Case: Prag Ice and Oil Mills and Another Vs. Union of India

New Delhi, the 30th September 1977S. O. WHEREAS the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary and expedient so to do for securing equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, of mustard oil;NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by sect ion 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), the Central Government hereby makes the following orders namely:1. Short title, extent and commencement. (1)This Order may be called the Mustard Oil (Price Control) Order, 1977(2) I t extends to the whole of India(3) It shall come into force at oncen this Order, dealer means a person engaged in the business of the purchase, sale or storage for sale of mustard oil3. Price at which a dealer may sell.No dealer shall, either by himself or by any person on his behalf, sell or offer to sell any mustard oil at a retail price exceeding Rs. 10/Joint Secretary to the Govt. of IndiaThe order WAS passed in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Central Government by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This provision lays down:3(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices, or for securing any essential commodity for the defence of India or the efficient conduct of military operations it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohibiting the production. supply and distribution thereof and trade and commerce therein.(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by subsection (1), an order made thereunder may provide(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx(c) for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold;(d) for regulating by licences, permits or otherwise the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of, any essential commodity;(e) for prohibiting the withholding from sale of any essential commodity ordinarily kept for sale;(f) for requiting any person holding in stock, or engaged in the production, or in the business of buying or selling, of any essential commodity,(a) to sell the whole or a specified part of. the quantity held in stock or produced or received by him, or(b) in the case of any such commodity which is likely to be produced or received by him, to sell the whole or a specified part of such commodity when produced or received by him to the Central Government or a Stat e Government or an officer or agent of such Government or to a Corporation owned or controlled by such Government or to such other person or class of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the ordern order made under this clause in relation to foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils, may, having regard to the estimated production, in the concerned area, of such foodgrains, edible oilseeds and edible oils, fix the quantity to be sold by the producers in such area and may also fix, or provide for the fixation of, such quantity on a graded basis, having regard to the aggregate of the area held by, or under the cultivation of, the producersr the purpose of this clause, production with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions includes manufacture of edible oils and sugar;We are not concerned here with other provisions of section 3 (2)Section 3(3), which will be relevant for the purposes of interpretation, runs as follows: 3 (3) Where any person sells any essential commodity in compliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of(2), there shall be paid to him the price therefore as hereinafter provided(a) where the price can, consistently with the controlled price, if any, fixed under this section, be agreed upon, the agreed price;(b) where no such agreement can be reached, the price calculated with reference to the controlled price, if any;(c) where neither clause (a) nor clause (b) applies, the price calculated at the market rate prevailing in the locality at the date of saleAgain, section 3A lays down:3A(1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for controlling the rise in prices, or preventing the hoarding, of any foodstuff in any locality, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that notwithstanding anything contained in(3), the price at which the foodstuff shall be sol d in the locality in compliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of(ii) Any notification issued under this subsection shall remain in force for such period not exceeding three months as may be specified in the notification(hi) Where, after the issue of a notification under this, any person sells foodstuff of the kind specified therein and in the locality so specified, in compliance with an order made with reference to clause (f) of(2), there shall be paid to the seller as the price therefore(a) where the price can, consistently with the controlled price of the foodstuff, if any, fixed under this section, be agreed upon, the agreed) where no such agreement can be reached, the price calculated with reference to the controlled price, if any;(c) where neither clause (a) nor clause (b) applies, the price calculated with reference to the average market rate prevailing in the locality during the period of three months immediately preceding the date of the notification(iv) For the purposes ofe (c) of clause (iii), the average market rate prevailing in the locality shall be determined by an officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf, with reference to the prevailing market rates for which published figures are available in respect of that locality or of a neighbouring locality and the average market rate so determined shall be final and shall not be called in question in any courts (3B) and (3C, ) w ill also require consideration in order to arrive at the correct meaning of section 3(2). They read as follows(3B) Where any person is required, by an order made with reference to clause (f) of subsection (2), to sell to the Central Government or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Government or to a Corporation owned or controlled by such Government, an y grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils in relation to which no notification has been issued under(3A), or such notification having been issued has ceased to be in force, there shall be paid to the person concerned notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in(3), an amount equal to the procurement price of such foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils, as the case may be specified by the State Government, with the previous approval of the Central Government having regard to( a) the controlled price, if any, fixed under this section or by or under any other law for the time being in force for such grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils;(b) the general crop prospects;(d) the recommendations, if any, of the Agricultural grains, edible oilseeds or edible oils available at reasonable prices to the consumers, particularly the vulnerable section of the consumers; and(d) the recommendations, if any, of the Agricultural Prices Commission with regard to the price of the concerned grade or variety of foodgrains, edible Oilseeds or edible oils(3C) Where any producer is required by an Order made with reference to clause (f) of subsection (2) to sell any kind of sugar (whether to the Central Government or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Government or to any other person or class of persons and either no notification in respect of such sugar has been issued under sub section (3A) or any such notification, having been issued hag ceased to remain in force by efflux of time, then, notwithstanding anything contained in(3), there shall be paid to that producer an amount therefore which shall be calculated with reference to such price of sugar as the Central Government may, by order, (determine, having regard to(a) the minimum price, if any, fixed for sugarcane by the Central Government under this, section;(b) the manufacturing cost of sugar;(c) the duty or tax, if any, paid or payable thereon; and(d) the securing of a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar, and different prices ma y be determined from time to time for different areas or for different factories or for different kinds of sugarthe purposes of this sub section, producer means a person carrying on the business of manufacturing sugarIt is necessary to keep other clauses of section 3 also in ones mind to get a true picture of the statutory context of the power of price control. The drastic measures which the Central Government may adopt, extending to virtually taking over of management of appointing Authorised Controllers of particular undertakings, so as to carry out the objects stated in section 3(1) of the Act, and the mechanism of control visualised to ensure due and proper exercise of the statutory powers are also very significant. The provisions containing these) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary so to do for maintaining or increasing the production and supply of an essential commodity, it may, by order, authorise any person (hereinafter referred to as an authorized controller) to exercise, with respect to the whole or any art of any such undertaking engaged in the production and supply of the commodity as may be specified in the order such functions of control as may be provided therein. and so long as such order is in force with respect to any undertaking or part thereof,a) the authorized controller shall exercise his functions in accordance with any instructions given to him by the Central Government, so, however, that he shall not have any power to give any direction inconsistent with the provisions of any enactment or any instrument determining the functions of the persons in charge of the management of the undertaking, except in so far as may be specifically provided by the order; and(b) the undertaking or part shall be carried on in accordance with any directions given by the authorized controller under the provisions of the order, and any person having any functions of management in relation to the undertaking or part shall comply with any such directions3(5) An order made under this section shall,(a) in the case of a n order of a general nature or affecting a class of persons, be notified in the Official Gazette; and(b) in the case of an order directed to a specified individual be served on such individual(i) by delivering or tendering it to that individual, or(ii) if it cannot be so delivered or tendered, by affixing it on the outer door or so me other conspicuous part of the premises in which that individual lives, and a written report thereof shall be prepared and witnessed by two persons living in the neighbourhood.3 (6) Every order made under this section by the Central Government or by any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament as soon as may be, after it is madeIt has also to be remembered that if the mechanism of price/, control of some essential commodities fails, there is under our Constitution, with its socialistic orientation and objectives, the provision in Article 19 (6) (ii) for the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, , whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwiseThe petitioners assail the control order on four grounds: firstly, that it violates the fundamental rights of the petitioners to property under Article 19 (1) (f) and to carry on their trade and business guaranteed by Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution; secondly, that the petitioners are denied the benefits of Article 14 of the Constitution; thirdly, that the order is hit by Article 301 of the Constitution; and, fourthly, that the Central Order is outside the scope of section 3 of the ActWe need not consider Article 301 o f the Constitution as the petitions do not, beyond citing the provision, set out any facts to show how this Article is involved. This Article is meant for protectinge as well as intrastate freedom of trade, commerce, and intercourseParliament may by law impose such restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the, territory of India as may be required in the public interestAlthough, Article 302 does not speak of reasonable restrictions, yet, it is evident that restrictions contemplated by it must bear a reasonable nexus with the need to serve public interest. It the tests of Section 3 of the Act are satisfied by an Order, it could not fail to serve public interest. Hence, from this point of view also, it is enough if we consider whether the Control Order falls within section 3 of the Act. It was evidently for this reason that, beyond mentioning Article 301, counsel for the petitioners did not, quite rightly, advance much argument to show how Article 301 is involved here. We will, therefore, not consider it any more here.It was, however, vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Control Order is assailable for violating Article 14 and 19(1) (f) and (g) despite the fact that the Act itself was placed in 1976 in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. The result of placing it there by a constitutional amendment is that section 3 of the Act became free from any limitations based on the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. Article 31B, providing for a removal of the protection to fundamental rights given by Part III of our Constitution, lays down:31B. Validation of certain Acts and RegulationsWithout prejudice to the generality. of the provisions contained in article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in forceIt is evident that Article 31B protects only Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule from the vice of invalidity for inconsistency with provisions of Part III of the Constitution but not anything done or t o be done in future under any of the provisions of any Act so specified, such as an order passed under section 3 of the Act.,If section 3 of the Act, which was held in Shri Hari Kishan Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh([1955] 1 SCR380.) to pass the tests o f validity imposed by articles 14 and 19 (1) (f) and (g), read with articles 19 (5) and (6), a Control Order passed under section 3 would also be required to pass these tests as its scope could not be wider than that of the provisions which authorises its promulgation. A delegate or derivative power could not rise higher or travel beyond the source of that power from which it derives its authority and force. If Baglas case (supra) is good law (no party has questioned its correctness) Artic les 14 and 19(1) (f) and (g) could be deemed to be, if one may so put it, written into section 3 of the Act itself. They would control the scope of orders which could be passed under it. That is, undoubtedly the way in which guarantees of fundamental rights could and should function if the Act containing section 3 itself had not been placed in the Ninth Schedule so as to take, away , be guaranteed of fundamental rights from the substance of it.The question of interpretation before us is: What is the effect of putting the Act in the Ninth Schedule upon Control Orders passed under section 3 of the Act? The answer to this question must necessarily depend upon the effect of such a change of the legal position upon the provisions of section 3 itself which authorise control orders passed under it. If the effect was to widen the orbit of section 3 of the Act or to remove the limitations put by Article 14 and 19 upon the exercise of powers under it, the logical and natural result would be to enlarge also the scope or sweep of the orders passed under it. But, if it has no such effect upon section 3 of the Act itself, orders passed under it would continue to be subject to provisions of section 3 of the Act as controlled by Articles 14 and 19 of our Constitution so that they will have to satisfy what may be described as a dual test: firstly that of provisions of section 3 of the Act itself; and, secondly, that of provisions of Chapter III o f the Constitution containing fundamental rightsOn September 30, 1977, the Government of India in its Ministry of Civil Supplies and Cooperation issued the Mustard Oil (Price Control) Order 1977, in exercise of the power conferred by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955. The Price Control Order provides by clause 3 that no dealer shall either by himself or by any person on his behalf sell or offer to sell any mustard oil at a retail price exceeding Rs. 10/per kilogram, exclusive of the cost of container but inclusive of taxes. Clause 2 defines a dealer to mean a person engaged in the business of purchase, sale, or storage for sale of mustard oilThe Price Control Order was challenged in this Court by several , dealers on the ground, mainly that it violates articles 14, 19 (1 ) (f) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. Article 301 was cited but not argued upon with any seriousness.

Reasoning:
But it makes no distinction whatsoever between any grants of powers and their exercise. Powers are granted or conferred so as to be exercised and not to be kept in cold storage for purpose s of some kind of display only as though they were exhibits in a show case not meant for actual use. The whole object of a protection conferred upon powers meant for actual use is to protect their use against attacks upon their validity based upon provisions of Part 111. If , his be the correct position, it would, quite naturally and logically, follow that their use is what is really protected.In practice, it is theexercise of power which is generally assailed and not the mere conferment of it which raises the somewhat different question of legislative competence. Indeed, the Ninth Schedule does not provide any protection at all against attacks based upon either the vice of excessive delegation or w ant of legislative compete defects which could be said to vitiate the grant of powers despite their place in the Ninth Schedule. But, questions of conflict with fundamental rights and of transgression of Legitimate or reasonable, limit.