Case: Maharashtra State Mining Corpn Vs. Sunil

2. The respondent was employed by the appellant. On the basis that the respondent had indulged in various activities of misconduct, he was placed under suspension pending disciplinary enquiry. The respondent was served with ap.m. Therefore when the Managing Director issued the order dismissing the respondent, he was incompetent to do so3. In the writ petition the respondent had taken several grounds for challenging the dismissal order for example, that the relevant documents were not supplied, that he was not allowed toe the witnesses, that he was not allowed to engage a lawyer etc. However, a perusal of paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that the writ petitioner did not press any of the grounds. The only ground which was pressed was that the order of dismissal was passed by the Managing Director of the appellant, who had no authority or power to do so, as the same was vested in the Board of Directors of the appellant. In view of the fact that the respondent had not pressed these grounds before the High Court, we cannot allow him to urge these points before us. The only issue which the High Court was called upon to decide was whether the removal of the respondent from service was by a competent authority. The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the Managing Director was not competent to terminate the respondents services as on the date of the passing of the order of termination and therefore the order of dismissal was invalid. The High Court was also of the view that this defect could not be rectified subsequently by the resolution of the Board of Directors. The High Court accordingly set aside the order of termination. Since the respondent had already retired from service, the appellant was directed to reinstate the respondent notionally with effect from the date of termination in the same post and pay salaries up to the date of superannuation and to pay all retrial benefits after the date of superannuation.

Reasoning: 5. The High Court was right when it held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act cannot be subsequently rectified by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim Ratihabitio priori mandato aequiparatur namely a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act. Therefore ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated9. In the present case, the Managing Directors order dismissing the respondent from the service was admittedly ratified by the Board of Directors on 20th February 1991, and the Board of Directors unquestionably had the power to terminate the services of the respondent. On the basis of the authorities noted, it must follow that since the order of the Managing Director had been ratified by the Board of Directors such ratification related back to the date of the order and validated it11. That was not a case of ratification but of empowerment subsequent to the operative date. The case is, therefore, distinguishable not only on facts but also on the law applicable.