Case: Raymond Ltd.  Vs. State Of Chhattisgarh

Appellant No. 1 herein is a public limited company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It had its cement division in the State of Madhya Pradesh in the year 1982. It intended to sell the same in favour of one Lafarge India Ltd. on "slump-sale" basis. The State of Chhatisgarh was carved out of the State of Madhya Pradesh in November, 2000. With a view to pre-assess the stamp duty payable on the instrument of sale and the impact thereof, an application was filed by the appellants for adjudication of the Collector in terms of Section 31 of the Act which occurs in Chapter III thereof. A report of a chartered designated valuer was enclosed with the saidCollector of Janjgir District, on receipt of the said application, formed a Valuation Committee comprising of Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) as Chairman, Sub-Divisional Officer (Building & Roads) PWD, Sub-Divisional Officer (Forest) Champa, Assistant Mining Officer, Janjgir – Champa and District Registrar, Janjgir – Champa as members to inspect the properties and submit an independent report in regard to the valuation of the properties sought to be transferred. The Valuation Committee assessed the same at Rs. 42,18,31,288/-. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said report, the stamp duty chargeable on the instrument under Section 31 of the Act was assessed by the Collector at Rs. 3,74,90,300/- and registration charges of Rs. 33,75,601/-. The said order was accepted by the appellants and the amount of stamp duty and the registration charges was deposited. An endorsement on the deed of conveyance was made by Respondent No. 2 on 16.01.2001 by way of a certificate in terms of Section 32 of the Act whereupon the instrument was dulydeed of conveyance was executed by Appellant No. 1 in favour of the said Lafarge India Ltd. on 19.01.2001 which was registered onState appears to have filed a revision application before the Board of Revenue seeking revision of the order dated 16.01.2001 passed by Respondent No.or about 26.12.2001, however, the Board of Revenue served a notice upon the appellants. Appellant No. 1 filed its objections in regard to the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue to entertain the revisional application filed by the State. Questioning the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue to issue the aforementioned notice, a writ petition was filed by the appellant, which by reason of the impugned judgment has been dismissed.

Reasoning: 14. It is true that(2) of Section 56 of the Act does not refer to Section 32 but the same, in our opinion, was not necessary.(4) of Section 56 was inserted by way of a State Amendment. The intention of the legislature in inserting the said provision is clear and explicit as by reason thereof a power of revision has been conferred upon the highest authority of Revenue in the State, viz., Board of Revenue. The revisional power is to be exercised by the Board of Revenue either on its own motion or on an application by any party. The term "any party" used in the said provision is of some significance. By reason of the said provision, not only the State but also the person who had filed an application under Section 31 of the Act, thus, may file a revision application before the Board of Revenue. The terms "any party", therefore, implies both the parties to the lis and not the party filing an application under Section 31 of the Act alone. The revisional power is to be exercised by the Board so as to enable it to satisfy itself in regard to the amount with which the instrument is chargeable with duty. The revisional proceeding has a direct nexus with determination of an instrument being charged with duty and not the endorsement made thereupon at a subsequent stage.15. Submission of Mr. Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, that the question of chargeability of an instrument with duty arises only at the stage of Section 31 of the Act and not under Section 32 thereof, and thus, the Board of Revenue would have no jurisdiction in the matter, cannot be accepted. Determination by the Collector is under Section 31 of the Act. Thus, it is only that order which can be the subject matter of revisional application.If the applicant intends to challenge the said order before the revisional authority, evidently it would not deposit the amount. However, only because the determination by the Collector has been accepted pursuant whereto a certificate has been issued, by itself cannot be held to be binding upon the State.18. The Act deals with a fiscal matter. It was indisputably enacted keeping in mind the revenue of the State, The amendment has been carried out to see that no evasion in regard to collection of actual stamp duty payable on instruments takes place. The Act provides for determination of such amount at different stages.19. If an application under Section 31 of the Act is not filed, it would be for the Registrar to do so at the time when the document is presented for registration in which event the matter would be referred to the Collector.In absence of any finality clause, it is difficult to comprehend that the right of the parties to approach the revisional authority in terms of(4) of Section 56 of the Act shall stand denuded. The said provision also must be given full effect to. It cannot be said that the revisional authority although is conferred with a power to satisfy itself as to the correctness or otherwise of the order of the Collector determining the quantum of stamp duty payable to an instrument, it would not have any jurisdiction to do so only because the order was accepted by one party to the dispute.We, however, accept that if the meaning of the provision of a statute is clear and explicit, it is not necessary to advert to the objects and reasons thereof in view of the decisions of this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [1953 SCR 1] and State of W.B. v. Union of India [(1964) 1 SCR 371] , as by taking recourse to the statements of Objects and Reasons, the generality of the words used in the statute cannot be cut down. It is axiomatic that an extended meaning thereof also cannot be given. If the contention of Mr. Desai is accepted, an extended meaning will have to be assigned to(3) of Section 32 of the Act which is not contemplated under the statute.29. Reliance placed by Mr. Desai on Section 53A of the Act, as amended by the Bombay Stamp Act, is again of no assistance inasmuch as an object can be achieved by different legislature by using different terms. Section 53A of the Bombay Stamp Act makes Section 32 subject to Section 53A. It was probably done by way of abundant caution. If a higher forum is provided, an order passed by a lower authority, whether the term "subject to" is used or not, shall be subservient thereto. When determination made by a statutory authority is capable of being challenged by way of revision, it is axiomatic that only the revisional order shall be final and not the order of the original authority.30. It is trite that no court can direct a matter to be governed by a statute other than that which is really applicable. [See Neeraj Munjal and Others (III) v. Atul Grover and Another, (2005) 5 SCC 404 ]