Case: M/S Queen'S Educational Society Vs. Commr.Of Income Tax

3. The facts necessary to understand the controversy in the two income tax appeals before the Uttarakhand High Court, Nainital, may be gleaned from the facts of one of them, namely, theEducational Society case. The appellant filed its return for assessment years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 showing a net surplus of Rs.6,58,862/- and Rs.7,82,632/- respectively. Since the appellant was established with the sole object of imparting education, it claimed exemption under Section 10(23C) (iiiad) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer vide its order dated 20th February, 2003 rejected the exemption claimed by the appellant. The CIT (Appeals) by its order dated 28th March, 2003 allowed theappeal, and the ITAT, Delhi, by its judgment dated 7th July, 2006 passed an order dismissing the appeal preferred by the revenue. In a reference to the High Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, the High Court vide the impugned judgment set aside the judgment of the ITAT and affirmed the order of the Assessing Officer.These appeals from the Uttarakhand High Court, Nainital, concern themselves with the provision of Section 10(23C) (iiiad) of the10- Incomes not included in total income.—In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included—(23-C) any income received by any person on behalf of—(iii-ad) any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit if the aggregate annual receipts of such university or educational institution do not exceed the amount of annual receipts as may beIt will be noticed that the Section has three requirements – (a) the educational institution must exist solely for educational purposes (b) it should not be for purposes of profit and (c) the aggregate annual receipts of such institution should not exceed the amount or annual receipts as may be prescribed. Such prescription is to be found in Rule 2CA being an amount of Rs.1 crore.6. The said Section was inserted by Finance Act No.2 of 1998 with effect from 1st April, 1999. Prior thereto, the Income Tax Act had a corresponding Section, namely, Section 10(22) which was as10- Incomes not included in total income.—In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included—(22) any income of a university or other educational institution, existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of

Reasoning:
15. It is clear that the High Court did not apply its mind independently. What has been copied is one paragraph from the Supreme Court judgment in Aditanar followed by a paragraph of faulty reasoning by the Assessing Officer and the said faulty reasoning of the Assessing Officer has been wrongly said to be the law laid down by the Apex Court.Secondly, the extracted portion from the said judgment in the judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court concerned itself with question two, namely, whether the educational society is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions. It is part of paragraph 80 of the said judgment. If the sentences after the quoted portion are also set out, it becomes clear that the passage relied upon by the High Court has absolutely nothing to do with the present case.It is clear, therefore, that the Uttarakhand High Court has erred by quoting a non existent passage from an applicable judgment, namely, Aditanar and quoting a portion of a property tax judgment which expressly stated that rulings arising out of the Income Tax Act would not be applicable. Quite apart from this, it also went on to further quote from a portion of the said property tax judgment which was rendered in the context of whether an educational society is supported wholly or in part by voluntary contributions, something which is completely foreign to Section 10(23C) (iiiad). The final conclusion that if a surplus is made by an educational society and ploughed back to construct its own premises would fall foul of Section 10(23C) is to ignore the language of the Section and to ignore the tests laid down in the Surat Art Silk Cloth case, Aditanar case and the American Hotel and Lodging case. It is clear that when a surplus is ploughed back for educational purposes, the educational institution exists solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit.It is these orders that were set aside by the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court impugned by the Revenue before us.We approve the judgments of the Punjab and Haryana, Delhi and Bombay High Courts. Since we have set aside the judgment of the Uttarakhand High Court and since the Chieforders cancelling exemption which were set aside by the Punjab and Haryana High Court were passed almost solely upon the law declared by the Uttarakhand High Court, it is clear that these orders cannot stand. Consequently,appeals from the Punjab and Haryana Highjudgment dated 29.1.2010 and the judgments following it are dismissed. We reiterate that the correct tests which have been culled out in the three Supreme Court judgments stated above, namely, Surat Art Silk Cloth, Aditanar, and American Hotel and Lodging, would all apply to determine whether an educational institution exists solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit. In addition, we hasten to add that the 13th proviso to Section 10(23C) is of great importance in that assessing authorities must continuously monitor from assessment year to assessment year whether such institutions continue to apply their income and invest or deposit their funds in accordance with the law laid down. Further, it is of great importance that the activities of such institutions be looked at carefully. If they are not genuine, or are not being carried out in accordance with all or any of the conditions subject to which approval has been given, such approval and exemption must forthwith be withdrawn. All these cases are disposed of making it clear that revenue is at liberty to pass fresh orders if such necessity is felt after taking into consideration the various provisions of law contained in Section 10(23C) read with Section 11 of the Income Tax Act.