Case: Shivamurthy Swami Inamdar Veerabhadrappa Veerappa Vs. Agadi Sanganna Andanappa Chanbasangouda Hanumanthagouda Patil and Another

2. On January 13, 1967, notifications were issued calling for the election of one member for the Lok Sabha the Koppal constituency as well as eight members to the Mysore Assembly from the eight assembly constituencies included in that Parliamentary constituency. One of those assembly constituencies was the Yelburga constituency in the District of Raichur. The last dated for present the nominations was January 19, 1967. The scrutiny of the nominations took place on January 21, 1967 and the poll was held on February 19, 1967. Both in the Koppal Lok Sabha constituency as well as in the Yelburga assembly constituency, the main contest was between the Congress candidates and the candidates of Lok Seva Sangh. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 980 of 1968 was the candidate of L.S. S. for the Lok Sabha Koppal constituency and the 1st respondent in that appeal Singanna was the congress nominee. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 981 of 1968 was the candidate for the L.S. S. in the Yelburga assembly constituency and the 1st respondent therein C. H. Patil was the Congress nominee. The Congress candidates succeeded by a large manority both in the Parliamentary constituency as well as in the Assembly constituency. The results of the elections were declared on February 24, 1967. Their elections were challenged by the nominees of the L.S.S. on various grounds. So far as the respondent in Civil Appeal No. 980 of 1968 is concerned it was said that he was disqualified for being a candidate both under Article 102 of the Constitution as well as under Section 9(a) of the Act. So far as the 1st respondent in Civil Appeal No. 981 of 1968, is concerned, it was said that he was disqualified for being a candidate under Article 191 of the Constitution and Section 9(a) of the Act, and further it was alleged it was alleged that both of them were guilty of offences under Section 123(3) and 123(7) of the Act. It was further said that the 1st respondent in Civil Appeal No. 980 of 1968 was also guilty of an offence under Section 123(1) of the Act. The High Court of Mysore which tried these election petitions rejected the allegations made on behalf of the appellants and dismissed the election petitions with costs. These appeals are directed against the decision.

Reasoning:
5. The High Court has come to the conclusion that the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants is insufficient to come to the conclusion that P.W. 18 printed or published the booklet in question at the instance or with the consent of the returned candidates. If this conclusion is correct then it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the booklet in question was printed and published by P.W. 18 or whether the poems therein amount to an appeal to the voters to vote for the Congress candidates on the grounds of religion. It is also unnecessary to go into the question whether the symbol complained of can be considered as a religious symbol6. A senior Judge of the Mysore High Court has tried this case. He felt unable to accept the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants to show that the booklet in question was printed and published with the consent of the returned candidates. The opinion of the trial Judge is entitled to great weight. It would be more so while dealing with a complaint of a corrupt practice in an election, an accusation which is akin to a charge of an offence. This Court, except under exception circumstances, does not interfere with the findings of fact reached by the Trial Courts in election petitions. This Court had occasions to observe that partisan feelings aroused during election die very slowly and therefore it is not difficult to procure a large number of witnesses seemingly disinterested, to support the case of the candidates8. In addition to the circumstance that there is material difference between the case pleaded and that sought to be proved, the appellants case is further weakened by the fact that in their pleadings, none of the necessary particulars of the grounds alleged were given. Neither the dates and time on which the public meetings were held nor the places where those meetings were held were mentioned therein. Therefore it would have been extremely difficult for the returned candidates to rebut the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants. The learned counsel for the appellants is right when he contends that the mere absence of the absence of the particulars of the grounds alleged is not sufficient to dismiss the election petition but that undoubtedly is a circumstance to be borne in mind while appreciating the evidence adduced. That circumstance goes to indicate that allegations were made in the election petitions without ascertaining facts and thereafter evidence was gathered to support those allegations. A wide net appears to have been cast in the election petitions and the details tried to be supplied by the evidence of obliging witnesses. Under these circumstances we agree with the Trial Court that no value can be attached to the evidence adduced to show that the returned candidates had contravened Section 123(3)11. During the trial of the case, no evidence was led to substantiate the allegation that Shri Deshpande or Devappa had worked for the returned candidates. Hence we need not consider that part of the appellants case11. During the trial of the case, no evidence was led to substantiate the allegation that Shri Deshpande or Devappa had worked for the returned candidates. Hence we need not consider that part of the appellants case14. Similarly in the case of Krishnarao as well as Pundangouda, the offices held by them stood abolished in 1963, in view of the aforesaid provision. The question whether the lands assigned to them as remuneration for the offices held by them remained to be resumed at the time of the election is irrelevant for finding out whether the holders of the offices in question continued to be village officers at the relevant time. Therefore the ground of attack under Section 123(7) must fail15. It was next said that he was a member of the Tungabhadra Board; he was appointed to that Board by the Government and as a member of that Board he was entitled to T.A. and D.A. at the rates prescribed by the Mysore Travelling