Case: National &amp; Grindlays Bank Ltd Vs. The Municipal Corporation Of Greaterbombay

2. The appellant is a banking company incorporated in the United Kingdom and has established places of business in India. The appellant is the sole trustee of the estate of the late Mr. F. E. Dinshaw and in that capacity is the owner of a plot of land at Manchubhai Road, Malad, Greater Bombay in the State of Maharashtra, bearing No. P. Ward No. 6418, Street No. 299B. The said plot of land had been leased by the former trustee of the estate to one Mr. R. R. Pande (hereinafter referred to as the lessee) since a number of years at a monthly rent of Rs. 12.50. The lessee had constructed at his own cost a tiled house on the said plot of land. The Malad area merged into Greater Bombay on lst February, 1957. Upto the date of the merger the Malad District Municipality was assessing and levying taxes on the land and the structure separately and recovering the same from the landlord and the tenant. After the merger, the Bombay Municipal Corporation issued a notice to the appellant under Section 167 of the Act informing him that the assessment book had been amended by inserting the name of the appellant and that the rateable value of the house had been fixed at Rs.Being aggrieved by this order the appellant preferred an appeal to the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court Bombay under Section 217 of the Act. The appeal was dismissed by the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court by his order dated 3rd August, 1960. The appellant took the matter in further appeal to the Bombay High Court. The appeal was heard by Mr. Justice Patel and was dismissed on the 14th January, 1964. The learned Judge felt that he was bound by the decision of Chagla, C. J. and Shah, J., in Ramji Keshavji v. Municipal Corporation for Greater Bombay, (1954) 56 Bom LR 132. The appellant thereafter preferred a Letters Patent Appeal No. 28 of 1964 which was summarily dismissed by Chief Justice H. K. Chainani and Mr. Justice Gokhale on 25th March, 1964. The present appeal is brought by special leave from the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 25th March, 1964.

Reasoning:
In our opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the respondent is well founded and must be accepted as correct. In the first place, the language of Section 146 (2) indicates that the Legislature contemplated that in a case where the land and the building are owned by different persons there should be a composite assessment of property tax. The reason is that in Section 146 (1) and (2) the word premises is used in contrast to Section 146 (3) where the words land and building are separately mentioned. In Section 154 (1) of the Act again, the Legislature uses the expression building or land. Then Section 155 provides for the right of the Commissioner to call information from, the owner or the occupier in order to enable him to determine the rateable value of any building or land and the person primarily liable for the payment of any property tax levied in respect thereof. Section 156 provides that the Commissioner shall maintain a book to be called the assessment book which book is to contain among other things a list of all lands and building.Therefore, the scheme of Section 146 is that when the land is let and the tenant has built upon the land, there should be a composite assessment of tax upon the land and building taken together. We are further of opinion that in the case of such a composite unit the primary liability of assessment of tax is intended to be on the lessor of the land under Section 146 (2) (a) of the Act.We shall, however, assume in favour of the appellant that the meaning of Section 146 (2) of the Act is obscure and that it is possible to interpret it as throwing the primary liability for payment of property tax upon the lessee who has constructed a building on the land.Even upon that assumption we think that the view of the law expressed by the Bombay High Court in this case ought not to be interfered with. The reason is that in a case where the meaning of an enactment is obscure, the Court may resort to contemporary construction, that is the construction which the authorities have put upon it by their usage and conduct for a long period of time.The principle applicable is "optima legum interpres est consuetudo": 2 Co Rep 81. InOhlsons case, The Queen v. Commrs. of Inland Revenue, (1891) 1 QB 485,489, in dealing with the interpretation of Section 39 of the Pawnbrokers Act, 1872, Stephen, J.,weighs with me very greatly in coming to the present conclusion is the practice of the Inland Revenue Commissioners for the past sixteen years. So long ago as 1874 this very point was decided by Sir Thomas Henry, for whose decisions we all have very great respect; and the least that can be said with regard to the case before him is that he pointedly called the attention of the commissioners to the case - the learned Magistrate having offered to state a case - an offer refused by the commissioner, who by their refusal must be taken to have acquiesced in the decision. That is a very strong contemporaneous exposition of the meaning of thesame principle was referred to by Lord Blackburn in ClydeNavigation Trustees v. Laird, (1883) 8 AC 658,The question in dispute in that case was whether the Clyde Navigation Consolidation Act, 1858 (repealing eight prior Acts) imposed navigation dues on timber floated up the Clyde in logs chained together. From 1858 to 1882 dues had been levied on this class of timber without resistance from the owners and some Judges in the Court of Session suggested that this non-resistance might be considered in construing the statute. On this point Lord Blackburnthink that submission raises a strong prima facie ground for thinking that there must exist some legal ground on which they (the owners) could not resist. And I think a Court should be cautious, and not decided unnecessarily that there is no such ground. If the Lord President (Inglis) means no more than this when he calls it contemporanea expositio of the statutes which is almost irresistible, I agree with him. I do not think that he means that enjoyment at least for any period short of that which gives rise to prescription, if founded on a mistaken construction of a statute, binds the Court so as to prevent it from giving the true construction. If he did, I should not agree with him, for whom I know of no authority, and am not aware of any principle, for so saying".In our opinion, the principle of contemporanea expositio applies to the present case. The Act was passed in the year 1888 and there appears to be a practice followed by the Bombay Municipal Corporation for a very long time of treating the land and the building constructed upon it as single unit and charging the property tax upon the owner of the land in a case where the land is let for a period of less than one year to a tenant who has constructed a building thereon (see Ramji Keshavjis case, (1954) 56 from LR 1132 (supra) ).