Case: High Court of Kerala Vs. Reshma A. &amp; Others Etc

2. A notification was issued by the High Court(Appellant) on 1 February 2019 inviting applications for appointment to the posts of Munsiff-Magistrate in the Kerala Judicial Service, against regular vacancies and against a carry-forward called No Candidates Available (NCA). Thirty-seven probable vacancies were notified including one vacancy reserved for persons with disabilities, for appointment by direct recruitment and recruitment by transfer. Eight vacancies were notified under the NCA category. The notification is reproduced below:3. A preliminary examination was held on 26 March 2019 and the result was declared on 19 July 2019. The main examination was held on 31 August 2019 and 1 September 2019 and the result was declared on 21 December 2019. Interviews were conducted between 8 and 25 January 2020 and the merit list was published on 20 February 2020. After the competitive examination, a list of candidates qualified for selection was prepared and was published on 20 February 2020. The merit list prepared by the appellant was approved by the Governor and was notified by the Government of Kerala through a gazette notification dated 07 May 2020. By way of this notification, 32 candidates were appointed as Munsiff-Magistrate trainees by direct recruitment for the year 2019 against regular vacancies and 5 candidates were subsequently appointed against NCA. All the selected candidates are undergoing training.4. Two petitions were filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, Writ Petition No. 10007 of 2020 and Writ Petition No. 10361 of 2020 in May 2020, claiming that as on 07 May 2020 and thereafter, several vacancies had arisen for the post of Munsiff-Magistrate, which were not specified in the notification inviting applications. The respondents, who were the original petitioners, claimed that in accordance with Rule 7(2) as amended with effect from 14 January 2019, all vacancies which arise for a period of one year after the approval of the merit list by the Governor, are to be filled from the approved merit list. The submission was that appointments of Munsiff-Magistrates must not be limited to thirty-two vacancies and must take into account all other vacancies that have arisen or which may arise till 6 May 2021, that is, within one year from the date on which the merit list dated 7 May 2020 was notified.5. Opposing these submissions, the High Court of Kerala, the appellant herein, contended that appointment to vacancies in the judicial service of the state is regulated by the Kerala Rules, 1991 and by the directions and timelines fixed by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (2008) 17 SCC 703  (Malik Mazhar Sultan (3)). Relying on Malik Mazhar Sultan (3), the appellant argued that the notification inviting applications is issued for only those vacancies that are available till 31 December of the year in which the notification is issued and only these notified vacancies can be filled up by the recruitment process of a given year.6. During the pendency of the petitions, a fresh notification dated 30 June 2020 was issued by the appellant inviting applications to 47 probable regular posts of Munsiff-Magistrate. A corrigendum dated 30 July 2020 was issued deleting the term probable from the number of regular vacancies notified.7. The Single Judge of the High Court, by a judgment and order dated 9 July 2020, held that Rule 7(2) provides that vacancies existing and arising within one year from the date of approval of the merit list by the Governor are to be filled up from the select list, unless a fresh list comes into force before the lapse of a year. The Single Judge held that since a special rule governs the selection and appointment of candidates to a post, the appellant- as the High Court of Kerala on its administrative side, could not deny appointment on the ground that the recruitment would not fall within the timelines prescribed in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). Denial of appointment to the additional vacancies would, in the view of the Single Judge, violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Single Judge further held that in case the appointments in accordance with the Kerala Rules, 1991 are not in consonance with the directions of this Court, the appellant would have to seek permission or furnish an explanation before this Court. Rejecting the contention of the appellant that no vacancy in excess of the thirty-seven specified in the notification can be filled up, the Single Judge held that only a probable number of vacancies was specified in the notification. The writ petitions were allowed and the appellant was directed to forward an additional list of candidates from the merit list dated 20 February 2020 to the Governor for approval and appointment to the posts of Munsiff-Magistrate.8. This judgment and order of the Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench in appeal. The Division Bench held that amended Rule 7(2) provides that the approved list is valid for the notified vacancies and the vacancies arising within one year from the date of approval by the Governor or till a fresh list comes into force. Consequently, the merit list approved on 7 May 2020 would be valid for vacancies till 6 May 2021 or till a fresh list comes into force, whichever is earlier. The Division Bench further held that the operation of the Kerala Rules, 1991 for selection and appointment was not in contradiction with the guidelines laid down in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) as this Court had noticed that selections were to be made according to the existing judicial service rules in the States/Union Territories. According to the Division Bench, the intent of Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) was not to interfere with statutory rules, but only to lay down guidelines for expeditious filling up of judicial vacancies. The Division Bench held that the term probable vacancies in the notification inviting applications indicated that there was a possibility of variance between the actual and advertised vacancies and the advertised vacancies could be reduced or enhanced. Thus, vacancies in excess of those notified could be filled up.

Reasoning:
17. As we have seen above, under the unamended Rule 7(2), there was a stipulation that a list approved by the Governor will remain in force for a period of three years or until a fresh list is prepared (the three years stipulation had earlier been substituted by SRO 660/2006). As a result of the amendment which came into effect in 2019, it has been stipulated that the list approved by the Governor shall be valid till the notified vacancies and the vacancies that may arise within one year from the date of the approval of the list are filled up or a fresh list comes into force, whichever is earlier.18. The existence of unfilled vacancies in posts falling within the district judiciary across the country has been considered by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) v. U P Public Service Commission (Malik Mazhar Sultan (3)) (2008) 17 SCC 703 .   