vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

2. The appellants in this appeal, claiming to be the tenants of agricultural land, bearing Survey No. 125/1, measuring 3 acres 11 Gunthas (hereinafter called as the "scheduled land") situated in Lingabahalli Village, Madhugiri Taluk in the State of Karnataka, filed Form No.7 before the Land Tribunal praying for a declaration that they had acquired occupancy rights in respect of the scheduled land. They alleged that they were cultivating the scheduled land from 1968 till the notified date under the Act on Wara basis giving 1/3rd of the share in the foodgrains to respondent No.4. Accordingly, the appellants prayed for an order of occupancy right in respect of the scheduled land alleging that they and their father were cultivating the scheduled land as occupancy right holders relying, inter alia, on the entries under the RTC record.

3. The case of the appellants, as made out, was disputed by the respondent No. 4. The case of respondent No.4 was that the scheduled land was mortgaged to the 3rd respondent, Rajashankar, in the year 1968 and after the expiry of the said mortgage, the mortgagee was liable to deliver possession of the same. The case of tenancy as made out by the appellants or their father was denied. It was alleged by the respondent No.4 that since the respondent No.3 was a film actor and had settled in Madras (now Chennai), with the consent of the respondent No. 3, the scheduled land was given to the father of the appellants and the father of the appellants was cultivating the same from the year 1968 but not as a tenant. Accordingly, they prayed for rejection of the application filed by the father of the appellants claiming occupancy rights under the Act. Initially, the Land Tribunal allowed the application of the father of the appellants and feeling aggrieved, a writ petition was filed against the said order. The High Court had set aside the order of the Land Tribunal and remanded the case back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision. The Land Tribunal, after remand, relying on the entries in the RTC record and some other materials on record, granted occupancy rights in favour of the appellants.

13. Considering the above aspect of the matter and after considering the scope of Section 121A of the Act, we are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellants that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act, the High Court was not entitled to set aside the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the appellate authority and the land tribunal. Such being the position, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court, although the High Court, in the exercise of its power under Section 121A of the Act, had set aside the concurrent orders of the appellate authority as well as the land tribunal.

18. In view of the aforesaid, we are, therefore, of the view that this is not a fit case where this Court shall interfere with the order passed by the High Court under Section 121A of the Act.

19. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal fails and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co.Ltd vs Commissioner Of Central Excise, ...

1. The assessee-appellant is, inter alia, engaged in the manufacture of chassis for various models and parts thereof falling under Chapter 87 of the Central Excise and Tariff Act, 1985 (for short "the Tariff Act") at its factory at Jamshedpur

3. The appellant submitted the price list dated 1.11.1994 and 1.4.1995 wherein it was mentioned that the chassis of model no. 1612 is fitted with engine no. 692 DI engines and GBS 30 gear box whereas the chassis in question were fitted with engine no. 697 NA and gear box GBS 40. Relying on these price lists, Department raised differential demand and issued show cause notices to the appellant dated 22nd June, 1995, 4th July, 1995 and 1st November, 1995. In these notices, it was assumed that the appellant has collected Rs.15,290/- per chassis over and above the value declared in the price lists. This demand was confirmed by the Commissioner-respondent. Against the order of the Respondent, the appellant filed appeals before the Tribunal.

4. On 31st October, 2000, the Tribunal passed a final order dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant. The contentions of the Appellant that they have paid duty at its invoice price on all clearances of chassis of model no. 1612 and that they have never recovered any amount over and above the invoice price from their customers, was not taken into account by the original Bench of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal. Therefore, appellant filed an application for rectification of mistake. Thereafter, the Tribunal passed order dated 11th January, 2001, dismissing the application for rectification of mistake. However, while passing the order on the application for rectification of mistake, a difference of opinion arose in the matter. The Member (Judicial), who was a party to the original Bench, allowed the application for rectification of mistake and ordered rehearing of the appeal. Learned Member specifically held that the appellant did urge this ground during the earlier arguments. The Member (Technical) dismissed the application on the ground of inherency. The 3rd Member who heard the matter referred to, agreed with the Member (Technical).

11. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals are allowed the impugned orders of the Tribunal as well as that of the Original Authority are set aside. Follow up action, if any, in terms of this Judgment be taken henceforth. The parties are left to bear their own costs.
Union Of India vs Anup Kumar Roy

The controversy lies within a very narrow compass.

