Case: Ajay Krishan Shinghal Etc. Etc Vs. Union Of India &amp; Ors

The Division Bench consisting of Honble Chief Justice T.V.R. Tarachari and Honble Justice S. Ranganathan, as they then were, in an elaborate judgment rendered by the latter running into 129 pages, considered threadbare two questions of law raised for consideration, namely, the validity of the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) (for short "the Act") acquiring an extent of 3470 acres in Naraina village for public purpose, viz., "Planned Development of Delhi" and secondly, whether the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was published in the locality as envisaged undern (1) of Section 4 of the Act. The learned Judges have upheld the judgment of the learned Single Judge and held that the planned development of Delhi is a public purpose and that, therefore, notification was not beset with any vagueness in the likely need of the land for the said purpose. It is held that the substance of the notification was published in the locality, Naraina. The Division Bench considered elaborately various discrepancies pointed out in compliance with the publication of the substance of the notification as noted in the judgment. Thereafter, it was held that they were satisfied that the substance of the notification was in fact effected as per law2. The material facts are that notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the Gazette on 24-10-1961. The substance of the notification was published on 21-11-1961. The declaration under Section 6 was published on 7-12-1966 after enquiry under Section 5-A

Reasoning:
So it is not necessary to deal with these cases in detail. Suffice it to state that each case has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. The planned development of Delhi was held to be a public purpose in Aflatoon case followed by several judgments including the latest judgment of this Court in Jai Narain case. The question then is whether the interim General Plan 1956, the Master Plan under the Development Act brought on statute in 1962 w.e.f.2 and further amended plan in 1990 are required to necessarily specify the purpose for which land is neededs the provisions ofthe Cantonments Act, 1924. It is true that when acquisition of the land was within the limits specified under Section 4 and declaration under Section 5 ofthe Cantonments Act, 1924 was published, the Cantonment Board and the authorities constituted thereunder get the power and jurisdiction to deal with the lands within its jurisdiction for the development. None of their representatives finds berth in Planning Council under the Development Act. Equally, under the Development Act the Delhi Development Authority and the various authorities constituted thereunder are required to prepare the Master Plan, the Zonal Plan and the Area Development Plan as required for planned development of the land. But one fact that needs to be emphasised and always kept in mind is that all these are development activities to be undertaken subsequent to the acquisition after the land is available. The harping and insistence on compliance of details by Shri Lekhi from several provisions in various Acts do not need elaborate consideration. As a fact the High Court had done that exercise and in our view in correct perspective. They need reiteration. Once a public purpose has been specified by the Governor in the notification and on specification obviously on presumptive satisfaction thereof the Governor issued the notification as required under Section 4(1); the absence of the specification and further elaboration of the development do not have the effect of rendering the satisfaction reached by the Governor illegal and the notification under Section 4(1) published by the Governor in exercise of the power of eminent domain is not rendered void. Therefore, it is not necessary to elaborately deal in detail with the manner in which the development has to be undertaken when the land is situated within the cantonment area. In fact, Section 12(3)(ii) of the Development Act takes care of the development in cantonment area when there would be a conflict between the authorities under the Development Act and the need for prior approval in that behalf of the cantonment, which is a local authority, for developing land under the Development Act. As a fact, except the land in question, the land in Naraina was developed as per plan. Under those circumstances, since the High Court has elaborately dealt with this aspect of the matter in the judgment running into 129 pages, we feel it unnecessary to burden this judgment with further discussion in that behalf. Accordingly, we hold that the notification under Section 4(1) is not vitiated on account of the fact that planned development was not specified with particularisation of the land in question needed for the public purposeTherefore, the first limb of the statutory requirement stands satisfied. The serious dispute is as regards the publication of the substance of the notification in the locality. In this behalf, the High Court also has spent considerable time and dealt with in about 20 pages in considering this question. In paragraph 57 of the judgment, the learned Judges have stated that the notification under Section 4(1) as regards the endorsement made on the back of the publication of the substance was put in issue and it was noted. The translated copy given by the learned counsel for the appellant was dealt with in paragraph 58 and thereafter in paragraph 59 the contentions raised by the learned counsel were dealt with12. After perusing the record and satisfying ourselves and also considering various cogent and weighty reasons given by the learned Judges, we are of the opinion that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was duly published in the locality. It is not the law and could not and would not be the law that publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification in the locality should be established beyond shadow of doubt and benefit should be extended to the owner or interested person of the land. Obvious thereto, presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act has been raised that official acts have been properly done unless proved otherwise. We are satisfied that it was properly done. It is futile to reiterate the settled legal position that the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) in the Gazette and substance thereof in the locality are mandatory requirements and the omission thereof renders the notification void. In Khub Chand case this Court had held the same view. But as records earlier, since substance of the notification was published in the locality, the second limb of the requirement also stands complied with. Considered from this perspective, we are of the considered view that the High Court has not committed any error of law13. Another contention raised by Shri Ravinder Sethi is that the claimant in the first appeal had purchased the property after the declaration under Section 6 was published and that therefore he does not get any right to challenge the validity of the notification published under Section 4(1). Since his title to the property is a void title, at best he has only right to claim compensation in respect of the acquired land claiming interest in the land which hise had. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. Pista Devi; Gian Chand v. Gopala; Mahavir v. Rural Institute and Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute. We need not deal at length with this issue as is the settled legal position. But since other appellants are owners of the lands who are challenging the validity of the notification and since we have upheld the validity of the notification though others have challenged its validity, it is not necessary to dismiss the appeal of Bahadur Singh on this ground alone as we are upholding the notification under Section 4(1) in the appeals of other appellantsPublication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the State Gazette and of the substance thereof in the locality are mandatory requirements under Section 4(1) of the Act.e thereof renders the entire acquisition void. Three versions on publication of the substance emerge from the record, namely, one, as given and translated by the counsel for the appellants in the High Court; second, as given by the court translator as was got done by the High Court; and the third, the affidavit filed by Daryao Singh, who was a peon attached to the office of the Land Acquisition Officer. The three versions are diametrically inconsistent. Consequently, there is no acceptable version found from the record. In those circumstances, unless it is proved to the hilt that substance of the notification was in fact published in the locality, the acquisition cannot be declared to be valid in law. The benefit of doubt should go to the owners in upholding the acquisition as it is an expropriator action. The High Court, therefore, had not considered this aspect of the matter in the proper perspective. Consequently, when the special leave petitions came to be filed in this Court, this Court had called upon the respondents to produce the original record. Since the records had not been produced, adverse inference was drawn and unqualified leave was granted though notice was limited to 2nd point. These circumstances would clearly indicate that there is no compliance of the requirement of publication of the substance of Section 4(1) notification in the locality. Resultantly, the presumption available under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act, 1872 stands displaced. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in holding that the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) was published in the locality.