In the judgment, which was delivered on 4 January 2007, comprehensive directions were issued in regard to the mode of determining vacancies and the manner in which the selection would have to be conducted every year. The judgment of this Court envisages an annual exercise for selection to posts in the judicial service of each state. While issuing directions, the two judge Bench consisting of Chief Justice YK Sabharwal and Justice CK Thakker noted that nearly five years had elapsed since the decision of this Court in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (2002) 4 SCC 247  (All India Judges Association). In the earlier decision, the Court had envisaged that existing vacancies at all levels in the district judiciary should be filled, if possible, by 31 March 2003. Despite this aspiration, the backlog of judicial vacancies remained unfilled. The problem, as the Court perceived it, was that:1. It was about five years back that this Court directed that existing vacancies in the subordinate courts, at all levels, should be filled, if possible, latest by 31-3-2003, in all the States. This direction is contained in All India Judges Assn. (III) v. Union of India [(2002) 4 SCC 247   : 2002 SCC (L&S) 508]. It has been noticed that an independent and efficient judicial system is one of the basic structure of our Constitution. If sufficient number of Judges are not appointed, justice would not be available to the people thereby undermining the basic structure. The judicial system has been facing the problem arising out of delay in dispensation of justice for which one of the major causes is insufficient number of Judges when compared to either the large number of cases pending or in relation to the average Judge- population ratio going by the number of Judges available in various other democracies in the world [Ed.: See also Beating the Backlog: Less Talk, More Actions by Dr. A.M. Singhvi, (2007) 2 SCC J-9]. In this light, it becomes all the more necessary to take all possible steps to ensure that vacancies in the courts are timely filled.While issuing these directions and the time schedule which must be adhered to in making judicial appointments for filling up vacancies, the Court dealt with the submission that its directions would impinge on the role and functions of the Public Service Commissions which were tasked with judicial appointments in states. Dealing with the submission, the court observed that:5… it is necessary to note that selections are required to be conducted by the authorities concerned as per the existing Judicial Service Rules in the respective States/Union Territories.19. This Court observed that progressively, a consensus would have to be arrived at so that the selection process for appointments to the district judiciary would be conducted by the High Courts or by the Public Service Commission under the control and supervision of the High Courts. The Court issued detailed directions specifying timelines for appointments of District Judges; Civil Judges (Senior Division) and Civil Judges (Junior Division). For appointment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) by direct recruitment, the following time schedule was stipulated in the judgment of this Court:D. For appointment to the posts of Civil Judge (Junior Division) by direct recruitment20. All Chief Justices of the High Courts were directed to constitute committees to oversee the process of selection and appointment of judicial officers and to set up a special cell within the High Court to look after the process. The judgment of this Court envisages that appointment letters would be issued by the State Governments within a month of the receipt of the recommendations from the High Courts/State Public Service Commissions. Paragraph 15 of the judgment contains a further direction that:15….ten per cent of unforeseen vacancies would be in respect of sanctioned posts and not vacancies occurring in a particular year.21. While the Court granted liberty to the High Courts and to the Governments of the States or, as the case may be, Union Territories to apply for a variation of the time schedule in the event of difficulties arising due to peculiar geographical and climatic conditions and other relevant considerations, the time schedule which was indicated in the judgment was directed to be adhered to and appointments made accordingly until it was varied.22. In the State of Kerala, certain proceedings took place in relation to the selection and appointment of Munsiff Magistrates from the select list which was prepared in 2013. The notification for 2013 for selection of Munsiff Magistrates was published after taking into account additional posts of 30 Gram Nyaylayas and 27 Special Magistrate Courts. Pursuant to the notification, 66 candidates were selected. For selection in 2013, the appellant had notified 74 probable vacancies for general recruitment and 7 for NCA. In calculating the 74 vacancies, the appellant took into account the establishment of the above Gram Nyaylayas and Munsiff Magistrate Courts. A select list of 66 candidates was approved by the Governor and on 31 October 2014 and 1 November 2014, all the 66 candidates were appointed as Munsiff Magistrate trainees. It so happened that after the 74 vacancies were notified, 30 Gram Nyaylayas were not established as anticipated, as a result of which a reduction of 30 anticipated vacancies occurred in the total number of notified vacancies. Apparently, 13 NCA slots were also required to be kept vacant.23. The appellant moved this Court in IA 141/2015 for exempting it for conducting the selection for 2014 and 2015 and for permission to fill up the vacancies of 2015 from the then existing 66 candidates within the 2013 selection. The IA came up before this Court together with reports filed by various High Courts on compliance with the Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) directions. By an order dated 27 October 2015, the following order was passed on the IA:I.A. No. 141 of 2015After hearing learned Amicus Curiae and learned counsel for the High Court of Kerala, we are of the firm view that the prayer in the application cannot be granted.I.A. No. 141 of 201524. The appellant was directed to file an appropriate status report/affidavit before this Court on or before 20 November 2015. The plea of the appellant for exemption from conducting the annual selection process, in light of the excess candidates in the previous years, was firmly rejected.25. The significance of these events for the controversy in the present case lies in appreciating the submission of the appellant that the requirement of an annual selection process and adherence to the timelines specified has been considered to be sacrosanct by this Court. It was on this basis that the application filed by the High Court for exempting it from carrying out a selection for 2014-15 was rejected.26. The stand out feature which emerges from the judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) is that the object and purpose of this Court in issuing the directions was to ensure that unfilled vacancies which continue to be the bane of the judicial system across the country would be filled up by adhering to fixed time-lines and by adopting an annual process for selection to judicial posts. It was with this object that detailed timelines were spelt out in the decision. Punctilious compliance was sought, save and except where for exceptional reasons, an extension was granted by this Court. Since the pronouncement of that decision, this Court has consistently monitored compliance across the country by all the High Courts. Faced with an unfavorable judge to population ratio, the effort of this Court has been to ensure that at least the available posts in the district judiciary are filled up.27. Another facet which needs to be mentioned at this stage is that in the decision which was rendered on 4 January 2007 in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3), this Court had directed that the number of vacancies to be notified by the High Court for the annual selection would be calculated by including:(i) Existing vacancies;(ii) Future vacancies that may arise within one year due to retirement;(iii) Future vacancies which may arise due to promotion, death or otherwise say 10 per cent of the number of posts.Existing vacancies are known. Vacancies arising due to retirement are also known, because the date of retirement is fixed by the date of birth, coupled with the age of retirement under service rules. The third category recognizes the imponderables of service: vacancies inevitably arise due to promotion, death or resignation and such other factors whose precise number cannot be predicted in advance. In computing the probable vacancies for the next year, the number of posts which may fall vacant due to uncertain events such as death, resignation and promotion cannot be determined with precision. Yet they have to be taken into account for the selection year. Hence, in the original judgment, this Court contemplated that about 10 per cent of the number of posts would cover contingencies of future vacancies arising due to promotion, death or otherwise. This category was dealt with in a subsequent decision(Malik Mazhar Sultan and anr. vs. Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission & Ors., (2009) 17 SCC 24) which was rendered on 24 March 2009 by a three judge Bench presided over by the learned Chief Justice KG Balakrishnan (as he was then). The precise reason for modifying the 10 per cent stipulation was explained in the order of this Court2. It has been pointed out by the counsel appearing for the various High Courts that 10 per cent of the sanctioned posts are notified in some States. A large number of posts are to be notified whereas there was corresponding number of vacancies to be filled if the candidates are selected in the select list. There may be an expectation for such candidates to get appointment and this creates unwanted litigation by the candidates and it is prayed that the existing vacancies alone be notified along with the anticipated vacancies that may arise in the next one year and some candidates also be included in the wait list prepared by the High Courts/PSCs.In view of the above submission of the High Courts, this Court modified the earlier judgment in terms of the following directions:3. In supersession of the order passed by this Court on 4.1.2007, this Court directs that in future the High Courts/PSCs shall notify the existing number of vacancies plus the anticipated vacancies for the next one year and some candidates also be included in the wait list. To this extent earlier order is modified.28. Hence, in computing the vacancies to be notified annually by the High Court, the three factors to be borne in mind would be(i) the existing number of vacancies;(ii) the anticipated vacancies for the next year; and(iii) some candidates to be included in the wait-list.34. While analyzing the two-pronged submission of the appellant, it must be noted at the outset that the Kerala Rules 1991 govern appointments to the Kerala Judicial Service. The decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) recognizes that Judicial Service Rules prevail in every State. Selections to the Judicial Service have to be conducted by the authorities by adhering to the rules which have been framed in the respective States. The Kerala Rules 1991 trace their authority to both- a constitutional and statutory power. SRO No. 1621/1991 by which the Rules were issued makes this clear in its prefatory recital:S.R.O. No. 1621/91: - In exercise of the powers conferred by Articles 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India and sub- section (1) of section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (19 of 1968) and in supersession of all the existing rules on the subject, the Governor of Kerala hereby makes the following Special Rules in respect of the Kerala Judicial Service…The decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) notices that selections are required to be conducted by the authorities concerned as per the existing Judicial Service Rules in the respective States/Union Territories. Emphasizing this, the judgment of the Court specifically dealt with the objection that the constitution of Selection Committees by the Chief Justices of the High Court to monitor the timely appointment of judges in the district judiciary at all levels would amount to an inference with the independent functioning of the Public Service Commissions. The Court held that the apprehension was wholly misplaced, in view of what we have already noted about the appointments to be made in accordance with the respective Judicial Services Rules in the States((2008) 17 SCC 703   , at pages 75-76, paras 5-6). The decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) was intended to deal with a specific problem namely, unfilled judicial vacancies in the district judiciary. The solution that was envisaged was in terms of a regulated process governed by specific timelines under which an annual exercise would be carried out for filling up the posts. Article 234 of the Constitution provides that:234. Appointments of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in that behalf after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State.Article 235 vests in the High Court control over district courts and courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State. The High Courts rules governing the appointment of persons other than district judges to the judicial service of a State have constitutional authority whose source originates in Article 234. The recognition in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) of the legal position that selections have to take place in accordance with existing Judicial Service Rules in the States, or as the case may be, Union Territories is hence in accordance with the mandate of Article 234.35. In two subsequent decisions of this Court, we find a reiteration of the principle imparting sanctity to the Rules governing the judicial service in the States. The three judge Bench decision in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi (2010) 2 SCC 637  (Rakhi Ray) involved a situation where the High Court had issued an advertisement for filling up 20 vacancies in the cadre of District Judge of which 13 were to be drawn from the general category, 3 from the Scheduled Castes and 4 from the Scheduled Tribes. All the 13 vacancies in the general category were filled up according to the merit list and the appellants who ranked below the selected candidates were not appointed. Some of the unsuccessful candidates moved the Delhi High Court with the submission that the vacancies which arose during the pendency of the selection process could also have been filled up from the select list in view of the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). This Court observed, following its earlier decisions in All India Judges Association and Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) that selection was to be made as per the existing Rules(At page 644, para 18) and that appointments have to be made giving strict adherence to the existing statutory provisions(at page 645, para 20). Dr Justice BS Chauhan, speaking for the three judge Bench, held that appointments have to be made in view of the provisions of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules 1970 which provide for advertisement of the vacancies after being determined. Moreover, the reservation policy is to be implemented, the number of vacancies to be filled up has to be determined, failing which it would not be possible to implement the reservation policy at all. Consequently, the Court held that there was no question of taking into consideration the anticipated vacancies as per the judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). Since the anticipated vacancies have not been determined in view of the existing statutory rules, and they could not be taken into consideration:21. The appointments had to be made in view of the provisions of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970. The said Rules provide for advertisement of the vacancies after being determined. The Rules further provide for implementation of reservation policies in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. As the reservation policy is to be implemented, the number