Case: BANGALORE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AREA PLANNING AUTHORITY Vs. BIRLA SUPRER BULK TERMINAL(NOW A UNIT OF ULTRA TECH CEMENT LIMITED

2. Brief facts of the case which led to filing of this appeal are that the provisions of Karnataka Town and Country Planning (KTCP) Act, 1961 to provide for regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. The State Government, by virtue of powers conferred under Sectionof the KTCP Act, issued Notification No.HUD142 MNX 95 dated 12.01.1996 declaring the area shown in the Schedule to the said notification as Bangalore International Airport Planning Area w.e.f. 12.01.1996. On the same day, the State Government issued another Notification No.HUD 142 MSX 95 constituting the appellant as the Planning Authority for the said local planning area. The State Government by Notification dated 14.05.1997 added some other villages including the villages in question in Doddaballapur Taluk in the planning area of the appellant3. Respondent No.1 approached the State Government to approve a project to establish the Cement Terminal near Bangalore which was approved by the Single Window Agency by its clearance order dated 29.11.1996. By exercising powers under Sections 3(1) and 1(3) of KIAD Act, the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB), issued a Notification on 03.07.1997 declaring some areas as industrial areas. Respondent No.1 was allotted lands by KIADB in Thippapura, Veerapura, Bashettinalli of Doddaballapur Taluk vide allotment letter dated 12/13.01.1998. Subsequently, respondent No.1 was asked to take possession of the said lands vide letter dated 29.05.1998 by KIADB and accordingly, possession certificate was issued on 16.07.1998 and respondent No.1 took possession on 16.7.19984. On 8.6.1998, Respondent No.1 applied to Appellant authority seeking permission for construction of Bulk Cement Terminal. The Appellant inspected the spot along with KIADB Special Land Acquisition Officer, Urban Planning Director and Deputy Metropolitan Commissioner. By letter dated 17.9.1998,1 was informed by the Appellant that on inspecting the land once again and being satisfied that there is an approach road measuring 15 feet to the proposed land, it was decided to approve the development plan as per Rules. The Appellant also informed Respondent No.1 to pay betterment charges @ Rs. 75 per sq. mtr., inspection charges @ Rs. 150 per hectare, building construction charges, penalty @ Rs. 150 per hectare and road charges @ Rs. 1 lakh per acre totalling Rs.1,48,29,173/pertaining to the sanctioning of the Development Plan consisting of the plans of storage, packing and5. Respondent No.1 objected to the demand by a letter dated16.10.1998 stating that it had already made payment to KIADB towards allotment of lands, and therefore, development fee for constructing the commercial establishment is not necessary. Appellant issued notice dated 08.12.1998 under section 15 (4) of KTCP Act stating that as per Section 15 (1) of the KTCP Act, every development has to be proceeded only after getting necessary Commencement Certificate from the Appellant. It was stated in the notice that records reveal that no permission has been obtained as required under the provisions of KTCP Act. KTCP asked respondent No. 1 to stop work and discontinue use of the property and to show cause as to why action should not be taken to remove or pull down the work and to restore the land to its original condition6. Respondents No. 1 and 2 filed Writ Petitions No. 37717719/1998 dated 14.12.1998 before the High Court challenging the said notice dated 17.9.1998 and notice dated 8.12.1998. Respondent No.1 contended that the appellant has no authority to demand any development charges since the lands in the question were allotted in favour of Respondent No.1 by the KIADB, under the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development (KIAD) Act. The Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions holding that in view of the declarations issued under sectionof the KTCP Act, the lands in question continue to be within the planning area. The Single Judge further held that when respondent No. 1 itself has submitted to the jurisdiction of the appellant by making an application for sanction of plan and for permission and while so, it is not open for them to say that the appellant has no jurisdiction or authority to demand development charges. The learned Single Judge held that by virtue of the power conferred on the appellant under Section 18, the appellant has rightly demanded the development charges having permitted Respondent No. 1 to use the land for establishment of an industry7. In the appeal filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2, the Division Bench held that KIAD Act is a special Act enacted for securing the establishment of industries in the State of Karnataka and the industrial area is governed by the provisions of the Act. The High Court further held that for the industrial plots allotted by KIADB, the change of land use and the development thereof comes under the purview of the special enactment KIAD Act and not under the general law of KTPC Act and the provisions of special Law will prevail over the provisions of the general Law. The High Court held that the only requirement for respondent No.1 is to obtain clearance from the appellant to show that the construction of the industrial unit is in conformity with the zonal regulations, etc. and this requirement does not in any way attract the provisions of Section 18 of the KTCP Act so as to empower the appellant to levy conversion fee/betterment fees.

