Case: Kesho Ram &amp; Co. &amp; Ors. Etc Vs. Union Of India &amp; Ors

2. The appellants in the appeals as well as the petitioners in the special leave petitions and petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution, are tenants of buildings situate within the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The buildings occupied by the appellants/petitioners as tenants were exempted from the operation of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for a period of five years under the impugned Notification dated September 24, 1974. The landlords of these buildings filed suits for eviction in the civil court, against the tenants. During the pendency of suits five years period expired, thereupon the tenants raised objection that the suits could not be decreed in view of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. Some of the tenants filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenging the jurisdiction of the civil court to proceed with the suits or to pass decree of eviction against them on the ground that on expiry of five years period of exemption Section 13 of the Act became applicable and the civil court ceased to have jurisdiction. The High Court repelled the tenants contentions and dismissed their petitions. The tenants filed civil appeals, special leave petitions in this Court challenging the correctness of the order of the High Court. Some of the tenants against whom suit is pending before the trial court approached this Court by means of petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the proceedings taken by the landlords for their eviction. Since all these cases involve common questions the same are being disposed of by a common order

Reasoning:
In this view if the submission made on behalf of the tenants is accepted it would render the exemption illusory, as in reality, it will be impossible for a landlord to get the suit decreed within the period of exemption even if he instituted the suit within the period of exemption. Interpretation of the Act and the impugned notification as suggested on behalf of the tenants if accepted would defeat the purpose of the beneficial social legislation. It is a settled rule of harmonious construction of statute that a construction which would advance the object and purpose of the legislation should be followed and construction which would result in reducing a provision of the Act to a dead letter or to defeat the object and purpose of the statute should be avoided without doing any violence to the language. We therefore reject the submission made on behalf of tenantsIn Mohinder Kumar v. State of Haryana ((1985) 4 SCC 221 ), this Court considering a similar challenge to the validity of Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 held that the classification of buildings with reference to the date of completion for the purpose of regulating the rent and eviction of tenants from such buildings has a rational basis and has a clear nexus with the object to be achieved. Classification is founded on intelligible differentia which has a rational nexus with the object of the Act. It does not practice any invidious discrimination between two classes of tenants, the classification is reasonable and it does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is not necessary to discuss the question further as we are in full agreement with the view taken in Mohinder Kumar case ((1985) 4 SCC 221 ). The object and purpose of the exemption as discussed earlier is to effectuate the purpose of the Act, to ensure availability of more accommodation to meet the need of tenants18. In view of the above discussion we hold that Section 3 as well as the impugned notification are valid and the same do not suffer from any constitutional or legal infirmity. We further hold that civil court has jurisdiction to pass decree even after the expiry of period of exemption, in suits instituted during the period of exemption, and to execute the same notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13 of the Act.In the result the civil appeals, special leave petitions, and the writ petitions fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs and all interim orders stand discharged6. The effect of the Notification dated January 31, 1973 was that all newly constructed buildings in the urban area of Chandigarh were granted exemption from the provisions of the Act for a period of five years. The notification also set out the method of computing the period of five years. But the Notification dated September 24, 1974 directed that the provisions of Section 13 of the Act shall not apply to buildings situate in the urban area of Chandigarh for a period of five years, in respect of decrees passed by civil courts in suits for ejectment of tenants, instituted during the period of exemption notwithstanding the fact that such decrees are passed during the period of exemption or at any time thereafter. The effect of the notification is that protection granted to tenants against eviction under Section 13 of the Act is not available to them for a period of five years and if the landlord institutes a suit for eviction against the tenant within the aforesaid period of five years, the restrictions contained in Section 13 of the Act shall not apply to such suits and the civil court has jurisdiction to pass decree of eviction and to execute the same, even though five years period of exemption expired during the pendency of the suit. The tenants have assailed validity of Section 3 of the Act and the Notification dated September 24, 1974After hearing the counsel for both the parties at some length, it seems to us that the correctness of the decisions in Firm Amar Nath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand ((1972) 1 SCC 