Case: Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Limited and Another

The Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1971, the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973, and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 were respectively enacted in that order.3. First came the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency) Provision. Act 1971 which provided for the taking over of the management of coking coal mines and coke oven plants pending nationalisation of such mines and plants. Sec. 3(1) of the Act declared that on and from the appointed day, the management of all coking coal mines shall vest in the Central Government. All coking coal mines which were known to exist were specified in the First Schedule to the Act and Sec. 3(2) declared that those were the coking coal mines whose management vested in the Central Government under sub- sec. (1). It was further provided that if any coal mine was found , after investigation made by the Coal Board, to contain coking coal, a declaration to the effect shall be made by the Board and thereupon the management of such mine shall vest in the Central Government and the mine shall be deemed to be included in the First Schedule. The idea clearly was not to leave out of the management of the Central Government any coking coal mine. The words mine, coking coal mine and coke oven plant were separately defined in the Act. Mine was defined widely enough that coking coal mine would take within its expanse coke oven plants belonging to or in a mine. By the very force of the definition of mine, the management of coke oven plants belonging to or in coking coal mines also stood vested in the Central Government from the appointed day. This aspect of the matter will be considered in slightly greater detail when we refer to the provisions of the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act. As one may well expect, there were some coke oven plants which were situated near about coking coal mines but which did not belong to the owners of such mines and the management of which did not, therefore, automatically vest in the Central Government along with the vesting of the management of the coking coal mines. It was apparently thought necessary and desirable that the management of such coke oven plants also should be taken over. Twelve such coke oven plants were identified and specified in the Second Schedule and by Sec. 7 of the Act the management of the coke oven plants specified in Second Schedule were declared to vest in the Central Government.4. Next, The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was enacted "t o provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owner of the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule, and the right, title and interest of the owners of such coke oven plants as are in or about the said coking coal mines with a view to reorganising and reconstructing such mines and plants for the purpose of protecting, conserving and promoting scientific development of the resources of coking coal needed to meet the growing requirements of the iron and steel industry and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". By Section 4 of the Act the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule stands transferred to and vests absolutely in the Central Government. The First Schedule mentions the names of 214 coking coal mines, with their location and with the names and addresses of the owners of the mines. Coking coal mine is defined by Section 3(c) to mean "a coal mine in which there exist one or more seams of coking coal, whether exclusively or in addition to any seam of other coal". Mine is, defined by s. 3(j) to mean "any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on", and to include, among otherall lands, buildings, works, adits, levels, planes, machinery and equipment, vehicles, railways, tramways and sidings belonging to, or about, a mine;"all lands, buildings and equipment belonging to, or in, a mine where the washing of coal or manufacture of coke is carriedmay also notice here the definition of Coke Oven Plants as in s. 3(b) which is as follows:"coke oven plant" means the plant and equipment with which the manufacture of hard coke has been, or is being, carried on, and... ... ...(ii) ... ... ...(iii) ... ... ...(iv) ... ... ...(v) all lands, buildings and equipment belonging to the coke oven plant where the washing of coal is carried on,(vi) ... ... ...If the definition of coke oven plant in s. 3(b) is read alongside clause (vi) and (x) of s. 3(j) which defines mine, it becomes plain that coke oven plant belonging to or in a mine is treated as comprised in mine as defined. Therefore, all coke oven plants belong to or in the mines mentioned in the First Schedule, by the very force of the definition of mine, go with the mines and the right, title and interest t hereto vest in the Central Government under s. 4(1) of the Act. But the object of the Act was not merely to acquire the right, title and interest of the owners of the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule including the coke oven plants in or belonging to such coking coal mines but also to acquire the right, title and interest of the owners of coke oven plants which were generally, in or about such coking coal mines, even if they did not belong to the owners of such mines. Apparently , it was not thought sufficient to acquire the coke oven plants in the acquired mines or belonging to the owners of the acquired mines but it was thought necessary, also, to acquire the coke oven plants which were near about the acquired mines. So a separate provision had to be made in the Act to acquire such coke oven plants as were near about the acquired mines but did not belong to the owners of the mines. Twelve such coke oven plants, the same twelve coke oven plants which w ere mentioned in the Second Schedule to the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act, are