Rules,. We are unable to hold that this office was an office of profit. A member of that Board had no pecuniary benefit. The allowances given to him are clearly compensatory allowancesThis contention has no merit. He becameo member of these bodies by virtue of his being elected as a member of the Mysore Legislative Council. Therefore it cannot be said that he was holding those offices under the Government. The Government neither appointed him nor could remove him. A member of the Koppal Taluk Development Board can only be removed by the Government on the strength of a resolution passed by the Board by a 2/3rd majority. A member of the District Development Board cannot be removed at all by the Government. The allowances paid for the members of the Taluk Development Board and District Development Board are intended to meet theirt expenses. In other words they are compensatory allowances. We are unable to hold that this office was an office of profit. A member of that Board had no pecuniary benefit. The allowances given to him are clearly compensatory allowances. Therefore it cannot be said that he was holding that office under the Government. The fact that thee society in question was dealing with the controlled articles supplied to it by the Government, does not change the legal position17. So far as the Khadi and Village Industries Board constituted under the Mysore Khadi and Village Industries Act, 1956, is concerned, the same is an independent Corporation though many of its activities come within the supervision of the Government and bulk of its funds are also supplied by the Government. Pursuant to the rules framed under the Khadi and Village Industries Act, 1956, certain allowances are paid to the members of the Board for the purpose of reimbursing the expenses incurred by them in attending the meetings of the Board or of any committee appointed under Section 10 of that Act. It is true that a member of that Board is entitled to a sitting fee of Rs. 16/a day on the days he attends the meetings of the Board or any of its committees. But he cannot draw the sitting fee as well as the daily allowance. He has to draw one of the two. Therefore the sitting fee paid to the members is in reality a payment made for the purpose of reimbursing the expenses incurred by the members. Hence the sitting fee paid to the members of that Board must be considered as compensatory allowance. This contention has no substance. The alleged contract was between the Society and the Central Government. Sanganna was only the Chairman of the Society. The Society has a personality of its own. It is fallacious to contend that because of the honorarium obtained by Sanganna, he became partner of the SocietyNo other ground was urged against the election of Sanganna. The High Courtcome to the conclusion that there is no satisfactory evidence to show that he was the Police Patil at the time of the nomination. The contention that he had been appointed a Representative Watandar has no substance in view of the abolition of the Watans. The hereditary right to the office of Police Patil had been abolished as far back as in 1963, as seen earlier20. Now coming to the alleged did qualification under Section 9(a) of the Act, there is absolutely no reliable evidence to show that Patil had a subsisting contract with the Government at the time he filed his nomination. No documentary evidence was produced to prove the same. The contract alleged is one of road work in respect of Yerenachinhal Mudhol Road, Patil had produced completion certificates from the Executive Engineer, Raichur (Exts.4 and) to show that contract had come to an end long before he field his nomination. Hence the finding of the High Court that it had not been proved that he had a subsisting contract at the relevant time is fully justified21. The only other plea advanced against the election of Patil is one coming under Section 123(1). The case put forward under this head is that Patil had engaged a large number of workers from Tondhihal in connection with the road work referred to earlier but he failed to pay their wages. Hence the villagers of Tondhihal were not willing to support his candidature. In order to buy over the support of the villagers of Tondhihal, it is said that two cousins of Patil, Basangouda Mulki Patil and Pundangouda, Police patil of Halkeri wrote Ext.4 to one Kalkayya of Tondhihal, a supporter of L.S.S. offering to clear up the arrears of wages due to the villagers, if the villagers promise to vote for Patil. This allegation was sought to be proved by the production of4 andby the evidence of one Neelappa, P.W. 22. Neither the alleged writer of Ext.4 andby the evidence of one Neelappa, P.W. 22. Neither the alleged writer of Ext.4 andby the evidence of one Neelappa, P.W. 22. Neither the alleged writer of Ext.4 nor Kalkayya has been examined to prove that letter. kalkayya was admittedly a supporter of the L.S.S. No explanation is forthcoming for his. Therefore the High Court was right in opinion that Ext.4 nor Kalkayya was admittedly a supporter of the L.S.S. No explanation is forthcoming for his. Therefore the High Court was right in opining that Ext.4 had not been satisfactorily proved. That letter is sought to be proved by the evidence of P.W. 22. His version is a highly artificial one. He deposed that when he chanced to pass through the village of Basangouda and Pundangouda, those persons met him at a Mutt and asked him why the villagers of Tondhihal are not supporting the candidature of Patil. Then he told them that they were opposed to Patil because he had not paid the wages of the workers that he had employed for his road work. Immediately Basangouda took out a piece of paper and wrote Ext.4 andread out the same to him and later on Kalkayya told him that he had received the letter in question. The place where Basangouda lives, is hardly within six miles from the place of Kalkayya. Therefore it is unbelievable that Basangouda instead of going and meeting Kalkayya would have sent him a letter and announced the contents of the letter to P.W. 22, a somewhat stranger to him. If there is any truth in this version, the best person to prove the receipt of the letter and further what happened thereafter, is Kalkayya. As mentioned earlier he has not been examined in the case. It is not surprising that the High Court did not find it possible to believe this version. It is a prima facie unacceptable version.