Case: Deepak Sibal &amp; Ors Vs. Punjab University And Another

3. The impugned rule that was published in the prospectus for the year 1988-89 relating to admission to 150 seats in the evening classes in the three year LL.B. Degree Course is extracted as followsAdmission to evening classes is open only to regular employees of government/semi-government institutions/affiliated colleges/statutory corporations and government companies. A candidate applying for admission to the evening classes should attach No Objection/Permission letter from his present employer with his application for admission4. It is not disputed that there are 150 seats in the morning classes and another 150 seats in the evening classes. In both the morning and evening classes reservation has been made for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes, physically handicapped persons, outstanding sportsmen and defence personnel. In the morning classes out of 150 seats, 64 seats are reserved for scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, backward classes etc. and the remaining 86 seats are allotted to general students selected on merits basis. Similarly in the evening classes, the remaining 86 seats are also reserved for regular employees of government/semi-government institution etc., as mentioned in the impugned rule for admission5. The appellant, Deepak Sibal, passed the Bachelor of Commerce examination from the University of Punjab in June 1981 securing 61.5 per cent marks in the aggregate. On June 1, 1988, he was appointed to the post of Accountant in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. with effect from June 2, 1988 on probation for a period of six months Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. is stated to be a joint venture with Punjab Agro Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh, an undertaking of the Punjab Government6. On July 18, 1988, the appellant, Deepak Sibal, applied for admission in the evening classes of the Punjab University for the three year LL.B. Degree Course with a No Objection Certificate from his employer dated July 18, 1988. He was granted an interview some time in the first week of August 1988, but he was not selected. On enquiry, he came to know that although his position was 29 in the merit list, he was declared ineligible because he was an employee of a Public Limited Company and did not fall within the exclusive categories, as mentioned in the impugned rule, to which admission in the evening classes was restricted7. The other appellant, namely, Miss Ritu Khanna, passed the Bachelor of Arts examination from the Punjab University securing 418 marks out or 650 marks. She was temporarily appointed to the post of Helper in the office of the Director, Water Resources, Punjab. She also applied for admission in the evening classes of the three year LL.B. Degree Course of the University with all requisite certificates on July 18, 1988. She was granted an interview on July 30, 1988 and although her position in the merit list was 19, she was not selected for admission on the ground that she was only a temporary employee8. Both the appellants, being aggrieved by the refusal of the University to admit them in the evening classes of the three year LL.B. Degree Course, filed two separate writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging, inter alia, the constitutional validity of the impugned rule. Five other writ petitions were also filed by the candidates who were refused admission in the evening classes in view of the impugned rule. At the hearing of the writ petitions before the High Court, it was contended on behalf of the petitioners including the appellants, that the impugned rule was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court overruled the contention and, as stated already, dismissed the writ petitions. Hence these two appeals by the two appellants10. By the impugned rule, a classification has been made for the purpose of admission to the evening classes. The question is whether the classification is a reasonable classification within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution. In order to consider the question as to the reasonableness of the classification, it is necessary to take into account the objective for such classification. It has been averred in the written statement of Dr. Balram Kumar Gupta, Chairman, Department of Laws, Punjab University, respondent 2, filed in the High Court, that the object of starting evening classes was to provide education to bone fide employees who could not attend the morning classes on account of their employment. The object, therefore, was to accommodate bona fide employees in the evening classes, as they were unable to attend the morning classes on account of their employment. Admission to evening classes is not open to the employees in general including private sector employees, but it is restricted to regular employees of government/semi-government institutions etc., as mentioned in the impugned rule. In other words, the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. have been grouped together as a class to the exclusion of employees of private establishments11. It appears that in or about the year 1986, admission to evening classes was open to those who were in bona fide employment including self-employed persons. In supersession of that rule, the impugned rule was framed excluding private sector employees and self-employed persons. In the counter-affidavit filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents by the Registrar of the Punjab University, an explanation has been given why the University framed the impugned rule restricting the admission in the evening classes open to government/semi-government institution etc. The explanation, as given in the counter-affidavit, is extracted below

Reasoning: 9. It is now well settled that Article 14 forbids class legislation, but does not forbid reasonable classification. Whether a classification is a permissible classification under Article 14 or not, two conditions must be satisfied, namely, (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group, and (2) that the differentia must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question14. It is difficult to accept the contention that the government employees or the employees of semi-government and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, stand on a different footing from the employees of private concerns, insofar as the question of admission to evening classes is concerned. It is true that the service conditions of employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. are different, and they may have greater security of service, but that hardly matters for the purpose of admission in the evening classes. The test is whether the employees of private establishments are equally in a disadvantageous position like the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. in attending morning classes. There can be no doubt and it is not disputed that both of them stand on an equal footing and there is on difference between these two classes of employees in that regard. To exclude the employees of private establishments will not, therefore, satisfy the test of intelligible differentia that distinguishes the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. grouped together from the employees of private establishments. It is true that a classification need not be made with mathematical precision but, if there be little or no difference