Case: Assistant Controller of Estate-Duty Vs. Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan

2. The proceedings before the Assistant Controller pertain to one Ghousunnissa Begum, aof the Nizam, who died on 30th November, 1955. She was receiving a sum of Rs. 1, 000 a month from the trust fund created by the Nizam on 6th August, 1950, referred to as H. E. H. the Nizams Miscellaneous Trust, for the benefit of his family and dependants. It would suffice to note that Ghousunnissa was receiving this allowance from the trust fund set part under the trust which consisted of (1) a loan of Hali sicca Rs. 4, 50, 00, 000 deposited with the Government of Hyderabad bearing interest at 1 1/4% ; (2) a Government of India loan of the face value of Rs. 25, 00, 000 bearing interest at 2 3/4% and (3) 3% Government of India loan,of the face value of Rs. 8, 00, 000.3. Two otherof the Nizam were also receiving like amounts from the trust fund ; but we are not concerned with their affairs now. The trustees were the accountable persons under the Act. They filed returns under the Estate Duty Act on the death of Ghousunnissa Begum. The Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Hyderabad, by his order dated 31st March, 1958, assessed the value of the property liable to estate duty at Rs. 6, 61, 347 and an amount of Rs. 83, 519.40 was assessed as the estate duty payable. The accountable persons appealed to the Central Board of Revenue without success, the assessment having been confirmed by an order of theof Revenue, dated 6th August, 1959Subsequently, section 59 was enacted giving powers to the Controller (which term included the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty) to reassess the property liable to duty under certain conditions which we would presently refer. Purporting to act under the said provision, the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty issued a notice assessing the property of the deceased at Rs. 7, 19, 811 as chargeable to estate duty. it is that notice that was impugned in the writ petition on two main grounds : firstly, that section 59 which came into force on 1st July, 1960, after the assessment was confirmed by the appellate authority, could not be given retrospective operation so as to affect assessments which had become final before that date ; and, secondly, that assuming that there was such power, there was no material before the Assistant Controller to act in the purported exercise of such power. Both these grounds of attack were upheld by our learned brother and he issued an order quashing the said notice. The department is the appellant.

Reasoning: 6. It is seen that under section 34 of theAct, before the amendment made by Act 48 of 1948, theOfficer, had power to issue a notice in respect of escaped orincome, but he could do so within a period of four years, whereas under the section as amended, he could issue a notice under certain conditions within a period of 8 years.We do not see that the instant case presents any similarity to the one cited to us. On the contrary, it has been held consistently that information expressed on the same facts could not be information. In Commissioner ofv. Janab S. Khaderwalli Sahib, a Bench of the Madras High Court observed thus" It is clear that a mere change of opinion based on the same facts and figures which were present to the mind of theOfficer at the time of the original assessment does not amount to discovery. The discovery must be the result of definite information, that is to say new information that has come to the knowledge of thetax Officer cannot act under this section even though the taxpayer has escaped assessment if he is acting on information which was already in his possession and within his knowledge. Unless it can be said that there is fresh information which was not in his possession at the time when the original assessment was made, action under section 34 of theAct is not justified. The mere fact that a different opinion on the same facts was taken by somebody else is not definite information leading to discovery on the part of theOfficer who was in possession of the same facts and entire facts at the time of the original assessment. "Ananthalakshmi Ammal v. Commissioner ofreiterated the same view. It was observed in that case thus" That appellate decision with nothing more will not amount to definite information within the meaning of section 34 of the Act to enable theOfficer to exercise the powers conferred on him by section 34 with reference to the same set of facts... The facts for consideration remained the same. Only his erroneous decision was eliminated. It was nothing more than a change of opinion on the same set of facts, though the change in this case was apparently forced by the decision of the Tribunal. There was no definite information or any discovery in consequence of such information within the meaning of section 34. "12. We are of the same opinion. We, therefore, affirm the finding of our learned brother that a mere expression of opinion by the Central Board of Revenue does not amount to information within the meaning of section 59(b) of the Estate Duty Act. As we have said above, the decision in this case could be properly rested on this findingWe find, therefore, no grounds for interference. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 150