Case: Ksl &amp; Industries Ltd Vs. M/S. Arihant Threads Ltd.

3. To understand the controversy in its proper perspective, it is necessary to keep in mind the factual matrix of the case. Respondent No. 1 (M/s. Arihant Threads Ltd.) (‘Company for short) was incorporated as a joint venture with Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation. It set up an export oriented spinning unit for manufacturing cotton yarn in the industrial area of Amritsar District of the State of Punjab. In 1992, Goindwal Sahib Industrial & Investment Corporation allotted Plot No. 454, Flocal Point of Goindwal Sahib Industrial Area by way of lease to the Company for a period of 99 years with a specific condition that the lessee will not transfer the interest in the property for first fifteen years without prior permission of the lessor. The lessee was to enjoy the right of possession so long as it continued paying instalments of the premium by due-date and abide by other terms and conditions of the lease. It was, however, stated that the lessee would be entitled to mortgage lease-hold rights to a Bank, Punjab Financial Corporation or Life Insurance Corporation of India as security for a loan to be raised for construction of factory building, purchase of raw materials, etc. The Industrial Development Bank of India (‘IDBI for short) which was the predecessor of the Stressed Assets Stabilisation Fund (SASF for short), financed the project undertaken by the Company by way of foreign currency loan and also working capital of Rs. 93.1 million.4. It was the case of the Company that due to overall recession in Textile Industry, the Company suffered huge loss and could not repay the amount of loan. Since the Company failed to pay instalments, IDBI filed Original Application No.1368 of 2001 on December 20, 2001 in Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh (‘DRT for short) for recovery of Rs.25,26,60,836/- under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘RDDB Act). On June 10, 2002, M/s Roland Exports (successor of Goindwal Industrial & Investment Corporation) cancelled the lease agreement on account of non-payment of lease money amounting to Rs.3,19,94,149/-. The Company did not remain present before the DRT though duly served. On July 15, 2003, therefore, an ex-parte final order in favour of IDBI (SAFS) for recovery of Rs.25,26,60,836/- along with interest @ 7.8% p.a. was passed by DRT.5. The Tribunal in operative part of the orderapplication for recovery of a sum Rs.25,26,60,836.00 is decreed against defendant company and the defendant company is ordered to pay:-i. A sum of Rs. 25,26,60,836.00 alongwith pendent elite and future interest @ 7.8% per annum with half yearly rests jointly and severally from the date of filing of the suit till realization;ii. Pay the cost of litigation;iii. Pay the said amount within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.2. In the event of failure on the part of defendants to pay the above amount within the stipulated period, the applicant bank shall be entitled to recover the said amount from the sale of mortgaged properties of the defendants. Even if the said amount is not so realized, it shall be recovered from the sale of personal properties of the defendants.3. Copy of the judgment be sent to the defendants and the recovery certificate be issued accordingly.4. Parties to appear before the Recovery Officer, DRT, Chandigarh on 22.8.2003.A recovery certificate was issued against the Company. On September 9, 2003, the Recovery Officer issued a composite demand notice under Rule 2 of Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the Company demanding payment of Rs.28,60,87,384/-. He also directed the Company to appear on October 23, 2003 for settling terms and conditions of the proclamation of sale and for disclosure of its movable and immovable assets. Harnek Singh, Security Guard who was present at the Company premises was served and he signed the summons in token of acceptance of notice on behalf of the Company. Service Report was filed by one Rajesh Mahajan, Advocate for certificate holder affirming Dasti service on the Company. Another service report was also filed along with affidavit by the same advocate on October 6, 2003. On January 3, 2004, Mr. Vivek Verma, Local Commissioner appointed by the Recovery Officer, visited the site and filed his report wherein he stated that two machines were missing. He also recorded that the unit was in running condition. At the instance of SASF, North India Technical