Case: Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation Vs. Jabar Singh

(2) A bunch of 38 appeals were filed by State of Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation against the judgment and order datedby the High Court of Uttaranchal in Writ Petition No. 1376 of 2001. The said writ petition was filed by theagainst the award datedof the Labour Court, Dehradun in Litigation Case No. 117 of 2006 (with 29 other cases). Dates and events(3) U. P. Forest Corporation had engagedworkers for the purpose of measurement of wood, protection of timber at the logging site and depots of the Corporation. The said engagement of workers was as per requirement. U. P. Forest Corporation was the predecessor of the appellant Corporation.(4) Writ Petition No. 21 of 1993 (Van Nigam Karmachari Kalyan Sangh vs. State of U. P.) was decided by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad vide judgment and order datedwherein the High Court, inter alia, held as under:"(iii) In case of reduction of work or shortfall in the work the authorities of the Forest Corporation would make an endeavour to adjust them in alternative work available in the particular region in which they are working or in any other region where work is available before giving them seasonal leave terminating their services.(iv) If in that particular region or any other region such alternative work is not available on account of reduction in work or shortfall in work, the authorities of the Corporation may retrench the services of field staff but only in accordance withthe provisions of sectionof the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act."(5) The predecessor Corporation of the appellant made its best endeavour to accommodate the surplusworkers but the alternative work was not available since the work of the Corporation had tapered down as felling of the trees had been banned in the forest under the policy of the Government and in these circumstances the predecessor of the appellant was compelled to reduce the work force ofworkers. As there was no work the services of the respondent workers were retrenched along with several others by the U. P. Forest Corporation in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.(6) The services of the respondent were retrenched by orders dated995 after giving one months wage in lieu of notice and retrenchment compensation in compliance with sectionof the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and also such payments were received by the respondents without any protest.(7) An industrial dispute was raised by the respondents, and the Labour Court, Dehradun in the award held that the retrenchment order was legal and valid asthe provisions of sectionof the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act were fully complied with. Further, it held thatthe provisions of sectionof the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted as the Forest Corporation is not an industrial establishment as defined in sectionB of the Industrial DisputesAggrieved by the award datedJabar Singh and others filed Writ Petition No. 8351 of 1999. Writ Petition No. 1376 of 2001 along with other writ petitions was allowed by the High Court onwith the direction that the writ petitioners shall be put back on duty and shall be paidThe High Court observed that the appropriate Government by framing the rules known as the Industrial Disputes (Uttar Pradesh) Rules, 1976 have made sectionapplicable in relation to industrial establishment in the State of U. P.(11) In view of the above the question which was raised was whether the Forest Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition of sectionor not.(12) The High Court held that the Forest Corporation carries the activity of cutting, removal, disposal and sale of trees over the area allotted to the Corporation and, therefore, the area of the land over which such activities are carried on is "premises". Thus, the first requirement of the definition of factory is satisfied.(13) The High Court held that cutting of trees by axe and shaping the cut trees into logs is a manufacturing process under the definition of section 2(k) of the Factories Act and therefore it is an industrial establishment within the meaning of sectionof the Industrial DisputesThe High Court held that since the retrenchment was made without complying withthe provisions of sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct, the retrenchment order was void and accordingly, the said order of retrenchment was quashed. The High Court further directed that the writ petitioners shall be put back on duty and shall be paid salary/wages.

