Case: Punjab National Bank Ltd Vs. Sri Ram Kanwar, Industrial Tribunal,Delhi

1. The Punjab National Bank Ltd. is the appellant before us. Shorn of all details not necessary for our purpose, the facts are these. By its Order No. LR-100(98) dated September 2, 1953, the Government of India, Ministry of labour, appointed Shri Ram Kanwar, respondent No. 1, as the Industrial Tribunal for the adjudication of a dispute which had arisen between the appellant and its workmen in respect of the followingof Bharat Bank employees in the Punjab National Bank Ltd., and their serviceApril 17, 1954, in the course of certain preliminary proceedings before respondent No. 1, an application was made on behalf of the All India Punjab National Bank Employees Federation, in which it was stated that a number of other Unions were involved in the dispute in question, because the appellant had branches all over in India and there were several Unions of its employees at those branches. It was further stated in the application that some of those Unions had submitted their statements when the dispute in question was referred to the Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, with Shri Panchapagesa Shastri as its sole member and Chairman; that Tribunal did not, however, function as Shri Panchapagesa Shastri was appointed a member of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India. Two substantial prayers were made in the application of April 17, 1954; one was that due publicity of the adjudication proceedings should be given by issuing notices to all those Unions to participate in the proceedings, and the second prayer was that an order should be made directing the appellant to pay travelling and halting allowances to the representatives of the various Unions so as to enable the latter to send their representatives to Delhi, the place where the adjudication proceedings were pending. A list of fourteen Unions and organisations was given along with the application, with the number of representatives which each union or organisation wished to send.2. In the present appeal we are concerned only with the second prayer made in the aforesaid application, and the order which respondent No. 1 made with regard to that prayer, being the order impugned before us, was in thesemanagement objects to the grant of any T. A. or Halting allowances to the representatives of the Unions. It is, no doubt, correct that there it no provision of law on this point in favour of the representatives, but the general practice of various Tribunals has all along been to allow reasonable T.A. and halting allowance to the representatives of the Unions, specially in Bank cases. It is, therefore, ordered that the representatives of the Unions, who put in appearance in the Tribunal from stations outside Delhi, shall be paid 2 1/2 second class railway fares to and from Delhi, plus Rs. 10 per day as halting allowance by the management of the Bank............................................................The Bank is also requested to direct its respective branches to pay travelling and halting allowances in advance to the employees who inter to come to Court as representatives".It may be stated here that out of the fourte Unions and organisations which wanted to see their representatives to take part in the adjudication proceedings, two have their offices in Delhi Respondent No. 1 directed the payment of travelling and halting allowances to the representatives of the remaining twelve Unions and organization and fixed the number of representatives to be sent by each Union or organisation.The plea of the appellant was that the order passed by respondent No. 1 was wholly without jurisdiction and was also unjust, involving as it did an expenditure of not less that Rs. 2,500 for each day of the hearing in the course of the proceedings before respondent No.On that plea the appellant moved the Punjab High Court for the issue of a writ of certiorari or such other writ as might be appropriate, for the purpose of quashing the order of respondent No.The Punjab High Court, however, dismissed the petition of the appellant in limine on May 14,The appellant then asked for and obtained special leave from this Court on October 18, 1954.

