Case: Chettian Veettil Ammad and Another Vs. Taluk Land Board and Others

2. In order to understand the controversy in its proper perspective, it may be mentioned that, as in the other States in the country, the Kerala State legislature felt the necessity of making comprehensive land reforms in the State. The Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Act 4 of 1961) was accordingly passed, and received the assent of the President on January 21, 1961. Some of its provisions were bro ught into force with effect from February 15, 1961. This Court struck down that Act as unconstitutional in its application to the ryotwari lands of Hosdurg and Kasaragod taluka. The Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1962, w as then passed for the temporary protection of tenants in those taluks. The State High Court declared it null and void in its application to the ryotwari lands of the Malabar area and most of the lands of Travancore area. So the Kerala Tena nts and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1963, was passed to provide some protection to tenants. It was an interim legislation. Even so it repealed the Kerala Ryotwari Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1962, and suspended the operation of the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960.After re-examining the requirements in the field of land reforms as a whole, the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, was published in State Gazette on September 15, 1963. It covered a wide field in t he matter of land reforms and, inter alia, provided for the imposition of a ceiling on holding of lands, the surrender of excess lands grant of compensation therefore, and the assignment of the surrendered lands in accordance with the order of priority mentioned in the Bill, collection of purchase price, constitution of Land Tribunals and Land Board etc. The Bill was enacted as the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1 of 1964), and received the assent of the President on December 31, 196 3. It was amended extensively, and in several material particulars, by Act 35 of 1969, and then by Act 25 of 1971 and Act 17 of 1972. There were other amendments also, but it is agreed that they do not bear on the controversy before us.62. The appellant was directed by the Taluk Land Board to surrender 18.93 acres of land. His grievance was that the land in R.S. No. 1/2 was a private forest until it was converted into rubber plantation. The Board held that the conversion took place after April 1, 1964. As in a document of December 12, 1963 the land was a private forest, the High Court remanded the case for further enquiry. The Board reexamined the evidence and found that there was satisfactory evidence to prove that the land was not a private forest as on April 1, 1964.

Reasoning:
9. Sub- section (3) of section 1 of the Act10. It therefore provides that: (i) section 1 of the Act shall come into force at once, (ii) the other provisions of the Act shall come into force on such dates as the Government may appoint, (iii) different dates may be appointed for different provisions of the Act, and (iv) any reference in any such provision to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision. The Act was published in the Gazette on January 14, 1964, and, by virtue of section 3 of the Kerala Interpretation and General clauses Act, section 1 came into force on that date. Section 82 as has been stated, came into force on April 1, 1964, and the reference in sub-section (4) of that section to the commencement of this Act meant a reference to the coming into force of that provision with effect from April 1, 1964. It may be that the first three rules or directions contained in sub-section (3) (mentioned above) were spent on the coming into force of section 1 of the Act or its other provisions on the dates appointed for them, but, for obvious reasons, rule (iv) continued to hold the field in as much as it laid down the rule of construction that any reference to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that particular provision. It was therefore applicable as a general rule of construction whenever it became necessary to ascertain the date of commencement of a particular provision of the Act other than section 1.It will be recalled that sub-section (4) of section 82, as originally incorporated in the Act, came into force on April 1, 1964. As has been mentioned, sub-section (4) of section 8 2 was emended by section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969, which came into force on January 1, 1970, but that proved to be fortuitous because it was supplanted by section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971 from the same date.11. The sub-section, as amend ed by the Amending Act of 1971, also dealt with the conversion of land into any other class of land after the commencement of this Act, but it added the words or into a plantation and provided that such conversion shall not be taken into consideration for determining the extent of land liable to be surrendered.12. The argument is however untenable on the p lain meaning of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act which clearly states that any reference in any provision of the Act to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision. So when the provision of sub-section (4) of section 82 was brought into force on April 1, 1964, its amended version would also come into force from that date. And it will be a matter of no consequence that section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971, w hich amended the sub-section, came into force on January 1, 1970. It will be remembered that section 66 of the Amending Act of 1969 which amended section 82 came into force on January 1, 1970, and as the legislature decided to amend it once again b y section 12 of the Act of 1971, with retrospective effect from the same date (January 1, 1970), it made a specific provision to that effect in section 1 of the Amending Act of 1971 and left the date of commencement of the Act for purposes of sub-sec tion (4) of section 82 to be determined according to the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Act which, as has been stated, was a subsisting provision. It would follow that sub-section (4) as amended by the Amending Act of 1971 came into force on April 1, 1964. It may be that, as has been argued by Mr. Venugopal, the expression commencement of this Act is a term of art. We have interpreted it as it stands, without detracting from the value attributed to it by Mr. Venugopa15. A provision is therefore a distinct rule or principle of law in a statute which governs the situation covered by it. So an incomplete idea, even though stated in the form of a section of a statute, cannot be said to be a provision for, by its incompleteness, it cannot really be said to provide a whole rule or principle for observance by those concerned. A provision of law cannot therefore be said to exist if it is incomplete, for then it provides nothing.Examined in this perspective, section 82 of the Act ( as amended by section 12 of the Amending Act of 1971) is, to say the least, a distinct rule or clause for it provides the extent of the ceiling area in the cases mentioned in it (sub-section (1) ), its effect on the lands owned or held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of the family (sub-section (2) ), the taking into account of the shares of the members of the family or an adult unmarried person (sub-section (3)), the effect of conversion of any class of land specified in Schedule II into any other class of land specified in the schedule or into a plantation and the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land (sub-section (4) ), lands owned by a private trust or a private institution (sub-section (5) ) and exemption of lands covered by section 81 (sub-section (6) ). The section is therefore a provision by any standard, and it is futile to argue that this is not so merely because the provisions relating to the prohibition on the owning or holding or possessing under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area and the surrender of excess land and its vesting in the State Government have been dealt with in the other sections (83, 85 and 86). Sections 83, 85 and 86 contain certain other provisions relating to the law of ceiling on land, but that cannot detract from the basic fact that section 82 contains a provision-in fact an important provision-of the law relating to the imposition of ceiling on land dealt with in Chapter III. It may well be said that sub-section (4) of section 82 is also a provision of the law by itself, for it lays down a distinct rule relating to conversion of lands for observance by all concerned.We have gone through Saidu Muhammed v. Bhanukuitan, (1) but that was quite a different case where the section which authorised the launching of the prosecution of a defaulter was brought into force, but not the other provision which prescribed the period of limitation for the prosecution, and the High Court, was persuaded to take the view that it was the legislative intent that the prosecution should be governed by the limitation prescribed by the other section. In the case before us, however, the application of section 82 is not dependent on any other section, so as to make it an incomplete provision by itself. It deals with ceiling area and is a provision by itself, so that it could be br ought into force from a date different from section 83 which prohibited the holding of land in excess of the ceiling area. It may be pointed out, that the ceiling prescribed by section 82 was material not only for the purpose of Chapter III of the Act, but had a direct co- relation to some of the provisions of Chapter II e.g. sections 16 and 53.But they were different cases. Thus State of Kerala v. Philomina (supra) related to the transfer of Kayal lands between September 15, 1963 and January 1, 1970. As Chapter III of the Act was not applicable to those lands because of th e exemption under section 81, and as that exemption continued until January 1, 1970 when section 65 of the Amending Act of 1969 came into force, it was held by this Court that as the exemption was not withdrawn until January 1, 1970, the transfers made between September 15, 1963 and January 1, 1970 were valid under the provisions of the Act. The decision in that case thus turned on the meaning of section 83 and 85. That view was noticed by this Court in State of Kerala and others v. K. A. Gangadharan (supra) and it was held that the dominant legislative intent was the imposition of the ceiling on lands and the consequential obligation to surrender lands owned or held in excess of the ceiling area on the notified date, namely, January 1, 1970. The gifts of excess land made on March 28, 1974 were therefore ignored. That was also, therefore, a different case and cannot avail the appellants.The view taken by the High Court in Ramunni Nair v. State of Kerala(1) in regard to the meaning to be attached to the words the commencement of this Act is thus substantially correct and does not call for interference by us. It may be mentioned that learned Advocate General has pointed out that in the Act as it stands amended at present, the expression commencement of this Act refers to the commencement of the Act, and while referring to the commencement of the Amending. Act of 1969, the words used are commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Am endment) Act, 1969 and that the Amending Act of 1971 has also been referred to as such. It is therefore futile to contend that the rule of interpretation mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 1 that any reference in a provision of the Act to the commencement of this Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision, shall not be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision as originally enacted.17. Mr. Balakrishnan tried to raise the argument that a landholder is, in any event, entitled to the benefit of the exemption under section 81 as amended by the Act of 1969 in respect of the extent of plantation within the ceiling area even if it were converted into a plantation during the period April 1, 1964 to December 31, 1969. The argument is untenable because while sub-section (1) of section 81 provides that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to the lands and plantations mentioned in it, that is overridden by, and is subject to, the requirement of sub- section (4) of section 82.18. Point No. 1 is decided against the appellants.Point No. 222. A reading of sub-section (1) of section 85 shows that the question for examination is not that relating to the existence of the tenancy rights of the person who files the statement, but that relating to the bona fides of his belief that the land sought to be excluded by him is liable to be purchased by a cultivating tenant. The Land Tribunal and the Taluk Land Board thus operate in their respective fields and serve the purpose of the Act.Now the certificate of purchase which the Land Tribunal issues (in the prescribed form) evidences the assignment of the assigned land to the purchaser. Sub-section (2) of section 72K of the Act mentioned above merely declares that the certificate shall be conclusive proof of that assignment of the right, title and interest of the land- owner and the intermediaries (if any) to the tenant in respect of the holding concerned (or portion thereof). There is nothing in the sub-section which could be said to declare that the finding recorded by the Tribunal in those proceedings would be conclusive proof of any other matter which it may determine so as to bind the Taluk and Board or any other authority. Sub-section (2) of section 72K therefore does not, in terms or in substance, impinge on the authority of the Taluk Land Board to discharge its own functions under section 85(5) of the Act.23. The Board is thus quite free to cause the particulars mentioned in the statement filed under sub-section (2) of section 85 to be verified and to ascertain whether the person filing the statement owns or holds any other land, and to determine the extent as well as the identity of the excess land which he is required to surrender. If a certificate of purchase is issued by the Land Tribunal to any such person and he tenders it in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board, the Board is required by law to treat it as conclusive proof of the fact that t he right, title and interest of the land owner (and intermediary) over the land mentioned in it has been assigned to him. It is however not the requirement of the law that the certificate of purchase shall be conclusive proof of the surplus or other land held by its holder so as to foreclose the decision of the Taluk Land Board under sub-section (5) of section 85.Mr. Warriyar is not justified in arguing that the Taluk Land Board has power only to determine the identity of the surplus land, leaving every other matter to the Land Tribunal. The argument loses sight of requirement of sub- section (5) of section 85 that the Board shall, inter alia, by order, determine not only the identity of the land to be surrendered but also its24. It would thus appear that even though the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) of section 72K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so-called conclusive effective is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shownIt may be stated that inaccuracy on the face of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an error apparent on the face of the record. It will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record, or that the Tribunals finding suffers from any procedural error. What sub-section (2) of section 72K provides is an irrebutable presumption of law, and it may well be regarded as a rule of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under section 85(5) after taking into consideration the conclusive evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to section 72K (2) as far as it goes.We are therefore of the opinion that the vie w taken in Kunjanujan Thampuran and others v. Taluk Land Board(1) is not quite correct. While the High Court was justified in taking the view that the scope of the enquiry in the Taluk Land Board is that relating to the surplus land with which t he Land Tribunal is not concerned, the certificate of purchase has its own conclusive evedentiary value to the extent provided in section 72K (2) in proceedings before the Taluk Land Board. It will therefore be for the Board to arrive at it s own decision under sub-section (5) of section 85, according to the law, and it will be permissible for it to examine, where necessary, whether the certificate is inaccurate on its face, or has been obtained by fraud or