Case: Rameshwar Prasad And Others Vs. M/S. Shyam Beharilaljagannathand Others

The facts leading to this appeal, by special leave, are these. Nine persons, including Kedar Nath, instituted a suit for ejectment and recovery of rent against two defendants on the allegation that defendant No. I was the tenant-inchief who had sub-let the premises to defendant No. 2. The suit for ejectment was decreed against both the defendants and for arrears of rent against defendant No. 1. On appeal by defendant No. 2 the District judge set aside the decree for ejectment against defendant No. 2 and confirmed the rest of the decree against defendant No. 1. It is against this decree that the nine original plaintiffs filed the second appeal in the High Court on February 29,Nath, appellant No. 3, died on September 8, 1955. In view of rr. 3 and 11 of O. XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated so far as Kedar Nath was concerned as no application for bringing his legal representatives on the record was made within the prescribedOctober 1, 1956, two applications were filed in the High Court One was an application under s. 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of the delay in filing the application for substitution of the heirs in placec of Kedar Nath. The other was the application for substitution in which it was prayed that Bithal Das and Banarsi Das, the sons of Kedar Nath, deceased, be substituted in place of the deceased appellant as they were his heirs and representatives. These two applications were dismissed on May 1, 1957, with the result that the appeal stood abated as against KedarPrasad, appellant No. 9 also died on July 2, 1956. His widow, Remeshwari Devi, was brought on the record in his place.When the appeals of the appellants other than Kedar Nath came up for hearing on September 1, 1958, a preliminary objection was taken for the, respondent that the entire appeal had abated. Mr. jagdish Swarup, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, contended that the deceased belonged to a joint Hindu family and other members of the family were already on the record and that it was not necessary to bring on record any other person. He further stated that the appeal could not be said to have abated in the particular circumstances. The Court allowed the appellants time for filing an affidavit stating that the deceased was a member of the joint Hindu family and other relevantSeptember 8, 1958, an affidavit was filed by Suraj Prasad Misra pairokar of the appellants. Para 9 of the Affidavit stated that Lala Ram Chandra Prasad, appellant No. 8, managed the family properties including the one in dispute which was joint and looked after the affairs of the properties and acted for and on behalf of the family and was already on the record. A counter-affidavit was filed stating that the allegations in para 9 of the affidavit were misleading, that there was no allegation in the affidavit that the family was a joint Hindu family and that the true facts were that the family of the plaintiffsappellants was not a joint family, that the members were separated, that Lala Ram Chandra Prasad was not karta of the joint Hindu family, that the plaintiffs were assessed to income-tax separately and that the property in dispute was not joint- family property or even joint property. A rejoinder affidavit was then filed by Sri Narain, general agent of the appellants stating that the aforesaid statements in the counteraffidavit were misleading and irrelevant and re- affirming that Ram Chandra Prasad managed the house property of the family including the one in dispute and that he looked after the affairs of the house property and acted for and on behalf of the family just as other members of the family looked after other affairs including the business belonging to the family.At the hearing of the appeal of the surviving appellants, the only point which was urged for consideration seems to have been that the surviving appellants were competent to continue the appeal in view of O.XLI, r. 4, C. P. C. This contention was repelled in view of the full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Baij Nath v. Ram Bharose (1), as the interests of the surviving appellants and the deceased appellant were joint and indivisible and as in the event of the success of the appeal there would be two inconsistent and contradictory decrees. It accordingly dismissed the appeal. It is against this decree -that this appeal has been filed after obtaining special leave.

Reasoning: We see no force in the first contention. We have already referred to the contents of the various affidavits filed by the parties subsequent to the point being raised that Kedar Nath, the deceased appellant and the surviving appellants constituted a joint Hindu family. They clearly indicate that the affidavits filed on behalf of the appellants made no averment that Kedar Nath and the surviving appellants formed a joint Hindu family, even though time had been given to them for filing an affidavit stating such a fact. The inference is obvious, and is that these people did not form a joint Hindu family as alleged by the respondents.It is further of significance that the application made on October 1, 1956, for substituting the sons of Kedar Nath in his place stated that they were his heirs and legal representatives. The application was on the basis that Kedar Nath was not a member of the joint Hindu family. We are, therefore, of opinion that it is not proved that Kedar Nath, deceased, and the other appellants constituted a joint Hindu family that the right to appeal survived to the surviving appellants alone and that they could have continued their appeal in view of r. 2 of of XXII of thesecond contention really is that the surviving appellants could have instituted the appeal against the entire decree in view of the provisions of O. XLI, r. 4 of the Code, that they were, therefore, competent to continue the appeal even after the death of Kedar Nath and the abatement of the appeal so far as he was concerned, that the Court could have reversed or varied the whole decree in favour of all the original plaintiffs and could have granted reliefwith respect to the rights and interests of Kedar Nath as well. We do not agree with this contention Rule 4 ofprovisions enable one of the plaintiffs or one of the defendants to file an appeal against the entire decree. The second appeal filed in the High Court was not filed by any one or by even some of the plaintiffs as an appeal against the whole decree, but was filed by all the plaintiffs jointly, and, therefore, was not an appeal to which the provisions of r. 4 O.XLI could apply.The appeal could not have been taken to be an appeal filed by some of the plaintiffs against the whole decree in pursuance of the provisions of r. 4 of O.XLI from the date when the appeal abated so far as Kedar Nath was concerned. If the appeal could be treated to have been so filed, then, it would have been filed beyond the period prescribed for the appeal. At that time, the decree stood against the surviving plaintiffs and the legal representatives of Kedar Nath. The legal representatives could not have taken advantage of r. 4 of O. XLI. It follows that r. 4 of O. XLI would not be available to the surviving plaintiffs at thatthe principle behind the provisions of r. 4 seems to be that any one of the plaintiffs or defendants, in filing such an. appeal, represents all the other non- appealing plaintiffs or defendants as he wants the reversal or modification of the decree in favour of them as well, in view of the fact that the original decree proceeded on a ground common to all of them. Kedar Nath was alive when the appeal was filed and was actually one of the appellants. The surviving appellants cannot be said to have filed the appeal as representing KedarNaths appeal has abated and the decree in favour of the respondents has become final against his legal representatives. His legal representatives cannot eject the defendants from the premises in suit. It will be against the scheme of the Code to hold that r. 4 of O. XLI empowered the Court to pass a decree in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased Kedar Nath on hearing an appeal by the surviving appellants even though the decree against him has become final.question of the Provisions of r. 4 of O.XLI overriding the provisions of r. 9 of O. XXII arises. The two deal with different stages of the appeal and provide for different contingencies. Rule 4 of 0 XLI applies to the stage when an appeal is filed and empowers one of the plaintiffs or defendants to file an appeal against the entire decree in certain circumstances. He can take advantage of this provision, but he may not. Once an appeal has been filed by all the plaintiffs the provisions of 0 XLI, r. 4 became unavailable. Order XXII operates during the pendency of an appeal and not at its institution. If some party dies during the pendency of the appeal, his legal representatives have to be brought on the record within the period of limitation. If that is not done, the appeal by the deceased appellant abates and does not proceed any further. There is thus no inconsistency between the previsions of r. 9 of O. XXII and those of r. 4 of O~. XLI, C.P.C. They operate at different stages and provide for different contingencies. There is nothing common in their provisions which make the provisions of one interfere in any way with those of thedo not consider it necessary to discuss the cases referred to at the hearing. Suffice it to say that the majority of the High Courts have taken the correct view viz., that the appellate Court has no power to proceed with the appeal and to reverse and vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants under O. XLI, r. 4 when the decree proceeds on a ground common to all the plaintiffs or defendants, if all the plaintiffs or the defendants appeal from the decree and any of them dies and the appeal abates so far as he is concerned under O.XXII, r.33 is of no greater help to the contention of the appellants that their appeal could continue even though the appeal by Kedar Nath had abated, as the Court could have passed a decree in favour of the rights and interests of Kedar Nath, deceased, as well.case like the present is not a case of such a kind.When the legal representatives of the deceased appellant and the surviving appellants were negligent in not taking steps for substitution, the Court is not to exercise its discretion in favour of such a party. The discretionary power cannot be exercised to nullify the effect of the abatement of the appeal so far as Kedar Nath is concerned. In fact such an exercise of power will lead to the existence of two contradictory decrees between the heirs of Kedar Nath and the respondents, one passed by the appellate Court and another to the contrary effect by the Court below which has attained finality consequent on the abatement of the appeal in so far as they are concerned. This is always33 deals with a matter different from the matter dealt with by r. 9 of O. XXII and no question of its provisions overriding those of r. 9 of O. XXII or vice versaare, therefore, of opinion that the High Court could not have heard the appeal of the surviving appellants when the appeal by kedar Nath had abated as all the appellants had a common right and interest in getting a decree of ejectment against defendant No. 2 and such decree could have been on a ground common to all of them. The defendant cannot be ejected from the premises when he has a right to remain in occupation of the premises on the basis of the decree holding that Kedar Nath, one of the persons having a joint interest in letting out the property could not have ejected him. It is not possible for the defendant to continue as tenant of one of the landlords and not as a tenant of the others when all of them had a joint right to eject him or to have him as their tenant.