between the persons or things which have been grouped together and those left out of the group, in that case, the classification cannot be said to be a reasonable one16. We are also unable to accept the contention of the respondents that such exclusion of the employees of private establishments is justified on the ground of administrative convenience. The decision in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India (1975 SCR 233 : AIR 1957 SC 397 ), relied on by the respondents does not, in our opinion, lay down any such proposition of law. In that case, the provision of Section 5(7-A) ofthe Income Tax Act, 1922 was, inter alia, challenged as ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was discriminatory. Section 5(7-A) confers power on the Commissioner of Income Tax and the Central Board of Revenue, inter alia, to transfer any case from one Income Tax Officer to another. It has been observed by this Court that in order to minimise the inconvenience of the assessee, the authority concerned may transfer the case of such assessee to the Income Tax Officer who is nearest to the area where it would be convenient for the assessee to attend and if, on account of administrative exigencies, this is not possible and the assessee requests that the examination of accounts or evidence to be taken should be in a place convenient to him, the Income Tax Officer comply with the request of the assessee by holding the hearing at the place requested. It is manifestly clear from the observation that the power of transfer is not exercised for administrative convenience, but for the convenience of the assessee. In the instant case, there is no question of any administrative inconvenience. The respondents have not placed any material before the High Court or in this Court as to in how many cases they had come across such bogus certificates produced by private employees during the time the admission to evening classes was open also to private employees. It may be that there were one or two cases of production of bogus certificate, but that cannot be a ground for the exclusion of all private employees from the benefit of getting legal education in the evening classes18. In this connection, we may also examine another ground restricting the admission in the evening classes to the employees government/semi-government and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, namely, imparting of legal education to such employees. According to the respondents, imparting of legal education to the employees of government/semi-government and other institutions, as mentioned in the impugned rule, would be in public interest. Indeed, in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court on behalf of the respondents by the Registrar of the University, that is also the objective for framing the impugned rule. The counter-affidavit is, however, silent as to why imparting of legal education to the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. would be in public interest. It is not understandable why government/semi-government employees in general should be imparted legal education and what sort of public interest would be served by such legal education. It may be that certain sections of government employees require legal education but, surely, Government employees in general do not require legal education19. A similar rule, which was framed by the Government of Kerala reserving 100 per cent seats to government and quasi-government employees irrespective of their category, came to be considered by the Kerala High Court in Jolly A. V. v. State of Kerala (AIR 1974 Ker 178 : 1974 Ker LT 94). In that case, it has been observed by the Kerala High Court that there may be some posts in government service, some even in public corporations which may require incumbents who may be able to perform their functions very efficiently with a legal background provided to them., but this cannot be said of all employees whether of the State Government or Central Government or of the public corporations or government owned companies. In our opinion, there is much force in the observation of the Kerala High Court. It cannot be laid down that only government employees require legal education and not private employees. Certain private sector employees may require legal education in the interest of the establishments of which they are employees. It is difficult to understand the logic of the rule restricting admission in the evening classes to employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. on the plea that such employees require legal education in public interest20. In considering the reasonableness of classification from the point of view of Article 14 of the Constitution, the court has also to consider the objective for such classification. If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as unreasonable. In the instant case, the forgoing discussion reveals that the classification of the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. by the impugned rule for the purpose of admission in the evening classes of three year LL.B. Degree Course to the exclusion of all other employees, is unreasonable and unjust, as it does not subserve any fair and logical objective. It is, however, submitted that classification in favour of government and public sector is a reasonable and valid classification. In support of that contention, the decision in Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. Government of Kerala ((1986) 3 SCC 398 ), has been relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents. In that case, it has been observed that as far as government undertakings and companies are concerned, it has to be held that they form a class by the themselves, since any project that they may make would in the end result in the benefit to the members of the general public. The government and public sector employees cannot be equated with government undertakings and companies. The classification of government undertakings and companies may, in certain circumstances, be a reasonable classification satisfying the two tests mentioned above, but it is difficult to hold that the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc., as mentioned in the impugned rule, would also constitute a valid classification for the purpose of admission to evening classes of three year LL.B. Degree Course. The contention in this regard, in our opinion, is without any substance24. It follows from the above discussion that the impugned rule, with which we are concerned, having made a classification which cannot be justified on any reasonable basis, must be held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is, however, submitted by Mr. P. P. Rao that in case the court holds against the constitutional validity of the impugned rule, the entire rule may not be quashed, but only such portion of it which is found to be discriminatory in nature and, as such, invalid. It is contended that if the impugned rule had not restricted the admission to evening classes to the employees of government/semi-government institutions etc. but had provided for admission to regular employees including employees of private sectors, the classification would have been a reasonable one and having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the rule, namely, to accommodate the regular employees in the evening classes, as they would be unable to attend the morning classes. Accordingly, it is submitted that instead of striking down the whole of the impugned