Case: The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Kiadb, Mysore  Vs. Anasuya Bai (D) By Lrs.

2. Factual narration that is required to be noted, giving rise to the aforesaid question of law, is stated hereinbelow:Respondents is the owner of land bearing Sy. No. 123/1 measuring 4 acres 9 guntas and Sy. No. 123/2 measuring 1 acre situated at Anganahalli Village, Belagola Hobli, Srirangapatna Taluk, Madhya District, Karnataka.3. The appellants issued a preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "KIAD Act") as it wanted to acquire certain lands, including that of the respondents for the purpose of developing the said lands as an Industrial Area and the same was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 15th September, 2000.4. After issuing the necessary notices and following the procedure prescribed under the KIAD Act, a final notification under Section 28(4) was issued on 15th June, 2005 in respect of total 153 acres 10 guntas of land.5. Section 29 of the KIAD Act deals with compensation. Section 29(2) provides that where the compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such an agreement. In case, where no agreement is arrived at, the State Government is to refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid. This scheme of acquisition of land is contained in Sections 29 and 30 which are reproducedAcquisition of land.- (1) If at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, give notice of its intention to acquire such land.(2) On publication of a notification under sub-section (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the occupier of the land and on all such persons known or believed to be interested therein to show cause, within thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the land should not be acquired.(3) After considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the land and by any other person interested therein, and after giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard, the State Government may pass such orders as it deems fit.(4) After orders are passed under sub-section (3), where the State Government is satisfied that any land should be acquired for the purpose specified in the notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to that effect.(5) On the publication in the official Gazette of the declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances.(6) Where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (5), the State Government may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of the land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or any person duly authorised by it in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.(7) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (5), the State Government or any officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may take possession of the land and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.(8) Where the land has been acquired for the Board, the State Government, after it has taken possession of the land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired.29. Compensation.- (1) Where any land is acquired by the State Government under this Chapter, the State Government shall pay for such acquisition compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.(2) Where the amount of compensation has been determined by agreement between the State Government and the person to be compensated, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement.(3) Where no such agreement can be reached, the State Government shall refer the case to the Deputy Commissioner for determination of the amount of compensation to be paid for such acquisition as also the person or persons to whom such compensation shall be paid.(4) On receipt of a reference under sub-section (3), the Deputy Commissioner shall serve notice on the owner or occupier of such land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state their respective interests in the said land.Section 30 of the KIAD Act deals with application of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Old LA Act) and same is reproduced30. application of Central Act 1 of 1894.-The provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to court, the apportionment of compensation and the payment of compensation, in respect of lands acquired under this Chapter.In view of the statutory obligations to pay compensation in accordance with the provisions of the KIAD Act, the Deputy Commissioner, Madhya came to be constituted as an authority to assess and fix the market value prevailing as on the date of notification under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act in consultation with land owners. The Advisory Committee consisting of eight persons was constituted.8. The appellants issued notice to all land owners for participating in the meeting of the Price Advisory Committee to fix the compensation with consent. The Advisory Committee headed by the Deputy Commissioner held its meetings with the land owners. The proceedings of the Advisory Committee under the Chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner was held on 9th September, 2005.9. According to the appellants herein, the outcome of the meeting with the land owners was that the Advisory Committee could achieve a consensus and the market rate with consent was fixed at Rs. 6,50,000/- per acre. It is also the case of the appellants that majority of land owners have accepted the said compensation. However, respondents have taken the position that they are not the parties to this agreement. This aspect shall be adverted to at a later stage with some more details. At this stage, it is suffice to mention that it has come on record that the respondents had sent letter dated 30th October, 2006 to the appellants in reply to letter dated 16th August, 2006 of the appellants, thereby