Case: Munshi Lal Beni Ram Glass Works Vs. S. R. Singh, Assistant Labour Commissioner Andothers

The relevant facts may first be briefly stated. In June 1956 there was a strike in the glass factory of the appellant, M/s. Munshi Lal Beni Ram Glass Works, at Ferozabad. As a result the factory was closed down for some time. In August 1956 a settlement was reached with the workers and it became possible to reassume operations from August 31, 1956. The workers were asked to report personally, latest by August 26, 1956, to show their willingness to work. According to the appellant, Lal Khan, one of the workers, failed to register his willingness to work before the appointed day, and indeed he did not care to report in spite of a messenger having been sent to him requiring his attendance. In his place one Jang Jit was thereupon employed and intimation of this fact duly sent to Lal Khan. This gave rise to a controversy between Lal Khan and the employers with the result that the State Government purporting to act under ss. 3, 4 and 8 of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act referred the following dispute to thethe employers have wrongly and/or unjustifiably refused employed to Shri Lal Khan with effect from 28/29th August, 1957 ? If so, to what relief is he entitledafter the reference the appellant presented a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court, (C.W. No. 899 of 1957) challenging its validity principally on the ground that there was no industrial dispute within the contemplation of the Industrial Disputes Act. As interim, stay of the proceedings was declined, the proceedings before the adjudicator continued and on December 31, 1957 the adjudicator gave his award. This was followed by an order of the State Government dated January 28, 1958 enforcing the award under ss. 3 and 6(2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The award and the order of the State Government were also challenged by the appellant by means of a writ petition in the High Court (C.W. No. 1025 of 1958). Though principally in this writ petition the power of the State Government to enforce the award was questioned, challenge to the order of reference was also reiterated. A learned Single Judge allowed this later writ petition on January 28, 1958, holding that the State Government had no power to enforce the award in question. According to the learned Single Judge the old s.6 having been replaced by a new section 6 by U.P. Act 1 of 1957, it was not a case of repeal simpliciter and therefore old s. 6 could not be resorted to by relying on s.6(e) of the General Clauses Act.On the matter having been taken on special appeal a Division Bench of the High Court following , its earlier decision reported as Central Distillery and Chemical Works Ltd. Meerut v. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1964 All. 156  .) reversed the order of the learned Single Judge and dismissed the writ petition.

Reasoning: Now looking, at the position as it stood on April 16, 1957, it would be seen that s.16 was designed to save the pending proceedings from the operation of U.P. Act No. 1 of 1957 itself. If this Act was held to be inapplicable, then s. 6-A as amended thereby would be excluded and that section as it stood prior to the amendment by U.P. Act No., 1 of 1957 would automatically be attracted. The question arises: where was then the occasion to provide specifically for applying to the pending proceedings s, 6-A as it stood before U.P. Act No. 1 of 1957 ? It may, of course, be contended that it was so done by way of abundant caution. To us, however, it seems that to specifically incorporate s.6-A in s.16 in this situation is suggestive of the intention of the Legislature to extend the amended s.6-A to the proceedings contemplated by s.16. The enactment under consideration is not an example of ideal draftsmanship and the provisions under consideration may admit of two constructions. Assuming the two constructions to be possible we are not satisfied that the construction placed on this provision by the two Benches of the Allahabad High Court is clearly erroneous justifying reversal of the view taken therein and thereby unsettling the legal position. On the other hand to uphold the view of the learned Single Judge would also render the awards like the present unenforceable, which intention is difficult to impute to the Legislature. And then this point is not likely to arise very frequently in future, the matter being confined only to the cases which were pending when U.P. Act No. 1 of 1957 was enforced. The enactment is also confined in its operation to the State of U.P.our, opinion the proceeding in question was clearly -pending before the adjudicator as contemplated by s.16. The adjudicator, therefore, could plainly proceed to. adjudicate upon the dispute. On his a judicious the provisions of s.6- A would be attracted and there under the State Government could enforce it. This submission of the appellant is, therefore, repelled. On the view that we have taken it is not necessary to decide whether the State Government is an authority constituted under the Act as envisaged by s.16 and also whether the proceeding in question could be considered to be pending before the Stateargument too need not detain us as it does not arise on the view we have taken. We may, however, point out that s. 17 only provides for delegated legislation in certain circumstances and resort to s. 17 is not essential, or a condition precedent for enforcing the awards, as suggested on behalf of the appellant.The appellants learned Advocate as a last resort submitted that the decision of the adjudicator is not an award as defined in s.2(c) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act as amended by U.P. Act No. 1 of 1957. Now if U.P. Act No. 1 of 1957 is excluded from its application to pending proceeding under s.16 then the word award has to be liberally construed and so construed it would be covered by s. 6-A. The power conferred by ss. 16 and 6A has to be construed as real and not illusory and it has to be interpreted so as to achieve the purpose for which it wasmust not be understood to accord our approval to the view of the learned Single Judge that s.6 of the Principal Act having not been repealed simpliciter, but having been replaced by a new section 6 by U.P. Act 1 of 1957, the principle underlying s.6(e) of the General Clauses Act cannot be attracted. In our opinion, this approach is not quite correct. Section 6 would seem to us to apply to a case of repeal even if there is a simultaneous enactment unless a contrary intention appears from the newobserved by this Court in the State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh([1955] 1 S.C.R. 893.) whenever there is a repeal of an enactment, the consequences laid down in section 6 of the General Clauses Act will follow unless, as the section itself says, a different intention appears. In the case of a simple repeal there is scarcely any room for expression of a contrary opinion. But when the repeal is followed by fresh legislation on the same subject we would undoubtedly have to look to the provisions of the new Act, but only for the purpose of determining whether they indicate a different intention. The line of enquiry would be, not whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. We cannot therefore subscribe to the broad proposition that section 6 of the General Clauses Act is ruled out whenever there is a repeal-, of an enactment followed by a fresh legislation. Section 6 would be applicable in such cases also unless the new legislation manifests an intention incompatible with or contrary to the proposition of the section.