Case: D. N. Sanghavi &amp; Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das

1. The facts of this case fall within a short compass. The respondent, Amba Lal Tribhuwan Das, is the owner of the suit accommodation. It is situated in Siyaganj, Indore. The appellants 2 to 4 are carrying on business in the name of the first appellant, D. N. Singhavi and Sons. They are the tenants of the accommodation. Courts below have held that it was being used predominantly as a shop by them and that a part of it was being used by them as their residence for the sake of more efficient conduct of the business they were carrying on in the shop. The respondent purchased the shop some time in 1963. The appellant were then carrying on their business in the shop. They attorned to the respondent. On October 10, 1964, the respondent gave the requisite notice to them to vacate. On November 16, 1964 he instituted a suit for their ejectment from the accommodation. It was alleged by him that he needed the accommodation for continuing "his business" within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act). At the evidence stage he gave evidence that it was needed for partnership business. There arose two crucial questions in the case: (1) What is the meaning of the phrase "his business" in Section 12 (1) (f)? (2) whether in the circumstances of the case the business for which he required the accommodation could be said to be "his business". The first question arose because he wanted the accommodation for continuing the business of a partnership firm of which he was one partner. There were two other partners. They are his brothers. The trial court held against the respondent on the second issue and dismissed the suit. No view was expressed on this issue. The respondent filed an appeal from the judgment. The appeal court reversed the judgment and decreed the suit for ejectment of the appellant. The appeal court recorded this finding of(plaintiff) has stated...that the partnership shop was previously run by his father. It is now run by the brothers in partnership. This business is thus of the family alone. Their shop is at Siyaganj itself where the premises in suit arethis finding the appeal court reached the conclusion that the business of the partnership firm, of which he is one partner is "his business" within the meaning of Section 12 (1) (f). As the firms business was being carried on in a rented premises, his need was found to be genuine. The appellants then filed an appeal in the Madhya Pradesh High Court from the judgment of the appeal Court. The High Court has upheld the judgment of the Appeal Court. It is noteworthy that the appeal court has simply assumed that the partnership business is "his business". No reasonings are given in support of the conclusion. The High Court agreed with the appeal court that the firms business of which the respondent was one partner is "his business". The reasoning of the High Court in support of this conclusion is summed up in the following passage in thethe present case what we are concerned with is whether the landlord can be said to have the necessity when the need was for the partnership firm. It cannot be doubted that when a person runs a business in partnership with others he does it for himself and therefore his necessity is identified with the necessity of the firm. Whether he wants to do business himself or he does it along with others, it still remains that he needs it for his own purpose."

Reasoning:
2. It is evident from this passage that the High Court, like the appeal court, has overlooked the words of Section 12 (1) (f) in arriving at its conclusion. The High Court considered that it is an elementary proposition of law that a partnership business is the business of cach and every partner so that it will be "his business". It seems that the High Court was misled by the apparent meaning of this phrase so that the necessity of examining the scheme of the Act and the setting of clause (f) of Section 12 (1) to discover its real meaning was not felt at all. But this is the first thing on which the High Court should have fixed attention. After all, it is a matter of statutory construction. And in such a case all attempts at construction should converge on the statute at hand, lest the reasoning should become abstract and artificial, having no contact with reality. The High Court has sought support from a decision of the erstwhile Nagpur Highreview of these provisions would show that the Act is more strict with respect to the eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation than from a residential accommodation. In the case of a residential accommodation, Section 12 (1) (e) provides for the eviction of a tenant where it is needed for the residence of the landlord or for any member of his family. But he cannot sue for eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation where he needs it for continuing, or starting his major married daughters business. Nor he can evict a tenant from such accommodation for continuing or starting his brothers business. Thus, while cl. (e) of Section 12 (1) is more hospitable to the landlord, clause (f) thereof is more protective of the tenant. Sub-sections (4), (5) (6) of Section 12 also point to this contrast. While the tenant evicted from a residential accommodation gets a respite of 14 months, the tenant evicted from a non-residential accommodation gets not only the said respite but also the prescribed compensation. In many cases the burden of compensation may act as a deterrent to eviction. Having regard to the rigour of clause (f) of Section 12 (1) we think that the phrase "his business" should not receive a wide construction as to the class of persons who may be included in the possessive pronoun his in the phrase, for it would be against legislative policy.The respondent has stated in his evidence that he and his two brothers are carrying on a partnership business in a rented shop in Siyaganj. He has further said that he needs the suit accommodation for that purpose. The appeal court has believed this evidence and has recorded the finding that the respondent bona fide requires the accommodation for his partnership business. But his finding does not fulfill the conditions of cl. (f) of Section 12 (1) as construed by us. Unfortunately for him, the respondent did not lead any evidence to show that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business. He filed the registration certificate showing that the partnership was registered with the Registrar of Firms. The certificate will only prove as to who are the partners of the firm, nothing more. The respondent did not file the deed of partnership. It would have disclosed whether the respondent is a mere sleeping partner or a partner who is entitled to manage the business either solely or with other partners, or that they are the sole managing partners. In his examination he has said that he was a partner in the firm. He has also said : "There is no proper accommodation for carrying on business in Indore by the members of his family". In cross-examination he has said, "In the members of my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore and Mani Lal, their wives and children and my mother are included. For our residence and running the shop we need the disputed shop." No doubt he has stated that he needs the suit accommodation for his residence also, but the lower courts did not examine the need for residence. Before the appeal court counsel for the parties had stated that the suit for eviction of the tenant should be disposed of only on the basis of Section 12 (1) (f). The respondent thus abandoned his case based on Section 12 (1) (e) which deals with residential accommodation. So we are concerned with his need for business accommodation. The passage in his statement, earlier reproduced would seem to suggest that his notion of his business is inclusive of his brothers business in which he may have no concern at all. So the possibility of his brothers separate business being set up in the suit accommodation is not ruled out. However, we do not ground our judgment on this statement. In his evidence he has said; "We, the three brothers and father are the partners in the shop. There is no person from outside. Before the partnership my father used to run the shop. (The father died during pendency of the suit)." He also said: "We deal in bidi, cigarettes, matches, tobacco and soap. We also want to have the same business in the disputed shop". In neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the evidence he has stated that on the terms of partnership he is entitled to manage the partnership business or even that he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining possession from the appellants. He has also not said that the other partners have agreed to shift the business.The Act professes to control letting and rent of accommodation and the eviction of tenants therefrom. The Act restricts the power of the landlord to let and toat will.It also restricts his power to eject the tenant at will. Thus the direct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure occupation of accommodation by them who are in need of it. Broadly speaking, a construction which fulfills this purpose should be preferred to the alternative construction which frustrates it.On this construction of cl. (f) of Section 12 (1), it is necessary for the respondent to prove that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation for the purpose of continuing or starting his business.If the deed of partnership has excluded him expressly or impliedly from the management of firms business and has made him a sleeping partner, it cannot be held that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business. Nor he has power to shift the business. To sum up, for the reasons already given, his suit should fail.In some of the cases cited by Sri Patel, own has been interpreted virtually as otiose. Nevertheless what it means in the Act would depend on its own context, for a word may take a colour from its context.18. In view of our decision against the respondent on the basis of the construction of Section 12 (1) (f), it is not necessary for us to decide several other points raised by Sri Phadke.