again specified in the Second Schedule to the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act too and s. 5 of the Act provides that the right, title and interest of the owners of each of the coke oven plants specified in the Second Schedule, being the coke oven plants which are situated in or about the coking coal mines specified in the First Schedule also vest in the Central Government. Thus, all coke oven plants which belonged to or which were in the mines specified in the First Schedule stood transferred to the Central Government along with those mines and, in addition, the twelve coke oven plants specified in the Second Schedule which did not belong to the mines but which were near about coking coal mines also stood transferred to the Central Government.6. In order that the ground may straight away be cleared, we must mention here that in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. P.K. Agarw ala and Anr.(1) Krishna Iyer and A.P. Sen, JJ. considered the definitions of "Mine" and "coke oven plant" in the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 and expressed the view, wrongly in our opinion, that Coking Coal Mine did not include a coke oven plant. The learned judges appear to have thought that there was a dichotomy between the word mine on the one hand and the words coke oven plant on the other and that was why separate provision was made in the same Act f or the nationalisation of mines and coke oven plants. The learned Judgesmust be said in fairness to counsel that there was some bafflement when confronted by these provisions although on a broader consideration, we are clear in our mind that a dichotomy was made by the statute between mines on the one hand as defined in Section 3(j) and coke oven plants as defined in s. 3(b) on the other. To give meaning to this dichotomy one has to read coke oven plants as clearly out from the mines, which in turn means that mere equipment where washing of coal or manufacture of coal is done as a simple subsidiary or an equipment or machinery which is a small part of a mine cannot be exalted to the position of a coke oven plant which, as Section 3(b) bears out, is an important but separate equipment with which the manufacture of hard coke is carried on. This is a processing of considerable significance, for coal that is extracted from a colliery has an independent existence. It cannot be confused with a minor item such as is covered by s. 3(j)(xi) or (x) of the Act. It is easy to find industrial similarity when we are referring to oil mines. It is one thing to take over oil fields and minor machinery or equipment that may be attached thereto necessary for the very mining operation, but by no stretch of imagination can it be said that nationalisation of oil fields or mines also covers oil refineries. In this view, we think that there is no substance in the submission on behalf of the appellant (Union of India) that mine b y definition includes cokeWe are afraid, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by Krishna Iyer and A.P. Sen, JJ. that coal mine as defined in s. 3(j) particularly cls. (vi) and (x) does not include coke oven plant. As already mentioned by us, there were in existence coke oven plants in or about coking coal mines, some of which belonged to the owners of the mines and some to persons other than the owners of the mines. The object of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was to nationalise all coking coal mines and coke oven plants situated in or about the mines whether or not they belonged to the owners of the mines. Those which belonged to the owners of the mines went with the mines but those which did not belong to the owners of the mines, obviously, did not so go with the mines and separate provision had to be made for their nationalisation, and payment of compensation etc. That was the reason for the separate definition of coke oven plant and the separate provision for the nationalisation of certain coke oven plants. The reason was not any dichotomy between the word mine on the one hand and the words coke oven plant on the other as was supposed in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. P.K. Agarwala. As was said, the separate definition of coke oven plant and the separate provision for the nationalisation of coke oven plants was necessary to cover those coke oven plants which were situated in or about the nationalised mines but which did not belong to the owners of those mines. It is important to note that all coke oven plants were not nationalised; only those which were situated in or about the nationalised coking coal mines were nationalised. There w as no separate legislation providing for the take-over of all coke oven plants but as a part of the legislation to take over coking coal mines, such coke oven plants as were in or about the mines were also nationalised. Quite obviously coke oven plants situated in for about coking coal mines had to be nationalised along with the mines in the interests of convenience and efficiency of the coal industry and to minimise the opportunities for clandestine operations for which the coal industry has become notorious. Coke oven plants away from the mines were not touched either by the Coking Coal (Emergency Provisions Act) or the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act.8. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was followed soon thereafter by the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1973. Coal Mine is defined by sec. 2(b) of the Act to mean a mine in which there exists one or more seams of coal. It is seen that the definition of coal mines takes in coking coal mines also. Mine is defined by Section 2(g) in practically the same terms as in Section 3(j) of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act with some differences which are not material for the purposes of this c ase. Sec. 3(1) provides that on and from the appointed day, the managements of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government. The provision is peremptory; all coal mines whether they are coking coal mines or non-coking coal mines are included; none is excluded. Sec. 3(2) further provides that the coal mines specified in the schedule to the Act shall be deemed to be the coal mines the management of which shall vest in the Central Government under sub-sec. (1) and further that if the existence of any coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, the Central Government shall make a declaration about the existence of such mine and the management of such coal mine shall thereupon be deemed to vest in the Central Government and the coal mine deemed to be included in the schedule. After the Coal Mines (Taking over of management) Act 1972, came the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 which was enacted "to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right, title and interest of the owners in respect of the coal mines specified in the schedule with a view to re-organising and re-constructing such coal mines so as to ensure the rational, coordinated and scientific development and utilisation of coal resources consistent with the growing requirements of the country in order that the ownership and control of such resources are vested in the State and thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common good and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto".The expressions coal mine and mine are defined on practically the same lines as in the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act. Sec. 3(1) declares that on the appointed day, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal mines specified in the schedule shall stand transferred to and shall vest absolutely in the Central Government free from all encumbrances. Sec. 3(2) provides that if the existence of any other coal mine comes to the knowledge of the Central Government, after the appointed day, the provisions of the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act shall apply to such mine until that mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation. We have already mentioned that the expression mine is defined in the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act in practically the same terms as in the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions) Act and the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. The definition is so wide, as to take in coke oven plants belonging to or in the mine. So, all coke oven plants belonging to or in a coal mine are nationalised along with the mine. But, there are no provisions in the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973 corresponding to Section 5 of and the Second Schedule to the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act 1972 to cover coke oven plants which are situated near the coal mines but which do not belong to the owners of the mines. Therefore, coke oven plants not belonging to or in coal mines (not already nationalised under the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act are left out of the Coal Mines (Taking over of Management) Act and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Of course, coke oven plants situated away from the mines are not touched by either the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 or the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972.9. The final result of these statutes is that all coal mines known to exist in the country are nationalised, whether they are coking coal mines or non-coking coal mines. Along with them coke oven plants in or belonging to the mines also stand nationalised. In addition twelve specified coke oven plants not belonging to the owners of the mines but known to exist near about the mines are also nationalised. All other coke oven plants are left out o f the scheme of nationalisation. The design revealed by the Acts is that mining of coal is reserved entirely for the public sector, and so, all existing coal mines, whether coking coal or non-coking coal, are nationalised and the management of mines which may be discovered in the future is automatically taken over by the Central Government until nationalisation by appropriate legislation; and, the manufacture of hard coke from coal is reserved for the joint sector and so all coke oven plants belonging to or in coal mines and twelve specified coke oven plants are nationalised while all other coke oven plants are left for private exploitation ; there is no ban against any new coke oven plants being set up.10. Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, who were the owners of the coke oven plant described in Item 9 of the Second Schedule and Bhowra Coke Company, who were the owners of the Coke oven plant described in Item 2 of the Second Schedule filed writ petitions in the Calcutta High Court challenging the inclusion of these coke oven plants in the Second Schedule. The writ petitions have been withdrawn to this Court for disposal. The principal ground of challenge was that other coke oven plants standing in exactly the same position as the coke oven plants of the petitioners were left out and had not been nationalised; there was, therefore, rank discrimination. It was said that as many as eighty seven new coke oven plants were allowed to come into existence subsequent to the Nationalisation Act and so the nationalisation of twelve of the existing coke oven plants was ex-facie arbitrary and discriminatory. There were other grounds, branches and shades of challenge to which we shall refer later in the course of the judgment. The straight answer of the Central Government was that the provisions of the Act were immune from the challenge based on the ground of discrimination because of the protection afforded by Art. 31C of the Constitution . The Central Government also defended the inclusion of the coke oven plants of the petitioners in Second Schedule on merits and explained how it came about that certain coke oven plants were excluded.

