Case: H. H. Raja Harinder Singh Vs. S.Karnail Singh

1. The appellant was one of the candidates who stood for election to the Legislative Assembly of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union from the Faridkot Constituency in the General Elections held in 1954. He secured the largest number of votes, and was declared duly elected. The result was notified in the Official Gazette on February 27, 1954, and, the return of the election expenses was published therein on May 2, 1954. On May 18, 1954, the first respondent filed a petition under S. 81 of the Representation of the People Act, No. XLIII of 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and therein he prayed that the election of the appellant might be declared void on the ground that he and his agents had committed various corrupt and illegal practices, of which particulars were given. The appellant filed a written statement denying these allegations. He therein raised the further contention that the election petition had not been presented within the time limited by law, and was therefore liable to be dismissed.The plea put forward by the appellant in his written statement based on R. 119 (a) was that whatever might have been the reason therefor, the fact was that the petition had not been filed "not later than fourteen days" from the publication of the return of the election expenses, which was on May 2, 1954 and that it was therefore not presented within the time prescribed. The Tribunal overruled this plea on the ground that under R. 2 (6) of the Election Rules, the General Clauses Act, X of 1897, was applicable in interpreting them, and that under S. 10 of that Act, the election petition was presented within the time allowed by R. 119 (a). On the merits, the Tribunal held that of the grounds put forward in the Election Petition, one and only one had been substantiated, and that was that the appellant had employed for payment, in connection with his election, 25 persons in addition to the number of persons allowed under R. 118 read along Sch. VI thereto, and had thereby committed the major corrupt practice mentioned in S. 123 (7) of the Act. The Tribunal accordingly declared the election void under S. 100 (2)(b) of the Act. It also observed that on its finding aforesaid, the appellant had incurred the disqualification enacted in Ss.140 (1) (a) and 140 (2) of the Act. Against this decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave.

Reasoning:
5. This argument proceeds on an interpretation of S. 10 of the General Clauses Act which, in our opinion, is erroneous. Broadly stated, the object of the section is, to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where, therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday then according to the section the act should be considered to have been done within that period, if it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. For that section to apply, therefore, all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday. Now, it cannot be denied that the period of fourteen days provided in R. 119 (a) for presentation of an election petition is a period prescribed, and that is its true character, whether the words used are "within fourteen days" or "not later than fourteen days".That the appellant between these two expressions is without substance will be clear beyond all doubt, when regard is had to S. 81 of the Act. Section 81 (1) enacts that the election petition may be presented "within such time as may be prescribed", and it is under this section that R. 119 has been framed. It is obvious that the rule- making authority could not have intended to go further than what the section itself had enacted, andif the language of the Rule is construed in conjunction with and under the coverage of the section under which it is framed, the words "not later than fourteen days" must be held to mean the same thing as "within a period of fourteen days". Reference in this connection should be made to the heading of R. 119 which is, "Time within which an election petition shall be presented". We entertain no doubt that the Legislature has used both the expressions as meaning the same thing, and there are accordingly no grounds for holding that S. 10 is not applicable to petitions falling within R. 119.6. We are also unable to read in the proviso to S. 37 of the Act an intention generally to exclude the operation of S. 10 of the General Clauses Act in the construction of Rules, as that will be against the plain language of R. 2(6). It should be noted that that proviso applies only to S. 30 (c) of the Act, and it is possible that the Legislature might have considered it doubtful whether S. 30 (c) would, having regard to its terms, fall within S. 10 of the General Clauses Act and enacted the proviso ex abundanti cautela. The operation of such a beneficient enactment as S. 10 of the General Clauses Act is not, in our opinion, to be cut down on such unsubstantial grounds as have been urged before us.We are accordingly of opinion that the petition which the respondent filed on May 18,1954 is entitled to the protection afforded by that section and is in time.7. We should add that the appellant also raised the contention that if we agreed with him that the election petition was not presented in time, we should hold that the order of the Election Commission admitting the petition was not one of condonation within the proviso to, S. 85, because that proceeded on the footing that the petition was in time, and did not amount to a decision that if it was not, there were sufficient grounds for excusing the delay. We are not disposed to agree with this contention; but in the view which we have taken that the petition is in time, it is unnecessary to consider it.In our opinion, neither of these contentions is well-founded. Rule 118 does not require that the person engaged by a candidate to work in the election should have been specially employed for the purpose of the election. It is sufficient, on the wording of the Rule, that that person is employed in connection with the election.In the present case, the finding is that 25 persons belonging to the staff of the appellant had taken part in the election. It has been found that they had been in the service of the appellant for long time and that their appointment was not colourable for election purposes. It has also been found that they were not paid anything extra for what work they might have done in connection with the election. But there is no finding that having regard to the work which they are proved to have done, they must be taken to have been relieved of their original work and put on election work.In the absence of such a finding, it cannot be held that R. 118 had been infringed. It is possible that the Election Tribunal did not appreciate the true legal position and has in consequence failed to record the findings requisite for a decision on R. 118, and that would be a good ground on which we could, if the justice of the case required it, set aside the order and direct the matter to be heard afresh and disposed of by another Tribunal in accordance with law. But we do not consider that this is a fit case for passing such an order. The evidence adduced by the first respondent is very largely to the effect that the appellants men did election work in the morning or in the evening, that is, out of office hours. That shows that the work of the staff was in addition to their normal duties, and on the principles stated above, they could not be held to have been employed in connection with the election. As the first respondent does not appear himself to have understood the true position under R. 118 and has failed to adduce evidence requisite for a decision of the question, he must fail, the burden being on him to establish that that Rule had been infringed.