Case: State Of M.P.  Vs. Anshuman Shukla

Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008 arises out of order dated 30.6.2005 in C.R.No.1330 of 2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur relying on the judgment and order dated 13.4.2005 passed by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in C.R.No.633 of 2003 etc. The connected Civil Appeal No.1145 of 2009 arises out of judgment and order dated 4.7.2006 passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in C.R.No.1 of 20062. Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008 was heard by a Division Bench of this Court, wherein by way of judgment dated 12.05.2008, it was opined that the case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena v. AgrawalConstruction Company (2004 (II) MPJR SN 55)was not correctly decided and, thus, the matter required consideration by a larger bench. It was further opined that the record of the case be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench. That is how this matter has come up for consideration before us3. As both the appeals are identical, for the sake of convenience, we would refer to the necessary facts of C.A.No.3498 of 2008 which are stated hereunder:The respondent filed a petition under Section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1983) raising certain claims about the works contract executed between the parties. The petition was partly allowed by the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal vide its award dated 18.6.2003. An amount of Rs.6,05,624/- with interest @12% per annum was awarded from 24.04.1998 till the date of realisation4. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed a Civil Revision No.1330 of 2003 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Section 19 of the Act of 1983, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Limitation Act) to condone the delay in filing the revision5. The High Court observed in its order dated 07.05.2004 in the Revision that the view expressed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena v. AgrawalConstruction Company(2004 MLJ 374)required consideration by a larger Bench on the question of:Whether Provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to revision filed under Section 19 in the High Court?6. After the reference was made, the matter in NagarpalikaParishad, Morena (supra) came up for consideration before a division bench of this CourtWhile dismissing the petition at the threshold, it was observed in an order dated 27.08.2004 (2004(II) MPJR SN 374):……In our view there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The authority in the case of Nasiruddinand Ors. v. SitaRam Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 has been correctly followed. Same view has also been taken by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs7. The full bench of the High Court in the order dated 13.04.2005, held that the dismissal of a special leave petition at the threshold stage by the Supreme Court is a binding precedent, and must be followed by the courts below. It was however also observed that no specific time limit can be fixed for exercising the suomotu revisionalpower under Section 19 of the Act of 1983. It was further held that the power has to be exercised within reasonable time which depends upon the nature of the order to be revised and other facts and circumstances of the case. The full bench of the High Court directed to place the revision petition before the appropriate bench for consideration in accordance with law8. The Civil Revision No. 1330 of 2003 which was barred by time of 80 days was dismissed by the High Court for the reasons given by the Full Bench in its order dated 13.04.20059. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellants filed a special leave petition before this Court against the dismissal of revision. The Division Bench of this court vide order dated 12.05.2008 was of the opinion that the case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (supra) had been incorrectly dismissed at the threshold and that the same requires consideration by a larger Bench and further directed that the records of the case be placed before the Honble the Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate Bench. Thus, the matter came before us for consideration

Reasoning:
20. The Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 came into force with effect from 01.03.1985. It was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Tribunal to arbitrate on disputes to which the State Government or a Public Undertaking (wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the State Government), is a party and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith21. The Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section 3 of the Act of 1983, for resolving all disputes and differences pertaining to works contract or arising out of or connected with execution, discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract22. Section 7 of the Act provides for reference to Tribunal. Such reference may be made irrespective of whether the agreement contains an arbitration clause or not. Section 7-A of the Act provides for the particulars on the basis whereof the reference petition is to be filed23. Section 19 of the Act confers the power of revision on the High Court. It provides that the aggrieved party may make an application for revision before the High Court within three months of the date of the award. This Section was amended in 2005, to confer the power on the High Court to condone the delay. Since this dispute pertains prior to 2005, thus, the provision of the unamended Act shall apply in the present case24. The Limitation Act, 1963 is the general legislation on the law of limitation25. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that an appeal may be admitted after the limitation period has expired, if the appellant satisfies the court that there was sufficient cause for delay26. Section 29 of the Limitation Act is the saving section. Sub-section (2) reads as follows:(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local lawSub section (2) thus, provides that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to any Act which prescribes a special period of limitation, unless they are expressly excluded by that special law27. This Court in the case of MukriGopalan v. CheppilatPuthanpuravil Aboobacker ((1995) 5 SCC 5 ) examined the question of whether the Limitation Act will apply to the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965. While holding that the appellate authority under the Kerala Act acts as a Court, it was held that since the Act prescribes a period of limitation, which is different from the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, and there is no express exclusion of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, in the above (Lease & Rent) Control Act, thus, those Sections shall be applicable to the Kerala ActWhile examining the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, it was observed:8. A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision:(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal or application(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act28. It was further held that if the two above conditions are satisfied, then the following implications would follow:9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically followThese consequences are as under:(i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule(ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24(inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded b y such special or local la w[emphasis laid by this Court]29. Further, in the case of HukumdevNarain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra ((1974)2 SCC 133) , a three judge Bench of this court, while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the provisions of Representation of People Act, observed as under:17. ....but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is in this case the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the Legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation30. According to HukumdevNarain Yadav (supra), even if there exists no express exclusion in the special law, the court reserves the right to examine the provisions of the special law, and arrived at a conclusion as to whether the legislative intent was to exclude the operation of the Limitation Act31. Section 19 of the Act of 1983 prescribes a period of limitation of three months. This limitation period finds no mention in the schedule to the Limitation Act. Further, Section 19 does not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963It is evident on a plain reading of the judgment in that case, that the reason why Section 5 of the Limitation Act was said to be inapplicable to the Rajasthan Act, Section 13(4), was because of the nature of the specific provision in question. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 13(4), as the deposit of rent by the tenant cannot be said to be an application for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This case cannot be said to be relevant to the facts of the present case, as Section 5 of the Limitation Act has got application for the purpose of Section 19 of the Act of 1983, and the cause of action accrued to the appellant when the Tribunal passed the award37. Section 19 of the Act of 1983, does not contain any express rider on the power of the High Court to entertain an application for revision after the expiry of the prescribed period of three months. On the contrary, the High Court is conferred with suomoto power, to call for the record of an award at any time. It cannot, therefore, be said that the legislative intent was to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 19 of the Act of 198338. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to delve into the question of whether the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Act is a Court or not for answering the issue in the present case, as the delay in filing the revision has occurred before the High Court, and not the Arbitral Tribunal