Case: G. Bassi Reddy Vs. International Crops Research Instt. &amp; Anr

The appellant in this appeal was appointed by ICRISAT on 15th January, 1975 as a Field Helper. The offer of appointment issued to the appellant stated that apart from the terms and conditions specifically mentioned in the appointment letter, the other terms of employment would be governed by the ICRISAT Personnel Policy Statement as amended upto date and all such further amendments made from time to time and intimated to the appellant. It was made clear that the Personnel Policy Statement would form part of the terms and conditions of service as though embodied specifically in the offer of contract of employment. A copy of the Personnel Policy Statement was enclosed with the letter. The appellant signed the offer of employment on 20th January, 1975 expressly accepting the terms and conditions. In a separate letter dated 23rd April 1975 the appellant acknowledged the receipt of the amendments to the Personnel Policy for professional and support staff (locally recruited). The letter recorded that the appellant had studied and understood the contents thereof and undertook to abide by ICRISATs policies. The letter concluded with the followingparticular I am aware of the legal position of the ICRISAT and I undertake to respect of the same and seek ventilation of my grievances, if any, strictly and only through the Grievance Procedure laid down in these policies. I further appreciate that since the ICRISAT is an international organisation immune from the laws of India. I am not entitled to seek recourse under such laws, including industrial laws, for rectification of grievances.On 23rd June, 1983, in view of growing indiscipline in the Institute the Director-General issued a circular which inter-alianew set of disciplinary and appeal procedures for staff has been drafted and the Staff-Management Joint Council will be consulted in this regard. Until these procedures are promulgated, procedures laid down in 1976 continue to apply. These provide for minor and major penalties according to the Schedule in Annexure I. Where the nature of the misconduct warrants a major penalty, an enquiry must be held before the penalty can be proposed and awarded.A show cause notice was issued to the appellant calling for an explanation for the acts of misconduct specified therein. The appellant gave an explanation on 25th July, 1983. The explanation was not found satisfactory and an Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the charges framed against the appellant. In August 1983, the appellant filed the writ application which was resulted in the impugned order. The prayer in the writ petition was for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing ICRISAT to frame rules regarding the conditions of service which nearly approximate to the accepted custom of India" and to direct the Union of India to taken action for fulfilment of clause G(a)(2) of the March agreement between the Union of India and CGIAR.21. It is not clear whether any copy of the writ petition was served on the respondents at that stage. In any event, ICRISAT proceeded with the disciplinary enquiry against the appellant. An inquiry notice was issued on 13th September 1983. The appellant did not participate in the inquiry. Ultimately, the Enquiry Officer submitted a report of the Personnel Manager on 17th October 1983 finding the charges against the appellant proved. The order of termination was passed on 5th August 1983 by the Principal Administrator. In the order dismissing the appellant, it was stated that the appellant would stand relieved with effect from 5th December 1983 and that the appellant would be entitled to three months salary in lieu of notice consequent upon the cessation of his employment with ICRISAT. It does not appear that the appellants writ petition was amended to challenge the order of dismissal.

Reasoning:
25. A writ under Article 226 lies only when the petitioner establishes that his or her fundamental right or some other legal right has been infringed (Calcutta Gas Co. vs. State of W.B., AIR 1962 SC 1044 , 1047-1048). The claim as made by the appellant in his writ petition is founded on Articles 14 and 16. The claim would not be maintainable against ICRISAT unless ICRISAT were a State or authority within the meaning of Article 12. The tests for determining whether an organization is either, has been recently considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others (2002) 5 SCC 111  at p.134 in which wequestion in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State".The facts which have been narrated earlier clearly show that ICRISAT does not fulfil any of these tests. It was not set up by the Government and it gives its services voluntarily to a large number of countries besides India. It is not controlled by not is it accountable to the Government. The Indian Governments financial contribution to ICRISAT is minimal. Its participation in ICRISATs administration is limited to 3 out of 15 members. It cannot therefore be said that ICRISAT is a State of other authority as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.27. It is true that a writ under Article 226 also lies against a person for any other purpose". The power of the High Court to issue such a writ to "any person" can only mean the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established principles, a writ lay. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III is clear enough from the language used. But the words "and for any other purpose" must mean "for any other purpose for which any of the writs mentioned would, according to well established principles issue [Carlshad M.W. Mfg. Co. V. H.M. Jagtiani AIR 1952 Cal 315 at 318]28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a person if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585 ; Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 , 698; VST Ind. Ltd. vs. VST Ind. Workers Union & Another (2001) 1 SCC 298 ). ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that the ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable against ICRISAT.30. The second relief sought in the writ petition is against the Union of India. The prayer is that the Union should take action to fulfil clause 6 of the March agreement. The prayer is unsustainable as in substance the relief claimed is against ICRISAT. Furthermore it is doubtful whether the agreement between the Indian Government and ICRISAT is specifically enforceable as such in domestic Courts, particularly when the agreement does not form part of any domesticwas no conflict between the Governments international obligation and the domestic law. In the present case there is no question of any conflict. What is sought for on the other hand is an enforcement of a clause in an international agreement.31. In any event, it could not be said that the Personnel Policy Statement framed by ICRISAT dealing with internal discipline was not in terms of clause 6 (2) of the March agreement. It has not been shown how these guidelines (which were in fact followed in the appellants case) deviated from or did not approximate to the established disciplinary procedures followed by other private concerns in the