Case: State Of Jharkhand  Vs. Govind Singh

On 10.4.1997 at Barkagaon Protected Forest Area, a truck bearing No. BR 13-9041 was found loaded with 11.8 tonnes of coal. Confiscation Proceeding No.3/1997 arising out of Pelawal case No.28/97 was instituted and show cause notice was issued. The respondent filed reply to the notice. After considering the same the Divisional Forest Officer, Hazaribagh directed confiscation of the truck.4. An appeal was preferred before the Deputy Commissioner, Hazaribagh, numbered as Case No.40/1997. By order dated 17.7.1999 the appeal was dismissed. The matter was carried in revision by the respondent before the Revisional Authority cum Secretary, Department of Forest and Environment and by order dated 3.12.2002 the revisional authority dismissed the revision. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the "Constitution") was filed before the High Court. It was the primary stand therein that there was no prohibition in directing release of the vehicle on payment of fine in lieu of confiscation. The High Court held that there was some dispute regarding weight of coal which was being carried. It was noted that the value of the coal was not established and considering the value of coal which was being transported it would be inequitable to direct confiscation and, therefore, it was held that to meet the ends of justice the power to impose fine in lieu of confiscation can be read into under Section 52 (3) of the Act. Accordingly, a fine of Rs.50,000/- was imposed and the seizing authority was directed to release the vehicle on payment thereof.

Reasoning:
Learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment held that though the power to levy fine in lieu of confiscation is not there, same has to be read into the statute to fully effectuate the legislative intent. It was a case of casus omissus.9. The conclusion is clearly erroneous. It is against the settled principles relating to statutoryprinciples of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou vs. Procopiou (1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid inLuke vs. IRC (1966 AC557) where at p. 577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".22. It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is casus omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accidunt." "But," on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (See Fentonvs. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C.A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however a casus omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis existit proetereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in Jones vs. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws."23. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal principles the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in reading into Section 52 (3) of the Act the power of direct release by imposing fine in lieu of confiscation.Confiscation in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 52 of the Act is the immediate statutory action which provides that when forest offence as defined in Section 2(3) of the Act is believed to have been committed in respect of the seized vehicle, the authorized officer may confiscate the forest produce and the vehicle involved in the transportation of the forest produce. Foundation for action in terms of Section 52(3) of the Act is the belief entertained by the concerned officer that forest offence has been committed. It is not the value of the forest produce which is relevant, but the value of the article liable for confiscation. In the instant case it is the truck carrying the forest produce.