Case: Ashok K. Gupta Vs. Vijay K. Agrawal

The appellant is the tenant of the premises1st Floor, 46 M.L.B. Colony, Gwalior (M.P.) (for short ‘thewhich was initially owned by one Sushil Kumar who sold it to the respondent. Thus, the appellant became the tenant of the respondent. The appellant filed a suit against the respondent being Case No. 453A 1996 in the court of 9th Civil Judge, II Class, Gwalior, seeking injunction against the respondent. In the said suit the respondent filed a counter claim under Order VIII, Rule 6 of C.P.C. claiming eviction of the appellant, inter alia, under clause (e) of(1) of Section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (for short ‘theThe appellant contested the counter claim filed by the respondent and pleaded that it was not maintainable. The trial court, after framing necessary issues and on considering the evidence adduced by the parties held that the counter claim under Order VIII, Rule 6 of C.P.C. was maintainable and that the respondent required the suit premises bona fide. Accordingly, it decreed the counter claim of the respondent and dismissed the suit for the relief of injunction filed by the appellant by judgment dated January 31, 1998. In regard to the decree of eviction passed on the counter claim of the respondent, an appeal was filed by the appellant before the court of the 6th Additional District Judge, Gwalior (M.P.). The learned Additional District Judge affirmed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the appeal on October 8, 1998. Against that judgment the unsuccessful appellant filed Second Appeal No. 621 of 1998 before the High Court. The Second Appeal was dismissed by the High Court by judgment dated March 15, 1999 which is assailed in this appeal by special leave.

Reasoning:
A plain reading of the above provision discloses that(1) opens with a non obstante clause and provides that notwithstanding anything contained to the contrary, in any law or contract, no suit can be filed in civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more grounds enumerated in clauses (a) to (p) of8. A perusal of this section shows that it bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain any suit or proceeding relating to the fixation of standard rent in relation to any accommodation or to any other matter which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or under the Act to decide. It also puts an embargo on the civil court or other authority to grant injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by the Rent Controlling Authority under the Act by any civil court.(2), however, clarifies that(1) shall not be so construed as to prevent a civil court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any question of title to any accommodation to which the Act applies or any question as to the person or persons who are entitled to receive the rent of such accommodation. This takes us to the question, what are other matters which the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered to decide by or under the Act. They are: (i) fixation of standard rent under Section 10; and (ii) eviction of tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement under Chapterof the Act.9. Here, it is pertinent of note that by Act 27 of 1983 Chapter IIIA was inserted in the Act with effect from August 16, 1983. That chapter had nine sectionsas originally enacted. Sectionto which reference will be made presently, was inserted in 1985. The ground of eviction for bona fide requirement contained in Sectionhas two limbs; clause (a) applies when the accommodation is let for residential purpose and clause (b) applies when the purpose of letting isalso opens with a non obstante clause and says that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or contract to the contrary a landlord may submit an application to the Rent Controlling Authority on one or more of the grounds contained in clauses (a) and (b) referred to above. It is provided that the accommodation let out for residential purposes, if required, bona fide by a landlord for occupation as residence for himself or for any member of his family or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation for his occupation in the same city or town, the application seeking eviction of the accommodation has to be made by the landlord to the Rent Controlling Authority. In other words, the jurisdiction to pass order of eviction on the ground mentioned in Sectionwas conferred on the Rent Controlling Authority and the Civiljurisdiction was ousted impliedly in that behalf. But that position remained in existence only for a short period till January 16, 1985 when by Act 7 of 1985 Sectionwas inserted in Chapter III and Sectionwas inserted in Chaptersays that the provisions of Chapter III so far as they relate to the matter specially provided in Chaptershall not apply to the landlord defined in Sectionenumerates five categories of landlords.The position after January 16, 1985 is that only in respect of the aforementioned categories of the landlords the Rent Controlling Authority has jurisdiction to order eviction of a tenant on grounds of bona fide requirement under SectionA conjoint reading of SectionJ and Section 45 would show that in regard to the bona fide personal requirement of the landlord who does not fall with the specified colonies inthe Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit and pass decree under clause (e) of(1) of Section 12 of the Act.It follows that the Civil Court rightly entertained counter claim under Section 12(1)(a) of the Act so the decree passed by it is not vitiated for want of jurisdiction.