Case: PRAMOD KUMAR  Vs. ZALAK SINGH

2. One Tikaram was the husband of respondent No.4 and the father of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. He was holding 8.22 acres of land in Khasra No.189 at Village Gondia in his name. On 21.01.1959, he sold the land to the extent of 3.20 acres out of the total 8.22 acres to the appellants and thereafter, on 11.02.1959, he sold the remaining portion of 4.82 acres of land, which was the balance out of 8.22 acres, also to the appellants. Tikaram passed away on 15.07.19592. The respondents filed a suit (bearing Civil Suit No. 131 of 1963) for setting aside the Sale Deed dated 21.01.1959 and for other reliefs. The allegation made by the respondents in the suit was that the land was a joint family ancestral property and he had sold it for immoral purposes and in a manner prejudicial to the interest of joint family. He was addicted to drink and there was no necessity to sell the property3. On 31.01.1969, the Trial Court dismissed the said suit holding that Tikaram was the owner of the property due to the partition effected in the year 1957. Hence, he had the right to sell the suit land. The appellants were bona fide purchasers4. Aggrieved by the decree of the Trial Court, the respondents filed an appeal (bearing Civil Appeal NO. 22 of 1969) on 10.02.19715. The respondents again filed the present suit (bearing Civil Suit No. 34 of 1971) challenging the Sale Deed dated 11.02.1959 and seeking other reliefs. It is the said suit which came to be dismissed both by the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. The Trial Court answered the issues including whether the Suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 and also affected by constructive res judicata. It found that the suit is liable to be dismissed on the ground of Order II Rule 2 and constructive res judicata. The dismissal by the Appellate Court was essentially on the basis of the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the CPC as also constructive res judicata on the score that the second alienation dated 21.02.1959 ought to have been the subject matter of the earlier suit. The Appellate Court, in fact, found that the Trial Court was right in answering the other points. It is to be noted that the judgment of the Trial Court in the first suit came to be reversed in the civil appeal and the same has become final6. The High Court, however, reversing the orders of both the courts found that Order II Rule 2 will not be a bar. For Order II Rule 2, the cause of action in the first suit and the cause of action in the second suit must be identical. In this case, there were two alienations by the Tikaram giving rise to two cause of actions. It is also found that constructive res judicata will not apply.

Reasoning: 27. Thus, in respect of omission to include a part of the claim or relinquishing a part of the claim flowing from a cause of action, the result is that the plaintiff is totally barred from instituting a suit later in respect of the claim so omitted or relinquished. However, if different reliefs could be sought for in one suit arising out of a cause of action, if leave is obtained from the Court, then a second suit, for a different relief than one claimed in the earlier suit, can be prayed for. There are three expressions which are found in Order II Rule 2. Firstly, there is reference to the word cause of action, secondly the word claim is alluded to and finally reference is made to relief28. The defence, which is set up by the defendants, would be irrelevant to determine what cause of action means. The reliefs, which are sought by the plaintiffs, will not be determinative of what constitutes cause of action. Cause of action, as explained by the Privy Council in Mohammad Khalil Khan case (supra), means the Media through which the plaintiff seeks to persuade the Court to grant him relief. It could, therefore, be said to be the factual and legal basis or premise upon which the Court is invited by the plaintiff to decide the case in his favour. It is also clear that the cause of action, in both the suits, must be identical. In order that it be identical, what matters, is the substance of the matter35. Let us first consider the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that under Article 109 of the Limitation Act, the period of limitation commences from the date of possession obtained by alienee, and therefore, the cause of action for the second suit, in respect of the sale deed dated 21.02.1959, would be different from the earlier suit, as in respect of the sale deed of an earlier date, it would have a different period of limitation. We are of the view that, that the period of limitation under Article 109 is different from the period of limitation in respect of the first sale deed, cannot operate so as to exclude the bar under Order II Rule 2. The principle underlying Order II Rule 2 is that no man can be vexed twice over the same cause of action. All claims and reliefs, which arise from a cause of action, must be comprehended in one single suit. Order II Rule 2 provides for the principle of repose. If this be the underlying object of Order II Rule 2, the fact that at the time when the first suit was filed even though the second alienation could be challenged and it stemmed from one single cause of action and not two different causes of action, the mere fact that a different period of limitation is provided, cannot stand in the way of the bar under Order II Rule 236. Now, let us consider the further argument of the learned counsel for the respondent based on Order VII Rule 1 CPC. Order VII Rule 1 provides for the particulars to be contained in a plaint. It, inter alia, provides that the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose, be pleaded. Apparently, the argument of the respondents is having regard to Article 109 of the Limitation Act, the cause of action as provided in Article 109, would commence from the date of the deed being 11.02.1959, and therefore, it has a different period of limitation as already noted. It indicates that cause of action, raised in the second suit, is not identical with a cause of action in the first suit. We are of the view that this argument proceeds on a misapprehension as to what constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action has been explained in many decisions. It is the bundle of facts, which if traversed, must be proved. However, as laid down by the Privy Council, it would be understood also to mean the media through which Courts intervention is sought by the plaintiff38. In this case, we have noticed the pleadings. The case of the plaintiffs appears to be that the property is ancestral property. Their late father Tikaram was given to wasteful ways and addicted to drink and otherwise. He was given to selling properties. His well-wishers intervened and partition ensued. However, 8.22 acres falling in Kh.No.189 was kept out of the partition deed. He decided to sell 8.22 acres without there being any legal necessity and without any benefit to the joint family. The first part of the transaction, which consisted of two parts, pertained to sale deed dated 21.01.1959 and that was the subject matter of the first suit. At the time of filing of the said first suit, late predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, had also executed another sale deed which constituted the remaining portion which consisted of the 8.22 acres as already noticed. The suits contained virtually identical averments in regard to both the transactions. The first suit was filed in 1963 and the second suit filed in the year 197139. We are of the view that in such circumstances, this is a case where the plaintiff ought to have included relief in the form of setting aside the second sale deed also. This is not a case where the second sale deed had not been executed when the plaintiff instituted the first suit. We are not, for a moment, declaring the effect of the sale deed having been executed subsequently to the institution of the suit as we do not have to pronounce on the effect of such a sale. We are only emphasizing that it was open to the respondent/plaintiff to seek relief in respect of the second sale executed by their predecessor-in- interest and what is more important in favour of the same parties (defendants) who are the appellants before us41. It is undoubtedly true that the law does not compel a litigant to combine one or more causes of action in a suit. It is open to a plaintiff, if he so wishes, however to combine more than one cause of action against same parties in one suit. However, it is undoubtedly true that the embargo in Order II Rule 2 will arise only if the claim, which is omitted or relinquished and the reliefs which are omitted and not claimed, arise from one cause of action. If there is more than one cause of action, Order II Rule 2 will not apply. It is undoubtedly also true that Order II Rule 2 manifests a technical rule as it has the effect of posing an obstacle in the path of a litigant ventilating his grievance in the Courts. But as already noted, there is an equally important principle that no person shall be vexed twice on the same cause of action42. That on the same cause of action, the plaintiffs having omitted to sue in respect of the sale deed in question, we would think that bar under Order II Rule 2 would apply. In this view of the matter we do not think it necessary to pronounce on the question relating to constructive res judicata. In the light of this, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. Parties to bear their respective costs.