Case: State Of H.P.  Vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan

The facts relating to the Civil Appeal are as under :-The first respondent (Mr. Kailash Chand Mahajan) retired from the post of Chief Engineer from the State of Punjab. On 24.7.81, he was appointed as member of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board and thereafter appointed as Chairman of the said board for a period of two years. On 13.8.82, the following notification came to be issued :-"No. 8-155/73-DP (Apptt.II) Dated Shimla-2, the 13th Aug., 1982NOTIFICATIONIn exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to appoint Shri Kailash Chand, Retd. Chief Engineer (Irrigation) Punjab, whose appointment as Member, H.P. State Electricity Board, has been notified vide Notification of even number, dated the 24th July, 1981, as Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board for a period to five years, with effect from 25th July, 1981. Detailed terms and conditions of his appointment has (six).This is in supersession of this deptt. Notification of even number, dated the 24th July, 1981.By order(K.C. Pandeya)Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh2. On 12.5.86, the term as Chairman was extended for another period of three years in the following terms :-"No. 8-155/73-DP(Apptt.II), dated Shimla-2, the 12th May, 1986.NOTIFICATIONIn continuation of this Departments Notification of even number, dated 13.8.1982, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to extend the appointment of Shri Kailash Chand Mahajan as Chairman of the H.P. State Electricity Board for a further period of three years with effect from 25th July, 1986, on the existing terms and conditions of his appointment as Chairman.By order(P.K. Mattoo)Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.3. There was a further extension on 12.6.89 for a period of 3 years and that notification reads as under :-"No. 8-155/73-DP (Apptt.II) dated Shimla-2, the 12th June, 1989.NOTIFICATIONIn continuation of this Departments Notification of even number dated 12th May, 1986, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to extend the appointment of Sh. Kailash Chand Mahajan as Chairman of the H.P. State Electricity Board for a further period of three years with effect from 25th July, 1989, on the existing terms and conditions of his appointment as Chairman.The Governor, Himachal Pradesh is further pleased to order that Shri Kailash Chand Mahajan, Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board shall also continue to function as Secretary (M.P.P. and Power) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.By order(B.S. Negi)Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh.Therefore, it is obvious that the appointment was to continue upto 25.7.92.4. In January, 1990, elections to the Legislative Assembly of the State of Himachal Pradesh were scheduled to take place. The respondent in this affidavit would aver that the third respondent (i.e. Mr. Shanta Kumar, the Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh) is alleged to have made speeches that should he come to power he could have the first respondant removed from the chairmanship of the Electricity Board. On 5.3.90, the third respondent became the Chief Minister. A notification dated 6.3.90, came to the issued in supersession of the notification dated 12.6.89 that the appointment of the first respondent as Chairman of Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board is extended from 25.7.89 of 6.3.90.5. Another notification dated 6.3.90 was issued directing that Mr. R.S.S. Chauhan shall function as Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board w.e.f. 7.3.90. At this stage the first respondent preferred a Writ Petition No. 123/90 challenging the validity of the notification dated 6.3.90, and prayed for certiorari to quash the same. While that writ petition was pending, on 30.3.90, another notification was issued terminating the appointment of the first respondent as Member of the State Electricity Board.6. On 30.3.90, the High Court while admitting the writ petition (CWP No. 123 of 1990) ordered that no appointment to the post of Chairman of the State Electricity Board will be made till further orders of the court. The matter was heard on 22.5.90. The learned Advocate General on conclusion of his argument requested the court that the judgment may not be pronounced since he desired to seek instructions from the Government to reconsider the impugned order in CWP No. 123 of 1990. On 11.6.90, the learned Advocate General submitted to the court that both the notifications dated 6.3.90 and 30.3.90 would be withdrawn. An undertaking to that effect was given. Accordingly the writ petition was disposed of. Consequent to this undertaking, by notification dated 11.6.90, the Government of Himachal Pradesh withdrew both the notifications dated 6.3.90 and 30.3.90. However, the matter did not rest there. On 11.6.90, a show cause notice was issued to the first respondent for having abused his position as Chairman, HP State Electricity Board and also ex-officio Secretary, M.P.P. & Power. He was also asked to submit his explanation within 21 days as to why action should not be taken under Section 10 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. Simultaneously it was also ordered that he shall be placed