Case: V. Tulasamma &amp; Ors Vs. V. Sesha Reddi (Dead) By L. Rs

Venkatasubba Reddy, husband of appellant No. 1 Vaddeboyina Tulasamma--hereinafter to be referred to as Tulasamma--died in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step brother V. Sesha Reddy and left behind Tulasamma as his widow. On October 11, 1944 the appellant Tulasamma filed a petition for maintenance in forma pauperis against the respondent in the Court of the District Munsif, Nellore. This application was set ex parte on January 13, 1945 bug subsequently the petition was registered as a suit and an ex parte decree was passed against the respondent on June 29, 1946. On October 1, 1946 the respondent filled an interlocutory application for recording a compromise alleged to have been arrived at between the parties out of Court on April 9, 1945. The appellant Tulasamma opposed this application which was ultimately dismissed on October 16, 1946. An appeal filed by the respondent to the District Judge, Nellore was also dismissed. Thereafter Tulasamma put the decree in execution and at the execution stage the parties appear to have arrived at a settlement out of Court which was certified by the Executing Court on July 30, 2949 under O. XXI r. 2 of theCode of Civil Procedure. Under the compromise the appellant Tulasamma was allotted the Schedule properties, but was to enjoy only a limited interest therein with no power of alienation at all. According to the terms of the compromise the properties were to revert to t he plaintiff after the death of Tulasamma. Subsequently Tulasamma continued to remain in possession of the properties even after coming into force ofthe Hindu Succession Act, 1956--hereinafter to be referred to as. the 1956 Act, or the Act of 1956. By two registered deeds dated April 12, 1960 and May 26, 1961, the appellant leased out some of the properties to defendants 2 &3 by the first deed and sold some of the properties to defendant 4 by the second deed. The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit on July 31, 1961 before the District Munsiff, Nellore for a declaration that the alienation made by the widow Tulasamma were not binding on the plaintiff and could remain valid only till the life-time of the widow. The basis of the action filed by the plaintiff was that as the appellant Tulasamma had got a restricted estate only under the terms of t he compromise her interest could not be enlarged into an absolute interest by the provisions of the 1956 Act in view of s. 14(2) of the said Act. The suit was contested by the appellant Tulasamma who denied the allegations made in the plaint and averred that by virtue of the provisions of the 1956 Act she had become the full owner of the properties with absolute right of alienation and the respondent had no locus standi to file the present suit. The learned Munsiff decreed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the appellant Tulasamma got merely a limited interest in the properties which could be enjoyed during her lifetime and that the alienations were not binding on the reversioner. Tulasamma then filed an appeal before the District Judge Nellore, who reversed the finding of the Trial Court, allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiffs suit holding that the appellant Tulasamma had acquired an absolute interest in the properties by virtue of the provisions of the 1956 Act. The learned Judge further held that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 had no application to the present case, because the compromise was an instrument in recognition of a pre-existing right. The plaintiff/respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court against the judgment of the District Judge. The plea of the plaintiff/respondent appears to have found favour with the High Court which held that the case of the appellant was clearly covered by s. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act and as the compromise was an instrument as contemplated by s. 14(2) of the 1956 Act Tulasamma could not get an absolute interest under s. 14(1) of the Act. The High Court further held that by virtue of the compromise the appellant Tulasamma got title to the properties for the first time and it was not a question of recognising a pre- existing right which she had none in view of the fact that her husband had died even before the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. We might further add that the facts. narrated above have not been disputed by counsel for theappeal has been argued only on the substantial questions of law which turn. upon the interpretation of sub-ss. (1) &(2) of s. 14 ofthe Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is common ground that in this case as also in the. other connected appeals, the properties in suit were allotted under a compromise or an instrument in lieu of maintenance. It is also admitted that the appellant Tulasamma was in possession of the properties at the time when the 1956 Act came into force. Finally it is also no t disputed that the compromise did purport to confer only a limited interest on the widow restricting completely her power of alienation. We have now to apply the law on the facts mentioned above. Similar points were involved in the other two appeals Nos. 135 of 1973 and 126 of 1972. We have heard all the, three appeals together and in all these appeals counsel for the parties have confined their arguments only to the questions of law without disputing the findings of fact arrived at by the Courts below..

