Case: Shyamcharan Sharma Vs. Dharamdas

d sought eviction of thet from the suit premises an two grounds: (i) failure to pay arrears of rent of Rs. 158.25 despite service of notice of demand and (ii) bonafide requirement of premises for landlords personal occupation. The second ground was rejected by all the subordinate courts and we are no longer concerned with that ground. In regard to the first ground, the trial Court found that the tenant was in arrears of payment of rent but that the tenant was entitled to the Protection of s. 12(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, as the tenant had deposited the arrears of rent within the time allowed by the Court on his application. When the appeal preferred by the landlord was pending before the Additional District Judge, Satna, the tenant filed an application for condonation o f delay R in depositing the rent, month by month, which had become payable after the filing of the suit, as stipulated by s. 13(1) of the Act. It appears that, on several occasions, when the suit and the appeal were pending before the trial court and the appellate court respectively, the tenant had deposited the monthly rent a day or two or three, beyond the prescribed date. The amount had been received by the court and drawn out by the landlord, apparently without any protest. Ta king advantage of the filing of the tenants application for condonation of delay, the landlord contended that the court had no power to extend the time for deposit of the monthly rent and that he was entitled to a decree for eviction consequent on thee with the provisions of s. 13 ( 1 ) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. The appellate court negatived the landlords contention and dismissed the appeal. The landlord preferred a Second Appeal to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. The High Court, holding that the court had no power to extend time, decreed the suit for eviction. The tenant, having obtained special leave, has appealed to this Court.

Reasoning:
It is true that in order to entitle a tenant to claim the protection of s. 12(3), the tenant has to make a payment or deposit as required by s. 13, that is to say, the arrears of rent should be paid or deposited within one month of the service of the writ of summons on the tenant or within such further time as may be allowed by the court, and should further deposit or pay e very month by the 15th, a sum equivalent to the rent. It does not, however, follow that failure to pay or deposit a sum equivalent to the rent by the 15th of every month, subsequent to the filing of the suit for eviction, will entitle the landlord, straight away, to a decree for eviction. The consequences of the deposit or payment andt ort are prescribed by. (5) and (6) of s. 13. Since there is a statutory provision expressly prescribing the consequence of nondepositort of the rent, we must look to and be guided by that provision only to deter mine what shall follow. S. 13 (6) does not clothe thed with an automatic right to a decreedoes it visit t he tenant with the penalty of a decreeeviction being straightaway passed against him. S. 13(6) vests, in the court, the discretion tor the striking out of the defence against eviction. In other, the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, mayormay not strike out the defence. If s. 13 were to be construed asy and not as vesting a discretion in the Court, it might result in the situation that a tenant who hasd the arrears of rent within the time stipulated by s. 13(1) but who fails todepositthereafter the monthly rent on a single occasiona cause beyond his control may have his defence struck out and be liable to summary eviction. We think that s. 13 quite clearly confers a discretion, on the court, to strikeoutornot to strikeoutthe defence, if default is made indepositorpayment of rent as required by s. 13(1). If the court has the discretionnot to strikeoutthe defence of a tenant committing default inpaymentordepositas required by s. 13(1), the court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time. Such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretionnot to strikeoutthe defence. Another construction may lead, in some cases, to a perversion of the object of the Act namely, the adequate protection of the tenant. S. 12(3) entitles a tenant to claim protection against evic tion on the ground specified in s. 12(1) (a) if the tenant makespaymentordepositas required by s. 13. On our construction of s. 13 that the Court has the power to extend the time, it must follow thatpaymentordepositwithin the extended time will entitle the tenant to claim the protection. of s. 12(3). One of the arguments advancede us was that there was no express provisionextension of time. of monthly rent subsequent to the filing of the suit whereas there was such express provisiont ofarrears of rent that had accruede the filing of the suit. Obviously, express provisionn of timet ofrent falling due after the filing of the suit was not made in s. 13(1) as the consequence oft wasproposed to be dealt with by a separate. namely s. 13(6). Express provision had to be maden of timet ofrent that had accruedr tothe filing of the suit, since that wouldy be at a very early stage of the suit when a written statement might not be filed and there would., be no question of strikingoutthe defence and, so, there would be no question of s. 13(6) covering the situation.In Jagdishv. New Education Society, a full bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that s. 13((6) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act did not make itr thecourt to strikeoutthe defence but vested in the court a discretion to strikeoutornot to strikeoutthe defence. Having so held, the full bench stoppedt ofgiving full effect to their conclusion by holding D. that the Court could condone the default and refuse to strikeoutthe defence but it could not give thet ofs. 12(3)or13(5) to the tenant. We do not see any justificationadopting this narrow construction of ss. 12 and 13. In our view the discretion given to the court under s. 13(6) must be held to imply a discretion to condone the delay and extend the time in makingdepositorpaymentunder s. 13(1). In B. C. Kame v. Nem Chand Jain, a tenant had committed default both inpaymentof arrears as well as inpaymentof the monthly rent which became payableafterthe filing of the suit.This Court took the view that on an application made by the tenant timet could