Consultancy Association Ltd. (‘NITCO for short) filed a valuation report in January, 2004 assessing the fixed assets at Rs.17.51 crores. It is alleged that on July 1, 2004, the Company created illegal tenancy in favour of M/s Roland Exports. On September 16, 2004, the Recovery Officer fixed the reserve price of the property at Rs.12.50 crores (Rs.4.50 crores for movables and Rs.8.00 crores for immovables). He also fixed the date for sale of immovable property as October 27, 2004 and for movable property as October 30, 2004. The auction was, however, adjourned. The Company on October 18, 2004, filed an appeal against the order dated September 16, 2004 fixing reserve price of Rs. 12.50 crores in the DRT being Appeal No. 52 of 2004 under Section 30 of the RDDB Act. On October 27, 2004, DRT allowed auction sale to proceed but ordered that the sale should not be confirmed till further orders. On October 30, 2004, auction was concluded and the appellant herein was declared the highest and successful bidder at Rs.12.52 crores. It deposited 25% of the reserve price. On November 2, 2004, on an application by the appellant, DRT appointed representative of the appellant as a receiver to prepare inventory of auctioned property.7. On November, 11, 2004, the appellant made an application to DRT praying for acceptance of the bank guarantee in lieu of payment of the remaining amount of 75% and also by refunding the amount deposited (25%). DRT dismissed the said application and the appellant-auction purchaser, on the same day, i.e. November 11, 2004 deposited the balance amount of 75% of the purchase money i.e. Rs.9,39,00,000/- by a Bank draft. On December 13, 2004, the receiver lodged a First Information Report (FIR) and filed an affidavit before DRT complaining that the agent of the Company had forcibly dispossessed him by using criminal force. On December 15, 2004, the Company moved an application for setting aside ex-parte final order passed on July 15, 2003 by DRT, Chandigarh which was registered as M.A. No.103 of 2004. The appellant filed an application objecting the prayer of the Company with an added prayer to implead it in Appeal No.52 of 2004 as also in M.A. No. 103 of 2004. The DRT allowed the impleadment application of the appellant vide order dated December 17, 2004. On March 28, 2005, the appellant filed an application for hearing preliminary issue as to maintainability of appeal filed by the Company (Appeal No. 52 of 2004). On April 8, 2005, a suit for permanent injunction was filed by Roland Exports against the Company in the Civil Court at Tarantaran, District Amritsar. Status quo with regard to possession was ordered to be maintained by the Court. An appeal against the said order is said to have been pending in the High Court. Meanwhile, the Company got the property valued by Himachal Consultancy Organisation Ltd. (‘HIMCO for short), according to which the realizable value of the property had been increased to Rs.20.22 crores. On July 26, 2005, DRT-I, Delhi allowed Appeal No. 52 of 2004, set aside the auction sale subject to the Company fulfilling terms and conditions with regard to payment of certain amount, interest, expenses etc.8. The Tribunal, while granting relief to the Company,my humble opinion, natural justice requires that the appeal be allowed but with some conditions so that further progress of recovery be not stalled by the appellant. In these circumstances, this appeal is allowed, subject to the following conditions:-(i) That the appellant will pay 5% of the amount deposited by the auction purchaser within 10 days as a penalty as per rule 60 of the Second Schedule of Income Tax Act.(ii) The appellant will pay an interest on the amount deposited by the auction purchaser @ 9% p.a. calculated from the date of deposit of the same till today. The interest accumulated on the FDRs of auctioned amount till date will be paid to the CH Fl who will adjust this amount against the outstanding dues of the appellant.