requesting the appellants to provide reasonable and adequate compensation. However, before compensation could be disbursed to the respondents at the rates purportedly fixed, some disputes among family members of the respondents arose about the proportionment of the compensation amongst them. The children of respondent, namely, Parmesh, Lakshamma and Sunil appeared through their counsel and opposed payment of compensation to the respondents. In view of this dispute, the appellants deposited the entire compensation payable to the respondents, before the Civil Court, Srirangapatna, as per the provisions of Section 30 of the Old LA Act. Precisely a sum of Rs. 30,15,871/- was deposited before the Civil Court vide cheque dated 8th March, 2007. On that basis LAC No. 13 of 2007 was registered and the court sent notice dated 13th June, 2008 to the respondents. At this stage, the writ petition was filed by the respondents in the High Court of Karnataka praying for quashing of preliminary notification dated 15th September, 2000 and final notification dated 15th February, 2005, inter alia, on the followingThat provisions of Section 11, 11A of the Old LA Act are made applicable to the proceedings under KAID Act by virtue of Section 30 of the KAID Act and the Deputy Commissioner has not passed any award as required under Section 11 of the Old LA Act;(b) The entire proceedings initiated under Section 28 of the KAID Act have lapsed as no award has been passed within two years from the date of publication of final declaration.(c) In the absence of consent award under Section 29(2) of the KIAD Act, the Deputy Commissioner is duty bound to pass regular award under Section 11A of the Old LA Act within two years from the date of publication of final notification.(d) That the respondent herein had not given any consent for the so-called consent award as she had not appeared before the Deputy Commissioner and did not participate in the said proceeding.The appellants contested the said writ petition by filing their statement of objection. As per the appellants, all the statutory notices had been sent at the correct address of the respondent and necessary procedure for fixation of compensation had been followed by them. It was also submitted that provisions of Section 11A of the Old LA Act were not applicable to the acquisition proceedings under KIAD Act. The Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated 9th November, 2012 allowed writ petition in part holding that the respondents were not the parties to the Consent Award. However, the Single Judge permitted the appellants to proceed with the fixing of the market value as on the date of final notification dated 15th June, 2005 after repelling the plea of the respondents that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed. Aggrieved by this judgment, the respondents preferred writ appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court wherein following stance was taken byThat mandatory notice required under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act was not served upon the appellants.(b) That Section 30 of the KIAD Act applies the provision of Old LA Act in respect of enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, Section 11A is applicable and in this case, the award is not passed under Section 11A within two years, therefore, the acquisition has lapsed.c) That proceeding of the Advisory Committee conducted on 9th September, 2005 is only a consultation with some of the land owners and cannot be said to be a consent award, which is required to be passed in writing under Rule 10(b) of the Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 in form No. D.During the pendency of the matter, the New LA Act came into force on 1st January, 2014 whereby Old LA Act stood repealed. The respondents filed application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 alleging that since the New LA Act had come into force, as per Section 24 of the said Act, acquisition of the land had lapsed since no award has been passed under Section 11 of the Old LA Act.12. The Division Bench of the High Court of Karanataka by its judgment and order dated 14th January, 2015, allowed the writ appeal and quashed the proceeding initiated by the appellants by way of preliminary and final notification on the followingWhen the award was required to be passed under the Old LA Act, it cannot be said that provisions of the New LA Act would not apply to acquisition under KIAD Act and, therefore, Section 24 of the New LA Act will apply.(b) Even though this Court has held that Section 11A of the Old LA Act has no application in respect of the land acquired under the provisions of KIAD Act, the New LA Act is applicable and that the acquisition proceedings would be deemed to have lapsed due to non-payment, compensation and non-passing of the award within a period of two years.(c) That the New LA Act does not say whether it is applicable to the lands acquired under the provisions of Karnataka Land Acquisition Act but what Section 24 says is that once the award is not passed under Section 11A of Old LA Act or the compensation is not paid within five years, such proceeding would be lapse.It could be gathered from the above that the Division Bench has held that the New LA Act would be applicable to the present proceedings though they were initiated under the provisions of the KIAD Act read with the Old LA Act. It has further held that since there was no consent on fixation of the compensation given by the respondents, the case would be governed by Section 24(1) of the New LA Act. However, since there is no provision for passing the award under the KIAD Act, which had to be passed only under the Old LA Act, and since no award had been passed after the final declaration on 15th June, 2005, acquisition proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed.

