Case: City Of Nagpur Corporation Vs. John Servage Phillip &amp; Anr

1. This appeal is against an order of the High Court of Bombay issuing a writ whereby the Municipal Corporation of Nagpur, the appellant before us, was restrained from carrying out a resolution proposing to send two of its members as delegates to a Health Congress at Harrogate in U. K. and sanctioning certain expenses in connection with the delegation.2. There is no doubt that if what a Corporation proposes to do is what it had been authorised by its incorporating statute to do it is not the business of a court to interfere with the mode in which the Corporation decides to act: see mayor etc., of Westminster v. London and North Western Ry. Co., 1905 AC 42. If therefore, the appellant Corporation had power under its incorporating statute,the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948, to send delegates to the Congress at Harrogate, it would appear prima facie that the writ was erroneously issued by the High Court. Now, S. 58 (s) of the ActCorporation may in its discretion provide from time to time either wholly or partly for all or any of the following matters, namely... ... ... ... ... ...... ... ... ... ... ... ...(s) any other matter likely to promote the public health, safety and convenience of thequestion is whether the action of the appellant Corporation is within this section.

Reasoning: 7. We think it right also to point out that in the petition for the writ it had not been said that the resolution was bad because the expenses sanctioned by it were outside the budget. That being so, this point should not have been taken into consideration by the High Court. It is true that the Corporation at the request of the High Court placed before the High Court some of the papers in connection with the budget. That the Corporation out of respect to the High Court should have done and, therefore, actually did. From this it cannot be contended that the appellant Corporation never objected to the resolution being challenged on the around of a want of express provision in the budget for the expenses of the delegation or would not have been prejudiced in the hearing of the petition if the resolution was attacked on the ground of want of a provision in the budget. This challenge involved a question of fact and without proper pleadings, the appellant Corporation was surely at a disadvantage in meeting it. Furthermore, we are not sure that S. 84 would have made the resolution invalid. That section only prohibits an expenditure for which the budget does not provide. So it may be that all that S. 84 affects is the actual expenditure. It may not affect the resolution itself.8. We think it right to point out that the High Court held that the appellant Corporation had acted honestly. It observed that the circumstances did not warrant the inference that the action of the Corporation was mala fide. That being so, and the action proposed being clearly within the statutory powers of the appellant Corporation, we think that the High court was in error in issuing the writ.9. We may now notice one or two points of minor importance argued at the bar on behalf of the respondents. It was said that the question raised in this appeal had become academic since the Congress was long over. It may be stated that the Congress was held from April 27 to May 1, 1959 and the writ was issued by the High Court on April 23, 1959. It is suggested that it is not, therefore, a fit case for decision in an appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. We are not at all impressed by this contention. It seems to us that it is a matter of the utmost importance for the appellant Corporation to know its rights under its incorporating statute. It will have to guide itself according to our decision in future when a similar point arises again. If we do not decide the point raised now, then on every subsequent occasion the Corporation would be bound by the judgment of the High Court under appeal and by the time the matter is brought up here the same argument that the question has become academic can always be raised to defeat the point. We think that the point raised by the appellant Corporation as to its powers under the statute and how far courts can review the exercise of its power by the appellant Corporation is of great importance and must be decided in this appeal.10. It is also said that in 1948 when the City of Nagpur Corporation Act was passed, these delegations were not in contemplation. Therefore, S. 58 (s) cannot be interpreted as including promotion of public health by sending of delegations. Thus is, in our view, a completely idle contention. We have no reason to think that the delegations were not sent in 1948.In any case, statutes cannot be confined only to thoughts prevalent at the time when they were enacted. They are put in general words to embrace innovations as they come along. Therefore, even if in 1948, delegations by Corporations were not in contemplation, there is nothing to prevent us interpreting S. 58 (s) as including within matters likely to promote public health, actions involving the sending of delegations where promotion of public health becomes likely as a result thereof.