Reasoning:
6. In our opinion, the question admits of only one answer. Sub- s. (3) of S. 11 enumerates certain powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, and says that every Board, Court and Tribunal under the Act shall have those powers; the last enumerated power is in general terms, being "in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed". No rules made under the Act, bearing on the question of costs have been brought to our notice; therefore, all that can be said, with regard to the effect of sub-s. (3) of S. 11, is that except the enumerated powers, other powers vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure have not been given to the Board, Court or Tribunal under the Act. The Act, however, contains a separate provisions in the matter of costs and that is sub-s. (7) of S.a plain reading of the sub-section, it is manifest that (1) the expression "costs of any proceeding" means costs of the entire proceeding as determined on its conclusion and not costs in a pending proceeding, nor costs to be incurred in future by a party; and (2) the expression "costs incidental to any proceeding" similarly means costs of interlocutory applications, etc. - such costs as have been determined thereon, at the conclusion of the hearing. Neither of the two expression has any reference to costs payable in advance or to be incurred in future by a party; far less do they refer to halting and travelling allowances to be incurred by a party while attending the Court on his ownour opinion, this argument is wholly fallacious and proceeds on a misreading of the sub-section. The expression "it" in the concluding portion of the sub- section refers to the appropriate Government and not to the Tribunal; thus the very basis of the argument disappears and it is unnecessary to consider if the Tribunal becomes functus officio with the submission of its award - a proposition regarding which we express no opinion.8. It is not disputed that sub-s. (7) of S. 11 of the Act gives a discretion to the Tribunal, and it has full power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if any, the costs are to be paid. It is clear, however, that the discretion is a judicial discretion and must be exercised according to the rules of reason and justice - not by chance or caprice or private opinion or some fanciful idea of benevolence or sympathy. It is a negation of justice and reason to direct the appellant to pay in advance the costs of the respondents irrespective of the final result of the proceeding. The general rule is that costs follow the event unless the Court, for good reasons, otherwise orders.Respondent No. 1 gave no reasons for his order except that of practice - a practice, assuming there be any such practice, which is neither legal nor just. It may be conceded that the jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal is not invoked for the enforcement of mere contractual rights and liabilities of the parties to the dispute referred to the Tribunal for adjudication; its jurisdiction in the matter of adjudication of an industrial dispute is wider and more flexible. All the same, it is not an arbitrary jurisdiction; it may be readily conceded that an employee is as much entitled to a fair deal as an employer and he must be protected from victimisation and unfair labour practice, but social justice does not mean that reason and fairness must always yield to the convenience of a party - convenience of the employee at the cost of the employer as in this case - in an adjudication proceeding. Such one-sided or partial view is really next of kin to caprice orIn our opinion, not one of the aforesaid grounds is really sustainable, either in law or on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience. The circumstance that the Banks are well organised and their managements are in possession of resources cannot be a ground for making them pay for the expenses of the other party; if that is the principle to be applied, then in every case the richer party must be made to pay the expenses of the weaker party, irrespective of the ultimate result of the dispute; even in a dispute raised by the workmen which may be ultimately found to be devoid of all merit, the employer must be made to finance the workmen. Such a principle will merely encourage frivolous and unsubstantial disputes and will run counter to the object and purposes of the Act, namely, the promotion of industrial peace in the interests of the general public. The second circumstance that the adjudication is a compulsory adjudication applies equally to both parties. If it is a compulsory adjudication for the employees, it is equally so for the employer and we can see no reason why that circumstance should involve the imposition of a penalty on one of the parties to the dispute and not on the other. We have already pointed out that on a proper construction of the sub- section, there is no power in the Tribunal to direct the payment of the costs of a party in advance by the other party, irrespective of the final result of the proceeding, and the view expressed by the Bank Disputes Tribunal as to the construction of the relevant sub-section is manifestly erroneous; nor are we satisfied that prior to the addition of the sub-section, there was any consistent or uniform practice in the matter, so as to lead to the inference that the provisions of the sub-section gave statutory recognition to the practice. It is difficult to understand how the principles of natural justice can be invoked in aid of an order which penalises one party to a dispute by making it pay for the costs of the other party in advance, irrespective of the result of the proceeding. We can only say that such an order is neither natural nor has any element of justice inare in agreement with the view expressed above.13. It would appear from what we have stated above that there was no uniform or consistent practice in the matter, and we are further of the view that if there was any such practice, it was neither warranted by law nor by the principles of reason and justice.As we began, so we end:, there is only one answer to the question and that answer is that respondent No. 1 had no power, in the exercise of his discretion under sub-s. (7) of S. 11 of the Act, to direct the appellant in this case to pay the travelling and halting allowances of the representatives of the Unions in a pending proceeding and irrespective of its final result.