Case: D. N. Chanchala Vs. State Of Mysore And Ors. Etc.(With Connected Petitions)

Writ Petition No. 619 of 19702. The petitioner in this writ petition passed the Secondary School Leaving examination in March 1965, obtaining first class marks. In March 1969, she passed theCourse Examination held by the Bangalore University securing 67% marks in optional subjects, namely, Physics, Chemistry and Biology, and 71% marks in the aggregate. Her father having retired at Dharwar, she prosecuted her further studies for B.Sc. Part I examination in the Karnatak Science College, Dharwar, a college affiliated to the Karnatak University. She passed the B.Sc. Part I examination held by the University securing once again a first class.3. Under Ordinance 144(c) of the Karnatak University, a student having passed the B.Sc. Part I examination with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as his optional subjects would be eligible for admission to a medical course provided he has obtained the minimum marks prescribed for admission to that course from time to time. The petitioner having obtained first class marks in the B.Sc. Part I examination was, therefore, eligible for admission to the medical course in the medical colleges affiliated to that University.4. There are three universities in Mysore State, namely, Karnatak, Mysore and Bangalore Universities. All the three universities heldcourse examination, the passing of which makes a student eligible for admission to courses leading to university degree. But, whereas the Karnatak University requires the passing of B.Sc. Part I examination leading to M.B.B.S. as the minimum qualification for being eligible for medical course, the other two universities require the passing of what is called theexamination, which is equivalent to B.Sc. Part I leading to M.B.B.S. degree of the Karnatak University.5. The State of Mysore conducts four medical colleges : the Government Medical College at Mysore, which is affiliated to the Mysore University, the Government Medical College at Bangalore, which is affiliated to the Bangalore University, and the Karnatak Medical College at Hubli and the Government Medical College at Bellary, which are affiliated to the Karnatak. All the four medical colleges together have 765 seats in the aggregate. Besides these four institutions, there are also private managed medical colleges at Manipal, Davangere, Belgaum and Gulbarga with 120 seats in each of them, admission upon 10% therein being under the control of the Government.6. The State Government has framed rules, called the Mysore Medical Colleges (Selection for Admission) Rules, 1970 regulating admission to Government medical colleges and for a certain number of seats specified therein in each of the said private medical colleges. Under these rules, the selection for admission to the Government medical colleges as also for the seats under the control of the Government in other colleges in entrusted to a selection committee constituted by the Government.7. In accordance with the said rules, the petitioner applied to the selection committee for admission to any one of the medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University. She was, however, not selected. For appreciating the reasons why the committee could not select her, one has first to examine the said rules framed by thePetition No. 621 of 197026. The petitioner here was born on August 2, 1954 at Bellary. Bellary had become part of the State of Mysore on October 1, 1953 in consequence of the reorganization of States. In April 1954, her father, who was till then serving as a Government servant in the State of Mysore, was transferred to Andhra Pradesh where he continued to serve until his retirement from service on June 11, 1970. According to Para (2) of the petition, the petitioner was during this period with her father at Cuddappah in Andhra Pradesh where he was serving. Inthe petitioner passed her S.S.L.C. examination at Cuddappah obtaining first class marks. Inshe passed her P.U.C. examination from a Government college affiliated to Venkateswara University in Andhra Pradesh with Physics, Chemistry and Biology as her optional subjects, securing in those subjects 150 out of 200 marks, i.e., 75%.27. On July 22, 1970, she made an application for selection to a seat in any one of the medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University. An interview card was issued to her which bore No.which signified that she was a candidate for selection for admission in a medical college affiliated to the Karnatak University. On October 6, 1970, the Selection Committee published a list of selected candidates, but her name was not included in the said list.28. According to the petition, the last student admitted to the Bellary Medical college in the general pool of seats, (that is from the balance of seats, after deducting from the total number of seats, seats reserved under Rules 4 and 5) had obtained less marks in the P.U.C. examination than marks obtained by her, that is, 295 out of 450 marks which would be 65.6%. The last student admitted to the Karnatak Medical College, Hubli had also obtained 295 out of 450 marks, i.e. 65.6%. Both these students had passed the P.U.C. examination held by the Karnatak University.29. The reason forof the petitioners name in the said list given by the Selection committee was that she was not "a resident in the State of Mysore for not less than 10 years at any time prior to the date of the application for a seat" as required by Rule 3 of the saidPetition No. 622 of 197036. The petitioner is a science graduate having passed her B.Sc. examination held by the Bangalore University in 1969. In that examination she secured 505 out of 1, 000 marks, i.e., 50.5%. On July 23, 1970, she applied for being admitted to theCourse in Medicine. Her name did not appear in the list of selected candidates issued by the Selection Committee under the Rules for Selection of Candidates for Admission, 1970, framed by the State Government. Aggrieved by theof her name, the petitioner filed this writ petition.

Reasoning: Under Rule 2, therefore, there are two categories of candidates who only are eligible for Selection : (1) those who have passed the P.U.C. examination or an equivalent examination, and (2) those who are graduates, having graduated with the optional subjects specified therein. The petitioner, not being a graduate, fell under the first category of candidates eligible for selection.Briefly, the effect of these rules is that the qualification for selection to thePart I leading to M.B.B.S. A student getting admission to the aforesaid course had thus to pass theexamination held by the Mysore and Bangalore Universities, or B.Sc. part I leading to M.B.B.S. examination held by the Karnatak University. It is only after passing the examination that a candidate can prosecute the regular M.B.B.S. course. The common qualification for being selected for thePart I leading to M.B.B.S. course and pass the requisite examination in that course.The second effect of these rules is that if a student has passed the P.U.C. examination held by a particular university, such a student is, by virtue of Rule 9(1), eligible for admission in the medical college or colleges affiliated to that university. The selection committee, however, has the discretion to allot seats, up to 20% of the seats in the colleges affiliated to a university, to students passing from colleges affiliated to any other university in the State or even elsewhere in India.13. Consequently, the petitioner having passed her P.U.C. examination from Bangalore University could apply for admission in a medical college affiliated to that university. If she were to apply for admission in a medical college affiliated to the Karnatak University she could only be selected to a seat from among seats up to the maximum of 20% of seats left in theof the SelectionCommittee as provided by Rule 9(1). It is true that she had got 67% marks in optional subjects in the P.U.C. examination and students with lesser number of marks, but passing from colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University, got admission. But that was because she had passed the P.U.C. examination held by the Bangalore University and wanted admission in a medical college affiliated to another university, namely, the Karnatak University.We propose to deal with those submissions in the order in which they were placed before us by counsel. As seen earlier, there are two sets of provisions dealing with the teaching of medical courses The first consists of Ordinances of the universities, and the second consists of the rules framed by the Government ores for admission to thePart I Course leading to M.B.B.S. degree in the Government medical colleges and in respect of 59 seats in the aggregate in the medical colleges run by private management. The control for admission in respect of the 59 seats in the private colleges must have been acquired by the Government with the consent of or under some agreement with those colleges by reason of their getting financial and other aid from the Government. So long as the rules for selection applicable to the colleges run by the Government do not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity, they cannot be challenged as the Government can regulate admission to its own institutions. The objection that it cannot, by such rules, provide for requirements over and above those laid down by the universities for eligibility cannot be sustained. (See State of Andhra Pradesh v. Lavu Narendranath (1971 (1) SCC 607  ) wherein the earlier decisions on this subject have been examined and followed.It will be easily seen that theof seats inthe Government medical colleges has nothing in common with theor unit wise selection struck down in Rajendrans case (supra) and Periakaruppans case (supra). In both the cases what was mainly objected to was that the selection would have to be made on the basis either of the place of birth or residence and the candidate was confined to the medical colleges at or nearest to such a place. Such a basis for selection was held to have no reasonable nexus with the object of the rules, namely, to select the most meritorious amongst the candidates to have the advantage of such education. In Periakaruppans case (supra) there was a further infirmity, in that, there were several committees for selection resulting in varying standards, thus defeating the very object of screening the candidates with a view to give chance to the best of them. Both these decisions are distinguishable as the basis on which thees is sought to be made under the present rules is quite different in that it is neithere, but isTherefore, the infirmities found in the selection rules in those two cases and for which they were struck down cannot be relevant in any scrutiny of the present rules much less can they be relied upon for an attack on them.22. The three universities were setup in three different places presumably for the purpose of catering to the educational and academic needs of those areas. Obviously one university for the whole of the State could neither have been adequate nor feaseable to satisfy those needs. Since it would not be possible to admit all candidates in the medical colleges run by Government, some basis for screening the candidates had to be set up. There can be no manner of doubt, and it is now fairly well settled, that the Government, as also other private agencies, who found such centers for medical training, have the right to frame rules for admission so long as those rules are not inconsistent with the university statutes and regulations and do not suffer from infirmities, constitutional or otherwise. Since the universities are set up for satisfying the educational needs of different areas where they are set up and medical colleges are established in those areas, it can safely be presumed that they also were so set up to satisfy the needs for medical training of those attached to those universities. In our view, there is nothing undesirable in ensuring that those attached to such universities have their ambitions to have training in specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied through colleges affiliated to their own universities. Such a basis for selection has not the disadvantage ofse selection as any student from any part