Case: M.K. Rappai &amp; Ors Vs. John And Ors

In order to appreciate the matters in controversy it is necessary to refer to a few facts and the frame of theplaintiffs filed this suit in 1961 for a declaration that defendants numbered 4 to 9 were "trespassers" on the trust and that all acts and proceedings of defendants numbered 1 to 9 done since the resignation of T.V. John and V.L. Lazar in respect of the administration of the trust are invalid and void; that the plaintiffs be appointed as trustees; that defendants numbered 10 to 11 be declared to be, and to have always been, lawful trustees and for injunction restraining defendants numbered 4 to 9 from interfering with the trust; that an enquiry be made into their administration and accounts, recovery of properties and funds misused, wasted, disbursed or appropriated, and that defendant numbered 1 to 3 be declared to be unfit to continue aswas a deed of settlement dated 20 December, 1953 executed by a Christian T.V. Kochuvareed called "Thattil Kochuvareed Educational and Charitable Trust". Apart from the settlor, V.L. Lazar father of the first plaintiff and T.V. John father of the second plaintiff and defendants numbered 1 to 3, 10 and 11 were trustees. On 27 May, 1957 V.L. Lazar resigned from the trusteeship. On 12 March, 1960 T.V. John followed suit. The settlor and the rest of the trustees appointed six more trustees being defendants numbered 4 to 9 inclusive. The settlor Kochuvareed died on 26 July, 1961.On 28 November, 1961 respondents numbered 1 and 2 namely, John son of V.L. Lazar and Varghese son of T.V. John the plaintiffs filed suit O.S. No. 115 of 1961 claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiffs be appointed asthe trial two preliminary issues were framed: Whether the suit was maintainable due to want of compliance with section 92 of theCode of Civil Procedure and whether the Court had jurisdiction to try this suit relating to trust. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the suit was within the mischief of non-compliance with the provisions of section 92 of theCode of Civil Procedure. The trial Court on 12 March, 1962 dismissed the suit and held that the suit had to be instituted after obtaining sanction under section 92 of the Code. The plaintiffs filed an appeal. On appeal the High Court on 20 August, 1962 allowed the appeal in part and set aside the dismissal of the suit in so far as it related to prayer e and remanded the suit to the trial Court for trial in respect of thattrial Court on remand by judgment dated 23 August, 1963 held that the suit as flamed was maintainable and the plaintiffs were entitled to be declared as rightful trustees but the second plaintiff would have to exercise rights as trustee only on attaining majority.Prayer e in the plaint was asplaintiffs be appointed to their rightful place as trustees and the second plaintiff being a minor now, be permitted to exercise his rights and safeguard his interests until he attains majority, through his Next Friend, namely hisappellants, viz., defendants numbered 4 to 9 preferred an appeal. The High Court on 18 May, 1964 allowed the appeal in part and altered the declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs were next in the line of succession and that they were entitled to claim appointment as trustees, but such appointment could be only in a properly framed, viz., defendants numbered 4 to 9 preferred an appeal. The High Court on 18 May, 1964 allowed the appeal in part and altered the declaration to the effect that the plaintiffs were next in the line of succession and that they were entitled to claim appointment as trustees, but such appointment could be only in a properly framed

Reasoning:
This contention is unacceptable because a suit for a bare declaration of right without further relief for possession and other reliefs as the facts and circumstances would require is not92 of the Codeof Civil Procedure prohibits a plaintiff from obtaining relief of appointment of new trustees without the compliance with the provision of the said section of thetherefore, follows that even under clause (6) of the deed of trust it would be an appointment of new trustees. The trustees in the present case did not appoint new trustees. The plaintiffs, therefore, came to court. The reason why the plaintiffs sought the aid of the Court is the appointment of trustees. It is only because the other trustees did not appoint a new trustee that the plaintiffs took recourse to the institution of the suit for the appointment of trustees. Further, unless the defendants are removed there cannot be an appointment of new trustees. We are, therefore, of opion that prayer e in the present case, viz. the plaintiffs be appointed as trustees falls within the provisions of section92 of theas we held that the appointment of new trustees falls within section92 of thecan it yet be said that the plaintiffs will be entitled to a bare declaration of their right to be appointed. In the first place, it will be granting them the right to be appointed which itself is the foundation of appointment. If the appointment fails within the vice of section 92 any decision giving them the right "to be appointed will be prejudging the question and will be an impediment as far as the defendants are concerned in questioning the right of the plaintiffs to be appointed as trustees. Secondly, it is well settled that if any matter is directly prohibited, the same cannot be achieved indirectly. The appointment of new trustees is prohibited in the absence of the compliance with the provisions of section92 of theIf a right is granted to the plaintiffs to be appointed as trustees it will amount to an indirect way of giving the plaintiffs the relief of the right to be appointed. It will be particularly so because the right will be res-inclusa and will, therefore, be res judicata. The right will not be open to be questioned in subsequent proceedings. Thirdly, if the appointment of new trustees cannot be proceeded with in the absence of compliance with the provisions of section92 of theand when a suit has been instituted by the plaintiffs for the self-same reliefs after compliance with section92 of theit is all the more necessary that the entire question of appointment which presupposes as its foundation the right to be appointed should be gone into the newly instituted suit in 1965 to which reference is made earlier. Fourthly, a bare declaration of right will be within the mischief of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.We are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the High Court giving the plaintiffs the right to be appointed trustees should be set aside. It is made clear that contentions of the rival parties in the newly instituted suit are left open. The finding of the High Court and the: declaration granted by the High Court are both set aside. The suit is, therefore, dismissed.