Case: STATE OF KERALA &amp; ANR Vs. M/S POPULAR ESTATES (NOW DISSOLVED) &amp; ANR

2. Popular Estates became owners of 1534.40 acres of land. Those lands were acquired by sale, by M/s Popular Automobiles, a registered firm, through four registered deeds executed in 1963. These lands fell to Popular Estates share upon partition of the firms assets. The Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (hereafter the Vesting Act) came into force with effect from 10.5.1971. Under Section 3 of the Vesting Act, all private forests vested in the State Government. The Act was challenged before the Kerala High Court, which struck it down, by a judgment, in 1972. That judgment was reversed by this Courts ruling in 1973 (State of Kerala v Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing and Weaving Co.1974 (1) SCR 671 ).3. The forest authorities attempted to take possession of large areas of land occupied by Popular Estates, arguing that they were private forests and had vested in the state, under the Act. Popular Estates moved two Original Applications (O.P Nos. Nos. 242 & 243/ 1974) before the Forest Tribunal (tribunal hereafter) under Section 8 of the Act claiming a declaration that no part of the estate consisting 1534.40 acres was liable to vest in the state. Since it was being cultivated and hence, it was exempt under the provisions of the Vesting Act. The state opposed those applications. The tribunal appointed a commissioner to inspect the entire area and report about its state to it. The commissioner after a preliminary inspection was of the view that a detailed survey of the land was necessary as most of the land was situated on hills, and therefore, inaccessible. Private surveyors, appointed to survey the land were unable to complete the work. The tribunal directed Forest Department Survey Officers to survey the lands. The tribunal, thereafter dismissed the Original Applications (By order dated 15.02.1978). It made critical comments about the manner in which the surveyors had made the report and recorded that:This exclusion by the forest officials, may be due to the fact that the magic money lulled them to sleep over the rights of the Government or may be due to the fact that the claim originally put forward by the forest officials was false. Neither way it is not very complimentary to the respondents here or to those officials concerned. It is for the Government to make necessary immediate enquiry in this matter through some official, other than Forest Department official, if the Government so think and ascertain whether any area which legitimately come under the classification of private forest and which had vested in the Government besides bits 1 to 7 have been excluded by the forest officials or by the forest survey officials. On the basis of the Commissioners report and the facts mentioned by him, I am inclined to think that prima facie it appears that areas which should really be vested forest have been excluded, when the claim was confined to 100 hectares.After orders of the tribunal, forest authorities attempted to take possession of the land. In the meanwhile, the state also issued notification no. 4713/1977 notifying 100 hectares of the respondent estate as private forest, based on survey undertaken by the forest department. Popular Estates filed two appeals (MFA 230 & 231/1978) impugning the tribunals orders, before the High Court. These were dismissed; the special leave petition against those orders too, were dismissed. Popular Estates then filed civil suits (Suit Nos. 69 & 71/ 1987 before the civil court Munsifs Court, Hosdurg) claiming that the state be permanently injuncted from taking possession. Initially, the civil court refused to register the plaint on grounds of maintainability, later, the suits were entertained on the intervention of the High Court in civil revision.4. On 22.7.1987, the Custodian and Conservator of Vested Forests issued a notification (Ex. A-27) under Section 6 of the Act demarcating 324 hectares of land belonging to Popular Plantation as vested forests under the Act. This notification was challenged in writ proceedings (Before the Kerala High Court in OP No. 7498/ 1987). Popular Plantation also withdrew the two suits. Their writ petitions were dismissed on the ground that the respondents had alternate remedy available before the tribunal. In these circumstances, Popular Estates filed applications (Original Applications Nos. 28 & 29/ 1988) before the tribunal under Section 8 of the Vesting Act challenging the notification dated 22.07.1987 and seeking a declaration that the property covered by the applications was not private forest and had not vested in the state government. Simultaneously, they also filed a writ appeal (Before the Kerala High court in WA No. 165/1989) against the order dismissing their writ petition. The writ appeal was admitted subject to the condition that Popular Plantation withdraw its original applications pending before the tribunal, and upon complying with the same, they approached the tribunal as directed, by filing original