Case: The Jhagrakhan Collieries Ltd Vs. Shri G.C. Agrawal, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur and Ors

The appellant is the Jhagrakhan Collieries (P) Ltd., a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act. The Company owns three collieries in Jhagrakhan in Surguja District of Madhya Pradesh. These collieries employ over 4, 200 workmen. At the relevant time there were three Trade Unions functioning at the collieries, namely, (1) Madhya Pradesh Koyla Mazdoor Panchayat (for short, the Panchayat); (2) Azad Koyla Shramik Sabha (for short, the Sabha), (3) Madhya Pradesh Colliery Workers Federation (f or short. thethe material time, the Panchayat, according to the allegations of the Company, had about 75 per cent of the workers on its rolls. This Union conducted a complete strike for 57 days in the months of March and April 1968 at the collieries. The Central Wage Board for Coal Mining Industry by its award recommended payment of Variable Dearness Allowance (for short, V.D.A.), correlated to the cost of living index prevailing from time to time. T he Company accepted these recommendations. The workers represented by *, he various Unions, on the basis of the Wage Boards award demanded V.D.A. at the rate of Rs. 1.47 per day with effect from April 1, 1968 while the Company was paying i t at the rate of Rs. 1. 11 per day. The Company refused to pay more than Rs. 1.11 per day. Thereupon, in December 1968. the Federation, which had a membership of 169 workers (Respondents 4 to 173 herein) made an application before the Central Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal Jabalpur (for short, the Labour Court) under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute-, ; Act (for short the Act) for determination of the amount of V.D.A. due to the workers- The Company submitted its written statement on May 13. 1969, challenging the jurisdiction of the court and raised other legalOctober 4, 1969, the Panchayat served a notice of strike under Section 22(1) of the Act on the Company together with a charter of 29 demands and threatened to strike on or after November 7, 1969 if their demands were not conceded. Thereupon. the counciliation Proceedings purporting to be under s. 22 read with s. 12(1) of the Act were held by Mr. B. D. Sharma, Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Shahdol on the 21st and 22nd October. 1969. In the course of these conciliation proceedings on October 22, 1969, besides other matters. the dispute relating to V.D.A. was settled. On October 22, 1969, the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Mr. Sharma) sent a report together with a copy of the settlement to the Government, as required by Section 12(3) of the Act. Subsequent to the signing of this conciliation agreement, dated October 22, 1969. the Company filed a supplementary statement on November 5, 1969, submitting that in view of the said settlement, the application under s. 33C(2) of the Act filed by the Federation, had become infructuous. The Labour Court by its order, dated December 20, 1969 framed this additional issue: "Whether the claim stands settled by reason of settlement dated 22-10-1969, ifbehalf of the workers several objections were raised to the enforceability of. this settlement, Their ultimate stand was that the settlement was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, inasmuch as it had not been brought about in proceedings before a duly appointed Conciliation Officer. The Labour Court tried this issue as a preliminary issue. It held that Shri Sharma was not a duly appointed Conciliation Officer on the date on which the settlement was arrived at, and consequently, it did not put an end to the dispute pending before the Labourimpugn this order of the Labour Court, the Company through it s agent and Mining Engineer filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, which as stated before, was dismissed by the High Court. Hence this appeal.

Reasoning: As analysis of. the above definition would show that it contemplates only two kinds of settlement (i) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation, proceedings under the Act and (ii) a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. But a written agreement of the latter kind in order to fall within the definition must satisfy two more conditions, namely: (a) it must have been signed by the parties thereto in the prescribed manner, and (b) a copy thereof must have been sent to the authorities indicated in s.is clear from a perusal of Section 18, that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is binding not only on the actual parties to the industrial dispute but also on the heirs, successors or assigns of the employer on the one hand, and all the workmen in the establishment, present or future, on the other. In extending the operation of such a settlement beyond the parties thereto, sub-section (3) of the Section departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to the principle of collective bargaining. Thus, had Mr. B. D. Sharma been a duly appointed Conciliation Officer, the settlement arrived at in the conciliation proceedings, duly conducted by him under Section 12, would have been binding on the entire body of the workers including Respondents 4 to 173 represented by the Federation. and others who are members of the Sabha. Since the finding of the High Court to the effect that the settlement between the Panchayat and the management cannot be deemed to be settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under the Act, now stands unassailed. the aforesaid sub-section (3) cannot be invoked to make it binding on Respondents 4 tothat the Act does not inhibit the employers and the workmen from arriving at a settlement during the pendency of proceedings under s. 33-C(2) of the Act, such a settlement, not being one arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings would be enforceable only against the parties thereto. In the present case, Respondents 4 to 173 and others who were not parties to the settlement dated October 22, 1969, would not be bound bywill be seen that the decision in Amalgamated Coffee Estates case (supra) stands on its own facts. There the appeals arose, out of an award of the Special Industrial Tribunal for plantations in a dispute between 228 coffee, tea and rubber estates in South India and their employees referred to it under S. 10(1) whereas the instant appeal arises out of proceedings under S. 33-C(2) for the recovery of money on the basis of the Wage Boards award and the dispute, if any, is about the computation of V.D.A. in implementation of that award. The scope of S. 33-C(2) is not the same as that of s. 10(1) of the Act. In East India Coal Company Ltd. Banares Colliery, Dhanbad v. Raweshwar and Ors.([1968] 1 L.L. J. 6.) this Court held that although the scope of s. 33-C(2) is wider than that of a 33-C(1), cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under S. 10(1) are outside the purview of S. 33 C(2). The provisions of S. 33-C are, broadly speaking, in the nature of executingappeal being a rehearing of the case, in Amalgamated Coffee Estates case, the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the dispute in a just manner was co-extensive with that of the Tribunal to which it was referred under s. 10(1). This Court found in agreement with the re port of the Tribunal that the settlement arrived at between the most of the Unions representing most of the workers and the managements was fair and conducive to industrial peace, and therefore, it was just and appropriate to decide the dispute and dispose of the appeals in terms of thethe case before us, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not only circumscribed by s 33-C(2) but the matter also is yet at the initial stage. The controversy between the parties still re mains to be determined on merits. We. therefore, do not think it necessary to say anything more with regard to contention No. 3 than what we have broadly indicated above.