Case: V. Purushotham Rao Vs. U.O.I.

1. In this batch of appeals the judgment of Delhi High Court, cancelling the allotment made by the concerned Minister from out of his so-called discretionary quota on petroleum dealership as well as LPG dealership is under challenge. Prior to 1995, the Minister of Petroleum in exercise of his discretion had been allotting retail outlets for petroleum products, LPG dealership and SKO dealership, without having any prescribed norms. A Public Interest Litigation had been filed in this Court by Centre for Public Interest Litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution, praying that guidelines to regulate the exercise of discretion in the matter of such allotment, which results in exercise of the discretion arbitrarily be fixed. It may be stated that initially a prayer had also been made in that application to cancel the dealership in favour of respondent No. 4, but that prayer stood deleted and an amended petition was filed as the said respondent did not accept the dealership in question. This Court after hearing the Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Attorney General, issued a set of guidelines for discretionary allotment of petroleumagencies to ensure that the exercise of discretion in making such allotments are in conformity with the rule of law and by excluding the likelihood of arbitrariness and minimising the area of discretion. The said decision of this Court has since been reported in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India and Ors., 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 382. In para (4) of the aforesaid judgment, the Court had directed as under:The Common Cause had filed a petition under Article 32 on the basis of a news-item which appeared in a national newspaper that the Minister of Petroleum was personally interested in making allotment of petrol pumps in favour of 15 persons, who were either the relations of his personal staff or sons of the Ministers, or sons/relations of the Chairman and Members of the Oil Selection Boards, praying for cancellation of allotments made inter alia on the ground that the allotments had been made by the concerned Minister, mala fide and the decision is arbitrary and motivated by extraneous considerations. The Court ultimately cancelled the allotments made in favour of the 15 persons mentioned in the petition, on a conclusion that the allotments are arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide and wholly illegal. The Court also issued certain other directions in relation to the allottees and called upon the concerned Minister to show cause as to why a direction be not issued to the appropriate police authority to register a case and initiate prosecution against him for criminal breach of trust or any other offence under law and in addition, why he should not be liable to pay damages for his mala fide action in allotting petrol pumps to 15 persons mentioned therein. This judgment of the Court is reported in 1996(6) SCC 530. While the Common Cause case was pending in this Court, Civil Writ Petition Nos. 4003 and 4430 of 1995 had been filed in Delhi High Court by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation, as Public Interest Litigation, which were pending in Delhi High Court. In those two petitions, allotment of petrol pumps/gas agencies to various persons during the period 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96 had been challenged. A Transfer Petition had been filed in this Court, which was registered as Transfer Petition No. 127/96 and this Court had issued notice in the transfer petition and stayed further proceedings before the High Court. In an affidavit filed by the Ministry of Petroleum in the aforesaid transfer petition, the then Joint Secretary had stated that in 1995-96 under the discretionary power of the Government, allotment had been made to 99 persons and further orders had already been made in favour of 61 more persons, allotting petrol pumps/gas agencies. One Mr. Srinivasan, Advocate had filed an affidavit giving a long list of persons who are related to the then Prime Minister/Ministers and other V.I.Ps. and who had been allotted petrol pumps and gas agencies. On behalf of Petroleum Ministry, an affidavit had been filed, stating that due inquiry had been made through the oil companies and after due inquiry, the concerned Minister had made the allotment. This Court ultimately held that since the two writ petitions are pending before the High Court, wherein the allotment made to all these persons have been challenged, it would not be necessary for this Court to get the writ petitions transferred and decide the matter. The Court, therefore, vacated the stay order granted and directed the Registry of the Court to send all affidavits filed by the parties in the transfer petition along with the annexures to the High Court. The Court observed :Pursuant to the directions contained in the judgment of this Court in Common Cause v. Union of India, II (1996) CLT 93 (SC)=1996(6) SCC 530, show-cause notice having been issued to the then Minister Captain Satish Sharma, said Shri Sharma had filed an affidavit in reply to the show- cause notice. The Court ultimately perused the show-cause notice filed and after hearing the Counsel appearing for the Minister, directed the CBI to hold an investigation, after registering a case against the concerned Minister in respect of the allegations dealt with and findings made by the Court earlier in the Common Cause case. On the question of liability of the Minister to pay exemplary or compensatory damages, the Court considered the matter and came to the conclusion that Captain Satish Sharma, the then Minister would