Case: Union Of India Vs. Reliance Industries Limited

2. A brief resume of the facts that led to the judgment of this Court on 28th May, 2014 are as follows:-Two Production Sharing Contracts (hereinafter referred to asfor the Tapti and Panna Mukta Fields were executed between Reliance Industries Limited, the Union of India, Enron Oil and Gas India Limited and the ONGC. The relevant clauses of the PSCs insofar as they are applicable to the present controversy are as32: APPLICABLE LAW AND LANGUAGE OF THE CONTRACT32.1 Subject to the provisions of Article 33.12, this Contract shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of India.32.2 Nothing in this Contract shall entitle the Government or the Contractor to exercise the rights, privileges and powers conferred upon it by this Contract in a manner which will contravene the laws of India.ARTICLE 33: SOLE EXPERT, CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION33.9 Arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) of 1985 except that in the event of any conflict between these rules and the provisions of this Article 33, the provisions of this Article 33 shall govern.…33.12 The venue of conciliation or arbitration proceedings pursuant to this Article, unless the Parties otherwise agree, shall be London, England and shall be conducted in the English Language. The arbitration agreement contained in this Article 33 shall be governed by the laws of England. Insofar as practicable, the Parties shall continue to implement the terms of this Contract notwithstanding the initiation of arbitral proceedings and any pending claim or dispute.34.2 This Contract shall not be amended, modified, varied or supplemented in any respect except by an instrument in writing signed by all the Parties, which shall state the date upon which the amendment or modification shall become effective.It needs to be mentioned that the PSCs were amended to substitute Enron Oil & Gas India Limited with BG Exploration and Production India Limited on 10.1.2005. Since certain disputes and differences arose between the Union of India and Reliance Industries Limited sometime in 2010, the Union of India invoked the arbitration clause and appointed Mr. Peter Leaver, QC as Arbitrator. Reliance Industries Limited appointed Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy as Arbitrator and Mr. Christopher Lau SC was appointed as Chairman of the Tribunal. On 14.9.2011, the Union of India, Reliance Industries Limited and BG Exploration and Production India Limited, agreed to change the seat of arbitration to London, England and a final partial consent award was made and duly signed by the parties to this effect. On 12.9.2012, the Arbitral Tribunal passed a final partial award which became the subject matter of a Section 34 petition filed in the Delhi High Court by the Union of India, dated 13.12.2012. The Delhi High Court by a judgment and order dated 22.3.2013 decided that the said petition filed under Section 34 was maintainable. This Court in a detailed judgment dated 28.5.2014 reversed the Delhi High Court. Since this judgment in effect determines the controversy raised in the present SLP, it is important to set it out in some detail. After stating the facts and the contentions of both parties, this Courtwe analyse the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for both the parties, it would be appropriate to notice the various factual and legal points on which the parties are agreed. The controversy herein would have to be decided on the basis of the law declared by this Court in Bhatia International [(2002) 4 SCC 105] . The parties are agreed and it is also evident from the final partial consent award dated 14-9-2011 that the juridical sea t (or legal place) of arbitration for the purposes of the arbitration initiated under the claimants notice of arbitration dated 16-12-2010 shall be London, England. The parties are also agreed that hearings of the notice of arbitration may take place at Paris, France, Singapore or any other location the Tribunal considers may be convenient. It is also agreed by the parties that the terms and conditions of the arbitration agreement in Article 33 of the PSCs shall remain in full force and effect and be applicable to the arbitration proceedings.The essential dispute between the parties is as to whether Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be applicable to the arbitration agreement irrespective of the fact that the seat of arbitration is outside India. To find a conclusive answer to the issue as to whether applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has been excluded, it would be necessary to discover the intention of the parties. Beyond this parties are not agreed on any issue. We are also of the opinion that since the ratio of law laid down in Balco [Balco v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] has been made prospective in operation by the Constitution Bench itself, we are bound by the decision rendered in Bhatia International [(2002) 4 SCC 105] . Therefore, at the outset, it would be appropriate to reproduce the relevant ratio of Bhatia International [(2002) 4 SCC 105] in para 32 which is as under: (SCC p.To conclude, we hold that the provisions of Part I would apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India the provisions of Part I would compulsorily apply and parties are free to deviate only to the extent permitted by the derogable provisions of Part I. In cases of international commercial arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to or excluded by that law or rules will notview of the aforesaid, it would be necessary to analyse the relevant articles of the PSC, to discover the real intention of the parties as to whether the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 have been excluded. It must, immediately, be noticed that Articles 32.1 and 32.2 deal with applicable law and language of the contract as is evident from the heading of the article which islaw and language of theArticle 32.1 provides for the proper law of the contract i.e. laws of India. Article 32.2 makes a declaration that none of the provisions contained in the contract would entitle either the Government or the contractor to exercise the rights, privileges and powers conferred upon it by the contract in a manner which would contravene the laws of India. Article 33 makes a very detailed provision with