893 : (1972) 3 SCR 922 ), is open to doubt. It appears that the interpretation placed by the court as to the scope and effect of the exemption in Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, which is parimateria with Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, (as extended to the Union Territory of Chandigarh) with which we are concerned in this appeal, requires reconsideration. We do feel that the second part of the impugned notification issued by the Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh dated September 24, 1974, under Section 3 of the Act, in effect permits the civil courts to pass decrees in suits for ejectment of tenants instituted by the landlords even after the expiry of the period of exemption, contrary to the statutory bar contained in Section 13 of the Act and therefore it could not be upheldIn our opinion the petitions by such tenants are not maintainable as the same are barred by principles of res judicata. Once the petitioners challenged the validity of the impugned notification dated September 24, 1974 in earlier proceedings they ought to have raised all the grounds which could have been raised in impugning the validity of Section 3 and the notification, if they failed to raise a ground in earlier petition they cannot raise the ground now in the present proceedings. Finality in litigation and public policy both require that a litigant should not be permitted to challenge validity of the provisions of the Act or notification at different times on different grounds. Once petitioners challenge to Section 3 and the impugned notification was considered by the court and the validity of the same was upheld it must be presumed that all grounds which could validity be raised were raised and considered by the court. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the questions which are being raised in the present proceedings were neither raised nor considered by this Court in Punjab Tin Supply Company case ((1984) 1 SCC 206 : (1984) 1 SCR 428 ), therefore it is open to them to question the validity of Section 3 and the Notification dated September 24, 1974. This submission is contrary to the principles of res judicata and it further ignores the binding effect of a decision of this Court under Article 141 of the Constitution. The binding effect of a decision of this Court does not depend upon whether a particular arguments was considered or not, provided the point with reference to which the argument is advanced subsequently was actually decided in the earlier decision, see Smt. Somavanti v. State of Punjab ((1963) 2 SCR 774 : AIR 1963 SC 151 : (1963) 33 Com Cas 745), T. Govindaraja Mudaliar v. State of Tamil Nadu ((1973) 1 SCC 336 ) and Anil Kumar Neotia v. Union of India ((1988) 2 SCC 587 ). It is therefore no longer open to thes to challenge the validity of Section 3 of the Act and the impugned Notification dated September 24, 1974 on the ground that some points had not been urged or considered in Punjab Tin Supply Company case ((1984) 1 SCC 206 : (1984) 1 SCR 428 ). On the principles of res judicata, and also in view of Article 141 of the Constitution, the law declared by this Court in Punjab Tin Supply Company case ((1984) 1 SCC 206 : (1984) 1 SCR 2 SCC 587) is binding on the petitioners. But even otherwise the submissions made on their behalf in impugning the validity of Section 3 and the Notification dated September 24, 1974 are devoid of any merit as we shall presently discuss the same11. The challenge to the validity of Section 3 of the Act on the ground that it suffers from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power need not detain us long in view of a number of decisions of this Court. Similar provision contained in Section 13 of the Madras Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949 was upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court in P. J. Irani v. State of Madras ((1962) 2 SCR 169 : AIR 1961 SC 1731 ). In Sadhu Singh v. District Board, Gurdaspur (C.A. 2594 of 1966 (decided on 29th October, 1968) (1969) 1 SCWR 139), this Court held that Section 3 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power nor it violates Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 3 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 conferring power on the government to exempt certain accommodations from all or any of the provisions of the Act was upheld in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanhaiyalal ((1976) 15 MPLJ 973). In fact validity of Section 3 of the Act was again upheld up this Court, holding that it does not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation of legislative power in Punjab Tin Supply Company case (Narendra Kumar Sharma v. Smt. Kailashwati, C.A. No. 3994/82 CSC) (CB). We find no good reason to take a different view; we therefore hold that Section 3 of the Act does not suffer from vice of constitutional infirmity and it is a valid provision12. As regards the validity of the impugned Notification dated September 24, 1974 is concerned, it is necessary to examine the object and purpose of the exemption granted by the notification. The paramount object of the Act, like any other rent control legislation is to safeguard the interest of tenants against their exploitation by landlords. After the Second World War there has been movement of population from rural areas to urban areas as a result of which the problem of accommodation became acute in cities. Landlords of the buildings took full advantage of the situation and they charged exorbitant rent from tenants and very often evicted them by terminating tenancy under the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. The tenants were helpless as the suits once filed by the landlord after terminating the