Case: Ved Prakash Gupta Vs. Delton Cable India Ltd

This civil appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 11th January, 1982 dismissing in limine Writ Petition No. 26 of 1982 which had been filed by the appellant Ved Prakash Gupta. The appellant was an employee of the first respondent M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., Faridabad, Haryana. He was given a charge-sheet by the management on 5th August, 1979 and dismissed from service on 13th September, 1979 after having been found guilty of the charge in the domestic enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer who has been examined as one of the witnesses on the side of the management before the Labour Court at a later stage. There was a reference of the dispute arising out of the dismissal of the appellant to the Labour Court, Faridabad in Reference No. 143 of 1980 under S. 10(i)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act.The Labour Court framed the following issuesWhether the claimant Shri Ved Prakash Gupta was in the position of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act ? If so, to what effect ?(ii) Whether the reference is bad in law in view of the objections raised in the written statement ? If so, to what effect ?(iii) Whether proper and valid domestic enquiry has been conducted ? If so, to what effect ?(iv) Whether the termination of the service of the workman is proper, justified and in order ? If not, to what relief is he entitledIssues 1 and 2 were tried preliminary issues by the Labour Court. The Labour Court held on issue No. 1 that the appellant is not a workman within the meaning of the definition of workman contained in S.2(s) of the Act. Consequently, it was held that the reference is bad in law in the light of the objections raised by the management in the written statement. The Labour Court held that there was no need to consider the other two issues and passed an award against the appellant. It was against that award that the appellant filed the writ petition which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court in limine on 11th January, 1982. This Court granted special leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court and later directed the Labour Court to try the other issues on the basis that the appellate is a workman as per the Act. The Labour Court accordingly tried the other two issues and held that though the domestic enquiry was fair and proper the finding of the enquiry officer was perverse. The Labour Court has observedEnquiry Officer sold have given findings according to the evidence before him in the enquiry proceeding. He has neglected Exts. M-4 and M-6 while giving the findings in the enquiry. He also failed to summon the necessary witnesses and rejected the request of the workman for challenging those witnesses.The Labour Court found that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the appellant was disproportionate to the gravity of the charge framed against him and that he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service.4. The management filed Writ Petition No. 4567 of 1982 in the High Court against the order of the Labour Court holding that the finding of the Enquiry Officer was perverse and that the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service. The writ petition has been withdrawn to this Court by order dated 9th July, 1983 to be heard along with the civil appeal. This is how the civil appeal and the writ petition have come up before us.

Reasoning:
11. The finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry was fair and proper in the light of its own finding that the enquiry officer failed to summon the necessary witnesses and rejected the request of the appellant for challenging the witnesses could not be stated to be correct. On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side of the management before the Labour Court and they are S. K. Bagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi Chand, MW-5 an Accountant of M/s. Gurumukh Dass. MW-2 has deposed about the appellant abusing Durg Singh who according to the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Union while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a revival trade union. MWs-3 and 4 are stated to have corroborated the evidence of MW-2. MW-5 is the only independent witness examined on the said of the management. It is seen from the judgment of the Labour Court relating to the merits of the case that MW-5 who has deposed about the challans Exts. M-7 and M-8 having been returned to the person who accompanied him from the maintenance department had not supported the management that the appellant abused Durg Singh or any other person within the premises of the factory. It is also seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that though the appellant had produced before the Enquiry Officer 5 sheets of papers with the signatures of about 100 workmen of the factory in support of the statement that the appellant had not abused anyone in the factory during the course of his service and the management had produced Exts. M-6, a list of 90 persons before the Enquiry Officer, he had not called any of those persons to ascertain the truth regarding the alleged abuse of Durg Singh and S. K. Bagga by the appellant. It is also seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that the appellant was not given a list of the managements witnesses before the commencement of the domestic enquiry. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Labour Court that the Enquiry Officer had not acted properly in the proceedings and that he had not given full opportunity to the appellant as required by law does not call for any interference. The charge levelled against the appellant is not a serious one and it is not known how the charge even if proved would result in any much less total loss of confidence of the management in the appellant as the management would have it in the charge. It was argued in the Labour Court that there was no previous adverse remark against the appellant. There is nothing on record to show that any previous adverse remark against the appellant had been taken into consideration by the management for awarding the extreme penalty of dismissal from service to the appellant even if he had in fact abused in filthy language Durg Singh and S. K. Bagga.We are therefore of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed against him. We are also of the opinion that no responsible employer would ever impose in like circumstances the punishment of dismissal to the employee and that victimization or unfair labour practice could well be inferred from the conduct of the management in awarding the extreme punishment of dismissal for a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the appellant within the premises of the factory. We therefore hold that the termination of the appellants service is invalid and unsustainable in law, and that he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits including continuity of service.A perusal of the evidence ofregarding the nature of the duties performed by the appellant shows that the substantial part of the work of the appellant consisted of looking after the security of the factory and its property by deputing the watchmen working under him to work at the factory gate or sending them toor around the factory or to accompany visitors to the factory and making entries in the visitors register as regards the visitors and in the concerned registers as regards materials entering or going out of the premises of the factory. It must be noted thathas admitted in his evidence that there is nothing in writing to show what duties are to be carried out by the appellant. Placed in such a situation the appellant might have been doing other items of work such as signing identity cards of workmen, issuing some small items of stores like torchcells etc. to his subordinate watchmen, which can be got from the stores even under the signatures of watchmen and filling up application forms of other workmen andthem or recommending advances and loans or for promotion of his subordinates. It must also be remembered that the evidence of bothshows that the appellant could never appoint or dismiss any workman or order any enquiry against any workman. In these circumstances we hold that the substantial duty of the appellant was only that of a Security Inspector at the gate of the factory premises and that it was neither managerial nor supervisory in nature in the sense in which those terms are understood in industrial law. In the light of the evidence and the legal position referred to above we are of the opinion that the finding of the Labour Court that the appellant is not a workman within the meaning of S.2(s) of the Act is perverse and could not be supported. On the evidence available or record we hold that the appellant clearly falls within the definition of a workman in S.2(s) of the Act and that the reference of the dispute under S. 10(i)(c) of the Act is valid in law.