Case: The Lord Krishna Textile Mills Vs. Its Workmen

2. It appears that on October 12, 1957, when the appellants Controller of Production and the General Superintendent were discussing certain matters in the office of the appellant mills, Har Prasad, one of the 8 workmen dismissed by the appellant, came to see the Controller along with some other workmen. These workmen placed before the Controller some of their grievances; and when the Controller told their leader Har Prasad that the grievances set forth by them were not justified Har Prasad replied that the Controller was in charge of the management of the appellant mills and could do what he liked, but he added that the ways adopted by the management were not proper and "it may bring very unsatisfactory results. With these words Har Prasad and his companions left the office of the Controller. Two days thereafter Har Prasad and Mool Chand saw the Controller again in his office and complained that one of the Back Sizers Yamin had reported to them that the Controller had beaten him; the Controller denied the allegation whereupon the two workmen left his office. At about 6 p.m. the same evening a number of workmen of the appellant mills surrounded Mr. Contractor, the General Superintendent, and Mr. Surti when they were returning to their bungalows from the mills and assaulted and beat them. The two officers then lodged a First Information Report at the Thana Sadar Bazar, Saharanpur,. P.m., thereupon the Inspector of Police went to the scene of the offence, and on making local enquiries arrest two workmen Ramesh Chander Kaushik and Tika Ram. This offence naturally led to grave disorder in the mills, and the officer of the mills felt great resentment in consequence of which the mills remained closed for three days. The appellants management then started its own investigations and on October 17 it suspended five workmen Har Prasad, Majid, Zinda, Yamin and Manak Chand. Notice was served on each of these suspended workmen called upon them to explain their conduct and to show cause why they should not be dismissed from the service of the mills. As a result of further investigation the management suspended two more workmen Om Parkash and Satnam on October 24 and served similar, notices on them. Ramesh Chander Kaushik and Tika Ram were then in police custody. After they were released from police custody notices were served on them on November 24 asking them to show cause why their services should not be terminated3. All the workmen to whom notices were thus served gave their explanations and denied the charges levelled against them. An enquiry was then held according to the Standing Orders. At the said enquiry all the workmen concerned as well as the representatives of the union were allowed to be present and the offending workmen were given full opportunity to produce their witnesses as also to cross-examine the witnesses produced by the management against them. As a result of the enquiry thus held the management found the charges proved against the workmen concerned, and on November 19 Om Parkash, Satnam, Majid, Yamin, Zinda and Har Prasad were dismissed. These dismissed workmen were asked to take their final dues together with one months pay in lieu of notice as required by the Standing Orders. On December 20, the enquiry held against Tika Ram and Ramesh Chander concluded and as a result of the findings that the charges were proved against them the said two workmen were also dismissed from service and required to take their final dues with one months wages in lieu of notice4. At this time an industrial dispute in respect of bonus for the relevant year was pending before the Industrial Tribunal (Textile) U. P., Allahabad. The appellant, therefore, made three applications before the Tribunal under S. 6E (2) of the U. P. Act on November 21 and 27 and December 21, 1957, respectively. By these applications the appellant prayed that the Industrial Tribunal should accord its approval to the dismissal of the workmen concerned. On February 18, 1958, the Tribunal found that the appellant had failed to make out a case for dismissing the workmen in question, and so it refused to accord its approval to their dismissal. Accordingly it directed the appellant to reinstate the said workmen to their original jobs with effect from the dates on which they were suspended with continuity of service, and it ordered that the appellant should pay them full wages for the period of unemployment. It is on these facts that the question about the construction of section 6E (2)(b) of the U. P. Act falls to be considered.

