Case: Jaysing S/O Bhimrao Ghuge &amp; Others Vs. Motiram Ukanda Khillare &amp; Others

2.Few facts relevant for the decision are that the petitioners and respondent Nos.1 to 3 are elected members of Gram Panchayat of Sukanda. The respondent No.1 was elected as Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat. A motion for no confidence against the Sarpanch was moved by the petitioners by submitting requisition to the Tahsildar of Malegaon on 12.01.2000. Pursuant to the requisition, the Tahsildar convened the special meeting of the Gram Panchayat on 19.01.2000. The motion was passed by majority of four versus three and it was accordingly recorded in the proceedings book. The respondent No.1, Sarpanch moved an appeal under Section 35 (3B) of Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 before the Additional Collector, Washim, who held that the meeting was not convened and held within seven days as required by the provisions of Section 35(2) of the Bombay Village Panchayats Act, 1958 and, therefore, the motion of no confidence violates section 35(2). The appeal preferred by the petitioners before the Additional Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati under Section 35 (3C) came to be dismissed. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Commissioner, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Reasoning:
n is when can the period of 7 days from the date of receipt of the notice be said to have commenced.There is a volume of authorities in England showing that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded. (See Goldsmiths Company .v. West Metropolitan Railway Company (1904) 1 KB 1). This rule was followed in Cartwright .v. Mac Cormack ((1963) 1 All ER 11 at page 13) where the expression "fifteen days from the date of commencement of the policy" sin a cover note issued by an insurance company was construed as excluding the first date and the cover note to commence at midnight of that day, and also in Marren .v. Dawson Bentley and Co. Ltd. ((1961) 2 QB 135), a case for compensation for injuries received in the course of employment, where for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the date of the accident, being the date of the cause of action, was excluded. In case of Haru Das .v. State of W.B. (AIR 1972 SC 1293  ) following the said English decisions, the Supreme Court has held that in computing the period of three months from the date of detention before the expiration of which the order or decision for confirming the detention order and continuation of the detention had to be made, the date of commencement of detention must be excluded. There is no reason why the aforesaid rule of interpretation followed consistently and for so long should not be applied here.5.It will be also useful to refer to section 9 of the Bombay General Clauses Act which deals with the commencement and termination of time. It provides that it shall be sufficient for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "from" and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word "to". This means if the word "from" is used. the first day is to be excluded and if the word "to" is used, the last day is to be included. This section applies to all State Acts made after the commencement of Bombay General Clauses Act. In the instant case, the meeting was required to be held within seven days from the date of receipt of notice under(1) of Section 35. The requisition was received by the Tahsildar on 12.01.2000 and that day will have to be excluded and thus the meeting which was held on 19.01.2000 was within the period of seven days as provided in 35(1). Therefore, the authorities below were clearly in error that there was breach of Section 35(2). No other infirmity or illegality is pointed out in respect of the said meeting.