Case: Badri Narayan Singh Vs. Kamdeo Prasad Singh And Another

1. Badri Narain Singh, the appellant, and four other persons including Kam Deo Prasad, respondents, were candidates to the Bihar Legislative Assembly during the last general election held in 1957. Two of those candidates withdrew before the relevant date. The appellant secured the largest number of votes and was declared elected on March 14, 1957. Respondent No. 2 secured larger number of votes than Kam Deo Prasad, respondent No. 1, who filed an election petition under Ss. 80 and 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act XLIII of 1951), challenging the election of the appellant on the ground that the nomination of the appellant and respondent No. 2, who, as Ghatwals, held an office of profit, was against the provisions of S. 7 of the Act and that the appellant had also committed corrupt practices. Kam Deo Prasad, by his election petition, not only prayed for the declaration that the election of the appellant was void, but also for the declaration that he himself was duly elected. The appellant denied the allegations against him. The Election Tribunal held that Badri Narain Singh, the appellant, was guilty of corrupt practices and that a Chatwal was not a holder of an office of profit under the State of Bihar. It therefore set aside the election of the appellant, but did not grant the declaration that Kam Deo Prasad was a duly elected candidate2. The appellant filed Election Appeal No. 7 of 1958 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna, against the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside his election, and prayed that the order of the Election Tribunal be set aside and that it be held that he had been duly elected. Kam Deo Prasad also filed Election Appeal No. 8 against the order of tile Election Tribunal not declaring him to be the duly elected candidate an prayed for a declaration that he had been duly elected. The grounds of appeal, questioned the correctness of the finding of the Election Tribunal that Badri Narain Singh and respondent No. 2, as Ghatwals, were not the holders of offices of profit and that Kam Deo Prasad could not be declared duly elected3. Both these appeals were disposed of by the High Court by one judgment. It did not accept, the finding of the Election Tribunal that Badri Narain Singh had committed any corrupt practice and accepted the contention for respondent No. 1 that Badri Narain Singh and respondent No. 2 held offices of profit under the Bihar Government as they were Ghatwals. It was in this view of the matter that it confirmed the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside the election of the appellant and, allowing the appeal of respondent No. 1, declared him duly elected4. The concluding portion of the judgment of the High Court may be usefully quoted here :To conclude, the election of the returned candidate is not valid, and the order of the Tribunal is, therefore, right, though on different grounds. Further, there was only one seat, and three persons contested it, namely, the petitioner and the two respondents. The two respondents were disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, mem-bers of Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of the State, and, therefore, their nomination papers were not validly accepted. If their nomination papers are rejected, and it cannot but be rejected, the only person left in the field was the petitioner Kamdeo Prasad Singh, and, therefore, he must be declared to be duly electedIn the result. Election Appeal No. 7 of 1958 is dismissed, and Election Appeal No. 8 of 1958 is allowed, and Kamdeo Prasad Singh is declared to be duly, elected to Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Sarnath State Assembly Constituency in the district of Santal Parganas,5. As a result of this order, separate decrees ,were prepared in the two appeals. Decree in Election Appeal No. 7 said, It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed. The decree in Appeal No. 8 said, It is ordered and decree that this appeal be and the same is hereby allowed and Kamdeo Prasad Singh is declared to be duly elected to the Bihar Legislative Assembly from the Sarnath State Assembly constituency in the District of Santhal Parganas6. The appellant has filed this appeal by special leave against the order in Election Appeal No. 8 of 1958. All the grounds of appeal relate to the finding of the High Court that the office of a Ghatwal is an office of profit. The petition for special leave to appeal does not mention the relief the appellant seeks from this Court. Presumably, he prays for the setting aside of the order in Appeal No. 7 confirming the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside his election and also the order in Appeal No. 8.

Reasoning:
The finding about his holding an office of profit served the purpose of both the appeals, but merely because of this the decision of the High Court in each appeal cannot be said to be one decision. The High Court came to two decisions. It came to one decision in respect of the invalidity of the appellants election in Appeal No. 7.It came to another decision in Appeal No. 8 with respect to the justification of the claim of respondent No. 1 to be declared as a duly elected candidate, a decision which had to follow the decision that the election of the appellant was invalid and also the finding that respondent No. 2, as Ghatwal, was not a properly nominated candidate. We are therfore of opinion that so long as the order in the appellants appeal No. 7 confirming the order setting aside his election on the ground that he was a holder of an office of profit under the Bihar Government and therefore could not have been a properly nominated candidate stands, he cannot question the finding about his holding an office of profit, in the present appeal, which is founded on the contention that that finding is incorrect15. It is true that both the appeals Nos. 7 and 8 before the High Court arose out of one proceeding before the Election Tribunal. The subject matter of each appeal was, however, different. The subject matter of appeal No. 7 filed by the appellant related to the question of his election being bad or good, in view of the pleadings raised before the Election Tribunal . It had nothing to do with the question of right of respondent No.1 to be declared as duly elected candidate. The claim on such a right is to follow the decision of the question in appeal No. 7 in case the appeal was dismissed, if appeal No. 7 was allowed, the question in appeal No. 8 would not arise for consideration. The subject matter of appeal No. 8 simply did not relate to the validity or otherwise of the election of the appellant. It related to the further action to be taken in case the election of the appellant was bad, on the ground that a Ghatwal holds an office of profit. The decision of the High Court in the two appeals, though stated in one judgment, really amounted to two decisions and not to one decision common to both the appeals. It is true that in his appeal No. 8, the respondent No. 1 had referred to the rejection of his contention by the Election Tribunal about the appellant and respondent No. 2 being holders of an office of profit. He had to challenge the finding on this point because if he did not succeed on it, he could not have got a declaration in his favour when respondent No. 2 was also in the field and had secured a larger number of votes. He could, however, rely on the same contention in supporting the order of the Election Tribunal setting aside the election of the appellant and which was the subject matter of Appeal No. 7. This contention was considered by the High Court in Appeal No. 7 in that context and it was therefore that even though the High Court did not agree with the Election Tribunal about the appellants committing a corrupt practice, it confirmed the setting aside of his election on the ground that he held an office of profitThis does not mean that whenever there be more than one appeal arising out of one suit, only one appeal is competent against the order in any of those appeals irrespective of the fact whether the issues for decision in those appeals were all common or some were common and others raised different prints for determination. The existence of one finding and one decision mentioned in this observation simply contemplates the presence of common points in all the appeals and the absence of any different point in those appeals, and consequently of one decision on those common points in all the appeals.