Case: M.V. Elisabeth and Ors.  Vs. Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

The Transferred Case No. 27 of 1987 is the appeal filed by defendants 1 and 2 against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court decreeing the suit. The case stood transferred to this Court pursuant to this Courts Order dated 25.11.1986.2. By our Order dated August 28, 1991 we allowed Civil Appeal No. 3392 of 1991 filed by the 3rd defendant against the order of the High Court dismissing its petition for condonation of delay in presenting O.S.A.S.R. No. 39789 of 1988 in the High Court. We held that the appeal filed by the 3rd defendant had to be heard on the merits particularly on the question of law regarding the liability of the agent.The 1st defendant, M.V. Elisabeth, is a vessel of foreign nationality and it is owned by the 2nd defendant which is a foreign company carrying on business in Greece, and the 3rd defendant is stated to be the local agent of the 2nd defendant at Goa.4. The plaintiff is a private limited company having its registered office in Goa. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendants acted in breach of duty by leaving the port of Marmagao on 8.2.84 and delivering the goods to the consignee in breach of the plaintiffs directions to the contrary, thereby committing conversion of the goods entrusted with them. The suit was instituted in Andhra Pradesh High Court invoking its admiralty jurisdiction by means of an action in rent. The vessel was arrested when it entered the Port of Vishakhapatnam on 13.4.84 after returning from foreign ports. On the owner of the vessel entering appearance and providing security by furnishing a Bank Guarantee under protest in the sum of Rs. 14,25,000/-, the vessel was released from detention.5. The defendants moved an application in the High Court raising a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of that Court. They contended that the plaintiffs suit against a foreign ship owned by a foreign company not having a place of residence or business in India was not liable to be proceeded against on the admiralty side of the High Court by an action in rem in respect of a cause of action alleged to have arisen by reason of a tort or a breach of obligation arising from the carriage of goods from apart in India to a foreign port. They did not, however, contend that the alleged cause of action not having arisen in Andhra Pradesh, the suit ought not to have been filed in Andhra Pradesh. Their sole contention on the question of jurisdiction was as regards the lack of admiralty jurisdiction of any court in Andhra Pradesh or any other State in India to proceed in rem against the ship on the alleged cause of action concerning carriage of goods from an Indian port to a foreign port. The preliminary objection was overruled by the learned Single Judge and his order was confirmed by the learned Judges of the Division Bench by their order which is challenged in S.L.P (C) No. 10542 of 1985. The suit was finally decreed by the learned Single Judge and appeal therefrom is the subject-matter of the case transferred to this Court.

Reasoning: If that question were to be answered in favour of the defendants, it would be unnecessary to express any view on the merits of the Transferred Case, for the suit itself would then stand dismissed.12. In a number of decisions of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Courts in India has been historically traced to the Charters of 1774 and 1728, as subsequently expanded and clarified by the Letters Patent of 1823, 1862 and 1865 read with the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, and the Colonial Court of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 and preserved by Section 106 of the Government of India Act, 1915, Section 223 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Article 225 of the Constitution of India. The pre Constitution enactments have continued to remain in force in India as existing laws: See Section 18 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, and Article 372 of the Constitution of India. See Kamalakar Mahadev Bhagat v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 Bom 186 Mrs. Sahida Ismail v. Petko R. Salvejkov and Ors. AIR 1973 Bom 18 Jayaswal Shipping Company v. S.S. Leelavati AIR 1954 Cal 415 Rungta Sons Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. S.S. Edison Mariner and Anr. 1961 (66) CWN 1083 and Smt. Reena Padhi v. Jagdhir AIR 1982 Ori 57 The view taken in these decisions is that the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in India does not extend beyond the ambit of the provisions of the (English) Admiralty Court Act, 1861. Further expansion of the jurisdiction of the English High Court under various statutes did not expand the jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts. This means, no High Court in India has jurisdiction to order the arrest and detention of a foreign ship in an action in rem in respect of a cause of action relating to outward cargo, as distinguished from inward cargo.13. The rationale of these decisions is that the chartered High Courts in India are Colonial Courts of Admiralty under Act 16 of 1891 exercising the same jurisdiction as was vested in the High Court of Admiralty in England under the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, and the subsequent merger of the English High Court of Admiralty with the English High Court of Justice in 1875 and the expansion of jurisdiction of that High Court under subsequent statutes did not expand the admiralty power of the Indian High Court or merge it