of vacancies to be filled up is to be determined, otherwise it would not be possible to implement the reservation policy at all. Thus, in view of the above, the question of taking into consideration the anticipated vacancies, as per the judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) case [(2008) 17 SCC 703   : (2007) 2 Scale 159] , which had not been determined in view of the existing statutory rules could not arise.22. In view of the above, we do not find any force in the submissions that the High Court could have filled vacancies over and above the vacancies advertised on 19-5-2007, as per the directions issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) case [(2008) 17 SCC 703    : (2007) 2 Scale 159] .36. Rakhi Ray involved a situation where candidates who were not successful in seeking appointment to the vacancies which were advertised, attempted to gain appointment as District Judges by the inclusion of additional vacancies, over and above those which were notified. This court turned down the request, holding that such a course of action was not permissible, both in terms of the judicial service rules and the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 (the latter aspect will be explored a little later in this judgment).38. In Rakhi Ray, the submission which did not find acceptance was that anticipated vacancies should be considered over and above the vacancies which were notified in the advertisement for making appointments. In Hirandra Kumar candidates who sought an age relaxation on the ground that they had crossed the age limit after the last recruitment met with a similar fate, with this Court holding that compliance with the age limit prescribed in the Judicial Services Rules cannot be obviated. We are thus unable to subscribe to the wider submission of the appellant that the directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) will prevail over the provisions contained in Rule 7(2). A better line of approach is to seek an interpretation which will bring harmony between them.41. The decision in Rakhi Ray which is by a Bench of three learned judges has been adverted to in a different context earlier. In that case, as we have noticed, the High Court had notified an advertisement to fill up 20 vacancies in the cadre of District Judge. All the 13 vacancies in the general category were filled up according to the merit list. Unsuccessful candidates belonging to the general category however asserted that additional vacancies which came up during the pendency of the selection process should also be filled up from the same select list. In this context, while analyzing the constitutional requirements of Article 14 and Article 16, Dr Justice BS Chauhan, speaking for the three judge Bench, observed:7. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over and above the number of vacancies advertised as the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to improper exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated from and such a deviation is permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rationale, otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, is not permissible in law. (Vide Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri [1992 Supp (3) SCC 84 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 999 : (1992) 21 ATC 851] , Gujarat State Dy. Executive Engineers Assn. v. State of Gujarat [1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1159 : (1994) 28 ATC 78] , State of Bihar v. Secretariat Asstt. Successful Examinees Union 1986 [(1994) 1 SCC 126    : 1994 SCC (L&S) 274 : (1994) 26 ATC 500 : AIR 1994 SC 736   ] , Prem Singh v. Haryana SEB [(1996) 4 SCC 319    : 1996 SCC (L&S) 934] and Ashok Kumar v. Banking Service Recruitment Board [(1996) 1 SCC 283    : 1996 SCC (L&S) 298 : (1996) 32 ATC 235 : AIR 1996 SC 976   ] .)In the view of the Court:12. In view of above, the law can be summarised to the effect that any appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without jurisdiction, being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India, thus, a nullity, inexecutable and unenforceable in law. In case the vacancies notified stand filled up, the process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list, etc. cannot be used as a reservoir, to fill up the vacancy which comes into existence after the issuance of notification/advertisement. The unexhausted select list/waiting list becomes meaningless and cannot be pressed in service any more.42. The decision in Prem Singh has been followed by a Bench of two learned judges in Anurag Kumar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2016) 9 SCC 426 .   In that case, the Public Service Commission advertised 38 posts of Assistant Prosecuting Officers for a year of recruitment comprising of 12 months commencing from first day of July of the calendar year. The Public Service Commission however, held a selection for 74 posts, 37 additional posts having been created subsequently. The High Court set aside the action, holding that the selection pursuant to an advertisement can only be for clear vacancies and anticipated vacancies, but not for future vacancies. Justice L Nageswara Rao, speaking for the Bench of two learned judges of this Court, observed that the rules referred only to the recruitment year. The Bench observed that only the number of vacancies that are advertised can be filled up and if the advertisement gives liberty to the Government to vary the number of posts this power could not be exercised for filling up future vacancies. The Court held that during the pendency of the proceedings a large number of persons would have become eligible for selection to the posts which were advertised and their right to be considered for appointment was guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the view of the Court, there would be an infraction of such a right if the additional posts are not filled up by a fresh selection. Hence the Court held that the selection pursuant to the advertisement should be confined only to the posts that were advertised and the additional posts which were created after the expiry of the recruitment year would have to be filled up by the issuance of an advertisement afresh.44. Having considered each of these judgments, we must notice that all of them involve factual situations which may not be identical with the facts of the present case. Precedent does not always rest on all fours. We have noticed earlier that, in the present case, the High Court while issuing its advertisement for recruitment specified 37 as a probable number of vacancies. The meaning which must be attributed to the expression probable will be considered shortly hereafter. At this stage we must recapitulate some of the salient aspects of the decisions which we have cited above. In Prem Singh the advertisement which was issued by the Haryana State Electricity Board was for filling up 62 vacant posts of Junior Engineers while as many as 138 candidates came to be appointed. In this backdrop this Court held that it was not open to the Board to travel beyond clear and anticipated vacancies. In other words, while clear and anticipated vacancies could be taken into consideration while issuing an advertisement for commencing the selection process, future vacancies could not be considered. While moulding the relief, this Court maintained the selection for the 62 vacancies which were advertised and 25 additional vacancies which arose during the selection process due to promotions and deaths, but not beyond that. The decision in Rakhi Ray involved a situation whether the High Court had advertised 20 vacancies of District Judges of which 13 were in the general category all of which were filled up. This Court rejected the contention of those among the general category candidates whose position in the merit