Case: Rai Bahadur Diwan Badri Das Vs. The Industrial Tribunal, Punjab

2. The facts leading to the dispute are few and they lie within a very narrow compass. The appellants are the Trustees of the Tribune Press and Paper and the Trust is being worked in accordance with the terms of the will executed by Dya1 Singh Majithia on the June 15, 1895. In carrying out the policy of the Trust, the five appellants have executed a Power-of-Attorney in favour of Mr. R. P. Sharma and the Press in managed and the Paper is conducted to carry out the policy laid down by the will.3. It appears that before the 1st of July, 1956, for the purpose of leave, the appellants had divided their employees into two categories (1) the Lino-operators and (2) the rest of the workmen in the Press Section; and Rule 57 made provision for leave on the basis of the said classification. The effect of the said rule was that no press worker other than the lino operator was entitled to any kind of paid leave although he was given the right to claim 30 days wages plus dearness allowance payable in January every year if he had worked for 11 months. In addition, the said press worker was entitled to quarantine leave on the terms mentioned in R. 53.4. This position was substantially altered on July 1, 1956, when the appellants framed a new Rule in respect of earned leave This rule abolished the two categories of worker on which the earlier R. 57 was based and divided the workers into two categories (i) workers who were employed on or before July 1, 1956, (ii) those who were employed after July 1, 1956) respect of the former category of workmen, the new Rule made the followingto the provisions of the Indian Factories Act, 1948, every workman in the service of the Tribune on the 1st July 1956 will be entitled to 30 days leave with wages, after having worked for a period of 11 months. This leave shall cease to be earned, when it amount to 60regard to the workmen falling under the latter category, earned leave was to be governed by the provisions of S.79 of the Indian Factories Act. It is common ground that the provision for earned leave made by the said Section is a provision for minimum earned leave which the employer is bound to give; whether or not additional leave should be granted by way of earned leave is a matter within the discretion of the employer. As a result of the new rule the position was that the employees who had joined the service of the appellants on or before July 1, 1956 were entitled to 30 days earned leave with wages whereas those who joined after the said date became entitled to the statutory minimum of 21 days of earned leave.5. At the time when this rule came into force there were 94 old employees to whom the rule applied and 27 new employees to whom by virtue of the new Rule, S. 79 of the Factories Act was made applicable. Gradually, new hands have also been employed and to all such new employees S. 79 is applicable. It appears that by its resolution passed on January 8, 1960, the Tribune employees union sent to the Management a charter embodying about 20 demands. Attempts at conciliation were made but they failed and so, on April 4, 1960, eight of the said demands were referred by the Punjab Government to the Industrial Tribunal for its adjudication under S. 10 of the Industrial disputes Act. One of these demands was in relation to earned leave. The demand was that the employees in the Press Section should be allowed 30 days earned leave with full wages for every 11 months service without any discrimination. The Tribunal allowed this demand and than held that all workmen of the Press are entitled to30 days earned leave without making any distinction between workmen who joined before July l, 1956 and those who joined subsequently.It is the validity of this award which is questioned before us by the appellants.

Reasoning:
We have referred to the illustrations to show how under the impact of the demand of social justice, the doctrine of absolute freedom of contract has beenin the decision of the dispute, some principles have to be followed or evolved, that must be done; but care must be taken not to evolve larger principles which would tend to prejudge issues not directly raised in the case before the industrial Tribunal. That is why we think we would not be justified in giving any general answer to the broad contention raised by the learned Solicitor-General before us in the presentis no evidence adduced in this case in regard to the conditions of earned leave prevailing in the comparable industry in this region. But we cannot ignore the fact that this very concern provides for better facilities of earned leave to a section of its employees when other terms and conditions of service are the same in respect of both the categories of employees. It is not difficult to imagine that the continuance of these two different provisions in the same concern is likely to lead to dissatisfaction and frustration amongst the new employees. It cannot be denied that the existence of industrial peace and harmony and the continuance of the said peace and harmony are relevant factors, but their importance should not be unduly exaggerated. If a frivolous demand in made by the employees and it is accompanied by a threat that noncompliance with the demand would lead to industrial disharmony or absence of peace, it would be unreasonable to treat the threat as relevant in deciding the merits of the demand. In this connection it is necessary to remember that the continuance of harmonious relations between the employer and his employees is treated as relevant by industrial adjudication because it leads to more production and thereby has a healthy impact on national economy, and so it is necessary that in dealing with several industrial disputes, industrial adjudication has to bear in mind the effect of its decisions on national economy. In their zeal to fight for their respective claims, the parties may choose to ignore the demand of national economy, but industrial adjudication cannot. If the demand is plainly frivolous, it has to be rejected whatever the consequences may be. In the present case, the argument that the continuance of two different provisions would lead to disharmony cannot however, be treated as frivolous. It is difficult to understand on what principle the discrimination isour opinion, the validity of this argument cannot be accepted in the circumstances of thisthese matters, there are no absolutes and no formula can be evolved which would invariably give an answer to different problems which may be posed in different cases on different facts.Take the case of the wages of dearness allowance which the appellants paid to their employees. Would the appellants be justified in assertion of their right of freedom of contract to offer less favourable terms of wages or dearness allowance to employees who would be employed after a certain date? If the general point raised by the learned Solicitor-General is upheld without any qualifications, then it would be open to the employer to fix different wages for different sets of workmen who are doing the same kind of work in his concern. We have rarely come across a case where such a claim has either been made or has been upheld. It is well-known that both industrial legislation and industrial adjudication seek to attain similarity or uniformity of terms of service in the same industry existing in the same region, as far as it may be practicable or possible, without doing injustice or harm to any particular employer or a group of employers. That being so, we do not think the Tribunal was in error in holding that in the matter of earned leave, there should be uniformity of conditions of service governing all the employees in the service of the appellants.12. There is another aspect of this question to which reference must be made. This is not a case in which the financial liability imposed on the employer by the award when it directed the employer to grant the earned leave of 30 days to all the employees, is very heavy; and so, having regard to the fact that the appellants have been conducting their business in a profitable way and their financial position is distinctly good, no attempt has been made before us, and rightly, to suggest that the burden imposed by the award is beyond their means. It is not disputed that the total annual liability which may accrue as a result of the award may not exceed Rs. 1,000/- and it is also common ground that the appellants are flourishing concern and their net profits which were in the neighbourhood of a lac of rupees in 1949 have shown an upward tendency and have reached almost rupees eight lacs in 1959. That is another factor which has to be borne in mind in dealing with the present dispute.13. It is not suggested by the appellants that the provision made by them for earned leave in respect of old employees is unduly generous or extravagant and so, it has become necessary to invoke the provisions of Section 79 of the Factories Act in respect of new employees on the other hand, earned leave provided by Section 79 is the minimum statutory leave to which employees are entitled and if the appellants thought it necessary to provide for additional earned leave to their old employees there is no reason why they should not make a similar provision in respect of the new employees as well. We ought to add that on the record, it does appear that the appellants are good employers and they are treating their employees in a liberal manner. It, however, appears that they have brought the present dispute to this Court more for asserting the general principle of the employers right to fix conditions of service with his new employees than for vindicating any real or substantial grievance against the award which would prejudicially affect their interest.In our opinion. having regard to the nature of the dispute raised in the present appeal and the other relevant facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the Industrial Tribunal erred in law in directing the appellants to provide for the same uniform rule as to earned leave for all their employees. We are satisfied that the award under appeal cannot be set aside only on the academic or abstract point of law raised by the appellants.