Case: ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (CT) LTU, KAKINADA &amp; ORS.  Vs. M/S. GLAXO SMITH KLINE CONSUMER HEALTH CARE LIMITED

3. The respondent is a registered dealer on the rolls of Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Large Tax Payer Unit at Kakinada Division (For short, the Assistant Commissioner) under the provisions of Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (For short, the 2005 Act ) and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (For short, the 1956 Act) and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale of Horlicks, Boost, Biscuits, Ghee, Ayurvedic Medicines etc. The Assistant Commissioner had called upon the respondent to produce books of accounts for the assessment year 2013-14 for finalisation of assessment under the 1956 Act. The authorised representative of the respondent produced declaration in Form F in support of its claim that certain transactions are inter- State transfers. The information and declaration furnished by the respondent was duly verified and after giving personal hearing to the respondent, final assessment order came to be passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 21.6.2017, raising demand of Rs.76,73,197/- (Rupees seventy six lakhs seventy three thousand one hundred ninety seven only) against turnover of Rs.3,44,15,240/- (Rupees three crores forty four lakhs fifteen thousand two hundred forty only) on the finding that the respondent had failed to submit Form F to the tune of the turnover reported in the Central Sales Tax (CST) return. This assessment order was duly served on the respondent on 22.6.2017. The respondent did not file appeal against this assessment order within the statutory period. Instead, amount equivalent to 12.5% of the demand was deposited on 12.9.2017. The respondent then filed an application under Rule 60 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 (For short, the 2005 Rules) , highlighting the error made in raising the demand based on incorrect turnover reported by the respondent. This application was filed only on 8.5.2018, which came to be rejected by the Assistant Commissioner vide order dated 11.5.2018. Aggrieved by the decision dated 11.5.2018, the respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Vijayawada (For short, the Appellate Deputy Commissioner or the appellate authority, as the case may be) on 28.5.2018, which came to be rejected on 17.8.2018. It is only thereafter, the respondent-assessee was advised to file appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner on 24.9.2018 against the assessment order dated 21.6.2017. In the meantime, another assessment order came to be passed on 31.3.2018 in relation to the Audit taken up for the tax period from 1.4.2013 to 31.3.2017. We are not concerned with the said order in the present appeal4. Reverting to the appeal filed by the respondent against the assessment order dated 21.6.2017, the same was dismissed on 25.10.2018 being barred by limitation and also because no sufficient cause was made out. The respondent was then advised to file writ petition before the High Court being Writ Petition No. 39418/2018, solely for quashing and setting aside of assessment order dated 21.6.2017 for tax period – April, 2013 to March, 2014 (CST) being contrary to law, without jurisdiction and in violation of principles of natural justice to the extent of levy on the Branch Transfer turnovers and to direct the Assistant Commissioner (CT) to re-do the assessment and reckon the correct Branch Transfer turnover and grant exemption on the basis of Form F. The respondent did not challenge the order passed by the Appellate Deputy Commissioner, rejecting the statutory appeal preferred by the respondent against the assessment order dated 21.6.2017, for reasons best known to the respondent. The Division Bench of the High Court, on 8.11.2018, noted that the respondent had already paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, for the purpose of filing an appeal. It also noted the stand taken by the respondent that the employee who was in charge of the tax matters of the respondent, had defaulted and was subsequently suspended in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, as a result of which statutory appeal could not be filed within the prescribed time. The Division Bench of the High Court directed the respondent to pay an additional amount equivalent to 12.5% of the disputed tax within one week and posted the matter for 19.11.2018. This was an ex-parte order. The respondent, in terms of the stated order, deposited an additional amount equivalent to 12.5% of the disputed tax amount. The writ petition was then taken up for hearing on 19.11.2018, when after hearing the counsel for the parties, the writ petition came to be allowed and the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, dated 21.6.2017 has been quashed and set aside and the respondent relegated before the Assistant Commissioner for reconsideration of the matter afresh after giving personal hearing to the respondent to explain the discrepancies. This order has also noted that the respondent had paid Rs.9,59,190/- (Rupees nine lakhs fifty-nine thousand one hundred ninety only) equivalent to the 12.5% of the taxes in the year 2013-14 (CST) on 13.11.20185. