Case: Bhaiyalal Vs. Harikishan Singh And Others

1. This appeal by special leave arises out of an Election petition filed by respondent No. 1, Harikishan Singh, challenging the validity of the election of the appellant, Bhaiyalal, in a reserved seat in the Beraisia Constituency in the district of Sehore in Madhya Pradesh. The election in question was held in February, 1962; at this election the appellant, respondent No. 1, and three others offered themselves as candidates. The appellant was declared duly elected on the 26th February, 1962 since he had polled the highest number of votes. His next rival was respondent No. 1. By his petition, respondent No. 1 challenged the validity of the appellants election on the ground that the appellant belonged to the Dohar caste and was not a Chamar. The appellant had filed his nomination paper on the 19th January, 1962 before the Returning Officer at Sehore and had declared that he was a member of the Chamar scheduled caste of the State of Madhya Pradesh in relation to Sehore district. This declaration was accepted by the Returning Officer. Respondent No. 1 contended that Dohar caste was not recognised as the scheduled caste for the district of Sehore and Raisen, and so, the Returning Officer had improperly and illegally accepted the declaration of the appellant as one belonging to the Chamar scheduled caste. Since the appellant did not belong to the scheduled caste in question, he was not entitled to stand for election for the reserved seat in respect of the said Constituency. This is the basis on which the validity of the appellants election was challenged by respondent No. 1. On the other hand, the appellant urged that the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 was not maintainable inasmuch as he had not deposited the security of Rs. 2,000 in the manner prescribed by the statutory rules2. On these pleadings, the Election Tribunal framed appropriate issues. The first four issues covered the principal contention raised by respondent No. 1 against the validity of the Appellants nomination as a member belonging to the Chamar scheduled caste, whereas the fifth issue related to the appellants contention about the incompetence of the election petition filed by respondent No. 1. Both parties led evidence in support of their pleas on the principal point of dispute between them. The Election Tribunal considered the oral evidence adduced by the parties, examined the documents on which they respectively relied, and found in favour of respondent No. 1. In regard to the plea raised by the appellant against the competence of the election petition, the Tribunal found against him. In the result, the election petition was allowed and the appellants election declared invalid3. Against this decision of the Election Tribunal the appellant preferred an appeal to the Madhya Pradesh High Court. Before the High Court, the same two points were urged. The High Court has confirmed the finding of the Election Tribunal on both the points. It has held that the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 was valid and the security deposit was made by him in accordance with the statutory requirements. On the merits of the controversy as to whether the appellant was a Chamar by caste and as such was entitled to be elected for the reserved seat in the Constituency in question, the High Court, in substance, has agreed with the conclusion of the Election Tribunal. In consequence, the appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed on the 23rd April, 1963. It is against this decision that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.

Reasoning: . Thus, the question which arose between the parties for decision in the present proceedings is a question of fact and on this question both the Tribunal and the High Court, have made concurrent findings against the appellant. It is true that in reaching their conclusion on this point, the Tribunal as well as the High Court had to consider oral as well as documentary evidence; but in cases of this kind where the Tribunal and the High Court make concurrent finding son questions of fact, this court does not usually interfere; and after hearing Mr. Chatterjee we see no, reason to depart from our usual practice in this matterIt is true that some of these documents which had been discarded by the Election Tribunal as unworthy of credence or as irrelevant, have been accepted by the High Court as relevant and genuine. Even so, the High Court has come to the conclusion that these documents do not show satisfactorily that the Dohar caste is a sub-caste of the Chamar caste. In that connection, the High Court has pointed out that the documents relied upon by the appellant do not support his case that the Dohar caste is a sub-caste of the Chamar caste, and in that sense, they are not consistent with the plea made by the appellant in the present proceedings. We allowed Mr. Chatterjee to take us through the material evidence; and on considering the said evidence in the light of the criticism made by Mr. Chatterjee, we are satisfied that there is no reason to interfere with the concurrent finding recorded by the Tribunal and the High Court on the main question of fact. We must, accordingly, hold that the appellant does not belong to the Chamar caste and as such was not qualified, to contest the reserved seat for the scheduled caste of Chamars in the Constituency in questionIn the district of Datia, for instance, entry 3 refers to Chamar, Ahirwar, Chamar Mangan, Mochi or Raidas. Similarly, in respect of Maharashtra, Item 1 entries 3 and 4 refer to the same castes by different names which shows either that the said castes are known differently or consist of different sub-castes. Likewise, item 2 entry 4 in the said list refers to Chamar, Chamari, Mochi, Nona, Rohidas, Ramnami, Satnami, Surjyabanshi or Surjyaramnami. It is also remarkable that in Maharashtra in certain districts Chambhar and Dhor are included in the list separately. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Chatterjee can seriously quarrel with the conclusion of the High Court that the appellant has not shown that he belongs to the Chamar caste which has been shown in the Order as a scheduled caste in respect of the Constituency in questionIn our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. The object of Art. 341 (1) plainly is to provide additional protection to the members of the Scheduled Castes having regard to the economic and educational backwardness from which they suffer. It is obvious that in specifying castes, races or tribes, the President has been expressly authorised to limit the notification to parts of or groups within the castes, races, or tribes, and that must mean that after examining the educational and social backwardness of a caste, race or tribe the President may well come to the conclusion that not the whole caste, race or tribe but parts of or groups within them should be specified. Similarly, the President can specify castes, races or tribes or parts thereof in relation not only to the entire State, but in relation to parts of the State where he is satisfied that the examination of the social and educational backwardness of the race, caste or tribe justifies such specification. In fact, it is well known that before a notification is issued under Art. 341 (1), an elaborate enquiry is made and it is as a result of this enquiry that social justice is sought to be done to the caste, races or tribes as may, appear to be necessary, and in doing justice, it would obviously be expedient not only to specify parts or groups of castes, races or tribes, but to make the said specification by reference to different areas in the State. Educational and social backwardness in regard to these castes, races or tribes may not be uniform or of the same intensity in the whole of the State; it may vary in degree or in kind in different areas and that may justify the division of the State into convenient and suitable areas for the purpose of issuing the public notification in question. Therefore, Mr. Chatterjee is in error when he contends that the notification issued by the President by reference to the different areas is outside his authority under Art. 341 (1).