Case: Acharaya Maharajshri Narandraprasadji Anandprasadji Mahara Vs. The State Of Gujarat &amp; Ors

2. The appellant is the Managing Trustee of the Trust of the Temples of Laxminarayan Deo of Vadtal and is the Acharya of the Gadi of the Swaminarayan Sampraday at Vadtal which is a public trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act. Under the scheme of the Trust the appellant is authorised to look after the management of the properties of the Trust. It is not disputed that the Swaminarayan Sampraday is a religious denomination which believes in Lord Krishna and RadhaThe Institution holds Devasthan Inam lands and the appellant challenges the constitutional validity of the Gujarat Devasthan Inams Abolition Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act)3. The Act came into force on November 15, 1969 and it extends to the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat. The preamble shows that it is an Act "to abolish inams held by religious or charitable institution in the Bombay area of the State of Gujarat and to provide for matters consequential and incidental thereto".

Reasoning:
25. Article 25 to 28 in Part III of the Constitution are placed under a sub-title "Right to Freedom of Religion" and deal with matters in the background of that freedom. It is true that Article 25 is made subject to "public order, morality and health" and also "to the other provisions of this Part while Article 26 is only subject to "public order, morality and health". Insertion of the expression "the other provisions of this Part" in Article 25 is understandable when we find the particular rights which are taken care of in this Article, namely, the right to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess practise and propagate. Bearing in mind the overlapping nature of the sensitive rights in Art.19 (1) (a) with reference to citizens and in Article 25(1) with reference to all the persons the founders of the Constitution left no room for doubt in expressly subjecting Article 25(1) to the other provisions of Part III. Not only so, sub-article (2) of Art.25 provides that "nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice"26.While Article 25, as stated earlier confers the particulars rights on all persons, Article 26 is confined to religious denominations or any section thereof. Article 19 (1) confers the various rights specified therein from (a) to (g) on citizens. A religious denomination or a section thereof as such is not a citizen. In that sense the fields of the two Articles may be to some extent different. Again with Article 26 (c) refers to the right "to own and acquire movable and immovable property", Article 19(1)(f) confers the right on citizens "to acquire, hold and dispose of property". We are not required to consider in this case why the same expression is not used in the said two clauses of the two Articles. One thing is, however, clear that Article 26 guarantees inter alia the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property for managing religious affairs. This right, however, cannot take away the right of the State to compulsorily acquire property in accordance with the provisions of Article 31(2).If, on the other hand, acquisition of property of a religious denomination by the State can be proved to be such as to destroy or completely negative its right to own and acquire movable and immovable property for even the survival of a religious institution the question may have to be examined in a different light. That kind of a factual position, however, is not taken in these appeals before us. When, however, property is acquired by the State in accordance with law and with the provisions of Article 31 (2) and the acquisition cannot be assailed on any valid ground open to the person concerned, be it a religious institution, the right to own that property vanishes as that right is transferred to the State. Thereafter there is no question of any right to own the particular property subject to public order, morality and health and Article 26 will in the circumstances be of no relevance. This being the legal position, there is no conflict between Article 26 and Article 31It is difficult to accept the submission that the views expressed in Khajamian Wakf Estates case (1971) 2 SCR 790   = (AIR 1971 SC 161  ) are contrary to Rustom Cavasjee Coopers case. Apart from that this Bench cannot pass upon the correctness or otherwise of the views expressed in Khajamian Wakf Estates case. Besides, we do not even think that the submission is well founded even to merit reconsideration of the Khajamian Wakf Estates caseWe do not think that the above opinion of the Court in that case is of any assistance of the appellants. The first and the second submissions of the learned counsel are, therefore, of no avail29.When we look at the objects of the Act and of the various provisions enacted in furtherance of agrarian reform, the Act is squarely protected under the saving provision of Art.31-A.But it is then submitted that Art.31-A does not provide against the vice of contravention of Article 26 while Article 14, 19 and 31 are expressly mentioned in Article31-ANo rights is an organised society can be absolute. Enjoyment of ones rights must be consistent with the enjoyment of rights also by others. Where in a free play of social forces it is not possible to bring about a voluntary harmony, the State has to step in to set right the imbalance between competing interests and there the Directive Principles of State Policy, although not enforceable in courts, have a definite and positive role introducing an obligation upon the State under Article 37 in making laws to regulate the conduct of men and their affairs. In doing so a distinction will have to be made between those laws which directly infringe the freedom of religion and others, although indirectly, affecting some secular activities or religious institutions or bodies. For example if a religious institution owns large areas of land far exceeding the ceiling under relevant laws and indulges in activities detrimental to the interests of the agricultural tenants, who are at their mercy, freedom of religion or freedom to manage religious affairs cannot be pleaded as a shield against regulatory remedial measures adopted by the State to put a stop to exploitation and unrest in other quarters in the interest of general social welfare. The core of religion is not interfered with in providing for amenities for sufferers of any kind. We take the view that the Act and its provisions do no violence to the rights guaranteed under Article 26(c). In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to mention Art.26 in Art.31-A and its omission therein is not at all of any consequence30. Right guaranteed under Article 26(c) not being absolute and unqualified is consistent with reasonable regulations made by the State provided the substance of the freedom is not affected. The Act does not make any inroad in such a way as to affect directly the substance of that freedom. A particular fundamental right cannot exist in isolation in a water tight compartment. One fundamental right of a person may have to co-exist in harmony with the exercise of another fundamental right by others and also with reasonable and valid exercise of power by the State in the light of the Directive Principles in the interests of social welfare as a whole. The Courts duty is to strike a balance between competing claims of different interests31. So far as the fourth submission is concerned, the objection is on the score of adequacy of compensation which cannot be agitated against a legislation which admittedly relates to agrarian reform and is, therefore, under the canopy of protection of Article 31-A of the Constitution and objection on the score of violation of Articles 14, 19 and 31 is not entertainable. Hence this submission also fails.