Case: Kailash Chandra Vs. Union Of India

1. The appellant, a clerk in the service of the East Indian Railways was compulsorily retired from service with effect from June 30, 1948, on attaining the age of 55 years. His prayer for further retention in service on the ground that he was entitled to be retained under R. 2046/2 of the Railway Establishment code having been rejected he brought the suit which has given rise to this appeal in the court of the Civil Judge, Lucknow, alleging that he was entitled to be retained under the above rule and the order for compulsory retirement on attaining the age of 55 years was void and inoperative in law. He accordingly prayed for a declaratory decree that the order of his compulsory retirement was illegal and void and for a money decree for arrears of pay on the basis that he had continued in service.2. The main defence was a denial of his right to be retained in service under the rules. The Trial Court accepted the plaintiffs contention as regards the effect of the rule, gave him a declaration as prayed for and also decreed the claim for money in part.3. On appeal the High Court took a different view of R. 2046 and held that that rule gave the plaintiff no right to continue in service beyond the age of 55 years. The High Court therefore allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. Against this decision the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution.

Reasoning:
It is clear therefore that whereas the authority appropriate to make the order of compulsory retirement or of retention is given no discretion by itself to retain a ministerial railway servant under cl. (b) if he attains the age of 55 years, that is not the position as regards the ministerial servants who fall under cl.are constrained to say that the language used in this rule is unnecessarily involved; but at the same time it is reasonably clear that the defect in the language creates no doubt as regards the intention of the rule-making authority. That intention, in our opinion, is that the right conferred by the first part is not in any way limited or cut down by the second part of the sentence; but the draftsman has thought fit by inserting the second clause to give to the appropriate authority an option to retain the servant for five years more, subject to the condition that he continues to be efficient. If this condition is not satisfied the appropriate authority has no option to retain the servant; where however the condition is satisfied the appropriate authority has the option to do so but is not bound to exercise the option. If the intention had been to cut down the right conferred on the authority to retire a servant at the age of 55 years the proper language to express such intention would have been; ......"may be required to retire at the age of 55 years provided however that he shall be retained in service if he continues to be efficient up to the age of 60 years" or some such similar words. The use of "should ordinarily be retained in service" is sufficient index to the mind of the rule-making authority that the right conferred by the first clause of the sentencethese words without the word "ordinarily" we find it unreasonable to think that it indicates any intention to cut down at all the right to require the servant to retire at the age of 55 years or to create in the servant any right to continue beyond the age of 55 years if he continues to be efficient. They are much more appropriate to express the intention that as soon as the age of 55 years is reached the appropriate authority has the right to require the servant to retire but that between the age of 55 and 60 the appropriate authority is given the option to retain the servant but is not bound to do so.8. This intention is made even more clear and beyond doubt by the use of the word "ordinarily". "Ordinarily" means "in the large majority of cases but not invariably". This itself emphasises the fact that the appropriate authority is not bound to retain the servant after he attains the age of 55 even if he continues to be efficient. The intention of the second clause therefore clearly is that while under the first clause the appropriate authority has the right to retire the servant who falls within cl. (a) as soon as he attains the age of 55, it will, at that stage, consider whether or not to retain him further. This option to retain for the further period of five years can only be exercised if the servant continues to be efficient; but in deciding whether or not to exercise this option the authority has to consider circumstances other than the question of efficiency also; in the absence of special circumstances he "should" retain the servant; but what are special circumstances is left entirely to the authoritys decision. Thus, after the age of 55 is reached by the servant the authority has to exercise its discretion whether or not to retain the servant; and there is no right in the servant to be retained, even if he continues to be efficient.It would be wholly unreasonable however to consider this as a decision on the question of what this rule means, Dealing with an argument that as the plaintiff under this rule has the right to continue in service till 60 and could not be retired before that except on the ground of inefficiency certain results follow, the Court assumed for the sake of argument that this interpretation was possible and proceeded to deal with the learned counsels argument on that basis. It was not intended to say that this was the correct interpretation that should be put on the words of the rule.11. The correct interpretation of R. 2046 (1) (a) of the Code, in our opinion, is that a railway ministerial servant falling within this clause may be compulsorily retired on attaining the age of 55 but when the servant is between the age of 55 and 60 the appropriate authority has the option to continue him in service, subject to the condition that the servant continues to be efficient but the authority is not bound to retain him even if a servant continues to be efficient.We therefore hold that the High Court was right in holding that this rule gave the plaintiff no right to continue in service beyond the age ofappears that on September 8, 1948, the Government of India came to a decision that no ministerial Government servant to whom the fundamental R. 56(b) (i) applied and who has attained the age of 55 years but has not attained the age of 60 years could be required to retire from service unless be has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed retirement and unless any representation that he may desire to make in this connection has been duly considered.This decision was communicated to different departments of the Government of India and it was directed that this should be noted "for future guidance". On October 19, 1948, the Ministry of Railways issued a notification for dealing with cases of retirement of ministerial servants governed by R. 2046(2)(a) (which corresponded to fundamental R. 56(b)(i) in the manner as directed by the Government of Indias notification dated September 8, 1948. This notification of October 19, 1948, again made it clear that it had been decided not to take any action in respect of ministerial servants who had already been retired. Again, in a notification dated April 15, 1952, the Railway Board communicated a decision that "such of the ministerial servants who had been retired after 8th September, 1948, but before attaining the age of 60 years without complying with Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution should be taken back to duty" under certaindo not think that this contention has any substance. What happened was that on September 8, 1948, the Government took a decision that ministerial servants should not be retired under the rule in question on attainment of 55 years of age if they were efficient without giving them an opportunity of showing cause against the action and accordingly from that date it changed its procedure as regards the exercise of the option to retire servants between the age of 55 and 60. The decision that nothing should be done as regards those who had already retired on that date cannot be said to have been arbitrarily made. The formation of a different class of those who retired after September 8, 1948, from those who had retired before that date on which the decision was taken is a reasonable classification and does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. This contention is therefore also rejected.The High Court was therefore right, in our opinion, in holding that there was a reasonable classification of the ministerial servants who had been retired under R. 2046(2)(a) on attaining the age of 55 into two classes: one class consisting of those who had been retired after September 8, 1948, and the other consisting of those who retired up to September 8, 1948. There is, therefore, no denial of equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.