Case: M. R. Balaji And Others Vs. State Of Mysore

2. Out of the twenty-three petitioners, six had applied for admission to the Pre-professional Class in Medicine in the Medical Colleges affiliated either to the Mysore University or to the Karnatak University, and seventeen had applied for admission to the First Year of the 5-Year integrated course leading to the Degree of B. E. in the University of Mysore. According to the petitioners, but for the reservation made by the impugned order, they would have been entitled to the admission in the respective colleges for which they had applied. As a result of the reservation made by the said order, students who have secured less percentage of marks have been admitted, but not the petitioners. That, in brief, is the petitioners grievance and they urge that the impugned order which has denied them the facility of admission in the respective colleges is void under Art. 15(1) and 29(2) and should not be enforced against them. Accordingly, the petitioners pray that a writ of mandamus and/or any suitable writ or direction should be issued against respondent No.1, the State of Mysore (hereinafter called the state), and the two Selection Committees which have been impleaded as respondents 2 and 3.

Reasoning:
17. Article 15 (4) provides that nothing in this Article or in Cl. (2) of Art.29 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally Backward Classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This Article was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.The object of this amendment was to bring Arts. 15 and 29 in line with Art.16 (1). It will be recalled that in the case of State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan 1951 SCR 525  : (AIR 1951 SC 226  ) the validity of the Government order issued by the Madras Government fixing certain proportions in which students seeking for admissions to the Engineering and Medical Colleges in the State should be admitted, was challenged. The said Government order was on the face of it a communal order fixing the admissions in the stated proportion by reference to the communities of the candidates. This order was struck down by the Madras High Court and the decision of the Madras High Court was confirmed by this Court in appeal, on the ground that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 15 (1) and 29(2) were not controlled by any exception, and that since there was no provision under Art. 15 corresponding to Art.16(4), the impugned order could not be sustained. It was directly as a result of this decision that Art.15 was amended and Art.15(4) was added. Thus, there is no doubt that Art.15(4) has to be read as a proviso or an exception to Art.15(1) and 29(2).In other words, if the impugned order is justified by the provision of Art.15(4), its validity cannot be impeached on the ground that it violates Art.15 (1) or Art.29 (2). The fundamental rights guaranteed by the said two provisions do not affect the validity of the special provision which it is permissible to make under Art.15(4)In our opinion, this contention is misconceived. It is true that the Constitution contemplated the appointment of a Commission whose report and recommendations, it was thought, would be of assistance to the authorities concerned to take adequate steps for the advancement of Backward Classes; but it would be erroneous to assume that the appointment of the Commission and the subsequent steps that were to follow it constituted a condition precedent to any action being taken under Art. 15(4). Besides, it would be noticed that Art. 340(1) provides that recommendations had to be made by the Commission as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State, inter alia, to improve that means that the recommendations were to be made which would be implemented in their discretion by the Union and the State Government and not by the President. Thus, Art.340(1) itself shows that it is the Union or the State that has to take action in pursuance of the recommendations made, and so, the argument that the President alone has to act in this matter cannot be acceptedThis argument is equally mis-conceived. Under Art.12, the State includes the Government and the Legislature of each of the States, and so, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the State must necessarily mean the Legislature and not the Government. Besides, where the Constitution intended that a certain action should be taken by legislation and not by executive action it has adopted suitable phraseology in that behalf. Article 16(3) and (5) are illustrations in point. Both the said sub-cls. of Art. 16, in terms, refer to the making of the law by the Parliament in respect of the matters covered by them. Similarly, Arts. 341(2) and 342(2) expressly refer to a law being made by Parliament as therein contemplated. Therefore, when Art.15(4) contemplates that the State can make the special provision in question, it is clear that the said provision can be made by an executive order20. Article 15(4) authorises the State to make a special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, as distinguished from the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. No doubt, special provision can be made for both categories of citizens, but in specifying the categories, the first category is distinguished from the second. Sub-clauses (24) and (25) of Art. 366 define Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes respectively, but there is no clause defining socially and educationally backward classes of citizens, and so, in determining the question as towhether a particular provision has been validly made under Art. 15(4) ornot,the first question which falls to be determined iswhether the State has validly determined who should be included in these BackwardClasses. It21. In considering the scope and extent of the expression "backward classes" under Art. 15(4), it is necessary to remember that the concept of backwardness is not intended to be relative in the sense that any classes who are backward in relation to the most advanced classes of the society should be included in it. If such relative tests were to be applied by reason of the most advanced classes, there would be several layers or strata of backward classes and each one of them may claim to be included under Art. 15(4). This position is not disputed before us by the learned Advocate-General for the State. The backwardness under Art. 15(4) must be social and educational. It is not either social or educational, but it is both social and educational; and that takes us to the question as to how social and educational backwardness has to be determined22. Let us take the question of social backwardness first. By what test should it be decidedwhether a particular class is socially backward or not ?The group of citizens to whom Art. l5(4), applies are described as classes of citizens, not as castes of citizens. A class, according to the dictionary meaning, shows division of society according to status, rank of caste. In the