Case: Satyawati Sharma Vs. Union Of India

2. For the sake of convenience, we have noted the facts from Civil Appeal No.1897 ofOn August 18, 1953, Delhi Improvement Trust leased out a plot of land measuring 184 sq. yards situated at Basti Reghar, Block R, Khasra Nos.2942/1820 to 2943/1820 to Shri Jagat Singh son of Pt. Ram Kishan. In terms of Clause 4(c) of the lease deed, the lessee was prohibited from using the land and building (to be constructed over it) for any purpose other than residence, with a stipulation that in case of breach of this condition, the lease shall become void.(ii) After constructing the building, the lessee inducted Shri Jai Narain Sharma and Dr. Ms. Tara Motihar, as tenants in two portions of the building, who started using the rented premises for running watch shop and clinic respectively.(iii) Smt. Satyawati Sharma (appellant herein), who is now represented by her LRs, purchased property i.e. house bearing No.3395-3397, Ward No.XVI, Block R, Gali No.1, Reghar Pura, New Delhi from legal heirs of the lessee.(iv) After purchasing the property, the appellant filed Petition Nos.184 of 1980 and 187 of 1980 for eviction of the tenants by claiming that she needed the house for her own bona fide need and also for the use and occupation of the family members dependant upon her. The appellant further pleaded that she wanted to demolish the building and reconstruct the same. She also alleged that tenants have been using the premises in violation of the conditions of lease and, therefore, they are liable to be evicted.(v) The tenants contested the eviction petitions by asserting that the so called need of the landlord was not bona fide; that there were no valid grounds for permitting the landlord to demolish the building and reconstruct the same and that they had not violated the conditions of lease. They further pleaded that the previous owner let out the premises for non-residential purposes; that the appellant was also issuing rent receipts by describing the rented portions as shop/clinic and that in view of order dated 11.12.1978 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, Delhi Development Authority was condoning violations of the lease conditions.(vi) By an order dated 17.5.1991, Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissed the eviction petitions. He held that the appellant is owner and landlady of the suit premises, but she has not been able to prove that portions thereof were let for residential purposes; that the appellant and her dependent family members do not have suitable alternative accommodation except the one occupied by her elder son, who was under the threat of eviction and that the need of the appellant is bona fide. The Additional Rent Controller further held that the tenants are guilty of violating clause 4(c) of deed dated August 18, 1953. He, however, declined to pass order for recovery of possession by observing that under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, such an order can be passed only in respect of premises let for residential purposes. The Additional Rent Controller also rejected other grounds of eviction put forward by the appellant.The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi vide its judgment dated 10.11.1998. The Tribunal agreed with the Additional Rent Controller that an order of eviction of the tenant can be passed under Section 14(1)(e) only if the premises were let for residential purposes. The Tribunal then held that the portions given to the tenants were being used for non-residential purposes and, therefore, they cannot be evicted on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord.4. The appellant challenged the orders of the Additional Rent Controller and Rent Control Tribunal in Civil Writ Petition No.1093 of 1999. She filed another petition, which was registered as Civil Writ Petition No.1092 of 1999, with the prayer that Section 14(1)(e) of the Act be declared ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution insofar as it does not provide for eviction of the tenant from the premises let for non-residential purposes. Both the writ petitions were heard by the Full Bench of Delhi High Court along with other writ petitions involving challenge to the vires of Section 14(1)(e) and were dismissed by the order under challenge. The Full Bench referred to an earlier judgment of the Division Bench in H.C. Sharma vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. [ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 90] and large number of judgments of this Court including Amarjit Singh vs. Smt. Khatoon Quamarin [1986 (4) SCC 736 ] andTenants of non-residential premises are a class by themselves. The Parliament in its legislative wisdom did not think it fit to make any provision for eviction of a tenant from such premises on the ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for residential purpose. Referenced to Section 29(2)(r) of the 1995 Act, in our opinion, cannot be said to have any relevance whatsoever for the purpose of determining. Admittedly, the 1995 Act is yet to come into force. If the said Act is yet to come into force, the question of taking recourse to the provisions of the said Act would not arise more so because this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be in a position to direct the Government to do so which is a legislative function. On the other hand, the very fact that said Act is yet to come into force in an indicia to the fact that the Central Government does not in its wisdom consider that the said benefit should be extended to non-residential premises also.ii) Judicial review of legislation is permissible only on limited grounds, namely when a statute is enacted by a legislature which had no authority therefor or when it inter alia violates any of the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution. Once it is held, as we are bound to, that the non-residential premises having regard to the interpretation clause, forms a separate