Case: Union Of India Vs. Jyoti Chit Fund &amp; Finance &amp; Ors

The moral of this case is that a short cut may often be a wrong cut-in law, as in life. The ratio of this appeal is that technicality will not triumph in courts of law and justice, where substantial public policy is involved and it is such public policy which humanistically protects provident fund and pensionary dues of government servants from claims of judgment-creditors to attach in satisfaction ofappellant, the Union of India, has come up in appeal, by special leave, challenging a laconic order of dismissal in Civil Revision made by the Delhi High Court, thus upholding the view of the executing court over-ruling the contention of the State, objecting to the attachment of certain provident fund and pension dues held by Union of India (on behalf of the Rajya Sabha Secretariat) in trust for the judgment-debtor who had been employed in the Rajya Sabha Secretariat. The first court had held that the Union of India had no locus standi to object to the attachment by the decree-holder on the score that an outsider to the suit without interest in the attached money has standing to intervene to dispute the attachability even if the sum was clearly immune to attachment in law. The relevant reasoning is in theseis not the case of the Union of India that Union of India has any interest in the attach ed property so as to entitle Union of India to make an application under Order 21, r. 58CPC. In my opinion, if the attachment has been wrongly made it is for the judgment-debtor to make an application to the court for releasing the provident fund or the compulsory deposits fromCourt also expressed the view that it was premature toattached money will fall within the definition of provident fund or compulsoryfairness to the Subordinate Judge it must be said he did feel inclined to agree that provident fund and compulsory deposits are not liable to any attachment under any decree or order of the civilground which weigh ed with the trial court and has won the approval of the High Court is that "the Government has no interest in the attached money and therefore no standing to come to court. The judgment-debtor may file objections for release of the attached money. The objections, if made, will be decided afresh on merits." It is apparent from this statement of facts that the courts below took the narrow view, with an escapist flavour which led to long litigation and large expense, that only the judgment-debtor and not the Government could raise objections regarding non-attachability of provident fund and pension amounts, as if Government were an officious intruder, bereft of any concern in the insultion of the amounts against execution of decrees of court.

Reasoning: We agree and indeed appreciate the States anxiety to fulfill the policy of the statute on behalf of the weaker-sections by taking up the burden on itself. May be, it is like a test case ventilating a cause in which a large number of employees may be vitallyare inclined to hold, , without hesitation that on all the points the appellant is bound to succeed. A bare reading of ss. 3 and 4 ofthe Provident Funds Act, 1925, read with s. 2(a) of that Act, will convince anyone that attachment of amounts bearing their description are prohibited. It will be a gross violation of legal mandates involving public interest if, in the teeth of such injunction, an attachment should still be ordered by a court.The finer distinction sought to be made by Shri Rohatgi that because the appellant has already retired, therefore, the provident fund and allied amounts have already fallen due and have ceased to possess the complexion of sums by way of provident fund under ss. 3 and 4, is fallacious. On first principles and on precedent, we are clear in our minds that these sums, if they are of the character set up by the Union of India, are beyond the reach of the courts power to attach. Section 2 (a) of the Provident Funds Act has also to be read in this connection to remove possible doubts because this definitional clause is of wide amplitude. Moreover, s-60(1), provides (g) and (k), leave no doubt on the point of non- attachability. The matter is so plain that discussion is uncalledfollow that ruling and over-rule t he contention.It is possible to take a broad view that cases where public policy is involved and the court has a certain duty to observe statutory prohibitions, a wider concept of locus standi has to be taken. Any public authority interested in the matter and not behaving partially as an officious busy body may bring to the notice of the court the illegality of the steps it proposes to take. When the courts jurisdiction is so invoked, it may be exercised without insisting on some other directly affected party, like the judgment-debtor in the instant case, appearing to defend himself.The argument that the Rajya Sabha Secretariat is different from the Union of India is a new gloss which Shri Rohatgi has put upon his contention of locus standi. He has pressed into service Articles 300 and 98(2) of the Constitution of India, neither of which is helpful or applicable. This point has the merit of novelty, little else. Consequentially, we set aside the decision o f the High Court and of the executing court, but this is not the end of the matter.