Case: Narayan Bhondoo Pimputkar &amp; Another  Vs. Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar &amp; Ors

2. The appellants and the respondent belong to one family. The respondent represents the seniormost branch of the family. The family was granted Patilki Watan in a number of villages, including Soleumbha, in district Thana. The watan land situated in Soleumbha is the subject matter of the present dispute. Underthe Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 the person who actually performs the duty of a hereditary office for the time being is called an officiator. Purshottam, father of the respondent, was the officiator till 1921 when, because of a disqualification incurred by him, a deputy was appointed in place of Purshottam. After the death of Purshottam in 1940, the respondent became the officiator. The branch of the appellants claimed to be in possession of the watan land in dispute and some other lands under a partition effected in 1914. In 1944 the respondent moved the Government for resumption of the watan land in dispute which was in possession of the branch of the appellants. Prayer was also made by the respondent that he might be delivered possession of the land. The Government after some enquiry resumed that land by order dated October 9, 1946 and directed that possession of the same be restored to the respondent. The appellants thereafter moved the Government for reconsideration of that order. The Government on May 2, 1947 modified its previous order by directing that the appellants could continue to retain the possession of the land in dispute subject to payment of rent as might be fixed by the Government from time to time. The respondent thereupon instituted suit for a declaration that the order of the Government dated May 2, 1947 and an ancillary order dated March 1, 1949 were null, void and inoperative. Prayer was also made that the appellants should remove all obstructions and hindrances from the land in dispute and should hand over the possession of the same to the respondent. It was further prayed that the appellants should render account of the income of the land to the respondent. The suit was resisted by the appellants on the ground that the impugned orders were administrative orders and no suit could lie for setting them aside. The suits were also stated to be barred by limitation. The trial court decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. On appeal the District Judge set aside the decree in favour of the respondent. The decision of the District Judge was affirmed on second appeal by the High Court. The respondent then came up in appeal to this Court by special leave. This Court as per its judgment dated December 13, 1962, reported in (1964) 1 SCR 200   = (AIR 1964 SC 436  ) accepted the appeal of the respondent and set aside the judgments of the High Court and the District Judge and restored that of the trial court whereby decree for possession of the land in dispute had been awarded in favour of the respondent against the appellants.3. In the meanwhile in 1960 the State of Bombay was bifurcated and the land in dispute which was earlier part of Bombay State became part of the State of Gujarat. On April 1, 1963 the Act came into force. On July 19, 1966 the respondent filed an application to execute the decree for possession of the land which had been awarded in his favour. Objection was then taken by the appellants that the decree awarded in favour of the respondent had become inexecutable because of the coming into force of the Act. This objection found favour with the executing court which consequently dismissed the execution application. Appeal filed by the respondent against the order of the executing court was dismissed by the District Judge Bulsar. The respondent thereafter filed second appeal before the Gujarat High Court. High Court came to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled to execute the decree for possession of the land obtained by him against the appellants. Appeal of the respondent was accordingly allowed. The appellants have thereafter come up in appeal to this Court by special leave.

Reasoning:
7. The provisions of Section 4 of the Act have been reproduced above and it is manifest therefrom that with effect from the appointed day, viz., April 1, 1963 all patel watans are abolished and all incidents appertaining to the said watans are extinguished. It is further provided that as from the appointed day no office of patel shall be hereditary and that subject to the provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 10 all watan lands are resumed and would be subject to the payment of land revenue.The question with which we are concerned is whether the right to execute the decree for the possession of watan land which has been obtained by the watandar against other persons comes to an end because of the abolition of patel watans and the extinguishment of all incidents appertaining to the said watans. The answer to this question, in our opinion, should be in the negative. There is nothing in the language of Section 4 which renders such decrees for possession to be inexecutable. Had the legislature intended that the decrees for possession of the watan lands which had been obtained by the watandars against third persons should become inexecutable, the legislature would have indicated such an intention by incorporating some provision to that effect. In the absence of any such provision, it is not permissible to read a prohibition in Section 4 of the Act on the execution of a decree for possession of the watan land obtained in favour of the watandar.It would follow from a combined reading of Sections 4, 6, 7 and 10 of the Act that a watandar on the abolition of patel watans and extinguishment of the incidents appertaining to the watans does not automatically lose his right to possession of the watan lands. The same is true of an authorised holder. Their right to retain possession of watan land as long as they comply with the prescribed conditions is statutorily recognised.The position of a watandar and an authorised holder is in marked contrast to that of an unauthorised holder who can be summarily evicted from the watan lands by the Collector under Section 10 of the Act. So far as quondam watandars are concerned, they are entitled to be in possession of the watan lands not in their capacity as watandars but by virtue of the operation of Section 6 of the Act.Likewise, the authorised holders are entitled to be in possession by virtue of Section 7 of the Act. If the respondent is entitled to be in possession of the land in dispute under Section 6 of the Act, the right to execute the decree for possession of the land can plainly be not denied to him on account of the provisions of theis, in our opinion, not necessary for the purpose of the present case to go into the question whether the appellants can claim regrant of the land under Section 10 of the Act because this question does not materially affect the right of the respondent to execute the decree for possession of the land in dispute obtained by him against the appellants. If the respondent is entitled to execute the decree for possession of the land obtained against the appellants, in that event the question whether the appellants, if allowed to remain in possession, could have applied for regrant of the land to them, is hardly of anycontention, in our opinion, is not well founded. What is contemplated by the opening clause of Section 4 of the Act is that notwithstanding any usage or custom or anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or any decree or order of a court or the existing law with effect from the appointed day, the results mentioned in the various clauses of that section would follow. The words "any decree or order of a court" are preceded by the words "anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad." It is a well-established rule in construction of statutes that general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature.