Case: Smt. Bhagwan Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and Others

1. Four groups of tenants of the appellant, who is a landowner, filed separate applications under Section 22 of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 (Pepsu Act XIII of 1955)hereinafter referred to as the Actfor the grant of proprietary rights in respect of lands being cultivated by them. These applications were made sometime in May, 1960. On May 31, 1960, the prescribed authorityed four orders granting the applications of the tenants on payment of 90 times the land revenue. We may mentioned that one group was constituted by Sundur, Ganga Ram, Ram Partap. Gurdial Singh and Dalip, sons of Kishan Singh.2. The appellant filed four appeals to the Collector, NabhaIt was urged in these appeals that the prescribed authority had not allowed time to the appellant to file copies of the reservation forms which the appellant is alleged to have submitted, but the Collector held that no copy of the reservation form had been presented to the prescribed authority. Other points were also raised but apparently not seriously pressed.3. The appellant then filed four revisions before the Commissioner who forwarded them to the Financial Commissioner for disposal. The Financial Commissioner by four orders, dated December 6, 1960, dismissed the revisions. The Financial Commissioner observed :"It is admitted that the petitioner owns more than the permissible limit of land, and that she has failed to exercise her right of reservation provided by Section 5. The tenants are, therefore, prima facie, entitled to acquire proprietary rights in their tenancy under Section 22, read with Sections 20 andof the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955. The only objection to the acquisition raised by the petitioners counsel is that the landowner had filed a return to the Collector under Sectionof the Act, and consequently should be allowed to retain her land equal to the permissible limit. This argument is understandable because that section benefits landowners and tenants who held land under their personal cultivation in excess of the permissible limit. In that event landowners and tenants could select 30 acres from theirbut is under the cultivation of the tenants themselves. This being so, the petitioner cannot derive any benefits from SectionHaving failed to reserve the land within the prescribed period she has no option but to acquiesce in the acquisition of the proprietary rights by her tenants. The result, unfortunately, will be that the landowner will he deprived of all her land, including the permissible limit allowed to a landowner, but this result cannot be avoided in the case of landowners who have failed to exercise their right of reservation within the prescribed period."4. The appellant then filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Punjab impugning all the 12 orders mentioned above. The High Court, although impressed by the inequity of the legislation, felt powerless and dismissed the petition. The appellant having obtained certificate of fitness from the High Court, the appeal is now before us.

Reasoning: It was only on July 25, 1966, that application was made to the High Court for setting aside the abatement. This application was dismissed by the High Court on March 20, 1967. The High Court (Narula, J.) held that the application was barred by time as it was not accompanied by application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This order has become final because no appeal to the Supreme Court was filed against the order. It is clear that the appeal insofar as it deals with the group of tenants of which Ram Pratap was a member hasare unable to appreciate how the fact that one petition was filed is relevant to the determination of the question of abatement. The other groups of tenants held separate lands, they had separate rights and they had been granted proprietary rights in separate lands and on separate terms. We are unable to hold that the whole appeal has abated.No objection was raised before the Tehsildar, the Collector or the Financial Commissioner that the respondents were not tenants within the definition in Section 20. During the course of discussion it, however, appeared that the inequity which has been noticed by the High Court may perhaps be obviated by giving close attention to the definition of the word "tenant" and applying it to Section 22. If this definition is applied it would appear that not only a tenant who held land which had been reserved by the landowner for his personal cultivation but also a tenant of a landowner who owns 30 standard acres or less of land and the land falls within his permissible limit, would be debarred from making an application under Section 22. It may be, though we do not decide the point in this case, that a landowner who has not reserved under Section 5, may at one stage after some tenants have exercised option under Section 22 fall within the description in Sectionof the Act. But, as we have said, this point was taken before the revenue authorities and it is too late now to allow the point to be raised because if this point was allowed to be raised various questions will have to be decided in order to finally decide the case. It would have to be decided if this interpretation was accepted as to at what stage landowner started falling under S.It may also be that this argument might be refuted on the ground that the tenants when they made the applications did fall within the definition under Section 20 as at that time the landowner owned more than 30 standard acres.It is the case of the appellant that she filed a return under Sectiong to therespondents she was not entitled to file a return because she did not own or hold as landowner or tenant land under her personal cultivation which in the aggregate exceeded the permissible limit.The High Court held that Sectionapplies only to a landowner owning or holding land under his personal cultivation which in the aggregate exceeds the permissible limit, and repelled the contention that the words "under his personal cultivation" applied only to a tenant and not to a landowner.12. It seems to us that although this interpretation leads to some hardship on some persons this is the correct meaning, and accordingly the appellant cannot take advantage of Sectionand the subsequent provisions in Chapteris out of the way then if is difficult to hold that Section 22 does not apply. Section 22 clearly enables the respondents to put in applications to acquire proprietary rights as it was not contested that they were tenants within the definition of the word in Section 20.This point is not open for any further discussion because this Court has held that this Act is protected by Articleof the Constitution and cannot be challenged on the ground that it violates Article 14. (See Pritam Singh Chahil v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 930   : (1967) 2 SCJ 325.); and Inder Singh v. State of Punjab. (AIR 1967 SC 1776   : (1967) 3 SCR 603   : (1966) 1 SCJ 557.)