Case: Pawan Kumar Sharma Vs. Gurdial Singh

2. Respondent is the complainant against the appellant-advocate. On 28.8.1991, he filed a complaint alleging that the appellant was doing taxi business and had at the relevant time four taxis in his ownership. It was alleged that since the appellant was practising as a lawyer, he could not have carried on the taxi business without the permission of the Bar Council and since no such permission had been obtained by him, he was guilty of committing professional misconduct. This complaint was filed initially with the State Bar Council but since it could not be disposed of within a period of one year from the date of the complaint, the same was transferred to the Bar Council of India under Section 36-B of the Advocates Act for its disposal. Before the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, evidence was led on the issue viz. whether respondent has committed the professional misconduct, as mentioned in the complaint ?  3. The evidence led on behalf of the complainant as well as that of the appellant shows that the appellant had himself enrolled as an Advocate with the Punjab and Haryana Bar Council in January, 1990. At the time when he so enrolled himself his family was doing taxi business and he himself also owned four taxis. The case of the appellant was that after his enrolment as an Advocate, he transferred all the taxis to different persons and handed over their possession to them and that he did not carry on with the taxi business thereafter. He filed copies of the affidavits by which transfers had been made by him in favour of different persons.  4. The Disciplinary Committee, after considering the evidence on the record, came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him from practice for one year.

Reasoning:
7. Charge of professional misconduct is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge. It is required to be established, not by preponderance of probabilities but beyond a reasonable doubt. In the entire evidence led on behalf of the complainant, there is not a whisper that after the enrolment of the appellant in January, 1990 he engaged himself or carried on the taxi business. The evidence led in the case only shows the appellant owned four taxis. Even if we ignore the evidence led by the appellant to the effect that he had disposed of those taxis after his enrolment as an advocate, the mere ownership of the taxis cannot lead to any irresistible conclusion that he was engaged in taxi business after his enrolment as an Advocate. In his deposition, the appellant appearing as RW-2, stated that after the issuance of the licence of the Bar Council, he had started winding up his business in which he was engaged prior to his enrolment as an Advocate and that he was not doing any taxi business after his enrolment. This statement has remained unrebutted and has also gone unchallenged in the cross-examination. Even the complainant in his evidence did not depose that the appellant carried on with his taxi business after his enrolment as an advocate8. In the face of this material on the record, it is not possible to say that the complainant has established that after the enrolment of the appellant as an Advocate, he was personally engaged in taxi business. The evidence on the record is vague, indefinite and scanty. It does not establish the charge of misconduct against the appellant. The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India, thus, fell in error in holding the appellant guilty of professional misconduct. The charge against the appellant has not been established at all, let alone being established beyond a reasonable doubt.