Case: Haryana State Coop Supply Mkt Fed.Ltd Vs. Sanjay

3. Sanjay, respondent, was engaged as Chowkidar on causal basis by the District Manager, HAFED, Jind on August, 1998 for 29 days. On expiry of the said contract, fresh contracts were executed from time to time and he rendered service there until December 31, 1998. He was engaged afresh by the District Manager, HAFED, Hissar on January 15, 1999 where he worked upto May 31, 1999. As the service of the respondent was not renewed after May 31, 1999, he issued demand notice under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "ID Act") raising dispute to the effect that his services were illegally terminated. Conciliation efforts having failed, upon receipt of the failure report, the appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the concerned Labour Court.4. The respondent in his statement of claim before the Labour Court set up the case that he had completed more than 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding the date of termination with the HAFED. He raised the grievance that without following the mandatory procedure provided in Section 25-F of the ID Act, his services were terminated which amounted to illegal retrenchment. It is pertinent to notice here that the respondent clubbed the period of his engagement with District Manager, HAFED, Jind and District Manager, HAFED, Hissar while computing 240 days of continuous service.5. The Appellant-Management traversed the workmans claim and set up the plea that the workman was engaged on contractual basis by the District Manager, HAFED, Jind for the period from August 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998 and there he completed 145 days of service. The District Manager, HAFED, Hissar, which is a separate industrial establishment, engaged the workman afresh on January 15, 1999 upto May 31, 1999 and accordingly, workman worked in the office of District Manager, HAFED, Hissar for 112 days. The Management, thus, set up a specific case that the workman worked at two different units of HAFED and the period of service rendered at these two places cannot be clubbed for the purposes of Section 25-F of the ID Act. The case of the Management was that the workman having not completed 240 days of continuous service, there was no necessity of compliance of Section 25-F of the ID Act.6. Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective case. The Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Hissar held that there was violation of Section 25-F of the ID Act and, therefore, termination of service of the workman was bad in law. It directed reinstatement of the workman with 50% back wages. The said award has been affirmed by the High

Reasoning:
8. For the purposes of applicability of Sectionthe workman has to show that he has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer. A workman is deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination, he has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days by virtue of Section 25B(2)of the ID Act.The words "has been in continuous service.......... under an employer" in Sectionare crucial. Can office of the District Manager, HAFED, Jind and office of the District Manager, HAFED, Hissar, for the purposes of Sectionbe said to be one establishment and, thus, covered by an expression "under an employer"? We do not think so. In our view, the office of the District Manager, HAFED, Jind and the office of the District Manager, HAFED, Hissar are two distinct and separate establishments and cannot be treated as one establishment for the purpose of reckoning continuity of service within the meaning of Sectionread with Sectionof the ID Act.It is so because the workman was engaged on contract basis by two separate authorities under different contracts. The contract of employment with District Manager, HAFED, Jind commenced on August 1, 1998 initially for 29 days and continued upto December 31, 1998. The contract with District Manager, HAFED, Hissar, January 15, 1999 was a separate contract. Both authorities are distinct. It is true that the office of District Manager, Jind and the office of District Manager, Hissar are the establishments or offices of the HAFED but the authority that engaged the workman as Chowkidar on casual basis at Jind is different from the authority that engaged him at Hissar. It is not unusual for an Institution, Corporation or Authority to have different offices, branches and establishments. When a casual employee is employed in different establishments of a Corporation, Institution or Authority, the concept of continuous service under one employer cannot be applied. In the case of Union of India v. Jummasha Diwan (2006) 8 SCC 544 ), this Court observed,"there are several establishments of Railway Administration. If a workman voluntarily gives up his job in one of the establishments and joins another, the same would not amount to his being in continuous service. When a casual employee is employed in different establishments, may be under the same employer, e.g. Railway Administration of India as a whole, having different administrative set ups, different requirements and different projects, the concept of continuous service cannot be applied............Learned counsel for the respondent, however, strenuously urged that the Managing Director, HAFAED has control over the office of District Manager, Jind as well as District Manager, Hissar and, therefore, workman can be said to have worked under the same employer. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel. Merely because the District Manager, Jind and the District Manager, Hissar are the subordinate officers under the control of Managing Director, HAFED, the two offices at Jind and Hissar do not cease to be separate establishment for the purposes of Sectionof the ID Act.As held by this Court in Jummasha Diwan, with which we respectfully agree, that when a casual employee is employed in different establishments, may be under the same employer, the concept of continuous service cannot be applied. There is also no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the workman was transferred from the office of the District Manager, Jind to the Office of District Manager, Hissar. No transfer order was placed by the workman before the Labour Court. As a matter of fact, by a separate and fresh contract, the workman was engaged by the District Manager, Hissar from January 15, 1999. The employment of the workman at Hissar was not an employment in continuity but a fresh