Case: Messrs Basant Lal Banarsi Lal Vs. Bansi Lal Dagdulal

2. In March 1952, disputes arose between the parties as to whether these contracts had been closed, each side making a claim on the other on the basis of its own contention, Eventually, on March 18, 1952, the appellant referred the disputes to arbitration under the arbitration clause contained in the contracts. On October 7, 1952, the arbitrators made one composite award for Rs. 22,529-15-9 against the respondent in respect of the said disputes. It is not very clear whether this award covered other disputes also3. This award was duly filed in the Bombay City Civil Court underthe Arbitration Act,, for a judgment being passed on it. Thereafter, on July 17, 1953, the respondent made an application to the Bombay City Civil Court for setting aside the award contending that forward contracts in groundnuts were illegal as the making of such contracts was prohibited by the Oilseeds (Forward Contract Prohibition) Order, 1943, issued under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and hence the arbitration clause contained in the forward contract in groundnuts between the parties was null and void. It was said that the award based on that arbitration clause was therefore a nullity. The appellants answer to this contention was that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act did not apply to Greater Bombay where forward contracts were governed bythe Bombay Forward Contracts Control Act,1947,hereafter called the Bombay Act, and as the contract in groundnuts had been made in terms of that Act, it was legal, and, therefore, the award in terms of the arbitration clause contained in it was a valid and enforceable award. The learned Principal Judge of the Bombay City Civil Court accepted the respondents contention and set aside the award. An appeal by the appellant to the High Court at Bombay against the judgment of the City Civil Court failed. The appellant has not come to this Court in further appeal.

Reasoning: Now S. 8 of the Bombay Act, it will be noticed, does not purport to make any contract legal. Its only effect is to render forward contracts in all varieties of oilseeds illegal if not made in compliance with its terms. The learned Advocate for the appellant says that the effect of S. 8 was to render a forward contract in all oilseeds made in terms of it, legal and, therefore, a repugnancy arose between its terms and the terms of the Oilseeds Order issued under the Central Act which made forward contracts in edible oilseeds illegal. The learned Advocate referred to various other provisions of the Bombay Act and the bye-laws of the Association made in terms of the Act to show that the Bombay Act was intended to cover the entire field of forward contracts with respect to all varieties of oilseeds and was therefore intended to oust the operation of the Central Act in Greater Bombay with regard to the forward contracts covered by the former. It does not seem to us that a reference to the other provisions in the Bombay Act or to the byelaws, is relevant in deciding the question. If the effect of S. 8 of the Bombay Act was not to render forward contracts made in terms of it legal, then no question of repugnancy with the Central Act can arise whatever may be the scope of the Bombay Act and the provisions in the bye-laws15. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that there is no repugnancy between the Bombay Act and the Central Act. It follows, that there is no scope for applying the provisions of S. 107(2) of the Government of India Act 1935. That would be the position in 1948, when the Bombay Act came into force and the Central Act was already in existence. Both the Acts would then by be applying to Greater Bombay as there is no inconsistency between them. Article 372 of the Constitution continued both these Acts after the Constitution came into force and there is nothing in the Constitution which provides that any one of two existing laws, both of which had applied upto to the coming into force of the Constitution, would apply to the exclusion of the other. It follows that in 1951 or 1952, when the contract in groundnuts - which it is not disputed, was a forward contract within the meaning of both the Acts - was made both the Acts applied to it. The Constitution had not affected such application. That being the position, the contract in groundnuts must be held to be illegal under the Central Act which clearly prohibited the making of it. The Bombay Act could not make it legal for, as we have said, it was not intended to make any contract legal. It would follow that the arbitration clause contained in that contract was of no effect. It has therefore to be held that the award made under that arbitration clause is a nullity and has been rightly set aside. The award, it will have been noticed, was however in respect of disputes under several contracts one of which we have found to be void. But as the award was one and is not severable in respect of the different disputes covered by it some of which may have been legally and validly referred, the whole award was rightly set aside.