Case: DR. DHRUVARAM MURLIDHAR SONAR Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

3. The appellant is the accused No.1 in the aforesaid FIR, registered at the instance of the complainant/respondent No.4. At the relevant point of time, the appellant was serving as a medical officer, Primary Health Centre at Toranmal, Dhadgaon Taluq, Nandurbar District, whereas the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse at the same establishment. The allegations made by the complainant in the FIR in brief are that her husband died on 05.11.1997, leaving behind her and her two children. During this time, the appellant informed her that there have been differences between him and his wife, and therefore, he is planning to divorce his wife. Further, the appellant informed the complainant that since they belong to different communities, a month is needed for the registration of their marriage. Therefore, she started living with the appellant at his Government quarters. The FIR further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she is a widow. Therefore, they started living together, as if they were husband and wife. They resided some time at her house and some time at the house of the appellant. The appellant acted as if he has married her and has maintained a physical relationship with her. However, he has failed to marry her as promised. When things stood thus, his brother, i.e accused No. 2, claims to have married her. Thereafter, in the year 2000, complainant received the information from the co-accused about the marriage of the appellant with some other woman. Therefore, she filed the aforesaid complaint and FIR dated 06.12.2000 came to be registered against the appellant and the co-accused.4. After the completion of the investigation, the investigating agency filed a final report on 14.06.2001. The appellant filed the criminal application under Section 482 before the High Court for quashing the FIR and the chargesheet. As noticed above, the High Court has dismissed the criminal petition by its order dated 02.07.2018.

Reasoning: 7. We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel made at the Bar and perused the materials placed on record.8. It is well settled that exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is the exception and not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of justice do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise.12. Recently, in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (2017) 13 SCC 369 , this Court has observed as under:Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed tobe converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding. The present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings.It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers.13. In the instant case, FIR was registered against the appellant and the co-accused under Sections 376(2)(b), 420 read with Section 34 of the IPC and under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Section 376(2)(b) prescribes punishment for the offence of rape committed by a public servant taking advantage of his official position on a woman in his custody as such public servant or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to him.16. In Uday v. State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46 , this Court was considering a case where the prosecutrix, aged about 19 years, hadgiven consent to sexual intercourse with the accused with whom she was deeply in love, on a promise that he would marry her on a later date. The prosecutrix continued to meet the accused and often had sexual intercourse and became pregnant. A complaint was lodged on failure of the accused to marry her. It was held that consent cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. It was held thus:-21. It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them.23. Keeping in view the approach that the court must adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider the evidence on record. In the instant case, the prosecutrix was a grown-up girl studyingin a college. She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was, however, aware of the fact that since they belonged to different castes, marriage was not possible. In any event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be seriously opposed by their family members. She admits having told so to the appellant when he proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this, she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in fact succumbed to them. She thus freely exercised a choice between resistance and assent. She must have known the consequences of the act, particularly when she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may not take place at all on account of caste considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the conclusion that she freely, voluntarily and consciously consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of any misconception of fact.19. Recently, this Court, in Shivashankar @ Shiva v. State of Karnataka & Anr., in Criminal Appeal No.504 of 2018, disposed of on 6th April, 2018, has observed that it is difficult to hold that sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eightyears is rape, especially in the face of the complainants own allegation that they lived together as man and wife. It was held as under:-In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges leveled against the appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the complainant.It is, however, difficult to hold sexual intercourse in the course of a relationship which has continued for eight years, as rape especially in the face of the complainants own allegation that they lived together as man and wife.20. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very carefully examine whether the complainant had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under Section 376 of the IPC.21. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that the is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a months time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas some time at his home. Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each others company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained.22. Further, the FIR nowhere spells out any wrong committed by the appellant under Section 420 of the IPC or under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition filed by the appellant under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.