Case: Gulraj Singh Vs. Mota Singh

2. The appellants are the illegitimate son and daughter of one Sardarni Prem Prakash Kaur. By a registered deed of sale dated December 1, 1956 the said lady sold 18 bighas, 1 biswas and 5 1/2 biswansis of agricultural land for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- to the respondents. The appellants filed a suit to pre-empt this sale. There was some dispute about the consideration actually paid but we are not now concerned with it. Both the trial court as well as the District Court on appeal granted to the appellants a decree for pre-emption, though to a limited extent. The respondents filed a second appeal to the High Court and the learned Judges, by the judgment now under appeal, directed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the appellants were not comprehended within the class of persons who were entitled to pre-emption under S. 15 (2) (b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act as it now stands under the amendment effected by Act X of 1960. It is from this judgment that, by special leave, the present appeal has been brought.

Reasoning:
The submission of learned Counsel virtually amounts to this that in order to construe the words used in S. 15 one should travel beyond the enactment and ascertain the class of persons who are entitled under the Hindu succession Act to succeed as the heirs of the intestate vendor. Even a cursory examination would show that this construction is untenable and that the framers of the Act did not proceed on any such theory. Take, for instance, the case where a female succeeds to property through her father or brother dealt with in S. 15 (2) (a) of the Pre-emption Act. Her heir under the Hindu succession Act would be, if the property was inherited from her father, her son or daughter (including the children of any predeceased son or, daughter) and in their absence the heirs of the father. If, however, the property was inherited from her brother, the devolution is different (vide S. 15 (1) and (2)).The devolution provided by S. 15 (2) (a) (i) of the Pre-emption Act is different and confers the right to Pre-empt on her brother or her brothers son. The theory, therefore, that we should resort to the line of heirs as in an intestate succession under the Hindu succession Act or, for the matter of that, to any other system of common Law or statute applicable to the vendor is obviously untenable. Pursuing this line of reasoning a little, it was not disputed that if the female vendor were a Christian by religion, only her legitimate issue would be denoted by these words. As it is common ground that the statutory right of pre-emption conferred by S. 15 is as much applicable to a Christian owner of property as to a Hindu, it would be seen that the construction of the words of this statute of general application would be made to depend on the religion to which the vendor belonged, and in fact would vary with any change made by statute in the law of intestate succession as applicable to different communities. The position that would arise on a conversion of the vendor to a different faith, with a different personal law as to succession would bring out in bold relief the unsustainability of the submission has on the peculiarities of the personal law as to intestate succession applicable to thethe normal rule of construction of the words "child, "son" or "daughter" occurring in a statute would include only legitimate children i.e., born in wedlock, is too elementary, to require authority. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and S. 3 (j) of the Hindu Succession Act (Act XXX of 1956) furnishes a goods illustration of such a provision. It might even be that without an express provision in that regard the context might indicate that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 with which we are concerned contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words "son or daughter" occur more than once in that Section. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain that where the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred to as in S. 15 (1), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a female vendor herself, there is a reference in S. 15(2) (a) (i) to the brothers son of such vendor. It could hardly be open to argument that a brothers illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. The matter appears to us to be too clear for argument that when S. 15 (2) (b) (i) uses the words "son or daughter" it meant only a legitimate son and a legitimate daughter of the female vendor.