Case: T. V. R. Subbu Chetty'S Family Charities Vs. M. Raghava Mudaliar And Others

1. This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the respondent M. Raghava Mudaliar who claims to be the reversioner of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar. In his suit the respondent alleges that after the death of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar which took place on March 22, 1893, his property came into the possession of his widow Manickammal. Subsequently the said Manickammal and Rengammal, the widowed mother of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar alienated the properties without any legal necessity. According to the respondent the said alienation was not binding on him and so he was entitled to recover possession of the said property free of any encumbrance or charge. Manickammal died on October 18, 1941, whereas Rengammal died in June, 1921. On the death of the widow Manickammal reversion fell open and that has given a cause of action to the respondent for his present suit2. Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar died issueless and was survived by his widow, his widowed mother, his sister Andalammal and the respondent and his sister Apurupammal who are the children of Ammakannu Ammal the second sister of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar, and Ethirajammal the daughter of the third sister of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar. To his suit the respondent impleaded the appellant Andalammal, Krishnasami Mudaliar, son of the said Apurupammal (defendant 1) and Susila Bai Ammal daughter of Ethirajammal as defendants 2 to 4. The Udayavar Temple by its sole trustee Bysani Krishnaiah Chetty was joined as defendant 53. After her husbands death Manickammal obtained letters of administration to his estate from the High Court at Madras. It appears that the relations of the widow with her mother-in-law were embittered, and that led to disputes between them. These disputes were settled by the two widows in pursuance of the advice of certain arbitrators who mediated between them. The settlement thus reached was recorded in writing on May 27, 1893, (Ex. D-2). It would be relevant to refer to the main terms of the settlement at this stage. This settlement set out the properties covered by it as Serial Nos. 1 to 5. Item No. 1 which was a house in three blocks was divided between the respondent and his sister Apurupammal who were to take one share; Ethirajammal who was to take another share; and Andalammal who was to take the third share. House No 62, which was Serial No. 2, and houses and shops Nos. 126 and 127 which were shown as Serial No. 3 were agreed to be sold, and it was settled that out of the sale proceeds the debts of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar and his father should be discharged; expenses incurred in obtaining the letters of administration should then be deducted along with the expenses of sale, and the balance should be divided equally between the two widows subject to a payment of Rs. 1,000 to the mother-in-law in lieu of her jewels. The two cawnies of lands which were Serial No. 4 were agreed to be given to the maternal uncle of the deceased Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar, whereas the moveables which were shown as Serial No. 5 had to be divided half and half between the two widows. This document contained a clause which provided that in case any one of us contravenes the terms the other party shall not only cancel this agreement but his title to the estate of Madhava Ramanuja Mudaliar prior to the agreement shall in no way be affected subject to which this agreement has been entered into. The document thus executed was attested by four attesting witnesses4. It appears that soon after this agreement was finalised Krishnasamy Mudaliar, defendant 3, objected to its validity and disputed the right of the widows to deal with the property in the manner specified in it. He was, however, persuaded to abandon his objections and a sale deed was executed by him conveying his reversionary rights to the two widows for consideration on September 10, 1894. By this document defendant 3 purported to recognise and grant an absolute title to the two widows in regard to the estate of the deceased. (Ex. D-3). Subsequent to this document the two widows began to enjoy the properties as agreed between them5. On February 4, 1895, the two widows sold item No. 1 in Schedule II attached to the plaint, i.e., Nos. 126 and 127, Anna Pillai Street and Audiappa Naik Street respectively to Thatha Venkata Raghava Subbu Chetty. The appellant is the successor in title of the said division in respect of the said item No. 1 in Schedule II. In the present appeal we are concerned only with this item6. On May 27, 1895, a composite deed of partition and administration of property of the deceased was executed by and between the two widows (Ex. D-5). By this document the three blocks in the house shown as Serial No. 1 in Ex. D-2 were delivered into the possession of the respective donees. The maternal uncle of the deceased was given two cawnies of lands as therein stipulated and the debts of the deceased were discharged and expenses incurred in respect of the letters of administration were met. It is under these circumstances