Case: Indian Oil Corp.Ltd Vs. Subrata Borah Chowlek

2. The present appeals, by special leave, are directed against order and judgment dated 29.1.2010 passed by a Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court, whereby appellants? application seeking condonation of delay of 59 days in preferring the appeal was rejected and their writ appeal was dismissed in limine as being barred by limitation.3. The respondents herein filed writ petitions in the High Court seeking regularization of their services? from the dates of their initial appointment with consequential benefits. A learned Single Judge of the High Court, vide his judgment dated 29.4.2009, allowed the writ petitions, and directed appellant No.2 viz. the Assam Oil Division of the Indian Oil Corporation to treat the respondents as having been regularly appointed from the date of their initial appointment, and to give them all the consequential service benefits.4. Being aggrieved by the said order, the appellants preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.7.2009, along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. It was pleaded that the delay of 59 days had occasioned because of the time taken by the company?s consultant at Delhi, mainly on account of summer vacation.5. As afore-mentioned, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal, on the ground of limitation, observingsuch, the averments made in the application do not disclose any weighty or convicting cause to construe the same as sufficient within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act. The applicant corporation had since the delivery of the judgment and order involved been cavalier and nonchalant in its approach. No urge or concern to act with expedition or dispatch in view of the period of limitation prescribed is discernible in its enterprise to decide the next course of action following the decision of the Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the applicants are not entitled to the equitable relief of condonation of delay, they having utterly failed to offer a sufficient cause therefore in filing the accompanying writ appeals.As stated above, the appellants had pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal was unintentional and bona fide in as much as on receiving an uncertified copy of the judgment, they sought legal opinion from their local lawyer on 7.5.2009, which was received by them on 21.5.2009. Thereafter, the same was forwarded to the General Manager (HR), Refinery Headquarters, New Delhi on 28.5.2009. Vide his letter dated 6.6.2009, the said General Manager sought some documents, including a certified copy of the judgment. Subsequently, the General Manager forwarded the case file to the company?s legal advisors at New Delhi on 18.6.2009. The said legal advisors gave their opinion on 7.7.2009, advising the appellants to file an appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge; the proposal was approved by the headquarters of the appellants; whereafter the case file was handed over to the counsel for preparing and filing the appeal, which was ultimately filed on 29.7.2009.

Reasoning:
7. Having heard the learned counsel, we are of the opinion that in the instant case a sufficient cause had been made out for condonation of delay in filing the appeal and therefore, the High Court erred in declining to condone the same. It is true that even upon showing a sufficient cause, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right, yet it is trite that in construing sufficient cause, the Courts generally follow a liberal approach particularly when no negligence, inaction or mala fides .can be imputed to the party. (See: Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari & Ors.(1969) 1 SCR 1006 ; The State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality & Ors. (1972) 1 SCC 366 ; N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 ; Sital Prasad Saxena Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1985) 1 SCC 163 ).It is manifest that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 envisages the explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the Court, and makes no distinction between the State and the citizen, nonetheless adoption of a strict standard of proof in case of the Government, which is dependant on the actions of its officials, who often do not have any personal interest in its transactions, may lead to grave miscarriage of justice and therefore, certain amount of latitude is permissible in such cases.12. Examined on theted observations, we are of the view that in the present case, the conduct of the appellants does not indicate inaction, negligence or mala fides. The explanation furnished for the marginal delay of 59 days, in our opinion, constitutes a sufficient cause and therefore, deserves to be accepted.