Case: Bhimraj Pannalal Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa

The assessee, appellant before us, is a Hindu undivided family carrying on business in cloth and grains at Ranchi in the State of Bihar. It was assessed toin the assessment years7. Subsequent to the original assessments made for those years, theOfficer received definite information that the appellant was carrying on business with Messrs. Mangalchand Basantlal of Khurja in the district of Aligarh in the State of Uttar Pradesh under different names; that it had remitted certain amounts from Ranchi to Messrs. Mangalchand Basantlal; that Messrs. Mangalchand Basantlal had sent a draft of Rs. 2, 500 to Amritsar on behalf of and under the instruction of the appellant ; and that the appellant had also earned profits by business dealings in peas, etc., none of which business transactions were shown in the account books of the appellant. When the original assessments were made, the profits made from the aforesaid business transactions were not taken into account. Thereafter, on receiving copies of the accounts of Messrs. Mangalchand Basantlal from Aligarh, theOfficer started proceedings under section 34 of the Act with the previous sanction of the Commissioner ofand issued notices to the appellant. In the returns which the appellant submitted in answer to the said notices, it showed the same income as in the original returns ; it admitted some of the transactions with Messrs. Mangalchand Basantlal but contended that those transactions were financed out of its " zamindari " income, and were, therefore, not entered in the account books. TheOfficer found that explanation to be incorrect, and held that the appellant had concealed its income and on the materials further held that the escaped income for the three years in question amounted to Rs. 40, 000, Rs. 40, 000 and Rs. 15, 000 respectively. The appellant then preferred appeals to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and contended that the proceedings under section 34 were ab initio void. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected that contention, but held the amounts of escaped income to be Rs. 32, 000, Rs. 30, 000 and Rs. 15, 000 respectively. Then, there was another appeal to theAppellate Tribunal and the same contention was again urged on behalf of the appellant, namely, that the proceedings under section 34 of the Act were not legally valid. The Tribunal rejected that contention, but reduced the amounts to Rs. 28, 000, Rs. 26, 000 and Rs. 12, 000 respectively. Thereafter, the appellant moved the Tribunal for referring a certain question of law which, according to the appellant, arose out of the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal originally framed the question in the following terms &quot; Whether in the facts and circumstances of these cases the proceedings started on December 10, 1947, under section 34 of theAct, as amended by Act XLVIII of 1948, for reopening the assessments of the years47 were valid ? "But this reference was not pressed. The appellant then moved the High Court under section 66(2) of the IndianAct, 1922, and the High Court framed the question in each of the three cases and called for a statement. We need read only one of the questions, viz., that relating to the assessment yearot; Whether in thecircumstances of the case the assessment of a sum of Rs. 28, 000 toin the hands of the assessee is legally valid under section 34 of theAn identical question was framed in the other two cases, except for the difference in the amount of escaped income for the yearshe High Court answered the question against the assessee in its judgment and order dated April 24, 1957. The answer was the same in all the three cases relating to the three assessment years. The three appeals have been preferred from the said judgment and order of the High Court of Patna

Reasoning:
We consider that this contention is not now open to the appellant. The question as framed by the High Court was indeed wide enough to entitle the appellant to raise the point that the quantum of the assessment for each assessment year was not legally sustainable as there were no materials in support thereof. But the appellant did not raise any such point in the High Court. Onthe contrary, the judgment of the High Court records that " Mr. S. N. Dutt, who appeared for the assessee in each case, has not disputed the quantum of assessment. " Thet advanced in the High Courtthat the assessed income could not be said to be "escaped income" within the meaning of section 34, and, secondly, that there was no material to support the assessment under section 34.Both these arguments were fully dealt with by the High Court and learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that there is any error in the reasoning of the High Court with regard to them. The quantum of assessment was not questioned in the High Court, and the appellant cannot now be allowed to raise a contention which counsel for the appellant had specifically given up in the High CourtLearned counsel for the appellant has made a futile attempt to show that the appellant contested the quantum of assessment also and in the High Court the validity of assessment even with regard to its quantum was challenged. The record of the High Court settles the question conclusively ; and neither in the application for leave to appeal to this court, nor in the statement of the case filed here on behalf of the appellant, was it stated that learned counsel did not make the concession as recorded in the judgment of the High Court or that he disputed the quantum of assessment for any of the three years in question