Case: Ksb Ali Vs. State Of A.P.

FACTUAL EVENTS IN BRIEF:3.1 Under a sale deed dated 17th Rabi Awal, 1269 H (1852 A.D.) Nusratpurchased the schedule property, of an extent of Ac.1635.35 gts., from the vendors, the five sons of Mir Jouhar Ali khan, son of Mir Hussain Ali Khan alias Asad Nawaz Jung (late), the wives of Mir Jouhar Ali KhanImtiazunissa Begum, Hayatunissa Begum and the daughters of Riazunissa Begum (the wife of Mir Asad Nawaj Jung)Navrooz Begum and Moula Begum. The property then known as Koutham Kunta and thereafter as Asadnagar is presently Kokapet village.3.2 Nusratdied issueless around 1875 leaving behind the widowRahimunnisa Begum, who died onhad two paternal first cousinsNawab Gulam Hussain and Nawab Md. Sardar.3.3 On 16th January, 1916 the entire properties of late Nusratwere taken over byMubarak (the private secretariat of the Nizam) for supervision. A judicial branch ofMubarak initiated succession inquiry which was later transferred to the Court of Nazim Atiyat which was constituted under provisions of the 1952 Act.3.4 In 1920 the heirs of Nusratrepresented to the Nizam for grant of Kokapet Jagir in their favour. By a Firman datedthe Nizam decreed rejection of the representation and granted only maintenance allowance, on compassionate grounds.3.5 In 1949, Jagirs were abolished under the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation and in 1359F the A.P. (T.A.) Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation was enacted providing for interim allowance payable, determination of commutation and abolition of Jagirs. Then followed the 1952 Act, providing for Atiyat enquiries.3.6 The Atiyat Court to which inquiry was transferred, as pointed out above, by its order, datedheld that lands in Kokapet village deserve to be confirmed as) in favour of heirs of the late Nusratthat though the land enjoyed by the holders aswas subsequently constituted into a separate village; the Maash (the property) will be deemed to have been continued only as Arazi (inam lands), is confirmed as such and Kokapet was regarded as a village only for administrative purposes.3.7 The Atiyat Court also held that Kokapet was taken over by the Government under the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; this action was not challenged by Maashadars and the question of appointing Qabiz for lands included in the village does not arise. In respect of the lands in(another village having lands of Nusuratthe Atiyat Court held that each of Maashadars (holders of the property) is entitled to his respective share and the extents being small the Collector should formulate proposals for disposal of lands by sale or otherwise after obtaining permission from the Government; should dispose of the same and distribute the money among the Maashadars.3.8 Gulam Mohammed and another, aggrieved by the decision of the Atiyat Court dated 15th February, 1954 preferred an appeal to the Board of Revenue, which was rejected by the order dated 24th September, 1954 and the order of the Atiyat Court was upheld. The order of Atiyat Court was placed before the Revenue Minister in the form of a note and approved by him on 22nd December, 1954. The Muntakhab did not set out the number of Sendhi (excise) trees on the land and the claimants were therefore denied their consequent rights.3.9 The claimants applied to the Assistant Nazim Atiyat for amendment of the Muntakhab (for inclusion of Sendhi trees). The application was rejected. Claimants then approached the Atiyat Court which also rejected their claim. They unsuccessfully approached the Board of Revenue and thereafter filed W.P.No. 227 of 1960. On 1st April, 1963 this Court allowed the writ petition and declared the claimants entitled to inclusion of income from Sendhi trees in the Muntakhab, directed the respondents to amend the Muntakhab and awarded Rs.as maash. In the judgment in W.P.No.227 of 1960 the High Court however declined to grant the relief of restoration of the property.3.10 One Mr. K.S.B. Ali (Mr. Ali) (claiming to represent 203legal heirs of Nusratapproached the Government several times seeking release of lands covered by the Muntakhab in favour of the legal heirs.3.11 Firoz Khan and another filed O.S.No.512 of 1973 (originally O.S.No.10 of 1967) for a declaration that they are the owners of the plaint schedule properties in survey Nos.41, 42 and 43 of Kokapet Village. J.H. Krishna Murthy and four others were impleaded as defendants in this suit. Krishna Murthy was impleaded as the GPA of the heirs of Nusrat JungI. Krishna Murthy through his written statement claimed entitlement to the lands on the strength of the GPA granted by the heirs of late Nusrat JungI and relied on the Muntakhab in support of the case of the defendants. The plaintiffs also prayed for a permanent injunction or in the alternative for recovery of possession of the suit lands.3.12 By the judgment dated 30th June, 1976, the Trial Court considered the entire evidence and by an elaborately reasoned order decreed the suit. The Trial Court concluded that the stand taken by the defendants was incorrect and observed that the two Firmans clearly established that the lands in question (Kokapet lands) were Jagir lands; that thelegal heirs of NusratI had also admitted inthat some of them had filed applications for restoration of the Jagir lands to the Nizam which was rejected; that the first defendant (Krishna Murthy) had not produced any evidence to establish that the suit lands were acquired by