with its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.14. The High Court as a Court of Admiralty is thus treated as a separate entity exercising a distinct and specific or prescribed or limited jurisdiction. This reasoning is based on the assumption that the continuance in force of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 as an existing law carves out a distinct jurisdiction of the High Court limited in ambit and efficacy to what has been granted by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, and that jurisdiction has remained stultified ever since. This restrictive construction is, in our view, not warranted by the provisions of the Constitution. The fact that the High Court continues to enjoy the same jurisdiction as it had immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, as stated in Article 225, does not mean that a matter which is covered by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 cannot be otherwise dealt with by the High Court, subject to its own Rules, in exercise of its manifold jurisdiction, which is, unless barred, unlimited. To the extent not barred expressly or by necessary implication, the judicial sovereignty of this country is manifested in the jurisdiction vested in the High Courts as superior courts.16. A similar view is echoed in other decisions on the point. In Kamalakar Mahadev Bhagat v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 Bom 186 a learned Judge of the Bombay High Court stated:...It will thus be seen that the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in particular being one of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty under Act 16 of 1891 today exercises the same admiralty jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England in 1890 when the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act was passed by the British Parliament. We have, therefore, to examine and ascertain as to what was the scope and nature of jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England either under any statute or otherwise in the year 1890, because, it would be just that jurisdiction which is exercisable by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay down to date.With respect we disagree. All this is reminiscent of a bygone age. The learned Judge failed to take note of the fact that in 1890 the Court of Admiralty had ceased to be a separate and distinct institution. By the Judicature Act of 1873, the High Court of Admiralty was merged with the High Court of Justice. It is, however, true that the substantive powers in admiralty matters were derived from the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, and those powers were not widened until 1920. The learned Judge further observes:...In my opinion, therefore, the present suit falls within the exclusive Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court and could not have been filed on the Ordinary Original Side of the High Court, much less in the City Civil Court. In this view of the matter, I am unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned Principal Judge of the City Civil Court that actions in personam used to be entertained in the Common Law Courts in England in respect of damage done by a ship on the high seas and that even at present in England it is open to a suitor to file an action in personam in the Kings Bench Division in respect thereof. In my opinion, no such action ever lay in the Common Law Courts of England, nor can it ever lie in the Queens Bench Division of the High Court of England at the present time....All this observation, as we shall presently see, is inconsistent with the true character of the Constitution of the courts in England and the powers exercised by them consequent upon the statutory changes between 1873 and 1981.17. It is true that the Colonial statutes continue to remain in force by reason of Article 372 of the Constitution of India, but that does not stultify the growth of law or blinker its vision or fetter its arms. Legislation has always marched behind time, but it is the duty of the Court to expound and fashion the law for the present and the future to meet the ends of justice.18. We do not accept the reasoning of the High Courts in the decisions cited above on the question of jurisdiction, whatever be the correctness of their decisions on the peculiar facts of those cases in regard to which we express no view. But the narrow view adopted in those decisions on the source and ambit of the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Courts is, in our opinion, not warranted.These provisions show that the admiralty jurisdiction conferred on the Colonial Courts of Admiralty was identical to that of the High Court in England. The Colonial Courts of Admiralty were, in relation to their respective territories, invested with the same jurisdiction over places, persons, matters and things as in the case of the English High Court in respect of England and Wales. This jurisdiction was derived from the statutes which then existed in England -namely, the Admiralty Court Acts of 1840 and 1861, as well as from other sources such as custom and practice as recognised by the Courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction. This is clear from the words whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise. The proviso makes the position even clearer. What the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 did was not to incorporate any particular English Statute into Indian law for the purpose of conferring admiralty jurisdiction, but to assimilate the competent courts in India to the