(iii) The appellant will also bear all the expenditure incurred by the CH FI in conducting the sale. The details of the same will be given by the CH FI within a week and thereafter within 10 days, this amount will be deposited by the appellant with the CH FI.Failing to comply all the above three conditions, this appeal will be treated as dismissed and the restraint order passed by this Tribunal will stand vacated and the Ld. Recovery Officer will be at liberty to pass the necessary orders as per law and if, the above conditions are fulfilled by the appellant, the Ld. Recovery Officer is directed to re-auction this property as early as possible, within 75 days as per law and release the amount deposited by the auction purchaser immediately. The present appeal bearing Transfer Appeal No. 1/2005 (Appeal NO. 52/04) stands disposed off accordingly. A copy of this order be given dasti to all the parties. A copy of this order be also sent to the Recovery Officer, DRT Chandigarh for necessary action and information. RC file be also sent immediately back to the DRT Chandigarh by special messenger along with copy of this order. File be consigned to records".The Company, objecting the conditions imposed by DRT, filed an appeal against the said order to the DRAT, Delhi being Appeal No. 167 of 2005. The appellant also filed an appeal being aggrieved by the setting aside the sale. DRAT stayed operation of the order dated July 26, 2005 which had set aside ex-parte order passed by DRT. It also directed refund of sale amount to the appellant. Appeals were then heard and the judgment was reserved.10. Meanwhile, on December 21, 2005, the Company filed a Reference before the Board of Industrial Finance & Reconstruction (‘BIFR for short) under SICA which was registered as BIFR Case No. 4 of 2006. On February 10, 2006, DRAT dismissed the appeal filed by the Company and allowed the appeal of the appellant and confirmed auction-sale in favour of the appellant on depositing the sale price. DRAT, in the operative part of the orderview of the detailed discussion made on the issues which are relevant for the purpose deciding these appeals, the Miscellaneous Appeal 167/2005 filed by the judgment-debtor shall stand dismissed. The Miscellaneous Appeal 173/2005 filed by the auction purchaser shall stand allowed. Consequently, the appeal filed by the judgment-debtor in Appeal 52/2004 before the Presiding Officer, DRT, Chandigarh which is renumbered on transfer to DRT-I, Delhi as Transfer Appeal No. 1/2005 shall stand dismissed. Points formulated for consideration are answered accordingly. No costs.Since, the appeal filed by the auction-purchaser is allowed, the Recovery Officer, DRT, Chandigarh shall confirm the sale and shall take all steps immediately for handling over the possession of properties in question, to the auction purchaser, if necessary, by taking assistance from all authorities concerned. The auction purchaser, who was permitted to withdraw the auction amount deposited towards sale price without prejudice to its rights during pending of these appeals, shall forthwith deposit the entire amount and thereafter the Recovery Officer shall proceed to complete the other requirements according to law forthwith.By a separate order of even date, DRAT ordered the Recovery Officer, Chandigarh to act upon and execute the directions issued by it. The appellant deposited Rs.12.50 crores on the same day. But the sale could not be confirmed since the Presiding Officer was on leave. The appellant moved an application before DRAT for appointment of Recovery Officer, DRT, Delhi for confirmation of sale. Within three days, however, the Company filed two Writ Petitions being C.W. Nos. 2041 and 2042 of 2006 in the High Court of Delhi on February 13, 2006 against an order of DRAT dated February 10, 2006. The High Court of Delhi, as already mentioned earlier, allowed the writ petitions on February 23, 2006, set aside the order passed by DRAT on the ground that Section 22 of SICA operated as a complete bar to recovery proceedings and no order could have been passed by the Tribunal.Subsequent development12. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the appellant filed Special Leave Petition in this Court on March 6, 2006. Notice was issued on March 27, 2006 by this Court and the appellant was allowed to withdraw sale price without prejudice to its rights and contentions. The matter was, thereafter, adjourned from time to time. It was ordered to be heard finally. For completion of record, it may be stated that on April 3, 2006, the BIFR rejected the Reference of the Company. The Company preferred an appeal against the said order which is pending before the Appellate Authority for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR). On September 15, 2006, second Reference was filed by the Company which has been registered as BIFR Case No. 18 of 2006. On February 22, 2007, the BIFR declared the Company as a ‘sick Company and appointed LSAS, respondent No. 5 as the Operating Agency to prepare Rehabilitation Scheme.