% upon their exercise arise when citizens complain of unreason. able impediments to the exercise of their fundamental rights. The distinction between protection to a mere grant of powers and to their exercise, therefore, seems specious in the context of the protection. It cannot explain why, if section 3 is protected by the Ninth Schedule. the exercise of power granted by it, which manifests itself. in control orders, is not protected. It would be so protected, if at all, not because the orders to be made in future, as such are protected, but because the power actually conferred and found in existence in section 3 is protected. The protection is given to a power which is specified and in existence which has to be used of certain purposes and not to what may be specified in futureIf orders passed under section 3 of the Act also get a protection it would be what may be described as a derivative protection so long as the orders are covered by section 3 of the Act. It is available only so long as and because the source of their authorityWe do not think that we need deal with American cases in price fixation such as Leo Nebbia v. People of the State of New York(291 U.S. (78 Law. En.) 502), where the guarantee of due process against capricious action was involved. in this country, such guarantees in regard to rights of property or to carry on industry or trade or business could only arise by reason of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution which it, excluded here because of the protection conferred upon section 3 of the Act by the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. I may, however, mention that in Permian Basin Area Rate cases (20 L. Ed. 2d. p. 312.), where the majority of learned judges of the U.S. Supreme Court laid down, inter alia, with regard to price fixation by a body of experts of Federal Power Commission required to proceed, that in order to over turn the Commissions judgment the petitioners must undertake the heavy burden of making a convincing showing that it is invalid, because it is unjust and unreasonable in its consequences. That was a case in which a Commission was charged with a duty to fix rates in accordance with certain principles after taking evidence and hearing parties effected. Nevertheless, the duty of the petitioners was held to extend to demonstrating the unreasonableness and injustice of the consequences. A fortiori, patent injustice and unreasonable injury to the interests of consumers must be shown if a measure of price control, in the nature of either legislative or purely administrative action, is assailed. So long as the action taken is not so patently unjust and unreasonable as to lead to the irresistible conclusion that it could not fall within section 3(1) of the Act it cannot be set aside or declared invalid. The test has to be that of consequences on objects sought by section 3 ( 1 ) of the Act. Judged by this test we think that the Order of 30th September, 1977, fell within the purview of section 3 of the Act and it has served , its purposes.For reasons given above, the order of dismissal of Writ Petitions already pass ed by us on 23rd November, 1977 is, in our opinion, fully justifiedThe argument that the Price Control Order offends against the right to property and the right to carry on trade or business requires for its appreciation and decision the awarene ss that by the 40th Amendment passed in 1976, the Essential Commodities Act was placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution as item 125. One of the main contentions of the Union Government in answer to the petitioners challenge to the constitutionality of the Price Control Order is that since the Act, by reason of its being placed in the Ninth Schedule, is immune from attack on the ground that its provisions violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, the Price Control Order which is but a creature of the Act must enjoy the same immunity. This contention has found favour with the learned Chief Justice, Shri M. H. Beg but, with respect, we are unable to share his view.Article 3 1 A of the Constitution saves laws which provide for matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) thereof from a challenge under articles 14, 19 or 31 notwithstanding anything contained in article 13 of the Constitution. Article 31A which w as introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, validates certain Acts and Regulations providing that without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void, or ever to have become void, on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of Part III. On a plain reading of this article it seems to us impossible to accept that the protective umbrella of the Ninth Schedule takes in its ever widening wings not only the Acts and Regulations specified therein but also Orders and Notifications issued under those Acts and Regulations. Article 31B constitutes a grave encroachment on fundamental rights and doubtless as it may seem that it is inspired by a radiant social philosophy, it must be construed as strictly as on e may, for the simple reason that the guarantee of fundamental rights cannot be permitted to be diluted by implications and inferences. An express provision of the Constitution which prescribes the extent to which a challenge to the constitutionality of a law is excluded, must be construed as demarcating the farthest limit of exclusion. Considering the nature of ther which article 31B deals with, there is, in our opinion, no justification for extending b y judicial interpretation the frontiers of the field which is declared by that article to be immune from challenge on the ground of violation or abridgement of fundamental rights. The article affords protection to Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule. Therefore, whenever a challenge to the constitutionality of a provision of law on the ground that it violates any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III is sought to be repelled by the State