Case: Banatwala and Company Vs. L.I.C of India and Ors.

2. The Appellant is a firm of Advocates and Solicitors, and is a tenant in possession of 5th floor of a seven storey building, situated at 269 D.N. Road, Fort Mumbai owned by the first Respondent, L.I.C. L.I.C. is a statutory corporation constituted under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The area under occupation of the Appellant is 1289.16 sq. feet (equivalent to 113 sq. metres). The Petitioner is a tenant of these premises since 1st August, 1988 under an agreement of lease which has been extended from time to time. It is relevant to note that there are no proceedings of eviction filed by the Respondent No. 1 against the Appellant. The second Respondent is the Regional Manager (estates) of L.I.C.3. The Respondent No. 2 revised the monthly rent of these premises suddenly by his letter of 14th July, 2004 from Rs. 6,891/- to Rs. 39,069/-, including Municipal taxes and miscellaneous charges. The Appellant filed a Writ Petition in the Bombay High Court being Writ Petition No. 2266 of 2004 to challenge the increasing of rent as arbitrary. The Respondents made a statement in the High Court that if the petitioner abides by clause IV (e) of the lease agreement between the parties and pays increased rent as provided therein, the Respondents will not enforce the increase in the rent that was proposed through letter dated 14.7.2001. Thereupon the writ petition was withdrawn. Subsequently, the Respondents sent a reduced bill of Rs. 9144/- per month which included basic rent of Rs. 6181/- plus municipal taxes and water charges of Rs. 355/- and misc. charges of Rs. 100/-. We place the above clause IV (e) on record. It reads as follows:(e) The Lessor doth hereby convenant with the Lessee that upon the Lessee paying the rent hereby reserved regularly and observing and performing all the convenants and conditions herein contained, the Lessor shall on Lessees request extend the period of the lease on the same terms and conditions not exceeding five years from the expiration of the terms hereby granted subject however that there will be an escalation/increase in the rent hereby reserved by 35% of the rate mentioned hereinabove.4. It so transpired that the lift of the building (wherein these premises are situated) was not working properly, and hence, sometime in 2007, the Appellant, alongwith two other tenants, filed an application bearing R.E.S. Application No. 48/Res of 2007 in the Small Causes Court, Mumbai for restoration of the lift services under Section 29 of the MRC Act. A Single Judge of that Court who heard an Interim application therein, directed the Respondents by his order dated 3.10.2007 to repair the lift. A revision petition bearing Revision Application No. 308/2007 was filed by the Respondents to challenge that order. The submission of the Respondents, that the MRC Act was not applicable, was turned down by a Division Bench of that Court, which dismissed that petition by its order dated 11.1.2008. In the meanwhile, in April, 2007 the Respondents further decreased the rent from Rs. 9144/- to Rs. 6891/- per month.5. The monthly rent for the premises, however continued to be uncertain. The Respondents increased the rent for the premises once again in March, 2008 to Rs. 8689/-. In April, 2008 they demanded rent of Rs. 25,063/- on the basis that the rateable value of the building had been raised by the Mumbai Municipal Corporation from the month of April, 2006 onwards from Rs. 17,895/- to Rs. 1,21,805/-. The Appellant was called upon to pay the arrears of rent also from April 2006 amounting to Rs. 8,89,503/-.6. The Appellant therefore asked for the break up of the rent bill by their letter dated 2.4.2008. Since no reply was received, Appellant filed an Application (registered as RAN application No. 24/SR/08) under Section 8(3) of the MRC Act in the Court of Small Causes for fixation of standard rent, and also filed an application for fixing interim rent. Respondents in their turn challenged the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court to entertain the proceeding, and contended that the suit premises were public premises covered under the Public Premises Act, and the MRC Act did not apply to them. They filed an application (exhibit 14) seeking a decision on that issue as a preliminary issue. The Small Causes Court, vide its order dated 30.3.2009, rejected this application Exhibit 14 and held that the said Standard Rent Application was maintainable under the provisions of MRC Act. Being aggrieved by that order, the Respondents filed a Writ Petition invoking Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the Bombay High Court bearing Writ Petition No. 5023 of 2009.7. A Learned Single Judge of the High Court who heard the matter, accepted the contention raised by the Respondents, and allowed the petition by his order dated 8.9.2009. Thereby, he set-aside the said order dated 30.3.2009 and dismissed the Standard Rent Application. Being aggrieved by that judgment and order, this Appeal by way of special leave has been filed.

Reasoning:
Although, the lease deed is also a contract between the parties, the provisions of T.P. Act relating to contracts, shall be taken as part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (vide Section 4 of T.P. Act). As a `lease deed is a contract relating to `leases governed by T.P. Act, the relationship between the landlord and the tenant would be governed by the terms of the lease deed and subject to its terms, by Section 108 relating to the rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee, and other statutory provisions controlling leases under the T.P. Act.11. Generally, the terms of the agreement between the landlord and the tenant would require the landlord to maintain the premises in tenantable condition, and he will get the premises repaired when necessary. The tenant will be required to vacate the premises at the end of the period of lease. During the lease period, it will be the responsibility of the tenant to pay the rent regularly and keep the premises in good condition subject only to changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force and when such defect has been caused by any act or default on the part of the lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound to make it good within three months after such notice has been given or left (See Section 108(m) of T.P. Act. If the tenant commits breaches of the lease agreement by not paying the rent regularly or remaining in arrears thereof, or causing damage to the premises, the landlord may terminate the lease earlier, even before the expiry of the agreed term as per the provisions concerning the termination provided in the agreement and the Transfer of Property Act. If the tenant does not vacate the premises after the termination of lease, the landlord will have to file a suit for evicting him in the Civil Court.15. The Bombay Rent Act came to be replaced by the MRC Act 1999. The MRC Act is subsequent to the Public Premises Act, 1971, and has come into force with effect from 31.3.2000 after receiving the assent of the President of India. Therefore, the subjects which were covered under the Bombay Rent Act came to be covered under the MRC Act, 1999 as appropriately modified including the concept of standard rent. Can it therefore not be said that as far as premises of L.I.C. are concerned, on all other subjects excluding the subject of eviction of unauthorized occupants and recovery of arrears of rent, the modified provisions under the MRC Act will apply wherever the Bombay Rent Act was applicable?16. As far as the Petitioner is concerned, it occupied the suit premises in the year 1988 under an agreement of lease with L.I.C, at which time the Public Premises Act as well as Bombay Rent Act were in force. This agreement has been extended from time to time. As stated above, the Bombay Rent Act was replaced with effect from 31.3.2000 by the MRC Act. Would it therefore not be correct to say that for aspects other than eviction, and recovery of arrears of rent, the relationship between the Petitioner and the Respondent (which was earlier governed by the Bombay Rent Act) will now be governed under the MRC Act?In this context, it must also be noted that the controversy in the case of Ashoka Marketing was with respect to the subject of eviction of the unauthorized occupants from the public premises. Eviction of tenants in general was a subject covered by both the statutes under considerations before the Court. However, the Public Premises Act contains the special provisions for the eviction of unauthorized occupants from the public premises, but for which they would fall within the ambit of the Rent Control Act. Consequently, in view of the above dicta, the proceedings under the Public Premises Act were held to be valid and legal, and not those under the Delhi Rent Control Act. The subject matter of controversy in our case is with respect to the fixation of standard rent, which is not covered under the provision in the Public Premises Act. On the other hand the same is very much covered under the MRC Act. The overriding effect given to Public Premises Act cannot mean overriding with reference to a matter which was not dealt with by that Act, since the Public Premises Act did not claim to cover the subject other than eviction of unauthorized occupants from public premises and recovery of arrears of rent.Public Premises Act vis-à-vis the Bombay Rent Act and the MRC Act on the issue of eviction of unauthorised occupants from Public Premises-31. The impugned judgment in the present case relies upon the above observations to hold that once the premises were covered under the Public Premises Act, that Act will override the Rent Control Act and therefore in the instant case, standard rent application was not maintainable.32. Before we deal with the rival submissions on the maintainability of the standard rent application, we may note that with respect to the aspect of eviction of unauthorised occupants from the public premises, it is now well settled that the Public Premises Act will apply and not the Bombay Rent Act or the subsequent MRC Act.The Public Premises Act creates a forum for eviction of the unauthorised occupants and provides for a special procedure for recovery of the premises from such occupants. Unauthorised occupation has been defined in a vide manner and it includes the continuation in occupation of any person of the public premises after his authority to occupy has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. It would as well include the determination of the authority to occupy whenever the premises are required bonafide and reasonably by the public authority. There was no such special procedure for the public bodies until the Public Premises Act was enacted. When it comes to the requirement of the Government or the Public Corporation, now the public body will be taking steps under the Public Premises Act. It is, however, relevant to note as held in this judgment that the Public Premises Act has a very limited application as against the Rent Act which affords a special protection to the tenants by fixing standard rent and requiring the landlord to maintain the essential services. It was, therefore, submitted that the standard rent application under the Rent Act would remain available to the tenant even if the premises are otherwise covered under the Public Premises Act for the purposes of eviction and recovery of arrears of rent from the unauthorised occupants.36. The question therefore to be examined is as to whether the two legislations occupy the same field. If they do not, then there is no repugnancy. Unless the provisions are irreconcilable, there will be a presumption in favour of the constitutionality.he question of repugnancy can arise only in connection with the subjects which are enumerated in the Concurrent List with respect to which both the Union and the State Legislatures have the concurrent power to legislate, and when the State Legislature makes a law on a subject on which the Parliament has already made a law. It is to deal which such a conflict that Article 254 has been enacted. Article 254 of the Constitution deals with the question of inconsistency between the laws made by the Parliament and laws made by the Legislatures of States.35. The question of repugnancy between the law made by the Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature may arise in cases when both the legislation occupy the same field with respect to one of the matters enumerated in List III and where a direct conflict is seen between the two. The Principles laid down by a bench of 3 Judges in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar reported in 1983 (4) SCC 45 were reiterated by a Constitution Bench in State of West Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. and Ors. reported in (2004 (10) SCC 201 ). Para 31 (5) thereof is instructive for our purpose and it reads as follows:31 (5) Where the legislative competence of the legislature of any State is questioned on the ground that it encroaches upon the legislative competence of Parliament to enact a law, the question one has to ask is whether the legislation relates to any of the entries in List I or III. If it does, no further question need be asked and Parliaments legislative competence must be upheld. Where there are three lists containing a large number of entries, there is bound to be some overlapping among them. In such a situation the doctrine of pith and substance has to be applied to determine as to which entry does a given piece of legislation relate. Once it is so determined, any incidental trenching on the field reserved to the other legislature is of no consequence. The court has to look at the substance of the matter. The doctrine of pith and substance is sometimes expressed in terms of ascertaining the true character of legislation. The name given by the legislature to the legislation is immaterial. Regard must be had to the enactment as a whole, to its main objects and to the scope and effect of its provisions. Incidental and superficial encroachments are to be disregarded.37. In the case of M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India and Anr. 1979 (3) SCC 431 a Constitution Bench was concerned with the question as to whether certain provisions of the Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973, were repugnant to the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1952. The Appellant was being prosecuted under Sections 161, 468 and 471 of Indian Penal Code and Section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Court referred to earlier decisions including the one in Deep Chand v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 648 wherein it was held that the repugnancy between the two statutes may be ascertained by considering whether the Parliament intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter considered in the State Act replacing the Act of the State Legislature. The Constitution Bench then laid down the principles governing the rule of repugnancy in paragraph 35 which are as follows:35. On a careful consideration, therefore, of the authorities referred to above, the following propositions emerge:1. That in order to decide the question of repugnancy it must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions, so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field.2. That there can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results.4. That where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct and separate offences, no question of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field.Consequently the Court held that there was no conflict amongst the legislations concerned.38. The question with respect to conflict between two such legislations came up before a Bench of three Judges in the case of Vijay Kumar Sharma and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in 1990 (2) SCC 562 , where the question was whether there was any conflict between the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act 1976 and Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This Court looked into the judgments holding the field and held that there was no conflict between the two. It laid down the law in paragraph 53 as follows:53. The aforesaid review of the authorities makes it clear that whenever repugnancy between the State and Central legislation is alleged, what has to be first examined is whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject matter. The test for determining the same is the usual one, namely, to find out the dominant intention of the two legislations. If the dominant intention, i.e. the pith and substance of the two legislations is different, they cover different subject matters. If the subject matters covered by the legislations are thus different, then merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate subjects they do not cover the same field. The legislation, to be on the same subject matter must further cover the entire field covered by the other. A provision in one legislation to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation. But such partial coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not bring about the repugnancy which is intended to be covered by Article 254(2). Both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject to attract the article.39. There could be provisions for certain purposes in one statute, and for another purpose in another statute, though both govern the common field. Thus, in Krishna Distt. Coop. Mktg. Society Ltd. Vijayawada v. N.V. Purnachandra Rao and Ors. 1987 (4) SCC 99 , the issue was, with respect to the application of Section 25-F of Industrial Disputes Act, to the employees who were otherwise governed under the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1966. In that context this Court had to examine whether there was any conflict between the two Acts and particularly when the A.P. Act was a later act and it had received the assent of the President. The question was whether compliance with Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act could be insisted for establishments governed under the Shops and Establishments Act. This Court held that those provisions will be applicable and there was no conflict between the provisions of the two Acts. Section 25-F of the Central Act provided for the conditions precedent for retrenchment, and the noncompliance therewith made the order of retrenchment fatal. Section 41 (1) and (3) of the A.P. Act provided for the authorities to settle the disputes arising out of retrenchment. Section 25J(2) of the I.D. Act reads as follows:25-J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this chapter.-(1)...(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this chapter shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State insofar as that law provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen insofar as they relate to lay off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.The court noted in para 8 that the State Act does not contain any express provision making the provision relating to retrenchment in the Central Act ineffective in so far as Andhra Pradesh is concerned. What is observed in para 6 is relevant for our purpose:6... Sub-section (1) of Section 25-J of the Central Act lays down that Chapter V-A, shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law. The proviso to that Sub-section however saves any higher benefit available to a workman under any law, agreement or settlement or award. Sub-section (2) of Section 25-J however makes a distinction between any machinery provided by any State law for settlement of industrial disputes and the substantive rights and liabilities arising under Chapter V-A of the Central Act where a lay off or retrenchment takes place. It provides that while Section 25-J would not affect the provisions in a State law relating to settlement of industrial disputes, the rights and liabilities of employers and workmen insofar as they relate to lay off and retrenchment shall be determined in accordance with Chapter V-A of the Central Act. It is thus seen that Section 41(1) and Section 41(3) of the State Act prescribe alternative authorities to settle a dispute arising out of a retrenchment. Those authorities may exercise their jurisdiction under the State Act but they have to decide such dispute in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V-A...40. Similarly, in the case of National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Shri Kishan Bhageria and Ors. 1988 Supp. SCC 82,  the question was whether a Reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 could be sought by the employees covered under the Rajasthan Shops and Establishments Act, 1958. This Court held that it would be so. In a similar way in Bharat Hydro Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. 