Case: Babu Singh and Others Vs. Union of India and Others

2. The State of Punjab published Notification dated March 15, 1963 Annexure A notifying that different pieces and parcels of land described in the notification were required for a public purpose namely : for the execution of soil conservation and other improvement works in the catchment areas of Sukhna Lake, Chandigarh and for raising a green belt around the capital. Simultaneously the notification recited that in view of the urgency in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 17 the requirement of the provision of Sectionshall be dispensed with. Immediately thereafter on the same day a declaration was made under Section 6 as per notification Annexure B that the pieces and parcels of land more particularly set out in the schedule to the notification were required for the public purpose namely : for carrying out soil conservation measures in Sukhna Lake Catchment Area in Kharar Tahsil, District Ambala. After this declaration was made under Section 6 an award was made by the Collector on October 23, 1963 and subsequently on March 21, 1964. The appellants and some other persons whose lands were required made a representation to the Chandigarh Administration presumably requesting for allotment of alternative land and a reply was given as per Annexure D that their request for allotment of alternative sites was rejected. The appellants filed their petition on April 22, 1969 inter alia contending that the urgency clause was unlawfully applied and accordingly if the inquiry as contemplated in Sectioncould not be dispensed with, it was illegal to simultaneously issue notification under Sections 4 and 6 on the same day and, therefore, the entire process of acquisition was vitiated. Some other contentions were also raised to which a reference would be made while examining the contentions put forth on behalf of the appellants in this appeal.

Reasoning:
In these circumstances we see no illegality in the issuance of the notification under Section 4 and under Section 6 on the same day and accordingly the first contention of Mr. Verma must behave not been able to appreciate this submission. If the impugned notifications are valid and the declaration made under Section 6 has become final and an award under Section 12 is made, even if possession is not taken, we fail to appreciate how thereby the notification under Section 6 would become invalid. It may be that after invoking the power under Section 17 proceedings for acquisition dragged on and possession is not taken, it may reflect upon the exercise of power under Section 17. It may indicate that there was no urgency and there is colourable exercise of power. That is not the contention. The submission of Mr. Verma is that as possession is not taken declaration under Section 6 becomes invalid. We see no substance in this contention. In fact the submission that possession of acquired land is not taken by the Government does not stand scrutiny. In the return filed on behalf of the respondents before the High Court it is in terms stated that the petitioners (appellants) are not in possession of the property acquired. On the other hand Mr. Verma pointed out that appellants are shown to be in possession till 1969 when they were threatened with forcible dispossession. Reference in this connection is made to a letter Annexure D addressed by the Divisional Forest Officer to one Subedar Babu Singh presumably appellant 1. This letter appears to be in reply to a representation made by the appellants for allotment of alternative land and the Government informed appellant 1 and others that it was not possible to allot any alternative land and there is no alternative left in the department but to get the house occupied illegally by the appellant and others vacated immediately. Relying on this Mr. Verma urged that at any rate appellant and his relatives were in possession of the houses that formed part of theof the acquisition and, therefore, they should not now be dispossessed as it would transpire that the houses are not needed for the carrying out the alleged public purpose.10. If one refers to the schedule to the notification under Section 6 it appears that large tracks of land were acquired for the public purpose set out in the notification. Houses are not referred to in the schedule. It appears that there were some Kachcha houses in some parcel of land. It is also pointed out that the occupants of these houses were themselves working as labourers when scheme to carry out the public purpose was being implemented. Mr. Markandey pointed that they were allowed to continue to stay in the kachcha houses as labourers. The rival submissions are based on a very nebulous state of evidence and it is difficult to base any firm finding on it. In the return on behalf of the respondents filed as far back as May 27, 1969, it was stated that the petitioners, i.e. the present appellants are not in possession of the property acquired. This averment was not countered on behalf of the appellants by any affidavit in rejoinder. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission that the appellants continued to be in possession of a portion of the land on which their houses are standing.11. It also transpires from the return filed on behalf of the respondents that the scheme is spread over a long period. Commencing from 1963 some amount is spent on carrying out the scheme each year and by 1969 Rs. 4, 59, 029.16 were spent on the scheme. This averment is not disputed. In the face of this averment it is difficult to believe that the appellants were allowed to continue in possession of the land which were put under acquisition, and at least on some portion of it some work for carrying out public purpose is done from year to year.12. Before we conclude, it must be pointed out that the writ petition was filed on April 22, 1969, i.e. nearly six years and one month after the publication of the impugned notifications and about five years after the award. No explanation is offered why writ petition was filed after such an inordinate delay and after the entire process of acquisition was over. The High Court dismissed the writ petition in limine presumably on account of delay. This Court in Aflatoon v.of Delhi ((1975) 1 SCR 802   : (1975) 4 SCC 285   : AIR 1974 SC 2077  ) and Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan ((1975) 2 SCR 68   : (1975) 4 SCC 296   : AIR 1974 SC 2085  ) held that if a person allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 were valid and then attacked the notification on the grounds which were available to him at the time when the notification was published, it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The length of the delay is an important circumstance because of the nature of the acts done within the interval on the basis of the notification and declaration and, therefore, a challenge to a notification under Section 4 and a declaration under Section 6 of the Act should be made within a reasonable time thereafter. If it is not so done the petition is liable to be dismissed. This appeal must fail for this additional reason because the challenge to two notifications was after a period of six years and after the whole process of acquisition was over and the State Government had spent a considerable amount in carrying out the public purpose.