Case: R. Chitralekha &amp; Anr Vs. State Of Mysore &amp; Ors

In the State of Mysore there are a number of Engineering and Medical Colleges - most of them are Government Colleges and a few of them are Government aided Colleges. The State Government appointed a common selection committee for settling admissions to the Engineering Colleges and another. Common selection committee for settling admissions to Medical Colleges. The Government by an order dated July 26, 1963, marked as Ex. C in the High Court, defined Backward Classes and directed that 30 per cent. of the seats in professional and technical colleges and institutions shall be reserved for them and 18 per cent. to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. On July 6, 963, the Government sent a letter to the Director of Technical Education in Mysore, Bangalore, informing him that it had been decided that 25 per cent. of the maximum marks for the examination in the optional subjects taken into account for making the selection of candidates for admission to Engineering Colleges shall be fixed as interview marks; it also laid down the criteria for allotting marks in the interview. It appears that a similar order was issued in respect of Medical Colleges. The selection committee converted the total of the marks in the optional subjects to a maximum of 300 marks and fixed the maximum marks for interview at 75. On the basis of the marks obtained by the candidates in the examination and those obtained in the interview, selections were made for admission to Engineering and Medical Colleges. Some of the candidates whose applications for admission to the said colleges were rejected filed petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Mysore for quashing the orders issued by the Government in the matter of admissions to the said Colleges and for a direction that they shall be admitted in the Colleges strictly in the order of merit. The High Court after considering the various contentions raised by the petitioners, held that the orders defining backwardness were valid and that the criteria laid down for interview of student were good; but it held that the selection committee had abused the powers conferred upon it and on that finding set aside the interviews held and directed that the applicants shall be interviewed afresh in accordance with the scheme laid down by the Government in Exs. C and D and in Annexure IV, subject to directions given by it. Two of the petitioners have filed the present appeals against the said order of the High Court.

Reasoning:
5. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, let us look at the fact of this case. Though Annexure IV does not conform to the provisions of Art. 166 of the Constitution, it ex facie says that an order to the effect mentioned therein was issued by the Government and it is not denied that it was communicated to the selection committee. In neither of the affidavits filed by the appellants there was any specific averment that no such order was issued by the Government. In the counter-affidavit filed by B. R. Verma, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Mysore, Education Department, there is a clear averment that the Government gave the direction contained in Annexure IV and a similar letter was issued to the Selection Committee for admission to Medical Colleges and this averment was not denied by the appellants by filing any affidavit.In the circumstances when there are no allegations at all in the affidavit that the order was not made by the Government, we have no reason to reject the averment made by the Deputy Secretary to the Government that the order was issued by the Government. There are no merits in thisand similar other passages indicate that if law made by the State by virtue of entry 11 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution makes impossible or difficult the exercise of the legislative power of the Parliament under he entry "Co-ordination and determination of standards in institutions for higher education or research and scientific and technical institutions" reserved to the Union, the State law may be bad. This cannot obviously be decided on speculative and hypothetical reasoning. If the impact of the State law providing for such standards on entry 66 of List I is so heavy or devastating as to wipe out or appreciably abridge the central field, it may be struck down. But that is a question of fact to be ascertained in each case. It is not possible to hold that if a State legislature made a law prescribing a higher percentage of marks for extra-curricular activities in the matter of admission to colleges, it would be directly encroaching on the field covered by entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. If so, it is not disputed that the State Government would be within its rights to prescribe qualifications for admission to colleges so long as its action does not contravene any otheris true that under S. 23 of the Mysore University Act, 1956, the Academic Council shall have the power to prescribe the conditions for admission of students to the University and, in exercise of its power, it has prescribed the percentage of marks which a student shall obtain for getting admission in medical or engineering colleges. The orders of the Government do not contravene the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University; what the Government did was to appoint a selection committee and prescribe rules for selection of students who have the minimum qualifications prescribed by the University. The Government runs most of the medical and engineering colleges. Excluding the State aided colleges for a moment, the position is as follows: The Colleges run by the Government, having regard to financial commitments and other relevant considerations can only admit a specific number of students to the said Colleges. They cannot obviously admit all the applicants who have secured the marks prescribed by the University. It has necessarily to screen the applicants on some reasonable basis. The aforesaid orders of the Government only prescribed criteria for making admissions to Colleges from among students who secured the minimum qualifying marks prescribed by the University. Once it is conceded, and it is not disputed before us, that the State Government can run medical and engineering Colleges, it cannot be denied the power to admit such qualified students as pass the reasonable tests laid down by it. This is a power which every private owner of a College will have, and the Government which runs its own Colleges cannot be denied that power.Even so it is argued that the same power cannot be exercised by the Government in respect of private Colleges though they are receiving aid from the State. But the management of aided institutions have not raised any objections. Indeed, from the year 1960 admissions were made to the Colleges by the selection committees constituted by the Government. The High Court, after considering the material placed before it, held that, with the consent of the management of the various professional and technical Colleges, the Government took over the responsibility of regulating admission of students to the Colleges in question. Nothing has been placed before us to prove that the Selection Committees were constituted against the wishes of the management of the aided colleges. In the circumstances, we cannot disturb the finding of the High Court in this regard.10. We, therefore, hold that the Government has power to prescribe a machinery and also the criteria for admission of qualified students to medical and engineering Colleges run by the Government and, with the consent of the management of the Government aided Colleges, to the said Colleges also.So too, highly qualified educationists were appointed to the Selection Committee for the Engineering Colleges. By notification dated July 6, 1963, in respect of the Engineering Colleges and a similar notification issued in respect of the Medical Colleges, the Government prescribed that in addition to the examination marks in optional subjects there should be an interview of students