Case: Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd Vs. C. Chandrasekaran &amp; Ors

1. This appeal has been brought to this Court by special leave and it has been filed against the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court by which the order passed by a learned single Judge of the said High Court directing the issue of a writ of certiorari in favour of the appellant Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. has been reversed. It appears that the Regional Transport Authority, Thanjavur called for applications for the grant of one stage carriage permit between Nannargudi and Nagapattinam. The distance between these two places is 34 miles. Four applicants applied for a permit on this route. They were the appellant, Raman and Raman (P) Ltd., Balasubrahmanya Udayar, and respondent No. 1 C. Chandrasekaran. The Regional Transport Authority considered the merits of these four applicants and assigned them marks as a result of which a permit was granted to the appellant on the ground that it got the highest number of marks2. This order was challenged by the three applicants whose applications for permit had been rejected by the Regional Transport Authority. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras (hereinafter called the Appellate Tribunal) considered the merits of the four applicants for itself, assigned them marks and ultimately came to the conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to a permit, The judgment of the Appellate Tribunal shows that though as a result of the marks assigned by it to the respective applicants, the appellant and Raman and Raman (P) Ltd. secured 4 marks each and the two other competitors 3-1/2 and 3-1/4 respectively the Appellate Tribunal took the view that the appellant was a monopolist over a distance of 18 miles which was a part of the route in question, whereas Raman and Raman (P) Ltd. had a near monopoly or predominant influence over the remaining part of the distance which was 16 miles, and so, it rejected the application for a permit made by the appellant and Raman and Raman (P) Ltd. and granted the permit to respondent No. 1 over the route in question. It is against this order of the Appellate Tribunal that the appellant preferred a writ petition before the Madras High Court (No. 25 of 1959). Srinivasan, J. who heard the writ petition came to the conclusion that the Appellate Tribunal had signally failed to consider the relevant evidence, and so, this order needed to be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Accordingly, a writ of certiorari was ordered to be issued as prayed for by the appellant3. This order was challenged by respondent No. 1 by preferring an appeal under the Letters Patent before a Division Bench of the said High Court. The Division Bench has taken the view that having regard to the reasons given by the Appellate Tribunal in support of its conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to a permit, Srinivasan, J. was not justified in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the result the order passed by Srinivasan, J. was reversed and the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court in appeal. Respondents 2 and 3 are State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and the Regional Transport Authority respectively and they have been impleaded because the order passed by respondent No. 2 was questioned in the writ proceedings and is the subject-matter of the present appeal.

Reasoning:
Speaking generally and in a broad way, we do not think it could be seriously denied that encouraging bus operators who do not own a fleet of buses and discouraging monopoly on the route is consistent with the interests of the general public which is of paramount importance under S. 47(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Besides, the Division Bench has also referred to some other aspects of the matter which would indicate that the Appellate Tribunal was right in not granting a permit to the appellant. In cases of this kind, the High Court should naturally be slow in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226. If the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from infirmities which would justify the issue of a writ under the well recognised principles laid down by judicial decisions in that behalf, the High Court should and ought to interfere but the writs of certiorari should not be issued merely on the ground that all relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would have taken a different view on the evidence adduced in the proceedings11. In support of his case that the impugned order was properly set aside by Srinivasan, J., Mr. Pathak has relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in R. V. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the Eastern Province of England, Ex parte Grant, 1956-3 All ER 321. In that case the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether the discretion vested in the Tribunal under S. 25 (1)(a) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, had been validly exercised. The test prescribed by Section 25(1)(a) was that the landlord should show that the carrying out of the purpose for which he proposed to terminate the tenancy in question is desirable in the interests of efficient farming, whether as respects good estate management or good husbandry or otherwise. In coming to the conclusion that the said requirement. had not been satisfied, the Tribunal appears to have relied substantially on the fact that the tenants sought to be dispossessed had been in possession of the lands for many years. It appears that the Court of Appeal took the view that the real grounds for the Tribunals decision on the Section 25 point which appeared from paragraphs 5 and 6 of the statement were ambiguous and to some extent in conflict with each other. Besides, the effect which would result if the landlords request was granted on the tenants other land which had influenced the Tribunal was, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, irrelevant in considering the applicability of S. 25(1)(a). In other words, the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that it rested at least on some invalid and irrelevant grounds, and that is why a writ of certiorari was ordered to be issued. There can be little doubt that if a decision of a quasi-judicial Tribunal is challenged before the High Court under Art. 226 and it is shown that the said decision is based on irrelevant considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law, a writ will undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the present case does not suffer from any such infirmity. Therefore, we are satisfied that the decision in the case of Ex parte Grant on which Mr. Pathak relies, does not assist his case.