2004 (2) SCC 553 , this Court held in the context of Electricity Act 1910, and Assam Act No. 1 of 1997 that if two legislations operate in different fields without encroaching upon each other fields there cannot be any repugnancy.41. In the field of criminal law also the same approach has been adopted by this Court. In State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah and Ors. 2008 (13) SCC 5 , the question was with respect to the conflict between the Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 (MCOC Act for short) and Telegraph Act, 1885. In Zameer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2010 (5) SCC 246 , the question was with respect to the conflict between the MCOC Act and Unlawful Activities (Prevention Act), 1967. In both matters this Court took the view that mere difference in the two Acts is not sufficient, and an incidental encroachment is irrelevant. This Court held that there was no conflict in both the cases.42. Whatever be the object of granting exemption, where the object is to see that the properties of the State or semi-state bodies should not suffer by the rigours of the Rent Control Laws or the possession of the public premises be recovered expeditiously, the Courts have expressed their views that these authorities being public bodies should so behave as not to act contrary to the policies laid down in the Rent Control Laws namely not to increase the rent unreasonably or excessively, nor to evict their tenant unreasonably or arbitrarily, save and except in public interest. (J.H. Dalal in his Commentary on the Bombay Rent Act, Fifth Edition, Page 65).Again, as we have noted earlier, the Appellants do not dispute that for the purposes of eviction of unauthorised occupants, and for the recovery of arrears of rent from them, the proceedings to be initiated by the Respondents would be fully competent under the Public Premises Act, and that in such an eventuality the occupants will not be entitled to seek any remedy under the MRC Act, since the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been ousted under Section 15 of the Public Premises Act in this behalf. It is also already held by this Court in the cases of Kaiser-I-Hind and Crawford Bayley (supra) that as far as the issue of eviction of unauthorised occupants from Public Premises is concerned, the authorities under the Public Premises Act alone will have jurisdiction to deal therewith, and no proceedings will lie either under the Bombay Rent Act or the MRC Act.59. Before we deal with the rival submissions, we may state once again that under the general law of landlord and tenant also, the landlord had the obligation to charge only the rent agreed under the lease agreement, and to carry out the repairs to the property which were necessary, failing which the tenant would be entitled to carry out the same and deduct the expenses from the rent (see Section 108(B) (f) of the Transfer of Property Act). As we have noted earlier, due to the problems of the scarcity of accommodation following the Second World War, special protection was made available to the tenants against unjustified increases in rent and ejectment from the tenancies. This protection was reflected in the provisions of various Rent Control Acts such as the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 which governed the premises of the Appellant for all purposes prior to the coming into force of the Public Premises Act, 1971. When the Public Premises Act was enforced, it covered the subject of eviction of unauthorised occupants of the public premises and recovery of arrears of rent from them, and those subjects no longer remained covered under the Bombay Rent Act.61. The question in this case is different in the sense that the MRC Act which is a State Act, is an Act subsequent to the Public Premises Act, and has been assented by the President, notwithstanding the existence of the Public Premises Act. The situation, therefore, would be governed by Sub-article (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution, and we will have to see whether the provisions of MRC Act with respect to the fixing of the standard rent and restoring the essential supplies and services are in any way repugnant to the Public Premises Act. In Vijay Kumar Sharma v. State of Karnataka (supra) a Bench of three Judges of this Court has laid down that whenever repugnancy is alleged, what has to be first examined is whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject matter. The test for that is to find out the dominant intention of the two legislations. If the subject matters covered by the legislations are different, merely because the two legislations refer to some allied or cognate subjects they do not cover the same field.62. We have noted the observations of a Bench of three Judges of this Court in M/s Jain Ink Mfg. Company (supra) that the Public Premises Act has a very limited application, whereas the Rent Act is an Act with much wider application than the Public Premises Act. In the present case, the subjects of fixation of Standard Rent and restoration of essential services by the landlord are covered under the MRC Act, but in no way under the Public Premises Act. The Public Premises Act, in fact does not claim to cover these subjects. As held by the Constitution Bench in Kesoram Industries Ltd. (supra), the Court has to look at the substance of the matter. Regard must be had to the enactment as a whole, to its main objects and scope of its provisions. Incidental and superficial encroachments are to be disregarded. Eviction and recovery of arrears of rent are alone covered under the Public Premises Act. The subject of fixation of rent is different and independent from eviction as held by the division bench of the Karnataka High in Bharath Gold Mines. That being the position, there is no conflict between the MRC Act and the Public Premises Act when it comes to the provisions in the MRC Act with respect to fixation of Standard Rent and requiring the landlord to maintain the essential services and supplies. Therefore, the provisions of MRC Act in that behalf cannot in any way be said to be repugnant to those under the Public Premises Act. The presumption is in favour of constitutionality, and the Court is