Case: Dhirendra Chandra Pal Vs. Associated Bank of Tripura Limited

The point involved is a short one and arises on the following facts. The respondent before us, Associated Bank of Tripura Ltd., went into liquidation on the 19th December, 1949. A month prior to the liquidation, i.e., on the 19th November, 1949, the appellant before us and the bank entered into an agreement whereby the appellant became a tenant of the bank in respect of a certain parcel of land. One of the terms of the tenancy agreement was that the appellant should vacate the land demised on 24 hoursthe bank went into liquidation the liquidator served on the appellant on the 18th April, 1950, a notice terminating his tenancy and calling upon him to vacate the land and to hand over possession by the end of April, 1950. This not having been done, the liquidator filed an application on the original side of the High Court under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act for ejectment of the appellant and obtained an ex parte decree against him on the 10th July, 1950. On the 28th August, 1950, the appellant applied for setting aside the ex parte decree but the application was dismissed on the 7th September,the appellant filed the present suit on the 12th September, 1950, in the original side of the High Court, asking for a declaration that the ex parte decree against him was made without jurisdiction and was a nullity and that he continued to be a tenant notwithstanding the said ex parte decree. The plaint does not specifically mention the reason for claiming the decree to be without jurisdiction or a nullity. But the point taken at the trial was that the court had no power to deal with a question relating to the ejectment of the appellant from the demised land in a summary proceeding initiated on an application but could pass the decree only on a suit regularlycontention was raised on the basis of a judgment of the Calcutta High Court given on the 24th August, 1950, that in respect of such a relief under section 45B a summary proceeding is not maintainable but that a suit has to be filed. This decision has since been reported in Sree Bank v. Mukherjee (1952 55 C.W.N. 400; 22 Comp. Cas. 73). The learned trial Judge before whom the present suit came up was of the opinion that though the ex parte decree for ejectment was obtained on a wrong proceeding, there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court and that the fact of the decree having been obtained in a wrong proceeding did not render it a nullity. This view of the learned judge was affirmed by the appellate Bench.

Reasoning: It has not been disputed before us that the relief by way of ejectment of the appellant from the land demised is one which would fall within the scope of section 45B of the Banking Companies Act and that the liquidator could obtain the said relief by an appropriate proceeding in the High Court. Indeed, the learned appellate Judges specifically held that the court had, by virtue of section 45B, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute and this view has not been challenged having regard to the wide and comprehensive language of theappears to us that, consistently with this policy and with the scheme of the Amending Act, where the liquidator has to approach the court under section 45B for relief in respect of matters legitimately falling within the scope thereof, elaborate proceedings by way of a suit involving time and expense, to the detriment of the ultimate interest of the company under liquidation, were not contemplated. In the absence of any specific provision in this behalf in the Act itself and in the absence of the any rules framed by the High Court concerned under section 45G, the procedure must be taken to be one left to the judgment and discretion of the court, having regard to the nature of the claim and of the questions thereinappears to us, with great respect to the learned Judges that this approach as to the nature of the proceeding required or permitted under section 45B of the Banking Companies Act was not correct. The question is not whether section 45B permitted summary proceedings but the question is whether the section prescribed definitely a particular method of proceeding and whether consistently with the policy of the Act it was not to be presumed that a speedy and cheap remedy was to be available to the liquidator, unless the court in its discretion though fit to direct or the rules of the High Court provided that a claim of a particular nature had to be pursued by ais to be remembered that section 45B is not confined to claims for recovery of money or recovery of property, movable or immovable, but comprehends all sorts of claims which relate to or arise in the course of winding up. Obviously the normal proceeding that the section contemplated must be taken to be a summary proceeding by way ofare clearly of the opinion that in the present case the court which passed the ex parte decree was fully competent to decide the matter raised before it on summary application and to pass the ex parte decree which has been challenged by the suit and that the decree of the courts below dismissing the suit is correct. We are not to be supposed to have expressed any opinion on the question of limitation which was raised before the High Court in the Sree Bank case (1952 22 Comp. Cas. 73). That is a question which may have to be decided in an appropriate case when it is raised directly.