Case: Mongibai Hariram Vs. State Of Maharashtra And Another

1. The appellants are trustees of a certain trust which owns a big block of buildings situate at Matunga in the city of Bombay. The room in this block of buildings are let out to various tenants. One P. S. Nambiar was a tenant of room No. 26 in this block for a long time. He had left the room without informing the appellants and having put one K. A. Nambiar in possession. It is not known when P. S. Nambiar left. The appellants never accepted K. A. Nambiar or anyone else as the tenant. No rent had been paid in respect of the room since January 1, 1956 which was prior thereto being paid in the name of P. S. Nambiar2. The appellants terminated the tenancy of P. S. Nambiar by a notice to quit, expiring on December 31, 1957, and thereafter on March 26, 1958 filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, against P. S. Nambiar and K. A. Nambiar for recovery of possession of the room, P. S. Nambiar being sued as the tenant and K. A. Nambiar as the person in occupation of the room. The grounds on which ejectment was sought were that (1) P. S. Nambiar had sublet the room without the permission of the appellants, (2) he had been in arrears with his rent from January 1, 1956, and (3) the premises were required by the appellants for their own use and occupation. On proof of any of these grounds an ejectment decree could be passed against the tenant under the provisions ofthe Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, hereafter referred to as the Rent Act. The defendants could not be personally served and eventually service of the summons was effected by affixing it on the room. That was due service of the summons but the defendants did not enter appearance to the suit. Evidence was led on behalf of the appellants to prove that the rents were in arrears as stated and that they required the room reasonably and bona fide for their own use and occupation as such trustees. No evidence appears to have been led as to any subletting by P. S. Nambiar. So this ground of eviction may be left out of consideration3. An ex parte decree in ejectment was passed in the suit on August 18 1958. The execution of that decree was obstructed in various ways including an application by K. A. Nambiar to set aside the decree on the ground of non-service of summons which was dismissed by the trial Court and an appeal from that order also failed. Eventually the appellants obtained possession of the room on April 30, 1959. On the next day, that is. May 1, 1959 K. A. Nambiar wrote to the Controller of Accommodation appointed underthe Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, stating that he was evicted from the room in execution of a decree and requesting that the room be requisitioned and allotted to him under the Requisition Act as he had no other accommodation. Thereafter, by a notice dated July 11, 1959 the appellants were called upon to show cause why the room should not be requisitioned under the Act and after certain enquiries had been made, an order was passed on September 10, 1959 declaring the room to be vacant and requisitioning it and by another order dated the same day, it was allotted to K. A. Nambiar. The appellants took certain steps under the Requisition Act in the nature of an appeal to have these orders annulled but their attempts were unsuccessful4. On September 30, 1959, the appellants moved the High Court at Bombay under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ directing the State of Bombay and the Accommodation Officer appointed under the Requisition Act to withdraw the orders of requisition and allotment and also for a writ quashing these orders. The petition was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court who dismissed it. The appellants then went up to a Division Bench in appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge but in this appeal also they were unsuccessful. They have now appealed to this Court with special leave.

Reasoning:
35. Section 13 (1) (g) of the Rent Act entitles the landlord to recover possession of the premises if the Court is satisfied that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. It is open to doubt whether a trustee-landlord, as the plaintiffs-appellants are, and be said to require the premises for occupation for himself. The first part of S. 13 (1) (g) appears to contemplate persons who receive or are entitled to receive rents on their own account and not to persons who receive or are entitled to receive rents as a trustee. A trustee-landlord can require the premises under Section 13 (1) (g) for occupation for purposes of the trust. The trustee-landlord himself need not be a homeless person. No occasion arose in the ejectment suit for the Court to determine whether reasonable accommodation was available for the tenant and whether greater hardship would be caused to the landlord if no ejectment be ordered as the suit was uncontested36. The provisions of S. 13 (2) (A) of the Rent Act show that the needs of the armed forces of the Union or their families get precedence over the needs of the landlord.The needs of the landlord, therefore, are not such a controlling factor as to over-ride the provisions of the Act if the requisition of the premises in suit comes within them. Requisition under the Act is for a public purpose and there seems to be no good reason why the needs of the landlord be not deemed subservient to the requirements of public purposes as judged by the State Government37. Another ground for the non-applicability of the Act to such ejected person, is urged on the basis of the provisions of S. 17 of the Rent