Case: Charan Singh And Anr Vs. Darshan Singh And Ors

2. About 70 years prior to the institution of the suit one Sant Baba Jaimal Singh used to reside end practice spiritual Sadhana at the place aforesaid. The residents of village Balsarai held him in great respect because of his high spiritual achievements and noble living. He got a Dharamsala built which came to be known as Gurdwara and according to the case of the plaintiffs Guru Granth Sahib was also installed there. The villagers gifted and dedicated 11 kanals 16 marlas of land out of village Shamilat to the Granth Sahib in the year 1897. Several persons succeeded as the Manager Trustee or Head of the Institution so established one after the other after the demise of Sant Baba Jaimal Singh - the appellant being the last one at the relevant time. The plaintiffs who filed the suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the devotees of the Gurdwara in the first instance had wanted to institute the suit after obtaining the consent of the Advocate - General of Punjab in accordance with Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code - hereinafter referred to as the Code. But they failed to obtain the consent of the Advocate - General. Later on the plaintiffs instituted the suit endeavouring to frame it in such a manner so as to take it out of the ambit of Section 92 of the Code. The grievance of the plaintiffs in the suit has been that the appellant was committing a breach of trust by not using the Dara in general and Darbar Sahib in particular for the purpose for which the same was dedicated. He had started denying the rights of the people to the Dara and Darbar Sahib and Guru Granth Sahib asserting that allowing them to do so depend upon his sweet-will and discretion. The plaintiffs, claiming a right in the institution for the Granth Sahib made a grievance that the appellant was interfering with their right and was not discharging his duties as he ought to do m accordance with the objects of the religious institution in question. In substance the relief claimed against the appellant is to prevent him from committing any breach of the trust and to direct him to perform his duties as a Manager or Trustee of the religious institution to carry out its objects.3. Several pleas were raised by the appellant in his written statement to resist the suit. Many of them were by way of preliminary objections to the maintainability of the suit. Tirlok Singh, appellant No. 2 and two others were added as defendants 2 to 4 in the suit at their instance. The Court of the Subordinate Judge, Second Class at Amritsar framed us many as 7 preliminary issues and decided most of them in favour of the plaintiffs. But the issue as to whether the suit was competent in the absence of the consent of the Advocate-General under Section 92 of the Code was decided against the plaintiffs. So the suit was dismissed. The facts that the institution was a Public Trust of a religious nature and that the suit had been filed by the plaintiffs in a representative capacity are no longer in dispute. One of the pleas taken by the appellant was that the suit was barred in view of the provisions of law contained in the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, Punjab Act No. 18 of 1961. But this plea was rejected by the Trial Court. From the dismissal of the suit plaintiffs went up in appeal. The first Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. They went up in a regular second appeal before the High Court. A learned Judge of the High Court dismissed the plaintiffs appeal on the ground that their suit was hit by Section 92 of the Code. One of the plaintiffs and two of the added defendants namely defendants 3 and 4 died during the pendency of the second appeal in the High Court. Their heirs were not substituted. The appellants plea that the appeal had abated as a whole was not accepted by the learned single Judge. He also held against him on the point of the suit being allegedly barred under Punjab Act 18 of 1961. On grant of leave under clause 10 of the Letters Patent the case was taken further - before the Letters Patent Bench. The learned Judges constituting the Bench have allowed the Letters Patent Appeal, remitted back the case to the Trial Court holding in favour of the respondents that the suit is not barred under Section 92 of the Code. The surviving two defendants have come up to this Court.

Reasoning:
6. It is well-settled that a suit of the nature envisaged by Section 92 (1) of the Code to obtain a decree for any one or more of the reliefs enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of the Code has to be filed by the Advocate-General or two or more persons having an interest in the Trust with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General. Sub-section (2) provides that save under certain circumstances "..................no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section." Out of the 3 conditions which are necessary to be fulfilled for the application of Section 92, two are in disputably present in this case viz. (1) the suit relates to a Public Charitable or Religious. Trust; (2) it is founded on an allegation of a breach of trust and the direction of the Court is required for administration of the trust. The debate and dispute between the parties centered round the requirement of the fulfillment of the third condition namely whether the reliefs claimed are those which are mentioned in sub-section (1) of S. 92 of the Code. A suit may be instituted under Section 92 (1) to obtain a decree -(a) removing any trustee;(b) appointing a new trustee;(c) vesting any property in a trustee;(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;(d) directing accounts and inquiries;(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;(f) authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged;(g) settling a scheme; or(h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.7. The High Court in the Letters Patent appeal has taken the view that the relief sought for in the suit does not fall under any of the clauses (a) to (h) of Section 92 of the Code. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed this view and submitted that the relief sought for falls under clause (e) or (g) or in any event under clause (h).In our judgment the relief sought for in this case does not strictly or squarely fall within clause (e) or (g) but is very much akin to either and hence is covered by the residuary clause (h).There were two parts of the said relief - one a declaration that the plaintiffs as Bhakats of the Satra were entitled to possess their own Basti and paddy lands and the other that they had a right to access to the use of the Satra for various religious purposes. Such a relief could not come under clause (h) because it was mainly concerned with the establishment of the rights of the plaintiffs in the lands as well as in the religious institution. In the plaint of the instant case the relief claimed is not primarily for the establishment of the right of the public to the religious institution. It recites the facts as to the right without mentioning any appreciable dispute concerning it, mainly alleges breach of duty on the part of the trustee and the plaintiffs seek the Courts aid against the trustee for forcing him to discharge his obligations by due performance of his duties. In our judgment therefore the Courts below were right in taking the view that the present suit was a suit for a decree under S. 92 of the Code and since it was not filed in conformity with the requirement Of the said provision of law it was not maintainable.The contrary view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal is not correct.