Case: State Of Rajasthan Vs. Raghuveer Singh &amp; Ors

The State of Rajasthan, defendant in Civil Suit No. 9 of 1963 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur, is the appellant in this appeal filed pursuant to a certificate granted under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India (as it stood prior to the 30th amendment). The plaintiff respondent took a building work on contract from the erstwhile Government of the State of Udaipur. He completed the work on 6th June, 1950. Despite demands and notices issued by the plaintiff a considerable amount due to him remained unpaid. He, therefore, filed the suit out of which the appeal arises to recover a sum of Rs. 5, 19, 458/11/- together with interest at the rate of 12%. The suit was contested by the State of Rajasthan. An interim decree for a sum of Rs. 66, 517 was passed on 7th November, 1955. After full trial a decree for Rs. 1, 67, 619 (including the sum of Rupees 66, 517 for which a preliminary decree had already been passed) was passed on 11-6-1958/30-6-1958. The decree also awarded interest at the rate of 41/2 % on the amount decreed from the date of suit till the date of realisation. The plaintiff and the defendant preferred appeals to the High Court to Rajasthan. The High Court reduced the decretal amount by a sum of Rs. 9, 991. The High Court, however, held that the plaintiff was entitled to interest from 1st January, 1951, and not merely from the date of suit. The High Court also enhanced the rate of interest pendente lite from 4 1/2% to 6 per cent. The High Court having varied the decree of the trial Court, the State of Rajasthan sought and obtained a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution and has filed this appeal.

Reasoning:
In regard to conveyance and lift charges the High Court pointed out that no. question was raised in the Memorandum of grounds of appeal and there was, therefore, no. justification for permitting the learned counsel for the State to assail the finding of the trial Court relating to those charges. We do not see any reason either why the learned counsel should be permitted to agitate this question in this appeal. Regarding double-charge for bond-stone, lintels and sills, the complaint of the appellant was that while separate payment was being made for them, they had also been included in the measurements of the walls in which they happened to be fixed. From the office circular issued by the Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department of the United State of Rajasthan on 12th July, 1948, it appears that it was the practice up till then to allow payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills separately without deducting their cubic contents from the general wall masonry. This had always been the practice and this was never objected to by the Accountant General. In view of the practice obtaining till then it could not be said that the contractor had wrongfully claimed double payment for bond-stones, lintels and sills. The use of Jodhpur slabs was not questioned in the written statement. All that was said was that the rate was high but at the trial there was no. evidence worth the name, as observed by the High Court to show that the charge was excessive. Again there was no. objection to the use of C. P. Teak Wood instead of Burma Teak Wood as the latter was not available. According to the letter of the Superintending Engineer dated 6th February, 1950, where Burma teak wood was not available and C. P. teak wood was used, the rate specified for Burma teak wood should be taken for C. P. teak wood. It could not, therefore, be said that the contractor had charged more than what he should have for C. P. teak wood.We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. Under the Interest Act, 1839, upon all debts or sums certain payable at a certain time or otherwise, the Court before which such debts or sums may be recovered may, if it shall think fit, allow interest to the creditor at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the time when such debts or sums certain were payable, if such debts or sums be payable by virtue of some written instrument at a certain time; or if payable otherwise, then from the time when demand of payment shall have been made in writing, so as such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest will be claimed from the date of such demand until the term of payments provided that interest shall be payable in all cases in which it is now payable by law. The claim of the present plaintiff was not for the payment of any unliquidated damages or for the payment of any amount arising out of an inchoate or contingent obligation. It was for the payment of a sum which was ascertainable on a calculation made in accordance with the terms of the agreement. It was clearly a sum certain within the meaning of the Interest Act. In any case it would be a debt, i.e. a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of a presentis true that the plaintiff mentioned loss by way of interest, suggesting that what he was claiming was compensation for the damage suffered by him. We are, however, not prepared to construe the notice so literally or technically. The mention of loss was only explanatory. The plaintiff was, without any manner of doubt claiming interest as such. Nor are we impressed with the argument that there was no. claim for future interest. In our opinion a claim for past interest would necessarily imply a claim for futureour view the condition prescribed by the Interest Act that such demand shall give notice to the debtor that interest shall be claimed is fulfilled if interest is claimed, notwithstanding the fact that the notice of demand explains that loss by way of interest has been suffered. To take any other view would be to over-technical in the construction of pleadings, including notices preceding thesentence far from supporting the case of the appellant appears to support the case of the plaintiff. The reference to "the withheld amounts" is to the amounts representing five per cent of the running bills which are required to be withheld at the time of payment of the running bills. The provision that the contractor is not entitled to interest on these withheld amounts appears to imply that interest is claimable on other amounts due to the contractor.7. While awarding interest pendente lite the trial Court adopted the rate of 41/2% but the trial Court gave no. reasons for so doing. The High Court considered the matter in some detail and having regard to the various continuous defaults committed by the defendant and its Officers, the High Court enhanced the rate of interest to 6%. The High Court was justified in doing so and we see no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court.