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present appeal8. From the indisputable facts, it is evident that the assessment order dated 21.6.2017 was challenged by the respondent by way of statutory appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner only on 24.9.2018. Section 31 of the 2005 Act provides for the statutory remedy against an assessment order. The same, as applicable at the relevant time, reads thus: -31. (1) Any VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer objecting to any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority under the provisions of the Act other than an order passed or proceeding recorded by an Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, may within thirty days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on him, appeal to such authority as may be prescribed:Provided that the appellate authority may within a further period of thirty days admit the appeal preferred after a period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period:Provided further that an appeal so preferred shall not be admitted by the appellate authority concerned unless the dealer produces the proof of payment of tax, penalty, interest or any other amount admitted to be due, or of such instalments as have been granted, and the proof of payment of twelve and half percent of the difference of the tax, penalty, interest or any other amount, assessed by the authority prescribed and the tax, penalty, interest or any other amount admitted by the appellant, for the relevant tax period, in respect of which the appeal is preferred(2) The appeal shall be in such form, and verified in such manner, as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a fee which shall not be less than Rs.50/- (Rupees fifty only) but shall not exceed Rs.1000/- (Rupees one thousand only) as may be prescribed(3) (a) Where an appeal is admitted under sub-section (1), the appellate authority may, on an application filed by the appellant and subject to furnishing of such security or on payment of such part of the disputed tax within such time as may be specified, order stay of collection of balance of the tax under dispute pending disposal of the appeal;(b) Against an order passed by the appellate authority refusing to order stay under clause (a), the appellant may prefer a revision petition within thirty days from the date of the order of such refusal to the Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner who may subject to such terms and conditions as he may think fit, order stay of collection of balance of the tax under dispute pending disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority;(c) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (a) or (b), where a VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer has preferred an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 33, the stay, if any, ordered under clause (b) shall be operative till the disposal of the appeal by such Tribunal, and, the stay, if any ordered under clause (a) shall be operative till the disposal of the appeal by such Tribunal, only in case where the Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner on an application made to him by the dealer in the prescribed manner, makes specific order to that effect(4) The appellate authority may, within a period of two years from the date of admission of such appeal, after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard and subject to such rules as may be prescribed:(a) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty, or both; or(b) set aside the assessment or penalty, or both, and direct the authority prescribed to pass a fresh order after such further enquiry as may be directed; or(c) pass such other orders as it may think fit(4A) Where any proceeding under this section has been deferred on account of any stay orders granted by the High Court or Supreme Court in any case or by reason of the fact that an appeal or other proceeding is pending before the High Court or the Supreme Court involving a question of law having a direct bearing on the order or proceeding in question, the period during which the stay order is in force or the period during which such appeal or proceeding is pending, shall be excluded, while computing the period of two years specified in sub-section (4) for the purpose of passing appeal order under this section(5) Before passing orders under sub-section (4), the appellate authority may make such enquiry as it deems fit or remand the case to any subordinate officer or authority for an inquiry and report on any specified point or points(6) Every order passed in appeal under this section shall, subject to the provisions of sections 32, 33, 34 and 35 be finalGoing by the text of this provision, it is evident that the statutory appeal is required to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on the assessee. If the appeal is filed after expiry of prescribed period, the appellate authority is empowered to condone the delay in filing the appeal, only if it is filed within a further period of not exceeding 30 days and sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within prescribed time is made out. The appellate authority is not empowered to condone delay beyond the aggregate period of 60 days from the date of order or service of proceeding on the assessee, as the case may be. In the present case, admittedly, the appeal was filed way beyond the total 60 days period specified in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act. In that, the respondent had filed the appeal accompanied by an application for condonation of delay setting out reasons in the following words: -2. It is submitted that the impugned Order-in-Original dated 21.06.2017 was received by the Applicant on 22.06.2017 and the appeal ought to have been filed by the applicant on 21.07.2017 in terms of section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005. Thus, there is delay in filing the appeal. The Applicants further submits that the delay is not due to any negligence on part of the Applicant3. It is submitted that the impugned order was received by Mr. P. Sriram