be liable to pay exemplary damages and quantified the same at Rs. 50 lacs. This judgment of the Court has been reported in 1996(6) SCC 5932. Pursuant to the directions of this Court in Common Cause case (supra), the Delhi High Court took up the writ petitions which had been filed as Public Interest Litigation by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation. On examination of the relevant files dealing with the allotment of retail outlets of petrol, LPG distributorship and SKO/LDO dealership under the discretionary quota made by the Minister concerned, it was revealed that between January, 1993 till 1996, 179 retail outlets (petrol pumps), 155 LPG distributorships and 45 SKO/LDO dealerships had been allotted by the concerned Minister under the discretionary quota. In its order dated 29th of August, 1997, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that the examination of files clearly shows that these are not the cases of aberrations here or there but are cases which show a pattern of favouritism. From the judgment of Delhi High Court in C.W. 4003/95 dated 29.8.1997, it transpires that even before the Supreme Court stayed the proceedings by order dated 6th December, 1995, the High Court had called upon the respondents by order dated 2nd November, 1995 to produce the list of allotments made under the discretionary quota of the petroleum Minister for allotment of petrol retail outlets, LPG distributorship and Kerosene distributorship from the date of the tenure of the Minister which was 18th of January, 1993. Before the Delhi High Court, it had been contended by the allottees as well as by the Government that the judgment dated 31st March, 1995 of the Supreme Court laying down the guidelines, since reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 382 would indicate that the Supreme Court had impliedly regularised the allotments made prior to 31st March, 1995 and consequently the validity of the said allotments need not be gone into. The High Court however was not persuaded to agree with the submissions and in our view rightly, particularly, when in the Common Cause case (supra) this Court has positively directed the High Court to examine the issues involved and dispose of the two pending writ petitions in accordance with law. Since the allottees were required to be noticed before any decision is taken, the High Court by its order dated 11st December, 1996, constituted a Committee of three Advocates and directed them to examine all the files and submit a report in a Proforma which had been prepared by the Court itself, after discussion with the Counsel appearing for the parties. The said Committee submitted its report, on the basis of which the Court issued notices to various persons by its order dated 27th of February, 1997 and 20th of March, 1997 and the Court was to deal with the cases of about 400 allottees. Pursuant to the notices issued, the allottees filed their respective show causes and then the Court heard the respective Counsel for the allottees as well as examined the report of the Committee and scrutinized the same by perusing the original file and finally disposed of the cases of about 100 allottees by its judgment dated 29th of August, 1997. The Court on examination of the materials before it and on perusal of the original files, appears to have taken the view in several cases that the discretion had been exercised on sufficient materials and after inquiry held those allotments to have been proper exercise of the discretion and accordingly discharged the notices of cancellation. But in those cases, where the Court found either there were no materials before the concerned Minister in support of the applications filed to justify the exercise of power for allotment under the discretionary quota or such allotments had been made on account of political patronage or some other extraneous considerations, the Court cancelled the allotment made with certain directions therein. In would be appropriate at this stage to notice the observations of the High Court:The Court also came to the further conclusion that there had been no verification of the statements made in the applications by the allottees and hardly any application contains details of annual income or bio-data and hardly any person had filed any affidavit in support of his claim, seeking grant of discretionary allotment and in several cases the applications even did not bear any data and a number of allottees belonged to one Parliamentary Constituency and were active members and supporters of the party in power at the relevant time. The Court having cancelled the allotments made in favour of the appellants, who are before us, the present appeals have been filed by grant of special leave. After the disposal of first batch of cases by the High Court by its judgment dated 29.8.1997, the High Court issued notices to some other allottees and disposed of the second batch of cases by its order dated 11.10.1999 and both these orders of Delhi High Court are under challenge, so far as it relates to the cancellation of allotments made under the discretionary quota3. Captain Satish Sharma, who was the concerned Minister and against whom the Court had directed registration of a criminal case by the C.B.I., and also levied penalty of Rs. 50 lacs, filed a review petition against the aforesaid two directions of the Court, which was entertained and that review petition was allowed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court, since reported in 1999(6) SCC 667. In the aforesaid case, this Court came to the conclusion that the factors relevant to the award of exemplary damages had not been taken by this Court and consequently the levy of penalty of