Reasoning: If this be the correct interpretation of the constitutional provision s, as I think it is, the amended Article 31 C does no more than codify the existing position under the constitutional scheme by providing immunity to a law enacted really ann genuinely for giving effect to a Directive Principle, so that needlessly futile and time consuming controversy whether such law contravenes Article 14 or 19 isow the question is what should be the test for determining whether a law is enacted for giving effect to a Directive Principle. One thing is clear that a claim to that effect put forward by the State would have no meaning or value; it is the court which would have to determine the question. Again it is not enough that there may be some connection between a provision of the law and a Directive Principle. The connection has to be between the law and the Directive Principle and it must be a real and substantial connection. To determine whether a law satisfies this test, the court would have to examine the pith and substance, the true nature and character of the law as also its design and the subject matter dealt with by it together with its object and scope. If on such examination, the court finds that the dominant object of the law is to give effect to the Directive Principle, it would accord protection to the law under the amended Article 31C. But if the court finds that the law though passed seemingly for giving effect to a Directive Principle, is, in pith and substance. One for accomplishing an unauthorised purpose-unauthorised in the sense of not being covered by any Directive Principle, such law would not have the protection of the amended Art. 31C.he point I wish to emphasize is that the amended Article 31C does not give protection to a law which has merely some remote or tenuous connection with a Directive Principle. What is necessary is that there must be a real and substantial connection and the dominant object of the law must be to give effect to the Directive Principle, and that is a matter which the court would have to decide before any claim for protection under the amended Article 31C can be allowed.at pp.therefore, protection is claimed in respect of a statute under the amended Article 31C, the court would have first to determine whether there is real and substantial connection between the law and a Directive Principle and the predominant object of the law is to give effect to such Directive Principle and if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the court would then have to consider which are the provisions of the law basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the Directive Principle and give protection of the amended Article 31 C only to those provisions. The question whether any particular provision of the law is basically and essentially necessary for giving effect to the Directive Principle, would depend, to a large extent, on how closely and integrally such provision is connected with the implementation of the Directive Principle. If the court finds that a particular provision is subsidiary or incidental or not essentially and integrally connected with the implementation o f the Directive Principle or is of such a nature that, though seemingly a part of the general design of the main provisions of the statute, its dominant object is to achieve an unauthorised purpose, it would not enjoy the protection of the amended Article 31(C) and would be liable to be struck down as invalid if it violates Article 14 or 19.While we broadly agree with much that has been said by Bhagwati J. in the extracts above quoted, we do not think that those observations really advance Mr. Sens contention. To accept the submission of Shri Sen that a law founded on discrimination is not entitled to the protection of Art. 31C, as such a law can never be said to be to further the Directive Principle affirmed in Art. 39(b), would indeed be, to use a hackneyed phrase, to put the cart before the horse. If the law made to further the Directive Principle is necessarily non-discriminatory or is based on a reasonable classification, then such law does not need any protection such as that afforded by Art. 31C. Such law would be valid on its own strength, with no aid from Art. 31C. To make it a condition precedent that a law seeking the haven of Art. 31C must be non-discriminatory or based on reasonable classification is to make Art. 31C meaningless. If Art. 14 is not offended, no one need give any immunity from an attack based on Art. 14. Bhagwati J. did not say anything to the contrary. On the order hand, it appears to us, he was at great pains to point out that the broad egalitarian principle of social and economic justice for all was implicit in every Directive Principle and, therefore, a law designed to promote a Directive Principles, even if it came into conflict with the formalistic and doctrinaire view of equality before the law, would most certainly advance the broader egalitarian principle and the desirable constitutional goal of social and economic justice for all. If the law was aimed at the broader egalitarianism of the Directive Principles, Art. 31C protected the law from needless, unending and rancorous debate on the question whether the law contravened Art. 14s concept of equality before the law. That is how we understand Bhagwati Js observations. Never for a moment did Bhagwati J. let in by another door the very controversy which was shut out by Art. 31C. Of course, the law seeking the immunity afforded by Art. 31 C must be a law directing the policy of the State towards securing a Directive Principle. Here, we are content to use the very words of Art. 31C, While we agree with Bhagwati, J. that the object of the law must be to give effect to the Directive Principle and that the connection with the Directive Principle must not be some