Case: State of Karnataka Vs. K. M. Krishnaiah

This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated November 20, 1974, upholding the judgment of the Sessions Judge of South Kanara dated July 16, 1974, setting aside the conviction of respondent Krishnaiah for an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and the sentence thereunder. The respondent was a grower of paddy, and it was alleged against him that while he grew paddy in 7.12 acres of land, and was liable to sell 3.12 quintals by way of levy, he ignored the demand notice which was served on him on October 28, 1971 and thereby contravened the provision of Clause 3 of the Karnataka Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order.2. The Sessions Judge took the view that it was only the "Purchase Officer" to whom the paddy was required to be sold, and that as the demand for the levy was made by the Enforcement Officer, it was unauthorised. It is however not in dispute before us that the Sessions Judge lost sight of the newly promulgated Karnataka Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the Levy Order, Clause 3 of which provided for the sale of paddy to the Enforcement Officer by way of levy. But it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that, even so, there was no evidence to show that the demand notice was signed by an Enforcement Officer. Our attention has been invited in this connection to that part of the judgment of the Sessions Judge where it has been stated that as the accused had challenged the appointment of the person who had issued the demand notice as the Enforcement Officer, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the appointment and that, in absence of any such proof, there is no occasion for taking a different view of the matter.

Reasoning: It was therefore necessary for the Enforcement Officer to ascertain the quantity of paddy in the possession or control of the respondent immediately after it was harvested, for the purpose of determining the quantity of the levy, and it was not enough for him to determine the quantity on the basis of extent of the cultivation in the field. It is not disputed before us that the prosecution did not lead any evidence to show that the Enforcement Officer had taken into consideration the quantity of the paddy in the possession or control of the respondent for the purpose of determining the quantity which he was required to sell to the Enforcement Officer, and it cannot be said that the order which was issued for the sale of paddy was drawn up in accordance with the law.7. Mr. Nettar tried to get out of this difficulty by arguing that as the respondent did not raise an objection regarding the quantity of the paddy specified in the order which was served on him all that the trial Court has to do was to make a reference to Schedule I of the Levy Order and to uphold the quantity of the levy by calculating it on the assumption that it has been grown over an area of 7.12 acres. The argument is however untenable because what Clause 3 of the Levy Order provides is not merely that a grower shall, inter alia, sell to the State Government that quantity of paddy which he is liable to sell in accordance with the scale specified in Schedule I, but also that his liability in that respect shall be "determined" by an Enforcement Officer. So when such a determination was not made on the basis of the paddy "held in stock" by the appellant, we have no reason to think that the Sessions Judge and the High Court went wrong in upholding the contention of the respondent that the order which had been served on him under Clause 3(2) of the Levy Order was not drawn up in accordance with the law and was not binding on him.