Case: Smt. Rukhamanbai Vs. Shivram and Others

Section 32 provided that on April 1, 1957 styled the tillers day, a tenant of agricultural land covered by the Tenancy Act would become the owner of the land held by him if other conditions specified in the section were fulfilled. A forum styled Agricultural Lands Tribunal was set-up and a procedure was prescribed in the Act to determine the price payable by such tenant to the erstwhile landlord on becoming owner of the land held by him. Accordingly five tenants of five different pieces of agricultural land made five separate applications on August 27, 1962 against a common landlord, the appellant herein before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal (ALT for short), Raver, under section 32 of the Tenancy Act for determining the price of land held by each of them as tenant. The land lord appeared in each proceeding and contested the right of the tenant to purchase the land, inter-alia, contending that under a deed of settlement dated May 22, 1930, she acquired a right only to usufruct of land involved in the dispute and thus she is a limited owner and the settlement imposes certain disability on her precluding her from dealing with the property which would indicate that she could not have leased out the land thereby creating an encumbrance which would be impermissible under the deed of settlement and consequently the tenant of each piece of land could not be said to be lawfully cultivating the land so as to become the deemed tenant under section 4 of the Tenancy Act. It was also contended that, the applicant (respondent herein) before ALT was not a tenant within the meaning of the Tenancy Act and therefore he could not have become the owner of the land on the tillers day. Alternatively, it was contended that the minor children of the landlord who being the limited owner, had acquired a vested right in the land involved in the dispute under the deed of settlement and therefore as the landlords were minors the date of compulsory purchase in the case of such minor-landlord would be postponed under section 32 and therefore the ALT had no jurisdiction to determine the price under section 32ALT held that the appellant was the landlord and the tenant in each case was a deemed tenant under section 4 of the Tenancy Act and on 1st April, 1957 by the operation of law he became the owner thereof. It was also held that the ALT was under a statutory obligation to determine the price under section 32 G. The ALT accordingly proceeded to determine the price in eachseparate appeals were preferred by the appellant landlord in each case to the Collector of Jalgaon. The Collector held that the present appellant landlord had a limited interest in the land and thus as her interest fell short of ownership, she could not be regarded as landlord within the meaning of the expression in the Tenancy Act , Consequently, the Collector held that the tenant in each case could not be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of the expression in the Tenancy Act. It was accordingly held that the tenant in each case did not become the deemed purchaser under section 32 and therefore the ALT had no jurisdiction to determine the price. The Collector allowed all the five appeals and dismissed the five applications preferred by the tenant in eachtenant in each case preferred a re vision petition under section 76 of the Tenancy Act before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Special Bench of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal by a common judgment allowed five revision petitions preferred by the tenants and set aside the order of the Collector and restored the order made by the ALT holding that even though the landlord in these cases was a limited owner the instrument settling the property on the landlord did not prohibit the landlord from leasing the land and l ease was accordingly valid and therefore under section 4, the tenant would be a deemed tenant within the meaning of the Tenancy Act and such deemed tenant would become the owner of the land held by him on the tillerslandlord approached the High Court under article 227 of the Constitution. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by a common judgment disposed of the five special civil applications filed by the landlord.

