Case: T.V.V. Narasimham &amp; Others Vs. State of Orissa

2. The facts giving rise to the said appeals may be briefly stated. The Government of Orissa treating the villages, which are the subject- matter of these appeals, as "estates" issued notifications declaring that the said estates became vested in the State free from all encumbrances from the dates specified therein. The inamadars of the respective villages filed petitions in the High Court of Orissa under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of an appropriate writ for canceling the said notifications and for orders prohibiting the State from taking possession of the said villages.3. The said villages can be placed in three groups, namely (i) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 150, 151 and 155 which are admittedly within the geographical limits of Jeypore Zamindari which was settled in the year 1603; (ii) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 149, 154 and 157 which are within the geographical limits of Kotpad Paragana as settled in 1863, but the terms whereof were subsequently modified in 1901 - the Kotpad Paragana, though it had separate existence at the time of the permanent settlement of the Jeypore Zamindari in 1803, had become part of the said Zamindari by subsequent events, the details whereof do not concern us at this stage; (iii) villages covered by Appeals Nos. 147, 148, 152, 153 and 156 of 1962 in regard to which there is a dispute whether these villages formed part of Kotpad Paragana or of the Jeypore Zamindari as originally settled in 1803.4. The case of the appellants is that the said villages, which formed part of the original Jeypore Zamindari are pre-settlement inams which were excluded from the permanent settlement; and, as they were neither confirmed nor recognized by the British Government, they were not estates within the meaning of S. 3(2 (d) of the Madras Act and therefore not liable to be abolished, under the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1952, hereinafter called the Orissa Act. Their contention in regard to the villages forming part of Kotpad Paragana is the same, namely, that the villages forming part of the said Paragana were grant made before the said Paragana was permanently settled in 1863 and, as they were not confirmed or recognized by the British Government, they were also not "estates" within the meaning of the said section. The State pleaded that the said villages whether they formed part of the orginal Jeypore Zamindari or of Kotpad Paragana, were included in the assets of the said Zamindari or the Paragana at the time of their respective settlements and, therefore, they were estates within the meaning of either S. 3(2)(a) or 3(2) (e) of the Madras Act and were rightly abolished by the State. They further contended that the third group of villages formed part of the original Jeypore Zamindari, and that even if the said villages formed part of Kotpad Paragana it would not make any difference in the legal position, as the permanent settlement of that Paragana was not made under Regulation XXV of 1802, and as such no land was excluded from its assets at the time of the settlement. To put it differently their case is that in the settlement of Kotpad Paragana, the said villages were included in its assets.5. The High Court did not give its decision on disputed facts but assumed the correctness of the appellants case, namely, that the first group of villages were pre-settlement inams within the geographical limits of Jeypore Zamindari, as originally settled in 1803, and that the second and third groups of villages were presettlement inams situated in Kotpad Paragana as settled in 1863, and held that, as the said villages were recognised by the British Government within the meaning of S. 3(2) (d) of the Madras Act, they were "estates" liable to be abolished under the Orissa Act. On that finding the High Court dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants. Hence the appeals.