not expected to strike down a provision unless the conflict is a real one. In the present matter there is no such real conflict.In the case of Church of North India (supra), relied upon by the Respondents, this Court was concerned with a suit for declaration as to the succession to a particular trust governed under the Bombay Public Trust Act. Such a suit was squarely covered under that Act and, therefore, it was held that the Civil Court will not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The seven principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (supra) were relied upon in that case. It is sufficient to refer to the first two principles therefrom which are as follows:(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.If we apply these two tests and examine the scheme of the Public Premises Act, it will be seen that Section 10 of the Act does give a finality to the orders passed by the Estate Officers or the Appellate Officers, and states that `the same shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. Section 15 of the Act specifically states that no court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of the subjects, amongst others concerning, `(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, and (d) the arrears of rent payable under Sub-section (1) of section 7 or damages payable under Sub-section (2), or interest payable under Sub-section (2A), of that section. Therefore, to that extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted. The actions which are covered under the Public Premises Act are concerning eviction of unauthorised occupants and recovery of arrears of rent. The Act however does not claim to speak anything about the fixation of Standard Rent or maintenance of essential services. For these purposes no remedy is provided under the Public Premises Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for these remedies cannot be held to be ousted.Thus, for example, where an industry is covered under a State Act such as the Bombay Industrial Relation Act, 1946 in Maharashtra, the workmen engaged therein will be required to raise the disputes concerning reinstatement and backwages in the event of dismissal, retrenchment, removal or termination before the authority under that Act. At the same time, whenever any money, including unpaid wages is due to the workmen, they also have the right to file the claim applications under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in the Labour Courts constituted under that Act, since similar provision is not made under the said Bombay Act. The MRC Act being a welfare statute like the labour laws is enacted after considering the requirements of the tenants, and contains the provisions for fixation of standard rent and for restoring essential services and supplies when necessary. The public premises are not specifically exempted from the applicability of the MRC Act. That being so, there is no reason to hold that these remedies will not be available to the tenants of the public premises, though for the purposes of eviction of unauthorised occupants and recovery of arrears of rent, the proceedings will lie only under the Public Premises Act. It is also to be noted that the proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent are at the instance of landlord, whereas those for fixation of standard rent are at the instance of the tenant. Both these proceedings are quite different in their prayers and scope of consideration. The fact that the proceeding for one purpose is provided under one statute can not lead to an automatic conclusion that the remedy for a different purpose provided under another competent statute becomes unavailable.66. Although the question of maintainability of the Standard Rent Applications concerning the public premises is only coming up now before this Court, we have referred to the views of Courts when different facets of this issue came up for consideration from time to time. The exemption from the Bombay Rent Act to the government premises was upheld in Rampratap Jaidayal (supra), on the basis of the presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the enactment which was also on the footing that Legislature correctly appreciates the needs of its own people. Chief Justice Chagla has clearly observed in that matter that the Legislature was not in any sense exempting the Government from the operation of the Act in order to permit the Government to do the very thing which the Legislature was prohibiting the landlords from doing, viz. not to increase rents and not to eject tenants unless it was absolutely necessary in the public interest. S.R. Das, J. (as he then was) has also observed similarly in Baburao Shantaram More (supra) that itwas not expected that the Government or the Local Authority would be actuated by any profit making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject the tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are likely to be. Sabyasachi Mukharji, J (as he then was) has gone further in Dwarkadas Marfatia (supra), and observed that when public authorities enjoy this benefit without being hidebound by the requirements of the Rent Act, they must act for public benefit, and to that extent this issue is liable to be gone into and can be the subjectmatter of adjudication. He has stated in no uncertain terms that the legislative expectations as observed by the Chagla, C.J. in Rampratap Jaidayal (supra) cannot