Hindu social structure, caste unfortunately plays an important part in determining the status of the citizens. Though according to sociologists and Vedic scholars, the caste system may have originally begun on occupational or functional basis, in course of time, it became rigid and inflexible. The history of the growth of caste system shows that its original functional and occupational basis was later over-burdened with considerations of purity based on ritual concepts, and that led to its ramifications which introduced inflexibility and rigidity. This artificial growth inevitably tended to create a feeling of superiority and inferiority, and to foster narrow caste loyalties. Therefore, in dealing with the question as to whether any class of citizens is socially backward ornot,it may not be irrelevant to consider the caste of the said group of citizens. In this connection it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the special provision is contemplated for class of citizens and not for individual citizens as such, and so, though the caste of the group of citizens may be relevant, its importance should not be exaggerated. If the classification of backward classes of citizens was based solely on the caste of the citizen, it may not always be logical and may perhaps contain the vice of perpetuating the castes themselves23. Besides, if the caste of the group of citizens was made the sole basis for determining the social backwardness of the said group, that test would inevitably break down in relation to many sections of Indian society which do not recognise castes in the conventional sense known to Hindu society. How is one going to decidewhether Muslims, Christians or Jains, or even Lingayats are socially backward or not ?The test of castes would be inapplicable to those groups, but that would hardly justify the exclusion of these groups in toto from the operation of Art. 15(4). It is not unlikely that in some States some Muslims or Christians or Jains forming groups may be socially backward. That is why we think that though castes in relation to Hindu may be a relevant factor to consider in determining the social backwardness of groups or classes of citizens, it cannot be made the sole or the dominant test in that behalf. Social backwardness is on the ultimate analysis the result of poverty to a very large extent. The classes of citizens who are deplorably poor automatically become socially backward. They do not enjoy a status in society and have, therefore, to be content to take a backward seat. It is true that social backwardness which results from poverty is likely to be aggravated by considerations of caste to which the poor citizens may belong, but that only shows the relevance of both caste and poverty in determining the backwardness of citizens24. The occupations of citizens may also contribute to make classes of citizens socially backward. There are some occupations which are treated as inferior according to conventional beliefs and classes of citizens who follow these occupations are apt to become socially backward. The place of habitation also plays not a minor part in determining the backwardness of a community of persons. In a sense, the problem of social backwardness is the problem of Rural India and in that behalf, classes of citizens occupying a socially backward position in rural area fall within the purview of Art. 15(4). The problem of determining who are socially backward classes is undoubtedly very complex. Sociological, social and economic considerations come into play in solving the problem, and evolving proper criteria for determining which classes are socially backward is obviously a very difficult task; it will need an elaborate investigation and collection of data and examining the said data in a rational and scientific way. That is the function of the State which purports to act under Art. 15(4). All that this Court is called upon to do in dealing with the present petitions is to decidewhether the tests applied by the impugned order are valid under Art.15(4).29. In this connection, it is necessary to add that the sub-classification made by the order between Backward Classes and More Backward Classes does not appear to be justified under Article15(4).Article 15(4) authorises special provision being made for the really backward classes. In introducing two categories of Backward Classes what the impugned order, in substance purports to do is to devise measures for the benefit of all the classes of citizens who are less advanced compared to the most advanced classes in the State and that, in our opinion, is not the scope of Art.15(4).here can be no doubt that the object of making a special provision for the advancement of the castes or communities, there specified, is to carry out the directive principle enshrined in Art. 46. It is obvious that unless the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people are promoted quickly and liberally, the ideal of establishing social and economic equality will not be attained, and so, there can be no doubt that Art. 15(4) authorises the State to take adequate steps to achieve the object which it has in view. None can dispute the proposition that political freedom and even fundamental rights can have very little meaning or significance for the Backward Classes and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes unless the backwardness and inequality from which they suffer are immediately redressed32. In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the reservation made by the impugned order is in regard to admission in the seats of higher education in the State. It is well-known that as a result of the awakening caused by political freedom, all classes of citizens are showing a growing desire to give their children higher university education and so, the Universities are called upon to face the challenge of this growing demand. While it is necessary that the demand for higher education which is thus increasing from year to year must be adequately met and properly channelised, we cannot overlook the fact that in meeting that demand standards of higher education in Universities must not be lowered. The large demand for education may be met by starting larger number of educational institutions, vocational schools and polytechnics. But, it would be against the national interest to exclude from the portals of our Universities qualified and competent students on the ground that all the seats in the Universities are reserved for weaker elements in society. As has been observed by the University Education Commission,"he indeed must be blind who does not see that mighty as are the political changes, far deeper are the fundamental questions which will be decided by what happen in the Universities" (P.32)Therefore in considering the question about the propriety of the reservation made by the impugned order, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the reservation is made in respect of higher university education. The demand for technicians, scientists, doctors, economists, engineers