Case: Balwan Singh Vs. Prakash Chand and Others (Vice-Versa)

Civil Appeal No. 775 of 1975 has been filed under section 116A of the Representation of People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, by Balwan Singh whose election to the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Sarwan Khera constituency at the general election of 1974, has been set aside by the Allahabad High Court by its judgment dated April 9, 1975. The appellant has been. held guilty of committing a corrupt practice under section 123(S) of the Act and has been disqualified for a period of six years. this election was challenged on several grounds by an election petition filed by respondents Prakash Chandra and Jai Chandra, hereinafter referred to as the election petitioners, who were electors of the constituency. There were several candidates at the election, but the main contestants were appellant Balwan Singh of the Bhartiya Kranti DaI (B.K.D.) who secured 34.968 votes, and Ragunath Singh, respondent No. 2 of the Congress (R) party who secured 31, 008 votes. Appeal No.1167 of 1975 is by election petitioner Prakash Chandra for setting aside the judgment on issues decided against the electionallegation regarding the commission of the corrupt practice referred to above was to the effect that the appellant, his workers, agents and supporters with his consent hired and procured vehicles for the free conveyance of electors. A concise statement of the material facts in that respect was made in paragraph 12 of the election petition. Particulars of the vehicles used for the free conveyance of the electors were given in Schedule III of the petition. The appellant denied the allegation and pleaded in his written statement that none of the vehicles mentioned in Schedule III was either, procured or hired by him or his workers and agents with his consent for the purpose of carrying voters to and from the polling stations and that no such vehicle was "used for the purposes of carrying electors to and from the polling stations on the date of poll". It was also stated that the allegations contained in sub-paragraphs 12(a), 12(b) and 12(c) were not the facts required by section 83. They were totally vague and lack ed in material particulars, and were liable to be struck off. The High Court considered that and the other objections and stated in its order dated August 30, 1974, in regard to the objection that the names of the persons who procured or hired vehicles were not given in paragraph 12 or Schedule III, that the counsel for the election petitioner had undertaken to furnish the names. The election tioners furnished better particulars by adding paragraph 12(d) stating that the names of the persons who hired or procured the vehicles by which the electors were "carried free of cost from their houses to the polling station" on the date of election by respondent No. 1 were given in Schedule III(I). They save the percentage and residence of the persons named in Schedule III, as also particulars and names of the persons who hired and procured vehicles for the free conveyance of the electors, and the names of the owners of the vehicles. An objection was then taken that such an amendment was not permissible. The High Court rejected that objection by its order dated October 10, 1974, except that the names of two new persons were not allowed to be inserted in Schedule V, with which we are not concerned.The High Court framed several issues, including issue No. 2 which was asWhether the respondent No. 1 himself, or his workers and agents with his consent, hired or procured vehicles for the free conveyance of the voters and whether the vehicles so hired and procured were used for the purpose and , . thereby the respondent No. 1 committed corrupt practice."After recording the evidence of the parties, the High Court recorded its finding as follows.-"My answer on issue No. 2 accordingly is that the respondent No. 2 procured tractor 9962 with trolly and hired Jeep UPW 359 and Tractor UTE 5865 with trolly and that the said vehicles were used for free conveyance of voters to Maubasta, Jaganpur and Tigain polling stations and further that the respondent N o. 1 thereby committed a corrupt practice under section 123(5) of the R.P.was in view of that finding that the election petition was allowed with costs, the election of the appellant was declared void, and he was disqualifi ed as aforesaid. That is how appeal No. 775 has arisen The other appeal No. 1 107 has been filed by election-petitioner. Prakash Chandra, as he feels aggrieved against the High Courts findings on the other issues, but Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad has stated that he would not press that appeal. We have therefore only Balwan Singhs appeal for consideration.

Reasoning: In view of this categorical finding it is not necessary for us to examine the allegation regarding the hiring or procuring of tractor No. UTE 5865 and jeep No. UPW 359 for the free conveyance of electors to two other pollingmay be mentioned that in arriving at the above finding we have  taken due note of the view expressed by this Court in Ram Awadesh Singh v. Sumitra Devi and others([1972] 2 S.C.R. 674.) in regard to the generation of factious feelings during elections and their continuance even after the election enabling the parties to produce a large number of witnesses some of whom may be seemingly disinterested, and the view expressed in Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed and others(19751 S.C.R. 643.) that an election once held should not be treated in a light-hearted manner and the court should insist on clear and cogent testimony compelling it to uphold the corrupt practice alleged against the returned candidate. So also, we have noticed the view expressed in Baburao Ragaji Karem ore and others v. Govind and others([1974] 2 S.C.R. 429.) that the Court should examine the evidence having regard to the fact that where the electorate has chosen their candidate at an election, their choice ought not to be lightly upset. We have also taken notice of the view expressed by Ray C.J. in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain(A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 299.) that in an election contest it is the public interest, not the parties claims, which is the paramount concern. Mr. Bindra has placed consider " able reliance on these decisions. But, as has been shown, the finding of the High Court regarding the aforesaid corrupt practice is based on clear, cogent and convincing evidence and there is no justification for interfering with it.Mr. Bindra has laid much stress on the fact that the appellant was successful at the election to the U.P. Legislative Assembly from another constituency in 1957, but his election was set aside on the round, inter alia, that he and/or his election agent and/or other persons with his consent, had committed corrupt practice, including the corrupt practice of hiring a tractor for the conveyance of electors. He has argued that in view of this Courts decision against him in Balwan Singh v. Shri Lakshmi Narain and others (supra) he could not possibly have taken the risk of committing another similar corrupt practice at the election in question. The argument is based on mere conjecture and cannot disprove or rebut the clear, cogent and reliable evidence on which the appellant has been held guilty of committing the corrupt practice in this case.Bindra tried to argue further that the High Court committed an illegality in setting aside the appellants election without finding that the result of the election had been materially affected thereby. The argument is misconceived, for it is not the requirement of section 100(1) (b) which has been found to be applicable to the corrupt practice in question, that the High Court should declare the election of the returned candidate to be void only if the result of the election has been materially affected byargument of Mr. Bindra was that the corrupt practice in question should not have been found to have been committed as the election petitioners did not examine themselves during the course of the trial in the High Court. There was however no such obligation on them, and the evidence which the election petitioners were able to produce at the trial could not have been rejected for any such fanciful reason when there was nothing to show that the election petitioners were able to give useful evidence to their personal knowledge but stayed away purposely.