Case: Bharat Petroleum Corp.Ltd Vs. Chembur Service Station

2. The appellant - Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (also referred to as BPCL) is a Public Sector Undertaking under the administrative control of the Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas, Union of India, engaged in refining, distributing and selling petroleum products, such as Motor Spirit (MS/Petrol), High Speed Diesel (HSD), Kerosene, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), etc. all over the country. It is the successor-in-title of Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. (for short `Burmah Shell).3. On 2.9.1971, Burmah Shell took on lease a piece and parcel of land admeasuring about 680 sq.yds. bearing CTS Nos. 339 and 339/1 situated at V.N. Purav Marg, Chembur, Mumbai, for the purpose of a Storage Depot or Service Station with the right to erect and maintain all manner of equipment, plant, machinery, tanks, pumps and structures. In the said plot, Burmah Shell erected and installed the Dispensing pumps together with underground tanks and other equipment, fittings and facilities for storage of petrol, High Speed Diesel (HSD) and other products and constructed some structures for carrying on the business of sale and supply of such products. The said service station is also referred to as a Retail Petroleum Outlet (for short `the RPO). On 1.4.1972, the appellant entered into a Dispensing Pump and Selling Licence agreement (for short `DPSL Agreement) with the respondent, appointing it as the dealer for selling the petroleum products of the appellant from the said RPO.4. The undertaking of Burmah Shell was taken over by the Central Government and subsequently vested in Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., appellant herein, in accordance with the provisions of the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976 on 24.1.1976.5. The respondent had originally two partners, Dharma Vir Joshi and Mahesh Mangtani and on the death of Dharma Vir Joshi, a fresh dealership agreement described as `Dispensing Pump and Selling Licence was executed between the appellant and respondent on 1.12.1995. In terms of the said agreement, the respondent was functioning as a dealer of the appellant.6. During a surprise inspection on 9.3.2007 carried out by the Quality Control Cell of the appellant in the presence of the Manager of the respondent, it was noticed that one of the dispensing units (No.OIC 3633) was giving a short delivery of 20 ml. of HSD (that is, when tested for accuracy against a five litre calibrated measure, the display showed 5.02 litres). When the Dispensing Unit was checked on flash mode 55555 twice, it gave short delivery of 210 ml. (that is as against 5 litres, the display showed 5.21 litres). Therefore, the Electronic Register Assembly (ERA) of the said dispensing unit was removed from the Unit and was sent for inspection to MIDCO - the manufacturer of the dispensing Unit. MIDCO gave a report on 27.3.2007 stating that there was a deviation in the counting ERA and the Microcontroller chip hardware in the ERA was not the original component supplied by them with the Dispensing Unit. The appellant, therefore, issued a show cause notice to the respondent on12.6.2007 alleging that the respondent had manipulated/altered the original chip with a view to making illegal gain by cheating the customers of the company, thereby causing breach of trust, and calling upon the respondent to show cause within 15 days, as to why action should not be taken including termination of the dealership. The respondent sent a reply dated 10.7.2007 denying the allegations in the show cause notice.7. The respondent filed a suit (Suit No.913/2008) in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay for the following reliefs : (a) for a declaration that it is the tenant of the appellant in respect of the structures and equipment and sub-tenant of the appellant in regard to the land comprised in the suit premises (CTS Nos. 339 and 339/1, V.N. Purav Marg, Chembur, Mumbai, measuring 6118 sq. ft.); (b) for a declaration that the supply of petrol and petroleum products by the appellant at the suit premises was an essential supply under section 29 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999; (c) for a declaration that the show cause notice dated 12.6.2007 was illegal and did not constitute a just and sufficient cause for cutting off or withholding the essential supply of petrol and petroleum products; (d) for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from forcibly dispossessing respondent from suit premises or in any manner interfering with the possession of the respondent in regard to the suit premises; and (e) restraining the appellant from withholding or cutting off the supply of petrol and petroleum products from the suit premises. An application for temporary injunction was also filed to restrain the appellant from forcibly dispossessing the respondent from the premises or interfering with its possession of the suit premises and from withholding or cutting off of any supply of petrol and petroleum products.8. The appellant resisted the suit and the application for temporary injunction by contending that the respondent was neither a tenant, nor a sub-tenant, nor a deemed tenant. The Court of Small Causes by interim order dated 13.5.2008 directed the appellant to maintain status quo as on that date, that is, the respondent "shall remain in possession of the suit premises" and the appellant shall "continue to supply petrol and petroleum products to the petrol pump in the suit premises", till the preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction to entertain the suit was framed and a decision was rendered thereon.9. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal. A Division Bench of the Small Causes Court, by order dated 26.8.2008, partly allowed the appeal. It set aside the order of the trial court in so far as it directed the appellant to continue the supply of petrol and petroleum products in the suit premises to respondent. The direction that the appellant shall maintain status quo by permitting the respondent to continue with the possession of the suit premises was not disturbed. The appellate bench held that the respondent had prima facie established its induction in the suit premises as a licensee in the light of the agreements dated 1.4.1972 and 1.12.1995. The said order dated 26.8.2008 of the appellate bench of the Small Causes Court was challenged by the respondent by filing W.P. No.6689/2008, to the extent it reversed the direction for supply of petroleum products. The said order was also challenged by the appellant in W.P.No.8130/2008 to the extent that it permitted the respondent to remain in possession of the suit premises.10. The respondents writ petition (WP No.6689/2008) was dismissed by a learned Single Judge by judgment dated 1.10.2008. The writ petition filed by the appellant (W.P. No.8130/2008) was disposed of by a brief order dated 29.1.2009, observing that "Instead of getting embroiled with the larger issues raised in the present petition, in my opinion, interest of justice would be subserved if the petition is disposed of, by clarifying the order of status quo granted by the Lower Court to mean that the said order of status quo shall not preclude the petitioner (BPCL) from taking recourse to recovery of possession of the suit property from the respondent (plaintiff) by following due process of law including by resorting to action under the provisions of the Public Premises Act, if permissible." The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave.Subsequent events11. Certain subsequent events require to be noticed. The respondent filed a second suit (Suit No.2557/2008) in the City Civil Court, Mumbai, praying for the following reliefs: (a) a declaration that supply of petrol and petroleum products in the suit premises to respondent by the appellant is an essential supply under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; (b) for a declaration that the notice dated 12.6.2007 is illegal and a further declaration that the appellant is not entitled to terminate/set aside the dealership under the agreement dated 1.12.1995; and (c) for an injunction restraining the appellant from stopping the supply of petrol and petroleum products or acting upon the notice dated 12.6.2007.12. On 19.3.2009, the appellant terminated the dealership agreement and informed the respondent that it shall have no right to use the retail outlet premises for any purpose whatsoever and the facilities (Motor Spirit and/or High Speed Diesel pumps, storage tanks, pipes and fittings and all other facilities erected and provided by the company at the retail outlets) or to sell any petroleum products lying in the retail outlets. Supply of petroleum products to the said Retail Petroleum Outlet was also stopped. The said termination however made it clear that the order was without interfering with or disturbing the order of status quo in regard to the possession passed on 30.5.2008 and affirmed the orders dated 26.8.2008 and 29.1.2009 passed by the appellate bench and the High Court respectively.13. The respondent filed a third suit (Suit No.706/2009 in the City Civil Court, Bombay) for the following reliefs :(a) a declaration that the termination notice dated 19.3.2009 was illegal and unenforceable and that the dealership agreement dated 1.12.1995 continues to subsist;(b) for a permanent injunction restraining the appellant or giving effect to the termination notice dated 19.3.2009; and (c) for an order restraining the appellant from discontinuing or withholding supply of petrol and petroleum products and CNG to the petrol pump premises and declare that the supply of petrol and petroleum products to the said premises is an essential supply.Short facts leading to this appeal are as follows:- The appellant is the successor to the erstwhile Burmah-Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Burmah Shell). On 2.9.1971, Burmah Shell took on lease a piece / parcel of land admeasuring about 680 sq.yds. bearing CTS Nos. 339 and 339/1 situated at V.N. Purav Marg, Chembur, Mumbai. This was for the purpose of erecting