Case: S. Rajagopal Vs. C. M. Armugam &amp; Ors

1. The appellant, S. Rajagopal, the respondent C. M. Armugam, and the other three respondents all filed nominations for election to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Mysore in the last General Elections held in 1967. The nomination papers were scrutinised on 21st January 1967, when respondent No. 1 (hereinafter referred to as "the respondent") raised an objection against the nomination of the appellant on the ground that the nominations were in respect of a seat reserved for a member of a Scheduled Caste, and the appellant was not an Adi Dravida Hindu, but an Indian Christian, so that he was disqualified to stand as a candidate for this reserved seat. The Returning Officer rejected the objection and accepted nomination paper of the appellant. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 withdrew their candidature, so that, when actual election took place, the two contesting candidates were the appellant and the respondent. The Constituency concerned was Kolar Gold Fields and polling in that constituency took place on 15th February, 1967. The appellant was declared as the successful candidate on the ground that he received a larger number of votes than the respondent. The respondent then filed an election petition under Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, challenging the validity of the election of the appellant on the same ground that he had taken before the Returning Officer, viz., that the appellant was not qualified to be a candidate to fill the seat reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste from the Kolar Gold Fields Constituency. The respondent admitted that the appellant was originally born as an Adi Dravida Hindu, but it was pleaded that he got himself converted as a Christian some time in the year 1949, shortly before he obtained admission in Woorhees High School at Vellore and to the Woorhees Christian Hostel attached to that School. The respondents case was that, thereafter, the appellant continued to be a Christian and, consequently, he could not be held to be a member of the Scheduled Caste for his candidature for the reserved seat under the constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. The appellant resisted this plea taken in the election petition on various grounds, but we are only concerned in this appeal with two of those grounds which formed the subject-matter of issues 1 and 3 framed by the High Court of Mysore at the trial of the election petition. Those issues are as follows.:-" (1) Does the petitioner prove that on the date of election the respondent No. 1 was an Indian Christian (Protestant) by conversion and not a member of the Scheduled Caste (Adi Dravida), professing Christian Religion and therefore, not qualified to stand for election to the Mysore Legislative Assembly as a candidate for the seat reserved for Scheduled Castes from the Kolar Gold Fields Constituency and his election should be declared void under Section 100 (1) (a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951?      * * * * *      (3) Even if it is true that Respondent No. 1 got himself converted to Christianity, does the respondent prove the facts and the circumstances set out in Para 11 of the written statement and do they constitute in fact and in law conversion back to Hindu religion as alleged; and is it enough, in law, to give him the benefit of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order 1950?"2. The High Court took the evidence both documentary and oral, adduced by the parties on these issue and then decided both the issues against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. That Court, therefore, held that the election of the appellant was void, because he was not qualified to be a candidate for the seat reserved for a member of the Scheduled Caste and, consequently set aside the election of the appellant. The appellant has now come up in appeal against that judgment under Section 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

Reasoning:
7. The main argument for challenging the evidence of this witness on behalf of the appellant was that the respondent, in adducing evidence before the High Court to prove the conversion of the appellant to Christianity, did not summon the Baptismal Register of the Church which would have been the best evidence available for this purpose. This argument was considered and rejected by the High Court and we agree with the view taken by that Court. There was no clear evidence that every Church was maintaining a baptismal register. It was only in his cross-examination that it was elicited from P. W. 9 that the baptismal certificate shown to him by the appellant had been issued by the Presbyter of Yehamur Church8. This evidence finds support from other documentary and oral evidence which has been relied upon by the High Court P. W. 10, S. A. Thomas, was also working as a Contractor, the appellant took service with his father. At that time also, the appellant was employed as a Christian an his service card was prepared showing him as a Christian. Then, there is evidence that, subsequently, the appellant entered Government service and even there in the service cards he was shown as a Christian. Some witnesses have come to prove that the appellant actually attended Church for prayers after his conversion in 1949. Evidence was also given to show that the appellant worked as the organiser of a body known as the Kavinjar Nataka Sabha where his name was shown as Victor Rajagopal indicating that he had adopted a personal name after conversion as a Christian which is not adopted by Hindus. We do not think that it is necessary for us to discuss that evidence in detail. We are inclined to agree with the High Court that all this oral and documentary evidence provides very strong corroboration of the statement of the principal witness P. W. 9 and establishes the fact that the appellant has been converted to Christianity in 1949 before he joined the Woorhees High SchoolWe are inclined to accept the evidence given on behalf of the appellant that, though he had been converted to Christianity in 1949, he did later on profess the Hindu religion. The circumstances which establish this fact are:(i) that he married a Hindu Adi Dravida woman in the year 1955;(ii) that against the entries of the children in birth registers of the Municipality, the caste of the mother was shown as Adi Dravida Hindu;(iii) that his children were brought up as Hindus;(iv) that, when his children were admitted in school, they