that the respondent filed his present Suit No. 56 of 1946 on the Originad Side of the Madras High Court; and he claimed that the alienations made by the two widows were not binding on him and he was entitled to the possession of the property left by the deceased Madhava Ramanuja. The schedule attached to the plaint referred to four items of property, and as we have already pointed out it is only with item No. 1 out of these four items with which we are concerned in the present appeal7. In regard to the said item the appellant urged that the agreement between the two widows (Ex. D-2) and the subsequent composite deed executed in pursuance of it (Ex. D-5) were in the nature of a family arrangement, and as such they were binding on the respondent. It was also alleged by the appellant that the respondent had received benefit under the said arrangement and by his conduct had ratified it. The appellant further pleaded that the transfer in favour of his predecessor was supported by legal necessity. Incidentally a plea of surrender was also raised by the appellant8. Mr. Justice Kunhiraman, who tried the suit, held that there was a family arrangement which bound the respondent. He also observed that the respondent had received benefit under the said arrangement and was therefore precluded from challenging its validity. The learned Judge incidentally made some observations which showed that he was inclined to uphold the plea of surrender raised by the appellant. In the result the respondents suit was dismissed9. The respondent then took the matter in appeal and succeeded. The appeal court held that the impugned arrangement cannot be said to be a bona fide family settlement which would bind the respondent. Before the appeal court it was conceded that the plea of surrender raised by the appellant could not be sustained, and that the contention that the respondent was bound by the family arrangement could not also be sustained. It was, however, urged on behalf of the appellant that the respondents conduct precluded him from disputing the validity of the arrangement but this argument was rejected by the appeal court; likewise, the contentions that the transfer in favour of the appellants predecessor was justified by legal necessity also failed. As a result of these findings the respondents appeal was allowed, the decree passed by the trial court was set aside, and the claim for possession made by the respondent was decreed. The respondents suit was accordingly directed to go before the Official Referee for ascertainment of mesne profits claimed by him. It is against this decree that the appellant has come to this Court in appeal.

Reasoning: There is of course no doubt about the correctness of the principle thus enunciated, but the difficulty in the way of the appellant arises when the applicability of the said principle is tested in the light of the relevant material findings in that caseThese two decisions also emphasies the fact that if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of his opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually falls open14. There can be no doubt that the transaction which took place on May 27, 1893, as a result of the dispute between the two widows and with the intervention of the well-wishers of the family is not a family arrangement as understood under Hindu Law. This position was conceded before the High Court and is not disputed before usThus in dealing with the question as to whetherthe respondent is precluded from challenging the validity of the impugned transactionit is necessary to bear in mind that the original transaction is not a transaction in the nature of a family arrangement. Besides, he was then a minor and admittedly he was not a party to any of the said transactionsThe explanation given by the respondent for not producing the patta is attacked as unsatisfactory, and it is urged that the said explanation cannot possibly conceal his intention to keep back the document from the Court. In his cross-examination the respondent stated that the Collectors certificate which had been given to him by his grand-mother had been filed by him in Suit No. 495 of 1916 in the City Civil Court, and he added that his advocate in the said suit had not returned the document to him. We may assume that the respondent has not produced the document though it was in his possession; but we have on the record two documents which were issued to the other donees, and all that the appellant is entitled to assume is that a similar document had been issued in favour of the respondent. In our opinion, the two documents on the record do not assist the appellants argument that any representation had been made by the respondent to the Collector before he obtained a patta in his favour. In fact the issue of the patta is a routine matter which would necessarily follow on the execution of the registered sale deed (Ex. D-5). On the registration of the said document persons who got certain immovable properties under it were given the certificates by the Collector in ordinary course, and so no argument can be built up against the respondent that the acceptance of the patta amounts to the ratification of the original transaction of saleIt appears that the plaintiff in that suit had based her claim on the said impugned transaction, and