position of the English High Court in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. It would, therefore, appear that any expansion of Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England was intended likewise to expand the jurisdiction of the Colonial Court of Admiralty. This should have been regarded as the position with respect to a Colonial Court of unlimited jurisdiction.23. By virtue of this provision, admiralty rules were made for Calcutta and Bombay High Courts. The Madras High Court adopted admiralty rules by virtue of the powers conferred by the Letters Patent of the High Court and the Government of India Act, 1915.25. It was because of the unlimited civil jurisdiction that was already vested in these High Courts that they were declared to be Colonial Courts of Admiralty having the same jurisdiction in extent and quality as was vested in the High Court of England by virtue of any statute or custom. The High Courts were declared to be competent to regulate their procedure and practice in exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in accordance with the Rules made in that behalf. There is, therefore, neither reason nor logic in imposing a fetter on the jurisdiction of these High Courts by limiting it to the provisions of an imperial statute of 1861 and freezing any further growth of jurisdiction. This is all the more true because the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 was in substance repealed in England a long time ago. See Halsburys Laws of England. 4th ed. Vol. 1(1), para 307; Halsburys Statutes of England, Vol. I, p.9.26. Assuming that the admiralty powers of the High Courts in India are limited to what had been derived from the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, that Act, having equated certain Indian High Courts to the High Court of England in regard to admiralty jurisdiction, must be considered to have conferred on the former all such powers which the latter enjoyed in 1890 and thereafter during the period preceding the Indian Independence Act, 1947. What the Act of 1890 did was, as stated earlier, not to incorporate any English statute into Indian law, but to equate the admiralty jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts over places, persons, matters and things to that of the English High Court. As the admiralty jurisdiction of the English High Courts expanded with the progress of legislation, and with the repeal of the earlier statutes, including in substance the Admiralty Court Acts of 1840 and 1861, it would have been reasonable and rational to attribute to the Indian High Courts a corresponding growth and expansion of admiralty jurisdiction during the pre-independence era. But a restrictive view was taken on the question in the decisions of the High Courts cited above.48. Merchant ships of different nationalities travel from port to port carrying goods or passengers. They incur liabilities in the course of their voyage and they subject themselves to the jurisdiction of foreign States when they enter the waters of those States. They are liable to be arrested for the enforcement of maritime claims, or seized in execution or satisfaction of judgments in legal actions arising out of collisions, salvage, loss of life .or personal injury, loss of or damage to goods and the like. They are liable to be detained or confiscated by the authorities of foreign States for violating their customs regulations, safety measures, rules of road, health regulations and for other causes. The coastal State may exercise its criminal jurisdiction on board the vessel for the purpose of arrest or investigation in connection with certain serious crimes. In the course of an international voyage, a vessel thus subjects itself to the public and private laws of various countries. A ship travelling from port to port stays very briefly in any one port. A plaintiff seeking to enforce his maritime claim against a foreign Ship has no effective remedy once it has sailed away and if the foreign owner has neither property nor residence within jurisdiction. The plaintiff may therefore detain the ship by obtaining an order of attachment whenever it is feared that the ship is likely to slip out of jurisdiction, thus leaving the plaintiff without any security.49. A ship may be arrested (i) to acquire jurisdiction; or (ii) to obtain security for satisfaction of the claim when decreed; or (iii) in execution of a decree. In the first two cases, the court has the discretion to insist upon security being furnished by the plaintiff to compensate the defendant in the event of it being found that the arrest was wrongful and was sought and obtained maliciously or in bad faith. The claimant is liable in damages for wrongful arrest. This practice of insisting upon security being furnished by the party seeking arrest of the ship is followed in the United States, Japan and other countries. The reason for the rule is that a wrongful arrest can cause irreparable loss and damages to the shipowner, and he should in that event be compensated by the arresting party. (See Arrest of Ships by Hill, Soehring, Hosoi and Helmer, 1985).50. The attachment by arrest is only provisional and its purpose is merely to detain the ship until the matter has been finally settled by a competent court. The attachment of the vessel brings it under the custody of the marshal or any other authorized officer. Any interference with his custody is treated as a contempt of the court which has ordered the arrest. But the marshals right under the attachment, order is not one of possession, but only of custody. Although the custody of the vessel has passed from the defendant to the marshal, all the possessory rights which previously existed continue to exist, including all the remedies which are based on possession. The warrant usually contains a monition to all persons interested to appear before the court on a particular day and show cause why the property should not be condemned and sold to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff.51. The attachment being only a method of safeguarding the interest of the plaintiff by providing him with a security, it is not likely to be ordered if the defendant or his lawyer agrees to accept service and to put in bail or to pay money into court in lieu of bail. (See Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edn, Vol. 1 p. 375 etc.)52. The service of the warrant is usually effected by affixing it on the main mast or single mast of the snip. A ship which has been arrested under an order of attachment may be released by the court if sufficient bail is put in to cover the claim of the plaintiff as well as the costs of the action. The sureties are liable for the amount entered in the bail bond.53. If the ship or cargo under arrest before judgment has not been released by the defendant by putting in sufficient bail, and if the property is found deteriorating, the court has the power to order the sale of the property after notice has been duly issued to the parties interested.54. If the plaintiff has finally obtained a decree of condemnation and sale of the ship, the court will issue an order to the competent Officer commanding him to sell the property, in execution of the decree, and to bring the proceeds into court. Thereupon the officer shall issue proper notice and arrange or the sale of the property by auction. The proceeds of the sale are paid into the registry of the court and they shall be disposed of by the court according to law.55. A personal action may be brought against the defendant if he is either present in the country or submits to jurisdiction. If the foreign owner of an arrested ship appears before the court and deposits security as bail for the release of his ship against which proceedings in rent have been instituted, he submits himself to jurisdiction.56. An action in rent is directed against the ship itself to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff out of the res. The ship is for this purpose treated as a person. Such an action may constitute an inducement to the owner to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, thereby making himself liable to be proceeded against by the plaintiff inpersonam. It is, however, imperative in an action in rent that the ship should be within jurisdiction at the time the proceedings are started. A decree of the court in such an action binds not merely the parties to the writ but everybody in the world who might dispute the plaintiffs claim57. It is by means of an action in rent that the arrest of a particular ship is secured by the plaintiff. He does not sue the owner directly and by name; but the owner or anyone-interested in the proceedings may appear and defend. The writ is issued to owners and parties interested in the property proceeded against. The proceedings can be started in England or in the United States in respect of a maritime lien, and in England in respect of a statutory right in rent. A . maritime lien is a privileged claim against the ship or a right to a part of the property in the ship, and it travels with the ship. Because the ship has to pay for the wrong it has done, it can be compelled to do so by a forced sale. (See The Bold Buccleaugh, (1851) 7 Moo. PC 267). In addition to maritime liens, a ship is liable to be arrested in England in enforcement of statutory rights in rent (Supreme Court Act, 1981). If the owner does not submit to the jurisdiction and appear before the court to put in bail and release the ship, it is liable to be condemned and sold to satisfy the claims against her. If, however, the owner submits to jurisdiction and obtains the release of the ship by depositing security, he becomes personally liable to be proceeded against in personam in execution of the judgment if the amount decreed exceeds the amount of the bail. The arrest of the foreign ship by means of an action in rem is thus a means of assuming jurisdiction by the competent court.61. It may not be correct to say that the admiralty jurisdiction of the English Courts is dependent entirely on statutes. It may be true in a very limited sense as regards the jurisdiction of the High Court after the merger of the High Court of Admiralty with the High Court of justice by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873 which came into force in 1875: See Supreme Court of Judicature (Commencement) Act, 1874. Even so, statutes are codifications of legal principles developed by the decisions of Courts and those principles remain the life-blood of the statutes. The observation of Lord Diplock in The Jade (1976) 1 All. E.R.920, on which much reliance is placed by Mr. Ramachandran in support of his arguments, has to be so understood. (See also Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 1, para 307).65. Where statutes are silent and remedy has to be sought by recourse to basic principles, it is the duty of the court to devise procedural rules by analogy and expediency. Actions in rem, as seen above, were resorted to by courts as a device to overcome the difficulty of personal service on the defendant by compelling him to enter appearance and accept service of summons with a view to furnishing security for the release of