Case: Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd. &amp; Ors Vs. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhrapradesh &amp; Ors

1. An industrial dispute arose between 25 Co-operative Central Banks in the State of Andhra Pradesh and their workmen represented by the Andhra Pradesh Bank Employees Federation, Hyderabad, which was referred by the Government of Andhra Pradesh to the Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad under Section 10 (1) (d) of the industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. The subject- matter of the dispute was divided into three issues. The first issue comprised a number of service conditions, viz., (1) Salary, Scales and Adjustments, (2) Dearness Allowance, (3) Special Allowances, (4) other Allowances, (5) Uniforms and Washing Allowances for subordinate staff, (6) Conveyance Charges, (7) Provident Fund and Gratuity, (8) Leave Rules, (9) Joining Time on Transfer, (10) Rules relating to departmental enquiry against employees for misconduct, (11) Probationary Period and Confirmation, (12) Working Hours and Overtime Allowance, (13) Age of Retirement, (14) Security (15) Common Good Fund, (16) Service Conditions and (17) Promotions. The second and the third issues both related to the question whether the transfers of some employees of two of the Banks, The Vijayawada Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Vijayawada, and The Vizianagram Co-operative Central Bank Ltd., Vizianagaram, were justified and, if not, to what reliefs were the employees entitled. Before the Industrial Tribunal, one of the grounds raised on behalf of the Banks was that the reference of the disputes to the Tribunal was invalid, because such disputes were required to be referred for decision to the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies under Section 61 of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act No. 7 of 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the effect of the provisions of the Act was to exclude the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunals to deal with the same disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act. Various other pleas were also taken by the Banks in resisting the claims of the workmen, but in these appeals, we are not concerned with them, because the Tribunal dealt with the point, mentioned by us above, as a preliminary issue and rejected the contention of the Banks. Twenty-four of the Banks there-upon challenged the preliminary decision of the Tribunal on this question, treating it as a preliminary award, by filing two Writ Petitions Nos. 2339 and 2742 of 1968 under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The High Court also rejected the plea of the Banks.

Reasoning: 2. The Tribunal, and the High Court, in rejecting the plea taken on behalf of the Banks, expressed the view that the disputes actually referred to the Tribunal were not capable of being decided by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies under Section 61 of the Act, and consequently, the reference to the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act was competent.It appears to us that it is not necessary to examine in detail the reasons given by the High Courts in the above cited cases for the interpretation placed by them on provisions similar to Sec. 61 of the Act in view of a very recent decision of this Court in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Messrs. Dalichand Jugraj Jain, Civil Appeal No. 358 of 1967, D/- 29-8-1968 = (AIR 1969 SC 1320  ).Applying these tests, we have no doubt at all that the dispute covered by the first issue referred to the Industrial Tribunal in the present cases could not possibly be referred for decision to the Registrar under S. 61 of the Act. The dispute related to alteration of a number of conditions of service of the workmen which relief could only be granted by an Industrial Tribunal dealing with an industrial dispute. The Registrar, it is clear from the provisions of the Act, could not possibly have granted the reliefs claimed under this issue because of the limitations placed on his powers in the Act itself.It is true that Section 61 by itself does not contain any clear indication that the Registrar cannot entertain a dispute relating to alteration of conditions of service of the employees of a registered society; but the meaning given to the expression "touching the business of the society", in our opinion, makes it very doubtful whether a dispute in respect of alteration of conditions of service can be held to be covered by this expression.Since the word "business" is equated with the actual trading or commercial or other similar business activity of the society, and since it has been held that it would be difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects, such as laying down the conditions of service of its employees, can be said to be a part of its business, it would appear that a dispute relating to conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society cannot be held to be a dispute touching the business of thethe position is clarified by the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 62 of the Act which limit the power to be exercised by the Registrar, when dealing with a dispute referred to him under Section 61, by a mandate that he shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules and bye-laws. On the face of it, the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws could not possibly permit the Registrar to change conditions of service of the workmen employed by the society. For the purpose of bringing facts to our notice in the present appeals, the Rules framed by the Andhra Pradesh Government under the Act, and the bye-laws of one of the appellant Banks have been placed on the Paper-books of the appeals before us. It appears from them that the conditions of service of the employees of the Bank have all been laid down by framing special bye-laws. Most of the conditions of service, which the workmen want to be altered to their benefit, have thus been laid down by the bye-laws, so that any alteration in those conditions of service will necessarily require a change in the bye-laws. Such a change could not possibly be directed by the Registrar when under Section 62 (4) of the Act, he is specifically required to decide the dispute referred to him in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws. It may also be noticed that a dispute referred to the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act can even be transferred for disposal to a person who may have been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator by the Registrar. Such person or arbitrator, when deciding the dispute, will also be governed by the mandate in Section 62 (4) of the Act, so that he will also be bound to reject the claim of the workmen which is nothing else than a request for alteration of conditions of service contained in the bye-laws.It is thus clear that, in respect of the dispute relating to alteration of various conditions of service, the Registrar or other person dealing with it under Section 62 of the Act in not competent to grant the relief claimed by the workmen at all. On the principle laid down by this Court in the case of the Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 358 of 1967, D/- 