Case: Public Services Tribunal Bar Association Vs. State Of U.P.

3. The U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act. 1976 (for short "the Act") was promulgated relating to public servants of the State Government and the employees of the government undertaking, local bodies etc. having power to grant interim relief as well. Before the coming into force of the Act the public servants were approaching civil courts for redressal of their grievances arising out of their services matters by filing civil suit before the civil court of competent jurisdiction or by approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. After the coming into force of the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was taken away. The decision to have a separate service Tribunal was taken by the State Government after considering the increasing workload of the civil courts and the delay in disposal of the service matters. The purpose for creating the Tribunal has been indicated in the statement of objects of the Act, which reads asnumber of cases in the courts pertaining to the employment matters of the Government servants was constantly on the increase. This, besides increasing the workload in the courts also delayed considerably the disposal of such cases. Such litigation also involved money and time of government servants. I these circumstances, it was decided to establish Public Services Tribunals to deal with cases pertaining to employment matter of government servants and also of the employees of the local authorities and Government Corporations and Companies, so that the employees may get quick and inexpenses justice. It was also decided that after the establishment of the Tribunals such suits be barred from being file in the subordinate courts.Under the original Act the State Government constituted five Tribunals each comprising of an IAS Officer as a Chairman and a Judicial Officer of the rank of District Judge as a Judicial Member. Each Tribunal was vested with the jurisdiction over service matters of different department to the State Government. Under Section 4 of the Act any person who is or has been a public servant could file a claim petition in any manner relating to employment as such public servant if his employer had dealt with him in a manner which was not in conformity with any contract or provisions or Article 16 or Article 311 of the Constitution of India or with any rules or law having force under Article 309 or Article 313 of the Constitution. Under Section 5 (5) (j) of the original Act the Tribunals had the power to pass interim orders in respect of all matters within their jurisdiction including orders of dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, reversion and compulsory retirement.5. The Act was amended by the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. 1 of 1977). By the said amendment after sub-section (5) of Section 5, sub-section (5-A) were inserted. Under Section 5 (5-A) the Tribunal could pass an interim order in specific type of cases, but under Section 5 (5-B) the Tribunal was prohibited from passing interim orders in respect of the order made or purporting to be made by an employer for the suspension, dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, termination, reversion and compulsory retirement.6. In the year 1982 a proviso was added to Section 4 of the Act by the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act 2 of 1982) divesting the Tribunal of the jurisdiction to deal with petitions arising out of orders of transfer of a public servant.7. In 1985 the Administrative Tribunal Act (Act No. 13 of 1985) was enacted by the Parliament under Article 323-A of the Constitution providing a Central Administrative Tribunal with benches for adjudicating disputes in respect of recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed under the Central Government and its undertakings in connection with the affairs of the Union. Under Section 5(1) of the said Act. Tribunal was to consist of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Judicial and Administration Members. Under Section 6(1)(c) of the said Act a person who had held the post of Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under Central or State Government carrying a scale of pay which as not less than that of a Secretary to the Government of India could be appointed as the Chairman of the Tribunal. The original Act vested the entire power of appointment of Chairman. Vice-Chairman Administrative & Judicial Members of the Tribunal in the Central Government without providing for their appointments being made on consultation with the Chief Justice of India.8. Writ Petition No. 12437 of 1985, S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India and other connected cases were filed in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India challenging the validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 including Section 28 of the Act whereby the High Courts were divested of their jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution in respect of matters within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals, i.e., in respect of service matters pertaining to employees of the Central Government, State Government or any undertaking which were brought within the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. S.P. Sampath Kumars case and other connected cases were referred to and disposed of by a Constitution Bench of this Court and the same is reported in 1987 (1) SCC 124. By the said decision, this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act but directions were issued to the Central Government to amend the Act, inter alia, to delete the provisions providing for IAS Officers to be appointed as Chairman of the Tribunal and providing for appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members of the Tribunal in Consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Thereafter in 1987 by Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, section 6(1)(c) of the said Act were omitted and section 6 (7) was submitted providing for appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members of the Tribunal