Case: Katikara Chintamani Dora &amp; Ors Vs. Guntreddi Annamnaidu &amp; Ors

1. This appeal by certificate involves an examination of the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the Civil Court in relation to an inquiry under Section 9 (1) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short, Abolition Act) and the effect of the Amending Acts 17 and 18 of 1957 and Act 20 of 1960 on cases regarding such an inquiry pending in or decided by the Civil Courts. It arises out of the following facts:2. The lands in dispute are situated in village Kadakalla, Taluk Palakonda. On June 13, 1950, the then State Government issued and published a notification under the Madras Estates (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947 (for short, Rent Reduction Act) in respect of this village. Subsequently, the Settlement Officer of Srikakulam suo motu made an enquiry as to whether this village was an "estate" or not within the contemplation of Section 9 (2) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (for short called Abolition Act) and by an order, dated September 2, 1950, held that it was not an inam estate within the meaning of Section 2 (7) of the Abolition Act. The Settlement Officer further recorded a finding that village Kadakalla became an estate by virtue of the Madras Estates Land (3rd Amendment) Act, 1936. Against that order of the Settlement Officer, the appellants herein carried an appeal to the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vizianagaram. The Tribunal by its order, dated September 16, 1952, dismissed the appeal in limine, with the observation that the decision of the Settlement Officer being in their favour, the appellants had no right of appeal.3. The appellants then instituted O.S. 47 of 1953 in the Court of the Sub-ordinate Judge, Srikakulam against the State Government for a declaration that Kadakalla village was not an estate under S. 3 (2)(d) of 1908 Act, and consequently, the Rent Reduction Act and the Abolition Act were not applicable to it. The trial Court decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the decree, the State preferred an appeal (A. S. No. 668 of 1954) to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.4. During the pendency of the said appeal, the appellants instituted Original Suit No. 101 of 1954 (out of which the present appeal has arisen) in the Court of Subordinate Judge Srikakulam, against the respondents herein and others for the recovery of Rs. 15.681/19 as rent or damages for the year 1953 in respect of the lands cultivated by them in the area of village Kadakalla.5. The suit was resisted by the respondents inter alia on the ground that the suit village was an estate as defined in Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act, and that it had been so held by the Settlement Officer as per his Order dated September 2, 1950. It was further averred that the defendants not being parties to O. S. 47 of 1953, were not bound by the decision in that case. It was added that the question as to whether this village was an estate or not, was pending in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in appeal from the decision in O. S. 47 of 1953, and as such, was sub judice. The jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge to try the suit (O. S. 101 of 1954) was also questioned. The claim for rent or damages was also resisted.6. On January 22, 1958, the respondents herein made an application for permission to file an additional written statement for adding the plea that the suit village is an inam estate. On March 17, 1958, the trial Court dismissed this application holding that the question sought to be raised, was already covered by Issue No. 1.7. The trial Court framed as many as eleven issues, out of which Issues 1, 6 and 8 were as follows:(1) Whether the suit village is an estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act ?(6) Whether the plaintiffs are barred and estopped to claim rents in view of prior pattas and rent decrees that were previously obtained?(8) Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?7-A. On March 26, 1958, the Advocates for the parties filed a joint memo to the effect that "both parties agree to abide by the final decision whether in the High Court or in the Supreme Court, as the case may be, in the appeal or revision, arising out of O. S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court on the question whether the suit village Kadakalla is not an estate under Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, as amended upto date". As a result of this compromise, it was held that the decision of Issues 1, 6 and 8 would follow the final decision in O. S. 47 of 1953. The remaining Issues were tried and decided on merits. On March 28, 1958, the trial Court keeping in view the joint memo filed by the parties and its findings on the other issues, passed a decree in these termscase it is ultimately decided by the High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, in the appeal or revision arising out of O. S. No. 47 of 1953 on the file of this Court, that the suit village Kadakalla is not an estate within the meaning of Section 3 (2) (d) of the Estates Land Act, the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of Rs. 3,000/- with interest at 5 1/2 per cent per annum from 26-3-1958 with interest thereon and for costs, and that otherwise suit should stand dismissed with costs and that the decree should take effect from the date of the final decision in O. S. No. 47 of 1953 referred to above.The appeal (A. N. 668 of 1954) arising out of O. S. 47 of 1953 was decided by the High Court on 12-2-1959 whereby the decree of the trial Court declaring that village Kadakalla was not an estate, was confirmed. The application of the State for issuance of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed by the High Court. The State did not prefer any Special Leave Petition in this Court, with the result, that the High Courts decision in that case became final and the decree, dated March 28, 1958, of the Subordinate Judge in O. S. 101 of 1954 also became effective. After the disposal of its appeal (A. S. 668 of 1954), the Government issued G. O. R. T. No. 619-Rev. dated June 30, 1966, cancelling the earlier notifications in respect of this village notwithstanding the fact that prior to such de-notification, Section 9-A had been inserted in the Abolition Act by the Amending Act 20 of 1960.9. Appellants preferred an appeal (A. S. 239 of 1961) against the said decree, dated March 28, 1958, of the Subordinate Judge, to the High Court. Though in the Memorandum of Appeal, it was said, as usual, in general terms, that the "decision of the lower Court is against law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case", and that its decree was "worthless" and did not conform to the requirements of Section 2(2) of the Civil Procedure Code, yet in substance, the appeal related only to the extent of the land in the possession of the respondents and the quantum of rent or damages. The appellants claim was that the entire suit land, as alleged in the plaint, was under the cultivation of the respondents, and consequently, the lower court was wrong in not decreeing the appellants claim for Rs. 15,681/19 as rent or damages, in toto.10. On April 6, 1962, the respondents filed cross-objections contending that the question as to whether Kadakalla village is or is not an estate as defined in S. 3(2) (d) of the 1908 Act, should have been gone into by the trial court and that the rent should have been decreed only in the sum of Rs.551/29.11. The High Court posted the appeal and the cross-objections for hearing in July, 1965. At that stage, on July 19, 1965, an application was made by the respondents praying that Exts. B-196 and B-197, being copies of the order, dated September 2, 1950, of the Settlement Officer and the order dated September 16, 1952, of the Estate Abolition Tribunal, respectively, be read as additional evidence. It was contended that the Amending Act 20 of 1960 had added Sec. 9-A to the Abolition Act, as a result of which, the order of the Settlement Officer had acquired statutory validity; and since the appellants did not file an appeal within two months from the commencement of the Amendment Act, the decision of the Settlement Officer became final and binding on all the parties including the appellants. In spite of opposition by the appellants, the High Court by its order, dated August 23, 1956, allowed this additional evidence and the setting up of the new plea.12. The appeal and the cross-objections were heard together in August, 1966. The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the suit itself was incompetent as the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide whether the suit, village is an estate or not, and, therefore, any decision given by the High Court in appeal (A. S. No. 668 of 1954) would not bind the parties and the decree in the present suit (O. S. No. 101 of 1954) on the basis of the judgment and decree in A. S. No. 668 of 1954, would be without jurisdiction rendering it null and void, that the Settlement Officer was the competent authority to decide the tenure of the village and his decision had become final in view of the introduction of Section 9-A by Act 20 of 1960.13. The preliminary objection of the respondents was upheld. The contention of the appellants, that since Section 9-A was inserted by an amendment which came into force on June 23, 1960, it could not affect the compromise decree of the Court passed earlier on March 28, 1958, or the decree of the High Court whereby both the parties agreed to abide by the decision of the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal or revision arising out of O. S. 47 of 1953, was rejected in thesesee no force in this contention as Section 9-A is designed to meet such of the decisions where it has been held that the village is not an inam estate as it stood after the 1936 Act and certainly the respondents can take advantage of change in statute, if it is to their benefit and there could be no estoppel against a statute and the rights accrued under a statute. It cannot reasonably be contended that the suit filed by the appellants and the decree obtained have reached any finality as an appeal is only the continuation of the proceedings instituted by the plaintiffs.In the result, it dismissed the appeal holding that the Civil Court was not the forum for the suit as framed by the appellants and the questions raised in the suit including the claim for arrears of rent or damages, were outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.

Reasoning:
18. Explanation I makes it clear that (apart from being made, confirmed, or recognised by the Government), an inam grant in order to come within the purview of "estate" under Section 3(2) (d) has to be a grant expressly made of a named village or whole village, and not only of a part of the village or of some defined area in a village. However, it remains and is deemed to be a grant of a whole village notwithstanding the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes; nor does it cease to be a grant of an entire village merely because the village has been subsequently partitioned amongst the grantees or their successors.It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957, made the Abolition Act applicable even to villages that became estates under the 1936 Amendment of the 1908 Act. For the purpose of the Abolition Act that distinction between pre-1936 and post-1936 inam grants disappeared, and this Act became applicable to all estates falling under the definition in Section 3(2) (d) of the 1908 Act.By virtue of Section 9 of theCode of Civil Procedure, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a Civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction, therefore, is not to be readily assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by inevitable implication does so.This matter is not res integra. In Desika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 807  , this Court held that there is an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon the question, whether "any inam village" is an "inam estate" or not, and that "to the extent of the question stated in Section 9 (1), the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal are exclusive". It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to two limitations. First, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to tribunal set up and other relevant factors.34. Applying the above principles, the Court clarified the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the Civil Court,the object of the Act is to abolish only "inam estates". This determination involves two distinct matters in view of the circumstances that every "inam village" is not necessarily "an inam estate" viz., (1) whether a particular property is or is not an "inam village" and (2) whether such a village is "an inam estate" within the definition of Sec. 2 (7). The first of these questions whether the grant is of an "inam village" is referred to in Section 9 (1) itself as some extrinsic fact which must pre-exist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by the provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this appeal, makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer.any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an inam village or not, is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact, only, the pre-existence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. Investigation as to the existence or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by the Settlement Officer to ascertain whether or not he has jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an inam estate. If upon such investigation, he finds that the property is an inam village, the foundation for the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is laid, and he can then, and then only, embark upon the enquiry envisaged by the statute. If such investigation reveals that the property is not an inam village, the condition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction by him, would be lacking.40. The Legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or non-existence of this pre-requisite, the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him, or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. Perhaps, that is why the statute does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and his erroneous finding on the fact is liable to be questioned in civil court.41. The contention of Mr. Rao that before the Settlement Officer the fact of Kadakalla village being an inam village was not disputed, does not appear to be borne out by the record. A perusal of the Settlement Officers order dated September 2, 1950, would show that it was contended before him on behalf of the Inamdars "that there was no village at all at the time of grant" and "that there were more than one grant as Inam in the village".42. Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellants had failed to contest or adduce proof before the Settlement Officer that Kadakalla was not an inam village, then also, we fail to appreciate how, on principle, that would make the case any different so as to preclude the appellants from reagitating that matter in the Civil Court. Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any doctrine of res judicata from getting the matter fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.43.In view of the above discussion, it is clear that under the law in force at the material time, a suit for a declaration that the decision of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal holding certain properties to be an estate under Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act was void, was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an inam village.44. There can be no dispute that Suit No. 47 of 1953 is of that category and falls well-nigh within the ratio of Venkata Narasayya v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 60  , which was approved by this Court in Desika Charyulus case, AIR 1964 SC 807   (supra). The main contention of the appellants in this suit was that the village Kadakalla was not an inam village as the grant did not comprise the whole village and consequently, it is not an estate within the definition in Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. The trial Court accepted this contention and decreed the suit. The High Court confirmed that decision, holding that when the grant was made (in 1774), it was neither of the whole village nor of a named village within the meaning of Explanation 1 to Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. In Original Suit 101 of 1954, also, the relief of rent or damages is conditional and dependent upon and linked up (by an agreement between the parties) with the determination of the main question involved in the former suit.45. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the common question in both these suits regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, on the ground that it was not an inam village, was within the competence of the Civilis well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights, (Maxwell on Interpretation, 12th Edn. 220). That is to say, in the absence of anything in the Act, to say that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act is passed.There is no non obstante clause in these Amending Acts of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. Nor is there anything in the scheme, setting or provisions of these Amending Acts which fundamentally alters the conditions on which such actions were founded. No back date or dates of their commencement have been specified in the body of these statutes as was done in Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 which was expressly enforced with effect from the date of the commencement of Act 18 of 1936. These Amending Acts were published in the Government Gazette on December 23, 1957, and will therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only. The provisions of these Amending Statutes are not merely procedural but affect, substantive rights, and impose new obligations and disabilities. In them the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle, settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued, or cause abatement of pending actions. These Amending Acts, therefore, can be construed as having a prospective operation only. They cannot be interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in suits O. S. 47 of 1953 and O. S. 101 of 1954 (which were at the commencement of these Amendments pending at the appellate or original stage) to have their respective claims determined in accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the actions.So far as the decree of the High Court (in A. S. 668 of 1954 arising out of O. S. 47 of 1953) is concerned, there is no dispute that it had become final and conclusive between the parties to that action, namely, the State Government and the present appellants on February 12, 1954. Learned Counsel are, however, not agreed as to whether the decree, dated March 28, 1958, passed by the Civil Court in Suit No. 101 of 1954 had also assumed such a character.Order 23, Rule 3,Code of Civil Procedure, not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement, but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful - and as we shall presently discuss it was so - the decree to the extent it was a consent decree, was not appealable because of the express bar in Section 96 (3) of the Code.There can be no doubt that as soon as the Court accepted the compromise agreement between the parties, and, acting on it, passed a decree in terms thereof, the compromise, to the extent of the matter covered by it, was complete. Nothing further remained to be done by the parties in pursuance of that agreement. The decree had become absolute and immediately executable on February 12, 1959 when the High Court in A. S. 668 of 1954 finally decided that Kadakalla was not an estate.59.Be that as it may, the bar to an appeal against a consent decree in sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel. It presupposes that the parties to an action can, expressly or by implication, waive or forgo their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or compromise, or even by conduct. Therefore, as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal (A. S. 668) and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement, the principle of estoppel underlying Section 96 (3) became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement, became final and binding between the parties. And, it was an effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on contest.Thus, the determination in A. S. 668 - that Kadakalla was not an estate - became as much binding on the respondents, as on the parties in that appeal.In the light of the above discussion, we would hold that that part of the decree in Suit No. 101 of 1954 which was in terms of the compromise agreement had become final between the parties, and the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a continuation of that part of the claim which had been settled by agreement. The combined effect of the two integrated decrees in Suit No. 47 and Suit No. 101, in so far as they declared that Kadakalla not being an inam village, was not an estate under Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act, was to completely vacate and render non est the decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer.The Order, dated September 2, 1950, of the Settlement Officer in the instant case, was a decision of this category, inasmuch as he held that Kadakalla was not an inam estate because it was a post-1936 inam, and as such, was not covered by the definition in Section 2 (7) of the Abolition Act. But, before the commencement of the Amending Act, 1960, this decision as a result of the High Courts decree, stood finally vacated. It is not at all clear from the language of this Amending Act, that the intention was to revive even such legally non-existent decisions of the Settlement Officer. On the contrary, definite indications are available that the section was not intended to have unlimited retrospective operation. The first of such indications is available from the marginal heading of Section 9-A, itself, which is to the effect: "Inquiry under Section 9 not necessary in certain cases". The heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent of the new provision. It envisages only such cases in which the decision of the Settlement Officer was not successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the particular property was not an inam village: for, it would be pointless, only in such cases, to hold a further inquiry into the matter.67. The second hint of legislative intent is available in Section 64-A (2) which has not been touched by the Amending Act. Section 64-A (2) provides that the decision of the civil court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under the Abolition Act before the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal. If the intention was to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court altogether, Section 64-A (2) would either have been deleted or drastically amended so as to alter the basic conditions with effect from the very inceptions of the parent Act, that in the altered conditions those decisions could not have been rendered by the civil courts. For instance, it could say that the decision of the Settlement Officer on the question whether a particular property is an inam village or not would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so.68. In view of what has been said above,we are of the opinion that Section 9-A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court. The decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case, was not such a decision. It has ceased to exist as a result of the inter-linked decrees in O. S. 47 of 1953 and O. S. 101 of 1954, passed before the enactment of this Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does not in any way, affect the finality or the binding effect of thosethe case before us, as already observed, the State had contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, right upto the High Court. It would, therefore, operate as res judicata between the State and the land-owners. The same binding effect is produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. thus, this ruling does not advance the case of the respondents.75. Krishna Iyer,judgment just delivered has my concurrence. But a certain juristic thought expressed therein and consecrated in an authoritative passage which has fallen from Bowen, L. J., in (1886) 31 Ch D 402, 408 persuades me to break my silence not so much in dissent but in explanatory divagation. The proposition there expressed and here followed relates to the presumption against vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation. Certainly this legal creed ofvintage has the support of learned pronouncements, English and Indian. But when we apply it in all its sternness and sweep, we err. Precedents should not be petrified nor judicial dicta divorced from themores of the age Judges are not prophets and only interpret laws in the light of the contemporary ethos. To regard them otherwise is unscientific. My thesis is that while applying the policy of statutory construction we should not forget the conditions and concepts which moved the judges whose rulings are cited, nor be obsessed by respect at the expense of reason. Justice*Cardozo has in felicitous words made the same point"*CardozoThe Nature of Judicial Process; pp.should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position .... when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or development with the progress of the years. In such circumstances, the words of Wheeler, J., in Dwyv. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn 74,99, express the tone and temper in which problems should be met: "That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and method of its growth, and in its growth found its health and life. It is not and it should not be stationary. Change of this character should not be left to the legislature." If Judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors.The Indian Constitution, adopting the fighting faith of equal protection of the laws to all citizens, necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be, and oftentimes are, extensively interfered with for achieving the founding fathers social goals. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice, as in the present case, cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system, though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts.77. However, in the present case, let me hasten to repeat, the Act in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little difficulty. I have said these words only to enter a mild caveat on the lines indicated, so as to obviate future misapprehensions about the rule ofto add a new element of judicial subjectivism. Speaking generally, courts have to be anchored tocanons of statutory construction and if they are out of time with the law makers meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act.