tenancy were bound to succeed. The legislature of different States took cognizance of the situation and enacted rent control legislation providing safeguards for tenants by making provisions for fixation of reasonable rent and also placing restrictions on the landlords right to evict tenants. Generally the rent control legislation of various States exclude the jurisdiction of civil court to entertain a suit or pass a decree of eviction against a tenant; instead the jurisdiction to evict a tenant is conferred on Rent Controller or some designated authority and the statutory grounds for eviction of a tenant have been laid down. The multiple restrictions placed on the landlords right to charge rent from tenants or to evict them from buildings resulted in shortage of accommodation because those who had money and capacity to build new houses were discouraged from investing money in constructing buildings on account of the restrictions placed by rent control legislations. The legislature stepped in, to meet the situation, in making provision for granting exemption to newly constructed buildings for certain number of years from the operation of the restrictions of the rent control legislations. These steps were taken to meet the acute scarcity of accommodation and to encourage landlords to construct buildings which would ultimately ease the situation of shortage of accommodation to a large extent. Provisions for exemption the newly constructed buildings from the restrictions of the rent control legislations for a limited period have been enacted by the Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Madhya Pradesh legislature. While considering the interpretation and validity of the provisions granting exemption, either by statutory provision made in the Act or by a notification issued under the Act, it is necessary to bear in mind the object and purpose of exemption to newly constructed buildings. The paramount object and purpose of exemption is to provide incentive for construction of new buildings, to meet the shortage of accommodation which would ultimately result in benefiting the tenantsWe do not find merit in the submission. As noticed earlier Section 13 (1) imposes a complete ban against the eviction of a tenant in execution of a decree passed by a civil court before or after the commencement of the Act and it further lays down that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of Section 13 or an order made in pursuance of the provisions of the Act.n (2) of Section 13 sets out statutory grounds on which the Controller, an authority constituted under the Act has power to pass order of eviction against a tenant. Section 13 takes away the jurisdiction of civil court to pass a decree of eviction or execution thereof against a tenant in respect of a building which is subject to the provisions of the Act. The impugned notification grants immunity to newly constructed buildings from the shackles of Section 13 of the Act for a period of five years. While doing so, the notification has taken care to make the exemption effective by providing that the exemption shall be available to the building even if the decree is is passed after the expiry of the period of five years provided the suit is instituted during the period of exemption. The emphasis is on the institution of the suit within the period of exemption of five years. Once the landlord institutes a suit before the expiry of the period of exemption, the decree even if passed after the period of five years will not be subject to the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. This is the true meaning of the notification. The notification does not enlarge the period of exemption instead it safeguards the rights of the parties which crytallise on the date of institution of the suitIt is a matter of common knowledge that final disposal of suits before the civil court are time consuming in view of the heavy workload of cases and dilatory tactics adopted by the interested party. Having regard to time normally consumed for adjudication of a suit by the civil court, it is too much to expect that a suit filed within the period of exemption of five years can be disposed of finally within the period of exemption. The exemption contemplated by the notification permits the institution of a suit within the period of exemption taking into account the delay caused in disposal of the suit, it further protects the jurisdiction of the civil court in passing decree of eviction with a view to make the exemption effective and meaningful.In this view if the submission made on behalf of the tenants is accepted it would render the exemption illusory, as in reality, it will be impossible for a landlord to get the suit decreed within the period of exemption even if he instituted the suit within the period of exemption. Interpretation of the Act and the impugned notification as suggested on behalf of the tenants if accepted would defeat the purpose of the beneficial social legislation. It is a settled rule of harmonious construction of statute that a construction which would advance the object and purpose of the legislation should be followed and construction which would result in reducing a provision of the Act to a dead letter or to defeat the object and purpose of the statute should be avoided without doing any violence to the language. We therefore reject the submission made on behalf of tenantsThere is no provision under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 or the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 containing similar provision as contained in the impugned notification. We therefore do not consider it necessary to discuss the aforesaid decisions in detail or to express any final opinion about the correctness of the same