in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.9. In Krishna Sahai v. State of U.P. [1990 (2) SCC 673 ] and Rajendra Singh Yadav v. State of U.P. [1990 (2) SCC 763 ], this Court directed the State of U.P. to consider the feasibility of setting up an appropriate Tribunal under the Central Tribunal Act. 1985 in place of the Services Tribunals functioning at present, and in case the existing State Tribunals were continued. Thiswould be appropriate for the State of Uttar Pradesh to change its manning and a sufficient number of people qualified in Law should be on the Tribunal to ensure adequate dispensation of justice and to maintain judicial temper in the functioning of the Tribunal......In the later decision in Rajendra Singh Yadavs case (supra), this Court reiterated its earlier view, a few other observations to improve the functioning of the Services Tribunal were made. The said observations read ashave been told that the Services Tribunal mostly consists of Administrative Officers and the judicial element in the meaning part of the Tribunal is very small. As was pointed out by us in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, the disputes require judicial handling and the adjudication being essentially judicial in character it is necessary that an adequate number of judges of the appropriate level should man the Services Tribunals. This would create appropriate temper and generate the atmosphere suitable in an adjudicatory Tribunal and the institution as well would command the requisite confidence of the disputants. We have indicated in the connected matter that steps should be taken to replace the Services Tribunals by Tribunals under the Administrative Tribunals Act. 1985. That would give the Tribunal the necessary colour in terms of Article 323-A of the Constitution. As a consequences of setting up of such Tribunals, the jurisdiction of the High Court would be taken away and the Tribunals can with plenary powers function appropriately. The disputes which have arisen on account of the Services Tribunals hot having complete jurisdiction to deal with every situation arising before it would then not arise.We have pointed out that notice has been issued in a latter case for the States response to the question of Tribunals to be located at different parts of the State. State of Uttar Pradesh territorially is the second largest State in India but considering the population it comes first. Almost every part of the State is well advanced and service litigation in such setting is likely to arise everywhere. To locate the seat of the Tribunals at the State capital in such a situation is not appropriate. The accepted philosophy relevant to the question today is that justice should be taken to everyones doors. This, of course, is not a statement which should be taken literally but undoubtedly the redressal forum should be available near about so that litigation may be cheap and the forum of ventilating grievance may not be difficult to approach. Keeping that in view which is a legitimate consideration it would be appropriate for the State Government to consider, firstly, increase in the number of benches of the Tribunal and secondly, to located then not at the same station but at various sectors or depending upon the number of institution of disputes and pendency at the level of independent Commissionerate or by clubbing two or three of them together. This, of course, is a matter which would require further examination at the administrative level and, therefore, we express no opinion regarding location of such Tribunals although we are of the definite view the there should be Tribunals available in different part of the State and all the benches of the Tribunal should not be located at one place.Thereafter in 1992 the U.P. Public Services (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act (U.P. Act No. 7 of 1992) was promulgated amending drastically the provisions of the original Act. Only one Tribunal with separate division and single member benches replaced the several Tribunals constituted under the original Act. According to section 3(2) of the Amending Act the Tribunal was to consist of one Chairman, one Vice-Chairman, Judicial and Administrative Members. Under section 3(3)(c) of the Amen ding Act an IAS Officer could be appointed as Chairman of that Tribunal. Similarly, under section 3(4) (c) of the Amending Act an IAS officer could also be appointed as Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal. Another significant change brought about by the Amending Act was that vide Section 5-A of the Amending Act the Tribunal was vested with the powers of punishment for its contempt in the same manner as th High Court has under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Thereafter in 1993 Sri S. Venkat Ramani, an IAS officer was appointed by the State Government as Chairman of the Tribunal. Sanjai Kumar Srivastava filed writ petition No. 1619(MB) of 1993 before the Allahabad High Court challenging the appointment of Sri Venkat Ramani as Chairman of the Tribunal as well as challenging the constitutional validity of the provisions of section 5(3) (c) and 5(4)(c) of the Act as amended in 1992 whereby an IAS officer could be appointed as Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court by its judgment dated 26th May, 1995 struck down the provisions of Section 5 (3) (c) and 5(4) (c) of the Act and quashed the appointment of Sri Venkat Ramani an IAS officer as Chairman of the Tribunal.12. In 1994 the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) Ordinance (U.P. Ordinance No.23 of 1994) was promulgated whereby sub-section 5-C was inserted to section 5 of the Act divesting the Tribunal from passing any interim order in respect of an adverse entry awarded to a public servant and providing that all interim orders passed in respect of any such adverse entry before the promulgation of the Ordinance would stand vacated. This Ordinance in due course of time lapsed and thereafter in the year 1995 again the same Ordinance was promulgated by U.P. Ordinance No.8 of 1995 introducing the same amendments as were in U.P. Ordinance No.23 of 1994. This Ordinance also lapsed in due course of time and thereafter on 25th August. 1995 the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) (Amendment) (Second) Ordinance, 1995 (U.P. Ordinance No.32 of 1995) was promulgated by the Government re-promulgating U.P. Ordinance No.8 of 1995 which had lapsed on expiry of the period specified in Article 213(2) of the Constitution.13. In February, 1997 a former Judge of the Allahabad High Court, Justice K.L. Sharma (retd.) was appointed as the Chairman of the Tribunal. Justice Sharma retired as Chairman of the Tribunal on 10th July, 1999.14. On 10th of September, 1999 U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Amendment Ordinance, 1999 (U.P. Ordinance No.17 of 1999) was promulgated by the Governor of U.P. and published vide notification dated 9th September, 1999. By Ordinance No. 17 of 1999 Section 4(1) was substituted in place of section 4 of the Act, further Section (5-C) was added to Section 5. Writ Petition No.l 4285 (MB) of 1999 was filed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Bar Association. The constitutional validity of newly added Section 4(1), sub-section (5-C) and Section 5(5-B) was challenged being ultra vires the Constitution. A further prayer was made that a writ in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the State Government to modify the Act strictly in conformity with the Central Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 as per the law laid down by this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumars case (supra) and L. Chandra, Kumar v. Union of India [1997 (3) SCC 261 ]. Lastly it was prayed that the U.P. Public Services Tribunal be given comprehensive powers to grant interim relief to make the Tribunal more efficient and effective. Subsequently the impugned U.P. Ordinance No. 17 of 1999 was replaced by U.P. Act No. 5 of 2000. Thereafter an application for amendment of the writ petition challenging the U.P. Act No. 5 of 2000 was moved which was allowed.15. Sri Satish Chand Shukla, a practising advocate of Allahabad High Court filed writ petition No. 5103 (MB) of 1999 challenging the constitutional validity of the U.P. Public Service (Tribunal) Act, 1976 on the ground that the same was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature.16. Shri Afzal Ahmad Siddiqui, a practising advocate filed writ petition No. 748 (MB) of 1999 challenging the constitutional validity of Section 3(5), (7) and (8) of the Act with a prayer to annual the above sections in order to remove the infirmities of the Act as pointed out by this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumars case (supra). The same advocate Shri Afzal Ahmad Siddiqui filed another writ petition No. 1636 (MB) of 1999 challenging the constitutional validity of the U.P. Ordinance No. 17 of 1999. After the coming into force of the U.P. Act No. 5 of 2000 replacing the Ordinance No.17 of 1999 Shri Afzal Ahmad Siddiqui filed writ petition No. 871 (MB) of 2000 challenging the provisions of the U.P. Act No.5 of 2000. Relief claimed in writ petition No. 871 (MB) of 2000 was the same as had been claimed in writ petition Nos. 748 (MB) of 1999 and 1636 (MB) of 1999 filed by him in which he had challenged the provisions of the Ordinance.17. The provisions of the Act which are under challenge and other relevant provisions are reproduced below for3. Constitution of the Tribunal (1) As soon as may be after the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 1992, the State Government shall, by notification, establish a Tribunal to be called the State Public Services Tribunal.(2) The Tribunal shall consist of a Chairman a Vice Chairman (Judicial), A Vice-Chairman(Administrative) and such number of other Judicial and Administrative Members not less that five in each category, as may be determinated by the State Government.(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Chairman unless he-(a) has been a Judge of a High Court, or(b) has, for at least two years held the post of Vice-Chairman, or(c) has been a member of the Indian Administrative Service who has held the post of a Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or the State Government equivalent thereto, and has adequate experience in dispensation of justice.(4). A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Vice-Chairman (Judicial) unlesshas held the post of District Judge or any other post equivalent thereto for at least five years; or(b) has, for at least two years, held the post of a Judicial Member.(4-A) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as Vice-Chairman(Administrative) unless the(a) has, for at least two years, held the post of an Administrative Member; or(b) has, for at least two years held the post of Additional Secretary to the Government of India or any other post under the Central or a State Government carrying a scale of pay which is not less than that of an Additional Secretary to the Government of India and has, in the opinion of the State Government, adequate experience in dispensation of Justice.(5) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judicial Member, unless he has held the post of District Judge, or any other post equivalent thereto.(6) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as an Administrative Member, unless he has field, or has been eligible to hold, the post of Commissioner of a Division or Joint Secretary to the Government of India and has in the opinion of the State Government, adequate experience in dispensation ofThe Chairman, Vice-Chairman and every other member shall be appointed by the State Government after consultation with the Chief Justice for which proposal will be initiated by the State Government:Provided that no person shall assume the Office of Chairman, Vice-Chairman or other member, as the case may be, unless he has resigned or retired from, as the case may be, the Judgeship of the High Court, or the Indian Administrative Service or the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service or any other service in which he was serving except the service as Vice-Chairman or Member.Section 4. Reference of claim to Tribunal - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a person who is