29-8-1968 = (AIR 1969 SC 1320  ) (supra) therefore, it must be held that this dispute is not a dispute covered by the provisions of Section 61 of the Act. Such a dispute is not contemplated to be dealt with under Section 62 of the Act and must, therefore, be held to be outside the scope of Sectionall these cases, it was held that an Industrial Tribunal acted illegally in prescribing leave in excess of the number of days laid down by the Delhi Shops and Establishments Act, 1954. In S. 22 of that Act there was a specific prohibition that leave for sickness or casual leave with full wages shall not exceed 12 days, and it was held that a direction made by the Tribunal granting to the workmen more than 12 days sickness or casual leave was illegal. The principle of the decisions in those cases does not, however, appear to us to be applicable to the cases before us, because, in the present case, there is no prohibition contained in the Act that the conditions of service prescribed are not to be altered. The argument on behalf of the Banks, however, was that the bye-laws, which contained the conditions of service, are themselves law, so that any direction made by an Industrial Tribunal altering a condition of service contained in a bye-law would be an order contrary to law and, hence illegal.10. We are unable to accept the submission that the bye-laws of a co-operative society framed in pursuance of the provisions of the Act can be held to be law or to have the force of law. It has no doubt been held that, , if a statute gives power to a Government or other authority to make rules, the rules so framed have the force of statute and are to be deemed to be incorporated as a part of the statute. That principle, however, does not apply to bye-laws of the nature that a co-operative society is empowered by the Act to make. The bye-laws that are contemplated by the Act can be merely those which govern the internal management, business or administration of a society.They may be binding between the persons affected by them, but they do not have the force of a statute. In respect of bye-laws laying down conditions of service of the employees of a society, the bye-laws would be binding between the society and the employees just in the same manner as conditions of service laid down by contract between the parties. In fact, after such bye-laws laying down the conditions of service are made and any person enters the employment of a society those conditions of service will have to be treated as conditions accepted by the employee when entering the service and will thus bind him like conditions of service specifically forming part of the contract of service.The bye-laws that can be framed by a society under the Act are similar in nature to the Articles of Association of a Company incorporated under the Companies Act and such Articles of Association have never been held to have the force of law. In a number of cases, conditions of service for industries are laid down by Standing Orders certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and it has been held that, though such Standing Orders are binding between the employers and the employees of the industry governed by these Standing Orders, they do not have such force of law as to be binding on Industrial Tribunal adjudicating an industrial dispute.The jurisdiction which is granted to Industrial Tribunal by the Industrial Disputes Act is not the jurisdiction of merely administering the existing laws and enforcing existing contracts. Industrial Tribunals have the right even to vary contracts of service between the employer and the employees which jurisdiction can never be exercised by a civil Court or a Registrar acting under the Co-operative Societies Act, so that the circumstance that, in granting relief on issue No.1, the Tribunal will have to vary the special bye-laws framed by the co-operative Bank does not lead to the inference that the Tribunal would be incompetent to grant the reliefs sought in this reference.In fact, the reliefs could only be granted by the Industrial Tribunal and could not fall within the scope of the powers of the Registrar dealing with a dispute under Section 61 of theour opinion, this submission must be rejected for two reasons. The first reason is that action taken by the Registrar under Section 16 (5) of the Act will not be a decision on a dispute referred to him under Section 61 of the Act. When dealing with the dispute under Section 61 of the Act, the Registrar is bound to decide the dispute in accordance with the existing bye-laws, so that, if the dispute relates to alteration of conditions of service laid down in the bye-laws, he will be incompetent to grant the relief claimed. It is also to be noticed that a dispute referred to a Registrar under Section 61 of the act may be transferred for disposal to a person who has been invested by the Government with powers in that behalf, or may be referred for disposal to an arbitrator. On the face of it, such person or arbitrator cannot possibly exercise the powers of the Registrar under Section 16 (5) of the Act. The second reason is that, under Section 16(5) of the Act, the power given to the Registrar to propose amendments in the bye-laws and to enforce them if the proposal is not accepted by a society is to be exercised only when the Registrar is of the opinion that it is necessary or desirable to do so in the interests of such society or of the co-operative movement.Amendments in bye-laws under Section 16 (5) of the Act are not contemplated in the interests of the workmen or for the purpose of resolving industrial disputes. The provisions of Section 16(5) of the Act thus appear to us to be irrelevant when considering the scope of the jurisdiction of the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act. Consequently, the decision of the High Court holding that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with the industrial dispute referred to it must bedo not think that at this stage there is any need for us to decide this question, because such a point was not raised at all in the petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. In those petitions, the competence of the reference to the Industrial Tribunal as a whole was challenged on the ground that it was barred because of the jurisdiction of the Registrar to deal with the dispute under Section 61 of the Act. Consequently, we need not deal with the question whether a particular issue forming part of the reference has been competently referred oris no doubt true that the Act is an enactment passed by State Legislature which received the assent of the President, so that, if any provision of a Central Act, including the Industrial Disputes Act, is repugnant to any provision of the Act, the provision of the Act will prevail and not the provision of the Central Industrial Disputes Act.The general proposition urged that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act will be barred if the disputes in question can be competently decided by the Registrar under Section 61 of the Act is, therefore, correct and has to be accepted.The question, however, that has to be examined is whether the industrial dispute referred to the Tribunal in the present cases was such as was required to be referred to the Registrar and to be decided by him under Section 61 of the Act.