Case: Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha &amp; Others Vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar &amp; Another

Respondent Nos.1 and 2 along with other plaintiffs (who are now deceased) filed a suit L.E. and C. No.430/582 of 1978 under Section 41 of the PSCC Act before the Small Causes Court, Bombay against the appellants (original defendants) for recovery and vacant possession of one bed room in Flat No.16, Ram Mahal, Churchgate, Mumbai and also for other consequential reliefs. Plaintiffs submitted that the defendants were in use and in occupation of the above premises as their guest-house and so far as hall and kitchen are concerned, family members of the plaintiff and defendants were using it as common amenities. The plaintiffs also claim that they are in occupation of another bed-room in the suit flat and no monetary consideration was charged by them from the defendants for exclusive use and occupation of one bed-room and joint use of the hall and kitchen as common amenities. Permission granted to the defendants to use the premises was later revoked and since they did not vacate the suit flat and continued to hold possession wrongfully and illegally, suit was filed for eviction.7. The Small Causes Court decreed the suit on 07.02.1997 and ordered eviction of the appellants with a specific finding that they are gratuitous licensee. The appellants preferred an appeal before the Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, which was dismissed on 05.04.2003. Against that order both the appellants and respondents filed writ petitions before the High Court, Bombay and thewrit petition was for claiming mesne profits.8. The Defendants questioned the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, Mumbai to entertain and try the suit before the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay, placing reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench in Ramesh Dwarkadascase (supra) contending that the licence created by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants was gratuitous, i.e. without consideration, hence the suit is not maintainable in that Court. Learned Single Judge vide his order dated 16.01.2006 referred the matter to a larger bench. Consequently, a Full Bench was constituted.9. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court formulated the following questions for itsWhether the expressionused in section 41(1) in Chapter VII of PSCC Act, not having been defined therein, would derive its meaning from the expressionas used in sub-section (4A) of section 5 of the Rent Act and/or whether the expressionused in section 41(1) of PSCC Act is a term of wider import so as to mean and include ai) Whether a suit by ais tenable before the Presidency Small Cause Court under section 41 of PSCCthe above mentioned questions, as already indicated, were answered by the Full Bench in the affirmative, the correctness of otherwise of those findings is the issue that falls for our consideration.

Reasoning: We find the expressionin Section 41 of the PSCC Act has been used to fully achieve the object and purpose especially of 1976 Amendment Act and legislature has used clear and plain language and the principle noscitur a sociis is inapplicable when intention is clear and unequivocal. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of a narrow significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear, the rule of Noscitur a Sociis can be applied. When the intention of the legislature in using the expressionin Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act is clear and unambiguous, the principle of Noscitur a Sociis is not to benotice in the instant case that the concept of licence and lease were dealt with by contemporary statutes - Indian Easement Act, Transfer of Property Act and Section 41 of the PSCC Act and, as already indicated, all those statutes were enacted in the year 1882. Therefore, Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act could not have been contemplated any other meaning of the termbut only the permission as contemplated by Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. The PSCC Act is a procedural law and as already indicated, the expressionused in Section 41 of the PSCC Act (as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976) relate to immovable property and Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act which defines a licence has an inseparable connection to immovable property and property law. Legislature was well aware of those contemporaneous statutes, that was the reason, why the expression licence as such has not been defined in the PSCC Act with the idea that the expression used in a contemporaneous statutes would be employed so as to interpret Section 41 of the PSCC Act. Above-mentioned principle, in our view, would apply to the instantare of the considered view that the High Court has correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expressionrd andin Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between theand theunder one umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship. The act of the legislature was to bring all suits betweenor andwhether under the Rent Act or under the PSCC Act under one roof. We find it difficult to accept the proposition that the legislature after having conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one Court in all the suits between licensee and licensor should have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its jurisdiction. The various amendments made to Rent Act as well the Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 would clearly indicate that the intention of the legislature was to avoid unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suitor or else they have to move from the one court to the other not only on the question of jurisdiction but also getting reliefs.51. We are of the view that in such a situation the court also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easementhave elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expressionin Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expressionused in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expressionas used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expressionused in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well.