Case: M. Ramakrishnan Vs. State Of Madras

This appeal by special leave is filed against the order dated March 12, 1969 passed in Civil Revision Petition No. 1791 of 1967 on the file of the High Court of Madras.2. On the date of the commencement of the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) i.e. April 6, 1960, the appellant owned approximately 47 acres of agricultural lands. He was required to file a statement under Section 8 of the Act within 90 days from the date specified in the notification issued by the Government in that behalf in respect of all lands held or deemed to have been held by him furnishing the particulars mentioned in that provision to the Authorised Officer within whose jurisdiction his holding or major part thereof was situated. Accordingly, he filed his return. In the course of the enquiry, the Authorised Officer found that under a will made by Sivagami Achi, the mother of the appellant, who died on April 20, 1962, the appellant became entitled to 4.99 standard acres and his wife, Devika got 8.81 standard acres of agricultural land. The Authorised Officer after ascertaining the true extents of the several bits of agricultural land held by the appellant on April 6, 1960, exempted 2.21 acres of land under Section 73 of the Act and determined the extent of surplus land which had to be surrendered by the appellant under the Act at 12.803 standard acres on the basis that the appellants family which included his wife was holding 44.46 acres as also the land which the appellant and his wife got under the will of Sivagami Achi. On the above basis, he directed the final statement to be published under Section 12 of the Act. Aggrieved by the order of the Authorised Officer, the appellant filed an appeal before the Land Tribunal, i.e. the Subordinate Judge of Thanjavur under Section 78 of the Act contending inter alia that the extent of 8.81 standard acres which had been bequeathed in favour of his wife, Devika by his mother Sivagami Achi under the will referred to above was stridhana land and had to be dealt with accordingly as required by Section 5(4)(a) of the Act. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the case of the appellant that the extent of 8.81 standard acres acquired by Devika on the death of Sivagami Achi should be allowed to be retained by her in addition to 30 standard acres. The case was, however, remitted back to the Authorised Officer for making a fresh determination of the surplus extent of land in accordance with the order passed in appeal. The State of Tamil Nadu filed a revision petition under Section 83 of the Act before the High Court against the appellate order. The High Court allowed the revision petition holding that the extent of 8.81 standard acres acquired by Devika was not stridhana land as defined under Section 3(42) of the Act and could not be treated as such while determining the surplus land. The High Court further held that the land acquired by Devika was governed by Section 21(1) read with Section 10(2)(b) of the Act. This appeal is filed against the said order.

Reasoning:
Admittedly on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. April 6, 1960, Devika was not the owner of the land in question. She acquired title to it only on April 20, 1962 on the death of testatrix. The appellant cannot, therefore, claim any benefit under Section 5(4)(a) of the Act. Section 21 of the Act under which the land in question becomes liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female acquired after the commencement of the Act by inheritance or bequest from any person and any other property held by her family. From a reading of the definition of the expression "stridhana land" in Section 3(42) of the Act and the provisions of Section 5(4) of the Act, we are of opinion that the State legislature intended to extend the concession available under Section 5(4) of the Act only to the stridhana property held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to property acquired by herdo not thing that there is any room for construing the said provision in that way. The object of the legislation as mentioned earlier was to acquire agricultural land in excess of the ceiling area from the holders thereof and to distribute the same amongst the landless among the rural population. If the construction urged by the appellant is placed on Section 21 of the Act, the very object of the statute would be defeated. If really the legislature intended that lands acquired by way of inheritance or bequest by a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also be dealt with in accordance with Section 5(4), it would have defined the expression "stridhana land" without the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act". It has also to be borne in mind that the expression stridhana is not used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu law. The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by other personal laws. It is, therefore, reasonable to construe the expression stridhana land as referring only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to lands inherited by her or acquired by her as a bequest at any subsequent point of time.It is true that the above passage supports the case of the appellant but we are of the view that in the context of Section 21 of the Act it is not necessary to give a meaning to the expression stridhana land different from what is stated in Section 3(42) of the Act. For the reasons already stated by us we hold that the aforesaid decision does not lay down the law correctly. It is also to be observed that the earlier decision of the High Court of Madras which is now under appeal does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the above case.17. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in this case in holding that Section 5(4) of the Act was not applicable to the land indo not think that it is advisable to do so at this stage. It is open to the appellant if he is so advised to resort to appropriate proceedings in order to claim the benefit that he may be entitled to under the amended law. Liberty is also reserved to the State Government to take whatever action it may take under the subsequent amendments to the Act.