were shown as Hindus in the school records;(v) that, in 1961, the appellant made an application for correction of his service cards and had the entry of his religion as Christianity altered , so that he was subsequently shown as Adi Dravida Hindu in those cards;(vi) that, in 1962, in the general elections, he stood as a candidate from a Reserved Scheduled Caste Constituency and(vii) that he again stood as a candidate in this general election of 1967 from the same Reserved Scheduled Caste Constituency14. In our opinion, if this test is applied to the present case, it must be held that at least by the year 1967, when the present election in question took place, the appellant had started professing the Hindu religion. He had openly married a Hindu wife. Even though the marriage was not celebrated according to the strict Hindu rites prevalent amongst Adi Dravidas, the marriage was not in Christian form and is alleged to have been in some reformed Hindu manner. Thereafter, the appellant in 1961 took the step of having his service cards corrected so as to show him as an Adi Dravida Hindu instead of a Christian. This was followed by his candidature as a member of the Adi Dravida Hindu Caste in the general elections in 1962; and, subsequently, he gave out the caste of his children as Adi Dravida Hindu. These various steps taken by the appellant clearly amount to a public declaration of his professing the Hindu faith. The first step of the marriage cannot of course, by itself be held to be a sufficient public declaration that the appellant believed in Hindu religion; but the subsequent correction of entries in service cards and his publicly standing as a candidate from the reserved Scheduled Caste Constituency representing himself as an Adi Dravida Hindu taken together with the later act of showing his children as Adi Dravida Hindus in the school records must be held to be a complete public declaration in the appellant that he was by this time professing Hindu religion. Finally in the general elections of 1967 also, the appellant, by contesting the seat reserved for a member of a Scheduled Caste on the basis that he was an Adi Dravida Hindu, again purported to make a public declaration of his faith in Hinduism. In these circumstances, we hold that, at the relevant time in 1967, the appellant was professing Hindu religion, so that paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 did not apply to him16. We agree with the High Court that, when the appellant embraced Christianity in 1949, he lost the membership of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste. The Christian religion does not recognise any caste classifications. All Christians are treated as equals and there is no distinction between one Christian and another of the type that is recognised between members of different castes belonging to Hindu religion. In fact, caste system prevails only amongst Hindus or possibly in some religions closely allied to the Hindu religion like Sikhism. Christianity is prevalent not only in India, but almost all over the world and nowhere does Christianity recognise caste division. The tenets of Christianity militate against persons professing Christianity faith being divided or discriminated on the basis of any such classification as the caste system. It must, therefore, be held that, when the appellant got converted to Christianity in 1949, he ceased to belong to the Adi Dravida casteIn the present case, therefore, we agree with the finding of the High Court that the appellant on conversion to Christianity, ceased to belong to the Adi Dravida caste and, consequently, the burden lay on the appellant to establish that, on his reverting to the Hindu religion by professing it again, he also became once again a member of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste22. As we have already held earlier, there was no specific ceremony held for reconversion of the appellant to Hinduism. We have found that he started professing the Hindu religion because of his conduct at various stages. The first step in that conduct was the marriage with an Adi Dravida Hindu woman. Then there were other steps taken by him, such as correction of his service records, declaration of the religion of his sons as Hindu and his standing as a candidate for elections in 1962 and 1967 as a member of a Scheduled Caste. These have been held by us to amount to a public declaration of his belief in Hinduism. The question is whether, by merely professing the belief in Hinduism, the appellant can also claim that the members of the Adi Dravida Hindu Caste re-admitted him as a member of that caste and started recognising him as such. In various cases, importance has been attached to the fact of marriage in a particular caste. But, in the present case, the marriage was the first step taken by the appellant and, though he was married to an Adi Dravida woman, the marriage was not performed according to the rites observed by members of that caste. The marriage not being according to the system prevalent in the caste itself, it cannot be held that that Marriage can be proof of admission of the appellant in the caste by the members of the caste in general. No other evidence was given to show that at any subsequent stage any step was taken by members of the caste indicating that the appellant was being accepted as a member of this caste. It is true that his close relatives, like his father and brother-in-law, treated him again as a member of their own caste, but the mere recognition by a few such relatives cannot be held to be equivalent to a recognition by the members of the caste in general. The candidature from the reserved seat in 1962 cannot also be held to imply any recognition by the members of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste in general of the appellant as a member of that caste. Consequently, it has to be held that the appellant has failed to establish that he became a member of the Adi Dravida Hindu caste after he started professing the Hindu religion; and this conclusion follows even on the assumption that a convert to Hinduism can acquire the membership of a caste.Ordinarily, the membership of a caste under the Hindu religion is acquired by birth. Whether the membership of a caste can be acquired by conversion to Hinduism or after reconversion to Hinduism is a question on which we have refrained from expressing our opinion, because, even on the assumption that it can be acquired, we have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant must fail in this appeal.