Case: State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan

The respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police, by the Inspector-General of Police, Central Provinces and Berar on January 1, 1943. Subsequently in January 1945, he was confirmed in that post. In September 1948, he was sent on deputation to Hyderabad State where he served as a Sub-Inspector of Police at Adilabad, Nirmal, Bhainsa and Nanded. He was working at Adilabad from September, 1948 till June, 1950. On May 13, 1951, he was served with an order of suspension issued on May 3, 1951, by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Eastern Range, Hyderabad Division. This order of suspension was issued because complaints had been received against him and a departmental enquiry was proposed to be held in that behalf. Accordingly on May 21, 1951, a chargesheet was framed against him and the same was delivered to him on June 13, 1951. This chargesheet included eight charges. In the enquiry which followed six witnesses were examined before Mr. Shamaldas, Sub-Divisional Officer (Police). On November 7, 1951, the District Superintendent of Police himself took up the enquiry under the orders of the Inspector-General of Police. He framed fresh charges because he thought that the charges previously framed were not clear. On this occasion five charges were framed against the respondent; however, charges four and five out of these were dropped, and the enquiry was confined to only three. Witnesses were examined during the course of this enquiry and were cross-examined by the respondent. On November 9, 1951, the respondent requested by an application that certain documents may be supplied to him to enable him to make his defence. His request was granted in respect of some documents but not with regard to all. After evidence had been led against the respondent he was directed to produce his witnesses on November 13, 1951, and he was warned that if he did not lead evidence on that date the enquiry would be closed. Meanwhile, on November 11, 1951, the respondent submitted an application to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, through the District Superintendent, repeating his request for the documents which he wanted to inspect before leading evidence in defence and giving his own statement: that application was however rejected. On November 28, 1951, the District Superintendent of Police made his report in which he found that the respondent was guilty of all the three charges mentioned in the chargesheet, and he recommended that he should be dismissed from service. On receipt of this report, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police made his own endorsement on it and supported the recommendation for the dismissal of the respondent. The Inspector-General of Police, Hyderabad, then forwarded the papers to the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh. On January 8, 1952, a notice was issued to the respondent by the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The respondent duly submitted his reply on February 10, 1952. Thereafter on June 14, 1952, the Inspector-General of Police passed an order dismissing the respondent from service which the respondent received on June 17, 1952. The respondent then preferred an appeal against the said order but his appeal failed and was dismissed. It is under these circumstances that the respondent filed his petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and challenged the validity of the order of dismissal on several grounds. This petition was resisted by the appellant; but by the majority decision of the Special Bench of the High Court which heard this petition the pleas raised by the respondent were upheld and the impugned order of dismissal has been set aside. The appellant applied for a certificate but its application was rejected by the High Court; and so it moved this Court and obtained special leave; that is how this appeal has come to this Court at the instance of the appellant.

Reasoning: It may be conceded that some of the observations made by the learned judge justified this argument. The learned judge has, for instance commented on the fact that the charge supplied to the respondent did not give sufficient particulars; and has also expressed his disapproval of the conclusion recorded in the report that there was overwhelming evidence on the record against the respondent; and that may seem like examining the correctness of the findings of fact recorded in the enquiry; but even if these observations made by the learned judge are left out of consideration on the ground that the learned judge was not entitled to consider the merits of the findings made against the respondent, there are two points on which the learned judge has substantially based his conclusion, and it is on those two points that it is necessary to concentrate in dealing with the present appeal. The first point is that the respondent should have been given a copy of the application on the strength of which the preliminary enquiry was started against him; and the second that the statements of Rajab Ali and Noor Bhai recorded by Mr. Ghatwal should have been supplied to himIt is obvious that Rajab Ali and Noor Bhai are the principal witnesses against the respondent. It is equally clear from the findings recorded in the report itself that they collected far more than they are alleged to have paid to the respondent in two cases. In fact the report says that the excess amount collected by these two witnesses had been quietly pocketed by them. Thus it was of very great importance for the defence to cross-examine these two witnesses, and for that purpose the respondent wanted copies of their prior statements recorded by Mr. Ghatwal in his preliminary enquiry. It is difficult to understand how these statements could be regarded as secret papers, for that alone is the reason given for not supplying their copies to the respondent. Failure to supply the said copies to the respondent made it almost impossible for the respondent to submit the said two witnesses to an effective cross-examination; and that in substance deprived the respondent of a reasonable opportunity to meet the charge. That is the view taken by Sen and Bhutt, JJ. and we see no reason to interfere with it8. Then as to the application on the strength of which the preliminary enquiry was commenced against the respondent, we agree with the High Court in holding that there was no justification for keeping back this document. Like the prior statements of Rajab Ali and Noor Bhai this document also has been improperly characterised as secret and withheld from the respondentIt is in connection with the alleged loss of this file that the criticism made by Mr. Justice Sen about the indecent haste made in the enquiry becomes relevant. If only more diligent efforts had been made to discover the file the enquiry officer would have been able to see whether the plea made by the respondent on the strength of the said file was genuine or not. It is in the light of these facts that the High Court has held that the enquiry was not satisfactory, and that in substance the respondent had been denied a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges framed against him.There is no dispute that under Art. 311(2) the respondent is entitled to have such a reasonable opportunity. A proper opportunity must be afforded to him at the stage of the enquiry after the charge is supplied to him as well as at the second stage when punishment is about to be imposed on him. If the first enquiry was materially defective and denied the respondent an opportunity to prove his case it is impossible to hold that a reasonable opportunity guaranteed to a public servant by Art. 311(2) had been afforded to the respondent in the present caseIn our opinion, this decision cannot assist the appellants case because, as we have already pointed out, the documents which the respondent wanted in the present case were relevant and would have been of invaluable assistance to him in making his defence and cross-examining the witnesses who gave evidence against him. It cannot be denied that when an order of dismissal passed against a public servant is challenged by him by a petition filed in the High Court under Art. 226 it is for the High Court to consider whether the constitutional requirements of Art. 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such a case it would be idle to contend that the infirmities on which the public officer relies flow from the exercise of discretion vested in the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer may have acted bona fide but that does not mean that the discretionary order passed by him are final and conclusive. Whenever it is urged before the High Court that as a result of such orders the public officer has been deprived of a reasonable opportunity it would be open to the High Court to examine the matter and decide whether the requirements of Art. 311(2) have been satisfied or not. In such matters it is difficult and inexpedient to lay down any general rules; whether or not the officer in question has had a reasonable opportunity must always depend on the facts in each case. The only general statement that can be safely made in this connection is that the departmental enquiries should observe rules of natural justice and that if they are fairly and properly conducted the decisions reached by the enquiry officers on the merits are not open to be challenged on the ground that the procedure followed was not exactly in accordance with that which is observed in Courts of LawIt is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that effective exercise of this right has been prevented by the enquiry officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would be that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice. That is the view taken by the High Court, and in the present appeal which has been brought to this Court under Art. 136 we see no justification for interfering with it. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India, 1953 SCR 1080   at p. 1096 : (AIR 1958 SC 300   at p. 307) where this Court has emphaised the importance of giving an opportunity to the public officer to defend himself by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him.