Case: Shantilal Thakordas &amp; Ors Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala

In these appeals by special leave the question which fails for our determination is whether the decision of a Bench of this Court consisting of two learned Judges in Phul Rani &Ors. v. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia ((1973) 3 S.C.R. 679.) is correct. If not, whether the appellants are entitled to get a decree for eviction in respect of the suit premises against the defendantBhagwandas--the father of the three appellants was owner of the suit premises. He was a partner in a partner-ship firm styled as Jai Hind Silk Weaving Works. There were three more partners in the firm-one of whom was Shantilal Thakordas, appellant No. 1, son of Thakordas Bhagwandas. The other two were outsiders. The suit was filed against respondent Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala for his eviction from the premises on several grounds. The only ground which need to be mentioned for the purpose of the disposal of this appeal is Thakordass claim of requiring the premise. reasonably and bona-fide for occupation by himself within the meaning of section 13(1)(g) ofthe Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. The necessity pleaded by the original plaintiff was that he required the premises for the use of the partnership firm aforesaid in which he was a partner. The Trial Court decreed the suit in part on April 30, 1965 and passed a decree for eviction of the tenant from a portion of the suit premises. Both sides went up in appeal before the First Appellate Court. Thakordas was dead and his heirs, namely, the present appellants were the appellants in one appeal and respondents in the other. The first Appellate Court by its judgment dated November 10, 2966 maintained the partial decree made by the Trial Court with slight modification. Both the parties went in revision before the Gujarat High Court. The High Court set aside the decree dated November 10, 1966 of the First Appellate Court and remanded the case to it for a fresh disposal of the appeal after trying out an additional issue of comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant as also the question as to whether the substituted heirs of the original plaintiff required the premises reasonably and bona-fide for their occupation.The first Appellate Court after remand again passed a decree for eviction from a portion of the suit premises on March 31, 1970. Two revisions were taken to the High Court--one by the appellants and the other by the respondent. Following the decision o f this Court in Phul Ranis case (supra) the High Court allowed the respondents revision, rejected that of the appellants and dismissed their suit for eviction in toto. Hence these appeals.

Reasoning:
In our considered opinion in face of the wordings of section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Act, the view expressed in Phul Ranis case, as stated above, is no t correct. If the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family",  then the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. On his death the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. We are unable to take the view that the requirement Of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death. After the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family. Many of the substituted heirs of the deceased landlord were undoubtedly the members of his family and the two married daughters and the children of a deceased daughter in the circumstances could not be held to be not members of the family of the deceased landlord.But even so the appellants cannot succeed in this appeal. Firstly it is doubtful whether the requirement of the premises by the landlord for occupation by the partnership firm in which he is a partner will be tantamount to "occupation by himself" i.e. by the landlord. Certain decisions of some High Courts were brought to our notice taking the view that it is so. We refrain from expressing our opinion in that regard. We assume, as seems to have been the view of the High Court in this case, that the requirement of the premises for the use of a partnership firm by the landlord in which he is a partner is covered by section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Act. Yet on the facts of this case there is an insurmountable difficulty in the way of the appellants. From the judgment dated March 31, 1970 of the First Appellate Court it would appear that on the death of Thakordas in June, 1965 a new partnership was constituted. One of his sons Shantilal who was a partner from before was taken as a partner in the new partnership along with Thakordass another son Dhanvantlal Thakordas, appellant No. 2. There were some outsider partners. Harish Thakordas, appellant No. 3, a minor son of Thakordas had not been admitted to the benefits of the partnership. He had, therefore, no interest in the partnership firm Jai Hind Silk Weaving Works. The Appellate Court took the view that the .substituted plaintiffs wanted to use the suit premises for , the purpose of godown for keeping the yarn clothes and machinery articles and also for a retail shop and show room of the partnership. This in no sense could be the requirement of appellant Harish even assuming that it could be said to be the requirement of his two cider brothers appellants 1 and 2. In that view of the matter we have got to dismiss the appeal although Mr. Dholakia, learned counsel for the appellants succeeded in persuading us to differ from the ratio of Phul Ranis case.Counsel for the appellants endeavoured to bring their case within one of the exceptions noted in Phul Ranis case. He submitted that a decree had already been passed in favour of the original plaintiff by the Trial Court and that could not be disturbed on his death either in appeal or revision. We do not accept the contention as sound or correct. In Phul Ranis case no final opinion was expressed on this question. Moreover, we find that on the earlier occasion the High Court had set aside the decree and remanded the suit to the First Appellate Court for a fresh decision. There was, therefore, no decree in existence to attract the exception.