Case: Surya Kant Roy Vs. Imamul Hai Khan

3. The facts relating to the first question are these: Under the Bihar and Orissa Mining Settlement Act, 1920 a Board called the Mines Board of Health may be established to provide for the control and sanitation of an area within which persons employed in a mine reside and for the prevention therein of the outbreak and spread of epidemic diseases. Before the area is declared to be a mining settlement for the purposes of the Act certain prescribed formalities like receiving objections etc. have to be observed. The Board is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to hold and acquire property. It consists of not less than seven and not more than eleven members of whom not less than two and not more than four are elected by owners of mines within the mining settlement, three non-officials selected by the State Government and two or more members but not exceeding four nominated by the State Government. The Chairman of the Board is to be appointed by the State Government from among the members of the Board. A fund called "The Mining Settlement Fund" is formed for every mining settlement and the fund vests in the Board. The fund consists of sums charged by the Board under the Act from land owners etc. as also sums allotted to the Board from the State revenues; sums -borrowed by the Board under the Local Authorities Loans, Act; grants received from Local Authorities, associations and private persons etc. The Board appoints Health Officers as well as Sanitary Inspectors. The Board can impose taxes like latrine tax and also make yearly assessment. There are certain powers conferred on the State Government under the Act but they are no more than powers conferred on State Governments in respect of various local bodies. The respondent was appointed by the Government as the Chairman of the Jharia Mines Board of Health.

Reasoning:
4. We agree with the learned Judge of the High Court that it is difficult to accept the argument that the Board is wholly under the control of the State Government in all its functions. The Board levies taxes and other assessments and has got its own funds. The fact that the Government and other local authorities might make grants to the Board does not mean that all the funds of the Board are Government funds or Government property. The provisions we have set out above are enough to establish that the Board is a local authority within the meaning of that expression as defined in clause (31) of Section 3 ofthe General Clauses Act, 1897. Indeed this position does not seem to have been disputed by the Petitioner before the High Court in the course of his argument. We do not, therefore, think that the mere fact that the respondent was appointed as Chairman of the Board by the Government would make him a person holding an office under the Stateoffice held by the respondent is held under a local authority. The holding of an office of profit in it does not bring about a disqualification even if that local authority be under the control of the Government. The mere control of Government over the authority having the power to appoint, dismiss, or control the working of the officer employed by such authority does not disqualify that officer from being a candidate for election as a member of the Legislature. Therefore, the control exercised by the Government. over the Board in this case does not make the Board an organ of the Government nor does it make the respondent a person holding an office under the Government. It is, therefore, unnecessary to go into the question whetherthe office held by the respondent was an office ofprofit, though we may indicate that on the evidence available in this case we have come to the conclusion that it is not an office of profit. We are not setting out the evidence at length only because it is unnecessary for the purpose of this case.8. As regards the 2nd question the allegation-of the appellant was that the respondent taking advantage of his position as a former Cabinet Minister of the State of Bihar had procured the services of the officer-in-charge of Chas police station in arranging and holding his election meeting on 20th February, 1972 within the premises of the Chas police station and this was a corrupt practice within the meaning of sub-s. (7) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act. According to the respondent the election meeting was held in the vacant space on the southern side of the compound wall of the police station. The evidence relied upon by the appellant for proving his charge was his own and that of two of his co-villagers. The appellant was not an eye witness of this meeting and his evidence was pure hearsay. The person who is said to have informed him was not examined. The evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 was not accepted by the High Court. The police officer concerned, who was examined as R.W. 8, as well as the respondent (R.W. 10) have denied the allegation. After a careful examination of all the evidence the High Court held this charge not proved. We have gone through the evidence and see no reason to differ from the High Court on this point.9. An allegation of corrupt practice being a serious one leading not merely to the consequence of the election of the successful candidate being set aside but also of his being disqualified to stand for election for a certain period should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and we find such proof lacking in this case.