Case: Saudi Arabian Airlines Vs. Ashok Hargovind Panchal &amp; Another

3. The workman was engaged by the appellant as a Security Guard with effect from 1st October, 1989 on consolidated wages of Rs.1400/per month. The appointment order contained a stipulation that the employment was for a period of two years and the workman was not eligible for benefits provided to permanent employees, except to the extent permitted in the appointment letter.4. On 27th September, 1991 i.e. three days prior to the expiry of the term stated in the appointment letter, the workman instituted Complaint (ULP) No. 1296 of 1991 under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade UnionsPrevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (MRTUPULP Act).5. The complaint alleged that the appellant was in the habit of engaging workmen for a fixed term, only to avoid awarding such workmen the benefits of regular employment. It was alleged that such workmen were invariably paid lesser wages and denied most of the benefits which their regularly employed counterparts were awarded. By way of instances, reference was made to the case of six Security Guards whose services were terminated on expiry of two year term. Based upon all such pleadings, a restraint was applied on the proposed termination and benefits of permanency and consequential benefits were also prayed for.6. Initially, the Industrial Court, by an ex parte order dated 28th September, 1999 restrained the appellant from terminating the services of the workman. However, later by order dated 16th June, 1993, such interim relief was vacated. By order dated 24th September, 1993 the appellant informed the workman that since the term of his employment had come to an end on 30th September, 1991, the workman, should know longer report for duties and that the workman will be offered no further work by the appellant. This was during the pendency of the complaint before the Industrial Court under the provisions of MRTUPULP Act.7. The workman examined himself in the complaint before the Industrial Court and was cross examined on behalf of the appellant. Mr. Ahmed Ibrahim Patel, SupervisorCustomer Services was examined on behalf of the employer and was cross examined on behalf of the workman.8. The Industrial Court by its judgment and order dated 21st October, 1995 allowed the workmans complaint and directed the appellant to award the workman the benefits of permanency from the date the workman completed 240 days of service and pay all consequential benefits on such basis.9. The appellant, aggrieved by the Industrial Courts judgment and order dated 21st October, 1995 instituted Writ Petition No. 1869 of 1996 before this Court. By order dated 3rd April, 1996 the learned Single Judge of this Court issued Rule in the petition, but declined interim relief.10. Aggrieved by the denial of interim relief the appellant instituted Letters Patent Appeal No. 153 of 1996, which was disposed of by the Division Bench vide order dated 12th August, 1996 by recording a statement on behalf of the appellant that instead of reinstating the workman, the appellant will pay to the workman salary as on the date of the admission of the petition i.e. 3rd April, 1996, which was Rs.2240/- per month.11. By judgment and order dated 25th September, 2002, the learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed the appellants Writ Petition No. 1869 of 1996. Aggrieved by this impugned judgment and order, the appellant has instituted the present appeal.12. During the pendency of this appeal, Civil Application No. 419 of 2002 taken out by the appellant seeking interim reliefs was disposed of by order dated 10th July, 2006 by directing the appellant to deposit a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- in the Registry and to pay to the workman an amount of Rs.8,000/per month from July2006. The workman was permitted to withdraw interest accrued on the amount of Rs.2,00,000/- was directed to be invested.13. The appellant, on 10th March, 2014 filed an affidavit in the present appeal stating that the Bureau of Civil Aviation Services (BCAS) had issued a notification preventing all foreign airlines from engaging any security guards and therefore, the appellant was in no position to reinstate the workman. The workman, on 30th August, 2018 filed a counter to refute appellants contention set out in the affidavit dated 10th March, 2014.

