Case: M/S SHRIRAM EPC LIMITED Vs. RIOGLASS SOLAR SA

3. The brief facts that are necessary for determination of the present controversy are as follows:3.1. An ICC award was delivered in London on 12.02.2015 by Mr. Christopher Style QC in the followingAfter consideration of all the factual and legal submissions which have been presented to me and for the reasons set out in full above, I award, declare and adjudge as follows:(1) I declare that I have no jurisdiction over the Second and Third Respondents.(2) I declare that Rioglass is not obliged to issue a Performance Bank Guarantee as provided for in clause 6 of the Agreement, as amended by Amendment No.1.(3) I declare that Rioglass is entitled to sell as scrap the mirrors that it holds in storage in relation to Delivery Four.(4) I declare that Shriram acted in breach of the Agreement in the respects set out above.Objections dated 21.07.2015 under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were filed by the Appellant which were dismissed on 27.09.2016, stating that a petition under Section 34 would not be maintainable as against a foreign award, citing this Court?s judgment in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552.   Meanwhile, the Respondent filed a petition under Section 47 of the 1996 Act, dated 05.08.2015, to enforce the said award. As stated hereinabove, all objections to the said award were rejected by the learned Single Judge on 09.02.2017. An appeal to the Division Bench resulted in an Order dated 14.03.2018, stating that in view of Section 50 of the 1996 Act, the said appeal would not be maintainable. This is how the present SLP has been filed against the decision of the learned Single Judge.

Reasoning: 16. It will thus be seen that ?award? under Item 12 of Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 has remained unchanged till date. As has been held by us hereinabove, in 1899, this ?award? would refer only to a decision in writing by an arbitrator or umpire in a reference not made by an order of the Court in the course of a suit. This would apply only to such award made at the time in British India, and today, after the amendment of Section 1(2) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 by Act 43 of 1955, to awards made in the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This being the case, we are of the view that the expression ?award? has never included a foreign award from the very inception till date. Consequently, a foreign award not being includible in Schedule I of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, is not liable for stampcannot forget that there is no challenge stage so far as a foreign award is concerned – so long as none of the grounds in Section 48 are attracted, the award becomes enforceable as a decree. The stage of enforceability, therefore, has arisen in these cases, and it cannot be said that the ratio of M. Anasuya (supra) would apply so that stamp duty would become payable only at some subsequent stage. This judgment is equally incorrect in stating that Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 356  , would apply.An argument was made by learned counsel for the Respondent that Section 47 of the Act requires three things and only three things to be produced before the Court for enforcement of a foreign award, and that therefore, stamp duty not being one of the three things required, cannot ever be levied. We are afraid that this again is an extreme argument. All that Section 47 deals with is production before the Court of proof of the fact that a foreign award is sought to be enforced. In no manner does Section 47 interdict the payment of stamp duty if it is otherwise payable in law. This argument must thus be rejected. Equally, the argument that under Section 48(2)(b), even if stamp duty is payable on a foreign award, it would not be contrary to the public policy of India, must be rejected. The fundamental policy of Indian law, as has been held in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644, and followed in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49  , makes it clear that if a statute like the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 dealing with the economy of the country is concerned, it would certainly come within the expression ?fundamental policy of Indian law?. The Indian Stamp Act, 1899, being a fiscal statute levying stamp duty on instruments, is also an Act which deals with the economy of India, and would, on a parity of reasoning, be an Act reflecting the fundamental policy of Indian law. This argument on behalf of the Respondent must also, therefore, be rejected.