collusion.is decided accordingly.25. Mr. Bhandare tried to raise an ancillary argument in C.A. No. 2585 of 1977 that if on the date on which the Taluk Land Board undertakes an enquiry for the determination of surplus land, a proceeding is pending before the Land Tribunal for the grant of a certificate of purchase, the Board will have no jurisdiction to examine a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. We find, however, that no such question was raised for t he consideration of the High Court, where the controversy was confined to the genuineness of the lease, and we are therefore not required to examine the abstract point of law set out by Mr. Bhandare. It will be sufficient for us to say that the ancillary argument can easily be answered in the light of our decision on point No. 2 if and when it arises for consideration in a given case, for the function of the Board is to determine the extent and the identity of the Land to be surrendered and not matters relating to the issue of a certificate of purchase. If a certificate of purchase has a bearing on what the Board is called upon to decide, we have no doubt that the Board will take it into consideration, if it is produced for its consideration, with due regard to the evidentiary value assigned to it under section 72K (2) in the light of our decision on point No. 2. Point No. 3Some of the persons who owned or held lands exceeding the ceiling prescribed by t he Act, had voluntarily transferred some of their lands after the publication of the Kerala Land Reforms Bill, 1963, in the State Gazette on September 15, 1963. Section 84 of the Act therefore provides that, except for the transfers mentioned in the section, the transfers so made shall be deemed to be transfers calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act, and shall be invalid. The section has thus been linked with section 82 which specifies the ceiling area.As has been stated, sub-section (3) of section 84 was inserted on November 2, 1972, and the point for determination is whether it was retrospective or retroactive in operation so as to govern the transfers effected after September 15, 1963 (date of publication of the Bill of 1963) even though the original section 84, read with the original section 82, invalidated only those transfers which were in excess of the higher ceiling prescribed by the original section 82.Section 84 follows section 82 which, it will be recalled, prescribes the ceiling area, and section 83, which prohibits the owning or holding or possession (under a mortgage) land in excess of the ceiling area. As has been observed by this Court in Gangadharans case, section 84 has been enacted with a view to making the provisions of section 83 and 85 effective. It makes references to ceiling area in sub-sections (1) and (2), and sub-section (3) states what exactly is meant thereby.27. The sub-section clarifies that the expression ceiling area in sub-sections ( 1) and (2) of section 84 means the area specified in sub-section (1) of section 82 as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 (35 of 1969). As has been mentioned, that amendment was made by section 66 which came into force o n January 1, 1970. It is true that section 15 of the Amending Act of 1972 (which inserted sub-section (3) in section 84 of the Act) does not state that it has been made with retrospective effect, and sub-section (3) does not, in terms, state th at it shall be deemed to have come into force from the date of the amendment which was made by the Amending Act of 1969.28. In doing so, we shall be guided by the plain and clear language of the sub-section, that is the primary rule of construction, for the legislature is intended to mean what it has expressed.29. Section 84 has been enacted for the purpose of making certain voluntary transfers invalid on the ground that they are deemed to be calculated to defeat the provision of the law relating to imposition of ceiling on land. It is therefore co-related to section 82 (which fixed the ceiling), and if the Legislature decided that the ceiling should be reduced, it is natur al that the deeming provision of section 84 should attach to transfers in excess of the reduced ceiling because the crucial date of invalidation has been stated in section 84, right from the inception of the Act, to be September 15, 1963, irrespective of the law relating to the ceiling. It will be remembered that the Act had not even come into force on September 15, 1963, but it, all the same, invalidated the transfers made after that date in excess of the ceiling it prescribed. So, as lon g as September 15, 1963 continues to remain the date with reference to which the transfers are to be invalidated, the variation in the extent of the ceiling has necessarily to work back to that date. The legislature therefore inserted sub-section (3) in section 84 to clarify that the expression ceiling area in the earlier sub-sections would mean the ceiling area specified in section 82(1) as amended by the Amending Act of 1969, i.e. the reduced ceiling. In taking this view we have only taken into consideration the plain and clear wordings of the sub-section, and if in doing so it so happens that sub-section (3) becomes retroactive in operation, we must hold that it is so. Any other view of the meaning and effect of sub- section (3) will amount to disregarding what the legislature has expressed and reading more in the law than what it provides.It has to be appreciated that, from the inception, the Act forward on voluntary transfers effected after September 15, 1963, for the obvious reason that the Bill was