Case: The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Bangalore Vs. The State of Karnataka &amp; Ors

3. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are as under: -3.1 That the lands in question were acquired in three parts. The first acquisition was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 – Jamanlal Bajaj Seva Trust (for short Trust). Second acquisition was in respect of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by very respondent No.4 – Trust and the third acquisition was in respect of 3 acres 34 guntas of land (which is not the subject matter of appeals before this Court).3.2 The relevant facts in respect of first and second acquisitions are as under: -In respect of 172 acres 22 guntas (First Acquisition)3.2.1 That a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1894) on 03.09.1994 in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 herein – Trust in Srigandadakaval Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bengaluru for establishing a mega market by the appellant – APMC, Bangalore.3.2.2 One Rajajinagar House Building Co-operative Society challenged the notification issued under Section 4(1), before the High Court of Karnataka by way of Writ Petition No.28988/1994. It was the case on behalf of the said society that the land should be acquired for them and not for APMC. The said writ petition came to be dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 23.12.1995.3.3.3 Thereafter a notification/declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 10.10.1996 and published on 13.10.1996. A draft award was prepared in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land on 12.08.1998.3.3.4 On the instructions given by the Land Acquisition Officer, the appellant – APMC deposited Rs.9,14,14,873/- on 19.08.1998 towards approximate cost of the acquisition.3.3.5 It appears that the aforesaid Rajajinagar House Building Co-operative Society filed another writ petition being W.P. No.6880/1997 before the High Court, before the acquisition of 172.50 acres of land at Srigandadakaval Village could be completed. The High Court granted an ex- parte order of stay of acquisition proceedings vide interim order dated 16.09.1998. Thereafter respondent no.4 – original land owner filed Writ Petition No.3884/1998 before the High Court, challenging the acquisition proceedings. Vide interim order dated 08.02.1999, the High Court ordered stay of dispossession.In respect of 104 acres 5 guntas (Second Acquisition)3.4 That a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the Act, 1894, dispensing with the requirement of hearing was issued on 13.04.1999 in respect of 104 acres 5 guntas of land owned by respondent No.4 – Trust in Herohalli Village, Yeshwanthpura Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, for establishing a mega market by the appellant – APMC. A final notification under Section 6(1) read with Section 17(1) to 17(4) was issued in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas out of 104 acres 5 guntas which had been notified under Section 4(1) on 13.04.1999, leaving an area of 3 acres 34 guntas out of acquisition. An enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with.3.4.1 That one Vishwaneedam Trust filed Writ Petition No.708/2000 before the High Court challenging the said acquisition. The High Court granted stay of dispossession in respect of 35 acres out of the 100 acres 5 guntas situated in Herohalli Village.3.4.2 Respondent No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed Writ Petition No.37140/2000 challenging the notifications dated 13.04.1999 and 26.10.1999 in respect of the lands at Herohalli Village.3.4.3 According to the appellant, possession was taken and handed over to the APMC by the Land Acquisition Officer vide an Official Memorandum of Possession dated 06.10.2000 in respect of 65 acres 19 guntas of the lands at Herohalli Village.3.4.4 That an award was made by the State Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) on 22.05.2002, referring to a Government order dated 26.03.2002, in respect of 100 acres 11 guntas covered by Section 6 notification dated 26.10.1999. The award provided for payment of compensation to respondent No.4 – Trust after excluding 34 acres 14 guntas of acquired land treating the same as Phut Kharab belonging to the Government and further excluding 35 acres in respect of the writ petition filed Vishwaneedam trust in which an order of stay of dispossession had been passed by the High Court. The said compensation was accepted by respondent No.4 under protest. Respondent No.4 – Trust – original land owner filed a Land Acquisition Case No.1/2003 seeking enhancement of compensation which seems to be pending.3.5 Thus, Writ Petition No.3884/1998 filed by respondent No.4 – original land owner was in respect of 172 acres 22 guntas of land. Writ Petition Nos.37140--37146/2000 was in respect of 100 acres of land and Writ Petition No.708/2000 was filed by Vishwaneedam Trust in respect of second acquisition (part).3.6 A common statement of objections was filed by the appellant – APMC to all the writ petitions.3.7 That the APMC filed IA No.01/2007 in W.P. No.37140/2000, to permit APMC to hand over 9 acres of land out of 65 acres 11 guntas to the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and 4 acres to the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board (BWSSB). That vide order dated 21.03.2007, the learned Single Judge allowed the said IA No.01/2007 and granted permission to the APMC as prayed.3.8 At this stage, it is required to be noted that in respect to the lands in question and other lands owned by respondent No.4 – Trust, proceedings were pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, Bangalore N. Taluk. At this stage, it is required to be noted that