Case: Smt. Rita Devi  Vs. New India Assurance Co.Ltd.&amp;Anr

One Dasarath Singh was a driver of an auto rickshaw owned by Lalit singh. The vehicle in question was registered as a public carrier vehicle used for hire by the passengers. This vehicle was insured with the respondent-Insurance Company. On 22nd of March, 1995, it is stated that some unknown passengers hired the above auto rickshaw from rickshaw stand at Dimapur between 5 to 6 p.m. It is also not in dispute that the said auto rickshaw was reported stolen and the dead baby of driver Dasarath Singh was recovered by the police on the next day, the auto rickshaw was never recovered and the claim of the owner for the loss of auto rickshaw was accepted by the respondent-Insurance Company and a sum of Rs. 47,220- was settled by the said company towards the loss suffered by the owner.One Darshan Singh claiming to be a Power of Attorney holder of the present appellants filed a claim petition along with the present appellants under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short the `Act) claiming damages for the death caused to the deceased Dasarath Singh during the course of his employment under Lalit Singh as a death caused in an accident arising out of the use of vehicle. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Nagaland as per its judgment dated 24th of June, 1996 came to the conclusion that the death of the driver of the auto rickshaw (Dasarath Singh) was caused by an accident coming within the purview of the Motor Vehicles Act, therefore, held that the owner of the vehicle was liable to compensate the death of the driver in money value. Since there was an agreement between the vehicle owner and the respondent-Insurance Company to compensate the employer of the vehicle, said legal and statutory liability stood fastened on the respondent-Insurance Company. The tribunal also held that the quantum of claim of the claimants stood established and consequently it awarded a sum of Rs. 2,81,500- against the Insurance Company with interest @ 12% on the amount awarded from the date of application tillInsurance Company preferred an appeal by itself before the Gauhati High Court (Kohima Bech) in M.A.(F) No. 8(K)96. The High Court by its judgment dated 9.3.1998 came to the conclusion that there was no motor accident as contemplated under the Act. The High Court further held that the case in hand was a case of murder and not of an accident, hence a petition for claim under the provisions of the Act did not arise. The High Court, accordingly, allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and the award made by thethe above mentioned Power of Attorney holder had preferred the above appeal making the wife and children of the deceased as proforma respondents along with the other respondent. By an order of this Court dated 18th of February, 2000, this Court felt that to protect the interest of the heirs of the deceased the wife and children of the deceased should be first impleaded as appellants to this appeal and the cause-title be amended, which having been done and notice being issued, the respondent-Insurance Company is represented before us.

Reasoning:
There is no doubt that `murder. as it is understood, in the common parlance is a felonious act where death is caused with intent and the perpetrators of that act normally have a motive against the victim for such killing. But there are also instances where murder can be by accident on a given set of facts. The difference between a `murder which is not an accident and a `murder which is an accident, depends on the proximity of the cause of such murder. In our opinion, if the dominant intention of the act of felony is the kill any particular person then such killing is not an accidental murder but is a murder simplicitor, while if the cause of murder or act of murder was originally not intended and the same was caused in furtherance of any other felonious act then such murder is an accidental murder.Applying the principles laid down in the above cases to the facts of the case in hand, we find that the deceased, a driver of the auto rickshaw, was duty bound to have accepted the demand of fare paying passengers to transport them to the place of their destination. During the course of this duty, if the passengers had decided to commit an act of felony of stealing the auto rickshaw and in the course of achieving the said object of stealing the auto rickshaw, they had to eliminate the driver of the auto rickshaw then it cannot but be said that the death so caused to the driver of the auto rickshaw was an accidental murder. The stealing of the auto rickshaw was the object of the felony and the murder that was caused in the said process of stealing the auto rickshaw is only incidental to the act of stealing of the auto rickshaw. Therefore, it has to be said that on the facts and circumstances of this case the death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was caused accidentally in the process of committing the theft of the autoare unable to accept this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents.We do not see how the object of the two Acts, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmens Compensation Act are in any way different. In our opinion, the relevant object of both the Acts are to provide compensation to the victims of accidents. The only difference between the two enactments is that so far as the Workmens Compensation Act is concerned, it is confined to workmen as defined under that Act while the relief provided under Chapters X to XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is available to all the victims of accidents involving a motor vehicle. In this conclusion of ours we are supported by Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act as per which provision, it is open to the claimants either to proceed to claim compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act or under the Motor Vehicles Act. A perusal of the objects of the two enactments clearly establishes that both the enactments are beneficial enactments operating in the same field, hence judicially accepted interpretation of the word `death in Workmens Compensation Act is, in our opinion applicable to the interpretation of the word death in the Motor Vehicles Act also.In the instant case, as we have noticed the facts, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the murder of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was due to an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle. Therefore, the trial court rightly came to the conclusion that the claimants were entitled for compensation as claimed by them and the High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the death of Dasarath Singh was not caused by an accident involving the use of motor vehicle.17. This leaves us to consider the second point raised before us by the counsel for the appellant. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company purported to be under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act was not maintainable because prior permission of the Court as required was not obtained by the appellants. In support of this contention of the appellants, reliance is placed on a judgments of this court in the case Shankarayya and Anr. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Anr., 1998(3) SCC 140.We respectfully agree with the ration laid down in the above case and in view of the fact admittedly the Insurance Company had not obtained leave from the tribunal before filing the above appeal. We are of the opinion that the appeal filed by the Insurance Company before the High Court was not maintainable in law.