Case: Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy  Vs. State Of A.P

1. These appeals involve identical issues and are, therefore, disposed of by this common judgment. Challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Factual background is almost undisputed and the controversy relates to the scope and ambit of Rule 11 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Rules, 1974 (in short the ‘Ceiling Rules?). The appellants were holding land in excess of the limit prescribed under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (in short ‘the Act?). The surplus land was surrendered by them which had cashew nut tree plantation. On the surrendered land the trees were fruit bearing trees. The dispute relates to the amount payable in respect of fruit bearing trees standing on the land which were surrendered by the appellant. The number of trees is also not in dispute. The amount payable for the land vested in the Government the amounts were duly paid. With regard to the amount payable for fruit bearing trees a Commissioner was appointed, who submitted a report regarding number of fruit bearing trees and other trees standing on the land so surrendered. The Commissioner of Land Reforms Urban Ceiling, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh directed the District Collector to issue necessary instructions not to fix the compensation payable in respect of the trees under the Rules until further orders. According to the authorities the payment was to be made for one year only and not for thirty years as was claimed by the appellants2. Writ petitions were filed before the High Court which came to be dismissed by the impugned orders.

Reasoning:
9. A bare reading thereof makes the position clear that the amounts are to be calculated from 5th to 30th years10. That being so, the stand of the State Government as accepted by the High Court that the seignorage rate is for one year and accordingly fixing it for the 12 years is clearly unsustainable. It is to be noted that the trees were 12 years old and stood on the surrendered land. It is further clear that up to 5 years cashew trees are held to be not fruit bearing trees11. The emphasis for the State was that the object of the concerned statue was not to confer any benefit beyond the statutory entitlements and for that purpose according to learned Counsel for the State the object of the statute was vital. According to him for the purpose of construction of the notifications of the District Collector, the same has to be read in a manner which would give true effect to the intention of the statute13. It is said that a statute is an edict of the Legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the Legislature. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous14. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the ?language? is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the Legislature cannot be approached as the Legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the Legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making16. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased17. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. [See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR 1998 SC 74 ]. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided22. We do not find any substance in the plea of learned Counsel for the appellants that the entitlement of the appellants is for 30 years. Admittedly the trees were 12 years old at the time the land were surrendered and, therefore, for the balance 18 years only the appellants will be entitled to at the relevant seignorage rates.