Case: Kangra Valley Slate Co. Ltd Vs. State Of Punjab &amp; Ors

The company is a public limited company having its registered office in New Delhi and is engaged in quarrying slate and marketing the same. The company had secured a perpetual lease dated March 22, 1879 of certain lands in villages Majra and Manhatti in District Gurgaon. The Controller of Mining Leases under powers reserved under sec. 16 of the Mines &Minerals (Regulations &Development) Act, 67 of 1957 (hereinafter called the Act) read with r. 6 of the Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Amendment Rules, 1960 modified the said lease reducing its period so as to expire on March 22, 1962. In consequence of certain correspondence which took place between the company and the Director of Industries, Punjab, the companys secretary met that official on September 12, 1961 when he was advised that the company should apply for renewal of lease in Form J if it so desired. Consequently, it was said that the company made an application bearing, the date September 20, 1961 which was received by the Director of Industries on October 9, 1961. The company thereafter applied for and obtained on November 10, 1961 a certificate of approval under sec. 5 of the Act. The Director of Industries, however, rejected the said application on two grounds (1) that it was beyond-the time prescribed under r. 28 of the Mining Concession Rules, 1960, and (2) that it was not a valid application under Form J as it was not accompanied by a copy of the certificate of approval. The company thereupon filed a revision application under r. 54 of the said rules to the Central Government. The Central Government by its order dated December 14, 1962 rejected it on the ground that it saw no valid ground for interfering with the decision of the Government of Punjab. Aggrieved by the said orders, the company filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab challenging the validity of the said two orders. In the petition the company averred that the said application for renewal, though received by the Director of Industries on October 9, 1961, was "sent by the petitioner on 20-9-1961 ".The petition also averred that the company had obtained the certificate of approval as required by sec. 5 of the Act and though it did not accompany the said application it was obtained before the Director passed his said order and, therefore, the certificate was within the knowledge of the State Government. In the petition the company challenged the said orders on the grounds that there was no valid ground to hold the said application to be time-barred, that there was no provision in the Act or the rules requiring the company to be in possession of the certificate of approval at the time of the said application, that the company had obtained that certificate and that fact was known to the Director, and lastly, that the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order waslearned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard the writ petition, held that though the said application was rejected on two grounds, one of them was demonstratively untenable the authority having recognised that the company had obtained the certificate of approval under sec. 5 (1) of the Act. He further held that the Director of Industries having relied upon two grounds for rejection, one of which was untenable, it was difficult to say which of the two grounds was considered sufficient by the Central Government to uphold the rejection in view of its order not containing any reasons whatsoever. The learned Judge relying upon the decision in Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Jhunjhunwala(A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 271) held that the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order was invalid. A Letters Patent appeal against the said order was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench held that as the said application was dismissed on two grounds, namely, of limitation and the failure to obtain the certificate of approval by the time the said application was made, even if the ground as to the certificate was not available, , the other ground of limitation was available and therefore the Central Government was entitled to hold that that being sufficient it would not interfere with the order of the State Government. The Division Bench held that the decision in Dhirajlal v. C.I.T.( A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 271) relied on by the learned Single Judge was not relevant as by reason of some irrelevant evidence having been considered by the authority in that case it became impossible to appreciate which evidence, relevant or irrelevant. was found sufficient by it. Since in this case there were two grounds which were distinct in themselves and were the basis of rejection, if the ground of non-possession of certificate was not tenable, the other ground of limitation was sufficient for upholding the order of rejection. The learned Single Judge, there- fore, was not correct in allowing the writ petition on the ground that it was not possible to ascertain on which of the two grounds the revision application was rejected. The Division Bench then held that "no challenge appears to have been raised in the writ petition on factual position regarding limitation", and therefore, the rejection was sustainable on the ground of limitation. As to the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order, the Division Bench distinguished Harinagars case(A.T.R. 1961S.C. 1669) on the around that the impugned order was an appellate order and not a revision order. Relying on Syed Yakoob v. Radha Krishnan ( A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477) the Division Bench held that the order need not be a speaking order where it is a revisional order and one of affirmance. The appellant company challenges in this appeal by special, leave the order of the Division Bench which allowed the appeal and dismissed its writ petition.

Reasoning: It is clear that the object of these rules laying down time limits for making applications, acknowledging their receipts and disposal thereof was to see that the development of mines and exploitation of minerals took place both in a regulated manner and without any undue delay. R. 28 with which we are immediately concerned not only lays down the time within which a renewal application is to be made but also provides that if it is not disposed of before the expiry of the lease the period of the lease shall be deemed to have been extended for a further period of six months or ending with the date of the receipt of the orders of the State Government thereon whichever is shorter..The object of providing time limit for the renewal application was that sufficient time before the expiry of lease was available to the State Government to decide whether the renewal should be granted or not, for, if the renewal was not granted the land in question would be available for re-grant and the State Government would have to declare that the land was so available for re-grant, invite applications for the grant of the lease and follow the procedure laid down in the Act and the Rules therefore. It is obvious that if the time of six months prescribed in rules 22 and 28 was not available to the State Government it would not be possible for it to decide within time and to follow the procedure for granting a fresh lease to someone else. The result would be that mining operations would be delayed in that particular land and to, that extent the object of the Act and the duty imposed by s. 18 on the Central Government would be delayed or defeated. Considering the scheme and the object of the Act and the rules it is not possible to agree with Mr. Gupte that r. 28 was not intended to be mandatory and is onlythe view that we take that r. 28 is a valid rule and that it is mandatory, the application was clearly beyond the time appointed under the rule, the company having failed to establish that it was made, as it alleged, on September 20, 1961. In that view it would not be necessary for us to go into the questions whether the order of the Central Government not being a speaking order was bad or whether the application by the company was not a valid one inasmuch as the company was not possessed a certificate of approval at the date when the application was made and its copy was, not annexed -thereto as required by Form J. Assuming that the application was a valid one and that the requirement of annexing the copy of the certificate of approval was not mandatory and assuming further that the order of the Central Government was not a valid one, the only thing that we could be asked to do would be to send back the matter to the Central Government directing it to pass a proper order. But in the view that we have taken of r. 28 and consequently of the application for renewal being time-barred, the Central Government can only reject once again the revision application adding in its order that the Director was right in rejecting the application as it was time-barred. Such an order of remand would serve no useful purpose so far as the appellant company is concerned. That being so, it is not worth our while to interfere under Art. 136 with the order of the Central Government and ask that Government to pass a fresh order.