Case: The Parbhani Transport Co-Operative Society Ltd Vs. The Regional Transport Authority,Aurangabad And Others

1. The petitioner is ae society duly registered and it carries on the business of playing motor buses as stage carriages on the public highways in the State of Bombay. Its case in this petition is that it has been deprived of its right to carry on this business and has also been subjected to discriminatory treatment in the matter of the grant of permits to run its buses. It complains of the infringement of its fundamental rights under Arts. 19 (1) (g) and 14 of the Constitution.

Reasoning: 6. It appears that the petitioner had permits to run buses on four routes in Aurangabad and that these permits were due to expire on October 1, 1958. The third respondent who really represents the Government of the State of Bombay and who may be conveniently referred to as the State of Bombay, had permits for two of these routes. On May 19, 1958, the State of Bombay applied for permits for all these four routes under Chapter IV of the Act. On May 27, 1958, the petitioner applied for renewal of its existing permits. The first respondent rejected the application of the petitioner and granted those of the State of Bombay. The petitioner appealed to the second respondent but its appeal was rejected. In the meantime on some date which does not appear on the record, the petitioner had been granted temporary permits up to December 31, 1958. On the expiry of its temporary permits on December 31, 1958, the petitioner would have been unable to run any of its buses and it therefore moved the High Court at Bombay under Art. 226 of the Constitution and the High Court quashed the orders of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and directed the applications of the petitioner and the State of Bombay for the permits to be reconsidered. With the reasons of this order of the High Court we are not concerned. Respondent No. 1, however, withoutg the applications as directed by the High Court, granted temporary permits to the State of Bombay. The petitioner again moved the High Court which thereupon quashed the order of respondent No. 1 granting temporary permits to the State of Bombay. Thereafter, on March 20, 1959, the respondent No. 1 granted temporary permits to the petitioner which were later extended to July 20, 1959. On June 1, 1959, the State of Bombay published a scheme under S. 68C in Chapter IVA of the Act. Various objections were filed against the scheme and nothing further appears to have been done to make the scheme final. On July 18, 1959, respondent No. 1 purporting to carry out the directions of the High Court, reconsidered the petitioners applications for renewal and the applications of the State of Bombay for permits and rejected the petitioners applications while allowing those of the State of Bombay. On July 20, 1959, the petitioners temporary permits having expired, it ceased to operate its buses. On August 27, 1959, the petitioner filed the present petition in this Court under Art. 32 of the constitution for appropriate writs quashing the order of respondent No. 1 dated July 18, 1959, restraining the State of Bombay from applying for permits save under the provisions of Chapter IVA and respondent No. 1 from entertaining any application by the State of Bombay under chapter IV and directing respondent No.1 to hear the petitioners applications for permits according to law.9. Now the position here is different. The Government has of course the power to do any business it likes and therefore the business of running stage carriages. We have earlier drawn attention to the change made in cl. (a) of S. 42 (3) by the amendment of 1956. Previously, it was not necessary for the Government to obtain permits under S. 42 (1) for buses that it intended to run as stage carriages. Since the amendment the Government can no longer run transport vehicles for commercial purposes without obtaining permits under S. 42 (1).Now the playing of buses as stage carriages is a commercial enterprise and for such buses, therefore, under the sections as they stand the Government would require permits as any one else. That being so, the sections clearly contemplate that the Government may apply for and obtain permits for its buses run as stage carriages.The rule applied in Nazir Ahmads case, 63 Ind App 372: (AIR 1936 PC 253   (2) ), does not permit the ordinary meaning of S. 42,. (1) and. (3), cl (a) to be cut down because of the provisions of Chapter IVA.The Act lays down two independent sets of provisions in regard to the running of buses by the Government, one under Chapter IV and the other under Chapter IVA. Chapter IVA was intended to give the Government, a special advantage. When the Government chooses to proceed under that chapter, it becomes entitled as a matter of right under S. 68F (1) to the necessary permits. Under Chapter IV the Government does not have any such advantage; it has to compete with other applicants, to secure permits to be able to run its buses. The powers under the two Chapters are therefore different.To such a case the principle of Nazir Ahmads case, 63 Ind App 372: (AIR 1936 PC 253   (2) ), cannot be appliedIt does not seem to us that this maxim carries the matter further. It is a maxim for ascertaining the intention of the legislature.Where the statutory language is plain and the meaning clear, there is no scope for applying the rule.Section 42 (3) (a) appears to us to be perfectly plain in its terms. It contemplates that the Government has to apply for permits under S. 42 (1) to run buses as a commercial enterprise. That being so, the maxim cannot be resorted to for ascertaining the intention of the legislature and implying a prohibition against the Government applying for permits under Chapter IV12. It is next said that S. 42 contemplates the owner of a transport vehicle obtaining a permit and a "State