Case: Satish Kumar Gupta And Etc. Etc Vs. State Of Haryana And Ors. Etc

3. Facts giving rise to the question may be briefly noted. Huge chunks of land were acquired by the State of Haryana in different phases for the public purpose of setting-up Industrial Model Township by the Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation (HSIDC) in Gurgaon District in Haryana. Substantial part of the acquired land was allotted by the HSIDC to Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL). One of the clauses in the Conveyance Deed executed in favour of the allottee provided that if compensation was enhanced, the allottee shall be liable to pay additional price on that basis. In HSIDC v. Pran Sukh, 2011(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 569 : 2011(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 130 : (2010) 11 SCC 175 , issue of compensation for land acquired in Phase I was decided by this Court. Review Petitions against the said judgment were dealt with in HSIDC v. Mawasi, 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 26 : (2012) 7 SCC 200  and HSIDC v. Pran Sukh, 2013(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 846 : 2013(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 160 : (2012) 7 SCC 721. Matter of determining compensation in respect of Phase II and Phase III came-up for consideration in HSIDC v. Udal, 2013(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 896 : 2013(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 491 : (2013) 14 SCC 506. As noticed in judgment of this Court in Udal (supra), the Reference Court awarded compensation in the light of compensation determined in the judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra) and other awards relating to land acquired for Phase III. Against the decision of the Reference Court, the land owners as well as the HSIDC filed appeals under Section 54 of the Act. The High Court assessed the compensation based on judgment of this Court in Pran Sukh (supra). Reference to paras 29 to 33 of the judgment of this Court Udal (supra) shows that after referring to the plea of the HSIDC that the annual increase of 12% for the time gap was erroneous in view of ONGC v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel, 2008(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 487 : (2008) 14 SCC 745  and Valliyammal v. Special Tehsildar (LA), 2011(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 903 : 2011(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 361 : (2011) 8 SCC 91 , this Court found merit in the arguments of the land owners that an important piece of evidence was not taken into account which necessitated remand. The matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh disposal and it was also observed that MSIL was free to file an appropriate application for its impleadment or for leave to act as intervenor.4. Thereafter, the matter was dealt with by the High Court in the impugned judgment. The High Court held that the allottee had a right to be impleaded as a party for the followingThe State or the local authority for whose benefit the land is acquired may not lead proper evidence or advance effective arguments.b) A clause in the deed of allotment in favour of the allottee provides for payment of additional price as a consequence of enhancement of compensation.c) As a result of enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court, the company in question was required to pay about Rs. 900 crores.d) Under Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC the Court can add or delete a party at any stage.e) Section 50 of the Act provides a right to a local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired to be represented before the Collector or the Court in the process of determination of compensation.f) The principle behind giving the right of representation to a local authority or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired can also be applied to any person who is liable to pay the enhanced compensation treating such person to be the "person interested" under Section 3(b) of the Act.After permitting the allottee to be impleaded as a party, the High Court also allowed application to lead additional evidence on the ground that the acquiring authority did not defend the case properly. Similar application filed by the HSIDC to lead additional evidence was also allowed and, thereafter, on considering the additional evidence it was observed that it was not possible for the High Court to assess the compensation as there was no site plan showing the location of the transactions relied. It was also considered necessary to give an opportunity to MSIL, who was impleaded for the first time. On that basis the matter was remanded to the Reference Court for fresh decision.6. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court these appeals have been preferred.

Reasoning:
9. To determine the question whether the post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation, we may refer to the scheme of the Act. The acquisition may either be for a "public purpose" as defined under Section 3(f) or for a company under Part-VII of the Act. If the acquisition is for a public purpose (as the present case), the land vests in the State after the Collector makes an award and the possession is taken. Till the award is made, no person other than State comes into the picture. Once the land vests in the State, the acquisition is complete. Any transferee from the State is not concerned with the process of acquisition. The State may transfer the land by public auction or by allotment at any price with which the person whose land is acquired has no concern. The mere fact that the Government chooses to determine the allotment price with reference to compensation price determined by the Court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest the claim for enhancement of compensation.We are in respectful agreement with the above view in Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya (supra) and Peerappa Hanmantha (supra). No contrary view of this Court has been brought to our notice. The judgments relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable as already held by this Court.The only other justification in the impugned judgment which has been relied upon by the respondents is lack of sincerity on the part of the State authority for whose benefit the acquisition has been made viz. HSIDC, which by itself cannot be a valid ground to permit post-acquisition allottee to be treated as a necessary or proper authority under Order I Rule 10 of CPC to proceedings for determination of compensation. The view taken in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained on any principle or precedent.17. We may now refer to an order of this Court dated 15th July, 2004 which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment in para 31. There is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law could not be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand.18. Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party.It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case N. Kamalam v. Ayyaswami, 2001(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 193 : (2001) 7 SCC 503 : para 19. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.21. We may also refer to the argument that this Court, while remanding the matter in the earlier round, had given liberty to the MSIL to file an application for impleadment or to act as an intervenor which implied that such application was to be accepted. We do not find any merit in this contention also. It cannot be held that any right was crystalised by the said observation and such prayer had to be considered according to law. We have already held that the post-acquisition allottee had no right in the matter.