Case: State Of Karnataka Vs. Laxuman

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2024 OF 19992. The State challenges the order of the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.3682 of 1995 by which the learned Judge dismissed the revision filed by the State challenging the order of the Civil Judge, being the land acquisition court, purporting to condone the delay in filing an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in Karnataka. The notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act was served on the claimant on 6.1.1984. Under Section 18(2) of the Act, the claimant had 90 days from the date of service of that notice, to seek a reference under that Section for enhancement of compensation. The respondent claimed that an application under Section 18(1) of the Act seeking a reference was filed on 15.3.1984, within 90 days of 6.1.1984, but the reference was not made by the Deputy Commissioner within 90 days thereafter as enjoined by Section 18(3)(a) of the Act. The claimant approached the civil court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act only in April 1994, more than 10 years after the receipt of the notice of the award. The claimant also purported to file an application for condoning the delay in making the application. This was in view of the fact that it had been held that an application to the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act had to be made within three years of the expiry of 90 days of the date of making an application seeking a reference for enhancement of compensation. The State opposed the application for condoning the delay on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had no application and that, in any event, no ground was made out for condoning the long delay of ten years in filing the application. The civil judge proceeded to condone the delay and proceeded to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. In revision, the High Court refused to interfere on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had application and there was no reason to interfere with the condoning of the delay by the civil judge. The High Court apparently without even a verification, merely accepted the evidence of PW 1 that he had made an application within 90 days of the receipt of the notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Feeling aggrieved by that order, this appeal by special leave has been filed by the State.CIVIL APPEAL NO.4459 OF 19993. In this case, the civil judge dismissed the application made under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act by the respondent on the ground that the application was barred by limitation. This order of the civil judge was challenged in an appeal before the District Judge. It is not clear under what provision such an appeal was filed, since under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in Karnataka no appeal is provided to the District Court from such an order of the civil judge and an appeal is provided only against the award. The appellate court is seen to have held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable and the learned civil judge was in error in dismissing the application for compelling the reference under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act without deciding the prayer for condonation of the delay in filing that application. This order of the District Judge was challenged in revision before the High Court. The High Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had application and declined to interfere with the order of remand made by the Additional District Judge. The High Court, thus, dismissed the revision filed by the State. Aggrieved by this order, the State has come up with this appeal by special leave.CIVIL APPEAL NOs.607-609 of 20004. In the first case it appears that the application for reference under Section 18(1) of the Act itself was made only two years after the award. Another seven years thereafter an application for compelling a reference was made under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. The civil judge dismissed the application on the ground that it was out of time. Ten years thereafter, the claimant filed a revision as C.R.P. No.1505 of 1997 before the High Court. The High Court ignored the delay of ten years in filing the revision in a somewhat cavalier manner and allowing the revision remitted the reference application to the Land Acquisition Court for entertaining the application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. The others were cases of a similar nature. In all of them there was considerable delay in making the application for reference and also delay in approaching the court. In these revisions also, same lack of application of mind was exhibited by the High Court and the revisions were allowed and the applications remitted. The common order thus passed, is subjected to challenge in these appeals.CIVIL APPEAL NO.5547 OF 20005. The State challenges the order of the High Court passed under the same circumstances leading to the challenge in C.A. No.4459 of 1999. Here the application for compelling a reference was dismissed on the ground that it was out of time. The District court permitted the claimant to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and directed its consideration. The High Court refused to interfere.CIVIL APPEAL NO.1567 OF 20016. In this appeal, the State of Karnataka challenges the order in Civil Revision Petition No.956 of 1998. In this case also the civil judge dismissed the application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act in view of the fact that it was not within time. An appeal was purported to be filed by the claimant under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same was allowed and the matter was remanded. Against the order of the District Court, the revision was filed by the State challenging the competence of the order. The High Court refused to interfere based on the same reasons it had adopted in the order giving rise to Civil Appeal No.4459 of 1999. Feeling aggrieved, the State has filed this appeal by special leave.CIVIL APPEAL NO.1566 OF 20017. This appeal challenges the decision of the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court which by a majority held that even though the right to the claimant to apply for compelling a reference under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended in the State of Karnataka may be lost, the Deputy Commissioner could still make a reference even if it be after ten years, if he so chose and that in such a situation, the court could also compel a reference notwithstanding that the period for applying for reference has expired. The State challenges the above view adopted by the Full Bench by a majority and contends that the minority view holding that once the right to the claimant to apply has come to end, the question of reference does not arise, is the correct one and deserves to be accepted.