Reasoning:
27. The Courtword "suit" and "proceeding" have not been used interchangeably in SICA.Referring to Pandurang R. Mandlik v. Shantibai R. Ghatge, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 627, the Court observed that in its comprehensive sense, the word ‘suit is understood to apply to any proceeding in a Court of Justice by which an individual pursues a remedy which the law affords. The modes of proceedings may be various, but if a right is litigated between parties in a Court of Justice, the proceedings by which the decision of the Court is sought may be a suit. The word ‘suit ordinarily means and, apart from some context, must be taken to mean a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint". (vide Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun - Mussoorie Electric Trameray Co. Ltd.; 60 IA 13 : AIR 1933 PC 63 ).29. In the instant case, proceedings had been initiated by the Bank not before a Civil Court by invoking Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but before DRT by taking recourse to jurisdiction under RDDB Act. It is, therefore, contended that the proceedings could not be said to be a "suit" falling within the mischief of Section 22 of SICA. In any case, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, ex parte final order was passed by DRT as back as on July 15, 2003 and hence even if it is assumed that the connotation "suit" should be construed liberally so as to take within its sweep all proceedings including an application before DRT, in view of final order passed by DRT in 2003, bar envisaged by Section 22 of SICA cannot operate.30. So far as "proceedings" are concerned, it was submitted by the appellant that the final order had been passed by DRT under RDDB Act. A Certificate had been issued under Section 19 and in accordance with Section 29 of the Act, procedure laid down in Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961 had been followed. Reserve price was fixed. Sale-proclamation was published. Auction was held. The appellant was found to be the highest bidder and its bid was accepted. Necessary amount was deposited. All actions were thus in conformity with law. If the Company felt aggrieved by auction sale, it ought to have proceeded in accordance with Rules 60 to 62 of the Rules in the Second Schedule. Rule 60 permits a person adversely affected by the sale to apply to the Tax Recovery Officer within thirty days from the date of sale to set aside such sale on his depositing the entire amount with interest thereon and penalty. Admittedly, the Company did not avail the said remedy. Rule 61 allows an application to set aside sale of immovable property on the ground of non-service of notice or material irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale. The said rule also provides for deposit of amount recoverable under the Certificate. The Company failed to do so. Under Rule 62, sale can be set aside when defaulter has no saleable interest. No such case had been put forward by the Company by applying under Rule 62. The Company, therefore, could not make grievance against the auction sale.31. Strong reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Rule 63 which states that where no application is made for setting aside the sale or where such application is made and is dismissed, the Tax Recovery Officer shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. It was submitted that none of the Rules had been invoked by the Company by applying to the Tax Recovery Officer and by depositing the amount. The Tax Recovery Officer, hence, was enjoined to confirm sale as per the mandate of Rule 63. An appeal filed by the Company under Section 30 of RDDB Act before DRT against the order of Tax Recovery Officer fixing reserve price was ill-conceived and not maintainable as there was no ‘order within the meaning of RDDB Act which was appealable. Attention of the Court in this connection was invited by the learned counsel to Rule 53 [Contents of proclamation]. It provides that a proclamation of sale shall specify, inter alia, "the reserve price, if any, below which the property may not be sold" [Clause (cc)]. It was submitted that fixation of ‘reserve price is not mandatory, condition precedent or sine qua non and if reserve price is not fixed, the order cannot be said to be non est, contrary to law or unlawful. In any case, when reserve price was fixed and property was sold not below such price, the only remedy available to the Company or any person whose interest was affected was to apply under Rule 60 or 61 or 62. The appeal before DRT was thus totally misconceived and ought not to have been entertained by the Tribunal.32. According to the Company, reserve price was grossly inadequate. The Company was aggrieved and preferred an appeal under Section 30 of RDDB Act as the order fixing reserve price was also an ‘order within the meaning of the Act. To buttress the submission, the counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Delhi High Court Bar Association & Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 275. In Delhi High Court Bar Association, while upholding the validity of RDDB Act, this Court considered various safeguards and remedies available to the aggrieved party. In paragraph 30 of the decision, it was inter alia observed;Furthermore, Section 30, after amendment by the Amendment Act, 2000, gives a right to any person aggrieved by an order of the Recovery Officer, to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Thus now an appellate forum has been provided against any orders of the Recovery Officer which may not be in accordance with law. There is, therefore, sufficient safeguard which has been provided in the event of the Recovery Officer acting in an arbitrary or an unreasonable manner. The provisions of Sections 25 and 28 are, therefore, not bad in law.33. I express no opinion one way or the other on the