Case: SANJAY RAMDAS PATIL Vs. SANJAY AND OTHERS

4. Facts in brief giving rise to filing of these appeals are as under:-We will refer to the facts in appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.7556 of 2021. The respondent No.1 though belongs to the Scheduled Caste category, was elected as a Councillor to the Dhule Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the said Corporation) from the General category. By the Notification dated 27th November 2019, the Office of Mayor in the said Corporation was earmarked for Backward Class of Citizens for the next term of two and half years commencing from June, 2021. Contending that from the year 2003 onwards, the Office of Mayor in the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class category on various occasions, but was not reserved for Scheduled Caste category, a petition came to be filed by the respondent No.1, challenging the said reservation with a prayer for direction to reserve the post of Mayor of the said Corporation for the next term of two and a half years for Scheduled Caste category. The said petition came to be allowed as aforesaid. Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.5. The Division Bench of the High Court while construing sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Maharashtra Municipal Corporations (Reservation of Offices of Mayors) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) and relying on the judgment of the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court held that since already on two earlier occasions, the Office of Mayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class, reserving the same again for Backward Class coupled with the fact that there has been no reservation for the Scheduled Caste category, amounted to violation of rotation policy. As such, it remanded the matter to respondent No.2-State for consideration afresh in accordance with these observations.

Reasoning:
10. It is not in dispute that from 2003 to 2017, the Office of Mayor of the said Corporation was reserved for Backward Class category for two terms, out of the total 7 terms. It is also not in dispute that there was no reservation provided for the Scheduled Castes category even once.19. It is thus clear that the scheme of Rules which is in tune with Section 19(1A) of the said Act and in turn with the constitutional provision under Article 243T, is to provide reservation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in proportion to the total population of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Municipal Corporation areas. Insofar as the Backward Class is concerned, the reservation provided is fixed at 27% of the total number of offices of Mayors. 1/3rd of the total number of posts shall be reserved for women category including the one belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Class of Citizens. Clause (a) of sub- rule(2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State Government to allot by draw of lots, the offices of Mayors for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens and Women, on the principles specified in sub-rule (1). Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules mandates the State Government to ensure that, at any given point of time, the number of offices of Mayors, reserved for the said categories, shall not be less than the number determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule(1). Clause (c) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that the lots in respect of women belonging to a particular category shall be drawn only among the offices of Mayors reserved for such category. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules provides that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules requires that the offices of Mayors to be reserved, shall be rotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation, in which no reservation has been made in the previous terms until such reservations are given by rotation to each category.20. The High Court, while interpreting clause (e) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules, has held that until the reservations are given by rotation to each category, the reservation cannot be provided to a category for which reservation was already provided. While doing so, the High Court has relied on the judgment of the Karnataka High Court in M. Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka and Others(Writ Petition No. 38256 of 2013 decided on 06.01.2014). We will have to examine the correctness of the said view.22. It could thus be seen from paragraph (8) of the said affidavit that insofar as Scheduled Castes are concerned, 3 posts of Mayor need to be mandatorily reserved. It could further be seen that out of 27 Corporations, 12 Corporations were reserved for Scheduled Castes in earlier years. It further states that those 12 Corporations and 1 Corporation (Vasai-Virar Corporation) which was reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the first draw of lots dated 13th November 2019 were excluded. As such, there are 14 Corporations available, which were not previously reserved for Scheduled Castes. It is further clear that when draw of lots was done for the Scheduled Castes category, amongst the other eligible Corporations, Dhule Municipal Corporation was also considered. However, in the said draw of lots, 3 Corporations i.e. Mira-Bhayandar, Ahmednagar and Parbhani Municipal Corporation got reserved for Scheduled Castes.23. Insofar as Backward Class is concerned, it is stated that 7 posts of Mayor need to be mandatorily reserved. Out of 27 Corporations, 26 Corporations excluding the newly created Panvel Corporation were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the earlier years. It is stated that since 26 Corporations were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens, even the minimum required 7 Corporations were not available in the draw in question. As such, 7 Corporations which