Case: Kishanchand Narsinghdas Bhatia Vs. State Transport Appellate Authority &amp; Ors

2. The appellant had applied for renewal of his stage carriage permit for that route. Respondent No. 3 and another person of the name of Balwantrao Gaikwad and the Madhya Pradesh Road Transport Corporation filed applications for grant of a fresh permit for the same route. As the application of Balwantrao Gaikwad was not ripe for hearing and the Corporation withdrew its application, the Regional Transport Authority considered the rival claims of the appellant and respondent No. 3. The latter made an offer at the hearing that he would run an air-cooled 1965 model vehicle. The Transport Authority, however, took the view that the offer had been made by way of a competitive bid. In its opinion both the applicants were at par in the matter of coverage and adverse remarks, but the appellant was superior in experience and provision of facilities for passengers. The permit of the appellant was renewed for a period of three years from the date of its expiry on the existing terms.Respondent No. 3 preferred an appeal under S. 64 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was disposed of by the State Transport Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority gave weight to the fact that whereas respondent No. 3 had offered to run an air-cooled vehicle of 1965 model, no such offer had been made by the appellant who was operating the route with a vehicle of 1957 model. It further found that the appellant had not been running the bus on the kachha portion of the road during the rainy season in the years 1962 and 1983. This was taken to amount to "adverse record of considerable significance" against the appellant. The Appellate Authority therefore decided that respondent No. 3 was entitled to the grant of the permit as against the renewal of the permit in favour of the appellant; It made a direction that a permit be issued to respondent No. 3 for a period of three years provided he put into service an air-cooled vehicle within four months.The appellant moved the High Court by means of a writ petition. It appears from the order of the Division Bench that the following points were pressed on behalf of the appellant :(1) Respondent No. 3 had not applied for the grant of a fresh permit for the same route for which renewal had been applied for by the appellant.(2) The Appellate Authority had taken into account an extraneous consideration when it regarded respondent No. 3s offer of operating an air-cooled bus as giving material superiority.(3) The finding that the appellant had been guilty of non-maintenance having not operated service on the kachha section of the route during the rainy season for two years was not well founded.(4) The Appellate Authority did not give due weight to all the relevant considerations.The High Court found that the Appellate Authority had rightly regarded the application of respondent No. 3 as one made for the same route and that the offer of operating an air-cooled bus was a perfectly relevant consideration and could not be regarded as extraneous vice Samrathmal v. State Transport Appellate Authority, C. A. No. 503 of 1965, D/- 25-8-1965 (SC). It was further of the opinion that the Appellate Authority had rightly not accepted the explanation of the appellant that the kachha section of the route was not operable during the rainy season, because respondent No. 3, who held a permit for Indore-Digthan route (which was the same as the Digthan-Indore route) had maintained the service even during the rainy season without finding it risky to do so. The High Court repelled the last contention raised before it by relying on Sri Rama Vilas Service (P.) Ltd. v. C. Chandrasekaran, 1964-5 SCR 860=(AIR 1965 SC 107  ) according to which it was for the Transport Authority to appreciate how public interest would be best served and in doing so it was entitled to take the view that one consideration was more likely to effectuate it than the other.

Reasoning: In cases of the present kind this court would be naturally reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the Act, specially when the legislature has entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the aforesaid authorities or tribunals which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention under the provisions contained in the Act.The present case has not been shown to contain any such infirmity as would justify interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The limitation on the exercise of power under that Article cannot be defined with any precision; but as observed in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal, 1955-1 SCR 941   = (AIR 1955 SC 65  ) the power being of an exceptional and overriding nature it has to be exercised sparingly with caution and only in special and extraordinary situations. It is well known by now that this court will not decide a matter brought before it by special leave as if it were an appeal court and examine or review findings of fact unless it can be shown that they are perverse or are such as are shocking to judicial conscience or the like, the paramount consideration always being the perpetuation of justice.