under suspension with immediate effect by virtue of power under Section 10 of the said Act. Consequent upon the suspension of the first respondent, the notification dated 16th July, 1990 came to be issued placing Mr. R.S.S. Chauhan, Member (Operations), HP State Electricity Board as Chairman with immediate effect until further orders.7. Being aggrieved by the above show cause notice and the order of suspension, the first respondent filed CWP 303 of 1990 on 12.6.90. The High Court while admitting the writ petition granted interim stay of the order of suspension.8. On 22.6.90, the Chief Secretary of the Govt. of Himachal Pradesh wrote to the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi requesting for permission to promulgate Electricity (Supply H.P. Amendment) Ordinance, 1990. It was stated in the letter that at present no age limit has been prescribed for holding office of the member of the State Electricity Board, it was necessary to prescribe an upper age limit. The concept of terminal appointment at which a person should cease to hold judicial offices and civil posts is entrenched in administrative and constitutional system. Therefore, it was proposed through the ordinance that no person above the age of 65 years could be appointed and continued as Chairman or member of H.P. State Electricity Board. This provision was not only to apply to future appointments, but also to the existing Chairman and Members, and where the existing incumbents tenure is curtailed adequate compensation could be provided. No doubt, rules could be framed under Section 78 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. But those rules cannot have retrospective operations, hence the proposed ordinance.9. On 9.7.90, the Government of India replied pointing out the desirability of the State Govt. examining with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Constitution about the promulgating the ordinance. The State was also advised to explore the feasibility of amending the rules.10. On 13.7.90, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh issued an ordinance, i.e. H.P. Ordinance Rule of 2/90, amending Section 5(6) of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The ordinance reads to the following effectENGLISH TEST H.P. ORDINANCE NO...of 1990.THE ELECTRICITY (SUPPLY) (HIMACHAL PRADESH AMENDMENT) ORDINANCE, 1990Promulgated by the Governor of Himachal Pradesh in the Forty-first year of the Republic of India.An ordinance to amend the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, (Central Act No. 54 of 1948) in its application of the State of Himachal Pradesh.Whereas the Legislative Assembly of the State of Himachal Pradesh is not in session and the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action;And whereas instructions from the President of India to promulgate the Ordinance have been obtained.Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 213 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to promulgate the following Ordinance :1. This Ordinance may be called the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Ordinance, 1990.2. In Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, for the words ``if he is a member of Parliament", the words ``if he has attained the age of 65 years or is a member of Parliament" shall be substituted.3. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, rules, regulations or bye- laws made thereunder or in any judgment, decree or order of the Court, any appointment, made before the commencement of the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Ordinance, 1990, whereby a person has a right to continue as a member of the Board after attaining the age of 65 years, shall be void, and on such commencement he shall be deemed to have ceased to hold office of the Member of the Board.(2) On ceasing to hold office of the member of the Board under sub-section (1), such member shall be entitled to a compensation as may be determined by the State Government; but such compensation shall not exceed the amount equivalent to the amount of salary and allowances payable to him for his unexpired term.B. RACHAIAHGOVERNORSHIMLAThe .....,As a sequel to the issue of this ordinance, the following notification was issued on 16.7.90 :-Government of Himachal PradeshDepartment of Personnel (AP-II)No. 8-155/71-DP(Apptt.II) dated, Shimla-2, the 16th July, 1990.NOTIFICATIONWhereas as a result of promulgation of the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Ordinance 1990, vide Notification No. LLR-D(6) 8/90-Legislation dated 13th July, 1990, published in the Rajpatra dated 13th July, 1990, Shri Kailash Chand Mahajan, Chairman, H.P. State Electricity Board, having already attained the age of more than sixty-five years, has ceased to be member of the H.P. State Electricity Board and consequently Chairman of the said Board.NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers vested in him under sub- section (5) of Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to appoint Shri R.S.S. Chauhan, Member (Operations), H.P. State Electricity Board as Chairman of the H.P. State Electricity Board with immediate effect, till further orders.By Order(M.S. Mukherjee)Chief Secretary to the Govt. ofHimachal Pradesh.12. Aggrieved by the ordinance dated 13.7.90 and the above notification dated 16.7.90, the first respondent