Reasoning:
(29) In the present case, it is admitted on both sides that the work of the respondents consisted of "cutting of trees by axe and changing the shape of the timber into logs by usingsaw". In our view the process of cutting by axe and changing the shape by saw both squarely fall within the definition of the first part of the manufacturing process as cutting would be included in the processes of making" and "breaking up" included in the said definition. Further, the changing of shape by saw would be included in the processes of "altering" and "adapting" of the trees. Admittedly, trees and logs both fall within the meaning of "any article or substance", the second part of the definition. Lastly, the conversion of trees into logs is admittedly for the purpose of sale, disposal, use and last but not the least for transport, all of which fall within the third part of the definition.(30) It is noteworthy that this Court in Ardeshir Bhiwandiwala case (supra) has specifically held that salt prepared by evaporation of brine in salt packs spread over an area of 254 acres would also constitute a manufacturing process so as to include the salt works in the definition of factory. This Court in Lal Mohd. case (supra) has held that construction of a railway line over a length of 54 miles would also constitute a manufacturing process and all the patches of land on which actual work is taking place from time to time to build rail line would be a factory for the purpose of section 2(m). This Court also gave the example of construction of electricity transmission lines which would be a manufacturing process though the process of actual transmission of electricity may not bethe establishment of the appellant Corporation would, in our opinion, fall within the definition of industrial establishment as contained in sectionand, therefore, sectionwould be applicable to the establishment of the appellant Corporation. It is also submitted that though Uttaranchal Forest Corporation is covered by the provisions of the U. P. Act, however, in terms of the 1976 Rules sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct is applicable to the State of Uttaranchal and, therefore, to the establishment of the appellantWith regard to theof the writ petition and the contention that the writ petition by the respondents was barred by laches, Mr. Mehta submitted that the availability of alternative remedy is only a rule of prudence and in a case like the present one where there were no disputed questions of fact, he submitted that the High Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition. Mr. Bharat Sangal also made his submissions that this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is entitled to mould the relief to be given to the workmen in the present case in view of the fact that sectionstatutorily provides all benefits to the workmen in case of illegal retrenchment; the workmen concerned in the present cases would be entitled to the said benefit without any modification or mould the relief by this Court. He, therefore, submitted that the civil appeals filed by the Corporation deserves to be dismissed in favour of the respondent workmen.(43) We are unable to countenance the above submission of Mr. Mehta and Mr. Sangal insofar as it relates to theof the writ petition and the delay and laches. It is not in dispute that the effective alternative remedy was not availed of by many of the workmen as detailed in paragraphs supra. The termination order was made in the year 1995 and the writ petitions were admittedly filed in the year 2005 after a delay of 10 years. The High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in entertaining the writ petition on the ground that the petition has been filed after a delay of 10 years and that the writ petitions should have been dismissed by the High Court on the ground of laches. We have already referred to the decision of this Court in U. P. State Spg. Co. Ltd. vs. R. S. Pandey (supra). This Court speaking through Arijit Pasayat, J. has held in categorical terms that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out.(44) In the instant case, the workmen have not made out any exceptional circumstances to knock the door of the High Court straightaway without availing the effective alternative remedy available under the Industrial Disputes Act. But the dispute relates to enforcement of a right or obligation under the statute and a specific remedy is, therefore, provided under the statute. The High Court should not deviate from the general view and interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution except when a very strong case is made out for making a departure. There are several decisions to the same effect. The respondents have not made out any strong case for making a departure. Accordingly, the conclusion is inevitable that the High Court was not justified in entertaining the writ petition.(45) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the writ petitioners (the respondents herein) who have not invoked the jurisdiction of the Tribunal are not entitled to any relief in the writ petitions. They are not entitled for any benefits of reinstatement, backwages and continuity of service.(46) On the other hand, the respondents in civil appeals arising out of special leave petitions as detailed infra who approached the Tribunal and the High Court are entitled for the relief of reinstatement, back wages and continuity of service in view of our finding that the appellant Corporation is an industrial establishment and that provisions of sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct are attracted.(47) Learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the other civil appeals have adopted the arguments of Mr. Dhruv Mehta and Mr. Bharat Sangal.(48) For the foregoing reasons, we hold thatthe provisions of sectionof the Industrial DisputesAct, 1947 are attracted andwith the said section makes retrenchment order illegal and non est.(49) We also hold that the appellant Corporation is an industrial establishment within the definition of sectionof the Industrial Disputes