were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the earlier years i.e. immediately preceding term, were excluded in the draw of lots. So also, 4 Corporations which got reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the first and second draw, were excluded. As such, the draw of lots was done from the pool of 16 Corporations after excluding the 7 Corporations which were reserved for Backward Class of Citizens in the immediately preceding term and the 4 Corporations which were reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.24. We have no hesitation in observing that sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules has not been happily worded. On a plain reading, various clauses in the sub-rule are capable of being interpreted in a manner that there are inconsistencies and at times, conflict amongst them. We will have to therefore examine the legal position with the aid of principles of interpretation as laid down by this Court in such situations.25. In Philips India Limited v. Labour Court, Madras and Others (1985) 3 SCC 103,  this Court observed thus:-15. No canon of statutory construction is more firmly established than that the statute must be read as a whole. This is a general rule of construction applicable to all statutes alike which is spoken of as construction ex visceribus actus. This rule of statutory construction is so firmly established that it is variously styled as elementary rule (see Attorney General v. Bastow [(1957) 1 All ER 497] ) and as a settled rule (see Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras [AIR 1953 SC 274  : 1953 SCR 667] ). The only recognised exception to this well-laid principle is that it cannot be called in aid to alter the meaning of what is of itself clear and explicit. Lord Coke laid down that: it is the most natural and genuine exposition of a statute, to construe one part of a statute by another part of the same statute, for that best expresseth meaning of the makers (Quoted with approval in Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 2 SCC 144  : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370 ]).30. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57,  this Court observed thus:-16. The courts will have to reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin [(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB 174 : 60 LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh case [AIR 1959 SC 352  : (1959) 35 ITR 408 ] .)17. If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility, and should rather accept the bolder construction, based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER 549 : 1940 AC 1014 : 109 LJKB 865 : 163 LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister for Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 : (1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)] .) The principles indicated in the said cases were reiterated by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1992) 19 ATC 881 : AIR 1992 SC 1 ] .18. The statute must be read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute.19. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with other parts of the law and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335  : 1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992 SC 81 ] .) Such a construction has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between two different sections or provisions of the same statute. It is the duty of the court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections of the same Act. (See Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC 373  : AIR 1997 SC 1006 ] .)20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it must be done to construe the provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed that Parliament had given with one hand what it took away with the other.21. The provisions of one section of the statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them.Thus a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a useless lumber or dead letter is not a harmonised construction. To harmonise is not to destroy.31. It could thus be seen that it is more than well settled that it is the duty of the Court to construe the Statute as a whole and that one provision of the Act has to be construed with reference to other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole Statute. It is the duty of the Court to avoid a head-on clash between two sections and construe the provisions which appear to be in conflict with each other in such a manner so as to harmonise them. It is further equally settled that while interpreting a particular statutory provision, it should not result into making the other provision a useless lumber or a dead letter. While construing the provisions, the Court will have to ascertain the intention of the law-making authority in the backdrop of dominant purpose and the underlying intendment of the Statute.32. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to construe the provisions that fall for consideration. Undisputedly, the said Rules are mechanism for giving effect to the constitutional mandate under Article 243T of the Constitution of providing reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the enabling provision for providing reservation for Backward Class of Citizens in proportion to their population. As already discussed hereinabove, the said Rules have been prescribed so as to provide a procedure for the reservation of the office of Mayor in the Corporation by rotation for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes, Women and the Backward Class of Citizens as mandated under Section 19 (1A) of the said Act. It could thus be seen that the intent and the dominant purpose of Rule 3 of the said Rules is to provide reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Class of Citizens and Women and further to ensure that there is no repetition of reservation of a particular category in a particular Corporation. It could thus be seen that the dominant purpose and the legislative intent of the said Rules is to provide reservation in proportion of the population of such categories in the Municipal areas and also to ensure that while all the eligible Corporations get reservation at some point of time for the different categories, at the same time there would be no repetition of reservation until the rotation is complete. However, while doing so, the number of seats reserved for a particular category also cannot be ignored. As already pointed out hereinabove, the total number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class of citizens, they are 7. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules prescribes the manner in which the seats are to be allotted to be reserved for various categories including women. Clause (a) thereof provides that it shall be done by notification in the Official Gazette by allotment of draw of lots. Clause (d) thereof provides that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. Clause (e) thereof provides that the offices of Mayors to be reserved shall be rotated in the subsequent terms of office of Mayor to such Corporation, in which no reservation has been made in the previous terms until such reservations are given by rotation to each category.33. No doubt, that at the first blush, an isolated reading of reservation is provided for each category by rotation, the said office cannot be reserved for a category for which it was already reserved. However, if the Rules along with Article 243T of the Constitution and Section 19(1A) of the said Act are read as a whole, then the dominant purpose behind the said Rules appears to be that the reservation as mandated in the Constitution, should be provided for offices of Mayors in the Corporations. While doing so, the reservation has to be provided by a draw of lots. It has to be ensured that at any given point of time, the number of offices of Mayors reserved for such categories should not be less than the number determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of the said Rules. Clause (d) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the said Rules also provides that while drawing lots, the offices of Mayors reserved for such category in the earlier years, shall be excluded from the draw of lots for those categories. The purpose appears to ensure that the reservation is not thrust upon a particular Corporation again and again and all the Corporations, at some point of time, will have the office of Mayor reserved for particular category in accordance with the said Rules. The office of Mayor can be reserved for Scheduled Tribes in only 9 Corporations whereas all the Corporations are eligible for reservation for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens. However, taking into consideration the fact that the number of seats reserved for Scheduled Castes are 3 whereas for Backward Class of Citizens, they are 7 i.e. more than twice, it is quite probable that the post of Mayor could be reserved for two earlier terms for Backward Class of Citizens and whereas no reservation is provided for Scheduled Castes. We find that a harmonious construction of the said Rules would not lead to a conclusion that the procedure as followed by the State Government in allotting the reservation by draw of lots, would be said to be inconsistent with the scheme of the said Rules. As has been explained in the affidavit filed before the High Court by Smt. Alice Sufi Pore, after excluding 12 Corporations which are already reserved for Scheduled Castes in the earlier years and the one which was reserved for Scheduled Tribes in the first draw of lots, there were 14 Corporations available including the Dhule Municipal Corporation. The said Corporation was also included in the draw of lots for Scheduled Castes. However, in the draw of lots, it could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes. However, insofar as Backward Class is concerned, out of 27 Corporations, 26 Corporations excluding newly created Panvel Corporation were already reserved for Backward Class in the earlier years. As such, the State excluded the 7 Corporations which were immediately reserved for the Backward Class and also excluded the 4 Corporations which were reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the present draw of lots. Coincidentally, in the draw of lots, Dhule Municipal Corporation was one of the 7 Corporations which got to be reserved for the Backward Class.34. We find that such a situation is bound to occur in view of the difference in number of seats, reserved for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens. If the interpretation as placed is to be accepted then unless the post of Mayor is reserved for Scheduled Tribes in all the Corporations to complete the rotation, it will not be possible to provide reservation for the categories which were already reserved earlier. However, it could be seen that as per the Rules, only 9 Corporations could be reserved for Scheduled Tribes. We therefore find that the combined reading of the said Rules along with the constitutional mandate under Article 243T of the Constitution and Section 19(1A) of the said Act would not permit the interpretation as placed by the High Court.37. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India and Others (2003) 7 SCC 628,  this Court observed thus:-25. A statute must be construed as a workable instrument. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a well-known principle of law. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam [(1989) 3 SCC 709  : AIR 1990 SC 123 ] this Court stated the law thus: (SCC p. 754, paras 118-120)118. The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat. It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a court of construction, dealing with the language of a statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it. In Manchester Ship Canal Co. v. Manchester Racecourse Co. [(1900) 2 Ch 352 : 69 LJCh 850 : 83 LT 274 (CA)] Farwell, J. said: (pp. 360-61)Unless the words were so absolutely senseless that I could do nothing at all with them, I should be bound to find some meaning and not to declare them void for uncertainty.119. In Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council [(1960) 3 All ER 503 : (1960) 3 WLR 831 (HL)] Lord Denning approving the dictum of Farwell, J. said: (All ER p. 516)But when a statute has some meaning, even though it is obscure, or several meanings, even though there is little to choose between them, the courts have to say what meaning the statute is to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity.120. It is, therefore, the courts duty to make what it can of the statute, knowing that the statutes are meant to be operative and not inept and that nothing short of impossibility should allow a court to declare a statute unworkable. In Whitney v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 95 LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] Lord Dunedin said: (AC p. 52)A statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable.26. The courts will therefore reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. [See Salmon v. Duncombe [(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT 446 (PC)] (AC at p. 634).] Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts would accept the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result…….38. It could thus be seen that the Court will have to prefer an interpretation which makes the Statute workable. The interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature, will have to be preferred. The interpretation which brings about the effect of result, will have to be preferred than the one which defeats the purpose of the enactment. As already discussed hereinabove, the dominant intent of the said Rules is to give effect to the reservation policy while ensuring that reservations are not repeated in particular Corporations and at the same time in all the Corporations, there shall be reservation, at some point of time, for all the eligible categories by rotation. The legislative intent is to exclude the Corporations which were earlier reserved for a particular category until all the categories are provided reservation. However, while doing so, the Court will have to interpret Rule 3 of the said Rules in such a manner that this scheme is made workable and not frustrated. At the cost of repetition and particularly taking into consideration the difference in number of seats for Scheduled Castes and Backward Class of Citizens, we find that the interpretation as placed by the High Court, would not make the said Rules workable and give effect to the legislative intent. It would have been a different matter that even after completion of the cycle, requisite reservation as per the Rules is not provided to the Scheduled Castes and excessive reservation is provided for Backward Class of Citizens. Such is not the case. Unfortunately, for the writ petitioner, even for the present term, Dhule Municipal Corporation was also in the pool of eligible Corporations for draw of lots for Scheduled Castes category. However, in the draw, it could not be reserved for Scheduled Castes. Only thereafter, Dhule Municipal Corporation was considered in the pool of draw of lots for Backward Class of Citizens. This was so because in the immediate preceding elections, the office of Mayor was not reserved for Backward Class of Citizens.39. The High Court has strongly relied on the following observations of the Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in M. Abdul Azeez v. State of Karnataka and Others (supra):-27.1. An elementary test to find out as to whether the principle of rotation is violated or not, is to examine as to whether any allotment to a reserved category is repeated in any Municipality before commencement of a fresh cycle of rotation for that category. If there is any allotment to any reserved category for the second time in a Municipality before completion of a cycle of rotation or before commencement of a fresh cycle of rotation for that category, it would be a clear violation of the principle of rotation.40. However, it is to be noted that the Rules that fell for consideration before the Karnataka High Court, provided that the offices of the President and Vice-President shall be rotated for the different categories from term-to-term. The Rules provided that the cycle of the reservation will begin from the Municipal Council which had the highest population of a particular category. The rotation will go to the other Municipal Councils in the descending manner on the basis of the population of a particular category in the concerned Municipal Council area. The scheme is that the Municipal Council which has the highest number of population of a particular category, will be the first to be reserved for that category and the Council with the least population of that category, would be the last one to be reserved for that category. Only after completion of the said cycle, the reservation can come back for a particular category which was reserved for it at the first instance. It could thus be seen that the Rules that fell for consideration before the Karnataka High Court, were totally different than the ones which fell for consideration before the Bombay High Court.41. Though the Division Bench of the High Court was not bound by the judgment of the Single Judge and it had only a persuasive value, we may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in The Regional Manager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey (1976) 3 SCC 334 :-7. …..Even where there appears to be some conflict, it would, we think, vanish when the ratio decidendi of each case is correctly understood. It is the rule deducible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of a case which constitutes its ratio decidendi and not some conclusion based upon facts which may appear to be similar. One additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts…..