Case: Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co.Ltd.  Vs. Union Of India

11. Prior to 1.10.1974, the Central Government, for arriving at the price of levy sugar, used to mop up the entire excess realization of amount received by the owners of the sugar mills out of sale of free sugar as no restriction thereupon was imposed.12. Levy sugar price also used to be premised on Statutory Minimum Price (SMP), a factor specified in clause (a) of Section 3(3C) of the Act which is to be determined in terms of clause (3) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 and not on the actual cane prices paid by the sugar factories to the cane growers.13. The Central Government, however, appointed a Committee commonly known as Bhargava Commission. It gave its recommendations, inter alia, opining that mopping up of the extra sale realization should be confined to 50%.14. The Central Government, relying on or on the basis of the recommendations of the said Commission, introduced clause 5A in the said Order as a result whereof additional price came to be paid to the growers of sugarcane (1) over and above the SMP by the sugar producers; (2) equivalent amount from free market sales realization came to be retained by the sugar producer.15. In terms of the said amendment carried out in Sugarcane Control Order in the year 1974, while determining the levy sugar price, 50% of the mopping up was permitted provided the liability of sugar producers towards cane growers to the extent of 50% of excess realization was also taken to be a factor as a part of cost of production. To put it differently, in the earlier scenario whereas entire extra sales realization was applied to reduce the price of levy sugar, upon amendment of the said Order, only 50% of the entire sales realization was considered to be permissible to reduce the price of levy sugar provided the liability of excess realization was also considered as a part of cost of production.16. Post October 1974, therefore, apart from the levy sugar being based on the SMP only, the same was based on the actual cane price payable by the sugar producer. However, according to the sugar mill owners, the Central Government continued with the exercise of determination of the price of levy sugar on the basis of 100% mopping up and had not been considering the said changed scenario.17. We may also notice that the State of Uttar Pradesh in purported of its power conferred upon it under Section 16 of the 1953 Act enforced a price to be paid by the owners of the sugar mill to the producers known as State Advisory Price (ASP). Indisputably, the SMP as also the ASP for sugarcane varied from year to year.18. Questioning the mode of calculation resorted to by the Central Government in determining the price of levy sugar, particularly, the effect of clause 5A of the Sugarcane Control Order, as also the price levied by the State known as ASP, Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills and Hari Nagar Sugar Mills filed writ applications before the Delhi High Court in the year 1985.19. Indisputably, similar writ applications for different sugar mills were filed by different owners of the sugar mills.20. One of the contentions raised in the said writ applications was that 100% mopping up was illegal and the liability of the sugar producers towards the cane growers was to be considered before arriving at the price of levy sugar.21. One of the matters which came up before this Court is Shri Malaprabha Cooperative Sugar Factor v. Union of India (Malaprabha-I) since reported in [(1994) 1 SCC 648] wherein this Court, inter alia,In paragraph 2.15 the details of the scheme were given as follows:"SUGARCANE SUPPLIES STABILISATION SCHEME2.15 The details of the scheme are as follows:(1) A statutory minimum price for sugar-cane related to a basic recovery of 8.6 per cent with a premium for every 0.1 per cent increase in recovery on proportionality basis will be fixed by the Government of India.(2) The minimum price payable by individual factories will be fixed on the basis of the recovery of the factory for the normal crushing period of the previous season.(3) The statutory minimum price as fixed above shall be paid to all the cane growers subject to clauses (18) and (19) of this scheme.(4) The factories shall share their extra sales realisation from sugar with the cane growers who execute agreements for supply of cane and fulfil contracts.(5) The extra sales realisations shall be calculated according to the following formula:S=R-LWhere S stands for the amount shareable; R stands for the sales realisations ex-factory excluding excise duty paid or payable to the factory by the purpose; and L stands for sugar price as calculated on the basis of the statutory minimum cane price and according to the Tariff Commission schedules in force at the time. (In periods of control and partial control, L stands for the final levy price of sugar fixed by Government.)(6) The sales realisations will be in respect of the sugar produced during the season.(7) The sales realisations will comprise-(i) the actual amount realised up to and inclusive of September 30; and(ii) the estimated value of the unsold stocks held at the end of September 30.In case (ii) the value of the stocks will be calculated at the average rate of the sales made during the last fortnight of September.