Case: Piare Lal Vs. Union of India &amp; Others

2. The appellant was an officer in the State Police Service in the erstwhile State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union and he was appointed to the Indian Police Service with effect from 8th December, 1952. He was promoted to the senior time scale of the Indian Police Service with effect from 6th March, 1955 and subsequently confirmed in that time scale with effect from 8th March, 1956. He was thus a confirmed officer in the Senior Time Scale of the Indian Police Service on 1st November, 1958 when, by reason of the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, l956, the State of Patiala and East Punjab States Union merged in the new State of Punjab to form a larger State. On the formation of the new State of Punjab, a combined gradation list of officers in the Senior Time Scale of the Indian Police Service was prepared and published by the Government of India. It appears that prior to 1960 certain officers, who were junior to the appellant according to this gradation list, were promoted to Selection Grade posts in preference to the appellant. The appellant made representations to the State Government against his supersession by junior officers and presumably in view of these representations, the appellant was promoted to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police in May 1960. This was, however, an officiating promotion and on 11th September, 1960 the appellant was reverted as no vacancy in the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police was available in which he could be continued.3. Thereafter verious orders were made by the State Government from time to time promoting officers junior to the appellant to the Selection Grade posts as also to the posts of Deputy Inspector General of Police in supersession of the appellant. These orders of promotion were made on different dates between 1st December, 1962 and 18th October, 1965. The principle which was followed by the State Government in making these promotions was that set out in the Circular dated 16th May, 1957 addressed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India to the State Governments. That principle was that for the purpose of making selection to the Selection Grade Posts and the selection posts, officers, who are eligible, should be classified into three categories, namely, outstanding, very good and good, on the basis of merit and their names should be placed in a selection list in the order of these three categories without disturbing their infer se seniority within each category and promotion should be made according to the order of merit in the selection list. The result of adopting this principle was that seniority was completely ignored as a relevant principle and promotions were made on the bests of merit alone. Appellant and other superseded officers alleged that this principle for making selections was wholly inapplicable but it was deliberately adopted at the instance of Pratap Singh Kairon, the then Chief Minister with a view to giving undue preference to one Ranjit Singh, who was aof Surender Singh, son of Pratap Singh Kairon and wreaking vengeance against some of the superseded officers who were not prepared to oblige Pratap Singh Kairon. There were also other allegations of nepotism and favouritism against Pratap Singh Kairon in the matter of promotions and supersessions. Therefore, when the regime of Pratap Singh Kairon came to an end onthe State Government constituted an Establishment Board on 12th August, 1964 for the purpose of looking into cases of undeserved promotions, supersessions and victimisation amongst the employees of the State Government during the regime of Pratap Singh Kairon from 5th July, 1959 to 5th July, 1964. The appellant made a representation against his supersession by his junior officers on 10th August, 1964 and on the Constitution of the Establishment Board this representation was forwarded to it for its consideration. The appellant also submitted a supplementary representation dated 29th August, 1964 directly to the Establishment Board. In the meantime, however, as already pointed out above, further promotions continued to be made to the Selection Grade posts as also to the posts of Deputy Inspector General of Police and in these promotions too the appellant was superseded by officers junior to him. The appellant, therefore, filed a petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana on 29th November, 1965 under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the various orders passed by the State Government promoting officers junior to the appellant to the Selection Grade posts and to the posts of Deputy Inspector General of Police from and after 1st December, 1982.Now, obviously after the making of the two orders dated 28th October, 1966, the petition, as it stood, could not survive, because the orders of promotion impugned in the petition were superseded by the two orders dated 28th October, l966. The appellant could have amended the petition so as to challenge the validity of the two orders dated 28th October, 1966, but he did not do so. The Union of India and the State of Punjab also did not draw the attention of the High Court to the fact that the two orders dated 28th October, 1966 had rendered the petition ineffectual and futile unless it was amended to include a challenge to the validity of the two orders dated 28th October, 1966. The result was that the petition was heard by the High Court as if the two orders dated 28th October, 1966 had not been passed by the President and it was still necessary to examine the validity of the orders of promotion impugned in the petition. The appellant contended before the High Court that he was entitled as of right to be promoted to the Selection Grade post as also to the post of Deputy Inspector General of Police on the basis of seniority and the withholding of his promotion amounted to imposition of penalty which could not be done without following the procedure laid down in the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955. The appellant also urged before the High Court that the relevant criterion for making selections to the Selection Grade posts and to the posts of Deputy Inspector General of Police was not followed and the promotions made to these posts were, therefore, invalid. These contentions did not find favour with the High Court and by a judgment dated 9th August, 1967 the High Court dismissed the petition with costs. The appellant thereupon preferred the present appeal on certificate of fitness obtained from the High Court.

Reasoning:
We do not think we can entertain these contentions urged on behalf of the appellant against the validity of the two orders dated 28th October, 1966, since there is no challenge to these two orders in the petition.The appellant could have very well amended the petition and challenged the validity of the two orders dated 28th October, l966 before the petition was heard and disposed of by the High Court, but the appellant failed to do so. The appellant did not care to apply for amendment of the petition even after the appeal was preferred in this Court and though the appeal remained pending in this Court for about seven years, no application for amendment to the petition was made on behalf of the appellant. It was only after the hearing of the appeal was concluded and when it was pointed out by us that the entire basis of the petition was knocked out by the making of the two orders dated 28th October, 1966 and no relief could be granted to the appellant unless those two orders were successfully impugned, that the appellant asked for time to move an application for amendment of the petition so as to include a challenge to the validity of those two orders. Obviously, we could not grant time for moving such an application for amendment at the stage at which it was sought to be moved. The two orders dated 28th October, 1966 could not be allowed to be challenged by an amendment of the petition more than eight years after the date when they were made. It is not possible to believe that the appellant was not aware of the making of these two orders and that he came to know of them for the first time when the affidavit dated 2nd January, 1975 was filed by H. S. Sekhon on behalf of the State Government. The appellant could have amended the petition earlier, at any rate during the long period of seven years when the appeal was pending in this Court, but the appellant was either lax or negligent. We cannot now, after the lapse of such a long time, and particularly after the hearing of the appeal is concluded, allow an amendment to the petition. It must follow a fortiori that, in the absence of challenge in the petition, we cannot examine the validity of the two orders dated 28th October, l966 and strike them down. We must, therefore, hold the petition to have become infructuous by reason of the making of the two orders dated 28th October, l966 and confirm the dismissal of the petition by the High Court, though for different reasons.