Case: Md. Usman &amp; Ors Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh &amp; Ors

2. The petitioners as well as respondent No. 3 onwards in the writ petition were serving as clerks, either in the upper division or in the lower division, in the registration and Stamps Department including the office of the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriage and the office of the Registrar of the Firms. Some of the respondents had been recruited by the Inspector-General of Registration and Stamps, Andhra Pradesh for being appointed as Sub-Registrars. The petitioners challenged the validity of their recruitment on various grounds, by means of a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. But that petition was summarily dismissed by a single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Thereafter, the matter was taken up in appeal to a Division Bench of that Court. The Division Bench rejected all the contentions of the petitioners except one viz., that rule 5 of the rules is ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. As a result of that conclusion it struck down the impugned recruitments.

Reasoning: The rules provide for the promotion to the posts of Sub-Registrar as well as for recruitment to those posts. Rule 2 provides that a post of Grade-I Sub-Registrar should be filled by promotion from Grade-II Sub-Registrar. So far as Grade II Sub-Registrars are concerned, they are to be appointed either by promotion from reserve Sub-Registrars or by "recruitment by transfer from the clerks of the Registration and Stamps Department including the office of the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages and the office of the Registrar of the Firms." Rule 5 deals with qualifications for being recruited as Grade-IIshall be given to persons who, in addition to the qualifications specified in items (i) to (iii) possess a degree in Law of a University in the State or any other equivalent qualification or a leadership certificate in the first category or Upper Division Clerks in the Registration Department".It was urged that this rule is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because though among the clerks there are U.D.Cs. as well as L.D.Cs. yet all of them had been put in one class for the purpose of recruitment. As per the Ministerial Service Rules the U.D.Cs. had to be selected from the L.D.Cs. after the L.D.Cs. had put in certain number of years of service and after they had passed the Accounts Test as well as the Registration Test. A.U.D.C. holds superior post to that of an L.D.C. His salary is higher and his conditions of service are better than that of anit was urged that as rule 5 treats U.D.Cs. as well as L.D.Cs. as equal for the purpose of recruitment for the post of a Grade II Sub Registrar, the rule violates the doctrine of equality.The Grade II Sub-Registrars are in a state wise cadre whereas the U.D.Cs. and L.D.Cs. belong to a district-wise cadres. Promotion from L.D.C. to U.D.C. is made district-wise. The chances of promotion from L.D.C. to U.D.C. in one district materially differs from another district. It depends on the number of posts available in a particular district. In one district an L.D.C. may be promoted as a U.D.C. as soon as he puts in a service of 5 years, whereas in another district an L.D.C. possessing the same or better qualifications as well as efficiency may not be promoted as a U.D.C. for 15 years or more. That being so while making recruitment to a State-wise cadre it was not possible for the State to make distinction between the L.D.Cs. and the U.D.Cs. The only reasonable basis that could have been adopted was to treat the U.D.Cs. and L.D.Cs. as one class for the purpose of recruitment. But at the same time the rule provides for giving preference to the U.D.Cs. who had put in a service of 5 years or more. There is force in these contentions though there may be some anomaly in the case of L.D.Cs. and U.D.Cs. serving in the same district. But that anomaly cannot be avoided. The validity of a rule has to be judged by assessing its over-all effect and not by picking up exceptional case. What the court has to see is whether the classification made is a just one taking all aspects into consideration.6. On the facts before us we are unable to agree that for the purpose of recruitment with which we are concerned herein the State should have classified the U.D.Cs. and L.D.Cs. separately. If the State had treated the U.D.C. as being superior to the L.D.Cs. for the purpose of that recruitment it would have resulted in a great deal of injustice to a large section of the clerks. The fortuitous circumstances of an officer in a particular district becoming a U.D.C. would have given him an undue advantage over his seniors who might have been as efficient or even more efficient than himself, merely because they chanced to serve in some other district. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not think that in the present case the State can be said to have treated unequals as equals. The rule of equality is intended to advance justice by avoiding discrimination. In our opinion the High Court by overlooking the reason behind rule 5 came to the erroneous conclusion that the said rule violated Art. 14 of the Constitution.7. We agree with the High Court that there is no substance in the petitioners contention that the impugned recruitments were not made in accordance with rule 5. It is clear from the affidavit filed on behalf of the State and the Registrar that the Registrar had considered the case of all the qualified clerks, but the Registrar though that the best basis for recruitment was to prepare a list of all the clerks, U.D.Cs. as well as L.D.Cs. arranging the names in the order of seniority as L.D.Cs. and thereafter consider each name and reject the unfit. In other words, the selection was made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit. The seniors among the clerks were selected subject to suitability. Those persons who were entitled to be given preference under the rules were considered separately and recruited at the first instance. Only thereafter the other recruitments were made. The rules do not prescribe that the recruitment should be made on the basis of merit and merit alone. Bearing in mind the fact that the recruitment with which we are concerned in this case is a recruitment by transfer which means recruitment from among the ministerial officials, the method adopted by the Registrar appears to us to be the most reasonable one.