Case: Board Of High School &amp; Intermediate Education, U. P Vs. Ghanshyam Das Gupta And Others

The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. The three respondents were students of G. S. Hindu Intermediate College at Sikandrarao and appeared at the Intermediate (Commerce) Examination conducted by the appellant in the year 1954. On 12th June 1954, the result of the examination was published in newspapers and the three respondents passed in the second division. Thereafter they prosecuted further studies. But in December 1954, their fathers and guardians received information from the Principal of the G. S. Hindu Intermediate College that the Examinations Committee of the appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) had cancelled the results of the respondents for the examination of 1954 and further that they had been debarred from appearing at the examination of 1955. Thereupon the respondents filed a writ petition in the High Court contending that the Committee had never afforded any opportunity to them to rebut the allegations made against them and that they were never informed about the nature of the unfair means used by them in the said examination and the first thing they came to know was the resolution of the Committee cancelling their results and debarring them from appearing in the examination of 1955. They therefore contended that they were entitled to an opportunity being afforded to them to meet the case against them of using unfair means at the examination before the appellant took action against them by cancelling their results and debarring them from appearing at the examination of 1955. The procedure thus adopted by the appellant was said to be in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as they were given no opportunity whatsoever to defend themselves and to show cause against the action contemplated against them. It was further contended that the procedure adopted by the appellant violated the provisions of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act, No. II of 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and the U. P. Education Code, and therefore, the resolution cancelling their results and debarring them from appearing in the later examination was without jurisdiction and illegal. They therefore prayed for a proper writ or order cancelling the resolution of the appellant2. The appellant opposed the application and its case was that the respondents had used unfair means at the examination and their cases were reported to the Committee under the Regulations and the Committee had acted under the powers conferred on it under the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder after a thorough inquiry. It was not disputed, however, that no opportunity had been afforded to the respondents to rebut the allegations against them in the inquiry made by the Committee which resulted in the resolution cancelling the results of the examination3. A large number of contentions appear to have been urged in the High Court; but we are here only concerned with one of them, namely, whether the respondents were entitled to a hearing before the appellant decided to cancel the results. The contention on behalf of the respondents before the learned Single Judge was that the appellant was under a duty to act judicially and therefore the respondents should have been given a hearing before any order was passed against them. The learned Single Judge held that no duty was cast on the Committee to act judicially and there was no statutory obligation on the Committee to give an opportunity to every examinee to be heard ; therefore he rejected the petition4. The respondents then went in appeal which was heard by Dayal and Brijmohan Lall JJ., who however differed. Brijmohan Lall J., was of opinion that the Committee was not required to act judicially or quasijudicially when it considered cases of this kind and was acting merely administratively; he nevertheless was of the opinion that one of the rules of natural justice contained in the maxim audi alteram partem would apply in this case, even though the Committee was acting administratively. He was therefore in favour of allowing the appeal, Dayal J., agreed with the view of Brijmohan Lall J., that in the present case no duty was cast on the Committee to act judicially and that the action of the Committee was merely administrative. He however did not agree that the Committee acted in violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as it did not give a hearing to the respondents. He was of the view that as the Committee was acting merely administratively it was not bound to give a hearing as the maxim audi alteram partem applied only to judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals. The two learned Judges also differed on two other points with which we are not concerned. Eventually they referred three questions to be answered by another learned Judge and one of these questions was whether the failure of the Committee to provide an opportunity to the respondents of being heard vitiated its order, which was of an administrative nature5. The matter then came before a third learned Judge. Agarwala J., He was doubtful whether the view of the Bench that there was no duty cast on the Committee to act judicially in the present case was correct; but as on that matter the two learned Judges were in agreement, he dealt with the case on the basis that the Committee was acting merely administratively. Even so, he came to the conclusion that the respondents were entitled to a hearing and agreed with the view of Brijmohan Lall J. Consequently, the appeal was placed before the Bench again and in accordance with the opinion of the third Judge it was allowed. Then followed an application by the appellant for leave to appeal to this Court, which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up before us.

