Case: Dhiyan Singh &amp; Another Vs. Jugal Kishore &amp; Another

1. This is a litigation between two branches of a family whose common ancestor was one Megh Raj Singh. The family tree is as followsThe dispute is about property which, according to the plaintiffs formed part of Shanker Lals estate. The plaintiffs state that the two branches of, the family were separate at all material times; that on Shankar Lals death in 1884 his daughter Mst. Mohan Dai (the defendants grandmother) succeeded to a limited estate. The reversion opened out on her death in October 1929 and the plaintiffs are entitled as the next reversioners, for Mst. Mohan Deis son Shri Kishan Das predeceased her.3. The defendants admit that Shankar Lal was separate from the other branch of the family. They divide the property which their grand mother Mst. Mohan Dai possessed into two categories. First there was property which they say belonged to her. These are properties which, according to them, she purchased or obtained under mortgages in her own right. Next, there were properness which belonged exclusively to her father and to which she succeeded as daughter. On Shankar Lals death disputes arose between Shankar Lals fathers brothers son Brijlal (the plaintiffs grand father) and the defendants grandmother Mst. Mohan Dei. Brijlal claimed the entire estate by survivorship, his allegation being that Shanker Lal died in a state of jointness with him and that all the properties were joint familydispute was referred to arbitration and an award was delivered. Under it Mst. Mohan Dei was given the suit properties as absolute owner and the rest of the estate then in dispute was given to Brijlal. A division was effected accordingly and ever since that is to say, from 21-12-1884, the date of the award down to 26-3-1941, the date of the suit, each branch has been in separate and uninterrupted possession of the properties respectively allotted to it and each has been dealing with them as absolute owner. The defendants claim that the plaintiffs are bound by this award and are in any event estopped.The plaintiffs lost in the first Court but won in the High Court. The defendants appeal.

Reasoning: 8. We do not thinkthese passages qualify the operative portion of the award and are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court who hold they do. In our opinion, the arbitrator was confused in his mind both as regards the facts as well as regards the law. His view of the law may have been wrong but the words used are, in our opinion, clear and, in the absence of anything which would unambiguously qualify them, we must interpret them in their usual sense.is neither here nor there whether the award was valid, whether the decision fell within the scope of the reference or whether it had any binding character in itself. Even if it was wholly invalid, it was still open to the parties to say: Never mind whether the arbitrator was right or wrong, his decision is fair and sensible, so instead of wasting further time and money in useless litigation. we will accept it and divide the estate in accordance with his findings. That would have been a perfectly right and proper settlement of the dispute, and whether it bound third parties or not it would certainly bind the immediate parties; and that in effect is what they did. By his conduct Brijlal induced . Mohan Dei to believe that this would be the case and on the faith of that representation, namely the acceptance of the award, he induced Mt. Mohan Dei to act greatly to her detriment and to alter her position by accepting the award and parting with an appreciables portion of the estate, and he himself obtained a substantial advantage to which he would not other wise have been entitled and enjoyed the benefit of it for the rest of his life; and to his credit be-it said, he never attempted to go behind his decision. In any event, we are clear that that created an estoppel as against Brijlal.In our opinion, the present case is very similar to the one which their Lordships of the Privy Council decided in Kanhai Lal v. Brif Lal,45 Ind. App 118 P. C. There also there was a dispute between a limited owner and a person who, but for an unproved claim (adoption) which he put forward, had no right to the estate. The dispute was taken to the Courts but was compromised and according to the agreement the property was divided between the two rival claimants and the agreement was given effect to and acted on for a period of twenty years. Later, the succession opened out and the other party to the compromise, who by then had stopped into the reversion, claimed the rest of the estate, which had been assigned to the limited owner. against her personalJudicial Committee rejected the claim on the ground of estoppel and held that even though the plaintiff claimed in a different character in the suit, namely as reversioner, he having been a party to the compromise and having acted on it and induced the other side to alter her position to her detriment, was estopped. We do not think the fact that there was a voluntary compromise whereas here there was the imposed decision of an arbitrator makes any difference because we are not proceeding on the footing of the award but on the actings of the parties in accepting it when they need not have done so if the present contentions arehave no doubt he did. The decision of the Judicial Committee which we have just cited, Kinhai Lal v. Brijlal,45 Ind. App 118, is we think, clear on that point. Although other reversioners who do not claim through the one who has consented are not bound, the consenting reversioner is estopped This is beyond dispute when there is an alienation by a limited owner without legal necessity.The present case is very different. When Kishan Lal took possession of his fathers property he held by virtue of the award and under no other title, and for forty years he continued to derive benefit from it. Accordingly, he would have been estopped even if he had claimed in a difference character as reversioner after the succession opened out.It was conceded that if the estoppel against Kishan Lal enured after October 1929, then the plaintiffs, who claim through Kishan Lal, would also be estopped.