Case: P. Kumaraswamy Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras And Anr

Many applicants for one permit for a "short route" pressed their claims before the Regional Transport Authority which evaluated the relevant merits and awarded the permit to Applicant No. 6, who is the Appellant before us. On appeal, Applicant No. 3, who is respondent No. 2 before us, succeeded. Whereupon a Writ Petition was filed without success and the disappointed appellant has come to this Court by specialthis case, therefore, the appellant before us, being admittedly a new entrant, was entitled to preference, the route being a short one, other things being equal. The short question that, therefore, fell before the Appellate Authority was as to whether other things were equal. This aspect attracted the attention of the Appellate Authority, but its consideration unfortunately was unsatisfactory. The Appellate Tribunal observed that though the Applicant No. 6 had secured higher marks than Applicant No. 3: "I am inclined, having regard to the public interest in the matter of passenger transport service, to agree with the appellants contention that the respondents experience as lorry operator cannot be equated with the appellants experience in bus operation." This view, according to him, is tenable under Section 47 (1) since this matter involves grant of bus permit. "The fact that the appellants are bus operators, must necessarily over-ride the fact of the respondent being a lorry operator. Though the route in question is a short route and there is a new entrant like the respondent, the respondent cannot automatically be preferred in the absence of other things being equal, in accordance with clause 5(1) of Rule 155-A".

Reasoning:
There is no doubt that bus transport is calculated to benefit the public and it is in the fitness of things that the interest of the traveling public is highlighted while evaluating the relevant worth of the variouserror that has crept into the order of the Appellate Tribunal consists in thinking that the rules or guidelines could be discarded in the name of Section 47 (1). Actually, Rule 155-A is in implementation of Section 47(1), but is not exhaustive of all the considerations that will prevail in a given situation. Therefore, it is that there is jurisdiction given to the Tribunal to take note of other considerations in public interest flowing out of Section 47(1). Not that the sub-rules of Rule 155-A can be discarded, but that they may be supplemented or outweighed. Not that, in the name of public interest, something opposed to the sub-rules o f Rule 155-A can be done but that, within the combined framework of Section 47(1) and rule 155-A, there is scope for play of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to promote public interest. Viewed in this perspective the Appellate Tribunal has actually contravened Rule 155(3)(D). That provision expressly accords two marks for applicants who have a certain experience in road transport service. Road transport service is defined in clause (a) of Section 68-A and this definition is specifically incorporated in Rule 155-A (3) (D). It follows that the rule makes no distinction between the type of transport vehicle in which experience has been gained whether it be a passenger transport or a lorry transport. The view taken by the appellate tribunal that because the permit is for passenger transport, lorry service experience, even if it falls under Rule 155-A (3) (D), can be ignored, is therefore, illegal. A relevant factor has thus been wronglywith the same flaw is what we have earlier indicated namely, that the Appellate Tribunal has held that the new entrant (Applicant No. 6) need not be given the preference he is eligible for under Rule 155-A (5) because other things are not equal. According to him, other things not equal because Applicant No. 6 has lorry transport experience while Applicant No. 3 has bus transport experience. We have already explained that this is a fallacy. In this view, the preference that flows in favour of applicant No. 6 under Rule 155-A (5) should not have been denied to him for the reasons set out by the Tribunal.For these reasons, the order of the Appellate Tribunal is liable to be quashed. The well-worn ground that mat material consideration, if ignored, makes the order vulnerable, applied. Moreover, these is an apparent misconstruction of the relevant rule by the Appellate Tribunal, as we have explaineddoes not mean that this Court will award the permit to one party or the other. That is the function of the statutory body created under the Motor Vehicles Act. Moreover, as Mr. Sen, appearing for the second respondent, has rightly pointed out, his client had m any other grounds to urge before the Appellate Tribunal to establish his superiority, which have not been adverted to by the Appellate Tribunal because on one ground he succeeded. It is only fair, therefore, that the case is remanded to the Appellate Tribunal for being heard de novo wherein both sides (no other applicant will be heard), will be entitled to urge their respective claims, for the single permit that is available to be awarded.