Reasoning:
Under the deed of settlement appellant acquired a life interest and the reversion-rem ainder was in her children. During her life time she was entitled to enjoy the income of the property but she could not dispose of the property by will, gift or sale. She was also under a disability to encumber the estate and it was urged th at lease is an encumbrance. The substantial question iswhether a limited owner of agricultural land governed by the Tenancy Act during his/her life time was entitled to lease the land and if he or she did lease the land whether the tenant ind ucted by the holder of life estate could be said to be lawfully cultivating the land so as to acquire the status of a deemed tenant under section 4 and as a corollary would become a deemed purchaser on the tillers day.Section 4 has been extrac ted hereinbefore. It comprehends within its sweep any person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to another person. If land belongs to one person and another is lawfully cultivating it, unless such person falls under any of the excepted ca tegories; he would acquire the status of a deemed tenant. The excepted categories are: (a) a member of the owners family, or (b) a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share of a hired labourer cultivating the land under t he personal supervision of the owner or any member of the owners family, or (c) a mortgagee in possession. It would thus appear that if the land belonging to one person is being lawfully cultivated by another person and that such other person is not a member of the owners family or a servant on wages payable in cash or kind but not in crop share or a hired labourer or a mortgagee in possession then such cultivator lawfully cultivating the land would be deemed to be a tenant. The legal fiction of clothing a lawful cultivator of land belonging to other person has widened the traditional concept of expression tenant which would normally imply contractual relationship.Under the deed of settlement appellant was given a life-estate. She was the owner of the land during her life time with a limitation that she could not will, gift or sell the property or encumber the same. In view of these four limitations she is undoubtedly a limited owner. But t his limited owner holding the life estate has been given the right to administer the estate after she attained majority. Administration of the estate would normally include leasing of the property except where a specific condition is prescribed precluding the administrator from leasing the property. There is no such limiting or restrictive condition prohibiting the appellant in the course of her management from leasing the land. The appellant beneficiary being a woman, the settlors must have thought that she may not be able to personally carry on agricultural operations and therefore when the settlors authorised her, on attaining majority, to administer the estate it would per se in the absence of a limiting or restricting condition to the contrary enable her to lease the land. Thus, if the appellant as beneficiary after attaining majority took over the administration and as part of the administration leased the land, the person so inducted by her on the land would be lawfully cultivating the land belonging to the appellant and being not in any of the excepted categories would be deemed to be a tenant. On a plain reading of the deed and the admitted position that she had leased the land to each of the respondents and keeping in view the requirements of section 4, the conclusion that the respondents would be deemed tenants under section 4 of the Act issuit ended in a consent decree recognising the right of the widow as a co-shebait. Subsequently the settlor Ramani and his two other sons filed a suit against widow of the pre-deceased son for a declaration that the consent decree was null and void. During the pendency of the suit the settlor Ramani executed a registered trust deed in respect of his entire property. The eldest son was appointed trustee to hold property under trust subject to certain powers and obligations. The second suit which was pending at the death of settlor Ramani ended in a consent decree. One of the terms of the consent decree was that widow of the predeceased son gave up her rights under th e earlier consent decree by which she obtained status of co-shebait and she was paid Rs. 475/- per month as allowance. Complaining of a default in the payment of allowance she filed an application for execution to realise the arrears and she s ought attachment and sale of certain properties. The eldest son filed an objection contending that under the settlement of trust his interest in the property was contingent till the debts are paid and as the precondition is not satisfied the contingent interest is not attachable. Negativing this contention, it was held that the determination of the question as to whether any interest created by trust deed is vested or contingent has to be guided by the principles recognised under sections 19 and 21 of the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Succession Act. After referring to certain English authorities and text-books by writers it was held that the question is really one of intention to be gathered from a comprehensive view of all the terms of a document. After examining all the terms of the deed of trust, this Court held that even though the debts were not discharged the appellants, namely, the sons acquired a vested interest and not a contingentexamined the trust deed before us, we are satisfied that the appellant had the vested interest in the property during her life time and the children had only contingent intermediating thatwas lastly contended that as the appellant was prohibited from creating an encumbrance on the property, she had no right to lease the property because in a certain way lease is also an encumbrance. Without going into the wider question whether the expression encumbrance in the context in which it is used would comprehend lease within its fold we would dispose of the contention on the short ground that the right to administer the property confined on the appellant on her attaining majority inheres the right to lease the property. If it be so, it is futile to contend that restraint on the right to encumber would preclude her from leasing the land. The right to manage or administer an immovable property such as agricultural land as a prudent man, comprehends the right to lease, save where the contrary intention is indicated. It is equally well recognised that a limited owner or a life estate holder in agricultural land, unless a clear intention to the contrary is expressed, would be entitled to lease the land during his or her life time. Reading the deed of settlement as a whole, we do not find any such contrary intention and, therefore, we must negative the contention .