Case: Radha Sundar Dutta Vs. Mohd. Jahadur Rahim And Others

2. The suit property is a Mahal of the extent of 84 Bighas 18 Cottas situated within lot Ahiyapur village, which is one of the villages forming part of the permanently settled estate of Burdwan Zamindari. This village was granted by the Maharaja of Burdwan in Patni settlement to the predecessors-in-title of defendants 1 to 7. The exact date of this grant does not appear, but it is stated that it was sometime prior to the enactment of the Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation (Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819), hereinafter referred to as the Regulation, and nothing turns on it. The Mahal with which this litigation is concerned, had been at or prior to the permanent settlement set apart as Choukidari Chakran lands; that is to say, they were to be held by the Choukidars for rendering service in the village as watchmen. In 1870, the Village Chaukidari Act (Ben. VI of 1870), hereinafter referred to as the Act, was passed, and S. 48 of that Act provides that all Choukidari Chakran lands assigned for the benefit of any village shall be transferred to the zamindar of the estate in the manner and subject to the provisions contained in the Act. Under S. 50, the Collector is authorised to make an order transferring those lands to the Zamindar after determining the assessment payable thereon, and S. 51 enactsorder shall operate to transfer to such zamindar the land therein mentioned subject to the amount of assessment therein mentioned, and subject to all contracts theretofore made, in respect of, under, or by virtue of, which any person other than the zamindar may have any right to any land, portion of his estate, or tenure, in the place in which such land may be situate.In accordance with the provisions aforesaid, the suit properties were transferred to the Maharaja of Burdwan, and on June 3, 1899, he granted the same to the predecessors- in-title of defendants 1 to 7, who at that time held the Patni interest in respect of lot Ahiyapur. Under the grant which has been marked as exhibit B, the yearly rental for the area was fixed at Rs. 126-8 as. out of which Rs. 84-4 as., had to be paid to the Panchayat within the 7th of Baisakh for being credited to the Choukidari Fund and the balance of Rs. 42-4 as., was to be paid to the Zamindar within the month of Chaitra. Exhibit B also provides that in default of payment of kist the lands are liable to be sold in proceedings taken under the Bengal Regulation VIII ofActing under this clause, the Maharaja applied under S. 8 of the Regulation to bring the suit lands to sale for realisation of arrears, and at the auction held on May, 15, 1937, himself became the purchaser. On February 13, 1941, he granted the lands again on Patni to the appellant, who filed the suit, out of which the present appeal arises, in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Burdwan, to recover possession thereof from the defendants alleging that they had trespassed thereon. The respondents contested the suit on the ground that, in fact, there were no arrears of rent due under Exhibit B, and that the sale was therefore void.The Subordinate Judge held that there were arrears of rent due from the respondents, and that further as they had not sued to set aside the sale under S. 14 of the Regulation within the time limited by law, they could not set up its invalidity as a defence to the action in ejectment. The defendants preferred an appeal against this judgment to the District Court of Burdwan, and there raised a new contention that under the grant, Exhibit B, the suit lands became part of lot Ahiyapur, and that a sale of those lands was illegal as being a sale of a portion of the Patni. The District Judge after observing that the point was taken for the first time, held on a construction of Exhibit B that it created a new Patni, and that it could therefore be brought to sale, and he also held that S. 14 of the Regulation operated as a bar to the validity of the sale being questioned on the ground that the rent claimed was not, in fact, due. He accordingly dismissed the appeal. The respondents took the matter in second appeal to the High Court, and that was heard by a Bench consisting of Das Gupta and Lahiri JJ., who differed from the District Judge both on the construction of Exhibit B and on the bar of limitation based on S. 14 of the Regulation. They held that the effect of Exhibit B was merely to make the suit lands part and parcel of the Patni lot Ahiyapur, and that, therefore, the sale of those lands only was bad, as being a sale of a part of the Patni". They further held that as such a sale was void, S. 14 of the Regulation had no application. They accordingly allowed the appeal, and dismissed the suit. It is against this judgment that the present appeal has been brought on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) (a).

