Case: NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL Vs. MINOSHA INDIA LIMITED

3. Pursuant to an agreement dated 20.02.2015, the appellant placed a purchase order of Rs.16,20,00,000/- with the respondent. The appellant, however, issued a termination notice to the respondent on account of its alleged inaction and conduct which is described as non-responsive. This led to the respondent approaching the High Court of Delhi which finally culminated in a direction by the High Court to afford an opportunity of hearing to the respondent and to consider its representation. The appellant, however, rejected the representation by communication dated 17.05.2016. Invoking the provision in the contract providing for arbitration, the respondent addressed communication dated 07.06.2016. The appellant sent its reply on 20.7.2016 where it, inter alia, did not consent for either of the names suggested by the respondent and instead proposed to proceed for arbitration through the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC). On 14.5.2018 the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) Mumbai admitted an application under Section 10 of the IBC and declared the moratorium. On 28.11.2019, a resolution plan was approved by the NCLT. On 25.11.2020, the respondent filed an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. By the impugned order dated 14.12.2020, the High Court of Delhi has allowed the application filed under Section 11(6) and appointed a former Chief Justice of a High Court to be the arbitrator. It is apposite at this point itself to notice certain parts of the impugned order in this regard:6. Learned counsel are also ad idem that, in view of Section 12(5) of the 1996 Act read with the Seventh Schedule thereto, the arbitral mechanism, contemplated by the afore-extracted Clauses from the Purchase Order and the Agreement, cannot be allowed to operate, as the Chairperson of the NDMC would be disabled from appointing the arbitrator. This position stands crystallized in a number decisions, including the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bharat Broadband Network Ltd. v. United Telecoms Ltd. (2019) 5 SCC 755  and Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. IISCC (India) Limited AIR 2020 SC 59 , and of this Court in Proddatur Cable TV DIGI Services v. SITI Cable Network Limited MANU/DE/0178/2020.7. The petitioner wrote to the respondent on 7th June, 2016, suggesting the names of two retired Judges of this Court as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate on the dispute.8. The respondent, however, vide its response, dated 20th July, 2016, suggested that the matter could be referred to the Delhi International Arbitration Centre (DIAC), for being arbitrated.9. Today, before me, learned counsel request the Court to appoint an independent arbitrator, who would conduct the arbitration under the aegis of the DIAC, and in accordance with the procedure established in that regard.10. Learned counsel are also agreeable to pay the fees of the learned sole arbitrator in accordance with the Fourth Schedule to the 1996 Act.It is in view thereto that the appointment of the arbitrator was made.

Reasoning:
In (1976) 3 All England Law Reports 611, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, in the case of Suthendran v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal has given an exposition of the golden rule of interpretation, which is the same as understanding the words of a Statute in their natural and ordinary sense, with reference to the grammatical meaning and the same has been adverted and approved by this Court in Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India and others (2002) 3 SCC 722 :Parliament is prima facie to be credited with meaning what is said in an Act of Parliament. The drafting of statutes, so important to people who hope to live under the rule of law, will never be satisfactory unless courts seek whenever possible to apply the golden rule of construction, that is to read the statutory language, grammatically and terminologically, in the ordinary and primary sense which it bears in its context, without omission or addition. Of course, Parliament is to be credited with good sense; so that when such an approach produces injustice, absurdity, contradiction or stultification of statutory objective the language may be modified sufficiently to avoid such disadvantage, though no further.21. No doubt, another principle, which has rightfully vied for the Courts approval in this regard, is that, an interpretation which furthers the object and purpose of the law, must weigh with the Court, the most. In this regard, we may notice the following view expressed by Justice S. B. Sinha in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia and another (2008) 3 SCC 279 :51. … With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled, which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfil its constitutional obligations as held by the Court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. [(1990) 4 SCC 406] 52. Barak in his exhaustive work on Purposive Construction explains various meanings attributed to the term purpose. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Baraks words:Hart and Sachs also appear to treat purpose as a subjective concept. I say appear because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislators shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity : First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfil their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably.(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at p. 87.)24. Under the IBC, by virtue of the order admitting the application, be it under Sections 7, 9 or 10, and imposing moratorium, proceedings as are contemplated in Section 14 would be tabooed. This undoubtedly does not include an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act by the corporate debtor or for that matter, any other proceeding by the corporate debtor against another party. At least there is no express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Court or authorities to entertain any such proceeding at the hands of the corporate debtor. However, we must not be oblivious to the other provisions as well. Under Section 17, the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor is taken over by the interim resolution professional. The powers of the Board of Directors or the partners of the corporate debtor shall stand suspended and it would be exercised by the interim resolution professional. When the authority changes hands from the interim