Case: Jai Singh  Vs. M.C.D.

The facts, as noticed by the High Court, are that the appellants are claiming themselves to be the landlords in respect of premises constructed on the plot of land No. 2, Block B, Transport Area of Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi.3. In the eviction petition, it was stated that the premises were let out to respondent No.2, Delhi Transport Corporation [for shorton a monthly rental of Rs. 3500/-. DTC has sublet/assigned the premises in favour of respondent No.1, Municipal Corporation of Delhi [for shortand parted with possession in favour of MCD without the written consent of the appellants. Therefore, both DTC and MCD were liable for eviction. The High Court has noticed the sequence of events since the transport services were being run by Gwalior Northern India Transport Company (for shortto the time when DTC stepped into its shoes. The appellants claimed that the tenancy of the premises was with DTC. MCD had, however, claimed that the legal possession was retained by MCD; rent was being paid by MCD to DTC.4. The ARC by an order dated 11th November, 1989, upon consideration of the rival contentions,Admittedly it is respondent No.2 (MCD) who is in possession of the premises in question. It is also admitted that respondent No. 2 (MCD) pays a sum of Rs. 3500/- as rent to respondent No. 1 (DTC) by way of cheques. It is not the case of the respondent that any written consent of the petitioners was obtained in this regard. Therefore, it has to be held that respondent No. 1 (DTC) has either sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the tenanted premises illegally to respondent No.2 (MCD). It is well settled that in voluntarily (sic) transfers are also included with the meaning of sub-letting etc. in Section 14(1)(b) DRC Act.The order passed by the ARC was upheld by the ARCT with the followingAfter having heard up the matter in all its possible aspects I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the finding of the learned trial Court by holding that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and since the exclusive possession of the premises was handed over by the erstwhile tenant to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, i.e., respondent No. 2 which is itself a separate and independent legal entity, it amounts to sub-letting.The High Court set aside the concurrent findings recorded by the ARC and ARCT with the followingorders passed by learned ARC and the learned ARCT categorically show that neither the learned ARC nor learned ARCT has devolved upon the facts of the case and nor had even considered the concept of tenancy and sub-tenancy in this case in the peculiar circumstances of this case.The High Court held that this is not a case of sub-letting as Delhi Transport Services (for shortDelhi Transport Undertaking (for shortMCD and DTC were the creation of statute. The premises had come to them after it was acquired by Union of India (UOI) from GNIT on nationalization of the business. There was no parting with possession by DTC to MCD, therefore, it was not sub-letting. The DTC was incorporated in lieu of DTU as a separate company to facilitate running of transport business. Mere payment of Rs. 3500/- per month by MCD to DTC does not show sub-letting or parting with possession. Relying on a judgment of this Court in Madras Bangalore Transport Co. [West] v. Inder Singh & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 1564 , the High Court has heldthe case in hand, the situation, is much better. The alleged original tenant GNIT stood acquired by a Legislative Act and the premises went to DTS. DTS was converted to DTU and DTU was further converted into DTC. The premises remained in occupation of the same entity which changed its form from one to another. Thus it cannot be said that it was a case of sub-letting under any circumstances. The orders passed by learned ARC and learned ARTC are liable to be set aside for non application of law and non consideration of facts at all.The objection raised by the appellants to the entertainment of the petition under Article 227, on the ground of laches, has been rejected with the followingrespondent in this case has strongly objected to entertaining the petition on the ground of limitation. The petitioner has filed this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In exercise of this power, interfering with the orders of the Court of Tribunal has to be done where this Court finds that there was a serious dereliction of duty and blatant violation of the fundamental principles of law and justice and where, the order caused grave injustice and needs to be corrected. Although the petitioner herein had not been vigilant in prosecuting the appeal below but that cannot prevent his Court from correcting the patent illegality writ large on the face of the orders of the ARC and Tribunal below. Both the ARC and ARCT passed orders without considering the facts of the case in a very mechanical manner. Neither the learned ARC nor learned ARCT had taken into account the sequence of facts brought before them regarding acquisition of the entire assets of GNIT and conversion of DTS to DTU and then to DTC by the Legislative Act and the order has been passed merely on the ground that amount of Rs.3500/- was being remitted by the MCD to DTC. The Courts below did not even consider the issue as to who was the tenant and how MCD became the sub-tenant of respondent once the premises was owned by Union of India and the leasehold rights of the entire land vested in Union of India. This Court can set aside the findings and the orders of the Tribunal below if there was no evidence at all to justify the findings and the findings were perverse. The order can also be set aside if no reasonable or prudent person can possibly come to such a conclusion despite the fact that the petition was not brought before this Court by the petitioner soon after the passing of the order. In Badlu and Anr. v. Shiv Charan and Ors., (1980) 4 SCC 401 , Supreme Court observed that the delay caused in prosecuting the case in bona fide and good faith in wrong Court due to mistake of law or facts can be condoned, I, therefore, consider that petition is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay, nor learned ARCT was justified in dismissing the application. Learned ARCT went wrong in dismissing the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay. The order of learned ARCT on this count also is liable to set aside. It is ordered

Reasoning:
