Case: Municipal Corporation, Indore Vs. Shri K.N. Palshikar, Indore

2. On January 21, 1961, the respondent K. N. Palsikar - hereinafter referred to as the applicant - filed an application under Sections 387 (4) and (5) of the Madhya Bharat Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 - hereinafter referred to as the Act - in the Court of District Judge, Indore. He alleged that the Municipal Corporation by its Memo No. 816 dated October 30, 1959, had informed him that in accordance with the Road Widening Scheme a set back of total area of 1455.1 sq. ft. had been cut down from his land comprised in House No. 1 (New No. 38) on Road No. 1, Choti Gwaltoli No. 1, Indore, and that the Municipal Corporation proposed to give him compensation only at the rate of Rs. 2.50 per sq. ft. which was not acceptable to him. He further alleged that the arbitrators appointed by the parties had given an award which was also not acceptable to him. The arbitrators had given Rs. 50/per sq. ft. while he demanded Rs. 145/per sq. ft. The Municipal Corporation in its reply dated February 28, 1961, submitted that the compensation given by the arbitrators was very much in excess of the actual price of the land and prayed that the application be dismissed.3. Various issues were framed by the Additional District Judge, Indore, but they were all directed to determining the fair amount of compensation including interest.4. The Municipal Corporation also applied on January 19, 1961, under Sec. 387 (4) of the Act praying that the price of the land be settled as per Section 387 (4). In Para 10 of this application it was alleged that the memo regarding set back was issued on October 30, 1959, and therefore the price is to be settled at the rates prevailing on that date.5. In his reply to this application the applicant, Palsikar, accepted para 10 of the application.6. The Additional District Judge on February 6, 1962, disposed of both the applications by one order and he fixed the compensation of land in question at the rate of Rs. 30 per sq. ft. with interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the delivery of the possession. He further ordered that the applicant shall be entitled to 15 per cent Solatium as decided by the award. He also valued the structure.7. During the pendency of these applications the Municipal Corporation applied on August l, 1961, to the Additional District Judge for withdrawing the claim of the Corporation over a portion of the land in question. On February 2, 1962, the Additional District Judge passed the followingN. A. applied that the Improvement Board is going to acquie portion of the land in question and hence the N. A. shall not be compelled to acquire this nothing to show that the Improvement Trust is going to acquire the land. Moreover, I have to fix the compensation in the case. The N. A. may or may not acquire the land at its own risk. The application is rejected.Against the common order of the Additional District Judge, three revisions, two by the Municipal Corporation and one by the applicant, were filed. Civil Revision No. 195 of 1962 was filed by the Municipal Corporation alleging that the compensation awarded by the learned Additional District Judge was excessive and praying that fair compensation be fixed.9. The High Court held that the Additional District Judge had given opportunity to the parties to lead evidence and determined the amount of compensation after hearing the parties and in these circumstances it could not be said that he was guilty of committing irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction, even assuming that the amount determined as payable was either too high or too low. The High Court then dealt with the point raised by the learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation that the Additional District Judge had refused to permit the Corporation to withdraw the acquisition proceedings and had thus refused to exercise jurisdiction. The High, Court held that in a proceeding under S. 387 (4) of the Act there was no provision to enable the Corporation to withdraw from any set back already given and no statutory provision had been pointed out entitling the Court to permit the Corporation to withdraw. In the result the High Court dismissed the revision petition.

Reasoning: 13. The learned counsel for the applicant, Palsikar, made a statement before us that he was willing to deposit Rs. 6,000 in the District Court within four months in respect of the area which is in possession of the tenants and that he will be entitled to withdraw this amount once the possession is given to the Corporation and not before. In view of this undertaking it is not necessary to determine point No. 2. The point is not free from doubt and we hesitate to express our opinion when the point has become academic in view of the under taking given by the learned counsel for the applicant, Palsikar.14. Regarding point No. 1, we agree with the High Court that there is no provision in the Act for enabling the Corporation to withdraw from the acquisition proceedings. In fact it seems to us that there is automatic vesting of the land in the Corporation under Sec. 305 once the requisite conditions are satisfied.The learned counsel for the Corporation was not able to cite any authority which has dissented from this view. We agree with the reasoning of the learned Chief Justice and hold that the Additional District Judge was right in awarding 15 per cent solatium.19. Coming to the fourth point, the revision to the High Court was filed under Section 392 of the Act which provides that"notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force, the District Court shall exercise all the powers and jurisdiction expressly conferred on or vested in it by the provisions of this Act, and unless it is otherwise expressly provided by this Act, its decision shall he subject to revision by the High Court."The High Court could not, in a revision under Section 392, go into questions of fact and determine the amount of compensation, and the High Court was right in declining to deal with this question. It is not necessary to determine whether the powers of revision under Section 392 are the same as under Section 115, C. P. C.,because even if the powers under Section 392 of the Act are wider than that under Section 115, C. P. C., they do not extend to determining questions of fact. In view of this conclusion this point cannot be agitated before us.