regard to the resolution of disputes through arbitration. The two articles do not overlap—one (Article 32) deals with the proper law of the contract, the other (Article 33) deals with ADR i.e. consultations between the parties; conciliation; reference to a sole expert and ultimately arbitration. Under Article 33, at first efforts should be made by the parties to settle the disputes among themselves (Article 33.1). If these efforts fail, the parties by agreement shall refer the dispute to a sole expert (Article 33.2). The provision with regard to constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal provides that the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators (Article 33.4). This article also provides that each party shall appoint one arbitrator. The arbitrators appointed by the parties shall appoint the third arbitrator. In case, the procedure under Article 33.4 fails, the aggrieved party can approach the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague for appointment of an arbitrator (Article 33.5). Further, in case the two arbitrators fail to make the appointment of the third arbitrator within 30 days of the appointment of the second arbitrator, again the Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague may, at the request of either party appoint the third arbitrator. In the face of this, it is difficult to appreciate the submission of the respondent Union of India that the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Part I) would be applicable to the arbitration proceedings. In the event, the Union of India intended to ensure that the Arbitration Act, 1996 shall apply to the arbitration proceedings, Article 33.5 should have provided that in default of a party appointing its arbitrator, such arbitrator may, at the request of the first party be appointed by the Chief Justice of India or any person or institution designated by him. Thus, the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague can be approached for the appointment of the arbitrator, in case of default by any of the parties. This, in our opinion, is a strong indication that applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1996 was excluded by the parties by consensus. Further, the arbitration proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules, 1976 (Article 33.9). It is specifically provided that the right to arbitrate disputes and claims under this contract shall survive the termination of this contract (Article 33.10).The article which provides the basis of the controversy herein is Article 33.12 which provides that venue of the arbitration shall be London and that the arbitration agreement shall be governed by the laws of England. It appears, as observed earlier, that by a final partial consent award, the parties have agreed that the juridical seat (or legal place of arbitration) for the purposes of arbitration initiated under the claimants notice of arbitration dated 16-12-2010 shall be London, England.We are of the opinion, upon a meaningful reading of the aforesaid articles of the PSC, that the proper law of the contract is Indian law; proper law of the arbitration agreement is the law of England. Therefore, can it be said as canvassed by the respondents, that applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1996 has not been[at paras 36 -The Court went on to state in paragraph 45 that it is too late in the day to contend that the seat of arbitration is not analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause and then went on to hold asour opinion, these observations in Sulamerica case [(2013) 1 WLR 102 : 2012 EWCA Civ 638 : 2012 WL 14764] are fully applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. The conclusion reached by the High Court would lead to the chaotic situation where the parties would be left rushing between India and England for redressal of their grievances. The provisions of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Indian) are necessarily excluded; being wholly inconsistent with the arbitration agreement which providesarbitration agreement shall be governed by EnglishThus the remedy for the respondent to challenge any award rendered in the arbitration proceedings would lie under the relevant provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, 1996 of England and Wales. Whether or not such an application would now be entertained by the courts in England is not for us to examine, it would have to be examined by the court of competent jurisdiction in>It ultimatelyare also unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Ganguli that since the issues involved herein relate to the public policy of India, Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be applicable. Applicability of Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not dependent on the nature of challenge to the award. Whether or not the award is challenged on the ground of public policy, it would have to satisfy the precondition that the Arbitration Act, 1996 is applicable to the arbitration agreement. In our opinion, the High Court has committed a jurisdictional error in holding that the provisions contained in Article 33.12 are relevant only for the determination of the curial law applicable to the proceedings. We have already noticed earlier that the parties by agreement have provided that the juridical seat of the arbitration shall be in London.Necessary amendment has also been made in the PSCs, as recorded by the final partial consent award dated 14-9-2011. It is noteworthy that the Arbitration Act, 1996 does not define or mention juridical seat. The termon the other hand is specifically defined in Section 3 of the English Arbitration Act. Therefore, this would clearly indicate that the parties understood that the arbitration law of England would be applicable to the arbitration agreement.In view of the aforesaid, we are unable to uphold the conclusion arrived at by the Delhi High Court that the applicability of the Arbitration Act, 1996 to the arbitration agreement in the present case has not been excluded.In view of the above, we hold that:The petition filed by respondents under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 in the Delhi High Court is not maintainable.We further overrule and set aside the conclusion of the High Court that, even though the arbitration agreement would be governed by the laws of England and that the juridical