The respondent was working as Transmission Executive in the Broadcasting Ministry of the Government of India. In November 1997, All India Radio was a part of the Ministry of Broadcasting. The Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990 (in short the 'Act') was enacted providing for creation of a Corporation with effect from the appointed date which is 23.11.1997. The respondent took voluntary retirement on 31.7.1997. Section 11 of the Act provided that option is to be called for from the employees working in the Doordarshan and All India Radio as and when they opted for the transfer from the Central Government to Prasar Bharati. No final decision in these matters had been taken. With effect from 23.11.1997 some employees were deemed to be sent on deputation to Prasar Bharati. There were demands for higher scales of pay by some employees considering which Memorandum dated 25.2.1999 was issued. The respondent filed an application before the CAT claiming that he was entitled to the benefits flowing from the aforesaid Memorandum dated 25.2.1999. The respondent in the original application i.e. present appellant took a positive stand that benefits flowing from the Memorandum dated 25.2.1999 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting was available to only those who were working on the date of the Circular. During the hearing of the Original Application before the CAT several orders passed by various Benches of CAT taking similar view were placed for consideration. It was clearly held that persons similarly situated as respondents were not entitled to the benefits flowing from the Memorandum dated 25.2.1999. By its impugned judgment dated 20.12.2002 the Guwahati Bench held that the applicant who was in service till 1997 was entitled to the benefits mentioned in Clause (iv) of para 2 of the Memorandum dated 25.2.1999.

4. The benefit of the upgraded pay scales will be available to existing incumbents only and those new direct recruits who join after issuance of these orders will not be entitled to these scales, but will be governed by pay scales recommended by the Vth Pay Commission. However, all promotions of existing incumbents shall be made in upgraded scales only."

The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
Jermani Yadav vs State Of Bihar

According to the prosecution case, in revenge for the killings of Shambhu Yadav and Jagdev Yadav, the accused, including the present appellant, picked up one Gorakh Yadav (a child aged about 10 years), who happened to be the nephew of one of the accused who killed Shambhu Yadav and Jagdev Yadav. The appellant and the other accused in the case are alleged to have brought the child to the spot where the bodies of their associates and friends Shambhu Yadav and Jagdev Yadav were lying and killed him there by gunshots.

The occurrence took place on December 08, 1999. The appellant was taken in custody 10 years later on November 24, 2009.

The High Court might have rejected the bail application of the appellant on the ground that he was an absconder for 10 years and his case was, therefore, distinguishable from Bipin Yadav; or the High Court might have taken steps for an expeditious conclusion of the appellant's trial. Instead, the High Court adopted rather a strange course and while directing the appellant to be released on bail added the condition that he would be enlarged on bail 'only after he completes life period of custody as co-accused Bipin Yadav'. As noted above, before being released on bail Bipin Yadav had remained in jail for 4 years 6 months and 28 days. Consequently, the appellant may not be released before November 24, 2014.

We find the order of the High Court difficult to sustain. We, accordingly, set aside the order and direct the High Court to reconsider the appellant's application for bail afresh and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law.

The criminal appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.

ITEM NO.28 COURT NO.9 SECTION IIA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl)... 2011 CRLMP.NO(s). 17005-17006 (From the judgement and order 02/07/2010 dated CRLM No. 22328/2010 and order dated 15/09/2010 in CRLM No. 33394/2010 of the HIGH COURT OF PATNA) JERMANI YADAV Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s) (With appln(s) for c/delay in filing SLP and office report) Date: 02/09/2011 These Petitions were called on for hearing today. CORAM :
Commissioner Of Central Excise, ... vs Ipf Vikram India Ltd.

1. The Assessee herein is engaged in the manufacture of detergent powder and scouring powder allegedly falling under Chapter Heading 3402.90 and 3405.40 respectively of the schedule to Central Excise Tariff Act 1985. The said activity was carried out by the Assessee on job work basis for its principal, viz., Hindustan Lever Ltd. (HLL). The Assessee filed declaration in Annexure II under Rule 173C of Central Excise Rules, 1944 (for short, "the Act").

2. The Assessee was clearing the goods manufactured by it on stock transfer basis to the depots of their above-named principal in various parts of the country. However, it allegedly did not supply depot sale prices to find out the assessable value for charging Excise Duty. On checking of RT-12 returns it was found that the Assessee had declared the value of the detergent less than the price at which it was being sold. And in respect of scouring powder the Assessee had failed to supply the depot sale price. Therefore, four show cause notices dated, 29th January, 1998, 01st May, 1998, 28th October, 1998 and 18th March, 1999 were issued to the Assessee to show cause as to why duty as per details annexed to the notices be not recovered under Section 11A of the Act and penalty under Rule 173Q of he Central Excise Rules be not imposed upon it.

7. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal rightly concluded that the amendment carried out in the definition of the expression, "place of removal" insofar as the facts of this case are concerned will not make any difference.

9. On the facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to interfere with the Order passed by the Tribunal. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
Bhagwan Das vs Kartar Singh & Ors

4. The prosecution case is that on the night intervening 1st and 2nd March, 2000, the deceased (Shobha) had committed suicide at about 2.00 a.m. by hanging herself from the ceiling of a room in the matrimonial home. It is alleged that she married Mangal Singh (since deceased) on 23.1.1992 and a girl child was born to them in the year 1999. Soon thereafter, in an accident, the said Mangal Singh became paralysed. It appears that the deceased (Shobha) did not leave any suicide note. It is the case of the prosecution that after her marriage, Shobha was being taunted for bringing less dowry and was being harassed on account therefore. A sum of Rs.50,000/- is alleged to have been given by her father a few days after her marriage to Mangal Singh for his business as he was allegedly unemployed. It is further the case of the prosecution that Mangal Singh squandered the said sum of Rs.50,000/- in gambling and drinking and thereafter he raised a further demand of Rs.2 lakhs which could not be fulfilled. The prosecution also alleges that Shobha was ill-treated and harassed by the present petitioners as she was not able to give birth to a child and this harassment continued till 1999 when she gave birth to a girl child as mentioned above. Till 1999, Shobha was being subjected to mental cruelty by being told that her husband would be married elsewhere. It is further alleged by the prosecution that since Mangal Singh, shortly after the birth of the girl child, was paralysed on account of an accident, the deceased (Shobha) was being taunted that she gave birth to a girl child which brought bad luck to the petitioners. It is these circumstances which, according to the prosecution, drove the said Shobha to commit suicide. On the basis of these allegations, the learned Additional Sessions Judge came to the following conclusion :

15. In our opinion the view taken by the High Court is correct. It often happens that there are disputes and discords in the matrimonial home and a wife is often harassed by the husband or her in-laws. This, however, in our opinion would not by itself and without something more attract Section 306 IPC read with Section 107 IPC.

17. In the present case, since no charge under Section 304B has been framed, obviously the accused cannot be convicted under that provision.

18. In view of the above, there is no force in the appeal and hence it is dismissed. We, however, make it clear that we are not approving or justifying harassment of wives by their husbands or in-laws, but are only clarifying the law in the peculiar facts of this case as it stands today. Whether the law should be amended is for the legislature to decide. Appeal dismissed.
Bundi Zila Petrol Pump Dealers ... vs Sanyojak Bundi Zila Petrol Mazdr.Sangh ...

2. A few facts need mention hereinbelow in brief to appreciate the controversy involved in these appeals.

9. Provident Fund Scheme be prepared for the workmen and deductions be made accordingly;

5. The appellant, on coming to know of the passing of the award, filed the writ petition in the High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur (W.P. No. 5294/1996. By order dated 10.09.1997, the Single Judge allowed the writ petition and set aside the award.

6. The respondent, therefore, felt aggrieved and filed writ appeal (No.449/1999) before the Division Bench of the High Court. By impugned order, the Division Bench allowed the respondent's appeal and set aside the order of the Single Judge. The impugned order was passed in appellant’s absence because none appeared for the appellant (respondent in appeal) before the Division Bench 4 when the appeal was heard. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant filed the review petition, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.

10. It is for all these reasons set out above, we allow the appeals, set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench, the order of the Single Judge and the award of the Industrial Tribunal and remand the case to the Industrial Tribunal. The appellant is granted an opportunity to file their written statement in answer to the statement filed by the respondent. Parties are also granted liberty to amend their respective statements, file documents, and lead oral evidence in support of their case.

11. The Industrial Tribunal will decide the reference within six months from the date of the appearance of the parties in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations made by the High 7 Court in their respective orders and in this Court’s order.

12. Parties to appear before the Industrial Tribunal, Kota on 05.03.2019 and file a copy of this order to enable the Tribunal to decide the matter as directed above.

February 12, 2019.
Thankachan & Anr vs State Of Kerala

3. The conviction of the appellants for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.20,000/- with default stipulation was upheld.

5. Placing reliance on the evidence of PWs 2, 3, 7 and 8 the trial Court recorded conviction. As noted above, appeal was preferred before the High Court by all the four accused persons, and the appeal filed by the present appellants was dismissed while that of co-accused was allowed.

11. The above position is highlighted in Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 4 SCC 653).

12. Considering the background facts, appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC and not Section 302 IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of ten years would suffice. Fine amount is reduced to Rs.5,000/-. In case fine is not paid, default sentence would be two years.

13. Appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.