Case: Arun Raj Vs. Union of India &amp; Others

The appellant joined the Indian Army in the year 1983 and in the year 1998 he was working as Ex-Signalman (Lance Nayak) of 787 (Independent) Air Defence Brigade Signal Company. On 22.3.1998, one Mr. S.S.B Rao (PW-4) was the Section In-Charge of Operator Section. At about 1 PM, Mr. Rao returned from lunch and the appellant reported to him that Havildar R.C Tiwari (deceased) and Havildar Inderpal (PW-3) abused him by using the word "Gandu". On Mr. Rao making an inquiry into the same, they replied in the negative, despite the appellant making repeated assertion that they insulted him using the said word. The appellant also brought to the information of Mr. Rao that in the previous night there was a heated discussion between the appellant and the deceased and Inderpal, and the matter was reported to the superior officer. Paulose (PW-1), after having his lunch, returned to the barrack from the rank mess and he was relaxing in the cot. At this point of time, he saw the appellant coming towards the door. He was wearing a half T-shirt and lungi. The cot of the deceased was near the door and he was sleeping on it. The appellant took out a knife which was hidden in the lungi and stabbed the deceased on the right side of the chest. On witnessing the incident, PW-1 was shocked and shouted to the appellant as to why he did it. On hearing the shout of PW-1, people came in and gathered immediately. The appellant was separated by the crowd and the deceased was sent to the hospital where he finally succumbed to the injury. Major Prabal Datta (PW-9) testified that there was no external injury on the body of the deceased except the stab injury caused by a knife.2) An FIR was lodged at the Dehu Road Police Station vide CR- 26 of 1998 under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, investigation commenced, during the course of which the body of the deceased was sent for post mortem and an inquest Panchnama was also prepared. On completion of the investigation, the charge- sheet was prepared against the appellant/accused and forwarded to the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Vadgaon Maval. In the meantime, since the appellant belonged to the armed forces, court martial proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the Army Act. Charges were framed against the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 69 of the Army Act for committing civil offence, i.e., knowingly causing the death of the deceased on 22.3.1998. On the appellant pleading not guilty, the General Court Martial proceeded to record the evidence of witnesses. The prosecution examined 18 witnesses. The General Court Martial after appreciating the facts and the evidence on record, found the appellant guilty of the offence for which he was charged and after hearing his submission with regard to the quantum of sentence, sentenced the appellant to undergo 7 years of rigorous imprisonment and he was also dismissed from service for committing the offence of murder punishable under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 302 of IPC. However upon revision, the Confirming Authority by an order dated 15.12.1998 held that the sentence awarded by the General Court Martial after finding the appellant guilty of murder under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 302 of IPC, was not justiciable and further observed that once the appellant was held guilty under the abovementioned Sections, he could be either sentenced to life imprisonment and fine or sentenced to death. Accordingly, the General Court Martial by an order dated 15.1.1999, revised the sentence and sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for life and dismissal from service, which was subsequently confirmed by the Confirming Authority. Being aggrieved by this order, the appellant filed a petition before the Chief of Army Staff under Section 164 of the Army Act, which was rejected. The appellant being aggrieved by the same filed a writ petition before the Bombay High Court.

Reasoning:
11) The first ingredient is easily solved by referring to the weapon used by the appellant to strike a knife blow to the appellant. The appellant in this instance has used a kitchen knife. A kitchen knife with sharp edges is a dangerous weapon and it is very obvious that the appellant was aware that the use of such a weapon can cause death or serious bodily injury that is likely to cause death. As far as the second ingredient is concerned, the appellants learned counsel contended that the fact that there was one single blow struck, proves that there was no intention to cause death. In support of the plea, reliance is placed on the decisions of this court in the case of Bhera v. State of Rajasthan, [(2000) 10 SCC 225] , Kunhayippu v. State of Kerala, [(2000) 10 SCC 307] , Masumsha Hasansha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra, [(2000) 3 SCC 557] , Guljar Hussain v. State of U.P., [1993 Supp (1) SCC 554], K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, [(1999) 3 SCC 309] , Pappu v. State of M.P., [(2006) 7 SCC 391] , Muthu v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, [(2007) 12 Scale 795] . A brief perusal of all these cases would reveal that in all these cases there was a sudden and instantaneous altercation which led to the accused inflicting a single blow to the deceased with a sharp weapon. Hence, there has been conviction under Section 304 Part II as delivering a single blow with a sharp weapon in a sudden fight would not point towards intention to cause death. These cases are clearly distinguishable from the case at hand, purely on the basis of facts. In the present case, there has been no sudden altercation which ensued between the appellant and the deceased in the present case. The deceased called the appellant `gandu following which there was a heated exchange of words between the two, the day before the murder. The next day, however, the appellant concealed a kitchen knife in his lungi and went towards the cot of the deceased and struck the deceased a blow on the right side of the chest, while the deceased was sleeping. The fact that the appellant waited till the next day, went on to procure a deadly weapon like a kitchen knife and then proceeded to strike a blow on the chest of the appellant when he was sleeping, points unerringly towards due deliberation on the part of the appellant to avenge his humiliation at the hands of the appellant. The nature of weapon used and the part of the body where the blow was struck, which was a vital part of the body helps in proving beyond reasonable doubt, the intention of the appellant to cause the death of the deceased. Once these ingredients are proved, it is irrelevant whether there was a single blow struck or multiple blows. This court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Dhool Singh, [(2004) 12 SCC 546] while dismissing a similar contention has stated that, "It is the nature of injury, the part of body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury which are the indicators of the fact whether the respondent caused the death of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. In the instant case, it is true that the respondent had dealt one single blow with a sword which is aweapon measuring about 3 ft. in length on a vital part of body, namely, the neck. This act of the respondent though solitary in number had severed sternoclinoid muscle, external jugular vein, internal jugular vein and common carotid artery completely leading to almost instantaneous death. Any reasonable person with any stretch of imagination can come to the conclusion that such injury on such a vital part of the body with aweapon would cause death. Such an injury, in our opinion, not only exhibits the intention of the attacker in causing the death of the victim but also the knowledge of the attacker as to the likely consequence of such attack which could be none other than causing the death of the victim. The reasoning of the High Court as to the intention and knowledge of the respondent in attacking and causing death of the victim, therefore, is wholly erroneous and cannot beIn the aforesaid decision, this Court held that there is no fixed rule that whenever a single blow is inflicted Section 302 would not be attracted.15) It is clear from the above line of cases, that it is necessary to prove first that there was an intention of causing bodily injury; and that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. From the evidence on record, it is very clear that the appellant intended to cause death. In light of this finding, the evidence on record makes it clear that Section 304 Part II of the IPC will not be attracted. Furtherion asserts that the deceased held his hand out after he was stabbed in the chest. It is very likely that this action on the part of the deceased prevented the appellant from stabbing him multiple number of times. The argument might deserve some merit in case there is a sudden altercation which ensues in the heat of the moment and there is no deliberate planning. In the present case, as stated above there was due deliberation on the part of the appellant and he assaulted the deceased a day after he misbehaved with him. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel that the appellant had no intention to cause death of the deceased has no merit and, accordingly, it is rejected.