Case: Raj Kali Kuer Vs. Ram Rattan Pandey

The appellant before us - a woman -brought this suit claiming joint title to the office along with the defendant and as such entitled to perform the Puja either by herself or through her Karinda and to get a half share in the income of offerings of the said Asthan. It is the admitted case that this office belongs to the family of both the parties and that the duties of the office were being jointly performed by the defendant and his deceased brothers. Rambeyas Pande, and that they were enjoying the emoluments jointly. The plaintiff - the widow of Rambeyas Pande - claims to have succeeded to her husbands share in this property and bases her suit on the saidthe written statement the defendant raised three main defences, two out of which are (1) the plaintiff was not the legally wedded wife of his brother, Rambeyas Pande, and (2) during the life time of Rambeyas Pande, there was a division between them with reference to the office of Pujari and Panda belonging to this family in respect of two temples (a) at Arrah and (b) at Gangipul, that the office of Pujari at Gangipul was given to the plaintiffs husband and that the temple of Aran Devi at Arrah was given to the defendant and that since then, i.e. for about 11 years prior to the date of the suit, the plaintiffs husband had no connection with the office of pujari in this temple nor with the receipt of any offeringsthese contentions were found against the defendant by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court and they have become conclusive. The further and third defence raised by the defendant was that the property in suit, viz., the office of Pujari and Panda of the temple cannot be inherited by acontention is set out in the following terms in he written statementplaintiff not at all entitled to the office and the post of Pujari and Panda of Arun Devi and she is not entitled to get 1/2 share or any share in the income and offering of the said Asthan, nor has she got any right to perform Puja as a Panda personally, or through her karinda and to get the income, etc. This is against the custom and usage and practice and also against the Sastras. The property in suit is such as cannot be inherited by ais the question thus raised which has got to be considered in this appeal.2. The trial court held against this contention in the followingauthority has been cited nor any custom proved to show that female cannot inherit a property of thisfirst appellate court also affirmed this view asdefendants objection that the plaintiff being a female is not authorised to hold the office of a priest of the Aranya Debi temple is not borne out by any evidence or material on the record. There is nothing to show that by reason of her sex she is debarred from holding this office either by religion, custom or usage. Moreover admittedly she holds the office at the Gangithe findings arrived at by the trial court and the first appellate court, the plaintiff got a decree as prayed for declaring her right to half share in the office and for recovery of mesne profits on that footing.On second appeal to the High Court, the learned Judges went into the question at some length and were of the opinionplaintiff being a female is not entitled to inherit the priestly office in question and her claim to officiate as a priest in the temple by rotation cannot be sustained. The declaration sought for by her that she is entitled to the office of Pujari cannot, therefore, beat she is not debarred from being entitled to be maintained out of the estate of her husband which, in the particular case, happens to be no other than the emoluments attached to the priestly office in the shape of offerings made to the deity which office was undoubtedlyshe will be entitled to receive from the defendant half the amount of the offerings in lieu of herthey varied the decree of the trial court accordingly.

Reasoning:
it was recognised that hereditary priestly office in a family is property liable to partition. A number of other decisions to be noticed in the later part of this judgment recognise this position. The learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment in the case under appeal, have attempted to distinguish the present case from that of the case of the Shebaitship and have come to the conclusion that while in respect of Shebaiti right a woman may succeed by heirship, she is not entitled to such succession in respect of the right of a Panda and Pujari. But in making this distinction they do not negative the idea that the right to the office of the Pujari itself is property to which a female could succeed. but for her supposed disqualification. The disqualification is said to arise with inference to the duties attached to this office, and it is said that in the respect it differ from the office of aSaraswatis Hindu Law of Endowments*the nature of the daily worship of a consecrated idol in a temple is set out at pages 134 and 135 in detail.It must be recognised that the daily worship differs according to the tenets and usages of the religious sect for which the temple is intended and the idol is consecrated. But whatever may be the details of the worship and the variations therein there can be no doubt that the ministration of various services involving personal touch of the idol and often enough, the recitation of religious hymns inclusive of Vedic hymns are amongst the normal and essential features of a Pujaris duties, at any rate in temples where the worship is conducted according to the Shastras. It is also undisputed that according to Hindu Shastras the functions of a Pujari can be performed only by certain limited classes and involves special qualifications and that these classes may vary with the nature of the institution. Now, whatever may have been the position in early times, of which there is no clear historical evidence, it appears to have been well established in later times that a female, even of the recognised limited classes, cannot by herself perform the duties of a Pujari. Even at a time when the institution of temple worship had probably not come into general vogue, the incapacity of a woman to recite Vedic texts, to offer sacrificial fire, or to perform sacramental rites, is indicated in certain texts ofappears on a careful consideration of the dispute passage with reference to its context, that the view of the learned author is correct. In any case the passage cannot be definitely relied upon as an authority for the contrary view. The discussion in connection with which this passage occurs in the commentary is under placitum No. 43 in Section II of Chapter III. Book II, which is a felt from Narada relating to hereditary priests. The statement relied on occurs at a place where there is an attempt to reconcile the disqualification of the female to discharge the functions of a hereditary priest, and the recognition of her right to succeed to all property including a hereditary office.Theconcluding portion seems father to indicate that the more categorical passage underlined above and relied upon is in the nature of an objection which is being answered and that the final conclusion is the recognition of a right to succeed by getting the duties of the office performed by the next male in succession. The learned Judges of the High Court have in fact noticed this concluding passage but have missed its correctis certainly form in this comment.But in a matter of this kind where there is no express prohibition in the texts for the performance of the duties of the Pujaris office by the appointment of substitutes and where such an office has developed into a hereditary right of property, the consideration of public policy cannot be insisted on to the extent of negativing the right itself. In such a situation what has, to be equally emphasised is the duty-aspect of the office and to insist, on the superior authorities in charge of the temple exercising vigilantly their responsibility by controlling the then incumbent of the priestly office in the exercise of his rights (or by other persons having interest taking appropriate steps through court), when it is found that the services are not being properly or efficiently performed. In view of the peculiar nature of such offices as combining in them both the element of property and the element of duty; it cannot be doubted that superior authorities in charge of the institutions or other persons interested have this right which may be enforced by appropriate legal means.So far as the Madras High Court area is concerned, the controversy has been settled by the Full Bench case in AIR 1919 Mad 598 (FB) (K), where the view taken by Justice Sadasiva Aiyar was specifically overruled on the ground that "there were numerous decision of the Madras High Court in conformity with the decisions of the other High Courts by which the widow and the daughter and the daughter of the last male Archaka are held entitled in accordance with the established user to succeed to the office of Archaka discharging his duties by deputy and to transmit it to their heirs, who as male heirs are preferred to female, and will generally be competent to perform the duties in person". These decisions of the Madras High Court seem to recognise both the factual and validity of the usage as one that has been accepted by the courts not only within its own jurisdiction but also within the jurisdiction of the other High Courts. It is urged, however, that there is no such usage that can be definitely said to be established with reference to the decisions of the other Highhas been already noticed, the reported cases dealing with this matter outside the Madras High Court do not appear to be many; At any rate, no others have been brought to our notice dealing with this question directly: though there are many cases relating to the questioned of succession to the office of Shebait and the performance of duties thereof by proxy, which is a matter distinguishable from case relating to the office of Pujari or Archaka simpliciter. The paucity of decided cases in the reports of the other High Courts may very well be due to what has been pointed out in one of the Madras cases, viz, that the practice of females succeeding to this office and getting the duties thereof performed by a Substitute was so common and well recognised that it has not been seriously contested and brought up to the Courts.Further the institution of private family temples and the endowments of large and substantial properties for the Deb-seva in such temples though somewhat uncommon in South India is fairly common in Bengal and some other States. In view of the Dayabhaga system of law of succession prevalent in Bengal and the very much larger number of occasions for wiyes and daughters succeeding to a sonless coparcener in Dayabhaga joint families, the practice of females succeeding to the priestly office and of getting the duties performed by other members of the family as proxies in their places must, by the very situation, have been common in thesecareful review, therefore, of the reported cases on this matter shows that the usage of a female succeeding to a priestly office and getting the same performed through a competent deputy, is one that has been fairly well-recognised. There is nothing in the textual Hindu law to the contrary. Nor can it be said that the recognition of such a usage is opposed to public policy, in the Hindu law sense. As already pointed out the consideration of public policy can only be given effect in he present State of the law, to the extent required for enforcing adequate discharge of the duties appurtenats to the office. Subject to the proper and efficient discharge of the duties of the office, there can be no reason either on principle or on authority to refuse to accord to a female the right to succeed to the hereditary office held by her husband and to get the duties of the office performed by a substitute excepting in cases where usage to the contrary is pleaded and established.In the present case such a usage was pleaded by the defendant in his written statement but no evidence of it was given. Indeed as pointed out by the first appellate Court, the plea that there has been a partition of the offices of the two temples and the implied recognition of the plaintiffs right to the office of the other temple at Gangupal appears to indicate the contrary usage. We are accordingly of the opinion that the claim of the plaintiff- appellant is made out and that she is entitled to succeed.12.The discussion above is more germane to the case of a public temple wherein the idol has been "Shastrically installed and consecrated and the worship is in accordance with the Shastras.There is nothing on the record to show whether the temple in this case falls within this category.If, however, the temple is a private one or the idol therein is not one Shastrically consecrated, the case in favour of the plaintiff is much stronger and her right cannot be seriously challenged.At this stage, it is desirable to mention one other matter. In the present case the emoluments attached to the office are stated to be the daily and other offerings made to the deity at the worship by the visiting devotees. Both the parties to this case have come upto Court on the common footing that it is this which constitutes the emoluments. Whether and how far such votive offerings can be appropriated by a Pujari for his emoluments if the temple is a public institution, (i.e. not a private family temple) and whether any usage in this behalf is valid is a matter which does not arise before us in this case.