Case: Dattatraya Govind Mahajan and Others Etc Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another

This is a group of appeals preferred by certain landholders in the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of the Bombay High Court upholding the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Ac t) as amended by the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Lowering of Ceiling of Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975), the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Lowering of Ceiling of Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 ) and the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling of Holdings) (Amendment) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred 10 as Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976). The Principal Act was enacted by the Maharashtra Legislature in implementation of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in clauses (b) and (c ) of Art. 39 of the Constitution. It imposed a maximum ceiling on the holding of agricultural land in the State of Maharashtra and provided for the acquisition of land held in excess of the ceiling and for the distribution of such excess land to landless and other persons. During the subsequent years, various amendments were made in the Principal Act from time to time and the Principal Act, as amended upto that date, was included in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. Thereafter certain further amendments were made in the Principal Act and the amending Acts were also included in the Ninth Schedule a s a result of the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975. Then came three major amending Acts which, according to the appellants, introduced the vice of unconstitutionality in the Principal Act. Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975 effected radical amendments in the Principal Act by lowering ceiling on agricultural holding and creating an artificial family unit for fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land. This amending Act was followed by Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 which affected certain further changes in the Principal Act but these are not very material for the purpose of the present appeals. Since these three am ending Acts were enacted after the Constitution (Thirty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1975, they were included in the Ninth Schedule along with certain other enactments by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 . The result was that the Principal Act, as amended by all the subsequent amending Acts including Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was protected against invalidation under Art. 31-B.The appellants are landholders in the State of Maharashtra and since the effect of the provisions of the Principal Act, as amended by Maharashtra Act 21 of 1975, Maharashtra Act 47 of 1975 and Maharashtra Act 2 of 1976 was to expropriate a part of the lands belonging to them, they preferred writ petitions in the High Court of Bombay challenging the constitutional validity of the Principal Act as amended by these amending Acts on various grounds.

Reasoning:
The determination of this question turns on the true interpretation of Article 31-B and its applicability in relation to the second proviso to clause (1) of Articledo not think this contention is well founded. It is plainly erroneous. It flies in the face of the express language of Article 31-B and also ignores the true meaning and effect of the second proviso to clause ( 1 ) of Article 31 A.Whilst interpreting Article 31-B it is necessary to bear in mind the object and purpose of the enactment of that Article by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. This article was introduced in the Constitution within almost eighteen months of the commencement of the Constitution, because it was found that agrarian reform legislation was running into rough weather and the policy of agrarian reform was being frustrated. Without a dynamic programme of agrarian reform, it was not possible to change the face of rural India and to upgrade the standard of living of the large masses of people living in the villages. In fact the promise of agrarian reform is implicit in the Preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy and it is one of the economic foundations of the Constitution. It was, therefore felt that laws enacted for the purpose of bringing about agrarian reform in its widest sense-agrarian reform which would be directed against gross inequalities in land ownership, disincentives to production and desparate backwardness of rural life and which would cover not only abolition of intermediary tenures zamindaris and the like but restructuring of village life itself taking in its broad embrace the entire rural population--should be saved from invalidation. It was with this end in view that Article 31-B was introduced in the Constitution along with Article 31A. The object and purpose of introducing Articles 31A and 31-B was to protect agrarian reform legislation from invalidation. We shall consider the provisions of Article 31A a little later when we examine the true meaning and effect of the second proviso to clause (1) of that , article. But so far as Article 31-B is concerned, it is clear on its plain terms that it saves from invalidation an enactment specified in the Ninth Schedule even if it happens to be "inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions, of Part III". It is immaterial whether such enactment is inconsistent with any provisions of Part III or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any such provisions, for both infirmities are cured. by Article 31-B. The words "such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part" in .Article 31-B are clearly an echo of the language of clauses (1) and (2) of Article 13 and they have obviously been employed because the enactment specified in the Ninth Schedule may be pre-Constitution as well as post-Constitution laws. But it would not be right to introduce an artificial dichotomy in Article 31-B by correlating the first part of the expression, namely, "is inconsistent with--any provisions, of this Part" and confining its applicability to pre- Constitution legislation and correlating and confining the applicability of the other part of the expression, namely, "takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part to post-Constitution legislation. That would be a highly unnatural construction unjustified by the language of Article 31-B. Both the parts of the expression, on a plain natural construction of the language of Article 31-B, apply equally to. post-Constitution legislation as welt as pre-Constitution legislation. It must be remembered that the aim and objective of Article 31-B is to make the most comprehensive provision for saving agrarian reform legislation from invalidation on the ground of infraction of any provision in Part 111 and it must, therefore. be so interpreted as to have the necessary sweep and coverage. It is an elementary rule of construction that a statutory provision must always be interpreted in a manner which would suppress the mischief and advance the remedy and carry out the object and purpose of the legislation. Moreover, we must not forget as pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes, that it is the Constitution that we are expanding. Our Constitution has a social purpose and an economic mission and every article of the Constitution must therefore be construed so as to advance the social purpose and