Case: Shramik Utkarsha Sabha Vs. Raymond Woolen Mills

5. The first respondent is a public limited company with an industrial establishment at Bombay. It is covered by the provisions of the B.R.I. Act. The second respondent is a trade union recognised as the representative union for the concerned industry under the provisions of the BIR Act. The appellant is a trade union registered under the provisions of the Trade Unions Act, 1926.6. The first respondent filed a complaint before the Industrial Court alleging the unfair labour practices mentioned in items 5 and 6 of Schedule III of the MRTU & PULP Act. Item 5 of Schedule III states that it is an unfair labour practice on the part of a trade union ``to stage, encourage or instigate such forms of coercive actions as wilful `go slow, squatting on the work premises after working hours or `gherao of any of the members of the managerial or other staff. Item 6 of the Schedule III states that it is an unfair labour practice on the part of a trade union ``to stage demonstrations at the residences of the employers or the managerial staff members. The Industrial Court made anorder restraining the commission of the unfair labour practices. Theorder was made absolute after the second respondent had been heard. It is the appellants case that the first respondent told the Industrial Court that it had no objection to such order being passed, and that this was done because the members of the first respondent were deserting it in favour of the appellant. The appellant moved an application seeking impleadment in the complaint proceedings on the ground that employees of the first respondent had sought its membership and that the complaint had been filed by the first respondent in collusion with the second respondent. The application was opposed by the first and second respondents. The Industrial Court rejected the application. The appellant filed a writ petition impugning the Industrial Courts order. The High Court held that the only ground for moving the impleadment application was that several employees of the first respondent had approached the appellant with the intention of becoming its members and that there was no material to support this ground. Upon consideration of the provisions of the BIR and the MRTU & PULP Acts, the High Court concluded that the second respondent, as the representative union, had the sole privilege of representing employees in the industry of the first respondent. The writ petition was, accordingly, dismissed.

Reasoning: 13. The M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act takes note of the provisions of the B.I.R. Act. Many of its definitions are stated to be those contained in the B.I.R. Act. Chapter III, which deals with the recognition of unions, states, in section 10(2), that its provisions do not apply to undertakings in industries to which the provisions of the B.I.R. Act apply. The B.I.R. Act was enacted to provide for the regulation of the relation of employers and employees in certain matters and to consolidate and amend the law in relation to the settlement of industrial disputes. The M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act was enacted to provide for the recognisition of trade unions for facilitating collective bargaining for certain undertakings to state their rights and obligations; to confer certain powers onunions; and to define and provide for the prevention of unfair labour practices; and to constitute courts in this behalf. It cannot, therefore be said that the B.I.R.Act and the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act operate in different fields. There is commonality in their objects and their provisions. The obvious intent of the legislature which enacted them was that they should operate in tandem and complement each other in respect of industries to which the B.I.R. Act had been made applicable. The two statutes must be read together.14. Section 21 of the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, upon the emphasis was laid on behalf to the appellants, states that no employee in an undertaking to which the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act applies shall be allowed to appear or act or be allowed to be represented in any proceeding relating to the unfair labour practices specified in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV except through the recognised union. It is important to note that the reference is to employee in an undertaking to which the Industrial Disputes Act applies and not to employees in an undertaking to which the B.I.R. Act applies. Apart therefrom, the section permits an employee, not an union other than the recognised union, to so appear. The provisions of section 21 do not, therefore, lead to the conclusion that an union other than a representative union can appear in proceedings relating to all unfair labour practices other than those specified in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV.15. It is true that an order of the Industrial Court in the concerned proceedings would bind all employees of the first respondent even though there may be some among them who owe allegiance not the representative union but to the appellant. The objective of the provisions of the B.I.R. Act and the M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, read together, and the embargo placed upon representation by anyone other than the representative of the employees, who, for the most part, is the representative union, except in matters pertaining to an individual dispute between an employ and the employer, is to facilitate collective bargaining. The rationale is that it is in the interest of industrial peace and in the public and national interest that the employer should have to deal, in matters which concern all or most of its employees, only with a union which is representative of them. It may be that a union which was representative of the employees may have in the course of time lost that representative character; it is then open, under the provisions of the B.I.R. Act, for a rival union to seek to replace it.