Case: Hindustan Lever Limited Vs. Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha &amp; Another

The Industrial Court based on facts pleaded before it framed the following four issues."1. Does the complainant prove that respondent has committed unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV by committing failure to implement settlement datedand the agreement arrived at under the correspondence entered into with the complainant in 19572. Whether the case is barred by limitation3.Whether the complaint is barred by principle of res judicata4. What order"The Industrial Court found all these issues in favour of the first respondent.2. In order to proceed further it is necessary to refer a few relevant facts for the purpose of deciding this case.3. The petitioner is a company and the first respondent is a Trade Union working in the petitioner company. It is alleged in the complaint filed by the first respondent before the Industrial Court that by correspondence exchanged between the parties in the year 1957 certain agreement has been reached between them. One of the conditions of the agreement was that the petitioner will not contest in any future dispute the status of the members of the field force such as salesman, sales supervisor, trade mark investigator, seed buyers etc. as workman. In other words, according to the said agreement, the status of the field force as workman will not be questioned by the petitioner in the matter of their service conditions and Industrial Tribunal or Court at Bombay will have jurisdiction to decide such matter relating to the field force of the first respondent. It is further alleged in the complaint that sometime in the year 1970 the Bombay Centre of the first respondent Sabha served a charter of demand on the petitioner company which not only pertains to the members of the Bombay branch field force but also to the other clerical staff in the petitioner companys Bombay Offices and the same came to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication and the status of the field force came to be disputed by the Company as not being workmen under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said reference is numbered as Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970. The said reference has culminated into an award by Mr. Justice Chitale holding that the members of the field force are not workmen. This award was passed onIt is to be noted that the said award was taken to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of the first respondent. It is further alleged that during the pendency of this reference the petitioner company onentered into an All India settlement on the charter of demands on behalf of the members of the field force but did not implement the same as far as the Bombay Region field force was concerned since the reference was pending adjudication before the aforesaid Tribunal of Mr. Justice Chitale. It is the further contention of the first respondent that immediately on the pronouncement of the award of Mr. Justice Chitale in Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970 the petitioner company by individual letters addressed to members of the field force and informed them that the benefit under the settlement datedhas been withdrawn and it is alleged that this withdrawal has been accepted by the individual employees.4. It has been further disclosed from the pleadings of the parties that nothing has happened or heard for a considerable period about this controversy. But onthe first respondent brought to the notice of the petitioner that in view of the agreement of 1957, the petitioner is bound to negotiate on the 1973 charter of demands pertaining to the members of the field force. In the meantime, a reference came to be filed before the Delhi Industrial Tribunal consequent on the termination of the service of the first respondents working President without a domestic enquiry. It was challenged before the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi. In that proceedings, the petitioner has taken up a stand that the reference was not maintainable because the said employee was not a workman, under the Industrial Disputes Act. This contention of the petitioner company was resisted by the first respondent contending that the letters exchanged between the petitioner and the first respondent on7, referred to above, amount to an agreement between the parties and one of the conditions of the agreement was that the petitioner company has agreed that the members of the field force are workman and, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, rejected the contention of the first respondent and ultimately the matter taken upto the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in an elaborate judgment which is reported in 1984(I) L.L.J. 388 in (The Workmen of M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd. and others v. The Management of M/s. Hindustan Lever Ltd.)1, in unequivocal terms held that the aforesaid three letters constitute a valid agreement and the said agreement continues to be valid and binding between the parties unless and until the same have been repudiated or replaced by another agreement between the parties. Construing the judgments of the Supreme Court that it gives the parties liberty to repudiate the agreement of 1957, the petitioner unilaterally repudiated the agreement by sending a letter datedAt the same time, it appears that the aforesaid judgment by the Supreme Court gave an impetus to the first respondent to revive their original claims about which the first respondent has slept over for about 13 years and by their letter datedoptimistically urged that the petitioners are bound to implement this agreement/settlement ofand to start negotiations with first respondent on the charter of demand of 1973. The petitioners did not heed to this demand. Ultimately above complaint has been filed before the Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay. As declared by the Supreme Court, the Industrial Court held that there was an agreement between the parties which recognise the status of the members of the field force of the petitioner company as workman. The Industrial Court issued followingis allowed. It is hereby declared that the respondent company has committed unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTUPULP Act, 1972. The respondent company is hereby directed to cease and desist from engaging in unfair labour practice under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTUPULP Act. The respondent is hereby further ordered and directed to take such affirmative action as to implement the provisions of the agreement of 1957 and settlement of 1971 and pay out all arrears of amounts due and payable, within the period of three months, to the members of the field force. The respondent is hereby further directed to take such affirmative action as to start negotiations with the complainant Sabha on the charter of demands, datedin order to arrive at a settlement if possible on the issues covered by the said charter of demands."

Reasoning:
We see considerable force in the argument of Mr. Singhvi as far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. Ambit and the scope of those three letters were in detail examined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. By those letters the petitioner had unmistakably conceded the status of workmen and we have no hesitation to hold that it pertains to the conditions of service. That apart, after the judgment of the Supreme Court on these letters, there is little scope for such contentions being raised at the instance of the petitioner. The Supreme Court without any pale of doubt has spoken in detail the ambit and scope of those letters constituting an agreement between the parties. Though Mr. Manohar, Counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued at length about termination of the agreement citing various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court, we are not very much impressed because it is not permissible for us to take any other stand different from what was taken by the Apex Court in view of the judgment (supra) which speaks about the conditions contained in those letters. Therefore, finding recorded on Issue No. 1 by the Tribunal warrants no interference by thiswe think that considerable importance is to be given to these long history of the case when we deal with the issue of limitation in thiswe see when Mr. Justice Chitales Award categorically declared that they are not workmen which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No, 27109/95, the first respondent was reconciled with that position and did not make any move to implement the settlement of 1971 or to enforce the letters of 1957. Only when the Supreme Court decided on the legal consequences of these letters, the first respondent become alert and filed the abovethis context we cannot appreciate the finding of the Industrial Court that theof a settlement is a continuing process. It is clear from the facts of this case, but for the Chitales Award and consequent rejection of the SLP by the Supreme Court, perhaps Industrial Court may be right in making such observations. But when a competent Court has given a finding, rightly or wrongly, and the parties have accepted it for a long time, one cannot conceive of a position that it is a continuing wrong. In the absence of a valid explanation for keeping the matter in cold storage for 13 years from 1971 to 1984 the present complaint is barred by limitation before the Industrial Court. As observed by the Industrial Court but for the Supreme Court decision the entire matter would have been considered as closed. Merely because Supreme Court has made the observation first respondent cannot save limitation.When we closely watched the conduct of the first respondent it can be seen that there was no room for any doubt that it has acquiesced on the award of Mr. Justice Chitale by keeping silence for a long time. The doctrine acquiescence is based on the conduct of the parties with knowledge of its legal rights. Acquiescence amounts to absolute or positive waiver of the rights of a person who acquiesced. Though it is quite different from delay or laches, but in the factual context of the case it is very relevant here. If a person having a right, stands by and see another deals with the rights inconsistent with that rights, watched it for considerable long time say, 12 years or more, he cannot afterwards complain. Under Indian Law of Limitation generally even rights over immovable property loses after 12 years where it was not properly exercised. Here the complainant knows that under section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 period of 3 years was prescribed for ventilating their grievance. No explanation worth consideration has been put forward by the first respondent. According to us, the Industrial Court committed serious miscarriage of justice in disposing of the issue of limitation. Under the circumstances we have no doubt that the complaint of the first respondent is barred by limitation.