Case: H.A.K. Rao, Chartered Accountant Vs. Council of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, New Delhi

2. The facts are not in dispute and they may be briefly stated. H. A. K. Rao, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965, is a Chartered Accountant by profession and is a fellow member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, hereinafter referred to as the "Institute". The election to the Central Council and the Regional Councils of the Institute was to take place in the month of August 1964. On February 22, 1964, the President of the Institute issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred by Cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to The Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (38 of 1949), hereinafter called the Act, notifying that a member of the Institute shall be deemed to be guilty of misconduct, if, in connection with election to the Councils of the Institute, he was found to have taken part, directly or indirectly, either himself or through any other person, in any of the following activities :-(1) issuing manifestoes or circulars;(2) canvassing votes by visiting places of business or residence of the voters or in any other manner ; and(3) organising parties to entertain voters.The appellants in Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965 was a prospective candidate for the Central Council of the Institute. He filed the aforesaid writ petition to quash the said notification on various grounds which we will consider in the course of the judgment. The High Court held that the impugned notification in so far as it directed that issuing of manifestoes or circulars was misconduct was illegal and that that part of the notification in so far as it directed canvassing of votes was miscondut was valid. Both the parties are challenging the said order in so far as it is against each of them.

Reasoning:
The gist of the said provisions may be stated thus: For the purpose of the Act the expression "professional misconduct includes the act or omission specified in the Schedule to the Act. The Council also may by notification make regulations in connection with the conduct of elections. Under Regulation 54-A (2) and (4B) a member of the Institute shall be liable to disciplinary action by the Council if he was guilty of the practice, among others, of undue influence and canvassing as defined therein. On February 22, 1964, the Council issued a notification specifying that a member of the Institute shall be decreed to be guilty of misconduct, if, in connection with the election to the Councils of the Institute he is found to have taken part, directly or indirectly, either himself or through an other person, or to have issued manifestoes or circulars or to have canvassed votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner. Part l of the Second Schedule to the Act describes the acts of professional misconduct in relation to chartered accountants in practice requiring action by the High Court and Part II thereof states generally that a member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations or is guilty of such other act or omission as may be specified by the Council in this behalf, by notification in the Gazette of IndiaThe argument at first sight appears to be attractive, but it involves a fallacy. The Regulations enumerated different heads for disciplinary action in connection with the conduct of an election; but they did not, either expressly or by necessary implication, prohibit the Council from adding additional heads of disciplinary action. While the Regulations provide for disciplinary action for undue influence and for canvassing for votes, etc., within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth, the notification placed other acts and omissions under different heads of misconduct. There is no inherent conflict between undue influence and canvassing of votes by visiting the places of business or the residence of the voters. So too, there is no conflict between canvassing of votes within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth and canvassing of votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner. All the three can stand togetherNor can we agree that apart from the fundamental rights, which the appellant does not claim in this appeal, he has an unlimited right to canvass for votes, either statutory or otherwise. Nothing has been placed before us to sustain any such right. His rights are defined by the statute and we cannot say that such an unlimited right to canvass is implicit in the right to stand for electionNow coming to the cross-appeal, the High Court held that issuing manifestoes or circulars directly came into conflict with the proviso to Cl. (2) of Regulation 54-A which says that a declaration of policy or a promise of a particular action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning, of the said clause. Doubtless the proviso to Regulation 54-A (2) saves issuing of manifestoes and circulars from the operation of the substantive part of the clause.The act of issuing a manifesto or a circular, therefore does not amount to undue influence within the meaning of that clause. If the notification says that such issuing of manifestoes or circulars is undue influence it certainly comes into conflict with that clause. But the notification does not, and indeed it cannot, amend the definition of "undue influence. The said Act, though if does not amount to an undue influence, is constituted a different head of professional misconduct which the Council is authorised to do under Cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act. From this perspective no conflict between the two arises. We cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning of the High Court that the notification in so far as it prohibited issuing of manifestoes, and circulars was illegal.