Case: Church Of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai  and Others

2. The basic fact of the matter is not much in dispute3. In or about 1895, some American Missionaries established a religious institution (Church) at Valsad for propagation of protestant faith of Christian religion and to establish and manage the churches for the people professing that faith. The object of the Brethren Church was to propagate the work of the church of the brethren in western India in order to reveal Christ by means of evangelistic, educational, medical, literary, industrial school, social and charitable activities leading to the establishment of the kingdom of God. A Continuation Committee is said to have been appointed in the year 1930 by the representatives of the Brethren Church and other churches in a Round Table Conference held in New Delhi with a view to consider the modalities and other details for amalgamation of churches. The Committee is said to have worked out a broad basis for the unification of churches which was accepted by the participant churches whereupon a new committee came into being in the year 1951. The First District Church of the Brethren in India (Brethren Church) was registered as a religious society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 bearing Registration No.1202/44; the object whereof was to promote the work of the church of the brethren in Western India with the same object wherefor the church was established. Another Round Table Conference is said to have been held in the year 1951 at New Delhi resulting in appointment of a new committee known as Negotiating Committee in order to continue deliberations for the union of churches; five other associations were included in the Committee, namely, The Council of the Baptist Churches in North India, The Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church (British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church in Southern Asia and The United Church o Northern India. The Brethren Church (First District Church of the Brethren) was registered as a public trust in Gujarat bearing No.E-643, Bharuch in terms of the BPT Act. The Negotiating Committee made its final recommendations which came to be known as the 4th Plan of the Union which was published in a book entitled Plan of Church Union in North India and Pakistan; the principal recommendation of the Committee being that all the six uniting churches should be dissolved and united to become one church to be known as "The Church of Northern India" (hereinafter referred to as "the CNI) which should be the legal continuation and successor of the united churches and all the properties, assets, obligations etc. thereof would vest in or devolve on CNI. The booklet of the 4th Plan is said to have been circulated to the governing bodies of the uniting churches with a view to enable them to deliberate thereover and to take appropriate decision in that behalf4. On or about 17.02.1970, a Resolution bearing No.70/08 is said to have been passed by the majority of members for effecting the dissolution as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. The Negotiating Committee thereafter on or about 29.11.1970 took a decision to formally inaugurate the CNI at Nagpur. The Brethren Church allegedly placed the said Resolution No.70/08 at the altar wherein it was explicitly affirmed that the CNI shall be deemed to be the legal continuation and successor of the brethren church and the rights, titles, claims, estates and the interests of the church together with its privileges and obligations shall vest in the CNI as its legal heir on or from the date of inauguration. The Church of North India Trust Association was registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956, in the year 1976. The original defendant Nos. 1 to 4 who were said to be initially part of the CNI and were parties to the resolution dated 17.02.1970 raised a contention that the Brethren Church continued to exist. They started obstructing the functioning of the CNI, and in particular the worship in churches, and asserted that the First Brethren Church had not been dissolved and continued and they represented the same5. The original plaintiffs, namely, Ambelal Okarial Patel, Shantilal Lakshmichand Purani, Bishop T.L. Christachari and Samuel Nagarji Bhagat (since deceased) said to be the former office bearers of the Brethren Church filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Bharuch, marked as Civil Suit No.72 of 19796. The CNI was impleaded as defendant No. 5 therein, although no relief thereagainst was claimed contending that it was a necessary and/or a proper party. The Brethren Church were not made parties in the said suit. It is stated at the Bar that the said churches were impleaded at a later stage of the proceedings but the said applications were later on dismissed. The original defendant No. 4 in his written statement filed in the said suit took a categorical stand that there had been no dissolution of the Brethren Church and their separate entity was not lost. According to the said defendant they were temporarily suspended till it was revived again and, thus, they were entitled to work for and on behalf of the Brethren Church. In the said proceedings, certain interim orders were passed wherewith we are not concerned. However, with a view to complete the narration of facts, we may notice that the CNI filed an application for its registration before the Charity Commissioner in terms of the provisions of the BPT Act, which was granted by an order dated 12.5.1980 with effect from 19.11.1971. The CNI thereafter filed a change report before the Charity Commissioner on or about 15.1.1981. Admittedly, the said application has not yet been disposed of7. While things stood thus, the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as a party in the suit and in its written statement a plea was raised that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in terms of Section 80 of the BPT Act contending :8. The learned Civil Judge by judgment and decree dated 31.3.1984 decreed the suit; findings in support whereof would be noticed a little later9. An appeal was preferred thereagainst on or about 4.5.1984 by the original defendants in the Court of the District Judge, Bharuch, which was marked as RCA No.72 of 1984. By judgment and decree dated 11.8.1986, the said appeal was allowed whereagainst the CNI (Appellant herein) preferred a Second Appeal before the Gujarat High Court, which was marked as Second Appeal No.303 of 1986. On or about 29.3.2002, the Charity Commissioner is said to have filed a detailed affidavit in support of the Change Report No.665/81. By reason of the impugned judgment and order dated 21.3.2003, the said Second Appeal was dismissed10. Hence the Appellant is before us.