Reasoning:
22. By careful reading of the provisions of both the Acts, it is seen that the object of KIAD Act is to make special provisions for securing the establishments of industrial areas in the State and to generally promote the establishment and orderly development of the industries. On the other hand, KTCP Act is for regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State. Both the Acts i.e. KIAD Act and KTCP Act operate in different fields. Considering the objects of both the enactments, we find that there is no merit in the plea of the fifth respondent that once a land is acquired for the purpose of industries under the KIAD Act and made over to the Board, the use of the land becomes use for industrial purpose and no further permission for change of use of land by KTCP or any other authority is required23. Though heading of Section 18 of the KTCP Act isRecovery of a fee in certain cases of permission for change in the use of land or building, the levy of prescribed fee is not only for permission for change of land use but also for development of land or building as contemplated under Section 14A or Section 14B or Section 15 or Section 17 of the Act. As pointed out earlier, development is defined in Section) of KTCP Act which inter alia provides forin the use of any building or land and includes. From a combined reading of Section 18 with Section) of KTCP Act, it is clear that the levy of prescribed fee under Section 18 of the Act is not merely for change of land use but also for development of land or building. The language of expression used in Section 18 that permission for change of land used….. and development of land or building…. is to be interpreted in the light of the object of KTCP Act as enunciated in the Preamble of the ActWhen the government of Karnataka, Finance Department and other departments and also the Commissioner for Industrial Development and other departments have participated in the abovesaid meeting and were all parties to the above decisions, it is not open to KIADB to resile from the minutes and put forth claim contrarily. Having been a party to the discussion in the meeting held on 04.12.1999, the State of Karnataka is also not justified in contending that the lands in question are included in the industrial area declared by the State Government and hence, not bound to pay the development fee under Section 18 of the Act27. Section 14 read with Section 18 of the KTCP Act clearly connotes that the Planning Authority is entrusted with the function of granting licence to put up construction on the land including the land acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. This is also clear from the provisions contained in theM of the KTCP Act which declares that the provisions of the said Act and the Rules, Regulations ands made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law. There is nothing in the provisions of this Act to exclude or exempt the lands which are covered by the KIAD Act29. The High Court, on the one hand, took the view that Sections 14, 15 and 18 of KTCP Act are not applicable to the industrial area which is governed by KIAD Act. On the other hand, the High Court held that for compliance of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the KTCP Act for all the establishment of the industrial unit, the allottee has to seek approval of the Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act and KTCP is to scrutinise the plan and other documents so as to ensure that the establishment of the industrial unit by the allottee in the industrial area is in conformity with the Zonal Regulations etc; but KTCP is not to levy betterment fee. The findings of the High Court are30. As discussed earlier, the Planning Authority constituted under KTCP Act is entrusted with the functions of granting approval for any development on the land within its jurisdiction including the land acquired and allotted by the Board under KIAD Act. Per contra, the enactment of KIAD Act is to make special provision for securing the establishment of the industrial area in the State and for that purpose to establish Industrial Areas Development Board. The provisions of both the Acts make the intention of the legislature very clear. As rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that if there are two possible interpretations of an enactment, one should avoid the construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the broader interpretation. A statute is designed to be workable and the interpretation thereof by the court should be to secure that object. In so far as the industrial area allotted by KIADB, the interpretation given by the High Court to the provisions of KTCP Act would render the existence of the Planning Authority like the appellant to futility. While on the one hand, the High Court has directed the first respondent to obtain permission from the Planning Authority under KTCP Act and that the appellantAuthority to scrutinise those plans only to ensure that they are in conformity with the Regulations etc. At the same time, the High Court is saying that they cannot collect the betterment fees. In our considered view, such findings are contradictory