Nusrat JungI under any purchase; and that thelegal heirs of NusratI were entitled only to commutation amounts. This judgment became final as the appeal thereagainst by the defendants was dismissed by this Court by the judgment datedin C.C.C.A.No.142 of 1976.3.13 170 persons claiming to be heirs of Nusratfiled W.P.No.20298 of 1993 for implementation of the Muntakhab as confirmed by the Revenue Ministers order dated 24th December, 1954 and for mutation of their names in respect of the lands in Kokapet village. Reliance was placed by the petitioners (apparently during oral hearing of the writ petition) on a letter datedaddressed by the CLR to the Government expressing an opinion that the Muntakhab must be implemented. By the judgment dateda learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition directing the Government to consider the report of the CLR and take further action in accordance with law, within six months. Thereafter several representations were made, including by Mr. Ali.3.14 On 15th April, 2002 the Principal Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, considered the order of this Court (datedin W.P.No. 20298 of 1993) and rejected (by an elaborately reasoned order) the request of Mr. Ali for release of the lands as per the Muntakhab. By a subsequent Memo dated 6th May, 2004, however, the order dated 15th April, 2002 was withdrawn, again by the Principal Secretary to the Government. The Memo dated 6th May, 2004 records no reasons whatsoever for rescinding the earlier elaborate order and was issued pursuant to representation of Mr. Ali for reconsideration of his request, for implementing the Muntakhab. The Memo dated 6th May, 2004 merely states: Government after careful examination of the issue as per the Act and Rules in force, hereby withdraw the orders issued in the Government Memo 1stcited and the CCLA was directed to instruct the Collector, Ranga Reddy District and the concerned authorities to implement the orders of Atiyat Court issued in Muntakhab No. 57 of 1955.3.15 A Memo datedreiterated the order datedand the CLR was directed to implement the earlier Memo datedIn turn, the CLR ondirected the Collector, Ranga Reddy District to ensure communication of the Memo datedto the Mandal Revenue Officer, Rajendranagar for handing over possession of the open land as per the M.R.O.s report datedand report compliance.3.16 Vide Memo dated 21st May, 2005 and G.O. Ms. No. 1084 dated 6th June, 2005 the whole issue was revisited and the earlier memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004. In this order (setting out elaborate reasons) it was concluded that the finding of the Atiyat Court (in its order dated(that Kokapet village was taken over by the Government under the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation and the said action was not challenged by the Maashadars and appointment of Qabiz for the lands included in the village does not arise), destroys the claim of the representationists, of the lands being Arazi Maktha; that according to provisions of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation read with the Jagir (Commutation) RegulationsJagirdar/Makthadar or his successor on the date of taking over of Jagirs were entitled to only commutation amounts, excepting lands which were under direct and personal cultivation of the Jagirdars or their successors as home farm lands under Section 17 of the Abolition of Jagirs Regulation; that there are no home farm lands in the name of the claimants as per the revenue and survey settlement records maintained from(1945 AD); that open land would not fall within the definition of `Home Farm Lands as per provisio to Section 17 of the Regulation; that the Muntakhab was issued and acted upon by drawing commutation from theand therefore there was no basis for any further claim in the matter. This Memo also concluded that the issue was finally decided by theorder issued with approval of the competent authority; and that as the matter was finally decided, the subsequent orders dated04 were without jurisdiction and competence.3.17 Thereafter, tenders were issued by the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority for sale ofin Kokapet village which was part of the subject lands and Mr. Ali filed W.P. No. 14439 of 2006 challenging the said tenders and sought a declaration that the said authority had no right in the property of the petitioners and the auction and sale process was illegal.3.18 A learned single Judge on 14th July, 2006 dismissed the writ petition ruling that under Article 226 of the Constitution an inquiry as to questions of title in immoveable property cannot be considered and observed that the petitioner may approach the Civil Court for appropriate declaration and injunction.3.19 Thereagainst W.A.No. 887 of 2006 was filed by Mr. Ali. This appeal was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court, by orders datedafter contest. Though, SLP was filed thereagainst in this Court, the writ petitioner/appellantMr. Ali sought leave to withdraw W.P.No.14439 of 2006, W.A.No. 887 of 2006 and for rescinding the order in the writ petition and writ appeal. This request was granted by this Court with liberty to Mr. Ali to pursue "appropriate remedy", leaving the issues open.3.20 However, after the aforesaid order of this Court (dated 13th December, 2007) several writ petitions were filed seeking reliefs already adverted to and these were tagged on to W.P.No. 10084 of 2006, earlier filed by Mr. Ali