Case: Nav Rattanmal And Others Vs. The State Of Rajasthan

2. Seth Lal Chand Kothari-the original first appellant in the appeal before us (he died pending this appeal and his heirs have been brought on record as his legal representatives-appellants 1 to 6) was appointed by the Commissioner Ajmer-Merwara as Government Treasurer, Ajmer-Merwara, by an order dated February 20, 1940, the treasuries to be under his charge being two-that at Ajmer and a sub-treasury at Beawar. Before accepting office he had, under the rules, to deposit Government promissory notes to the extent Rs. 60,000 and also execute a Security Bond for a like amount with two sureties to cover any loss to the Government in these treasuries. He accordingly made the deposit, and a security bond was executed by him on February 27, 1940 with Seth Phool Chand -who is now the 7th appellant in the appeal and one Seth Kanwarlal Ranka who died even before the suit and was not impleaded in it. Thereupon Lal Chand Kothari was directed to take charge of the office as Treasurer and he did so on March 6, 1940.3. We are not concerned with the treasury at Ajmer, but only with that at Beawar. Lal Chand, at the time of his taking charge, executed a receipt headed "charge-report" and in its is recited that he had taken over from the previous incumbent (M. L. Patni) the amount of cash which tallied with what had to be in the treasury according to the books. Nothing happened between 1940 and 1948  the business at the treasury appeared to be proceeding regularly and according to the rules. It may be mentioned that there were the usual periodical checks and audits by Government officials but no impropriety was discovered during these checks or audits. On March 31, 1948, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Ajmer, made a check of the treasury at Beawar. The treasury staff who ought to have been there were however absent in spite of their having had prior intimation of his arrival and thereupon he directed the treasury to be scaled. There were two cash chests at this sub-treasury- one secured with a single lock, the key of which was with the staff of the Treasurer and the other with double-locks, the keys of which were held, one by the employee of the treasurer and the other by the Government Treasury Officer-the Tahsildar. A verification of the balance in the two chests disclosed that a sum of 7 annas, 9 pies was missing from the single-lock chest and Rs. 84,215/- from the chest with the double-lock. The Government thereupon took proceedings to realise the missing amount from the security of Rs. 60,000 which had been under deposit. The Government securities were sold and they realized about rupees 58 thousands and odd leaving a sum of Rs. 25,786-13-9 still due. The Union of Indian thereupon filed a suit-Civil Suit 125 of1951 before the Sub-Judge First class Beawar on the security bond dated February 27, 1940 against Lal Chand Kothari and Seth Phool Chand for recovery of this sum. Several defences were raised by the defendants but they were all rejected by the learned Subordinate Judge who granted the respondents a decree in terms prayed for in the suit. The defendants filed an appeal to the Judicial Commissioner who dismissed sit, but having regard to the fact that some of the defences turned on the interpretation of the security should dated February 27, 1940, granted a certificate under Art.133(1) of the Constitution and that is how the appeal is now before us.

Reasoning:
This argument was rejected by the courts below and, in our opinion, correctly. In the face of the receipt executed by Lal Chand Kothari it would not be open to him to contend that the recitals in it were not correct, and in any event it would be for him to show that it was incorrect and, of course, there was no possibility of his establishingsubmission is without any foundation, because the liability under the Board would depend upon its terms and in the face of the language used in the document learned Counsel realised that the submission could not be seriouslyif Lal Chand agreed to those terms-and this is not disputed, the terms must prevail. Apart from the terms of the security bond however, it would be apparent that if the key of one of the locks was with the employee of the Treasurer the defalcation could not have occurred without such employees connivance or negligence. If so, the fixing of liability upon the employer could not be characterised even as unreasonable apart from the liability flowing from the terms of the Bond, and such a vicarious liability for the negligence or misconduct of his servants, is not lessened by reason of the assistance or negligence of Government officials.8. These exhaust the points urged based on the terms of the Bond. It remains to deal only with the contention that the claim is barred by limitation under Art. 83 of the Limitation Act on the plea that Art.149 of the Limitation Act which fixes a period of 60 years for suits by the Government is unconstitutional as violating Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged that there is no rational basis for treating claims by Government differently from those of private individuals in the matter of the time within which they could be enforced byconsidering this matter two points have to be kept separate. (1) whether a distinction could be drawn or a classification supported between the provision of any variation in the time that should be available for enforcing claims by private individuals and claims by the State, (2) whether if such a classification were good, the period of 60 years provided by Art. 149 of the Indian Limitation Act is such a long period of time as to be unreasonable. We are drawing attention to the distinction between these two points because learned Counsel laid much stress on the fact that the period of limitation