published on that date in the State Gazette and those concerned know that they would be required to surrender the excess lands. It is not surprising that voluntary transfers of land should have been made to get over that eventuality.30. Section 84 therefore provided from the very beginning that such transfers shall be deemed to be calculated to defeat the provisions of the Act and shall be invalid. When the ceiling fixed by the original section 82 was considerably reduced by the Amending Act of 1969, and when the reduced ceiling was to govern the liability to surrender the excess land, it was only natural that provision should have been made to invalidate voluntary transfers effect ed after September 15, 1963 with reference to that reduced ceiling. It has to be appreciated that even those who did not want to defeat the provisions of the Act by voluntary transfers after September 15, 1963 and retained the lands themselves, we re affected by the amendment which was made by the Amending Act of 1969 and were not entitled to claim that this should not be so merely because the Amending Act came into force later.32. The legislature inserted the sub-s ection without any change. It is true that the intention of the legislature cannot be ascertained from any statement by way of a note on the clauses of a Bill or breviate and, as has been stated, the duty of the court is to find the natural m eaning of the words in a statute, in the context in which they are used, but it has always been considered permissible, and even desirable, for a court, while interpreting a statute, to take note of the history of the statute and t he circumstances in which it was passed or the mischief at which it was directed. The reason is that the meaning which is to be given to a statute should be such as will carry out its object. If sub-section (3) of section 84 is examined with due re gard to all these factors, it will appear that, as has plainly been stated in it, the ceiling area referred to in sub-sections (1) and (2) of that section for examining the question of the validity of the transfers made after September 15, 1963 is the reduced ceiling area specified by the Amending Act of 1969.33. In fact as has been stated in the Craies on Statute Law,seventh edition, at page 395, to explain a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the earlier Act was passed. In such a case, as the Act is declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively so as to respect vested rights, is not applicable. As sub-section (3) of section 84 in terms clarifie s the meaning of the expression ceiling area with reference to which certain voluntary transfers are to be invalidated, it is clearly retrospective as it is meant to invalidate the transfers made after September 15, 1963 when the Bill of 1963 was published.We are therefore satisfied that the view taken in Narayana Patar v. State of Kerala(1) and others in this respect is quite correct and point No. 3is decided accordingly.38. The view taken by the High Court in regard to the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate is not correct for reasons mentioned by us while dealing with point No. 2.40. Mr. Warriyar has argued that the appellant is a widow and that the ancestral lands have wrongly been treated as her own lands. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court but no such point was raised for its consideration. It cannot be allowed to be raised now and as no other point has been argued in this Court42. Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Act provides that in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, the ceiling area of the land shall be ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member in excess of five, subject to the limit prescribed by the clause.43. And the expression minor has been defined by clause (36A) to mean a person who has not attained the age of eighteen years. So two postulates are necessary for obtaining the benefit of the increase of one standard acre for each member of the family in excess of five, namely, that the member should be in existence, and it should be possible to ascertain that he had not attained the age of eighteen years on the appointed date. Both these conditions cannot be said to exist in the case of a child en ventre sa mere and it will not therefore be regarded as a member of the family for purposes of section 82. We are aware that a child en ventre sa mere has been regard ed in some legal systems as a person in being for the purpose of acquisition of property by the child itself, particularly in regard to gifts, but section 82 of the Act with which we are concerned does not deal with any such contingency or benefit to the unborn child. The view taken by the High Court in Balakrishna Karup case is therefore correct and as it has been rightly followed in the appeal before us,44. It has been argued by Mr. Warriyar that the lands in question should have been treated as joint family property and if that had been done there would have been no excess land for surrender. The claim was advanced on the basis of parol evidence and was rejected by the High Court. It is therefore a finding of fact and does not call for re-examination here.45. It is not disputed that there is a pine-apple-canning factory on 2.15 acres, and there is a pine-apple plantation on the adjoining area of 11 acres. It has been argued that the whole of 13.15 acres should have been exempted from the ceiling limit as it was a commercial site within the meaning of section 2(5) of the Act. But, according to that definition, commercial site means (leaving out the