in respect of the said claim the respondent had alleged in paragraph 2 of his written statement that he admitted that in consequence of certain disputes which arose between the mother and the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar a compromise settlement was arrived at in pursuance of which some transfers were effected. This, it is said, amounts to an admission of the validity of the said transaction (Ex. D-15). This argument, however, fails to take notice of the fact that while referring to the said compromise settlement the respondent had expressly added that the said compromise settlement was obviously to take effect only during the life tenancy of the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar (Ex. P-3). In other words, taking the statement as a whole, as we must, the respondent looked upon the said compromise settlement as an alienation made by the widow and as intended to take effect during her lifetime and no more. In other words, far from supporting a plea of ratification against the respondent this statement strengthens his case that he took the benefit with the knowledge and under the belief that the arrangement under which the said benefit flowed was intended to be operative during the lifetime of the widow, and as such he had no occasion to challenge its validity whilst the widow was aliveIt is unnecessary to refer to the pleadings in the said suit or to specify in detail the reliefs claimed. The only point which is relevant to consider is that the reversioner had challenged the arrangement in question. The respondent by his written statement had purported to support the plea made by the plaintiff, and had added that he was no personally aware of any attempt on the part of defendants 2 to 4 to alienate the properties in respect of their possession and enjoyment. This suit, however, did not proceed to a trial as it was dismissed for want of prosecution, and the argument is that since the respondent had supported the plaintiff in the said suit it was necessary that he should have got himself transposed as a plaintiff, when he found that the original plaintiff was allowing the suit to be dismissed for non-prosecution. In our opinion, this argument is far-fetched and cannot possibly sustain the plea of ratification against the respondent. If the respondent took possession of the property under the arrangement with the distinct understanding that the arrangement was to last only during the lifetime of the widow, we see no justification for the assumption that he should have carried on Civil Suit No. 1117 of 1921 or should in fact have challenged the said arrangement at allIn our opinion there is no substance in this argumentHaving regard to the arrangement disclosed by the said document the benefit given to the respondent and the other children of the sisters of the deceased Mudaliar may as well have been based on the said arrangement, and all that the transactions of 1893 and 1895 did was to give effect to it (Exs. D-2 and D-5). Besides, as we have already pointed out, in 1893 the respondent was a minor, and when subsequent to 1895 he took possession of the property it does not appear on evidence that he knew that the intention of the widows was to treat the property as absolute owners and to convey absolute titles to the respective donees and transferees under the said transaction. He also could not have known about his rights as a possible reversioner. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the appellant had failed to establish his plea of ratification against the respondentIn dealing with this question it may be relevant to recall that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar had obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased on April 26, 1893, and, as usual, in issuing the letters limitation had been imposed upon the widow that she could not deal with or transfer the property in question without the requisite sanction. There is some force in the argument urged before us by Mr. Sastri on behalf of the respondent that it was with a view to avoid the necessity to obtain the requisite sanction that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar was persuaded by her mother-in-law to enter into the impugned transaction under the guise of a family arrangement. The document itself (Ex. D-5) does not purport to be justified by legal necessity. In terms it purports to give effect to the original arrangement of 1893 (Ex. D-2); and if the said arrangement is not valid as a family arrangement the subsequent transfer would also be invalid. Besides, out of a total consideration of about Rs. 10,000 the amount of Rs. 776 can be taken to represent the debts due by the deceased Mudaliar; the rest of the items of consideration cannot be treated as constituting a legal necessity at all. The amount of Rs. 558 was the expense incurred for executing the document; similarly the amount of Rs. 409 representing the funeral expense of the deceased Mudaliar, had apparently been spent by the widow who wanted to reimburse herself and that cannot be a legal necessity. The other items of consideration do not even purport to be for legal necessity. Therefore, in our opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that the impugned transfer is not justified by legal necessity.