Case: Ajit Savant Majagavi Vs. State of Karnataka

6. The appellant was married to a young woman, by name, Padmavathi @ Janaki, in or about April, 1984 in Belgaum Taluk. Her father was P.W.8, Paris Savant Kaggodi who was, incidentally, also brother of appellants mother. Padmavathi, after bidding adieu to her father and other relations, came to live with the appellant in her new house where her parents-in-laws also lived. She became the victim of mental torture and cruelty for a charge, which, unfortunately, can be levied easily against any virtuous woman, that she was involved in extra-marital relationship; in this case with one Gundu Badasad.7. On becoming pregnant, Padmavathi came back to her fathers house for performance of certain ceremonies connected with the pregnancy and continued to stay there till she delivered a male child. The information of the birth of the child was conveyed to the appellant and his parents but nobody, not even the appellant, came to see Padmavathi or the child although, in normal course, the birth of a male child has the effect of bringing smile even on a frowning face. Like a lull before the storm, this cold-shouldering was the precursor of the evils that were to befall Padmavathi.8. Four months after the delivery, the appellant suddenly, on a Saturday, came to the house of his father-in-law (P.W.8) and sought his permission to take his wife and the child to a temple at Stavanidhi which was a sacred and holy place for the Jains. The next morning, that is, on Sunday, the appellant, his wife and the child were seen off by his sister-in-law at the Bus Station where they boarded a Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation bus and came to Halaga village where on Monday, at 1.00 A.M., the appellant, with his wife and child came to the house of a person named Gopal Bhimappa Inchal. The appellant told Gopal Bhimappa Inchal that on their return from the temple, they could not get the "bus" and, therefore, they had come to his house for the night halt. As promised, the appellant with his wife and the child left the house in the early morning and came to "Ashoka Lodge" in Belgaum where he checked in Room No. 113 at 9.30 A.M. on 9.9.85. That was the most unfortunate, as also, the last day in Padmavathis life. At about 12.00 Noon, the appellant came to the reception counter of "Ashoka Lodge" and informed the people there that his wife had died of heart-attack and that he was going to bring his relations. He left the "Lodge", with child in his lap, never to come back. He gave the child to a lady called Gangavva, in village Halaga who, later, sent the child to Padmavathis father.9. The Police was informed of the matter in due course which visited the "Lodge" and held the inquest. The body of Padmavthi was sent for post mortem examination which revealed that Padmavathi had died not because of cardiac arrest, but on account of asphyxia. Her death was homicidal.10. The Police arrested, challaned and prosecuted the appellant, who was found "not guilty" by the trial court but the High Court, on appeal by the State, reversed the verdict and convicted the appellant u/s 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Now, the matter is before us.

Reasoning:
The Addl. Sessions Judge had fallen into the web of this, apparently forceful argument but the High Court, and in our opinion, rightly, accepted the remaining evidence and held that in spite of hostility of the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution story was fully established.This Court has thus explicitly and clearly laid down the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. These principles have been set out in innumerable cases and may be reiterated as underIn an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers and nothing less than the powers, it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction.(2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings in place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in order words, perverse.(3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to record its own reasons for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial Court that the accused is entitled to acquittal.(4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court.(5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted.(6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness-box.(7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.This Section consists of two parts. While the first part provides for comparison of signature, finger impression, writing etc. allegedly written or made by a person with signature or writing etc. admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the Court to have been written by the same person, the second part empowers the Court to direct any person including an accused, present in Court, to give his specimen writing or finger prints for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare it with the writing or signature allegedly made by that person. The Section does not specify by whom the comparison shall be made. However, looking to the other provisions of the Act, it is clear that such comparison may either be made by a handwriting expert under Section 45 or by anyone familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned as provided by Section 47 or by the Court itself.38. As a matter of extreme caution and judicial sobriety, the Court should not normally take upon itself the responsibility of comparing the disputed signature with that of the admitted signature or handwriting and in the event of slightest doubt, leave the matter to the wisdom of experts. But this does not mean that the Court has not the power to compare the disputed signature with the admitted signature as this power is clearly available under Section 73 of the Act.We have already recorded above that on the comparison of the signature in the "Register of Lodgers" with the appellants signature on the "Vakalatnama", we have not found any dissimilarity and are convinced that the appellant himself had signed the "Register of Lodgers" in token of having taken Room No. 113 in "Ashoka Lodge" on rent wherein he had stayed with his wife and the child.40. On an overall consideration of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court, in reversing the judgment of the trial Court, had fully adhered to the principles laid down by this Court in various decisions and there is no infirmity in its judgment.41. The circumstances, the conduct and behaviour of the appellant conclusively establish his guilt and no amount of innovative steps by him including sporting a beard and later shaving off the beard and the head could conceal the offence or his identity.