controversy. As noted earlier, the High Court allowed the petitions filed by the Company only on the ground of bar of Section 22 of SICA. Since I am of the view that the High Court was not right in coming to that conclusion, the matter must go back to the High Court for deciding all points not dealt and decided.34. The learned counsel for the Company emphatically argued that Section 32 of SICA is explicitly clear and uses non-obstante clause ("Notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law"). It was urged that SICA is a ‘self-contained Code and makes detailed and exhaustive provisions in respect of sick companies. It is also a ‘special law and effect must be given to the provisions of the Act. The argument of the appellant on the other hand is that Section 34 of RDDB Act is a subsequent legislation which also contains a similar non-obstante clause and that Act should prevail over SICA.35. The learned counsel for the parties, in support of their respective submissions, referred to several decisions. Let us consider few of them.36. In Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial & Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. & Anr., (1993) 2 SCC 144 , this Court was called upon to consider the provisions of SICA and State Financial Corporation Act, 1951. Observing that the word ‘proceedings in sub-section (1) of Section 22 of SICA could not be given narrow or restricted meaning to limit the legal proceedings, the Court held that if Section 22(1) is attracted, the proceedings must be held to be barred.37. Keeping in view the underlying object of enacting SICA, the Court stated;Now we come to the impugned decision. The High Court was considerably influenced by the fact that the appellant-company owed crores of rupees to banks and felt that so far as such creditors are concerned, different considerations may come into play but the High Court with respect failed to appreciate that the 1985 Act was enacted primarily to assist sick industrial undertakings which inter alia failed to meet their financial obligations. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the view of the High Court that where the creditors of a sick industrial concern happen to be Banks or State Financial Corporations different considerations would come into play. It must be realised that in the modern industrial environment large industries are generally financed by banks and statutory corporations created specially for that purpose and if they are permitted to resort to independent action in total disregard of the pending inquiry under Sections 15 to 19 of the 1985 Act the entire exercise under the said provisions would be rendered nugatory by the time the BIFR is able to evolve a scheme of revival or rehabilitation of the sick industrial concern by : device of the Financial Corporation resorting to Section 29 of the 1951 Act. We are, therefore, of the opinion that where an inquiry is pending under Section 16/17 or an appeal is pending under Section 25 of the 1985 Act there should be cessation of the coercive activities of the type mentioned in Section 22 (1) to permit the BIFR to consider what remedial measures it should take with respect to the sick industrial company. The expression proceedings in Section 22(1), therefore, cannot be confined to legal proceedings understood in the narrow sense of proceedings in a Court of law or a legal tribunal for attachment and sale of the debtors property.38. In Deputy Commercial Tax Officer & Ors. v. Corromandal Pharmaceuticals & Ors., (1997) 10 SCC 649 , this Court held that the embargo under Section 22(1) would not apply to payment of tax collected by the sick industrial company after the date of the sanctioned scheme and legitimately belonged to the Revenue. "Any other construction will be unreasonable and unfair and will lead to a state of affairs enabling the sick industrial unit to collect amounts due to the Revenue and withhold it indefinitely and unreasonably. Such a construction which is unfair, unreasonable and against the spirit of the statute in a business sense, should be avoided." (emphasis supplied)39. Justice Jeevan Reddy was much more emphatic. In a concurrent judgment, His Lordship stated;Looking at the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 [the Act], I was wondering how out of tune the Act has become with the economic policies being pursued now in this country. Since 1991-92, we are launched upon, what is being called, liberalisation of our economy. We have given up the policy of protecting our industries against foreign competition on the ground that it has given rise to an inefficient and outdated industrial system in our country. Our industries are suddenly being asked to compete with foreign companies, many of whom being giant multi-nationals have vast resources at their disposal. [They are merrily gobbling up our poor native companies. Many local industries, unable to stand the said competition are joining the foreign giants in one form of venture or other. Several hundreds of small-scale and medium scale units in telecom sector, for example have suffered enormously because of our love for foreign companies and their capital. The state of several public sector companies is no better. I am not saying that we have totally embraced, what may be called "Reaganism" or "Thatcherism". The fact, however, remains that it is no longer thought advisable to keep alive inefficient and uneconomic industries by injecting public funds or in the name of safeguarding the employment of the workers. And here is this Act, a product of the era of protectionism, seeking to keep alive "sick" companies by pumping in funds - mostly public funds - and by providing various concessions. In the process, nobody inquires why a particular industrial company has become sick, viz., whether it is an induced one or whether it is on account of factors beyond their control. The object of