Case: Smt. Saiyada Mossarrat Vs. Hindustan Steel Ltd: Bhillai Steel Plant,Bhillai (M.P.) &amp; O

2. The petitioner was allotted a piece of land on licence by the respondents. The licence was cancelled on the allegation that petitioner had illegally made encroachment on further land and had illegally raised a structure on the land granted on licence. The respondent terminated the licence. Proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Act. The competent authority passed an order of eviction against the petitioner. Petitioners appeal to the appellate authority under the Act was dismissed. The High Court also dismissed the petition referred by the petitioner. This Court refused to grant special leave and dismissed petitioners special leave petition. Petitioner even so filed a civil suit which came to be dismissed for default of appearance. Meanwhile the petitioner had approached this Court by way of a special leave petition against an interlocutory order passed by the civil court. The said special leave petition also came to be dismissed for default of appearance. And thereafter the present writ petition has been instituted under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In the petition as originally framed the constitutionality of the Act was not challenged. The said challenge was interpreted (sic) by amending the petition. When the matter came up for hearing this Court issued a rule nisi limited to the question of constitutionality of the Act as is evident from the relevant part of the order extracted hereinbelowApplication for amendment allowed. Rule nisi on the question of constitutional validity of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. Notice to thel and the Union of India ordered

Reasoning: The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Act insofar as it includes in the definition of public premises "any premises belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any company as defined in Section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956, in which not less than 51 per cent of thep share capital is held by the Central Government, " is ultra vires and void, as to that extent the Act is beyond the legislative competence of Parliament. The argument of the learned counsel is that the Act was enacted under entry 32, List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, which relates to "property of the Union and the revenue therefrom", and that this entry cannot be construed to include the property of a government company which is a different and distinct legal entity from the Union. It may be conceded that the expression "property of the Union", as used in entry 32, List I, cannot be construed to include the property of a government company. But if entry 32 gives jurisdiction to Parliament to enact the Act in respect of government premises, as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, entry 43 which relates to incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading jurisdictions read with entry 95 which relates to jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in List I, can be construed to confer power on Parliament to enact the Act in respect of premises belonging to a government company. It seems, however, more appropriate that insofar as the Act deals with a lessee or licensee of premises belonging to a government company, the subject matter of the Act would be covered by entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III. These entries broadly deal with transfer of property, contracts and jurisdiction and powers of courts with respect to an of the matter in List III. Taking either view, in our opinion, it is not correct to say that the Act insofar as it relates to premises belonging to a government company suffers from want of legislative competenceLearned counsel for the Petitioner has not been able to show that there is any infirmity in the reasoning of the High Court. Besides, a legislation pertaining to a government company including one pertaining to eviction of trespassers, or unlawful occupants of properties belonging to government companies speedily can be enacted by the Parliament. Government companies are governed by the Indian Companies Act which had itself been enacted in exercise of the legislative authority conferred by entry 43 of the Union List (List I) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It is idle to contend and it has accordingly not been contended, that a State can legislate under the authority to legislate conferred by the State List (List II) in regard to properties of a government company which may have properties in more than one State and even in Union territories. The need to speedily evict trespassers or unauthorised occupants of such properties is. The States cannot legislate for such properties in respect of properties situated in more than one State or government companies situated in different States all over India. Surely, the Parliament, in obeisance to its obligation to protect and safeguard the national and overall public interest, can legislate in this respect under the residuarye entryentry 97 of the Union List (List I) of the Constitution of India which clothes the Parliament with the requisite legislative authority in regard to "any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of these lists". It has not been shown that any of the entries in List II or List III would be attracted to the subject matter of speedy eviction of unauthorised occupants from properties belonging to a government company wherein Central Government has more than 51 per cent of thep share capital. The source of authority can thus in any case be traced to entry 97 read with entry 95 of the Constitution of India13. In any view of the matter therefore it is futile to contend that Parliament had no legislative competence in this behalf. We therefore concur with the conclusion reached by the High Court in L. S. Nair case (AIR 1980 MP 106 : 1980 MPLJ 429 : (1980) Ren LR 553) and repel the challenge unhesitatingly