Case: Bhagwan Das Vs. Paras Nath

2. The appellant was a tenant of the respondent in respect of a shop in Baluganj in Agra. On January 2, 1959, the respondent applied to the District Magistrate under Section 3 (1) of the Act for permission to institute a suit against the appellant for evicting him from the shop in question. That application was rejected by the District Magistrate as per his order of July 9, 1959. The respondent took up the matter in revision to the Commissioner under sub-section (2) of Section 3. The Commissioner reversed the order of the District Magistrate and granted the permission asked for on October 16, 1959. As against that order the appellant moved the State Government under Section 7-F on November 17, 1959. On January 1, 1960, the respondent served on the appellant a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The appellant replied to that notice on January 6, 1960. In that reply he informed the respondent that he had already moved the State Government to revoke the permission granted by the Commissioner. On February 13, 1960 the respondent instituted suit No. 115 of 1960 in the Court of Munsiff, Agra seeking for the eviction of the appellant from the suit premises. The appellant filed his written statement in that case on May 7, 1960. Therein again he took the plea that the permission granted by the Commissioner is not final as he had moved the Government to revoke the same. The suit was decreed by the learned Munsif on November 2, 1960. The appellants went up in appeal as against that order to the Civil Judge, Agra. On January 27, 1961, the State Government revoked the permission granted by the Commissioner during the pendency of the appeal. Relying on this order the Civil Judge of Agra allowed the appeal of the appellant on February 9, 1961. As against that decision the respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court. The High Court allowed the second appeal on 19th March, 1968 following the Full Bench decision of that Court in Bashi Ram v. Mantri Lal, ILR (1965) 1 All 545 = (AIR 1965 All 498  ) (FB). This appeal is directed against that decision.

Reasoning:
7. After examining the provisions of this Act, we are constrained to observe that the drafting of this Act leaves considerable room for improvement despite the fact that it was amended twice over. Though it was intended to be a temporary measure when it was originally enacted, it has now remained in the statute book for over 20 years and there is no knowing how long the same will continue to be in force. Therefore it is but appropriate that the provisions of this Act should be clear and unambiguous. From sub-section (1) of Section 3 it is not possible of the District Magistrate. No guidelines are laid down therein to regulate the exercise of the powers of the District Magistrate. It is not possible to find out from that provision under what circumstances the District Magistrate can grant the permission asked for and under what circumstances he can refuse the same. It is likely that different District Magistrates are exercising that power in different ways. One consideration may appeal to one District Magistrate and a totally different consideration may influence another District Magistrate. It would have been appropriate if the legislature had defined the scope of the powers of the District Magistrate or at least laid down certain guidelines for regulating his discretion. Sub-s. (3) of S. 3 says that if the Commissioner is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed by the District Magistrate, he may alter or reverse the order of the District Magistrate or make such other order as may be just and proper. It is not possible to find out on what basis the Commissioner can determine the correctness, legality or propriety of the order made by the District Magistrate. As seen earlier no restrictions are placed on the powers of the District Magistrate in granting or refusing to grant the permission asked for under Section 3 (1). Therefore the only thing the Commissioner can do is to exercise his discretion in preference to the discretion exercised by the District Magistrate. Now coming to the power conferred on the State Government under Section 7-F, it would be seen that it is a power of wide amplitude. It can be exercised by it in any way it pleases. No restriction either as to the time within which it can be exercised or as to the circumstances under which it can be exercised is placed on the State Government. Under these circumstances the anomalies pointed out by Mr. Goyal as well as by Mr. Aggarwal are inevitable. Therefore in construing this Act, no useful purpose will be served by taking into consideration the hardship to one party or the other is inevitable. Neither Counsel suggested to us any interpretation which could steer clear of the anomalies pointed out at the bar.Therefore we have to fall back on the grammatical construction of sub-section (1) of Section 3 and leave out of consideration all other rules of construction for finding out the intention of the legislature.Section 3 (1) does not restrict the landlords right to evict his tenant on any of the grounds mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) of that sub-section. But if he wants to sue his tenant for eviction on any ground other than those mentioned in those clauses the he has to obtain the permission of the District Magistrate whose discretion is subject to any order passed under sub-section (3) of Section 3 by the Commissioner. These are the only restrictions placed on the power of a landlord to institute a suit for eviction of his tenant. If a landlord files a suit for the eviction of his tenant without obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate and if the Commissioner revokes the permission granted by the District Magistrate in a properly instituted application under Section 3 (2) then the suit instituted by him will be considered as having been filed without the permission of the District Magistrate because Section 3 (1) in specific terms says that the permission given by the District Magistrate is subject to any order passed under sub-section (3). In other words the permission given by the District Magistrate does not acquire any finality until either the period fixed for filing an application under sub-section (2) of Section 3 expires and no application under that section was filed within that time or if an application had been filed within that time, the same had been disposed of by the Commissioner. The permission to file a suit for eviction assumes finally under Section 3 (1) once the Commissioner decides the revision petition pending before him. In fact sub-section (4) of Section 3 says that the order of the Commissioner is final. It is true that that order despite the fact that it is final is subject to any order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F. There is no provision in the Act providing that a suit validly instituted after getting the required permission under Section 3 (1) ceases to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under S. 7-F. Similarly there is no provision in the Act invalidating a decree passed after the Act came into force in a validly institutedprovision applies only to decree passed before the date of the commencement of the Act. A decree of a Court in a suit validly instituted is binding on the parties to the same. It is true that the finality or the force of a decree can be taken away by a statute, but the Court will not readily infer that a decree passed by a competent Court has become unenforceable unless it is shown that a provision of law has specifically or by necessary implication made that decree unenforceable. No such provision was brought to our notice. On an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act our conclusion is that when the Commissioner set aside the order passed by the District Magistrate granting permission to file a suit for ejecting a tenant, the order of the Commissioner prevails. If he cancels the permission granted by the District Magistrate there is no effective permission left and the suit instituted by the plaintiff without awaiting his decision must be treated as one filed without any valid permission by the Districtthis it follows that the Full Bench decision in Bashi Rams case, ILR (1965) 1 All 545 = (AIR 1965 All 498  ) (FB) to the extent it held that a suit filed by the landlord after obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate cannot become infructuous even if the Commissioner revokes the permission, is incorrect. But we agree with the Full Bench that a suit validly instituted after obtaining a permission as required by Section 3 (1) does not cease to be maintainable even if the State Government revokes after the institution of the suit, the permission granted. If the State Government revokes the permission granted before the institution of the suit then there would be no valid permission to sue. In other words the State Governments power to revoke the permission granted under Section 3 (1) gets exhausted once the suit is validly instituted.