Case: Tara Chand And Anr Vs. Ram Prasad

The facts lie in a short compass : that Smt. Anandi, wife of appellant 1 and the mother of the appellant 2, Nand Kishore had lease of the demised premises for 11 months from May 1, 1964 on payment of monthly rent of Rs. 18 which expired on March 31, 1965. The respondent landlord terminated the lease by a notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act but she remained in possession and enjoyment of the shop carrying on small kirana business. She died in September 1966. The demised premises are governed by the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act 26 of 1950 for short the Act) Section 13(1) thereof, postulates that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law or a contract, no court shall pass any decree or make any order in favour of the landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and wiling to pay rent thereof to the full extent allowable by the Act" unless the landlord proves to the satisfaction of the court any one of the grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (k) thereof. The action for the ejectment was initiated by the respondent on the premise that on the death of the tenant, the appellants have no right to continue in occupation of the demised premises. The findings recorded by all the courts are that Smt. Anandi was the tenant. The appellants during her lifetime, had not carried on the business with her till date of her death. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that Smt. Anandi paid and the respondent accepted the rent after determination of the lease. So she was a tenant holding over. During the pendency of the appeal, the Act was amended through Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Ordinance 26 of 1975 which was replaced by Act 14 of 1976 (for short Amendment Act). Therein the definition of Tenant was amended by Section 3(ii) of the Amendment Act introducing to Section 3 clause (vii),(vii) "tenant" means -(a) the person by whom or on whose account or behalf rent is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any premises to his landlord including the person who is continuing in its possession after the termination of his tenancy otherwise than by a decree for the eviction passed under the provisions of this Act; and(b) in the event of death of the person as is referred to in sub-clause (a), his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him who had been in the case of the premises leased out of the for residential purpose, ordinarily residing and in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, ordinarily carrying on business with him in the such premises as members of his family up to his death.Consequently, the appellant amended the written statement adding therein paragraphs 16 and 17 contending that they have been jointly carrying on the business in the demised premises along with Smt. Anandi and, therefore, they are entitled to the continuance of the tenancy. The amendment was allowed by the appellate court and it called for a finding from the trial court in that regard. After giving an opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence afresh the court recorded the finding in the negative. On its receipt and consideration thereof the appellate court affirmed the finding but confirmed the decree of the trial court on the other grounds. The High Court held that as the appellants had not carried on the business with the tenant during her lifetime as family business they were not entitled the benefit of the amended definition of the tenant. Accordingly decreed the suit

Reasoning:
14. Admittedly Smt. Anandi was inducted into possession of the demised property under a contract of tenancy which was determined by issuance of notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Even thereafter she continued to remain in possession as statutory tenant under the Act. The finding of trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court is that the respondent landlord after termination of tenancy received the rent from her and thereby she became tenant holding over till date of herSmt. Anandi enjoyed the status as a statutory tenant of the premises even after the determination of the tenancy. Notwithstanding the termination of the contractual tenancy the jural relationship of the landlord and tenant between the respondent and Smt. Anandi under the Act was not snapped off. The heritable property or interest in the leasehold right in the tenancy continued to subsist in the tenantOn her death, the rights to succession to an estate of the deceased owner vested immediately on his/her than (sic then) nearest heirs and cannot be held in abeyance except when a nearer heir is then in the womb. The vested right cannot be divested except by a retrospective valid law. The appellants by virtue of intestate succession under Hindu Succession Act, being Class I heirs, succeeded to the heritable interest in the leasehold right of a demised premises held by Smt. Anandi. They, thereby, stepped into the shoes of the tenant. They continued to remain in possession an on the date of the suit as statutory tenants. Thereby, they are entitled to the protection of their continuance as a statutory tenant under the Act. The succession having been opened to the appellants and succeeded in September 1966 to the estate of the tenant without any hiatus and restriction on the heritable interest in the leasehold right held by the tenant Smt. Anandi, the Amendment Act being admittedly prospective in operation, does not apply to the facts of the case and does not have the effect of divesting their vested rights in the leasehold held by the tenant. They are entitled to enjoy the tenancy rights without any restrictions or hedge put by the Amendment Act. We, thereby, hold that the Amendment Act does not apply to the facts of this case. But the appellants succeeded to the heritable interest in the leasehold right in the demised premises governed by the Act subject to the rights and limitations prescribed under the Act and also subject to the rights in favour of the respondent created under Section 13(1)(a) to (k) and other provisions of theAccordingly, we have no hesitation to hold that the appellants are entitled to remain in possession of the demised shop in question till the appellants are duly evicted in accordance with the provisions of the Act as amended from time to time.