and were disposed of by the common judgment datedby a Single Judge of the High Court.4. By the aforesaid common judgment dated 2nd June, 2009, the learned single Judge invalidated the memo dated 2nd May, 2005 on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice and directed the State to pass fresh orders after issuing notice to the writ petitioners enabling the petitioners to urge all the grounds before the State. The order in G.O.Ms.No.1084, datedwas upheld with a caveat that as and when rights of the petitioners in respect of the property in question are determined in their favour they may pursue remedies in this behalf. It was clarified that the judgment shall not be treated as a pronouncement or adjudication of any dispute or question involved in the matter and the legal representatives of Late Nawab Nusrat Jungor their authorized agent are at liberty to pursue the matter with the Government; and that that disputes, if any, among them (the legal representatives) could be agitated before a competent forum.5. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, writ appeals were filed primarily by the State of Andhra Pradesh as well as Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA). It is significant to mention that as far as appellants in these appeals, who claim themselves to be thelegal heirs of Nusratand rightful owner of the subject lands, are concerned, they did not challenge the order of the Single Judge in respect of those findings which had been rendered against them. Before we take note of the salient features of the decision rendered by the Division Bench it would also be apposite to remark that the core issues is as to whether the subject lands in Kokapet village belong to the State or it is the purportedlegal heirs of NusratJung who are entitled thereto. The chronology of events narrated above would also make it clear that the claimants have primarily rested their claim on the basis of the order dated 15th February, 1954 passed by the Atiyat Court[1*] which held that the subject lands deserved to be confirmed as) in their favour. They also argued that the aforesaid order had been approved by the Revenue Minister on 22nd December, 1954 and, thus, rights in their favour had got crystalised. As per them, it is the Atiyat Court which was competent to decide such a dispute and once the rights of the appellants were recognised by the Atiyat Court, the State Government was bound thereby. Further submission of the appellants was that memos dated 21st May, 2005 and G.O. dated 6th June, 2005, no opportunity of hearing was given to the appellants and, therefore, the said memo and G.O. were violative of principle of natural justice (which contention was accepted by the learned Single Judge as well).[1. Through Mr. Raghupati, Advocate appearing for some of the appellants has taken different stance before us, which is noted later at an appropriate stage.]ISSUE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT:6. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Division Bench noted that the generic issue which fell for consideration was as to whether the learned Single Judge was right in invalidating the said Memo and G.O., thereby directing the Government to reconsider the issue after affording an opportunity to the appellants herein. It was because of the reason that insofar as that part of the decision of the learned Single Judge, rejecting substantive reliefs, namely, implementation of the Muntakhab, mutation of their names in the Revenue records; restoration of possession of the subject lands and declining to invalidate G.O. dated 6th June, 2005 are concerned, the appellants herein never challenged that part of the order.THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT :7. After taking note of the aforesaid generic issue which arose for consideration, the High Court, at the outset, discussed the validity of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge directing the Government to reconsider the issue after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellants. In this behalf, it noted that the seminal dispute was as to whether landbelonged to the legal heirs of Nusrajor the State. Having regard to this nature of dispute, the High Court has concluded that such a dispute cannot be decided by the Government inasmuch as deciding the aforesaid lis between the parties is a judicial function and such a judicial power, as per our constitutional scheme, rests with the courts and not the Executive. Therefore, order of the learned Single Judge remanding the matter to the Government for de novo consideration was of no legal consequence.8. Thereafter, the High Court delineated various other issues which arose for consideration and discussed those issues at length and answered the same. A perusal of the judgment shows that deliberations were undertaken on the followingWhat is the `appropriate remedy for Mr. Ali to pursue?(ii) Whether the impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005 is unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice?(iii) What was the import and effect of memos dated 15th April, 2002, 6th May, 2005 and 31st July, 2004 as well as impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005?