Case: Rajkumar Devindra Singh &amp; Anr Vs. State Of Punjab &amp; Others

2. The appellants case was as follows. On the demise of the late Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, his eldest son, Maharaja Yadavindra Singh succeeded to the gaddi of the erstwhile State of Patiala which subsequently merged with the State of Punjab. Maharaja Bhupinder Singh, along with his sons including the appellants, constituted a joint Hindu family. The appellants along with the other sons of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh had an interest, by virtue of their being coparceners, in all the properties of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh. The appellants, along with their brothers, were in occupation of a property known as "Colonel Mistrys House", Moti Bagh Palance, Patiala, in their own right as the sons of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh. It was an ancestral property in the hands of Maharaja Bhupinder Singh and they were residing as members of the family in the said property.On March 10, 1958, Maharaja Yadavindra Singh sold Moti Bagh Palace to the Government of Punjab, as property belonging to him, and delivered actual possession of certain portion and agreed to deliver possession of the rest subsequently. The State Government was not competent to evict them under the provisions of the Act as they were not in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and that the impugned notice was issued without jurisdiction.The counter affidavit on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 was filed by Shri S. P. Jain, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab and it stated that there was no proof that the appellants were the sons of Maharaja Bhupendra Singh, that Bhupinder Singh and his sons were not members of a Hindu Undivided Family; that the Maharaja and his progeny being Jats, did not constitute a Joint Hindu Family and that the appellants never acquired any interest by birth in the property. The counter affidavit did not admit the allegation of the appellants that they were in possession of the property as coparceners.The learned single Judge came to the conclusion that since the case raised complicated questions of law and fact, it was not meet that they should be resolved in a petition under Art. 226 and that, even if the appellants were in possession before the date of the sale of the property to the Government, they were in unauthorised occupation of public premises since the appellants were not holding the property under any allotment, lease or grant from the Government after the date of the sale deed and dismissed the writ petition. A letters patent appeal was preferred this decision and that was dismissed in limine. This appeal, by certificate is against the decision of the High Court in the letters patent appeal.The appeal as originally filed, challenged the correctness of the order of the High Court, on the basis of the decision of this Court in Northern India Caterers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1967) 3 SCR 399  = (AIR 1967 SC 1581 ). But the Punjab Legislature amended the Act by passing the Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Amendment Act, 1969. By S. 10E of the Amendment Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court, among other things, to entertain a suit or proceeding for eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, was taken away. On their motion, the appellants were permitted by this Court to amend the appeal petition and challenge the validity of the relevant provisions of the Amendment Act, and the appeal petition was amended accordingly.

Reasoning: A person shall be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation of public premises for purposes of S. 3 (a) where he has, before or after the commencement of the Act, entered into possession thereof, otherwise than under and in pursuance of any allotment, lease or grant.The word thereof makes it clear that the person must have entered into possession of public premises before or after the commencement of the Act in order that he may be deemed to be in unauthorised occupation. If the appellants were in possession before the date of the sale of the property to the Government, it could not be said that the appellants entered into possession of public premises, for, at the time when they were in occupation of the property, the property was not public premises. Then it was either the joint family property or the property of the Maharaja, namely, Yadavindra Singh. The property was not public premises before it was sold to the Government. So, if the appellants were in possession of the property before it was sold to the Government, it could not be said that they entered into possession of public premises before or after the commencement of the Act and clause (a) of S. 3 of the Act cannot obviously apply and the appellants were not in unauthorised occupation of public premises within the meaning of clause (a) of S. 3appellants, were not, therefore, in unauthorised occupation of public premises within the meaning of S. 3 of the Act. It is only if the appellants were in unauthorised occupation of public premises that the Collector would get jurisdiction to issue a notice under S. 4 (1) of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the notice was issued without jurisdiction and it has to be quashed and we do so.