one or more petrol pumps together with underground tanks and other fittings and facilities for storage of petrol and High Speed Diesel (HSD) Oil, for carrying on the business of sale & supply of such products. Burmah Shell constructed the necessary structures and erected the petrol pumps and other structures, fittings and facilities which are jointly referred to hereafter as Retail Petroleum Outlet (RPO). A few rooms were also put up on that land for facilitating the working of the RPO. On 1.4.1972, the appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent, whereby the respondent were appointed as the dealers for selling the petroleum products of the appellant from the said RPO.4. The Burmah Shell Company was taken over by the Government of India under the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, and later the name of the Company was changed to Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL), the appellant herein. By a subsequent notification issued under Section 7 of the said Act of 1976, the rights and liabilities of Burmah-Shell in relation to its undertakings in India, stood transferred to be appellant. Accordingly, upon the aforesaid vesting by virtue of the provisions of this Act, the appellant Company became the lessee in respect of the said RPO at Chembur, Mumbai.5. Subsequently, on the death of one of the partners of the respondent, a fresh dealership agreement was executed between the appellant and the respondent on 1.12.1995, and we are concerned with the rights and liabilities of the parties under this agreement.6. It so transpired that during a surprise inspection carried out by the Quality Control Cell of the appellant in the presence of the manager of the respondent, it was noticed that one dispensing unit was making a short delivery of 20 ml. of HSD per 5 litres. It was checked twice thereafter, when it gave short delivery of 210 ml. per 5 litres measure. Therefore, the Electronic Register Assembly (ERA) of the said dispensing unit was removed therefrom and was sent for inspection to the manufacturer MIDCO. MIDCO gave a report on 27.3.2007 stating amongst others, that there was a deviation in the ERA, but the Microcontroller chip hardware in the ERA was not the original as supplied by them. The appellant, therefore, issued a show cause notice to the respondent on 12.6.2007 under the relevant provisions of the agreement between the parties stating therein that the respondent had manipulated / altered the original chip with a view of making illegal gain by cheating the customers of the Company, thereby causing breach of trust, and calling upon the respondent to show cause within 15 days, as to why action should not be taken including termination of the dealership.7. Respondent denied all these allegations by their reply dated 10.7.2007, but before the appellant could take any decision on the show cause notice, the respondent instituted a suit in the Court of Small Cause at Mumbai (being RAD suit No. 913/2008) for a declaration that the respondent was a tenant of the appellant company in respect of the structures, and a sub-tenant of the appellant in respect of the land on which the RPO was situated. The respondent made a further submission that the supply of petrol and petroleum products was an essential supply under Section 29 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the MRC Act). The show cause notice, therefore, was illegal, and that the appellant had no sufficient cause for withholding the essential supply of petrol and petroleum products. The respondent moved an interim application to restrain the appellants from dispossessing them from the said RPO and also from withholding supply of petrol and petroleum products.8. The appellant filed a reply to the injunction application and stated amongst others that the respondent was neither a tenant, nor a sub-tenant, nor a deemed tenant in respect of the suit premises. In para 3 (b) it was stated asThe defendant is a Government company wherein the Govt. of India has more than 51% shares. The defendant is a lessee of land. The alleged suit premises are public premises within the meaning of Public Premises Eviction Act, 1971. The plaintiff who claims through the defendant possession of the suit premises is covered under the said Act." It was further stated that the respondent was only a dealer, and the open piece of land under the agreement was not covered in the definition of the `premises under the MRC Act, and that the MRC Act was not applicable.A learned Single Judge of the Court of Small Causes initially granted an interim injunction as prayed by the respondent herein. Since the appellant wanted the issue regarding jurisdiction to be decided as a preliminary issue, the learned Judge directed that until the framing of preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, and decision thereon, the appellant will not dispossess the respondent from the petrol pump, and shall continue to supply the petroleum products, though the appellant will have the right to inspect the petrol pump and equipments for the purpose of checking smooth