applications in 1990 (Original Applications Nos. 166 & 167/ 1990) challenging the states jurisdiction to issue the notification after a long lapse of time. Popular Plantation also filed an appeal before this court, which was disposed of Civil Appeal No. 200/ 1991 disposed by order dated 11.1.1991 [reported in Popular Plantation v. State of Kerala, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 720]. This court observed that Popular Plantation had the liberty of appearing and pursuing their application before the tribunal, confining the challenge to the validity of the notification on the grounds set out in the writ petition filed in the High Court. In the event the tribunal held it had no jurisdiction, liberty was given to file an appeal and/or a writ petition before the High Court to challenge the notification but only on the said grounds.5. Popular Estates amended its original applications pending before the tribunal (OA Nos. 166 & 167/1990) and also filed a writ petition before the High Court (OP No. 4751/ 1993) challenging the validity of the notification dated 22.7.1987. The tribunal dismissed (By order dated 30.10.1992) the two original applications holding that in its earlier order it had only dealt with the status of 100 hectares of the land and, therefore, with regard to rest of the land the State was empowered to issue a fresh notification. This order was challenged in an appeal before the High Court (MFA No. 72/ 1993). By a common judgment (Dated 07.04.1994 the High Court allowed MFA No. 72/1993 and writ petition OP No. 4751/1993) the High Court allowed the appeal and writ petition, holding the notification to be valid only in respect of the 100 hectares of vested forest. It was held that there was no vesting so far as the rest of the land was concerned. The High Court also directed the Custodian of Vested Forests to demarcate the boundaries of the certain extent under Section 6 of the Act and restore possession of the remaining extent of the properties to Popular Plantation.6. The state appealed to this court, by special leave. The appeal (C.A 7111/1999) was decided by a judgment [State of Kerala v. Popular Estates, (2004) 12 SCC 434 ] dated 04.11.2004 (hereafter referred to as Popular-II). This court, in Popular-II noticed that the High Court had proceeded on the basis that the order made by the Taluk Land Board in a land ceiling case pertaining to Popular Plantation would amount to res judicata. A draft statement under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (hereafter, KLR Act) was filed. Section 81 of the KLR Act exempted private forests and plantations. Rule 10 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Ceiling) Rules, 1970 prescribed that Taluk Land Boards were to prepare a draft statement of lands to be surrendered and serve copies of such drafts on persons interested in the lands. In the draft statement prepared by the Taluk Land Board (hereafter, the Board), Popular Estates was shown to hold an extent of 1576-73-257 acres of land, of which 1537-25-645 acres fell under the exempted category, and that Popular Estates was eligible to retain the balance extent within the ceiling area. The Board concluded (Order of Taluk Land Board dated 04.11.1980) that there was no surplus land to be surrendered to the state. The state government did not challenge the declaration made by the Board but sought to initiate proceedings under Section 85(9-A) of the KLR Act, by issuing notice dated 18.05.1992 for reopening the final order of the Taluk Land Board. That notice had been challenged by Popular Estates by their civil revision petition (CRP No. 1409/ 1992) before the Kerala High Court by which further proceedings were stayed. Based on a previous judgment rendered in Kunjanam Antony v. State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 221    this court held that the Boards determination could not operate as res judicata, but would be a piece of evidence. This court remanded the matter back to the tribunal.7. The tribunal re-appreciated the evidence on the record as required by this court and rejected Popular Estates appeal (By its order dated 25.05.2005). Noticing that the burden was upon Popular Estates to establish that the disputed properties were not private forests but were cultivated as plantations, the tribunal observed that in terms of the Vesting Act, especially Section 2(f) and its various components, the first requirement was to consider whether the lands or any part of the lands fell within the purview of the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (hereafter, the Madras Act) which was immediately in force before the Vesting Act was enacted. It was noticed that the Madras Act applied to all private forests in Malabar and south Kanara having a contiguous area of 100 acres. The disputed properties were situated at a place within erstwhile Malabar district and the tribunal took note of the Range Officers evidence (RW-1) which suggested that the Madras Act applied to the disputed property. The tribunals order also took into account Ex. A-37, one