Case: Mangoo Singh Vs. The Election Tribunal, Bareillyand Others

1. This appeal has been preferred to this Court on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court of Allahabad on 3rd February 1956, to the effect that the case is a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court under Ar. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution. The question that falls for decision is the true scope, meaning and effect of cl. (g) of S. 13-D, U. P. Municipalities Act (U. P. Act No. II of 1916), hereinafter referred to as the Act.The relevant facts, which are not now in dispute, are these. There was a general election to the Municipal Board of Bareilly in OctoberThe appellant, Mangoo Singh, and respondent No. 3, Imdad Husain, along with several others, were candidates at the said election from Ward No.The date fixed for filing nominations was 5th October 1953, and the date for scrutiny of the nominations filed was 7th Octoberappellant and respondent No. 3 both filed their nominations on the due date, and at the time scrutiny Imdad Husain raised an objection to the nomination of the appellant on the ground that the latter was disqualified under cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the Act for being chosen as a member of the said Municipal Board because he was in arrears in the payment of Municipal Tax in excess of one yearsobjection was dismissed, and the nomination of the appellant was accepted by the Assistant Officer. The poll took Place on 26th October 1953, and the counting of votes was done on 29th OctoberFour persons were to be elected from the said Ward, and the appellant was the third in the list by reason of the number of votes which he had obtained. Imadad Hussain was fifth in thethe appellant was declared as one of the returned candidates, and Imdad Husain was at the top of the unsuccessful candidates. Imdad Husain then filed an election petition to act aside the election of the present appellant on various grounds. The only ground with which we are now concerned is the disqualification under cl. (g) of S. 13-D of theelection petition was held by the Election Tribunal and by its judgment dated 20th October 1954, the Election Tribunal held that the appellant was in arrears in the payment of municipal tax in excess of one years damage to which S. 166 of the Act applied and therefore came under the disqualification in cl. (g) of S. 13-D of thefurther held that the payment of a sum of Rs. 115-3-0 on 10th October 1953, five days after the date fixed for the filing of nominations, did not wipe off that disqualification, and, the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to S. 13 D of the Act. It may be here stated that the Election Tribunal also held that no bill for payment of the tax was presented to the appellant as required by S. 166, nor was any demand notice served on him as required by S. 168 of thethe above findings, the Tribunal allowed the election petition, set aside the election of the appellant and declared, a casual vacancy under cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of S. 25 of the Act, which vacancy was subsequently filled up by the election of respondent 3 on 5th AprilThe next general election in the Municipality is due in October 1957.3. Against the decision of the Election Tribunal, the appellant moved the High Court of Allahabad for the issue of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The main point urged by the appellant was that the Election Tribunal was in error in its interpretation of cl. (g) of S. 13-D of the Act Chaturvedi J., who dealt with the application of the appellant, agreed with the view of the law as expressed by the Election Tribunal and dismissed theappellant then preferred an appeal to a Division Bench of the said High Court. This appeal was also dismissed by Agarwala and Sahai JJ., by their judgment dated 30th AugustThe appellant then moved and obtained a certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution from the said High Court.

Reasoning:
We are clearly of the view that the expression to which S. 166 applies cannot bear the meaning sought to be given to it on behalf of the appellant. That expression merely describes the nature of the demand referred to in cl. (g). Section 166 refers to three types of dues; cl. (a) of sub-s (1) refers to any sum on account of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable under cl. (C) of S. 196 or S. 229 or S. 230 in respect of the supply of water etc., and cl, (C) refers to any other sum declared by the Act or by rule or bye-law to be recoverable in the manner provided by chap.demand to which S. 166 applies must be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in one or other of the aforesaid three clauses, and the demand referred to in cl. (g) of S. 13 D must be of that nature or type; this in our view, is the true meaning and effect if the expression to which S. 166 applies.9. Nor do we think that the word demand attracts the operation of S.It may be readily conceded that the word demand ordinarily means something more than what is due; it means something which has been demanded called for or asked for. But the meaning of a word must take colour from the context in which it iscl. (g) the context in which the word, demand is used has a very obvious and clear reference to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends; therefore, the expression used is - arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one years demand. The word demand in that context and in the collocation of words in which it has been used can only mean in excess of one years municipal tax or otherhave been referred to several meanings of the word demand in standard English dictionaries and Law lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of according toit sufficient for our purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons, it is well recognised that the word demand may mean simply a claim or due, without importing any further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay claim or due.