Case: Devender Pal Singh Vs. State, N.C.T. Of Delhi And Anr

R.P. (Crl.) No. 497 of 2002 in W.P. (Crl) No. 993 of 20012. In this case, it is to be stated that I had arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution case depends solely upon the confessional statement. The reasons recorded therein for acquitting him are not required to be reiterated. However, considering the majority view also, in my opinion, if death sentence is altered to imprisonment for life, it would be sufficient to meet the ends of justiceR.P. (Crl.) Nos. 626 and 627 of 2002 in Crl. A. No. 761 of 20013. In this case, it is to be stated that appeal of the main accused Bihari Manjhi and others was allowed and were acquitted on the basis that there was no other evidence except the so-called confessional statement which was totally unreliable and faulty investigation. This is also a fit case for altering the death sentence and imposing sentence of imprisonment for lifeThese three review petitions have been filed in terms of Article 137 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the Constitution). Though the review applications contain certain references to the conclusions arrived at the judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 761/2001 with death reference No. 1/ 2001, at the time of the hearing it was restricted to the question whether imposition of death sentence would be proper when one of the three Honble Judges recorded a finding of acquittal. So far as review application No. 626/2002 is concerned, same was the plea. In review application No. 627/2001 the plea was that when one Honble Judge held that life sentence should be proper, death sentence could not be imposed merely because the two other Honble Judges held so. Though at the outset learned counsel for the applicants submitted that they were not questioning the correctness of the conclusions but reference was made to certain findings recorded in the appeals and the death references to contend that the conclusions arrived at by the majority were not in order. However, when it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the applicants that they had conceded to the position that their submissions with regard to the review application were restricted to the question of sentence at the threshold, it was submitted that a reference to the conclusions arrived at may be incidental and necessary.

Reasoning:
6. Though the scope of review in criminal proceedings has been widened to a considerable extent in view of the aforesaid exposition of law by the Constitutional Bench, in any case review is not re-hearing of the appeal all over again, and as was observed in Suthendraraja (supra) in order to maintain the review petition it has to be shown that there is a miscarriage of justice. Though the expression miscarriage of justice is of wider amplitude, it has to be kept in mind that the scope of interference is very limited. Ordinarily application for review is disposed of by circulation without any detailed arguments, unless otherwise ordered by the Court in terms of Rule 3. As regards the desirability of awarding life sentence when there is diversion of review, in Suthendrarajas case (supra) a similar question was considered. Here again by majority it was held that the scope for the review of the death sentence awarded is not there merely because one of the Judges held so14. In our opinion compelling reasons for review aret in these cases and acceptance of the prayer for reference to a larger Bench would be the creation of a new forum. It may be pointed out that while laying the norms for a curative petition a Constitution Bench of this Court in Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok Hurra and Anr"24. There is no gainsaying that the Supreme Court is the court of last resortthe final court on questions both of fact and of law including constitutional law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/tribunals and authorities in India. In a judgment, there will be declaration of law and its application to the facts of the case to render a decision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. It is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard to the highest court departing from its binding precedent are different from the grounds on which a final judgment between the parties, can be reconsidered. Hence, we are mainly concerned with the latter. However, when reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought, the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to the decision made in the case, is normally brought under challenge. It is, therefore, relevant to note that so much was the value attached to the precedent of the highest court that in TheLondon Street Tramways Company, Limited vs. London County Council (1898 Appeal Cases, the House of Lords laid down that its decision upon a question of law was conclusive and would bind the House in subsequent cases and that an erroneous decision could be set right only by an Act of Parliament25. InHoystead vs. Commissioner of Taxation (1926) AC 155at 165), Lord Shaw observed:"Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new various which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the court of the legal result... If this were permitted litigation would have no end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted"26. To the same effect is the view expressed by the Federal Court of India is Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudharys case (supra) placing reliance on dicta of the privy council inVenkata Narasimha Appa Row vs. Court of Wards (1886 (II) Appeal Cases 660at 664). Gwyer, C.J., speaking for the Federal Court observed:"This Court will not sit as a court of appeal from its own decisions, nor will it entertain applications to review on the ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself to be aggrieved by the decision. It would in our opinion be intolerable and most prejudicial to the public interest if cases once decided by the court could bed and"There is a salutary maxim which ought to be observed by all courts of last resortInterest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, (It concerns the state that there be an end of. It is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of. Its strict observance may occasionally entail hardship upon individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source must be small in comparison with the great mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions of such a tribunal as this"27. In S. Nagarajs case (supra) an application was filed by the state for clarification of the order passed earlier. It was urged by the petitioner that any modification or recalling of the order passed by this Court would result in destroying the principle of finality enshrined in Article 141 of the Constitution. Sahai, J. speaking for himself and for Pandian, J., observed:"Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in administrative law as in public law. Even the law bends before justice"The learned judge referring to the judgment of Raja Prithwi Chand Lall Choudharys case (supra) further observed:"Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order, the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice"28. The position with regard to conclusive nature of the precedent obtained in England till the following practice statement was made by Lord Gardiner, L.C. inLloyds Bank, Ltd. vs. Dawson and others (1966(3) All E.R., at p.77) on behalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary"They propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so"15. The parameters for filing curative petition are indicated in the said judgment; and even the writ petitions do not fulfill these parameters. It is relevant to note that a petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution (V. Mohini Giri vs. Union of India (W.P. (Crl.) 96/2002) wherein prayer was made to issue guidelines as to what would be the approach where one of the Honble Judges acquits while others confirm death sentence. The petition was dismissed on 16.8.2002 with the following order:"This petition has been filed for issuance of a guideline as to what should be the appropriate approach in the case where one of the Judges in the Bench of this Court while hearing an appeal against death sentence, acquits the accused person. We do not think that the judicial discretion of the Bench hearing the appeal can be curtailed in any manner by issuing guidelines. This petition is dismissed accordingly."16. Further as noted above, in the cases cited to show that life sentence was imposed in case of acquittal by trial/High Court, for compelling reasons departure can be made. In the case at hand, one related to TADA Act, and the two others related to killings on caste grounds.