Case: MUZAFFAR HUSAIN Vs. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANR

2. Factual Matrix:i. The appellant had joined the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Services in the year 1978 and sought voluntary retirement from the said services in September 2003. Immediately after the retirement, appellant joined as a Judicial Member, Central Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai. On 19.07.2005, the appellant was informed vide the letter dated 19.07.2005 of the O.S.D (Enquiry), Allahabad High Court, addressed to the Principal Registrar, CAT, New Delhi that the High Court had initiated a departmental enquiry, being no. 26 of 2005 against him. A copy of chargesheet was enclosed therewith. There were twelve charges levelled against the appellant in the said chargesheet. It was alleged against the petition inter alia that the appellant, while posted as the 11th Additional District Judge, Agra during the period from 23.05.2001 to 19.05.2003, had decided a batch of matters under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and had awarded enhanced compensation which was multiple times more than the investments made by the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands; that such subsequent purchasers had no right to claim compensation for the acquired lands; that the appellant had determined the compensation in terms of square yards and not in terms of bighas, and had awarded such compensation in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of law and equity and against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to unduly favour such subsequent purchasers. It was therefore alleged that the appellant had failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty, and thereby had committed a misconduct within the meaning of Rule-3 of U.P. Govt. Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. The charge no. 12 levelled against the appellant pertained to an undue favour shown to the son of a Counsel named Shri KC Jain, by exorbitantly enhancing the compensation in his favour.ii. The appellant vide the letters dated 07.09.2005 and 19.09.2005 denied all the charges levelled against him. On 20.01.2006, the appellant received the written submissions submitted on behalf of the department in the departmental enquiry initiated against him and the appellant also submitted his written submissions on 10.02.2006 in the said enquiry.iii. The Enquiry Officer vide his Enquiry report dated 05.04.2006 held charges no. 1 to 11 as Proved and charge no. 12 as Not Proved. The Enquiry Officer submitted the said report to the Chief Justice/Administrative Committee/Full Court for further consideration on the question of quantum of punishment. The appellant was called upon and he filed his response on 14.06.2006 to the said Enquiry report. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in its Full Court Meeting held that 02.09.2006 accepted the report of the Enquiry Officer and resolved to punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of his pensionary benefits with immediate effect. Pursuant to the said recommendation made by the Full Court of the High Court, the respondent-State passed an order dated 22.01.2007, sanctioning withholding of 90% from the pension of the appellant in view of the provisions contained in Article 351(A) of the Civil Services Regulations.iv. The aggrieved appellant challenged the legality of the said order dated 22.01.2007 by filing a writ before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow. The Division Bench of the High Court vide the impugned order dated 17.04.2019 found that the punishment order in reference to the charge nos. 1 to 3 was not sustainable in the eye of law as the respondents could not have framed the charges for the incidences which have taken place 4 years prior to the chargesheet. However, the High Court held that there was no ground to interfere with the findings recorded in reference to the charge nos. 4 to 11. The High Court considering the overall circumstances reduced the curtailment of pensionary benefits to the extent of 70% in place of 90%. The present appeal is directed against the said order passed by the High Court.

Reasoning: 5. At the outset, it may be noted that maintenance of high standard of conduct and character of the judicial officers has always been a matter of great concern for this court. In C. Ravichandran Iyer Vs. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 457,  this court emphasizing the need to maintain high standard of integrity, honesty and moral vigour by the judges, observed: -Judicial office is essentially a public trust. Society is, therefore, entitled to except that a Judge must be a man of high integrity, honesty and required to have moral vigour, ethical firmness and impervious to corrupt or venial influences. He is required to keep most exacting standards of propriety in judicial conduct. Any conduct which tends to undermine public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the court would be deleterious to the efficacy of judicial process. Society, therefore, expects higher standards of conduct and rectitude from a Judge. Unwritten code of conduct is writ large for judicial officers to emulate and imbibe high moral or ethical standards expected of a higher judicial functionary, as wholesome standard of conduct which would generate public confidence, accord dignity to the judicial office and enhance public image, not only of the Judge but the court itself. It is, therefore, a basic requirement that a Judges official and personal conduct be free from impropriety; the same must be in tune with the highest standard of propriety and probity. The standard of conduct is higher than expected of a layman and also higher than expected of an advocate. In fact, even his private life must adhere to high standards of probity and propriety, higher than those deemed acceptable for others. Therefore, the Judge can ill-afford to seek shelter from the fallen standard in the society.6. In Sadhna Chaudhary Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2020) 11 SCC 760, this court reiterated that the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity.19. It has amply been reiterated by this Court that the judicial officers must aspire and adhere to a higher standard of honesty, integrity and probity. Very recently in Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra [Shrirang Yadavrao Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 144  : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 582] , a Division Bench of this Court very succinctly collated these principles and reiterated that: (SCC pp. 146-47, paras 5-10)5. The first and foremost quality required in a Judge is integrity. The need of integrity in the judiciary is much higher than in other institutions. The judiciary is an institution whose foundations are based on honesty and integrity. It is, therefore, necessary that judicial officers should possess the sterling quality of integrity. This Court in Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2005) 1 SCC 201]  held as follows: (SCC p. 203)Integrity is the hallmark of judicial discipline, apart from others. It is high time the judiciary took utmost care to see that the temple of justice does not crack from inside, which will lead to a catastrophe in the justice-delivery system resulting in the failure of public confidence in the system. It must be remembered that woodpeckers inside pose a larger threat than the storm outside.6. The behaviour of a Judge has to be of an exacting standard, both inside and outside the court. This