Case: B. Prabhakara Rao Vs. Desari Panakalala Rao and Others and Others

Counsel for the appellant a jolted transport operator has assertively argued for an untenable position, heedless of the true nature of transport permit jurisprudence. The sole issue on which limited leave has been granted to him by this Court under Art. 136 lends itself to straight forward resolution, once we grasp the public character of the litigation an d public purpose of the jurisdiction where per nits regulating the plying of stage carriages are awarded or refused. The conscience of this branch of public law is justice to the public, although, in the process of adjudication, private claims to carry on transport business through permits are comparatively evaluated. Public interest is the paramount consideration, while private rights, fundamental though, apparently constitute the quasi-lis for decision. The touchstone of better merit is solely the ability to serve the public, and the hierarchy of transport tribunals, bearing true faith and allegiance to s. 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1948 (for short, the Act) have the duty and, therefore, the power to consider as factors pertinent to the larger scheme of efficient public transport. To equate-and thereby hamstring this jurisdiction and processual law with what governs a civil proceeding under the Civil Procedure Code, is to miss the policing policy of t he law and maim the amplitude of the power duty complete. In other words, the duplex scheme of the statute is the holding of a public enquiry to determine who will serve public interest best but ordinarily activated into that enquiry by private applicants for permits. The pro bono publico character of the hearing cannot be scuttled in the name of competitive individual rights and narrow procedural trappings.The minimal facts. The appellant and the 1st respondent, among others, applied for permits to ply a stage carriage on a specified route in the Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh. Although there were two permits for issuance, one was given to R2 and that has become final. We are now concerned only with the other permit which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority (acronymically, RTA) to the appellant but was switched over to the 1st respondent by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (STAT) or taking into consideration a fresh ground and supporting evidence to the effect that the appellant was guilty of a transport tax violation and had compounded that offence under s. 60(3) of the Act. The power in this behalf was stated to be based on s. 15 of the Andhra Pradesh State Transports Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Appellate rules), whichAdditional Evidence (i) The parties to the appeal 9 or application shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary before the Tribunal but, -(a) if the authority from whose order the appeal or application is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or(b) if the party seeking to adduce additional evidence satisfies the Tribunal that such evidence, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at or before the time when the order under appeal was passed; or(c) if the Tribunal requires any documents to be produced or any witnesses to be examined to enable it to pass just orders, or(d) for any other sufficient reason, the Tribunal may allow such evidence or documents to be produced or witnesses examined:Provide d that where such evidence is received the other party shall be entitled, to produce rebutting evidence, if any.(ii) If the Tribunal is of opinion that any witness should be examined in connection with any case before it, it may instead of examining him before itself, issue a commission to the concerned Regional Transport Authorities or the State Transport Authority as. the case may be, or to an Advocate or such other suitable per son as it may deem fit, in the circumstances of thevires of this rule was challenged before us and we will examine the contention. But, to continue the narrative" when the appellate authority deprived the appellant of h is permit he attacked the order without avail, before the High Court at both tiers. Undaunted he has carried the appeal to this Court where the controversy is confined to the validity of s. 15, although we have heard arguments on a wider basis to appreciate the point made by counsel. The argument of ultra vires urged before us rests on The scope of ss. 57(4) and 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the fitment of s. 15 into the purpose and text of these provisions.

Reasoning:
The decision of the Assam High Court (AIR 1959 Assam 183) brought to our notice by Shri Phadke does not really consider the issue from the position we have delineated and turns on approach which is not quiteconclusion therefore is that s. 15 is intra vires and, further that the said rule merely makes patent what is otherwise latent in the statutory provisions.