Case: Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala Vs. State of Bombay &amp; Others

It appears that on June 23, 1949, in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 6(2) of the Act the Government had issued a notificationthe case of an irrigated land 1/5 and in the case of any other land 1/4 of the crops of such land or its value as determined in the prescribed manner as the maximum rent payable by the tenants of the lands situate in the areas specified in the schedule appendedthe areas thus specified was the area in which the appellants lands are situated. Subsequently, on October 17, 1952, by virtue of the same powers and in supersession of all other earlier notifications issued in that behalf the Government purported to prescribe a rate as the lower rate of maximum rent at which the rent shall be payable by the tenants in respect of the lands situate in the areas specified in Schedule I appended to it. It is unnecessary to set out the rates thus prescribed; it would be enough to state that the rate of maximum rent prescribed by this notification is very much lower than the rate which had been fixed by the earlier one. By their petitions filed in the Bombay High Court the appellants contended that S. 6(2) was ultra vires, and that even if S. 6(2) was valid the impugned notification was invalid. Accordingly they prayed for a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate direction or order against the Government, the Mamlatdar of the area concerned and their respective tenants prohibiting them or any one of them from giving effect to the said notification. They also claimed a direction or order to the opponents directing them to cancel or withdraw the impugned notification. These two petitions were heard by the High Court along with other companion matters in which the same points were raised, and in the result the High Court dismissed the petitions. It held that S. 6(2) was intra vires and the impugned notification was legal and valid. The appellants then applied for and obtained a certificate from the High Court, and it is with the said certificate that they have come to this Court by their two appeals.

Reasoning:
4. It is now well established by the decision of this Court that the power of delegation is a constituent element of the legislative power as a whole, and that in modern times when the Legislatures enact laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, they often find it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegates of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by their Acts. The extent to which such delegation is permissible is also now well settled. The Legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative function in any case. It must lay down the legislative policy and principle, and must afford guidance for carrying out the said policy before it delegates its subsidiary powers in thatdealing with the challenge to the vires of any statute on the ground of excessive delegation it is, therefore, necessary to enquire whether the impugned delegation involves the delegation of an essential legislative function or power and whether the Legislature has enunciated its policy and principle and given guidance to the delegate or not. As the decision in Baglas case, 1955-1 SCR 380  : (AIR 1954 SC 465 ), shows, in applying this test this Court has taken into account the statements in the preamble to the Act, and if the said statements afford a satisfactory basis for holding that the legislative policy and principle has been enunciated with sufficient accuracy and clarity the preamble itself has been held to satisfy the requirements of the relevant tests. In every case it would be necessary to consider the relevant provisions of the Act in relation to the delegation made and the question as to whether the delegation is intra vires or not will have to be decided by the application of the relevant tests.Broadly stated S. 6(2) seeks to provide for the fixation of a lower rate of maximum rent areawise. We have already seen that individual tenants are given the right to apply for the fixation of reasonable rent by S. 12, and specific factors have been specified which the Mamlatdar must consider in fixing a reasonable rent. The Legislature realised that a large number of tenants in the State were poor, ignorant and in many cases helpless, and it was thought that many of them may not be able to make individual applications for the fixation of a reasonable rent under S.That is why it was thought necessary to confer upon the Provincial Government the power to fix a lower rate of the maximum rent payable by tenants in respect of particular areas. In a sense what could be done by the Mamlatdar in individual cases can be achieved by the Provincial Government in respect of a large number of cases covered in a particular area. If that be so, the legislative policy having been clearly expressed in the relevant provisions and the factors for determining reasonable rent also having been specified in S. 12(3), it is difficult to accept the argument that the Provincial Government has been given uncanalised or unfettered powers by S. 6(2) to do what it likes without any guidance. The relevant factors having been specified by S. 12 (3) when the Provincial Government considers the question of fixing a lower rate of the maximum rent payable in any particular area it is expected to adopt a basis which is suitable to that particular area. The relevant conditions of agriculture would not be uniform in different areas and the problem of fixing a reduced maximum rent payable in the respective areas would have to be tackled in the light of the special features and conditions of that area; that is why a certain amount of latitude had to be left to the Government in fixing the lower rate of the maximum rent in the respective areas, and that is intended to be achieved by giving it liberty to adopt a basis which it thinks is suitable for the area in question. The word "suitable in the context must mean suitable to the area having regard to the other provisions of the Act such as S. 6(1) and S.It is true that the power to fix a reasonable rent conferred on the Mamlatdar under S. 12 is subject to the power of the Provincial Government under S. 6(2). Even so we think it would be difficult to hold that the factors prescribe for the guidance of the Mamlatdar would have no relevance at all when the Provincial Government acts under S.our opinion, therefore, having regard to the legislative policy laid down by the Act in its preamble and in the other relevant sections to which we have referred, and having regard to the guidance which has been provided for fixing a reasonable rent under S. 12(3), it would not be possible to hold that the power delegated to the Provincial Government by S. 6(2) suffers from the infirmity of excessive delegation. The fact that no minimum has been prescribed would not materially affect thisis no substance in this argument. If S. 6(2) is valid then the exercise of the power validly conferred on the Provincial Government cannot be treated as fresh legislation which offends against Art.If the Act is saved by Art. 31B, S. 6(2) is also saved, and the power must be held to be validly conferred on the Provincial Government, and a notification issued by virtue of the said powers cannot be challenged on the ground that it violates Art.argument proceeds on the assumption that the power conferred on the Government by S. 6(2) can be exercised only once, and it seeks to derive support from the fact that the words "from time to time which were used in the corresponding section of the earlier tenancy legislation in the State have not been used in S. 6(2). Reliance is also placed on the fact that the said words have been used in S. 8(1) of the Act. The omission of the said words from S. 6(2) as contrasted with their inclusion in S. 8(1), says Mr. Limaye, indicates that the power delegated under S. 6(2) was intended to be used only once. This argument is fallacious. Why the Legislature did not use the words "from time to time in S. 6(2) when it used them in S. 8(1) it is difficult to understand; but in construing S. 6(2) it is obviously necessary to apply the provisions of S. 14 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904 (I of 1904).Section 14 provides that where by any Bombay Act made after the commencement of this Act any power is conferred on any Government then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Quite clearly if S. 6(2) is read in the light of S. 14 of the Bombay General Clauses Act it must follow that the power to issue a notification can be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. It is true that S. 14 of the Central General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897) provides that where any power is conferred by any Central Act or Regulation then, unless a different intention appears, that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Since there is a specific provision of the Bombay General Clauses Act relevant on the point it is unnecessary to take recourse to S. 14 of the Central General Clauses Act; but even if we were to assume that the power in question can be exercised from time to time unless a different intention appears we would feel no difficulty in holding that no such different intention can be attributed to the Legislature when it enacted S. 6(2). It is obvious that having prescribed for a maximum by S. 6(1) the Legislature has deliberately provided for a modification of the said maximum rent and that itself shows that the fixation of any maximum rent was not treated as immutable. If it was necessary to issue one notification under S. 6(2) it would follow by force of the same logic that circumstances may require the issue of a further notification. The fixation of agricultural rent depends upon so many uncertain factors which may vary from time to time and from place to place that it would be idle to contend that the Legislature wanted to fix the maximum only once, or, as Mr. Limaye concedes, twice. Therefore the argument that the power to issue a notification has been exhausted cannot be sustained.