Court in Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad [Daya Shankar v. High Court of Allahabad, (1987) 3 SCC 1  : 1987 SCC (L&S) 132] held thus: (SCC pp. 4-5, para 11)11. … Judicial officers cannot have two standards, one in the court and another outside the court. They must have only one standard of rectitude, honesty and integrity. They cannot act even remotely unworthy of the office they occupy.7. Judges are also public servants. A Judge should always remember that he is there to serve the public. A Judge is judged not only by his quality of judgments but also by the quality and purity of his character. Impeccable integrity should be reflected both in public and personal life of a Judge. One who stands in judgments over others should be incorruptible. That is the high standard which is expected of Judges.8. Judges must remember that they are not merely employees but hold high public office. In R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P. [R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P., (2012) 8 SCC 58  : (2012) 2 SCC (Civ) 343 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 782 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 469] , this Court held that the standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than that of an ordinary person. The following observations of this Court are relevant: (SCC p. 70, para 29)29. Judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold the public office; their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of impeccable integrity and unimpeachable independence. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secured that the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. This is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesars wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it. For a democracy to thrive and the rule of law to survive, justice system and the judicial process have to be strong and every Judge must discharge his judicial functions with integrity, impartiality and intellectual honesty.9. There can be no manner of doubt that a Judge must decide the case only on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case. If a Judge decides a case for any extraneous reasons then he is not performing his duty in accordance with law.10. In our view the word gratification does not only mean monetary gratification. Gratification can be of various types. It can be gratification of money, gratification of power, gratification of lust etc., etc.10. Again, in the State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584,  it was observed in para 7 as under:7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. Courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations.11. Reverting to the facts of the case, it may be noted that there was a regular disciplinary proceedings conducted against the appellant after serving him the chargesheet and giving him full opportunity of hearing. Thereafter, pursuant to the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, Full Court of the High Court had resolved on 02.09.2006 to accept the said enquiry report and punish the appellant with curtailment of 90% of pensionary benefit with immediate effect. The order of punishment passed by the respondent-State on the basis of the said recommendation made by the full court of the High Court, was challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court. The High Court dropped the charge nos. 1 to 3 and upheld the charge nos. 4 to 11 against the appellant, and reduced the punishment to the curtailment of 70% in place of 90% of his pensionary benefits.12. Pertinently, the appellant had not made any allegation with regard to violation of principles of natural justice or contravention of any statutory rules or regulations having occasioned during the course of enquiry proceedings or in the decision-making process. Therefore, in absence of any such allegations, the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the High Court on the administrative side, and the impugned order passed by the High Court on the judicial side did not warrant any interference of this court. When the Enquiry proceedings have been found to have been conducted in proper and legal manner, and when the High Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, has accepted the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer qua the charge nos. 4 to 11 levelled against the appellant as proved, holding him guilty of having committed misconduct, this court was not expected to sit as an appellate authority and revaluate the adequacy or reliability of the evidence adduced before the Enquiry Officer. Nonetheless, this court just for the sake of satisfying its conscience, had permitted the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Pradeep Kant to argue on the merits of the charges levelled against the appellant.In case of Union of India & Ors. Vs. Iqbal Singh (supra), this court was examining the right of the claimant as a legatee under the will executed by a displaced person under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955. In case of Khorshed Shapoor Chenai Mrs Vs. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty (supra), the question of legality and validity of the notices issued by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderabad in respect of the compensation received by the legal heirs and representatives of the deceased owner of the acquired land was under consideration. So far as the charges levelled against the appellant were concerned, it was alleged that the appellant had awarded enhanced compensation at an exorbitantly higher rate in favour of the subsequent purchasers/investors, who had no right to receive any compensation, more particularly when Section 6(e) of the Transfer of Property Act specifically prohibited the transfer of mere right to sue. The said cases were found to have been decided by the appellant in flagrant violation of the cardinal principles of law and equity, and against all judicial norms and propriety, with a view to unduly favour such subsequent purchasers who had no legal right to receive the compensation.We completely agree with the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and with the ratio of judgments relied upon by him. Nonetheless, in the instant case the appellant was found to have conducted the proceedings in the manner which had reflected on his reputation and integrity. There was enough evidence and material to show that the appellant had misconducted himself while discharging his duties as a judicial officer, and had passed the judicial orders in utter disregard of the specific provisions of law, to unduly favour the subsequent purchasers of the acquired lands who had no right to claim compensation, and that such orders were actuated by corrupt motive. Under the circumstances, the High Court was perfectly justified in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 235 of the Constitution.15. In our opinion, showing undue favour to a party under the guise of passing judicial orders is the worst kind of judicial dishonesty and misconduct. The extraneous consideration for showing favour need not always be a monetary consideration. It is often said that the public servants are like fish in the water, none can say when and how a fish drank the water. A judge must decide the case on the basis of the facts on record and the law applicable to the case. If he decides a case for extraneous reasons, then he is not performing his duties in accordance with law. As often quoted, a judge, like Caesars wife, must be above suspicion.