Case: Jagdish Prasad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

1. This appeal raises a question of construction of sub-s. (1) of S. 16 ofthe Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The sub-section in providing for punishment for breaches of the Act states, "for a second offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and with fine". In respect of the first offence it provides for a smaller sentence. The question is whether the appellant was liable to punishment for a second offence. The order of this Court granting leave to appeal confined it only to that question.2. It appears that on an earlier occasion the appellant kept foodstuffs for sale in a container without covering it as required by sub-r. (3) of R. 49 of the rules made under the Act and was thereupon convicted under S. 16 and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 40 as for a first offence. This time he has been convicted for selling foodstuff which had been coloured with a dye the use of which was prohibited by Rs. 28 of the same rules.

Reasoning:
Learned counsel for the appellant no doubt agrees that the second offence must refer to an offence under the Act but he says that since it would amount to adding the words "under the Act", it would justify the addition of further words implying that the second offence had to be of the same type as the first. This is a wholly unfounded contention.The offence contemplated in the expression "second offence" has to be under the Act because that arises from the object of the Act and, as we shall later show, from the necessary implication of the structure of theThere is no such reason to confine the second offence to an offence of the same type.10. We have so far been dealing only with that portion of(1) of S. 16 which concerns the penalty for the second offence. Considering theas a whole we find that it supports the interpretation of the expression "second offence" which has appealed to us. It says that if any person does any of the acts mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) in it, he shall be punishable for the first offence with a certain penalty, for the second offence with a higher penalty and for the third a still higher penalty. It is clear that the acts or omissions mentioned in the different clauses constitute offences for which the penalties are provided. From this structure of thethe implication necessarily arises that the penalties were imposed for offences under the Act only. Now Cl. (a) deals with a person importing, manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any article of food in contravention of the provisions of the Act or of any rule made thereunder. This clause contemplates the breaches of various provisions of the Act and the rules, which are numerous. It covers various types of conduct, act or omission, each of which is punishable and each of which is, therefore, an offence. Turning next to the part of thewhich prescribes penalties, we find it provides increasing degrees of punishment for the second offence and the third and subsequent offences. It follows that an offence contemplated in this part of thewith it we are now directlybe constituted by any of the acts which would come within Cl. (a) and likewise within all the other clauses following it.We have pointed out that the acts and omissions contemplated there are of diverse kinds. The words "second offence" must, therefore, mean any act which is an offence under any of the clauses in thewhich has been done later in point of time after a conviction for an offence under the Act, no matter whether the acts or omissions constituting the two offences are of the same type or not. The appellant must, therefore, be held to have committed the second offence within the meaning of theon the present occasion and was liable to have the heavier punishment awarded to him. The sentence awarding such punishment is unexceptionable.