Case: Raja Sri Sailendra Narayanbhanja Deo Vs. The State Of Orissa

1. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed onby a Bench of the Orissa High Court in an Original suit which was filed onin the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cuttack and was ontransferred to the High Court and marked as Original Suit No. 1 of 1953. The suit was filed by theclaiming as the Raja and owner of the Rajgee, known as the Kanika Raja against the State of Orissa, praying for a declaration that the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Abolition Act") was, in its application to the Rajgee of Kanika, invalid, unconstitutional and ultra vires the State Legislature and for an injunction restraining the State of Orissa from taking any action under the said Act. The suit was instituted evidently under an apprehension that the State of Orissa might issue a notification under S. 3 (1) of the Abolition Act declaring that the Rajgee of Kanika had passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The High Court dismissed the suit but gave a certificate of fitness for appeal to this court. Hence the present appeal by the plaintiff.

Reasoning: We are unable to accept the line of reasoning developed by Mr. P. R. Das. To accede to his contention would be to add words to S. 2 (g) of the Abolition Act so as to make it applicable tolands which were "validly" included under one entry in any of the general registers "properly" prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force, that is to say, the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876. This the court has no power to do. If. S. (2) (g) defined "estate" as including lands mentioned in the schedule to the Act, then whatever was included in the schedule would be an "estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act, irrespective of whether such land was or was not an "estate" within the meaning of any other Act. The same reasoning applies when the definition includes lands entered in the general registers prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876. Here the reference to the register prepared or kept under the law for the time being in force was meant only to identify the particular register in which the particular land was included under one entry. Suppose that a register prepared and maintained under the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876,included lands which were "estates" within the meaning of the Land Registration Act and also lands which were not "estates" within the meaning of that Act. Suppose further that the Orissa Legislature by the Abolition Act intended to include all these lands, properly or improperly included in the register, what language would they then have used? Precisely the language they have used in S. 2 (g) of the Abolition Act, namely, that an "estate" means any land included in the general registers prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force.In other words, the definition covers lands which are factually included in the particular register referred to. Whether they are "estates" within the meaning of the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876, and whether they were validly or properly entered according to the provisions of that Act, appears to us to be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of construing S. 2 (g) of the Abolition Act.In our opinion, the contention of the State of Orissa on this must be accepted.The compromise decree is also sought to be pleaded by the State against the plaintiff as estoppel by representation. It is said, that even if the compromise had not the imprimatur of the court, it would, nevertheless, be representation that the plaintiffs predecessor was the Zemindar of a permanently settled estate. The compromise consisted of reciprocal concession, those made by one party being the consideration for those made by the other. It was on the basis of the concession made by the plaintiffs predecessor, namely, that he was a Zemindar of a permanently settled estate, that the State gave up the benefit of the decree which had been passed in its favour by the trial court and also the right to levy assessment on the accretions of future Chars. One of the main considerations for the compromise was the clear admission on the part of the plaintiff in that case that his status in respect of Killa Kanika was nothing more than that of a proprietor of a permanently settled estate liable to pay land revenue. The High Court decided the issue of estoppel against the State on two considerations, namely, (1) that the status of the owner of Killa Kanika was not directly and substantially in issue in the earlier litigation and (2) that there was no clear evident led on the side of the State to establish that the admission by the plaintiff in that case of his status was the main consideration for the compromise. We are satisfied that the High Court was in error on both these points. As already pointed out, the pleadings summarised above and the passages in the judgments quoted above clearly indicate that the status of the plaintiff was the foundation of his claim to the river beds and was consequently directly and substantially in issue in that litigation and was understood to be so by the parties themselves. On the second ground the terms of the compromise speak for themselves. It is quite clear that the concessions made by one party were the consideration for those made by the other party and therefore, it was not necessary to adduce any further evidence, assuming that any evidence was admissible for the purpose. In our judgment, the finding of the High Court on this issue was clearly erroneous.