Case: M/s. Trutuf Safety Glass Industries Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:Appellant (hereinafter referred to as the assessee) filed an application for grant of recognition certificate under Section 4-B of the Act in respect of notified goods mentioned in Annexure-III of the Notification No.7551 dated 31st December, 1976. By order dated 22.12.1987 the Assessing Authority granted recognition certificate in regard to "Automobile Safety Toughened Glass" whereby the assessee was authorized to purchase raw materials and packing materials at the concessional rate of tax. Being aggrieved by the denial of total exemption of sales tax on the purchase of raw materials and packing materials, an appeal under Section 9 of the Act was filed which was allowed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) by order dated 11.1.1989. Consequentially, the recognition certificate was directed to be amended to the effect that the assessee would be entitled to purchase raw materials and packing materials without payment of any sales tax on such purchases. This order was confirmed in Second appeal by the Tribunal, as Revenues appeal before the Tribunal was dismissed. An application for revision was filed before the High Court which, by the impugned order, confirmed the view of the Assessing Officer. It was held that the expression "glass" or "glass ware" does not include the articles manufactured by the assessee. While coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Atul Glass Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (1986 (3) SCCstand before the High Court was that the entry "glass and glass wares in all forms" cannot include the articles manufactured by the assessee. Reference was made to para 17 of the judgment in Atul Glasss case (supra). The stand of the revenue was accepted as noted by the High Court.

Reasoning: The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L. Cas. 61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution. "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378).