Act. Sub-section (1) of S. 17 empowers the Court to order the landlord to re-allot the premises to the tenant who had been evicted therefrom in case the landlord does not occupy the premises within a period of one month or if the landlord re-allots the premises to another person within a year of the tenants eviction. The Court has a discretion to pass such an order on the application of the tenant. If the Act provides by S. 6 that the landlord cannot occupy the premises which had become vacant on the eviction of the tenant within a month of the receipt of the intimation of vacancy by the State Government, there is no conflict between that provision and the discretionary power vested in the Court under sub-s. (1) of S. 17. The Court, undoubtedly, cannot exercise such a discretionary power when another enactment by its language provides for the landlords not occupying the premises for a period in excess of a month. Under sub-s. (2) of S. 17, a landlord is liable to conviction if he keeps premises unoccupied without reasonable cause or if he fails to comply with the order passed under sub-s. (1) of S. 17. No question of conviction in the latter circumstances arises if as indicated earlier the Court will not pass an order of re-allotment to the evicted tenant in case the premises are subject to the provisions of S. 6 of the Act. The non-occupation of the premises within one month of the ejection of the tenant on the ground that the premises are situate in an area covered by the notification under S. 6 (1) of the Act will be non-occupation of the premises for reasonable causes and, therefore, there can be no occasion for a conviction on the ground that the premises were kept unoccupied within a period of one month from the date of recovery of possession38. We do not, therefore, consider that there is any real conflict between the provisions of S. 6 of the Act and the provisions of Ss. 13 or 17 of the Rent Act39. It is also to be noticed that the Act was enacted later than the Rent Act. The legislature is presumed to know the provisions of the Rent Act. It did not make an exception from requisition with respect to premises becoming vacant on the eviction of a tenant on the ground mentioned in S. 13(1)(g) of the Rent Act. On the contrary, not only sub-s. (1) of S. 6 speaks of the vacancy of the premises on a tenant ceasing to occupy them but the Explanation to S. 6 clearly states that the premises which are in the occupation of a tenant shall be deemed to become vacant when such tenant ceases to be in occupation by eviction. An exception could have been made in case of evictions for a particular reason, such as in Cl. (g) of sub-s. (1) of S. 13 of the Act. The legislature made no such exception40. The field of operation of the two Acts, the Rent Act and the Act, are different. The Rent Act deals with the question arising between the landlord and the tenant on account of the incidents of tenancy, while the Act deals with the necessities of a public purpose as determined by Government in a particular area for which notification under sub-s. (1) of S. 6 has been issued, keeping in mind the interests of the landlord also41. The Civil Court, in deciding a suit for eviction, simply takes into consideration the needs of the landlord vis-a-vis the tenant and the grounds of eviction. It does not take into consideration the requirements of any public purpose. It adjudicates between the rights of the landlord and the tenant in accordance with the statutory provisions of the Rent Act. The State Government, on the other hand, when considering the question of requisitioning the premises under sub-s. (4) of S. 6 does not consider such matters but considers only whether the purpose for which it is to requisition the premises is a public purpose or not. If it is satisfied that it requires the premises for a public purpose, it has not to consider the considerations affecting the landlord except when the landlord applies for permission under S 6 (3) of the Act. It has certainly no occasion to consider the interests of the tenant as the premises can be requisitioned only when they are vacant or are deemed vacant in view of somebody occupying it in contravention of the provisions of the Act. If the Government happens to requisition the premises for the person who had been evicted therefrom in execution of a decree of a civil Court it does not mean that the Government is not respecting the decree of the Court and is acting against public interest or the interests of administration of justice42. To hold that the benefit to the Act cannot be given to persons evicted on the ground that the landlord required the premises for his use would not only deprive the evicted person from getting the premises allotted to himself but would also deprive many other homeless persons besides some special class of persons allotments to whom would clearly come within public purpose. Merely because there is a possibility of the evicted person getting allotted the premises he had been evicted from, does not appear to us to be good reason for holding that the provisions of S. 6 of the Act do not apply to the requisitioning of premises when the premises became vacant on the eviction of a tenant by a Civil Court on the ground that the landlord required the premises for his own use43. K. A. Nambiar is no part to these proceedings and this should also prove fatal to the writ petition by the appellants when the appellants seek the quashing of the order of requisition and the order of allotment to K. A. Nambiar44. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that the requisition order cannot be said to be mala fide.