Case: Collector of Land Acquisition &amp; Others Vs. M/s. Andaman Timber Industries

s. Andaman Timber Industries owned 8.86 hectares land comprised in Survey Nos. 23/3 and 23 in Shorepoint Village, Bambooflat, South Andaman. In furtherance of the request made by the Port Management Board, Port Blair for acquisition of the respondents land for the purpose of creating Foreshore Port facilities, the Andaman and Nicobar Administration issued notification dated 23.7.2002 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). On the next day, i.e., 24.7.2002 another notification was issued under Section 17(4) and the application of Section 5A of the Act was dispensed with. The declaration under Section 6 read with Section 17(1) was issued on 30.7.2002. The Land Acquisition Collector issued notice dated 6.8.2002 under Section 9(1) to the respondent for taking possession. Simultaneously, the requisitioning body was directed to deposit an estimated amount of L 14,20,97,426. However, due to paucity of funds, the requisitioning body represented that it is in a position to deposit only L 3.10 crores towards a portion of the acquired land in the first phase of acquisition. Thereafter, the Land Acquisition Collector passed an award in respect of 3.64 hectares land out of total 8.86 hectares land and the amount payable under the said part, i.e., L 3,03,03,567 was paid to the respondent. No further steps were taken for the acquisition of the remaining land despite the fact that the Administration had invoked Section 17 of the Act. In the meanwhile, the workers of the respondent company, who had not received their Voluntary Retirement Scheme compensation, raised an industrial dispute which culminated into an award providing for payment of the compensation out of the compensation to be received by the respondent company from acquisition of its land. The respondent then filed Writ Petition No.197/2004 for issue of a direction to the Administration to pass final award in respect of balance land measuring 5.22 hectares. By an order dated 25.11.2004, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants herein to complete the land acquisition proceedings within four months from the date of order. M.A.T.No.001/2005 filed by the appellants was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.

Reasoning:
17. In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of the estimated compensation was not paid to the appellants although Sectionrequired that it should have been paid before possession of the said land was taken but that does not mean that the possession was taken illegally or that the said land did not thereupon vest in the first respondent."7. Besides it has to be pointed out that the Government after taking possession pursuant to the notification under Section 17 of the Act cannot withdraw itself from acquisition even under Section 48 of the Act. This Court in the very same decision in Satendra Prasad Jains case has dealt with this aspect. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted below:"14. There are two judgments of this Court which we must note. In Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan 1993(2) SCC 84 it was held that Government could not withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 once it had taken possession of the land. In Lt. Governor of H.P. v. Avinash Sharma 1970(2) SCC 149 it was held that:"8. ...after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Section 17(1) the land is vested in the Government, and the notification cannot be cancelled under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of the powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Any other view would enable the State Government to circumvent the specific provision by relying upon a general power. When possession of the land is taken under Section 17(1), the land vests in the Government. There is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification."8. In view of the aforesaid judgment, we hold that there is no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants.