Case: Nawab Usmanali Khan Vs. Sagar Mal

1. The appellant is the Ruler of the former Indian State of Jaora. He had money dealings with the respondent. By an agreement dated February 23, 1957, the appellant and the respondent agreed to refer their disputes regarding those dealings to the arbitration of Lala Durgashankar. On the Same date, the arbitrator trade an award. By this award the arbitrator found that a sum of Rs. 1.60,000 was due to the respondent from the appellant, and directed that this sum would be payable in eight quarterly instalments, the first four instalments to be of Rs. 21,000 each and the next four instalments to be of Rs. 19,000 each, the amount of interest would be payable in another quarterly instalment, the respondent would have a first charge on the sums receivable by the appellant from the Government of India as privy purse, and would be entitled to realise those sums under a letter of authority issued by the appellant and if the Government would raise any objection to the payment the respondent would have the right to realise the dues from the personal property of the appellant Some of the items of the loans in respect of which the award was made were secured on lands and ornaments. The award therefore provided:"The documents relating to debts obtained on lands and ornaments shall remain as before all the payment of the debts and they shall also remain as securities all then, and the Nawab saheb shall have no right to transfer the land." The award was signed by the arbitrator and also by the appellant and the respondent2. On the same day, the arbitrator filed the award in the Court of the District Judge, Ratlam. Notice of the filing of the award under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 was duly served on the parties. On March 9, 1957, an agent of the appellant filed a written submission accepting the award and requesting the Court to pass a decree in terms of the award. But the same day, an application was made by another agent of appellant intimating that steps would be taken for setting aside award. The Court fixed March 23, 1957 for filing the objection. The time was subsequently extended up to April 2, 1957. On that day, an application was filed on behalf of the appellant praying for setting aside the award. But on April 5, 1957, an application was filed on behalf of the appellant withdrawing the objections and asking the Court to pass a decree in terms of the award, subject to the modification that the amount of the award would be payable in quarterly instalments of Rs. 13,000 each. This application was signed by the respondent in taken of his consent to the modification of the amount of the instalments. On April 30, 1957, the arbitrator filed the relevant papers. On the same day, an agent of the appellant filed an application praying for setting aside the compromise and the award. The case was fixed for hearing in June 19, 1957. On that date, the Court received by registered post an application from the appellant withdrawing the objections and praying for in order in accordance with the compromise application filed on April 5, 1957. In the circumstances, on June 19, 1957, the Court recorded the compromise and passed a decree in terms of the award as modified by the compromise. The appellant filed in the Madhya Pradesh High Court Appeal No. 81 of 1957 under S. 39 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 against the Order dated June 19, 1957 treating it as an Order refusing to set aside the award. The appellant also filed Appeal No. 82 of 1957 under Order 43(1) (m) of theCode of Civil Procedure against the Order dated June 19, 1957 recording the compromise3. In the meantime, the respondent stated Execution Case No. 5 of 1957 and on September 9, 1957 obtained an ex parte Order for transfer of the decree to the Court of the District Judge, Delhi. On November 1, 1957, the Central Government gave a certificate under S. 86 (3) read with S. 87-B of theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908 consenting to the execution of the decree against the properties of the appellant. On November 8, 1957, the District Judge, Delhi passed a prohibitory Order under O. 21, R. 46 of theCode of Civil Procedure in respect of sums payable to the appellant on account of the Privy purse. By letter dated December 26, 1957, the Central Government informed the appellant of the prohibitory Order. On January 8, 1958, the appellant applied to the Court of the District Judge, Ratlam praying for vacating the Order of transfer of the decree and for cancellation of the certificates issued under O.21, R. 6 (b) of theCode of Civil Procedure. By Order dated March 15, 1958 the Court recalled the decree and cancelled the certificate as prayed for on the ground that the amount receivable by the appellant on account of his privy purse was not attachable. The respondent preferred Appeal No. 33 of 1958, before the High Court against this Order. By another Order dated January 7, 1959, the District Judge, Ratlam dismissed certain objections of the appellant filed in Execution Case No.2 of 1958. We are informed that the appellant filed before the High Court Appeal No. 13 of 1959 from this Order4. Appeals Nos. 81 and 82 of 1957, 33 of 1958 and 13 of 1959 were heard and disposed of the High Court by a common judgment on October 10, 1960. The High Court dismissed Appeals Nos. 81 and 82 of 1957 and 13 of 1959 preferred by the appellant and allowed Appeal No. 33 of 1958 preferred by the respondent. The appellant has preferred to this Court Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 against the Order of the High Court passed in Appeal No. 33 of 1958. He has also preferred Civil Appeal No. 767 of 1963 from the Order of High Court passed in Appeals Nos. 81 and 82 of 1957. Civil Appeals Nos. 568 and 767 of 1963 were heard together, and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

Reasoning:
5a. The first contention raised by Mr. Pathank must be rejected. The award stated that the existing documents relating to debts obtained on lands would remain as before, and they would remain as securities till payment of the debts and the appellants would have no right to transfer the land. This portion of the award stated an existing fact. It did not create, or of its own force declare any interest in any immoveable property. Consequently, the document did not come within the purview of Section 17 ofthe Indian Registration Act, 1908, and was not required to be registered6. The second contention of Mr. Pathak raises question of construction of Ss. 86 and 87 B of theCode of CivilProcedure.By reason of S. 86 (1) read with S. 87B, no Ruler of any former Indian State "may be sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Government."Section 86 (2) provides that the requisite consent may be given with respect to a specified suit or with respect to several specified suits or with respect to all suits of any specified class or classes. Section 86 plainly deals with a special class of suits, and this conclusion is reinforced by the heading of Part IV, Suits in Particular Cases, in which Ss. 86 and 87B appear. Order 4, R. 1,Code of CivilProcedureprovides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such other officer as it appoints in this behalf. In the context of S. 176 ofthe Government of India Act, 1935, Mahajan and Mukherjea, JJ. observed that the expression "sue" means the "enforcement of a claim or civil right by means of legal proceedings, see Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, 1950 SCR 621   at pp. 661, 697, : (AIR 1950 SC 222   at pp. 236, 249). But in the context of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Lord Russell of Killowen observed in Hansraj Gupta v. Officcial Liquidator, Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co., 60 Ind App 13 at p. 19: (AIR 1933 PC 63   at P. 64):"The word suit ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint."And construing S. 86 of theCode of Civil, Shah, J. speaking on behalf of this Court observed in Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 444   at pp. 445, 446;The appellant is recognised under Article 866(22) of the Constitution as a Ruler of an Indian State, but S. 86 in terms protects a Ruler from being sued and not against the institution of any other proceeding which is not in the nature of a suit. A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claim is not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a Civil Court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within S. 86,7. Now, a proceeding under S. 14 read with S. 17 of the Indian Arbitration. Act, 1940 for the passing of a judgment and decree on an award does not commence with a plaint or a petition in the nature of a plaint, and cannot be regarded as a suit and the parties to whom the notice of the filing of the award is given under S. 14(2) cannot be regarded as "sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit, within the meaning of S. 86 (1) read with S. 87B,Code of Civil. Accordingly, the institution of this proceeding against the Ruler of a former Indian State is not barred by S. 86(1) read with S. 87B. Section 141,Code of CivilProceduredoes not attract the provisions of Section 86(1) read with S. 87B to the proceedings under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, Section 86(1) read with S. 87B confers upon the Ruler of former Indian States substantive rights of immunity from suits. Section 141 makes upplicable to other proceedings only those provisions of the Code which deal with procedure and not those which deal with substantive rights. Nor does S. 41(a) of the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 carry the matter any further. By that section, the provisions of theCode of Civil, 1908 are made applicable to all proceeding before the Court under the Act. Now, by its own language S. 86(1) applies to, and S. 141,Code of CivilProceduredoes not attract the provisions of S. 86(1) to proceedings other than suits. Accordingly, by the conjoint application of S. 41(a) of the Indian Arbitration Act and Ss. 86(1) and 141 of theCode of Civil, the provisions of S.86 (1) are not attracted to a proceeding under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. It follows that the Court was competent to entertain the proceedings under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and to pass a decree against the appellant in those proceedings, though no consent to the institution of those proceedings had been given by the Central Government. A sovereign foreign State and a Ruler of such State may enjoy a winder immunity from legal proceedings other than suits under the rules of International Law recognised by our Courts. but the appellant is not now a Ruler of a sovereign State, and cannot claim immunity from proceedings other than suits.The second contention of Mr. Pathak must, therefore, be rejected11. Now, the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Madhya Bharat States was a treaty entered into by the Rulers of independent States by which they gave up their soveignty over their respective territories and vested it in the new United State of Madhya Bharat. The Covenant was an act of State, and any violation of its terms cannot form the subject of any action in any municipal courts. The Guarantee given by the Government of India was in the nature of a treaty obligation contracted with the sovereign Rulers of Indian States and cannot be enforced by action in municipal courts. Its sanction is political and not legal. On the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the guarantee for the payment of periodical sums as privy purse is continued by Act. 291 of the Constitution, but its essential periodical character is preserved by Art. 363 of the Constitution, and the obligation under this guarantee cannot be enforced in any municipal court. Moreover, if the President refuses to recognise the person by whom the Covenant was entered into as the Ruler of the State, he would not be entitled to the amount payable privy purse under Art. 291. Now, the periodical payment of money by the Government to a Ruler of a former Indian State as privy purse all political considerations and under political sanctions and not under a right legally enforceable in any municipal court is strictly a political pension within the meaning of S. 60 (1)(g) of theCode of Civil. The use of the expression "privy purse instead of the expression pension" is due to historical reasons. The privy purse satisfies all the essential characteristies of a political pension, and as such, is protected from execution under S. 60(1)(g), Code Civil. Moreover,an amount of the privy purse receivable from the Government cannot be said to be a debt or other property over which or the proceeds of which he has disposing power within the main part of S. 60 (1),Code of Civil. It follows that the third contention of Mr. Pathak must be accepted, and it must be held that the amounts of the privy purse are not liable to attachment or sale in execution of the respondents decree. The third contended is raised, in Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 arising out of Appeal No. 33 of 1953. It follows that Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 must be allowed. All the contentions raised in Civil Appeal No. 767 of 1963 arising from Appeal Nos. 81 and 82 of 1957 fail, and according this appeal must be dismissed.