(8) The excess or shortfall in realisation from the actual sale of the unsold stock of the season after September 30 shall be carried forward to and adjusted in the extra sales realisations of the following season.(9) The extra realisation shall be divided equally between the factory and the cane growers. ..."104. It is true that Clause 5-A deals with additional price payable to the sugar-cane grower. However, if the recommendations made by the Bhargava Commission and the method of computation are taken into consideration, it will be clear that the producer of sugar will be entitled to retain an amount equivalent to the amount paid to the cane grower under Clause 5-A. That amount cannot be taken into consideration for determination of the price of levy sugar. This will be evident from paragraphs 2.17, 2.20, 2.21 and 2.39 of Chapter II of Bhargava Commission08. We are unable to agree with the submissions advanced on behalf of the Government that Clause 5-A deals only with the amount payable to the cane grower and that it cannot have any relevance for determination of levy sugar. If the determination of minimum price of sugar and fixation of the price of levy sugar under quantity of sugar to be supplied by the producer are inter connected, then they must be read as a whole and not separately as though each is distinct. While fixing the price of levy sugar regard is had only to the minimum cane price as spoken to under Section 3(3-C)( a ). This minimum cane price is referable to clause (3) of Sugar-cane (Control) Order. The additional price payable to the cane grower under Clause 5-A will arise after the expiry of the sugar year. Sugar price will have to be met only from the extra realisation made by the producer by the sale of sugar in free market which will naturally be more than the levy price.109. In view of the above discussion, the impugned notifications except the one dated November 28, 1974 cannot be upheld. The reason why we leave out the notification dated November 28, 1974 is that the same came to be issued before the new pricing policy was introduced. We hereby direct the Union of India to amend the notifications taking into account the liability of the manufacturers under Clause 5-A of the Sugar-cane (Control) Order as regards cane price and refix the price of levy sugar having regard to the factors mentioned in Section 3(3-C) of the Act. The Government will have time to issue the amended notifications as directed above till December 31, 1993.Indisputably, a review application filed there against was dismissed by this Court by an order dated 23.2.1994. The Central Government filed an application praying for clarification as also for extension of time so as to enable it to re-determine the price of levy sugar which by an order dated 22.2.1995 was dismissed but the time for re-fixation of the price was extended as prayed for. It appears that during the pendency of the said writ petitions, in the said appeals before this Court in Malaprabha-I, a transfer application came to be filed by Modi Industries Ltd. The sugar year involved therein was 1982-83. In that case, the Central Government stated that additional cane price payable under clause 5A of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1966 had not been taken into consideration and furthermore no mopping up of excess realization on levy free sale sugar having been resorted to while fixing the levy price for the year 1982-83 by a judgment and order dated 30.1.1996 opined that Malaprabha-I was not applicable. The said decision is since reported in Modi Industries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. [1999) 9 SCC 245]. This Court thereincompliance with our order dated 30.1.1996, an additional affidavit on behalf of the Union of India has been filed by Shri Deepak Khandekar, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India. In the additional affidavit, it has been expressly stated that while determining the minimum cane price of levy sugar in regard has been had only to the minimum cane price as spoken to in Section 3(3-C)(a) ofthe Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the additional cane price payable under clause 5-A of the Sugar (Control) Order, 1966, has not been taken into account, and that also there has been no mopping up of excess realization on levy-free sale sugar while fixing the price of levy sugar for the season 1982-83.In view of the above further statement made in the additional affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, we are satisfied that this matter is not covered by the decision of this Court in Shri Malaprabha Coop. Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Union of India [(1994) 1 SCC 648] .We may notice that similar orders were passed by this Court on 19.8.1998 in the case of Bharat Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. and Union of India & Ors. v. Triveni Engg. Works Ltd. & Ors. by a judgment and order dated 2.2.1999 which are since reported in (1999) 7 SCC 246 and (1999) 7 SCC 244 respectively. In Bharat Sugar Mills (supra) as also in Triveni (supra), this Court followed the decision in Modi on the premise that the sugar year involved therein was also 1982-83.24. It is, however, of some significance to notice that in the case of Bharat Sugar Mills, the Central Government in its counter affidavit filed on 16.4.1998, in response to the Courts order in regard to the sugar year 1983-84 and 1984-85 to re-fix the price,is submitted that in regard to the Levy Sugar (Price Determination 1982-83 