Case: Rohtas Industries Ltd Vs. Brijnandan Pandey

The relevant facts lie within a narrow compass. On 4-5-1953 the appellant, the Rohtas Industries Limited, Dalmianagar, made an application to the said Labour Appellate tribunal under S.22, Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (48 of 1950), hereinafter referred to as the Act, for permission to discharge ninety-six temporary employees in the following circumstancesThe appellant company have a number of factories at Dalmianagar including a cement factory, power house, pulp mill, paper factory, chemical factory, factory for manufacture of certain acids and an asbestos cement factory. The company had a number of temporary employees who were engaged temporarily in connection with certain works for the extension and enlargement of those factories. The terms of employment of these employees were embodied in a temporary appointment form, which was signed by the employees as well as the management. The said terms stated, inter alia, that"the company could discharge the employee at any time without notice, compensation and giving any reason therefor, whether on completion of the work on which the employee was engaged or earlier";The terms also made it clear that whether the employee was on the same job or some other job, in the same department or some other, either on temporary work or permanent work, he would remain a temporary employee until the Work Manager issued a written letter expressly making him a permanent employee. As and when the various erection works were completed, the temporary employees were first put on a list of spare men and then discharged. Some time prior to 3-7-1952, sixty-nine of the temporary employees were spared for being dischargedThe names of these sixty-nine employees were given in two lists, Appendix A and Appendix B. It was alleged that on 3-7-1952, a number of these employees headed by one Brij Nandan Pandey entered the office of Shri L.C.Jain, Manager of the Cement Factory, and Brij Nandan Pandey assaulted the Manager. A serious situation resulted from that incident and the company stopped the sixty-nine temporary employees from coming to their factories or to their Labour Office and issued a notice to them stating that the company were applying to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to terminate their services. At that time an industrial dispute relating to, among other things, the payment of bonus to the employees was pending adjudication in the Court of the Industrial Tribunal, BiharOn 5-7-1952, the appellant company made an application to the said Tribunal for permission to discharge the sixty-nine employees. The application was made under S.33, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On 12-7-1952, forty nine out of the said sixty-nine employees made an application, under S.33-A, Industrial Disputes Act, to the Chairman, Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, on the allegation that the appellant company had discharged sixty-nine employees on 5-7-1952 and had there by contravened S.33, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On 20-8-1952 thirty six more temporary employees were put on the spare list and an application was made to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, for including these thirty-six persons also in the application which had been made for permission to discharge the temporary men; thus, all told, the application related to one hundred and five temporary menThe case of the appellant company was that of the completion of the erection works for which these temporary men were originally employed was a gradual process and so far as the Cement Factory erection work was concerned, it was completed by the end of March 1952 except for certain minor additions and alterations. Therefore, the appellant company no longer required the services of the temporary employees and they were put on the spare list as and when their services were no longer required2. The two applications which had been made to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, the one under S.33, Industrial Disputes Act and the other under S.33-A of the said Act, remained pending with the Industrial Tribunal till 17-12-1952 on which date the application under S.33-A filed by forty nine of the sixty nine temporary employees, was dismissedOn 3-1-1953, the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, intimated to the appellant company that the Tribunal was no longer competent to pass any orders on the application under S.33, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as the adjudication proceedings on the main reference had already concluded. Two appeals were taken to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, one from the award made on the main adjudication and the other from the order made on the application under S.33-A, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. On 20-5-1953, the appeal from the order under S.33-A was dismissed. As we are not concerned with that appeal in any way, nothing further need be said about it in this judgment4. The application was contested by forty two of the temporary employees, and in their affidavit they denied that any of the sixty nine workmen were originally recruited as temporary workmen and they further denied that they were involved in the incident relating to the assault on Shri L.C. Jain on 3-7-1952. They said that in effect they were permanent employees and enjoyed all the benefits of permanent employees. They further stated"The erection work of the cement plants of the petitioners was completed towards the end of 1950 and it is therefore patently false to suggest that we became redundant as a result of the completion of the erection of the cement plants. It is significant to note that a large number of workmen who had worked on the job of erecting the cement