Rs. 50 lacs was not in accordance with law. The Court also held that no case could be said to have been made out against the concerned Minister for directing registering a case under Section 409 and such a direction could not have been given under Article 32 or under Article 142 and further, such a direction would be contrary to the concept of right to life under Article 21. The Court, therefore, set aside the two directions earlier made in relation to registering a criminal case and levy of penalty against the Minister. Certain observations had been made in the aforesaid three-Judge Bench judgment, which form the sheet- anchor of one of the contentions of the appellants in the present batch of appeals and we will refer to those observations and deal with the same at appropriate stage. The aforesaid judgment of the Court has since been reported in 1999(6) SCC 667. Between 1997 and 1999, against the order of cancellation of allotments made under discretionary quota, about 79 special leave petitions had been filed in this Court, which had been dismissed or dismissed as withdrawn. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the aforesaid special leave petitions, after the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court dated 3rd August, 1999 since reported in 1999 (6) SCC 667, special leave petitions having been filed, this batch of cases were listed before the Bench presided over by the very learned Judge, who was presiding over the Bench which reviewed the earlier judgment and absolved the concerned Minister from the direction of levy of penalty as well as from the criminal prosecution. The Bench, therefore, having granted leave, the present appeals were placed for hearing. At this stage, it would be appropriate for us to notice that the review petitions filed by Captain Satish Sharma, the concerned Minister was in relation to the order dated 4.11.1996 in the case of Common Cause v. Union of india, 1996(6) SCC 593 and was not in relation to the judgment dated 25.9.1996 in the case of Common Cause v. Union of India, reported in 1996(6) SCC 530. The three-Judge Bench however committed an error in paragraph (7) by noticing that the review petition relates to both the judgments viz. the judgment dated 25.9.1996 and 4.11.1996. Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned Counsel, appearing in four of these appeals viz. Civil Appeal Nos. 3085, 3094, 3099 and 3092, seriously contended that the judgment of this Court in the Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 382, in no uncertain terms, stipulates that the norms and guidelines should be followed by the Central Government in making discretionary allotment of retail outlets of petroleum products, LPG distributorship and SKO dealership, subsequent to the said judgment which necessarily and impliedly indicates that the Court has approved the earlier lapses in the matter of such allotment under discretionary quota and, therefore, it was not open to the High Court to re-examine all the cases and decide the legality of the allotments made under the discretionary quota. He further contended that in view of the observations of this Court in the three- Judge Bench judgment (supra), in paragraph 115 of the said judgment, the plea of constructive res-judicata should have been applied by the High Court and the High Court committed error in rejecting the said contention. According to Mr. Rao, on a plain reading of the judgment of this Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation case (supra), the conclusion is irresistible that the Court in that case had given its stamp of judicial approval to the discretionary allotments had already been made by that date and it is for that reason, the Court had indicated that the guidelines therein would be followed hereafter. That being the position, not only that the principle of constructive res-judicata would apply, but also it was not open for the High Court to re-open and examine the legality of the discretionary allotments made prior to 1995. According to Mr. Rao, during the period when the allotments had been made in favour of his clients, which is prior to the guidelines indicated by this Court in the Centre for Public Interest Litigation case, under the pre-existing practice and norms, the concerned Minister having exercised the discretion, the High Court committed serious error in interfering with those discretionary orders of allotment. Mr. Rao further urged that the impugned judgment would indicate that there has been no due consideration of the show-cause filed by the allottees and the materials referred to in the show-cause have not been considered by the High Court and, therefore, it would be a fit case where matter should be remitted back to the High Court for re-consideration. According to Mr. Rao, the discretion having been exercised in favour of his clients, who happened to be political sufferers and a political sufferer having been recognised as a class/category by themselves in the case of D.N. Chanchala v. State of Mysore and Ors. etc., 1971 Supp. SCR 608 at 629, the High Court committed serious error of law in interfering with the allotments made in favour of his clients and as such the impugned orders cannot be sustained. Mr. Rao also urged that allotments having been made in individual cases of extreme hardship by the Minister concerned and that being one of the norms which this Court formulated in its guidelines in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation and the appellants having invested huge money and this being the only source of livelihood since 1993, the same ought not to have been cancelled, particularly when no public interest will be served by such cancellation.