or has been a public servant and is aggrieved by an order pertaining to a service matter within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, may make a reference of claim to the Tribunal for the redressal of hisFor the purpose of this sub-section "order" means an order made by the State Government or a local authority or any other Corporation or company referred to in clause (b) of Section 2 or by an officer, committee or other body or agency of the State Government or such local authority or Corporation or company:Provided that no reference shall, subject to the terms of any contract, be made in respect of a claim arising out of the transfer of a public servant.Section 5. Powers and procedure of the Tribunal - (1)(a) The Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), or the rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act 1 of 1872), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice, and subject to the provisions of this section and of any rules made under Section 7, the Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure (including the fixing of places and times of its sittings and deciding whether to sit in public or private):Provided that where, in respect of the subject- matter of a reference, a competent court has already passed a decree or order or issued a writ or direction, and such decree, order, writ of direction has become final, the principle or res judicata shall apply.Section (5-B) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing sub-sections, the Tribunal shall have no power to make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) in respect of an order made or purporting to be made by an employer for the suspension, dismissal, removal reduction in rank termination, compulsory, retirement or reversion of a public servant, and every interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner), in respect of such matter, which was made by a Tribunal before the date of commencement of this sub-section and which if in force on that day, shall stand vacated.Section (5-C) Notwithstanding anything in the forgoing sub-sections, the Tribunal shall have no power to make an interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) in respect of an adverse entry made by an employer against a public servant, and every interim order (whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner) in respect of an adverse entry, which was made by a Tribunal before the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Tribunal (Amendment) Act, 2000 and which is in force on the date of such commencement shall stand vacated.The validity of Section 4(1) inserted by Act No. 5 of 2000 has been challenged on the ground that a public servant could not approach the Tribunal for in action on the part of the authorities in respect of his legal rights. If there was inaction on the part of the employer a public servant had no remedy before the Tribunal and further the incumbent could not approach the Civil Court for the reason that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court had already been barred under Section 6 of the Act. That by the amendments made in the impugned Act the powers of the Tribunal regarding judicial review of administrative in-action deprives the litigants of their valuable right. Divesting of power of judicial review too was ultra vires to the Constitution of India. Judicial review being basic and essential feature of the Constitution as held by this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India reported in 1980 6 SCC 625. The object of the Act was not to leave a public servant without any remedy. It was further averred that initially there were provisions in the Act conferring powers upon the Tribunal to grant interim relief. However, in due course of time on one pretext or the other the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to grant interim reliefs has gradually been taken away. Firstly embargo was put with respect to grant of interim relief in certain matters. Subsequently the jurisdiction with respect to transfer was taken away and lastly the power to make interim order in respect of an adverse entry made by an employer against a public servant has been taken away. By the impugned action of the respondents the whole concept of the aims and objects of the Act have been diluted. If the Tribunal is not conferred with full powers of the court and the authority to grant effective relief to the public servants then it cannot be the real substitute of the courts. If the Tribunal is not empowered to deal with every situation with respect to the services of the public servants then it will loose its identity. If the rule of law is to prevail the Tribunal has to play effective role in administration of justice and in the process the Tribunal should have all powers as are vested in courts. Challenging the later part of sub-section (c) to the effect that "every order made whether by way of injunction or stay or any other manner in respect of an adverse entry which was made by the Tribunal before the date this sub-section came into force and which was in force on that date shall stand vacated", it was contended that the interim orders granted by the Tribunal before the coming into force of section (5-C) with retrospective effect could not be nullified by exercise of legislative power and only the provisions which are the basis of the judicial orders could be amended. That the complete ouster of jurisdiction in the matter of grant of interim relief from the Tribunal in specified cases was ultra vires to the Constitution as there was no judicial remedy open for the incumbent. For example in the matter of suspension the Tribunal does not have the power to grant any interim relief whereas the order many suffer from legal infirmity, error of jurisdiction, mala fide and arbitrary exercise of power. In view of these circumstances it was submitted that public servant does not have any judicial and continues under suspension during the period of disciplinary proceedings. Similarly, it was submitted that right of livelihood is a fundamental right of a government servant and by illegal termination of his service the said right