of the title deeds which referred to the permission granted by the District Collector to sell the property and held that such permission was necessary having regard to the provisions of the Madras Act. Relying on Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Vesting Act, the tribunal stated that this provision takes lands which were principally used for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation, out of its coverage. In this regard Popular Estates had examined PW- 5 and relied on a few documents to establish that the properties were cultivated with rubber, coffee and cardamom. PW-5 was the manager of the plantation: his services began in 1969 as Office Assistant. He stated, in his evidence that at that stage (in 1969), 1130 acres of the estate was plantation and that 160 acres were also planted before commencement of the Act. The tribunal brushed aside this evidence, concluding that nothing tangible emerged from it and that Popular Estates necessarily had to prove that the disputed properties were principally cultivated with rubber, coffee or cardamom. The tribunal faulted PW-5s evidence as not being precise with respect to the extent of properties which had been planted with the different crops. It also faulted his evidence on the ground that he had limited knowledge since he had to deal only with the estate when he became an Estate Supervisor in 1974-75; it was concluded that he did not have any direct knowledge with respect to the nature or extent of cultivation. The tribunal considered Ex. A37-A41 holding that they were title deeds. It was noted that Ex. A41 was executed in 1972, i.e. after the appointment date; and being a photocopy - was in any case inadmissible. The other documents had come into existence before the appointed day, however, their recitals did not disclose expressly that before the appointed date, the properties were cultivated with rubber, coffee and cardamon. The tribunal noted that the schedules in two of the documents - Ex. A-37 and 38 - showed that the properties were cultivated with cardamom. These were to the extent of 72.762 hectares and 89.92 acres, but were not proved to be land within the disputed properties.8. The tribunal noted that this courts holding was that the Boards orders were not binding on the authorities under the Vesting Act. It proceeded to analyse Ex. A-50 & 51 which was the draft statement of lands surrendered to the government under the KLR Act and the certified copy of the order of the Taluk Land Board, respectively. In this context, the tribunal considered Objection no.7, that Popular Automobiles owned 1530.4 acres in Maloth village and that out of this, the private forest coming within the purview of the Madras Act - an extent of 1127.50 acres - had been converted into plantation. The tribunal discarded the Boards findings as inconclusive.9. The tribunal further rejected the evidence of PW-1, the Range Forest Officer, who had deposed before the earlier tribunal proceedings in O.A. 242 & 243/1974 to say that the dispute was confined to 100 hectares. In this regard, the tribunal relied firstly, upon certain observations of this court in Popular-II and secondly, that PW-1 had no authority to admit any fact to the detriment of the state. Likewise, the tribunal rejected other documentary evidence in the form of Ex. A-11 and A-14 as well as Ex. A-6 and A-7 as insufficient to prove that the disputed properties were principally planted with rubber, coffee or cardamom. In the final analysis, the tribunal went by the fact that the disputed properties were covered by the Madras Act immediately before the appointed date. It consequently held that Popular Estates failed to bring their case under any of the clauses to Section 2(f)(1)(i) of the Vesting Act (i.e. the exclusionary part), and therefore, failed to prove that any part of such properties were Estates meant for the cultivation of coffee, rubber, cardamom etc.10. Aggrieved by the tribunals order, Popular Estates preferred an appeal. the High Court in the impugned judgment recounted the entire proceedings particularly the judgement of this court in Popular-II and the decision in Kunjanum Anthony (Supra). It gave certain weight and credence to the observations and findings of the Board and held that the land ceiling proceedings were not res judicata in the proceedings under the Vesting Act but constituted a valid piece of evidence. The impugned judgement relied upon the judgment in Kunjanum Antonys case (supra) that until a contrary state of affairs is shown to exist, the order of the Board would have to be given due weight. The High Court observed that the excess land automatically vests with the state like in the private forests vesting under Section 3 (1) of the Vesting Act. The purpose of or intent of both enactments is to distribute excess lands to landless agricultural labourers. The High Court was of the view that the state never alleged that the Boards order was obtained under fraud but rather that it was passed after considering all statutory formalities. The Board, noted