remote or tenuous connection, we deliberately refrain from the use of the words real and substantial, dominant, basically and essentially necessary and closely and integrally connected lest anyone chase after t he meaning of these expressions, forgetting for the moment the words of the statute, as happened once when the words substantial and compelling reasons were used in connection with appeals against orders of acquittal and a whole body of literature grew up on what were substantial and compelling reasons. As we have already said, we agree with much that has been said by Bhagwati J. And what we have now said about the qualifying words is only to caution ourselves against adjectives getting the better of the noun. Adjectives are attractive forensic aids but in matters of interpretation they are diverting intruders. These observations have the full concurrence of Bhagwati J.19. We are firmly of the opinion th at where Art. 31C comes in Art. 14 goes out. There is no scope for bringing in Art. 14 by a side wind as it were, that is, by equating the rule of equality before the law of Art. 14 with the broad egalitarianism of Art. 39(b) or by treating the principle of Art. 14 as included in the principle of Art. 39(b). To insist on nexus between the law for which protection is claimed and the principle of Art. 39(b) is not to insist on fulfilment of the requirement of Art. 14. They are different concepts and in certain circumstances, may even run counter to each other. That is why the need for the immunity afforded by Art. 31C. Indeed there are bound to be innumerable cases where the narrower concept of equality before the law may frustrate the broader egalitarianism contemplated by Art. 39(b). To illustrate, a law which prescribes that every landholder must surrender twenty percent of his holding as well as a law which prescribes that no one shall hold land in excess of 20 acres, may both satisfy the ritual requirements of Art. 14. But clearly, the first would frustrate and the second would advance the broader egalitarian principle. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the submission of Shri Sen, that any law seeking the protection of Art. 31C must not be a law founded on discrimination.The nationalisation of the coking coal mines and the coke oven plants was with a view to reorganising and reconstructing such mines and plants for the purpose of protecting, conserving and promoting scientific development of the resources of coking coal needed to meet the growing requirements of the iron and steel industry and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. We do not entertain the slightest doubt that the nationalisation of the coking coal mines and the specified coke oven plants for the above purpose was towards securing that the ownership and control of the material resource of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good.We are unable to appreciate the submission of Shri Sen. The expression material resources of the community means all things which are capable of producing wealth for the community. There is no warrant for interpreting the expression in so narrow a fashion as suggested by Shri Sen and confine it to public owned material resources, and exclude private-owned material resources. The expression involves no dichotomy. The words must be understood in the context of the Constitutional goal of establishing a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. Though the word socialist was introduced into the Preamble by a late amendment of the Constitution, that socialism has always been the goal is evident from the Directive Principles of State Policy. The amendment was only to emphasise the urgency. Ownership, control an d distribution of national productive wealth for the benefit and use of the community and the rejection of a system of misuse of its resources for selfish ends is what socialism is about and the words and thought of Art. 39 (b) but echo the familiar language and philosophy of socialism as expounded generally by all socialistArt. 39 (b) refers to material resources of the community it does not refer only to resources owned by the community as a whole but it refers also to resources owned by individual members of the community. Resources of the community do not mean public resources only but include private resources as well. Nor do we understand the word "distribute" to be used in Art. 39 (b) in the limited sense in which Shri Sen wants us to say it is used, that is, in the sense only of retail distribution to individuals. It is used in a wider sense so as to take in all manner and method of distribution such as distribution between regions, distribution between industries, distribution between classes and distribution between public, private and joint sectors. The distribution envisaged by Art. 39(b) necessarily takes within its stride the transformation of wealth from private-ownership into public ownership and is not confined to that which is already public-owned.We hold that the expression `Material resources of the community is not confined to natural resources; it is not confined to resources owned by the public; it means and includes all resources, natural and man-made, public andare unable to see any force in this submission. The distribution between public, private and joint sectors and the extent and range of any scheme of nationalisation are essentially matters of State policy which are inherently in appropriate subjects for judicial review. Scales of justice are just not designed to weigh competing social and economic factors. In such matters legislative wisdom must prevail and judicial review mustobject of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act is to reorganize and reconstruct coking coal mines and coke oven plants for the purpose of protecting, conservi ng and promoting scientific development of the resources of coking coal needed to meet the growing requirements of the Iron and