Case: Khardah Co. Ltd Vs. Their Workmen

2. The respondents case was that Jadav had been dismissed by the appellant mala fide with the motive of victimising him for his trade union activities. Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union and since he supported the Unions demands very strongly, the appellant wanted to get rid of him. It appears that Jadav had been working as a Weaver for some years past. He was confirmed in service with effect from April 12, 1954. On September 19, 1960, he went on a weeks leave. When he returned on September 26, 1960, he was asked to work on the machine producing twill, though , normally, he was assigned work on a plain machine. Jadav was not accustomed to work on the complicated machine which produces twill and so, he requested the management that he should be asked to do his usual work on a plain machine. This request was, however, turned down. Being unaccustomed to work on the machine producing twill, Jadav met with an accident on September 27, 1960; and was granted medical leave for a week ending on Saturday October 1, 1960. On October 3, 1960, when he resumed duty, he again requested the management that he should be permitted to work on the plain machine, but when his request was turned down, he told the management that he would work on the twill machine in the second shift which starts from 1 P. M. On that day another employee Mahboob, who was ailing and had been on leave, asked for further leave which was refused and he fell unconscious while he was going to operate his machine. As a result. 700 weavers of the appellant stopped work and the weaving section could not resume work at 1 P. M. The management then declared a lock-out on October 5, 1960 which continued until October 29, 1960.3. On October 3, 1960, the management served a charge-sheet on Jadav in which it was alleged that Jadav had wilfully disobeyed the lawful and reasonable order of his superior and had acted in a manner subversive of discipline. The case against him was that he had moved from one place to another in the Weaving Department and incited workers of the said department to go on strike. The management alleged that by his conduct, Jadav had committed misconduct under R. 14(c) (I) and (viii) of the Standing Orders. Jadav was called upon to offer his explanation within 24 hours after receipt of the charge-sheet.4. After Jadav gave his explanation, an enquiry was heard. At the initial stages of the enquiry. Jadav appeared, but, later, he did not take part in the proceedings. The appellant contends that Jadav deliberately refrained from taking part in the proceedings, whereas according to the respondents, the enquiry was conducted unfairly, and so, it became impossible for Jadav to participate in it. This enquiry was conducted by the Manager himself. After the enquiry was over, the Manager decided that Jadav was guilty of the charge, and so, dismissed him on November 21, 1960. The respondents case was that the dismissal was purely vindictive and was not justified at all.5. On other hand, the appellants case was that Jadav had been working in the weaving department both on plain looms and on looms that produce twill. When he returned to duty on October 3, 1960, the departmental Overseer, Mr. Jha asked Jadav to go his loom, but he refused to obey his orders. The appellant further alleged that Jadav moved inside the weaving department and incited the workers to stop work. The appellant also pleaded that a proper enquiry had been held against Jadav and it was as a result of the said enquiry that he was dismissed for misconduct under R. 14 (c) (I) and (viii) of the Companys Standing Orders. Regarding the incident of Mahboob, the appellant alleged that Mahboob was absent on October 3, 1960 and therefore, no question of his working on any machine arose on that day. In other words, the appellants contention was that the Unions version that the strike was spontaneous because Mahboob fainted, was untrue and the strike was, in substance, the result of the instigation of Jadav.6. Before the Tribunal some oral evidence was led by the parties and reliance was placed by the appellant on the proceedings of the enquiry itself. The Tribunal held that the management had deliberately suppressed the fact that Mahboob had gone to the mill on October 3, and prayed for extension of leave which was refused, and so, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the strike could not have been instigated by Jadav. The Tribunal further commented on the fact that after the enquiry was held, no finding was recorded by the Manager who held the enquiry, and it appeared to the Tribunal that the conclusions on which the management presumably acted in dismissing Jadav were of such a character that "no person acting fairly and honestly could have reached them. The Tribunal also held that Jadav was not used to work on a twill loom, and so, his request that he should be allowed to work on a plain loom was not unjustified. Its conclusion, therefore, was that a grave charge had been unjustly framed against Jadav and that showed want of good faith and vindictiveness. On these findings, the Tribunal answered the question in favour of the respondents and directed reinstatement of Jadav.

Reasoning:
There is no doubt that this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the conclusion reached by the enquiry officer who conducts domestic enquiries against industrial employees unless one of the four tests laid down in the case of Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. 1957-1 Lab LJ 260 : (AIR 1958 SC 130  ) is satisfied, because we have generally accepted the view that if the enquiry is fairly held and leads to the conclusion that the charge framed against the employee is proved, the Industrial Tribunal should not sit in appeal over the finding recorded at the said enquiry and should not interfere with the managements right to dismiss a workman who is found guilty ofwe would discourage the idea of recording statements of witnesses ex parate and then producing the witnesses before the employee concerned for cross-examination after serving him with such previously recorded statements even though the witnesses concerned make a general statement on the latter occasion that their statements already recorded correctly represent what they stated. In our opinion, unless there are compelling reasons to do so, the normal procedure should be followed and all evidence should be recorded in the presence of the workman who stands charged with the commission of acts constituting misconduct.Take the present case where, after the enquiry was held, the Manager who held the enquiry has not recorded any findings, and so, we do not know what reasons weighed in his mind and how he appreciated the evidence led beforeWe are not impressed by this argument. The whole object of holding an enquiry is to enable the enquiry officer to decide upon the merits of dispute before him, and so, it would be idle to contend that once evidence is recorded, all that the employer is expected to do is to pass an order of dismissal which impliedly indicates that the employer accepted the view that the charges framed against the employee had been proved. One of the tests which the Industrial Tribunal is entitled to apply in dealing with industrial disputes of this character is whether the conclusion of the enquiry officer was perverse or whether there was any basic error in the approach adopted by him. Now, such an enquiry would be impossible in the present case because we do not know how the enquiry officer approached the question and what conclusions he reached before he decided to dismiss Jadav. In our opinion, therefore, the failure of the Manager to record any findings after holding the enquiry constitutes a serious infirmity in the enquiry itself. The learned Solicitor-General suggested that we might consider the evidence ourselves and decide whether the dismissal of Jadav is justified or not. We are not prepared to adopt such a course. If industrial adjudication attaches importance to domestic enquiries and the conclusions reached at the end of such enquiries, that necessarily postulates that the enquire would be followed by a statement containing the conclusions of the enquiry officer. It may be that the enquiry officer need not writ a very long or elaborate report; but since his findings are likely to lead to the dismissal of the employee, it is his duty to record clearly and precisely his conclusions and to indicate briefly his reasons for reaching the said conclusions, Unless such a course is adopted, it would be difficult for the Industrial Tribunal to decide whether the approach adopted by the enquiry officer was basically erroneous or whether his conclusions were perverse. Indeed, if the argument urged before us by the learned Solicitor-General is accepted, it is likely to impair substantially the value of such domestic enquiries. As we have already observed, we must insist on a proper enquiry being held, and that means that nothing should happen in the enquiry either when it is held or after it is concluded and before the order of dismissal is passed, which would expose the enquiry to the criticism that it was undertaken as an empty formality. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Industrial Tribunal was right in not attaching any importance to the enquiry held by the Manager in dealing with the merits of the dispute itself on the evidence adduced before it.In the present case, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the dismissal of Jadav was not effected in good faith and has been actuated by a desire to victimise him for his trade union activities. That is a conclusion of fact which cannot be said to be perverse, and so, it is not open to the appellant to challenge its correctness on the merits before us.12. There is one point to which we ought to refer before we part with this appeal. It appears that the main dispute between the parties was whether the strike on October 3, 1960 was spontaneous, or had been instigated byminutes show that when an enquiry was made as to why the strike had commenced, it was definitely reported to the Committee that Mahboob, who had gone on leave, had extended his leave and after the expiry of the extended leave, he reported on October 3, and pleaded that he was still unwell and should be given still further leave, but "nobody paid any heed to his prayer, and so presumably he had to resume duty. The minutes further show that the Labour Officer informed the members of the Committee that Mahboob had produced a certificate of fitness of September 22, 1960 and after discussion, it was unanimously decided to refer his case to the Mills Medical Officer on whose recommendation the leave should be considered. These minutes, therefore, clearly prove that Mahboob had gone to the Mill on October 3, had asked for further leave and his request for further leave was not granted. We ought to add that these minutes have been signed by the Joint Secretary on the employers side and the Joint Secretary on the employees side, and their correctness cannot be impeached. It is in the light of these statements that the plea made by the appellant before the Tribunal had to be considered by it.13. The plea specifically made was that Mahboob was absent on October 3, and, therefore, there was no question of his working on any machine. This plea would seem to suggest that Mahboob was absent from the Mill and that undoubtedly is notstatement would show that leave had been granted to Mahboob in the morning of 3rd October, but as we have already seen, the Labour Officer himself told the members of the Works Committee at 3 P. M. on the same day that leave had not been granted to Mahboob because he had produced a certificate of fitness dated September 22 and the Works Committee had resolved that Mahboobs case should be referred to the Mills Medical Officer on whose recommendation action should be taken. Thus, there can be no doubt that even if the plea made by the appellant is liberally construed and is read in the light of the statement made by one of the witnesses at the domestic enquiry, the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that the stand taken by the appellant was wholly untrue and that Mahboob had not been given leave on 3rd October. That being, so, if the Industrial Tribunal took the view that the refusal of the management to give leave to Mahboob exasperated the workmen, we cannot hold that its conclusion is erroneous or that its propriety can be successfully challenged before us. The incident in regard to Mahboob forms the main background of the strike and the anxiety of the appellant was to show that Mahboob was not present on that date. Therefore, once the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the version given by the appellant was untrue, it naturally changed the complextion of the whole of the charge-sheet framed by the appellant against Jadav. That is why the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the conduct of the appellant in dismissing Jadav showed lack of good faith and appeared to have been inspired by the desire to victimise Jadav for his trade unionIt appears that both the parties appeared before the Tribunal on January 19, 1961 when arguments were heard and the award was reserved. The Union then filed an application praying that the trade union record may be called for, and the Tribunal ordered that the record be called for.We do not think there is any force in this argument, because the only purpose for which the record was called for by the Union was to show that Jadav was the Organising Secretary to the Union. Since that fact was presumably disputed by the appellant in arguing the case before the Tribunal, the Union urged that the record kept by the Registrar of Trade Unions would show that the appellants plea was not well founded. If, in such circumstances, the Tribunal sent for the record to satisfy itself that the record showed that Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union, we do not think any serous grievance can be made by the appellant about the conduct of the Tribunal. It is perfectly true that in dealing with industrial matters, the Tribunal cannot allow evidence to be led by one party in the absence of the other, and should not accept the request of either party to admit evidence after the case has been fully argued unless both the parties agree. In the present case, however, what the Tribunal has done, is merely to send for authenticated record to see whether Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union or not.