inapplicable portion) any land which is used principally for the purposes of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. A cross reference to sub-section (5) of section 10 1 shows that such a question has to be decided after taking into account the extent of, the amount invested in, and the income from, the portion so used and the remaining portion and the other relevant matters. It has been held that the 11 acres of land did not fall within this definition and the finding of fact that it is not a commercial site does not call for interference.46. We have made a reference to this appeal in connection with the ancillary argument of Mr. Bhandare on point No. 2.e find however that the High Court did not interfere with the finding of the Taluk Land Board be cause there was no lease deed and there was absolutely no material to prove that the land was held by the tenants. The two demand bills of the Panchayat dated November 1, 1974 could not possibly prove that a lease was in existence before September 15, 1963. There is nothing on the record to show that a certificate of purchase was produced for the Boards consideration, and it is futile to argue that its evidentiary value was ignored by the Board. No such argument was advanced for the consideration of the High Court. The other argument regarding exclusion of 1.75 acres, on the basis of an alleged gift to the appellants son, was not urged for the consideration of the High Court; and does not require consideration by us.47. Mr. Bhatt has argued that the High Court erred in not granting the exemption for the entire area as a coffee plantation; but the finding of fact in this respect is against the appellant. The conversion of the land has also been held to be illegal. On the claim that the land used for growing fuel was exempt as it fell within the definition of plantation under section 2(44) (a) as it was an ancillary purpose also, there is a finding of fact against the Company.48. The controversy before us relates to exclusion of fuel area and rested area The Company has claimed that it has planted red gum as fuel in 924.01 acres as it was required for the manufacture of tea. The Taluk Board found it to be an exorbitant claim and reduced it to 200 acres, but the High Court has restored the entire claim. The General Manager of the Company has stated that fire wood is being supplied to the employees free of cost. So the claim to plant red gum all over is belied by its General Managers statement. Moreover supply of fuel wood cannot be said to be a purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops. The Land Board has disallowed the claim for exemption of 136.17 acres, but it has been allowed in full by the High Court. Here again the High Court was not justified in interfering with the Boards finding of fact for there was nothing to show that it was an area from which crop was not gathered at the relevant time. If that had been so, it might have been an area within the plantation. In fact it appears from the order of the Board that no other estate had made any such claim49. Mr. Raghavan has argued that the Land Board erred in excluding only 25 cents on account of road and 55 cents for the house site and the approach road. These are findings of fact which have not been shown to be vitiated by any error of law or procedure and the High Court has given its reason for refusing to take additional evidence in regard to the alleged dedication of the road.50. The appellant has been called upon to surrender 8.75 acres of land and the claim to exclude 6.29 acres on account of a will of 1963 in favour of the grand daughter has been rejected as the will has not been found to be genuine. Mr. Raghavan has not been able to show how that finding, which is essentially one of fact, can be said to require reconsideration when it is admitted that the will has not been probated so far.51. Mr. Raghavan has argued that the High Court has erred in rejecting the contention that as the appellant had two unmarried daughters who had attained majority before January 1, 1970, they were entitled to 6 acres each under section 82(1) of the Act. But the two daughters did not have any share in the property under their personal law, and the Act did not give it to them.52. The High Court has remanded the case in some respects, but the grievance here is that although the appellants unmarried daughter Sheela became a major in 1969 and was given a share in the partition held on December 15, 1969, that has not been excluded from the appellants holding. We find that there was no satisfactory evidence to prove the partition and separate possession of the daughter. The finding of fact is therefore against the appellant and does not call for reconsideration here.53. The grievance of the appellant is that the Taluk Land Board has revised its earlier order and raised the excess land for surrender from 7.66 acres to 11.09 acres. But that is permissible under section 85(9) of the Act. The Board has justified the correction with reference to the reports already on the record and it has not been argued before us that they were not read correctly or that that excess land has been incorrectly determined. It may be mentioned that the Collector and the Tahsildars were authorised under section 105A (1) to make the reports which were lost sight of when the first determination of surplus land was made, and all that the Board has done is to rectify the mistake.54. It has been argued by Mr. Harindranath that Mammad son of Mohammad Kutty was a major on January 1, 1970 and he was wrongly taken to be a minor for the determination of the ceiling area. But we find from the High Courts order dated July 5, 1976 that Mohammad Kutty had himself mentioned in the statement which he filed about his holding that his son Mammad was a minor on that date. It is therefore clear that the attempt to show that he was a major on January 1, 1970 was an after thought, and it has rightly been rejected.55. Mr. Harindranath has argued that the house, cattleshed, tank, well and outhouse should have been exempted. But no such argument was advanced in the High Court and it cannot be agitated here. The other argument t hat the land which was on lease with C. Ouseph should have been allowed to be surrendered, is also futile in view of the findings about the alleged lease56. It has been argued that out of the 30 acres of land which was taken on lease on May 2, 1962, from Haji, one Palakkat Varkey was in possession o f 13 acres which he refused to surrender and that land should have been left out of consideration. It has however been found as a fact that the alleged tenancy of Varkey had not been established, and there is nothing wrong if the plea to that effect has been rejected.C.A. No. 895 of 1979 : Kuttikrishnan and another vs. The State of Kerala and others57. We have dealt with the evidentiary value of the purchase certificate while examining point No. 2 which has a bearing on this appeal.58. The only argument which has been advanced before us relates to the question whether the finding about unculturable waste land is correct. That is a finding of fact which has not been shown to have been vitiated for any reason.59. It has been argued by Mr. Sudhakaran that although certificates of purchase had been obtained by some of the tenants, they were not taken into consideration by the Land Board and the High Court. We find that no such argument was advanced in the Board or before the High Court and, as it happens, there is nothing to show that even the existence of the certificate of purchase was brought to the notice of the Board or the High Court. All that was urged in the High Court was that out of 30 acres acquired in 1962, the appellant got possession of only 17 acres, and that there was a lease of some land in favour of Avirah Joseph in 1962. These were questions of fact which the High Court rightly refused to re-examine.60. The controversy relates to the three gift-deeds executed after January 1, 1970. The High Court has refused to exclude the gifted lands, and in view of this Courts decision in Gangadharans case, (supra) that decision is correct as transfers made after January 1, 1970 have to be ignored even if they are of the excepted variety mentioned in section 84 of the Act.The High Court has examined the document concerned and held that the properties were private properties of the executants of the document. This is a finding of fact and there is nothing wrong with the view that the property which fell to Nanikuttys share was her own property.The High Court has upheld that finding after examining the document of 196363. Mr. Nambiyar has argued that the High Court erred in upholding the finding of the Taluk Land Board that the land in question was not forest but paramba and its conversion into plantation after April 1, 1964 had to be ignored under section 82(4) of the Act. But that is a f inding of fact, which has not been shown to have been vitiated, and does not call for interference here.64. The Taluk Land Board made its order on November 21, 1975 determining the extent of the land to be surrendered by the appellant. He applied to the Board much after the period of 60 days prescribed in sub-section (8) of section 85 to have that order set aside. No real attempt was made to explain the delay and the High Court therefore rightly upheld the Boards decision that the application was barred by limitation.65. The Taluk Land Boards earlier order was set aside by the High Court to the extent mentioned in its order dated November 16, 1976 and the Board was directed to dispose of the matter afresh. The Board allowed relief to the extent of 53.59 acres by exempting it as rubber plantation. But it disallowed the claim that 3.41 acres was arecanut garden in a part of the rubber plantation as it was interspersed with in the boundary of the rubber estate, because it was found from the report of the authorised officer that this was not so. The High Court ha s given satisfactory reasons for that view and there is no occasion for us to interfere with that finding.The Taluk Land Board has held that she was minor on January 1, 1970 and was a member of the appellants family. That finding has been based on the entries in the school certificate, and as a certified copy of the birth register was not produced, it cannot be said that the High Court erred in refusing to disturb the Boards finding.The Board gave its finding in this matter after making the necessary enquiries and visiting the lands. The High Court has stated in its order dated October 11, 1976 on the review petition that the question of non-applicability of the Act to non-agricultural lands was not urged for its consideration. As it is essentially a question of fact, it does not require consideration in this Court.68. The evidentiary value of the purchase certificate came up for consideration in this case in the High Court.The Taluk Land Board has held that she was minor on January 1, 1970 and was a member of the appellants family. That finding has been based on the entries in the school certificate, and as a certified copy of the birth register was not produced, it cannot be said that the High Court erred in refusing to disturb the Boards finding.