is infringed. The order of termination on the face of it may be without jurisdiction and bad in law but since the Tribunal did not have the power to grant interim relief such incumbent would go without relief till the matter is finally heard and decided. It takes considerably long period before the dispute is finally decided and during has period the incumbent faces financial and mental torture. Another submission made was that judgment and orders of the Tribunal before the promulgation of the amended Act could be executed after issuance of a certificate by the Tribunal to the principal civil court under sub-section (7) of Section 5 of the Act. However, by the amendment made in the impugned Act by U.P. Act No. 7 of 1992, sub-section (7) of Section 5 was submitted by the followingThe order of the Tribunal finally disposing of a reference shall be executed in the same manner in which any final order of the State Government or other authority or office or other person competent to pass such order under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances in any appeal preferred or representation made by the claimant in connection with any matter relating to his employment to which the reference relates would have been executed.In view of the aforesaid substituted sub-section (7) of Section 5, the orders and judgment of the Public Services Tribunal cannot be executed as a decree of civil court and they are executable only as orders of the State Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such orders under relevant service rules. It was also contended that powers and functions of the Tribunal as they stand today under the Act are not in consonance with the dictum of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumars case (supra) and L. Chandra Kumars case (supra).20. The validity of Section 3 and especially an appointment of an Administrative Member as Vice-Chairman of the Tribunal was challenged on the ground that the same was contrary to the decision of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumars case (supra). That an IAS officer could not be made Vice-Chairman because in the absence of a Chairman or Vice Chairman (Judicial), a Vice-Chairman (Administration) could officiate as a Chairman which would be contrary to be law laid down by this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumars case (supra).21. In the written statements filed by the respondents a preliminary objection was taken regarding the maintainability of the writ petition challenging the vires of the Act by the Tribunal Bar Association which was not an aggrieved party. On merit it was submitted that the amendments brought out in the Act are in consonance with the directions issued by this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumars case (supra) and various other judgments order rendered by the Allahabad High Court. The amendments have been made to bring the U.P. Public Services (Tribunal) Act, 1976 at par with the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. That the appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman (Judicial) as well as Vice-Chairman (Administration) as well as Members has now to be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. That it has been done in pursuance to the directions issued by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 1619(MB) of 1993 Sanjay Kumar Srivastava vs. State of U.P. and other by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court wherein the provisions of sub-section 3(c) and 4(c) of Section 3 of the unamended Act were struck down. These sub-sections (as they stood on the statute book) provided that an IAS officer could be appointed as Chairman. Now the appointment of the Chairman, the two Vice-Chairman and Members has to be made by the State Government after effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court on the basis of parameters indicated in Sanjai Kumar Srivastavas case (supra) of the Allahabad High Court. That the State Legislature was competent to enact the U.P. Public Service (Tribunal) Act as well as to carry out the amendments in it in exercise of it legislative power.22. In regard to challenge of sub-section (1) of Section 4 that only an order passed by the authority could be challenged and not the in-action on the part of the government to pass an order, it was submitted that order also would mean omission and inaction on the part of the authority concerned for which a public servant could move the Tribunal. Advocate General who had appeared before the High Court on behalf of the State very fairly stated that the inaction or omission to Act could also be challenge before the Tribunal. Since no explanation/clarification had come in the Act, the High Courtit is certain that there is no remedy provided in the Act to the Government employee to approach the Services Tribunal as far as non-action of the State Government is concerned. Therefore we are of the considered opinion that now the remedy open to such incumbent is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It could be a blessing in disguise to such employees as this Court can even grant interim relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.After detailed examination of the various submissions made before it, the High Court the constitutional validity of the Act as well as the subsequent amendments made therein. In the concluding portions the High Court culled out the conclusions asThe composition of the Tribunal as provided by the impugned Act is constitutional and valid.(ii) The State Legislature is competent to enact, revalidate on re-enact any provisions of law.(iii) The impugned Act (U.P. Act No.5 of 2000) does not suffer from any colourable exercise of power.(iv) The impugned Act is not inconsistent with the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution.(v) By issuance of the impugned Act there has neither been violation of fundamental rights nor violation of the principles of basic structure of the Constitution.(vi) For non-action on the part of State Government in relation to service matters of the State employees the remedy open is only under Article 226 of the Constitution of India."

