Case: Chinnamarkathian Alias Muthu Gounder and Another Vs. Ayyavoo Alias Periana Gounder and Others

The respondents purchas ed the land cultivated by the tenants in each of the petitions under sale deeds Ext. P-6 dated January 22, 1960 and Ext. P-7 dated March 9, 1960, from the erstwhile owner of the land one Nachayammal. Subsequently by the deed of assignment Ext. P-5 dated 5th December, 1960, Nachayammal, the vendor of the respondents assigned the rent in arrears for the period 1958-59 and 1959-60 to the respondents. By the time, action in each case was commenced, according to the respondents-landlor ds rent for the year 1960-61 had become due and payable The respondents accordingly filed C.T.P.A. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of 1961 against the respective tenants on January 2, 1951, for eviction of the tenants on the ground that they were in arre ars of rent due and payable for the years 1958-59, 1959- 60 and 1960-61.The Revenue Divisional Officer overruled all the contentions of the appellants-tenants in each case and held that the tenants were in arrears of rent for the aforementioned three years and that they were liable to pay the same. It was further held that since by the deed of assignment, previous landlord assigned the arrears of rent for two years 1958-59 and 1959-60 in favour of the respondents, they were not only entitled to commence the action for recovery of arrears of rent due and payable to the previous landlord but they were also entitled to evict the tenants for failure to pay rent in arrears. Having recorded these finding s the Revenue Divisional Officer passed identical order in each case with variation in figures. only one order may be extracted to focus the attention on the controversy now brought to this Court. In C.T.P.A. No. 1/61 the following fina l order wasview of my findings above I hold that the respondents are in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 2, 850 for the years 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960-61 to the petitioners. I direct under section 3, 4(a) that this amount be paid to the petitioners within six weeks from the date of this order failing which they shall be evicted from the suitorder was made on November 6, 1961. The tenants were, therefore, under an obli gation to pay the arrears found due by December 18, 1961, to qualify for the protection of the Act. Admittedly the tenants did not deposit the arrears found due by the Revenue Divisional Officer but filed three Civil Revision Petitions on December 11, 1961 in the High Court. While admitting the revision petitions on December 15, 1961, the High Court granted conditional stay directing that the rent found in arrears be deposited within the time set out in the order of the High Court. A dispute appears to have been raised about the deposit made by the tenants whereupon the High Court on May 2, 1962, directed that an additional amount of Rs. 950 be deposited by the tenants within the time prescribed by it and it is conceded that the conditional orders have been fully complied with.The most important contention that engaged the attention of the High Court at the hearing of the Revision Petitions was whether the Revenue Divisional Officer was in error in passing a comp osite order whereby he determined the amount of rent in arrears and after specifying the time within which the amount in arrears should be paid up, prescribed the consequences of failure to act within the prescribed time, namely, that the tenants would be evicted. The High Court noticed some of its own conflicting decisions bearing on the topic but ultimately held that the view taken by Srinivasan, J. in Venkitaswami Naicker v. Ramaswami Naicker, in which it was held as under, was corregard to the object of the enactment it is clear that the law empowers the Revenue Divisional Officer to grant a reasonable time to the tenant to pay the arrears in order to avoid eviction. There may be a v ariety of circumstances by reason of which the tenant might find it difficult to comply with the direction to deposit the arrears by the date fixed. If the date so fixed initially is to be an inflexible and unalterable date, it is bound to work considerable hardship upon the tenants. It would be a mechanical application of the provision of the section for the purpose of eviction. The object of the section is to avoid eviction wherever possible an d not insist upon eviction for such reasons as obtain in thenoticed the law as indicated in the passage extracted, the High Court observed that the order made by the Revenue Divisional Officer was not one for eviction. A further unqualified order has to be passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer directing the eviction But at a later stage in the judgment the High Court appears to have taken a somersault when it observed that in the case before it the High Court found nothing wrong in the order which the Revenue Divisional Officer had passed. In other words, the composite order was held to be legal and once the revision petitions filed by the tenants were dismissed by the High Court, the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer would immediately come into operation. With respect our task became none too easy to wade through the irreconcilably contradictory approach of the High Court. Ultimately the High Court dismissed the three rev ision petitions. Hence these three appeals by certificate.The object behind enacting the Act clearly manifests itself by reference to its long title which reads:"An Act for the protection from eviction of cultivating tenan ts in certain areas in the State of Madras.Respondents in each of these appeals are the landlords of the land more particularly described in the three different petitions filed by them in the Court of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Namakkal in Tamil Nadu State seeking to evict tenants of different parcels of land on the allegation that the concerned tenants were in arrears of rent for the years1. The tenants who are appellants in these three appeals appeared in the respective petitions and contested the same on diverse grounds but the only one now surviving at this stage is; whether in view of the language employed in section 3, 4(a) and (b) of the Madras (now Tamil Nadu) Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1955 (Act for short), the Re venue Divisional officer erred in passing a composite order for payment of rent found to be in arrears within the time prescribed by him and on default, without any further proceeding, directing eviction of the tenants.