It is, however, well to remember the well known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well recognized constraints. It can not be exercised like a ‘bull in a chinato correct all errors of judgment of a Court, or Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. The High Court cannot lightly or liberally act as an Appellate Court and re-appreciate the evidence. Generally, it can not substitute its own conclusions for the conclusions reached by the Courts below or the statutory/quasi judicial Tribunals. The power to re-appreciate evidence would only be justified in rare and exceptional situations where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. The exercise of such discretionary power would depend on the peculiar facts of each case, with the sole objective of ensuring that there is no miscarriage of justice.14. In our opinion, the High Court in this case, has travelled beyond the limits of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Both ARC and ARCT had acted within the limits of the jurisdiction vested in them. The conclusions reached cannot be said to be based on no evidence. All relevant material has been taken into consideration. Therefore, there was hardly any justification for the High Court to undertake an investigation into issues which did not even arise in the lis.We have been constrained to make elaborate reference to the orders of ARC and ARCT only to demonstrate that High Court was not justified in observing that there has been ‘serious dereliction ofor that there has been ‘blatant violation of the fundamental principles of law andby the ARC and ARCT. We also cannot accept the observations of the High Court that both ARC and ARCT have considered the facts in a very mechanical way, or that the orders passed by ARC and ARCT exhibited any patent illegality writ large on the face of the orders. We also do not agree that the ARC and ARCT ignored the sequence of events through which GNIT was substituted by DTC. The entire sequence of metamorphosis of GNIT into DTC have been elaborately explained and dilated upon.22. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court ought not to have exercised the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in the peculiar circumstances of thisour opinion the aforesaid order was unexceptional since the pleas taken by the DTC and MCD before the Additional Rent Controller were identical. Therefore, it was in fitness of things that the subsequent Coordinate Bench also dismissed the appeal filed byperusal of the aforesaid order clearly shows that the application was disposed of on the statement made by the learned Counsel for MCD that the appellant (MCD) should file a fresh petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India if the same is permissible under law.Therefore, the aforesaid order cannot be treated as an order passed by the High Court permitting MCD to file a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However using the aforesaid order of the High Court as an excuse, MCD filed the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on 9.4.2007, being CM (Main) No. 57/2007, challenging the order which was passed by the ARC dated 11.11.1989 and the order passed by ARCT dated 12.3.2001. At this stage, in our opinion, the High Court failed to bestow proper attention to the objections taken by the appellants to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. Proceedings under Article 227 can be initiated in the absence of the availability of an alternative efficacious remedy. In the present case, MCD had consciously withdrawn RCSA which had been filed under Section 39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appeal had been filed against the order of the ARCT dated 12.3.2001. However, the objection on the ground of delay and laches was brushed aside by the High Court on two wholly untenable grounds, i.e.:(i) The orders passed by the ARC and ARCT suffered from patent illegality on the face of the orders.(ii) The MCD was bona fide prosecuting a case in the wrong Court, due to mistake of law.23. We are of the opinion that the High Court committed a patent error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution which was unconscionably belated. Both reasons stated by the High Court in support of its conclusions, are contrary to the facts on the record. It must be remembered that in these proceedings, the pleas raised by the DTC and MCD before the ARC as well as the ARCT were identical. The order passed by the ARCT has been upheld by a Coordinate Bench of the High Court. The RCSA No. 17/2001 filed by MCD on identical grounds was thus dismissed by a subsequent Coordinate Bench. That was indeed in conformity with the high traditions, procedures and practices established by the Courts to maintain judicial discipline and decorum. The underlying principle being, to avoid conflicting views taken by Coordinate Benches of the same Court. Except in compelling circumstances, such as where the order of the earlier bench can be said to be per incuriam, in that it is passed in ignorance of an earlier binding precedent/ statutory or constitutional provision, the subsequent bench would follow the earlier Coordinate Bench.24. It appears that the entire proceedings adopted by MCD after the dismissal of the RCSA- CM(M) No. 31 of 2001, on 31.1.2001 were a subterfuge to avoid the execution proceedings in a decree which had become final between the parties. In the application seeking conversion of RCSA No. 17/2001 to a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it was categorically stated by MCD that the aforesaid RCSA was not maintainable. The aforesaid statement is a clear admission that the appeal filed by the MCD did not involve a substantial question of law. It is apparent from the fact that under Section 39(1) of the DRC Act subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), an appeal lies to the High Court from an order made by themade an admission that no substantial question of law was raised in the RCSA, withdrawal of the same could not possibly have been used as a justification for filing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. If the RCSA was devoid of any substantial question of law, the petition under Article 227, based on the same facts, would be equally devoid of any substantial question of law. This categoric admission of the MCD was ignored by the High Court whilst recording the finding that the orders of ARC and ARCT were passedblatant violation of fundamental principles of law andThis apart in the peculiar facts of this case, noticed above, it could not be held that MCD had been bona fide prosecuting a case in the wrong Court. It was seeking a remedy provided under Section 39(1) of DRC Act. Even this appeal was filed beyond limitation. It was delayed by 431 days. In the meantime possession of a part of the premises had already been taken by the appellants. In spite of the objections having been raised to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, they were rejected by the High Court with the observations noticed in the earlier part of the judgment. In such circumstances, in our opinion, it was wholly inappropriate for the High Court to entertain the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution ofour opinion, the High Court committed a serious error of jurisdiction in entertaining the writ petition filed by MCD under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the peculiar circumstances of this case. The decision to exercise jurisdiction had to be taken in accordance with the accepted norms of care, caution, circumspection. The issue herein only related to a tenancy and subletting. There was no lis relating to the ownership of the land on which the superstructure or the demised premises had been constructed. The whole issue of ownership of plot of land No. 2, Block-B, Transport Area of Jhandewalan Estate, Desh Bandhu Gupta Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi is the subject matter of a civil suit being Suit No: 361 of 1980 in the High Court of Delhi. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have given any opinion on the question of ownership.26. We are of the opinion the High Court travelled beyond the well defined contours of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.