Reasoning: 21. From the issuance of notice alone to the respondents under Section 29 of KIAD Act, it cannot be said that respondents had agreed to the compensation. It may be noted that large chunk of land was acquired and there were other land owners as well, despite the respondents. No doubt, proceedings dated 9th September, 2005 indicate that consent agreement is arrived at fixing the compensation at Rs. 6,50,000/- per acre. However, the moot question is as to whether respondents are also consenting parties. The learned Single Judge of the High Court returned a categorical finding that respondents never gave any such consent. For this purpose, reference was made to Rule 10(b) of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 which states the format in which the said mutual agreement is to be arrived at i.e. Form D. Rule 10(b) states the form of agreement to be executed under sub-section (2) of Section 11 shall be in Form D. No such document is produced by the appellants. Moreover, the appellants also could not show that notice dated 23rd August, 2005 was, in fact, served on the respondents. Therefore, the respondents had not consented to the amount of compensation that was determined in the minutes dated 9th September, 2005. This finding is upheld by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment as well. There is no reason to disagree with this finding.The New Act does not say whether the Act is applicable to the land acquired under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act 1894. What Section 24 says that if the award is not passed U/s 11 of the Act and the compensation is not paid within 5 years or more prior to new act, if the physical possession of the land is taken or not especially the compensation is not paid or deposited in Court such proceedings deem to have been lapsed. In th instant case, it is not case of the respondent that award is not required to be passed under the provisions of LA Act. When the award is required to be passed under LA Act, the respondents cannot contend that the provisions of New Act cannot be made applicable on account of non payment of compensation within a period of five years.This approach of the High Court, we find, to be totally erroneous. In the first instance, matter is not properly appreciated by ignoring the important aspects mentioned in para 24 above. Secondly, effect of non-applicability of Section 11A of the Old LA Act is not rightly understood. The High Court was not oblivious of the judgment of this Court in M. Nagabhushanas case which is referred by it in the aforesaid discussion itself. This judgment categorically holds that once the proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, Section 11A of the Old LA Act would not be applicable. Such an opinion of the Court is based on the followingThe appellant has not challenged the validity of the aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication of the Notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30-3-2004, the land in question vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs as under:"16.Power to take possession.-When the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the judgment of this Court in Mariyappa v. State of Karnataka, 1998(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 598 : [(1998) 3 SCC 276]   . The said decision was cited for the purpose of contending that Section 11-A is applicable to an acquisition under the KIAD Act. In Mariyappa [(1998) 3 SCC 276]   before coming to hold that provision of Section 11-A of the Central Act applies to the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter "the 1972 Act"), this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a self-contained code. The Court also held that the 1972 Act and the Central Act are supplemental to each other to the extent that unless the Central Act supplements the Karnataka Act, the latter cannot function. The Court further held that both the Acts, namely, the 1972 Act and the Central Act deal with the same subject. But in the instant case the KIAD Act is a self-contained code and the Central Act is not supplemental to it. Therefore, the ratio in Mariyappa [(1998) 3 SCC 276]   is not attracted to the facts of the present case.36. Following the aforesaid well-settled principles, this Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that acquisition under the KIAD Act lapsed for alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11-A of the said Act. For the reasons aforesaid all the contentions of the appellant, being without any substance, fail and the appeal is dismissed.Having regard to the aforesaid raison detre for non-application of the Old LA Act, on the parity of reasoning, provision of Section 24(2) of the New LA Act making Section 11A of the Old LA Act would, obviously, be not applicable. We would like to refer to the judgment in the case of State of M.P. v. M.V. Narasimhan, (1975) 2 SCC 377     in this behalf where following proposition is laida subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge was correct in law which should not have been interfered with by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment. It is significant to state that insofar as direction of the Single Judge is concerned that was accepted by the appellants herein, as the appellants did not challenge the same. It is the respondents which had filed the intra court appeal. Thus, appellants by their aforesaid conduct, are satisfied with the order of the learned Single Judge in directing them to determine the