Case: Bharat Forge Co. Ltd Vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate

2. In the said proceeding, two preliminary issues were framed, namely, (i) whether the enquiry was proper, and (ii) is the finding recorded by the enquiry officer perverse. The Labour Court by its order dated 21.5.1985 held that the domestic enquiry against the Respondent was fair and proper and the finding recorded by the enquiry officer was not perverse. He thereafter proceeded with the case on merits and in terms of its order dated 31.7.1985, the Labour Court held that the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the employee was harsh and disproportionate and no reasonable employer could impose such punishment for the proved misconduct. Consequently, the Appellant herein was directed to reinstate the Respondent on his original post with continuity of service with 50% of the back-wages for the period from 23.12.1983 till his reinstatement.3. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith both the parties herein preferred separate Revision Applications before the Industrial Tribunal. By a common judgment dated 12.6.1987, the Revision Application filed by the Appellant was allowed and that of the Respondent was dismissed. The Respondent thereupon filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court and by reason of a judgment and order dated 9.2.1995, the said Writ Petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. A Letters Patent Appeal there-against was filed by the Respondent herein which by reason of the impugned judgment was allowedthe judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 9th February 1995 and the order of the Industrial Court dated 12th June 1987 are quashed and set aside.ii) the order passed by the second labour court dated 31st July 1985 is modified by directing the employer to pay a sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- to the employee within one month from today. In the event of failure to pay the said amount to the employee within one month from today, the employer shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from today till such payment is made.The Appellant is in Appeal before us questioning the aforementioned judgment.

Reasoning:
10. The jurisdiction of a Labour Court was, therefore, confined to make an enquiry and pass an order thereupon as to whether the Appellant herein had committed an act of unfair labour practice within the meaning of Section 26 read with the relevant provisions of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act.11. Before we proceed to determine the merit of the decision rendered by the Division Bench, it is useful to notice that the act of misconduct committed by the Respondent was admitted by him in terms of his letter dated 26.8.It is also pertinent to note that the Enquiry Officer in his report categorically stated as to how the Respondent had been conducting himself during the domesticNo sufficient or cogent reason, in our opinion, was assigned by the learned Labour Court as to why a lenient view should be taken. The Revisional Court while allowing the Revision Application of the Appellant and dismissing the Revision Application of the Respondent came to the conclusion that as the misconduct has been proved and relying on the decision of this Court in Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel (supra) where it was opined that a proved misconduct is anti thesis of victimization in the industrialState Road Transport Corpn. vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma and others (2000) 3 SCCWe have noticed hereinbefore that all the courts have answered the question as regard commission of misconduct by the Respondent in one voice. The Labour Court evidently had taken recourse to Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of the Act which ex facie was inapplicable. The said provisions clearly postulates two situations, namely (i) the misconduct should be of minor or technical character, and (ii) the punishment is a shockingly disproportionate without having any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past record of service of the employee. The past record of service, therefore, is a relevant factor for considering as to whether the punishment imposed upon the delinquent employee is shockingly disproportionate or not. As has been noticed hereinbefore, before the learned Single Judge an attempt on the part of the Respondent to take recourse to Clause (b) of Item (1) of Schedule IV failed. In absence of any plea of factual victimization and furthermore in absence of any foundational fact having been laid down for arriving at a conclusion of the legal victimization, in our opinion the Division Bench committed a manifest error in invoking Clause (a) thereof.27. The Division Bench, thus, was not correct in relying on Colour-Chem Ltd. (supra) and failed to notice the distinguishing features thereof. A decision, as is well-known, is an authority of what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. (See Cement Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Purya and others (2004) 8 SCC 270 )28. In Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel (supra), this CourtIn such a case the employee, found guilty, cannot be equated with a victim or a scapegoat and the plea of victimization as a defence will fall flat. This is why once, in the opinion of the tribunal a gross misconduct is established, as required, on legal evidence either in a fairly conducted domestic enquiry or before the tribunal on merits, the plea of victimization will not carry the case of the employee any further. A proved misconduct is antithesis of victimization as understood in industrial relations. This is not to say that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to interfere with an order of dismissal on proof of victimization.It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the Respondent to plead and prove the acts of victimization. He failed to do so.30. Furthermore, it is trite, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, must act within the four-corner thereof. The Industrial Courts would not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there exists a statutory provision in this behalf. Although its jurisdiction is wide but the same must be applied in terms of the provisions of the statute and no other.31. If the punishment is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be imposed, but such an order cannot be passed on an irrational or extraneous factor and certainly not on a compassionate ground.