the High Court, rendered findings with respect to the nature of the land as on the appointed date of the KLR Act, i.e., 01.01.1970. The appointed date for the Vesting Act was 10.05.1971. The High Court held that there is not much difference between the two dates in point of time and that there was nothing on record to suggest that the land usage had changed in between. Proceeding with its analysis on the evidence on record, the Court took note of the title deeds (Ex. A-37 to A-40) and the balance sheets and profit and loss account (Ex. A-59 to A-64) to show that Popular Estates was earning agricultural income from the land before the appointed date, and that it maintained regular balance sheet, and profit and loss account. The High Court was of the opinion that the notification issued on 08.07.1977 ultimately led to the state establishing that only 100 hectares were private forest. It was also stated that Ex. A-27, i.e., the notification dated 22.07.1987, was issued after demarcating the land under Section 6 and taking those 100 hectares as included in the 1534.40 acres purchased by the firm after nine years when legal proceedings were pending. Ex. A-65 is the accounts ledger for 1970-71 which showed that there was cultivation in the relevant accounting year. There were other letters in the form of exhibits, i.e., Ex. A-66, A-69 and A-70 which showed that Labour authorities such as the Labour Commissioner and Provident Fund authorities were involved with respect to labour unrest in the estate. Exhibit A-67 and A-68 were addressed to the Agricultural Income Tax Officer and Ex. A-71 and A-72 were letters addressed to the Sales Tax Officer. These also showed that some labour disputes in the estate starting from 1983 existed and that production had slowed down. It was only after these that Ex. A-27, notification dated 22.08.1987 was issued.11. The High Court was of the opinion that all these documents clearly showed that the entire area other than the 100 hectares of land earlier notified by notification dated 08.07.1977 were not private forests on the appointed date but exempted in view of the definition of private forest. The court also noted the location sketch given by PW-3 the Commissioner, a copy of the memorandum submitted before the Advocate Commissioner by forest officials (Ex. A-4), and the reports of the Commissioner (Ex. A-6 and A-7), all of which revealed that only 100 hectares in the entire lands were private forest on the appointed date. The final report Ex. A-7, Ex A-8 and A-9 (location sketches) also showed the details of the survey by the forest officials. All these were produced by the Commissioner. Also, the demarcated areas by the official survey ascertained the extent by actual theodolite survey. The High Court observed that all these showed only the disputed area marked as Bits 1-7; the plan was also exhibited as Ex. C- 3. The High Court took into account the evidence of the then Range Officer (PW- 1), the Commissioner (PW-3), PW-4 & PW-5 – all of which pointed that the disputed area covered by Ex. A-7 was plantation on the date when the act came into force.12. The High Court then relied on the full bench decision of the Kerala High Court in Parameswara Sastrigal K.S. v. State of Kerala & Ors. 2008 2 ILR 371. That judgment observed that if the land vested in the government as a private forest on the appointed date, the owner cannot thereafter alienate or transfer or assign the land for certain. However, if it is not a private forest vested in the government there is no impediment for the title holder to transfer the land. The Court also took note of the judgment of this court in Bhawani Tea & Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors. 1991 (2) SCC 463    where it was observed that:The reverse question is involved in this case, namely if the land was not private forest but plantation under the M.P.P.F. Act and was similarly not private forest but plantation on 10.5.1971, it could not, without anything more, become private forest thereafter even though it was not under the same efficient or successful plantation as it was earlier. Whether the plantation yielded any crop or not was for the owners to decide and not by the authorities under the Vesting Act, unless it did make specific provisions to cover such a situation.13. Taking note of these circumstances the court concluded that on the appointed date, except the area of 155.9 acres of land, the rest of the lands covered by Ex. A-27 were not private forest but plantations falling within the exclusions under Section 2(f)(1)(i)(A) to (D) of the Vesting Act. The High Court finally held that 1127.50 acres of land were plantation and 100 hectares, i.e. 247 acres were private forest. Since there was no claim with respect to 155.90 acres of land nor any proof that it was converted into plantation on the appointed date, that extent was also held to vest in the state. However with respect to the rest, i.e. 1127.50 acres minus 155.90 acres of land, the appeal was allowed and Ex.A-27 notification to that extent was set aside.

