Case: Municipal Corporation Of Delhi Vs. Tek Chand Bhatia

2. The facts of the prosecution case are these. The respondent is a partner of the firm M/s. Narain Dass Tak Chand, Khari Baoli, Delhi. The firm is engaged in wholesale business in dry-fruits including cashew nuts which it gets from different manufacturers. On August 1, 1968 three samples of cashew nuts were taken from its shop by the two Food Inspectors, S. L. Mehra, P. W. 1 and H. K, Bhanot, P. W. 3 from three sealed tins supplied by Sri Venkateswara Cashews, Panruti. These samples were duly forwarded to the Public Analyst, Delhi who by his three reports dated August 3, 1968 in Form III, Exts, PE, PE/1 and PE /2 found that all the three samples taken were insect-infested. Of these, two were insect-infested to the extent of 20.6 and 20. 7 per cent # and the third to the extent of 5.63 per cent3. The Magistrate 1st Class, Delhi acquitted the respondent holding (1) that the respondent was a sleeping partner residing at Kanpur, and that there was nothing to show that he was in charge of and was responsible for the conduct of the business which was carried on at the shop of the firm at Khari Baoli, Delhi; (2) that alternatively, the invoice Ext. DW 3/A produced by the respondent contained a warranty which absolved him from liability, and (3) that the ratio of living insects to dead insects not having been given in the Public Analysts report there being no. evidence to show that the cashew nuts in question were deleterious to health and if so, how much harmful effect it would have upon the health of a person consuming them, the mere fact of the cashew nuts being insect infested was not sufficient to bring home the charge4. The Delhi High Court without going into the question as to whether the respondent was protected under sub-section (2) of Section 19, maintained the order of acquittal, holding that merely because an article of food is insect-infested, it cannot be treated as adulterated within the meaning of Sec. 2 (1) (f) of the Act unless it is further proved to be otherwise unfit for human consumption within the meaning of the section following its decision in Dhanraj v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, ILR (1972) 2 Delhi 681. In that view, it did not touch upon the other question namely, whether the invoice Ext. DW 3/A was sufficient warranty in law as to the purity of the article of food sold.

Reasoning:
7. We are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly wrong in its interpretation of Section 2 (1) (f). On the plain language of the definition section, it is quite apparent that the words or is otherwise unfit for human consumption are disjunctive of the rest of the words preceding them. It relates to a distinct and separate class altogether. # It seems to us that the last clause or is otherwise unfit for human consumption is residuary provision which would apply to a case not covered by or falling squarely within the clauses preceding it. # If the phrase is to be read disjunctively the mere proof of the article of food beings filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed.....or insect infested would be per se sufficient to bring the case within the purview of the word adulterated as defined in sub-clause (f) and it would not be necessary in such a case to prove further that the article of food was unfit for human consumptionAdmittedly, there was no. warranty in the prescribed form in the instant case. The testimony of the two Food Inspector, S. L. Mehra, PW 1, and H. K. Bhanot, PW 3, no. doubt show that they bought the samples out of the sealed tins, but there is nothing to show that they were tins bearing the manufacturers lable guaranteeing purity20A. In R. G. Pamnani v. State of Maharashtra (1975) 2 SCR 886     this Court after distinguishing Andhra Pradesh Grain & Seed Merchants case observed :The reason why a warranty is required in both the cases contemplated in Section 19 (2) (a) (i) and (ii) is that if waranty were not to be insisted upon by the statute and if a vendor would be permitted to have a defence merely by stating that the vendor purchased the goods from a licenced manufacturer, distributor or dealer adulterated or misbranded articles would be marketed by manufacturers, distributors, dealers as well as purchasers from them with impunity. That is why a written warranty is enjoined in both the case in Section 19 (2) (a) (i) and (ii). Sec. 19 (2) (a) of the Act will provide a defence where a vendor purchases articles of food from a licensed manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a written warranty in the prescribed form. Again, a vendor shall not be deemed to have committed an offence pertaining to the sale of any adulterated or misbranded article of food if he proves that he purchased the article from any manufacturer, distributor or dealer with a written warranty in the prescribed form. These salutary provisions are designed for the health of the nation. Therefore, a warranty is enjoined. No. laxity should be permitted. (Emphasis supplied)21. That, in our opinion, really concludes the matter. In the instant case, there is no. proof that the samples were taken from tins bearing the manufacturers label guaranteeing purity of goods, nor is there any such warranty in the invoice Ext. DW 3/A. It is, however, urged that the tins bore the imprint Good. There is nothing to substantiate this fact, and even if it were so, it is of little consequence. The word Good on which great emphasis is placed merely contains a description of the goods. At the most it amounts to puffing of goods. The word Good is not a warranty as to quality. The respondent is, therefore, not protected under Section 19 (2) ofthe Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 read with Rule 12A of the rules framed under the Act.