Case: Kailash Chandra  Vs. Mukundi Lal

2. The Landlords who are respondent Nos.13in the present appeal filed a suit for eviction of the appellant in the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Jaunpur. The ground for eviction on account of subletting by the appellant / tenant, was not accepted by the Trial Court. However, it was found that the appellant / tenant was in arrears of rent, but decree of eviction was not passed, since the appellant paid the amount due on the first date of hearing in accordance with S.20 (4) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (to be referred as Act). The Revisional Court, however, upset the order passed by the Trial Court and passed decree of eviction on account of arrears of rent as well as on the ground of subletting. The said order was upheld in the Writ Petition in so far it related to default in payment of rent. The High Court however held that the Revisional Court was wrong in substituting its own finding of fact regarding subletting, in exercise of its revisional powers. Therefore, finding of the Trial Court on the point of subletting stood restored.

Reasoning:
whether the defendant appellant had cleared the arrears of rent or not4. The High Court came to the conclusions that benefit of deposit under S.30(2) of the Act could not be given to the tenant under S.20(4) of the Act and the tenant has to clear off all the dues as standing against him including the amount of arrears which may, though have become barred by time. So far latter proposition is concerned, the High Courts view cannot be faulted with5. The view taken by the High Court as indicated above requires examination though apparently on the face of it, it may seem to be correct7. A perusal ofn (4) of S.20 of the Act, no doubt indicates that the deduction of an amount from the total amount due is permissible only to the extent of deposit made undern (1) of S.30. It does not mention about the deposits made undern (2) of S.30 of the Act8. A tenant is required to make deposit, undern (1) of S.30 on refusal of the landlord to accept the rent. The deposit undern (2) of S.30 is required to be made where any doubt or dispute arises as to the person who may be entitled to receive rent in which event, the tenant may deposit the amount in the Court till such doubt has been removed or dispute has been settled. The effect of the deposits made undern (1) and (2) is to be found undern (6) of S.30 according to which it shall be deemed that the person depositing the amount has paid it on the date of deposit, to the person in whose favour deposit is made undern (1) and to the landlord in case deposit is made undern (2). It is thus clear that the effect of deposit under two different circumstances as provided unders (1) and (2) of S.30, is the same. The deposit is deemed to be payment made by the person depositing to the landlord. That being the position, it is not open to say that a deposit made under) of S.30 would not be deemed to be payment of rent to the landlord and the same is not liable to be accounted for while considering the amount due. Omission ofn (2) of S.30 inn (4) of S.20 of the Act, cannot lead to an inference, which would negate or nullify the express and statutory effect provided undern (6) of S.30 regarding deposits made under S.30 (2) of the Act9. As a matter of fact, it would not at all be necessary to incorporate the effect ofn (6) of S.30 inn (4) of S.20 of the Act. The effect ofn (6) of S.30 flows from the provision itself. Therefore,n (4) of S.20 will have to be read withn (6) of S.30 where it relates to deposit of rent made undern (2) of S.30, which it would not be necessary in case of deposits undern (1) of S.30. The interpretation as accepted by the High Court is unnatural and against the spirit and specific provision undern (6) of S.30. There may or may not be a mention ofn (2) of S.30 inS.20(4), the plain and natural consequences statutorily provided should be allowed to flow irrespective of mention ofn (1) alone inn (4) of S.20. There cannot be converse inference in the teeth ofn (6) of S.30. Hadn (6) of S.30 been not there, it could perhaps provide some scope for such an inference12. In the background of what has been held by this Court in the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, it would only be proper rather necessary to readn (4) of S.20 along withn (6) of S.30 of the Act.n (4) of S.20 provides for payment of entire rent by the tenant at the first hearing of the Suit. It further permits, deduction of any amount therefrom which has already been deposited by the tenant undern (1) of S.30.n (2) of S.30 is omitted. The effect of payment undern (2) of S.30 is that of payment by the depositor to the landlord. If it is so, how the said amount can be treated to be due from the tenant for payment to the landlord? If the amount deposited under. (2) is not deductible undern (4) of S.20 like the deposit made under) of S.30 and despite the deposit the tenant is liable to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent, it would rendern (2) of S.30 devoid of meaning andn (6) of S.30 otioseDouble payment or deposit for the same period is not envisaged, nor it can be, therefore, for construing the meaning of entire amount due as occurring inn (4) of S.20 of the Act,n (6) of S.30 will have to be read along with it and not in isolation. It would also saven (6) of S.30 from becoming OTIOSE. The anomalies and differentiation in the deposits made unders (1) and (2) of S.30, though the effect is the same, would also be saved. It would only harmonize the construction of the two provisions; namelyn (4) of S.20 ands (2) and (6) of S.30 of the Act. Provisions of one Section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them. (See Raj Krushna v. Vinod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 and Sultana begum (Supra) as also Mohd. Sher Khan v. Raja Seth, AIR 1922 PC page 1714. We also find that there are certain observations made in the judgment of the High Court for which there seems to be no basis. It is observed that amount of arrears of rent w.e.f. 1971 to 1973 have not been deposited, namely the amount which was left out to be claimed by the plaintiff being barred by time it does not appear to be correct on the face of it. It has been the case of petitioner that he had deposited the amount undern 2 of S.30 only when the Municipal Board demanded rent from the defendant in 1971 on expiry of lease period of the plaintiff. It is nobodys case that amount deposited undern 2 of S.30 was any amount other than for the period w.e.f. 1971. It is also not understandable as to how it has been observed by the High Court that even after the deposit made under S.30(2) is taken into account the time barred amount has not been paid. It is not necessary for us nor it would be appropriate to go into the details of the payments made but we find that the Trial Court observed that the defendant deposited Rs.700/more than what was claimed in the plaint. A total sum of Rs. 648/was demanded in the plaint, whereas the amount deposited was. Rs. 443.50 p. was demanded on account of arrears of rent for the period from3 to, thereafter, up to6 a sum of Rs. 204.50 as mesne profit for use and occupation. Rent for the period1 to3 had become time barred. There was admittedly a deposit made under S.30(2) of the Act15. We again find that at one place the High Court has observed that the Revisional Court made some observations that deposit under S.30(2) was not a bona fide deposit, hence it was not liable to be taken into account. No such question about the deposit under S.30(2) being bona fide or not, appears to have been raised before the Trial Court. No such issue was framed, nor finding recorded either way and rightly. It is not understandable how the observation came to be made by the Revisional Court for the first time. There is no denial of the fact that the Municipal Board had also served notice upon the defendant to make payment of the rent to it. It also does not appears that the plaintiff placed any document on the record to show that the Court where the deposit was being made under S.30(2) may have rejected the petition for deposit holding it to be not bona fide. Such an observation by the Revisional Court at the first instance is but only to be ignored