Murthy, but the receipt of this assessment order was not informed to any other person of the company4. Mr. P. Sriram Murthy was authorized to handle day to day affairs of sales tax (VAT), service tax and excise and he was also authorized to sign and submit documents with the tax departments, file periodic tax returns and represent the company before Concerned tax authorities5. However, the company has alleged Mr. P. Sriram Murthy with committing certain irregularities for past more than 12 months and initiated disciplinary proceedings against him. He has been suspended from his official duties with effect from 26 th July 20186. It is only post his suspension that the Applicant came to know about the receipt of impugned order. Also, the Appellant has come to know that Mr. Murthy paid the 12.5% of the demand amount on 12.09.2017 as if it is a regular tax payment. Further, since he did not file the appeal in time, therefore to protect himself from the disciplinary action, he adopted alternate route and filed rectification application under rule 60 which is not permissible under law in case demand has been raised on technical grounds7. A separate affidavit as to the facts of the case is also attached herewith8. It is stated that in view of the facts and circumstances mentioned above and in the attached affidavit, your honor would appreciate that the delay in filing the appeal is completely unintentional and for the bona fide reasons stated above. The applicant company should not be imposed with tax liabilities due to inaction and malafide intention on one employee. The Applicants further submit that if the delay in filing the above numbered appeal is not condoned, the Applicant would be put to great injustice and irreparable injury. On the other hand, no prejudice would be caused if the delay is condonedWHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Ld. Appellate Joint Commissioner (ST) be pleased to allow the application for condonation of delay as prayed forAs stated in the application for condonation of delay in filing the statutory appeal, the respondent caused to file affidavit of Mr. Sreedhar Routh, son of Late Mr. R. Seetha Rama Swamy, who was working as Site Director in the respondent company. In this affidavit, in support of the application for condonation of delay, it is averred thus: -….. That Mr. P. Sriram Murthy, Deputy Manager-Finance, was authorized to handle day to day affairs of sales tax (VAT), service tax and excise. He was also authorized to sign and submit documents with the tax departments, file periodic tax returns and represent the company before concerned tax authoritiesthat the CST assessment for the period 2013-14 was completed by the Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU raising demand of Rs.76,73,197/- vide assessment order dated 21.06.2017. that the assessment order was received by Mr. P. Sriram Murthy. But, the receipt of this assessment order was not informed to any other person of the companythat Mr. P. Sriram Murthy filed application under Rule 60 of the Andhra Pradesh Act, 2005 without informing the company about such filingthat Mr. P. Sriram Murthy also engaged a Chartered Accountant and filed an appeal against rejection of application filed under rule 60. The appointment of Chartered Accountant and filing this appeal was also not informed to the companythat the company has alleged Mr. P. Sriram Murthy with committing certain irregularities and initiated disciplinary proceedings against himthat Mr. P. Sriram Murthy has been suspended from his official duties with effect from 26 th July 2018. Investigation in this matter is going onthat it is only post his suspension that we have come to know about the demand of Rs.76,73,197/- lakhs raised vide CST assessment order for the year 2013-2014 and therefore could not respond or take any action in respect of this order/demandIt is prayed that the Ld. Appellate Joint Commissioner (ST) be pleased to allow the application for condonation of delay as prayed forThe appellate authority vide order dated 25.10.2018, considered the reasons offered by the respondent for the delay in filing of the appeal and concluded that the same were not substantiated with sufficient cause. On that finding including that the delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date of service of the assessment order on the respondent-assessee cannot be condoned, the appellate authority observed thus: -However, to abide the principles of natural justice, the appellant has been issued notices dated 03.10.2018 and 19.10.2018 to appear for admission hearings to be held on 10.10.2018 and 25.10.2018 respectively, in the office of Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Vijayawada for explaining reasons and his contentions in support of the admission of appeal petition. The A.R. appeared for the admission hearing on 25.10.2018 and prayed for admission of appeal petition, but not submitted any reliable grounds and substantial documentary evidence in support of their submission that they were unaware of the receipt of original assessment orderIt is further pertinent here to record that after receiving the original assessment order, the appellant- dealer has filed a request letter before the assessing authority for re-assessment under rule 60 of APVAT Rules, 2005. However, the AA has not considered re- assessment request, and issued an endorsement dt.11.05.2018, rejecting the re-assessment request. The appellant also filed an appeal on such endorsement. That appeal petition based on endorsement has also not been admitted in this office and rejected vide ADCs orders no. 3470, dt. 17.08.2018. Therefore, cannot be assumed under any circumstances, and by no stretch of