the res, or, in his absence, proceed against the res itself, by attributing to it a personality for the purpose of entering a decree and executing the same by sale of the res. This is a practical procedural device developed by the courts with a view to rendering justice in accordance with substantive law not only in cases of collision and salvage, but also in cases of other maritime liens and claims arising by reason of breach of contract for the hire of vessels or the carriage of goods or other maritime transactions, or tortious acts, such as conversion or negligence occurring in connection with the carriage of goods. Where substantive law demands justice for the party aggrieved, and the statute has not provided the remedy, it is the duty of the court to devise procedure by drawing analogy from other systems of law and practice. To the courts of the civil law countries in Europe and other places, like problems seldom arise, for all persons and things within their territories (including their waters) fall within their competence to deal with. They do not have to draw any distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam.66. It is likewise within the competence of the appropriate Indian Courts to deal, in accordance with the general principles of maritime law and the applicable provisions of statutory law, with all persons and things found within their jurisdiction. The power of the court is plenary and unlimited unless it is expressly or by necessary implication curtailed. Absent such curtailment of jurisdiction, all remedies which are available to the courts to administer justice are available to a claimant against a foreign ship and its owner found within the jurisdiction of the concerned High Court. This power of the court to render justice must necessarily include the power to make interlocutory orders for arrest and attachment before judgment.68. The observation of this Court in Raja Soap Factory and Ors. v. S.P. Shantharaj and Ors. [1965] 2 SCR 800 , that Section 151 of the CPC did not confer on the High Court jurisdiction which was not specifically vested was made in the context of Section 105 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act (43 of 1958) which conferred a specific jurisdiction in respect of a passing off action. That observation is not relevant to the question regarding the inherent and plenary jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court of record. The Andhra Pradesh High Court, as a successor to the Madras High Court, is vested with all the appellate and original jurisdiction, including admiralty jurisdiction to order the arrest and detention of a ship.69. In decisions such as Jayaswal Shipping Company v. S.S. Leelavati AIR 1954 Cal 415 ; Kamalakar Mahadev Bhagat v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd,, Bombay AIR 1961 Bom 186 ; Rungta Sons Private Ltd, and Anr. v. S.S. Edison Mariner and Anr. 1961 (66) CWN 1083; National Co, Ltd. v. Asia Mariner 1967 (72) CWN 635; Mrs. Sahida Ismail v. Petko R. Salvejkov and Ors. AIR 1973 Bom 18 and Smt. Reena Padhi v. Jagdhir. AIR 1982 Ori 57 , the High Courts took an unduly restrictive view of the courts admiralty jurisdiction by limiting it to what was permitted by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 and the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890. This was, in our view, an unjustified abdication of jurisdiction and a self-assumed fetter on competence to render justice.70. In equating the admiralty jurisdiction of the Indian High Court to that of the English High Court, the Colonial Court of Admiralty Act, 1890 significantly refers to the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise. This is an enabling statute, and not a statute of limitation of power. It aids, and does not fetter, the growth of jurisdiction. There is no reason why the words statute or otherwise should be so construed as to exclude the various sources from which the admiralty jurisdiction in England developed. Apart from statutes, the powers of that Court, as seen above, were derived from custom and practice and the principles developed by common law and equity as well as by the generally recognised principles of civil law. developed and practised in Europe. There is no reason, as rightly stated by Westropp. C.J. of the Bombay High Court in Bardot (supra), why the expression statute or otherwise should be so construed s to exclude all these vast areas of legal principles which enriched and strengthened the maritime laws of England. Likewise, there is no reason why those principles should also not be drawn upon to enrich and strengthen the jurisprudence of this country, even if the jurisdiction of our courts were to be, by compulsions of history, considered to be curtailed and dovetailed to the colonial past - a proposition which is neither correct nor consistent with our status as a sovereign republic. It is time to take a fresh look at the old precedents.72. It is well recognised in international law that a merchant ship, though generally governed by the laws of the flag State, subjects itself to the jurisdiction of a foreign State as it enters its waters.81. The Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 applies to carriage of goods by sea under bills of lading or similar documents of title from a port in India to any other port whether in or outside India. (See Section 2). The Act imposes certain responsibilities and liabilities and confers certain rights and immunities upon the carrier (see Articles III & IV). In respect of a claim relating to an outward cargo, the cargo owner has a right to bring