Case: Janendra Nath Roy Vs. State of W.B

1. This petition is for a writ of habeas corpus and is directed against an order of detention passed against the petitioner on April 16, 1971 by the District Magistrate, Burdwan, under Sec. 3 (1) read with. (3) of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act Presidents Act 19 of 1970. The order recites that it was passed on the District Magistrate being satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order , one of the two grounds provided by the Act for exercise of the power of detention thereunder2. In consequence of the said order, the petitioner was placed under arrest on April 21, 1971 and detained in jail. As required by the Act, he was served with the grounds of detention on that very day. The District Magistrate reported the case to the State Government on April 16, 1971 and the State Government thereafter on April 26, 1971 approved the said order. On that day, the petitioners detention to the Central Government. On May 19, 1971, the State Government received a representation from the petitioner against his said detention. On May 20, 1971, it referred the petitioners case together with the said representation to the Advisory Board constituted under Sec. 9 of the Act. On June 16, 1971, the State Government considered the said representation and rejected it. On June 28, 1971, the Advisory Board, after considering the petitioners case, made its report to the State Government to the effect that there was sufficient cause for this detention. Thereupon, the State Government on September 6, 1971 confirmed the detention order and the continuation of the petitioners detention. The petitioner was informed of the Governments said decision on September 17, 19713. The grounds for detention furnished to the petitioner recited four activities in respect of which the District Magistrate was said to have been satisfied for passing the impugned order. These were :(a) that on July 5, 1970 at 9.25 p.m. the petitioner and some of his associates trespassed into the projector room of a cinema theatre known as Anuradha Cinema Hall at Benachity, while a picture called Yadgar was being shown, and threw bombs which set fire to the cinema screen, caused other damage to the cinema property and created panic and alarm among those watching the picture, as also the residents of that locality;(b) that on July 14, 1970 at about 9 p.m. the petitioner and his associates, armed with explosives, namely bombs, assembled at the crossing of Ram Mohun Avenue and Dayananda Road, and with a view to cause the murder of Lt. Col. Chattar Singh, hurled two bombs at him while he was returning home in a jeep from his official duties, thereby causing multiple injuries to the said officer, and fear amongst the people of that locality;(c) that on March 8, 1971, at about 9.30 p.m. the petitioner together with his associates, armed with deadly weapons, such as daggers, stabbed a bus conductor near Nehru Stadium at Durgapur and caused his immediate death, the reason for the said murder being the refusal of the conductor to fall in line with and promote the cause of the extremist political group to which the petitioner and his associates belonged; and(d) that on April 5, 1971, at about 1.30 p.m. the petitioner and his associates, armed again with daggers and other lethal weapons, trespassed into N. E. College Post Office at Durgapur, and forcing the staff thereof at the point of daggers to leave the Post Office, set fire to its records and furniture, thereby creating panic amongst the local inhabitants."

Reasoning: 5. In support of his first contention, counsel relied on two decisions of this Court, viz. Abdul Karim v. State of West Bengal, (1969) 3 SCR 479  = (AIR 1969 SC 1028 ) and Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 3 SCR 225  = (AIR 1970 SC 675 ).Both these decisions were under the Preventive Detention Act IV of 1950, but the provisions of the present Act being almost similar to those of that Act, the principles laid down in the decisions under the latter Act would undoubtedly applyIf the two decisions were to be understood, as counsel urged us to do, it would be impossible in cases, where a detenu sends his representation late, for the State Government to discharge its function. Such a construction could not have been intended either by Ramaswami, J., or by Ray, J., in the two decisions referred to above7. As stated earlier, the petitioner was arrested on April 21, 1971. The State Government received his representation on May 19, 1971, that is to say, one day before the expiry of 30 days from the date of his detention within which the Government had to refer his case to the Advisory Board under Sec. 10 of the Act together with his representation. It is manifest that it was practically impossible for the State Government to properly and bona fide consider that representation and arrive at its decision thereon before it referred the case to the Board. Supposing that instead of the State Government receiving the said representation on May 19, 1971, it had received it a day or two later, the time for referring the case to the Board would have expired and the State Government would have been placed in a quandary, if it were intended that it should consider and come to its decision on the representation before it could refer the petitioners case to the Board. There can be no. doubt, therefore, that the obligation of the Government under Art. 22 (5) spelt out in the decisions of this Court, is that consideration by the State Government of a detenus representation is an obligation distinct from and independent of its consideration by the Board. It need not as a rule be done before the Government refers the detenus case to the Board. Such consideration, however, must be done without any inordinate delay. But each case must depend upon its own facts. And the question whether the obligation by the Government was discharged properly or not and without any inordinate delay has to be decided upon a consideration of such facts. The first contention of counsel cannot, therefore, prevail8. The second contention has no. merit. The allegation in the petition that the grounds of detention were motivated is only a bare allegation without its being supported by any facts or particulars. Such an allegation, obviously, could be met only by an equally bare denial which has been done in the. But counsel contended that thet ought to have been sworn by the District Magistrate himself upon whose satisfaction the impugned order was founded. While there is some force in it, it appears from this petition as well as from other similar petitions which we had recently to deal that the West Bengal Government has given the entire work relating to detention orders to one of its officers, who naturally has to get acquainted with the facts of cases coming to him. The Government, therefore, seems to consider it convenient that that officer, and not the District Magistrate, makes the. By the time such an affidavit has to be made, the record would have come to the secretariat, and therefore, it has been found more convenient that such an officer, rather than the relevant District Magistrate, should make the affidavit. In these circumstances, it is not possible to say that the objections raised by a detenu in his petition cannot be satisfactorily explained or replied to by the officer entrusted with detention cases.