and experts for the further economic advancement of the country is so great that it would cause grave prejudice to national interests if considerations of merit are completely excluded by whole-sale reservation of seat in all technical, Medical or Engineering colleges or institutions of that kind. Therefore, considerations of national interest and the interests of the community or society as a whole cannot be ignored in determining the question as to whether the special provision contemplated by Art. 15(4) can be special provision which excludes the rest of the society altogether. In this connection, it would be relevant to mention that the University Education Commission which considered the problem of the assistance to backward communities, has observed that the percentage of reservation shall not exceed a third of the total number of seats, and it has added that the principle of reservation may be adopted for a period of ten years. (P. 53)This argument is well founded, and must be upheld. When it is said about an executive action that it is a fraud on the Constitution it does not necessarily mean that the action is actuated by mala fides. An executive action which is patently and plainly outside the limits of the constitutional authority conferred on the State in that behalf is struck down as being ultra vires the States authority. If, on the other hand, the executive action does not patently or overtly transgress the authority conferred on it by the Constitution, but the transgression is covert or latent, the said action is struck down as being a fraud on the relevant constitutional power. It is in this connection that courts often consider the substance of the matter and not its form and in ascertaining the substance of the matter, the appearance or the cloak, or the veil of the executive action is carefully scrutinized and if it appears that notwithstanding the appearance, the cloak or the veil of the executive action, in substance and in truth the constitutional power has been transgressed, the impugned action is struck down as a fraud on the Constitution. We have already noticed that the impugned order in the present case has categorised the Backward Classes on the sole basis of caste which, in our opinion, is not permitted by Art. 15(4); and we have also held that the reservation of 68% made by the impugned order is plainly inconsistent with the concept of the special provision authorised by Art.15(4).We do not see how it would be possible to sever the invalid provisions of the impugned order. If the categorisation cannot and would not attempt the task of enumerating the said categories; and if the percentage of reservation is improper and outside Art. 15(4), this Court would not attempt to lay down definitely and in an inflexible manner as to what would be the proper percentage to reserve. In this connection, it may be relevant to refer to one fact on which the petitioners have strongly relied. It is urged for them that the method adopted by the Government of Maharashtra in exercising its powers under Art. 15(4) is a proper method to adopt. It appears that the Maharashtra Government has decided to afford financial assistance, and make monetary grants to students seeking higher education where it is shown that the annual income of their families is below a prescribed minimum. The said scheme is not before us and we are not called upon to express any opinion on it. However, we may observe that if any State adopts such a measure, it may afford relief to and assist the advancement of the Backward Classes in the State, because backwardness, social and educational, is ultimately and primarily due to poverty. An attempt can also be made to start newer and more educational institutions, polytechnics, vocational institutions and even rural Universities and thereby create more opportunities for higher education. This dual attack on the problem posed by the weakness of backward communities can claim to proceed on a rational, broad and scientific approach which is consistent with, and true to, the noble ideal of a secular welfare democratic State set up by the Constitution of this country. Such an approach can be supplemented, if necessary by providing special provision by way of reservation to aid the Backward classes and Scheduled castes and Tribes.It may well be that there may be other ways and means of achieving the same result. In our country where social and economic conditions differ from State to State, it would be idle to expect absolute uniformity of approach; but in taking executive action to implement the policy of Art. 15(4), it is necessary for the States to remember that the policy which is intended to be implemented is the policy which has been declared by Art. 46 and the preamble of the Constitution. It is for the attainment of social and economic justice that Art. 15(4) authorises the making of special provisions for the advancement of the communities there contemplated even if such provisions may be inconsistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 15 or 29(2). The context, therefore, requires that the executive action taken by the State must be based on an objective approach free from all extraneous pressures. The said action is intended to do social and economic justice and must be taken in a manner that justice is and should be doneThe judgment shows that the only point which was raised for the decision of this Court in that case was whether the reservation made was outside Art. 16(4) and that posed the bare question about the construction of Art. 16(4). The propriety, the reasonableness or the wisdom of the impugned order was not questioned because it was not the respondents case that if the order was justified under Art. 16(4), it was a fraud on the Constitution. Even so, it was pointed out in the judgment that the efficiency of administration is of such a paramount importance that it would be unwise and impermissible to make any reservation at the cost of efficiency of administration; that, it was stated, was undoubtedly the effect of Art. 335.Therefore, what is true in regard to Article 15(4) is equally true in regard to Art. 16(4). There can be no doubt that the Constitution-makers assumed, as they were entitled to, that while making adequate reservation under Art. 16(4), care would be taken not to provide for unreasonable, excessive or extravagant reservation, for that would, by eliminating general competition in a large field and by creating wide-spread dissatisfaction amongst the employees, materially affect efficiency. Therefore, like the special provision improperly made under Art. 15(4), reservation made under Art. 16(4) beyond the permissible and legitimate limits would be liable to be challenged as a fraud on the Constitution. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise that Art. 15(4) like Article 16(4) is an enabling provision; it does not impose an obligation, but merely leaves it to the discretion of the appropriate Government to take suitable action if necessary.