Case: Bachharam Datta Patil And Another Vs. Vishwanath Pundalik Patil Andothers

2. The propositus was one Shreemant who died on 23-11-1941 leaving him surviving his wife Radhabai. Radhabai died on 9-5-1945 and on her death the dispute arose between the reversioners on the one hand including the plaintiffs 2 and 3, appellants in this Court, and the defendants on the other who claimed by virtue of alleged adoptions said to have been made by Radhabai aforesaid. The first plaintiff is out of the picture now on the concurrent finding by the Courts below that he had no right to the estate left by the propositus by virtue of the adoption found in his favour, inasmuch as before he was adopted the estate had already vested in the actual reversioners, plaintiffs 2 and 3, the agnatic relations of Shreemant. The estate of Shreemant, so far as it related to Watan lands, vested in plaintiffs 2 and 3 aforesaid under the provisions of Bombay Act V ofeither defendant 2 or defendant 3 had proved his alleged adoption by Radhabai aforesaid, he would have been entitled to the estate as the adopted son of propositus, thus excluding the agnatic relations, namely, plaintiffs 2But both the Courts below have concurrently found that neither of the two defendants 2 and 3 had succeeded in proving the adoption respectively pleaded by them. The trial Court had substantially decreed the suit in respect of all the items of property in dispute including the three items which, as indicated above, are the only properties now in controversy in this Court, on the finding that these two were Watan properties which like the rest of plaint properties were inherited by the reversioners aforesaid, namely, plaintiffs 2 andHigh Court on appeal held that the three items of property now in dispute, though originally Watan properties, had lost their character as such by reason of the fact that they had been resumed by Government after dispensing with the service and after levying full assessment on those lands. Those lands have been called "Japti Sanadi Inam lands" in the records of the Courts below and it is by that name that we shall refer to the disputed lands in the course of this judgement.

Reasoning: It is not disputed that in the former case the plaintiff-appellants will be entitled to them also even as they have been adjudged to be entitled to the rest of the properties in dispute which were admittedly Watan lands. It is equally undisputed that if the Japti Sanadi Inam lands are no more Watan lands, this appeal mustthese definitions it is clear that in order that there may be a Watan it is necessary that there should be a hereditary office and Watan property which is assigned to the "Watandar" by way of remuneration for the performance of the duty appertaining to his office. But it has been argued on behalf of the appellants that it is common ground that the Sanadi Inam lands were once Watan property and that once the property is impressed with the character of inam lands, they continue to bear that character, because the Government have not been authorised by any law to change their character. No precedent or statutory provisions directly supporting this wide proposition have been brought to our notice. But our attention was called to the provisions of S.15 which make it permissible for the Collector to commute the service and relieve the holder of the Watan and his heirs and successors in perpetuity of their liability to perform the service on such conditions as may be agreedwe have been able correctly to appreciate the argument based upon S.15, it was sought to be made out that the service in respect of the Watan lands in question may have been commuted but even after the commutation of the service the Watan remained and the lands continued to ret in the character of Watan lands. This argument assumes that even upon the service being entirely dispensed with in perpetuity, the Watan character of the land continued. That is begging the question. Furthermore, cl. (1) S.15 contemplates commutation "upon such conditions, whether consistent with the provisions of this Act or not, as may be agreed upon by the Collector and such holder." Thus the conditions to be agreed upon between the holder of land which was once part of a Watan and the Government at the time of the commutation may be of so many varieties that in some cases the Watan character of the land may be maintained, whereas in others the conditions agreed between the parties may themselves contemplate the cessation of that character. In the present case, apart from the entries in the Record of Rights, we have no other evidence to indicate as to on what terms the service had been completely dispensed with in perpetuity and the full assessment levied upon thoseis not therefore clear upon the findings of the Court below that there were any such conditions attaching to the holding of the lands in question which could be consistent with the continuance of the original Watan tenure. It is possible to conceive of a case where the conditions agreed upon provide for the continuance of the Watan tenure, in spite of the fact that the holders have been excused the performance of the customary service. On the other hand, it may be that there were no conditions agreed between the parties continuing the Watan character of the land after dispensing with the service.5. On findings of the Courts below there was no hereditary office any more and therefore the question of remunerating any service with the usufruct of Watan property or otherwise did notbeing so, it is impossible to contend that Government have not the power to destroy the Watan character of a Watan land. Such an argument completely ignores the legal position that an authority which has the power to create an office and to provide for its remuneration in cash or in kind has also the power to revoke the grant, and upon such revocation, if any, land has been assigned for remunerating the office so abolished it must revert to the source from which it came; that is to say, ryotwari land subject to land revenueare in agreement with the conclusion reached by the Letters Patent Bench in that case, the facts of which were similar to those of the present case. Hence it must be held that there is neither authority nor principle in favour of the contention raised on behalf of the appellants.