filed CWP No. 396 of 1990, praying for certiorari to quash the ordinance as well as the notifications.13. Inter alia, the first respondent as writ petitioner before the High Court urged that there has been deliberate attempt on the part of the State to get rid of him through the ordinance. The same is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In so far as he is the only person affected by the ordinance having crossed the age of 65, he had been singled out for a total discriminatory treatment. It is a colourable exercise of power. While obtaining the consent of the President of India with regard to a subject falling under the Concurrent List, it was not even let known that a writ petition was actually pending concerning the petitioner. There had been a deliberate concealment of facts. In any event, the Chief Minister (who was the fourth respondent) was activated by malafides. He was determined to remove the writ petitioner, as he held out in the election meeting.14. The State filed a detailed counter-affidavit. The fourth respondent (the Chief Minister) specifically denied the allegations of malafides and urged that the ordinance came to be issued since a policy decision had been taken to introduce age of superannuation fixing the limit at 65. During the pendency of the writ petition, the ordinance came to be replaced by the Electricity (Supply) (Himachal Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1990 (H.P. Act of 10 of 1990). Therefore, an application for amendment was taken out challenging the validity of the amending act. Before the High Court, the following points were urged.(i) malafides(a) against the Chief Minister; and(b) against the legislature.(ii) The act was unconstitutional and arbitrary, in that it had been passed to get rid of the petitioner. Though a single person legislation was permissible in law, yet where the discrimination of the petitioner was wholly unjustified such a legislation would be bad in law.(iii) The enactment was void as violative of Article 254.(iv) It was also violative of Article 21 as it damaged the reputation of the writ petitioner therein.(v) Section 3(1) of the Ordinance/Act renders a judgment of the court void and was unconstitutional as being excessive legislative powers in so far as it impinges upon the judicial field.(vi) Inasmuch as the right of the petitioner to continue as a Member/Chairman of the Board had been taken away, it is violative of Article 19. The compensation provided under Section 3(2) is vague and illusory.(vii) Section 3(1) does not apply to the petitioner at all.15. The Division Bench held that the evidence furnished by the petitioner in the form of newspaper reports would not be enough to hold that the Chief Minister had any personal bias. The legislature as a body cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Therefore, no malafides could be attributed to the legislature.16. Dealing with the repugnancy it was held that by the impugned ordinance of the Electricity (Supply) Act, an age of superannuation has been brought in. There was no such age prescribed by the Central Act. Therefore, there was no repugnancy.17. By mere curtailment of the term as Chairman of the Board without any mention about his inability or professional competence, so as to affect his reputation in any manner, no injury had taken place so as to complain of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. The plea of interference with judicial power was negatived. The plea of violation of Article 19 that the provision of compensation is illusory was negatived.18. On an elaborate consideration of violation of Article 14, the court after referring to the leading decisions of this court concluded that prescription of maximum age by the amending act at 65 years cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational. Moreover public interest demands that there ought to be an age of retirement in public services.19. On the ancillary question whether the legislation had been enacted only with a view to get rid off the petitioner and whether it would be bad as a single persons legislation, it was held that there was nothing illegal about it. In relation to applicability of Section 3(1) of the amending Act to the petitioner, the High Court construed that Section 3(1) will apply only to an appointment where a person has a right to continue after the attainment of 65 years. If, therefore, the petitioner had been appointed after he had attained the age of 65 years, he would not be affected by Section 3(1). Any contrary inference would not be justified by its language. It was also held that when Section 5(6) precluded the petitioner from "being aof the Board after he had attained 65 years of age, would not help the State as it would apply only prospectively. We may also refer to that particular argument advanced on behalf of the State that Mr. R.S.S. Chauhan having been appointed as Chairman, he ought to have been impleaded as a party. The court rejected the plea not only on the ground that he was not a necessary party, but also on the ground that his appointment was only "until furtherthe result, the notification dated July 17, 1990 was quashed. It is under these circumstances, Special Leave Petition was preferred to the court. By an order dated 5th August, 1991, special leave was granted. Hence, this Civil Appeal.

Reasoning:
21. Section 3 of the amending Act was given retrospective effect from 13.7.90. This Section presupposes an appointment prior to amendment, namely, prior to 13.7.90. In this case, the appointment gives a right to continue after attaining the age of 65 years. If, therefore, the two tests are answered, the appointment is rendered void irrespective of the fact when the appointment took place. The "Objects & Reasons" of the Act put the matter beyond doubt. In our country, the concept of age of superannuation is entrenched both in administrative as well as constitutional systems. Public policy requires to prescribe the age of 65 years for retirement of the members of Electricity Board as in the case of High Court judges, members of tribunals and other high functionaries.22. The High Court had gone wrong as though the appointment of the first respondent was not covered by Section 3(1) since the right to continue as Chairman was pursuant to an appointment after he had attained the age of 65 years. Factually this is incorrect because the appointment of the first respondent as Chairman was on 13.8.82. Thereafter the same appointment came to be extended from time to time. Each of those extensions cannot constitute a new appointment. It is one appointment which is being continued from time to time. Legally speaking also, the reasoning of the High Court is wrong because it leads to unconstitutionality.Looking it from that point of view this is a legislation which applies to all. The chance that the first respondent was affected at the relevant time by introduction of this legislation will not in any manner render it violative of Article 14 on the ground thatit is a single personsa matter of fact, the counter-affidavit of the State makes it clear that the order of reappointment came to be passed under Section 5 read with Section 8 rule 4. The statement of `Objects and Reasons also makes a reference to Section 8. Thus, both legally and factually Section 5(6) cannot help the State.34. Much cannot be made of the words "or being" brought in by way of amendment of Section 5(6). This only connotes the attainment of age of 65 subsequent to the appointment. When the Constitution uses similar language both under Articles 102 and 191, it makes it clear that under both the Articles 102 as well as 190, the seat falling vacant retrospectively on the incurring of such a disqualification there is no automatic cessation provided under Section 10. Thus the words "has attained" occurring under Section 5(6) assume great importance because there is no provision under Section 10 prescribing age of disqualification and the consequent removal. Even under Section, it supposes a person being appointed before the age of 65 and attaining the age of 65. Such a contingency does not arise here. Therefore, it is submitted that Sections 5(6) and 3(1) of the amending Act should be read together. As regards the amending Act, it cannot be denied that on the date of ordinance it applied only to the respondent and nobody else. While Section 5(6) takes care of future appointment Section 3(1) deals with reappointment. On the date of ordinance Section 5(6) would apply to nobody else because this respondent alone was holding a tenure appointment. The legislation was brought about only with a view to unseat the respondent. There can be a single persons legislation provided it is in furtherance of legislative objects. The burden is on the State to prove the reason or the basis for this legislation. Such a burden had not beenit is clear but for mismanagement or subserving a public cause or a social or economic obligation, such pieces of single persons legislation would not have been upheld.36. Certainly, there may be a legislation in general application and it may apply to an individual; but that is not the case here. On the date of the coming into force of the Act this respondent alone was affected. The amending Act itself makes a discrimination without any justification or rationale. If the respondent is treated alongwith others, it would amount to treating unequals as. A careful reading of the Section will clearly disclose the section merely talks of term of office and conditions for reappointment. Those conditions may be as prescribed. The word "prescribed" has come to be defined under Section 2(9) of the said Act. "Prescribed" means prescribed made by rules under this Act. Nowhere in the Section, in our considered view, an additional power for appointment is conferred. At best it could be said that it merely lays down the eligibility for reappointment. As stated above, that eligibility must be as per conditions prescribed under the rules. As a matter of fact, when it says "shall hold the office for such period" it means the period as prescribed under the rules. Beyond this, we are unable to persuade ourselves to come to the conclusion that there is any separate power for reappointment. It is not even necessary to provide for such a separate power. The reason why we say so is that Sections 14 and 16 of Central General Clauses Act provide for such a power. Section 16 deals with the power of appointment carrying with it the power of dismissal, while Section 14 states any power conferred unless a different intention appears could be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Where, therefore, Section 5 provides for a power to appoint, certainly, that power could be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Thus one need not search for a separate provision in this regard. We may also note that the prescriptions in relation to the term was contained under Electricity (Supply) (H.P. Amendment) Act, 1990.In our view this Section confers an enabling power on the State Government to take punitive action against a member of the Board who falls under any one of the clauses (a) to (f). The fact that it is punitive is clear because Sub-section (3) contemplates giving an opportunity to