(iv) Who are theRelying upon the aforesaid judgments, the High Court held that Business Rules framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution are mandatory in nature and have to be strictly adhered to. The High Court also took note of another judgment of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1963 SC 395  , on the basis of which it concluded that merely writing something on the file did not amount to an order and, therefore, noting in the file by the Revenue Minister, without further action thereupon or issuing another order in the name of the Governor, as required by Article 166(1) of the Constitution, did not have any force in law. In the process, reference was also made to another judgment of this Court in Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of India and others, (2009) 15 SCC 705 wherein this Court held that notings recorded in official files by officers of the Government at different levels even of Ministers, do not become decisions of the Government unless same are sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in the name of the President or the Governor as the case may be, authenticated in the manner provided in Articles 77(2) and 166(2); and communicated to affected persons. The High Court also referred to many other judgments in support of its aforesaid finding.12. Treating the aforesaid principle of law as binding precedents contained in the aforesaid judgments, the High Court concluded that none of the memos dated 15th April, 2002, 6th May, 2004, 31st July, 2004 and 21st May, 2005 would lawfully be considered as constituting Executive decisions/order of the State Government since they were not authenticated in the manner mandated by Article 166 of the Constitution. Further letter dated 6th April, 2004 and memo dated 31st July, 2004 were, in any event, inoperable or inexecutable as they created no rights in favour of the appellants.13. At the end, the High Court considered the status of the appellants while answering the question `who are the appellants? Pointing out that all the aforesaid memos as well as impugned memo, flow out of representations made by Mr. Ali who claimed himself to be the sole representative of thelegal heirs of Nusratthe High Court has examined the locus of Mr. Ali to espouse the cause of others and found that he could not produce anything on record to show as to how he was authorised to plead the case of the purported legal representatives or the heirs of NusratThe High Court further noted that other writ petitions were filed, by other appellants, for implementation of memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004 which memos were issued only on the basis of Mr. Alis representation. Therefore, none of the other appellants could legitimately assert a grievance that impugned memo was issued without notice or opportunity to them. According to the High Court, there was absence of clarity as to whether Mr. Ali and or the other writ petitioners were even thelegal heirs of Nusrator were lawfully authorised to represent any legal heirs and, therefore, none of the appellants had any locus to litigate.14. After answering the questions in the manner stated above, the High Court has summarised the position as under:"SUMMARY OF OURNeither the State nor any Officer of the State, including the Principal Secretary or the Special Chief Secretary to the Government, Revenue Department is conferred judicial or quasi judicial jurisdiction, power or authority, either as Court, a Tribunal or a persona designata, to adjudicate disputed questions of title to immovable property, even where one of the competing claimants to such title is the State;(b) Consequent on conclusion (a) supra, none of the instruments/decisions/orders dated4, or the impugned Memo dated(impugned in the writ petitions), could be considered as having efficacy or operative force as determinative or deprivatory of title in or entitlement to possession of immovable property of an extent ofguntas in Kokapet village of Ranga Reddy District, in favour of the State itself or any other private individual or individuals, including the writ petitioner and/or therespondents in this batch of writ appeals;(c) The decision/order in Memos dated04 were not formally communicated to any of the writ petitioners including Sri K.S.B.Ali, the representationist at whose instance and on whose representation these Memos were issued;(d) In the light of conclusion (c) above, the Memos dated4, being uncommunicated administrative orders, are inoperative, inexecutable and sterile;(e) The instruments/decisions/orders dated04 or the impugned Memo datednot having been expressed or authenticated in the manner ordained by Article 166 (1); or established to have been decisions taken at the specified level of authority, in accordance with the Rules of Business issued by the Governor of the State under Article 166 (2) and (3), cannot be regarded as orders issued by the State in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution;(f) Consequent on conclusions (a) to (e) above, the impugned Memo datedis not susceptible to invalidation by this Court in exercise of its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. Since the impugned Memo rescinds uncommunicated and inoperative Memos dated4, violation of the audi alterem partem principle (even if applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case), is of no legal consequence and would not result in resuscitation of the unauthorized and sterile memos datedg) Having withdrawn W.P.No.14434 of 2006 and obtained invalidation of the judgment in the said writ petition and in W.A.No.887 of 2006, in SLP (Civil) No. 23392 of 2007, by the order of the Honble Supreme Court datedwhile