Case: Babulal Parate Vs. The State Of Bombay And Another

2. On 22-12-1953, the Prime Minister of India made a statement in Parliament to the effect that a Commission would be appointed to examine "objectively and dispassionately" the question of the re-organisation of the States of the Indian Union "so that the welfare of the people of each constituent unit as well as the nation as a whole is promoted". This was followed by the appointment of a Commission under a resolution of the Union Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs, dated 29-12-1953. The Commission submitted its report in due course and on 18-4-1956, a Bill was introduced in the House of the People (Lok Sabha) entitled the State Reorganisation Bill (No. 30 of 1956). Clauses 8, 9 and 10 of the said Bill contained a proposal for the formation of three separate units, namely, (1) Union territory of Bombay; (2) State of Maharashtra including Marathawada and Vidharbha; and (3) State of Gujerat including Saurashtra and Cutch. The Bill was introduced in the House of the People on the recommendation of the President, as required by the proviso to Article 3 of the Constitution. It was then referred to a Joint Select Committee of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) and the Council of States (Rajya Sabha). The Joint Select Committee made its report on July 16, 1956. Some of the clauses of the Bill were amended in Parliament and on being passed by the both Houses, it received the Presidents assent on 31-8-1956, and became known asthe States Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37 of 1956) hereinafter called the Act.3. It is necessary to read here S. 8(1) of the Act which instead of constituting three separate units as originally proposed in the Bill constituted a composite State of Bombay as stated8 (1) As from the appointed day, there shall be formed a new Part A State to be known as the State of Bombay comprising the following territories, namely:-(a) the territories of the existing State of Bombay, excluding-(i) Bijapur, Dharwar and Kanara districts and Belgaum district except Chandgad taluka; and(ii) Abu Road taluka of Banaskantha district;(b) Aurangabad, Parbhani, Bhir and Osmanabad districts, Ahmadpur, Nilanga and Udgir taluks of Bidar District, Nanded district (except Bichkonda and Jukkal circles of Deglur taluk and Modhol, Bhiansa and Kuber circles of Modhol taluk) and Islapur circle of Both taluk, Kinwat taluk and Rajura taluk of Adilabad district, in the existing State of Hyderabad;(c) Buldana, Akola, Amravati, Yeotmal, Wardha, Nagpur, Bhandara and Chanda districts in the existing State of Madhya Pradesh;(d) the territories of the existing State of Saurashtra; and(e) the territories of the existing State of Kuch;and thereupon the said territories shall cease to form part of the existing States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madhya Pradesh,. Saurashtra and Kuch,appointed day from which the new State of Bombay came into existence was defined in the Act as meaning November 1, 1956. But before that date, to wit, on 12-9-1956, the appellant herein filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in which he alleged, in substance, that the formation of the composite State of Bombay as one unit instead of the three separate units as originally proposed in the Bill contravened Art.3 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the Legislature of the State of Bombay had no opportunity of expressing its views on the formation of such a composite State. The appellant asked for a declaration that S. 8 and other consequential provisions of the Act were null and void and prayed for an appropriate writ directing the State Government of Bombay and the Union Government not to enforce and implement the same. This writ petition was heard by the Bombay High Court on 14-9-1956, and by its judgment of even date, the High Court dismissed the petition, holding that there was no violation or contravention of Art. 3 of the Constitution. The appellant then obtained the necessary certificate under Art. 132 (1) of the Constitution, and filed his appeal in this Court on 18-10-1956, on the strength of that certificate.

Reasoning:
Thus, the proviso lays down two conditions: one is that no Bill shall be introduced except on the recommendation of the President, and the second condition is that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the Legislature of the State for expressing its views thereon. The period within which the State Legislature must express its views has to be specified by the President; but the President may extend the period so specified. If, however, the period specified or extended expires and no views of the State Legislature are received, the second condition laid down in the proviso is fulfilled in spite of the fact that the views of the State Legislature have not been expressed.The intention seems to be to given an opportunity to the State Legislature to express its views within the time allowed; if the State Legislature fails to avail itself of that opportunity, such failure does not invalidate the introduction of the Bill. Nor is there any thing in the proviso to indicate that Parliament must accept or act upon the views of the State Legislature. Indeed, two State Legislatures may express totally divergent views. All that is contemplated is that Parliament should have before it the views of the State Legislatures as to the proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit, following the usual practice and procedure prescribed by an under the rules of business. Thus the essential content of the second condition is a reference by the President of the proposal contained in the Bill to the State Legislature to express its views thereon within the time allowed. It is worthy of note, and this has been properly emphasised in the judgment of the High Court, that what has to be referred to the State Legislature by the President is the proposal contained in the Bill. The proviso does not say that if and when a proposal contained in the Bill is modified subsequently by an amendment properly moved and accepted in Parliament, there must be a fresh reference to the State Legislature and a fresh bill must be introduced. It was pointed out in the course of arguments that if the second condition required a fresh reference and a fresh bill for every amendment, it might result in an interminable process; because any and every amendment of the original proposal contained in the Bill would then necessitate a fresh Bill and a fresh reference to the State Legislature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a construction were put on the proviso, for example, in a case where two or three States were involved, different views might be expressed by the Legislatures of different States . If Parliament were to accept the views of one of the Legislatures and not of the other, a fresh reference would still be necessary by reason of any amendment in the original proposal contained in theare of the view that the words of the proviso are clear enough and bar their ordinary plain meaning. According to the accepted connotation of the words used in the proviso, the second condition means what it states and what has to be referred to the State Legislature is the proposal contained in the Bill; it has not such drastic effect as to require a fresh reference every time an amendment of the proposal contained in the Bill is moved and accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure ofsee no reasons for importing into the construction of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for giving an extended meaning to the expression State occurring therein.None of the constituent units of the Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were before they formed their federal unions. The Constituent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the sovereign people, was unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole. Unlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has been vested with the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or diminishing the area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the proposals. It is significant that for making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary even to invoke the provisions governing constitutionalview of these provisions, we cannot accept an interpretation of Art, 3 which may nullify the effect of Art. 122, an interpretation moreover which is based not on the words used therein but on certain abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of what learned counsel for the appellant has characterised as the democratic process.10.We recognise that the formation of a new composite State of Bombay as in S. 8 of the Act was a substantial modification of the original proposal of three units contained in the Bill. That, however, does not mean that it was not a proper amendment of the original proposal or that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views on all aspects of the subject-matter of the proposal.The High Court rightly pointed out that in the debates in the State Legislature several members spoke in favour of a composite State of Bombay. The point to note is that many different views were expressed in respect of the subject-matter of the original proposal of three units, and as a matter of fact it cannot be said that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views in favour of one composite unit instead of three units if it so desired. It cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to the subject-matter of the originaldo not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the presentdo not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the present