Case: BALJEET SINGH (DEAD) THROUGH LRS Vs. STATE OF UP

3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that there is an inordinate delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days respectively (approximately 21 years) in preferring the special leave petitions before this Court challenging the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court. There is a further delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the special leave petitions3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/are vehemently opposed by the respondents herein.

Reasoning: 7. Having considered the averments made in the application/applications for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that as such the petitioners have miserably failed to make out a case to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years. No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years. It is required to be noted that as such in the application itself it is submitted by the petitioners that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court. The only explanation in approaching this Court after about 21 years is given in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:That the primary reason in not approaching this Honble Court in time was the fact that it was only in December, 2016, the claimants pertaining to village Kasana got the enhanced compensation from this Honble Court to the tune of Rs.65/- per sq. yard. The petitioners herein came to know about the said fact in the month of January, 2017 causing not only lots of heartburn but spelling miseries over them. It took not only lots of courage in mustering support from number of affected families but also it took time for the petitioners to collectively file the instant special leave petition claiming not only the enhanced compensation but also parity with regard to the compensation awarded to their co-villagers at village Kasana7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there is a reasonable case made out by the petitioners to get the enhanced compensation to the tune of Rs.65/- per square yard, but fairly enough in order to balance the equity, this Court may not grant interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court i.e., 2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before this Court. Except the explanation in paragraph 3, reproduced hereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explaining the huge delay of approximately 21 years. Neither any poverty is pleaded nor any financial difficulty is pleaded. Nothing is on record that after the impugned common judgment and order is passed by the High Court, the petitioners made any grievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of the compensation determined by the High Court. On the contrary, all the petitioners have accepted the compensation as per the judgment and award passed by the reference Court determining the compensation at the rate of Rs.30/- per square yard. It appears that with respect to some of the land owners even the execution petitions are pending with respect to recovery of the differential amount of compensation, determined by the reference Court and the High Court as by the impugned common judgment and order the High Court has reduced the compensation from Rs.30-/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/- per sq. yard. Be that as it may, the fact remains that after the impugned common judgment and order is passed by the High Court, no grievance at all is made by the petitioners with respect to inadequacy of the compensation determined by the High Court. Thus, it can be said that for a period of approximately 21 years no grievance was made by the petitioners. Therefore, considering the terms of doctrine of acquiescence, the petitioners lose their right to complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case the party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and therefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrongIt is a very recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is nonexistent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. In those cases, where the period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over, however, subject to the prayer for condonation of delay and if there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is shown, the court may condone the delay. Therefore, in a case where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not brought within the period of limitation and subsequently proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay with a proper explanation. It is not that in each and every case despite the sufficient cause is not shown and the delay is not properly explained, the court may condone the delay. To make out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating the proceedings within the period of limitation. Otherwise, he will be accused of gross negligence. If the aggrieved party does not initiate the proceedings within the period of limitation without any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order. These principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such right is non-existent9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal (supra); Dhiraj Singh (supra); and K. Subbarayudu (supra), relied upon by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is concerned, having gone through the said decisions, we are of the opinion that none of the said decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or the said decisions shall be of any assistance to the petitioners. First of all, in the relied upon cases, there was no such inordinate delay of approximately 21 years. In the relied upon cases, this Court was satisfied on the sufficient cause for delay. In the relied upon cases, parity was claimed with respect to the land acquired under the very notification and it was pointed out that due to poverty and financial difficulty some of the land owners whose land was acquired under the same notification could not prefer the appeals earlier and thereafter they preferred the appeals subsequently and claimed parity of compensation at par with the land acquired under the same notification. It is also required to be noted that as such in none of the aforesaid decisions, this Court had dealt with and/or considered the adverse impact/effect on the State/acquiring body if after inordinate delay/laches the State/acquiring body is directed to pay the enhanced amount of compensation. In the present case, lands were acquired as far back as in the year 1985 and the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988. The reference Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/- per square yard, which came to be reduced by the High Court by the impugned common judgment and order in the year 1996. It is required to be noted that the lands were acquired for Industrial development purposes. That after the acquisition, the land has been developed, infrastructure and amenities are laid and the developed land has been allotted approximately before 30 years. It is the specific case on behalf of the respondents that the rate of allotment was based on the cost of acquisition and the amount spent on development, laying out the infrastructure. Therefore, if the cost of acquisition is increased now and the State/acquiring body is directed to pay enhanced compensation, in that case, it would be very difficult to recover the difference of amount of compensation from the allottees after decades of allotment. The acquiring body will have to make additional budgetary provision and as observed hereinabove it would be very difficult for the acquiring body to recover the difference of compensation from the allottees after so many years. All these aspects and the cascading effect on the State/acquiring body if they are directed to pay the additional compensation after number of years, have not been considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. Even if the petitioners are denied the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the delayed period as requested by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in that case also, to direct the State/acquiring body to pay the enhanced amount of compensation after number of years (21 years) would be unreasonable and would have a financial burden upon them and as observed hereinabove it would be very difficult for the State/acquiring body to recover the same from the allottees. Under the circumstances, none of the aforesaid decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand and/or the same shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.