Case: Satish Chandra Anand Vs. Union of India

2. In October 1945 the petitioner was employed by the Government of India on a five year contract in the Directorate-General of Resettlement and Employment of the Ministry of Labour. This was after selection by the Federal Public Service Commission. After a short period of practical training, he was posted in January 1946 at Jabalpur as the Manager of the Sub-Regional Employment Exchange and was later confirmed in this appointment.3. This contract of service was due to expire in 1950. Shortly before its expiration the Government of India made him a new offer, embodied in its letter dated 30-6-1950, to continue him in service on the expiry of his contract on the terms specified in that letter. Among them were the followingOther conditions of service:--On the termination of your contract you will be allowed to continue in your post temporarily for the period of the Resettlement and Employment Organisation and will be governed by the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 unless you are a permanent Governmentwas asked in the letter to intimate to the Ministry of Labour whether he was willing to continue in service on those terms and he admit that he accepted the offer and continued in service. He was not a permanent Government servant though it was contended in argument that he was, for he was on a five year contract and the work for which he was employed, namely, Resettlement and Employment, was itself only of a temporary character. Therefore, the Temporary Service Rules applied.Of those Rules, R. 5 is material. It runs as follows(a) The service of a temporary Government servant who is not in quasi-permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority, or by the appointing authority to the Government servant.(b) The period of such notice shall be one month, unless otherwise agreed to by the Government and by the Government servant.Quasi-permanent service is defined in the Rules and it is clear that the petitioner does not come within that class. It is also an undisputed fact that there was no agreement between the petitioner and Government regarding the period of the notice. Therefore, according to this Rule, which was a term in the petitioners contract of further service, his services were liable to termination at any time by one months notice in writing. This notice was given on 25-11-1950 and he was told that his services would terminate on the expiry of one month from 1-12-1950.

Reasoning: 7. Taking Art. 14 first, it must be shown that the petitioner has been discriminated against in the exercise of enjoyment of some legal right which is open to others who are similarly situated. The rights which he says have been infringed are those conferred by Art. 311. He says he has either been dismissed or removed from service without the safeguards which that Article confers. In our opinion, Art. 311 has no application because this is neither a dismissal nor a removal from service, nor is it a reduction in rank. It is an ordinary case of a contract being terminated by notice under one of itsterms are used in the same sense in Art. 311. It follows that the Article has no application here and so no question of discrimination arises, for the "law" whose protection the petitioner seeks has no application to him.There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the law as any other person to accept or to reject the offer which was made to him. Having accepted, he still has open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which have been denied to him, assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land such remedies for a breach as are open to him to exactly the same extent as other persons similarly situated. He has not been discriminated against and he has not been denied the protection of any laws which others similarly situated could claim. The remedy of a writ is misconceived.11. Article 16 (1) is equally inapplicable. The whole matter rests in contract. When the petitioners first contract (the five year one) came to an end, he was not a permanent Government servant and Government was not bound either to re-employ him or to continue him in service. On the other hand, it was open to Government to make him the offer it did of a continuation of his employment on a temporary and contractual basis. Though the employment was continued, it was in point of fact, and in the eyes of the law, under a new and fresh contract which was quite separate and distinct from the old even though many of its terms were the same. Article 16 (1) deals with equality of opportunity in all matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of employment or of appointment. He has been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment under these conditions was made. His grievance, when analysed, is not one of personal differentiation but is against an offer of temporary employment on special terms as opposed to permanent employment. But of course the State can enter into contracts of temporary employment and impose special terms in each case, provided they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and those who chose to accept those terms and enter into the contract are bound by them, even as the State is bound. When the employment is permanent there are certain statutory guarantees but in the absence of any such limitations Government is, subject to the qualification mentioned above, as free to make special contracts of service with temporary employees, engage in works of a temporary nature, as any other employer.12. Various matters relating to the merits of the case were referred to but we express no opinion about whether the petitioner has other rights which he can enforce in other ways. We are dealing here with a writ under Art. 32 to enforce a fundamental right and the only point we decide is that no fundamental right has been infringed.