Case: Vishnu Awatar Etc Vs. Shiv Autar And Ors

These petitions for special leave deserve to be dismissed because the Full Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court which is challenged in all the three has been rightly decided in our view. Even so, a speaking order has become necessary because, as rightly pointed out by counsel, the earlier decision of this Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad does not specifically cover the precise point that has bee n raised before us by counsel for the petitioner. We are concerned with the ambit and impact of s. 3 of theCode of Civil Procedure (Uttar Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1978 (for short, the Act), which forbids a revision under s. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (acronymically, the C.P.C.) to the High Court from a judgment or order in appeal by the District Court where the suit out of which the case arises is not one of the value of Rs. 20, 000/- and above.

Reasoning: The provision now before us is slightly different although the purpose and the result are the same. The scheme is clear. The High Court has revisory power only in cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of twenty thousand rupees and above including such suits or other proceedings instituted before Aug.1, 1978. The entire residuary area belongs to the District Court. An- other test of revisional jurisdiction for the High Court is to see whether the first proviso applies:Provided that in respect of cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of any valuation, decided by the District Court, the High Court alone shall be competent to make an order under this section.The High Court, in the last Full Bench decision traced the story of the race between the legislature and judicial interpretation and summed up the result rightlye High Court was confined to cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings of the value of Rupees 20, 000/- or above, including such suits or other proceedings instituted before 1st August, 1978. The jurisdiction of the District Court was in respect of any other case including a case arising out of an appeal suit or other proceeding instituted before such date. The legislature has continued to use the phrase "cases arising out of original suits". The interpretation placed upon this phrase by the Full Bench in Har Prasad Singhs case (AIR 1973 All. 390 ) will apply. The revisional jurisdiction would hence not extend to cases arising out of the disposal of appeals or revisions by the District Court. The proviso is also in the same terms as the proviso added in 1973 namely, it uses the phrase cases arising out of original suits or other proceedings".As already seen, it will not cover cases arising out of disposal of appeals or revisionsThe phrase "in any other case" used with reference to the District Court will refer to cases arising out of original suits of the value of less than Rs. 20, 000/- and also cases arising out of other proceedings of an original nature of a valuation below Rs. 20,y when a State legislation is being interpreted the meaning received by it in the High Court as the settled intent should rarely be disturbed by this Court unless the error is so egregious, the impact goes beyond the State or like legislation elsewhere and decisions of the High Courts thereon may lead to confusion and uncertainty. Here no such consideration arises and the reasoning of the High Court strikes us as soundThe residuary power is with the District Court. The High Court has no revisional power under s. 115 unless the case arises out of an original suit or other proceeding i.e. other original proceeding decided by the District Court or where the case arises from a suit of and above Rs. 20, 000/- in value. If the District Court has decided, not in its original jurisdiction, then the case, be it a revisional or appellate order, is not amenable to the High Courts revisional jurisdiction. Of course, if the case arises out of suits or other proceeding of the value of Rs. 20, 000/- and above, the High Court has revisory power. All other cases fall outside and become final at the District Court levelAfter all, our District Courts are easier of access for litigants, and the High Courts, especially in large States like Uttar Pradesh, are untouchable and unapproachable for agrestic populations and even urban middle classes. Nor is there ground to distrust the District Judges. A hierarchy of courts built upon a heritage of disbelief in inferiors has an imperial flavour. If we suspect a Munsif and put a District Judge over him for every thing he does, if we distrust a District Judge and vest the High Court with pervasive supervision, if we be skeptical about the High Courts and watch meticulously over all their orders, the System will break down as its morale will crack up. A psychic communicable disease of suspicion, skepticism and servility cannot make for the health of the judicial system. If the Supreme Court has a super-Supreme Court above it, who knows how many of its verdicts will survive, judging by the frequency with which it differs from, we are satisfied, that decisions of District Courts rendered in appeal or revision are beyond revision by the High Court, if the suit is of less than Rs. 20, 000/-. But an except ion has been engrafted by the first proviso to s.3 to the effect that where an original decision has been made by a District Court the High Courts appellate or revisional power will come into play. That is at as it should be, for one appeal or revision is almost universal. But otherwise, the District Courts decision is immune to revisional probe by the High CourtLexically, there is no escape from s. 3 because the whole residue, except where the High Court has be en expressly vested with revisory power, is beyond reach under s. 115 C.P.CPrecedentially, the result is no different as the Full Bench of the High Court has been at pains to make out. Purposively speaking, it will be stultifying to interpret s. 3 to mean that orders in appeal by District Courts must suffer a distant journey to revisory justice from the High Court. Thus we reach the convergent conclusion of "no revision to the High Court", viewing the text of s. 3, lexical ly, literally, schematically, and in the setting of social justice of which saving the average litigant from the intoxication of tantalising litigation is a componentThe short test to refuse revisory jurisdiction to the High Court is to ascertain whether the decision sought to be challenged is in a case arising out of a suit of the valuation of Rs. 20, 000/- and more. If the answer is yes then the High Court has revisory power, but if the suit from which the case arises and in which the decision is made is one where the valuation is less than Rs. 20, 000/- then the litigation cannot travel beyond the District Court except in that class of cases where the decision is taken for the first time by the District Court itself in a case arising out of an original proceeding. From this angle none of the Special Leave Petitions survive. Special Leave Petition No. 9945 of 1979 is a case where the District Judge disposed of an appeal and the revision to the High Court was directed against the appellate order. The subject-matter of the suit being below Rs. 20, 000/- in valuation, the High Court was right in refusing to exercise any revisional power. Special Leave Petition No. 10550 of 1979 falls in the same category and must be dismissed. The result in Special Leave Petition No. 8857 of 1979 is equally fatal and for the same lethale we part with the case, we may make a general observation in the hope that it may have value as legislative guidance. Democracy, in a vast country, of diversity, demographic immensity, logistic difficulty and large-scale indigency, makes decentralisation and imperative of Administration. Access to Justice also implies early finality within reach of t he rich and the poor. These considerations persuaded the U.P. State, one of the direst in poverty, largest in population, and most agrestic in life-style, to attempt a tepid procedural reform in the field of revision to the High Court in litigations of lesser financial stakes. Judicial reform is upto now a tinkering exercise, not an engineering project but even that little tinkering is fiercely challenged as litigative anathema by the profession which is unfortunate.