fulfil the economic mission it seeks to accomplish. The Court must place an expansive interpretation on the language of Article 31-B so as to carry out the object and purpose of enacting that article. We must, in the circumstances, hold that Article 31-B is sufficiently wide to protect legislation not only where it takes away or abridges any the fights conferred by any provisions of Part III, but also where it is inconsistent with any such provisions. It must follow a fortiori that even if the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A is construed as not conferring any fundamental right but merely imposing a restriction on legislative competence, the Act, in so far as it contravenes or is inconsistent with the second proviso to clause (1) of article 31A would still be saved from invalidation by Article 31-B.But we are clearly of the view that the second proviso to clause(1) of Article 31A does confer a fundamental right. This conclusion is inevitable if we look at the conspectus of the provisions contained in Article 31 and 31A. These provisions occur under the heading "Right to Property" and they define and delimit the right to property guarantied under Part III of the Constitution. Article 31, clause (1) protects property against deprivation by executive action which is not supported by law. It is couched in negative language, but, as pointed out by S.R. Das, J., in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh([1952] S.C.R. 889 at 988.) it confers a fundamental right in so far as it protects private property from State action. The only limitation put upon the State action is the requirement that the authority of law is pr e-requisite for the exercise of its power to deprive a person of his property. This confers some protection on the owner, in that, he will not be deprived of his property save by authority of law and this protection is the measure of the fundamental right. It is to emphasise this immunity from State action as a fundamental right that the clause has been worded in negative language". Article 31, clause (1) thus , by giving limited immunity from State action, confers a fundamental right. Clause (2) of Article 31 then proceeds to impose limitation on the exercise of legislative power by providing that no property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of law which provides for acquisition or requisitioning of property for an amount which may be fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with such principles and given in such manner as may be specified in such law. This clause is also couched in negative language, but it confers a fundamental right of property on an individual by declaring that his property shall not be liable to be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned except for a public purpose and the law which authorises such acquisition or requisitioning must provide for "payment of an a mount which may be either fixed by such law or which may be determined in accordance with the principles and given in the manner specified in such law". The limitation imposed on the power of the legislature to make a law authorising acquisition or requisitioning of property is the measure of the fundamental right conferred by the clause. It was for this reason pointed out by this Court in R.C. Copper v. Union of India([1970] 3 S.C.R. 530 atfunction of the two clauses--clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31 is to impose limitations on the power of the State and to declare the corresponding guarantee of the individual to his right to property. Limitation on the power of the State and the guarantee of right are plainly complementary" (Emphasis supplied).Article 31A carves out an exception to the applicability of Article 31--and also Articles 14 and 19--and immunises certain categories of agrarian reform legislation from attack on the ground that they violate any, of these three articles. Even if any agrarian reform legislation falling within the specified categories infringes Articles 14, 19 and 31, it would not be invalid. Having regard to the high objective of bringing about agrarian reform in the country with a view tO improving the life conditions of the common man, such agrarian reform legislation is not required to meet the challenge of any of these three articles. But, in order to earn this immunity, the first proviso requires that such agrarian reform legislation when made by a State must receive the assent of the President. That is a condition for the applicability of the exception contained in Article 31 A. Th en follows the second proviso which enacts an exception to this exception. It says that even where a law makes any provision for acquisition by the State. of any estate and thus falls within one of the categories" specified in Article 31A, it would not qualify for immunity under me provisions of that article, if it seeks to acquire any portion of the land held by a person under his personal cultivation which is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force and such a law, in order to be valid, would have to provide for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value of the land s ought to be acquired. This provision is also couched in negative language like clauses (1) and (2) of Article 31 and it imposes a fetter on the exercise of the legislative power of the State by providing that the State shall not be entitled to make a law authorising acquisition of land held by a person under his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit applicable to him, unless the law provides for payment of compensation at a r ate not less than the market value. This limitation on the legislative power of the State is the measure of the fundamental right conferred on the owner of the land. It is by imposing limitation on the exercise of legislative power that protection is given to the owner in respect of the land held by him under his personal cultivation within the ceiling limit. Restriction on legislative competence and conferment of right on the holder of land within the ceiling limit are complementary to each other. They are merely two different facets of the same provision. What is limitation of legislative power from the point of view of the State is conferment o f right from the point of view of the holder of land within the ceiling limit. The former secures the latter. The second proviso in effect guarantees protection to the holder against acquisition of that portion of his land which is within the ceiling limit except on payment of the market value of such land. It will, thus, be seen that the second proviso clearly confers a right of property on a person holding land under his personal cultivation. This interpretation was, however, assailed by the appellants on the ground that it would convert the second proviso. into a substantive provision and that would be contrary to the well recognised canon of construction that a proviso must be read so. as to. carve out from the main provision something which would otherwise fall within it. Now, it is true that the proper function of a proviso is to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which, but for the provision would be within that clause but ultimately, as pointed out by this Court in Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula v. Motibai Naglibhai ([1966] 1 S.C.R. 367 at 373.)question is one of interpretation of the proviso: and there is no rule that the proviso must always be restricted to the ambit of the main enactment".Here, the intention of the legislature in enacting the second proviso is very clear