of the State can pass the qualifying examination in any of the three universities irrespective of the place of his birth or residence. Further, the rules confer a discretion on the selection committee to admit outsiders up to 20% of the total available seats in any one of these colleges, i.e., those who have passed the equivalent examination held by any other university not only in the State but also elsewhere in India. It is, therefore, impossible to say that the basis of selection adopted in these rules would defeat the object of the rules as was said in Rajendrans case (supra) or make possible less meritorious students obtaining admission at the cost of the better candidates. The fact that candidate having lesser marks might obtain admission at the cost of another having higher marks from another university does not necessarily mean that a less meritorious candidate gets advantage over a more meritorious one. As is well known, different universities have different standards in the examinations held by them. A preference to one attached to one University in its own institutions foror technical training is not uncommon. Rules giving such a preference are to be found in various universities. Such a system for that reason alone is not to be condemned as discriminatory, particularly when admission to such a university by passing a qualifying examination held by it is not precluded by any restrictive qualifications, such as birth or residence, or any other similar restrictions. In our view, it is not possible to equate the present basis for selection with those which were held invalid in the aforesaid two decisions. Further, the Government which bears the financial burden of running the Government colleges is entitled to lay down criteria for admission in its own colleges and to decide the sources from which admission would be made, provided of course, such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational basis and a reasonable connection with the object of the rules. So long as there is no discrimination within each of such sources, the validity of the rules laying down such sources cannot be successfully challenged, (see Chitra Ghosh v.ia (1969 (2) SCC 228   : (1970) 1 SCR 413     at 418)). In our view, the rules lay down a valid classification. Candidates passing through the qualifying examination held by a university form a class by themselves as distinguished from those passing through such examination from the other two universities. Such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules, namely, to cater to the needs of candidates who would naturally look to their own university to advance their training in technical studies, such as medical studies. In our opinion, the rules cannot justly be attacked on the ground of hostile discrimination or as being otherwise in breach of Articlealready stated, under Clauses (a) to (i) of Rule 4, sixty, out of the present aggregate of 765 seats at the disposal of the Government are set apart for the various categories of persons therein mentioned. As aforesaid, the Government is entitled to lay down sources from which selection for admission would be made. A provision laying down such sources is strictly speaking not a reservation. It is not a reservation as understood by Article 15 against which objection can be taken on the ground that it is excessive. The reservation, as contemplated by Article 15, is the one which is made under Rule 5, Under that rule, 15% reservation is for persons belonging to the Scheduled casts, 3% for Scheduled Tribes and 30% for socially and educationally backward classes, that is to say, 48% in all against 690 available seats after deducting 60 seats set apart under Rule 4. But, setting apart 15 seats under Rule 4 (g) for candidates who take up family planning programme does not constitute a reservation as any one of the lady candidates can take up that programme. Therefore, the seats available for distribution would be 720, 48% of which are reserved under Rule 5.It was not disputed that Article 15(4) the state was entitled to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes. It has to be remembered that the object of Article 15(4) is to advance the interests of the society as a whole by looking after the interests of its weaker sections. But as stated in Balaji v. Mysore, (1963 Supp (1) SCR 439 : AIR 1963 SC 649   : (1963) 2 SCA 1) while making such a provision the rights and interests of the rest of the society are not to be absolutely ignored. Consideration for the rest of the society and those who are its weaker elements have both to be kept in mind and taking the prevailing circumstances as a whole have to be adjusted. The impugned provision in Balajis case (supra) made8% of the seats for the socially and educationally backward classes in medical and engineering colleges. Such a high percentage was held to amount almost to ahe deserving and qualified candidates from other communities, which also was not in the interests of the society as a whole. The Court there observed that in adjusting the claim of both the weaker and the stronger elements the reservation for the former should ordinarily be less than 50% although no inflexible percentage could be fixed and the actual reservation must depend upon the relevant prevailing circumstances in each case. In Periakaruppans case (supra) 41% reservation for the socially and educationally backward classes was held not to be excessive. No materials have been placed before us which would show that in the circumstances prevailing in Mysore State reservation made under Rule 5 is unreasonably excessive Setting apart 60 seats under Rule 4 is, as already stated, not a reservation but laying down sources for selection necessitated by certain overriding considerations, such as obligations towards those who serve the interests of the countrys security certain reciprocal obligations and the like. The reservation under Rule 5, though apparently on the high side, not having been shown as unreasonably excessive, the contention in regard to it mustcandidates applying for selection fall into two two categories : (1) those having passed the P.U.C. examination from colleges affiliated to that university to which a medical college in which admission is sought is affiliated, and (2) those