Reasoning:
22. From the perusal of the deposition of Ahmed Ibrahim Patel, the sole witness on behalf of the appellant, there appears to be no objection raised to the maintainability of the complaint in the context of the so called termination of the workmans services from 24th September 1993. The complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act, obviously, could not have been defeated such subsequent actions of the appellant. For all these reasons, we see no merit in Mr. Talsanias first contention as to the maintainability of the complaint under the MRTU and PULP Act.The Industrial Court has taken cognizance of advertisement issued by the appellant for filling up the posts of Security Guard. The Industrial Court has quite rightly rejected the oral contentions raised before it to the effect that the workman was not qualified to hold the posts as a Security Guard or that since security problems are involved no relief ought to be granted to the workmen. In fact, the material on record makes it clear that a case of unfair labour practice was made out by thedid contend that these were by way of compromise or settlement. However, all this material is sufficient to bring home the case that the appellant was indeed engaged in such unfair labour practices of engaging employees on contract basis only to deprive them benefits of regular service or permanency. The appellant, in its pleadings, has simply sought to state that the circumstances involving 14 employees of the workmen were different without specifying what the difference was. Again, the appellants witness did not explain what such difference was in the course of his evidence.40. The findings recorded by the Industrial Court are sufficiently borne out from the material on record. Such findings have in fact been reassessed by the learned Single Judge though, it was strictly speaking not necessary to do so. The learned Single Judge has also confirmed such findings of fact. The concurrent findings of fact recorded in the present case, are not vitiated by any perversity and therefore, there is really no case made out to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.41. Mr. Talsanias contention that the termination of workmans services was governed by section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act, strictly speaking, does not arise in this matter. Admittedly, the complaint alleged unfair labour practices was made before such termination. Once the material on record establishes that the appellant was indulging in unfair labour practices inter alia of engaging employees as casuals or temporary and to continue them for years with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent employees, it was open for the appellant to fall back upon the very contracts of the appellant on the basis of which such unfair labour practices was being perpetrated by them.Therefore, although, there may be some merit in Mr.Talsanias contention that some of the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge may not have represented the correct position in law on account of subsequent rulings of the Apex Court, the same, by itself, is no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact relating to unfair labour practices recorded in the present case. Even if, the legal reasoning with regard to interpretation of section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D.Act as propounded by the learned Single Judge is kept aside, on facts, there is really no case made out to warrant interference., although, there may be some merit in Mr.Talsanias contention that some of the decisions relied upon by the learned Single Judge may not have represented the correct position in law on account of subsequent rulings of the Apex Court, the same, by itself, is no ground to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact relating to unfair labour practices recorded in the present case. Even if, the legal reasoning with regard to interpretation of section 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D.Act as propounded by the learned Single Judge is kept aside, on facts, there is really no case made out to warrant interference.In the decisions relied upon by Mr. Talsania including, in particular, the decision of the Apex Court in M. Venugopal (supra), there was not the slightest issue of the appointment letter or contract of employment entered into between the LIC and its employees constituting any unfair labour practices. In fact, the Apex Court, was concerned with clause 11 of the contract of the employment, by which, Mr. M. Venugopal was appointed as a Development Officer with the LIC on probation for a period of one year from 23rd May 1984 to 22nd May 1985. Thereafter, the period of probation was extended for a further period of one year from 23rd May 1985 to 22rd May 1986. Clause 11 of the contract of employment very clearly provided that Mr. M. Venugopal, on satisfactory completion of period of probation and in compliance with all conditions set out in letter of appointment will be confirmed in the services of LIC. Further, clause 11 of the contract of employment had specified that confirmation will depend, inter alia, upon fulfillment of the minimum business guarantee and upon his record of posts and service to the Corporations policyholders and other functions performed by him in the area allotted to you to the satisfaction of the competent authority.46. Since, Mr. M. Venugopal failed to fulfill the terms of clause 11 of the contract of employment, his services were not confirmed and it is in this context that the Apex Court held that the matter was governed by section 2(oo)(bb) of the I.D. Act and such termination could therefore, not be regarded as retrenchment. The fact situation in M. Venugopal (supra) and the fact situation in the present case is not even remotely comparable. There was not even an allegation in case of M.Venugopal (supra), that the contract of employment or for that matter the insertion of clause 11 in the contract of employment was a result of some unfair labour practice or for purposes of denying the benefits of permanency to employees. Therefore, reliance on M.Venugopal (supra) and the other decisions which were delivered in similar circumstances, can be of no assistance to the appellant.47. There is also no necessity to go into the contention based upon the Standing Orders Act and the Rules made thereunder. This is because on facts, we are satisfied that the concurrent findings recorded by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge are sufficiently borne from the material on record. These findings established unfair labour practices on the part of the appellant. On this basis, there was no infirmity in the judgments and orders rendered by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge in the presentthe workman already attained the age of superannuation, then, the issue which survives, may relate to payment of backwages and other consequential benefits. In any case, based upon the BCAS letter/notification, there is no case made out to upset the reliefs granted by the Industrial Court and the learned Single Judge to the workman.49. For all the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in this Letters Patent Appeal.case.48. The contention based upon BCAS letter or notification also warrants no acceptance. This is because the appellant, apart from producing such letter/notification, has nowhere explained about the fate of Security Guards already in the employment of the appellant post issuance of such letter/notification.