Case: D. S. Reddy Vs. Chancellor, Osmania University &amp; Ors

2. The appellant filed the said writ petition under the following circumstances. The appellant was the Vice-Chancellor of the Osmania University, having been appointed, as such, by order, dated April 30, 1964, passed by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, in his capacity as Chancellor of the said University. The appointment of the appellant, under the said order, as Vice-Chancellor, there is not controversy, was for a term of five years from the date of taking charge; and the appointment itself was made under sub-s. (1) of S. 12 of the Osmania University Act, 1959 (Andhra Pradesh Act No. IX of 1959). There is, again, no controversy that the appellant took charge as Vice-Chancellor, in terms of the said order, on April 30, 1964 and, as such, he became entitled to hold office for the full period of five years, which will expire at the end of April 19693. The Osmania University was established in 1918 and the administration of the University was then governed by a Charter of His Exalted Highness, the Nizam of Hyderabad, promulgated in 1947. With effect from November 1, 1956, the State of Hyderabad ceased to exist, and the Telengana region of that State became part of Andhra Pradesh. In 1959, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University Act, 1959, earlier referred to. That Act itself was one to amend and consolidate the law relating to the Osmania University. It is only necessary to note, at this stage, that under S. 12 (1) of the said Act, it was provided that the Vice-Chancellor shall be appointed by the Chancellor from a panel of not less than three persons selected by a Committee, as constituted under sub-s. (2); but, if the Chancellor does not approve any of the persons so selected, he may call for a fresh panel from the Committee. Section 13, again, provided for the term of office, salary and allowances, etc., of the Vice-Chancellor. Under sub-s (1), the term of officer of the Vice-Chancellor was fixed for a term of five years and there was also a further provision to the effect that he shall be eligible for re-appointment4. By S. 51 of the said Act, the Osmania University Revised Charter of 1947 was repealed: but, nevertheless, it was provided that the person holding office immediately before the commencement of the Act as Vice-Chancellor, was to be the Vice-Chancellor on such commencement of the Act, and was to continue to hold the said office, in circumstances mentioned therein5. There is, again, no controversy that the appellant, who was already the Vice-Chancellor of the Osmania University form 1957, was again appointed in 1959, as Vice-Chancellor for a period of five years under this Act; and he was similarly appointed for a further term of five years, on April 13, 1964, as Vice-Chancellor, as mentioned earlier. During the middle of 1965, certain amendments were sought to be introduced in the Act by providing for removal of the Vice-Chancellor, by the Chancellor, form office under certain circumstances. There was also a proposal to reduce the term of office of the Vice-Chancellor from 5 years to 3 years, from the date of his appointment, and for provisions being made enabling the Government to give directions to the University relating to matter of policy to be followed by it6. The amendment sought to be introduced in the Act, appear to have come in for considerable criticism from several quarters, and these have been elaborately dealt with in the order under attack. According to the appellant, he was one of those who very strenuously opposed the proposed amendments on the ground that the autonomy of the University was sought to be interfered with by the Government. According to the appellant, again, the various criticisms made by him and others were taken note of by the Inter-University Board, by the Education Minister of the Union and others. It is the further case of the appellant that it was felt by the Government of Andhra Pradesh that he was responsible for the agitation that was being made, against the proposed amendments. But, ultimately, the Andhra Pradesh Legislature passed the Osmania University (Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act II of 1966), amending the Osmania University Act of 1959 in certain particularsThe said amendments are to the effect that the Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from office, except as provided for in Section 12 (2) of the Amended Act. The term of office was also fixed at 3 years under the amended S. 13. Another provision relating to the power of Government to give instructions to the University was also introduced, as S. 7A; but the appellant continued as Vice-Chancellor7. The Osmania University Act, was again amended by the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966 (Act XI of 1966). Under this amendment. S. 13A was enacted. In brief, that section was to the effect that the person holding the office of the Vice-Chancellor, immediately before the commencement of the amending Act of 1966, was to hold office only until a new Vice-Chancellor was appointed under sub-s. (1) of S. 12; and it also provided that such appointment shall be made within 90 days after such commencement. There was a further provision that on the appointment of such new Vice-Chancellor, and on his entering upon his office, the person holding the office of Vice-Chancellor immediately before such appointment, shall cease to hold that office. Section 7-A, which had been introduced by Act II of 1966, was deleted. Section 33-A was enacted, making special provision as to the re-constitution of the Senate Syndicate, Academic Council and Finance Committee of the University8. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 853 of 1966, in the High Court, praying for the issue of a writ or order declaring S. 5 of the Osmania University (Second Amendment) Act, 1966, which introduced S. 13-A in the original Act, as unconstitutional and void. In that writ petition, he challenged the validity of the new Section, S. 13-A, on several grounds. In brief, his plea was that by virtue of his appointment as Vice-Chancellor for 5 years on April 30, 1964, he had acquired a vested right to hold that office for the full term and that such a vested right could not be taken away during the currency of the period, by any legislative enactment. The legislature had no competence to enact the said provision inasmuch as S. 13-A could not be treated as legislation in respect of University education. The appellant had also pleaded that the provision virtually amounted to removal of the appellant from his office without giving him any opportunity to show cause against such removal. According to the appellant, even assuming the Legislature was competent to enact the provision in question, nevertheless, S. 13-A is unconstitutional and void, inasmuch as it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Reasoning:
