Case: Lakshmi Narain Vs. First Additional District Judge,Allahabad

3. In order to bring out the points in controversy between the parties it is necessary to State the following facts. The appellant, as plaintiff, instituted Suit No. 7 of 1949 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mathura, for possession of certain properties, on January 26, 1949, against respondents 2 and 3. That suit stood dismissed on November 27, 1951. The unsuccessful plaintiff preferred a first appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, and it was numbered First Appeal No. 37 of 1952. The First Appeal aforesaid remained pending in the High Court from February 8, 1952, when it was instituted, until April 23, 1952, when it was notified to the parties that the appeal had been transferred to the Court of the District Judge, Allahabad, for hearing. His order was passed by the learned Chief Justice in Chambers, under S. 24 (1)(a) of theCode of Civil Procedure, on his own motion without notice to the parties concerned. The order of the Chief Justice is in these termsis hereby ordered that first appeals mentioned in the list annexed hereto transferred under orders of this Court to the Court of the District Judge, Allahabad, are now transferred from that Court to the Court of the 1st Additional District Judge atthe list annexed is the appeal now in question, alongwith a number of other appeals. This order of the learned Chief Justice appears to have been passed in view of the recent legislation, the Act aforesaid, which amended a large number of statutes, one of them being the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (XII of 1887). Section 21, cl. (a) of sub-sec. (1) was amended so as to substitute ten thousand rupees for five thousand rupees, thus enabling District Courts to entertain first appeals up to a valuation of ten thousand rupees. The appellant appeared before the Court and raised a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of that Court to hear the appeal. That Court overruled the preliminary objection as to its jurisdiction by its order dated May 31, 1962, observing that it could not contravene the orders of the High Court and that the remedy of the appellant, if any, lay in the High Court itself. Thereupon the appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 and 227, of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari for calling for the records of the appeal, and for a writ of Prohibition restraining the first respondent from hearing the appeal. The writ petition was placed before a single Judge of that Court (Dwivedi J.), who by his order dated July 11, 1962, dismissed the petition in view of a Division Bench ruling of the same Court in a judgment dated November 14, 1961, in the case of Sarjudei v. Rampati Kunwari, 1962 All LJ 544 : (AIR 1962 All 503  ). The learned Single Judge rightly pointed out that he could not go behind the decision of the Division Bench, even though it was pressed upon him that the decision required reconsideration. The appellant then preferred an appeal from the order of the learned Single Judge, dismissing the appeal in limine. The appeal being Special Civil Appeal No. 82 of 1962, was dismissed summarily on July 20, 1962, on the ground that the question raised in the appeal was concluded by the decision of the Division Bench aforesaid. The Division Bench refused to refer the question to a larger bench and preferred to follow that decision. The appellant moved the High Court for special leave to appeal to this Court which was granted, and that is how the appeal has come to this Court.

Reasoning:
6. With all respect, the High Court has completely misdirected itself in interpreting the provisions of S. 3(1) of the Act, which must govern this case. That section runs as underamendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any release or discharge of or from any debt, decree, liability, or any jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by suchHigh Court has not given effect to the words "any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continue to be heard and decided by such Court. Now, giving full effect to the words just quoted of S. 3 (1) of the Act, the High Court and the High Court alone would be competent to hear and decide the appeals pending before it. In other words, the District Courts were not competent to hear such appeals, and, therefore, the High Court could not have transferred those appeals to be heard by the District Judge or Additional District Judge, inasmuch as S. 24 postulates that the Court to which the suit or appeal or other proceeding is transferred should be competent to try or dispose of the same. On the date the appeal in question was preferred in the High Court, the District Courts were not competent to hear such a case. The competency of those Courts to hear such cases rises by virtue of the amendment to S. 21 of the Civil Courts Act, aforesaid. We are here not concerned with the question whether in the absence of a saving clause, like the one introduced by S. 3 (1), the High Court would have been right in taking recourse to S. 24 of theCode of Civil Procedure. But in the face of S. 3(1) of the Act, it is impossible to hold that the District Courts were competent to hear appeals of the valuation of ten thousand rupees or less in suits decided before the Act came into force, and appeals from which were pending before the High Court.7. The High Court was led to the conclusion to which it came in view of the declared objects and reasons for the Amending Act. As a matter of fact, the High Court has relied upon the following extract from the Statement of Objects and Reasonsorder to reduce the volume of work in the High Court and to ensure quicker disposal of appeals,the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, is proposed to be amended so that appeals is cases from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 10,000/- in valuation may be heard by Districtt is true, as pointed out by the High Court, that the object behind the amendment in question was to give relief to the High Court. But the High Court was in error in thinking that the legislature amended the law as "the relief was required instantaneously. The Amending Act may have given relief to the High Court in respect of appeals to be instituted after the commencement of the Act, but it did not grant the much required relief to that Court in respect of pending first appeals. On a plain reading of the provisions of S. 3(1), it is clear that the legislature did not grant that very much needed instantaneous relief. If it intended to do so, it has failed to give effect to its intentions by the words used in S. 3(1).8. The High Court was fully congnizant of the legal position that District Judges could hear only such appeals, on transfer by the High Court, as they were competent to hear and dispose of. But its conclusion that such competency was there on the date the Act came into effect, suffers from the infirmity that it does not give effect to the concluding words of S. 3(1).9. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be held that the High Court had not taken the correct view of the legal position.