Case: Dalip Singh Vs. The State Of Punjab

1. The appellant Dalip Singh entered the service of the Patiala State in 191 and rose to the rank of Inspector General of Police of the State in June 1946. After the formation of the State of Pepsu he was absorbed in the Police Service of the newly formed State and was appointed and confirmed as Inspector General of Police thereof. While holding that post he proceeded on leave from October, 18, 1949, till August 17, 1950. On August 18, 1950, an order was made by the Rajpramukh of the State in theseHighness the Rajpramukh is pleased to retire from service Sardar Dalip Singh, Inspector General of Police, Pepsu (on leave) for administrative reasons with effect from the 18tgh August, 1950.A copy of this order was forwarded to the appellant. Thereupon on August 19, 1950, the appellant wrote to the Chief Secretary of the State stating that by his retirement he would be put to heavy loss, i.e., about Rs. 50,000/- which he would have earned as his pay and allowances etc., during this period and that his pension was also being affected and that this decision of the Government tantamounts to his removal from service. He requested that the Government should let him know the grounds which had impelled the Government to take this decision about his removal. Ultimately on March 30, 1951, the Government mentioned the charges against him on the basis of which the Government had decided to retire him on administrative grounds. After service of notice under S. 80 of theCode of Civil Procedure the appellant brought a suit in the Court of the District Judge, Patiala against the State of Pepsu asking for a declaration that the orders of August 16, 1950 and August 18, 1950, whereby "the plaintiff has been removed from the post of Inspector-General of Police, Pepsu, are unconstitutional, illegal, void, ultra vires and inoperative and that the plaintiff still continues to be in the service of the defendant as Inspector General of Police and is entitled to the arrears of his pay and allowances from August 18, 1950, and is also entitled to continue to draw his pay and allowances till his retirement at the age of superannuation; and a decree for the recovery of Rs. 26,699/-13/- and full costs of this suit and future interest."3. The main plea on which the suit was based was that the order of August 18, 1950, amounted to his removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and the provisions of that article not having been complied with the termination of his service was void and inoperative in law. The respondent State contended that the plaintiff had been retired from service and had not been removed from service and so Art. 311 of the Constitution had no application. On this question the trial Court came to the conclusion that the order compulsorily retiring the plaintiff amounted to his removal within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution and as the requirement of that Article had not been complied with it held that the termination of service effected by that order was void in law. The Court accordingly decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff declaring that the orders of the Government dated August 18, 1950, whereby the plaintiff had been removed from the post of Inspector-General of Police. Pepsu, are unconstitutional, illegal, void and ultra vires and inoperative and that the plaintiff still continued to be in the service of the defendant as Inspector General of Police and is entitled to the arrears of his pay and allowances from August 18, 1950, and is also entitled to continue to draw his pay and allowance till his retirement at the age of superannuation and a decree for the recovery of Rs. 26,699/13/-.4. On appeal by the State the Pepsu High Court disagreeing with the trial court held that the order of compulsory retirement did not amount to removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311 of the Constitution and accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit.

Reasoning:
7. This makes it clear that up to the publication in 1952 of Volume III of the Pepsu Service Regulations the pension rules appearing in the 1931 edition of the Patiala State Regulations continued to be applicable to Pepsu. On August 18, 1950, therefore it is reasonable to hold that Rule 278 in its entirety remained in force and was applicable to Pepsu. It is interesting to mention that in this 1952 edition also this reservation by the Government of the "right to retire any of its employees on pension on political or on other "reasons" has been maintained (Vide Chapter V, Rule 10). The contention of the learned counsel that Rule 278 was not applicable to the case of the appellant on August 18, 1950, is therefore totally without foundation.In the case before us the order of the Rajpramukh does not purport to be passed on any charge of misconduct or inefficiency. All its states is that the compulsory retirement is for "administrative reasons". It was only after the appellants own insistence to be supplied with the grounds which led to the decision that certain charges were communicated to him.There is therefore no basis for saying that the order of retirement contained any imposition or charge against the officer. The fact that considerations of misconduct or inefficiency weighed with the Government in coming to its conclusion whether any action should be taken under Rule 278 does not amount to any imputation or charge against the officer.11. Applying the other test, viz., whether the officer has lost the benefit he has earned, we find that the officer has been allowed full pension.There is no question of his having lost a benefit earned. It may be pointed out that Rule 278 itself provides for retirement on pension. If the provision had been for retirement without pension in accordance with the rules there might have been some reason to hold that the retirement was by way of punishment. As however the retirement can only be on pension in accordance with the rules-in the present case full pension has been granted to the officer-the order of retirement is clearly not by way of punishment.We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that the order of compulsory retirement made against the appellant was not removal from service so as to attract the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution and that the suit was rightly dismissed.