it was the specific case on behalf of the State and the APMC that unless the proceedings under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (KLR Act) are disposed of, the compensation is not required to be deposited as, if ultimately it is held that the land acquired is excess vacant land under the provisions of KLR Act, in that case, the said land would vest with the State Government and therefore, no compensation would be payable. Therefore, since the Government was not proceeding with making of awards or offering compensation on the ground that proceedings were pending before the Land Reforms Tribunal, by the same order dated 21.03.2007 the learned Single Judge directed the Tribunal to dispose of application No.LRF 2099/74--75 under Section 66 of the KLR Act, within three months.3.9 The order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 21.03.2007 granting permission to the APMC to hand over 9 acres of land to BDA and 4 acres of land to BWSSB was challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court by way of Writ Appeal No.1011/2007. The Division Bench of the High Court stayed the order of the learned Single Judge. The said appeal along with some companion appeals came to be disposed of by the Division Bench vide order dated 28.06.2012, directing learned Single Judge to decide all the connected writ petitions finally and continued the interim stay granted by the Division Bench until the final disposal of all the petitions.3.10 Thereafter APMC filed IA No.03/2008 seeking permission to build a wall around 65 acres of land, which came to be allowed vide order dated 12.02.2009. It is reported that thereafter APMC has completed the fencing work.Proceedings before the Land Reforms Tribunal3.11 That the Land Reforms Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) passed an order dated 12.01.2010 in the proceedings under the KLR Act holding that 213 acres 20 guntas of respondent No.4 – Trusts land was excess land under the said Act.3.11.1 The order passed by the Tribunal was challenged before the High Court in Writ Petition No.4311/2010. The High Court vide order dated 24.03.2014 remitted the proceedings to the Tribunal with directions for a fresh consideration.3.11.2 On remand the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 22.09.2015 and declared that 265 acres 24 guntas of land held by respondent No.4 – Trust was excess land. That the order passed by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 was challenged before the High Court and the High Court vide order dated 02.05.2017 set aside the order passed by the Tribunal dated 22.09.2015 and once again remitted the matter to the Tribunal.3.11.3 That the Tribunal passed a fresh order dated 28.11.2017 and declared that 354 acres 10 guntas was excess land. The order passed by the Tribunal dated 28.11.2017 was again the subject matter before the High Court by way of Writ Petition No.55344/2017. By judgment and order dated 30.06.2021, the learned Single Judge has quashed and set aside the Tribunals order dated 28.11.2017. It is reported that against the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 30.06.2021 passed in Writ Petition No.55344/2017, the State has preferred a writ appeal being W.A. No.1089/21, which is reported to be pending before the Division Bench of the High Court.3.12 That all the aforesaid writ petitions being W.P. No.3884/1998 (in respect of 172 acres of land), W.P. Nos. 37140--37146/2000 (in respect of 100 acres of land) and others writ petitions being W.P. No.708/2000 and 19579--19585/2001, were clubbed together. During the pendency of the aforesaid writ petitions the Act, 2013 came into force. Therefore, the writ petitioners submitted an application dated 24.02.2014 seeking to invoke the benefit of the Act, 2013 and urged that the benefit of provisions of the said Act would be available to it.3.13 That the learned Single Judge framed the following points for consideration: -a. Whether the disposal of these petitioners should be deferred pending adjudication and determination by the Land Tribunal, Bangalore North Taluk of the excess holdings or otherwise under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 of the very lands which are the subject matter herein.b. Whether the possession of a portion of the lands in question having said to have been given to APMC can be said to be valid and in accordance with law.c. Whether the invocation of Section 17 of the LA Act in the acquisition of a portion of the lands for the same purpose was justified.d. Whether the acquiring authority could keeping abeyance the mandate to pay or deposit the compensation amount pending disposal of the proceedings before the Land Tribunal in respect of the lands.e. Whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act.3.14 That though some observations were made on the proceedings under the Act, 1894, thereafter, without further finally deciding any other point framed for consideration, as reproduced hereinabove, the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petitions by holding that respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.3.15 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 24.06.2014 holding that respective acquisitions have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, the APMC preferred writ appeals before the High Court. By the impugned common judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the said appeals confirming the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge declaring that the acquisition have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.3.16 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in respective Writ Appeal No.1732/2014 and others along with accompanied appeals, the APMC, Bangalore, has preferred the present appeals.

