Case: Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram locharam alias Brijramand &amp; Others

Appellant was a tenant of the premises at Ward No.3 Nondh. No. 1823/9 in the Salabatpur area of Surat. He was in arrears of rent since 16-10-1961. On 16-11-1962 the landlords respondents herein) served a notice on the appellant terminating his tenancy and also requiring him to pay the arrears of rent. On 2-1-1964 the landlords instituted the suit in the Court at Surat for possession against the tenant on two grounds namely(i) non-payment of rent in arrears for a period of more than one year(ii) bona fide requirement of the premises by the landlord for their own use and occupation2. The rate of contractual rent was Rs.15/- per month. On 23-9-1964 the parties arrived at a compromise the terms of which as incorporated in the decree were as under:(i) The defendant do hand over possession of the suit premises by 30-9-1968 without any objection. The tenant to pay Rs.532.50 P as arrears of rent and mesne profits up to 30-9-1964. The plaintiff is to receive Rupees 380/- deposited by the defendant in court and the remaining amount is to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs on or about 31-12-1964. The defendant is to pay Rs.15/- p.m. as mesne profits from 1-10-1964(ii) The relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties has come to an end and no such relationship is to be created by the compromise. The defendant has been given time to vacate the suit premises by way of grace if the defendant fails to comply with the aforesaid terms of the decree the plaintiffs would be entitled to execute the decree both for the decretal amount as well as for possession of the suit premises(iii) If the plaintiffs get for the defendant the lease of the premises bearing Nondh No.1602 of Ward No.3 on a monthly rent of Rs.50/- the defendant is to hand over the possession of the suit premises immediately(iv) The parties are to bear their own costs"3. On 12-1-1968, the landlords filed a petition for execution of the decree. It was dismissed as premature. The tenant having failed to pay Rupees 152/50 i.e. the balance of arrears by the agreed date the decree-holder on 17-1-1968 again took out execution for the recovery of the said amount. Thereafter on 3-10-1968 the landlords filed the second petition to recover possession of the suit premises in execution of the decree4. The tenant admitted that he had according to the compromise, agreed to give possession on 30-9-1968 but added that in 1968 A.D. the ground floor of the premises had become submerged in flood waters and thereupon the decree-holders seeing his (tenants) plight orally agreed to allow him to continue in the premises on payment of a monthly rent of Rs.15/- and thus the decree had been adjusted and satisfied. Subsequently by another application the judgment debtor raised an objection that since the decree had been passed by the Court without satisfying itself as to the existence of a ground of eviction under the Bombay Rent Act, it was a nullity and as such not executable5. The executing court (Joint Civil Judge Surat) rejected the story of adjustment and satisfaction of the decree but accepted the other objection holding that the decree was void because "the Court did not apply its mind while allowing it under Sec. 13 (1) (j) Rent Act, With regard to the second ground it was said that it had ceased to exist because "under the terms of compromise the default in payment of rent was waived and the defendant was given time to pay up to 30-9-1968". In the resutl, the execution was dismissed6. From the order of the executing court the decree-holders carried an appeal to the Extra Assistant Judge. Surat who held that there was ample material in the shape of admission in the compromise itself from which the court could be satisfied about the existence of both the statutory grounds for evcition alleged in the plaint. He therefore set aside the dismissal of the execution and remanded the case to the executing court "to be dealt with in accordance with law" Aggrieved by that order of the Extra Assistant Judge the tenant preferred a revision petition in the High Court of Gujarat. The revision was dismissed in limine by an order dated 26-10-1972 against which this appeal by special leave has been filed.

Reasoning:
14. All these three Acts lay down specific grounds more or less similar on which a decree or order of eviction can be passed by the Rent Court or the Tribunal exercising exclusive jurisdiction. In the Delhi Rent Act, such grounds are specified in a consolidated from under S.13, while the same thing has been split up into two and provided in two Sections 912 and 13) in the Bombay Rent Act which represent the negative and positive parts of the same pattern. Taken together they are exhaustive of the grounds on which the Rent Court is competent to pass a decree of possession. Similarly, IN THE Madras Rent Act, the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, are tiven in Ss. 10, 14 and 1616. It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant sections of those statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not travel beyond the statutory grounds mentioned in Ss. 12 and 13 and to the parties that they shall not contractor out of those statutory grounds is inherent in the public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act)23. The case before u falls wellnigh within the ratio of Seshadris case (1973) 1 SCC 761   = (AIR 1973 SC 1311  ) (supra). Therein K. K. Chari, who was under an eviction order purchased the suit premises in the same city for his occupation. Seshadri was then the tenant of the suit premises under the vendor, and after the purchase, he attorned in favour of the appellant and had been paying rent to him Chari issued notices under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy of Seshadri. Since Seshadri did not surrender possession, Chari filed a suit for eviction under S.10 (3) (a) (i) of the Madras Act mainly on the ground that he required the premises for his bona fide use and occupation. Seshadri controverted Charis claim. As the commencement of the enquiry, Chari was examined before the Court. He particularly testified how he had purchased the house for his own occupation. He also filed a number of documents to establish that the requirement of premises for his own occupation was true. Seshadri did not refer to cross-examine Chari. About 1 1/2 months thereafter, both the parties entered into a compromise in these terms :"(1) The respondent hereby withdraws his defence in the aforesaid petition and submits to decree for eviction unconditionally(2) The respondent prays that time for vacating up to June 5, 1969 might please be given and the petitioner agrees to the same(3) The respondent agrees to vacate the petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to the petitioner on or before the said date viz. June 5, 1969, without fail under any circumstances and undertakes not to apply for extension of time(4) It is agreed by both the parties that this memo of compromise is executable as a Decree of Court."24. The Court, after referring to the petition of the landlord being under S.10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act on the ground of his own occupation passed the following order :"Compromise memo filed and recorded by consent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till June 5, 1969 No costs"27. We do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in Section 12 (3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act merely because the tenant had made an application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at the time of passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs.15/- per month the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the compromise was thus an admission of the material facts which constituted a ground for eviction under S.12 (3)(a). Rent was admittedly payable by the month since the application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn, there was no dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent. Further the rent was admittedly in arrears for a period of more than six months, so much so that in the present case the tenant had neglected to pay the balance of arrears amounting to Rs.152/50, even long after the decree and the landlord was compelled to recover the same by execution29. Be that as it may in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity is taken the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree if the decree on the face of it discloses some material on the basis of which the Rent Courtcould besatisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial courts jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressly finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was material on the basis of which the Rent Courtcouldhave - as distinguished frommusthave - been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12 (3) (a) the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity.