Case: S.A.I.L.  Vs. National Union Water Front Workers&amp;Ors

2. In Food Corporation of India, Bombay and others v. TransportDock Workers Union and others, 1999(7) SCC 59, aBench of this Court, having noticed the conflict of opinion between different Benches including twoBenches of this Court on the interpretation of the expression "appropriate Government" in Section 2(1)(a) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (for short, `the CLRA Act) and in Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, `the I.D. Act) and having regard to the importance of the question of automatic absorption of the contract labour in the establishment of the principal employer as a consequence of an abolition notification issued under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, referred these cases to a larger Bench. The other cases were tagged with the said case as the same questions arise in them also. That is how these cases have come up before us.To comprehend the controversy in these cases, it will suffice to refer to the facts in Civil Appeal Nos.@ SLP Nos.of 1998 which are preferred from the judgment and order of the Calcutta High Court in W.P. No. 1733 of 1994 and FMAT No. 1460 of 1994 dated July 3, 1998. The appellant, a Central Government Company and its branch manager, are engaged in the manufacture and sale of various types of iron and steel materials in its plants located in various States of India. The business of the appellants includes import and export of several products andthrough Central Marketing Organisation, a marketing unit of the appellant, having network of branches in different parts of India. The work of handing the goods in the stockyards of the appellants, was being entrusted to contractors after calling for tenders in that behalf. The Government of West Bengal issued notification dated July 15, 1989 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act (referred to in this judgment as `the prohibition notification) prohibiting the employment of contract labour in four specified stockyards of the appellants at Calcutta. On the representation of the appellants, the Government of West Bengal kept in abeyance the said notification initially for a period of six months by notification dated August 28, 1989 and thereafter extended that period from time to time. It appears that the State Government did not, however, extend the period beyond August 31, 1994.ion representing the cause of 353 contract labourers filed Writ Petition No. 10108/89 in the Calcutta High Court seeking a direction to the appellants to absorb the contract labour in their regular establishment in view of the prohibition notification of the State Government dated July 15, 1989 and further praying that the notification dated August 28, 1989, keeping the prohibition notification in abeyance, be quashed. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition, set aside the notification dated August 28, 1989 and all subsequent notifications extending the period and directed that the contract labour be absorbed and regularised from the date of prohibition notificationJuly 15, 1989within six months from the date of the judgment i.e., April 25, 1994.The appellants adopted aattack strategy. Assailing the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, they filed writ appeal (FMAT No. 1460 of 1994) and challenging the prohibition notification ofJuly 15, 19896. In these appeals, the Food Corporation of India is the appellant. Having regard to theunamended definition of theappropriate Government which was in force till 28.1.1986, the appropriate Government within the meaning of CLRA Act was the Government of the State in which the concerned establishment of FCI was situated. With effect from 28.1.1986, the amended definition of that expression under the CLRA Act came into force. Consequently, the definition of that expression as given in the Industrial Disputes Act would apply for purposes of the CLRA Act also. FCI is included within the definition of appropriate Government in(1) of clause (a) of the Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It follows that for any establishment of FCI for the purposes of the CLRA Act, the appropriate Government will be the Central Government.In these appeals, prohibition notification was issued on March 26, 1991 under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in the concerned establishment in the process, operation or work of handling of foodgrains including loading and unloading from any means of transport, storing and stocking. The respondents claimed absorption of contract labour in the concerned establishment of the appellant. A Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay following the judgment of this Court in Air Indias case (supra) directed the appellant to absorb the contract labour engaged in the depots of the appellant in Jalgaon, Srirampur and Ahmednagar (Khedgaon). Inasmuch we haveNo. 6029/2001 @ SLP(C) No.No. 6023/2001 @ SLP (C) No.This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated 189.8.1999 of the High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench, Ranchi, in L.P.A. No. 214/99 (R). The Division Bench declined to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.The case arose out of the award dated October 3, 1996 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 directing the appellant to absorbthe contract labour.The Tribunal, on appreciation of the evidence, found that the contract labourers were not regularised to deprive them from the due wages and other benefits on par with the regular employees under sham paper work by virtue of the same transaction. It was also pointed out that the workmen in the other coal washery were regularised. The claim of the appellant that the washery was given to the purchaser was not accepted as being a sham transaction to camouflage the real facts. The learned Single Judge on consideration of the entire material confirmed the award and the Division Bench declined to interfere in the LPA.

Reasoning:
23. It is aproposition of law that the function of the Court is to interpret the Statute to ascertain the intent of theWhere the language of the Statute is clear and explicit the Court must give effect to it because in that case words of the Statute unequivocally speak the intention of the legislature. This rule of literal interpretation has to be adhred to and a provision in the Statute has to be understood in its ordinary natural sense unless the Court finds that the provision sought to be interpreted is vague or obscurely worded in which event the other principles of interpretation may be called in aid. A plain reading of the said phrase, under interpretation, shows that it is lucid and clear. There is no obscurity, no ambiguity and no abstruseness. Therefore the words used therein must be construed in their natural ordinary meaning as commonly understood.We are afraid we cannot accept the contention that in construing that expression or for that matter any of the provisions of the CLRA Act, the principle of literal interpretation has to be discarded as it represents common law approach applicable only to private law field and has no relevance when tested on the anvil of Article 14, and instead the principle of public law interpretation should be adopted. To accept that contention, in our view, would amount to abandoning a straight route and of treaded road in an attempt to create a pathway in a wildness which can only leadhave not come across any principles of public law interpretation as opposed to private law interpretation for interpreting a statute either in any authority of this Court or any other Court brought to our notice.Now, going back to the definition of the said expression, it combines three alternatives, viz., (a) any industry carried on by the Central Government; (b) any industry carried on under the authority of the Central Government; and (c) any industry carried on by a railway company. Alternatives (a) and (c) indicate cases of any industry carried on directly by the Central Government or a railway company. They are too clear to admit of any polemic. In regard to alternative (b), surely, an industry being carried on under the authority of the Central Government cannot be equated with any industry carried on by the Central Government itself. This leaves us to construe the words "under the authority of the Central Government". The key word in them is `authority.We wish to clear the air that the principle, while discharging public functions and duties the Govt. Companies/Corporations/Societies which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government must be subjected to the same limitations in the field of public lawconstitutional or administrative lawas the Government itself, does not lead to the inference that they become agents of the Centre/State Government for all purposes so as to bind such Government for all their acts, liabilities and obligations under various Central and/or State Acts or under private law.From the above discussion, it follows that the fact of being instrumentality of a Central/State Government or being `State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution cannot be determinative of the question as to whether an industry carried on by a Company/Corporation or an instrumentality of the Government is by or under the authority of the Central Government for the purpose of or within the meaning of the definition of `appropriate Government in the CLRAthe definition of `establishment in CLRA Act takes in its fold purely private undertakings which cannot be brought within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. In such a case how is `appropriate Government determined for the purposes of CLRA Act or Industrial Disputes Act ? In our view, the test which is determinative is whether the industry carried on by the establishment in question is under the authority of the Central Government ? Obviously, there cannot be one test for one part of definition of `establishment and another test for another part. Thus, it is clear that the criterion is whether an undertaking/instrumentality of Government is carrying on an industry under the authority of the Central Government and not whether the undertaking is instrumentality or agency of the Government for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution, be it of Central Government or State Government.We have held above that in the case of a Central Government company/undertaking, an instrumentality of the Government, carrying on an industry, the criteria to determine whether the Central Government is the appropriate Government within the meaning of the CLRA Act, is that the industry must be carried only or under the authority of the Central Government and not that the company/undertaking is an instrumentality or an agency of the Central Government for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution; such an authority may be conferred either by a statute or by virtue of relationship of principal and agent or delegation of power and this fact has to be ascertained on the facts and in the circumstances of each case. In view of this conclusion, with due respect, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned Judges on interpretation of the expression "appropriate Government" in Air Indias case (supra). Point No. 1 is answeredglance through the said notification, makes it manifest that with effect from March 1, 1977, it prohibits employment of contract labour for sweeping, cleaning, dusting and watching of building owned or occupied by establishment in respect of which the appropriate Government under the said Act is the Central Government. This clearly indicates that the Central Government had not adverted to any of the essentials, referred to above, except the requirement of consultation with the Central Advisory Board. Consideration of the factors mentioned above has to be in respect of each establishment, whether individually or collectively, in respect of which notification under(1) of Section 10 is proposed to be issued. The impugned notification apart from being an omnibus notification does not reveal compliance of(2) of Section 10. This is ex facie contrary to the postulates of Section 10 of the Act. Besides it also exhibitsof mind by the Central Government. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the said impugned notification dated December 9, 1976 issued by the Centralour view, the following consequences follow on issuing a notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Actcontract labour working the concerned establishment at the time of issue of notification will cease to function; (2) the contract of principal employer with the contractor in regard to the contract labour comes to an end; (3) no contract labour can be employed by the principal employer in any process, operation or other work in the establishment to which the notification relates at any time thereafter; (4) the contract labour is not rendered unemployed as is generally assumed but continues in the employment of the contractors as the notification does not sever the relationship of master and servant between the contractor and the contract labour; (5) the contractor can utilise the services of the contract labour in any other establishment in respect of which no notification Section 10(1) has been issued where all the benefits under the CLRA Act which were being enjoyed by it, will be available; (6) if a contractor intends to retrench his contract labour he can do so only in conformity with the provisions of the I.D. Act.We have given punctilious reading to the report of the Joint Committee of the Parliament on the said Bill. Neither in the main report nor in the dissent note, do we find a reference to the automatic absorption of9. We have already referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act elsewhere in this judgment which also does not allude to the concept of automatic absorption of the contract labour on issuance of notification for prohibition of employment of2. In the light of the above discussion we are unable to perceive in Section 10 any implicit requirement of automatic absorption of contract labour bythe principal employer in theconcerned establishment on issuance of notification by the appropriate Government under Section 10(1) prohibiting employment of contract labour in a given establishment.Much emphasis is laid on the judgment of this Court in The Standard Vacuums case (supra) in support of the contention that the Courts directed absorption of contract labour as a consequence of prohibition of employment of contract labour. We have pointed out above that a thoughtful reading of the said judgment would disclose that no such principle has been laid down therein. On the contrary, the Court having affirmed the direction prohibiting employment of contract labour extended the date from which the prohibition was to take effect so as to permit the existing contractor to continue for the rest of the period of the contract. Thus it is clear that before the enactment of the CLRA Act the industrial adjudicators/courts did direct abolition of contract labour system but did not order absorption of contract labour by the principal employer on such abolition of the contract labour system.In Vegoilss case (supra), the question before this Court was had the Industrial Tribunal jurisdiction to issue direction to the establishment to abolish contract labour with effect from the date after coming into force of the CLRA Act ? The appellant company had engaged contract labour is seeds godown and solvent extraction plants in its factory. The appellant took the plea that the type of work was intermittent and sporadic for which the contract labour was both efficient and economic. On the other hand, the union of the workmen submitted that the work was continuous and perennial in nature and that in similar companies the practice was to have permanent workmen; it claimed that the contract labour system be abolished and the contract labour be absorbed as regular employees in the concerned establishment of the appellant. The Tribunal having found that the work for which the contract labour was engaged was closely connected with the main industry carried on by the appellant and that the work was also of perennial character, directed abolition of contract labour system from a date after coming into force of the CLRA Act but rejected the claim for absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the appellant. On appeal to this Court, after pointing out the scheme of Section 10 of the Act, it was held that under the CLRA Act, the jurisdiction to decide about the abolition of contract labour had to be in accordance with Section 10, therefore, it would be proper that the question, whether the contract labour in the appellant industry was to be abolished or not be left to be dealt with by the appropriate Government under the Act, if it became necessary. From this judgment, no support can be drawn for the proposition that absorption of the contract labour is a concomitant of the abolition notification under Section 10(1) of the Act.A Constitution Bench of this Court in M/s Gammon India Ltd.Ors. v. Union of Indiaothers, 1974(1) SCC 596 considered the constitutional validity of the CLRA Act and the Rules made thereunder in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the work of construction of a building for the banking company was entrusted to the petitionerscontractors who engagedcontract labour for construction work. While upholding the constitutional validity of the CLRA Act and the Rules made thereunder, this Court summed up the object of the Act and the purpose for enacting Section 10 of the Act as followsAct was passed to prevent the exploitation of contract labour and also to introduce better conditions of work. The Act provides for regulation and abolition of contract labour. The underlying policy of the Act is to abolish contract labour, wherever possible and practicable, and where it cannot be abolished altogether, the policy of the Act is that the working conditions of the contract labour should be so regulated as to ensure payment of wages and provision of essential amenities. That is why the Act provides for regulated conditions of work and contemplates progressive abolition to the extent contemplated by Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 of the Act deals with abolition while the rest of the Act deals mainly with regulation. The dominant idea of Section 10 of the Act is to find out whether contract labour is necessary for the industry, trade, business, manufacture or occupation which is carried on in the establishment.There is nothing in that judgment to conclude that on abolition of contract labour system under Section 10(1), automatic absorption of contract labour in the establishment of the principal employer in which they were working at that time, would follow.The principle that a beneficial legislation needs to be construed liberally in favour of the class for whose benefit it is intended, does not extend to reading in the provisions of the Act what the legislature has not provided whether expressly or by necessary implication, or substituting remedy or benefits for that provided by the legislature. We have already noticed above the intendment of the CLRA Act that it regulates the conditions of service of the contract labour and authorizes in Section 10(1) prohibition of contract labour system by the appropriate Government on consideration of factors enumerated in(2) of Section 10 of the Act among other relevant factors. But, the presence of some or all those factors, in our view, provide no ground for absorption of contract labour on issuing notification under(1) of Section 10. Admittedly when the concept of automatic absorption of contract labour as a consequence of issuing notification under Section 10(1) by the appropriate Government, is not alluded to either in Section 10 or at any other place in the Act and the consequence of violation of Sections 7 and 12 of the CLRA Act is explicitly provided in Sections 23 and 25 of the CLRA Act, it is not for the High Courts or this Court to read some unspecified remedy in Section 10 or substitute for penal consequences specified in Sections 23 and 25 a different sequel, be it absorption of contract labour in the establishment of principal employer or a lesser or a harsher punishment. Such an interpretation of the provisions of the statute will be far beyond the principle of ironing out the creases and the scope of interpretative legislation and as such clearly impermissible. We have already held above, on consideration of various aspects, that it is difficult to accept that the Parliament intended absorption of contract labour on issue of abolition notification under Section 10(1) of CLRA Act.We have gone through the decisions of the Court in V.S.T. Industries case (supra), G. B. Pant Universitys case (supra) and Mohammed Aslams case (supra). All of them related to statutory liability to maintain the canteen bythe principal employer in thefactory/establishment. That is why in those cases, as in The Saraspur Mills case (supra), the contract labour working in the canteen were treated as workers of the principal employer. These cases stand on a different footing and it is not possible to deduce from them the broad principle of law that on the contract labour system being abolished under(1) of Section 10 of the CLRA Act the contract labour working in the establishment of theprincipal employer hasto be absorbed as regular employees of the establishment.Mr. Shanti Bhushan alone has taken this extreme stand that by virtue of engagement of contract labour by the contractor in any work of or in connection with the work of an establishment the relationship of master and servant is created between theprincipal employer andthe contract labour.We are afraid, we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel. A careful survey of the cases relied upon by him shows that they do not support his proposition.In The Maharashtra Sugar Mills case (supra), the question that fell for consideration of this court was whether the contract labour was covered by the definition of `employee under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and, therefore, should be treated as employees of themills. There contractors were engaged by the appellant for carrying on certain operations in its establishment. The contractors were to employ contract labour (workers) for carrying out the work undertaken but they should have the approval of the appellant, although it was the obligation of the contractors to pay wages to the workers. However, the contract labour engaged by the contractors got the same amenities from the appellant as were available to its muster roll workers. An industrial dispute arose in respect of the payment of wages of the contract labour engaged by the contractors which, along with other disputes, was referred to the Industrial Court by the Government. The reference was contested, as being not maintainable, by the appellant on the plea that the contractors workers were not `employees within the meaning of the said Act. The term `employee is defined in the said Act to mean `any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward in any industry and includes a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in execution of a contract with an employer within the meaning of(3) of clause 14. It was on the basis of the definitions of the terms "the employer" and "the employee", the contract labour engaged by the contractors was held to be employees of the appellant. The decision in that case cannot be read as holding that when a contractor engages contract labour in connection with the work of the principal employer, the relationship of master and servant is created between theprincipal employer and3. In Shivnandan Sharmas case (supra), theentrusted its cash department under a contract to the treasurers who appointed cashiers, including thehead cashier. The question before theBench of this Court was : was the appellant an employee of the Bank ? On the construction of the agreement entered into between the Bank and the treasurers, it was held that the treasurers were under the employment of the Bank on a monthly basis for an indefinite term as they were under the complete control and direction of the Bank through its manager or other functionaries and, therefore, the appointees including the appellant (nominees) of the treasurers, were also the employees of the Bank. This Court laid downa master employs a servant and authorises him to employ a number of persons to do a particular job and to guarantee their fidelity and efficiency for a cash consideration, the employees thus appointed by the servant would be equally with the employer, servants of thedo not think that the principle, quoted above, supports the proposition canvassed by the learned104. The decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Basti Sugar Mills case (supra) was given in the context of the reference of an industrial dispute under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. TheMills entrusted the work of removal of press mud to a contractor who engaged the respondents therein (contract labour) in connection with that work. The services of the respondents were terminated by the contractor and they claimed that they should bein the service of the appellant. The Constitution Benchwords of the definition of workmen in Section 2(z) to mean "any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of the employment be express or implied" are by themselves sufficiently wide to bring in persons doing work in an industry whether the employment was by the management or by the contractor of the management. Unless however the definition of the word "employer" included the management of the industry even when the employment was by the contractor the workmen employed by the contractor could not get the benefit of the Act since a dispute between them and the management would not be an industrial dispute between "employer" and workmen. It was with a view to remove this difficulty in the way of the workmen employed by contractors that the definition of employer has been extended by(iv) of Section 2(i). The position thus is : (a) that the respondents are workmen within the meaning of Section 2(z), being persons employed in the industry to do manual work for reward, and (b) they were employed by a contractor with whom the appellant company had contracted in the course of conducting the industry for the execution by the said contractor of the work of the removal ofwhich is ordinarily a part of the industry. It follows therefore from Section 2(z) read with(iv) of Section 2(i) of the Act that they are workmen of the appellant company and the appellant company is their employer.It is evident that the decision in that case also turned on the wide language of statutory definitions of the terms "workmen" and "employer". So it does not advance the case pleaded by the learned counsel.We find no substance in the next submission of the Mr. Shanti Bhushan that a combined reading of the definition of the terms `contract labour, `establishment and `workman would show that a legal relationship between a person employed in an industry and the owner of the industry is created irrespective of the fact as to who has brought about such relationship.We are persuaded to accede to the contention that a workman, who is not anmust be treated as a regular employee of the principal employer. It has been noticed above that anfalls within the exclusionary clause of the definition of `workman. The wordconnotes a person who carries out the type of work, mentioned in(C) of the clause (i) of Section 2, of the principal employer with the materials supplied to him by such employer either (i) at his home or (ii) in some other premises not under the control and management of the principal employer. A person who is not anbut satisfies the requirement of the first limb of the definition of `workman would, by the very definition fall within the meaning of the came workman. Even so, if such a workman is within the ambit of the contract labour, unless he falls within theclauses, he cannot be treated as a regular employee of the principal employer.We have also perused all the Rules and Forms prescribed thereunder. It is clear that at various stages there is involvement of the principal employer. On exhaustive consideration of the provisions of the CLRA Act we have held above that neither they contemplate creation of direct relationship of master and servant between theprincipal employer andthe contract labour nor can such relationship be implied from the provisions of the Act on issuing notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, a fortiorari much less, can such a relationship be found to exist from the Rules and the Forms made thereunder.The leftover contention of Ms. Indira Jaisingh may be dealt with here. The contention of Ms. Indira Jaisingh that the principles of contract law sticto sensu do not apply to the labour and management is too broad to merit acceptance.In the case of Uptron India (supra), the controversy related to the termination of the services of the workmen for unauthorised absence. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 provided that a workman is liable to automatic termination on the ground of unauthorised absence. It is in that context that this Court has observed that the general principles of the Contract Act, 1872 applicable to an agreement between two persons having capacity to contract, are also applicable to a contract of industrial employment but relationship so created is partly contractual and partlyas the State have already by legislation prescribed positive obligations for the employer towards his workmen, as for example terms, conditions and obligations prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936; Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946; Minimum Wages Act, 1948; Payment of Bonus Act, 1965; Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 etc. In our view, the law has been correctly laid down therein. The judgment in that case cannot be read as laying down a principle of law that the provisions of the Contract Act are not applicable to relation between the labour and the management.In Rai Bahadurs case (supra), the industrial dispute referred to the Industrial Tribunal was : whether all the employees of the appellant should be allowed 30 days earned leave with full wages for every 11 months service without discrimination. The appellant framed the rules on July 1, 1956 providing that every workman employed on or before the date would be entitled to 30 days earned leave with full wages for every 11 months service. The contention of the employer was that those who were employed after that date were not entitled to the same period of leave. It was contended that the appellant was entitled to fix the terms of the employment on which it would employ the workmen and it was open for the workman to accept or not to accept those terms so the Tribunal was not justified in interfering with such matter. ABench of this Court, by majority, held that the Tribunal was justified in directing the appellant to provide the same uniform rules as to earned leave for all its employees that the doctrine of absolute freedom of contract had to yield to the higher claims for the social justice and had to be so regulated. After referring to Western Indias case (supra) and The Bharat Banks case (supra), Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar speaking for the majority observedorder that industrial adjudication should be free from the tyranny of dogmas or the subconscious pressure ofnotions, it is important that the temptation to lay down broad principles should be avoided. Accordingly, it is not necessary to decide the broad contention whether the industrial adjudication can interfere with the contract between the employers and the employees.It is apparent that the case was decided on the ground that there could be no discrimination of the employees in regard to their entitlement for earned leave on the basis of a fixed date and that no general principle was laid down that the contract laws are inapplicable toIn view of the fact that we have. 6029/2001 @ SLP(C) No.as the Central Government became the appropriate Government, for an establishment of ONGC after the amended definition of the appropriate Government came into force under the CLRA Act w.e.f. 28.1.1986 whereunder the definition of the said expression under the Industrial Disputes Act is adopted in the CLRA Act, therefore, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government for ONGC w.e.f. 28.1.1986. It follows that the notification issued on December 9, 1976 would not cover the establishments of the appellant. However, as the High Court directed absorption of the contract labour in the establishments of the appellant following the judgment of this Court in Air Indias case (supra) and that judgment has since beenboth on the question of appropriate Government as well as on the point of automaticupshot of the above discussion is outlined thus(a) Before January 28, 1986, the determination of the question whether Central Government or the Stare Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression "appropriate Government" as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry; or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oil field or the establishment of banking or insurance company ? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise is relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriateAfter the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, if (i) the concerned Central Government company/undertaking or any undertaking is included therein eo nomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by railway company; or (c) by specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in the any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Governmentafter consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be,(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question;other relevant factors including those mentioned in(2) of Sectioninasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on December 9, 1976 does not satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10 it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has beenNeither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by appropriate Government under(1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment. Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the concernedle the judgment of this court in Air Indias case (supra) prospectively and declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment of in Air Indias case (supra), shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has becomeOn issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of the having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance of various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the