Case: H.R. Adyanthaya etc. etc Vs. Sandoz Ltd., etc. etc

( 8 ) ALL that remains, therefore, is C. A. No. 818 of 1992 where the dispute arose out of transfers of the employees concerned effected on 16/02/1988. The complaint was made to the Industrial Court under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the maharashtra Act ).

Reasoning:
Hence the position in law as it obtains today is that a person to be a workman under the ID Act must be employed to do the work of any of the categories, viz. , manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. It is not enough that he is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the definition. We reiterate the said interpretation. WHAT is further necessary to remember is that in none of the aforesaid decisions which we have discussed above, the word "operational" or the words "skilled" and "unskilled" independently of "manual" fell for consideration as the amendment under which they were introduced came into operation for the first time w. e. f. 21/08/1984 and the dispute involved in the aforesaid decisions were of the prior dates.(6 ) IN the light of the above position of law emerging from the judicial decisions, the statutory provisions and the changes in them, we may now deal with the contentions advanced before us.IT was contended by Shri Sharma, appearing for the workmen that the definition of workman under the ID Act includes all employees except those covered by the four exceptions to the said definition. His second contention was that in any case, the medical representatives perform duties of skilled and technical nature and, therefore, they are workmen within the meaning of the saiddefinition. We are afraid that both these contentions are untenable in the light of the position of law discussed above. The first contention was expressly negatived by twoBenches in May and Baker (AIR 1967 SC 678 ) and Burmah Shell (AIR 1971 SC 922 ) cases (supra) as has been pointed out in detail above. As regards the second contention, it really consists of twoviz. , that the medical representatives are engaged in "skilled" and "technical" work. As regards the word "skilled", we are of the view that the connotation of the said word in the context in which it is used, will not include the work of a sales promotion employee such as the medical representative in the present case. That word has to be construed ejusdem generis and thus construed, would mean skilled work whether manual orwhich is of a genre of the other types of work mentioned in the definition. The work of promotion of sales of the product or services of the establishment is distinct from and independent of the types of work covered by the said definition. Hence the contention that the medical representatives were employed to do skilled work within the meaning of the said definition, has to be rejected. As regards the "technical" nature of their work, it has been expressly rejected by this Court in Burmah Shell case (supra ). Hence that contention has also to be rejected. SHRINaphade, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in W. P. 5259 of 1980 contended that inasmuch as the SPE Act, as it was originally enacted made a distinction between sales promotion employees drawing wages not exceeding Rs. 750. 00 per mensem (excluding commission) or Rs. 9000. 00 per annum (including commission) and those drawing wages above the said amounts included only the first category of employees in the said definition, it was discriminatory as against those who fell in the second category and was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. According to him, the classification made had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by theenactment. We are afraid that this argument is not tenable. The service conditions and their protection are not fundamental rights. They are creatures either of statute or of the contract of employment. What service conditions would be available to particular employees, whether they are liable to be varied, and to what extent are matters governed either by the statute or the terms of the contract. The legislature cannot be mandated to prescribe and secure particular service conditions to the employees or to a particular set of employees. The service conditions and the extent of their protection as well as the set of employees in respect of which they may be prescribed and protected, are all matters to be left to the legislature. Hence when a legislation extends protective umbrella to the employees of a particular class, it cannot be faulted so long as the classification made is intelligible and has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In the present case, the classification made between two categories of the sales promotion employees, viz. , those drawing wages up to a particular limit and those drawing wages above it, is fairly intelligible. The object of the legislation further appears to be to give protection of the service conditions to the weaker section of the employees belonging to the said category. The legislature at that particular time thought that it was not either necessary to extend the said protection to all the employees belonging to the said category irrespective of their income or that at that stage the circumstances including the conditions and the nature of the employment and the sales business or operation did not warrant protection to the economically stronger section of the said employees, and that economically weaker among them alone needed the protection. Hence it cannot be said that the classification made of the said employees on the basis of their income had no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz. , the protection of the weaker section of the said employees. The extension of the protective umbrella could not as a matter of right, therefore, be demanded by