Case: Union of India and Another Vs. Avtar Singh and Another

S . Harnam Singh was the owner of agricultural land comprised in Deh No. 100 as also a portion of the land included in Deh No. 99 situated in District Nawab Shah, in erstwhile Sind Province now forming part of Pakistan. Harnam Singh had three sons: Avtar singh, Dr. Kartar Singh and Harbans Singh. Smt. Tej Kaur was the wife of Harnam Singh. It was alleged that in the year 1946 Harnam Singh effected a partition of agricultural land between himself, his three sons and his wife Smt. Tej Kaur each being given an almost equal share. It was alleged that intimation of the alleged partition was sent to the revenue authorities of Sind Province with a request to effect necessary mutation in the revenue records showing land as having been given in the partition to the particular person. After the partition of the country S. Harnam Singh his three sons and his wife migrated to India and they claim to be displaced persons. Harnam Singh lodged a claim on March 15, 1948 in respect of the entire land including the land belonging to the heirs of Ch. Attar Singh who was his father-in-law. Later on, on April 21, 1948 Harnam Singh intimated to the Rehabilitation Authorities that out of a total claim of 300 acres of land lodge d by him, about 75 acres of land was of the ownership of Ch. Attar Singh and confined his claim to the total area of 225 acres of land. It may be mentioned that in the claim lodged on March 15, 1948 there was no reference to the partition effected by Harnam Singh between himself his sons and his wife. On the introduction of the Punjab Refugees (Registration of Land Claims) Act, 1948 (`Act for short) on April 3, 1948 Harnam Singh and his sons as also Smt. Tej Kaur filed separate claims on the basis of the partition of the land which originally belonged to S. Harnam Singh. It was alleged that these claims were verified and allotments of land were made to the extent of 21-8 standard acres in favour of each claimant on temporary basis. On October 5, 1953, Harnam Singh and his sons approached the authorities in the Rehabilitation Department to convert temporary allotment into quasi-permanent allotment. Deputy Registrar Land Claims accepted the request of Harnam Singh and his sons, both with regard to the ownership of the land as well as partition thereof amongst various members of the family. However, it was recommended that on the basis of the revised calculations, each claimant would be entitled to 19-11 1/2 S.A. of land instead of 21-8 S.A. and the excess allotment should be cancelled This recommendation was approved by the competent authority vide its order dated October 28, 1953 as also by the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property as per its order dated November 11, 1953. Consequently excess allotment of 8-14 1/2 standard acres in respect of five claimants was cancelled and the remaining allotment was ordered to be made on quasi-permanent basis. It was alleged that later on proprietary rights were conferred on each claimant in respect of the land allotted to him by the Managing Officer. Some time in 1960, a notice was received by the allottees from the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Punjab calling upon them to show cause why their allotment should not be cancelled. In view of the notice, it became necessary for the allottees to establish not only the ownership of land in Sind but the partition thereof amongst themselves. The allottees claimed that they offered the necessary proof which satisfied the Chief Settlement Commissioner who had issued notice on the basis of Jamabandi entries received from Pakistan. Accordingly the Chief Settlement Commissioner by his order dated August 21, 1961 confirmed the allotment, directed conferment of quasi- permanent status and rejected the departmental reference. Somewhere in October 1961, Harnam Singh apprehended that the claim to ownership of land in Sind and the partition between himself, his sons and his wife and the allotment of land was being re-examined whereupon on March 13, 1962 he submitted a representation to the Government of India for issuing a direction under Section 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally settled. It is allege d that on this representation, the Government of India sent for the record of the whole case, called for the comments of the Punjab Rehabilitation Department which led Land Claims Officer to forward his note dated October 27, 1961 to the Government of India alongwith the whole record of the case. It is alleged that the case was examined and the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Rehabilitation, one Shri Dube, conveyed the decision of the Government of India to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur vide his D.O. Letter No. 13(66) L &RO-62 dated May 31, 1963 with certain observations which it is alleged tend to show that the power of revision under Sec. 33 was exercised and both, the holding of the land in Sind, partition thereof between Harnam Singh, his sons and his wife and the allotment of land to them as displaced persons in India were considered as valid and finally settled . It appears that the Managing Officer of the Rehabilitation Department, Punjab Government submitted a note dated November 5, 1963 to move the Central Government under Sec. 33 of the Act for cancellation of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961. Thereupon the Chief Settlement Commissioner issued a notice dated May 21, 1964 to the allottees calling upon them to show cause why allotment in favour of each of them should not be cancelled. The allottees appeared and submitted their objections to the re-opening of the case inter alia contending that the power of revision conferred by Sec. 33 of the Act cannot be repeatedly exercise and it having been earlier exercised and the allotment having been held t o be valid as per the letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963, the Central Government had no jurisdiction either to revise or review its previous decision more particularly when no fresh material against the allottees is produced after the earlier decision. Ultimately the Joint Secretary of the Government of India exercising power of revision conferred by Sec. 33 by his order dated March 15, 1965 Annex. G to the writ petition quashed and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 and further directed that the allotment of land in favour of Harnam Singh, his sons and his wife be cancelled and that a fresh allotment be made on the footing that Harnam Singh alone was the owner of the land situated in Sind. In other words, the claim that each sons of Harnam Singh had acquired land on partition was rejected as untenable. Thereupon, two sons of Harnam Singh, Shri Avtar Singh and Dr. Kartar Singh filed Civil Writ Petition in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh.An affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 3 by one A. G. Vaswani, Settlement Commissioner (A) &Ex-Officio Under Secretary to the Government of