Case: New Prakash Transport Company Limited Vs. New Suwarna Transport Company Limited

2. The facts of this case lie in a short compass and may be stated as follows:-The Suwarna Transport Company Limited, which will be referred to as the first respondent in the course of this judgement, held seven permits for running buses on the Buldhana-Malkapur route as the sole operator on that route. It applied for another permit for the same route. The appellant, The New Prakash Transport Co. Ltd., as also another party called the Navjivan Transport Service (not cited in this Court) applied for a similar permit on that route. On May 26,1953 all the three applicants aforesaid were beard by the Regional Transport Authority of Amraoti, which is the third respondent in the Court, in connection with the permit applied for Consideration of the several applications was postponed, but a resolution was passed to the effect that "No one service should have monopoly on Buldhana-Malkapur route". On March 30, 1954 another meeting of the Regional Transport Authority took place and the first respondent was granted the permit. The appellants application was rejected on the ground that the police report was against it. The appellant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority (constituted under R.73 of the Motor Vehicles Act), Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, which is the second respondent to this appeal. The appellant challenged the correctness of the police report against it and applied to the District Superintendent of Police personally to verify the facts stated in the first report on the basis of which the appellants application for permit had been rejected, as aforesaid. The police made a further report, which was placed before the second respondent. That further report by the police was read out to the parties by the Chairman of the Appellate Authority at the time of the hearing of the appeal. At the hearing no objection appears to have been raised by any of the parties to the course adopted by the second respondent. By its order dated July 29, 1954, the second respondent set aside the order of the third respondent, allowed the appeal and ordered the permit to be issued to the appellant. The first respondent moved the High Court at Nagpur for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of the Constitution, substantially on two grounds, namely, (1) that the order passed by the second respondent was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, and (2) that it contravened the principles of natural justice. The first ground was founded on the allegation that the second respondent had misread the police report, and the second on the allegation that the revised report by the police had not been shown to the petitioner who had been afforded no "real and effective opportunity to deal with the report or to meet any relevant allegation made therein, and to study that report and make his submissions in regard thereto before the appeal was decided". The appellant and the second respondent showed cause against the rule issued by the Court. The appellant while showing cause, admitted that the third respondent had rejected its application on the basis of the police report dated March 27, 1954, which "was full of mistakes and falsehoods", that it moved the District Superintendent of Police personally to verify the contents of the said report and that the fresh report submitted by the police after due verification had absolved the appellant from the allegations of misconduct contained in the first report. It also controverted the ground that there was any mistake apparent on the face of the record. The fresh report submitted by the police after verification at the appellants request was received by the second respondent and the Chairman read the same during the hearing of the appeal and that therefore it was wrong to suggest that there had been a failure of justice. The second respondent also showed cause and corroborated the appellants statement that the first police report had been subsequently modified by the District Superintendent of Police by the report dated May 13, 1954, which showed that the previous report was "based on some misunderstanding". It was also stated that the report was actually read out to the parties by the Chairman while the appeal was being heard.The petition under Arts, 226 and 227 made, as aforesaid, by the first respondent was heard by a single Judge (Mr. Justice V. R. Sen) who by his orders dated December 13, 1954, discharged the rule with costs. In the course of his judgement the learned Judge after referring in detail to the orders of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, that is to say, the second and third respondents, observed that there was no substance in the contention that the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority was opposed to the principles of natural justice and had operated to the prejudice of the first respondent; and that there was no error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Judge also pointed out that when the report was brought to the notice of the first respondent, it did not indicate that it wished to controvert the report.4. The first respondent preferred an appeal under the Letters Patent and repeated its grounds of attack against the orders of the Appellate Authority. The appeal was heard by a Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice Hidayatulla and Justice S. P. Kotwal. The Letters Patent Bench seemed to be inclined to negative the plea that there was a mistake apparent on the face of the record and pointed out that though the language used by the second respondent was ambiguous and not quite accurate, it was possible to take the view that it had in fact considered the subsequent police report when it observed that the police had practically absolved the appellant from all blame except on a minor question, not necessary to be referred to in detail here. On the second ground it differed from the learned single Judge and came to the conclusion "that the Appellate Authority erred in rushing through without giving a proper and effective chance to the appellant to state its case". In the result it granted a writ quashing the order of the Appellate Authority and directing it to rehear the appeal in the light of the observations made in the course of the judgement.5. The appellant made an application to the High Court for a certificate of fitness for appeal to this Court. Having been unsuccessful there, the appellant came up to this Court and obtained special leave to appeal.

