Case: Bharat Coking Coal Ltd Vs. Karam Chand Thapar &amp; Bros.P. Ltd

4. Adverting to the contextual facts be it noted that vide notices dated 19.8.1972 and 30.8.1972, the Appellant herein directed the Respondents to make over possession of the properties mentioned in the enclosure to the Sub-Area Manger of the Colliery by end August 1972 under intimation to the Head Office.5. Significantly, by letter dated 8th September, 1972 from the Oriental Coal Company Ltd. being a party-respondent herein, it has been specifically made clear that as regards the lands and buildings referred to in the enclosure to the notice, question of vesting of the same would not arise since the said properties belong to M/s. Karam Chand Thaper & Bros. P. Ltd. and the same were being used for purposes other than coking coal mines.6. It is on this factual backdrop, the Respondent No.1 moved the Calcutta High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of a writ of mandamus for the quashing of the notices mentioned above in so far as they related to the properties of Respondent No.1.7. Subsequent to the initiation of the Writ Petition, the Estate Officer of Jharia initiated proceedings under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 against the Oriental Coal Company Ltd. and individual occupants of buildings. A written objection by way of show cause before the Estate Officer praying for staying of further proceedings considering the pendency of the aforesaid Writ Petition, was filed but the Estate Officer, however, rejected the said prayer for stay and fixed the date of hearing some time thereafter. It is on the wake of this factual backdrop, the Writ Petition was amended by the Respondent No.1 with a further prayer for quashing of the aforesaid proceedings under the Act of 1971.8. The learned Single Judge of the High Court recorded that since the Secretaries of the Company were the owners of the properties in question and not the coal company and since the former did not possess any coking coal mine, the properties belonging to them cannot be taken possession of. The learned Single Judge in fineBut the said term should be read, viewed, and considered in the perspective of the provisions of the said 1972 Act, which as mentioned above, deal with coking coal mines or coke oven plants and is further subject to the extent of properties or components as mentioned in Section 3(j) of its sub-clause. For a proper requisition of the properties in question, I am thus of the view, that the ownership of the coking coal mine or coke oven plant, would have to be established, before taking over possession and such fact has not been duly satisfied or established in this case as yet and that too in view of the specific exceptions as taken".Incidentally, it has been the specific observation of the learned Single Judge that the notices have been issued without any application of mind and the entire action was initiated in a manner totally mechanical.10. Aggrieved by the order as above, the matter was placed before a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in appeal and the appellate Court was well negated the contention of the appellant herein and hence the appeal before this Court upon the grant of leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Reasoning: In our view, the effort though strenuous and apparently very attractive at first, but on a closer scrutiny the same loses its efficacy since submissions in a court of law that by itself cannot form the basis of the issuance of the notices, spoken of earlier.21. It is trite that there be some co-relation with the activity of a coal mine-the user must be there for the purposes of the coal mine, be it a weighbridge, be it a Directors bungalow or be it even a Unions office, but it must relate to the affairs of the coal mine concerned and not de hors the same. The nexus concept introduced by the High Court cannot in our view be taken exception to since there is no factual justification in support of the issuance of the notice on the wake of the reply to the show-cause notice by the Respondent No.1 herein. In any event the user being the requirement of the statute and since the contextual facts did not have the factual support to prove the same, question of vesting within the meaning of the Act of1972 would not arise.22. Adverting to the other aspect of the matter, to wit, that the appeal involves more of a factual issue than a legal issue and as such intervention under Article 136 is not warranted - be it noted that intervention under Article 136 can be had when the judgment is tainted with serious legal infirmities or is founded on a legal construction which cannot but be attributed to be otherwise wrong. The jurisdiction under Article 136 stands out to be extremely wide but that does not, however, warrant intervention having concurrent set of facts and an appeal therefrom on the factual issue. The Article has been engrafted by the founding-fathers of the Constitution for the purposes of avoiding mischief of injustice on the wrong assumption of law. The justice delivery system of the country prompts this Court to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution when the need of the society stands established and the judgment, if left outstanding, would not only create prejudice but would have an otherwise adverse effect on to the society - it is this solemn objective of administration of justice with which the Constitution-makers thought it prudent to confer such a power on to the Apex Court of the country. It is the final arbiter but only when the dispute needs to be settled by the Apex Court so as to avoid injustice and infraction of law.23. In the contextual facts we do not find such an infraction. By reason whereof the appeal, in any event, cannot be sustained.