offer an explanation and thereafter removing him. Once so removed, he is ineligible for reappointment either as a Member or any other capacity in the Board.One thing that is striking is that rules may themselves provide for eligibility for reappointment. In this connection it may not be out of context to refer to the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs asking the State to explore the possibility of making rules instead of amending the Act. This was at a time when the State Government sought the assent of the Present. Where, therefore, rules could provide for the conditions for eligibility for reappointment, equally it should follow by amending the Act such eligibility for reappointment can be provided. In the conspectus of this Section it would be thus clear - (1) there is only one source of power of appointment contained under Section 5; (2) there is no separate power in relation to reappointment under Section 8; (3) Section 10 is only an enabling power for taking punitive action against such of those members who fall under clauses (a) to (f) of the said Section and (4) Section 78(2) (a) confers a power upon the State Government to frame rules.It is rather unfortunate that the High Court has missed the true import of the words "or being". Therefore, we are unable to subscribe to the findings of the High Court when it states "the provision lays down the age of superannuation for a member prospectively which disqualifies a person from being appointed or being a member after he attains the age of 65 years" by itself it does not affect those who had been given appointment after having attained the age of 65 years. The Legislature was conscious of it, but thought of enacting a provision like Section 3 on that account.65. We are unable to see any warrant for holding that Section 5(6) as amended having regard to the use of language "or being" would any way exclude such of those members or even the Chairman who have attained the age of 65 years of age at the time of appointment. Accordingly, we conclude that Section 5(6) itself would be enough to hold that on the coming into force of the amending Act, namely, 13.7.90 the first respondent ceases to hold the office by the rigour of law, as rightly contended by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for thehas already been seen that Section 10 merely confers an enabling power to take punitive action. It is one thing the State has power to take punitive action, it is entirely different thing to say that in law the first respondent ceases to hold office on the incurring of the disqualification of attainment of 65 years of age. If Section 5(6) itself brings about a cessation of office, that sub-section being self-executory in nature, there is no need to provide for the same under Section 10 once over again. Merely because the parent Act (Central Legislation) provides for a disqualification on account of becoming a Member of Parliament, State Legislature or Local Board, that does not mean there must be a corresponding provision incorporating age as well under Section 10. We are unable to agree with Mr. Kapil Sibal. Equally, the contention that Section 5(6) only deals with initial appointment and would not cover a case of reappointment after attaining the age of 65 is wholly unacceptable to us. First of all, as we have stated earlier there is no question of any separate power for reappointment under Section 8 and the only power being traceable to Section 5 read with Section 14 and 16 of the General clauses Act.From this we are unable to see how any help could be derived by the first respondent to base his arguments that the power of reappointment is traceable to Section 8. This aspect of the matter had already been dealt with by us.71. The statement of `Objects and Reasons makes a reference to Section 8. But it does not again mean there is an independent power of appointment. What the above extract of counter-affidavit and reference to Section 8 mean is denial of malafide. Besides, hitherto no outer age limit has been prescribed for the post of Chairman. It is that which is sought to be prescribed now. The reference to Section 8 means only the "term" and nothing else.72. We are also unable to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the first respondent that for a tenure post no period can be fixed. Instances are not wanting in this regard. Therefore, rightly reference is made by Mr. Shanti Bhushan to Article 224 of theOne thing that is significant is it contains a `non obstante clause. An appointment of a Member of the Board made prior to the commencement to this Act namely, 13.7.90 (giving retrospective operation) when gives a right to continue as a member after attaining the age of 65 years, that appointment is rendered void.Once it is so rendered void, the law deems that he has ceased to hold office of the Member of the Board. By a reading of the Section we are unable to conclude how Section 3(1) would fail to apply to a person who on the date of the commencement was already more than 65 years. This line of reasoning adopted by the High Court does not appeal to us. The Section nowhere makes a distinction between those who on the date of the enactment are "below" or "over" 65 years of age. Such a distinction is totallythat question is answered in the affirmative there is a cessation of office, in view of the terms of that Section. The contrary conclusion would lead to strange results. Those who are appointed prior to the Act and on the attainment of 65 years on 13.7.90, would vacate the office while a person already 65 on that date and after the passing of the Act notwithstanding the policy of prescribing the age of superannuation at 65 years would continue in the office. The object of introducing an age of superannuation itself is to weed out the older elements and infuse fresh blood so that the administration could function withthe only conclusion possible is, by reason of appointment if the incumbent is enabled to continue after attaining the age of 65 years such continuing is rendered void.79. No doubt as we have stated above, Section 5(6) as amended achieves this purpose. Yet if there is another Section which deals with the same it must be regarded as one introduced by way of abundant caution. In short, Section 3(1) is epexegesis.80. The arguments advanced by Mr. Kapil Sibal remind us of the eloquent words of Dr. Johnson "There is a wicked inclination in most people to suppose an old man decayed in his intellects. If a young or middle aged man, when leaving a company does not recollect where he laid his hat, it is nothing; but if the same in attention is discovered in an old man, people will shrug up their shoulders, and say, `His memory is going. 81. In our opinion such sentiments can be no answer against the operation of law.Thus, it will be clear that even legitimate expectation cannot preclude legislation.85. Where the right to continue in office has been put an end to by statute, even then it may be complained that the other rights like salary and perks would continue to be reserved and they could be claimed. To avoid that contention, Section 3(2) provides for compensation equivalent to the amount of salary and allowances for the unexpired term of office.86. Even assuming that the reasoning of the High Court is correct, in that, by the term of appointment he should have a right to continue after attaining the age of 65, when we look at the notification dated 12.6.89, that gives the first respondent a right to continue beyond the age of 65.From the proposition it is clear that there could a legislation relating to a single person. Assuming for a moment, that the Section 3 applies only to the first respondent even then, where it is avowed policy of the State to introduce an age of superannuation of 65 years of age, there is nothing wrong with the same.We are unable to agree with this argument. No doubt, in this case Lalit Narayan Mishra Institute alone was taken over by the Legislature. That was the only institution affected thereby. In spite of this the Court held this enactment is not violative of Article 14, since the institutions of like nature would fall within the ambit of the statute, notwithstanding the fact that only one institute has been specified in the schedule. The attempt of the learned counsel for the first respondent that in all these cases legislative intervention became necessary because there were some other reasons namely, mismanagement requiring taking over the banks and temples etc. and therefore, the single persons legislation was upheld is not tenable. We also hold that in order to justify a legislation of this character, no extraordinary situation need be disclosed. The contention that this is not in furtherance of the legislative object, cannot also be accepted because it has already been seen that the legislative object is to introduce an age of superannuation. Beyond this nothing more need be established by the State. The possibility of this legislation applying to one or more persons exists in principle. The fact that only one individual came to be affected cannot render the legislation arbitrary as violative of Article 14. This is because Section 3 is general in terms and the incidence of its applying to one individual does not render the legislation invalid.93. The theory advanced by the learned counsel for the first respondent that there must be mismanagement or some extraordinary situation to warrant a legislation of its character also does not seem to be correct as seen from The Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd., Sonepat v. Their Workmen, 1953(30 S.C.R. Suppl. 89 atThe attempt to distinguish this case that it was one wherein a benefit of extension was conferred and that a number of industrial adjudications were pending cannot be accepted.The contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the failure to implead Chauhan will be fatal to the writ petition does not seem to be correct. He relies on A.I.R. 1979 Kerala 179. That case related to admission to medical college whereby invalidating the selection vitally affected those who had been selected already. Equally, the case Padmraj Samrendra and others v. State of Bihar and another, A.I.R. 1979 Patna 266 has no application. This was a case where the plea was founded in Article 14 and arbitrary selection. The selectees were vitally affected. The plea that the decision of the court in the absence of Chauhan would be violative of principle of natural justice as any adverse decision would affect him is not correct.What was the first respondent seeking in the writ petition? He was questioning the validity of the Ordinance and the Act whereby he had been deprived of his further continuance. What is the relief could he have asked for against Chauhan? None. The first point is Chauhan came to be appointed consequent to the suspension of the first respondent which suspension had come to be stayed by the High Court on 12.6.90. Then, again, as pointed out by the High Court it was "till further orders." Therefore, we hold the failure to implead Chauhan does not affect the maintainability of the writ petition.103. One postscriptum needs to be added. It was argued on the basis of Pritam Singh v, The State, 1950 S.C.R. 435 that unless the court comes to the conclusion that the High Court is palpably wrong, it should not interfere. No doubt, the same principle is stated in Union of India v. M.P. Singh, 1990(2) SLR 3 (SC) that if substantial justice is done the interference under Article 136 is not warranted. We do not think this principle will have any application.In the light of the above discussion, it follows that the appellant is entitled to succeed. We hold that on 13.7.90 the first respondents right to hold office as Chairman/Member of Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board came to end.