Reasoning: It was a beneficient legislation for granting security or tenure to cultivating tenants of agricultural lands. It is a well-settled canon of construction that in construing the provisions of such enactments the court should adopt that construction which advances, fulfils and furthers the object of the Act rather than the one which would defeat the same and render the protection illusory.It is not in dispute that the tenants in each of th ese appeals are cultivating tenants and the lands of which they are tenants are lands covered by the Act. They are sought to be evicted on the only ground that they have committed default in payment of rent payable from year to year for a period o f threefact the High Court itself has taken this very view when it observed that the view taken by Srinivasan, J. was the correct one having regard to the avowed object of the Act, namely, preventing unreasonable eviction and affording protection to the tenants to retain the holdings s o long as interests of the landlord in the matter of the prompt payment of rent are safeguarded. At another stage, the High Court observed that the time that has to be given or allowed to the tenant to deposit the arrears is to be determined by co nsidering what is just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of both the parties and by its very nature this must be elastic and flexible and not fixed or final. In other words, the High Court was of the opinion that the comp osite order is not contemplated by sub-section (4)(b) of section 3.If sub-section (4)(b) of section 3 does not contemplate passing of a composite order, what is the correct procedure that must be followed in a proceeding under that sub-section ? Tha t is self-evident from the language employed in that sub-section. After the application is received and the parties are summoned and representations are heard, the Court must determine whether the cultivating tenant is in arrears of rent. If the answer is in the affirmative, it has to determine the arrears in terms of its money value. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Officer must ascertain relative circumstances of the landlord and the tenant and as indicated hereinabove, these circumstances must be relatable to the need of the landlord for prompt payment and the present prevalent circumstances of the tenant relatable to his paying capacity. Thousand and one circumstances can be envisaged which may have a bearing on this aspect. After these circumstances are properly adjudicated and evaluated the Revenue Divisional Officer must fix time within which the tenant should pay the amount and repair thet the High Court itself has taken this very view when it observed that the view taken by Srinivasan, J. was the correct one having regard to the avowed object of the Act, namely, preventing unreasonable eviction and affording protection to the tenants to retain the holdings s o long as interests of the landlord in the matter of the prompt payment of rent are safeguarded. At another stage, the High Court observed that the time that has to be given or allowed to the tenant to deposit the arrears is to be determined by co nsidering what is just and reasonable having regard to the relative circumstances of both the parties and by its very nature this must be elastic and flexible and not fixed or final. In other words, the High Court was of the opinion that the comp osite order is not contemplated by sub-section (4)(b) of section 3.If sub-section (4)(b) of section 3 does not contemplate passing of a composite order, what is the correct procedure that must be followed in a proceeding under that sub-section ? Tha t is self-evident from the language employed in that sub-section. After the application is received and the parties are summoned and representations are heard, the Court must determine whether the cultivating tenant is in arrears of rent. If the answer is in the affirmative, it has to determine the arrears in terms of its money value. Thereafter, the Revenue Divisional Officer must ascertain relative circumstances of the landlord and the tenant and as indicated hereinabove, these circumstances must be relatable to the need of the landlord for prompt payment and the present prevalent circumstances of the tenant relatable to his paying capacity. Thousand and one circumstances can be envisaged which may have a bearing on this aspect. After these circumstances are properly adjudicated and evaluated the Revenue Divisional Officer must fix time within which the tenant should pay the amount and repair thewas seriously contended by Mr. Natesan as to what is there in the scheme of the Act and especially in the language of sub- section (4)(b) which would make it impermissible for the Revenue Divisional Officer simultaneously passing an order determining rent in arrears and directing that i f the tenant