Case: A. K. Gupta And Sons Vs. Damodar Valley Corporation

2. The appellant had done work for the respondent under a contract which only specified the rates for different categories of work. The contract contained the following clause: "This quotation is based on prevailing labour rate of Rs. 1-4-0 per cooly but if there is increase of labour rate of more than 10 per cent in any particular month the proportionate increase in rate will be charged". Subsequent to the making of the contract there was an increase in the labour rate per cooly by 20 per cent. The appellant claimed that under the clause it was entitled to the whole amount of the increase while the respondent contended that it was entitled to a part of it only. This was the only dispute between the parties in respect of the contract. There was no other dispute either concerning the quantity or quality of the work done or otherwise howsoever.          3. The appellant filed a suit against the respondent only claiming a declaration that on a proper interpretation of the clause it was entitled to an enhancement of 20 per cent over the tendered rates as the sole difference between the parties was about the interpretation. The plaint stated that work had been done under the contract and that the value of the suit for purposes of jurisdiction was Rs. 65,000, but as it was a suit for a declaration only court-fees on that basis had been paid. The respondent in its written statement challenged the appellants interpretation of the clause but did not dispute any material fact or that the only dispute was about the interpretation. The written statement concluded by saying that the respondent "was ever ready and willing and is still really and willing to pay the legitimate due to the plaintiff ".          4. Before the learned trial Judge several issues were raised but it is necessary to mention only two. One issue was as to the maintainability of the suit in the form in which it had been framed and the other issue was as to the proper interpretation of the clause. The first of these issues was not pressed at the hearing. The other issue having been decided by the trial Court in favour of the appellant, the suit was decreed. The other issues which had been raised had also not been pressed.          5. The respondent then went up in appeal to the High Court at Patna. There the issue as to the maintainability of the suit was resuscitated and pressed and it was decided in the respondents favour because of the terms of the proviso to S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The correctness of this view is not challenged in this Court. In the result the High Court dismissed the suit.          6. Now the appellant had in view of the High Courts decision as to the maintainability of the suit, sought its leave to amend the plaint by adding an extra relief in the following words: "That a decree for Rs. 65,000 of such other amount which may be found due on proper account being taken may be passed in favour of the plaintiff against the defendant" The amendment having been refused the present appeal has been preferred.

Reasoning:
10. Now, how does the present case stand on these principles? Does the amendment introduce a new cause of action or a new case?We do not think it does. The suit was on the contract. It sought the interpretation of a clause in the contract only for a decision of the rights of the parties under it and for no other purpose. It was the contract which formed the cause of action on which the suit was based. The amendment seeks to introduce a claim based on the same cause of action, that is, the same contract. It introduces no new case of facts. Indeed the facts on which the money claim sought to be added is based are not in dispute. Even the amount of the claim now sought to be made by amendment, was mentioned in the plaint in stating the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. The respondent had notice of it. It is quite clear that the interpretation of the clause was sought only for quantifying the money claim. In the written statement the respondent specifically expressed its willingness to pay the appellants legitimate dues which could only mean such amount as might be due according to the rates applicable on a proper interpretation of the clause. The respondent was fully aware that the ultimate object of the appellant in filing the suit was to obtain the payment of that amount. It was equally aware that the amount had not been specifically claimed in the suit because the respondent had led the appellant to believe that it would pay whatever the court legitimately found to be due. It in fact said so in the written statement. If there was any case where the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of the law of limitation, the present is that one. The respondent cannot legitimately claim that the amendment will prejudicially affect his right under that law for really he had no such right. It is a case in which the claim for money was in substance in the plaint from the beginning though it had not formally been made11. This, therefore seems to us to be pre-eminently a case for allowing the amendment. The authorities also lead us to the same view. In L. J Leach and Cos case, 1957 SCR 438  : (AIR 1957 SC 357  ), a suit for damages for conversion was by amendment allowed to be converted into a suit for damages for breach of contract after that claim had become barred, the necessary facts, as in the case in hand being already in the plaint. In Charan Dass case, 47 Ind App 255: (AIR 1921 PC 50) an amendment adding a claim for possession after a suit for such claim had become barred was allowed in a suit which originally had only claimed a declaration of a right to pre-empt. In the last mentioned case, the plaintiff had in spite of warning at the earliest stage refused to make the amendment which he later sought and got. It was therefore, a case where the plaintiff had initially deliberately refused to make a claim and an amendment being allowed later permitting that claim to be raised after it had become barred. It was in a sense a stronger case than the present one where the plaintiff had omitted to make the claim initially on a wrong notion and a wrong legal advice. Punishing of mistakes is, of course, not administration of justice12. It is true that the plaint does not set out the details of the work done. But there never was any dispute about them. Indeed the respondent had prepared a final bill of the appellants dues for the work done under the contract and the appellant had accepted that bill as correct except on the question as to the proper rate chargeable under the clause. Strictly the details of the work done were not necessary in the plaint for it would be a waste of time of a court to go into them, it not being unusual to direct an enquiry by a commissioner or a subordinate officer about such details when as in the present case, the items of work done are innumerable. It would be enough in such cases to file the details before the authority making the enquiry. Besides, in Pirgonda Hongonda Patis case, 1957 SCR 585 (AIR 1957 SC 363)  , in a suit for a declaration of title, this Court permitted an amendment setting out the detailed facts on which the title was claimed after the suit had become time barred. The absence of the details of the work does not furnish a legitimate ground for refusing the amendment13. It may be that as a result of the amendment, if the respondent chooses to raise a controversy about the work done, that is, about the quantity, quality and other things concerning it, which it had never raised so long the matter will have to be gone into. That again would not justify a refusal of leave to amend. It would not mean any waste of time or money or any duplication of work. That investigation would now be made for the first time and nothing done so far would become futile. Such an enquiry was indeed directed in L. J. Leach and Co.s case. 1957 SCR 438  : (AIR 1957 SC 357  )14. The amendment sought is necessary for a decision of the real dispute between the parties which is what are their rights under the contract ? That dispute was clearly involved in the plaint as originally framed. All the necessary basic facts had been stated. Only through a misconception a relief which could be asked on those facts had not been asked. It would not have been necessary to ask for it unless the plaintiff had at a late stage taken the point that the suit should fail without more in the absence of that relief. We find the present case indistinguishable from Charan Dass case, 47 Ind App 255: (AIR 1921 PC 50).