Case: Undavilli Nagarathnam &amp; Anr Vs. Reddi Satyanarayana Murthi &amp; Ors

This is an appeal on certificate from the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh Hightwo plaintiffs in the original suit are the appellants. They brought a suit in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry, for evicting defendants 1 to 3 from the properties in Schedule A, B and C and for delivery of possession of A and Schedule properties to the first plaintiff and of the Schedule properties either to the first plaintiff or to the second plaintiff. The suit properties were owned and possessed by Meenavalli. Subbarayudu of Vedurupaka (hereinafter to be described as Subbarayudu). Subbarayudu was the husband of the second plaintiff and father of the first plaintiff. He had no male issue. He had only two daughters, plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 4., who was the older of the two. Subbarayudu made various dispositions of his property by executing several documents during his life time in favour of his daughters. So did his wife, the second plaintiff. While making such dispositions he was careful enough to make provision for himself and for his wife during their life time. The fourth defendant was married in 1923 and defendant No. 1 is her son. The first plaintiff was married in 1935. After the marriage of the first plaintiff the mother executed a deed of gift (Ex. B-6) on February 13, 1935 in her favour in respect of certain land. On the same day her father also executed is her favour of deed of gift (Ex. B-7) in respect of some other land. On June 7, 1935, Subbarayudu executed another deed of gift in favour of his first daughter, defendant No. 4, giving her also some land (Ex. B-8). All the three documents were registered on the same day, namely, on June 11, 1935. After about nine years the mother executed a settlement deed (Ex. B-5) dated June 7, 1944, in respect of her joint 1/3 share in certain property in favour of her two daughters to be shared by them equally reserving life interest for herself. Then followed a settlement deed (Ex. A-4) of January 8, 1950 executed by Subbarayudu in favour of the first plaintiff living her ten acres of pasture land as mentioned in Schedule. Subbarayudu further executed a registered deed dated January 23, 1950 (Ex. A-B), described as will, whereby he gave to his daughters all the properties barring a few mentioned therein and stating that after his own life time and after the life time of his wife all his movable and immovable properties would be taken in equal shares by h is two daughters. On April 14, 1955, he executed a settlement deed (Ex. A-l) hereunder he gave A and Schedule properties to the first plaintiff, his second daughter. By this document the A Schedule property was to beyond by the first plaintiff after his life time and Schedule property after the life time of her parents. Three years later on August 4, 1958, Subarayudu executed four more documents including a deed of revocation. Ex. B-10 is the document by which the earlier document E x. A-l was revoked stating that the earlier one had been brought about by fraud and misrepresentation. Ex. B-ll was executed purporting to settle his property on both the daughters to be enjoyed in equal shares after the life time of their parents. Ex . B-12 was executed in favour of his wife and the elder daughter giving them a certain extent of the land in Mellore village besides the house sites and houses in Vedurupaka. It was mentioned in Ex. B-12 that after his life time his wife would be in possession without powers of alianation and that thereafter the elder daughter would be entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property as an absolute owner. Ex. B-13 was executed in favour of the first defendant, namely , grandson of Subbarayudu through his first daughter, giving him possession of the properties in which he had life interest stipulating at the same time that he (the first defendant) should deliver forty three bags of paddy and obtain receipt from him every year during his life time.The plaintiffs case is that Subbarayudu had leased out A and Schedule properties mentioned in Ex. A-l on August 16, 1958, to the third defendant, the son of the second defendant and that both these defendants were in possession of the properties as tenants from that time. Subbarayudu died on May S, 1960. After his death plaintiffs 1 and 2 basing their claim on Ex. A-l respectively gave notice to the third defendant on June 14, 1960 and on July 11, 1960 to deliver back the lands in their possession. The third defendant replied that he was only working as a farm servant under the first defendant and the latter was the lessee under a deed dated August 4, 1950 and that the settlement deed in favour of the plaintiff`s had been removed by late Subbarayudu. The first plaintiff also had trouble with the first defendant when the latter drove away his watchman and lodged a complaint with the police claiming that he was in possession of the lands. The first plaintiff thereupon sent a notice on August 20, 1960, to the first defendant who, on the other hand, asserted his rights in the lands under a deed of settlement (Ex. B-13) dated August 4, 1958. That led to the institution of the present suit by the plaintiff out of which this appeal has arisen.The first daughter of Subbarayudu was impleaded as defendant No. 4 in the plaint.The first and the fourth defendants filed separate written statements. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 filed a memo adopting the written statement filed by the first defendant. All of them repudiated the plaintiffs claim for possession of the lands.Several issues were raised, but we are concerned in this appeal only with Issue No. S and the additional Issue No. 1 which are asNo. 5. Whether defendant No. 1 is entitled to any protection under the Andhra Tenancy Act ?Additional Issue No. 1 "Whether the deed dated 4-8-1958 executed by late Meenavalli Subarayudu in favour of the 1st defendant is a settlement deed or a leasemay be mentioned that issue were raised regarding the validity of Ex. A-l, Ex. B-10, Ex. B-11 and Ex. B-13. The trial court held that Ex. A-1 on which the plaintiffs based their suit was a valid document. The trial court further held that the deed of revocation (Ex. B-10) and deed of settlement (Ex. B-11) were invalid. The High Court affirmed these findings of the trial court and that controversy isregard to Ex. B-13, the trial court held it to be a true document and that it was a settlement deed and not a lease and that the first defendant was not entitled to any protection underthe Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act, 1956 (briefly the Andhra Act) and that defendants 2 and 3 were not tenants in possession of the land at the time of institution of the suit. In the view it tools the trial court decreed the suit for possession of A and Schedule properties in favour of the first plaintiff and directing that the future profits, which would be payable by the first defendant, were to be determined in separate proceedings. The suit was also decreed in favour of the second plaintiff for possession of the Schedule properties with similar orders regarding future profits.On appeal by the defendants the High Court, after hearing the parties, remanded the matter for a finding under order 41, rule 25, Civil Procedure Code, by framing the followingthe plaintiffs accepted the gift of A and Schedule properties by late Subbarayudu before its revocation on 4-8-1958 by late Subbarayudu"subordinate judge returned a finding that t he gift had been accepted prior to the execution of the deed of revocation (Ex. B-10). The High Court thereafter heard the appeal and partly allowed the same.The High Court, in disagreement with the trial court, came to the conclusion that the document Ex. B-13 satisfied all the conditions of the definition of lease under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and could not be treated as a settlement. The High Court furtherterm of lease is co-terminus with the life of the lessor with the result that as soon as the life of Subbarayudu ended, the term of lease automatically expired. On the death of Subbarayudu the property would pass to the per sons specified in Exc. A-1. That must be the normal incidents of the transaction under the ordinary law. At the time of the transaction of lease was entered into the Andhra Tenancy Act had already come into force. Subbarayudu was the landlord and the 1st defend ant was the cultivating tenant within the meaning of those terms in the Andhra Tenancy Act. On the death of Subbarayudu his heirs, assignees and successors would likewise be landlords and they are entitled to evict the cultivatingthe contention of the plaintiffs that the first defendant was not the tenant of Subbarayudu at all, but only a trespasser, the High Court held, on the oral and documentary evidence as well as on the admissions of defendants 2 and 3 with regard to the possession of defendant No. 1 as a lessee, that the defendant No. 1 was a cultivating tenant under the plaintiffs on the death of Subbarayudu. The High Court having come to that conclusion further held that the plaintiffs could evict the defendants only under the provisions of the Andhra Act by making an appropriate application to the Tehsildar and not in the present suit in the civil court. The High Court, therefore, granted all the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs except that of eviction from A and Schedule properties which was directed to be obtained by due recourse to the provisions of the Andhra Act The High Court accordingly partly allowed the appeal refusing the prayer for eviction from A and Schedule properties but at the same time declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to the suit properties in terms of Ex. A-l. The Schedule property was not the subject matter of appeal before the High Court an d the decree in relation to that property was unaffected.

Reasoning: We are satisfied that the document (Ex. B-13) fulfils the ingredients of a lease under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. The submission of Mr Natesan, therefore, cannot be accepted.Mr. Natesan next contends that Subbarayudu reserving; only "life interest" in the Schedule and properties after he had gifted the same to the plaintiffs by A-1 on April 14, 1955, could not in law imperil their rights to possession of the same after his death by leasing out the same properties in 1958 in the manner done in view of the provisions of the Andhra Act which had already come into force in 1956. At any rate, says Mr. Natesan, it was not an act of prudent management of the properties in which he had only life interest and the principles applicable to a mortgagee in possession under section 76(a) and (e) of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable in the present case and the lease will not be binding on theof tenancy under the Andhra Act is provided for under section 13. Under section 16" there is a special forum for adjudication of disputes under the Act including eviction of cultivating tenants. Under section 17 the provisions of the Andhra Act override anything inconsistent therewith contained in any preexisting law, custom, usage, agreement or decree or order of a Court.It is, therefore, clear that the civil litigation between the parties having established their respective rights based on the two documents, Ex. A-1 and Ex. B-13, and the plaintiffs being landlords and defendant No. 1 being a cultivating tenant, eviction will have to be sought for in accordance with the provisions of the Andhra Act. The High Court is right in refusing eviction through the process of the civil court.