a suit against a shipowner subject to the period of limitation specified under the Act, namely, one year [Article III (6)]. The substantive rights recognised by the statute are of equal application to foreign merchant ships as they are to Indian merchant ships. The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act does not, however, contain any provision for the enforcement of the right by arresting the foreign vessel found in Indian waters. In the absence of arrest, no effective remedy against a foreign owner may be available to the cargo owner. The same is the position with regard to claims relating to cargo carried under a charterparty. It is, therefore, necessary that he should have recourse to the remedy available to him under the Merchant Shipping Act. That Act, as stated earlier, confers a right to arrest a vessel in respect of any damage caused by a ship. If that. expression, in the absence of any other more appropriate statute, is understood sufficiently broadly as an enabling provision to effectively assume jurisdiction over a foreign ship for the enforcement of a substantive right recognised by law, there would be no difficulty in finding a remedy for the right the law has conferred on the cargo owner.82. The Merchant Shipping Act empowers the concerned High Court to arrest a ship in respect of a substantive right. A right conferred by the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 in respect of outward cargo is one of those rights which can be enforced by arrest and detention of the foreign ship in order to found jurisdiction over the vessel and its owners, just as it can be done in respect of inward cargo by reason of the substantive rights conferred by the Admiralty Court Act, 1961 read with the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, and other rules of law. The same principle must hold good for carriage under a charterparty. These and other laws, such as a the law of contract, tort, crime, mortgage, marine insurance, customs, port operations, etc., and the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes as well as the relevant rules of court regulating procedure and practice together constitute the body of substantive and procedural laws governing claims relating to inward and outward cargo, and such claims are enforceable against foreign ships by recourse to arrest and detention when found within jurisdiction. Viewed in this light, and by this reasoning, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as a successor to the Madras High Court, does not lack admiralty jurisdiction in respect of claims relating to outward cargo.83. The admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court is dependent on the presence of the foreign ship in Indian waters and founded on the arrest of that ship. This jurisdiction can be assumed by the concerned High Court, whether or not the defendant resides or carries on business, or the cause of action arose wholly or in part, within the local limits of its jurisdiction. Once a foreign ship is arrested within the local limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, and the owner of the ship has entered appearance and furnished security to the satisfaction of the High Court for the release of the ship, the proceedings continue as a personal action.84. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 provides a detailed code of substantive and procedural rules regulating shipping as an industry and the control exercised over it by the competent authorities in conformity with various international conventions which have, under the auspices of International Organisations such as the IMO or the ILO, unified and developed various aspects of snipping laws. Conventions regulating sea traffic, safety of life at sea, employment of seamen, wages, hours of work, social security, etc. are cases in point. Likewise, the substantive rules concerning transport of goods are contained in the Indian Bills of Lading Act, 1856 and the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925. But the jurisdictional questions concerning arrest of foreign ships for enforcement of claims against the shipowner as a transporter of goods, which in England are regulated by The Supreme Court Act, 1981, are in many respects left unregulated by Indian legislation. While the provisions of various international conventions concerning arrest of ships, civil and penal jurisdiction in matters of collision, maritime liens and mortgages etc. have been incorporated into the municipal laws of many maritime States, India, as stated above, lags behind them in adopting these unified rules.15 By reason of this void, doubts about jurisdiction often arise, as in the present case, when substantive rights, such as those recognised by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, are sought to be enforced. The remedy lies, apart from enlightened judicial construction, in prompt legislative action to codify and clarify the admiralty laws of this country. This requires thorough research and investigation by a team of experts in admiralty law, comparative law, and public and private international law. Any attempt to codify without such investigation is bound to be futile.89. Admiralty jurisdiction is an essential aspect of judicial sovereignty which under the Constitution and the laws is exercised by the High Court as a superior court of record administering justice in relation to persons and things within its jurisdiction. Power to enforce claims against foreign ships is an essential attribute of admiralty jurisdiction and it is assumed over such ships while they are within