Case: The Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd Vs. Their Workmen &amp; Another

1. The industrial dispute between the Bijay Cotton Mills Ltd. (hereinafter called the appellant) and their workmen (hereinafter called the respondents) which has given rise to this appeal by special leave has gone through a protracted and tortuous course. The respondents claimed that the scale of minimum wages and rates for contract works should be fixed for them because it was alleged that the payments made by the appellant were below the level of the bare subsistence wage. The appellant did not accede to the demand thus made by the respondents, and so on December 1, 1950, the present dispute was referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal consisting of Mr. D. N. Roy, under S. 10 (1) read with S. 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act). Amongst the items thus referred for adjudication, the first two were (1) that the mill employees be paid minimum wages and rates for contract works as shown in the two statements enclosed, and (2) that dearness allowance be paid to all workers at the rate of Rs. 35 per mensem each and it may be increased or decreased according to rise or fall in prices. In the present appeal we are concerned with the minimum wages2. It appears that Mr. Roy found himself unable to fix any basic minimum wage, and to support his view, that it would be inexpedient to fix any minimum basic wage in the proceedings pending before him, he referred to the fact that the question of fixation of the basic wage had been rendered enormously difficult by the state of industrial development in the Stage of Ajmer and by the unsteady and frequent fluctuations in prices. Even so he considered several items of dispute referred to him and announced his award on October 5, 19513. This award was challenged by the respondents before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellate tribunal thereupon remanded the matter to Mr. Roy with a direction that the issues as to the basic wage and as to dearness allowance should be specifically determined and appropriate directions issued on those two items. This remand order was passed on October 20, 19524. By the time the proceedings were taken up before the tribunal on remand, Mr. Roy was not available because he had ceased to be a District Judge in Ajmer. In his place Mr. Sharma was appointed. Mr. Sharma then made his award on September 8, 1953. He fixed Rs. 25 as basic wage and Rs. 10 as minimum dearness allowance. It appears that the award thus made by Mr. Sharma was subsequently quashed on the ground that his appointment had not been duly published as required by the Act. This order was passed on May 25, 19555. Mr. C. Jacob was then appointed Industrial Tribunal. He made his award on January 25, 1956. By this award Mr. Jacob in substance agreed with the view taken by Mr. Sharma and fixed the basic wage at Rs. 25 per mensem and the minimum dearness allowance at Rs. 10 per mensem. This award was directed to come into operation as from December 1, 1950. This award was again challenged before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the appellate tribunal has partly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondents and increased the basic wage from Rs. 25 per mensem to Rs. 30 per mensem. The amount of the minimum dearness allowance has been affirmed at Rs. 10 per mensem. This decision was announced by the appellate tribunal on December 12, 1956. It is this decision that has given rise to the present appeal by special leave.

Reasoning: Thus it would be clear that there is no dispute between the parties as to what would be the basic wage and the minimum dearness allowance subsequent to January 8, 1953It is presumably on these grounds that Mr. Jacob fixed the basic wage at Rs. 25 per mensem7. It appears that Mr. Jacob who fixed the basic minimum wage at Rs. 25 per mensem relied upon the fact that the said rate represented the basic minimum wage on the industry-cum-region basisIt, however, appears that in ascertaining the wages which labour in comparable trades was getting in the relevant region, the tribunal has completely lost sight of the fact that in addition to the basic wages of Rs. 26, Rs. 43 was the average minimum dearness allowance paid to the workers and that made a very large difference in the total earnings of the workmen. In determining the minimum basic wage the fact that a large amount of dearness allowance was being paid to employees in other comparable occupations in the same region should not have been ignored by the tribunal, and that is one infirmity on which the appellate tribunal was entitled to comment10. Besides, if the appellate tribunal thought that more useful assistance can be derived from the statutory fixation of the minimum wage in Ajmer under the Minimum Wages Act, we do not see how we can interfere with the said view in the present appeal. It would not be wrong to assume, as the appellate tribunal did, that in fixing the minimum wage in the area, the Statutory Committee took in to consideration all the relevant factors, and came to the conclusion that that would be a fair minimum to prescribe. On the other hand, before the tribunal much relevant or useful evidence was not adduced, and so the appellate tribunal could not be said to have committed any error of law in preferring to rely on the statutory notification rather than on the other unsatisfactory evidence produced in the case. After all, from January 8, 1953, the minimum basic wage was statutorily fixed, and so, if for a couple of years before that date the same basic wage awarded by the appellate tribunal it cannot be said that any error of law has been committed, which should be corrected by us in our jurisdiction under Art. 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, we are not satisfied that any case for interference has been, made out by the appellant on this pointIn our opinion there is no substance in this argument. The notification on which the whole of the argument is based was issued on December 31, 1954, for the sole purpose of correcting the error which had crept into the appointment of Mr. Sharma by reason of the fact that his earlier appointment made on May 4, 1953, had not been duly published and notified as required by the Act. Indeed, it was because of this infirmity that the award made by Mr. Sharma on September 8, 1953, had been quashed on May 25, 1955. In reading the later notification this fact must be borne in mind. No doubt the notification purports to refer to Mr. Sharma for his adjudication the matter referred to him by the Labour Appellate Tribunal on remand; it, however, appears as pointed out by the appellate tribunal that at the time when the proceedings after the remand commenced Mr. Sharmas services were not available, as he was apparently not in the service of the State, and it was impossible to refer the matter to him for his adjudication. That is the finding made by the appellate tribunal and this finding is fully justified. Therefore, since Mr. Sharmas services were not available to the appropriate Government it was perfectly competent to the said Government to fill in the vacancy and appoint Mr. Jacob in his place to take up the work of adjudication. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the decision of Mr. Jacob is invalid in lawIt is true that the textile industry is controlled by the provisions of Act 65 of 1951 and in that sense it is controlled industry; but that would not be enough to attract the application of S. 2 (a) (i) of the Act.What this latter provision requires is that the Central Government must specify "in this behalf" that the industry in question is a controlled industry; in other words the specification must be made by the Central Government by reference to, and for the purpose of, the provisions of the Act in order that the Central Government may itself become the appropriate Government qua such industry under S. 2 (a) (i) of the ActIndeed, we ought to add in fairness to Mr. Sastri that he did not very seriously press this point.