Case: Srinivasa Reddiar And Others Vs. N. Ramaswamy Reddiar And Another

1. The present appeal has been brought to this Court by special leave and it arises from a suit filed by the appellants against four respondents. The properties involved in the suit consist of agricultural lands situated in Eragudi village, Musiri taluk, Tiruchirappalli district. According to the appellants, the said lands had been granted in Inam to the ancestor of one Ambalathadum Pachai Kandai Udayavar by the Carnatic Rulers before the advent of the British power in India. The original grant-deeds are not available; but at the time of the settlement of the Inams in the sixties of the last century, Inam title deeds were issued in favour of the family of Pachai Kandai Udayavar. The appellants averred that the properties covered by the grant had been granted in Inam to the original grantee burdened with the obligation of performing certain services in a Matam. The said properties were alienated from time to time, and as a result of the last alienation, the appellants became entitled to them. The appellants in the present litigation claimed a declaration about their title to the properties in suit and a permanent injunction restraining respondents 1 to 3, who claimed to be the trustees of an alleged Pachai Kandai Udayavar Temple at Eragudi, from interfering with their possession of the same. Respondent No. 4 is the Deputy Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Tiruchirapalli, and he has been impleaded because he has purported to appoint respondents 1 to 3 as trustees of the said alleged Temple on the 7th March 1951. This suit (No. 103 of 1954) was instituted on the 13th September 1954, under S. 87 of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (No. XIX of 1951) (hereinafter called the Act), in the Court of the District Munsif at Turaiyur.2. Respondents 1 to 3 who have been appointed as trustees of the said temple by respondent No. 4, obtained a certificate from him that the properties in question belonged to the Temple; and on the basis of the said certificate, they had filed an application before the Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area under S. 87 of the Act for possession. Notice of this application was served on the appellants and they pleaded their own title to the properties. The Magistrate, however, overruled the claim made by the appellants and directed them to deliver possession of the properties to respondents 1 to 3. Before this order could be executed and possession delivered to respondents 1 to 3, the appellants instituted the present suit.3. Respondents 1 to 3 resisted this suit and contended that the properties in suit had not been granted to the predecessor of Pachai Kandai Udayavar as alleged by the appellants. Their case was that the said properties had been granted to the Pachai Kandai Udayavar Temple and formed part of its properties. As trustees appointed by respondent No. 4, they claimed that they were entitled to the possession of the properties.4. On these pleadings, four substantive issues were framed by the learned trial Judge, they were: whether the grant of the Inam was a personal Inam; whether the grant of the Inam was a religious endowment; whether plaintiffs have title to the suit properties. and whether plaintiffs have acquired title by prescription? On the first two issues, oral and documentary evidence was adduced by the parties. The learned trial Judge examined the whole evidence and came to the conclusion that the grant of the Inam was a personal Inam, and that it was not a grant in favour of the religious endowment within the meaning of the Act. That is how the first two issues were answered in favour of the appellants. In consequence, the learned trial Judge also held that the appellants had proved their title to the suit properties. The alternative plea made by the appellants that they had acquired title to the properties by prescription, was also upheld by the trial Judge. In the result, the appellants suit was decree on the 14th February 1955.5. Respondents 1 to 3 preferred an appeal (No. 129 of 1955) in the Court of the Subordinate Judge at Tiruchirapalli, challenging the correctness of the said decree. The lower appellate Court considered three main points; they were: whether the grant was in favour of Ambalathadum Pachai Kandi Udayavar; whether there is a temple and whether the plaintiffs had prescribed their title to the suit properties by adverse possession. The lower appellate Court made a finding against respondents 1 to 3 on point No. 2. It held that the evidence adduced by the respondents did not prove the existence of any temple in favour of which the original grant had been alleged to have been made according to them. On that view, it thought it unnecessary to consider the first point. In regard to the third point based on the appellants claim that they had acquired title by adverse possession, the lower appellate Court found that "it was evident that from the very beginning Pachai Kandai Udayavar and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in the property and they were not holding the same as mangers of the trust. The alienations must, therefore, be regarded only as repudiation of the trust". In the result, the lower appellate Courts finding was that the appellants had established their claim of prescriptive title. The appeal preferred by respondents 1 to 3, therefore, failed and was dismissed with costs on March 29, 1957.6. This decision was challenged by respondents 2 and 3 before the Madras High Court in Second Appeal (No. 774 of 1957). Subramanyam, J., who heard this appeal, held that the original grant had been made in favour of the Temple. There was evidence to show that the properties originally granted had been resumed by the Collector but the learned Judge took the view that the said resumption was only of the melwaram or assessment, and that since the lands had been granted in Inam to the deity and its matam, their title to the lands remained unaffected by the resumption proceedings. In other words, he negatived the appellants claim that the original grant was in favour of their predecessors-in-title, though burdened with an obligation to render service to the matam. The learned Judge reversed the finding of the lower appellate Court that the existence of the Temple had not been proved.7. Having thus held that the properties belonged to the Temple. The learned Judge proceeded to consider the question of limitation by reference to the several alienations with which the present litigation is concerned. In dealing with the question of limitation, the learned Judge took the view that the present suit would be governed by Article 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act. This article has been introduced in the said Act be Amending Act I of 1929 and came into force on 1st January 1929 It was conceded before the lower appellate Court that the new article was not retrospective in operation and that if the title of the alienees in regard to dharmadayam properties had been acquired by adverse possession prior to 1st January 1929, it would not be affected by the provisions of Art. 134-B. Thus considered, the alienations in regard to items 1, 2, part of item 3, items 7 and 8, and a portion of the well in item 5 sold under Ex. A-2 in 1914 were held to be outside the mischief of Art. 134-B. The possession of the vendees in regard to the properties covered by the said sale-deed was held to have conferred title on them. Similarly item 4 and a part of item 6 which had been sold in auction in execution of a decree in 1927 (vide Exs. A-7 and A-8), were also held to be outside the scope of Art. 134-B, because the said article does not cover auction sales.8. That left the alienations covered by Exts. A-3, A-6 and A-12 to be considered. These three alienations were effected on the 7th October, 1917, 2nd July 1926, and 2nd July 1926 respectively. The High Court held that the properties covered by these sale-deeds fell within the purview of Article 134-B, and the appellants title in respect thereof was open to challenge. In the result, the appellants claim regard to the properties covered by these three sale-deeds was rejected, whereas their claim in regard to the other properties was upheld. In consequence, the appeal preferred by respondents 2 and 3 was partly allowed and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court in regard to Exs. A-3, A-6 and A-12 was set aside. This judgment was pronounced on the 2nd September 1959. It is against this decision that the appellants have come to this Court by special leave.

Reasoning:
11. The argument is that in cases falling under Art.the transfer made by the manager of a Hindu endowment is challenged by his successor on the ground that it was beyond the authority of the manger; and such a challenge necessarily postulates that the transfer was effected by the manager as manager purporting to deal with the property as belonging to the religious endowment. Where, however, the transfer is made by the manager not as manager, but as an individual, and he deals with the property not on the basis that it belongs to the religious endowment, but on the basis that it belongs to himself, considerations which would govern the application of limitation are substantially different; and in such a case, the transfer being void ab initio the possession of the transferee is adverse from the date of the transfer. That is how Mr. Tatachari has attempted to avoid the application of Art.in the present case. There can be no doubt that if the assumption made by Mr. Tatachari is well founded, the appellants title to the three transactions in question would have to be upheld.Reverting then to the question as to whether a transfer effected by the manager of a temple in regard to properties belonging to the temple falls outside the purview of Art.if it is shown to have been made on the basis that the transferor treated the properties as his own, it does appear that the two earlier Privy Council decisions in Ganasambandas and Damodar Dass cases (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC) and 37 Ind App 147 (PC) (supra) lend some support to the contention.It would thus be seen that the observations made by Mr. Justice Mukherjea on which Mr. Tatachari relies, really purport to extend the principle which has apparently been mentioned by the Privy Council in Gnanasambandas case, (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC). It does appear that Mr. Justice Mukherjea had expressed this view as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hemanta Kumari v. Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 38: (AIR 1946 Cal 473  ), and had relied on the two Privy Councils decisions in Gnanasambandas and Damodar Das cases, (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC) and 37 Ind App 147 (PC) (supra). In the case of Hemanta Kumari Basu, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 38: (AIR 1946 Cal 473  ) (supra), the attention of Mukherjea, J. was drawn to the fact that in an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ronald Duncan Cromartic v. Ishwar Radha Damodar Jew, 62 LJ 10, D. N. Mitter, J., had made observations which were inconsistent with the view which Mukherjea, J., was disposed to take; but the learned Judge commented on the said observations by saying that they were open to criticism.18. Thus, on the question raised by Mr. Tatachari before us, there does appear to be some divergence of opinion in the Calcutta High Court itself. No other decision has been cited before us which has accepted the proposition that if any part of the property belonging to a Hindu religious endowment is transferred by its manager, the transfer is void and the possession of the transferee becomes adverse to the endowment from the very beginning. In fact, as we have already indicated, in the case of Gnanasambanda (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC) (supra) what had been transferred unauthorisedly was the religious office itself and all the properties appertaining thereto. It is open to doubt whether the said decision could lead to the inference that if a part of the property is transferred by the manager of a religious endowment on the basis that it belongs to him and not to the religious endowment the transfer is void ab initio, with the result that the possession of the transferee is adverse to the religious endowment from the very beginning and the succeeding managers right to challenge the said transfer would be lost if his predecessor who made the transfer lives for more than 12 years after effecting theis not easy to see why the successors right to challenge an unauthorised alienation made by his predecessor should be affected adversely if the alienation is made by his predecessor of the basis that the property belonged to him and not to the religious endowment.20. However, we do not think it necessary to decide this point in the present case, because, in our opinion, the plain words of Art.do not permit such a plea to be raised. Column 1 of Art.provides for suits brought, inter alia, by the manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. The period prescribed for such suit is 12 years, and the time from which the period begins to run is the death, resignation or removal of the transferor.our opinion, such limitation cannot be read in the words used by the said article Articleapplies to all case where it is shown that the immovable property was comprised in the endowment, and that it has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. The successor has to prove three facts : (1) that the property belongs to the religious endowment; (2) that it was transferred by a previous manager, and (3) that the transfer was for a valuable consideration. The character of the representations made by the previous manager in regard to his relation with the property which is theof transfer, is irrelevant for the purpose of Art.All transfers made would fall within Art.if the three essential facts are proved by the successor of the transferor manager of the Hindu religious endowment. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Tatachari is justified in contending that the transfers with which we are concerned in the present appeal fall outside the purview of Art.inasmuch as they are effected by the alienors on the representations that the properties transferred belonged to them as their separate properties. On the findings recorded by the High Court, it is clear that the properties belonged to the temple; that they have been transferred by persons who must be deemed to be the previous managers of the temple; and that they have been transferred for valuable consideration. The present suit has been brought against respondents 1 to 3 who are appointed trustees of the temple by respondent No. 4; and so, all the ingredients prescribed by the first column of Art.are satisfied. That is why we must reject the ingenious argument urged before us by Mr. Tatachari that Art.does not apply to the present case.It is on these facts that the learned trial Judge held that the alienor must be deemed to have resigned his office or left it. The lower appellate Court does not appear to have considered or made any specific or clear finding on this aspect of the matter. It, however, held that the transferor and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in the properties all along and that they were not holding the same as managers of the trust. That is why he confirmed the finding of the trial Judge on the question of adverse possession, though on a somewhat different ground.25. The High Court relied on the fact that the alienor is still alive, and so, it thought that the plea of adverse possession could not be sustained. Unfortunately, the question as to whether the facts proved in this case did not show that the alienor had been removed from office by other persons who were in management of the temple de facto, has not been discussed by the High Court.In our opinion, all the facts which have been brought on the record in relation to this aspect of the matter, clearly show not only that the alienor disposed of all the property and left the village, but also that for the last 25 years or so, the management has been taken over by other persons who are acting as de facto managers of the temple. This evidence appears to us to show that the alienors had been removed from management of the temple, and other persons have taken up the position as de facto managers; and this position has lasted for more than 25 years. If that be so, there is no escape from the conclusion that more than 12 years have elapsed since the date of the removal of the previous manager who transferred the properties in question; and so, if a suit were brought by respondents 1 to 3 on the date when they were appointed trustees by respondent No. 4, it would be barred under Art.On that view of the matter, we must hold that the trial Judge and the lower appellate Court were right in decreeing the appellants suit in its entirety.