Case: A.P. Krishnasami Naidu &amp; Others Vs. State of Madras

1. These six petitions under Art. 32 of Constitution raise a common question about the constitutionality of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, No 58 of 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), which was assented to by the President on April 13, 1962 and came into force on publication in the Fort St. George Gazette on May 2, 1962. The constitutionality of the Act is attacked on the ground that it violates Arts. 14, 19 and 31 (2) of the Constitution. It is not necessary to set out in full the attack made on the constitutionality of the Act in these petitions. It will be enough if we indicate the two main attacks on the constitutionality of the Act under Art. 14. The first of these is with respect to S. 5 of the Act which lays down the ceiling area. The second is on S. 50 of the Act read with Sch. III thereof, which provides for compensation. It is urged that the Act is not protected under Art.of the Constitution and is therefore open to attack in case it violates Arts. 14, 19 or 31. The petitioners in this connection rely on the judgment of this Court in K. Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, 1962 Supp (1) SCR 829 : AIR 1962 SC 723  ).

Reasoning:
We are of opinion that this contention is correct and the ratio of that case applies with full force to the present case. It was observed in that case that " where the ceiling is fixed ... by a double standard and over and above that the family has been given an artificial definition which does not correspond with a natural family as know to personal law, there is bound to be discrimination resulting from such a provision" . In the present case alsohas been given an artificial definition as will immediately be clear on reading S. 3(14), which we have set out above. It is true that this definition ofin S. 3(14) is not exactly the same as in the Kerala Act. Even so there can be no doubt that the definition of the wordin the present case is equally artificial. Further in the Kerala Act S. 58 fixed a double standard for the purpose of ceiling; in the present case S. 5(1)(a) fixes a double standard though there is this distinction that in S. 5(1) the same ceiling is fixed in the case of a person as in the case of family consisting of not more than five members, namely, 30 standard acres while in the Kerala Act, the ceiling fixed for a family of not more than five was double that for an adult unmarried person. But that in our opinion makes no difference in substance. The provision of S. 5(1) results in discrimination between persons equally circumstanced and is thus violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This will be clear from a simple example of an undivided Hindu family, which we may give. Take the case of a joint Hindu family consisting of a father, two major sons and two minor sons, and assume that the mother is dead. Assume further that this natural family has 300 standard acres of land. Clearly according to the personal law, it there is a division in the family, the father and each of the four sons will get 60 standard acres per head. Now apply S. 5(1) to this family. The two major sons being not members of the family because of the artificial definition given to "family" in S.3(14) of the Act will be entitle to S. 32 standard acres each as individuals and the rest of their holdings i.e. 30 standard acres in the case of each will be surplus land. But the father and the two minor sons being an artificial family as defined in S. 3(14) will be entitled to 30 standard acres between them and will thus lose 150 standard acres, which will become surplus land. This shows clearly how this double standard in the matter of ceiling read with the artificial definition ofwill result in complete discrimination between these five members of a natural family. Under the Hindu law each member would be entitled to one-fifth share in the 300 standard acres belonging to the family.Under the Act however the two major sons will keep 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons together will keep 30 standard acres which work out to 10 standard acres each. The two major sons will thus lose 30 standard acres each while the father and the two minor sons will lose fifty standard acres each. No justification has been shown on behalf of the State for such discriminatory treatment resulting in the case of members of a joint Hindu family; nor are we able to understand why this discrimination which clearly results from the appellant of S. 5(1) of the Act is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Examples can be multiplied with reference to joint Hindu families which would show that discrimination will result on the application of this provision. Similarly we are of opinion that discrimination will result in the case of Marumakattayyam family, Aliyasanthana family and a Nambudiri Illom, particularly in the case of the former two where the husband and wife do not belong to the same family. We are clearly of opinion that as in the case of S. 58 of the Kerala Act so in the case of S. 5(1) of the Act discrimination is writ large on the consequences that follow from S. 5(1). We therefore, hold that S. 5(1) is violative of the fundamental right enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. As the section is the basis of Chapter II of the Act, the whole Chapter must fall along withthe four cases where the net annual income is respectively Rs. 5,000/- Rs. 10,000/- Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 20,000/-. The first person whose net annual income is Rs. 5,000/- will get Rs. 60,00/-, as compensation the second person whose net annual income is Rs. 10,000/- will get Rs. 1,15,000/-, and third person with a net annual income of rupees 15,000/-- will get Rs. 1,65,000/- and the person with a net annual income of Rs.20,000/- will get rupees 2,10,000/- If the same multiplier had been applied as in the case of the first slab of Rs. 5,000/- to the other three slabs also, these persons would have got compensation of Rs. 1,20,000/-; Rs. 1,80,000/- and Rs. 2,40,000/-. This will show that in effect there is a cut of about 4 per cent on the total compensation which corresponds to the purchase price in the Kerala Act in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 10,000/-, of about 8 per cent in the case of a person with a net annual income of Rs. 15,000/- and of about 12 percent in the case of person with a net annual income of Rs 20,00/-. Though the manner of arriving at the total compensation is ostensibly different from that provided in the Kerala Act, its effect is the same, namely as the total net income goes up after the first slab of Rs. 5,000/-, there is a progressive cut in the total compensation just as was the case in the Kerala Act. The argument that the cut is justified on the same basis as higher rates of income-tax on higher slabs of income has already been rejected by this Court in K. Kunhikomn case, (1962) Supp (1) SCR 829: (AIR 1962 SC 723  ). Therefore, for the reasons given in that case we are of opinion that the provisions contained in S. 50 read with Sch. III of the Act with respect to compensation are discriminatory and violate Art. 14 of the Constitution.Sections 5 and 50 are the pivotal provisions of the Act, and if they fall, then we are of opinion that the whole Act must be struck down as unconstitutional. The working of the entire Act depends on S. 5 which provides for ceiling and S. 50 which provides for compensation. If these sections are unconstitutional, as we hold they are, the whole Act must fall.