Case: Krishna Mohan Mookherjee Vs. Secretary and Treasurer, State Bank of India and Others

2. In March, 1948 the appellant was appointed as a clerk in the Head Office of the Imperial Bank of India. The State Bank of India was constituted in 1955 by the state Bank of India Act (Act No. 23 of 1955) to take up the undertaken of the Imperial Bank of India and the entire undertaking of Imperial Bank of India vested in the state Bank of India by virtue of the provisions contained in the said Act. Under Section7 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955 the appellants services were transferred to State Bank Of India (hereinafter referred to as the Bank). In February, 1961 the appellant was transferred to Dinhata Pay Office of the Bank in the District of Coochbehar. In December, 1961 the appellant was served with a show cause notice on a charge of misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 2339.63 belonging to the Bank. On February 23, 1962 the Staff Superintendent of the Bank caused ato be served on the appellant. On February 19, 1962 the appellant replied to the saidAn enquiry officer was duly appointed to enquiry into the charges against the appellant. The enquiry officer not he conclusion of the enquiry made a report holding the appellant guilty. Thereafter in July, 1962 the appellant was served with another notice asking him to show cause against the proposed punishment of his dismissal form service. On November 21, 1962 the appellant submitted his representation to the second show cause notice against the proposed punishment. The appellant was also given an opportunity to make an oral representation. On December 31, 1962 the appellant was dismissed from service.3. On April 11, 1963, the appellant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court at Calcutta challenging the order of his dismissal form service. In the writ petition filed by the appellant two principal contentions were raised. The first contention urged was that there had been violation of the principles of natural justice in the matter of enquiry proceedings; and the second contention was that the officer who had dismissed him form service was not competent to dismiss him.4. The writ petition came to be heard before a learned single Judge of the High Court. The learned single Judge negatived the contention of the appellant that there has been any denial of reasonable opportunity to the appellant in the matter of the enquiry. The learned single Judge, however, accepted the contention that the appellant was not dismissed by the competent authority and the order of dismissal of the appellant was, therefore, invalid. In that view of the matter, the learned single Judge by his judgment and order dated February 8, 1967 quashed the order of dismissal and made the rule obtained by the appellant absolute.5. It may be noticed that the appellant had been dismissed form service by the Staff Superintendent who had signed the letter of dismissal.6. Against the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge, the Bank preferred an appeal in the High Court. A Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment and order dated June 13, 1975 allowed the appeal, holding that the dismissal of the appellant was by appropriate authority. The Division Bench also held that there had been no violation of the principles of natural justice and the appellant had been afforded full opportunity of defining himself in the enquiry proceeding and also in the matter of making his representation in the second show cause notice.7. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the appellant field a special leave petition in this Court on February 12, 1979 and this Court by its order dated November 23, 1981 granted special leave to the appellant to file his appeal in this Court after condoning the delay in filing the appeal.

Reasoning: 11. The law with regard to the applicability of the principles of natural justice isWe may, however, point out that the appellant in his representation dated December 12, 1962 clearly knowledges and admitted that the appellant had been afford full opportunity and all the points raised by him had been compiled with. It may also be noted that the further prayer of the appellant to make an oral representation after his representation in writing, was also allowed by the bank and the appellant was allow given an oral hearing.The learned Trial Judge has proceeded to hold that in view of regulation 50 of Schedule II and section22 of the Imperial Bank of India Act (Act XLVI of 1920) the dismissal of the employee could only be ordered by the Central Board or by the Local Board. He was of the view that the Amending Act of 1955 retained the said Regulation 50 of the Imperial Bank Act in the State Bank of India Act itself and in that view of the matter, the employee could be dismissed only in accordance with the provisions of the said Regulation.14. The Appellant Bench of the High Court has rightly pointed out that the learned single Judge failed to note that by the next Amending Act 58 of 1960, the said Regulation 50 on which the learned single Judge had relied was expressly repealed.From the averments made in the petition and from the materials on record, it does not become possible for us to come to any conclusion whether Regulation 55 has at all any application to the instant case.20. Even if we proceed on the basis that Regulation 55 has any bearing on the question of dismissal of the appellant, we cannot in the facts and circumstances of the case hold that there was been any breach of the said Regulation. Regulation 55(1) lays down that save as provided in(2) and as may be directed by Central Board, a Local Board may exercise all the powers of the State Bank in respect of the staff serving in the areas in its jurisdiction. There is nothing to indicate that the memorandum and the notice which we have earlier quoted did not come into existence as a result of a decision of the Local Board as directed by the Central Board or under the directions of the Central Board. There is also nothing to indicate that the appellant had been dismissed form service by an authority lower than the appointing authority. The order of dismissal has been communicated by the Superintendent, Staff Section who held the rank of General Manager who was duly authorised by the memorandum dated July 4, 1982 to take disciplinary action and pass orders imposing punishment against the appellant. It is also to be noticed that the appellant at no stage had raised any objection to the disciplinary proceedings against him initiated by the Superintendent and the punishment imposed on him by the Superintendent by virtue of the authority conferred on him by the said memorandum which we have earlier set out. It may also be pointed out that there are no proper averments in the petition filed by the appellant and indeed there are no materials to indicate that there has been any breach of Regulation 55 even if we assumed that the said Regulation had any application. In the absence of a statutory regulation, dismissal of an employee becomes entirely a managerial function.21. Para 521(12) of the Sastry Award, binding on the parties, requires that the person who cold pass an order of punishment, k should be notified. In compliance with the said requirement, the necessary notification had been made in the instant case and it may be pointed out once again that no objection had ever been taken to the nomination notified. We must, therefore, hold that in the instant case there is no substance in the contention of the appellant that the appellant had been dismissed by a person not competent to pass the order of dismissal.22. In this view of the matter, it does not really become necessary for us to consider the further argument of the learned counsel for the Bank that even if it could be said that the order of dismissal had not been passed by the competent authority, the order would result only in wrongful dismissal of the employee giving rise to a claim for damages, but could no be interfered with in a writ petition.