on the plea that the law is placed in the Ninth Schedule, the narrow question to which one must address oneself is whether the impugned law is specified in that Schedule. If it is, the provisions of article 31B would be attracted and the challenge would fail without any further inquiry. On the other hand, if the law is not specified in the Ninth Schedule, the validity of the challenge has to be examined in order to determine whether the provisions thereof invade in any manner any of the fundamental r ights conferred by Part III. It is then no answer to say that though the particular law, as for example a Control Order, is not specified in the Ninth Schedule, the parent Act under which the Order is issued is specified in that Schedule.The Mustard Oil (Price Control) Order, 1977, was passed under section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, which by the relevant part of itsempowers the Central Government to provide by an order for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of an essential commodity or trade and commerce therein, if it is of the opinion that it is necessary or expedient so to do for maintaining or increasing supplies of any essential commodity or for securinge distribution and availability at a fair price. Since the Act of 1955 has been placed in the Ninth Schedule, none of its provisions, including of course section 3(1), is open to attack on the ground that it ever was or is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitution. But that is the farthest that the immunity offered by article 31B can go. In other words, speaking of a provision directly in point, s. 3(1) of the Act of 1955 is not open to challenge on the ground, to take a relevant instance, that it violates the guarantee contained in article 19 (1) (f) or 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. But there is no justification for extending the protection of that immunity to an Order passed under section 3 of the Act like the Mustard Oil (Price Control) Order. Extending the benefit of the protection afforded by article 31B to any action taken under an Act or Regulation which is specified in the Ninth Schedule, appears to us to be an unwarranted extension of the provisions contained in article 31B, neither justified by its language nor by the policy or principle underlying it. When a particular Act or Regulation is placed in the Ninth Schedule, the Parliament may be assumed to have applied its mind to the provisions of the particular Act or Regulation and to the desirability, propriety or necessity of placing it in the Ninth Schedule in order to obviate a possible challenge to its provisions on the ground that they offend against the provisions of Part III. Such an assumption cannot, in the very nature of things, be made in the case of an Order issued by the Government under an Act or regulation which is placed in the Ninth Schedule. The fundamental rights will be eroded of their significant content if by judicial interpretation a constitutional immunity is extended to Orders the validity of which the Parliament at least theoretically, has had no opportunity to apply its mind. Such an extension takes for granted the supposition that the authorities on whom Dower is conferred to take appropriate action under a statute will act both within the framework of the statute and within the permissible constitutional limitations, a supposition which past experience does not justify and to some extent falsifies. In fact, the upholding of laws by the application of the theory of derivative immunity is foreign t o the scheme of our constitution and accordingly orders and Notifications issued under Acts and Regulations which are specified in the Ninth Schedule must meet the challenge that they offend against the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The immunity enjoyed by the parent Act by reason of its being placed in the Ninth Schedule cannot proprio vigore be extended to an offspring of the Act like a Price Control Order issued under the authority of the Act. it is therefore open to the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court for determination of the question whether the provisions of the Price Control Order violate articles 14, 19 (1) (f) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. The learned Solicitor General relies, justifiably, on two decisions of this Court in Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. The State of Bombay and Others([1961] 1 S.C.R. 341.) and Latafat Ali Khan and Ors. v. The State of U.P.([1971] Supp. S.C.R. 719.), in support of his argument that the Price Control Order must receive the protection of the Ninth Schedule to the same extent as the Essential Commodities Act under which that order was issued and which has been placed in the Ninth Schedule. In Vasantlal Maganbhai([1961] 1 S.C.R. 341.), the vires of section 6(2) of the Bombay. Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, was challenged on the ground that it suffered from the vice of excessive delegation. In exercise of the power con feared by section 6(2), the State Government had issued a Notification fixing the maximum rent payable by tenants of lands situated in the areas specified in the schedule appended to the Notification. The validity of that Notification was challenged on the ground. that it offended against Article 31 of the Constitution. The first contention was rejected by the majority which held that section 6(2) did not suffer from excessive delegation. On the second question it was held by the Court that since the Bombay Tenancy Act was placed in the Ninth Schedule, the Notification which was issued under section 6(2) of that Act could not be challenged on the ground that it violated article 31. Subba Rao J., who was in minority, did not consider the latter point regarding the validity of the Notification issued under section 6(2) because he took the view that section 6(2) suffered from the vice of excessive delegation and was therefore unconstitutional. This decision undoubtedly