Steel Industry and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The requirements of the Iron and Steel Industry are recognized as `growing requirements and it is found necessary to protect, conserve and promote the scientific development of resources of coking coal so as to meet those growing requirements. The Act is contemplating the future. If the object of the Act is to provide for the future, we do not see what difference it makes if in the past or in the present, the hard coke produced by the nationalised cocking coal mines is diverted elsewhere than the Iron and Steel Industry. The requirements of the Iron any Steel Industry which are to be met by the nationalised coke oven plants are its growing requirements, that is to say, its future requirements. The design of nationalisation as it appears from the statute itself, including the preamble, is that the increasing future demands of the iron and steel industry are to be met by the nationalised coke oven plants and demands of other industry are to be met by the non-nationalised and new coke oven plants That the iron and steel industry is not now utilising the hard coke produced by the nationalised coke oven plants is not material since the industry is expected to expand, its requirements of hard coke are expected to grow and the nationalised coke oven plant s are to be harnessed and be in readiness to meet those requirements.26. In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 is a legislation for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principle specified in Art. 39(b) of the Constitution and is, therefore, immune, under Art. 31(C), from attack on the ground that it offends the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14.27. But we do not also see that there is any merit in the attack based on Art. 14. The facts that we are able to gather from the several affidavits filed in the case are like this: In the beginning, that is, when the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was passed, there were in existence seventy five coke oven plants. Later, that is, after the Nationalisation Acts came into force, eighty seven new coke oven plants came into existence. Now, out of the original seventy five coke oven plants, forty six were part s or units of the coking coal mines which were nationalised by the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. Those forty six coke oven plants stood nationalised as parts or units of the Coking Coal Mines. Another coke oven plant which was in the same posit ion went out of the statutory nationalisation design by reason of the judgment of this Court in Bharat Coking Coal Company v. P.K. Agarwala and another, a judgment from which we have now retracted. We are told that the coke oven plant which was the subject matter of Bharat Coking Coal Company v. P.K. Agarwala has since been acquired by the Central Government by private treaty. Out of the remaining twenty six coke oven plants, twelve were identified as situated near nationalised Coking Coal Mines and so they were expressly specified in the 1972 Nationalisation Act and nationalised.Of the remaining fourteen, eleven were parts or units of non-coking Coal Mines and they too stood nationalised when non-coking coal Mines also were nationalised by the Coal Mines Nationalisation Act, 1973. That leaves out three pre- existing coke oven plants unaccounted. After the passing of the Nationalisation Acts, eighty seven new coke oven plants were allowed to come into existence. Thus, finally, we have three pre-existing and eighty seven new coke oven plants outside the nationalisation scheme.28. From the additional affidavit filed by P.R. Desai on behalf of Bharat Coking Coal Limited, it transpires that when the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was passed, fourteen coke oven plants were left out as they were not situated in or about coking coal mines but they were expected to be nationalised when the coal mines in which they were located or to which they belonged were to be nationalised by the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. In fact, eleven coke oven plants were so nationalised. But it was later discovered that three coke oven plants, Nichitpur Coke Oven Plant, Shri Gopinathpur Coke Oven Plant and Royal Tisra Coke Oven Plant did not belong to the owners of the collieries after which they were named and near which they were located. So they were not covered by the 1973 Nationalisation Act too. Quite obviously, legislation is now necessary to nationalise these three coke oven plants also. The process of nationalisation of the coal industry is, of course, not complete yet. Nationalisation of any industry or means of production may not be and need not be effected all at once. It may be achieved in stages. If in the process of nationalisation, some units are left out in the earlier stages, either because it is so planned or because of some mistake, we do not think we can possibly say that there has been a violation of Art. 14. Nor can we draw any inference of discrimination from the circumstance that subsequently eighty seven new coke even plants have been allowed to come up. Obviously, there is demand for hard coke from industries other than the iron and steel industry and, naturally, the state does not want to stifle those industries by making it difficult for them to obtain their requirements, especially since the production of the Nationalised Coke oven plants has first to meet the requirements of the iron and steel industry. What is important to note is that these eighty seven new coke oven plants are not situated in or about coal mines though they are in the coal field area, as indeed they are bound todo not think there is any possible doubt about the identity of the coke oven plant shown as Item No. 9 in the second schedule to the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. It is the coke oven plant belonging to the Sanjeev Coking Coal Company.