Reasoning:
This being the position after marriage, it is manifest that the law enjoins a corresponding duty on the husband to maintain his wife and look after her comforts and to provide her food and raiments. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties then his wife is entitled as of right to be maintained out of such properties. The claim of a Hindu widow to be maintained is not an empty formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession or indulgence, grace or gratis or generosity but is a valuable spiritual and moral right which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of the husband an wife. As the wife is in a sense a part of the body of her husband, she becomes co-owner of the property of her husband though in a subordinate sense. Although the right of maintenance does not per se create a legal charge on the property of her husband, yet the wife can enforce this right by moving the Court for passing a decree for maintenance by creating a charge. This right is available only so long as the wife continues to be chaste. Thus the position is that the right of maintenance may amount to a legal charge if such a charge is created either by an agreement between the parties or byare a number of authorities which have taken the view that even if the property is transferred and the transferee takes the property with notice of the right of the widow to be maintained out of the property, the purchaser takes the obligation to maintain the widow out of the property purchased and the wife or widow can follow the property in the hands of the purchaser for the limited purpose of hersump up, therefore, according to. Sastris interpretation of Shastric Hindu Law the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu widow is a very important right which amounts. to a charge on the property of her husband which continues to the successor of the property and the wife is regarded as a sort of co-owner of the husbands property though in a subordinate sense, i.e. the wife has no dominion over themight further mention that the Hindu womens right to maintenance finally received statutory recognition and the entire law on the subject was consolidated and codified by the Hindu Married Womens Right to Separate Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946--hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1946--which came into force on April 23, 1946. Thus there appears to be complete unanimity of the various schools of Hindu law on the important incidents and indicia of the Hindu womens right to maintenance which has now received statutory recognition and which only shows that the right to maintenance though not an indefeasible right to property is undoubtedly a pre-existingon a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu Law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu womans right tothat a Hindu womans right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow;(2) though the widows right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly pre-existing right in property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widows right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance;(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a preexisting right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, there fore, a pre-existing right;(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for herthe light of the above decisions of this Court the following principles appear to be clear:(1) that the provisions of s. 14, of the 1956 Act must be liberally construed in order to advance the object of the Ac t which is to enlarge the limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow which was in consonance with the changing temper of the times;(2) it is manifestly clear that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely recognises a pre-existing right without creating or conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly held by this Court in Badri Parshads case (supra).(3) that the Act of 1956 has made revolutionary and far-reaching changes in the Hindu society and every attempt should be made to carry out the. spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a long felt need and tried to do away with the invidious distinction between a Hindu male and female in matters of intestate succession;(4) that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 is merely a proviso to. subs. (1) of s. 14 and has to be interpreted as a proviso and not-in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the mainhave given our anxious consideration. to the language of s. 1 4(1) &(2) and we feel that on a proper interpretation of s. 14(2) there does not appear to be any real inconsistency between s. 14(1), . the explanation thereto and sub-s. (2). To begin with, s. 14(1) does not limit the enlargement of the estate of a Hindu widow to any particular interest in the property. On the other hand the Explanation to s. 14(1) brings out the real purpose. of s. 14(1) by giving an exhaustive category of cases where principle of s. 14(1 ) has to operate, i.e. to cases where a Hindu female would get an absolute interest. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that as the right of maintenance was a pre-existing right, any instrument or transaction by which the property was allotted to the appellant would not be a new transaction so as to create a new title but would be only in recognition of a pre-existing right, namely, the right of maintenance. On the other hand Mr. Natesan appearing for the respondents submitted that the object of the proviso was to. validate rather than disturb the past transactions which had 131aced certain restrictions or curbs on the power of a Hindu female and as the language of the proviso is very wide there is no warrant for not applying it to cases where pre-existing rights are concerned. In the alternative, Mr. Natesan argued that the Hindu womans right to maintenance is not a legal right. unless an actual charge is created in respect of the property and is, therefore not enforceable at law. It is, there fore, not correct to describe a claim of a Hindu females right to. maintenance simpliciter as a pre-existing right because all the necessary indicia of a legal right areconsidering various aspects of the matter we are inclined to agree with the contentions raised by Mr. Krishna Murthy Iyer appearing for the appellant. In the: first place, the appellants contention appears to be more in consonance with the spirit and object of the statute itself. Secondly, we have already pointed out that the claim of a Hindu female for maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right and this has been So held not only by various Courts in India but also by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and by this Court. It seems to us, and it has been held as discussed above, that the claim or the right to maintenance possessed by a Hindu female is really a substitute for a share which she would have got in the property of her husband. This being the position, where a Hindu female who. gets a share in her husbands property acquires an absolute interest by virtue of s. 14(1) of the Act, could it be intended by the legislature that in the same circumstances a Hindu female who could not get a share but has a right of maintenance would not get an absolute interest ? In other words, the position would be that the appellant would suffer because her husband had died prior to the Act of 1937. If the husband of the appellant had died after 1937, there could be no, dispute that the appellant would have got an absolute interest, because she was entitled to her share under the provisions of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937. Furthermore, it may be necessary to study the language in which the Explanation to s. 14(1) and sub-s. (2) of s. 14 are couched. It would be seen that while the Explanation to s. 14( 1 ) clearly and expressly mentions "property acquired by a female Hindu" at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance there is no reference in sub-s. (2) at all to this particular mode of acquisition by a Hindu female which clearly indicates that the intention of the Parliament was to exclude the application of sub-s. (2) to, cases where the property has been acquired by a Hindu female. either at a partition or in lieu of maintenance etc. The Explanation is an inclusive definition and if the Parliament intended that everything that is mentioned in the Explanation should be covered by sub-s. (2) it should have expressly so stated in sub-s. (2). Again the language of sub-s. (2) clearly shows that it would apply only to such transactions which. are absolutely independent in nature and which are not in recognition of or in lieu of pre-existing rights. It appears from the Parliamentary Debates that when the Hindu Succession Bill, 1954, w as referred to a Joint Committee by the Rajya Sabha, in s. 14(2) which was clause 16(2) of the Draft Bill of the Joint Committee, the words mentioned were only gift or will. Thus the intention of the Parliament was to confine sub-s. (2) only to two transactions, namely a gift or a will, which clearly would not include property received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance or at a partition. Subsequently, however, an amendment was propose d by one of the, members for adding other categories, namely, an instrument, decree, order or award which was accepted by the Government. This would show that the various terms, viz., gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award mentioned in s. 14(2) would have to. be read ejusdem generis so as refer to transactions where right is created for the first time in favour of the Hindu female. The intention of the Parliament in adding the other categories to sub-s. (2) was merely to ensure that any transaction under which a Hindu female gets a new or independent title under any of the modes mentioned in s. 14(2), namely, gift, will, decree, order, award or m instrument which prescribes a restricted estate would not be disturbed and would continue to occupy the field covered by s. 14(2). This would be the position even if a Hindu male was to get the property by any of the modes mentioned in s. 14(2): he would also get only a restricted interest and, therefore, the Parliament thought that there was no warrant for making any distinction between a male or a female in this regard and both were, therefore, sought to bethe following propositions emerge from a detailed discussion of thisthat the widows claim to maintenance is undoubtedly a tangible right though not an absolute right to property so as to become a fresh source of title. The claim for maintenance can, however, be made a charge on the joint family properties, and even if the properties are sold with the notice of the Said charge, the sold properties will be burdened with the claim for maintenance;(2) that by virtue of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 the claim of the widow to maintenance has been crystallized into a full-fledged right and any property allotted to her in lieu of maintenance becomes property to which she has a limited interest which by virtue of the provisions of