rule, a full stop may be put after the words "regular employees" in the impugned rule and the remaining part of the rule after the said words can be struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. If that be done, the rule will be read as "Admission to evening classes is open only to regular employees". Prima facie it appears that this part, which is sought to be retained, is not severable from the remaining part of the rule. In R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India (1957 SCR 930 : AIR 1957 SC 628 ), it has been laid down by this Court that if the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated from one another then the invalidity of the portion must result in the invalidity in its entirely. In the instant case, the invalid portion is inextricably mixed up with the valid portion of the rule and, accordingly, the entire rule requires to be struck down. Our attention has, however, been drawn to a later decisions of this Court in B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985 Supp SCC 432 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 49). In this case, a bench of three Judges of this Court struck out the word not from the provisions of Clause 3(1) of Ordinance 24 of 1984 and Section 4(1) of the Act 3 of 1984 so as to bring those provisions to conform to the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution. We do not think we should try to bring the impugned rule in conformity with the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution by putting a full stop after the words "regular employees" and striking down the remaining part of the impugned rule on the basis of the same principle as in Prabhakar Rao case (1985 Supp 432 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 49). For, it has been stated by Mr. P. P. Rao, learned counsel for the respondents, that the respondents will frame a fresh rule for admission in the evening classes in conformity with and in the light of the decision of this Court in the instant case26. In our opinion, the above contention is not without force. In this connection, we may refer to a decision of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963 Supp 1 SCR 439 : AIR 1963 SC 649 ). In that case, the State of Mysore passed an order reserving 68 per cent of seats in the engineering and medical colleges and other technical institution for the educationally and socially backward classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and left only 32 per cent of seats for the merit pool. In striking down such reservation, it was observed by this Court that it would be extremely unreasonable to assume that in enacting Article 15(4), Parliament intended to provide that where the advancement of the backward classes or the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was concerned, the fundamental rights of the citizens constituting the rest of the society were to be completely and absolutely ignored. Speaking generally and in a broad way, it was observed by this Court that a special provision should be less than 50 per cent and the actual percentage must depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. Thus, the provision of Article 15(4) does not contemplate to reserve all the seats or the majority of the seats in an educational institution at the cost of the rest of the society. The same principle should also apply with equal force in the case of cent per cent reservation of seats in educational institutions for a certain class of persons to the exclusion of meritorious candidatesIt has been already noticed that the appellant, Deepak Sibal, was refused admission on the ground that he was an employee of a Public Limited Company which did not fall within the exclusive categories, as mentioned in the impugned rule, to which admission to the evening classes was restricted. The appellant was appointed on probation for a period of six months in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. with effect from June 2, 1988. In proof of his appointment, the appellant produced before the respondents a certificate of employment dated June 1, 1988 issued by the Director of Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. According to the respondents, the certificate of employment produced by the appellant is not a genuine one inasmuch as the appellant was admitted to the first semester in the LL.B. Course of the Himachal Pradesh University at Simla on July 12, 1988. We fail to understand how it can be said that the certificate of employment of the appellant in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. was not a genuine certificate, simply because the appellant was admitted in the first semester of the LL.B. Course of the Himachal Pradesh University on July 12, 1988. It is common knowledge that a candidate very often seeks admission in more than one college or university. The appellant also made an application for admission to the LL.B. Course in Himachal Pradesh University and he was admitted. It may be that after the respondents refused to admit the appellant in the evening classes, the appellant had to join LL.B. Course of the Himachal Pradesh University after giving up his service in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. But, when the appellant made the application for admission in the evening classes of the Law Department of the Punjab University, he was in employment of Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. We do not find any reason to doubt the genuineness of the certificate of employment in Agro Chem Punjab Ltd. It is the case of the appellant that to prosecute his studies in LL.B. Course in Himachal Pradesh University will put him to great hardship and inconvenience and it will be convenient for him to prosecute his studies in the University of Punjab. Similarly the other appellant, Miss Ritu Khanna, was refused admission by the respondents on the ground that her appointment was purely temporary, although her position was 19 in the merit list31. It has been already found that the impugned rule is discriminatory and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and, as such, invalid. The refusal by the respondents to admit the appellants in the evening classes of the three year LL.B. Degree Course was illegal. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to be admitted in the evening classes. It is, however, submitted on behalf of the respondents that all the seats have been filled up and, accordingly, the appellants cannot be admitted. As injustice was done to appellants, it will be no answer to say that all the seats are filled up32. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and the impugned rule for admission in the evening classes is struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and, accordingly, invalid. We, however, make it clear that the striking down of the impugned rule shall not, in any manner whatsoever, disturb the admissions already made for the session 1988-89. The respondents are directed to admit both the appellants in the second semester which has commenced from January 1988 and shall allow them to complete the three year LL.B. Degree Course, if not otherwise ineligible on the ground of unsatisfactory academic performance. As was directed by this Court in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi ((1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 258 : (1981) 2 SCR 79 ), the seats allocated to the appellants will be in addition to the normal intake of students in the college