Case: Member-Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Stateboard For Prevention Vs. Andhra Pradesh Rayons Ltd. &amp; Ors

4. In this case, thewas registered as a company in 1975. The supply of energy to the company commenced on August 22, 1981 and the production began from September 1, 1981. The company manufactures rayon grade pulp of 26, 250 tonnes per annum. The company was served with a notice on August 12, 1981 to furnish the quantum of water consumed for assessment under the Act. Based on there turns filed by the respondent as required under Section 5 of the Act, Assessment of water cess was made by an order dated December 31, 1981. Aggrieved by the said order the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Committee constituted under the Act. The Appellate Committee by its order dated November 30, 1982 confirmed the orders of the assessment passed by the petitioner. Before the Appellate Committee various contentions were urged and only one of such contention survives now and is agitated before us, namely, that the rayon industry is not included in Schedule I of the said Act. The Appellate Committee by its order said as followsWe are unable to agree with the arguments advanced by the learned counsel. The appellant industry is manufacturing rayon grade pulp which comes under the category of textile industry as it involves the production of rayon grade pulp, a base material for manufacture of synthetic or. From the aforesaid, it appears that the Appellate Committee was of the view that the respondent herein was manufacturing rayon grade pulp which comes under the category of textile mentioned in Schedule I of the Act. Textile industry is item 10 in the aforesaid Schedule. Aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Committee, the respondent herein filed writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of the Act as well as the levy of cess on water on the ground that it was not one of the industries mentions in the Schedule. The High Court by its order dated October 9, 1987 rejected the contention relating to the constitutional validity but upheld the contention that the respondents industry was not an industry which is mentioned in Schedule I and as such was not liable to pay cess.

Reasoning: It is the propriety; or the correctness of that decision which is sought to be canvassed before us by this petition. It must therefore, be made clear that we are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the decision of the High Court about the constitutional validity of the Act in question. That is not at issue before us since the petitioner, Andhra Pradesh State Board for Prevention and Control of Water Pollution has not challenged that finding. The only question is whether the respondent is an industry as mentioned in the aforesaid Schedule. The High Court in take impugned judgment has held that rayon grade pulp is not covered by any of the items specified in the said Schedule. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.We fail to see that rayon grade pulp could be considered even remotely connected as such with chemical industry or textile industry or paper industry. In all preparations, there is certain chemical process but that does not make all industries chemical industries.Bearing the aforesaid principle in mind, we find that there is no absurdity in the literal meaning. The purpose of the Act is to realise money from those whose activities lead to pollution and who must bear the expenses of the maintenance and running of the State Board. It is a fiscal provision and must, therefore, not only be literally construed but also be strictly construed. Having regard to the literal expression used and bearing in mind the purpose for the legislation, we arrive at a result that certain industries have to pay the expenses of the maintenance and functioning of the State boards Considering the principle broadly and in common sense point of view, we find nothing to warrant the conclusion that rayon grade pulp is included in either of the industries as canvassed on behalf of the petitioner here and as held by the High Court in the judgment underIn this case, we must also note that neither the Water Pollution Board nor any authorities under the Act nor the High Court proceeded on any evidence how these expressions are used in the particular industry or understood in the trade generally. In other words, no principle of understanding in "common parlance" is involved in the instantIn that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the contention sought for by the petitioner is of noOur attention, however, was drawn to the decision of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in M/s. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd., Mavoor v. Appellate Committee for Water Cess, Trivandrum (AIR 1983 Ker 110 : ILR (1983) 2 Ker 224).The said High Court also relied on a passage from the "Book of Popular Science" Grolier, 1969, Vol. 7, p. 55 which reads aswhat is a chemical, after all ? Presumably it is a pure chemical substance (an element or compound) and not a mixture. Thus sulphuric acid is a chemical ..... But common salt and sugar, with which all of us are familiar, are also pure chemical substances ..... The truly chemical industries, which manufacture chemicals, are seldom well known to the public. This is because we, as consumers, do not ordinarily make use of Chemicals in their pure form. Instead they are converted into products that reach the consumer only after a number ofAs mentioned hereinbefore, the expression should be understood not in technical sense but from broad commonsense point of view to find out what it truly means by those who deal with them. Bearing the aforesaid perspective in mind, we are unable to agree with the view of the Kerala High Court Expressed in the aforesaid judgment. In that conspectus of the Kerala High Court everything would be included in the process ofIn the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the impugned judgment was right and the High Court of Kerala in the judgment referred to hereinbefore was not right