Case: M/s. Chhotobhai jethabhai Patel &amp; Company Vs. Industrial Court, Maharashtra Nagpur Bench, Nagpur &amp; Others

2. The facts are as follows. One Nathu, respondent No. 3 herein was employed as a munshi in the appellants Bidi factory at Bhandara. The appellant had framed a charge sheet against him in respect of certain acts of misconduct, gross negligence of duty, insubordination etc. on May 13, 1965. As enquiry in respect thereof was held on May 15th after receipt of written statement from Nathu. Holding that the charges levelled against him were proved, the employer dismissed the third respondent with effect from August 1, 1965. The said respondent filed an application challenging the order of dismissal before the Labour Court under Section 78 ofthe Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, hereinafter referred to as the Act, on the 5th August. His complaint was that the charge sheet was not proper, that the Head Office of the appellant had no authority to deal with his case under the Standing Orders, that no evidence was allowed or filed on behalf of the employer and that the finding was based only on his statement and in particular his cross-examination. He had been forced to append his signature to a certain paper without the same having been read over to him. The Labour Court after holding an enquiry took the view that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse, that the order of dismissal was passed by a person not authorised to exercise the power and consequently the Labour Court directed the reinstatement of the third respondent with all back wages. The appellant preferred an appeal to the State Industrial Court contending, inter alia, that the third respondent had failed to comply with the provisions of law in that he did not make an application under Section 42 (4) of the Act which was a condition precedent to approaching the Labour Court and prayed that the order of the Labour Court should be set aside on that ground alone. The Industrial Court confirmed the order of the Labour Court. The appellant then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court. The High Court held against the appellant. Unfortunately, there is no appearance for the respondent before us.      3. In order to appreciate the scope of the Labour Courts jurisdiction under the Act and in particular the attractability of Section 78 (1) (D) it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act as a whole including the provisions relevant for this appeal. The Act when first passed in 1946 known as the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was applicable to a limited area with the State. In the Vidarbha region of the State, there was another similar Act in operation. The Act suffered numerous amendments from time to time until 1965 when Maharashtra Act 22 of 1965 was passed. The new Act was described as an Act "to extendthe Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 throughout the State of Maharashtra and for that and for certain other purposes further to amend that Act, and to repeal corresponding laws in force in any part of the State."

Reasoning:
In our view, there is nothing in the Act which warrants such a conclusion. The scheme of Chapter VIII seems to be that in regard to any "change" in an industrial matter there must be compliance with the provisions of that Chapter. In other words, effort must first be made by the employer intending to effect any change in respect of matters covered by S,. 42 (1) or an employee desiring a change in respect of any order passed by the employer under standing orders which would of necessity include an order of dismissal, to see whether it was possible to come to any agreement and an application to the labour court could only be resorted to after efforts had been made to settle the dispute and no agreement had been arrived at14. The scheme of S. 78 (1) seems to be that a Labour Court is to have power to decide all the disputes covered by paragraph A, Paragraph B thereof gives the Labour Court the power to try offences punishable under the Act and cognizance of such offences can only be taken under S. 82. Paragraphs C and D set out what relief the Labour Courts are empowered to give including directions as may be found necessary in that behalf. As already noted, the Statement of Objects and Reasons of clause 31 of the bill which later resulted in Act 22 of 1965, shows that the underlying idea was to enlarge the powers of the Labour Court. The Legislature nowhere intended to make a complete departure from the procedure to be adopted when powers under S. 78 (1) D were to be exercised15. Rule 55 of the Bombay, Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 shows how an application is to be made and the period within which it is to be made16. It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within the meaning of S. 3 (13) of the Act and we can see no valid reason for differentiating the case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change. As the scheme of the Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement, it does not stand to reasons that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to the Labour Court. A Labour Court is a creature of the statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as the statute confers on it. If there are certain pre-conditions to the exercise of its jurisdiction, it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with.