Case: Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd Vs. Girja Shankat Pant

Since the decision of this Court in Kraipaks case [A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, 1969(2) SCC 262], one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean ? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge v. Baldwin & Ors., 1964 Appeal Cases 40, very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances - who then is a reasonable man - the man on the clapham omnibus ? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds good even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., 1973(1) SCC 380, upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below :"8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in In re H.K. (an infant), (1967)2 QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case (supra) as "insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances." However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Every thing will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, L.J. observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949)1 All ER 109requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth."

Reasoning: 29. Having discussed the issue as above in the contextual facts, we do feel it expedient to record that the action of the Managing Director in the matter of withdrawal of authority as noticed above and subsequent introduction of charges, in particular, the list of the charges as noted above and the further factum of issuance of an eighteen page letter of termination on the self same date and within a few hours after the pretended hearing was given, cannot but be ascribed to be wholly and totally biased.30. On the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record our concurrencewith the submissions of the appellant. The judgment under appeal, in our view, cannot be faulted in any way whatsoever.