Case: Firm Sardarilal Vlshwanath and Others Vs. Pritam Singh

The backdrop of facts is this: the tenant, a firm, under two separate rent notes from two separate landlords having specified shares in the demised premises, took on lease the premises and the tenancy commenced from 1st January 1960 and the demise was for a period of 11 months. On the expiry of the period reserved by the lease the tenant continued in possession.

Reasoning:
It is manifestly clear that the Court did not lay down a proposition that a notice to quit is necessary before commencing an action against a statutory tenant under any of the enabling provisions of the Rent Restriction Act. On the contrary, apparently the view that such a notice is not necessary is affirmed and simultaneously a doubt is reflected in saying that the aspect may not be explored any more. However, it cannot be said that Ratanlals case is an authority for the proposition that a notice under s. 106, Transfer of Property Act must be served before initiating an action for ejectment against a statutory tenant. We may point out that the Court having not been seized of such a point, has not referred to K. B. Capadias case (supra) and Ganga Dutt Murarka s casesecond contention requires re-examination of the findings of fact which this Court ordinarily in appeal by special leave would not undertake. After one remand by the first appellate authority , all the Courts have concurrently found that the building is in a dilapidated condition and unfit for human habitation and requires to be constructed. Mr. Mahajan made a cryptic submission that even after the lapse of 15 years during which this protracted litigation has moved from court to Court, the building stands erect and the tenant has used it for the purpose for which it was let out and, therefore, this Court would be shutting its eyes to the reality if it affirms the decree for evict ion on the ground that the building is unfit for human habitation. It appears that the tenant has been carrying out some minor repairs to keep the building standing and that he seems to be doing in his own interest. The finding, however, is that t he eastern wall of the building is altogether out of plumb and it cannot be repaired or replaced without the building being vacated by the tenant. The roof of the building is also uneven and that too cannot be set right without eviction. The se are findings supported by evidence and once they are accepted, the decree for eviction deserves to bethe period reserved under the lease was of 11 months, obviously the lease determined by efflux of time limited thereby as provided in s. 111 (a) of the Transfer of Propertythe period reserved under the lease was of 11 months, obviously the lease determined by efflux of time limited thereby as provided in s. 111 (a) of the Transfer of PropertyAct. Section 116 provides for effect of holding over. If a lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease and the lessor accepts rent from the lessee or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased, as specified in s. 106. Ordinarily, acceptance of rent from a lessee whose lease determined b y efflux of time, would manifest the assent of the lessor to the lessee continuing in possession and in that event the lease would be renewed from year to year or month to month as the case may be, and the lessee would be a lessee holding over. This position which emerged under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act under went a basic change when the Rent Restriction Act was put on the statute book. The lessor, on the introduction of the Rent Restriction Act could not seek to evict the lessee on the only ground that the lease determined by efflux of time. The lessee was clothed with the protection of Rent Restriction Act. In such a situation the lessor, unless he wanted to proceed under the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act, had no option but to accept the rent and, therefore, acceptance of rent from a lessee clothed with the protection of Rent Restriction Act would not manifest the intention of the lessor to renew the lease. Something more than mere payment and acceptance of rent would be necessary to assert that the lessor has assented to the lessee continuing in possession and the lessor intended the renewal of the lease. Except for the acceptance of rent after the lease deter mined by efflux of time, nothing was pointed out to us to show that the lessor had otherwise assented to the lessee continuing in possession so as to infer the renewal of lease. Therefore, the lessee in this case is indisputably a statutory tenant and cannot seek any assistance from the provisions contained in s. 116 of the Transfer of Propertywould be advantageous to refer to the line of decisions unequivocally asserting that no notice as contemplated by s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary before initiating an action in ejectment against a statutory tenant under any of the enabling provisions of the relevant Rent Restriction Act and thereafter we would examine the batch of decisions from which sustenance is sought to be drawn in support of the submission that such a notice is necessary.