Case: Silla Chandra Sekharam Vs. Ramchandra Sahu

2. Ramchandra, respondent, executed an agreement to sell the house in suit to the appellant, on February 21, 1951. The agreement stated that he was in sole possession and enjoyment of the house which was his paternal property, that he was the Managing Member and Karta of the family and that for meeting family necessities and discharging certain loans he agreed to sell his undisputed house for Rs. 6,000/- on condition that he and his mother would execute a deed of sale in favour of the appellant with respect to the house within a period of one year from the date of the execution of the deed of agreement. Ramchandra did not execute the sale deed and the appellant instituted the suit for specific performance of the contract.3. The trial Court held that the sale was not to be for legal necessity and therefore decreed the suit in part, on the appellants depositing a sum of Rs. 6,000/- less the sum of Rs. 300/ paid before the Sub-Registrar at the time of the execution of the agreement to sell and less the amount of costs granted to the appellant against Ramchandra within a month and directed that defendant No. 1 would execute the sale deed for the alienation of his interest in the entire house as covered by the agreement and that the plaintiff would be entitled to get possession of the same jointly with defendant No. 2 mother of Ramchandra.4. The appellant went up in appeal to the High Court against the dismissal of his suit with respect to the sale of half the house. During the pendency of the appeal Ramchandras mother died, and therefore the only question urged on behalf of the appellant at the hearing of the appeal was that Ramchandra, respondent, having perfected his title to the entire house, be made to sell the same. The High Court did not agree with the contention and held that S. 18(a) of the Act did not apply to the facts of the case as it comes into operation subsequent to the sale having taken place. The High Court therefore dismissed the appeal. It is against this order that this appeal has been filed.

Reasoning:
14. The expression in cl. (a) of S. 18 should preferably be construed in a way so that there will be no overlapping between the provisions of this clause and of S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, as ordinarily the legislature does not intend to make duplicate provisions for similar situations.15. The use of the words vendor or lessor in cl. (a) is no definite pointer to the conclusion that the expression subsequently to the sale or lease be given the meaning subsequently to the actual sale or lease.16. The sections preceding S. 18 deal with specific performance of contracts in general and therefore use the expression party to a contract. Section 18 deals with the cases of contracts to sell or let and therefore appropriately uses the simple word vendor or lessor with respect to the party contracting to sell or let and purchaser or lessee with respect to the party agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease. There is no incongruity in using such expression so long as one knows to whom those expression refer. In fact the word purchaser or lessee can be appropriately applied to persons agreeing to purchase or take the property ondo not consider it necessary to decide this question as we are of opinion that it cannot be said that Ramchandra had no interest in half the house. He had interest in the entire house and so had his mother, though in case of actual partition the interest of each would have been fixed at half. If Ramchandra was not competent to pass title with respect to the entire house during the lifetime of his mother, he can be said to have imperfect title to it.23. We are, therefore, of opinion that on the death of the mother, Ramchandra obtained title to and interest in the portion of the house which on a private partition subsequent to the contract to sell had taken place between Ramchandra and his mother and that therefore he has to make good his contract out of the property he acquired subsequent to the contract tosuch allegation appears to have been made before the High Court where it was urged that Ramchandra had acquired title to that portion of the house. It was in view of this allegation that the appellant did not argue the appeal on the basis of the ground that had been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the ground being that Ramchandra had agreed to sell for reasons of legal necessity. We, therefore, do not consider any force in this contention.was in view of this allegation that the appellant did not argue the appeal on the basis of the ground that had been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the ground being that Ramchandra had agreed to sell for reasons of legal necessity. We, therefore, do not consider any force in this contention.