Reasoning:
32. We agree with the view taken by the High Court that unless a clarification is made by the Legislature in the Act clarifying that an order would include an "omission" or "inaction" on the part of the authority, the "inaction" on the part of the authority can be challenged in High Court by filing the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It cannot be said that the public servant is left without a remedy to challenge any omission or inaction on the part of the authority. Inaction by itself is an independent cause of action and the High Court can effectively deal with the same.Transfer is an incident of service and is made in administrative exigencies. Normally it is not to be interfered with by the courts. This Court consistently has been taken a view that orders of transfer should not be interfered with except in rare cases where the transfer has been made in a vindictive manner.The Principal Act was promulgated in 1976 for adjudication of the disputes pertaining to employment matters of public servants of the State Government and the employees of the Government Corporations and Companies, local authorities etc. and the jurisdiction of the civil courts for redressal of their grievances was taken away. It was set up with five Tribunals and each Tribunal was independent and consisted of one Judicial member and one administrative member. Out of them one member was the Chairman. Constitution of the Tribunal was challenged in the High Court successfully. Consequently, the Original Act was amended by U.P. Act No. 7 of 1992. Sub-sections 3 (1), (2), (3) and (6) were amended. The Tribunal was constituted of one Chairman, a Vice Chairman at least five Judicial Members and Five Administrative Members which were to function at different Benches consisting of a Single Member or two members for the disposal of such references of claims and other matters as ay be specified by the Chairman. Under the Act 7 of 1992 an Administrative Member could be appointed as Chairman and in fact Shri Venkatramani, IAS was appointed as the Chairman. This Act was challenged by filing a writ petition in Sanjai Kumar Srivastava in the High Court. It was contended that administrative member could not become a Chairman and the appointment of Chairman. Vice Chairman and members could not be made without consulting the Chief Justice of the State. This objection was upheld and accordingly Section 3(3)(c) and Section 3(4)(c) of the Act were struck down. State was permitted to make suitable amendments to bring about suitable amendments in the Act. It was also directed that in future all appointments to the Tribunal be made only after effective consultation with the Chief Justice of the State. Special Leave Petition filed against the judgment was dismissed by this Court. The Government thereafter deleted the offending clauses of Section 3(3)(c) and Section 3(4)(c) from the Act. Thereafter, Ordinance No. 17 of 1999 was promulgated which culminating in the passing of Act 5 of 2000. Section 3(2) of the Principal At was substituted for the words "a Vice-Chairman", the words "A vice-Chairman (Judicial) a Vice-Chairman (Administrative)". From now onwards there are two Vice Chairmen instead of one Chairman. In Section 3(4)(b) the words "or an Administrative" were deleted. Sub-section (4-A) was inserted which prescribed the qualification for appointment as Vice-Chairman (Administrative). Sub-section (4-A)(a) was the same as was earlier in Sub-section 4(b) by deleting the words "or an Administrative". The new Sub-section (4-A) (b) was an addition now added in 1999. This is in pari materia of Section 6 (2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 except the words. "Additional Secretary" instead of "Secretary" to the Government of India. Sub-Section (4-A) (b) is the same as the original Section 3(6) except adding the words as"has adequate experience", the words "has, in the opinion of the State Government, adequate experience" have beento Sub-Section (4-A) (b) of Section 3 that the same is not in conformity with the judgment in Sanjai Kumar Srivastava case is unfounded because this sub-section is in pari materia with Section 6(2)(b) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Sub-Section (7) in Section 3 was also substituted by adding the words "State Government after consultation with the Chief Justice for which proposal will be initiated by the State Government." In other words, the power of appointments with the State Government has been retained but the same has to be exercised in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as directed by the High Court in Sanjai Kumar Srivastava case.44. Appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman (Judicial) and (Administrative) and members has now to be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. Submission that the amendment carried out in Section 3 regarding appo9intment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) as well as (Administrative) and members is not in conformity with the corresponding provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has no substance.Appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman (Judicial) and (Administrative) and members has now to be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. Submission that the amendment carried out in Section 3 regarding appo9intment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen (Judicial) as well as (Administrative) and members is not in conformity with the corresponding provisions of Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has nofind that the State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned provisions. Further that the provisions enacted are not arbitrary and therefore not violative of Articles 14, 16 or any other provisions of the Constitution. They are not against the basic structure of the Constitution of India either.