obtaining permission "to take appropriate remedy", Sri K.S.B.Ali is disentitled either to file another writ petition for the same relief as in W.P.No. 14434 of 2006 or to pursue the pending writ petition No. 10084 of 2006, as this would not be an appropriate remedy; and pursuit of public law remedy by Sri K.S.B.Ali, for substantially the same grievance as in the earlier abandoned proceedings constitutes an abuse of process of the Court; and(h) Neither has Sri K.S.B.Ali established by specific pleadings nor by due authorization on record that he is authorized to represent the cause of 203legal heirs of Nusratnor have the other petitioners pleaded or established the basis for their claims, to be the heirs of NusratIn view of the foregoing analyses, for thereasons and in the light of our conclusions supra, the common judgment dated 02.06.2009 in W.P.Nos.10084 of 2006; 22619 of 2007; 3421, 7747, 8761 and 12928 of 2008; 3750 and 6425 of 2009 is set aside and the several writ appeals are allowed, with costs; and for reasons alike W.P.No.29063 of 2009 is dismissed and with costs.By the aforesaid common judgment dated 2nd June, 2009, the learned single Judge invalidated the memo dated 2nd May, 2005 on the ground that it was in violation of principles of natural justice and directed the State to pass fresh orders after issuing notice to the writ petitioners enabling the petitioners to urge all the grounds before the State. The order in G.O.Ms.No.1084, datedwas upheld with a caveat that as and when rights of the petitioners in respect of the property in question are determined in their favour they may pursue remedies in this behalf. It was clarified that the judgment shall not be treated as a pronouncement or adjudication of any dispute or question involved in the matter and the legal representatives of Late Nawab Nusrat Jungor their authorized agent are at liberty to pursue the matter with the Government; and that that disputes, if any, among them (the legal representatives) could be agitated before a competent forum.5. Challenging the aforesaid judgment of the learned Single Judge, writ appeals were filed primarily by the State of Andhra Pradesh as well as Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority (HMDA). It is significant to mention that as far as appellants in these appeals, who claim themselves to be thelegal heirs of Nusratd rightful owner of the subject lands, are concerned, they did not challenge the order of the Single Judge in respect of those findings which had been rendered against them. Before we take note of the salient features of the decision rendered by the Division Bench it would also be apposite to remark that the core issues is as to whether the subject lands in Kokapet village belong to the State or it is the purportedlegal heirs of NusratJung who are entitled thereto. The chronology of events narrated above would also make it clear that the claimants have primarily rested their claim on the basis of the order dated 15th February, 1954 passed by the Atiyat Court[1*] which held that the subject lands deserved to be confirmed as) in their favour. They also argued that the aforesaid order had been approved by the Revenue Minister on 22nd December, 1954 and, thus, rights in their favour had got crystalised. As per them, it is the Atiyat Court which was competent to decide such a dispute and once the rights of the appellants were recognised by the Atiyat Court, the State Government was bound thereby. Further submission of the appellants was that memos dated 21st May, 2005 and G.O. dated 6th June, 2005, no opportunity of hearing was given to the appellants and, therefore, the said memo and G.O. were violative of principle of natural justice (which contention was accepted by the learned Single Judge as well).[1. Through Mr. Raghupati, Advocate appearing for some of the appellants has taken different stance before us, which is noted later at an appropriate stage.]ISSUE BEFORE THE HIGH COURT:6. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Division Bench noted that the generic issue which fell for consideration was as to whether the learned Single Judge was right in invalidating the said Memo and G.O., thereby directing the Government to reconsider the issue after affording an opportunity to the appellants herein. It was because of the reason that insofar as that part of the decision of the learned Single Judge, rejecting substantive reliefs, namely, implementation of the Muntakhab, mutation of their names in the Revenue records; restoration of possession of the subject lands and declining to invalidate G.O. dated 6th June, 2005 are concerned, the appellants herein never challenged that part of the order.THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT :7. After taking note of the aforesaid generic issue which arose for consideration, the High Court, at the outset, discussed the validity of the direction issued by the learned Single Judge directing the Government to reconsider the issue after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellants. In this behalf, it noted that the seminal dispute was as to whether landd to the legal heirs of Nusrajor the State. Having regard to this nature of dispute, the High Court has concluded that such a dispute cannot be decided by the Government inasmuch as deciding the aforesaid lis between the parties is a judicial function and such a judicial power, as per our constitutional scheme, rests with the courts and not the Executive. Therefore, order of the learned Single Judge remanding the matter to the Government for de novo consideration was of no legal consequence.8. Thereafter, the High Court delineated various other issues which arose for consideration and discussed those issues at length and answered the same. A perusal of the judgment shows that deliberations were undertaken on the followingt is the `appropriate remedy for Mr. Ali to pursue?