Reasoning:
14. The foregoing discussion leads us to the following conclusion: recognition signifies an admission or an acknowledgment of something existing before. To recognise is to take cognizance of a fact. It implies an overt act on the part of the person taking such cognizance. "Recognition" is, therefore, an acknowledgment by the Government of the title of a grantee expressly or by some unequivocal act on its part. Acquiescence in the context of certain surrounding circumstances may amount to recognition, but it must be such as to lead to that inevitable conclusion. Mere inaction de hors such compelling circumstances cannot amount to recognition within the meaning of the section.15. Now coming to the merits of the case we shall first deal with the group of villages admittedly lying within the geographical limits of Jeypore zamindari as originally settled in 1803. It appears that the Inam Commission appointed by the Government in 1862 called for and obtained from the zamindar a statement of pre-settlement and post-settlement inams within the geographical limits of the zamindari; but it did not make any inquiry in regard thereto. But in the year 1907 the Government of Madras directed an inquiry of the inams in the Jeypore zamindari by a Special Deputy Collector by name Meenakshisundaram Pillai. In the inquiry held by him the zamindar did not put forward his claim. His report was not full or complete as it should be and it was simply recorded by the Government in its order dated February 25, 1910. The Government again by its order dated November 16, 1910 directed another officer named Burkitt to make a further or detailed inquiry into the inams of Jeypur zamindari and he submitted his report to the Government which was recorded by it in its order dated May 19, 1914. On the basis of the said report the Government gave notice to the Maharaja of Jeypore to show cause why the said villages found to be pre-settlement inams by Burkitt should not be enfranchised. The Maharaja submitted his objections claiming that all the said villages formed part of his zamindari and the Government had no right of reversion therein. On November 1, 1919 the Government issued the following order No.Board of Revenue is informed that the Government have on reconsideration decided to take no further action in connection with the question of the settlement of pre-settlement inams in the Jeyporethis context the relevant records, namely the reports of Meenalcshisundaram Pillai and Burkitt and the objections filed by the Maharaja were not filed in the High Court. If they had been produced as they should have been, the High Court and this Court would have been in a better position to appreciate the situation. But the aforesaid facts were given in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State in O.J.C. No. 68 of 1954 and the correctness of those facts is not disputed before us. From the foregoing narration, the factual and legal position was this:The inamdars were holding the said inams under grant made by the Jeypore Maharaja prior to 1803. The Government claimed reversionary rights therein on the basis that these were pre-settlement inams not included in the assets of the zamindari at the time of the. permanent settlement. The Maharaja claimed that the said villages were part of his zamindari i.e. they were included in the assets of the zamindari at the time of the permanent settlement. The Government presumably accepted that claim by deciding not to take further action in connection with the settlement of the pre-settlement inams of the Jeypore zamindari. It is not possible to accept the contention that there was only inaction on the part of the Government in the aforesaid circumstances. As there were conflicting claims between the Maharaja and the Government, and by withdrawing further action the Government accepted the claim of the Maharaja namely, that the Inamdars were holding the inams as under-tenure holders under the zamindar. This was a clear recognition of the Inamdars title to hold under the zamindar. We agree with the High Court that the Government "recognized " the said grants within the meaning of S. 3 (2) of the Madras Act.16. As regards the second and the third groups of villages there is nothing on the record which discloses any recognition by the Government of the grants of the said inam villages. It does not appear that the Government had directed any inquiry into the titles of the said inams or did any act de hors the inquiry to recognize the said title. We find it very difficult to agree with the High Court that mere inaction on the part of the Government amounts to recognition of the grants in favour of the Inamdars. Butthe learned Additional Solicitor-General contends that the Inam Rules framed by the Government providing for an inquiry, and particularly the rule directing the confirmation of title on the basis of possession would amount to recognition within the meaning of S. 3(2)(d) of the Madras Act.We cannot accept this contention. Inam Rules were framed by the Government in 1859 for investigating into the titles of various inamdars and for enfranchising inams. These rules proprio vigore did not confer title on, or recognize title of any inamdar. They lay down only a procedure for ascertaining the titles in those areas where an inquiry was held for the purposes of investigation of titles and confirmation thereof. In this case no such inquiry appears to have been held in respect of korpad Paragana. These rules do not therefore help the State. In our view the High Court went wrong in holding that the British Government recongnized the said inams.17.Lastly the learned Additional Solicitor General contended that a grant of pre-settlement inam villages which did not fall within the definition of an estate in S. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Act would be an estate within the definition of that expression in S. 2 (g) of the Orissa Act and therefore the Government validity issued the notifications under S. 3(1) of the Orissa Act abolishing the aforesaid villages not recognised by the Government.This contention has been raised or the first time before us. The contention raised is not a pure question of law, but depends upon the proof of the conditions laid down in the said cl. (g) of S. 2 of the Orissa Act. We do not think we are justified in allowing the respondent to raise a plea of mixed question of fact and law for the first time before us. There must have been very good reasons for the State not raising the extreme contention in the High Court. We should not be understood to have expressed our opinion one way or the other on this question.