Case: Trust Mai Lachmi Sialkoti Bradri Vs. The Chairman, Amritsar Imppovementtrust

2. A few facts are necessary to be stated in order to appreciate how this point arises. The appellant claims to be the trustee of a public Trust created for the management of certain properties situated in Amritsar. Of the properties belonging to the trust is one which is said to be a dharamshala. By a resolution of the Amritsar Improvement Trust dated March 21 1957 the Improvement Trust decided to acquire a portion of this property for the purpose of widening a road under a development scheme framed under S. 3 of the Act.It is common ground that a scheme has been framed under S. 3 and this has been finalised after considering objections. It was in pursuance of this scheme that the Improvement Trust took steps to effect the acquisition of the property bearing Municipal No. 2320/1, 884/9 belonging to the appellant-trust. The appellant filed a suit for a declaration that the acquisition proceedings were illegal and ultra vires and for a permanent injunction restraining the Improvement Trust from proceeding with the acquisition. The suit was, however, withdrawn by reason of a Consent Memo which was filed and subsequently the appellant filed a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court challenging the validity of the action of the Improvement Trust and praying for appropriate reliefs quashing the proceedings for the acquisition. The petition, however, was summarily dismissed by the High Court by order dated April 20, 1961. The further petition fled by the appellant praying for a certificate of fitness under Art. 133 (1) (c) was also dismissed. Thereafter the appellant obtained special leave of this Court to prefer an appeal against the Judgment of the High Court and that is how the appeal is now before us.

Reasoning:
This definition therefore contemplates only two classes of areas as falling within it: (1) areas which the State Government may, by notification declare to be "a damaged area, i.e., which may be so declared in the future- after the comma into force of the Act, and (2) the areas already notified under the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1949. It is common ground that the area in respect of which the scheme has been framed at present and in pursuance of which the impugned acquisition is sought to be made, falls neither under the one nor the other of these two classes. on a plain reading of the definition therefore it is manifest that the scheme is without legal foundation since it is in regard to an area which is not "a damaged area" within the definition for which alone schemes may be framed under Ss. 3 to 5 and in pursuance of which an acquisition may be made under the provisions following in the Act.Ultimately, the question would have to be decided on the proper interpretation of S. 2(d) of the Act of 1951 under which the impugned scheme was framed and proceedings for acquisition are sought to be taken. It is clear that besides the areas notified under the Act of l951 the only other areas contemplated are those which were notified under the Act of 1949 which on any normal and reasonable construction could only include the areas which were the subject of notification under S. 3 of the Act of -1949 and not those under the Act of 1947 but which are deemed to be areas notified under the Act of 1949 assuming every submission of the respondent to be correct. In this view we consider that the appellant is entitled to the relief sought because the acquisition was in respect of a scheme for an area which it was not within the power of the Improvement Trust to frame under S. 3 of thefoundation of the jurisdiction of the Improvement Trust to frame a scheme and for the government to approve of the same depends upon the scheme relating to a "damaged area" and if, as we have held, the property now sought to be acquired is within an area which does not fall within the definition of a damaged area under S. 2 (d) of the Act, it follows that there was total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Improvement Trust or the government to frame a scheme for this area. The position is not very different from what it would have been if the Act itself had not been extended to an area in regard to which a scheme has been framed. The conclusive effect postulated by S. 5 (4) can only be in regard to the formalities prescribed by Ss. 3, 4 and 5 and does not touch a case where there is complete lack of jurisdiction in the authorities to frame a scheme.