(ii) Whether the impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005 is unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice?(iii) What was the import and effect of memos dated 15th April, 2002, 6th May, 2005 and 31st July, 2004 as well as impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005?(iv) Who are theInsofar as question no. (i) is concerned, in essence, it touched upon the locus standi of Mr. Ali to file the writ petition. The High Court noted that this Court vide orders dated 13th February, 2007 had disposed of the Special Leave Petition filed by Mr. Ali permitting him to withdraw the writ petition No. 14439 of 2006 filed by him in the High Court thereby setting aside the judgments of the High Court in the said writ petition as well as in the writ appeal no. 887 of 2006 preferred thereagainst and had accorded permission to Mr. Ali `to take appropriate remedy. The High Court thereafter proceeded to discuss what would be meant by such `appropriate remedy which was accorded to Mr. Ali. In this process, the High Court referred to and relied upon judgment of this Court in BSNL v. Telephone Cables Ltd., (2010) 5 SCC 213     and made the following remarks on the saidthe light of the above facts and circumstances: the substantial similarity of the two writ petitions (W.P.No.10084 of 2006 and 14439 of 2006); the conduct of Sri Ali in having withdrawn the writ petition while obtaining effacement of the elaborate and painstaking judgment in the writ appeal, without determination of the merits of that judgment by the Supreme Court; and then pursuing W.P.No.10084 of 2006 (a writ petition filed earlier to W.P.No.14439 of 2006), constitutes in our considered view an abuse of the process of law; wanton litigative behaviour, pejorative to the larger public interest, involving casual and reckless commandeering of scarce judicial time. In the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in BSNL, Sri K.S.B. Ali must be held disentitled to pursue remedies under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of the grievances presented in his earlier writ petition (W.P.No.14439 of 2006 and W.A.No.887 of 2006). We hold accordingly.Insofar as question no. (ii) is concerned, which discussed the validity of the judgment of the Single Judge holding impugned memo to be unsustainable for violation of principles of natural justice, the High Court pointed out that through this memo the earlier memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004 were rescinded. However, there was no question of giving any opportunity of hearing to the appellant because of the reason that memos dated 6th May, 2004 and 31st July, 2004 remained uncommunicated and, thus, did not confer or create any rights in favour of the appellants. Consequently, these could be withdrawn without notice, since no rights flew from uncommunicated order. For arriving at this conclusion, the High Court has extensively dealt with the provisions of Article 166(1) of the Constitution and the manner in which the aforesaid provision is dealt with by this Court in the following judgments:(i) Dattatreya Mareshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay, AIR 1952 SC 181  (ii) John v. State of T.C., (1955) 1 SCR 1011  (iii) MRF Ltd. v. Manohar Parrikar and others, Vol IX (2010) SLT 58011.Relying upon the aforesaid judgments, the High Court held that Business Rules framed under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution are mandatory in nature and have to be strictly adhered to. The High Court also took note of another judgment of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab and another, AIR 1963 SC 395  , on the basis of which it concluded that merely writing something on the file did not amount to an order and, therefore, noting in the file by the Revenue Minister, without further action thereupon or issuing another order in the name of the Governor, as required by Article 166(1) of the Constitution, did not have any force in law. In the process, reference was also made to another judgment of this Court in Shanti Sports Club and another v. Union of India and others, (2009) 15 SCC 705 wherein this Court held that notings recorded in official files by officers of the Government at different levels even of Ministers, do not become decisions of the Government unless same are sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in the name of the President or the Governor as the case may be, authenticated in the manner provided in Articles 77(2) and 166(2); and communicated to affected persons. The High Court also referred to many other judgments in support of its aforesaid finding.12. Treating the aforesaid principle of law as binding precedents contained in the aforesaid judgments, the High Court concluded that none of the memos dated 15th April, 2002, 6th May, 2004, 31st July, 2004 and 21st May, 2005 would lawfully be considered as constituting Executive decisions/order of the State Government since they were not authenticated in the manner mandated by Article 166 of the Constitution. Further letter dated 6th April, 2004 and memo dated 31st July, 2004 were, in any event, inoperable or inexecutable as they created no rights in favour of the appellants.13. At the end, the High Court considered the status of the appellants while answering the question `who are the appellants? Pointing out that all the aforesaid memos as well as impugned memo, flow out of representations made by Mr. Ali who claimed himself to be the sole representative of the