Reasoning:
At the outset we may observe that, in our opinion, there is no substance in the second ground sought to be resuscitated in this Court by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent. Error apparent on the face of the record in the context of this case must mean an assumption of facts which are not borne out by the record. We are not concerned with other grounds which may in the context of each particular case support a contention of error apparent on the face of the record. In this case if there was any such error, it was with reference to the two police reports. As observed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court, though the language used by the Appellate Authority with regard to strict grammatical construction may refer to the first police report, it was difficult to hold that the matters referred to in the order challenged before the High Court were not contained in the subsequent report submitted by the police at the instance of the appellant. The judgement under appeal did not take the view that there was any such mistake apparent on the face of the record as was contended for on behalf of the first respondent. We have been referred to the orders of the Appellate Authority as read by the Appellate Bench of the High Court and, in our opinion, no such mistake has been shown to have vitiated the orders impugned before the Highwill thus be seen that though the substantive section creating the right of appeal does not in terms create any right in a respondent to be heard, the rules framed providing for the procedure before the Appellate Authority contemplate that sufficient notice shall be given to "any other person interested in the appeal" which expression must include persons other than the appellant who may be interested in being heard against the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither the sections nor the rules framed under the Act contemplate anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in the usual way as in courts of law. Besides the parties interested in the grant of stage carriage permits or those interested against it, the police authority of the locality, is also entitled to be heard both at the original stage and at the appellate stage.8. Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder with particular reference to the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority, do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a court of justice. No elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties interested have to be heard in connection with the question, who is to be granted a stage carriageRegional Transport Authority is charged with the duty of granting or refusing a stage carriage permit, only to mention the matter with which we are immediately concerned. In that connection the statute requires that authority to have regard to the matters set forth in S. 47 of the Act, as already indicated. The police authority within whose local jurisdiction any part of the proposed route lies, has also been given the right to make representations. But the police report submitted to the Regional Transport Authority or to the Appellate Authority, if it requires the police authority to do so, is not intended to be anything more than an expression of opinion by an authority interested in the maintenance of law and order, with particular reference to the question as to whether any of the applicants for a permit had anything to its credit or discredit as supplier of transport facilities. Such a report is meant more for the use of the authority in making or refusing a grant than for the use of the several applicants or any one of them. In other words, it is in the nature of information supplied by the police in order to assist the authority in making up itsour opinion, the High Court has made a number of assumptions in making those observations which do not appear to be justified by the scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or by any a priori considerations of what has been characterised as "natural justice". The Tribunal in question was not administering justice as a court of law, though while deciding as between that rival claims of the applicants for a permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner.But a tribunal even acting "judicially" is not obliged to grant an adjournment suo motu without any application on behalf of any of the parties interested. We do not find that any of the parties made at that time any grievance about the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority. But the question appears to have been raised for the first time before the High Court after the Appellate Tribunal had decided to grant the permit to thein our opinion, there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of the police report to be furnished to any of the parties, nor was there any circumstance necessitating the adjournment of the hearing of the appeal, particularly when no request for such an adjournment had been made either by the first respondent or by any other party. At that time none of the parties appears to have made any grievance about the police report only being read out by the Chairman, or any request being made for an adjournment in order to adduce evidence pro and con. The rules framed under Chapter IV for "the conduct and hearing of the appeals that may be preferred under this chapter" (S. 68(2)(b)) do not contemplate any such facilities being granted to the parties, though it is open to the Appellate Authority to make any such "further enquiry, if any, as it may deemreport did not directly contain any allegations against the first respondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it, could be called upon to meet. The only effect of that report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that the Appellate Authority had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out that no grievance was made at the time the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal by any of the parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to have a further opportunity of looking into that report and to controvert any matter contain therein.For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view of the legal position.