Case: Hindustan Brown Boveri, Limited Vs. Their Workmen and Another

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the labour court, Rohtak, in Reference No. 26 of 1965. The labour court held that the domestic inquiry held by theagainst its two workmen, Samunder Lal and Arjan Singh, was a proper inquiry and the findings against the two workmen were valid. But it held that the companys works manager had to power to direct dismissal of the one and demotion of the other as under the standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946, it was the company and not its works manager who had the authority to pass such orders.

Reasoning:
In view of the clear distinction drawn in these definitions it is not possible to say that the company includes its officers. Apart from this distinction, it appears from the scheme of the standing orders that wherever a certain duty or power is sought to be entrusted to the company of its officers the standing orders say so in express terms. Thus standing orders 3 empowers the manager or the general manager in his discretion to recruit persons in the companys service at Faridabad. Standing order 12(1) authorizes the general manager or the manager or a person authorized by him to great leave to a workman depending on the exigencies of work. The procedure for such leave is by way of an application to the general manager or manager or the person authorized byfollows that the powers to pass an order of dismissal and of the lesser punishment in lieu of dismissal are both vested in the company and not in any of its other authorities. Broadly stated, the scheme of the standing orders seems to be that matters ofroutine are entrusted to the manager or the general manager or a person authorized by him, in the present case to the works managers, in the absence of any officer designated as manager or general manager, while matters such as those involving change in the conditions of work which are likely to raise industrial disputes have been retained with the company. The company of course acts through its officers where it empowers any of them to do so. But in the absence of any such delegation it is the company and not its works manager who can exercise the power of punishment either under standing order 23 or standing order 27. The contention that the expression "company" in standing order 2(a) includes the works manager and therefore the works manager was competent to pass the aforesaid orders is not tenable.The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act was passed for requiring employers in industrial establishments to define conditions of employment underprovisions show that the purpose of the Act is to have for each industrial establishment standing orders laying down conditions of work for the employees therein and ensuring security ofas provided by standing orders 23 and 27, it is that company which is given the power to pass order of punishment in respect of both minor and majorapplication is in substance one for leading additional evidence to establish thesaid to have been executed by the company in favour of its works manager though it is in the guise of raising an additional ground. We must therefore be guided by thoseprinciples under which only additional evidence is allowed to be adduced at the stage of the hearing of anwhere such delegation is properly made, the delegate can validly discharge the duty and exercise the power delegated to him. However, it is undisputed that the company failed to produce theand allowed the labour court as also the respondents to remain in ignorance ofalready stated, the point as to the existence of thewas raised for the first time in the application for leave to raise an additional plea filed after the special leave petition was lodged. Even at that stage it failed to annex along with that application theand contented itself with producing some extracts from it.Now, the principles on which the appellate Court permits additional evidence areIt is quite clear that this is not a case where the company can avail itself of any of those principles. There is no manner of doubt that the company was negligent in not producing the document. This is therefore, not a case where the company not produce this additional evidence or was prevented from doing so, or that it has now discovered a fresh piece of evidence.