Case: Birendra Pratap Singh And Another Vs. Gulwant Singh And Others

1. The disputed land was the ex-proprietary tenancy of one Parmeshwar Singh who, on the 5th June, 1947, executed a sub-lease in favour of the appellants on an annual rent of Rs. 74. The sub-lease was registered on 22nd June, 1947. It laid down that the tenancy was to commence from the beginning of the year 1355 Fasli, i. e., with effect from 1st July, 1947. In pursuance of this sub-lease, the appellants entered into possession. On 15th January, 1951, Parmeshwar Singh, the ex-proprietary tenant, surrendered his tenancy rights to the landlord and on the same date the landlord executed a lease in respect of this land in favour of the respondents. The appellants, however, continued to remain in possession. Thereafter, on 1st July, 1952, the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (No. I of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") came into force. Disputes arose between the appellants and the respondents who both claimed to have become Sirdars of this land and consequently, on 1st August, 1952, the appellants instituted a suit for a declaration that they were the Sirdars of the disputed land. They also prayed for an injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession of the appellants. In the alternative, a prayer was also made for a decree for possession in case it was found that the appellants had been dispossessed. The Munsif, who tried the suit held that the appellants had become Sirdars under Section 19 (vii) of the Act and, consequently, decreed the suit. The decree was affirmed by the first appellate Court as well as by a Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in second appeal. A special appeal to a Division Bench was taken up by the respondents with the leave of the single Judge. In this special appeal, the High Court held that the appellants did not become Sirdars of this land when the Act came into force and, consequently, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit of the appellants. The appellants have now come up to this Court against this decree of the High Court under special leave granted by this Court.

Reasoning: In this case, there is no doubt that a written lease consistent with the provisions of the Tenancy Act was executed together with a counterpart thereof on the 5th June, 1947; and learned Counsels argument was that this lease and the counterpart having been delivered in accordance with this provision on 5th June, 1947, it should be deemed that the appellants became tenants with effect from that very date.The argument fails for two reasons. One is that the mere delivery of the lease and the counterpart by one party to the other does not make the lessee under the lease a lessee from the date of delivery of the written documents, nor is any such principle laid down in S. 55 (1). The rights under the lease can only arise in accordance with the terms of the lease. In the present case, the terms of the sub-lease themselves laid down that the appellants were to be sub-lessees from 1st July, 1947 and, consequently, the mere delivery of the documents could not bring into existence the relationship of lessor and lessee from an earlier date. The second reason is that, even on facts, there is nothing to show that the written lease and its counterpart were actually delivered by one party to the other on the 5th June, 1947.On the other hand, there is material on the record which makes it clear that there could not possibly have been such delivery of the written documents prior to 14th June, 1947 The sub-lease itself shows that it was registered on 22nd June, 1947. The sub-lease was not valid and effective until it was registered. This registration was required under S. 56 of the Tenancy Act which lays down that a lease for a period exceeding one year or from year to year shall be made by a registered instrument only. The appellants themselves came forward with the case that this was not a lease for a period not exceeding one year, so that the lease to be valid had to be registered in accordance with S. 56 of the Tenancy Act. The registration took place on 22nd June, 1947 and it is, therefore, clear that the written lease properly executed and effective could not have been delivered by Parmeshwar Singh to the appellants before 22nd June, 1947. Consequently, even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted, though we consider that it is entirely wrong, that on delivery of the written lease under S. 55 the rights as a lessee commence, such rights as sub-lessee in favour of the appellants could not arise before 22nd June, 1947 as there could not possibly be delivery of the written lease to the appellants by Parmeshwar Singh prior to that date.In these circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the appellants were not sub-tenants on 14th June, 1947, which was the date of commencement of the United Provinces Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1947 and, therefore, Section 295-A of the Tenancy Act never became applicable to the case of the appellants4. The applicability of S. 19 (vii) of the Act was claimed, in the alternative, on the ground that the appellants were holding this land as sub-tenants referred to in S. 47 (4) of the Tenancy Act. The case put forward on behalf of the appellants was that the sub-lease in their favour by Parmeshwar Singh was not for any fixed term mentioned in the sub-lease itself, but from the surrounding facts and circumstances it should be held that it was a sub-lease for a period of five years. The appellate Bench of the High Court, in deciding the case against the appellants, has held that the sub-lease was a lease from year to year and not for a period of five years as contended on behalf of the appellants. The term of five years as the period of sub-lease was claimed on the basis that, under the Tenancy Act, an ex-proprietary tenant could sublet his holding for a period not exceeding five years and any sub-lease for a period exceeding five years would be invalid The argument was that when Parmeshwar Singh sublet his ex-proprietary holding to the appellants without mentioning any period, it must be inferred that he intended it to be a sub-lease for the full period of five years for which he was entitled to sublet his holding. We do not think that this argument can be accepted. If Parmeshwar Singh had intended to sublet the land for a period of five years only, or for a period less than five years, there was no difficulty in his making a mention of that period in the sub-lease itself. Parmeshwar Singh chose not to mention any period at all and, consequently, this sub-lease cannot be held to be a lease for any fixed period. The sub-lease reserves an annual rent, and the period of the lease has to be determined on the basis of his reservation of rent. We are unable to find any reasons in support of the plea put forward on behalf of the appellants that the term of the sub-lease should be held to be five years simply because no period at all was mentioned in the sub-lease itself. No principle of law could be cited on behalf of the appellants in support of this pleaIt is true, as urged by learned Counsel, that there is a distinction between a lease from year to year and a lease for a fixed period of one year only. The sub-lease in favour of the appellants was not for a fixed period of one year. Being a sub-lease from year to year, the right of the appellants acquired under it was to hold the land as sub-lessees year after year as those years commencedIn our opinion, this is the correct principle to be applied in giving effect to a lease from year to year.In the present case, the appellants had obtained this sub-lease with effect from 1st July. 1947 and, as we have held earlier, it was a sub-lease from year to year.On 1st July, 1947, therefore, the appellants were entitled to hold the land for one year which would expire on the 30th June, 1948, but, if they were allowed to continue by their landholder on 1st July, 1948, they became entitled to hold the land for another year expiring on 30th June, 1949. During that year, therefore the sub-lease would be held to be a sub-lease for two years. Similarly since the appellants were allowed to continue by Parmeshwar Singh in possession until 15th January 1951, it must be held that under that same sub-lease, the appellants were sub-lessees for the subsequent years 1949-50 and 1950-51 also. On 15-1-1951, consequently, the appellants were sub-tenants of Parmeshwar Singh under this sub-lease and their term vas to continue up to 30th June, 1951.On 15th January. 1951, Parmeshwar Singh lost his right as chief-tenant and the effect of Section 47 (1) of the Tenancy Act was, that with effect from that date, the rights of the appellants as sub-tenants of Parmeshwar Singh became extinguished. The sub-lease in favour of the appellants terminated on that date.The appellants continued to remain in possession even after 15th January, 1951, but that possession could no longer be held to be in the capacity of sub-tenants of Parmeshwar Singh7. We are unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the appellants that it should be held that this right granted by Section 47(4) would again accrue to the appellants. 1st July, 1951 in accordance with the terms of the sub-lease because the sub-lease in their favour was from year to year.We have already mentioned earlier the effect of Section 47 (1) of the Tenancy Act was that that sub-lease was extinguished and no accrual of a fresh right with reference to that sub-lease could be claimed thereafter. The right that accrued under Section 47 (4) was no longer. In the same terms as the right under the sub-lease and was only limited to the period during which that sub-lease was to remain effective on the date when Section 47 (1) and Section 47 (4) became applicable On that date, the remaining term of the sub-lease was up to 30th June, 1951. so that the right that accrued under Section 47 (4) was limited upto 30th June, 1951 only and it could not arise afresh on 1st July 1951 as it was not a tecurring right like that of a sub-tenant, holding under a sub-lease from year to yearSo far as the right granted by Section 47 (4) is concerned, it is granted by the statute itself for a limited period and, once that period expires, it cannot be held that the right continues thereafter. There is no requirement in law that, after the expiry of that period, there must be eviction from the land in order to extinguish the right granted by Section 47(4). The possession subsequent to 30th June, 1951 cannot, therefore, be held to be in pursuance of a right conferred on a sub-tenant referred to in Section 47 (4) of the Tenancy Act and. consequently, the land was not held by the appellants thereafter in the capacity mentioned in Section 19 (vii) of the Act. The High Court, in these circumstances, was right in rejecting the claim of the appellants.