Case: Jagat Ram Sethi Vs. R.B.D.D. Jain &amp; Others

2. The facts may be shortly stated. Harbans Lal deceased, now represented by the respondents, let out certain land to one Mistri Ibrahim In January, 1941, at a monthly rent of Rs.. The rent was later on increased to Rs. 24/with effect from February, 1948. According to the respondent the present appellant colluded with the tenant, Mistri Ibrahim, and entered into possession of the land sometime before 1950. Mistri Ibrahim ultimately left for Pakistan and the appellant was recognised as his tenant by Harbans Lal on the same terms and conditions. Harbans Lal died in November, 1954, and left a will in which he created a trust known as Harbans Lal Charitable Trust. In 1959 after serving a notice on the appellant in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy the respondent filed a suit for ejectment. The suit was contested by the appellant on the ground, inter alia, that when the land was let out to him it had a roofed verandah and kothri. Mistri Ibrahim had installed a workshop and in 1949 the appellant acquired the goodwill, workshop and business of Mistri Ibrahim and settled on the land with consent and permission of Harbans Lal. He also constructed a permanent building by investing a sum of Rs. 40, 000/with the knowledge and consent of Harbans Lal. The main plea was that the suit was barred by Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. III of 1947), hereinafter called the Act3. After framing the necessary issues and trying them the Trial Court decreed the suit for ejectment as well as for recovery of Rs. 314.80 as arrears of rent. The appellant filed an appeal to the court of the Additional Civil Judge who dismissed the same. The appeal to the High Court also failed4. Section 2(a) of the Act to the extent it is material is as follows :"Accommodation means residential andl accommodation in any building or part of a building and includes..................."According to Section 3 no suit can be filed without the permission of the District Magistrate in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on the grounds set out in clauses (a) to (g) of that section. It is common ground that if the demised premises in the present case falls within the meaning of "accommodation" as defined by Section 2(a) the permission of the District Magistrate was necessary and the suit could not have been filed for eviction of the appellant without obtaining such permission which admittedly was not done.

Reasoning: 6. Mr. M. C. Chagla who argued the case on behalf of the appellant does not and indeed cannot contend that if the structures which were put up by Mistri Ibrahim never became the property of Harbans Lal any accommodation within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Act could be said to have been leased or let out to the appellant by HarbansLal.It was the land alone in respect of which the tenancy existed. That by itself could not fall within the definition of accommodation and consequently the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 3 of the Act was not necessary for institution of a suit for ejectment. We have no doubt, therefore, that the conclusion of the courts below on this point is correct7. Mr. Chagla has sought to urge that the respondents were estopped from filing the suit. According to him several constructions were made by the appellant on the land in question with the knowledge of the respondents.The High Court relied on the findings of the courts below that no such action on the part of the lessor had been proved on the basis of which it could be held that the appellant had altered the position to his detriment. If the lessee chose to make unauthorised constructions at his own risk and the lessor did not take action the latter could not, on that account, be estopped from filing a suit for ejectment. According to Mr. Chagla the allotment order made in February, 1950, by the Rent Control Officer in favour of the appellant was never challenged by Harbans Lal or the respondents. It was on the basis of that order and the representation contained in it that it was accommodation which was to be ther of tenancy that the appellant had expanded a good deal of money on further construction. We are wholly unable to understand how any description of the property in the allotment order could be treated as a representation made by the respondents. It has not been shown that the allotment order created any such rights on the basis of which the appellant could find his defence on the rule of estoppel. The Additional Civil Judge had found on Issue No. 4 that Harbans Lal never gave express consent for the constructions to be raised but he knew about their existence. We concur in the view of the High Court that mere inaction on the part of the lessor did not entitle the lessee to resist the suit on the ground of estoppel. The lessee had the right under Section 108(h) of the Transfer of Property Act to remove the constructions while he was in possession. There was no provision in that Act which debarred the lessor from determining the lease under Section 111 merely because constructions had been made by the lessee even to the knowledge of the lessor, and from instituting the suit for ejectment.