class, such classification, having a reasonable nexus with the ground of eviction, cannot be said to be discriminatory in nature. Article 14 of the Constitution would apply only to persons similarly situated. Owners of residential and non-residential premises stand on different footings. In the event, the legislature in its wisdom thinks it fit to extend its protective wing to a class of tenants from being evicted on a particular ground, the same by itself cannot be said to be discriminatory so as to attract the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The court in a situation of this nature is only entitled to see as to whether such classification is valid and rational. Once the rationality in such legislation is found, the court will put its hands off.iii) Furthermore, the provisions of the said Act had been declared intra vires by the Apex Court in Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (supra). In that case, an argument was advanced that unless the second limb of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act is read in such a way that it was in consonance with Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, the same would be void as being unconstitutional. The question raised therein has been dealt with the Apex Court.(iv) In the instant case, the Statute itself has indicated the persons or things to whom its provisions are recommended to apply. The said Act is a beneficial legislation. It seeks to protect the tenants. Tenants are broadly classified into three categories - residential, non-residential and/or other tenant. Such a classification as regards premises or tenancy cannot per se be said to be unreasonable.(v) In the instant case, so far as Sections 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(k) are concerned, the statute itself has indicated the persons to whom the provisions would apply. The provision is absolutely clear and unambiguous. In such a case the Court is only required to examine whether the classification is based upon reasonable differentia, distinguishing the person, group from those left out and whether such differential has reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved. The impugned provision indisputably was intended to beneficially apply to landlords and of one class of tenancy viz. tenancy in respect of the residential premises and not non-residential premises.The Full Bench also noticed the judgment in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [1996 (1) SCC 1 ] whereby Section 13(3)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as amended by Punjab Act No.29 of 1956, was struck down but distinguished the same by making the followingobjects and reasons of the said Act, thus, were considered having regard to the provisions made at the time of commencement of the said Act. Such a contingency does not arise in the instant case. Reasonable nexus to the objects to be achieved of the said Act having regard to the performance for which the building is being used must be found out from the legislative intent. Legislative intent may change from State to State."

Reasoning: 14. Article 14 declares that the state shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. The concept of equality embodied in Article 14 is also described as doctrine of equality. Broadly speaking, the doctrine of equality means that there should be no discrimination between one person and another, if having regard to the subject matter of legislation, their position is the same. The plain language of Article 14 may suggest that all are equal before the law and the State cannot discriminate between similarly situated persons. However, application of the doctrine of equality embodied in that Article has not been that simple. The debate which started in 1950s on the true scope of equality clause is still continuing. In last 58 years, the courts have been repeatedly called upon to adjudicate on the constitutionality of various legislative instruments including those meant for giving effect to the Directive Principals of State Policy on the ground that same violate the equality clause. It has been the constant refrain of the courts that Article 14 does not prohibit the legislature from classifying apparently similarly situated persons, things or goods into different groups provided that there is rational basis for doing so. The theory of reasonable classification has been invoked in large number of cases for repelling challenge to the constitutionality of different legislations.A careful reading of the aforementioned judgment shows that the plea of unconstitutionality of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act was neither raised nor debated with any seriousness and the observation made by the Court in that regard cannot be treated as the true ratio of the judgment, which as mentioned above, mainly rested on the interpretation of the expression "reasonably suitable residential accommodation".In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him and restricts the latters right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not be misunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties nor the learned counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutional in its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by striking down the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that the remaining part thereof may read as under:-"that the premisesare required bona fide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitableadopting this course, we have kept in view well recognized rule that if the offending portion of a statute can be severed without doing violence to the remaining part thereof, then such a course is permissible - R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India (AIR 1957 SC 628 ) and Bhawani Singh vs. State of Rajasthan [1996 (3) SCC 105 ]. As a sequel to the above, the explanation appearing below Section 14(1)(e) of the 1958 Act will have to be treated as redundant.