imagination that the appellant-dealer was not aware of the service of original assessment orders. Hence, it is to be affirmed that the causes put-forth for delay condonation are not rational and against the facts of the case. It is also relevant here to state that whatever may be circumstances, the delay beyond 60 days could not be condonable in the hands of the appellate authority, therefore, such request prima-facie is not in tune with the provisions of the Act, hence, liable to be rejectedFrom the aforesaid discussion, it is construed that no favourable grounds can be made to admit the appeal, since the appellant have failed to file appeal petition within the prescribed time under APVAT Act, 2005. It is also pertinent here to note that the Department has duly served the original assessment order to the appellant without any procedural lapse, and also the appellant has admitted that the original orders were received on 22.06.2017In view of the above, since the appellant failed to prefer an appeal on the original assessment order dated 21.06.2017, which was duly served on the appellant, and as such the original assessment order has become final, and the present appeal filed by the appellant on 24.09.2018 with a delay of 1 year 62 days, hence cannot be admittedFurther the appellants have not submitted any valid reasons/sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed & condonable time of 30+30=60 days of receipt of the original assessment order. Hence the appeal petition is hereby REJECTED as per the provisions of Section 31 of APVAT ActIt is represented by Mr. S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has already paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, for the purpose of filing an appeal. But, the employee, who was incharge and who was subsequently, suspended in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, failed to file the appeal. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the issue lies in a narrow campusSince the petitioner has already paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, the request of the petitioner for granting one more opportunity would be considered favourably, if the petitioner pays an additional amount equivalent to 12.5% of the disputed tax. The petitioner shall make such payment within a period of one weekPost on 19.11.2018 for ordersBe it noted that the respondent was advised to file writ petition merely for setting aside of the assessment order dated 21.6.2017, presumably, in light of the decision of Full bench of the same High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. 2018 (361) ELT 22(A.P.)7. From the above, it can be summarized that the total disputed demand has arisen on account of two reasons. Firstly, the 1 st Respondent has considered the total branch transfer turnover as per monthly CST returns and ignored the revised turnover as per VAT 200-B. Even though, the such revised stock transfer value was considered by the 1 st Respondent while computing the ITC credit as per rule 20 (8) of AP VAT act. Secondly, receipt of excess forms on account of inclusion of value of freebies, free samples etc. by receiving state while issuing the F Forms. The 1 st Respondent treated these excess F Forms value as concealment by the petitioner and levied tax even, on this branch transfer value duly covered by F Forms which is [sic] grossly against the principle of law8. It is submitted that the order was served on the petitioner on 22.6.2017 against which, the Petitioner could have preferred appeal before the 2 nd Respondent within 30 days from the said date. Unfortunately, no steps were taken to file any appeal within the due date for the reason that the day to day affairs of the Sales Tax, Service Tax and Excise Law was being handled by one Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy, who was working as Deputy Manager (Finance) in the Company, who failed to take appropriate steps to prefer an appeal within time, by his negligence. Excepting Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy, there was no other person who was well conversant with the facts and the steps to be taken against the assessment order. The other person Mr. Siddhant Belgaonker, Senior Manager (Finance) who attended the assessment hearing also left the services of the Petitioner on 31.1.2018. Consequently, the assessment order remained uncontested9. It is respectfully submitted that apart from this act of negligence, Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy also committed certain other irregularities over a period of one year, which came to the light of the Management of the Company in the month of July, 2018. Immediately, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, by issuing a notice on 26.7.2018 (ex. P-3) and also suspending him from official duties with immediate effect10. It is submitted that the Petitioner was not aware of the impugned order since that fact was not brought to the notice by its own employee, due to this negligence11. It appears, the said Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy having realized his negligence, made further mistake, by filing an application under Rule 60 of the APVAT Rules read with Rule 14-A(10) of the CST (AP) Rules on 9.5.2018 (Ex. P-4) contending, inter-alia, that the revised value of stock transfer as per VAT 200-B should have been considered instead of Rs.866,25,15,490/-. In the said representation, it is claimed that it has filed revised returns under the VAT Act, disclosing the correct F form turnover for the purposes of restricting the input tax credit while filing Form 200-B at the end of the year. The ITC credit under VAT was also allowed by the 1 st Respondent, considering the stock transfer