Case: Grindlays Bank Ltd Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal And Ors

2. The facts giving rise to the appeal are these : The Government of India, Ministry of Labour by an order dated July 26, 1975 referred an industrial dispute existing between the employers in relation to the Grindlays Bank Ltd., Calcutta and their workmen, to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal in exercise of its powers under S.10 ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947for adjudication. By a notice dated March 6, 1976 the Tribunal fixed peremptory hearing of reference for May 28, 1976, but the hearing was adjourned from time to time on one ground or other. Eventually, the hearing of the reference was fixed for December 9, 1976. On December 9, 1976 counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3, the Commercial Establishments Employees Association, representing respondents Nos. 5 to 17, sought an adjournment on the ground that the General Secretary of the Association had suffered a bereavement as his father had died no November 25, 1976, and, therefore, he had to leave to perform the shradhha ceremony falling on December 9, 1976. In support of his prayer for adjournment, the counsel produced a telegram, but the Tribunal refused to grant any further adjournment and proceeded to make an ex parte award. On the basis of the statement recorded by the manager of the appellant, the Tribunal held that the respondents Nos. 5 to 17 were employed as drivers by the officers of the appellant and were not the employees of the appellant and, therefore, they were not entitled to the benefits enjoyed by the drivers employed by the appellant. On January 19, 1977, respondent No. 3, acting for respondents Nos. 5 to 17 applied for setting aside the ex parte award on the ground that they were prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the reference was called on for hearing on December 9, 1976. The Tribunal by its order dated April 12, 1977 set aside the ex parte award on being satisfied that there was sufficient cause within the meaning of O, IX, Rule 13 of theCode of Civil, 1908, The appellant challenged the order passed by the Tribunal setting aside the ex parte award but the High Court declined to interfere.

Reasoning: 5. In dealing with these contentions, it must be borne in mind thatthe Industrial Disputes Act,1947is a piece of legislation calculated to ensure social justice to both employers and the employees and advance progress of industry by bringing harmony and cordial relations between the parties.In other words, the purpose of the Act is to settled disputes between workmen and employers which if not settled, would result in strikes or lock-outs and entail dislocation of work, essential to the life of the community. The scheme of the Act shows that it aims at settlement of all industrial disputes arising between the capital and labour by peaceful methods and through the machinery of conciliation, arbitration and if necessary, by approaching the Tribunals constituted under the Act. It, therefore, endeavors to resolve the competing claims of employers and employees by finding a solution which is just and fair to both the parties6. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had the power to pass the impugned order if it thought fit in the interest of justice. It is true that there is no express provision in the Act or the rules framed thereunder giving the Tribunal jurisdiction to do so. But it is a well known rule of statutory construction that a Tribunal or body should be considered to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental powers as are necessary to discharged its functions effectively for the purposes of doing justice between the parties. In a case of this nature, we are of the view that the Tribunal should be considered as invested with such incidental or ancillary powers unless there is any indication is the statute to the contrary. We do not find any such statutory prohibition. On the other hand, there are indications to the contrary10. When sub-s. (1) of S. 11 expressly and in clear terms confers power upon the Tribunal to regulate its own procedure, it must necessarily be endowed with all powers which bring about an adjudication of an existing industrial dispute, after affording all the parties an opportunity of a hearing. We are inclined to the view that where a party is prevented from appearing at the hearing due to a sufficient cause, and is faced with an ex parte award, it is an if the party is visited with an award without a notice of the proceedings. It is needless to stress that where the Tribunal proceeds to make an award without notice to a party, the award is nothing but a nullity. In such circumstances, the Tribunal has not only the power but also the duty to set aside the ex parte award and to direct the matter to be heard afresh11. The language of Rule 22 unequivocally makes the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to render an ex parte award, conditional upon the fulfillment of its requirements. If there is no sufficient cause for the absence of a party, the Tribunal undoubtedly has jurisdiction to proceed ex parte. But if there was sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then under the terms of Rule 22, the Tribunal will have had no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award. In other words, there is power to proceed ex parte, but this power is subject to the fulfillment of the condition laid down in Rule 22. The power to proceed ex parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing13. We are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, amounts to review. The decision in Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji, A.I.R 1970 S.C. 1273 is distinguishable. It is an authority for the proposition that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implication. Sub-sections (1) and (3) of S.11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act, while the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of civil Court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in S. 11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in sub-s. (1) of S. 11 and not in sub-s. (3) of S. 11. Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression "review" is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a mis-apprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershis case held that no review lies on merits unless a statute specifically provides for it, obviously when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex debito justitiae to prevent the abuse of its process, and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section(3) of S.20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under S. 17A. Under S.17A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under S. 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under S.10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the disputes referred to if for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under S. 17A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by respondent No. 3, acting on behalf of respondents Nos. 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977, i.e., before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal. It had jurisdiction to entertain it and decided it on merits.