Case: Shibsankar Nandy Vs. Prabartak Sangha And Ors

2. Respondent No. 1 is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, XXXI of 1860. Its objects as set out in Cl. 3 (s) of its Memorandum of Association inter alia are "to work, manage, develop, improve and utilise properties and business for the promotion of education, art science, religion and charity or other useful objects". On March 23, 1941 one Kashinath Seal, the owner of a large plot of land, granted a permanent lease of the land in dispute out of the said plot in favour of respondents 2 and 3. By a registered deed of lease, dated September 29, 1944 he granted lease of the entire plot of land including the land in dispute to one Motilal Roy for 99 years. So far as the land in dispute is concerned, which as aforesaid was leased out to respondents 2 and 3, the said Motilal Roy acquired under this lease only the right of realising the rent. The said Motilal Roy was the founder of the 1st respondent Association and was a mere benamidar thereof. By a deed of relinquishment, dated March 14, 1953 he relinquished all his interest in the said plot in favour of the 1st respondent Association. By a registered deed of sale with a condition for reconveyance, dated November 3, 1960 respondents 2 and 3 transferred the land in dispute to the appellant and handed over its possession to him. On coming to know of this sale the 1st respondent Association made an application claiming a right of transfer under S. 24 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, XX of 1949 on the ground that it was the immediate landlord in relation to that land that the land in question was contiguous to its other lands and that it required it for the purpose of extension of the school conducted by it3. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that the land in dispute was not contiguous to the land in possession of the 1st respondent Association. It, however, held that it was satisfied that the 1st respondent Association required the said land, bona fide for the purpose of expanding its school. In an appeal against this order by the 1st respondent Association. the Additional District Judge set aside the finding of the Trial Court holding that the land in dispute was adjacent to the other land in possession of the 1st respondent Association. But he held that the 1st respondent Association was an "intermediary" within the meaning of S. 2 (a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1 of 1954. that, therefore, its interests vested in the State of West Bengal on the extension of the Act to Chandernagore after its merger in the State of West Bengal and consequently respondent No. 1 had no right to claim transfer and dismissed the appeal. The 1st respondent Association thereupon filed a revision application in the High Court under S. 115 of theCode of Civil Procedure and Art. 227 of the Constitution4. Three contentions were raised before the High Court on behalf of the present appellant:(1) that the first respondent Association was an intermediary within the meaning of S. 2 (1) (i) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and, therefore, all its rights vested under that Act in the State of West Bengal,(2) that S. 24 of the Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act did not apply as (a) the land in dispute was not contiguous, (b) that under proviso (b) to that section it must be established to the satisfaction of the Court that such land was required for any of the purposes specified in S. 4 and that the Courts below had not given any finding as to their satisfaction; and(3) that S. 24 did not apply to a case where an under-tenant transferred his rights to a third party as the section applied only to a transfer by atenant.The High Court repelled all the three contentions and allowed the revision setting aside the order of dismissal passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Additional District Judge.

Reasoning:
In view of the clear finding by the Additional District Judge it can no longer be disputed that the land in question is contiguous to the land in actual possession of the 1st respondent Association. There is also no reason why the finding of the High Court that the land is bona fide required by the 1st respondent Association for expansion of its educational institution should be disturbed. The Trial Court held that it was bona fide required by the 1st respondent and though the Additional District Judge did not expressly give any finding it appears as the High Court has stated that that fact was not challenged before him. The proviso to S. 24, however, requires that though such land may be needed bona fide the use for which it is needed must be for any of the purposes set out in S. 4. Since the land is not required for a hostel or residential purpose of the 1st respondent or its employees it cannot fall under Cl.(a) but the case would seem to fall under Cl. (b) and in any event under Cl. (c). As aforesaid, the objects of the 1st respondent are inter alia to promote education, arts, etc., by utilising, improving and developing properties and business. Since the case of the 1st respondent is that it requires the land in question for expansion of its educational activities, the land in dispute is required for its business purposes, viz., to develop, improve its properties or in any event for the "other purposes", viz., to carry out its educational objects for which the land in its actual possession is being utilised. There is, therefore, no difficulty in holding that Cl. (b) of the proviso is satisfiedIt is true that by reason of the perpetual lease in favour of respondents 2 and 3 in respect of the land in dispute the first respondent Association had only the right of receiving rent from them but that makes no difference to the position that the first respondent was the immediate landlord of respondents 2 and 3 in regard to the land in question. Therefore there can be no doubt that both section 23 and Section 24 were attracted to the transfer made by respondents 2 and 3 and under Section 24 the first respondent as their immediate landlord became entitled to apply for transferThis contention also cannot be accepted, for an "intermediary" as defined in S. 2 (1) (i) of that Act means "a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure holder, or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and in relation to mines and minerals, a lessee or a sub-lessee". It is thus obvious that the 1st respondent being itself a non-agricultural tenant in respect of the entire land including the land in dispute it does not fall within this definition. Not being thus an intermediary it is impossible to say that its interests in the land in dispute vested in the State or that therefore it was not entitled to apply under Section 24The scheme of the Act clearly is to afford security of tenure to tenants and under-tenants even to the extent of making their rights transferable and heritable. It is only when such land is sought to be transferred that the immediate landlord is given the right to have it transferred to himself instead of to a third party. These provisions clearly reflect the true object of the legislature in enacting Section 24. That object is to have an adjustment of rights of landlords and tenants. The consideration of the land being contiguous is therefore not the sole consideration as in the case of (1962) Supp (3) SCR 724: (AIR 1961 SC 1327  ) (Supra).The restriction contained in Section 24 cannot by any means be treated as an unreasonable restriction. Consequently the contention as to the constitutional invalidity of Section 24 cannot be accepted