resolution professional to the resolution professional, the previous management continues to be excluded. The committee of creditors comes into being. Under the supervision, as it were, of the committee of creditors, all the matters are proceeded with. The resolution plans are received by the resolution professional and the resolution plan which is finally approved by the committee of creditors and still further at the hands of the adjudicating authority, would result in the curtains being wrung down on the moratorium under Section 31(3). During this entire period, what is noteworthy is that while in law and in form, the corporate debtor continues to exist and represented by the interim resolution professional to begin with and the resolution professional thereafter, the erstwhile management of the corporate debtor is displaced. When the resolution plan is approved, a new management takes over. All this is contemplated when the CIRP is successful. Undoubtedly, if it is unsuccessful, the corporate debtor slips into liquidation. Therefore, on the one hand, an application under Section 7, 9 or 10, does bring in a period which is intended to bring a corporate debtor back to life if possible, a period of calm, in the words of the respondent. But this is a period during which the management of the corporate debtor is displaced, ironically, a period of turbulent churning. While it may be true that proceedings by the corporate debtor through the resolution professional is contemplated, it is not impossible to contemplate that the resolution professional for whatever reason it may be, does not discharge his duties and conduct proceedings in all matters as he should. We are noting this as this can be the rationale for the Law Giver excluding the period of limitation in regard to suits or applications at the instance of the corporate debtor under Section 60(6).25. As far as understanding the meaning of Section 60(6) is concerned, there cannot be a slightest doubt that the period of Moratorium is excluded even in the case of a suit or application brought by a corporate debtor, viz., in regard to the period of the moratorium. It is true that on the one hand what is tabooed in Section 14 when a Moratorium is put into place is inter alia the institution of suits or continuance of pending suits or proceedings against the corporate debtor including proceeding in execution of inter alia, the decree or order of an arbitration panel. So, also the provision prohibits any action to foreclose, recover or enforce any security interest created by the corporate debtor in respect of its property including any action under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act 2002. Still further, the recovery of any property by an owner or lessor in the occupation of the corporate debtor is forbidden. These provisions do not in any manner appear to stand in the way of the corporate debtor instituting or proceeding with a suit or a proceeding against others. Section 60(6) on the other hand excludes the period during which the Moratorium under Section 14 is in place in computing the period of limitation. An ambiguity is introduced, namely the need to exclude the period of limitation for a suit or an application, at the instance of the corporate debtor when a Moratorium ushered in by an order under Section 14 does not pose any bar against a suit or an application at the instance of the corporate debtor. The words for which an order of Moratorium has been made under this part is intended to be the point of reference or the premise for the exclusion of the time for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. Besides being the point of reference and being the sine qua non for applying Section 60(6), it also specifies the period of time which will be excluded in computing of the period of limitation. In other words, present an order of Moratorium under Section 14, the entire period of the Moratorium is liable to be excluded in computing the period of limitation even in a suit or an application by a corporate debtor.26. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant based on the approval of the resolution plan and the effect of Section 31 apparently of the IBC does not appeal to us. What Section 31 of the Act, IBC undoubtedly proclaims is that on approval of the resolution plan by the adjudicating authority the plan becomes binding on a corporate debtor, its employees, members, creditors, the Central Government any State Government or any local authority as provided therein, guarantors and others stakeholders involved in the resolution plan. We are unable to perceive how the appellant can derive support from the said provision. In fact, taking the scheme of the IBC Section 60(6) would become an integral part of the scheme which will enure to the benefit of the resolution applicant which is enabled to take suitable measures to ventilate its legitimate grievances by excluding the period during which a Moratorium was enforced for the purpose of computing the period of limitation.27. In other words, notwithstanding the period of limitation under the Limitation Act, the Law Giver has thought it fit to provide that in respect of a corporate debtor if there has been an order of moratorium made in Part II, the period during which such moratorium was in place shall be excluded. For which an order of moratorium cannot bear the interpretation which is sought to be placed by the appellant. The interpretation placed by the appellant is clearly against the plain meaning of the words which have been used. We have already undertaken the task of understanding the purport of the Code and the context in which section 60(6) has been put in place. This Court cannot possibly sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Law Giver. The period of limitation is provided under the Limitation Act. The law giver has contemplated that when a moratorium has been put in place, the said period must be excluded. We cannot overlook also the employment of words any suit or application. This is apart, no doubt, from the words by a corporate debtor. Interpreting the statute in the manner which the appellant seeks would result in our denying the benefit of extending the period of limitation to the corporate debtor, a result, which we think, would not be warranted by the clear words used in the statute.28. Therefore, we are of the view that section 60(6) of the IBC does contemplate exclusion of the entire period during which the moratorium was in force in respect of corporate debtor in regard to a proceeding as contemplated therein at the hands of the corporate debtor.