turnover as Rs.863,33,95,259/-. In the said representation, it was contended that the turnover of Rs.1,85,03,360/-, could not have been levied with the tax since it is admittedly covered by F forms12. The representation of the Petitioner under Rule 60 was rejected by the 1 st Respondent, by endorsement, dated 11.5.2018 (Ex. P-5) on the ground, that it is not a case for considering it as a mistake rectifiable under Rule 60. It is also submitted that Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy appear to have filed an appeal against the endorsement of the 1 st Respondent dated 11.5.2018 to 2 nd Respondent on 28.5.2018. This was also without knowledge of the petitioners management13. It is submitted that the Petitioner was not aware of these developments till the misdeeds of Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy were being enquired into. It is submitted that Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy has in fact, remitted an amount of Rs.9,59,150/- being 12.5% of the disputed tax in the assessment order online, on 12.9.2017 (Ex. P-6). The payment was made as if it is towards miscellaneous tax payment for June, 2014. When the Petitioner was seeking to reconcile as to how this amount was deposited and under what account it came to known it is for the purpose of preferring an appeal against the impugned order. All this verification happened post suspension of Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy14. The Petitioner faced with this unfortunate situation, filed an appeal under Section 31 of the VAT Act on 24.9.2018 on the bona fide belief that there are good grounds for condonation of the delay since the Petitioner cannot suffer for the errors committed by one of its employees15. It is submitted that the 2 nd Respondent, vide order, dated 25.10.2018 (Ex. P-7), rejected the appeal on the ground that he has no power to condone the delay beyond 30 days. It is also observed in the said order that appeal against the Endorsement was also dismissed by him on 17.8.2018. However, copy of the order is not yet served on the petitioner. The 2 nd Respondent observed that the Petitioner cannot dispute the service of assessment order on 22.6.2017 and failure to file the appeal within 60 days would mean that the assessment order has attained finality16. The petitioner submits that filing of a further appeal to the APVAT Appellate Tribunal at Visakhapatnam is a futile exercise, since as a creature under the Act, the Tribunal cannot find fault with the 2 nd Respondent for not condoning the delay beyond 30 days17. The petitioner has lost the appellate remedy by efflux of time. It does not mean that the Petitioner should be left remediless. The petitioner submits that a full Bench of this Honble Court in Electronics Corporation of India Limited (Writ Petition Nos. 9482 and 9485 of 2017, dated 13.3.2018, dealing with similar situation, under Central Excise Act, held that even if the appeal time under the Act has expired, it does not prevent the assessee from preferring a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the ConstitutionThe impugned order of assessment is dated 21.6.2017. As against the said order the petitioner filed an appeal with a delay. Since the delay was beyond the period after which it can be condoned, the same was not entertained. Therefore, the petitioner has come up with the above writ petitionThe reason stated by the petitioner is that one of the employees who was in charge, indulged in malpractices forcing the management to suspend him and initiate disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner claims that they were not aware of these orders. Therefore, the petitioner seeks one opportunityThe reason why the petitioner seeks one opportunity is that F forms submitted by the petitioner were rejected by the Assessing Officer, on the ground that the value of the goods transferred to branch office have not been disclosed in F forms. But the claim of the petitioner is that the value was wrongly reported in the CST returns and that the amount indicated in the F forms was more than the turnover. Therefore, they seek one opportunity to explain this discrepancyIn view of the peculiar circumstances, even while granting an opportunity to the petitioner, we wanted to put them on condition. Therefore, on 8.11.2018 we passed an interim order to the following effect,It is represented by Mr. S. Dwarakanath, learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has already paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, for the purpose of filing an appeal. But, the employee, who was incharge and who was subsequently, suspended in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, failed to file the appeal. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the issue lies in a narrow campusSince the petitioner has already paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, the request of the petitioner for granting one more opportunity would be considered favourably, if the petitioner pays an additional amount equivalent to 12.5% of the disputed tax. The petitioner shall make such payment within a period of one weekPost on 19.11.2018 for ordersPursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner made payment of Rs.9,59,190/-, representing 12.5% of the taxes for the year 2013-2014 (CST). The amount was paid on 13.11.2018Therefore, the writ petition is ordered, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the 1 st respondent. The petitioner shall appear before the 1 st respondent on 10.12.2018 and explain the discrepancies. After such personal hearing, the 1 st respondent may pass orders afreshAs a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed. No costs.

