Case: Ramnikal Pitambardas Mehta Vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth

2. The facts leading to the appeal, in short, are that the appellant is a tenant of the ground-floor of a house owned by the respondent. The respondent sued for the ejectment of the appellant on the ground that he required the entire house including the portion occupied by appellant, for his residential purpose. He further stated in the plaintwhole suit bungalow is very old-built about 75 years ago and at present its different parts are likely to give way and collapse. Before sometime, a little portion of an upper balcony had collapsed. In the circumstances, on finding it unsafe to stay in it without making additions, alterations and necessary changes. I, the plaintiff, am obliged to wait till I get possession of the whole bungalow.I, the plaintiff, have got the upper portion of the said suit bungalow vacated at present and only after the whole bungalow got overhauled as stated in para above. I, the plaintiff can utilize it for my personal use.The appellant contested the suit on various grounds including the ones that the respondent did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and that he did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for his occupation and that he did not reasonably and bona fide require the premises for carrying out repairs.4. The trial Court found that the respondent bona fide the premises for his occupation. It repelled the contention of the appellant that the provisions of S. 13(1) (g) would not be applicable when the landlord did not wish to occupy the premises as such but intended to occupy it after carrying out major repairs, and decreed the respondents suit for ejectment.5. The defendant went up in appeal. It was dismissed. The appellate Court agreed with the views of the trial Court. The defendant then presented a revision petition to the High Court. It was rejected. It is against this order that he has filed this appeal.

Reasoning:
12. We agree with the Curt below that the respondents case falls under cl. (g) when he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation. The mere fact that he intends to make alterations in the house either on account of his sweet will or on account of absolute necessity in view of the condition of the house, does not affect the question of his requiring the house bona fide and reasonably for his occupation, when he has proved his need for occupying the house. There is no such prohibition either in the language of cl. (g) or in any other provision of the Act to the effect that the landlord must occupy the house for residence without making any alterations in it. There could not be any logical reason for such a prohibition. Under ordinary law, the landlord is entitled to eject his tenant whenever he likes, after following certain procedure except in cases where he has contracted not to eject him before the happening of a certain event. The Act restricts that general right of the landlord in the special circumstances prevailing in regard to the availability of accommodation and the incidental abuse of those circumstances by landlords in demanding unjustifiably high rents.We are therefore of opinion that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from tenant in view of the provisions of sub-cl. (g) of Section 13 (1) irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the premises without making any alteration to them or after making the necessary alteration.16. The provisions of cl. (hh) cannot possibly apply to the case whether a landlord reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation even if he had to demolish premises and to erect a new building on them. The provisions of cl. (hh) apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation but requires them for erecting a new building which is to be let out to tenants. This is clear from the provisions of sub-s. (3A) which provides that a landlord has to give certain undertaking before a decree for eviction can be passed on the ground specified in cl. (hh). He has to undertake that the new building will have not less than two times the number of residential tenements and not less than two times the floor area contained in the premises sought to be demolished, that the work of demolishing the premises shall be commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed not later than three months from the date he recovers possession of the entire premises and that the work of erection of the new building shall be completed by him not later than fifteen months from the said date. These undertakings thus provide for a time schedule for the new building to come up into existence and ensure atleast the doubling of the residential tenements, i. e. rooms or groups of rooms rented or offered for rent as a unit void S. 5 (12) of the Act.17. Such undertakings would be unnecessary if the landlord seeks to eject the tenant from the premises in order to occupy the premises himself after making the necessary alterations to suit his convenience. Further, Section 17A provides for the ejected tenants reoccupying the premises in case the landlord does not start the work of demolition within the period specified in sub-s. (3A). Section 17B provides for the ejected tenant to notify to the landlord within six months from the date on which he delivered vacant possession of the premises of his intention to occupy a tenement in the new building on its completion on the conditions specified in the section. Section 17 C provides that the landlord would intimate to the tenant the date when the new building would be complete and that the tenant would be entitled to occupy the tenement on that date. These provisions clearly establish that the provisions of cl. (hh) apply when the landlord desires to demolish the premises for the purpose of ejecting a new building on the premises for being let to tenants.18. We may mention that the provisions of clauses similar to cls. (g) and (hh) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 13 of the Act have been construed in this way in Krishna Das v. Bidhan Chandra, AIR 1959 Cal 181  , McKenna v. Porter Motors Ltd., 1956 AC 688   and Bettys Cafes Ltd. v. Phillips Furnishing Stores Ltd., 1959 AC 20.In Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desais case, Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962 D/- 18-1-1963 (SC) this Court said in connection with the provisions of S. 17 (1) of the Actis, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalfof the premises in cl. (g) does not necessarily refer to occupation as residence. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. In a case like the present, if the plaintiffs on getting possession start their work of demolition within the prescribed period, they would have occupied the premises in order to erect a building fit for their occupation.is clear from this section that the trial Court had full jurisdiction to entertain the suit for ejectment. That being so, it had jurisdiction to interpret whether cl. (g) of S. 13(1) would apply to the present case. The appellate Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The High Court could not, therefore, interfere in revision with the decision of the appellate Court, even if it had gone wrong, on facts or law, in the exercise of it jurisdiction. It follows that the revision application had to be dismissed by the High Court and that this appeal too must fail.8. Since the merits of the case have been argued fully before us, we express our opinion on the law point urged beforeneed not express an opinion on this point, as, for reasons to be mentioned later, the case falls under cl. (g) and not under cl. (hh) of S. 13 (1) of theis therefore no reason why restrictions not mentioned in the grounds be read into them. We do not therefore agree with the contention that cl. (g) will apply only when the landlord bona fide needs to occupy the premises without making any alteration in them i. e. to occupy the identical building which the tenant occupies. There is no jurisdiction to give such a narrow construction either to the word premises or to the word occupies which have been construed by this Court in Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desai v. Bai Vijkor, Civil Appeal No. 804 of 1962 D/referred to later.