make such conduct a matter of contract pure and simple. He has further observed that the exercise of discretion of public authorities must be tested on the assumption that they would not act as private landlords and they must be judged by that standard. We may however, add that these principles will have no relevance while considering a dispute between a statutory body as landlord and an affluent tenant in regard to a commercial or non-residential premises.68. We have referred to the general guidelines dated 30.5.2002, laid down by the Central Government in this behalf. Guidelines No. 2(i) and 2 (iii) are relevant for our purpose. Guideline No. 2 (i) states that the provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 should be used primarily to evict totally unauthorised occupants. Guideline No. 2 (iii) specifically states that it will be open to the public authority to secure periodic revision of rent in terms of the provisions of the Rent Control Act in each State, or to move under genuine grounds under the Rent Control Act for resuming possession. Thus, these guidelines specifically recognise the relevance of certain provisions of Rent Control Acts for their application to the properties covered under the Public Premises Act. It is stated in the guidelines that the public authorities would have rights similar to private landlords under the Rent Control Acts in dealing with genuine legal tenants. It follows that the public authorities will have the obligations of the private landlords also. It is relevant to note that the purpose of these guidelines is to prevent arbitrary use of powers under the Public Premises Act. The relevance of the guidelines will depend upon the nature of guidelines and the source of power to issue such guidelines. The source of the right to apply for determination of standard rent is the Rent Control Act, and not the guidelines.69. We may also note by subsequent clarificatory order dated 23.7.2003, the Central Government has made it clear that the guidelines dated 30.5.2002 will not apply to affluent tenants70. It was submitted on behalf of the Respondents that if the Appellant or the tenants are aggrieved by the fixation of the rent, their remedy is to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In making this submission, the Respondents are ignoring that the writ jurisdiction is a discretionary jurisdiction. Besides, normally oral evidence is not recorded while exercising the writ jurisdiction. Although part of the evidence to be examined in the process of rent fixation would be documentary, such as the provisions of the contract between the parties, there would also be many other factors which may require oral evidence, particularly with respect to the comparable properties. An appropriate remedy, forum and procedure are therefore necessary in the interest of fairness and proper adjudication. That apart, there is no reason to insist upon such an interpretation which will deny to the tenants of the public premises, a remedy and a forum which are otherwise available to the tenants under the MRC Act,.71. In view of what is stated above, the interpretation as canvassed by the respondents will deny the appropriate remedy to the Petitioner and the like tenants, to have the rent of their premises being fixed by filing a Standard Rent Application, and also to get the essential services restored in the event of any difficulty. There is no reason to accept any such interpretation because as stated above there is no conflict between this provisions of the MRC Act with those under the Public Premises Act, when it comes to fixation of standard rent and restoring the essential supplies. Otherwise it will expose the provisions of Public Premises Act to the vires of unreasonableness also. The interpretation canvassed by the Respondents is not in consonance with the welfare state that is contemplated under the Indian Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court does not lay down the correct position in law. As against that we approve the approach and the interpretation adopted by the Karnataka High Court in Bharath Gold Mines Ltd. (supra).72. In the circumstances, we hold as follows:(a) The provisions of the Maharastra Rent Control Act, 1999 with respect to fixation of Standard Rent for premises, and requiring the landlord not to cut off or withhold essential supply or service, and to restore the same when necessary, are not in conflict with or repugnant to any of the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.(b) The provisions of the Public Premises Act, 1971 shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings covered under the Act and their occupants to the extent they provide for eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises, recovery of arrears of rent or damages for such unauthorised occupation, and other incidental matters specified under the Act.(c) The provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 shall govern the relationship between the public undertakings and their occupants to the extent this Act covers the other aspects of the relationship between the landlord and tenants, not covered under the Public Premises Act, 1971.(d) The application of Appellant and similar applications of the tenants for fixation of Standard Rent or for restoration of essential supplies and services when necessary, shall be maintainable under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999.