list was below the 13 selected candidates that they were entitled to selection on the basis of the vacancies which occurred during the pendency of the selection process, based on Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). This Court held that vacancies over and above those which were notified could not be filled up, save and except in a rare and exceptional situation. Absent an exceptional situation an exercise to fill up vacancies over and above those which were notified would be arbitrary. The decision in Anurag Kumar Singh involved a requisition by the State of Uttarakhand to the Public Service Commission for selection of 38 Assistant Prosecuting Officers. Despite the advertisement which was for filling up 38 posts, an additional 37 posts were sought to be filled up which had been created subsequently. This was held to be impermissible, as violating the guarantees of Articles 14 and 16. The decision in Rahul Dutta of two judges has held that restricting the field of a written examination to 10 per cent of the candidates who appeared at the preliminary examination is violative of the dictum in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) besides being arbitrary on the ground that it unreasonably restricts the field of competition.45. The constitutional principle which finds recognition in the precedents of this Court is that the process of selection in making appointments to public posts is subject to the guarantees of equality under Article 14 and of equality in matters of public employment under Article 16. The process of selection must comport with the principles of reasonableness. Where the authority which makes a selection advertises a specific number of posts, the process of selection cannot ordinarily exceed the number of posts which have been advertised. While notifying a process for appointment, the authority may take into consideration the actual and anticipated vacancies but not future vacancies. Anticipated vacancies are the vacancies which can be reasonably contemplated to arise due to the normal exigencies of service such as promotion, resignation or death. Hence, in notifying a given number of posts for appointment, the public authority may legitimately take into account the number of vacancies which exist on the date of the notification and vacancies which can reasonably be accepted to arise in the exigencies of the service. While the exact number of posts which may fall vacant due to circumstances such as promotion, resignation or death may be difficult to precisely determine the authority may make a reasonable assessment of the expected number of vacancies on these grounds. However, future vacancies conceptually fall in a distinct class or category. Future vacancies which arise during a subsequent recruitment year cannot be treated as anticipated vacancies of a previous selection year. Vacancies which would arise outside the fold of the recruitment year would not fall within the ambit of anticipated vacancies. For it is only the vacancies, actual and anticipated which would fall within the course of the selection or recruitment year that can be notified when the selection process is initiated. These are constitutional principles to which statutory edicts are subordinate.46. In the present case, the essential aspect on which we need to dwell is the meaning of the expression probable, in the context of Rule 7(1). The essence of the present case will depend upon the manner in which the statutory rules are interpreted. That indeed is the central task in deciding the appeal. Intrinsic to the process of interpreting the rules is the meaning which is to be ascribed to the expression the probable number of vacancies.47. After its amendment in 2019, Rule 7(1) as it stands speaks in the first instance of the notification of the probable number of vacancies likely to be filled up. Rule 7(1) also refers to notified vacancies in two places, the first in the context of maintaining the ratio between the vacancies which are notified and successful candidates while the second refers to the proportion between the notified vacancies and the number of candidates called for the viva voce. Now sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7 which has been substituted in its entirety as a result of the amendment provides the tenure over which the merit list which has been approved by the Governor would be valid. As we have seen, before its amendment, sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7 provided for a tenure for the list approved by the Governor for a period of three years or until a fresh approved list is prepared whichever is earlier. This tenure is now modified by the amendment brought about by the substitution of Rule 7(2). The modified tenure for the list approved by the Governor indicates that the list will be valid till the notified vacancies and vacancies that may arise within one year from the date of approval of the list are filled up or a fresh list comes into force, whichever is earlier. Thus, we find that the expression notified vacancies which has been used at two places in sub-Rule (1) of Rule 7 finds a presence also in substituted Rule 7(2). Now what is material to note is that it is Rule 7(1) which provides for the initial notification by which a probable number of vacancies is notified. The notified vacancies also determine the ratio of 1:10 in the preliminary examination and the number of candidates called for the interview. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7 does not have any bearing on the notification of the vacancies under Sub- rule (1) but it provides for the period of time over which the list approved by the Governor is to remain valid.48. The Kerala Rules 1991 preceded the judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). The amendment which came into force on 19 January 2019 is evidently after the decision of this Court. The effort, as a matter of statutory interpretation, must be to harmonize the directions which were issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) which are relatable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution and the statutory rules. Undoubtedly, this Court has noticed in that decision that there were rules in force in the States and the Union Territories governing the selection to their judicial service. While issuing directions in regard to the maintenance of timelines and for the modalities to be followed in an annual selection, this Court clarified that this would not impinge upon the independence of the Public Service Commission or the role of the High Courts in the States. In the subsequent decisions in Rakhi Ray and Hirandra Kumar, this Court has specifically negatived the attempts made by candidates that did not qualify in terms of the rules governing selection to the judicial service to seek appointment merely on the basis of the observations in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). Rakhi Ray involved a situation where candidates who did not qualify for the notified vacancies of District Judge in Delhi claimed appointment on the basis of the vacancies which had arisen during the process of selection. Their plea was turned down on the ground that once vacancies have been notified, no candidate could seek appointment beyond the extent of the vacancies which were advertised. Hirandra Kumar was a decision of this Court where candidates for the higher judicial service examination claimed an exemption from the age limit set out in the State Judicial Service Rules on the ground that after the date of the last examination for recruitment, they had become age barred. This effort was again negatived by the decision of this Court which held candidates down to the requirement of complying with the rules and selection process of the State Judicial Service. These two decisions would indicate that a