Production) Order, the Supreme Court has already upheld the notification issued under Essential Commodities Act in M/s Modi Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. [TC (C) No.9 of 1990 (Annexure-I)].In the case of Malaprabha Co-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Union of India the Supreme Court had in their order dated 22.9.1993 [(1994) 1 SCC 648] and order dated 28.1.1997 directed the refixation of ex-factory price of levy sugar for the season 1974-75 to 1979-80. The Supreme Court had in its order dated 28.1.1997 held that their order dated 20.2.1996 in TC (C) No.9 of 1990 was applicable only in respect of sugar year 1982-83 and it cannot have any bearing for the years 1975-76 to 1979-80.Based on the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court Order dated 28.1.1997 in the case of M/s Malaprabha Co-operative Sugar Factor Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., the Government is considering the question of revision of levy sugar prices for the years 1974-75 to 1979-80 and other subsequent years with the exception of the sugar year 1982-83 in accordance with the directions contained in the aforesaid judgment.(Civil) Nos. 18-20, 23-28, 30, 32-36 and 38-39/9 are disposed of in the light of the judgments of this Court in Malaprabha Coo-operative Sugar Factory Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Anr. (1994 (1) SCC 648 ) read with 1997 (1) SCC 216. The respondents 2 and 3 in their counter dated 16.4.98 have also stated that for these years they are revising sugar prices in the light of the above two judgments. It is, therefore, ordered accordingly. The prices will be fixed within 12 weeks from today. In respect of the year 1982-83 the respondents shall file an additional affidavit setting out the basis on which the prices have been fixed for the zones with which we are concerned in the Transferred Cases. The affidavit will be filed within six weeks. Rejoinder may be filed within two weeks thereafter. Rest of the TCs. are adjourned till after the summer vacation.The Central, Government, therefore, in no uncertain terms took the stand that they would follow Malaprabha-I in the involving relevant sugar years except for the year 1982-83.27. The question of implementation of Malaprabha-1 vis-à-vis Modi again came up for consideration before this Court, as some interlocutory applications were filed in Shri Malaprabha Co-op. Sugar Factory Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr. (Malaprabha-II) [(1997) 10 SCC 216] . This Court noticed the wrong attitude on the part of the Central Government to find excuses for not complying with the judgment of this Court as the same was not palatable to them. It therein moreover noticed several notifications issued by the Central Government from time to time. Upon consideration of several contentions raised by the Central Government in Malaprabha-I, this Court pointed out how the Union of India had been making attempt(s) to misconstrue and misinterpret the earlier judgments. It, upon noticing the contentions of the Central Government that Section 3(3C) of the Act and clause 5A were totally independent, in Malaprabha-I,the determination of minimum price of sugar and fixation of the price of levy sugar under quantity of sugar to be supplied by the producer are interconnected, then they must be read as a whole and not separately as though each is distinct".The factors which were to be taken into consideration, therefore, were necessary to depress and reduce the levy sugar price. It was also noticed that clause 5-A was introduced as a new pricing policy creating a new liability upon the owners of the sugar millsview of this new liability this Court held that the Government was bound to take that also into account while fixing the price of levy sugar, without specifying as to whether the liability became component of Factor A or Factor B or both those factors of Section 3(3-C).Dealing with a new contention which was raised by the Union of India vis-à-vis the decision in Modi, it was observed that the direction given in paragraph 109 of Malaprabha-I was quite clear and did not lend itself to two interpretations and there was no confusion in relation thereto as thereby this Court had directed the Central Government to take into account the liability of the manufacturer under clause 5A of the 1996 order as regards cane price for re-fixation of the price of levy sugar. It wasdoubt or confusion, if any, appears to us to be the result of unwillingness of the Government to give up its views and accept and implement the decision of this Court.It was furthermore clarified that the issue as to whether the entire or only 50% of the free sugar price could be mopped up in view of the new price policy contained in clause 5A for depressing the levy of the price,by the new pricing policy a benefit was sought to be conferred on the producer of sugar by making him entitled to retain 50% of the extra realization, this Court held that the said amount cannot be taken into consideration for determination of the price of levy sugar. That was entirely a different aspect. The observation which is made in para 109 and the direction given therein is with respect to the aspect of sugar producers liability to pay additional sugarcane price. Clause 5-A being interconnected with Section 3(3-C), this new liability would certainly get projected into Factors A and B of Section 3(3-C). As earlier