Case: Kasturi &amp; Sons Private Limited Vs. N. Salivateswaran &amp; Another

The petitioner is a private limited company having its registered office at No. 201, Mount Road, Madras. The company is the proprietor of a daily newspaper called "The Hindu" which is published at Madras and has a large circulation in India and abroad. The shareholders of the company are all citizens of India. The first respondent, Shri N. Salivateeswaran, is a journalist of Bombay and he has been supplying news to various newspapers and journals one of which was the Hindu. The supply of news by the first respondent to the Hindu was under an agreement under which he was being paid a fixed monthly honorarium. Contrary to the advice and instructions of the petitioner, the first respondent left India for Zurich on 1st May, 1956. The petitioner thereupon relieved him of his duties and terminated with effect from 1st March, 1956, the arrangement under which he was supplying news to the Hindu. He returned to India in July 1956, and requested the petitioner to reconsider its decision; but the petitioner did not think that any case for reconsideration had been made out. Thereupon the first respondent made an application to the Labour Minister of the State of Bombay under S. 17 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Act 45 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as the Act. On receiving this application the State of Bombay nominated Shri M. R. Meher, I. C. S. (Retired), second respondent, as the authority under S. 17 of the Act for the purpose of enquiry into the first respondents application and requested him to examine the claim made by the first respondent and, in case he was satisfied that any amount was due, to issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector of Bombay for further action as provided under S. 17. A copy of the application was served on the petitioner by order of the second respondent; and a covering letter addressed to the petitioner called upon him to file his written statement in reply to the first respondents claim2. By his application the first respondent had claimed a sum of Rs. 1,57,172-8-0 from the petitioner. In his written statement, the petitioner disputed the whole of the claim made by the first respondent and traversed all the material allegations made by him in support of his claim. The petitioner also contended that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to go into the matters arising from the first respondents application. It was also urged by the petitioner alternatively that, even if the second respondent had jurisdiction to deal with the matter, he had the discretion to decline to consider the matter and leave it to be tried in the ordinary courts. The petitioner requested the second respondent to exercise his discretion and direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the appropriate civil court. The petitioners written statement was filed on 18th October 19563. The second respondent decided to deal with the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue. He heard both the parties on this preliminary issue and, by his order dated 12th November 1956, he recorded his conclusion that he had jurisdiction to deal with the matter and that it was unnecessary to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil court. Accordingly the matter was adjourned to 1st December 1956, for hearing on the merits. It is this order which is challenged by the petitioner before us by his present petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.

Reasoning:
In our opinion, this approach really begs the question. If the legislature did not confer adequate powers on the specified authority under S. 17, a more reasonable inference would be that the nature and scope of the powers under S. 17 is very limited and the legislature knew that, for holding such a limited and narrow enquiry, it was unnecessary to confer powers invariably associated with formal and complicated enquiries of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. We must accordingly hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application at this stage13. It appears from the order made by the second respondent that he took the view that, though he had jurisdiction to deal with the application, it would have been open to him to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction and to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil Court. He however, thought that he need not exercise that power in the present case. We are satisfied that the second respondent was in error in both these conclusions.If he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under S. 17, it is difficult to appreciate how, in the absence of any provision in that behalf, he could have directed the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil Court. Such an order would clearly have amounted to the second respondents failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him.Besides, if S. 17 had really given him discretion in this matter as assumed by the second respondent, on the merits of this case it would obviously have been a case which should have been referred to the ordinary civil Court. This, however, is now a matter of purely academic interestIn our opinion, there is considerable force in this contention. We would accordingly hold that the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application;; but,since the petition itself is not competent under Art. 32The present petition purports to invoke our jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution and it was a valid and competent petition in so far as it challenged the vires of S. 17; but,once S. 17 is held to be valid and in order, the competence of the petition under Art. 32 is naturally open to serious jeopardy. No question about the fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved and his grievance against the order passed by the second respondent cannot be ventilated by a petition under Art. 32. This position is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He, however, argued that, if we construe S. 17 in his favour, and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application, his purpose would be effectively served even though technically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not competent under Art. 32 of the Constitution.