working of the same.10. Being aggrieved by this order the appellant filed an appeal before the Division Bench of Small Causes Court at Mumbai (being Appeal No. 401 of 2008). The Division Bench by its order dated 26.8.2008 allowed this appeal in part deleting the direction to continue to supply petrol and petroleum products, but maintained the order of status- quo with respect to the possession of the respondent.11. Being aggrieved by the part of that order which vacated the direction to supply petrol and petroleum products, the respondent filed a Writ Petition (bearing W.P. 6689 of 2008) in the Bombay High Court. A Learned Single Judge by his order dated 1.10.2008 dismissed the said Writ Petition. The Learned Single Judge noted that the respondent herein was claiming a tenant-landlord relationship on the basis of the dealership agreement between them, and then seeking a direction to supply petrol and petroleum products as an essential supply to be enjoyed by the tenant under Section 29 of the MRC Act. The Learned Judge held that it had to be first decided as to whether the relationship between them was that of tenant and landlord. Until then, such a mandatory order could not be passed. He further held that:-`any dispute or cause of action pertaining to the breach of terms and conditions of the such dealership agreement cannot be gone into by Court under MRC Act.The remedy is elsewhere.The Learned Judge held that the order of the lower appellate court was reasoned and correct one.12. The appellant also filed another Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 8130 of 2008 and challenged the other part of the order dated 26.8.2008 to the extent it was against the appellant viz. the direction to maintain the status quo with respect to the possession of the RPO. Another Learned Single Judge heard the petition and by his order dated 29th January, 2009 heldof justice would be subserved if the Petition is disposed of by clarifying the order of status quo granted by the Lower Court to mean that the said order of status quo shall not preclude the Petitioner from taking recourse to recovery of possession of the suit property from the Respondent/plaintiff by following due process of law including by resorting to action under the provisions of Public Premises Act, if permissible"He further heldthe Competent Authority were to order eviction of the Respondent in the said proceedings, that order will naturally supersede the order of status quo passed by the Lower Court, if it were to be established that the property is public premises as it belongs to the Petitioner Corporation. In order words, order of status quo shall operate only till the Competent Authority and/ or the appropriate forum were to pass order of eviction against the Respondent in relation to the suit premises.The Counsel for the respondent submitted before the Learned Single Judge that the observations in the order may influence the proceedings pending between the parties before the Civil Court. Thereon the Learned Single Judge observed that the Civil Court is bound to follow the mandate of law, if the suit premises are public premises, and the question of precluding the petitioner from taking recourse to the action under that act, if available, cannot be countenanced.He further heldthat in spite of pendency of the civil action, it will be open to the Petitioner Corporation to proceed in respect of suit premises if the same are public premises. Lastly he heldany case the possession of the premises cannot be obtained by the Petitioner by force, but by following due process of law which option is left to the Petitioner in terms of this order."The petition was disposed of accordingly by the order dated 29th January, 2009. Being aggrieved by this order the present Petition for leave to Appeal has been filed on 4.4.2009.14. It so transpired that the respondent on the other hand filed another suit being Short Cause Suit No. 2557 of 2008 in the City Civil Court of Mumbai, seeking a direction that the appellant should continue to supply the petroleum products. A summons / notice dated 3.2.2009 was served on the appellant. On 19.3.2009 the appellant has, by their letter dated 19.3.2009 terminated the dealership agreement and stopped the supplies of petroleum products to this RPO. The respondent has thereafter fled a third suit bearing No. 706 of 2009 in the City Civil Court at Mumbai for a declaration that the termination was illegal and unforceable, and for other consequential reliefs.15. As stated earlier, the main submission of the appellant in the SLP is that they are not required to proceed under The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupant) Act, 1971, hereinafter referred to as the Public Premises Act. They have terminated the dealership agreement and stopped the supply of petroleum products. They contend that they should be entitled to take possession without re- course to the proceedings under the Public Premises Act. According to them the observations of the Learned Single Judge that the possession of the premises cannot be obtained by force was uncalled for.