and that is to ensure payment of full market value as compensation to a person in personal cultivation of his land where a portion of the land within the ceiling limit applicable to him is acquired by the State Government. But for the second proviso, even if a law authorising acquisition of land within the ceiling limit did not provide for payment of compensation, it would be protected from invalidation under Article 31A. That was not a result which the Parliament favoured. Parliament was anxious to protect the interest of the small holder, the common man who holds land within the ceiling limit and therefore enacted the second proviso requiring that a law which permits acquisition of land within the ceiling limit must provide for compensation at a rate not less than the market value. The second proviso in fact restores the right of property with added vigour in case of small holdings of land. it goes much further than Article 31, clause (2) and provides a larger protection, in that, clause (2) of Article 31. merely requires that a law authorising acquisition should fix an amount to be paid for the acquisition or specify the principles in accordance with which the amount may be determined and the manner in which it may be given--and this may be very much less than the market value--while the second proviso insists that at the least, full market value must be paid for the acquisition. Thus, there can be no doubt that the second proviso confers a right--and this right is higher than the one under clause (2) of Article 31---on a person in respect of such portion of land under his personal cultivation as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him and if the Act, by creating an artificial concept of a family unit and fixing ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such family unit, enables land within the ceiling limit to be acquired with out payment of full market value, it would be taking away or abridging the right conferred by the second proviso. In that event too, it would be protected by Article 31-B since it is included in the Ninth Schedule.Before we part with this contention based on Article 31-B, we must refer to one other argument advanced on behalf of the appellants with a view to repelling the applicability of Article 31-B. The appellants leaned heavily on the Explanation to. section 3 of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment), Act, 1964 and urged that this Explanation shows that an acquisition made in contravention of the second proviso to clause ( 1) of Article 31A is void and does not have the protection of Article 31-B, even if the law under which such acquisition is made is included in the Ninth Schedule. We do not think this contention is well rounded and in fact not much argument is needed to negative it. The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 was enacted by the Parliament with a view to. expanding the scope of Article 31A by enlarging the meaning of the expression estate and while doing so, the parliament added the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A. The Ninth Schedule was also amended by including certain State enactments relating to agrarian reform in order to remove any uncertainty or doubt that may arise in regard to their validity. One of the State enactments included in the Ninth Schedule by this amendment was the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 which was added as Entrymust be remembered that the legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by the legislature alone are the true repository of the intent of the legislature and they must be construed having regard to the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the provision in question has been called an Explanation, we must construe it according to its plain language and not on any a priori considerations. The Explanation does no more than provide that so far as the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 is concerned, if any acquisition is made under it in contravention of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A, it shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Obviously, this Explanation was rendered necessary, because otherwise, acquisition under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, even if in contravention of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A, would have been valid under Article 31-B and that result the Parliament did not wish to produce. It was manifestly not the intention of the Parliament that acquisition made under any enactment included in the Ninth Schedule should be void where it conflicts with the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A and that Article 31-B should not protect it from invalidation. If such had been the intention of the Parliament, it would have been expressed in clear and unambiguous terms by providing that an acquisition made under any enactment included in the Ninth Schedule, in contravention of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void. Parliament would not have resorted to the device of picking out one legislation from the enactments specified in the Ninth Schedule and declared only in relation to that legislation that any acquisition made under it in contravention of the second proviso to clause ( 1 ) of Article 31A shall be void. The Explanation, in our view, far from supporting the construction contended for on behalf of the appellants, militates against it. We may also in the passing refer to the view taken by t he Allahabad High Court in regard to the true meaning and effect of Article 31-B in relation to the second proviso to clause (1 ) of Article 31A. The Allahabad High Court took the view in a decision given on 14th November, 1975 which is the subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 1307 of 1976 in this Court that the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A places restriction only on executive action and not on legislative action and since Article 31-B validates merely enactments specified in the Ninth Schedule: and not the executive action taken under those enactments, the placing of the Act in the Ninth Schedule does not dispense with the requirement that executive action taken by the State in the shape of acquisition under the Act should conform to. the restriction set out in the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A. This view taken by the Allahabad High Court is a little difficult to understand. The protection afforded by the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A is undoubtedly against acquisition by the. State but this protection is secured by imposing limitation on exercise of legislative power and it is the law under the authority of which the acquisition is made which has to conform to the requirement of this proviso. If the law authorising acquisition does not conform with this requirement, it would be void and the acquisition made under it would be unlawful, but for Article 31-B. It is indeed difficult to see how the law authorising acquisition can be valid and yet acquisition mane under it can be void as offending the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A. The view taken by the Allahabad High Court is plainly erroneous and must be rejected.We are, therefore, of the view that even if the Act, in so far as it introduces an artificial concept of a family unit and fixes ceiling on holding of agricultural land by such family unit, is violative of the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31A, it is protected by Article 31-B by reason of its inclusion in the Ninth