Case: Martin Burn Ltd Vs. The Corporation Of Calcutta

1. These (two appeals arise out of proceedings for ascertainment of the annual value of premises No. 12, Mission Row, Calcutta, occupied by the appellant. The annual value was ascertained with a view to assess the municipal rates payable in respect of the premises. The appeals raise a common question of law making it unnecessary to deal with them separately, that question being whether the order of remand made by the High Court at Calcutta to the Court of Small Causes, Calcutta for ascertaining the annual value was justified.2. The annual value was ascertained under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923. This Act was repealed and replaced by the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 as from May 1, 1952, but as the valuation had originally been made by the respondent Corporation under the repealed Act it is that Act by which the question that arises will have to be determined.

Reasoning:
13. While on S. 131 (2) (b) we observe that it was not contended that a Court had on power to cancel a valuation; all that was said was that after cancellation the Court must or may proceed to make a fresh valuation. This we have held to be an untenable view. A point was, however, made that S. 131 (2) (b) applied only to a cancellation on the ground of irregularity, that is, a procedural defect such as, absence of notice, omission to give a hearing, etc. There is, however, no reason to restrict the ordinary meaning of the word "irregularity" and confine it to procedural defects only. None has been advanced. Such a contention was rejected, and we think rightly, in 57 Cal WN 882: (AIR 1953 Cal 773  ). That word clearly covers any case where a thing has not been done in the manner laid down by the statute, irrespective of what that manner might be. In principle there would be nothing to justify a special provision like S. 131 (2) (b) being made to cover a case of procedural irregularity only.14. We can now deal with the reasoning on which the High Court in the present case justified its order of remand. It realised that by making the order it was depriving the appellant of one of its chances to object to the valuation, namely, the chance under S. 139, but it felt that by upholding that right of the appellant it would be depriving the Corporation of its rates wholly as the time limit prescribed by S. 131 (2) (b) had expired. It thought that it was faced with two evils and that it would be choosing the lesser of the two if it allowed the Corporation a chance to collect its rates. With great respect, we find this line of reasoning altogether unsupportable. A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operating. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a Court likes the result or not. When the High Court found that S. 131 (2) (b) had been attracted to the case, it had no power to set that provision at naught.15. It remains to deal with one other argument advanced for the Corporation. It was said that the entire proceeding in connection with the ascertainment of the valuation was one and continuous and its only object was to ascertain the valuation and therefore, the Court annulling a valuation made on a wrong basis, must have power to make a new valuation itself on the correct basis. We are not impressed by this contention. The conclusion does not follow form the premise. The proceeding for making the valuation, whether it is continuous on not must be in terms of the statute. If the statute does not give the Court the power to make the valuation, it cannot be said to possess that power so that the supposed object may be achieved. Further the object is not to make a valuation anyhow but to make it only in terms of the Act.16. We think we have now considered all the different aspects of the matter that were placed before us by learned counsel on either side. Our conclusion for the reasons earlier stated is that looked from all points of view, the order remand is not justifiable in law; it was not within the inherent power of the High Court to remand the case for the doing of a thing which the Act did not countenance. The remand was futile. It offended the Act as it deprived the appellant of one of its statutory rights. The order has to be set aside.17. Before concluding we may state that the Corporation had made two valuations of the premises, one called a general valuation for the entire six yearly period mentioned in S. 131 (1) and the other an intermediate valuation made later but within that period to have effect for the remainder of the period, on account of certain additional construction in the premises put up since the earlier assessment. Objections had been taken by the appellant to both these valuations under S. 139 by independent proceedings and separate appeals filed under S. 141 from the order made in each of the proceedings. As earlier stated, the appeals raised the same point. They were therefore, dealt with in one judgment by both the Courts below, hence the two appeals before us.