Case: Competent Authority Vs. Barangore Jute Factory

However, keeping in view the fact that possession of the acquired land had already been taken by the authorities, the High Court felt that no useful purpose would be served by quashing the Notification. The High Court also took note of the power of the Acquiring Authority to issue a fresh Notification for acquisition of the land which could only lead to possible increase in the amount of compensation payable to the owners. Keeping these aspects in view it ordered that an additional amount of compensation be awarded to the land owners. Accordingly, an additional amount calculated at 30% over and above the compensation already determined was ordered to be paid to the writ petitioners. The Competent Authority is aggrieved of the order of the High Court holding the Notification regarding the acquisition of the land to be illegal, while the NHAI is aggrieved of the award of additional 30 per cent amount as compensation to the writ petitioners. The owners/writ petitioners are aggrieved of the Notification not being quashed in spite of having been declared as illegal3. The acquisition of land in the present case is under the National Highways Act, 1956. The power to acquire land is contained in Section 3A of the Act. According to Sub-section (1 ) where the Central Government is satisfied that for a public purpose, any land is required for the building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway or part thereof, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare its intention to acquire such land. Sub-section (2) provides that every Notification under Sub-section (1) shall give a brief description of the land. Under Sub-section (3) the Competent Authority is required to cause the substance of the notification to be published in two local newspapers, one of which will be in a vernacular language. The impugned notification in this case is challenged on the ground that it does not give a brief description of the land sought to be compulsorily acquired. There has been lot of argument on either side on this aspect. The Competent Authority and the NHAI have supported the Notification urging that brief description of the land contained in the Notification meets the requirement of the statute while according to the writ petitioners it is not so. A copy of the impugned Notification dated 11th June, 1993 has been placed on record. As per the Notification, a brief description of the land sought to be acquired is given in the Appendix to the Notification. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary to reproduce some portions of the AppendixThe GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY[PART II SEC. 3 (iii)]Brief description of land with or withoutStructure falling within the proposed Rightof way in terms of Sub-section (2) ofSection 3A of National Highways Laws(Amendment) Act, 1997A.D.NARAIN, Director General(Road Development & Addl. Secy. )APPENDIX-A to NOTIFICATION NoBRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PRIVATE LAND WITH/WITHOUT STRUCTUREFALLING WITHIN PROPOSED RIGHT OF WAY OF SECOND VIVEKANANDABRIDGE & ITS APPROACHES IN NATIONAL HIGHWAY-2, WEST BENGAL(Vide Sub-section (2) of Section 3A of the NH Laws(Amendment) Act, 1997State — West Bengal, District — Howrah,State — West Bengal, District — Howrah,State — West Bengal, District — Howrah,

Reasoning: So far as the question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of Section 3A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of land in respect of each Mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the lawSo far as the question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of Section 3A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of land in respect of each Mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the lawThe Act confers no general right to object, therefore, failure to object becomes irrelevant. The learned Counsel relied on the judgment of this Court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Others, VII (1999) SLT 308=81 (1999) DLT 514 (SC)=(1999) 7 SCC 44. In our view, this judgment has no application in the facts of the present case where right to object is a very limited right. The case cited is a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under Section 5A. Failure to exercise that right could be said to be acquiescence. The National Highways Act confers no such right. Under this Act there is no right to object to acquisition of land except on the question of its user. Therefore, the present objection has to be decided independently of the right to file objections. De hors the right to file objection, the validity of the Notification has to be considered. Failure to file objection to the notification under Section 3C, therefore, cannot non-suit the writ petitioners in this caseThe Notification in this case fails to meet this requirement. We have held it to be bad in law. It has no legs to stand. The conduct of the opposite party cannot be used to make it stand. Moreover, the writ petitioners have explained the reasons for the delay in filing the writ petition. The Company which owns the lands had been de-registered. It is a company registered in the U.K. It had to be revived. Revival came in mid-2001 whereafter the action was taken. Thus we find no merit in the argument about delay in challenging the Notification rendering the challenge liable to be rejected12. The aspect of possession of land having been taken by the Competent Authority, is an important issue for consideration in this case. Vesting of land in the Central Government has been held to be not in accordance with the law. The other statutory requirement which needs to be complied before taking possession is deposit of compensation. Under Section 3E(1) possession can be taken only after the land vests in the Central Government and the amount determined by the Competent Authority as compensation under Section 3G has been deposited under Sub-section (1) of Section 3H. In the present case in view of an order dated 3rd April, 2002 passed by the High Court final compensation could not be determined by the Competent Authority. Therefore, there could not be a valid deposit of amount finally determined as required under Section 3E(1) of the Act, which means the possession could not have been taken. But the fact is that possession was taken on 19th February, 2003 on deposit of provisional amount of compensation. The NHAI had in fact applied for permission of Court to take possession of the land under acquisition. But without any order being passed on that application, it hastened to take possession after giving only one day?s notice when the Act requires 60 days notice. Moreover, the possession is to be taken through the Commissioner of Police or the Collector. This was not done. Neither of the three statutory requirements for taking possession were fulfilled. Thus taking of possession of the lands in the present case is in total violation of the statutory provisions. The learned Counsel for the Acquiring Authority submits that possession was taken on basis of oral observations of the Court. This is a totally misconceived plea. Court orders are always in black and white. Oral orders are never passed. Moreover, this plea is wrong because the Division Bench observed in its order dated 27th March, 2003 that it never dealt with question of possession. The result is that taking possession of the land sought to be acquired cannot be said to be in accordance with law in this case and does not improve matters for the NHAI13. At this stage we would like to note that the learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioners made reference to a publication in the nature of a brochure issued by the West Bengal Government wherein it is mentioned that motels/shops/petrol pumps etc. will also come up in the area where the acquired land is situated. On this basis it was sought to be argued that such use of the acquired land would be contrary to the use mentioned in Section 3A of the Act and, therefore, is not permissible. There was lot of controversy on this aspect between the parties particularly, on the ground that this plea was being taken at this belated stage when the respondents had no opportunity to give a proper reply thereto. We have mentioned this only for the reason that the issue has come up during the course of hearing. We do not consider it necessary to go into this aspect, in view of the fact that we have held in this judgment that the basic acquisition notification itself is not in accordance with law14. Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the Acquiring Authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of actionWe express no opinion about other statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise the same, if available.