Case: Modula India Vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo

1. A somewhat important question as to the nature and scope of the rights available to a defendant whose defense has been struck out calls for determination in this appeal in the particular context of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The appeal arises from the judgment of a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court constituted to resolve a conflict in the earlier decisions of the same court on this issue. The Full Bench, by a majority of two (P.K. Banerjee and Chittatosh Mookerjee, JJ) to one (Ramendra Mohan Datta, Acting C.J.) decided that in a matter where the defence against delivery of possession has been struck out under Sub-section 3 of Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the defendant-tenant cannot cross-examine the witnesses called by the plaintiff, excepting on the point of notice under Section 13(6) of the said Act. The correctness of the view taken by the majority is contested in this appeal.2. Though the learned Judges were of opinion that the issue decided on the reference raised substantial questions of law of general importance, they considered themselves unable to grant a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court since the reference had arisen only on an interim order and the view expressed did not result in a judgment, order or decree against which leave to appeal could be granted. Thereupon the aggrieved party filed a petition for special leave to appeal before this Court, which was granted. It is in this manner that the issue has been brought up before this Court.3. A detailed factual background is not necessary since the question raised is purely one of law. It may, however, be mentioned that the respondent in this appeal filed a suit in 1979 on the original side of the Calcutta High Court praying for a decree directing the defendant (present appellant) to deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of certain premises in Calcutta and also for a decree for mesne profits or damages from February 1, 1978 till the date of delivery of possession. The appellant, a company carrying on business at the premises in question, filed its written statement denying the averments in the plaint and the claims made therein. During the pendency of the suit several interlocutory applications were made from time to time in which orders were passed directing the present appellant (hereinafter referred to as the tenant) to deposit certain sums in court. At one stage it appears that the tenant made an application praying that he may be permitted to deposit the arrears of rent in monthly installments along with the current rents. No orders were passed on this application on the ground that the application was out of time. However, it appears that subsequent to disposal of this application, the defence of the tenant had been struck off under the provisions of Section 17(3) of the Act. The correctness of this order striking out the defence of the tenant has become final and is no longer in issue. It, however, appears that the tenant contended before the trial court (though the details are not available on record) that the order under Section 17(3) could, at worst, preclude the tenant only from adducing evidence, oral or documentary, in support of the averments made in its written statement. It was claimed that it was open to the tenant to exercise his rights-(a) of cross-examining the plaintiffs witnesses;(b) of pointing out to the court the factual and legal infirmities in the plaintiffs case; and(c) of addressing arguments on the basis of evidence as adduced by the plaintiff and tested by the cross-examination on behalf of the defendant.

Reasoning: 14. We have considered the contentions urged on behalf of both the parties and the respective view points of the two lines of decisions of the High Court. We have also perused the decisions of this Court to which reference has been made. Though none of them is a direct decision on the issue before us, the observations made, in so far as they enunciate general principles and relate to analogous statutory provisions are most helpful and instructive. After giving careful thought to all the aspects, we have come to the conclusion that the view expressed in the case under appeal by Ramendra Mohan Dutta, Acting Chief Justice, is preferable to the view taken by the other two learned Judges. It is a more liberal and equitable view and also one consistent with the requirements of justice in such cases. We proceed now to set out the reasons for our conclusion.15. A provision like the one in Section 17(4) is a provision in terrorem. It penalises the defendant for certain defaults of his. As pointed out by the decisions earlier referred to, the court will act with great circumspection before striking out the defence of a tenant under this provision. This Court has interpreted provisions like this in rent acts to say that striking off of defence is not obligatory on the court merely because there is a default and that it is a matter for exercise of great judicial restraint. But it does not necessarily follow that, once the defence is struck off, the defendant is completely helpless and that his conduct of the case should be so crippled as to render a decree against him inevitable. To hold so would be to impose on him a punishment disproportionate to his default. The observations made by this Court, while discussing the provisions of the CPC, and the Original Side rules of the Calcutta High Court which deal with somewhat analogous situations, cannot be lightly brushed aside. Those decisions have enunciated a general equitable principle. We are also of the same view that provisions of this type should be construed strictly and that the disabilities of a person in default should be limited to the minimum extent consistent with the requirements of justice. This should be all the more so in the context of a tenancy legislation, the main object of which is to confer protection on tenants against eviction by the landlord, unless certain statutory conditions are fulfilled. The provisions should not be given any wider operation than could have been strictly intended by the legislature.16. It has already been noticed that, in the Calcutta High Court, there has been unanimity on the point that, even where defence is struck out, the validity of the notice under Section 13(6) is challengeable. This has been the settled view of that court for several years now which it would be inequitable to disturb after such a long time. This type of cases, however, has been sought to be distinguished on the ground that such notice is a condition precedent to the institution of the suit and cannot perhaps be described as a defence to the suit. This, however, is too tenuous a distinction. For, in truth and substance the plea regarding the validity of the notice has invariably to be taken as a plea in defence in such suits. The rule, therefore, is really an exception to the strict application of a rule that a tenant whose defence is struck off cannot be heard at all against the plea of ejectment.17. We agree that full effect should be given to the words that defence against ejectment is struck off. But does this really deprive the defendant tenant of further participation in the case in any manner? While it is true that, in a broad sense, the right of defence takes in, within its canvass, all aspects including the demolition of the plaintiffs case by the cross-examination of his witnesses, it would be equally correct to say that the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses really constitutes a finishing touch which completes the plaintiffs case. It is a well established proposition that no oral testimony can be considered satisfactory or valid unless it is tested by cross-examination. The mere statement of the plaintiffs witnesses cannot constitute the plaintiffs evidence in the case unless and until it is tested by cross-examination. The right of the defence to cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses can, therefore, be looked upon not as a part of its own strategy of defence but rather as a requirement without which the plaintiffs evidence cannot be acted upon. Looked at from this point of view it should be possible to take the view that, though the defence of the tenant has been struck out, there is nothing in law to preclude him from demonstrating to the court that the plaintiffs witnesses are not speaking the truth or that the evidence put forward by the plaintiff is not sufficient to fulfill the terms of the statute.18. To us it appears that the basic principle that where a plaintiff comes to the court he must prove his case should not be whittled down even in a case where no defendant appears. It will at once be clear that to say that the Court can only do this by looking the plaintiffs evidence and pleadings supplemented by such questions as the court may consider necessary and to completely eliminate any type of assistance from the defendant in this task will place the court under a great handicap in discovering the truth or otherwise of the plaintiffs statements. For after all, the court on its own motion, can do very little to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the plaintiffs averments and it is only the opposite party that will be more familiar with the detailed facts of a particular case and that can assist the court in pointing out defects, weaknesses, errors and inconsistencies of the plaintiffs case.19. We, therefore, think that the defendant should be allowed his right of cross-examination and arguments. But we are equally clear that this right should be subject to certain important safeguards. The first of these is that the defendant cannot be allowed to lead his own evidence. None of the observations or decisions cited have gone to the extent of suggesting that, inspite of the fact that the defence has been struck off, the defendant can adduce evidence of his own or try to substantiate his own case.20. Secondly, there is force in the apprehension that if one permits cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses by the defendant whose defence is struck off, procedural chaos may result unless great case is exercised and that it may be very difficult to keep the cross-examination within the limits of the principles discussed earlier. Under the guise of cross-examination and purported demolition of the plaintiffs case, the defendant may attempt to put forward pleas of his own. To perceive quickly the difference between questions put out to elicit a reply from the plaintiff which may derogate from his own case and questions put out to substantiate pleas in defence which the defendant may have in mind and to restrict the cross-examination to its limits will be not easy task. We think, however, that this is a difficulty of procedure, rather than substance. As pointed out by Ramendra Mohan Dutta, J. this is a matter to be sorted out in practical application rather than by laying down a hard and fast rule of exclusion.21. A third safeguard which we would like to impose is based on the observations of this Court in Sangram Singhs case. As pointed out therein, the essence of the matter in all such cases is that the latitude that may be extended by the court to the defendant inspite of his not having filed a written statement, should not cause prejudice to the plaintiff. Where the defendant does not file a written statement or where he does not appear to contest the case the plaintiff proceeds on the basis that there is no real opposition and contents himself by letting in just enough evidence to establish a prima facie case. Therefore, the court should ensure that by permitting the defendant at a later stage either to cross-examine the witnesses or to participate in the proceeding the plaintiff is not taken by surprise or gravely prejudiced. This difficulty however can be easily overcome in practice, because there is a wide discretion with the court and it is always open to the court, where it believes that the plaintiff has been misled, to exercise its discretion to shut out cross-examination or to regulate it in such manner as to avoid any real prejudice to the interests of the plaintiff.22. An objection to our above conclusion has been raised on the basis of the provisions of Order VIII of the CPC. Rules 1, 5 and 10 of this Order have been recently amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. We find nothing in these rules which will support the contention urged on behalf of the respondents. Rule 1 merely requires that the defendant should present a written statement of his defence within the time permitted by the court. Under Rule 5(2), where the defendant has not filed a pleading it shall be lawful for the court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint except against a person under disability but the court may in its discretion require any such fact to be proved. Again under Rule 0 when any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. It will be seen that these rules are only permissive in nature. They enable the court in an appropriate case to pronounce a decree straightaway on the basis of the plaint and the averments contained therein. Though the present language of Rule 0 says that the court shall pronounce judgment against him, it is obvious from the language of the rule that there is still an option with the court either to pronounce judgment on the basis of the plaint against the defendant or to make such other appropriate order as the court may think fit. Therefore, there is nothing in these rules, which makes it mandatory for the court to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff straightaway because a written statement has not been filed. Reference was made before us to Sub-rule 1 of Rule 5. This Sub-rule, however, has application only in a case where a pleading is filed but does not contain a specific or implicit denial of the averments contained in the plaint or other document to which it is a reply. Rule 5(1) cannot be made use of to sustain the contention that where there is no written statement the court is bound to accept the statements contained in the plaint and pass a decree straightaway. These provisions of the CPC, far from supporting the contentions of the plaintiff that a decree on the basis of the plaint should follow a failure to file the written statement, rather indicate a contrary position, namely, that even in such cases, it is a matter for the court to exercise a discretion as to the manner in which the further proceedings should take place. We, therefore, do not think that the terms of Order VIII in any way conflict with the conclusion reached by us.