Reasoning:
31. The definition of private forest given in Section 2(f) of the Vesting Act and Section 2(47) of the KLR Act were considered by this court in Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Ltd v. The Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat & Anr 1990 (Supp) SCC 785. The lands involved in that case were forests as defined in the Madras Act and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971. It was observed that the definition of private forests applicable to the Malabar district was not general in terms but limited to the area and lands to which the Madras Act applied, and exempted therefrom land described under sub-clause (A) to (D). It was held that the previous decision of this court in Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [1973] 1 SCR 399    and the earlier decision in State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Ltd [1974] 1 SCR 67 1 (supra) was aa judicial recognition of the distinction between private forest in Travancore- Cochin area in Kerala State and the private forest in Malabar district. This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act. Garden means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same. Nilam means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit beating trees. It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term agricultural crop in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-beating or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-beating trees. It may be significant to note that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have associations, echoes and overtones.33. The correct manner of interpreting the interplay between the Madras Act and the Vesting Act, was explained lucidly in the judgment of this court in State of Kerala v. Pullangode Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd (1999) 6 SCC 92.  This court observed that:8. It is necessary first, we think, to construe the definition of private forest in the said Act. It means, as aforestated, in relation to the erstwhile Malabar District of the State of Madras, land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act applied immediately before 10-5-1971, being the appointed day under the said Act, but excluding, inter alia,lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market. Such lands so used are, therefore, not private forests within the meaning of the said Act. Now what this means is that the lands in Malabar District aforementioned which are used (a) principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon, (b) for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops, and (c) for the preparation of such crops for the market are not private forests under the said Act. The use of the words are used in this context necessarily refers to such use as on the appointed date under the said Act, namely, 10-5-1971. It is not possible to give any other meaning to the words are used. They must relate to use on that particular day for it is on that day that land is or is not a private forest within the meaning of the said Act.34. The states contention that as Popular Estates had mentioned in its petition that a certain area was forest (since it was so, by virtue of provisions of the Madras Act) therefore, does not preclude the latters contention that no vesting could take place; whether the lands were forest or cultivated plantations or estates, for the purposes of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Vesting Act, especially whether they stood excluded from operation of that Act, had to be considered independently.35. The judgment in Kunjanam Antony (supra) enunciated the rule that where the Land Board arrives at a determination about the character of lands, under the KLR Act, that becomes a piece of evidence for the purposes of the Vesting Act. It was observed that:There can be no doubt that the order of the Thaluka Land Board, a statutory authority, is binding on the authorities under the Land Reforms Act. So far as the proceedings under the Forest Act are concerned, the order of the Thaluka Land Board would be a piece of evidence but it cannot be treated as a binding on the authorities under the Forest Act. Unless a contrary state of affairs is shown to exist, the order of the Thaluka Land Board would have to be given due weight. From the material placed before the High Court and also before us, it appears that there is no evidence in regard to the destruction of the rubber plantation due to fire. There is, however, material to show that the appellant has been cultivating tapioca. Further, the High Court recorded a finding that there was no evidence indicating that the appellant had intention to cultivate the land which only meant cultivation of rubber plantation. There is also nothing on record to show that absence of rubber plantation was for short period and that the land was in the process of rubber plantation.36. Apart from this courts judgment in Popular II, another recent judgment, in State of Kerala v. Mohammed Basheer (2019) 2 SCC 260    has also followed the rule in Kunjanam Antony. Therefore, it is no longer open for the state to argue that the Boards determination or order, had little or no evidentiary value. In view of the judgments of this court, including Popular II, the enunciation of the principle that unless a contrary state of affairs were shown to exist, the Boards order would have to be given due weight had to apply, and was correctly invoked by the High Court.37. Coming to the facts of this case, what can be seen is that the two reports: preliminary and final, filed by the Commissioner, in the first proceeding (instituted by Popular Estates in 1974 by two applications) were the nearest in point of time, to the appointed date. The preliminary report, Ex. A-6 (filed on 15.01.1976) discloses widespread cultivation of coffee, cardamom, rubber, areca nut, etc. The two reports are part of the record. Ex. A-7 by the Commissioner, i.e. the final report dated 12.09.1977 recorded that the Forest Range Officer, after inspection stated that only disputed portions in Bit Nos. 1 to 7 had been demarcated and that the other areas were cultivated. The respondents contention was that this reflected the true factual position, coupled with the Range Officers memorandum (Ex. A-4) filed before the Commissioner on 01.09.1977.38. A combined reading of these materials, leads one to infer that a detailed inspection of the area took place. Only those areas that vested with the government were demarcated by the survey party, attached with the Superintendent, Land Records. It was in these circumstances that the respondent successfully urged before the High Court that what was demarcated was only 100 hectares and the others were not demarcated since they were cultivated. This was borne out by Ex. A-7, the final report. The possession with respect to 100 hectares of uncultivated forest lands was also covered by draft statement of land (Ex. A- 50, dated 24.01.1979) furnished to the Board in proceedings under the KLR Act. Ex. A-50 was the foundation for the Boards order dated 04.11.1980 (Ex. A-51). Both these documents confirmed that 100 hectares was vested forest. Popular Estates had submitted that 533 acres was under cardamom cultivation; 120 acres under rubber plantation; 257 acres under coffee plantation and that 155.9 acres was forest land; and 17.5 acres of were comprised of roads and buildings. These arguments found favour with the High Court. In our considered opinion, there is no glaring error in the impugned judgment, having regard to these circumstances.39. The tribunal entirely rejected the evidence of PW-1, the Forest Range Officer, who gave the memorandum to the Commissioner on 01.09.1977. The tribunal wholly discredited and brushed aside the evidence of this officer and viewed it with suspicion. This is clear from the repeated use of the phrase magic money suggesting that PW-1 was devious and had been bribed. A reading of his deposition shows no such suggestion to him; no material was placed on record that he was prosecuted for an offence, nor were departmental proceedings initiated, for misconduct.40. The other materials on record (the auditors balance sheets, Ex. A-57 to A- 64) the evidence of the auditor (PW-4), the deposition of the manager of the respondent/ Popular Estates, PW-5, who had worked since 1969 onwards reinforce the respondents contentions that the largest part of the area was cultivation for plantation crops. The tribunal, in this courts opinion unreasonably discarded these materials.41. The other documents, i.e. Ex. A-66, Settlement arrived at between Popular Estates and its workers after closure on 25.6.1982 reveal that it had 80 permanent workers and 29 temporary workers on its rolls. Likewise, copies of income tax returns for various dates showed that income from these estates was consistently reported, along with expenditure. For the year ending on 31.3.1968 income was reported as ? 81,319; for the year ending 31.3.1969 it was ?95,707/-; the year ending 31.3.1970 it was ? 1,12,524; and for the year ending 31.3.1971 it was ? 1,38,918. The respondent Popular Estates was apparently depositing agricultural income tax and employees provident fund (Ex. A-67, A-69 and A-70). It had produced correspondence with these statutory authorities, as well as sales tax returns (Ex. A-71).42. The title deeds of the predecessor-in-interest of the partners of the Popular Estates who had acquired the lands in 1963, show that large areas were shown as cardamon plantation. Popular Estates had filed agricultural income returns and even in 1970, it was producing coffee, rubber and cardamom. The fact that it had some labour trouble also supported its contention that Popular Estates plantation activities were on in full scale. All these materials, in the opinion of the court, support the conclusions of the High Court, which are based on plausible (and not an unreasonable) inference of the overall analysis of the evidence on the record.43. There is some authority for the proposition that where two plausible views on the conclusions that can be drawn from facts on the record exist, this court, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of the High Court. It has been observed in Pritam Singh v. The State 1950 SCR 453, this Court observed that:On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article.44. Likewise, in Union of India v. Gangadhar Narsingdas Agarwal & Anr (1997) 10 SCC 305    this court, declining to interfere with the order of the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution, said that even if two views are possible, the view taken by the High Court being a plausible one, it would not call for intervention by this court. A similar view was expressed in Jai Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak (Smt) & Ors (2000) 5 SCC 141 , wherein this court held that when there was nothing illegal and wrong in the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the High Court and it appeared to be merited and in accordance with the interpretation of statutory provisions, this court would not interfere with the order of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In Taherakhatoon (D) By Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1992) 2 SCC 635 , this Court at observed as follows:In view of the above decisions, even though we are now dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, we are not bound to go into merits and even if we do so and declare the law or point out the error- still we may not interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not require interference or if we feel that the relief could be moulded in a different fashion.45. This court has carefully considered the findings of the High Court while setting aside the order of the tribunal. The reasons which led the High Court to conclude that the tribunals findings called for interference are merited and in accord with the material evidence on record.