Reasoning:
According to the learned Counsel, the three-Judge Bench accepted the contention of the applicability of principle of constructive res judicata and, therefore, this Bench being a two-Judge Bench must be bound by the said observations or in the alternative, may refer the matter to a Larger Bench. We are not in a position to accept either of these submissions. It may be stated at the outset that the three-Judge Bench was concerned with the review petition that had been filed in relation to the order dated 4.11.1996 since reported in 1996(6) SCC 593. The learned Judges committed an error in the beginning in thinking that the review petition filed by Capt. Satish Sharma, was in relation to both the judgments viz. 1996(6) SCC 530 as well as 1996(6) SCC 593. In the review petition, the Court was concerned with the correctness of the directions contained in the order dated 4.11.1996 to institute criminal prosecution against the concerned Minister and levy of penalty as exemplary damages to the tune of Rs. 50 lacs. It is in that context the Court made the aforesaid observations not noticing the fact that in 1996(6) SCC 530, the Court had earlier directed the High Court to dispose of the two writ petitions pending in the High Court and decide the legality of the order of discretionary allotment made by the concerned Minister. It is indeed interesting to notice that in paragraph 125 of the judgment of the three-Judge Bench, the Court itself had indicated that the conduct of the concerned Minister in making allotments of petrol outlets was atrocious and reflects a wanton exercise of power by the Minister. But what the Court wanted to examine and ultimately held was that the said action fell short of ‘misfeasance in publicwhich is a specific tort and the ingredients of that tort were not wholly met in the case, so that there was no occasion to award exemplary damages. It would be indeed a travesty of justice to accept the submission of the Counsel for the appellants that the three-Judge Bench expressed opinion that the principle of constructive res judicata would apply to the case in hand, so as to debar the High Court from entertaining the writ petitions and disposing them of on merits. As we have already noted, prior to the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court, the self-same order of the Delhi High Court had been assailed in as many as 79 cases by approaching this Court by way of special leave petitions and all those petitions had been dismissed20. The extent to which corruption in the governing structure has corroded the very core of our democracy, the notoriety which the discretionary allotment of petroleum dealership and LPG gas agencies had acquired, the earlier petition under Article 32 entertained by this Court at the behest of the Common Cause, the cancellation of 15 of such allotments and finally, the express direction therein to the High Court to dispose of the pending writ petitions after examining the individual cases, it is difficult for us to accept the bar of principle of constructive res judicata on the ground that the earlier judgment in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation has accorded any tacit approval or the subsequent so-called observation made in the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the review petition. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the aforesaid contention is devoid of any substance21. The third contention was seriously argued by Mr. Sharma, the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3106 of 2000. The learned Counsel very much emphasised that Common Cause v. Union of India (supra), has been over-ruled and, therefore, nothing survived for Delhi High Court to examine the legality of the allotments made under discretionary quota. This argument appears to have been made on the basis of the Head Note at page 671 of the reported judgment with reference to paragraph 123 of the judgment. But when we examine paragraph 123 of the judgment, we do not find anywhere that the three- Judge Bench had in fact over-ruled the judgment in Common Cause case, 1996(6) SCC 530. On the other hand, in paragraph 125 it affirms the earlier conclusion that the conduct of the Minister was wholly unjustified. Then again, the review petition itself, as already stated, had been filed by Capt. Satish Sharma, the then Minister only in relation to the order and direction dated 4.11.1996 since reported in 1996(6) SCC 593. In this view of the matter, we find no substance in the aforesaid contention raised by Mr. Sharma, appearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3106 of 2000. We have therefore no hesitation in rejecting the same22. So far as the fourth question is concerned, it is no doubt true that the three- Judge Bench decision of this Court, reviewing the direction in the Common Cause case, so far as order dated 4.11.1996 is concerned, is subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition by the Delhi High Court, but we do not find any justification for requiring the Delhi High Court to re-consider the appeals in the light of the observations made by the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court inasmuch as in the said judgment this Court was merely concerned with the directions to register a criminal case and prosecute the concerned Minister, if he is found to have committed any criminal offence and levy of exemplary damages to the tune of Rs. 50 lacs. Consequently, any observation made in that regard will have no bearing on the merits of the individual allotments, which were the subject matter of consideration in the two writ petitions before the Delhi High Court. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the appellants23. So far as the fifth question is concerned, it is no doubt true that the appellants have invested considerable amount in the business and have operated for about eight years but even on equitable considerations, we do not find any equity in favour of the appellants. The conduct of the Minister in making the discretionary allotments has been found to be atrocious, in the very three-Judge Bench decision of this and in relation to similar allotments made by the said Minister in favour of 15 persons, who were respondents in the Common Cause case. This Court came to hold that the allotments of the public property has been doled out in arbitrary and discriminatory manner and the appellants had been held to be beneficiaries of such arbitrary orders of allotments. The question of granting the allottees relief on an equitable consideration did not arise at all, for the same reasons in a case like this, a sympathetic consideration on the ground of equity would be a case of misplaced sympathy and we refrain from granting any relief on any equitable consideration. In our view, the appellants do not deserve any equitable consideration24. So far as the sixth question is concerned, we have examined the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of each individual appellant. We have also considered the questionnaire that had been evolved and also the replies to the show-cause notices that had been filed by the allottees. We have also considered the original applications that had been filed by these appellants and the orders of allotment made by the concerned Minister, wherever they are available on record as well as the recommendations and circumstances leading to the exercise of discretion. The impugned judgment also indicates that in each and every case, the High Court had considered the original file, dealing with the allotments in question and it cancelled only those allotments where there was not an iota of material in support of the claim made by the applicant, whereas it sustained several other cases of discretionary allotments made during that period, wherever materials were available in the original file. It is difficult for us to come to a conclusion that the conclusion of the High Court in the cases in hand can be said to be vitiated on account of non-consideration of any germane materials. Factually, we do not have any basis to come to the aforesaid finding. On the other hand, we are satisfied that the High Court has applied its mind to each and every individual case of discretionary allotment and cancelled only those, which it came to hold to have been arbitrarily granted without any inquiry and only on being persuaded by certain recommendations of high dignitaries and without verification of any materials. We, therefore, see no infirmity with the ultimate conclusion of the High Court, cancelling the allotments in favour of the appellants, so as to be interfered with by this Court25. So far as the seventh question is concerned, it is Mr. Bhandari, who argued with vehemence that non-issuance of notice under Order I Rule 8, CPC by the High Court before deciding the legal issues by its order dated 22.8.1997, has vitiated the entire proceedings and, consequently, the order of cancellation must be set aside by this Court. According to Mr. Bhandari, in a matter like the present one, unless the Court directs issuance of notice by publication in a newspaper, following the procedure under Order I Rule 8, CPC and all the affected persons get an opportunity to appear and made their submissions, before the Court formulates the legal position and answers them, the subsequent notice to different persons like the appellants is nothing but a compliance of paper formality and such procedure adopted has grossly prejudiced the appellants. We, however, are not persuaded to accept this submission. The provisions of Order I Rule 8, CPC get attracted when there are numerous persons having the same interest, are sued or sue and the Court can permit such a suit to be defended by adopting the procedure under Order I Rule 8, CPC. In the case in hand, the writ petition that had been filed was in fact a petition in public interest, where the allegations were that the concerned authority had been involved in large-scale allotments of retail outlets in petrol, gass and kerosene, arbitrarily and for extraneous considerations without having any guidelines for such allotments and as such it tantamounted to disposal of public property in a manner which is shocking to conscience. By the time when the High Court went into those allegations in the two petitions filed, this Court had taken the view that such allotments had in fact been made arbitrarily and contrary to the public interest and this Court directed the High Court to dispose of the pending proceedings in accordance with law. The High Court, on receipt of the names of the allottees during a specified period from the Union Government, issued notice to each and every such allottee, who had been allotted out of the discretionary quota of the concerned Minister and granted opportunity to each of such allottee to inspect the relevant file dealing with the allotment in his/her favour and then heard the said allottee before passing the final order, either discharging notice of cancellation or cancelling the allotment made. In this view of the matter, we hardly find any justification in the submission of Mr. Bhandari that the entire proceedings are vitiated as notice under Order I Rule 8, CPC had not been given. If the allottee like the appellant whose allotment has been cancelled by the impugned order, had the opportunity of examining the materials on the file of the Government, wherein his case of allotment has been dealt with and had the opportunity of filing his show-cause, pursuant to the notice of cancellation that had been issued and the allotment in his case having been cancelled on the ground that the concerned Minister did not make any verification with regard to the necessary criteria indicated in the application for discretionary allotment, we fail to understand how a contention could be raised