to each other and cannot be sustained31. The High Court held that KIAD Act being a Special Act, the same will prevail over KTCP Act which is a General Act. KTCP Act is applicable to all the developmental activities in respect of any land coming within the area of Outline Development Plan (ODP) and the lands in question even though situated in industrial area comes within the area of ODP of the Planning Authority. The developmental activities over the said land have to be carried on only with the permission of the Authority and both the enactments have to be harmoniously construed so as to give effect to each of the Acts enacted by the State Government32. The question to be considered in this regard is whether KIAD Act is a special enactment and KTCP Act a general Act and whether the maxim Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant is applicable as held by the High Court. Rule of interpretation says that a statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted, which can be seen from the preamble of an Act. As discussed earlier, as per the preamble of the KIAD Act, it is an Act to make special provision for securing the establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries therein. KTCP Act on the other hand, as we have pointed out earlier, was enacted to provide for the regulation of planned growth of land use and development and for the making and execution of town planning schemes in the State of Karnataka. Thus, considering the legislative intent of the two enactments, it is seen that there is nothing in the KIAD Act to destroy the authority of the Appellant which has its own assigned role to perform under the provisions of the KTCP Act. Considering the object and purpose for which both the Acts were enacted, there is no inconsistency or overlapping between the two enactments and the power of authorities constituted under the Acts. As the areas of operation of KIAD Act and KTCP Act are wholly different, there is no question of applicability of the maxim Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant33. Seeking grant of permission for construction of industrial buildings – Bulk Cement Terminal near Dodaballapur Railway Station, the first respondent submitted its application to they on 08.06.1998. On that application for sanctioning the development plan consisting of the plan of storage, packing and administrative office buildings in the plot in question, they vide order dated 17.09.1988 levied betterment charges, road charges etc. of Rs.1,48,29,173/under various heads. In response to the same, the first respondent has sent its reply on 16.10.1998 inter alia stating that:(i) since the first respondent has made payment to KIADB towards allotment of lands considering the first respondent as commercial establishment and levy of development at the rate of Rs.75/per sq. mtr. may not be necessary; (ii) the construction put up by the first respondent are industrial buildings and not commercial establishments; and (iii) the first respondent is situated in Bengaluru Rural (North) District and it is not situated in Bengaluru Urban District attracting levy of such higher fee34. By careful perusal of the first respondents response dated 16.10.1998, it is seen that the first respondent has not challenged the jurisdiction ofy to levy betterment charges and that the objections that the first respondent has raised were regarding the rate of betterment fee treating the first respondent as commercial establishment and the fact that they are situated in Bengaluru Rural (North) District and not in Bengaluru Urban District. When the first respondent has not raised the objection regarding the jurisdiction/competence of they to levy betterment fee, the first respondent was not justified in turning around and challenging the powers of theg Authority to levy betterment charges. The High Court, in our view, did not properly consider the response of the first respondent and the High Court erred in saying that the role of KTCP is only to scrutinise the application to ensure that the plan is in conformity with the provisions of the KTCP Act and that it cannot levy the fee35. It is also pertinent to note that for obtaining sanction of their plan, the other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB have paid the betterment charges and also the road cess as demanded by the. In this regard, the learned senior counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the communication from ITC Limited including the Pay Order dated 01.08.1997 for payment of betterment charges of Rs.. When other allottees of industrial plots by KIADB have paid betterment charges and road cess for obtaining sanction of the plan, the first respondent cannot challenge the levy and contend that they are not liable to pay the betterment charges36. The High Court, in our view, ignored the important provisions of KTCP i.e. Sections 14 and 15 regarding the development act and the development activities including the industrial areas fall within the scope of they and that the first respondent while obtaining the approval from they for its plan is bound to pay the betterment charges, road cess and other charges as per the laws.