Case: Chittaranjan Das Vs. The State Of Orissa

1. Chittaranjan Das appellant was convicted by Magistrate First Class Cuttack under S. 16 (1) (a) ofthe Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (Act 37 of 1954) (here-in-after referred to as the Act) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500, or in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six weeks. Appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge Cuttack. The appellant then went up in revision to the High Court but his revision petition too was dismissed by the Orissa High Court. The appellant thereafter filed the present appeal by special leave.2. The case for the prosecution is that on July 17. 1965 Food Inspector Behera went to the stall of the accused in the old Secretariat Compound Cuttack and found potato chops being fried by an employee of the accused in groundnut oil in a frying pan. The Food Inspector disclosed his identity to the accused and after giving the requisite notice, he purchased 375 gms of the groundnut oil in which the potato chops were being fried. After the oil was cooled, the Food Inspector divided it into three equal parts and poured each part of the oil in a clean bottle. The bottles were then sealed. One of the bottles was handed over to the accused. Another bottle was sent to a public analyst. The public analyst found on analysis the groundnut oil to be adulterated as it did not conform to the prescribed standard. The Superintendent of Police, Vigilance thereafter gave written consent for the prosecution of the accused. The accused was after that sent up for trial.3. It may be stated that the date on which the sample of groundnut oil was purchased by the Food Inspector from the accused has been mentioned in the judgments of the trial magistrate as well as those of the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court to be March 14, 1964. This date was wrong because on reference to the record of the trial court we find that the date on which the sample of the oil was purchased by the Food Inspector from the accused was July 17, 1965. This mistake in any event does not affect the merits of the case.4. The plea of the accused at the trial was that the sample of the oil had been taken not from the frying pan but from a tin wherein he had kept burnt oil for the purpose of using it as fuel. The oil, according to the accused, was stored neither for sale nor for being used for frying food articles. This plea of the accused was found by the trial court as well as by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to be false. In the High Court it was not disputed on behalf of the accused that the groundnut oil purchased by the Food Inspector lied been taken out of the frying pan and that potato chops were being prepared with that oil. One of the contentions which was raised on behalf of the accused before the High Court was that the sanction or consent given by the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance for the prosecution of the accused was not in conformity with Section 20 of the Act as the authority contemplated by that section must be in respect of each individual case and a general authority given to the Superintendent of Police to sanction prosecution was not legal. The High Court rejected this contention as also some other contentions which had been raised on behalf of the accused.

Reasoning: We have reproduced above Section 20, as it stood before the amendment, and we find nothing in its language which makes it imperative to specify a particular offence in the order authorising a person to give consent to the institution of prosecution. The words "in this behalf" in the above provision, to which our attention has been invited, indicate that the authority conferred by the State Government or local authority upon a person should relate to the giving of written consent for institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act. It is difficult to spell out an inference from those words that the authority conferred upon a person under the above provision cannot be a general authority in respect of offences under the Act but must relate to some specified individual offence. If the interpretation sought to be placed upon the words "in this behalf" on behalf of the appellant were to be accepted, in such an event no general authority can be conferred even under sub-section (1) of Section 20, as amended by Act 49 of 1964, because even the amended section contains those words. The words "by general or special order" in the amended section in that event would become meaningless and lose all significance. It is, indeed, not disputed that under the amended section a general authority can be conferred upon a person for giving consent to the institution of prosecutions for offences under the Act. The words "in this behalf" in sub-section (1) of S. 20, as it existed before the amendment, as well as after the amendment must obviously carry the same meaning. If those words in the amended section do not postulate that the authority conferred by the State Government or local authority should have reference to a specified individual offence committed by a particular accused, we fail to understand as to how those words as used in the section before the amendment would carry a different connotation.The change made in S. 20 by Act 49 of l964 has now put the thing beyond any plea of controversy. Even without the change made in the section, the authority conferred by the State Government or local authority upon a person for giving the consent contemplated by the section, in our opinion, could be of general nature and it was not essential that the order authorising the person should have mentioned specified individual offences. The amendment made in this section had the effect of making more clear what was already contemplated by the section.11. The Madras High Court in the case of Corporation of Madras v. Arumugham, AIR 1966 Mad 194   the Mysore High Court in the case of Laxman Sitaram Pai v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1967 Mys 33 and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Public Prosecutor v. Thatha Rao. AIR 1968 Andh Pra 17 have all taken the view that a general authorisation to launch prosecutions under the Act is sufficient. For the reasons stated above, we agree with the view taken in the above three cases.