Reasoning:
Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were raised before the High Court on the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings, the learned Single Judge decided only one issue, namely, whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. Whereas a number of issues/grounds were raised and as such the original reliefs sought (acquisition proceedings under Act 1894) were the main reliefs which were required to be dealt with and considered, unfortunately, the learned Single Judge did not give findings on the other issues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed hereinabove, disposed of the writ petitions considering only one relief/ground, namely, whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. When a number of submissions were made on the other issues/grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have considered the other issues and ought to have given the findings on other issues also. Because of not deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such one issue, is held to be bad in law for the reasons stated hereinbelow, this Court has no other alternative but to remand the matters to the learned Single Judge for deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order 14 Rule 2 (as amended w.e.f. 01.02.1977), this Court in the case of Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties & Ors, (2020) 6 SCC 557,  has observed and held that after the amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977, though Order 14 Rule 2(2) enables the court to decide the issue of law as a preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction of court or (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time being in force, a departure has been made in amended provision whereby now it mandates the court to pronounce judgment on all issues notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. It is further observed that intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand in an appealable case for deciding other issues.9. Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under sub--section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, is concerned, the same is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Constitution bench of this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph 365 and 366 as under: -365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183  : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183  : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353  : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412  : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether or has to be read as nor or as and was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment.366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.366.3. The word or used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as nor or as and. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.366.4. The expression paid in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the landowners as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non- payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that all judgments rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183]  are overruled in view of the interpretation made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in Indore Development Authority (supra). There has been a trend of land owners filing fresh cases seeking lapse of acquisition on the basis of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, although such land owners may have earlier unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition notifications. Such land owners may have had the benefit of interim orders of stay of further proceedings in the acquisition process or dispossession resulting in a delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of the compensation and consequently in taking over possession of the acquired land. There being a delay in the passing of the award owing to interim orders granted by the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners cannot now take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award has been made and consequently there has been no payment or deposit of the compensation and that possession of the acquired land continues with them. The land owners having had the benefit of interim orders granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them against the acquisition cannot take benefit under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The High Court or the civil courts which may have granted interim orders in favour of the land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the land owners.10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, the view taken by the High Court while declaring the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case Indore Development Authority (supra). Even the same is also not disputed by Shri C. U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore, the common judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petitions and declaring that the acquisition proceedings with respect to the lands in question have lapsed under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be quashed and set aside.11. As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues were raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894 and though other points for consideration were raised/framed by the High Court reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues are adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other alternative but to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for deciding the writ petitions afresh and to adjudicate on all the other issues, other than the lapse of acquisitions under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High Court ought to have adjudicated on all the issues raised and ought not to have decided and disposed of the writ petitions, adjudicating only on one issue which has been found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not applied its mind to this aspect of the matter and has simply dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant herein.