for which the maximum marks prescribed shall be 25 per cent. of the maximum marks of the optional subjects. The Selection Committee has to allot marks, having regard to general knowledge, aptitude and personality, previous academic career, including special distinctions etc., N.C.C., A.C.C. etc., extra-curricular activities including sports, social service, debating, dramatics etc. It is, therefore, clear that the Government by its order not only laid down a clear policy and prescribed definite criteria in the matter of giving marks at the interview but also appointed competent men to make the selection on that basis. The order of the Government does not in any way contravene Art. 14 of thethis case the criteria laid down by the Government are certainly relevant in the matter of awarding marks at the interview. Learned counsel contends that the ability of a student on the basis of the said criteria can be better judged by other methods like certificate from the N.C.C. Commander or a medical board or a psychiatrist and should not be left to a body like the selection committee which cannot possibly arrive at the correct conclusion in a short time that would be available to it. The criticism does not affect the validity of the criteria, but only suggests a different method of applying the criteria than that adopted by the Committee. It is not for us to say which method should be adopted: that must be left to the authority concerned. If in any particular case the selection committee abuse its power in violation of Art. 14. of the Constitution, that may be a case for setting aside the result of a particular interview, as the High Court did in this case. We cannot, therefore, hold without better and more scientific material placed before us that selection by interview in addition to the marks obtained in the written examination is itself bad as offending Art. 14 of thethe observations of the learned Judge, the argument proceeds, are not corrected, the State may be bound by such observations in the matter when it finally prescribe the criteria for ascertaining the Backward Classes under Art. 15(4) of the Constitution. In Ex. C the Government laid down that classification of socially and educationally Backward Classes should be made on the following basis : (1) economic condition; and (2) occupation. According to that under a family whose income is Rs. 1,200/- per annum or less and person or classes following occupations of agriculture, petty business, inferior services, crafts or other occupations involving manual labour, are, in general, socially, economically and educationally backward. The Government lists the following occupations as contributing to social backwardness : (1) actual cultivator; (2) artisan; (3) petty businessmen; (4) inferior services (i.e., Class IV in Government services and corresponding class or service in private employment) including casual labour; and (5) any other occupation involving manual labour. It is, therefore, manifest that the Government, as a temporary measure pending an elaborate study, has taken into consideration only the economic condition and occupation of the family concerned as the criteria for Backward Classes within the meaning of Art. 15(4) of the Constitution. The order does not take into consideration the caste of an applicant as one of the criteria for backwardness. Learned counsel does not attack the validity of the said order. But in the High Court conflicting arguments were advanced in support of this order as well against it. The High Court heavily relied upon the decision of this Court in M. R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649   and came to the conclusion that the scheme adopted by the State was a very imperfect scheme and that in addition to the occupation and poverty tests, the State should have adopted the "caste" test as well as the "residence" test in making the classification. It also observed that the decision in Balajis case, AIR 1963 SC 649   says that "the "caste" basis is undoubtedly a relevant, any an important basis in determining the classes of backward Hindus but it should not be made the sole basis".Two principles stand out prominently from the said observations, namely, (i) the caste of a group of citizens may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social backwardness; and (ii) though it a relevant factor to determine the social backwardness of a class of citizens, it cannot be the sole or dominant test in that behalf. The observations extracted in the judgment of the High Court appear to be in conflict with the observations of this Court. While this Court said that caste is only a relevant circumstance and that it cannot be the dominant test in ascertaining the backwardness of a class of citizens, the High Court said that it was an important basis in determining the class of backward Hindus and that the Government should have adopted caste as one of the tests. As the said observations made by the High Court may lead to some confusion in the mind of the authority concerned who may be entrusted with the duty of prescribing the rules for ascertaining the backwardness of classes of citizens within the meaning of Art. 15(4) of the Constitution, we would hasten to make it clear that caste is only a relevant circumstance in ascertaining the backwardness of a class and there is nothing in the judgment of this court which precludes the authority concerned from determining the social backwardness of a group of citizens if it can do so without reference to caste. While this Court has not excluded caste from ascertaining the backwardness of a class of citizens, it has not made it one of the compelling circumstances affording a basis for the ascertainment of backwardness of a class. To put it differently, the authority concerned may take caste into consideration in ascertaining the backwardness of a group of persons; but, if it does not, its order will not be bad on that account, if it can ascertain the backwardness of a group of persons on the basis of other relevant criteria.This interpretation will carry out the intention of the Constitution expressed in the aforesaid Articles. It helps the really Backward Classes instead of promoting the interests of individuals or groups who, they belong to a particular caste a majority whereof is socially and educationally backward, really belong to a class which is socially and educationally advanced. To illustrate, take a caste in a State which is numerically the largest therein. It may be that though a majority of the people in that caste are socially and educationally backward, and effective minority may be socially and educationally far more advanced than another small sub-caste the total number of which is far less than the said minority. If we interpret the expression "classes" as "castes", the object of the Constitution will be frustrated and the people who do not deserve any adventitious aid may get it to the exclusion of those who really deserve. This anomaly will not arise if, without equating caste with class, caste is taken as only one of the considerations to ascertain whether a person belongs to a backward class or not. On the other hand, if the entire sub-caste, by and large, is backward, it may be included in the Scheduled Castes by following the appropriate procedure laid down by the Constitution.21. We do not intend to lay down any inflexible rule for the Government to follow. The laying down of criteria for ascertainment of social and educational backwardness of a class is a complex problem depending upon many circumstances which may vary from State to State and even from place to place in a State. But what we intend to emphasize is that under no circumstance a "class" can be equated to a "caste" though the caste of an individual or a group of individuals may be considered along with other relevant factors in putting him in a particular class. We would also like to make it clear that if in a given situation caste is excluded in ascertaining a class within the meaning of Art. 15(4) of the Constitution, it does not vitiate the classification if it satisfied other tests.