Act of 1956 is enlarged into an absolute title;(3) Section 14(2) applies only to cases where grant is not in lieu of maintenance or in recognition of pre-existing rights but confers a fresh right or tide for the first time and while conferring the said title certain restrictions are placed by the grant or transfer. Where, .however, the grant is merely in re cognition or in implementation of a pre-existing right to claim maintenance, the case. falls beyond the purview of s. 14(2) and comes squarely within the explanation to s. 14we fully agree with the first part of the observations made by the learned Chief Justice, as he then was. that one of the basic concepts of Hindu Law is that a Hindu woman has right to be maintained by her husband or from her husbands property or the joint family property we respectfully disagree with his conclusion that even though this is the legal position yet the right to receive maintenance does not confer on her any right, title or interest in the property. It is true that the claim for maintenance is not an enforceable right but it is undoubtedly a pre-existing right, even though no charge is made on the properties which are liable for her maintenance. We also do not agree with the view of the learned Chief Justice that if the property is given to the widow in lieu of maintenance she will get only a restricted estate. In our opinion, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh has proceeded on wrong premises. Instead of acknowledging t he right of a Hindu woman to maintenance as a right to a right--or that matter a preexisting right---and then considering the effect of the subsequent transactions, the High Court has first presumed that the claim for maintenance is not a tangible right at all and, therefore, the question of a pre-existing right does not arise. This, as we have already pointed out, is against the consistent view taken by a large number of Courts for a very long period. Furthermore, this case does not appear to have noticed the previous Division Bench decision in Gadam Reddayyas case (supra) taking the contrary view, and on this ground alone the authority of this case is considerably weakened. At any rate, since we are satisfied that the claim of a Hindu woman for maintenance is a pre-existing right, any transaction which is in recognition or declaration of that right clearly falls beyond the purview of s. 14(2) of the 1956 Act and, therefore, this authority does not lay down the correct law. We, therefore, do not approve of the view taken in this case and overrule theregards the Madras High Court, the position appears to be almost the same. There also, while a single Judge took the same view as the Bombay High Court and held that s. 14(2) w as not applicable, the Division Bench of the Court in an appeal against the order of another Single Judge took the contrary view. In S. Kachupalaya Gurukal v. Subramania Gurukkal (supra) the Court seems to draw an artificial distinction between a claim of a widow for maintenance and a pre-existing right possessed by her. According to the High Court, while a claim for maintenance simpliciter. was not a right at all, the right to get a s hare in the husbands property under the Hindu Womens Right to, Property Act, 1937 was a pre-existing right. The Madras High Court appears to have fallen into an error by misconceiving the scope and extent of a Hindu womans right to maintenance. Secondly, it appears to have interpreted the proviso in such a manner as to destroy the effect of the main provision, namely, s. 14(1) and the explanation thereto, for which there can be no warrant in law. The decision of Natesan, J, in Gurunadham v. Sundrarajulu Chetty (supra) which had been affirmed by this judgment also, appears to have taken the same view and had fallen into the same error. Furthermore, the view of the learned Judge that on the interpretation given and the view taken by the Bombay High Court which we have accepted, s. 14 is intended to override lawful terms in contracts, bargains, bequests or gifts etc. is not correct, because the scope and area of sub-s. (2) of s. 14 is quite separate and defined. Such a sub-section applies only to such transactions as confer new right, title. or interest on the Hindu females. In such cases the titles created under sub-s. (2) are left in tact and s. 14(1) does not interfere with the titles so created under thosein short, these two, decisions suffer from the following legal infirmities: (i) the Madras High Court has not correctly or properly appreciated the nature and extent of the widows right to. maintenance: and (ii) the distinction drawn by the Court regarding the share given to the widow under the Hindu Womens Right to. Property Act allotted to her before the passing of the Act in lieu of maintenance is based on artificial grounds. In fact the Act of 1937 did not legislate anything new, but merely gave statutory recognition to the old Shastric Hindu Law by consolidating the same and clarifying the right of the widow which she already possessed in matter of succession under the, Hindu Law. This being the position, the Act of 1937 makes no difference. so far as the legal status of a widow in regard to her right to maintenance was concerned. The Act neither took away the: right of maintenance nor conferred the same; (iii) the Court appears to, have given an extended meaning to sub-s. (2) of s. 14 of the 1956 Act which has been undoubtedly enlarged so as to set at naught the express words in the Explanation to sub -s. (1) of s. 14 which expressly exclude the. property given to a widow in lieu of maintenance or at a partition