Reasoning:
As regards the power of the High Court to issue directions, orders or writs in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the same is no more res integra. Even though the High Court can entertain a writ petition against any order or direction passed/action taken by the State under Article 226 of the Constitution, it ought not to do so as a matter of course when the aggrieved person could have availed of an effective alternative remedy in the manner prescribed by law (see Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar AIR 1969 SC 556 and also Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India & Ors. (2011) 14 SCC 337 )14. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what this Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the High Court can take a different approach in the matter in reference to Article 226 of the Constitution. The principle underlying the rejection of such argument by this Court would apply on all fours to the exercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution15. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2015 Guj 97 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeal-I), Bangalore 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) . The logic applied in these decisions proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also non-suit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner choses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose18. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such19. Arguendo, reverting to the factual matrix of the present case, it is noticed that the respondent had asserted that it was not aware about the passing of assessment order dated 21.6.2017 although it is admitted that the same was served on the authorised representative of the respondent on 22.6.2017. The date on which the respondent became aware about the order is not expressly stated either in the application for condonation of delay filed before the appellate authority, the affidavit filed in support of the said application or for that matter, in the memo of writ petition. On the other hand, it is seen that the amount equivalent to 12.5% of the tax amount came to be deposited on 12.9.2017 for and on behalf of respondent, without filing an appeal and without any demur - after the expiry of statutory period of maximum 60 days, prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. Not only that, the respondent filed a formal application under Rule 60 of the 2005 Rules on 8.5.2018 and pursued the same in appeal, which was rejected on 17.8.2018. Furthermore, the appeal in question against the assessment order came to be filed only on 24.9.2018 without disclosing the date on which the respondent in fact became aware about the existence of the assessment order dated 21.6.2017. On the other hand, in the affidavit of Mr. Sreedhar Routh, Site Director of the respondent company (filed in support of the application for condonation of delay before the appellate authority), it is stated that the company became aware about the irregularities committed by its erring official (Mr. P. Sriram Murthy) in the month of July, 2018, which pre-supposes that the respondent must have become aware about the assessment order, at least in July, 2018. In the same affidavit, it is asserted that the respondent company was not aware about the assessment order, as it was not brought to its notice by the employee concerned due to his negligence. The respondent in the writ petition has averred that the appeal was rejected by the appellate authority on the ground that it had no power to condone the delay beyond 30 days, when in fact, the order examines the cause set out by the respondent and concludes that the same was unsubstantiated by the respondent. That finding has not been examined by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order at all, but the High Court was more impressed by the fact that the respondent was in a position to offer some explanation about the discrepancies in respect of the volume of turnover and that the respondent had already deposited 12.5% of the additional amount in terms of the previous order passed by it. That reason can have no bearing on the justification for non-filing of the appeal within the statutory period. Notably, the respondent had relied on the affidavit of the Site Director and no affidavit of the concerned employee (P. Sriram Murthy, Deputy Manager-Finance) or at least the other employee [Siddhant Belgaonker, Senior Manager (Finance)], who was associated with the erring employee during the relevant period, has been filed in support of the stand taken in the application for condonation of delay. Pertinently, no finding has been recorded by the High Court that it was a case of violation of principles of natural justice or non-compliance of statutory requirements in any manner. Be that as it may, since the statutory period specified for filing of appeal had expired long back in August, 2017 itself and the appeal came to be filed by the respondent only on 24.9.2018, without substantiating the plea about inability to file appeal within the prescribed time, no indulgence could be shown to the respondent at all20. Reverting to the contention that the respondent having failed to assail the order passed by the appellate authority, dated 25.10.2018 rejecting the application for condonation of delay, the assessment order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, dated 21.6.2017 stood merged, need not detain us in view of the exposition of this Court in Raja Mechanical Company Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-I (2012) 12 SCC 613 . It is well settled that rejection of delay application by the appellate forum does not entail in merger of the assessment order with that order21. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the High Court ought not to have entertained the subject writ petition filed by the respondent herein. The same deserved to be rejected at the threshold.