that the whole procedure adopted is vitiated for non-compliance of the procedure under Order I Rule 8, CPC. The object of Order I Rule 8, CPC is to give notice to persons likely to be affected by litigation, so that they may be heard. If the Court would have directed issuance of notice under Order I Rule 8, CPC without giving individual notice to the allottees to show-cause why the allotment will not be cancelled, then that perhaps would have been an infraction and violation of the principle of natural justice. But in this case, each and every allottee had been duly noticed, they have filed their replies to the notices, they have availed of the opportunity of examining the original file, wherein the case of discretionary allotment had been dealt with and it was only after hearing them that the orders of cancellation had been passed. We have, therefore, no hesitation in answering this question that there was no requirement of following the procedure under Order I Rule 8 nor can it be said that the entire exercise is vitiated26. So far as the eighth question is concerned, it was repeatedly argued before us by several Counsels that the concerned Minister was not required to verify and since the order of allotment stipulates that the Oil Company would verify before granting the agency in question that itself is a good verification and, consequently, the High Court was in error in cancelling the allotment on the ground that there had been no proper verification. It is no doubt true that the Minister having exercised his discretion and allotting a particular agency in favour of the applicant, has required the Oil Company to make necessary verification before entering into an agreement with the allottee, but that verification supposed to have been done by the Oil Company has nothing to do with the materials on which the subjective satisfaction of the Minister was arrived at for exercise of his discretion in favour of any individual for any justifiable reason. When a State property as distinct from a private property is being dealt with by a Minister then it is of paramount importance that such public property must be dealt with for public purpose and in the public interest. The disposal of a public property undoubtedly partakes the character of a trust and, therefore, in the matter of such disposal, there should not be any suspicion of a lack of principle. The exercise of discretion must not be arbitrary or capricious or for any extraneous considerations. It is in that context when the Court was examining each and every individual case of discretionary allotment, the Court was trying to find out whether there existed some materials, on the basis of which the Minister could be said to have arrived at his subjective satisfaction for exercise of his discretion in favour of the applicant. It is the so-called satisfaction of the Minister for exercise of his discretionary power and making the grant that was being examined and scrutinized by the Court and only when the Court found that there had been absolutely no materials or that Minister had made the grant without making any inquiry or verification, that the Court had interfered with the allotments in question, obviously on a conclusion that such allotments had been arbitrarily made. The subsequent inquiry supposed to have been conducted by the Oil Company cannot replace the pre-conditions for exercise of discretion by the Minister. If the initial order of allotment by exercise of discretion is vitiated on the ground of absence of any materials or verification by the concerned authority who has exercised the discretion, then the so-called subsequent inquiry by the Oil Company which operates in different fields cannot make the so-called arbitrary order of the Minister a legal or just order. This being the position, we see no force in the submission made by the Counsel appearing for the appellants in this score. The same accordingly stands rejected27. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the judgment of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 6840 of 2001 and principles evolved therein can be applied to the case in hand, so as to protect the allotments already made under the discretionary quota. The aforesaid case no doubt was a case of allotment of land by the Chief Minister of a State in the State of Haryana. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana by its order dated 20th January, 1988 disposed of the case of S.R. Dass v. State of Haryana, 1988 Punjab Law Journal page 123, under which it formulated certain principles on which the discretionary allotments could be made with certain conditions. The so-called discretionary allotments made by the Government and HUDA, pursuant to the earlier judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court were sought to be assailed as being contrary to certain stricter principles, which were evolved in the case of Anil Sabharwal which stood disposed of on 5.12.1997. This Court in the appeal in question held that the stricter scrutiny required to be made as per the guidelines evolved in Anils case, must be made applicable to the period subsequent to the judgment viz. 5.12.1997 and allotments made between 1988 and 1997 in accordance with the principles and guidelines indicated in S.R. Dass case, were protected by applying the principle of prospective application, so far as the judgment in Anils case. We fail to understand how the aforesaid principle can apply to the case in hand where the allotments made prior to the judgment of this Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation, 1995(3) Supp. (3) SCC 382, are the subject matter of scrutiny and had been made indiscriminately, as there had been no guiding principle for making such allotments. Consequently, the principles evolved in Civil Appeal No. 6840 of 2001, will have no application at all to the present appeals. The said contention, therefore, must fail