Case: P. Dasa Muni Reddy Vs. P. Appa Rao

2. The appellant is the owner of the building in question. The building was constructed sometime in 1958. The appellant on 1 November, 1958 let out the building to the respondent on a lease for three years. The lease was on monthly basis. The lease expired on 31 October, 1961.3. The appellant filed an application before the Rent Controller Chandragiri for eviction of the respondent from the building. The application was under section 10(2)(i) read with Section 3(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act. On 30 September, 1963, the Rent Controller dismissed the application for eviction.4. On 7 October, 1963 the appellant gave a notice to the respondent determining the lease and asked for possession. The appellant stated in the notice that the building was constructed after 26 August, 1957 and therefore, the Act did not apply to the building in question. On 21 October, 1963 the respondent replied and denied that the building was constructed after 26 August, 1957.5. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority under the Act against the order of the Rent Controller dated 30 September, 1963. On 17 December, 1965, the appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Authority.6. On 20 November, 1967 the appellant instituted a suit in the Court of the District Munsiff, Tirupathi for eviction of the respondent. The cause of action was that the respondent did not surrender possession of the building on the expiry of the lease. Further allegations were that the respondent committed default in payment of rent. The appellant referred to the proceedings before the Rent Controller resulting in dismissal of the appellants application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the respondent. The appellant also alleged that the provisions of the Act did not apply to the building in question because it was constructed after 26 August, 1957.7. On 26 March 1969 the appellants suit was decreed. The respondent preferred an appeal. The Subordinate Judge on 24 February 1972 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decree.8. The High Court on 5 September 1972 reversed the decree of the Subordinate Judge and set aside the decree.

Reasoning: The concurrent finding of the trial Court and the First Appellate Court is that the building was constructed in the year 1958. The Act would not apply to the month of August, 1957. The Civil Court and not the Rent Controller would have jurisdiction in respect of such buildings. The First Appellate Court held that the appellant sought eviction before the Rent Controller on the ground that there was default in payment of rent. The date of construction of the building was not in question before the Rent Controller. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the appellants suit was barred neither by res judicata nor by any principle of estoppel.12. It is indisputable that the Rent Controller could have no jurisdiction in respect of the building in question becaue of the date of construction of the building. The decree in the suit before the Rent Controller cannot be pleaded as res judicata because the Rent Controller would have no jurisdiction to try and decide not only a particular matter in the suit but also the subsequent suit in which the issue is44 of the EvidenceIn the present case, the building in question is beyond doubt outside the protection of Rent Control Acts. The foundation of the doctrine of estoppel is that the representation must be of existing facts and not of mereThe appellant proved that the appellant made a mistake of fact in regard to the building being outside the mischief of the Act.The appellant instituted the suit before the Rent Controller in mistake about the underlying and fundamental fact that the building was outside the ambit of the Act. The Civil Court has jurisdiction in the subsequent suit which is the subject of this appeal. The appellant is not disentitled to any relief on the grounds of res judicata or estoppel or waiver. As one cannot confer jurisdiction by consent similarly one cannot by agreement waive exclusive jurisdiction of courts. The Civil Court and not the Rent Control Court possesses jurisdiction over the building in question.