lends support to the contention of the Union Government that if an Act or Regulation is specified in the Ninth Schedule, any order or notification issued under it would equally be entitled to the protection of that Schedule. We are, however, of the opinion, respectfully, that the decision in Vasantlal Maganbhai (supra) does not reflect the true legal position which, according to us, is that the immunity enjoyed by an Act placed in the Ninth Schedule cannot be extended to an order or notification issued under it. The decision of. the Court appears to have been influenced largely by the consideration that the only argument advanced against the validity of the notification was that in substance it amended the provisions of section 6(1) and was therefore a fresh legislation to which article 31B could not apply. The Court rejected that argument and held that if section 6(2) was Valid, the exercise of the power validly conferred on the Provincial Government could not be treated as a fresh legislation.The decision in Latafat Ali Khan (supra) contains no reasons beyond the bare statement thatif a statutory rule is within the powers conferred by a section of a statute protected by Art. 3 1 B, it is difficult to say that the rule must further be scrutinised under arts. 14, 19, etc.This discussion will not be complete without reference to the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of India([1974] 2 S.C.R.398.). The question which arose in that case was as regards the validity of a notification fixing fair prices of cotton yarn. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners therein that the price fixed was arbitrary because the fluctuation in the price of cotton was not taken into consideration, the price of raw materials, the liability for wages and the necessity for ensuring reasonable profit to the trader were not taken into account; and above everything else, the industry was not ensured a reasonable return on its investment. These contentions were rejected by this Court on the ground that, just as the industry cannot complain of rise and fall of prices due to, economic factors in an open market, it cannot similarly complain of some increase in or reduction of prices as a result of a notification issued under section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act because, such increase or reduction is also based on economic factors. Dealing with the contention that a reasonable profit must be assured to the manufacturers, the Court held that ensuring a fair price to the consumer was the dominant object and purpose of the Essential Commodities Act and that object would be completely lost sight of, if the producers profit was kept in theRay C.J., speaking for the Court, observed:In determining the reasonableness of a restriction imposed by law in the field of industry, trade or commerce, it has to be remembered that the mere fact that some of those who are engaged in these are alleging loss after the imposition of law will not render the law unreasonable. By its very nature, industry or trade or commerce goes through periods of prosperity and adversity on account of economic and sometimes social and political factors. In a , largely free economy when controls have to be introduced to ensure availability of consumer goods like foodstuff, cloth and the like at a fair price, it is an impracticable proposition to require the Government to go through the exercise like that of a Commission to fix the pricesAnother passage from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice which has an important bearing on the instant case is to the following effect:When available stocks go underground and the Government has to step in to control distribution and availability in public interest, fixing of price can, therefore, be only empirical. Market prices at a time when the goods did not go underground and were freely available, the general rise in prices, the capacity of the consumer specially in case of consumer goods likeetc. the amount of loss which the industry is able to absorb after having made huge profits in prosperous years, all these enter into the calculation of a fair price in an emergency created by artificial shortagesOn this aspect of the matter, the Court cited with approval a passage from an American decision, Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Reig Refining Company(94Law Ed. 381.) to the effect that Courts of Law cannot be converted into tribunals for relief from the crudities and inequities of complicated experimental economic legislation.Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions in Panipat(A.T.R. 1973 S.C. 536.) and Anakapalle Cooperative Agricultural and Indus trial Society Ltd. v. Union of India(A.T.R. 1973 S.C. 734.) in support of their contention that fixation. of a price without ensuring a reasonable return to the producers or dealers is unconstitutional. The infirmity of this argument, as pointed out in Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India, (supra) is that these two decisions turn on the language of section 3(3c) of the Essential Commodities Act under which it is statutorily obligatory to ensure to the industry a reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar. These decisions can, therefore, have no application to cases of price fixation under section 3 (1) read with section 3 (2) (c) of the Act. Cases failing unders 3A, 3B and 3C of section 3 of t hat Act belong to a different category altogetherIt is customary in price fixation cases to cite thed decision in Premier Automobiles Ltd. &Anr. etc. v. Union of India([1972] 2 S.C.R. 526.) which concerned the fixation of price of motor cars. It is time that it was realized that the decision constitutes. no precedent in matters of price fixation and was rendered for reasons peculiar to the particular case. At page 535 of the Report Grover J., who spoke for the Court, stated at the outset of the judgment: Counsel for all the parties and the learned Attorney General are agreed that irrespective of