Case: Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur Vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company

e respondent M/s. Ramdev Tobacco Company, a sole proprietory concern, was at all material times a dealer in tobacco having a licensed warehouse at Guntur. The dealer was liable to pay duty on the tobacco received at his warehouse and transported to another dealer. On August 30, 1972 the appellant issued a notice calling upon the respondent to show cause why duty should not be demanded under Rule 160 of Central Excise Rules, 1944 (the Rules hereafter) on 64, 444 kgs. of VFC Farmash tobacco removed from his warehouse and not accounted for in the warehouse register maintained under the Rules. The respondent was also asked to show cause why penalty should not be imposed for infraction of Rules 151 and 32(1) of the Rules for illicit removal of the aforementioned quantity of tobacco. This show cause notice was founded on the allegation that in 1970 the respondent obtained six transport permits (T.P. 2) dated January 13, 1970, February 10, 1970, March 26, 1970, May 16, 1970, July 24, 1970 and August 5, 1970 and transported under each permit more than quantity of tobacco allowed thereunder in contravention of the aforementioned rules. The respondent sent a detailed reply to the said show cause notice on November 4, 1972. After giving a personal hearing to the respondent on September 18, 1973, the appellant came to the conclusion that the respondent had evaded payment of duty on 1272 bags weighing 48, 304 kgs. of VFC Farmash tobacco and issued a demand under Rule 160 in the sum of Rs. 1, 66, 165.76 under Adjudication Order No. 173/74 dated April 9, 1974. In addition thereto the appellant imposed a penalty of Rs. 100 for contravention of Rules 151 and 32(1) of the Rules. Thereupon the respondent filed a Writ Petition No. 2600 of 1974 under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the aforesaid order of the appellant. This writ petition was heard and disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High Court who took the view that the appellants action was time barred inasmuch as it was initiated after the expiry of the period of six months from the accrual of the cause of action. According to the learned Judge under Section 40(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (the Act hereinafter) no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding could be instituted for anything done or ordered to be done under the law after the expiration of six months from the accrual of the cause of action. Since a period of more than six months had indisputably expired from the dates on which the excess tobacco was transported under the six transport permits in question, the action was clearly time barred. In this view of the matter the writ petition was allowed and the demand made under the impugned adjudication order both in respect of duty and penalty was quashed. The present appellant questioned the correctness of this view in appeal, Writ Appeal No. 358 of 1976, but in vain. The Division Bench found the view taken by the learned Single Judge in accord with its view in Writ Petition No. 2516 of 1974 decided on April 1, 1976. It, therefore, dismissed the appeal but since it had granted a certificate to appeal in the case relied on, it also granted a similar certificate which has given rise to this appeal

Reasoning:
5. The rule of ejusdem generis is generally invoked where the scope and ambit of the general words which follows certain specific words (which have some common characteristic and constitute a genus) is required to be determined. By the application of this rule the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words constituting a genus is restricted to things ejusdem generis with those preceding them, unless the context otherwise requires. General words must ordinarily bear their natural and larger meaning and need not be confined ejusdem generis to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect. Courts have also limited the scope of the general words is cases where a large meaning is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results. To put it differently, the general expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred to by the preceding specified things constituting a genus, unless of course from the language of the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. The cardinal rule on interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the statue gives a different indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. But unless there is a genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specificWe have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions. In consider in the scope of the expression other legal proceeding we have confined ourselves to the language of sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Act before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and should not be understood to express any view on the amended provision. On careful consideration we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions that the wide expression other legal proceeding must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words suit and prosecution as they constitute a genus. In this view of the matter we must uphold the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the penalty and adjudication proceedings in question did not fall within the expression other legal proceeding employed in Section 40(2) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and therefore, the said proceedings were not subject to the limitation prescribed by the saidMr. Nambiar, the learned counsel for the respondents strongly argued that we should not entertain the submission based on the ejusdem generis rule since it was not raised before the High Court.That indeed is true but being a pure question of law we have thought it fit to entertain the same. We, therefore do not entertain this objection