the jurisdiction of the High Court by arresting and detaining them.90. All persons and things within the waters of a State fall within its jurisdiction unless specifically curtailed or regulated by rules of international law. The power to arrest a foreign vessel, while in the waters of a coastal State, in respect of a maritime claim, wherever arising, is a demonstrable manifestation and an essential attribute of territorial sovereignty. This power is recognised by several international conventions18. These conventions contain the unified rules of law drawn from different legal systems. Although many of these conventions have yet to be ratified by India, they embody principles of law recognised by the generality of maritime States, and can therefore be regarded as part of our common law. The want of ratification of these conventions is apparently not because of any policy disagreement, as is clear from active and fruitful Indian participation in the formulation of rules adopted by the conventions, but perhaps because of other circumstances, such as lack of an adequate and specialised machinery for implementation of the various international conventions by co-ordinating for the purpose the concerned Departments of the Government. Such a specialised body of legal and technical experts can facilitate adoption of international unified rules by national legislation. It is appropriate that sufficient attention is paid to this aspect of the matter by the concerned authorities. Perhaps the Law Commission of India, endowed as it ought to be with sufficient authority, status and independence, as is the position in England, can render valuable help in . this regard. Delay in the adoption of international conventions which are intended to facilitate trade hinders the economic growth of the nation.91. The British statute assimilating Indian High Courts to the position of the English High Court in respect of admiralty jurisdiction is an enabling legislation and it is but one of the strands of jurisdiction vested in the High Court by virtue of the constitutional provisions. The jurisdiction of the High Court is governed by the Constitution and the laws, and the continuance in force of the existing laws is not a fetter but an additional source of power. Access to court for redressal of grievance being an important right of every person, it is essential that the jurisdiction of the courts is construed harmoniously and consistently with its vital function in that respect, so that absence of legislation will not jeopardise that right.92. Admiralty jurisdiction, despite the peculiarities of its origin and growth - rooted as it is in history and nurtured by the growing demands of international trade - is nevertheless a part of the totality of jurisdiction vested in the High Court as a superior court of record, and it is not a distinct and separate jurisdiction as was once the position in England before the unification of courts. The 1890 and 1891 Acts specifically conferred admiralty jurisdiction on the Indian High Courts by reason of their being courts of unlimited jurisdiction. These Acts did not create any separate or distinct jurisdiction, but merely equated the Indian High Courts to the position of the English High Court (united and consolidated as that Court has been since 1875) for the exercise of admiralty powers within the jurisdiction of the former. The contrary view expressed in some of the decisions of the High Courts referred to earlier is clearly wrong.93. Once a foreign ship is arrested in Indian waters by an order of the High Court, in exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction vested in it by statute, or inherent in it as a court of record, in respect of any maritime claim against its owner, wherever the cause of action may have arisen, and whether or not the ship is subsequently released by the owner furnishing security, proceedings must continue against the owner as in any other suit. The arrest of the vessel while in Indian waters by an order of the concerned High Court, as defined under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 [section 3(15)] attracts the jurisdiction of the competent court to proceed with the trial, as in the case of any other suit, as an action against the owner, and any decree obtained by the plaintiff is executable against any property of the owner available within jurisdiction, including the security furnished by him for release of the vessel.94. All foreign ships entering Indian waters are presumed to know that they fall within the jurisdiction of this country during their stay here. The vessel in question was lying in the Port of visakhapatnam when she was arrested in respect of a cause of action relating to cargo. The sole contention of the defendants as regards jurisdiction was that no High Court in India was invested with admiralty jurisdiction to order the arrest of the vessel in respect of a cause of action relating to outward cargo because Section 6 of the Admiralty Court Act, 1861 (read with the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890) conferring admiralty jurisdiction on Indian High Courts confined it to claims for damage to cargo imported. This contention, for the reasons we have stated, has no merits. The High Court, in our view, rightly assumed jurisdiction by the arrest of the vessel while it was lying in the port of Vishakapatanam.95. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction over claims relating to inward and outward cargo. In the circumstances, the preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was totally devoid of merits.