Case: Amar Jyoti Stone Crusting Company Vs. Union of India and Others

2. The appellant-firm is the lessee under a lease, dated December 21, 1955, of kasra Nos. 1621, 1646, 1652, 1653 and 1703 in Naraina village within the administration of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi. As lessee the firm was working certain stone-quarries in the fields which were the subject-matter of its lease. The right of persons to quarry in the area is subject to the provisions contained in the Delhi Minor Mineral Rules 1938 framed in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 155 (1) ofthe Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. Under these rules an application has to be made to the Collector for the grant of permits to effect quarrying who was empowered to grant them at his discretion, the duration of these permits being one year. When such quarrying took place the royalty at the rates specified in the rules was payable by the permit-holder. The rules, however. expressly saved from their operation and from the need for a permit or the payment of royalty, the quarrying of any mineral proved to be on land belonging to the land-owner in which he had the right to the mineral under S. 42 ofthe Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887. The appellant-firm had applied for and obtained permits under these rules and were paying the royalty prescribed therefor from the commencement of their lease right upto June 30,1957. For quarrying thereafter its .application for a permit was not granted. The appellant-firm thereupon issued notice to the governmental authorities under S 80 of the Civil Procedure Code and filed the suit out of which the present appeal arises, on October 8,1957.3. The appellant prayed in the suit for two main reliefs: (1) a declaration that it had a right to quarry stones from the suit-land apparently even without a permit, and (2) alternatively for a perpetual injunction directing the defendants - the Union of India and the Collector and the Delhi Development Authorities-to issue the required permit on payment of royalties as before. The first of the above reliefs was based on the plea that the land-owner from whom it claimed title under the lease, had vested in him the ownership of the minerals with the result that the appellant had a right to effect the quarrying without the necessity for a permit under the Delhi Minor Mineral Rules referred to earlier The other alternative prayer was rested on the ground that even if the mineral rights in the suit-land vested in Government, the appellant had a legal right to carry on quarrying operations on the land and that there was an obligation on the part of the Collector to grant the permit applied for. It was the further case of the appellant that the Collector refused the permit mala fide, and for reasons which were extraneous to the purpose for which the power to grant permits was vested in him under the statutory rules. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding against the appellant on every crucial issue and this judgment has been affirmed by Courts right up to the High Court in the judgment now under appeal.

Reasoning:
5. There were however two facts before the Courts on the basis of which the title to the minerals could have been decided. The first was that the appellant had been working the minerals only on the strength of permits obtained from the Collector and, as we have pointed out earlier, this could have happened only if its lessor was not the owner of the minerals. Learned Counsel, no doubt, sought to explain this conduct of the appellant on the basis that it might have made application for a permit under a mistake as to its rights. This however does not help him, because the making of the application would constitute an admission which would throw upon the appellant the burden of proving that it was done under a mistake and the mistake established to the satisfaction of the Court. This was not even attempted. This apart, a plaintiff who comes to Court with an allegation that he is the owner of the minerals would have to prove his title to the property before he could succeed in the suit, but the appellant led no evidence to prove his title. Mr. Bindra made a submission that a presumption in favour of the plaintiffs ownership arose under S. 110 of the Indian Evidence Act by reason of the appellants admitted possession of the property. This however is entirely without force, since the possession of the minerals, with which alone we are now concerned was under the permit granted by the Collector-a situation which clearly negatived the plaintiffs ownership of the minerals having regard to the scheme of the Minor Mineral Rules. The Courts below were therefore right in holding that the appellants claim on the basis of established proprietary rights to the quarry shouldview of our conclusion as regards the rights of the appellant even without these additional documents, we do not consider it necessary to admit them. We hold that the appellant has not proved its title to the mineral rights in the suit lands and that its claim for a declaration on that basis was properly dismissed by the Courtsargument, in our opinion, proceeds on a fallacy. If the application of the appellant was properly refused by the Collector before the suit, the result was that there was no pending application before the authority for the grant of a permit. It is common ground that during the pendency of these proceedings in the trial Court no fresh application was made to the Collector on the basis of the altered state of facts. There was consequently no application pending before the Collector which he could be directed by the issue of a mandatory injunction by the Court to grant. It is clear therefore that the change in the law in the shape of Act 53 of 1955 ceasing to be operative does not assist the appellant to obtain any relief in this suit.8. In the view we have taken it is not necessary for us to canvass the point which has been discussed in the Courts below as to whether in cases where the Government is the owner of a property its discretion in its management and control could be the subject of directions by the Court unless, of course, the statute or statutory rule enables individuals to claim any particular rights.