Reasoning: 9. As can be seen, no time for applying to the court in terms of sub-section (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court, though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the application. The position is settled by the decision of this Court in The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore vs. Thakoredas, Major and others (AIR 1994 SC 2227 ). It wasthe cause of action for seeking a reference had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service of notice, the respondents made the application requesting the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the Civil Court under Section 18. Under the amended sub-section 3(a) of the Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from September 1, 1970 make reference under Section 18 to the Civil Court which he failed to do . Consequently, by operation of sub-section 3(b) with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action had accrued to the respondents to make an application to the Civil Court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed in sub-section 3(b) to make that application but it should be done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Since no Article expressly prescribed the limitation to make such application, the residuary article under Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted. Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period of limitation prescribed by clause (b) of sub- section (3) of Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made within three years from the date of expiry of 90 days prescribed in Section 18(3)(b) i.e. the date on which cause of action had accrued to the respondent-claimant. Since the applications had been admittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in Municipal Corporation of Athani (AIR 1969 SC 1335 ), which has stood overruled, the order of the High Court isState Electricity Board vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma (1976 (4) SCCe Electricity Board vs. T.P. Kunhaliumma (1976 (4) SCCAddl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore vs. Thakoredas, Major and others (supra), the time for approaching the court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act stands crystalised. The application has to be made within three years of the expiry of 90This Court has also held that in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act before the authorities under that Act, Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application (See Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and others (1996 (9) SCC 414). Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be resorted to while making an application under Section 18(1) of the Act and the application has to be made within the period fixed by Section 18(2) of theon Special Duty (Land Acquisition) and another vs. Shah Manilal Chandulal and others (1996 (9) SCC18(3)(a) and Section 18(3)(b) read in harmony, casts an obligation on the claimant to enforce his claim within the period available for it. The scheme brings about a repose. It is based on a public policy that a right should not be allowed to remain a right indefinitely to be used against another at the will and pleasure of the holder of the right by approaching the court whenever he chooses to do so. When the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference on the application of the claimant under Section 18(1) of the Act stands extinguished on the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of application for reference, and the right of the claimant to move the Court for compelling a reference also stands extinguished, the right itself looses its enforceability and thus comes to an end as a result. This is the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as adopted in the State of Karnataka. The High Court is, therefore, not correct in searching for a specific provision bringing about an extinguishment of the right to have a reference and on not finding it, postulating that the right would survive forThe High Court has made much of the fact that there is no obligation on the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 of the Act to convey the information to the claimant about the making of the reference or the declining of the application for reference. Once a claimant has made his application for reference within the period prescribed by Section 18 of the Act, and he does not get any notice from the reference court regarding the reference made to that court for enforcement of his claim for enhanced compensation, it is for the claimant to move the concerned court for getting a reference made in terms of Section 18 of the Act. If he gets intimation from the reference court about the lodging of the reference, obviously, it becomes unnecessary for him to approach the court for compelling a reference. But in a case where he gets no intimation from the reference court about the reference having been made, it is for him to invoke the jurisdiction of the reference court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act within the time prescribed therefor by law. The extinguishment of the remedy by way of moving the civil court is not dependent on receipt or otherwise of an intimation from the Deputy Commissioner about the fate of his application for reference. 20. The view we have taken, after all, does not deprive a claimant who had protested, of his right to enhanced compensation in view of the introduction of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act. He could seek an enhancement based on any award that might have been made within the time prescribed therefor in respect of land covered by the sameCourt has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before the Collector or Deputy Commissioner here, while entertaining an application for reference. We see no reason not to accept thathave held in agreement with the earlier Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, that the right to have a reference enforced through court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We may incidentally notice that in Thakoredas (supra) this Court rejected the application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act which was beyond time, though, of course, there was no specific discussion on thishave held in agreement with the earlier Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, that the right to have a reference enforced through court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We may incidentally notice that in Thakoredas (supra) this Court rejected the application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act which was beyond time, though, of course, there was no specific discussion on this