Case: Hasmukhalal Dahayabhai &amp; Ors. Etc. Etc Vs. State Of Gujarat

The eight Civil Appeals before us by certificates of fitness of the cases for appeals to this Court raise common questions involving the interpretation of Articles 31A and 31B of the Constitution of Indian relation to the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act XXVII of 1961 (herein-after referred to as thepreamble of the Act says that it was enactedit is expedient in the public interest to make a uniform provision for the whole of the State of Gujarat in respect of restrictions upon holding agricultural land in excess of certain limits and it is also expedient for so securing the distribution of agricultural land as best to sub-serve the common good to provide for the acquisition of surplus agricultural land for the allotment thereof to persons who are in need of lands for agriculture (including cooperative farming societies, landless persons, agricultural labourers and small holders) or for the allotment of such surplus agricultural lands the integrity of which is maintained in compact blocks to a department of Government or to cooperative farming societies or corporations owned or controlled by the State, for ensuring the full and efficient use thereof and to provide for other consequential and incidental matters hereinafterpart of section 6 of the Act with which we are especially concernedNotwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement, usage or decree or order of a Court, with effect from the appointed day, no person shall, subject to the provisions of sub sections (2), (3), (3A) and (3B) be entitled to hold, whether as owner or tenant or partly as owner and partly as tenant land in excess of the ceiling area. (2) Where an individual, who holds land, is a member of a family, not being a joint family which consists of the individual and his spouse (or more than one spouse) an d their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters, irrespective of whether the family also includes any major son, and land is also separately held by such individuals spouse or minor children, then the land held by the individual and the said members of the individuals family, excluding major sons, if any shall be grouped together for the purposes of this Act and the provisions of this Act shall apply to the total land so grouped together as if such land had been held by one person.(3) xxx xxx xxx(3A) x xx xxx xxx(3B) Where a family or a joint family consist of more than five members comprising a person and other members belonging to all or any of the following categories, namely:--(i) Minor son,(ii) widow of a pre deceased son,(iii) minor son or unmarried daughter of a pre-deceased son, where his or her mother is dead,Such family shall be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area to the extent of one-fifth of the ceiling area for each member in excess of five, so however that the total holding of the family does not exceed twice the ceiling area; and, in such a case, in relation to the holding of such family, such area shall be deemed to be the ceiling area:Provided that if any land is held separately also by any member of such family, the land so held separately by such member shall be grouped together with the land to such family for the purpose of determining the total holding of such family:Provided further that where. in consequence of any member of such family holding any land in any other part of India outside the State, the ceiling area in relation to the family is reduced as pro- vided in sub-section (3A), the one-fifth of the ceiling area as aforesaid shall be calculated with reference to the ceiling area as would have been applicable had no such land been held by such member in any other part of India. (3C) Where a family or a joint family irrespective of the number of members includes a major son, then each major son shall be deemed to be a separate person for the purposes of sub-section (1)accordance with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, classes of land, nature of irrigation facilities provided there, and the ceiling area for each particular class of land in each locality were specified in Schedule I. This is found classified in nine local areas. The range of ceiling limit varies from 10 acres to 54 acres, according to the irrigation facilities and quality of land, the ceiling for less productive and less advantageously situated land being higher.

Reasoning: We do not find any fixed concept of "person" anywhere. No .doubt the concept is wide so that it could be contended that it should not be narrowed down or confined, But does Section 6 (2) do that? Section 6 (2) does not either disable a husband or wife from owning or holding their separate properties separately. It does not merge or destroy their separate legal personailties. It requires their separate holdings to be grouped together as though they were held by one person only for the purpose of determining the ceiling limit for each member of a family. It may indirectly have the effect of disabling a member of a family from holding land upto the prescribed ceiling limit for a person holding as an individual. In other words, the result is that such a member of a family will have to be content with a holding less than that of an unmarried individual. It has the effect of making it clear that what have to be grouped together are the separate properties of individuals belonging to families other than what are "joint families", in law. It takes in and applies to members of families other than undivided Hindu families. It means that married persons and their minor children will have to be viewed as though they hold one lot together even though they retain their separate legal personalities and remain competent owners of their separate holdings. It does not affect either their legal status or competence. It does reduce their individual holdings. But, we do not find any prohibition enacted by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) against different ceiling limits prescribed for various individuals or classes of individuals differently situated. Nor does the second proviso to Article 31A(1) prescribe any particular or direct more of imposing different ceilings on individuals differently circumstanced.A glance at the provisions of Section 20 of the Act shows that separate rights to properties grouped together for purposes of computation only do not vanish. On the other hand, each holder of such separate rights above the ceiling , limit is permitted to select the property he or she wishes to continue to hold in such a way "that the lands selected for such continuance shall be in the same proportion in which lands held by each spouse before furnishing the relevant statement were under sub-sect ion (1) of Section 10. The reduction in their holdings would, therefore, be proportionate to the areas of lands held separately but brought together only for the purposes of determining the: ceiling limit for the family. The whole object of the process prescribed seems to be that families, as contemplated by the Act, should be units for merely determination of ceilings for each member of awas urged that Article 31A(1) and 3lB of the Constitution operate in different fields of legislation. Whereas Article 3 IA( 1 ) cures certain possible invalidities in ordinary legislation, arising from its. inconsistencies with Articles 14 or 19 or 31 of the Constitution, Article 3lB cures a wider range of infirmities arising from conflict with any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and necessitates a constitutional amendment so as to protect an impugned legislation by its inclusion in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution. Legislation protected by Article 31A o f the Constitution would fall under appropriate legislative entries in the 7th Schedule. But, to secure the protection of Article 3lB of the Constitution, resort to the provisions of Article 368 of the Constitution is imperative. These differences do not mean that legislation falling under any part of Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, including the provisos, cannot receive also the protection contemplated by Article 3lB of the Constitution. There is nothing in our Constitution to bar any statute from receiving a dual protection, so to speak, of both Article 31A(1) and 3lB of the Constitution if the conditions of each are satisfied.It is clear to us that the proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution confers certain rights upon individuals and protects them from -constitutionally illegal invasion. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the "protective umbrella" of Article 3lB does not shield the impugned provisions , against an attack based upon the limits imposed by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) on legisl ative power. The argument overlooks certain obvious answers: firstly, that limits on legislative powers, imposed by Part III of the Constitution, do have the direct result of protecting individual rights; and, secondl y, that no part of the second proviso to Article 31 (1) of the Constitution was, as already pointed out above, infringed by the impugned provisions; and, thirdly, even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that rights conferred on individuals by the 2nd proviso to Article 31 (1), were infringed in any way, pro. visions of Article 31B of the Constitution are enough to repel an attack based upon such an alleged infringement. Both Article 31A(1) and 31B are intended to operate as protections against consequences of what could otherwise be breaches of the Constitution.