Case: Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd Vs. Gutta Mill Workers' Union.The State Of U. P: Intervener

(2) There is no dispute as to the facts. An industrial dispute having arisen between the appellant Company and its employees, by Labour Department Notification No. 637 (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated 18/2/1950 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh was pleased, in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 3 read with S. 4 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1947), to refer the said dispute to the Labour Commissioner, U.P. or a Conciliation Officer of the State Government nominated by him for adjudication on seven several issues specified therein and to direct the adjudicator to conclude the adjudication proceedings and submit his award to the Government not later than 5/4/1950. The Labour Commissioner by his letter No. I. M. R. 14-A nominated Shri M. P. Vidyarthi, Regional Conciliation Officer, U.P., as the adjudicator in the above dispute with a direction that he should submit his award by 25/3/1950 and that if the proceedings were not likely to be completed within that time he should move the Government for extension of time at least a week before the specified date. By Notification No. 897 (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated 20/3/1950 the Governor was pleased to order that the adjudicator should also adjudicate on an additional issue formulated therein. By a further Notification No. 950 (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated 24/3/1950 the Governor was pleased to refer another additional issue for the decision of the adjudicator. The adjudicator did not make his award on or before 5/4/1950 as directed by the first order of reference but made his award on 13/4/1950, that is to say , 8 days after the expiry of the time originally fixed for the making of the award. About thirteen days after the delivery of the award Labour Department Notification No. 1247 (ST)/XVIII53 (ST)/50 was issued on 26/4/1950 whereby the Governor was pleased, in exercise of powers conferred by S. 3 read with S. 4 of the Act, to allow the adjudicator in the said dispute to submit his award by 30/4/1950. Thereafter by Notification No. 1447 (ST)/XVIII-53 (ST)/50 dated 1/08/1950 the Governor was pleased, in exercise of powers conferred by S. 6(2) read with Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act, to order that the award be enforced for a period of six months from the date of that order in the first instance and thereafter for such further period as might be prescribed.(3) On 17/8/1950 the appellant Company preferred an appeal against the award to the Labour Appellate Tribunal contending, inter alia, as follows: "That the award dated 13/4/1950 is vitiated, having been given after the expiry of the time limit. (a) In its order dated 18/2/1950 para (5) Government directed the Adjudicator to conclude the proceedings and submit his Award not later than 5/4/1950. The Award is dated 13/4/1950. The Government, however, tried to remedy this defect by the issue of G. O. No.1247 (ST) /XVIII-53 (ST)/ 50 dated 26/4/1950 but under the law this is of no avail. To be a valid extension of date granted to the Adjudicator, Government order should have been issued before 5/4/1950 to keep the authority of the Adjudicator alive. On the date the Adjudicator made the Award i.e. 13/4/1950, he had no power to make an award." The Appellate Tribunal by its decision given on 20/11/1950 dismissed the appeal with the following observations on the point mentioned above: "With regard to the last point our view is that as the Government had the authority under S. 6 of the Act to fix time limit for submitting an award it had also the necessary and incidental power to extend the time limit originally fixed, if it considered it necessary. The first proviso to S. 3 empowers the Provincial Government to add more matters for adjudication. It is obvious that additions to the matters already referred to would or may take more time than that had been originally estimated, and so it may lead to an impossible position if the Government had no power to extend the time originally fixed by it, and it makes no difference, in our opinion, whether the time is extended before or after the expiry of the time originally limited." The present appeal is against that decision of the Appellate Tribunal but limited to the question hereinbefore mentioned.

Reasoning:
Sections 3 and 4 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 certainly confer power on the State Government to refer disputes to an adjudicator for decision and S. 6 (1) may be read as empowering the State Government to specify the time within which the adjudicator to whom an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication is to submit his award. The combined effect of S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act and S. 6(1) of the G. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is contended, is that the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his report "within such time as may from time to time be specified" and that this being the position, the principles laid down in the English decisions referred to above must be held to be applicable to the present case. We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Under S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act the State Government may exercise the power conferred on it by Ss. 3, 4 and 6, that is to say, it can from time to time make orders referring disputes to an adjudicator and, whenever such an order of reference is made, to specify the time within which the award is to be made. This power to specify the time does not and indeed cannot include a power to extend the time already specified in an earlier order. The legislative practice, as evidenced by the provisions of the different statutes referred to above, is to expressly confer the power of extension of time, if and when the Legislature thinks fit to do so. There is no question of any inherent power of the Court and much less of the Executive Government in this behalf. S. 14 of the U.P. General Clauses Act does not in terms, or by necessary implication, give any such power of extension of time to the State Government and, therefore, the respondents can derive no support from that section.(6) Learned advocate for the Intervener, the State of Uttar Pradesh, draws our attention to section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1904, and contends that the order of 26/4/1950 should be taken as an amendment or modification, within the meaning of that section, of the first order of 18/2/1950. It is true that the order of 26/4/1950 does ex facie purport to modify the order of 18/2/1950 but, in view of the absence of any distinct provision in S. 21 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the State Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of 26/4/1950 viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification, cannot, by virtue of S. 21, have that effect. If, therefore, the amending order operates prospectively, i. e. only as from the date of the order, it cannot validate the award which had been made after the expiry of the time specified in the original order and before the date of the amending order, during which period the adjudicator was, functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all. We do not think the respondents can derive any support from S. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act.