fails to pay the amount within the time prescribed by the Court eviction shall follow as a matter of course. If this construction of sub-section (4)(b) as canvassed by Mr. Natesan is adopted the Revenue Divisional Officer would be denying to himself a more beneficial jurisdiction conferred upon him, namely, to extend the time for making the payment if an evaluation of circumstances so placed before him he is satisfied that a further extension is not only just but not to grant it would be harsh and unjust and would be defeating the object for which the Act was enacted. An analogous provision may be noticed, It is a well accepted principle statutorily recognised in section 148 of theCode of Civil Procedure that where a period is fixed or granted by the court for doing any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, Court may in its discretion from time to time enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed or granted may expire. If a Court in exercis e of the jurisdiction can grant time to do a thing, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary curtailing, denying or withholding such jurisdiction, the jurisdiction to grant time would inhere in its ambit the jurisdiction to extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in a disregard of the jurisdiction in that while directing time simultaneously the court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The principle of equity is tha t when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re-examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitated extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys. Conditional orders, w ere held by this Court to be in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay, but they do not completely estop a court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the timeall the three cases the Revenue Divisional Officer determined the arr ears of rent and gave six weeks time to pay the same. Within the period of six weeks the cultivating tenants in each case approached the High Court and obtained conditional stay, the condition being to deposit the rent in arrears within the time presc ribed by the High Court and these orders have been complied with. If the Revenue Divisional Officer had not denied to himself the further jurisdiction to examine the situation as it emerged on the date of expiry of the period prescribed by him, it would have been brought to his notice that the eviction was unjustified in view of the orders made by the High Court. But as the order became effective according to the Revenue Divisional Officer on the mere failure to deposit the arrears found due by him, the order of eviction without jurisdiction became effective. The High Court held that there was no order of eviction but affirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer as one for eviction.The question then is: What should be my approach in these appeals ? Frankly speaking, on my finding that the latter part of the Revenue Divisional Officers order that in the event of failure to deposit the amount within the time prescribed eviction wo uld follow,  being without jurisdiction, I would be required to remand the matter to the Revenue Divisional Officer to proceed from that stage. However, I cannot overlook the fact that the initial proceedings before the Revenue Divisional O fficer started in 1961. Two decades have rolled by. The ground of eviction was a technical ground of default repaired by the orders of the High Court when the rent found in arrears was deposited. The landlords have been paid, may be not specifically withi n the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer but within the time prescribed by the High Court. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether the time prescribed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, if challenged in the superior court i.e. the High Court, the High Court would have jurisdiction to prescribe its own time calling upon the tenant to deposit the amount to repair the default. That question be kept open but in the facts of this case the amount having been deposited way back in 1961-62, it would be merely adding to the agony of the parties for a very technical consideration to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In the facts of this case it would be an idle formality to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer for the additional reason that he will have to fix a fresh date for deposit of the amount and the amount has already been deposited 19 to 20 years back. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the inevitable consequence flowing from the passage of time, I do not consider it just and proper to remit the case to the Revenue Divisional Officer. In my opinion the tenants have qualified for the protection of the Act and they were not liable to be evicted.