Reasoning:
6. We see no substance in the first contention. It is true that the defendants did not put forward in the trial Court the plea that the effect of Exhibit B was to incorporate the suit lands in lot Ahiyapur Patni, and that, in consequence the sale was illegal as being of a part of the Patni. On the other hand, the written statement proceeds on the view that Exhibit B created a new Patni unconnected with lot Ahiyapur, and the only defence raised on that basis was that no arrears of rent were due under Exhibit B, and that the sale was therefore invalid. But the true nature of the grant under Exhibit B is a matter to he decided on a construction of the terms of the document, and that is a question of law. It is argued for the appellant that it would be proper in determining the true character of the grant under Exhibit B to take into account surrounding circumstances, that to ascertain what those circumstances are, it will be necessary to take evidence, and, that, in consequence, a question of that kind could not be permitted to be agitated for the first time in appeal.But it is well settled that no evidence is admissible on a question of construction of a contract or grant, which must be based solely on the terms of the document, there being no suggestion before us that there is any dispute as to how the contents of the document are related to existing facts. Vide Balkishen Das v. Legge, 27 Ind App 58 at p. 65 (A), and Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La, 44 Ind App 236 at p. 243 : (AIR 1917 PC 207 at p. 209) (B). It should, moreover, be mentioned that when the defendants sought to raise this contention in their appeal in the District Court, no objection was taken by the plaintiff thereto. Under the circumstances, the learned Judges were right in allowing this point to be taken. This contention must therefore be rejected.These being the rights and obligations of the Zamindar and the Patnidar under S. 51 of the Act, a grant of the Choukidari Chakran lands by the former to the latter serves, in fact, two purposes. It recognises that the grantee is entitled to hold those lands by virtue of his title as Patnidar of the village of which they form part, and it fixes the amount payable by him on account of assessment and share of profits. The question then arises as to what the exact relationship is in which the new grant stands to the original Patni grant. Now, when S. 51 of the Act recognises and saves rights which had been acquired under contract with the Zamindar, its reasonable implication is that the rights so recognised are the same as under the contract, and that, in consequence, the settlement of the Choukidari Chakran lands in Patni must be taken to be a continuance of the Patni of the village in which they are included. But it is open to the parties to agree that the Choukidari Chakran lands should form a new and distinct Patni, and the result of such an agreement will be that while the grantee will hold those lands in Patni right, that is to say, the tenure will be permanent, heritable and alienable so far as his liability to pay jama and the corresponding right of the Zamindar to sell it under the Regulation if there is any default in the payment thereof are concerned, the new grant will be an entity by itself independent of the original Patni. That that could be done by agreement of parties is well settled, and is not disputed before us. If that is the true position, then the real question to be considered is, what is the agreement of parties with reference to the Choukidari Chakran lands, whether they are to be constituted as an independent Patni or whether they should be treated as a continuation of the original Patni or an accretion thereto, and the answer to it must depend on the interpretation to be put on themust now refer to these Exhibit B begins by reciting that the grantees desired to take a Patni settlement of 84 Bighas 18 Cottas, which is some indication though not very strong, that it is to be held as a distinct entity. We have then the clause which provides that when there is default in the payment of kist, the lands are liable to be sold in proceedings instituted under the Regulation.Now, the law had long been settled that a sale of a portion of a Patni is bad, but that if by agreement of all the parties interested different portions thereof are held under different sanads, which provide for sale of those portions for default in payment of kist payable respectively thereon, then each of those sanads might be held to have created a separate Patni in respect of the portion comprised therein.Now, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if there be admissible two constructions of a document, one of which will give effect to all the clauses therein while the other will render one or more of them nugatory, it is the former that should be adopted on the principle expressed in the maxim "ut res magis valeat quam pereat".What has to be considered therefore is whether it is possible to give effect to the clause in question, which can only be by construing Exhibit B as creating a separate Patni, and at the same time reconcile the last two clauses with that construction. Taking first the provision that if there be other persons entitled to the Patni of lot Ahiyapur they are to have the same rights in the land comprised in Exhibit B, that no doubt posits the continuance in those persons of the title under the original Patni. But the true purpose of this clause is, in our opinion, not so much to declare the rights of those other persons which rest on statutory recognition, but to provide that the grantees under the document should take subject to those rights. That that is the purpose of the clause is clear from the provision for indemnity which is contained therein. Moreover, if on an interpretation of the other clauses in the grant, the correct conclusion to come to is that it creates a new Patni in favour of the grantees thereunder, it is difficult to see how the reservation of the rights of the other Patnidars of lot Abiyapur, should such there be, affects that conclusion. We are unable to see anything in the clause under discussion, which militates against the conclusion that Exhibit B creates a newaccordingly hold that Exhibit B created a new Patni and that the sale of the lands comprised therein is not bad as of a portion of a Patni.We are conscious that we are differing from the learned Judges of the Court below on a question relating to a local tenure on which their opinion is, by reason of the special knowledge and experience which they have of it, entitled to the greatest weight. It is also true that the decision in Kanchan Barani Debi v. Umesh Chandra (I) (supra), has stood now for over three decades, though it is pertinent to add that its correctness does not appear to have come up for consideration in any subsequent decision of the Calcutta High Court, prior to this litigation. But then, the question is one of construction of a deed, and our decision that the effect of an agreement of the kind in Exhibit B was to constitute the Choukidari Chakran lands into a distinct Patni will not result in any injustice to the parties. On the other hand, the rule that a portion of a Patni should not be sold being one intended for the benefit of the Patnidars, there is no reason why an agreement entered into by them with the Zamindars providing for the sale of a portion, thereof-which is really to their advantage, should not be given effect to. Having anxiously considered the matter, we have come to the conclusion that Exhibit B creates a distinct Patni, that the sale thereof on May 15, 1937 is valid, and that the plaintiff has therefore acquired a good title to the suit lands under the grant dated February 13, 1941. In this view, it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the point that was the subject of considerable argument before us as to whether it is open to the defendants to raise the invalidity of the sale held on May 15, 1937 in answer to this action, they not having taken steps to have set it aside, as provided in S. 14 of the Regulation.