Case: Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Vs. Roop Singh Rathore &amp; Others

2. The appellant before us, Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar, was elected to the House of the People at the third general elections held in the month of February, 1962. He was elected from a constituency known as the Jhunjhunu Parliamentary Constituency in Rajasthan. Two election petitions were filed for setting aside the election of the appellant. One of these was filed by one Ridmal Singh who stated that he was an elector in the said constituency. Another application was filed by one Balji who was also an elector in the said Parliamentary Constituency and whose nomination paper was rejected by the returning officer. We are not concerned in the present appeals with the grounds on which the two election petitions, one by Ridmal Singh and numbered as 269 of 1962 and the other by Balji and numbered as 295 of 1962, were based, because the election petitions have not yet been tried on merits. By two applications dated July 6, 1962, the appellant who was one of the respondent to the two election petitions raised certain preliminary objections to the maintainability of the two election petitions. The Election Tribunal dealt with these preliminary objection by its orders dated August 13, 1962. It dismissed the preliminary objections. Thereupon the appellant filed two writ petitions in the High Court of Rajasthan by which he prayed that the orders of the election Tribunal dated August 13, 1962 and certain consequential orders passed on "August 14, 1962 be quashed and that an order or direction be issued to the Election Tribunal to dismiss the two election petitions on the main ground that they do not comply with certain mandatory provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the Act. These two writ petitions were dismissed by the High Court by its order dated August 31, 1962. The appellant then applied for special leave to this court and having obtained such leave, has preferred the present appeals.

Reasoning:
Section 82 then provided aspetitioner shall join as respondents to his petition all the candidates who were duly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so(4) of S. 90 then provided that notwithstanding anything contained in S. 85, the tribunal may dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Ss. 81, 83 or117. There has been a change of law since that decision. Section 82 has been re-cast and sub-s. (3) of S. 90 now states that the tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of S. 81 or S. 82 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under S. 85. Therefore we do not think that the decision in 1954 SCR 892 : (AIR 1954 SC 210  ) is determinative of the problem before us. We need not however pursue this question any further, because we have held that in the present case there was no contravention of the provisions of S. 82.We agree with the view expressed by the Election Tribunal. We have pointed out that sub-s. (4) of Sec. 90 originally referred to three sections, namely, Ss. 81, 83 and 117. It said that notwithstanding anything contained in S. 85 the Tribunal might dismiss an election petition which did not comply with the provisions of S. 81, S. 83 or S. 117. Section 90 was amended by Act 27 of 1956. Sub-section (3) then said that the Tribunal shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of S. 81, S. 82 or S. 117 notwithstanding that it has not been dismissed by the Election Commission under S. 85. There was a further amendment by Act 40 of 1961 and sub-s. (3) of s. 90 as it now stands has already been quoted by us in an earlier part of this judgment. It seems clear to us that reading the relevant section in Part VI of the Act, it is impossible to accept the contention that a defect in verification which is to be made in the manner laid down in theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the verification of pleadings as required by cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 83 is fatal to the maintainability of the petition.We agree with the High Court and the Election Tribunal that the first defect is not a defect at all. When every page of the copy served on the appellant was attested to be a true copy under the signature of the petitioner, a fresh signature below the word "petitioner" was not necessary. Sub-section (3) of S. 81 requires that the copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature and this was done. As to the second defect the question really turns on the true scope and effect of the word "copy" occurring in sub-sec. (3) of S. 81.Having regard to the provisions of Part VI of the Act, we are of the view that the word "copy" does not mean an absolutely exact copy. It means a copy so true that nobody can by any possibility misunderstand it. The test whether the copy is a true one is whether any variation from the original is calculated to mislead an ordinary person. Applying that test we have come to the conclusion that the defects complained of with regard to Election Petition No. 269 of 1962 were not such as to mislead the appellant; therefore there was no failure to comply with the last part of sub-s. (3) of S. 81. In that view of the matter sub-s. (3) of S. 90 was not attracted and there was no question of dismissing the election petition under that sub-section by reason of any failure to comply with the provisions of S. 81. This disposes of the second preliminary objection raised beforethe copy served on the appellant the original treasury receipt of Rs. 2,000/- deposited by way of security was not re-produced. A certified copy of the order of the returning officer rejecting the nomination of the petitioner was appended to the copy but this certified copy was not further signed by the petitioner. As to the security deposit it was mentioned in the body of the petition (Paragraph 9) that such a deposit had been made. The certified copy of the rejection of the nomination paper was verified to be a true copy and we fail to see how any further signature of the petitioner was necessary thereon. It is obvious to us, that a copy of the Vakalatnama was not required under sub-s. (3) of S. 81 nor was it necessary to make a further endorsement that two copies of the petition had been filed along with the petition. It is not disputed that copies as required by sub-s. (3) of S. 81 were filed. The only grievance made is that the endorsement "two copies" was not repeated in the enclosure portion of the copy served on the appellant. We have already explained what is meant by the word "copy" in sub-s. (3) of S. 81 and we are of the view that the defect pointed out on behalf of the appellant are not of such a character as to invalidate the copy which was served on the appellant in the present case.In conclusion we have to point out that we allowed one Dr. Z. A. Ahmed to intervene in these appeals on the ground mentioned in his petition dated April 4, 1963. The intervener supported the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant. We have fully dealt with those arguments in this judgment and nothing further need be said about the interveners petition.