Case: Gurdev Singh Sidhu Vs. State of Punjab &amp; Another

2. The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Superintendent of Police in the erstwhile Patiala State by His Highness, Maharaja Adhiraj of Patiala on the 4th of February, 1942. The conditions of his service were governed by the Patiala State Service Regulations which had been issued by the Ruler of Patiala State who was at the relevant time the sovereign legislature of the State. Later, the petitioner was confirmed in the rank on the occurrence of a regular vacancy after he had undergone practical district training course in Punjab in 1947. On the formation of Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948, the petitioner was integrated in Pepsu Police Service. In due course, he was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police in February, 1950 by His Highness, the Rajpramukh of the erstwhile State of Pepsu.3. On the 25th March, 1963, respondent No. 2 S. Gurdial Singh ,Inspector General of Police and Joint Secretary to the Government of Punjab, issued a notice against the petitioner purporting to act under the second proviso to Article 9.1 of the Pepsu Services Regulations to show cause why he should not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner alleges that the second proviso to Article 9.1 under which the said notice has been issued against him, is invalid, and so, he has moved this Court under Art. 32 for quashing the said notice on the ground that the article on which it is based is itself ultra vires and inoperative. Respondent No. 1, the State of Punjab, and respondent No. 2 have by their counter-affidavit denied the petitioners contention that the impugned Article 9.1 is constitutionally invalid and they have resisted his claim for quashing the notice issued by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner.

Reasoning:
In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasise that for the efficient administration of the State, it is absolutely essential that permanent public servants should enjoy a sense of security of tenure. The safeguard which Art. 31(2) affords to permanent public servants is no more than this that in case it is intended to dismiss, remove or reduce them in rank, a reasonable opportunity should be given to them of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them.A claim for security to tenure does not mean security of tenure for dishonest corrupt, or inefficient public servants. The claim merely insists that before they are removed, the permanent public servants should be given an opportunity to meet the charge on which they are sought to be removed. Therefore, it seems that only two exceptions can be treated as valid in dealing with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Art. 311(2). If a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, Art. 311(2) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor removal of the public servant. If a permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under the rules which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasonably long period of qualified service after which alone compulsory retirement can be ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or removal under Art. 311 (2) mainly because that is the effect of a long series of decisions of this Court. But where while reserving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant, a rule is framed prescribing a proper age of superannuation, and another rule is added giving the power to the State to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant at the end of 10 years of his service, that cannot, we think, be treated as falling outside Art.termination of the service of a permanent public servant under such a rule, though called compulsory retirement, is in substance, removal under Art. 311(2). It is because it was apprehended that rules of compulsory retirement may purport to reduce the prescribed minimum period of service beyond which compulsory retirement can be forced against a public servant that the majority judgment in the case to Moti Ram Deka, Civil Appeals Nos. 711 to 714 of 1962 and 837 to 839 of 1963 D/- 5-12-1963 : (reported in AIR 1964 SC 600  ) clearly indicated that if such a situation arose, the validity of the rule may have to be examined, and in doing so, the impugned rule may not be permitted to seek the protection of the earlier decisions of this Court in which the minimum qualifying period of service was prescribed as high as 25 years, or the age of the public servant at 50 years. We are, therefore, satisfied that Mr. Bhandari is right in contending that the effect of the majority decision in the case of Moti Ram Deka Civil Appeal Nos. 711 to 714 of 1962 and 837 to 839 of 1963, D/- 5-12-1963; (reported in AIR 1964 SC 600  ) clearly is that the impugned Article 9.1 contravenes Article 311(2) of the Constitution and must be struck down as invalid.