Case: Oil And Natural Gas Commission And Ors Vs. Dr. Mohd. S. Iskender Ali

The respondent, Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali, was ap pointed on a purely temporary basis to the post of a medical officer in the Oil and Natural Gas Commission. Under the terms and conditions of his service, he was to remain on probation for a period of One year which could be extended at the discretion of the appointing authority. The respondent was appointed on October 15, 1965 and the order of his appointment may be extracted thus:With reference to his interview on the 18th August 1965 held at Sibsagar, Shri Dr. Md. S. Iskender Ali is hereby informed that he/she has been selected for a temporary post of Medical officer in the Oil &Natural Gas Commission on an initial pay of Rs. 325/- p.m. in the scale of pay of Rs. 325-25-500-31-EB-30-800 (plus non practising allowance @ 25% of basic pay subject to minimum of Rs. 150/-). He will be entitled to draw dearness and other allowances at such rates and subject to such conditions as may be laid down in the rules and orders governing the grant of such allowances from time to time."The order of appointment was accompanied by conditions regulating his appointment and two of them may be extracted below, as they appear to be very relevant for the purpose of deciding the question at issue:-"(ii) The appointment may be terminated at any time by one months notice to be given by either side, viz., the appointee or the appointing authority, without assigning any reasons. The appointing authority, however, reserves the right of terminating the services or the appointee without notice or before expiration of the stipulated period of notice by making payment to him of a sum equivalent to the pay and allowances for the period of notice or the unexpired portion) He will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment. This period may be extended at the discretion of the appointing authority, if necessary. During the period of probation, the services are liable to be terminated at any time without notice, and/or assigning any reasons whatsoever."It appears that during the period of his probation there were some reports against the respondent as a result of which a departmental enquiry was held against him but which does not appear to have been proceeded with nor was any punishment imposed on him. After he had completed the period of one year on 15-10-1966 his probation was extended for another six months and before his services were terminated, there was no express order either confirming him or extending the period of probation. Ultimately, by a n order dated 28th July 1967 the services of the respondent were terminated with effect from 28th July 1967. The order of termination runs thus:-"No. 57/191/67-ENT Dated July 28, 1967Under para 2(iii) of offer of appointment No. 52/35/65-ENT dated October 16, 1965 the service of Dr. Md. Iskender Ali, Medical officer (still on probation), is hereby terminated with effect from the date of the service of this order on him."The respondent felt aggrieved by the termination of his services and filed a writ petition in the High Court on the ground that the order terminating his services was mala fide and was in fact passed by way of penalty entailing evil consequences. The plea taken by the respondent found favour with the High Court which allowed the petition and quashed the order of the appellant terminating the services of the respondent. The appellant obtained special leave to appeal from this Court: hence the appeal has now been posted before us for hearingBefore examining the respective contentions of the parties it may be necessary to mention a few admitted facts(1) It is not disputed that the respondent was appointed in a temporary post of Medical Officer and on probation of one year(2) Being a probationer, the respondent had no right to the service(3) Under the terms of his appointment particularly clauses (ii) and (iii), extracted above, the appointing authority could terminate the services without assigning any) Under clause (iii) of the conditions of appointment, the appointing authority had a discretion to extend the period of probation and to terminate the services of the respondent without any notice and without giving any reasons whatsoever(5) After the respondent had put in one years probation, his period of probation was extended for a further period of six months which is a clear pointer to the fact that the appointing authority was not convinced that the respondent had satisfactorily completed the period of his probation.

Reasoning: The confidential roll reflecting the assessment of the work of the respondent during the period 31-12-1965 to 30-12-1966 clearly shows that the officer was careless and lacking in sense of responsibility. The report also shows that the reporting officer recommended that the period of probation should be extended. In accordance with the recommendation, the period of probation was further extended by six monthsWe are, However, unable to agree with this submission. It is obvious that a temporary employee is appointed on probation for a particular period only in order to test whether his conduct is good and satisfactory so that he may be retained. The remarks, in the assessment roll, merely indicate the nature of the performance put in by the officer for the limited purpose of determining whether or not his probation should be extended. These remarks were not intended to cast any stigmaIn these circumstances, therefore, it is obvious that as the respondent was merely a probationer, the appointing authority did not consider it necessary to continue the enquiry but decided to terminate the services of the respondent as he was not found suitable for the job. It is well settled by a long course of decisions of this Court that in the case of a probationer or a temporary employee, who has no right to the post, such a termination of his services is valid and does not attract the provisions of Art. 311 of the ConstitutionThe facts of the present case appear to be on all fours with those of the aforesaid decision. From the undisputed facts detailed by us in an earlier part of the judgment, it is manifest that even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the employer to terminate the services of the employee, a power which the appellants undoubtedly possessed, even so as under the terms of appointment of the respondent such a power flowed from the contract of service it could not be termed as penalty or punishmentApplying the principles enunciated by this Court in various cases to the facts of the present case, the position is that the order impugned is prima facie an order of termination simpliciter without involving any stigma. The order does not in any way involve any evil consequences and is an order of discharge simpliciter of the respondent who was a probationer and had no right to the service. The respondent has not been able to make out any strong case for this Court to delve into the documents, materials in order to determine a case of victimisation or one of punishmentReliance was, however, placed by the respondent on a decision of this Court in t he case of The State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad,where it was held that although termination of the service of a person holding the post on probation cannot be said to deprive him of any right to the post and is no punishment but where inst ead of terminating a persons service the employer choose to hold an enquiry into his alleged misconduct and proceeds by way of a punishment, such a course involves a stigma and an order of termination is bad. Such, however, is not the case here. The short history of the service of the respondent clearly shows that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in service and that is why even e though some sort of an enquiry was started, it was not proceeded with and no punishment was inflicted on him. In these circumstances, therefore, if the appointing authority considered it expedient to terminate the services of the respondent-a probationer-it cannot be said that the order of termination attracted the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution. Thus, if the appellant found that the respondent was not suitable for being retained in service that will not vitiate the order impugned as held and observed by this Court in t he cases citedr these reasons, therefore, we are satisfied that the order terminating the services of the respondent was valid and did not involve any stigma and was fully justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Court, therefore, erred in law in quashing the. impugned order.