Case: Bathutmal Raichand Oswal Vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta &amp; Another

The appellant was admittedly a tenant of the shop since 1949 and the standard rent and permitted increases in respect of the shop are Rs. 20.12 per month. There was at one time a dispute between the parties as to what was the purpose for which the shop was let to the appellant, but having regard to the finding given by the First appellate Court, which is the ultimate court of fact, it must be taken that the shop was let out to the appellant only for the purpose of business. The respondents were not the original landlords of the shop but they purchased , the building, of which the shop forms part on 12th, December 1963 and after purchasing it, they gave a notice dated 12th November, 1964 to the appellant terminating his tenancy in respect of the shop. The appellant declined to hand over possession of the shop and the respondents thereupon filed a suit in the court of Small Causes Poona for recovering possession of the shop from the appellant. There were several grounds on which the possession of the shop was sought by the respondents but barring one, the remaining grounds do not survive as they were negatived by the Trial Court and also in appeal, by the First Appellate Court. The one ground which still survived is that relating to recovery of possession under cls. (a) and (k) ofsubsection (1) ofSec.13 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Rent Act) and that is the ground which has evoked the most serious controversy between the parties and led to the filing of the present appeal.The Trial Court found, one consideration of the oral as well as documentary evidence led in the case, that though the shop was let to the appellant for the purpose of business he was using a portion of it for his residence as well and the respondents had therefore, made out a case for recovery of possession of the shop under clause (k) ofof Section 13. The Trial Court accordingly passed a decree for eviction against the appellant. The appellant preferred an appeal to the District Court but the appeal was unsuccessful and the District Court confirmed the decree for eviction passed by the Trial Court. The appellant thereupon preferred a petition in the High Court of Bombay under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the decree for eviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the District Court.

Reasoning:
We were taken through the judgment of the District Court as also through the judgment of the High Court and it was contended before us that the judgment of the District Court was based on a close and careful appreciation of the evidence and there was no justification at all for the High Court to set it aside on the assumption that it misread or ignored any part of the evidence or drew any inferences and conclusions which were unwarranted or unjustified. The consideration of this second contention would require us to examine the large mass of evidence on record and scrutinise the judgments of the District Court as well as the High court, but it is not necessary to go through this long and tedious exercise since we are of the view that the first contention raised on behalf of the appellant is well founded and the High Court plainly acted outside the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 in disturbing the findings of fact reached by the District Court.Here, when we turn to the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court has clearly misconceived the scope and extent of its power under Art. 227 and overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction under that Article. It has proceeded to reappreciate the evidence for the purpose of correcting errors of fact supposed to have been committed by the District Court. That was clearly impermissible to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. The District Court was the final court of fact and there being no appeal provided against the findings of fact reached by the District Court it was not open to the High Court to question the propriety or reasonableness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence by the District Court. The High Court could not convert itself into a court of appeal and examine the correctness of the findings of fact arrived at by the District Court. The limited power of interference which the High Court possessed under the Art. 227 was to see that the District Court functions within the limits of its authority and so far as that was concerned, there was no complaint against the District Court that it transgressed the limits of its authority. It is true that the High Court claimed to interfere with the findings of the fact reached by the District Court on the ground that the District Court had misread a part of the evidence and ignored another part of it but that was clearly outside the jurisdiction of the High Court to do under Art. 227. This is precisely what the High Court did in Nagendra Nath Boras case, 1958 SCR 1240   = (AIR 1958 SC 398  ) (supra) while setting aside the orders of the Appellate Authority under the Excise Act and that was disapproved by this Court in clearest terms. The exercise of the power of interference in that case was sought to be justified by reference both to Articles 226 and 227. So far as the exercise of jurisdiction under Art 226 is concerned, this Court pointed out that a writ or order of Certiorari could be issued by the High Court only if there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record and no error of fact, howsoever apparent on the face of the record, could be a ground for interference by the High Court exercising its writwas observed by this Court, while applying this principle to the facts of appeals before it:"In the judgments and orders impugned in these appeals, the High Court has exercised its supervisory jurisdiction in respect of errors which cannot be said to be errors of law apparent on the face of the record. If at all they are errors, they are errors in appreciation of documentary evidence of affidavits, errors in drawing inferences or omission to draw inferences. In other words, those are errors which a court sitting as a court of appeal only, could have examined and, if necessary, corrected.""The High Court, in its several Judgments and orders has scrutinised, in great detail, the order passed by the excise authorities under the Act. we have not thought it fit to examine the record or the orders below in any detail, because, in our opinion, it is not the function of the High Court or of this Court to do so. The jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is limited to seeing that the judicial ortribunals or administrative bodies exercisingpowers, do not exercise their powers in excess of their statutory jurisdiction but correctly administer the law within the ambit of the statute creating them or entrusting those functions to them. The Act has created its own hierarchy of officers and appellate authorities as indicated above, to administer the law. So long as those Authorities function within the letter and spirit of the law the High Court has no concern with the manner in which these powers have been exercised. In the instant cases, the High Court appears to have gone beyond the limits of its powers under Art. 226."This Court also held that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the orders of the Appellate Authority in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. since this jurisdiction was limited only to seeing that the District Court functions within the limits of its authority and did not extend to correction of mere errors. What this Court said in that case applies with equal force in the present case and we must hold that the High Court acted beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Art. 227 in interfering with the findings of fact reached by the District Court. Even if the Special Civil Application had been under Art. 226 that would have made no difference and the High Court would still have had no jurisdiction to disturb these findings of fact. Now, if these findings of fact stand, as they must, it is obvious that the dominant or primary user of the shop by the appellant was for business and not residence and there was accordingly no change of user of the shop, and if that be so, the respondents were not entitled to recover possession of the shop from the appellant either under clause (a) or clause (k) ofsubsection (1) of