having passed the P.U.C. examination or an equivalent examination held by other universities in Mysore State or even elsewhere. The petitioner, therefore, belonged to the second category inasmuch as she was a candidate who had passed her P.U.C. examination not through a collage affiliated to the Karnatak University, but one who had passed the P.U.C. examination from a university to which none of the medical colleges in Karnatak was affiliated. Therefore, the proviso to Rule 9(1) would be applicable to her and she would be eligible for selection only from out of the 20% of the seats at the most left in theAnnexed to her application for selection, dated July 22, 1970, was a certificate from the Tehsildar, Bellary, certifying that she had not only her domicile in Mysore State but that she had also resided in the State for a period of 10 years prior to the date of her application. In Column 13 of the application, where particulars of institutions where the candidate had studied had to be given, it was stated that the petitioner had studied in Bellary during the years 1959 to 1963, and thereafter, from69 in different institutions in Andhra Pradesh. We will assume, though her father was in Andhra Pradesh where he served from 1954 to June 1970, that she was kept in her infancy in Bellary, the total Period of her residence would prima facie come to little less than 9 years, i.e., from August 2, 1954, her date of birth, to 1963. Therefore, the certificate obtained from the Tehsildar, certifying that she had resided in Mysore for 10 years at any time prior to the date of her application, would appear not to be factuallyan explanation, however, suffers from two defect : (1) that such a plea was made for the first time in the affidavit in rejoinder in answer to thefiled by the respondents, and (2) that residence as contemplated by Rule 3 must prima facie have an element of continuity or regularity in residence and would not mean an intermittent stay such as during the vacations. It would thus appear that the petitioner did not, notwithstanding the certificate of residence issued by the Tehsildar, comply with the requirement of 10 years residence under Rule 3. However, for the reasons stated hereafter it is not necessary to go into these questions either as regards the facts relating to her residence in Bellary or the validity of Rule 3 sought to be challenged in this petition.33. It is true that the petitioner obtained in the P.U.C. examination held by Venkateswara University, 150 out of 200 marks in optional subjects taken by her, but as her application itself shows, the total number of marks secured by her in that examination were 389 out of 600 marks, i.e. 65%. Even according to her, the last student who secured selection for the Bellary Medical College had secured 295 out of 450 marks, i.e., 65.6%. The same percentage of marks was also secured by the last student admitted to the Karnatak Medical College, Hubli, both these students having passed the P.U.C. examination held by the Karnatak University. Therefore, even irrespective of the fact whether she had qualified herself or not under Rule 3, she could not have been selected for either of these two college in Karnatak.34. The argument that she had been discriminated against in the sense that though she had secured 75% marks she was not selected and others with lesser number of marks than those secured by her were selected for medical colleges affiliated to the Karnatak University was founded on a wrong premise. For comparison between herself and the said two candidates she took her marks in optional subjects only and apparently compared them with the total marks obtained by the said two students in the whole of the P.U.C. examination. There was thus no comparison between persons equally situated even as regards the number of marks secured by them. But apart from that, the result obtained by a student in an examination held by one university cannot be regarded as comparable with the result obtained by another candidate in an examination held by another university. Even assuming that a conscious effort is made to equalise standards obtaining in different universities, such standards depend on several human factors, methods, of teaching and examining, the syllabus in such universities etc. even though the subjects taught and examined were to be the same. It ison ofdiscrimination can only arise in the case of persons equally situated. That the petitioner and those whom the Selection Committee selected were equally situated cannot, from the facts above stated, be assumed. Consequently, the argument that Rule 3, by prescribing the 10 years residence in Mysore State as a qualification for eligibility, is arbitrary and discriminatory becomes academic and need not to be gone into in the present writ petition as the petitioner, even without insisting on that qualification, was not entitled to be selected.So far as the first part of the argument is concerned, it is difficult to envisage the danger apprehended by counsel or to see the kind of vagueness or ambiguity complained of by him. The rule contains thea "political Sufferer" as meaning a person who "on account of participation in the national movement for thet; had suffered imprisonment or detention for a period of at least six months, or had been awarded capital punishment, or had died while undergoing imprisonment or detention or was killed or became permanently incapacitated by police or military firing or Lathi charge, or lost his "job, property or other means of livelihood". The definition is couched in clear and unambiguous language, besides containing sufficient details, so as to distinctively identify the persons who would fall within it. The person must have suffered incarceration, whether as imprisonment or detention, for a period of at least six months or been awarded capital punishment, or must have died while actually in detention or undergoing imprisonment, or killed or incapacitated permanently by firing or Lathi charge by the police or by the military, or must have lost employment, property or other means of livelihood. These should have been the consequences of his having participated in the national movement for thea. The "national movement" must obviously mean the late struggle for the freedom of the country