Case: Sri Mahalinga Thambiran Swamigal Vs. His Holiness Sri La Sri Kasivasi Arulnandithambiran Swamiga

1. The appellant as plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he was entitled to continue as the Elavarasu or Junior Head of the Tiruppenandal or the Kasi Mutt and for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, the Head of the Mutt, from interfering in any way with his functioning as the Elavarasu or Junior Head of the Mutt2. The defendanst, who is now dead, contended that the appellant was not validly nominated as the Elavarasu of the Mutt, that even if he was nominated as the Elavarasu, the appellant acquired no right by the nomination to continue as the Elavarasu, that the appellants conduct after he became the Elavarasu was such that he was unworthy to become the future head of the Mutt, that he (the defendant) cancelled the nomination and so the appellant had no right to get the declaration prayed for3. The questions which arose for consideration in the trial court were: whether the appellant had been nominated by the defendant as the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt; whether, by virtue of the nomination, the appellant was holding an office or had acquired any right or status; whether the appellant was guilty of misconduct which disentitled him to continue as the Elavarasu and whether the appellants nomination as the Elavarasu was validly cancelled by the defendant4. The trial court found that by Exhibit B-1 will, the defendant nominated the appellant as the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt, but that he acquired no status nor did he become the holder of an office by virtue of the nomination. The court further found that the defendant was competent to cancel the nomination even though the appellant was not guilty of any misconduct and that he had cancelled it by executing Exhibit B-9 will. The trial court, therefore, dismissed the suit5. The District Judge, in appeal by the appellant, confirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal6. In the second appeal filed by the appellant, a learned single Judge of the High Court of Madras found that by the nomination of the appellant as the Elavarasu, he became the holder of an office or that, at any rate, he acquired a status and that the defendant could terminate the office or status only for a good cause and in the light of the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court that the appellant was not guilty of any misconduct, the cancellation of the nomination by Exhibit B-9 will was ineffective. The learned Judge, therefore, granted a decree to the appellant declaring that he was the duly appointed junior head of the Kasi Mutt and that he was entitled to continue as the junior head, subject to the right of the head of the Mutt to remove him for good cause. The learned Judge, however, did not make a declaration that the appellant had a right to succeed to the headship of the Mutt after the lifetime of the defendant, nor was the appellant granted an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the appellant exercising the right as the junior head7. Appeals were preferred against this decree by both the appellant and the defendant to a Division Bench of the High Court8. The Division Bench reversed the decree passed by the learned single Judge on the basis of its finding that the appellant did not become the holder of an office by virtue of the nomination and so it was open to the defendant to cancel the nomination without notice to the appellant and without assigning any reason9. It is against this decree that this appeal has been preferred by special leave.

Reasoning: 22. We do not think that this contention is correct. As we said, the power of nomination is a concept pertaining to the law of Hindu Religious Endowments. It is not because the Mahantship was treated as property that in the Sambandha case (1887) ILR 10 Mad 375 it was observed that in the Kasi Mutt nomination is made by a will, but because it was the custom of that MuttIt is a well known custom in several Mutts, for the heads to nominate their successors. Junior heads so nominated form a class by themselves and as they stand in a relationship with the senior heads which is peculiar in the sense that no other class of persons hold that relationship with them, the question is whether, according to the law of Hindu Religious Endowments, they acquire a status in law. The custom or usage will certainly govern the question whether the head of the Mutt has the power to make a nomination during his lifetime, and the manner of its exercise and the religious ceremonies to be performed at the time of the nomination. But, in the absence of any custom or usage, the question whether nomination would confer a status upon the junior heads so nominated is a matter for the court to decide in the light of the law relating to Hindu Religious Endowments. And, in deciding it, the interests of the Hindu religious community and of the Mutts in general are of paramount importance. Whether or not a particular condition or relationship is one of status depends primarily on the existence and extent of the social interest in the creation and supervision of such a condition or relationship. The test is not a simple one of the existence ore of the concern of the society; it is also one of the degree of such concern. It is, further, obvious, that the degree and even the existence of this concern in a particular condition will vary from time to time in the same society It is not possible to draw a clear line of distinction in a dogmatic and a priori manner between conditions of status and special conditions not of status. In other words, the picture of status cannot be painted in elemental colours of black and white on any a priori considerations35. There was some debate at the bar on the question whether, by nomination, the junior gets a contingent interest in the office or in the properties of the Mutt, the contingency being the survival by the junior of the head of the Mutt. A contingent interest or ownership is a present right. But we do not propose to decide that point in this appeal. As we said, the concept in this appeal. As we said, the concept of nomination is sui generis; and that makes it rather difficult to bring it under any legal rubric. Perhaps it has its analogue in Canon Law and that was the reason why Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. in (1904) ILR 27 Mad 435   likened the position of a junior head to that of ar in Canon Law. Ar stands in a peculiar relationship with the Bishop. He has a right to succeed the Bishop; while he is a, he has no administrative functions of his own, but has only to do the work assigned to him by the Bishop. But nevertheless, during the lifetime of the Bishop he enjoys a status and is accorded honours and regard by the religious community, second only to those accorded to the Bishop44. Looking at the matter from another angle, we come to the same conclusion. We have already said that the power of nomination must be exercised not corruptly or for ulterior reason but bona fide and in the interest of the Mutt and the Hindu community. It then stands to reason to hold that power to revoke the nomination must also be exercised bona fide and in the interest of the institution and the community. It other words, the power to revoke can be excercised not arbitrarily, but only for good cause. We do not pause to consider what causes would be good and sufficient for revoking a nomination as the defendant had no case before us that he revoked the nomination for a good cause45. We hold that a nomination when made can be cancelled or revoked only for a good cause and, as admittedly, there was not good cause shown in this case for cancellation of the nomination by Exhibit, the cancellation was bad in law., it must be held that the appellant was holding the status of the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt during the lifetime of the defendant. Normally, a court will declare only the rights of the parties as they existed on the date of the institution of the suit. But, in this case, on account of the subsequent event, namely, the death of the defendant, we have to mould the relief to suit the altered circumstance. If the defendant had been alive, it would have been sufficient if we had declared, as the learned single Judge has done, that the appellant was the Elavarasu of the Kasi Mutt. Now that the defendant is dead, we make a declaration that the appellant was holding the position of the Elavarasu during the lifetime of the defendant, that the revocation of the nomination of the appellant as the Elavarasu by Exhibit9 was bad, and that the appellant was entitled to succeed to the headship of the Mutt on the death of the defendant.