Case: Sri Baru Ram Vs. Shrimati Prasanni &amp; Others

The appellant Shri Baru Ram was elected to the Punjab Legislative Assembly from the Rajaund constituency in the Karnal District, Initially seventeen candidates had filed their nomination papers in this constituency. Out of these candidates, thirteen withdrew and the nomination paper filed by Jai Bhagawan was rejected by the returning officer. That left three candidates in the field. They were the appellant Baru Ram, Mrs. Prasanni and Harkesh, respondents 1 and 2 respectively. The polling took place on March 14, 1957, and the result was declared the next day. Since the appellant had secured the largest number of votes he was declared duly elected. Soon thereafter Mrs. Prasanni, respondent 1, filed an election petition in which she alleged that the appellant had committed several corrupt practices and claimed a declaration that his election was void. The appellant denied all the allegations made by respondent 1. The election tribunal first framed six preliminary issues and after they were decided, it raisedissues on the merits. The tribunal was not satisfied with the evidence adduced by respondent 1 to prove her allegations in respect of the corrupt practices committed by the appellant and so it recorded findings against respondent 1 on all the issues in regard to the said corrupt practices. Respondent 1 had also challenged the validity of the appellants election on the ground that the returning officer had improperly rejected the nomination paper of Jai Bhagawan. This point was upheld by the election tribunal with the result that the appellants election was declared to be void.2. The appellant then preferred an appeal to the Punjab High Court. He urged before the High Court that the election tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the nomination paper of Jai Bhagawan had been improperly rejected. This contention was accepted by the High Court and the finding of the tribunal on the point was reversed. Respondent 1 sought to support the order of the election tribunal on the ground that the tribunal was not justified in holding that the appellant was not guilty of a corrupt practice under S. 123(7) (c). This argument was also accepted by the High Court and it was held that the appellant was in fact guilty of the said alleged corrupt practice. In the result, though the appellant succeeded in effectively challenging the only finding recorded by the tribunal against him, his appeal was not allowed because another finding which was made by the tribunal in favour of the appellant was also reversed by the High Court. That is why the order passed by the tribunal declaring the appellants election to be void was confirmed though on a different ground. It is this order which is challenged before us by Mr. Aggarwala on behalf of the appellant and both the points decided by the High Court are raised before us by the parties.

Reasoning:
Mr. Doabia fairly conceded that there was no legal evidence on this point; but his argument was that from the other finding of fact recorded by the High Court it would be legitimate to infer that the appellant had made the said signature.In our opinion this contention is wholly untenable. It must be borne in mind that the allegation against the appellant is that he has committed a corrupt practice and a finding against him on, the point would involve serious consequences. In such a case, it would be difficult to hold that merely from the findings recorded by the High Court it would be legitimate to infer that the appellant had signed the form and had in fact appointed Puran Singh as his pollingour opinion, it is impossible to accede to Mr. Doabias argument that the facts held proved in the High Court inevitably lead to its final conclusion that the appellant had in fact signed the form. It is clear that in reaching this conclusion the High Court did not properly appreciate the fact that there was no legal evidence on the point and that the other acts found by it cannot even reasonably support the case for respondent 1. We must accordingly reverse the finding of the High Court and hold that respondent 1 has failed to prove that the appellant had committed a corrupt practice under S. 123(7)(c) of thethe present case no appeal could have been preferred by respondent 1 because she had succeeded in obtaining the declaration that the appellants election was void and it should therefore be open to her to support the final conclusion of the High Court by contending that the other finding recorded by the High Court which would go to the root of the matter is erroneous. Prima facie there appears to be some force in this contention; but we do not think it necessary to decide this point in the present appeal. Mr. Aggarwals objection assumes that respondent 1 should have preferred a petition for special leave to appeal against the finding of the High Court on the issue in question; if that be so, the application made by her for leave to urge additional grounds can be converted into a petition for special leave to appeal against the said finding, and the delay made in filing the same can be condoned. As in the case of the preliminary objection raised by respondent 1 against the appellant on the ground of limitation, so in the case of the objection raised by the appellant against respondent 1 in this matter, we would proceed on the basis that we have condoned the delay made by respondent 1 in preferring her petition to this Court for leave to challenge the finding of the High Court that the nomination form of Jai Bhagawan had been properly rejected. That is why we have allowed Mr. Doabia to argue this point before us. We may add that the two points of law raised by the respective objections of both the parties may have to be considered by a larger Bench on a suitableother words, this is a case where the statute requires the candidate to produce the prescribed evidence and provides a penalty for his failure to do so. In such a case it is difficult to appreciate the relevance or validity of the argument that the requirement of S. 33 (5) is not mandatory but is directory, because the statute itself has made it clear that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to the rejection of the nomination paper. Whenever the statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner and also lays down that failure to comply with the said requirement leads to a specific consequence it would be difficult to accept the argument that the failure to comply with the said requirement should lead to any other consequence.15.It is, however, urged that the statute itself makes a distinction between defects which are of a substantial character and those which are not of a substantial character. This argument is based upon the provisions of S. 36(4) of the Act which provides that the returning officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect "which is not of a substantiale failure to produce therequisite copy, it is urged, may amount to a defect but it is not a defect of a substantial character.We are not impressed by this argument. There is no doubt that the essential object of the scrutiny of nomination papers is that the returning officer should be satisfied that the candidate who is not an elector in the constituency in question is in fact an elector of a different constituency. The satisfaction of the returning officer is thus the matter of substance in these proceedings; and if the statute provides the made in which the returning officer has to be satisfied by the candidate it is that mode which the candidate must adopt. In the present case Jai Bhagawan failed to produce any of the copies prescribed and the returning officer was naturally not satisfied that Jai Bhagawan was an elector of a different constituency. If that in substance was the result of Jai Bhagawans failure to produce the relevant copy the consequence prescribed by S. 36(2)(b) must inevitably follow. It is only if the returning officer had been satisfied that Jai Bhagawan was an elector of a different constituency that his nomination papers could have been accepted as valid. It is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law have to be strictly observed.Mr. Doabia has also relied upon a decision of the Andhra High Court in Mohan Reddy v. Neelagiri Muralidhar Rao, AIR 1958 Andhra Pra 485 in support of his argument thatthe failure toproduce the prescribedcopy cannot justify the rejection of the nomination paper.In our opinion this decision does not assist Mr. Doabias contention. In this case it was urged before the High Court that the document produced by the party was not a certified copy as required by S. 33(5) of the Act. This argument was based on the assumption that the certified copy mentioned in S. 33(5) of the Act must satisfy the test prescribed y S. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. The High Court rejected this argument for two reasons. It held that the certified copy mentioned in S. 33(5) need not necessarily satisfy the test prescribed by S. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. Alternatively it held, on a consideration of the relevant statutory provisions, that the document in question was in fact and in law a certified copy under S. 76 of the Indian Evidence Act. These points do not arise for our decision in the present appeal. Mr.Doabia, however, relies on certain observations made in the judgment of the High Court and it may be conceded that these observations seem to suggest that according to the High Court the provisions of Ss. 33(5) and 36(7) do not preclude proof by other means of the fact that the name of the candidate is on the relevant electoral roll.These observations are clearly obiter. Even so we would like to add that they do not correctly represent the effect of the relevant provisions of the Act.