Case: Raja Suriya Pal Singh Vs. State Of U.P. &amp; Anr

As regards the appeal of the Maharaja of Kapurthala (Appeal No. 285 of 1951), the facts are these: By article 12 of the Covenant of Merger dated the 5th May, 1948, entered into between the Rulers of the States now comprised in the Pepsu Union, the properties which are the subject-matter of the appeal were declared and guaranteed as the private properties of the Maharaja. Tha Maharaja was also guaranteed a privy purse of Rs. 2,40,000, It was suggested that the Maharaja accepted this sum which was smaller in amount than what was allowed to other Rulers as privy purse because he was assured of the income of the Oudh estate.

Reasoning:
It is well-settled that recourse cannot be had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provisions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter. When the fundamental law has not limited either in terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce a limitation from something supposed to be inherent in the spirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is no guide in this matter.truth is that Part III of the Constitution is an important and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in article 31-A of the Constitution; on the other hand, article 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legislature of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This proviso in express terms keeps alive the alternative provisions of Part III of the Constitution in article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The provisions of article 31(2). therefore, do not stand repealed by article 31-A. On the other hand, they are kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties fall within the definition of the expression "estate" in article 31-A are deprived of their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and the President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in those eases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and is not justiciable. Once the assent is given, the law is taken to have complied with the provisions of article 31has, however, to be observed that these non-income fetching properties are integral parts of an estate as defined in article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation is of a confiscatory character. Different considerations might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of property were made the subject-matter of acquisition. Properties comprised in an estate may be incomefetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said that the legislation is outside the ambit of entry 42 of Listthe provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter this law from any attack based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was not disputed. As the validity of the Act could not be impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on its constitutionality was made on other grounds-ingenious but unsubstantial--lying outside the ambit Part65 in clear terms provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as compensation the amount declared in that behalf underexpression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be denned by a process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In other words, the definition of the expression is elastic and takes its colour from the statute in which it occurs, the concept varying with the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is in the general interest of the community as distinguished from the private interest of an individual.In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating the status of tenants by conferring upon them the bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindars have also been levelled down cannot be said as Wanting in public purposes in a democratic State. It aims at destroying the inferiority complex in a large number of citizens of the State and giving them a status of equality with their former lords and prevents the accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a few individuals which is contrary to the expressed intentions of the Constitution.The Crown cannot deprive a legislature of its legislative authority by the mere fact that in the exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within the territory over which such legislative authority exists and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its sovereign competence. If therefore it be found that the subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence of a provincial legislature, nothing can prevent that legislature from legislating about it, unless the Constitution Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely orcharity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereigns power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them.