Case: Smt. Bimla Devi Etc Vs. Mst Additional District Judge and Others Etc

The appellant owns a house bearing No. 113, Amroha Gate, Fruit Market, Moradabad, in a portion of which he had inducted respondent No.3 (Vishwa Nath Kapoor) as a tenant while retaining some portion for himself, when he (appellant) was serving as a Judicial Officer in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In the year 1968, the appellant retired as a District Judge as a result of which he had to vacate his official residence, which necessitated the present eviction proceedings against respondent No.3. The application for eviction was filed on 2.1.1973 under s.21(1) (b) ofthe Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 1972 Act) in which the appellant prayed that the portion occupied by respondent No.3 may be released on the ground of personal requirement as after retirement he wanted to occupy the entire house. The appellant further claimed that due to shortage of accommodation he had to stay with his son elsewhere. The eviction proceedings were contested by the respondent on the followingthat since the appellant was already living with his son there was no particular urgency or personal necessity for him to occupy the rented portion also,(b) that the appellant had in his occupation a part of the house which was retained by him even after inducting him (respondent) as a tenant and which was sufficient for his needs, and(c) that the appellant after keeping his household effects in the portion retained by him had locked up the same and was , therefore, not in actual occupation of the house as required by Explanation (iv) to s. 21 (1)the same token, it was submitted as a point of law that the essential ingredient of Explanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) was t hat the building must have been in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes which alone would be a conclusive proof of personal necessity. It was also contended as a question of fact that as the appellant- landlord was not in actual occupation of the premises, Explanation (iv) would not be attracted in the instant case. To buttress this argument it was submitted that the landlord never occupied or possessed the premises but had locked up the same and was residing elsewhere. This plea of the respondent-tenant did not find favour with the Prescribed Authority or the Highdominant question, therefore, turns upon the import and interpretation of Explanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b), particularly the nature and meaning of the word occupation as used in Explanation (iv). The crux of the matter, therefore, was as to whether or not the case of the appellant squarely fell within the four corners of Explanation (iv) and whether the word occupation included actual residence of the landlord even though he may not have been residing there. We might mention that while the eviction proceedings were pending before the Prescribed Authority the 1972 Act was amended by U.P . Act No.28 of 1976 (for short to be referred to as the 1976 Act) which came into force with effect from 5th July 1976 and which deleted Explanation (iv). The Prescribed Authority, relying on Explanation (iv), held that the need of the landlord was fully made out and accordingly passed an order of eviction against the tenant, partly releasing some portion in appellants favour. The appellant then filed an appeal before the District Judge which was heard by an Additional District Judge who accepted the offer of the tenant and modified the Order of the Prescribed Authority by further releasing some other portion in his favour. The appellant then filed a writ petition before the High Court which upheld the decision of the District Judge and dismissed the writ petition.Before we approach the question of law raised before us it may be necessary to give a detailed picture of the position of the premises retained by the landlord and that rented out to t he tenant. The house in question is a double- storeyed one containing some rooms on the first floor and some on the ground floor which were retained by the landlord at the time of the lease and the rest of the portion was let out to the tenant.

Reasoning: We are, however unable to agree with this argument. We must remember that all the Rent Control Acts try to deprive and curtail the le gal right of an owner to his property and have put constraints and restraints on his right by giving substantial protection to the tenants in public interest, otherwise if the Rent Acts were to be abolished or were not there, the landlord could get a tenant evicted only by a notice after expiry of the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The words "shall be conclusive to prove" in Explanation (iv) clearly indicate that it is a substantive right which b elongs to the landlord and which has been affirmed and recognised if a part of an accommodation is retained by the landlord. We are unable to agree with Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the words "conclusive to prove that the building is bona fide require d by the landlord" constitute a rule of evidence. In fact, this argument was put forward before us because the learned counsel wanted to submit that in view of the 1976 Amendment Act, deleting Explanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) of the 1972 A ct, it would be deemed to be retrospective and therefore the relief given by Explanation (iv) would disappear. We cannot agree with this somewhat far-fetched submission because Explanation (iv) deals not merely with a particular procedure but with the substantive rights of the parties. The said Explanation has asserted and affirmed the substantive right of a landlord to get a portion of a building vacated where he is in occupation of a part of it. Such a substantive right can not be taken away merely by a procedural amendment nor does the language of the amendment introduced by the 1976 Act envisage or contemplate such a position. Section 14 of the 1976 Act merely recites that Explanations (ii) and (iv) of s.21(1) (b) shall be omitted. There is nothing to show that the legislature intended to give any retrospective effect to the deletion of Explanation (iv).In these circumstances, therefore, the right to ejectment having accrued to the appellant under Explanation (iv) was a vested right as an owner and could not be affected by the 1976 amendment unless it was couched in a language which was either expressly or by necessary intendment meant to be operativeattempt was made by the parties to come to a settlement but, unfortunately, the efforts failed. The argument of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that merely because the landlord was living with his son or his relation after retirement and, therefore, was not in occupation of the house cannot be accepted because it was not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how he should use his own premises. A tenant has got no right nor any business to interfere with the mode or manner in which a landlord may choose to use his property or live therein.In these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the case of the appellant is clearly covered by the provisions of Explanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) and a decree for release of the entire premises should have been passed by the District Judge against the respondent. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgments of all the courts below and order release of the entire premises in possession of the respondent to the appellant. Time is granted to the respondent to vacate the premises on or before 31st December 1984, subject to the usual undertaking to be given and filed by him in the Court within four weeks from today, failing which the grant of time shall stand revoked without further reference to the Bench and the appellant would be entitled to be put in possession forthwith. Civil Appeal No. 41 ofappeal was heard alongwith civil appeal No. 379 of 1980 which we have decided by our judgment.n point involved in this appeal was as to whether the portion of the premises sought to be vacated by the landlady was one single unit or two separateunits. This Court remanded the matter to the trial court for examining this point and the trial court has returned a finding, basing its decision on the report of the Commissioner appointed for the Purpose, that the entire building constituted one singleis, therefore, manifest that if the entire building was one unit and the appellant being in occupation of a portion of the same, she is entitled to get release of the other portion also.