Reasoning:
19. After considering the respective submissions, we find ourselves in agreement with the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for respondent. There are various reasons to dismiss these appeals, which are discussed herein below:20. In the first place, it is to be noticed that as far as Mr. Ali is concerned, his writ petition no. 10084 of 2006 which was filed in the High Court after passing of the order dated 31st July, 2007 in SLP(C) No. 23392 of 2007 by this Court, was not maintainable. This Court, by the said order, had permitted him to withdraw his writ petition no. 14434 of 2006 and `to take appropriate remedy. Obviously, the remedy could not be in the form of another writ petition on the same facts and grounds which were pleaded earlier. The High Court has rightly held that having given up his pursuit of public law remedy in earlier abandoned proceedings, filing of the fresh writ petition or pursue pending writ petition no. 10084 of 2006 would constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.21. Secondly, the High Court is also right in holding that neither Mr. Ali had established by specific pleadings nor by due authorisation on record that he was authorised to represent the case of 203legal heirs of NusratIt is clear from the above that insofar as Mr. Ali is concerned, his appeals are not even maintainable.22. Thirdly, the High Court has specifically remarked, and rightly so, that even the other appellants did not plead or establish the basis of their claims that they are the heirs of Nusratpointed out above, the High Court has discussed the locus of these appellants (writ petitioners in the High Court) under the caption `who are the writ petitioners? At this juncture, it would be apt to reproduce the entire discussion in this behalf which compelled the High Court to observe that entirely chaotic and incoherent state of facts were pleaded by all these writ petitioners in their writ petition since we are in agreement with the High Courts analysis.Fifthly, as pointed out above, the judgment of the learned Single Judge insofar as it was against the appellants, was never challenged by them by filing any writlearned Single Judge had specifically clarified that his judgment was not to be treated as a pronouncement for adjudication of any dispute or questions involved in the matter and disputes, if any, among them could be adjudicated before a competent forum. In view of the above, in the appeals filed by the State against the judgment of the Single Judge, the Division Bench was only called upon to decided as to whether the direction to relegate the matter to the State Government was proper or not. The High Court has decided that aspect in the impugned judgment. It is obvious that the appellants cannot rake up those issues in these appeals which are not decided either by the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench.24. Sixthly, Insofar as the decision of the Division Bench on the issue raised before it is concerned, no arguments were even advanced by the appellants questioning the validity thereof. Even otherwise, having gone through the said judgment minutely, we are in complete agreement with the impugned judgement on those aspects, decided by the High Court. To recapitulate in brief it is stated that even the writ petition filed by the petitioners herein (writ petition no. 3421 of 2008) which inter alia sought to challenge memo dated 21st May, 2005 issued by the Revenue Department as illegal and also sought to implement Muntakhab No. 55 of 1955 dated 7th May, 1955, by mutating the names of the petitioners in the Revenue Records and return the custody of the property was clearly not maintainable for two reasons. Insofar the memo dated 21st May, 2005, was concerned, the main grievance of the writ petitioners appears to be that the same had been passed without giving any notice to the writ petitioner and that the same could not have reviewed/rescinded the memos dated 6th May, 2004. The said arguments are not tenable on account of the fact that the impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005, only sought to reinforce the memo dated 15th April, 2002, issued by the Government in response to the representation made by Mr. Ali. Therefore, when the impugned memo dated 21st May, 2005 was admittedly not issued at the instance of the writ petitioners there could not have been any question of hearing them prior to the same. Further, neither the impugned memo nor the memo dated 6th May, 2004 (purporting to create rights in favour of the legal heirs of Nawab Nusratwas communicated to the writ petitioners. Hence, insofar as the memo dated 21st May, 2004 is concerned, no cause of action accrued in favour of the writ petitioners to have approached the High Court and, therefore, the only person, if any, who could have challenged the same was Mr. Ali. As far as Mr. Ali, is concerned, as already pointed above, he could not maintain the writ petition as it was not `appropriate remedy as granted by this Court.