Case: Terapalli Dyvasahata Kumar Vs. S.M.Kantha Raju (Dead) Thr. Lr.

2. Sometime in June, 2004, the appellant filed a petition under Section 23 of the Andhra Pradesh Societies Registration Act, 2001 in which it asked for the followingFor a declaration that none of the respondents, their men or agents have any legal right whatsoever to call, hold or organize the annual convention of the members of CBCNCor conduct elections for the office bearers of CBCNCor its various boards, at any place including at Kakinada or Visakhapatnam under any notification or in pursuance of the notifications/pamphlets already passed/issued or proposed to be passed or issued either by themselves or through their nominees, privies etc;(b) For a consequential relief for permanent injunction restraining the respondents their men and agents, from proclaiming or projecting as Office bearers of CBCNCor from organizing the annual convention of the members of the CBCNCor election of office bearers of CBCNCmembers or its various boards at any place including at Kakinada or Visakhapatnam under any notification or in pursuance of the notifications/pamphlets already passed/issued or proposed to be passed or issued either by themselves or through their nominees, privies etc:(c) To appoint an Advocate Commissioner for the purpose of holding an annual convention for all the members of the CBCNCeither in the month of January 2004 or immediately thereafter, as per the constitution andof the CBCNCand entrust the administration and management of all assets of CBCNCto the office bearers so elected in the said elections, who shall be the rightful body to represent the CBCNCFor Costs; and(e) For such other relief or reliefs as your Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.A preliminary objection was raised by means of an I.A. being I.A. No. 234 of 2004 in which it was contended that the petition filed at Visakhapatnam was filed in the wrong Court and hence was without jurisdiction.4. The learned District Judge, by his judgment dated 17.01.2005, first observed that the expression "District Court" was not defined by the 2001 Act, and that this being so, hethe law is well settled that when the special enactment did not specify the limits territorial jurisdiction of any Court prescribed under the said Act to entertain the litigation, the general provisions of C.P.C., regarding the said territorial jurisdiction, can be take into consideration. As can be seen from the A.P. Societies Act, it has not ousted the application of C.P.C., specifically. Therefore, when the Act is silent regarding the limits of territorial jurisdiction, and when the Act did not oust C.P.C., specifically, undoubtedly, the provisions of C.P.C., can be taken into consideration to decide the territorial jurisdiction of District Court concerned as envisaged U/sec.23 of the Act. Sec.20 C.P.C., envisages that the proceedings can be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the cause of action wholly or in part arises. Therefore, the present petition can also be filed within the jurisdiction of the Court where a part of cause of actionheld this, the learned District Judge dismissed the preliminary objection.5. A Revision Petition filed before the High Court was, however, allowed, and the judgment of the District Judge was set aside by the High Court observinga comparative look at the expression used in the provisions of the A.P. Societies Registration Act, 2001 as already pointed out, a dispute as under Section 23 of the said Act has to be raised in the District Court concerned. Even though the District Court concerned in its comprehensive term bodily does not find place in the definition clause. However, it is to be noted that the expression "the Court" finds its place amongst definition clauses in the Section 2(d) to mean that principal civil Court of original jurisdiction. These two provisions have to be read together and gather not only the meaning but also the object. Thus, the Court having been specifically defined in the very same legislation it can only be looked on for the purpose of finding out the competent District Court as referred to under Section 23 of the said Act. It refers to that Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. The District Court or Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction are one and the same and interchangeable expressions. The court of concerned can only be that it exists or created or formed and registered. Necessarily it means that the District Court of that place and not otherwise. It is needless to mention that the said legislation is a special enactment and therefore, the general principles as applicable could not be brought in and therefore, no reliance as such can be brought in, in respect of the various situations contemplated under Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The theory of part cause of action will not find place either to the facts of the case or very scope and object of the legislation under this Act. Hence, it has to be necessarily held that it is only concerned District Court, where the society is registered that which will have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute under Section 23 of the said Act and not otherwise."

Reasoning: 8. We are inclined to observe that what learned counsel for the respondents has argued before us is correct. However, in view of the recurring nature of the question that arises before us, it is important to settle the law once and for all for future guidance in cases like the present one.It will be apparent that the scheme of the Societies Registration Act on the one hand, and that of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Act and the consolidating Act of 2001 on the other is completely different. On the one hand, the 1860 Act refers the dispute that arises under Section 13 only to the Principal Court of original civil jurisdiction of the District in which the chief building of the Society is situate. Under this Act therefore, jurisdiction is confined to one court and one court only: that is the principal court of original civil jurisdiction where the actual physical main building of the society is situate. On the other hand, Section 11 of the 1940 Act and Section 23 of the 2001 Act enable the person aggrieved to file an application in the "District Court concerned". It is this expression that has to be construed by this Court in the present case.13. As the District Judge correctly states in the impugned judgment dated 17.01.2005, where the expression "District Court" is not defined by the special enactment in which it occurs, it must necessarily take with it all the trappings that go along with a District Court that is established under the general law. This would necessarily mean that the provisions applicable to District Courts generally would apply, and that therefore the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it comes to determining the jurisdiction of such District Court, would necessarily apply.15. The same position obtains in the present case as Section 23 of the 2001 Act also does not provide for any procedure for the conduct of the application in the District Court concerned. This judgment would therefore apply on all fours to the facts in the present case.This judgment would be relevant if the pari materia provision under Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 had fallen for decision. As has been pointed out above, this provision gives only one court jurisdictionthe principal court of original civil jurisdiction of the District in which the chief building of the society is situate, somewhat like Sectionof the Companies Act. Inasmuch as this Section is completely distinct from Sections 23 of the 2001 Act and 11 of the earlier Telangana Act, it is clear that the judgment in James Chadwicks case squarely applies to the present case, and not the aforesaid judgment.