Case: Ratilal Balabhai Nazar Vs. Ranchhodbhai Shankarbhai Patel &amp; Another

1. This is an appeal by special leave against the order of the High Court of Gujarat dismissing summarily the appellants application under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure for revision of the judgment of the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad passed in an appeal under S. 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.2. The appellant is the tenant of certain premises belonging to the respondent, the rent of which was fixed at Rs. 50 According to the respondent, the appellant was required under the terms of the tenancy to pay in addition municipal taxes and charges for electric energy consumed by him. The appellant did not pay rent from June 1, 1956 for a period of over six months, in consequence of which the respondent gave a notice to him on February 20, 1957 terminating his tenancy and also demanding the rent and other charges which were due from the appellant. As the appellant did neither vacate the premises, nor pay the arrears due from him, the respondent instituted a suit on April 1, 1957 for recovery of possession and for the recovery of Rs.This amount comprised of the standard rent in arrears amounting to Rs. 600, proportionate electric charges of Rs.in respect of municipal taxer and Rs. 25 as charges incurred for giving notice to him. In his written statement the appellant pleaded that the rent of R. 50 p.m. was inclusive of taxes as well as of charges for consumption of electricity, Subsequently, however, as the appellant sought leave to amend his written statement by adding to it the plea that the rent agreed to originally between the parties was excessive and that the reasonable rent would be Rs. 30 p.m. The amendment was allowed by the trial court, and upon the finding that the standard rent of Rs. 50 was inclusive of municipal taxes and electric charges and the relief for possession was refused to the respondent. The court found that on June 30, 1960 the total amount due to the respondent in respect of rent was Rs. 2,550. It may be mentioned that at the first hearing of the suit the appellant had in fact deposited Rs. 2,890 in court, which, according to him, was an amount larger than that due to the respondent on the date of deposit. While passing the decree the trial court directed that out of the amount deposited by the appellant a sum of Rs. 2,550 and half the costs of the suit be paid to the respondent and the remaining amount returned to the appellant. In appeal the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court held that the appellant was bound to pay taxes and electric charges and also held that there was a bona fide dispute between the parties about standard rent. But upon a construction placed by him on the provisions of S. 12 of the Act the learned Judge held that the case fell under S. 12 (1) of the Act read with the Explanation thereto and not under either Cl. (a) or Cl. (b) of(3) of S. 12. Upon that view he decreed the relief for possession in favour of the respondent and also held the respondent entitled to a sum of Rs.in addition to the amount of Rs. 2,550 decreed by the trial court.

Reasoning:
This contention was negatived by the Court after citing the following passage from the opinion of Sir John Beaumont in that case. The passage runs thus:"There have been a very large number of decisions of Indian High Courts on S. 115 to many of which their Lordships have referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observations that High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in a decision of a subordinate court does not by itself involve that the subordinate court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under(c), nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the Subordinate Court exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, a case for revision arises unders, (c) can be ignored."This Court then observed that the Privy Council had distinguished between cases in which on a wrong decision the Court assumes jurisdiction which is not vested in it or refuses to exercise jurisdiction which is vested in it by law and those in which in exercise of its jurisdiction the Court arrives at a conclusion erroneous in law or in fact, and that while in the former class of cases exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court is permissible it is not permissible in the latter class of cases.