The findings recorded, and the views expressed, by the High Court are sought to be sustained by the learned Additional Solicitor-General, appearing for the respondents. But, we do not think it necessary to go into the larger controversy that has been raised by the appellant, before the High Court, in the view that we take, that the appellant must succeed in respect of the attack levelled against the impugned provision, based upon Art. 14 of the Constitution. As to whether the criticism, made by the appellant about the proposals to amend the Act, was or was not responsible for the passing of the legislation in question does not assume much of an importance; because, the simple question iswhether the provision, S. 13-A, as it now stands in the Act, is violative, in any manner, of Art. 14 of theConstitution.Therefore, it is clear that S. 13-A applies only to the appellant. Though, no doubt, it has been stated, on behalf of the respondents that similar provisions were incorporated, at about the same time in two other Acts, relating to two other Universities, viz., the Andhra University and the Sri Venkateswara University, and though this circumstance has also been taken into account by the learned Judges of the High Court, in our opinion, those provisions have no bearing in considering the attack levelled by the appellant on S. l3-A of the ActThis is a clear case where the statute itself directs its provisions, by enacting S. 13-A, against one individual, viz., the appellant; and, before it can be sustained as valid, this Court must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for grouping the appellant as a class by himself and that such reasonable basis must appear either in the statute itself or must be deducible from other surrounding circumstances. According to learned counsel for the appellant, all Vice- Chancellors of the Osmania University come under one group and can be classified only as one unit and there is absolutely no justification for grouping the appellant under one class and the Vice-Chancellors to be appointed in future under a separate class. In any event, it is also urged that the said classification has no relation or nexus to the object of the enactmentWhile a Vice-Chancellor appointed under S. 12 of the Act can be removed from office only by adopting the procedure under S. 12 (2), the services of the appellant, who was also a Vice-Chancellor and similarly situated, is sought to be terminated by enacting S. 13-A of the Act. We do not see any policy underlying the Act justifying this differential treatment accorded to the appellant. The term of office of the Vice-Chancellors has been no doubt reduced wider the First Amendment Act and fixed for 3 years for all the Vice-Chancellors. But, so far as the appellant is concerned, by virtue of S. 13-A of the Act, he can continue to hold that office only until a new Vice-Chancellor is appointed by the Chancellor, and that appointment is to be made within 90 days. While all other Vice-Chancellors, appointed under the Act, can continue to be in office for a period of three years, the appellant is literally forced out of his office, on the expiry of 90 days from the date of commencement of the Second Amendment Act. There is also no provision in the statute providing for the termination of the services of the Vice-Chancellors, who are appointed under the Act, in the manner provided under Section 13-A of the Act. By S. 13-A, the appellant is even denied the benefits which may be available under the proviso to sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of the Act, which benefit is available to all other Vice-ChancellorsThe appointment of the appellant in 1959 and, again in 1964, wider S. 12 (1) of the Act, as it stood prior to the two object amendments, by the Chancellor, must have been, no doubt, from a panel of names submitted by a committee constituted under S. 12 (2). The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor after the passing of the First Amendment Act, is to be made exclusively by the Chancellor under S. 12 (1), as the section now stands. That is a circumstance, relied on by the respondent, for differentiating the appellant as an existing Vice-Chancellor from a Vice-Chancellor to be appointed under the Act as amended. Another circumstance relied on is that the appellant has been a Vice-Chancellor for 7 years. In our opinion these are not such vital or crucial factors which will justify treating the appellant as a class by himself. because the powers and duties of a Vice-Chancellor, either under the Act, prior to the amendment or under the Act, after amendment continue to be the same. To conclude, the classification of the appellant, as a class by himself, is not founded on any intelligible differentia, which distinguishes him from other Vice-Chancellors and it has no rational relation to the object of the statute, and so S. 13-A is hit by Art. 14The appointment of the appellant in 1959 and, again in 1964, wider S. 12 (1) of the Act, as it stood prior to the two object amendments, by the Chancellor, must have been, no doubt, from a panel of names submitted by a committee constituted under S. 12 (2). The appointment of a Vice-Chancellor after the passing of the First Amendment Act, is to be made exclusively by the Chancellor under S. 12 (1), as the section now stands. That is a circumstance, relied on by the respondent, for differentiating the appellant as an existing Vice-Chancellor from a Vice-Chancellor to be appointed under the Act as amended. Another circumstance relied on is that the appellant has been a Vice-Chancellor for 7 years. In our opinion these are not such vital or crucial factors which will justify treating the appellant as a class by himself. because the powers and duties of a Vice-Chancellor, either under the Act, prior to the amendment or under the Act, after amendment continue to be the same. To conclude, the classification of the appellant, as a class by himself, is not founded on any intelligible differentia, which distinguishes him from other Vice-Chancellors and it has no rational relation to the object of the statute, and so S. 13-A is hit by Art. 14We have, however, not considered the question as to whether the appellant can be treated as falling under the same class, as the other authorities mentioned in S. 33-A as we have accepted the appellants contention, based upon Art. 14, on other grounds.