transport undertaking" cannot apply for a permit under Chapter IV as it cannot be such owner. But here we are not concerned with a State transport undertaking for that comes into existence for the purposes of Chapter IVA and that Chapter has not been resorted to by the Government yet. Here the Government applied for the permits under Chapter IV. The Government can of course be the owner of transport vehicles. We have earlier said that in view of cl. (a) of S. 42 (3) the Government has to apply for permits under S. 42(1) as any other owner. Therefore the Act contemplates the Government as owner of transport vehicles. Further, under S. 68A a "State transport undertaking" has been defined as an undertaking providing road transport service carried on by a State Government. Such an undertaking is really a department of a Government and in order to be able to provide transport service, it must be able to own transport vehicles. In fact S. 68F(1) requires the State transport undertaking to apply for permits under Chapter IV and therefore contemplates it as an owner of a transport vehicle for the purposes of S. 42 which is contained in that Chapter13. The learned counsel then referred to the concluding portion of S. 47 (1) which makes it incumbent on the authority considering applications for permits to take into consideration the representations made by the persons therein mentioned. He said that the persons there mentioned did not include the Government and therefore the intention is clear that applications for permits by the Government were not intended to be considered under S. 47 and if Government could not come under S. 47, it could not come under Chapter IV at all. But assume that representations by the Government are not contemplated by S. 47. That does not show that applications for permits by the Government are also not contemplated by that section14. It is also said that the matters to which the authority granting the permits is required to have regard in considering applications for permits under S. 47 are such that if the State enters into competition with citizens for the grant of permits the State must necessarily get them. Therefore, it is said that it could not have been intended that the State would compete with the citizens in the matter of obtaining permits under Chapter IV. We are unable to assent to this contention. There is nothing in S. 47 which leads to the conclusion that whenever the Government applies along with private citizens for permits, the Government must get them. Indeed, if that were so, then it would not have been necessary to provide by S. 68F (1) that when the Government, that is, its State transport undertaking, applied in pursuance of an approved scheme for a permit, the authority concerned would be bound to grant such permit. Section 68F (1) clearly contemplates that without the provision made therein it may so happen that the authority acting under S. 47 may think it fit to grant the permit to a private operator in preference to the Government. It also seems to us that there is nothing in our law to prevent the Government from entering a business in competition with private citizens.Indeed, Art. 19 (6) by providing that nothing in Art. 19(1)(g) shall affect the application of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to the carrying on by the State of any trade, business, industry or service whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise, would seem to indicate that the State may carry on any business either as a monopoly, complete or partial, or in competition with any citizen and that would not have the effect of infringing any fundamental rights of such citizen15. Our attention was then drawn to the proviso to S. 47 (1) under which other things beings equal ae society is entitled to preference over individual owners in the matter of grants of permits. It is said that the Government is not an individual owner and therefore it is not contemplated as an applicant for a permit under S. 47. It seems to us that if the Government is not an individuals to which we are not called upon to sayt does not follow that that section does not contemplate the Government as an applicant for permit. If Government is not an individual owner, then all that will happen in view of the proviso to S. 47(1) will be that ae society will not be able to claim any preference over the Government.All that the proviso does is to give ae society a preference over individual owners. It is not concerned with stating who can apply for permits16. It seems to us therefore that the petitioners contention that the Government cannot apply for a permit under Chapter IV of the Act is unsustainable. The petitioner cannot complain of the Government having applied under that Chapter. We are not called upon, therefore, to discuss the further question, whether any fundamental right of the petitioner under Art. 19 (1) (g) would have been affected by the Government having applied for and obtained permits under Chapter IV without having the right to do so. This disposes of the contentions concerning the infringement of the petitioners fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution17. We will now consider the question of the violation of Art. 14 of the ConstitutionThis contention is in our view clearly untenable. The decision of respondent No. 1 may have been right or wrong and as to that we say nothing, but we are unable to see that that decision offends Art. 14 or any other fundamental right of the petitioner. The respondent No. 1 was acting as al body and if it has made any mistake in its decision there are appropriate remedies available to the petitioner for obtaining relief. It cannot complain of a breach of Art. 14This point is clearly unfounded. Article 19(6) as it now stands, contemplates such a competition as we have earlier pointed out. The petitioner can base no grievance on such competition.