the technical or legal points that may be involved, we should base our judgment on examination of correct and rational principles and should direct deviation from the report of the Commission which was an expert body presided over by a former judge of a High Court only when it is shown that there has been a departure from, established principles or the conclusions of the Commission are shown to be demonstrably wrong or erroneous. By an agreement of parties the Court was thus converted into a Tribunal for considering every minute detail relating to price fixation of motor cars. Secondly, as regards the escalation clause, the Court recorded at page 543 that it was not disputed on behalf of the Government, and the Attorney General accepted the position, that a proper method should be. Thirdly, it is clear from page 544 of the Report that the Learned Attorney General also agreed that amust be al lowed to the manufacturers on their investment. The decision thus proceeded partly on an agreement between the parties and partly on concessions made at the Bar. That is the reason why the judgment in Premier Automobiles (supra) cannot be treated as a precedent and cannot afford any appreciable assistance in the decision of price fixation cases.The contention that the Price Control Order is arbitrary because it is not limited in point of time is without any merit. In the very nature of things, orders passed under section 3(1) read with section 3(2) of the Essential Commodities Act are designed primarily to meet urgent situations which require prompt and timely attention. If a price control order brings about an improvement in the supply position or if during the period that such an order is in operation there is a fall in prices so at to bring an essential commodity within the reach of the ordinary consumer, the order shall have lost its justification and would in all probability be withdrawn. That in fact is what has happened in the instant case. It appears that the supply position having improved, or, so at any rate seems to be the assessment of the situation by the Government , the order has been recently withdrawnIn support of that submission the judgment of this Court in K. C. Gajapati Narayan Deo anti Others v. The State of Orissa([1954] S.C.R. 1.) was cited in which it was said that when a legislative power is defined by reference to purpose, legislation not directed to that purpose will be invalid. We are unable to appreciate how, if the Government has got the power to fix a fair price of an essential commodity, it can be said that they have under a pretext trespassed upon a field which does not properly belong to them. The power conferred by section 3(1) of the Essential Commodities Act is undoubtedly purposive. But it seems to us incontrovertible that the Price Control Order was promulgated by the Government in order to achieve the purpose set out in section 3(1) of the Act. The fact that a legislative remedy or an administrative order passed in exercise of a statutory power is effective to mitigate an evil may show that it has failed to achieve its purpose, highlighting thereby the paradox of reform. But, as observed in Joseph Beaubarnais v. People of the State of Illinois(96 Lawyers Edition 919.) , that is the price to be paid for ther inherent in legislative efforts to dial with obstinate social issues. We are, therefore, unable to hold that by fixing a fair price for mustard oil, the Government has committed a veiled and subtle trespass upon private rights or upon a legislative field which is not open to them to occupy.To sum up, it seems to us impossible to accept the contention of the petitioners that the impugned Price Control Order is an act of hostile discrimination against them or that it violates their right to property or their right to do trade or business. The petitioners have taken us into the mutest details of the mechanism of their trade operations and they have attempted to demonstrate in relation thereto that a factor here or a factor there which ought to have been taken into account while fixing the price of mustard oil has been ignored. Dealing with a similar argument it was observed in Metropolis Theater Company v. City of Chicago(57 Lawyers Edition 730.) that to be able to. find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its invalidityIt may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require rough , accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void. . . .The Parliament having entrusted the fixation of prices to the expert judgment of the Government, it would be wrong for this Court, as was done by common consent in Premier Automobiles (supra) to examine each and every minute detail pertaining to the Governmental decision. The Government, as was said in Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, (supra) is entitled to make pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances and the price control can be declared unconstitutional only if it is patently arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy which the legislature is free to adopt. The interest of the producer and the investor is only one of the variables in the constitutional calculus of reasonableness and Courts ought not to interfere so long as the exercise of Governmental power to fix fair prices is broadly within a zone of reasonableness. If we were to embark upon an examination of the desperate contentions raised before us on behalf of the contending parties we have no doubt that we shall have exceeded our narrow and circumscribed authority. Before closing, we would like to mention that the petitioners rushed to this Court too precipitately On the heels of the Price Control Order. Thereby they deprived themselves of an opportunity to show that in actual fact, the Order causes them irreparable prejudice. Instead, they were driven through theirt haste to rely on speculative hypotheses in order to buttress their grievance that their right to property and the right to do trade was gone or was substantially affected.