Case: Union Of India Vs. Shri A.B. Shah &amp; Others

2. The appellant preferred a complaint under Section 73 of the Mines Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") read with Regulation No. 100(1) of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations"). The facts leading to the filing of this appeal may be stated in brief to appreciate the contentions raised before us. The facts are asKamptee Colliery originally was owned by the Oriental Coal Company Limited. At the instance of the agent of Oriental Coal Company Limited, the Director General of Mines Safety granted permission onunder Regulation 100(1) of the Regulations to split pillars in conjunction with hydraulic sand stowing in No. 1 seam in the area. Later on, the agent of the Oriental Coal Company Limited applied for certain modifications in Conditions 5 and 6 which was granted on73, the possession of the coal mines was taken over by the Central Government and the ownership of the said coal mines vested in the Coal Mines Authority onThe Deputy Director of Mines at Nagpur made an inspection onand found that the sizes of split galleries were about 8.2 meters. It was in violation of Condition 1 imposed by the Director of Mines Safety. The agent was called upon to explain the violation by the Joint Director of Mines Safety by his letter datedA reply was sent onExplanation was called for from Respondent 1 onNo reply was received in spite of several reminders. The Deputy Director of Mines Safety again inspected the mines in question onalong with the agent, and found the violation of Condition 1 continuing and also found that the adjacent galleries were not kept stowed of the pillar where splitting had commenced. After the taking over of mines as mentioned above, the coal mine in question formed part of the Western Coal Fields Limited. As the persons concerned had not complied with the conditions subject to which the splitting of pillars in conjunction with hydraulic sand stowing was granted, the Inspector (now, Deputy Director of Mines) filed a complaint in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First class, Ramtak, Nagpur, alleging contravention of the conditions of permission. The trial court framed charged accordingly to which Respondents 1 to 4 pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Two principal contentions were advanced in defence before the trial court. They were that the complaint was barred by limitation prescribed under Section 79 of the Act and in any case, Respondents 1 to 4 were not in management of the coal mines in question when the alleged offence was alleged to have been committed and, therefore, they could not be criminally proceededThe learned trial Judge accepted both the contentions of Respondents 1 to 4 and consequently acquitted them. On appeal preferred by the appellant, the High Court also confirmed the acquittal accepting the same contentions. Hence the present appeal

Reasoning:
11. Bearing the above principle in mind, we have to find out whether the offence committed by the respondents, in particular violation of Conditions 3 and 6, could be treated as "continuing offence" or completed offence. To appreciate this, we must also bear in mind the object and purpose of the Act. This we can get from the long title which reads "An Act to amend and consolidate the law relating to the regulation of labour and safely in mines"12. If we look into Conditions 3 and 6 with the object and purpose of the Act in mind, it has to be held that these conditions are not only relatable to what was required at the commencement of depillaring process, but the unstowing for the required length must exist always. The expression "at any time" finding place in Condition 6 had to mean, in the context in which it has been used, "at any point of time", the effect of which is that the required length must be maintained all the time. The accomplishment of object of the Act, one of which is safety in the mines, requires taking of such a view, especially in the backdrop of repeated mine disasters which have been taking, off and on, heavy toll of lives of the miners. It may be pointed out that the word any has a diversity of meaning and in Blacks Law Dictionary it has been stated that this word may be employed to indicate all or every, and its meaning will depend "upon the context andof the statute". A reference to what has been stated in Strouds Judicial Dictionary Vol. I, is revealing inasmuch as the import of the word any has been explained from pp. 145 to 153 of the 4th Edn., a perusal of which shows it has different connotations depending primarily on theof the statute and the context of its use. A Bench of this Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, gave a very wide meaning to this word finding place in Section 2(o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defining service. (See paraWe, therefore, hold that the aforesaid conditions have to be obeyed always, disobedience of which shall become "continuing offence", in the light of what has been stated in the decision of Deokaran. So, even it other conditions are held to be falling under completed offence, violation of Conditions 3 and 6 cannot be so treated as to invoke theprescribed under Section 79 of the Act. Therefore, we are inclined to differ from the view taken by the High Court and hold that violation of Conditions 3 and 6 are "continuing offences" and the charge framed is not barred by limitation. Once this conclusion is reached, the plea taken by Respondents 1 to 4 that they were not the officers concerned when the offence was detected, will not hold water. Consequently the preliminary objection raised by Respondents 1 to 4 cannot be sustained