candidate who does not qualify in terms of the judicial service rules prevailing in the State (or Union Territory) cannot seek a mandamus which is founded on a breach of the rules. The observation in Rakhi Ray and Hirandra Kumar that the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) did not override the State Judicial Service Rules must therefore be construed in an appropriate sense. The object and purpose of this Court in the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) was to ensure the expeditious filling up of judicial vacancies in the State Judicial Services. It was in this perspective, that the Court set down strict timelines for compliance. At the same time, it is evident that the decision did not provide for other essential aspects such as eligibility, modalities for conducting the examination and the application of reservations in making appointments to state judicial services. Hence, a significant field in regard to the process of selection and appointments to the judicial services is not covered by the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) for which one has to fall back upon construing the rules governing the state judicial service in question. But a stand out feature which emerges from the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) must equally be emphasized. The judgment of this Court enunciates, in no uncertain terms, that the process of selection to the state judicial services has to take place on an annual basis. As the orders passed by this Court on the IAs by the appellant indicate, the requirement of yearly selection does not ordinarily brook exception. The court however reserved to itself the power to exempt in a given situation a State or Union Territory from compliance with the time schedule or extend time where peculiar local conditions require the grant of such an exemption or extension. The significant aspect of the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) is that the recruitment process is initiated each year with a notification of vacancies by the appellant and culminates in the appointment of candidates and their joining service. Once the process of selection is annual, the notification of probable or anticipated vacancies has to be for the selection year. The expression probable means what is anticipated, expected and likely. The expression thus comprehends the existing vacancies and those which are anticipated due to retirement, promotion, death or resignation and to which some vacancies can be added to incorporate imponderable events during the recruitment process. In construing the rules by the State Judicial Service, more particularly the process of notifying the probable vacancies, an effort must be made to harmonize the rules with the object, intent and purpose underlying the directions that were issued under Article 142 in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). This exercise becomes necessary for another reason. In the present case, Rule 7(1) refers to notifying the probable number of vacancies likely to be filled up. However, Rule 7(1) does not expressly indicate what is meant by this expression. The ambit of that phrase should receive content and meaning based on what was envisioned in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). The decision of this Court indicates that by 15 January every year the number of vacancies is to be notified by the appellant.Originally, in the judgment of this Court dated 4 January 2007, the third category [(c) above] was to consist of say 10 per cent of the number of posts. Subsequently, by the order dated 24 March 2009, the stipulation was varied as a consequence of which, it has been envisioned that in future the High Courts/Public Service Commissions shall notify the existing number of vacancies plus the anticipated vacancies for the next one year and some candidates also to be included in the wait- list. The existing number of vacancies is an objective fact which is known to the particular High Court. Anticipated vacancies are those which arise as a part of the normal exigencies of service in the ensuing year due to factors such as promotion, death or resignation from service. These exigencies are normal to a service but these vacancies are difficult to predict with precision. In the original order dated 4 January 2007 in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) category (b) consisting of future vacancies that may arise within one year was qualified by the expression due to retirement. Retirements are known as an objective factor since the date on which a candidate appointed to judicial service would attain the age of superannuation is known in advance. Category (c) consisting of future vacancies referred to those which may arise due to promotion, death or otherwise, the exact number being somewhat in the realm of an imponderable future event. As a result of the modification which has been brought about by the order of this Court dated 24 March 2009, the first category of existing vacancies is maintained as it is. The second category consists of anticipated vacancies for the next one year. This category would incorporate vacancies which were likely to arise on account of retirement as well as those which may be anticipated in the ordinary course due to the exigencies of service such as promotion, resignation or death of candidates within the service. Significantly, the last category incorporates the principle that some candidates also be included in the wait-list. The inclusion of some candidates in the wait-list is to ensure the availability of candidates in the event that additional vacancies occur during the course of the year due to the exigencies of service. But significantly, the entire process which is contemplated by the decision in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) is an annual process. Hence, the vacancies which are to be notified in the advertisement which is issued by the High Court are relatable to the recruitment year for which a selection is carried out. Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) does not incorporate future vacancies, that is those which lie beyond the recruitment year for which the selection is to be made.49. Now while giving meaning and content to the provisions of Rule 7(1) of the Kerala Rules 1991 as amended, it would be appropriate to harmonize the ambit of the expression notifying the probable number of vacancies on the basis of the Article 142 directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3). This would not do violence to the provisions of Rule 7(1), since Sub-rule 1 does not define what is meant by probable vacancies. Moreover, as we have already explained, Rule 7(2) deals with tenure of the approved list while the determination of the probable number of vacancies falls within the ambit of Rule 7(1). Hence, in determining the probable number of vacancies likely to be filled up, the particular High Court has to take into account:(i) The existing number of vacancies;(ii) Anticipated vacancies during the year arising due to retirements and other exigencies of service including promotion, death and resignation; and(iii) Some candidates are to be included in the wait-list.The ambit of the probable number of vacancies in Rule 7(1) must be based on this assessment. In fact, as noted earlier, this was exactly what was done by the appellant.There are significant problems in accepting this line of interpretation which has found acceptance by the High Court.51. Firstly, this line of interpretation requires the appointing authority to take into account vacancies which have arisen in the subsequent recruitment year 2020 in making appointments in pursuance of the selection for recruitment year 2019. This, as a matter of first principle, is impermissible. The determination of probable vacancies in terms of Rule 7(1) is a determination which is based on the vacancies which are projected during the course of that recruitment year, in this case 2019. This exercise cannot cover, consistent with the mandate of Art 14 and Art 16, future vacancies of a subsequent year of selection. Nor does Rule 7(1) bring vacancies of a future year within the computation of probable vacancies.52. Secondly, adopting the interpretation which has been suggested on behalf of the respondents would lead to serious anomalies. As we have seen, a notification was issued by the appellant in the month of June 2020 for the 2020 recruitment. The consequence of accepting the arguments of the respondents would be that posts which have to be allocated for recruitment against the existing and anticipated vacancies for 2020 would have to be reduced by allocating them to recruitment year 2019. The appellant has expressly determined and notified the vacancies which have arisen for 2020. The respondents argued that though the original notification referred to a probable number of vacancies the corrigendum deleted the expression probable. This, in our view, is not a matter of moment since the essence of the controversy lies in interpreting the provisions of the Rules as they stand. If the respondents were right in their submission, this would require the appellant to progressively remove from the ambit of the vacancies which are notified for the subsequent recruitment year, the vacancies which are allocated to the previous year on the basis of a supposed interpretation of Rule 7(2). This would clearly be impermissible and bring uncertainty to the recruitment for subsequent years. It will cause serious prejudice to candidates who qualify in terms of eligibility during the recruitment process of 2020 by reducing the number of probable vacancies and adding them to the previous recruitment cycle.53. The third anomaly which arises from the interpretation, which has been suggested by the respondents and which has been accepted by the High Court, was noticed by the High Court itself in the course of its judgment. If Rule 7(2) were to be given overriding importance without reading it in juxtaposition with the determination of the probable number of vacancies under Rule 7(1), the issue is until what period of time would vacancies arising after the date of approval by the Governor have to be factored into account. Some of the petitioners before the High Court, as indeed some of them in the written submissions before this Court, indicated that the number of vacancies as existing on the date of the approval of the Governor should form the basis of making appointments. The High Court rejected these arguments in the following observations:9. Immediately we have to notice that we cannot go mid-way to direct appointment to vacancies arising till the date of approval. We either decline the relief or grant it as permissible under the rules. The date of approval is only relevant to determine the validity period of the list, as per the rules. We cannot give the date of approval any significance other than that prescribed in the rules. Which if allowed would literally be a half baked cake, neither good for consumption nor completely worthless to be thrown out. We would not rest ourselves on such sticky premise of uncertainty.The High Court was correct in comprehending that it could not accept a half-way measure merely because it suited the interest of some of the candidates who would be appointed if the vacancies which had arisen up to the date of approval were taken into account. Noticing this anomaly, the High Court by its impugned judgment went the entire extent by issuing the following directions:38… We direct the appellant to prepare a select list from the approved merit list including those vacancies which arise as on today and those anticipated till 06.05.2021 or any other date on which the appellant expects the next list to be published.In its conclusion, the High Court also observed:We dismiss the Writ Appeals, directing the High Court to forward a select list in accordance with the rules 14 to 17 of Part II of the KS&SSR, 1958 from the approved merit list.The plain consequence of the decision of the High Court would be that vacancies which have arisen during 2020 would be allocated to 2019. This could only be done if the vacancies for 2020 were anticipated to arise during 2019, which is not the case.54. The fourth difficulty in accepting the line of approach of the High Court rests on constitutional principles. Undoubtedly, the validity of Rule 7(2) was not in question before the High Court. Counsel for the respondents argued that it does not lie in the province of the appellant to raise a doubt about the validity of its own rules, more particularly Rule 7(2). It is necessary to note that Mr V Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant did not suggest or argue that Rule 7(2) should be held to be invalid.We are in agreement with this line of submissions, based as it is on the precedent of this Court. It is a settled principle of service jurisprudence that when vacancies are notified for conducting a selection for appointments to public posts, the number of appointments cannot exceed the vacancies which are notified. The answer to this submission, which has been proffered by the respondents is that under Rule 7(1) a probable number of vacancies is required to be notified and since an exact number is not notified, there is no constitutional bar in exceeding the 37 probable vacancies that were notified in 2019. The difficulty in accepting the submission is simply this: it attributes to the expression probable number of vacancies a meaning which is inconsistent with basic principles of service jurisprudence, the requirement of observing the mandate of equality of opportunity in public employment under Articles 14 and 16 and is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the expression.Probable number of vacancies, as we have seen, is based on computing the existing vacancies and the vacancies anticipated to occur during the year. It also accounts for the possibility of inclusion of some of the candidates that are in the wait-list. However, the expression probable cannot be interpreted as a vague assessment of vacancies that isnt founded in reason and can be altered without a statutorily prescribed cause. To allow the concept of probable number of vacancies in Rule 7(1) to trench upon future vacancies which will arise in a succeeding year would lead to a serious constitutional infraction. Candidates who become eligible for applying for recruitment during a succeeding year of recruitment would have a real constitutional grievance that vacancies which have arisen during a subsequent year during which they have become eligible have been allocated to an earlier recruitment year. If the directions of the High Court are followed, this would seriously affect the fairness of the process which has been followed by glossing over the fact that vacancies which have arisen during 2020 will be allocated for candidates in the select list for the year 2019. Such a course of action would constitute a serious infraction of Articles 14 and 16 and must be avoided. To reiterate, the submission of the appellant which we are inclined to accept is not that Rule 7(2) is invalid but that a harmonious interpretation of Rules 7(1) and (2) must be adopted that is consistent with the Article 142 directions in Malik Mazhar Sultan (3) to bring the rules in accord with the governing principles of constitutional jurisprudence in matters of public employment.55. Fifthly, at this stage, we must also advert to another serious aspect which arises from the judgment of the High Court. The High Court noticed in the course of its analysis that the acceptance of the submission of the respondents would lead to the appellant, on its administrative side, having to carry out piece-meal training for candidates who are appointed to vacancies arising in the year after approval of the merit list. The approval of the Governor was received on 7 May 2020. If vacancies which arise between 7 May 2020 and 6 May 2021 are to be reckoned in making appointments for the 2019 process, the training of candidates who are appointed against the subsequent vacancies would take place piece-meal and in a sporadic manner after the initial batch of recruits has been sent on training. Upon receipt of the approval of the Governor, candidates to whom appointment orders were issued joined their training and are in fact in the midst of their training. The High Court without venturing a solution to this imbroglio came out with a suggestion in paragraph 29 of this judgment, which is extracted below:29. There could arise one problem insofar as the High Court having to carry out training, piece meal, of the recruits appointed to the vacancies arising in the one year after the approval of the merit list. This could be solved by selecting for training even persons whose vacancies have not arisen, in anticipation. When appointments are made in June 2020 in accordance with Rue 7(2) it could only be regularly made to vacancies that actually arose till that date. The High Court then would be faced with the problem of appointing fresh recruits in the enabling year to arising vacancies who also would have to be given training for one year which may put the training process into jeopardy. We only observe that the High Court on its administrative side in consultation with the Government could device a procedure through which training could be commenced even for successful candidates, finding a place in the merit list, who could be appointed to the anticipated vacancies, which vacancies definitely would arise by the time their training is completed. This can especially be managed since the validity of the list go beyond one year from the date of approval of the merit list and the training can commence only after the approval of the merit list. The selection of recruits to anticipated vacancies for undergoing training could also be made subject to the vacancy arising and the new list coming into force with continuance in training on a stipend till a regular appointment is made to the vacancy. We do not intent these observations to be in the nature of a direction and are only our thoughts, expressed aloud.The solution which the High Court has indicated is, as it clarified, not in the nature of a direction but only our thoughts, expressed allowed. The solution suggested by the High Court is that candidates may be selected and sent for training even against vacancies which have not arisen, in anticipation of vacancies arising in future. The High Court observed that when appointments were made in June 2020, they could only be regularly made to vacancies that actually arose until that date. The High Court took notice of the fact that on its administrative side, appointment of fresh recruits to vacancies which would arise in the ensuing year would put the training process into jeopardy. However, it suggested that in consultation with the government, a procedure could be devised by which training could be commenced for candidates against vacancies which have still not arisen and which would arise in the future. The High Court even suggested that the trainees appointed against possible future vacancies could be paid a stipend. The solution which has been suggested by the High Court is plainly unacceptable. Persons are sent on training on being appointed to the judicial service and there cannot be two categories of trainees, one of whom receives a stipend since the vacancies for which they have been selected are yet to arise. Moreover, there will be a serious discontent if not all the candidates who are sent on training in expectation of future vacancies can be accommodated in service. We have emphasized the above aspect, for the simple reason that the High Court was cognizant of the serious problems which would result in the administration if its decisions were to hold the field. The suggestion by the High Court that the administration must send on training, candidates for whom there are no vacancies in the service is contrary to law. In the event that some of the candidates who are sent on training cannot be absorbed at a future date for want of vacancies, it would lead to a serious dissatisfaction and be unfair to the candidates who were sent for training. This would also cause a burden on the exchequer requiring it to pay a stipend to persons who are yet to be recruited to the judicial service, there being no present vacancies to accommodate them.Virendra S Hooda v. State of Haryana (1999) 3 SCC 696 .  This was a case where the Haryana Public Service Commission issued an advertisement for recruitment to the Executive Branch of the Haryana Civil Service. The advertisement covered 12 posts, 7 of which were in the general category and 5 were reserved. A written examination was held following which the results were published. The appellants were in the list of candidates whose results were declared but did not place sufficiently high to be appointed to the Civil Service (Executive Branch). They were given alternate posts. The writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed by the High Court and when the matter reached this Court, they were granted liberty to file fresh writ petitions for getting appointments on the basis of two circulars of 1957 and 1972 which laid down the procedure to be adopted for selection against all notified additional vacancies which arise within six months from the recommendation of the names. The High Court rejected the claim again but this Court eventually took the view that when a policy was declared by the State as to the manner of filling up the post and the policy is declared in terms of the rules, the instructions not being contrary to the rules, the State ought to follow them. Now significantly, the administrative instructions which were referred to were subsequently repealed by legislation with retrospective effect. The validity of the law was upheld by this Court in Virender Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 588   , though appointments made already in pursuance of the directions of this Court were left undisturbed. The first decision in Virender Singh Hooda would have to be read in the context of the facts of the case. Significantly, this Court did not have occasion to consider the earlier decision including the principle that appointments cannot be made, consistent with Articles 14 and 16, in excess of notified vacancies. This principle was reiterated in Prem Singh (supra) which was prior to the decision in Virender Singh. Be that as it may, we are of the view that in the above facts the decision in Virender Singh Hooda will not assist the respondents and would have to be confined to the peculiar circumstances in that case.We are unable to subscribe to this submission. The respondents participated in the selection process on the basis of 37 probable vacancies.Having come to the conclusion that the judgment of the High Court is erroneous, we are of the view that it would be impermissible to grant relief to the respondents purely on this basis. The respondents have no vested right to appointment for the 2019 selections. They cannot claim any right, or even equity, on the ground that the selection for the subsequent year may be delayed. Vacancies for 2020 must be allocated to candidates who are duly selected in pursuance of the recruitment process for 2020. Candidates who have ranked lower in the 2019 selection and were unable to obtain appointments cannot appropriate the vacancies of a subsequent year to themselves. To allow such a claim would be an egregious legal and constitutional error.