Reasoning: 15. We have set forth the rival contentions in regard to the construction of the proviso, but we do not propose to express our decision on the point, because, having regard to their pleadings, we cannot allow the respondents to raise this question for our decision in the present appeal.It is clear from the contentions raised before the Tribunal and the pleas specifically raised by the respondents in their statement of cases before this Court that both parties agreed that the application in question had been properly made under the proviso; and the only point at issue between them is about the validity and propriety of the order under appeal having regard to the limited jurisdiction of the enquiry under S. 33(2)(b), and it is to that question that we must now return.Before we do so, however, we ought to add that our attention had been drawn to three decisions of this Court in which, without any discussion of the point, the validity of the employers applications made under S. 33(2)(b) appears to have been assumed though the said applications were presumably made after the employers had dismissed their employees. They are: Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806 ; Management of Swatantra Bharat Mills, New Delhi v. Ratan Lal, Civil Appeal No. 392 of 1959 decided on 28-3-1960; and Central India Coalfields Ltd., Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath, Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1959 decided on 31-3-1960. We wish to make it clear that these decisions should not be taken to have decided the point one way or the other since it was obviously not argued before the Court and had not been considered at all16. In view of the limited nature and extent of the enquiry permissible under section 33(2)(b) all that the authority can do in dealing with an employers application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not. If before dismissing an employee the employer has held a proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass the impugned order as a result of the said enquiry, all that the authority can do is to enquire whether the conditions prescribed by S. 33(2)(b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. Do the standing orders justify the order of dismissal? Has an enquiry been held as provided by the standing order? Have the wages for the month been paid as required by the proviso? ; and, has an application been made as prescribed by the proviso? This last question does not fall to be decided in the present appeal because it is common ground that the application has been properly made. Standing Order 21 specifies acts of omission which would be treated as misconduct, and it is clear that under 21(s) threatening or intimidating any operative or employee within the factory premises is misconduct for which dismissal is prescribed as punishment. This position also is not in dispute. There is also no dispute that proper charge-sheets were given to the employees in question, an enquiry was properly held, and opportunity was given to the employees to lead their evidence and to cross-examine the evidence adduced against them; in other words, the enquiry is found by the Tribunal to have been regular and proper. As a result of the enquiry the officer who held the enquiry came to the conclusion that the charges as framed had been proved against the workmen concerned, and so orders of dismissal were passed against them. In such a case it is difficult to understand how the Tribunal felt justified in refusing to accord approval to the action taken by the appellant17. It has been urged before us by the appellant that in holding the present enquiry the Tribunal has assumed powers of an appellate court which is entitled to go into all questions of fact; this criticism seems to us to be fully justified. One has merely to read the order to be satisfied that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to enquire if the conclusions of fact recorded in the enquiry were justified on the merits. It did not hold that the enquiry was defective or the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied in any manner. On the other hand it has expressly proceeded to consider questions of fact and has given reasons some of which would be inappropriate and irrelevant if not fantastic even if the Tribunal was dealing with the relevant questions as an appellate court. "The script in which the statements have been recorded; observes the Tribunal,. "is not clear and fully decipherable. How this can be any reason in upsetting the finding of the enquiry it is impossible to understand. The Tribunal has also observed that the evidence adduced was not adequate and that it had not been properly discussed. According to the Tribunal the charge-sheets should have been more specific and clear and the evidence should have been more satisfactory. Then the Tribunal has proceeded to examine the evidence, referred to some discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses and has come to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry should not have recorded the conclusion that the charges have been proved against the workmen in question. In our opinion, in making these comments against the findings of the enquiry the Tribunal clearly lost sight of the limitations statutorily placed upon its power and authority in holding the enquiry under S. 33(2)(b).It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate court which is entitled to consider facts; but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the court is limited as under S. 33(2)(b).It is conceivable that even in holding an enquiry under section 33(2) (b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry is perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatever, only in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether approval should be accorded to the employer or not; but it is essential to bear in mind the difference between a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory evidence. Having carefully considered the reasons given by the Tribunal in its award under appeal, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant is fully justified in contending that the Tribunal has assumed jurisdiction not vested in it by law, and consequently its refusal to accord approval to the action taken by the appellant is patently erroneous in law18. Mr. Maheswari, however, wanted us to examine the case of Har Prasad because, according to him, Har Prasad has been victimised by the employer for his trade union activities. Har Prasad is the President of the Kapra Mill Mazdoor Union, Saharanpur, and it is because of his activities as such President that the appellant does not like him. It is common ground that at the relevant time Har Prasad was not recognised as a protected workman, and so his case does not fall under S. 33(3). The Tribunal has observed that this workman has not been named by any witness as having taken part in any assault, and it was therefore inclined to take the view that his dismissal amounted to victimisation. We have carefully considered this workmans case, and we are satisfied that the Tribunal was not justified in refusing to accord approval even to his dismissal. It is common ground that Har Prasad led the deputation to the Controlles of Production both on October 12 and October 14; and the threat held out by him on the earlier occasion is not denied by him. In terms he told the Controller that his conduct would bring trouble. It is significant that some of the workmen who assaulted the officers on October 14 had accompanied Har Prasad and were present when he gave the threat to the Controller. Mr. Sushil Kumar, who is the appellants Controller of Production, has deposed to this threat. The sequence of events that took place on October 14, unambiguously indicates that it was the threat held out by Har Prasad and the incitement given by him that led to the assault on the evening of October 14. Mr. Sushil Kumars evidence appears to be straightforward and honest. He has frankly admitted that in the past Har Prasad had been co-operating with him and that he had never instigated any attack on the officers on any previous occasion. Har Prasad no doubt denied that there was any exchange of hot words during the course of his interview with the officers but he has not disputed Mr. Sushil Kumars evidence that he uttered a warning at the time of the said interview. In fact his contention appears to have been that action should have been taken against him soon after he uttered the threat. On the evidence led at the enquiry, the enquiry officer came to the conclusion that the charge framed against this workmen had been clearly proved. The charge was that he had plotted and hatched a conspiracy for assaulting the General Superintendent, Weaving Master, Chief Engineer, Factory Manager and the Controller of Production. The details of the charge were specified, and at the enquiry it was held that these charges had been proved. There is no doubt that these charges, if proved, deserve the punishment of dismissal under the relevant standing orders. The Tribunal, however, purported to examine the propriety of the finding recorded against Har Prasad and came to the conclusion that the said finding was not justified on the merits. As we have already pointed out the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the findings of the enquiry as it has purported to do. The result is that the conclusion of the Tribunal in regard to all the workmen is unjustified and without jurisdiction.