Reasoning:
42. The question as regard ouster of a jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be construed having regard to the Scheme of the Act as also the object and purport it seeks to achieve. The law in this regard is no longer res integra43. A plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court must be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed dehors the factual averments made in the plaint. The rules of pleadings postulate that a plaint must contain material facts. When the plaint read as a whole does not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can be entertained by a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure45. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not(c) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals(d) When the provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit(e) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies(f) Questions of the correctness of the assessment, apart from its constitutionality, are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry(g) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply[See also Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. Krishna Kant and Others (1995) 5 SCC 75 , Dwarka Prasad Agarwal vs. Ramesh Chand Agarwal - (2003) 6 SCC 220 , Sahebgouda vs. Ogeppa (2003) 6 SCC 151 , Dhruv Green Field Ltd. vs. Hukam Singh (2002) 6 SCC 416  and Swamy Atmananda & Ors. Vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors, [2005 (4) SCALE 116]46. The same, however, would not mean that in a given case if the court has the jurisdiction to determine a part of the relief claimed, it will not confine itself thereto and reject the plaint in its entirety. For the purpose of determination of question as to whether the suit is barred, the averments made in the plaint are germane. [See Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 137 ]61. We have noticed hereinbefore that as regard the correctness or otherwise of functioning of the congregation of Ankleshwar and Valsad had been the subject matter of complaints before the authorities under the BPT Act62. One of the causes of action for instituting the suit is said to be constitution of a special committee by the defendant Nos. 1 to 4; resolution dated 12th November, 1978 was passed and the obstructions created by them to the plaintiffs and other members of the Pastorates through the actions of the Plaintiffs and other members of the Pastorates in the name of the former Brethren Church63. The plaintiffs made their position clear when they categorically stated in paragraph 21 that the suit inter alia involved questions as to the rights of property of the former Brethren Church65. The plaint nowhere suggests that the society and the trust had ever been treated as two different entities. No case has been made in the plaint to the effect that the society as registered under the Societies Registration Act plays any role or discharges any function which is not done by the trustees of the trust. It also does not appear from a perusal of the plaint that the society and the trust comprises of different persons or for different functions to perform. In fact in paragraph 2 of the plaint it is accepted that the Church which was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act was a public trust as defined under Section 2(13) of the BPT Act. The ownership of movable and immovable properties at the places mentioned in the plaint is referable to the congregations under the Brethren Church. It is not alleged that whereas the properties belong to the trust it was managed by the society. The plaint furthermore does not disclose that the decision as regard dissolution of the churches and congregation of Brethren Church had been taken by anybody other than the trustees. The committees constituted for the aforementioned purpose, viz., Continuation Committee and Negotiating Committee, evidently were represented by the authorities of the congregations and not of any society. A decision, as would appear from the averments made in paragraph 6 of the plaint, to dissolve six uniting Churches and merge the same into one, viz., the Church of Northern India (C.N.I.) so as to make the latter a legal continuation and successor of the United Churches and all the properties, assets, obligations, etc. of these uniting churches would vest in or dissolve on C.N.I. The very fact that a decision having been taken as regard the properties, assets, obligations of the United Churches, the same would mean that they would vest in the trust to be created for the said purpose and not for the benefit of any society66. We are not oblivious of the fact that the Resolution adopted in the meeting held on 17th February, 1968 allegedly fulfilled all the requirements for such resolution as provided in the Societies Registration Act but it is now beyond any controversy that the society having not owned any property, their transfer in favour of a new society was impermissible in law. In terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration act, all properties would vest in the trustees and only in case in absence of vesting of such properties in trustees the same would be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such property. In this case, it is clear that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in the governing body of the society67. There is nothing on record to show that the concerned churches were being managed by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act. In any event, it stands accepted that the dispute as regard dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs should have been referred to the principal court of original civil jurisdiction68. The suit in question also does not conform to the provisions of Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act68. Section 20 of the Act provides that the societies enumerated therein can only be registered under the said Act70. Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the Act, the Society is not dissolved. Even assuming that the society stands dissolved in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, the same would not ipso facto mean that the properties could be adjusted amongst the members of the society in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Concededly, the properties of the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested in such trust. Such a provision, we have noticed hereinbefore, also exist in the BPT Act. Thus, only because the society has been dissolved, ipso facto the properties belonging to the trust cannot be said to have been adjusted. The Appellants, thus, we have noticed hereinbefore, have averred in the plaint that the suit relates to the property of the trust and their administration. If the properties of the churches did not belong to the society, the Appellant herein cannot claim the same as their successor. The plaint has to be read meaningfully. So done, it leads to the only conclusion that the dispute was in relation to the management of the churches as religious trust and not as a society. Even if it is contended that the administration of the property would mean the properties of the Brethren Church both as a trust and as a society, still then having regard to the legal position, as discussed supra, the property belonging exclusively to the trust, the suit will not be maintainable74. The finding of the learned Trial Judge on that count is apparently wrong. The learned counsel for the Appellants also did not raise any contention before us that having regard to the provisions contained in Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Societies Registration Act shall prevail over the BPT Act75. In fact the Appellants have categorically admitted that the Memorandum of Association of the Society itself became the deed of trust. It also stands admitted that only with a view to have one body to administer and manage the properties, the trust so created by the society was also registered. It is not a case where the trust was created for the benefit of the society. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show the mode and manner of the management and control of the trust property. [See Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) and another, AIR 1962 SC 458 , Dharam Dutt and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 712 , para 52 and Illachi Devi (Dead) By LRs. and Others Vs. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India and Others, (2003) 8 SCC 413 , paras 21 and 22]76. In Athmanathaswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar [AIR 1965 SC 338 ], this Court did not permit a new question to be raised. In this case also, a new contention has been raised contrary to the pleadings that the society and the trust are different entities77. We have noticed hereinbefore that the BPT Act provides for finality and conclusiveness of the order passed by the Charity Commissioner in Sections 21(2), 22(3), 26, 36, 41(2), 51(4) and 79(2)78. In view of the decision of this Court in Dhulabhai (supra) such finality clause would lead to a conclusion that civil courts jurisdiction is excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a civil suit. In this case, we are not concerned with a dispute as regard absolute title of the trust property. We are also not concerned with the question as regard creation of any right by the trust in a third party which would be otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also not a case where the plaintiffs made a complaint that the provisions of the BPT Act were not complied with or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In fact no order has been passed on the Appellants application for changes in the entries made in the registers maintained under Section 17 of the Act. The BPT Act provides for express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It in various provisions contained in Chapter IV a power of inquiry and consequently a power of adjudication as regard the list of movable and immovable trust property, the description and particulars thereof for the purpose of its identification have been conferred. In fact, the trustee of a public trust is enjoined with a statutory duty to make an application for registration wherein all necessary descriptions of movable and immovable property belonging to the trust including their description and particulars for the purpose of identification are required to be furnished. Section 19 provides for an inquiry for registration with a view to ascertaining inter alia the mode of succession to the office of the trustee as also whether any property is the property of such trust. It is only when the statutory authority satisfies itself as regard the genuineness of the trust and the properties held by it, an entry is made in the registers and books, etc. maintained in terms of Section 17 of the Act in consonance with the provisions of Section 21 thereof. Such an entry, it will bear repetition to state, is final and conclusive. Changes can be brought about only in terms of Section 22 thereof79. A change notice having been given, it would now be for the appropriate authority