those who drew more wages. Even in the definition of the workman under the ID Act as well as under the very SPE Act, the classification of those employed to do supervisory work has been made on the basis of their monthly income although the work done by the two sections of the workmen is the same, viz. , supervisory and those drawing wages above the particular limit have been excluded from the said definition. According to us, it is permissible to classify workmen on the basis of their income although the work that they do is of the same nature. The protective umbrella need not cover all the workmen doing the particular type of work. It can extend to them in stages. At what stage which of the said section of the employees should come under the said umbrella is a matter which should be left to the legislature which is the best judge of the matter. We, therefore, do not see any merit in the contention.( 7 ) HENCE S. L. P. (C) No. 15641 of 1983, W. P. No. 5259 of 1980 together with C. A. No. 235 of 1983 and C. A. No. 242 of 1990 will have to be dismissed since in these cases the medical representatives were not governed either by the ID Act or the SPE Act at the relevant time. In S. L. P. (C) No. 15641 of 1983 and in W. P. No. 5259 of 1980 connected with C. A. No. 235 of 1983, the terminations of the services of the employees complained of were effected on 26/04/1976 and 9/12/1977 respectively. It is not the case of the employees involved in these cases that the wages of the concerned employees were less than Rs. 750. 00 per mensem (excluding commission) or Rs. 9000. 00 per annum (including commission ). Hence the SPE Act which came into force on 6/03/1976 also did not apply to them. In C. A. No. 242 of 1990 the dispute with regard to the bonus for the year80 arose on 28/01/1981. It is again not the case of thethat his wages were less than the said amounts and the SPE Act applied to him on thatis no doubt that in view of S. 3 (18) of the Maharashtra Act the definition of "workman" under that Act would be the same as under the ID Act. The definition of "workman" under the ID Act will obviously not cover the sales promotion employees within the meaning of SPEhave already pointed out as to why the word "skilled would not include the kind of work done by the sales promotion employees. For the very same reason, the word "operational" would also not include the said work. To hold that everyone who is connected with any operation of manufacturing or sales is a workman would render the categorisation of the different types of work mentioned in the main part of the definition meaningless and redundant. The interpretation suggested would in effect mean that all employees of the establishment other than those expressly excepted in the definition are workmen within the meaning of the said definition. The interpretation was specifically rejected by this Court in May and Baker (AIR 1967 SC 678 ), WIMCO (AIR 1964 SC 472 ), Burmah Shell and A. Sundarambal (AIR 1988 SC 1700 ) cases (supra ). Although such an interpretation was given in S. K. Verma (AIR 1984 SC 1462 ), Delton Cables (AIR 1984 SC 914 ) and Ciba Geijy (AIR 1985 SC 985 ) cases (supra) the legislature impliedly did not accept the said interpretation as is evident from the fact that instead of amending the definition of "workman" on the lines interpreted in the said latter cases, the legislature added three specific categories, viz. , unskilled, skilled and operational. The "unskilled" and "skilled" were divorced from "manual" and were made independent categories. If the interpretation suggested was accepted by the legislature, nothing would have been easier than to amend the definition of "workman" by stating that any person employed in connection with any operation of the establishment other than those specifically excepted is a workman. It must further be remembered that the independent categories of "unskilled" "skilled" and "operational" were added to the main part of the definition after the SPE Act was placed on the statute book. The reliance placed on the aforesaid observation in Kasturi and Sons case (AIR 1958 SC 507 ) (supra) is also not correct. In that case the court was considering the question whether Section 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 empowered the authorities specified by it to adjudicate upon the merits of the claim made by a newspaper employee against his employer under any of the provisions of thatis thus clear that the use of the expression "in substance" in the said context was not so much for holding that the working journalists were workmen within the meaning of ID Act but to indicate that since Section 3 (1) of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act applied the provisions of the ID Act to the working journalists for all other purposes, the working jurnalists were for the purpose workmen within the meaning of the ID Act. This is apart from the fact that the construction suggested on behalf of the workmen resting their case on the provisions of Section 6 (2) of the SPE Act would be against the rules of interpretation. WE are, therefore, of the view that the contention raised on behalf of the management in this appeal, viz. , since the medical representatives are not workmen within the meaning of the Maharashtra Act the complaint made to the Industrial Court under that Act was not maintainable has to be accepted. Hence the complaint filed by theunder the Maharashtra Act in the present case was not maintainable and hence it was rightly dismissed by the Industrial Court. ALTHOUGH we hold that the complaint filed by the workmen is not maintainable under the Maharashtra Act, we are of the view that taking into consideration the fact that a long time has lapsed since the filing of the complaint, it is necessary that 7we exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,