seat of arbitration would be in London, Part I of the Arbitration Act would still be applicable as the laws governing the substantive contract are Indian laws.In the event a final award is made against the respondent, the enforceability of the same in India can be resisted on the ground of public policy.The conclusion of the High Court that in the event, the award is sought to be enforced outside India, it would leave the Indian party remediless is without any basis as the parties have consensually provided that the arbitration agreement will be governed by the English law. Therefore, the remedy against the award will have to be sought in England, where the juridical seat is located. However, we accept the submission of the appellant that since the substantive law governing the contract is Indian law, even the courts in England, in case the arbitrability is challenged, will have to decide the issue by applying Indian law viz. the principle of public policy, etc. as it prevails in Indian law.In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment [(2013) 199 DLT 469] of the High Court is set[at paras 74 -Continuing the narration of facts, the present SLP arises out of a judgment dated 3.7.2014 whereby the Delhi High Court has dismissed an application filed under Section 14 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, dated 12.6.2013, on the ground that thisjudgment dated 28.5.2014 having held that Part-I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 is not applicable, such petition filed under Section 14 would not be maintainable.6. It needs further to be pointed out that a review petition against the said judgment dated 28.5.2014 was dismissed on 31.7.2014 and a curative petition filed thereafter was also

Reasoning: 16. It will thus be seen that facts like the present case attract the Bhatia International principle of concurrent jurisdiction inasmuch as all arbitration agreements entered into before 12.9.2012, that is the date of pronouncement of Bharat Aluminiumjudgment, will be governed by Bhatia International.17. It is important to note that in paragraph 32 of Bhatia International itself this Court has held that Part-I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 will not apply if it has been excluded either expressly or by necessary implication. Several judgments of this Court have held that Part-I is excluded by necessary implication if it is found that on the facts of a case either the juridical seat of the arbitration is outside India or the law governing the arbitration agreement is a law other than Indian law. This is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court [see: Videocon Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., (2011) 6 SCC 161 , Dozco India Private Limited v. Doosan Infracore Company Limited, (2011) 6 SCC 179 , Yograj Infrastructure Limited v. Ssang Yong Engineering and Construction Company Limited, (2011) 9 SCC 735 ), the very judgment in this case reported in Reliance Industries Limited v. Union of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603 , and a recent judgment in Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. v. Gupta Coal India Ltd. & Anr., (decided on 10th March, 2015 in Civil Appeal No. 610 ofsaid that the implied exclusion principle stated in Bhatia International (supra) would be applicable, regard being had to the clause in the agreement, there is no need to dwell upon the contention raised pertaining to the addendum, for any interpretation placed on the said document would not make any difference to the ultimate conclusion that we have already arrived[at paras 46 andIt is interesting to note that even though the law governing the arbitration agreement was not specified, yet this Court held, having regard to various circumstances, that the seat of arbitration would be London and therefore, by necessary implication, the ratio of Bhatia International would not apply.20. The last paragraph of Bharatjudgment has now to be read with two caveats, both emanating from paragraph 32 of Bhatia International itself – that where the Court comes to a determination that the juridical seat is outside India or where law other than Indian law governs the arbitration agreement, Part-I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be excluded by necessary implication. Therefore, even in the cases governed by the Bhatia principle, it is only those cases in which agreements stipulate that the seat of the arbitration is in India or on whose facts a judgment cannot be reached on the seat of the arbitration as being outside India that would continue to be governed by the Bhatia principle. Also, it is only those agreements which stipulate or can be read to stipulate that the law governing the arbitration agreement is Indian law which would continue to be governed by the Bhatia rule.21. On the facts in the present case, it is clear that this Court has already determined both that the juridical seat of the arbitration is at London and that the arbitration agreement is governed by English law. This being the case, it is not open to the Union of India to argue that Part-I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be applicable. A Section 14 application made under Part-I would consequently not be maintainable. It needs to be mentioned that Shri Ranjitvaliant attempt to reopen a question settled twice over, that is by dismissal of both a review petition and a curative petition on the very ground urged before us, must meet with the same fate. His argument citing the case of Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613 , that res judicata would not attach to questions relating to jurisdiction, would not apply in the present case as the effect of clause 34.2 of the PSC raises at best a mixed question of fact and law and not a pure question of jurisdiction unrelated to facts. Therefore, both on grounds of res judicata as well as the law laid down in the judgment dated 28.5.2014, this application under Section 14 deserves to be dismissed. It is also an abuse of the process of the Court as has rightly been argued by Dr. Singhvi. It is only after moving under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and getting an adverse judgment from the Permanent Court of Arbitration dated 10.06.2013 that the present application was filed under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act two days later i.e. on 12.6.2013.