fixed by Art.149 was 60 years and that this was an unreasonably long period of time. If learned Counsel is right in his submission that there is no rational basis for placing private individuals and the Government in different classes while framing a legislation providing for limitation for actions he might succeed; but if he is wrong there and t he correct view is that there is a rational basis of classification, then the period that should be allowed to the Government to file a suit would be a matter of legislative policy and could not be brought within the scope or purview of a challenge under Art. 14 or indeed of any other article in the Constitution. It is sufficient therefore if we confine ourselves to the first point, viz., whether there is a rational basis for treating the Government differently as regards the period within which claims might be put in suit between the Government on the one hand and private individuals on thematters apart, the ratio underlying the special provisions for summary recovery of amounts due to Government without resort to suits by a procedure not available for enforcing the dues of private individuals like the "Revenue Recovery Acts" and "Public Demands Recovery Acts" which have been on the statute book for over a century is also similar, viz., the interest of the public and of the community in realising what is due to it expeditiously; and the constitutional validity of such provisions have been sustained by this Court. In Purshottam Govindji Halai v. B. M. Desai, 1955-2 SCR 887  : ( (S) AIR 1956 SC 20  ) this Court held that S. 13 of the Bombay Land Revenue Act,1876, by virtue of which a person had been arrested in pursuance of a warrant issued for recovery of a demand certified under S. 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act , did not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. Similarly, in Collector off Malabar v. Ebrahim, 1957 SCR 970  : ( (S)AIR 1957 SC 688  ) the arrest of a defaulter in respect of an income-tax demand under S. 48 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act was held not to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. Perhaps another decision of this Court of more immediate relevance, in which the point now raised that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between the claims of the Government and the claims of private individuals-was considered and negatived, is that in Mannalal v. Collector, Jhalawar, C. A. No. 88 of 1957: (AIR 1961 SC 828  ) in which judgment was delivered on December 7, 1960. In this last case it was urged before this Court that the summary mode of recovery of amounts due to the Government for which provision was made by the Rajasthan Public Recovery Act there impugned-a mode of recovery which was not available to the private citizen-contravened the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 and this contention was repelled. The argument of learned Counsel for the appellants has therefore to be rejected both on the ground of principle as well as on the ratio underlying the decision of this Court.First and foremost there is this feature that the Limitation Act, though a statute of repose and intended for quieting titles, and in that sense looks at the problem from the point of view of the defendant with a view to provide for him a security against stale claims, addresses itself at the same time also to the position of the plaintiff. Thus, for instance where the plaintiff is under a legal disability to institute a suit by reason of his being a minor or being insane or an idiot, it makes provisions for the extension of the period taking into account that disability. Similarly, public interest in a claim being protected is taken into account by S. 10 of the Act by providing that there shall be no period of limitation in the case of express trusts. It is not necessary to go into the details of these provisions but it is sufficient to state that the approach here is from the point of view of protecting the enforceability of claims which, if the ordinary rules applied, would become barred by limitation. It is in great part on this principle that it is said that subject to statutory provision, while the maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura Subveniunt is a rule for the subject, the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi is in general applicable to the Crown. The reason assigned was, the quote Coke, that the State ought not to suffer for the negligence of its officers or for their fraudulent collusion with the adverse party. It is with this background that the question of the special provision contained in Art. 149 of the Act has to be viewed.First we have the fact that in the case of the Government if a claim becomes barred by limitation, the loss falls on the public, i.e., on the community in general and to the benefit of the private individual who derives advantage by the lapse of time. This itself would appear to indicate a sufficient ground for differentiating between the claims of an individual and the claims of the community at large. Next, it may be mentioned that in the case of governmental machinery, it is a known fact that it does not move as quickly as in the case of individuals. Apart from the delay occurring in the proper officers ascertaining that a cause of action has accrued- Government being an impersonal body, before a claim is launched there has to be inter-departmental correspondence, consultations, sanctions obtained according to the rules. These necessarily take time and it is because of these features which are sometimes characterised as re-tape that there is delay in the functioning of Government officers. It is precisely for this reason that we have from earliest Civil Procedure Codes provisions which find place in the Code of 1908, like O. 27, Rr. 5 and 7