Case: National Buildings Construction Corporation Vs. Pritam Singh Gill And Others

1. Facts necessary for understanding the short but important point arising for decision in this appeal by special leave are these :The appellant is a company incorporated underthe Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office in New Delhi. Its entire share capital has been subscribed by the Central Government. Pritam Singh Gill, respondent No. 1, in this appeal was employed by the appellant as Junior Engineer at its Bhopal office with effect from the 9th November, 1962 at Rs. 280/- p.m. as basic salary with other allowances. On October 5, 1964 he was suspended and this order of suspension remained in force till September 18, 1967. He was dismissed from service on September 19, 1967. During the period of suspension on October 7, 1965, the respondent was transferred to Delhi. On June 15, 1968 the respondent applied to the Labour Court at Delhi under Sec. 33C (2) ofthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) for computing the benefits and amounts he was entitled to receive alleging that the appellant had not paid to him such amount and benefits. The appellant contested the respondents claim on various grounds. The Labour Court framed the following four issues:"1. Whether the application is not legally maintainable?2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this petition?3. Whether the petitioner has been dismissed with effect from 19-9-1967, if so its effect?4. Whether the applicant is entitled to any of the benefits claimed?" and decided all of them in favour of the respondent who was held entitled to Rs. 5,195/- as balance of salary at the rate of Rs. 150/- p.m. for the period of suspension and also other allowances, that total amount computed being Rs. 10,259,98.

Reasoning: 5. We now turn to some decisions of the High Courts which directly deal with this point. In Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co. (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court Madurai, (1961) 1 Lab L.J. 729=(AIR 1961 Mad 307  ) Ramchandra Ayyar J., repelled a similar contention as was raised before us by Shri Malhotra on behalf of the appellant. In the case cited, one Iswaran was employed as a traffic supervisor in Tiruchi- Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. His services were terminated in December 1956 under a scheme of retrenchment. Later, disputes were raised between the management and other workers regarding bonus for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and a settlement was reached in April, 1958 pursuant to which the management declared additional bonus and one months wage for each of the two years. Iswaran having not been paid anything by the way of bonus though he had worked during those two years applied to the Labour Court for necessary relief under Section 33C (2) of the Act. The Labour Court having granted the relief claimed, the management approached the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain Iswarans claim. The High Court repelled this challenge though on an other point relating to the claimants right to benefit under the settlement, the case was remitted back to the Labour Court for a fresh decision. It was observed in that decision that while enacting Section 33-C (2), the Legislature did not intend merely to provide a remedy for the limited class of the persons who are in actual employment on the date of the application under that section. The words "any workman" in Section 33-C (2), according to that decision, would mean workman who would be entitled to benefits conferred under the Act and would necessarily include a discharged workman as well. In Manicka Mudaliar (M) v. Labour Court, Madras, (1961) Lab LJ 592 (Mad), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while hearing a writ appeal, from the decision of a learned single Judge of that Court also upheld the competency of a petition under Section 33-C (2) of the Act for arrears of salary and one months salary in lieu of notice, although at the time of the application, the applicant was no longer in service of the employer. Following these Madras decisions a learned single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bachittar Singh v. Central Labour Court, Jullunder, AIR 1969 Punj 187 a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in Management of Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bangalore, AIR 1970 Mys 225 and the Allahabad High Court in U.P. Electric Supply Co., Ltd v. Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Allahabad, (1966) 2 Lab LJ 714 (All) took the same view. In the Allahabad case, however the provision which directly came up for construction was section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, the language of which was considered to be identical with that of Section 33-C of the Act. Incidentally it may be pointed out that Section 6-H of the U.P. Industrial disputes Act has been held to be identical with Section 33-C of the Act even by this CourtAccording to the appellants submission these decisions have ignored the vital point that the definition of "workman" specifically includes within its fold, only for the purpose of a proceeding under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, persons who have been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. Since certain categories of persons are also expressly stated not to be included in this definition the Legislature must according to the argument, be considered to have intended to define this word with exactitude and precision and its scope, therefore, cannot be extended to the dismissed, discharge or retrenched persons strictly for the purposes of the proceedings expressly mentioned in the inclusive clause. The fact that the definition also specifically excludes from its purview four categories of persons employed in an industry who would have otherwise been within the periphery of the definition shows that the legislature intended to be meticulously precise leaving no scope for any intendment extending the literal meaning of the language used to dismissed employees for purposes of other proceedings not specified in Section 33-C (2) of the Act. The definition, said Shri Malhotra, is exhaustive rendering its extension impermissible. The counsel also commented on the recent decision of this Court in AIR 1972 SC 