Case: The University Of Mysore And Anr Vs. C. D. Govinda Rao And Anr

1. The petition from which these appeals by special leave arise was filed by the respondent, C. D. Govinda Rao, in the Mysore Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. By that petition, he prayed that a writ of quo warranto be issued calling upon Anniah Gowda to show cause as to under what authority he was holding the post of a Research Reader in English in the Central College, Bangalore. He also prayed for a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or direction calling upon the University of Mysore to appoint him Research Reader in the scale of Rs. 500-25-800. His case was that the appointment of Anniah Gowda to the post of Research Reader was illegal in the face of the prescribed qualification and that he was qualified to be appointed to that post. That is why he wanted the appointment of Anniah Gowda to be quashed, and he asked for a writ, directing the University to appoint him in that post. To his petition, he impleaded the University of Mysore by its Registrar, and Anniah Gowda as the opposite party.2. The University of Mysore and Anniah Gowda disputed the validity of the claim made by the respondent. They urged that Anniah Gowda was property appointed Research Reader and that the contention made by the respondent that the said appointment was invalid was not justified.3. On these pleadings, evidence was led by both the parties in respect of their respective contentions the form of affdavits. The High Court has held that the appointment of Anniah Cowda was invalid and so it has quashed the Resolution of the Board of Appointments of the University of Mysore recommending his appointment and has directed that his appointment subsequently made by the Chancellor of the University should be set aside. The High Court however, refrained from granting the respondent a writ of mandamus, directing his appointment to the said post, because it took the view that even if the appointment of Anniah Gowda was set aside, it did not follow that the respondent would necessarily be entitled to that post. That question, according to the High Court, may have to be considered by the University, and the Board afresh. The University and Anniah Gowda, then, moved the High Court for a certificate to appeal to this Court against judgment, but the application was rejected. Thereupon, the University and Anniah Gowda by separate applications moved this Court special leave, and on special leave being granted to them, they have brought the two present appeals before us (Civil Appeals 417 and 418 of 63). In this judgment we will describe the University and Anniah Gowda as Appellants 1 and 2 respectively.

Reasoning:
6. The judgment of the High Court does not indicate that the attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by the respondent in the present proceedings, and the conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could issue in such proceedings.In the present case, it does not appear that the attention of the Court was drawn to this aspect of the matter. The judgment does not show that any statutory provisions or rules were placed before the Court and that in making the appointment of appellant No. 2, these statutory provisions had been contravened. The mader appears to have been argued before the High Court on the assumption that if the appointment of appellant No. 2 was shown to be inconsistent with the qualifications as they were advertised by appellant No. 1, that itself would justify the issue of a writ of quo warranto. In the present proceedings, we do not propose to consider and decide whether this assumption was well founded or not.We propose to deal with the appeals on the basis that it may have been open to the High Court to quash the appointment of appellant No. 2 even if it was shown that one or the other of the qualifications prescribed by the advertisement published by appellant No. 1 was not satisfied bythough some reference was made to the ordinances, no attempt was made to show when the ordinances came into force and no arguments appear to have been urged on that account. The judgment delivered by the High Court in the present proceedings is an elaborate judgment and we think it would be legitimate to assume that it does not refer to the statutory rules and ordinances for the simple reason that neither party relied on them and the High Court had, therefore, no occasion to examine them. In any case, we do not think it would be open to the respondent to take a ground about the effect of the statutory rules and ordinances for the first time in appeal. The petition, which he originally filed, when read with the affidavit made by him, does support this view and unambiguously shows that he confined his attack against trio validity of the appointment of appellant No. 2 solely to the ground that appellant No 2 did not satisfy the qualifications prescribed by the notification by which applications had been called for by appellant No. 1. That is the basis on which the High Court has dealt with this matter and that is the basis on which we propose to deal with it.Thus, it is clear that substantially the High Court decided to quash the appointment of appellant No. 2 on the ground that it was plain that he did not satisfy the first qualification. In this connection, the High Court has also criticised the report made by the Board and has observed that the Members of the Board did not appear to have applied their minds to the question which they were called upon to consider.12. In our opinion, in coming to the conclusion that appellant. No. 2 did not satisfy the first qualification, the High Court is plainly in error. The judgment shows that the learned judges concentrated on the question as to whether a candidate obtaining 50 per cent marks could be said to have secured a high Second Class Degree, and if the relevant question had to be determined solely by reference to this aspect of the matter, the conclusion of the High Court would have been beyond reproach. But what the High Court has failed to notice is the fact that the first qualification consists of two parts - the first part is : a high Second Class Masters Degree of an Indian University, and the second part is : its equivalent which is an equivalent qualification of a foreign University. The High Court does not appear to have considered the question as to whether it would be appropriate for the High Court to differ from the opinion of the Board when it was quite likely that the Board may have taken the view that the Degree of Master of Arts of the Durham University which appellant No. 2 had obtained, was equivalent to a high Second Class Masters Degree of an Indian University. This aspect of the questions (sic) purely to an academic matter and courts would naturally, hesitate to express a definite opinion, particularly, when it appears that the Board of experts was satisfied that appellant No.2 fulfilled the first qualification. If only the attention of the High Court had been drawn to the equivalent furnished in the first qualification, we have no doubt that it would not have held that the Board had acted capriciously in expressing the opinion that appellant No. 2 satisfied all the qualifications, including the first qualification. As we have already observed though the High Court felt some difficulty, about the two remaining qualifications, the High Court has not rested its decision on any definite finding that these qualification also had not been satisfied. On reading the first qualification, the position appears to be very simple; but unfortunately, since the equivalent qualification specified by cl : (a) was apparently not brought to the notice of the High Court, it has failed to take that aspect of the matter into account. On that aspect of the matter, it may follow that the Masters Degree of the Durham University secured by appellant No. 2, would satisfy the first qualification and even the second. Besides, it appears that appellant No. 2 has to his credit published works which by themselves would satisfy the second qualification. Therefore, there is no doubt that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that since appellant No. 2 could not be said to have secured a high Second Class Master Degree of on Indian University he did not satisfy the first qualification. It is plain that Masters Degree of the Durham University. which, appellant No. 2 has obtained, can be and must have been taken by the Board to be equivalent to a high Second Class Masters Degree of in Indian University, and that means the first qualification is satisfied by appellant No. 2. That being so, we must hold that the High Court was in error in issuing a writ of quo warranto, quashing the appointment of appellant No.is undoubtedly true that Thimmaraju should have looked into the record more carefully and should have stated clearly that the facts stated in the statement filed by him were taken partly from the individual service register of appellant No. 2 and partly from the Register which is kept as a general Register for gazetted servants in that State. Therefore, we think there is some substance in the contention made by the learned Attorney-General that the harsh criticism made by the High Court against appellant No. 1 is not fully justified.