Case: Prem Nath Raina and Others Vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others

The petitioners are mostly small land-holders owning agricultural lands in the State of Jammu &Kashmir. The Government of Jammu &Kashmir introduced several land reforms in the State, beginning with Tenancy Act VII of 1948. Jagirs and Muafis were abolished under that Act as a result of which, approximately 9()00 owners of agricultural lands lost their proprietary interest in about 4.5 lakh acres of land. The State Legislature thereafter passed the Tenancy (Amendment) Act VII of 1948, the Tenancy (Amendment) Act of 1950, the Big Landed Estates Abolition Ac t of 1950, the Tenancy (Amendment) Arts of 1956, 1962 and 1965, the J &K Tenancy (Stay of Ejectment) Proceedings Act 1966, the Agrarian Reforms Act of 1972 and finally the impugned Act, 17 of 1976. The last named Act received the assent of the Governor on August 21, 1976. It was amended by the Amendment Act of 1978 which received the assent of the Governor on April 7, 1978.

Reasoning: The grievance of the petitioners is that not only do certain provisions of the Act militate against agrarian reform, but those provisions will involve the State Government into payment of considerable amounts to land- holders f or the extinction and acquisition of their rights, which would be far greater than the amounts which the State Government would be liable to pay under Acts likethe Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Agricultural lands which are situated within the limits of municipalities and Town Area Committees are also comprehend within the scope of the Act and the apprehension of the petitioners is that, after the tillers become statutory purchasers of those lands, they will be free to dispose them of at urban prices which have escalated sky-high. Another facet of the same argument is that no agrarian reform is involved in applying the impugned statute to lands situated in urban agglomerations.These arguments are not relevant for deciding the question as to whether the dominant purpose of the Act is agrarian reform. The payment of a larger compensation to land-holders under a Land Reform Law than what would be payable under an Act like the Urban Ceiling Act does not lead to the conclusion that the former is not a measure of agrarian reform The extent and mode of payment of compensation for the extinction of a land-holders right is a matter for the legislature to decide and the circumstance that the compensation or the amount fixed by the legislature in any given case is excessive, will not make the law any-the-less a measure of agrarian reform. In the same manner, the circumstance that the impugned statute is made applicable to agricultural lands situated within the limits of Local Authorities will not affect its character as a measure of agrarian reform. If any land situated in a developed area is used predominantly for the purpose of agriculture, it is open to the legislature to include that land in a scheme of agrarian reform so as to make the tiller of that land its owner. The apprehension expressed by the petitioners that, after becoming statutory owners of agricultural lands situated in developed areas on payment of a paltry price, the tillers will part with those lands at a high price which lands in developed areas like urban areas fetch, is hypothetical though not unreal. Not unreal, because the temptation to trade in immovable property is common to agriculturists and non-agriculturists alike. But the hypothetical possibility that the lands will be disposed of by to-days tillers to-morrow, cannot affect the basic position that the Act is conceived in the larger interest of agrarian reform. Besides, section 13 which places restriction on utilisation of lands, section 17 which imposes restrictions to a limited extent on the transfer of such lands and section 14 which prescribes the optimum land which can be retained even by an erstwhile tenant are effective deterrents against profit-oriented disposal of high-priced lands.Before parting with this case, we would like to observe that section 7(2) (b) of the Act creates an anomalous situation, especially in the context of the definition of personal cultivation in section 2(12) of the Act. One of the conditions imposed by section 7(2) (b) on the right of a land-holder to resume land is that, unless he is a member of the defence forces, he must take his residence in the village in which the land is situated or in an adjoining village. "Personal cultivation" is defined in section 2(12) to mean cultivation by any member of ones family or by a khana-nishin daughter or a khana-damad or a parent of the person or by other relations like the son, brother or sister who are specified in the various clauses of section 2(12). Under clause (g) of section 2(12), a land-holder who is a minor, insane, physically disabled, inc apacitated by old age or infirmity, a widow or a person in detention or in person can cultivate the land through a servant or hired labourer under the personal supervision of his or her guardian or agent. If it is permissible to cultivate a land through another person as specified in clauses (b) to (g) of section 2(12), it is difficult to understand why residence in the village where the land is situated or in an adjoining village should be compulsory for all persons, even for minors, widows, insane persons and persons in detention. The exception made by the legislature in favour of the members of defence forces ought to be extended to these other persons also, The exclusion of a constitutional challenge under Articles 14, 19 and 31 which is provided for by Article 31A does not justify in equity the irrational violation of these articles. This Court did observe in Waman Rao(l) that: "It may happen that while existing inequalities are being removed, new inequalities may arise marginally and incidentally" but the legislature has to take care to see that even marginal and incidental inequalities are not created without rhyme or reason. The Government of J &K would do well to give fresh consideration to the provisions contained in section 7 (2) and modify the provisions regarding residence in order that they may accord with reason and commonsense. Article 31A does not frown upon reason and commonsense