from the alien British rule. The ambiguity, counsel complained of, in these words in the definition is difficult to comprehend. There are ample details in the definition not to leave any scope for arbitrariness or discrimination in its application to a candidate who claims to be a child of the political sufferer envisaged by clause (h) of the rule. We, therefore, turn to the second part of the argument without detaining ourselves any further on the grievance of ambiguity in the definition.On account of paucity of institutions imparting training in technical studies and increasing number of candidates seeking admission therein, there is obviously the need for classification to enable fair and equitablele seats. The very decisions relied on by counsel for the petitioner implicitly recognise the need for classification and the power of those who run such institutions, to lay down classification. In Rajendrans case (supra) this Court impliedly accepted two sources of recruitment made under the rules there challenged, namely, (1) those competing for seat in the general pool, and (2) those from the socially and educationally backward classes for whom reservation permitted under Article 15(4) was made. What was struck down there was thedistribution based on sheer residence as that would defeat the very object of the rules, namely, thehe best and the most meritorious from the two sources of recruitment. The power to lay down sources from which selection would be made was expressly conceded to the Government in Chitra Ghosh v.ia (supra), this Court observing in that connection at pp. 418 and 419 of the report that since it was the Government which bore the financial burden of running the medical college, it could lay down the criteria for eligibility and that from the very nature of things it was not possible to throw the admission open to students from all over the country. Consequently, the Government could not be denied the right to decide from what sources admissions would be made. The Court at the same time emphasised that if the sources were properly classified, whether on territorial, geographical or other reasonable basis, the Court would refuse to interfere with the manner and the method of making the classification. The classifications there made were in relation to candidates from Union territories other than Delhi, children of Central Government servants posted in Indian mission abroad, candidates under the Colombo Plan and other international arrangements, scholars from Jammu and Kashmir, etc. These classifications were found justifiable on one ground or the other and based on intelligible differentia which distinguished candidate falling within them from the rest. The Mysore High Court, in Subhashini v. State (AIR 1966 Mys 40) similarly recognised that there could be valid reservations, apart from those permissible under Article 15(4), that such reservations did not necessarily infringe the equality protection under Article 14 and held that classification based on a lawful State policy was not violative of that article. It upheld on this principle the reservation for children of Defence PersonnelPersonnel as being clearly in national interest. (see also Anil Kumar v. Mysore ((1969) 17 LR (Mys) 110).)43. Once the power to lay down classifications or categories of persons from whom admission is to be given is granted, the only question which would remain for consideration would be whether such categorisation has an intelligible criteria and whether it has a reasonable relation with the object for which the rules for admission are made. Rules for admission are inevitable so long as the demand of every candidate seeking admission cannot be complied with in view of the paucity of institutions imparting training in such subjects as medicine. Thea political sufferer being a detailed one and in certain terms, it would be easily possible to distinguish children of such political sufferers from the rest as possessing the criteria laid down by the definition. The object of the rules for admission can obviously be to secure a fair and equitablets amongst those seeking admission and who are eligible under the University Regulations. Such distribution can be on the principle that admission should be available to the best and the most meritorious. But an equally fair and equitable principle would also be that which secures admission in a just proportion to those who are handicapped and who, but for the preferential treatment given to them, would not stand a chance against those who are not so handicapped and are, therefore, in a superior position. The principle underlying Article 15(4) is that a preferential treatment can validly be given because the socially and educationally backward classes need it, so that in course of time they stand in equal position with the more advanced sections of the society. It would not in any way be improper if that principle were also to be applied to those who are handicapped but do not fall under Article 15(4). It is on such a principle that reservation for children of Defence personnel andpersonnel appears to have been upheld. The criteria for such reservation is that those serving in the Defence forces or those who had so served are and were at a disadvantage in giving education to their children since they had to live, while discharging their duties, in difficult places where normal facilities available elsewhere are and were not available. In our view it is not unreasonable to extend that principle to the children of political sufferers who in consequence of their participation in the emancipation struggle became unsettled in life; in some cases economically ruined, and were therefore, not in a position to make available to their children that class of education which would place them in fair competition with the children of those who did not suffer from that disadvantage. If that be so, it must follow that theal sufferer not only makes the children of such sufferers distinguishable from the rest but such a classification has a reasonable nexus with the object of the rules which can be nothing else than a fair and justs. In our view, neither of the two contentions raised by counsel for the petitioner can be accepted, with the result that the writ petition fails and is dismissed.