Case: Dalmia Dadri Cement, Limited Vs. Avtar Narain Gujral and Others

The appellant is a public limited company engaged in the manufacture of cement. On 8 April 1955, the appellant and its workmen entered into an agreement, Ex. A6, setting the mattes in dispute between them and fixing inter alia grades of several categories of workmen and their scales of wages. The agreement proceeds that the settlement should be binding on both the parties for a period of two years commencing from 8 April 1955, but that the union would have the right to move for re-consideration of the grades, if that was recommended by the government, wage board. It is common ground that the union terminated this agreement as from 8 April 1957, hereinafter referred to as "the Act" and then made a demand on the management for revision of the agreement in respect of the grades of the workmen and certain allowances. On 19 May 1957, the appellant and the union referred their disputes to the decision of two arbitrators but as they could not agree they wrote to the Government of Punjab on 30 August 1957, to refer the matter to the industrial tribunal, as an umpire. Before any acting was taken on this, both the parties applied to the Punjab Government on 5 April 1958, under S.10(2) of the Act for referring the disputes to a tribunal, and on 24 July 1958, the Government referred them to the industrial tribunal, Punjab, Jullundur, for adjudication under S. 10(1)(d) of the Act. The tribunal pronounced its with it, the appellant has preferred this appeal against the same with the leave of this Court(1) Taking up the first contention that the tribunal was not validly constituted, the relevant facts are that on 28 April 1953, the Government of Punjab issued a notification whereby it constituted an industrial tribunal under S.7 of the Act and appointed Sri A. N. Gujral as its sole member and presiding officer under S. 7(3)(c) of the Act. Sri Gujral continued to hold this office at all material times. Parliament then enacted the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 36 of 1956, whereby it introduced several amendments in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This Act which came into force on 10 March 1957, repealed S.7 in the principal Act, and substituted in its place Ss. 7A, 7B and 7C. On 19 April 1957, the Government of Punjab issued a notification under S. 7A constituting a new tribunal and appointed Sri A. N. Gujral as its sole member and presiding officer. It is the award made by this tribunal that is the Subject-matter of the present appeal. Section 7A(3) omitting what is not relevant for the present discussion runs as follows :"A person shall not be qualified for appointments as the presiding officer of a tribunal unless(a) he * * *;(b) he was held the office of the chairman or any other members of the Labour Appellate Disputes (Appellant Tribunal) Act, 1950, or of any tribunal, for a period of not less than two years."3. It was under this provision that Sri A. N. Gujral who had held the office of the president of the industrial tribunal, Punjab from 28 April 1953, was appointed as the presiding officer of the new tribunal.

Reasoning: The question whether a person who has attained the age of sixty could validly be appointed as a member of the tribunal under S. 7(3)(c) came up for consideration before this Court in Atlas Cycle Industries, Ltd. v. Its workmen in Civil Appeal No. 188 of 1961, decided on 8 February 1962 [Since reported in p. 250 (infra)] where also the validity of the appointment of Sri A. N. Gujral under the notification, dated 28 April 1953 aforesaid, was in question. The present appeal was heard along with Civil appeal No. 188 of 1961 and but our judgment in that appeal we have held that on the construction of S. 7(3)(c), a person who had attained the age of sixty could validly he appointed as a member. Following that decision we must hold that Sri A. N. Gujral was validly appointed to the industrial tribunal on 28 April 1953, and that in consequence, he was duly qualified to be appointed as presiding officer of the tribunal under S. 7A(3)(b).(2)On the very principle of it, this decision can have application only where there is an adjudication by the tribunal on the merits. In the present case there has been no adjudication by any tribunal but only a settlement between the parties. That would, of course, be binding on them but only to the extent provided in the agreement itself. Here the agreement was to be in operation for two years. It provides for the revision of the terms even earlier in accordance with the decision of the wage board. The agreement, therefore, becomes spent on its one terms, on 8 April 1957, and that is how the parties understood it as is clear from their conduct in referring the disputes including the one for revision of grades, first to the decision of arbitrators and then that failing, to the Government of Punjab, under S.10(2) of the Act. We must accordingly hold that it was competent to the tribunal to revised the grades for the period subsequent to the agreement event if there was no proof of change in circumstancesIt is true that the tribunal does not expressly deal with this point in its award. In view of this we have examined the record with a view to satisfy ourselves whether that had resulted in failure of justice. The union has adduced considerable body of evidence as to the grades and scales of wages in this industry with a view to show that the existing scales required revision. Exhibits A1, A2 and A5 are statements of the scales of wages in the cement industry. The secretary of the union, Madanlal, has also given evidence on this matter as A.W. 3. Besides filing the above documents, he stated that the wages for some of the skilled workmen were less than what were paid in other factories. He also filed Ex. A10 which is a comparative chart of wages prevailing in certain industries. As against this there was practically no evidence on the side of the appellant. R. L. Agrawal, R.W. 2, who has been the manager of the appellants concern for the last nine months stated in his examination in-chief "our scales and grades are higher than those prevailing in other cement factories." But in cross-examination he admitted that he had got no personal knowledge about the wages prevailing in other cement concerns. As examination of the evidence let in by the appellant clearly shown that it was chiefly directed to showing that the company losses and that, therefore, it would not be able to bear the burden of an increase in the wages. It seems probable that before the tribunal the appellant did not place much reliance on the contention that the scale of wages in this factory compare favourably with those prevailing in other cement concerns and that what it seriously pressed was the contention that the industry was not in a position to pay more wages. Having examined the evidence we are satisfied that the appellant has no real cause for complaint on this score.That this revision has not in fact resulted in any injustice6. The tribunal also refers to the fact that the number of unskilled workmen is not very high and that a slight increase in their wages would be justified. As regards the skilled workmen it takes into account the rates which are in vogue in other industries. In view of these facts, the revision of the grades and scales of wages of the workmen by the tribunal must be held to be justified and just8. Thus the award was set aside on the ground that apart from the award in Martin Burn & Co. case which was not in evidence, there was no other material in support of it. That is no other material in support of it. That is not the position here. The award given in the case of the Punjab Cloth Mills, Bhiwani, was not the only evidence before the tribunal, and even it that is rules out, there was on record other evidence supporting the demand for revision, on which the finding of the tribunal could be sustained. It should also be mentioned that the tribunal has not fully adopted the scale fixed in Punjab Cloth Mills case. It has modified it so as to suit the present case. The reference to the award in Punjab Cloth Mills case had not resulted in any prejudice to the appellant, and we must therefore, decline to interfere on this groundBut them there was evidence - and indeed this was admitted - that the clerks working in the shifts have to work for more hours than those working in the offices. Under the circumstances the grant of an workmen cannot be said to be unjustA contention was also raised that there was no justification for increasing the dearness allowances but this was expressly abandoned before us.