Case: Ram Narain Mahto Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

Thakur Randhirshah, Jagirdar of Sonpur Jagir executed a deed dated August 5, 1949, in favour of Ram Narain Mahto-hereinafter called, the plaintiff - relating to sale of timber, for Rs. 51, 501/- and received Rs. 15, 000/- in part payment. On February 19, 1951, the Forest Officer of the State of Madhya Pradesh prevented the plaintiff and the Jagirdar from cutting the trees. On March 31, 1951, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 1951) was brought into force and by virtue of that Act the interest of the Jagirdar in the estate vested in the State. On June 14, 1954, the plaintiff instituted an action in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Chhindwara, for a decree for Rs. 1, 50, 000/- for breach of the contract of sale against the State of Madhya Pradesh and against the Jagirdar. There were four heads of the claim for compensationRs. 21, 375/- .. being the value of 4, 275 logs of timber which were cut but which the plaintiff could not remove;(ii) Rs. 30, 000/- ..for 6, 000 logs of timber which though cut were not found on the spot and some of which were either burnt or stolen;(iii) Rs. 30, 000/- .. on account of 6, 000 logs of timber from the standing timber of four village which had not been cut; and(iv) Rs. 75, 000/- .. for 15, 000 logs of timber which the plaintiff could not cut from the remainingplaintiff claimed compensation for the logs of timber at the rate of Rs. 5/- per log in the aggregate.2. The State of Madhya Pradesh contended that the Jagirdar had started illegal cutting for which proceedings were taken against him and that he was prevented from cutting any timber; that sometime thereafter the logs of timber lying in the forest were "hammer-marked" and the Jagirdar was permitted to remove the logs till March 31, 1953, subject to certain conditions, e.g., obtaining Malguzari passes for the transit and submitting weekly statement of the removal, that the agreement, dated August 5, 1949, being unregistered was inadmissible in evidence, and created no title, that in any event the deed could not be enforced against the State because of the vesting of the Jagir under the Madhya Pradhesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, in the State; that the contract created a mere personal liability enforceable against the Jagirdar, and that the State was not the successor-in-interest of the Jagirdar but claimed a right to the Jagir under a statute.3. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the value of the logs of timber described under the four heads of his claim, at the rate of Rs. 1/8/- per log. Accordingly the Trial Court determined the compensation payable to the plaintiff at Rs. 46, 912/- and after giving credit for Rs. 36, 000/- payable by the plaintiff to the Jagirdar and to which the State became entitled, passed a decree for the balance of Rs. 10, 912/- and interest thereon. The plaintiff and the State appealed to the High Court. The High Court agreed with the Trial Court that the rate per log could not exceed Rs. 1/8/-. The High Court disallowed the claim of the plaintiff for items (ii), (iii) and (iv) and for item (i) the High Court allowed Rs. 3, 712/- being the value of 2475 logs of timber which had not been removed. The High Court held that out of the amount awarded nothing was liable to be deducted towards the alleged arrears due to the Jagirdar. The plaintiff appeals to this Court with certificate granted by the High Court.

Reasoning:
. On the first plea not much need be said. The Trial Court as well as the High Court, on a consideration of the evidence held that the value of a log of timber did not exceed Rs. 1/8/-. That is a concurrent finding of fact and this Court will not interfere with that finding, unless it is shown to be based on no evidence or is grossly erroneous or perverse. No such attempt is made before us.6. On the second plea also the plaintiff claim must fail. The evidence led by the plaintiff relating to the cutting of 6000 logs of timber and appropriation thereof is vague, and is not supported by reliable evidence. The books of account and the registers maintained by the Jagirdar were not tendered in evidence. It was said that they were burnt. The High Court has disbelieved the story that the books of account and registers were burnt and we see no reason to disagree with that finding. The plaintiff himself had no personal knowledge about the destination of the logs of timber; he merely repeated what the Jagirdar men had told him. He admitted that out of the logs of timber which were cut, 4500 logs were "hammer-marked" by the Forest Department and he was asked to remove them by the end of March 1953. The testimony of witnesses Badrinarayan P.W. 4, Ramlal P.W. 5, and Ramkesh P.W. 7 was found by the High Court to be unreliable. We have been taken through the record of the evidence by counsel for the plaintiff and we see no reason to disagree with the view which appealed to the High Court. The second claim must also fail.7. Then remain the claims for items (iii) and (iv) in the plaint. The logs of timber under these claims were admittedly not cut. There were standing trees.Under the deed all trees standing in the forests in the nine villages were not agreed to be sold: it was provided that trees with logs of "2 feet or more in girth" were to be cut and the logs were to be supplied in four different periods set out in the deed. The deed created by its own force no rights in the standing trees, for the Jagirdar was to cut the trees at his expense, and to supply thefrom which logs of timber were agreed to be cut and sold are things attached to or forming part of the land. The trees were agreed to be severed under the contract of sale. A contract for sale of logs is doubtless a contract for sale of goods. But in view of the terms of the deed the contract was not for sale of ascertained goods. Only logs with a girth not less than 2 feet were to be supplied after the trees were cut by the Jagirdar. This is not a contract under which the trees of the entire forest in a particular village were agreed to be sold. Goods to be sold were, therefore, unascertained, and it is well settled that a contract for unascertained goods is not a complete sale, but only a promise toa thing is attached to, or forms part of, land at the time of the contract and which is to be severed by the buyer, the property in the thing passes in the absence of a contract to the contrary to the buyer on the severence of the thing from the land. This is clearly the effect of Section 18 of the Sale of Goods Act. For property to pass, the identity of the thing intended to be delivered must be ascertained, and unless the parties are agreed as to what goods are to pass under the terms of the contract, the property will not pass. It is essential that the thing should be specific and ascertained in the manner binding upon the parties unless that be so, the contract cannot be construed as a contract for sale of moveable property. Again under Section 21 of the Sale of Goods Act, even if there be a contract for the sale of specific goods, but the seller is obliged under the terms of the contract to do something to the goods for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the property passes only when the thing agreed to be done is done and the buyer is informed thereof.Granting that the contract was for sale of specific goods, that is, it was a contract for sale of logs out of trees in the forest with a girth of two feet or more, the timber had to be cut and had to be put in a deliverable state. The Jagirdar did not by the deed sell the trees of his forests. The plaintiff had no right even to cut the trees. The logs of timber agreed to be supplied had no existence as individual chattel, until the trees were cut and severed from the land, and logs of the specifications were separated. But before the trees were cut and the logs appropriated to the contract, the estate of the Jagirdar vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It is true that the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, especially Sections 18 to 44 are rules of construction of contracts for determining the interest of the parties. If there be a contract that the property is to pass even before the property is put into a deliverable state, the property may pass. But in the contract executed by the Jagirdar no such intention appears.In all these cases there had been a partial examination of the problem in the light of a claim to an existing and enforceable fundamental right vested in the contractor. In the first case Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company case (supra) the Court held, without disclosing the ground for so holding, that the fundamental right of the contractor was enforceable against the State.n all these cases there had been a partial examination of the problem in the light of a claim to an existing and enforceable fundamental right vested in the contractor. In the first case Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel & Company case (supra) the Court held, without disclosing the ground for so holding, that the fundamental right of the contractor was enforceable against the State.