Case: Thakker Keshavlal Mohanlal Vs. Parekh Amrutlal Harilal &amp; Others

1. On April 11, 1954 respondents 1 to 5 granted to Respondent 8 a lease of certain premises in Morvi, Gujarat, for the purposes of a soap factory. Respondent 8 entered into a partnership with the appellant for running the factory. The partnership was dissolved on June 3, 1966 and on July 27, respondents 1 to 5 gave a notice to quit to respondent 8 on the ground that he hadthe premises to the appellant and to respondents 6 and 7. Respondents 1 to 5 thereafter brought a suit to evict the appellant and respondents 6 to 8, in the court of the learned Civil Judge Jr. Dv., Morvi. That suit was decreed and the decision was confirmed in appeal as well as in the revision application filed by the appellant in the High Court of Gujarat. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court.

Reasoning: Besides, it is significant that not only was no such point taken in the High Court but the assignment of the business as a going concern does not find a place in the special leave petition either. The judgment of the High Court shows that the sole contention advanced by the appellant in this behalf was that the tenancy rights in the premises were transferred to him. No reference was made to the assignment of the business. We must therefore reject the contention that the appellant is entitled to the protection of the notification.3. There is also no substance in the contention that the suit in regard to the appellant was one as against a trespasser and therefore theCourt had no jurisdiction to entertain it. In Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Pheroze Framroze Taraporewala, 1953 SCR 226  = (AIR 1953 SC 73 ) this Court, on similar facts, ruled that the joinder of acy was invalid cannot alter the nature of the suit and make it any the less a suit between a landlord and tenant or take it out of the scope of the Rent Act.4. The appellants reliance on the decision in Hiralal Vallabhram v. Kastoribhai Lalbhai, (1967) 3 SCR 343  = (AIR 1967 SC 1853 ) is misplaced for, the distinguishing feature of that case was that the appellate court under the Rent Act passed a decree of ejectment against theonly treating him as a trespasser. Thewere impleaded to the suit but no order of eviction was passed against them. This circumstance lent to the suit the character of a typical proceeding between an owner and trespasser and therefore theCourt was held to have no jurisdiction to pass the decree. It was observed that S. 28 of the Bombay Rent Act gave power to the Small Cause Court to "proceed to evict a tenant (along with whom awould also go)................But when the appellate court held that the present appellant was a trespasser, there was no jurisdiction under the Act to pass a decree for ejectment against a trespasser." That explains why the court observed that "the appellate court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment against the present appellant in the manner in which it did so".