Case: N. Narasimhaiah &amp; Others Vs. State of Karnataka, Union of India &amp; Others

2. Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act [1 of 1894] [for shorts "the Act"] acquiring total extent of 114 acres of land in Narayanpura Village in Bangalore Districts Karnataka was published for public purpose, viz., Defence Research & Development Organization, Government of India. The Government, exercising the power under Section 17(4), dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act and the modification under Section 4(1) was accordingly published on January 22, 1987. Thereafter, the declaration under Section 6 was published on June 24, 1987.3. The appellants had challenged the exercise of emergency power under Section 17(4) by filing W.P. No.13316-20/1987 and batch in the High Court of Karnataka and the learned single Judge quashed the order of the Government dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A and directed as underthe result these petitions are partly allowed and the declaration dated 24.6.1987 published in the Gazette dated 6.8.1987 made under Section 6(2) of the Act read with Section 17(1) of the Act as also that portion of the Preliminary Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act in so far as the petitioners lands are concerned and also the notice under Section 9(1) of the Act dated 12.8.1987 are quashed reserving liberty for the authorities to continue the acquisition proceedings from the stage of preliminary notification. The petitioners shall file their objections against the preliminary notification within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order and they shall file their objections against the preliminary notification within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order and they shall present themselves before the Land Acquisition Officer - 3rd respondent on 15.7.1988 without awaiting any fresh notices from the said officer. The Land Acquisition Officer shall hold the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act expeditiously and complete the proceedings in accordance with law.Thereafter, enquiry under Section 5A was conducted and declaration thereof was published on May 13, 1989. The validity of this declaration was again questioned in present Writ Petition No.19245/89 and batch. The learned single Judge again allowed the writ petitions. The Division Bench by judgment dated April 22, 1993 in Writ Appeal No.2189-97 of 1992 and batch allowed the appeals; set aside the order of the learned single Judge and consequently upheld the declaration published under Section 6 of the Act.5. The learned single Judge had quashed the notification in the first instance giving liberty to the Government to conduct an enquiry under Section 5A and it was accordingly completed within one year from the date of the judgment. Declaration under Section 6 was published. The declaration under Section 6 published in the first instance was within the period prescribed under proviso to Section 6(1). The Division Bench has held that after the declaration under Section 6 was quashed in the first instance, the limitation of one year does not apply. It further held that the view that the declaration under Section 6 is still required to be published from the date of the notification under Section 4(1) is not correct in law. It also found that since there was no evidence on record as to which was the last of the dates of the publications contemplated under Section 4(1), it could not be said that the limitation under Section 6 from that date is barred by limitation.

Reasoning: 10. The limitation, under the first proviso begins to run from the last of the date on which the notification under Section 4(1) is published. By operation of clause (ii) of first proviso to sub-section (1), the declaration under Section 6 shall be published within one year from the date of the last of the dates of the publication of the notification as required under Section 4(1) of the Act. Explanation I to Section 6(1) postulates that in computing the period referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4 (1) is stayed by an order of the Court, the period during which the proceedings are pending, shall be excluded. In other words, before the declaration under Section 6 is published, if further proceedings are stayed by an order of the Court, further action stands interdicted, the running of limitation stops and the time occupied in the Court proceedings should be excluded in computation of the period of limitation mentioned in proviso to Section 6(1). After the said period is excluded and if the declaration published is within the limitation of one year, then necessarily the notification under Section 4(1) would remain valid.11. If that be the position, when the exercise of the power under Section 17(4) dispensing with enquiry under Section 5A is quashed by the Court and liberty is given to the State to proceed further in accordance with law, i.e., to conduct enquiry under Section 5A and even after conducting the enquiry as prescribed under Section 5A the Government forms opinion that the land was needed for public purpose and declaration was published, the question is: whetherthe limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) would still remain operative and be capable to be compliedHaving considered the respective contentions, we are of the considered view that if the construction as put up by the learned counsel for the appellants is given acceptance, i.e., it should be within one year from the last of the dates of publication under Section 4(1), the public purpose would always be frustrated. It may be illustrated thus: In a given case where the notification under Section 4(1) was published, dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A and declaration was published within one month and as the urgency in the opinion of the Government was such that it did not brook the delay of 30 days and immediate possession was necessary, but possession was not taken due to dilatory tactics of the interested person and Court ultimately finds after two years that the exercise of urgency power was not warranted and so it was neither valid nor proper and directed the Government to give an opportunity to the interested person and the State to conduct an enquiry under Section 5A, then the exercise of the power pursuant to the direction of the Court will be fruitless as it would take time to conduct enquiry. If the enquiry is dragged for obvious reasons, declaration under Section 6(1) cannot be published within the limitation from the original date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). A valid notification under Section 4(1) becomes invalid. On the other hand, after conducting enquiry as per Court order and, if the declaration under Section 6 is published within one year from the date of the receipt of the order passed by the High Court, the notification under Section 4(1) becomes valid since the action was done pursuant to the orders of the Court and compliance with the limitation prescribed in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to sub-section (1) of the Act would be made.13. It is true that this Court in OxfordSchools case (supra) in paragraph 7 had held that when declaration under Section 6 was quashed and the notification under Section 4(1) was upheld. the second declaration is required to be published within the same period prescribed in clause (i) of first proviso. In that case, the limitation of three years under clause (i) of the first proviso to sub-section <1) could not be complied with. The notification under Section 4(1) was held to be invalid. Unfortunately, the above distinction was not brought to the notice of this Court when the case was considered and decided. Similarly, the ratio in P.Chinnannas case (supra) directly does not deal with the problem but observations in paragraph S do support the contention of the appellants as possession was not taken in these cases and the observations get attracted. But it was not necessary in that case to deal with that question since the possession under Section 17(2) was already taken and the land stood vested in the