Case: CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER CORPORATION LTD.  Vs. RAM GOPAL

3. UPPCL conducted selections for certain Class IV positions of Junior Meter Tester & Repairer, Mate and Meter Coolie/Chaukidar and declared results on 31.08.1978 through an Office Memorandum. The Respondent emerged as one of the successful candidates for being appointed as Meter Cooli/Chaukidar. Owing to subsequent discovery of certain irregularities in the selection process, UPPCL cancelled these selections on 03.11.1978 and consequently terminated services of all appointees on 07.11.19784. Shyam Behari Lal, another successful candidate whose services too had been terminated, promptly approached the jurisdictional High Court which allowed his writ petition on 26.10.1989 observing that no reasons had been assigned for the termination. UPPCL unsuccessfully filed an intra-court appeal, and thereafter approached this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 7123 of 1993 (U.P. State Electricity Board and Others v. Shyam Behari Lal). The said appeal was allowed vide order dated 22.11.1993 with an observation that the reason for termination was writ large on the order itself, namely, cancellation of result of selection of operating staff, and the matter was accordingly remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits5. Thereafter, a Division Bench of the High Court considered Shyam Behari Lals case and held that though the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on merits, however, considering the peculiar circumstances wherein Shyam Behari Lal had already served the UPPCL for 17 years, rendering him jobless might be too harsh a consequence. The relevant operative part of the order dated 30.05.1997 reads as follows:In view of what has been discussed above, is true that the petitioner is liable to be dismissed, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that the petitioners are continuing in service for last seventeen years, it would be too harsh to render him jobless at this stage. We would, therefore, only provide that the opposite parties may consider his continuance in service and take a suitable decision as may be thought appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case expeditiously6. After the initial round of litigation in which Shyam Behari Lal had obtained relief from the High Court in 1989, the present Respondent also filed WP No. 7897 of 1990 in July, 1990, impugning the order dated 07.11.1978 terminating his services. A learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad summarily allowed the Respondents writ petition on 05.04.2007 on the premise that the matter was squarely covered by the decision of the High Court dated 26.10.1989 in Shyam Behari Lals case7. The aggrieved UPPCL preferred Special Appeal No. 643 of 2007 which was dismissed by a Division Bench vide the impugned order dated 29.04.2016. Although the Court noted that the order of 1989 relied upon by the learned Single Judge had been set-aside by this Court and during fresh consideration of the matter a co-ordinate Bench had held Shyam Behari Lals case being devoid of any merit; yet it laid emphasis on the equitable considerations which were pressed into aid in Shyam Behari Lals case for his resultant continuation in service. The Division Bench, thus, dismissed UPPCLs appeal and held as follows:The case of the respondent is similarly situated as his appointment pertains to the same selection and no reason has been assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the respondent. Therefore, learned Single Judge has rightly extended the parity of the aforesaid judgment and order to the respondent while allowing the Writ Petition.

Reasoning:
10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length, we find that the impugned order of the High Court is legally untenable and cannot be sustained for at least three glaring reasonsi) Erroneous conclusion of termination order being non-speaking11. First, the Division Benchs finding that no reason has been assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the respondent, is vividly erroneous. This Court had earlier vide order dated 22.11.1993 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7123 of 1993 overruled the High Courts finding of non- reasoned termination in Shyam Behari Lals case and had held that the termination order was in fact a speaking order, with the reason for termination being writ large and clearly given. The High Courts findings thus undoubtedly fall foul of the observations made by this Court and the impugned order hence ought to be set-aside on this count aloneii) Lack of similarity between Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal12. Second, Quite palpably, the High Court has erred in concluding that the Respondents claim fell squarely within the four corners of its previous decision in Shyam Behari Lals case. The relied-upon judgment dated 30.05.1997 determined unequivocally that there was no merit in the writ petition and that Shyam Behari Lals claim was liable to be dismissed. It was only on account of pending litigation and interim directions of courts that Shyam Behari Lal had spent 17 years in employment of UPPCL. Paying heed to these equitable considerations, and not as a matter of any legal right, the High Court urged the employer to sympathetically consider his case for retention in employment. This conclusion of the High Court was not appealed by any party and has undoubtedly attained finality. Hence, it is clear in law that Shyam Behari Lals termination was legal, and that he had no right of continuation in service, let alone reinstatement as sought in the present case.13. At the outset, it is apparent that Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal share little similarity. Whereas the former had remained in service for over seventeen years (except a brief period between August to November in 1978) and had fought his case tooth and nail, the Respondent has not been in the employment of UPPCL since 1978. The fact-situation in Shyam Behari Lals case was unique and altogether different from that of Ram Gopal, and there arises no reason to seek or grant parity. Even otherwise, it is a settled canon of common law that equity acts in personam and not in rem. Hence, there could be no extension of parity between the case of Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal (Respondent)iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in 1990)15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 199018. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in-rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts.19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari Lal in service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in-rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the Respondents rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it apparent from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to approach the court-of-law in time on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he seems to be under the assumption that the termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and that he can agitate the same at his own sweet-will. Neither of these three assumptions are true, as elaborated by us earlier16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept 8over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced.