Case: Inderjeet Singh Sial And Anr Vs. M/S. Karam Chand Thapar And Ors

4. The appellants are the plaintiffs. They are the heirs of one Sardar Pishora Singh Sial. By deed Ex. D-2 dated 19.11.1938, Pishora Singh obtained a mining lease from the erstwhile Government of Central Provinces for extraction of coal in 420.27 acres of land in village Dighawani, District Chhindwara. He also obtained in the same village a prospecting licence vide deed Ex. D-3 dated 22.11.1938 to prospect of coal in area measuring 242.29 acres. Beforehand, on 16.11.1938 in anticipation of obtaining the lease and the licence he entered into a contract with Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd. to assign his rights in the lease and prospecting licence when maturing. On obtaining, he sought and received permission from the Government on 7.3.1939 vide Document Ex. D-4 for transferring those two rights to Karam Chand Thapar and Brothers Ltd. The Government however secured thereunder for itself payment of due royalty from Pishora Singh uptil a particular date and thereafter from the said company. On such permission being granted, a sale deed was executed by Pishora Singh Sial in favour of Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. Ltd. on 13th June, 1939/30th June, 1939 vide document Ex. D-5. This first assignee later assigned its brights, interests and obligations in favour of the second assignee M/s. Rawanawara Collieries vide document Ex. D-8 dated 5.7.1940 and in the same pattern, the second assignee sold its rights, interests and obligations to the third assignee M/s. Oriental Coal Company Ltd. The lease and licence was for a period of thirty years starting from particular date as embodied in the initial deads.5. In the assignment deed Ex. D-5, the consideration settled has been detailedly mentioned. We would advert to the same later. At this juncture, we need only to highlight that there are distinct two royalties which are playing their part. First is the royalty which Pishora Singh, legally bound, had undertaken to pay to the State Government on obtaining mining and prospecting rights. The State Government while sanctioning subsequent transfers had to specifically keep preserved that right against all the subsequent transferees. That royalty undeniably was in assertion of the States rights and privileges conferred in regard thereto. That the State had such right in such venture as known to law, in the primary or secondary sense, is beyond dispute. The second "royalty" figuring is embodied in the assignment deed Ex. D-5 wherein royalty has been undertaken to be paid by Karam Chand Thapar and Bros. Ltd. to Pishora Singh to the extent and manner stipulated therein as part of the consideration for assignment, over and above the royalty payable to the State. The liability to pay such stipulated royalty to Pishora Singh ultimately rested on the three aforementioned assignees, jointly as well as severally. And in the discharge of that liability undisputably periodic payments had been made to Pishora Singh (including his heirs) for about 20 years. Then suddenly, as is the case, the assignees cooled off and stopped making payments. Correspondence then ensued between the parties, but to no avail. Ultimately, the heirs of Pishora Singh Sial filed a suit against the three assignees for recovery of the sums of royalty then fallen due, together with interest; total claim then being for Rs. 2,32,627.18 up to a certain period and on quantities of coal despatched.6. The defendants-respondents contested the suit. The execution of the documents inter se, reference of which has been made earlier, was not denied. The main thrust of the defendants was that deed Ex. D-5 postulated payment of royalty, descriptively well known to the mining world, which is representative of the States share in the mineral for such right conferred, but not by a prerogative exercised by an individual. It was further pleaded that the situation of law at that point of time, when the suit was being contested, was that demand of any payment as royalty by an individual was prohibited. Past payments of almost 20 years were termed by the defendants as having been made mistakenly. The Trial Court then on interpreting the terms of document Ex. D-5 held that the obligation of the defendants- respondents to pay the so-called royalty to the plaintiff-appellants was merely a periodic pavement as, in the deed stipulated, and was thus not royalty as such. Accordingly, the Trial Court decreed the suit but reduced the interest on the sum claimed to 4 per cent per annum till payment, details of which are evident from its judgment and decree.7. The defendants first appeal before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh was placed before a Division Bench of two Honble Judges. One of whom took the view that the stipulated payment was meant to be royalty as such and thus not claimable by the plaintiffs as individuals. We would rather quote the very words employed by the Honbletenor of the document clearly shows that a distinction was drawn between consideration for assignment of the lessees interest which was to be paid to be vendor in addition to this consideration for the remaining period of the lease subsequent to the transfer of the leases interest by the vendor. This distinction has also been maintained in the plaint averments and the suit is expressly for recovering the amount claimed as royalty subsequent to the transfer of the leases interest. There is thus no ambiguity in the plaintiffs case contained in the plaint which clearly shows that the claim is not for payment of a part of the consideration but is only for payment of the royalty claimed in addition to the consideration of Rs. 30,000/- for transfer of the lessees interest. The endorsement of registration on Ex. D-5 also indicates that the consideration for the transfer was treated to be the sum of Rs. 30,000/- only. It is also significant that Ex. D-5 is drafted as a formal document apparently by some lawyer and the parties thereto were persons quite conversant with mining lease and consequently with the meaning of the expressions `consideration and `royalty. That being so, there is no reason to construe the word `royalty in a manner different than that in which it is used and understood by persons in the mining business. All these facts clearly show that royalty as it is ordinarily understood by persons in the mining business and it was in that sense that the word was used also in Ex. D-5 as distinct from the consideration for assignment of the lessees interest. There is thus no basis to contend that the suit is for recovery of a part of the unpaid consideration and the term providing for payment or royalty must be construed as one providing for deferred payment of a part of the consideration.The other Honble Judge agreed with the view so expressed by his colleague. Yet he went on to hold that the term in the deed Ex.D-5 directing payment of royalty or rent would be offensive to enjoyment of absolute rights and thus hit by the provisions of Section 11 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal of the defendants-respondents were thus allowed and the suit was dismissed. This gave birth to this appeal.

Reasoning: 11. It is manifest that four reasons have been advanced by the High Court to upset the judgment and decree of the trial Court. These are (i) that deed Ex. D-5 was drafted as a formal document apparently by some lawyer and parties thereto were persons quite conversant with mining lease; and consequently with the meaning of the "consideration" and "royalty"; (ii) the word "royalty" used in the document must be understood the way it is used and understood by the persons in the mining business; (iii) the consideration money was Rs. 30,000/- only as the endorsement of registration on the deed indicates and that was the total consideration; and (iv) in the plaint distinction has been kept between the word "consideration and "royalty" and so royalty could to be part of the consideration.12. With respect we do not agree with any of those reasons. It may be true that document Ex. D-5 written in English language, may have been prepared by a lawyer and was entered into between persons conversant with the vocabulary employed in mining leases. Yet these factors per se cannot conclude the matter that the word "royalty" used in the document was meant to be royalty as such. If intelligence and responsibility is to be attributed to the draftsman and the contracting parties for using the word "royalty" in that technical sense, then it cannot be imagined that they would have overlooked the status of the contracting parties inter se. We cannot thus assume that they were well versed in one aspect and not in the other. Strictly speaking, had the draftsman and the signatories to the deed meant "royalty" as such, then they could not have omitted to identify who had the sovereign prerogative or the State part to play. The word "royalty" thus, in the deed was used in a loose sense so as to convey liability to make periodic payment to the assignor for the period during which the lease would subsist; payment dependent on the coal gotten and extracted in quantities or on despatch. We label therefore to construe document Ex. D-5 on its own terms and not barely on the label or description given to the stipulated payments. Conceivably this arrangement could well have been given a shape by using another word. The word "royalty" was perhaps more handy for the authors to be employed for an arrangement; like this, so as to ensure periodic payments. In nor event could the parties be put to blame for using the word "royalty" as if abrogating to themselves the royal or sovereign right of the State and then make redundant the rights and obligations created by the deed.13. The commodity goes by its value; not by the wrapper in which it is packed. A man is known for his worth; not for the clothes he wears. Royal robes worn by a beggar would not make him a King. The document is weighed by its content, not the title. One needs to go to have value, not the glitter. All the same, we do not wish to minimise the importance of the right words to be used in documents. What we mean to express is that if the thought is clear, its translation in words, spoken or written, may, more often than not tend to be faulty. More so in a language which is not, the mother tongue. Those faulted words cannot bounce back to alter the thought. Thus in sum and substances when the contracting parties and the draftsman are assumed to have known that the word "royalty" is meant to be employed to secure for the State something upon out what the State conveys, their employment of that word for private ensuring was not intended to confer on the assignor the status of the sovereign or the State, and on that basis have the document voided. Therefore, we are of the view that the reword "royalty" was used in the deed misdescriptively and was really meant to cover an important item of the consideration due for future payments. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act clearly postulates that sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised to be paid or part paid and part promised. In either situation title to the property would get transferred. This, in our view, demolishes the first two reasons.