from the ambit of sub-s. (1). In other words, such a property, according to the Explanation, is a property in which the widow would have undoubtedly a limited interest which by operation of law i.e. force of s. 14(1) would be enlarged into an absolute interest if the widow is in possession of the property on the date when the Act was passed; (iv) similarly the Court failed to notice that sub-s. (2) of s. 14 would apply only where a new right is created for the first time by virtue of a gift, will etc . or the like executed in favour of the widow in respect of which she had no prior interest in the property at all. For instance, a daughter is given a limited interest in presence of the widow. Here the daughter not being an heir in presence of the widow (before the Hindu Succession Act came into force) she had, no fight or share in the property, and if she was allotted some property under any instrument, a new and fresh right was created in her favour for the first time which she never possessed. Such a case would be squarely covered by s. 14(2) of theon a careful scrutiny and analysis of the authorities discussed above, the position seems to be that the view taken by the High Courts of Bombay, Andhra Pradesh, Patna, Mysore, Punjab, Calcutta .and Kerala to the effect that the widows claim to maintenance, even though granted to her subject to certain restrictions, is covered by s. 14 (1) and not by sub-s. (2) is based on the followingThat the right of a Hindu widow to claim maintenance is undoubtedly a right against property though not a right to property. Such a right can mature into a full-fledged one if it is charged on the property either by an agreement or by a decree. Even otherwise, where a family possesses property, the husband, or in case of his. death, his heirs are burdened with the obligation to maintain the widow and, therefore, the widows claim for maintenance is not an empty formality but a pre-existing right.(2) Section 14(2) which is in the nature of a proviso to s. 14(1) cannot be interpreted in a way so as to destroy the concept and defeat the purpose which; is sought to, be effectuated by s. 14(1) in conferring an absolute interest on the Hindu women and in doing away with what was hereto before known as the Hindu womens estate. The proviso will apply only to such cases which flow beyond the purview of the Explanation to s. 14(1).(3) That the proviso would not apply to any grant or transfer in favour of the widow hedged in by limitation or restrictions, where the grant is merely in recognition or declaration of a pre-existing right, it will apply only to such a case where a new right which the female did not possess at all is sought to be conferred on her under certain limitations or exceptions. In fact in such a case even if a conditional grant is made to a male, he would be bound by the condition imposed. The proviso wipes out the distinction between a male and a female in thiscontrary view taken by the Madras, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Allahabad and Jammu &Kashmir High Courts proceeds on the followingThat a widows claim to maintenance is merely an inchoate or incomplete right having no legal status, unless the widow gets a property in lieu of maintenance or unless a charge is created in a particular property the claim for maintenance cannot be legally enforced. Thus, where under a grant, compromise, transfer or a decree, a property is allotted to the widow in lieu of maintenance, it is not the recognition of any p re-existing right but it amounts to conferment of a new right for the first time which in fact did not exist before the said demise. This view is really based on the provisions of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, under which the widow has got the right to get a share of his son in lieu of partition and even otherwise she is entitled to her share in the joint Hindu family property on partition. These High Courts, therefore, seem to be of the opinion that in view of the provisions of the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, the widow in claiming a share in the property has a pre-existing right which is recognised by law, namely, the Act of 1937. The same, however, cannot be said of a bare claim to maintenance which has not been recognised as a legal right and which can mature into a legally enforceable right only under a grant or demise. This view suffers from a serious fallacy, which is, based on a misconception of the true position of a Hindu widows claim for maintenance. It has been seen from. the discussion regarding the widows claim for maintenance and her status in family that under the pure Sastric Hindu Law the widow is almost a co-owner of the properties with her husband and even before the Act of 1937 she was entitled to the share of a son on the death o f her husband after partition according to some schools of Hindu Law. The Act of 1937 did not introduce any new right but merely gave a statutory recognition to the old Sastric Hindu Law on the subject. In this respect the Act of 1937 is very different from the Act of 1956, the latter of which has made a revolutionary change in the Hindu Law and has changed the entire complexion and concept of Hindu womens estate. In these circumstances, therefore, if the widows claim for maintenance or right to get the share of a son existed before the Act of 1937, it is futile to dub this! right as flowing from the Act of 1937. The second fallacy in t his view is that the Court failed to consider that the. claim for maintenance is an important right which is granted to the widow under the Sastric Hindu Law