pointed out mopping up of extra realization is an element of Factor D of Section 3(3-C). Thus, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents even otherwise also do not deserve to be accepted.Distinguishing Modi (supra), the law was stated in the followingif the Government has omitted to take into consideration one unfavourable element, namely, mopping up of excess realization it cannot justify its omission to take into consideration another relevant element which is favourable to the producer of sugar.It was, therefore, emphasized that whereas an unfavourable element, namely, mopping up of excess realization is to be taken into consideration, the favourable element, namely, liability created towards cane growers for the purpose of determination of the price could not have been ignored.33. Two different Benches of the Delhi High Court, however, reacted differently to the aforementioned decisions of this Court by reason of the judgments which are impugned before us in the case of Hari Nagar Sugar Mills disposed of on 16.3.2005 and in the case of Mahalakshmi Sugar Company disposed of on 9.11.2006.Before us, there are various owners of sugar mills who purchased sugarcane from the farmers.Some of the States in India, however, even prior to coming into force of the said Parliamentary Act, had enacted Legislative Acts, inter alia, providing for to regulation and control of production of sugar.9. We may notice that in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Government of Uttar Pradesh enacted Sugar Control Act, 1938. The Legislature of the State of Uttar Pradesh, furthermore, enacted UP Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953.10. We may divide the mode and manner in which the prices for levy sugar were to be fixed by the Central Government in three different periods.To complete the narration of facts, we may also notice that validity of the orders passed by the State of U.P. in purported exercise of its power under Section 16 of the 1953 Act was questioned before a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in West UP Sugar Mills Association & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [1997 (1) UPLBEC 541]. A Division Bench of the said Court noticed that the purported policy of the State of Uttar Pradesh which had been prevailing from 1973 was ultra vires, the legislative field being covered under the Essential Commodities Act. The UP Cooperative Cane Union Federations came up before this Court questioning the correctness of the said judgment. The matter was referred to a Constitution Bench. The majority reversed the decision of the Allahabad High Court holding that the State in exercise of its power of regulation and control of sugar industries could fix a higher price for the sugarcane,cases clearly lay down that under the 1966 Order, the Central Government only fixes the minimum price and it is always open to the State Government to fix a higher price. Under the enactments made by the State Legislatures, areas are reserved for the sugar factories and thetherein are compelled to supply sugarcane to them and therefore, the State Government has incidental power to fix the price of sugarcane which will also be the statutory price. They further lay down that the Cane Commissioner can direct theand the sugar factories to enter into agreements for purchase of sugarcane at a price fixed by the State Government and such agreements cannot be branded as having been obtained by force orThe second reasoning given by the High Court is that even if the State Government had the power to fix the minimum cane price under Section 16 of the 1953 Act, this power came to an end in view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution on the enactment of the EC Act and the promulgation of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1955 (later replaced by the 1966 Order), which now gives exclusive power to the Central Government to fix the minimum price. As discussed earlier, we are not in agreement with the aforesaid reasoning as the question of repugnancy does not arise. The High Court has also held that the Central Government, while fixing the price of sugar under Section3(3C) of theEC Act, takes into consideration the minimum price of sugarcane fixed under the 1966 Order and if the sugar mills are compelled to pay a higher price than that fixed by the Central Government, it will disturb the price of the levy sugar and such an eventuality could not have been contemplated by the legislature. Over a period of time, the quota of levy sugar has gone down from 40 per cent to 10 per cent of the total production of sugar and the sugar mills are now free to sell 90 per cent of their production in open market. Under Section3(3C) of theEC Act, the Central Government has to determine the price of the levy sugar having regard to several factors enumerated in theand the minimum price fixed under the 1966 Order is only one of the factors. The manufacturing cost of sugar and securing of reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar are also relevant factors under clause (b) and (d) of Section3(3C) of theEC Act and, therefore, the fixation of higher price for sugarcane by the State Government by itself cannot have any major or substantial impact on the fixation of the price of the levy sugar by the Central Government.We have noticed hereinbefore the divergent views taken by two Division Benches of the Delhi High Court.

Reasoning:
61. We are not unmindful of the fact that the learned counsel for the appellant in Mahalakshmi before the High Court confined its case only to SAP but then in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills, the Delhi High Court accepted the contentions which have been raised before us.62. When the legislative policy is reflected in a statutory provision, the Court, while being called upon to determine as to whether the same has been complied with or not, must apply the rule of purposive construction. It is idle, in a case of this nature, to contend that as the element of additional price paid under Clause 5A of the Order and SAP had not been specifically provided for in Section 3(3C), they should be kept out of consideration for the purpose of determination of the price of levy sugar. If the actual price payable to the cane growers is absolutely relevant for determining the price of levy sugar, we have no doubt in our mind that consideration of the said elements would come either under clause (b) or clause (d) of Section3(3C) of theAct. It was so held in Malaprabha-I. It is interesting to note that the Constitution Bench of this Court in UP Coop. Cane Unions Federations rejected a contention raised by the parties that in the event the State is held to have the legislative competence to impose the same, it will have an adverse effect on the price of levy sugar required to be determined under Section3(3C) of theAct as noticed supra.63. Clauses (b) and (d) of Section 3(3C) were, therefore, clearly held to be attracted by the Constitution Bench also.64. The importance of applying the Rule of purposive construction has recently been noticed by this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia [2007 (14) SCALE 556 ] in the following linessSection 5 of the Act, on a plain reading, would place the entire onus upon a noticee. It, in no uncertain terms, states that once a notice under Section 4 is issued by the Estate Officer on formation of his opinion as envisaged therein Page 0183 it is for the noticee not only to show cause in respect thereof but also adduce evidence and make oral submissions in support of his case. Literal meaning in a situation of this nature would lead to a conclusion that the landlord is not required to adduce any evidence at all nor it is required even to make any oral submissions. Such a literal construction would lead to an anomalous situation because the landlord may not be heard at all. It may not even be permitted to adduce any evidence in rebuttal to the one adduced by the noticee nor it would be permitted to advance any argument. Is this contemplated in law? The answer must be rendered in the negative. When a landlord files an application, it in a given situation must be able to lead evidence either at the first instance or after the evidence is led by the noticee to establish its case and/ or in rebuttal to the evidence led by the noticee.49. The literal interpretation of the statute, if resorted to, would also lead to the situation that it would not be necessary for the landlords in any situation to plead in regard to its need for the public premises. It could just terminate the tenancy without specifying any cause for eviction. 50. Except in the first category of cases, as has been noticed by us hereinbefore, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, in our opinion, may have to be construed differently in view of the decisions rendered by this Court. If the landlord being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to prove fairness and reasonableness on its part in initiating a proceeding, it is for it to show how its prayer meets the constitutional requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For proper interpretation not only the basic principles of natural justice have to be borne in mind, but also principles of constitutionalism involved therein. With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act fulfilled; which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfill its constitutional obligations as held by the court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. (supra).51. Barak in his exhaustive work on Purposive Construction explains various meanings attributed to the term purpose. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Baraks words:Hart and Sachs also appear to treat purpose as a subjective concept. I say appear because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislators shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members Page 0184 of the legislative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably.(Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (2007) at pg. 87)52. In Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli and Ors. [(2007) 6 SCC 81] , this Court held:The Parliament moreover is presumed to have enacted a reasonable statute (see Breyer, Stephen (2005): Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution, Knopf (Chapter on Statutory Interpretation - pg. 99 for Reasonable Legislator Presumption).53. The provisions of the Act and the Rules in this case, are, thus required to be construed in the light of the action of the State as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. With a view to give effect thereto, the doctrine of purposive construction may have to be taken recourse to. [See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan and Ors. [2007 (7) SCALE 753 ].We are of the opinion that the same principle should be applied herein.66. That is how the Central Government itself understood the decision of this Court in Malaprabha-I. It explicitly said so in the counter affidavit filed in Bharat Sugar Mills. Indisputably, for the purpose of determination of the price of levy sugar, it called for the relevant materials from each of the owner of the sugar mill. It is, therefore, too late in the day for the Central Government to contend contra.67. Rules of executive construction in a situation of this nature may also be applied where a representation is made by the maker of legislation at the time of introduction of the Bill or construction thereupon is put by the executive upon its coming into force, the same carries a great weight.68. In this regard, we may refer to the decision of the House of Lords in the matter of R.V. National Asylum Support Service [(2002) 1 W.L.R.2956] and its interpretation of the decision in Pepper v. Hart [(1993) A.C. 593]. on the question of executive estoppel. In the former decision, Lord Steynexceptionally there is found in the Explanatory Notes a clear assurance by the executive to Parliament about the meaning of a clause, or the circumstances in which a power will or will not be used, that assurance may in principle be admitted against the executive in proceedings in which the executive places a contrary contention before a court.A similar interpretation was rendered by Lord Hope of Craighead in Wilson v. First County Trust Ltd., [2004] 1 A.C. 816, wherein it wasI understand it [Pepper v. Hart], it recognized a limited exception to the general rule that resort to Hansard was inadmissible. Its purpose is to prevent the Executive seeking to place a meaning on words used in legislation which is different from that which ministers attributed to whose words when promoting the legislation in Parliament.See for a detailed analysis of the rule of executive estoppel in a writing of Francis Bennion entitled "Executive Estoppel: Pepper v. Hart revisited", published in Public Law, Spring 2007 issue, pg. 1.71. Reliance placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General on Malaprabha-III is not apposite. This Court therein found the action of the Central Government to be not an act of contempt presumably because the directions were held to have been substantially complied with. We are not exercising any contempt jurisdiction. Contempt is a matter between the Court and the contemnor. We are herein called upon to determine as to which view of Delhi High Court in Hari Nagar or Mahalakshmi is correct. We cannot refuse to lay down the law having been called upon to do so. We must lay down a law for the future. We, therefore, while directing the Central Government to refix the price of levy sugar, would keep this direction confined only to the parties before us including the interveners. The reason therefor is that the other mill owners were not aggrieved thereby. The parties before us are fighting their grievance for more than 22 years. They should not be allowed to go empty handed.We are not unmindful of the fact that the learned counsel for the appellant in Mahalakshmi before the High Court confined its case only to SAP but then in Hari Nagar Sugar Mills, the Delhi High Court accepted the contentions which have been raised before us.62. When the legislative policy is reflected in a statutory provision, the Court, while being called upon to determine as to whether the same has been complied with or not, must apply the rule of purposive construction. It is idle, in a case of this nature, to contend that as the element of additional price paid under Clause 5A of the Order and SAP had not been specifically provided for in Section 3(3C), they should be kept out of consideration for the purpose of determination of the price of levy sugar. If the actual price payable to the cane growers is absolutely relevant for determining the price of levy sugar, we have no doubt in our mind that consideration of the said elements would come either under clause (b) or clause (d) of Section3(3C) of theAct. It was so held inIt is interesting to note that the Constitution Bench of this Court in UP Coop. Cane Unions Federations rejected a contention raised by the parties that in the event the State is held to have the legislative competence to impose the same, it will have an adverse effect on the price of levy sugar required to be determined under Section3(3C) of theAct as noticed supra.