Case: O.P. Kathpalia Vs. Lakhmir Singh (Dead) &amp; Others

A dispute of a trivial nature between a landlord and now his transferees and the tenant is awaiting disposal for over 3 decades thanks to the literal and unimaginative approach to the provisions of a procedural statute which times without number has been described as one for advancing justice and not to make a mockery of it.      2. A bungalow with an attached cottage situated at No. 1. Hailey Road, New Delhi was taken on lease by one E. B. Brook and he inducted the appellant as a5. During the pendency of the proceedings for determination of standard rent in the trial Court, the then landlord Lakhmir Singh filed Civil Suit No. 231/56 in the Court of the Senior Sub Judge, at Delhi on July 3, 1956 against the appellant for recovering the arrears of rent and possession. Eviction was sought under S. 13(l)(a) of the Act primarily on the ground of default in payment of rent despite notice dated May 10, 1956 having been duly served upon the tenant. The appellant as defendant contested the suit inter alia contending that his petition for fixation of standard rent under S. 8 of the Act has already been instituted and is pending and unless the standard rent is determined he is not in a position to meet the demand of arrears of rent claimed at the agreed rate. It was also contended that a suitable reply stating the aforementioned facts to the notice served by the landlord was sent yet he has unnecessarily rushed to the Court without waiting for the determination of standard rent. It appears that along with filing of the written statement, thet deposited all the arrears of rent as claimed by the plaintiff landlord. The then landlord made an application on August 1, 1956 for permission to withdraw the amount of rent deposited by the tenant. This application of the landlord was resisted on the ground that the amount has been deposited under protest and the landlord could not be permitted to withdraw the same till the standard rent is determined. The application was set down for hearing on October 1, 1956. In the meantime on August 27, 1956 the landlord filed an application under S. 13(5) of the Act for a direction that the tenant should deposit the rent as it falls due month by month. The order sheet shows that the Court directed notice of the application to be served upon the tenant and be fixed for hearing on October 1. 1956. It appears that the application for withdrawal of the rent deposited by the tenant was heard on October 1, 1956. On October 5, 1956, the appellant tenant moved an application under S. 9 of the Act for fixing interim rent pending the determination of the standard rent of the premises. The order sheet shows that the application was set down for hearing on the same day in the afternoon and it was as a matter of fact heard and adjourned for order to October 6, 1956 in the afternoon. An order purports to have been passed on October 6, 1956 to the effect that the Court directed the tenant to deposit future rent at the agreed rate of rent. The appellant contended that what appears to be the order dated October 6, 1956 is a subsequently interpolated writing and no. such order was made. It is not necessary to refer to the unsavoury details of this allegation save and except that the two learned Judges of the High Court before whom this matter reached at different stages : Justice Tek Chand and Justice D. Falshaw : both were satisfied that the Trial Court appeared to be guilty of interpolation and this finding resulted in withdrawal and transfer of the suit pending before the learned Judge to another Court competent to try the same. It appears that at one stage, the suit filed by the landlord was dismissed for default but the same was ultimately restored at the instance of the landord. When the suit stood transferred to another Court pursuant to the order made by Falshaw, J. an application was made by the landlord to strike off the defence of the tenant on the ground that he failed to comply with the order made on the application dated August 27, 1956 by the landlord by which a direction was given under S. 13(5) that the tenant should deposit the rent at agreed rate of rent month to month as it becomes due and payable. It may be recalled that it is in respect of this very order that the allegation of interpolation was made and accepted by the High Court. The learned Judge before whom the suit came up for hearing pursuant to the order of transfer made by the High Court by his order dated March 17, 1958 accepted the contention of the landlord and ordered the defence of the tenant to be struck off on the ground that the tenant failed to comply with the directions of the Court made under S. 13( 5) of the Act. An appeal preferred by the tenant in the Court of the District Judge was dismissed as being barred by limitation after rejecting the application for condoning the delay, if any. The appellant tenant filed two revision petitions in the High Court of Punjab; one against the order of the learned District Judge dismissing the appeal as barred by limitation after refusing to condone the delay in preferring the appeal and the second against the order of the trial Court striking off the defence of the tenant on the ground that he failed to deposit the rent for the subsequent period from month to month as directed by the order dated October 6, 1956. By a common judgment dated December 17, 1962 the learned Single Judge of the High Court after observing that what purports to be the order dated October 6, 1956 was in interpolated writing for the distinct advantage of the landlord, dismissed both the revision petitions. Hence the tenant has preferred Civil Appeals Nos.5 of 1971 by special leave.      6. The mere narration of events leading to the present three apeals would be sufficient to convince even the most callous person that an utterly trivial dispute in which serious allegations of interpolation in the record by the learned trial Judge having been accepted, the tenant is under a threat of eviction on the ground of failure to deposit the rent though all the arrears of rent claimed in the suit were deposited on the Ist day of hearing in the trial Court.

Reasoning:
14. We have dealt with the view taken by the learned District Judge a little more in detail because the learned Single Judge of the High Court has practically adopted the construction which commended to the learned District Judge. We are therefore unable to accept the construction put by the Learned Judge of the High Court on Cl. 11(b). In our opinion on a proper construction, the petition for determination of standard rent filed by the appellant was within time and the learned District Judge was in error in rejecting the petition on the short ground that it was barred by limitation15. It may be mentioned that the learned trial Judge had determined the standard rent but as neither appellate Court nor the High Court dealt with the point we are constrained to remand the matter to the learned District Judge to decide the second point as to what is the standard rent of the suit premises30. Before we conclude the judgment, one aspect to which our attention was drawn may be noticed. Original landlord Lakhmir Singh died on April 9, 1978 during the pendency of these appeals in this Court. Civil Misc. Petitions Nos.9 of 1984 were moved on March 21, 1983(1984) for substitution of his heirs and legal representatives and for condoning delay, if any, in moving the petitions. The ground on which condonation of delay is sought has been set out in the petition and affidavit in support. Appellant has stated in the petition that learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 handed over a letter to the Registry on March 2, 1984 intimating about the death of first respondent, the original landlord. Thereafter the petition for substitution was moved on March 21, 1984 that is within three weeks from the date of the knowledge conveyed by the letter of the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The date of death of respondent No. 1 is not disputed but it is said that appellant came to know about it for the first time from the aforementioned letter. This is countered by the respondents. In our opinion there is good and sufficient reason for condoning delay and granting substitution in the facts of this case. First respondent who is dead was the original landlord and he conveyed and transferred the whole property including the suit premises to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 way back on December 21, 1959 and since then respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are the real contesting respondents. Respondent No. 1 has lost all interest in the property and the litigation concerning the property sold and conveyed by him a quarter of a century back. Coupled with this is the fact that under R.A of O. 22 a duty is cast on the pleader appearing for the deceased party to give intimation of the same to the opposite party. This duty in this case was discharged on March 2, 1984 that is six years after the death and promptly within three weeks the petition for substitution is filed. Having regard to the cumulative effect of all these facts we are satisfied that the appellant has made out a sufficient case for condoning the delay in seeking substitution. We accordingly set aside abatement of appeal and grant substitution.