which enjoins the husband to maintain his wife even if he has no, property. Where he has a property the widow has to be maintained from that property so much so that after the death of her husband any one who inherits that property takes the property subject to. the burden of maintaining the widow. Even where the property is transferred for payment of family debts and the transferee has the notice of the widows claim for maintenance, he has to discharge the burden of maintaining the widow from the property sold to him. Thus the nature and extent of the right of the widow to claim maintenance is undoubtedly a pre-existing right and it is wrong to say that such a right comes into existence only if the property is allotted to the widow in lieu of maintenance and notreasoning given by the courts taking the contrary view is that sub-s. (2) being in the nature of a proviso to s. 14(1) all grants with conditions take the case out of s. 14(1). This, as we have already pointed out, is based on a wrong interpretation of the scope: and ambit of sub-s. (2) of s.the contrary view is in direct conflict with the observations made by this Court in the cases referred to above, where a grant in lieu of maintenance. of the widow has been interpreted as being in recognition of a pre-existing right so. as to take away the case from the ambit of sub-s.these reasons and those given hereto. before we choose to prefer the view taken by Palekar, J., in B-B. Patil v. Gangabai (supra) which appears to be more in consonance with the object and spirit of the 1956 Act. We, therefore, affirm and approve of the decisions of the Bombay High Court in B.B. Patil v. Gangabai; of the Andhra Pradesh High Court m Gadam Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju &Anr.;of the Mysore High Court in H. Venkanagouda v. Hanamanagouda; of the Patna High Court in Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari; of the Punjab High Court in Smt. Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hira Lal &Anr and Calcutta High Court in Sasadhar Chandra Dev v. Smt. Tara Sundari Dasi (supra) and disapprove the decisions of the Orissa High Court in Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani; Andhra Pradesh High Court in Gopisetty Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu (supra); Madras High Court in S. Kachapalaya Gurukkal v. V. Subramania Gurukkal (supra) and Gurunadham v. Sundararaulu; of the Allahabad High. Court in Ram Jag Missir v. Director of Consolidation, U.P. and in Ajab Singh &Ors. v. Ram Singh &Ors. of the Jammu &Kashmir Highwould now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above; on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of s. 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be statedThe Hindu females right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the fema le has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been. couched in the widest possible terms. and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends, sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.(3) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of s. 14(1) materially. The proviso. should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.(4) Sub-section (2) of s . 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise preexisting rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the females limited interest would automatically be enlarged into. an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub s. (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.(5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance" etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2).(6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in s. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act h ad been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser with- out any right or title.(7) That the words "restricted estate" used in s. 4(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s. 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also. any other kind of limitation that may b e placed on thethe principles enunciated above to the facts of the present case, wethat the properties in suit were allotted to the appellant Tulasumma on July 30, 1949 under a compromise certified by the Court;(ii) that the appellant had taken only a life interest in the properties and there was a clear restriction prohibiting her from alienating the properties;(iii) that despite these restrictions, she continued to be in possession of the properties till 1956 when the Act of 1956 came into. force; and(iv) that the alienations which she had made in 1960 and 1961 were after she had acquired an absolute interest in theis, therefore, clear that the compromise by which the properties were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma in lieu of her maintenance were merely in recognition of her right to maintenance which was a pre-existing right and, there- fore, the case of the appellant would be taken out of the ambit of s. 14(2) and would fail squarely within s. 14 (1) read with the Explanation thereto. Thus the appellant would acquire an absolute interest when she was in possession of the properties at the time when the 1956. Act came into force and any restrictions placed under the compromise would have to be completely ignored. This being the position, the High Court was in error in holding that the appellant Tulasamma would have only a limited interest in setting aside the alienations made by her. We are satisfied that the High Court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on an erroneous view of the law.