Case: Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate Vs. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

2. The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dimakuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, Dibrugarh. The respondent is the Management of the Dimakuchi tea estate, district Darrang in Assam. One Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1, 1950. He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of appointment:"While you are on probation or trial, your suitability for permanent employment will be considered. If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment, you will receive seven days notice in writing terminating your appointment. If you are guilty of misconduct, you are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will be confirmed in the gardens service."In February 1951 Dr. Banerjee was given an increment of Rs. 5/- per mensem, but on April 21, Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Booth, manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated:"It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will of course receive one months salary in lieu of notice."As no reasons were given in the notice of termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services were being terminated. To this Dr. Banerjee received a reply to this effect:3. The cause of Dr. Banerjee was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the secretary of that Sangha wrote to the manager of the Dimakuchi tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr. Banerjees discharge. The manager wrote back to say that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was discharged on the ground of incompetence in his medical duties and the chief medical officer (Dr. Cox) had found that Dr. Banerjee was incompetent and did not have sufficient "knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medical officer in tea garden practice." It was further stated that Dr. Banerjee gave a faulty, inexpert and clumsy quinine injection to one Mr. Peacock, an assistant in the Dimakuchi tea estate, which produced an extremely acute and severe illness very nearly causing a paralysis of the patients leg. The reasons given by the manager for the termination of the services of Dr. K. P. Banerjee did not satisfy the appellants herein and certain conciliation proceedings, details whereof are not necessary for our purpose, were unsuccessfully held over the question of the termination of the service of Dr. Banerjee. The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha respectively. This Board recommended that Dr. Banerjee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his discharge. After the recommendation of the Board, the respondent herein appears to have offered a sum equal to 28 months salary and allowances in lieu of re-instatement; to this, however the appellants did not agree. In the meantime, Dr. K. P. Banerjee received a sum of Rs. 306-1-0 on May 22, 1951 and left the tea garden in question. Then, on December 23, 1953, the Government of Assam published a notification in which it was stated that whereas an industrial dispute had arisen between the appellants and the respondent herein and whereas it was expedient that the dispute should be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal constituted under S. 7 of the Act, the Governor of Assam was pleased to refer the dispute to Shri U. K. Gohain, Additional District and Sessions Judge, under Cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 10 of the Act. The dispute which was thus referred to the Tribunal was described in these terms:"(i) Whether the management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate was justified in dismissing Dr. K. P. Banerjee, A.M.O.?4. Both parties filed written statements before Mr. Gohain and the respondent took the plea that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a "workman" within the meaning of the Act; therefore, there was no industrial dispute in the sense in which that expression was defined in the Act and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an adjudication on merits. Mr. Gohain took up as a preliminary point the question if Dr. Banerjee was a "workman" within the meaning of the Act and came to a conclusion which may be best expressed in his own words:5. There was then an appeal to the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta. That Tribunal affirmed the finding of Mr. Gohain to the effect that Dr. Banerjee was not a workman within the meaning of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal then said:"A dispute between the employers and employees to be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, must be between the employers and the workmen. There cannot be any industrial dispute between the employers and the employees who are not workmen."The appeal was accordingly dismissed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellants herein then moved this Court for special leave and by an order dated March, 14, 1956, special leave was granted, but was"limited to the question whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a workmen falls within the scope of the definition of industrial dispute contained in S. 2 (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947."

Reasoning:
At first sight, it does appear that there is considerable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression "any person" occurring in the third part, and if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed, they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provisions of the Act9. A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that"the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety or language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained."We think that there is no real difficulty with regard to the first two limitations. They are, we think, implicit in the definition clause itself. It is obvious that a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen must be a real dispute capable of settlement or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the dispute to give necessary relief to the other. It is also obvious that the parties to the dispute must be directly or substantially interested therein, so that if workmen raise a dispute, it must relate to the establishment or part of establishment in which they are employed. With regard to limitation (3) ,while we agree that the expression any person cannot be completely equated with any workman as defined in the Act, we think that the limitation formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is much too widely stated and is not quite correct. We recognise that if the expression any person means any workman within the meaning of the Act. then it is difficult to understand why the legislature instead of using the expression any workman used the much wider expression any person in the third part of the definition clauseThe expression any person in the definition clause means, in our opinion, a person in whose employment, or non-employment, or terms of employment, or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest - with whom they have under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. Our reason for so holding is not merely that the Act makes a distinction between workmen and non-workmen, but because a dispute to be a real dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substantially interested in the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit, who cannot by themselves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose representation the Act makes no particular provision? We venture to think that the answer must be in the negative. Limitation (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of labour welfare may furnish, in some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the principle of solidarity of the labour movement or general welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the principle of community of interest; the workmen can raise a dispute in respect of those persons only in the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of whom they have a direct or substantial interest. We think that Chagla, C. J., correctly put the crucial test when he said in 55 Bom LR 125 at p. 131: (AIR 1953 Bom 325   at p. 327( (A)In the case before us, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a workman. He belonged to the medical or technical staff - a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act.