plants were discharged shortly after the completion of the said work on the ground that they were surplus. The cement plants started to work in full swing from about the first quarter of 1951 and we were working in the said cement plant producing cement from the very beginning right up to 5-7- 1952, when we were informed that we were surplus. In fact the real reason for the proposed retrenchment is the petitioners desire to increase the rate of exploitation of its workmen by increasing the workload."With regard to the terms embodied in the appointment form, it was alleged that on or about 3-12-1948 the employees of the appellant company were forced to go on strike on account of an industrial dispute; towards the end of the strike the workmen became exhausted and drifted back to work. The strike was ultimately called off and the appellant company taking full advantage of their victory compelled a section of the workmen, who did not return to work until the strike was called off, to sign the appointment form with the purpose of humiliating and terrorising them5. The Labour Appellate Tribunal gave its decision on 25-9-1953 which is the decision under appeal. It dismissed the application of then appellant company on a finding which the Tribunal expressed in the following words:"It is thus clear that these 96 workmen had been working in the production departments from as far back as the beginning of the year 1951 and so the completion of the erection work cannot be put forward as the ground for their retrenchment."Referring to the Directors Report dated 10-7-1951, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the workmens version that the erection works had been completed by the end of 1950 was supported by the said report. In other words, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal was primarily based on the finding that the erection works were completed by the end of 1950 and there was no ground for discharging the ninety six temporary men.

Reasoning:
In our opinion, these contentions are correct and should be upheldLearned counsel for the Appellant has rightly pointed out that even in respect of the completion or erection works the conclusion of the Appellate Tribunal is a complete non sequitur. First of all, the Directors Report was dated 10-7-1951 though the balance sheet of the company within which the report was dealing related to the period ending on 31-10-1950. The report naturally referred to such works as were completed on or before 10-7-1951. It should be obvious that the completion of erection works must be a gradual process, and while some of the erection works might have been completed by the end of 1950 or July 1951, some were still in the process of completionUnder their terms of employment temporary employees could be moved from one work to the other and the mere circumstance that they were employed in a production department for some time, even if true, did not make them permanent employees; nor did the circumstance that they enjoyed some of the benefits of permanent employees make them permanent. These are circumstances which have been completely ignored by the Labour Appellate TribunalThe respondents gave no evidence in support of the allegation that the appointments forms were taken from them for the purpose of humiliating or terrorising them, nor did the Appellate Tribunal come to any such finding. None of the affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents suggested, ever in a remote way, that the appellant company were restoring to any unfair practice or victimisation in the matter of the proposed dischargeWe have, however, pointed out that the Labour Appellate Tribunal gave no finding on the question whether the respondents were temporary employees or not. The only finding which the Tribunal gave related to a different matter, namely, the completion of erection worksIt is true that this Court does not sit upon the decisions of Industrials. Tribunals like an ordinary Court of appeal, and there must be special circumstances to justify the exercise of our special power under Art. 136 of the Constitution. In our opinion, such special circumstance exists in the present case where the Labour Appellate Tribunal has not directed its mind to the question to be decided on an application under S.22 of the Act and has passed an order on the basis of a somewhat irrelevant finding which has resulted in manifest injusticeWe cannot, however, accept the extreme position canvassed before us that an Industrial Tribunal can ignore altogether an existing for no rhyme or reason whatsoever12. It has been necessary for us to go into facts and circumstances of this case in greater detail than is usual with this Court, because the Labour Appellate Tribunal did not do so. The Act under which the Appellate Tribunal purported to pass its orders has now been repealed by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions,) Act, 1956. A question of some nicety as to the correct interpretation of S.33, Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956, might have arisen if we had thought fit to remand this caseWe do not, however, think it necessary to pass an order of remand in this case and therefore abstain from expressing any opinion as to the correct position in law under sub-s.(2) of S.33 of that Act. No new facts need investigation in this case. Learned counsel for the parties have taken us through all the affidavits filed and the facts necessary for an enquiry under S.22 of the Act clearly emerge from those affidavits. We are satisfiedprima faciethat the respondents were temporary employees and were put on the spare list as and when the erection works were gradually completed. The appellant company have made out aprima faciecase for the permission which they have asked for and there is no suggestion even of any unfair practice or victimisation.