Case: Kamgaranchao Ekvott Vs. Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha &amp; Others

2. Before we deal with the contentions raised by the parties and the decision of the learned single judge, few relevant facts may be stated:3. It is the case of the appellant that the workmen of the erstwhile Hindustaned into M/s. Syngenta India Ltd. and M/s. Ciba Speciality Chemicals India Ltd. (respondent Nos.2 and 3 respectively), submitted a Charter of Demands on May 11, 1993 through Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha, respondent No.1 herein. The Commissioner of Labour called the parties to get the matter settled. Since, however, no settlement could be arrived at, he submitted a Failure Report in July, 1995 to the Appropriate Government. By an order dated 23rd August, 1995, the Appropriate Government (Government of Goa) was pleased to refer the dispute for adjudication to the industrial Tribunal, Goa at Panaji which was registered as Reference IT No.38 of 1995. It was the case of the appellant union that several employees of respondent No.1 union resigned from the first respondent union and joined the appellant union. They also withdrew the authority given to respondent No.1 to represent them in industrial dispute pending before the Industrial Tribunal, Goa. The appellant union, therefore, made an application on September 11, 2000 (Ex.37), to the Tribunal making a prayer that it may be joined as party to the Reference. Another application was also made by the appellant union on 29th September, 2000, for the similar relief (Ex.40). It was stated in the applications that employees of respondent Nos.2 and 3, who were members of respondent No.1 union had joined appellant union and hence the appellant union should be joined as party respondent in the industrial dispute.4. Respondent No.1 union objected the applications and prayer made by the appellant union contending inter alia that the appellant union was neither necessary nor proper party to the Reference and the applications were liable to be dismissed.5. The Industrial Tribunal considered both the applications, Exhs.37 and 40, as also the objections raised by respondent No.1 union. Finally, by an order dated 30th November, 2000, the Tribunal allowed both the applications and impleaded appellant union as party to the Reference.6. In the order below Exhs.37 and 40, the Tribunal observed that majority of the workers who were with respondent No.1 union had resigned from the membership and had become members of the appellant union. It also observed that a settlement has been arrived at between the appellant union and the Company. The said settlement was required to be proved before the Tribunal in the Reference at the instance of respondent No.1 union which was pending. In the circumstances the prayer made by the appellant union that it should be joined as party respondent was well founded and deserved to be allowed. The Tribunal also considered the cases cited before it and stated that since the question whether the settlement arrived at by the appellant union was fair, just and reasonable or not would have to be considered by the Tribunal, the appellant union was right in submitting that it should be joined as party respondent. Accordingly, the prayer was granted and appellant union was joined as party respondent.7. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, the first respondent union approached the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Goa Bench. The learned single Judge by an order dated 26th April, 2002 held that the Tribunal had committed an error of law and of jurisdiction in granting Exhs.37 and 40 by joining appellant union as party respondent. He also observed that since the members of the appellant union had arrived at a settlement with the company, there did not appear to be any industrial dispute in existence. If it were so, according to the learned Single Judge, presence of appellant union was not necessary in industrial dispute between respondent No.1 on the one hand and respondent Nos.2 and 3 on the other hand. The appellant union was, therefore, neither necessary nor proper party and the Tribunal ought not to have granted the applications.8. The learned Judge proceeded to state:Undoubtedly, the petitioner union is reduced to a minority in the sense that majority of its workmen have joined the respondent No.3 and have settled their disputes. However, six of the workmen who continued to be the members of the petitioner union would be free to agitate their demands. It was rightly submitted by Mr. Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, that while adjudicating the dispute, the Court may hold the settlement to be fair, just and proper and may pass award in terms of the settlement arrived at by the respondent No.3 union with the respondents 1 and 2 companies or the Industrial Tribunal may grant the petitioner union more benefits than what is settled between the parties. However, that is a matter, which will be dealt with by the learned Presiding Officer of the Industrial Tribunal after the evidence of the parties is adduced in the proceedings. One thing is clear that those of the workmen who have settled their disputes are not necessary parties to the proceedings as in between them and the employer as no industrial disputesupplied)He further stated;It is true that the Industrial Tribunal would be called upon to decide whether the settlement arrived at between the respondent No.3 Union and the respondents 1 and 2 companies is a just, fair and proper settlement of the dispute. The employers, parties to the reference would have to establish before the Industrial Tribunal that the settlement is just, fair and proper. The workmen who have entered into a settlement, may be examined as witnesses by the employers, in its attempt to establish that the settlement is just, fair and proper. Unless the workmen take exception to the settlement and complain to the Industrial Tribunal that the settlement is unjust, unfair or improper, the workmen are not necessary parties to decide whether the settlement is just, fair and proper.The learned single Judge conceded that the order of impleadment of a party was a discretionary exercise of power on the part of the Court and the High Court should not normally interfere in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with such a discretionary order. According to the learned single Judge, however, as the appellant union was neither necessary nor proper party, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Industrial Tribunal was arbitrary, and deserved interference. Accordingly, the petition was allowed and the order passed by the Tribunal on 30th November, 2000 was set aside.

Reasoning:
From the above clause, it is clear that the management and the workmen agreed that the settlement was full and final excluding that the demand pertaining to the temporary workmen which is the subject matter of Reference IT/38/95 which is pending. It is thus clear that the settlement which has been arrived at specifically refers to Reference IT/38/95. It also mentions a demand pertaining to temporary workmen which is the subject matter of Reference IT/38/95 which is pending. The industrial Tribunal, therefore, in our opinion, rightly relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Hochtier Gammon vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa,7 SCLJ 653 (SC) and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen, (1981) II LLJ 429 (SC). To us, the Tribunal was also right in distinguishing a decision of this Court in V.V.F. Employees Union vs. S.M. LimayeOthers, (1990) I CLR 359 (Bom). In V.V.F. Employees Union, as rightly observed by the Tribunal, there were two disputes and two references. The workmen represented by one union settled its dispute in respect of demands made by it covered by the settlement and the dispute thus came to an end. So far as the other union was concerned, certain demands were raised which did not result into a settlement. Obviously, therefore, the first union which had settled its dispute was neither necessary nor proper party to the second dispute which was raised by another union. This Court also observed that there was no dispute in existence so far as the first union was concerned, in view of settlement arrived at between the parties. The dispute raised by another union was totally different, distinct and independent. The said dispute concerned the members of the other union and the union which had settled the matter had no interest therein. A prayer by that union to be joined as party in respect of demands made and dispute raised by the second union, therefore, was totally8. The learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was not right in interfering with the discretionary order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Though conscious of the fact that normally the High Court should not interfere with such order and though the learned Single Judge observed in the order that while deciding Reference IT/38/95, the Tribunal has to consider whether the settlement arrived at by the appellant union with the Company was just, fair and reasonable, he held that the presence of the appellant union for that purpose was not necessary. In the opinion of the learned single Judge, whether the settlement was just, fair and reasonable or not could be decided even in absence of the appellant union and necessary witnesses can be examined. In our opinion, however, when that question is required to be decided in Reference IT/38/95 and when Clause 35.2 made it clear that the settlement excluded demand pertaining to permanency of temporary workmen which is subject matter of Reference IT/38/95, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order passed by the Tribunal.19. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be confirmed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge therefore, is hereby set aside and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Goa at Panaji is restored.