Reasoning:
9. We must therefore proceed to examine the provisions of the Act and the Regulations framed thereunder in connection with matters of this kind to determine whether the Committee can be said to have the duty to act judicially when it deals with cases of examinees using unfair means in examination halls. Under S.7 of the Act, the Board constituted thereunder has inter alia powers to prescribe courses of instruction, to grant diplomas and certificates, to conduct examinations to admit candidates to its examinations, to publish the results of its examinations, and to do all such things as may be requisite in order to further the objects of the Board as a body constituted for regulating and supervising High School and Intermediate education. Under Section 13, the Board has power to appoint and constitute various committees, including the examinations committee, and under S.14, the Board can delegate its powers by Regulations to such committees. Section 15 gives power to the Board to make Regulations with respect to the constitution, powers and duties of committees, the conduct of examinations, and all matters which by the Act may be provided for by Regulations. Section 20 gives power to the Board and its committees to make bye-laws consistent with the Act and the Regulations10. It will be clear from the above that the Act makes no express provisions as to the powers of the committees and the procedure to be adopted by them in carrying out their duties, which are left to be provided by Regulations, and we have therefore to look to the Regulations framed under S. 15 to see what powers and duties have been conferred on various committees constituted under the Regulations. Section 13 (1) makes it incumbent on the Board to appoint the Committee and Chap. VI of the Regulations deals with the powers and duties of the Committee11. We thus see that the Committee can only carry out its duties under R. 1 (1) by judging the materials, placed before it. It is true that there is no lis in the present case, in the sense that there are not two contesting parties before the Committee and the matter rests between the Committee and the examinee; at the same time considering that materials will have to be placed before the Committee to enable it to decide whether action should be taken under R. 1(1), it seems to us only fair that the examinee against whom the Committee is proceeding should also be heard. The effect of the decision of the Committee may in an extreme case blast the career of a young student for life and in any case will put a serious stigma on the examinee concerned which may damage him in later life.The nature of misconduct which the Committee has to find under R. 1 (1) in some cases is of a serious nature, for example, impersonation, commission of fraud, and perjury; and the Committees decision in matters of such seriousness may even lead in some cases to the prosecution of the examinee in courts. Considering therefore the serious effects following the decision of the Committee and the serious nature of the misconduct which may be found in some cases under R. 1 (1), it seems to us that the Committee must be held to act judicially in circumstances as these. Though therefore there is nothing express one way or the other in the Act or the Regulations casting a duty on the Committee to act judicially, the manner of the disposal, based as it must be on materials placed before it, and the serious effects of the decision of the Committee on the examinee concerned, must lead to the conclusion that a duty is cast on the Committee to act judicially in this matter particularly as it has to decide objectively certain facts which may seriously affect the rights and careers of examinees, before it can take any action in the exercise of its power under R. 1 (1). We are therefore of opinion that the Committee when it exercises its powers under R. 1 (1) is acting quasi-judicially and the principles of natural justice which require that the other party, (namely, the examinee in this case) must be heard, will apply to the proceedings before the CommitteeThere is no doubt in our mind that considering the totality of circumstances the Committee has to act judicially when taking action under R. 1 (1). As to the manner in which it should give an opportunity to the examinee concerned to be heard, that is a matter which can be provided by Regulations or Bye-laws if necessary: As was pointed out in Local Government Board v. Alridge, 1915 A. C. 120 all that is required is that the other party should have an opportunity of adequately presenting his case. But what the procedure should be in detail will depend on the nature of the tribunal. There is no doubt that many of the powers of the Committee under Chap. VI are of administrative nature ; but where quasi-judicial duties are entrusted to an administrative body like this it becomes a quasi-judicial body for performing these duties and it can prescribe its own procedure so long as the principles of natural justice are followed and adequate opportunity of presenting his case is given to the examinee. It is not however necessary to pursue this matter further, for it is not in dispute that no opportunity whatsoever was given to the respondents in this case to give an explanation and present their case before the Committee. We are therefore of opinion that though the view of the High Court that the Committee was acting merely administratively when proceeding under R. 1 (1) is not correct, its final decision allowing the writ petition on the ground that no opportunity was given to the respondents to put forward their cases before the Committee is correct.