Case: P. Chinnanna &amp; Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh &amp; Others

These are the appeals in which special leave is granted under Article 136 of the Constitution. They are directed against the common judgment dated 3-8-1993 of a Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which Writ Appeal Nos. 1389 of 1991 and 608 of 1993 filed against the orders dated 10-3-1989 and 30-3-1989 of a learned Single Judge of the same court in Writ Petition Nos. 13439 of 1986 and 7689 of 1989 respectively refusing to quash acquisition of certain land acquired for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the L.A. Act), are dismissed.2. That on 23-4-1976 Bhainsa Regulated Market Samiti made a request to the State Government to acquire a compact block of 6 acres and 29 guntas of land in Survey Nos. 342/1A, 342/IB and 343 of Bhainsa Village needed for extension of its existing Cotton Market Yard. That on 6-7-1977 the State Government which regarded the said request to acquire land, to be a case involving urgency, invoked its power under sub- section (4) of Section 17 of the L.A. Act and made an order directing that the provisions of Section 5-A of the L.A. Act shall not apply. Further, that on 21-7-1977, it got published in the State Gazette a notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act and a declaration under Section 6(1) thereof, in respect of the said land, as was required under sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the L.A. Act. Thereafter, the District Collector who got published the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) of the L.A. Act took possession of the said acquired land on 10-7-1978 as provided for in sub- section (1) of Section 17 of the L.A. Act. Such taking of possession made the said land vest absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances as provided for in the said sub-section itself. Thereupon, the District Collector gave possession of the said acquired land to the Bhainsa Regulated Market Samiti for whom it had been acquired. When the said 6 acres and 29 guntas of land, had been so acquired and its possession was taken by the Collector resulting in its vesting in the State, the appellants in the present appeals filed WP Nos. 8433 of 1978 and 3416 of 1978 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and sought the quashing of Section 4(1) notification and 6(1) declaration insofar as they related to 1 acre 29 guntas of land claimed to have been purchased by them in April 1977. WP No. 3416 of 1978 was disposed of by the High Court by a judgment dated 23-8-1982 which read thusthis writ petition the acquisition of Ac. 1-29 guntas in S. No. 342/IA of Bhainsa Village is challenged by the writ petitioners. This land is sought to be acquired for the purpose of extention of agriculture market yard of that place. The gazette notification was made under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 21-1-1977 and in view of the alleged urgency, Section 5-A enquiry has been dispensed with. That is to say, possession has been taken nearly a year after Section 4(1) notification was published. This circumstances is alone sufficient to show that the invoking of the emergency clauses to dispense with Section 5-A enquiry is done mechanically.In these circumstances, the order made on 21-7-1977 dispensing with Section 5-A enquiry is set aside and there will be a direction to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nirmal, Respondent 3 to give notice to the petitioners and hold Section 5-A enquiry and the proceedings will commence from that point. The writ petition is allowed as indicated above, but in the circumstances withoutWrit Petition No. 8433 of 1978 was disposed of on the same date by the High Court by a judgment which reads thus :"No orders are necessary."3. An enquiry under Section 5-A of the L.A. Act appears to have been held pursuant to the said judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3416 of 1978 and a decision taken by the State Government, on the basis of the report of the enquiry to the effect that the land concerned shall be acquired. Thereafter, on 29-11-1984, a declaration has come to be made under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act in respect of the said 1 acre 29 guntas of land and the notification of declaration is got published on the same date in the State Gazette.4. One of the appellants who had, as other appellants, purchased a building plot out of the said land respecting which the declaration dated 29-11-1984 was made, filed Writ Petition No. 13439 of 1986 in the High Court challenging the validity of the said declaration made on the basis of the opinion of the Government, formed on consideration of Section 5-A enquiry report. That writ petition was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 10- 3-1989. Despite the dismissal of that writ petition, all other appellants appear to have joined and filed Writ Petition No. 7689 of 1989 on the very grounds on which dismissed writ petition had been filed. But that writ petition also has come to be dismissed subsequently. Both the writ petitions had been dismissed by the learned Single Judge concerned finding that the grounds raised in support of those petitions lacked in merit. Since the appellants who were the petitioners in the said writ petitions had filed Writ Appeal Nos. 1389 of 1991 and 608 of 1993 against the orders dated 10-3-1989 and 30-3-1989 by which their writ petitions were dismissed, a Division Bench of the High Court heard those appeals on 3- 8-1993. At the hearing of the appeals, a fresh ground is said to have been raised in support of the appeals. The fresh ground was that Section 6(1) declaration made on 29-11-1984 and under challenge, had not been made within the period allowed by the first proviso to Section 6(1) thereof, inserted into the L.A. Act by the L.A. (Amendment) Act, 1984, and hence was liable to be quashed. However, the Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment delivered on the same day, dismissed the appeals, rejecting, inter alia, the fresh ground urged in support of the appeals at the hearing thuslearned counsel for the appellants also submits that in any view of the matter, the declaration under Section 6 published on 24-11-1984 is beyond three years. In fact, this plea has not been taken in the writ petitions. As already stated, when Writ Petition No. 3416 of 1978 was filed, stay of further proceedings was granted. Finally, the writ petition was allowed on 23-8-1982. The respondents must know about the said order and after receipt of a copy of the judgments they have conducted enquiry and also published the draft declaration. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the declaration was published beyond the time allowed under

Reasoning:
Hence, we feel that there is no need to set aside the impugned declaration inasmuch as the earlier acquisition was complete and had resulted in vesting of the land in the State Government and there was no land available for acquisition in the subsequent proceedings which have been carried pursuant to the judgment of the High Court made in WP No. 3416 of 1978. Therefore, in the stated facts, although we find that no need arises to declare the impugned declaration as void we clarify that the earlier proceedings which had taken place in respect of the appellants land, resulting in its vesting in the State Government free from encumbrances, has stood unaffected and any award made by the Collector or be made by him under the L.A. Act shall be regarded as that based on earlier acquisition proceedings.11. We may, however, state that though we have examined the fresh ground of challenge in respect of Section 6(1) declaration raised on behalf of the appellants nearly seven years after it had become available to them, the same had been done solely to decide on the scope and applicability of the first proviso to Section 6(1) and its explanation, inserted into the L.A. Act by the L.A. (Amendment) Act, 1984. Such examination cannot, therefore, be understood as laying down that notwithstanding the lapse of time or laches in raising a legal ground in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution or a proceeding under Article 136 of the Constitution there is an obligation on the part of the court concerned to examine such fresh ground. In fact, in relation to acquisition proceeding involving acquisition of land for public purposes, the court concerned must be averse to entertain writ petitions involving the challenge to such acquisition where there is avoidable delay or laches since such acquisition, if set aside, would not only involve enormous loss of public money but also cause undue delay in carrying out projects meant for general public good. When a fresh ground of attack to acquisition proceedings, even if it involves purely a question of law, its entertainment cannot be governed by a principle different from that which governs entertainment of writ petitions before the High Court or proceedings arising therefrom before this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. however without costs.