Case: Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturing (Wvg) Company Limited Vs. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Another

3. The facts of the case are immaterial for the purpose of this judgment, save to state in the barest outline that the appellant is the Rayon Silk Manufacturing Company registered in the State of Madhya Pradesh. One of its industrial undertakings is located in Bilakootam, Mavoor in Kozhikode District, Kerala State. This establishment produces Rayon Grade Pulp, using Bamboo Eucalyptus and other species of wood as basic raw material. It has a large eucalyptus plantation covering thousands of acres, maintained as captive raw material for use in the factory. The state says that as a consequence of the Vesting Act, the eucalyptus plantation being a private forest and not excluded therefrom is vested in the State with no right, title and interest subsisting with the company. The claim of the company however, is that the term private forest as defined under the Vesting Act, excludes the eucalyptusPrivate forest has been defined in the Vesting Act as well as under the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964) as amended by Amendment Act 35 of 1969 ("the KLR Act").

Reasoning:
13. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act.Garden means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same.Nilam means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit-bearing trees. It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term agricultural crop in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It may be significant to note that the legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have "associations, echoes and over-tones". While construing such words, judges must, as Felix Frankfurther, J., said "retain the associations, hear the echoes and capture the overtones" (at p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C) "any other agricultural crop" are quit wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptusIt is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1), private forests vest in government. Sub-clause (2) however, excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for this purpose "includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species". The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of trees, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-clause (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause (C). the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause (C) would have been in a differentIn our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees