Case: Rananjaya Singh Vs. Baijnath Singh And Others

1. Kunwar Rananjaya Singh, the appellant before us, is the son of Raj Bhagwan Bux Singh of Amethi. He was the successful candidate at an election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly Amethi from (Central) constituency the polling in respect of which took place on the 31st January, 1952 and the result whereof was announced on the 6th February,and finally published in the Uttar Pradesh State Gazette on the 26th February,The respondent Baijnath Singh who was one of the unsuccessful candidates filed an election petition calling in question the election of the appellant. Three other unsuccessful candidates were also impleaded asgrounds on which the election was challenged were that the appellant himself, together with his, own and his fathers servants and other dependents and agents, committed various corrupt practices of bribery, exercise of undue influence, publication of false and defamatory statements and concealment of election expenses as per particulars set forth in the petition and the schedules thereto. He prayed that the election of the appellant be set aside and that he, the said respondent, be declared to have been dulyappellant alone contested the petition. In his written statement he denied each and every one of the charges of corrupt practises levelled against him and he also filed a petition of recrimination challenging the conduct of the said respondent at the election. The said respondent denied the charges imputed to him. Altogether 15 issues were raised, namely, eight on the election petition and 7 on the petition of recrimination. All the 7 issues arising out of the petition of recrimination were found by the tribunal constituted for hearing of the election petition against the appellant and the petition of recrimination was dismissed. The appellant has not contested the correctness of those findings before us and nothing further need be said about them.As regards the issues arising on the main election petition the election tribunal found in favour of the appellant on issues Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 but decided issue No. 3 against the appellant. That issue was asDid respondent No. 1 employ for election more persons than authorised by law?Did respondent No.1 incur the expenditure shown in the list of "Heads of other concealed expenditure?" Did he exceed the prescribed limit of expenditure forabove issue related to charges made out in Paragraph 6 of the election petition and the list of particulars set out in Part III of the schedule thereto. The particulars in that part were grouped under two main heads, each containing several items. The first head referred to persons alleged to have been employed on payment far in excess of the prescribed number and not shown in the return of election expenses. The second head of particulars contained other alleged concealed expenditures.The election tribunal held in favour of the appellant on all items of charges under both heads in Part III except items (ii) and (iii) of the first head. Item (ii) charged that all the paid Ziladars of Amethi estate who were about 20 in number assisted by their peons and orderlies worked for the appellant and item No. (iii) complained that the Manager and the Assistant Manager of that estate also worked for him. The tribunal held that the number of all these persons coming within these two categories far exceeded the prescribed number of persons who could be employed in an election and their salary for the period they worked for the appellant in connection with the election, if added to the admitted elections expenses, would exceed the maximum expenditure permissible for contesting a single member constituency. The tribunal, therefore, held that the appellant was guilty, under both these heads, of corrupt practice as define in Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and was consequently liable to be dealt with under Section 100 (2) (b) and Section 145 of that Act.These findings as to employment of extra persons on payment and the expenditure of money in excess of the permissible maximum election expenses necessarily led to the further finding that inasmuch as these expenses had not been shown in the appellants return of election expenses the appellant was also guilty of a minor corrupt practice as defined in Section 124(4) of the Act and was liable to be dealt with under Section 100(2)(a) and Section 145 of the Act. In the result, the tribunal under the general issue No.8 only declared the election of the appellant to be void. Hence this appeal filed by the unseated candidate with the special leave of this Court.

Reasoning: The tribunal took the view - we think quite erroneously - that although the estate belonged to the father of the appellant, nevertheless, as the appellant was the heir apparent and actually looked after the estate on behalf of the old and infirm proprietor, these servants of the estate were "virtually" his "own" servants and could properly be regarded as having been employed for payment by thecan be no doubt that in the eye of the law these extra persons were in the employment of the father of the appellant and paid by the father and they were neither employed nor paid by the appellant. The case, therefore, does not fall within Section 123(7) at all and if that be so, it cannot come within Section 124(4).It obviously was a case where a father assisted the son in the matter of the election. These persons were the employees of the father and paid by him for working in the estate. At the request of the father they assisted the son in connection with the election which strictly speaking they were not obliged to do. Was the position in law at all different from the position that the father had given those employees a holiday on full pay and they voluntarily rendered assistance to the appellant in connection with his election? We think not. It is clear to us that qua the appellant these persons were neither employed nor paid by him. So far as the appellant was concerned they were mere volunteers and the learned Advocate for the respondents admits the employment of volunteers does not bring the candidate within the mischief of the definition of corrupt practice as given in Section 123(7).On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules and the arguments advanced before us we are of opinion that the appellant cannot in the circumstances of this case be held to be guilty of any corrupt practice under Section 123(7) as alleged against him. It follows from this that not having incurred any expenditure over and above what was shown by him in his return of election expenses he cannot be said to have concealed such expenditure and, therefore, he cannot be held to have been guilty of any minor corrupt practice under Section 124(4) of the Act.