to consider the matter and if a change has occurred, a finding is required to be arrived which must contain the reasons therefor. The defendants are disputing that any such change in accordance with law was effected. An order passed by Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is appealable. Yet again, when an amendment is made in the entry in the register, the same would be final and conclusive. Even a power exists for holding a further inquiry82. Prayer (a) in the plaint is for a declaration. Such declaration cannot be granted by a civil court as regard succession of the District Church of Brethren as the same was a religious trust registered under the BPT Act83. Prayer (b) of the plaint also could not have been granted, as the question as to whether the applicant is the legal continuation and successor of the First District Church of Brethren is a matter which would fall for exclusive determination of Charity Commissioner keeping in view the provisions of the deed of trust as regard its succession. It would necessarily follow that whether the First Appellant became a legal successor of the properties held by the First District Church of Brethren could not also have been granted. The decision and resolution purported to have been adopted by the Synod and Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all churches or not would again be a question which could have been gone into by the Charity Commissioner as the same had direct bearing not only with the administration and management of the Church registered with it but also related to the properties held by it. Such a decision of the Charity Commissioner is again final and conclusive subject to the decision of the appellate authority, viz., Bombay Revenue Tribunal84. Grant of prayer (c) for perpetual injunction would also give rise to adjudication on the question as to whether the Appellant herein had the legal right to own the properties of the First District Church of Brethren and administer or manage the same although at the relevant time it was not registered trust and although no amendment had been effected in the registers and books maintained by the Charity Commissioner in terms of Section 17 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act. The plaintiffs with a view to obtain an order of injunction furthermore were required to establish that they could file a suit for enforcement of right of the Appellant as a religious trust and such a legal right vests either in the plaintiff or in the Appellant herein indirectly. Such a prayer, related to the possession of the property, comes squarely within the purview of the BPT Act. If the question as regard recovery of possession of the property belonging to a public trust squarely falls within the purview of Section 50 of the Act, had such application been filed before the Charity Commissioner he was required to go into the question as to whether the plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and whether a consent should be given to them to maintain a suit. Only when, inter alia, such consent is granted, a suit could have been filed in terms of Section 51 of the Act. In the event of refusal to give consent, the persons interested could have preferred an appeal85. Yet again the question as regard existence of a trust is a matter which squarely falls within the purview of Section 79 of the Act86. We have no doubt in our mind that the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as a party at a later stage of the suit only with a view to fulfill the requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 50 of the Act90. The provisions of the Act and the Scheme thereof leave no manner of doubt that the Act is a complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person interested in the trust to put forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner who is competent to go into the question and to prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Act clearly points out that a third party cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the rigours of the provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be different if the property is not a trust property in the eye of law. The civil courts jurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to a jurisdictional question. If a property did not validly vest in a trust or if a trust itself is not valid in law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction to determine the said question91. With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the court comes to the conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated. Section 26 of the Act must be read in that context as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedly barred. Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to the nature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that civil court has no jurisdiction, Section 26 per force will have no application whatsoever106. The principle enunciated in each of the decision laid down relate to the fact situation obtaining therein. In each case indisputably the lis arose for determination of a question relating to interpretation of one or the other clause enumerated in different provisions of the BPT Act which come either within the exclusive jurisdiction of the statutory authorities or otherwise. The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in relation to a matter, unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. In this case, having regard to the nature of the lis, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly barred.