the Act is undoubtedly laudatory but it must also provide for appropriate measures against persons responsible where it is found that sickness is caused by factors other than circumstances beyond the control of the management. It is also a well-known fact that the proceedings before the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction take a long time to conclude and all the while the protective umbrella of Section 22 is held over the company which has reported sick. We have come across cases where unfair advantage is sought to be taken of the provisions of Section 22 by certain industrial companies - and the wide language employed in the section is providing them a cover. We are sure Section 22 was not meant to breed dishonesty nor can it be so operated as to encourage unfair practices. The ultimate prejudice to public monies should not be overlooked in the process of promoting industrial progress. We are quite sure that the Government is fully alive to the situation and are equally certain that they must be thinking of necessary modifications in the Act. These few observations are meant merely to record the need for changes in the Act. (emphasis supplied)40. In Real Value Appliances Ltd. v. Canara Bank & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 554 , a contention was advanced on behalf of the creditors that the conduct of the Company was far from satisfactory and highly objectionable. It suppressed several facts from the Court. Contradictory and inconsistent pleas were taken and fraud was practised on the Court.41. This Court agreed with what was submitted and observed;This conduct of the appellant, in our view, was certainly very unfair to the High Court and, therefore, the High Court had rightly depreciated the same. In our view, there was a clear attempt to keep the Court in the dark".42. The Court, however, proceeded to state that on that count reference-application to the BIFR would not become bad and if the Company was entitled to the benefit of SICA, it could not be denied the said benefit.43. In Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515 , this Court held that where conditions precedent for applicability of SICA were satisfied, then notwithstanding that the order for winding up of the Company had been passed, the bar would get attracted.44. In Patheja Bros. Forgings & Stamping & Anr. v. ICICI Ltd. & Ors., (2000) 6 SCC 545 , this Court held that without requisite sanction under Section 22 of SICA, no suit can be proceeded with.45. In Jai Engineering Works Ltd. v. Industry Facilitation Council & Anr., (2006) 8 SCC 677 , after referring to all leading decisions on the point and describing 1985 Act as a ‘complete Code, this Court stated;The 1985 Act was enacted in public interest. It contains special provisions. The said special provisions had been made with a view to secure the timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owning industrial undertakings, the speedy determination by a Board of experts for preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and the expeditious enforcement of the measures so determined and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.46. In my view, however, the learned counsel for the appellant is right in submitting that RDDB Act is a ‘special law and also a subsequent legislation, i.e. later law. It is well-settled that when any law has been enacted, the Legislature must be presumed to be aware of all existing laws. When RDDB Act was enacted in 1993, SICA was very much in force since it was enacted in 1985. In spite of that, Parliament was pleased to give ‘overriding effect to RDDB Act by using non-obstante clause in Section 34. Sub-section (1) expressly stated that the provisions of the Act "shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force".47. I am thus at a point where two statutes employ non-obstante clause having ‘overriding effect. Such a conflict, as laid down in several cases, may be resolved by judiciary on various considerations; such as the policy underlying the enactments, the language used, the object intended to be achieved; or mischief sought to be remedied, etc. One of the tests applied by Courts is that normally a later enactment should prevail over the former. The Courts would also try to reconcile both Acts by adopting harmonious interpretation and applying them in their respective fields so that both may operate without coming into conflict with each-other. In resolving the clash, the Court may further examine whether one of the two enactments is ‘special and the other one is ‘general. There can also be a situation in law where one and the same statute may be held to be a ‘special statute vis-à-vis one legislation and ‘general statute vis-à-vis another legislation. On the basis of one or more tests, the Court will try to salvage the situation by giving effect to non obstante clause in both the legislations.48. Let me consider some of the decisions of this Court on this vexed issue.49. In Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking & Industrial Co. Ltd., 1956 SCR 603 , two competing statutes came up for consideration before this Court being the Banking Companies Act, 1949 (as amended by Act 52 of 1953) and the Displaced Persons (Debt Adjustment) Act, 1951. Section 45-A of the Banking Companies Act (introduced by the amending Act of 1953) and Section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act, 1951 both contained a non-obstante clause stating that certain provisions of the Act shall have effect "notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith in any other law for the time being in force". This Court resolved the conflict by considering the object and purpose of the two laws and giving primacy to the Banking Companies Act. The Court indicated that when two Acts contain provisions giving overriding effect, it would be a difficult question as to which Act should prevail.