Reasoning:
21. Where an employer or principal permits the use of its premises, by its employee or agent, such use, whether loosely referred to as `possession or `occupation or `use by the employee or the agent, is on behalf of the employer/principal. In other words, the employer/principal continues to be in possession and occupation and the employee/agent is merely a licensee who is permitted to enter the premises for the limited purpose of selling the goods of the employer/principle. The employee/agent cannot claim any `possession or `occupation or `right to use independent of the employer/principal who is the licensor. In such cases if the employee is terminated from service, he cannot obviously contend that he is in "occupation" of the premises and that he can be evicted or dispossessed only by initiating action in a court of law. Similarly the agent who is permitted to enter the premises every day to sell the goods cannot, on termination of the agency, contend that he continues to be in exclusive occupation of the premises and unless evicted through a court of law entitled to continue in occupation. This is because licence that is granted to the employee/agent is a limited licence to enter upon and use the premises, not for his own purposes or his own business, but for the purposes of the employer/principal, to sell its goods in the manner prescribed by the employer/principal and subject to the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract of employment/agency in regard to the manner of sales, the prices at which the goods are to be sold or the services to be rendered to the customers. In such cases, when the employment or agency is terminated and the employer/principal informs the employee/agent that his services are no longer required and he is no longer the employee/agent, the licence granted to such employee/agent to enter the retail outlet stands revoked and the ex- employee/ex-agent ceases to have any right to enter the premises. On the other hand, the employer/principal who continues to have possession will be entitled to enter the premises, or appoint another employee or agent, or legitimately prevent the ex-employee/ex-agent from entering upon the premises or using the premises. In such cases, there is no need for the licensor (that is the employer or the principal) to file a suit for eviction or injunction against the ex-employee or ex-agent. The licensor can protect or defend its possession and physically prevent the licensee (employee/agent) from entering the outlet.Where the licence in favour of the licensee is only to use the retail outlet premises or use the equipments/facilities installed therein, exclusively in connection with the sale of the goods of the licensor, the licensee does not have the right to use the premises for dealing or selling any other goods. When the licensee cannot use the premises for any purpose on account of the stoppage of supply of licensors goods for sale, it will be wholly unreasonable to require the licensor to sue the licensee for `possession of such company controlled retail outlet premises. This is not a case where the licensee has alleged that any amount is due to it from the licensor by way of commission or remuneration for services, or that on account of non-payment thereof it is entitled to retain the retail outlet premises and facilities of the licensor by claiming a lien over them under section 221 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. In regard to a licence governed by a commercial contract, it may be inappropriate to apply the principles of Administrative Law, even if the licensor may answer the definition of `State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In view of the above, it is unnecessary to examine whether appellant is a `state within the meaning of that expression under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, nor necessary to keep in view the requirement that if the licensor answers the definition of `state, a duty to act fairly and reasonably without any arbitrariness or discrimination is also implied. Be that as it may.27. It is made clear that this decision applies only to licences where the licensor is the owner/ lessee of the premises and the equipment (in this case dispensing pumps and other equipment) and where the licensee is engaged merely for sale of the products of the licensor. In other words, this decision would apply to petrol stations which are known as CCROs (`Company Controlled Retail Outlets).In this case in pursuance of a routine inspection certain serious irregularities were viewed and as a consequence supply of its products was stopped, suspended and a show cause notice was issued calling upon respondent to show cause why action should not be taken including termination of the dealership for the reasons stated therein. Therefore when such a notice is issued as a precursor to termination, the respondent licensee ceases to have right to sell the goods in the outlet premises and does not get the cause of action either to seek continuance of the supply of the products or remain in and use the premises. The show cause notice was followed by a termination of the licence of dealership on 19.3.2009. Even if the termination or non-supply amounts to breach of contract, the remedy of the agent-licensee at best is to seek damages, if it is established that the dealership was wrongly determined or supply was wrongly stopped. Consequently, the licensee does not have any right to use the premises nor any right to enter upon the premises after the termination of the agency.Only those persons who held a licence to occupy any premises as on 1.2.1973 could become deemed tenants under Section 15(A) of the old Bombay Rent Act. As a person conducting a running business on behalf of the owner of such business is not a `licensee as defined under the Rent Act, even if the person concerned was using premises on 1.2.1973, he will not become a deemed tenant. Consequently the respondent could not claim that he became a deemed tenant. Therefore the respondent could not claim the protection of any rent control law as a tenant. One more aspects may be noticed here. If the respondent had become a deemed tenant in 1972, it would not have entered into an agreement on 1.7.1995 reiterating that it continue to be a licensee and that it does not have any leasehold or tenancy rights in the premises. In view of the above, it is not necessary to consider the alternative contention of the appellant that even if the respondent had become a deemed tenant in pursuance of the agreement dated 1.4.1972, such a tenancy come to an end and the appellant again become licensee pure and simple from 1.12.1995 when the fresh agreement was entered, does not require to be considered.In view of the above, this appeal is allowed. The order of the High Court and the order of the courts below, directing status quo are set aside. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to continue in possession of the petrol pump premises and use it for its business. The appellant is also entitled to lawfully prevent the respondent from entering upon the premises. The trial court is directed to dispose of the suit expeditiously, on the basis of the evidence, in accordance with law, keeping in view the legal position explained above.The case of the appellant, however was that the appellant were right in challenging the other part of the order of the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes wherein the bench had maintained the part of the order of status-quo passed by a Single Judge at that Court with respect to the possession of the respondent. The appellant had, therefore, rightly filed the abovereferred Writ Petition No. 8130 of 2008. According to the appellant, they had not let out the premises to the respondent, but had allowed the respondent only to sell appellants petroleum products at a price fixed by the Ministry of Petroleum from time to time. The manipulation in the dispensing unit effected by the respondent had led to the issuance of the show cause notice. The respondent had rushed to the Court of Small Causes even before the reply of the respondent could be considered by the appellant. By seeking an injunction in the Court of Small Causes, the respondent had restrained the appellant from taking any decision on the show cause notice, which decision the appellant has now taken after the impugned order was passed by the Learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 8130 of 2008, who has held that the civil action initiated by the respondent could not prevent the appellant from taking action in accordance with due process of law. That is why now the appellant has determined the respondents licence by their letter dated 19.3.2009 and according to them that is sufficient compliance of the requirement of due process of law. According to the appellant, with this determination of agency, the action in accordance with the due process of law is complete and they can take the possession of the RPO, if required forcibly. According to them the emphasis of the Learned Single Judge on following the due process under the Public Premises Act was erroneous.It is true that in Southern Roadways Limited (supra) this Court did observe in paragraph 22 that the possession of the respondent in that case was on behalf of the company and not on his own right. And therefore, it was not necessary for the company to file a suit for the recovery of possession. Those observations will have to be read as laying down the law in the fact situation which emerged in that case and would apply to similar situations. The issue with respect to the premises of a Public Corporation did not arise in that matter. Besides, in the facts of the case before us, amongst others the respondent had raised the issue with respect to the nature of his licence to remain on the premises, and had also sought the protection which was available to the licencee in occupation of the premises prior to 1.2.1973. Whether the respondent was right in that contention or not is not for this Court to determine. It is for the appropriate authority to decide. That is the minimum opportunity which will be required to be provided to the respondent in the facts of the present case, when he is in occupation of the concerned premises for nearly 40 years. It is also relevant to note that even on the footing of being an agent, apart from the right to receive the compensation in a situation which could be placed under Section 205 of the Contract Act, the agent also has the right to remain on the property of the principal under Section 221 of the Contract Act, for the reliefs which are available under that section if he makes out such a case. It is another matter that as stated above the respondent has placed his case on a higher pedestal, but even on the basis that he is a mere agent, he does have certain rights under Sections 205 and 221 of the Contract Act, and para 13 of Southern Roadways Limited (supra) specifically recognizes that. This being the position it cannot be said that the respondent does not deserve even an opportunity of being heard. What are the relevant terms of the agreement between the parties, what is their true connotation and what order could be obtained by the appellant against the respondent, or what relief at the highest the respondent would be entitled to, will have be considered and decided before an appropriate forum.36. It is also relevant to note that all throughout the respondent has contended that respondent has been in exclusive possession of the premises concerned, and all the employees on the premises are that of the respondent. Even in the first suit filed in the court of small causes, respondent has pointed out that there was a problem with respect to the dispensing unit once in the past in year 2002, and in consultation with the petitioner the respondent took corrective measures. The reports all throughout thereafter have been satisfactory and the respondent has relied upon a voluminous correspondence in that behalf in paragraphs 33 to 60 of the plaint filed in the court of small causes. In the third suit bearing No. 706 of 2009 challenging the termination of the licence filed in the City Civil Court Mumbai, the respondent has specifically pleaded in paragraph 69 that the termination was without any reasons and was contrary to public policy, and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 77, respondent has specifically submitted that a technical fault in the machine cannot amount to manipulation and that apart it was not a case of adulteration. All these submissions of the respondent require a determination. An opportunity of being heard is something minimum in the circumstances. The proceedings before the authority under the Public Premises Act is an expeditious proceeding and that is something minimum in the circumstances. A Public Corporation from which a higher standard is expected, cannot refuse to follow this much minimum due process of law.37. In the circumstances we have no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Learned Single Judge. We, however, make it clear that the observations made above are for the purposes of deciding the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order passed by the Learned Single Judge and not on the merit of the rival claims. We make it very clear that in the event the appellant takes the steps under the Public Premises Act, it will be open to the respondent to plead their case before the competent authority on all counts, though it will also be open to the competent authority concerned to take its own decision on the merits of the rival contention on facts as well as on law.