451   (Supra). According to Shri Malhotra this decision does not touch the question whether a dismissed employee can be considered as a workman for the purpose of approaching the Labour Court under Section 33-C (2) of the Act and he emphasised that this case should be considered to be confined to its own facts. The further contention pressed by Shri Malhotra was that the respondents claim raises an industrial dispute and, therefore, it would be more appropriate for him to claim a reference under S. 10 of the Act. This contention being based only on the appellants denial of the claim cannot exclude the applicability of Section 33-C (2). He also made a reference to the decision of this Court in Bennet Coleman and Co. (P) Ltd., v. Punya Priya Das Gupta, (1970) 1 SCR 181   = (AIR 1970 SC 426  ) which was concerned with the working Journalists (conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 45 of 1955 and contended that in that decision the definitions of S. 2 (c) and (f) of that Act took within their fold persons who were no longer in the employment of their erstwhile employer against whom their claim was made, provided the claim related to a period when they were in his employment. Shri Malhotra pointed out that in the reported case there was no clause in the statutory definition including therein for limited purposes certain persons otherwise not within the definition and excluding therefrom certain other categories of persons who would otherwise fall within the definition. This is how the case was sought to be distinguished from the present. The crucial point which requires consideration on the appellants argument is thus confined to the precise scope and meaning of the word "workman" used in Section 33-C (2) in the background of the definition of this word as contained in Section 2 (s)7. Now, it is noteworthy that Section 2 of the Act, which is the definition section begins, as is usual with most of the definition sections, with the clause, "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context". This clearly indicated that it is always a matter for argument whether or not this statutory definition is to apply to the word "workman" as used in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration, for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject-matter. The context and the subject-matter in connection with which the word "workman" is used are accordingly important factors having a bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construing the word "workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may turn to the purpose and object of Section 33-C of the Act. This section was enacted for the purpose of enabling individual workman to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to Section 10 by raising disputes and securing a reference which is obviously a lengthy process. Section 33-C of the Act has accordingly been described as a provision which clothes the Labour Court with the power similar to those of an executing Court so that the workmen concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing individual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to provide the aggrieved workman with a forum similar to the executing Courts it calls for a broad and beneficial construction consistently with other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which Section 33C was designed to suppress was the difficulties faced by individual workmen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having resort to Section 10 of the Act. To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always be open an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by Section 33-C and compel him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under Section 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and object of enacting this provision. This in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part of Section 2 of the Act an such a position could hardly have been contemplated by the legislature. In order to remove this repugnancy Section 33-C (2) must be so construed as to take within its fold a workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims relief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words the term "workman" as used in Section 33-C (2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computation under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alone can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object of inserting Section 33-C in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we approve of their approach. According to Shri Malhotra, in cases where there is no dispute about the employees right which is not denied, he will be entitled to file a suit. Whether or not the right of suit can be claimed by the employee we are not persuaded on the basis of this argument to accept the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant and deny to a dismissed employee the benefit to speedy remedy under Section 33-C (2) of the Act8. We are aware of a conflict of decisions in some High Courts on the interpretation of Section 20 read with Sec. 2 (I) of the Minimum Wages Act, 12 of 1948. This aspect was not canvassed before us and, therefore, we should not be deemed to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of either view. We are referring to this aspect only to make it clear that our decision must be confined to the construction of the provisions of the Act and we must not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the construction of the Minimum Wages Act. In the Madras High Court two single Judges have taken divergent views and the Kerala High Court agreed with the view that the employees under the Minimum Wages Act need not be in the employment at the time of their applications under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act whereas the Punjab High Court on the other hand agreed with the contrary view of the Madras High Court. The language of Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act is not completely identical with that of Section 33-C (2) of the Act and the relevant clauses of the definition sections in the two statutes are also somewhat differently worded. Without any further discussion on this aspect we are content to observe that this judgment should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Minimum Wages Act.