Case: UNION OF INDIA &amp; ORS Vs. GOPALDAS BHAGWAN DAS &amp; ORS

2. In 1943, Government of India requisitioned 4 acres and 34 gunthas of the land owned by one Rajabahadur Bhagwandas Haridas, bearing Survey No. 120/2 (Part) of Village Malad, Mumbai, in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. On 27.07.1949, the Collector, Thane, de-requisitioned 2.68 acres in the Survey No. 120 Part 2 out of the aforesaid 4 acres 34 gunthas. Ultimately, despite the land having first being requisitioned, a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as Act), was issued on 24.10.1975 acquiring the aforesaid extent of 8623 square meters. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 30.11.1978. According to the respondents herein, a Draft Award was passed under Section 11 of the Act on 23.09.1986, against which references were made, both under Section 18 and 30, of the Act. The respondents confirmed that after symbolic possession was taken on 06.01.1987 by the State, such possession has remained with the State till date3. In a proceeding that was filed, insofar as other lands in Village Malad were concerned, covered by the same section 4 notification, this Court in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (2012) 6 SCC 348 ,  allowed an appeal by the land owner. After stating in paragraph 2 that the very same section 4 notification was issued in order that a Central Ordinance Depot for the Union of India be made for defence purposes, the judgment records that the beneficiary of these lands, being the Central Government, was served, but did not appear at the time of hearing of the appeal. The appellant in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case (supra) argued several points before this Court, which were resisted by the learned counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra, basically on the ground that the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as was done by the impugned High Court judgment. After setting out Section 4 of the Act, this Court observed that the requirement that the notification under Section 4 be published in the Official Gazettee and the requirement that the Acquiring Authority should publish public notices of the substances of such notification in a convenient place or places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situate, are cumulative conditions, both being mandatory. The Court then held: -13. In the instant case, the respondents before the High Court had filed their reply affidavit. They did not dispute the contentions of the appellants that they had not issued any public notices as required under Section 4 of the Act. They only reiterated that such notification was published in the Official Gazette. Since the mandatory requirement as required under Section 4(1) of the Act is not complied with by the respondents, while acquiring the lands in question, in our opinion, the entire acquisition proceedings requires to be declared as null and void14. This Court in J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul has observed that all the formalities of serving notice to the interested person, stipulated under Section 4 of the Act, has to be mandatorily complied with in the manner provided therein, even though the interested persons have knowledge of the acquisition proceedings. This Court further observed thus:32. It is settled law that when any statutory provision provides a particular manner for doing a particular act, the said thing or act must be done in accordance with the manner prescribed therefor in the Act. Merely because the parties concerned were aware of the acquisition proceedings or served with individual notices does not make the position alter when the statute makes it very clear that all the procedures/modes have to be strictly complied with in the manner provided therein. Merely because the landowners failed to submit their objections within 15 days after the publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the State Act, the authorities cannot be permitted to claim that it need not be strictly resorted to15. In view of the conclusion that we have reached on the first issue canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants, we do not think that other issues that the learned counsel for the appellants has raised and canvassed before us need to be answered4. It may only be mentioned that in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case (supra), the challenge was made by way of a writ petition filed in 1987, as opposed to the present challenge, which was made only in the year 2002.

Reasoning:
8. Though this Court has, by its order dated 27.03.2018, referred this case to a larger Bench in view of the decision in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case that delay and laches have to be ignored, we are of the view that on the facts of this case, we need not answer this question. This is for the reason that the section 4 notification that was struck down in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case is the very notification in the facts of this case. We may also note that in paragraph 13 of the Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case set out hereinabove, this Court quashed the entire acquisition proceedings stating that they be declared as null and void. We are unable to agree with Ms.Pandeys contention that the Section 4 notification not only deals with various other lands in Village Malad but also deals with a land in a different village altogether viz., Village Wadhawan, and that this Courts judgment did not go to the extent of declaring the acquisition bad so far as village Wadhawan is concerned. So far as village Malad is concerned, where the land in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case was land that was adjacent to the present land, the very section 4 notification has been struck down and declared null and void, and this being the case, it would not be in the interest of justice to allow the present appeal in favour of the Union of India, as this would amount to a discrimination between two persons who are otherwise similarly placed9. Adverting to some of the other submissions made by Ms.Pandey, first and foremost, in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case, the High Court dismissed the writ petition filed therein on the ground of there being a 12 years delay in filing the writ petition, and not on the ground that there was a one year delay as the Award in this case was passed only in 1986. Secondly, the factum of notices actually being served in this case, as opposed to notices not being individually served in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case, apart from making no difference to mandatory conditions that have to be followed, as held in Kulsum R. Nadiadwala, has been repelled by the judgment under appeal as follows:10. Insofar as the per incuriam point is concerned, this can be disposed of by stating that even though newspaper publication of the section 4 notification came in by amendment for the first time in 1984, the requirement of public notice where the land is situate in addition to publication in the Official Gazette, was always there from the inception. Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case did not deal with newspaper publication at all. It only dealt with the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and public notices of the substance of the notification being given in the locality in which the lands are acquired, both of which were held to be cumulative and mandatory requirements of section 411. So far as the Indore Development Authoritys case (supra) is concerned, the Constitution Bench is seized of several questions, all of which pertain to the construction of section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 201312. This being the case, and regard being had to what we have stated hereinabove, it is wholly unnecessary for us to adjourn this case in order to await the judgment of the Constitution Bench in this case13. Given the fact that this is a Defence project in which possession has been with the Union since 1942, the same facts would obtain as in Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas case in which relief has been granted to Kulsum R. Nadiadwala. This case, therefore, cannot lead to a different conclusion on similar facts15. On a reading of paragraph 16 of Kulsum R. Nadiadwalas judgment, it is important to note that though the appellants claim was restricted to only 50 per cent of the land in question, so far as the other 50 per cent is concerned, the judgment itself makes a reference to the fact that the appellants are legal heirs of one deceased Ismail Nadiadwala and that there was another claimant whose name was Ibrahim Nadiadwala to whom, presumably, 50 per cent of the property went. Since only Ismail Nadiadwalas heirs were prosecuting the appeal, this direction appears to have been made.