India, Minis try of Labour Employment &Rehabilitation inter alia contending that in April 1948 when for the first time Shri Harnam Singh lodged his claim as displaced person against the loss of his land and property in Pakistan, he had categorically stated that 225 acres of land situated in Sind belonged to him and there was no express or implied, overt or covert reference or even a whisper of a partition between himself and his sons and wife before he migrated to India. It was also contended that the claim lodged by Harnam Singh in April, 1948 was attested by Shri Harnam Singh, then Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, East Punjab and at the relevant time Judge of the Punjab High Court. It is alleged that on the basis of the alleged partition, separate claims were lodged for the first time in June 1948 each claiming 48 acres of land which was reduced to 32 acres. It was specifically contended that the separate claims on the basis of alleged oral partition were an after thought and were submitted to escape a higher graded cut under the Quasi-permanent Allotment Scheme. Other averments in the affidavit are hardly relevant. With respect to the D. O. Letter of Shri Dube, it was stated that the opinion expressed in it was not a judicial decision in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 33 of the Act nor could it constitute an exercise of power under Sec. 33 of the Act. It was submitted that the revisional power was exercised for the first time when the allotment was cancelled and a direction was given for fresh allotment on the basis that Harman Singh alone was the owner of the land situated in Sind.The writ petition came up before a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The learned Judge by his Judgment and order dated October 4, 1966 made the rule absolute and quashed the order dated March 15; 1965The Union of India preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 384 of 1966 which was heard by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Division Bench broadly agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the `D. O. letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 conveyed the decision of the Government of India in exercise of powers under Sec. 33 and therefore, the power of revision against the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was exhausted because a quasi-judicial tribunal has no power to revise or review its earlier decision on merits even if the earlier decision is wrong on facts or law. Accordingly, while dismissing the L.P. Appeal the High Court held that the impugned order of the Government of India dated March 15, 1965 was without jurisdiction and was invalid and of no legal efficacy. Hence this appeal by special leave by the Union of India.

Reasoning:
Harnam Singh claimed to be the owner of 225 acres of land situated in erstwhile Sind Province. In the first claim lodged by him, he clearly stated that he was the owner of 300 acres. He then modified it to 225 acres. In neither of the two claims, he ever suggested that there was a partition between him and his sons also giving a share to his wife. The story of partition clearly appears to b e an after thought because it is helpful in obtaining higher allotment. No documentary evidence has been placed on record to support the case of partition which clearly appears to have been an after thought. Earlier Jamabandi entries from Pakistan permitted a negative inference that there was no partition. The Central Governments while setting aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 recorded the finding that: (i) there is no writing or deed of partition: (ii) Revenue records show the name of Shri Harnam Singh alone on the basis of the sale deed in his exclusive name: (iii) there are no receipts indicating separate payment of land revenue by any one of the respondents after alleged partition; (iv) no objection was taken by the sons at the time of the filing of the claim by the father; (v) there is no mention of individuals share in the claim filed by the father; These are relevant considerations which would certainly throw doubt on the claim of oral partition alleged to have been effected by Harnam Singh. Once the allegation of oral partition is rejected, the respondents are not entitled to any consideration even on equitable grounds.In the concluding stages of the arguments the respondents contended that Harnam Singh has died and his heirs having not been substituted, the appeal has abated. There is no merit in this contention. Harnam singh was not the petitioner before the high Court. He was respondent No. 2. No relief was claimed against him. Further Harnam Singh was not asked to surrender the land. Petitioners before the High Court were adversely affected by the impugned decision. Death of Harnam Singh would therefore, have no impact on this appeal. Therefore, the contention is rejected15. It needs to be recalled that the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 was wholly in favour of Harnam Singh and his sons. Atleast Harnam Singh and his sons could not be said to be persons aggrieved by the order so as to move the Central Government invoking its revisional power under Sec. 33. Mr. Rao however, contended that the representation Annexure `D dated March 13 of Harnam Singh reveals that he apprehended that the case may be reopened and therefore, by his representation he moved the Central Government to affirm or confirm the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961. We remain unimpressed. If every litigant in whose favour a competent authority has made an order can still approach the higher authority for the affirmance of the order without any rhyme of reason, the whole gamut of power of revisional jurisdiction would become a play thing for already successful party who may foreclose the decision and when needed can successfully urge that the power of revision is exhausted. Further, assuming Harnam Singh made the representation apprehending danger to his allotment, the letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does not record any decision of the Central Government. It merely says that it is not necessary to wait any more for response to the queries addressed to authorities in Pakistan and the matter should be finalize d on the basis of finding arrived at in the case. It further proceeds to aver that there is a feeling that there is no reason to differ from those judicial pronouncements at `this stage. Such expression of feeling could hardly tentamount to a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. It is not for a moment suggested that the decision of the Central Government has to be recorded in any particular form. In D.N. Roy and S.K. Bannerjee &Ors. v. State of Bihar &Or s. (1) a letter addressed byy to the Government of India to a particular person Stating therein `that with reference to the application of the addressee on the subject noted, he was directed to say that after careful consideration the Central Government by the letter rejects the revision application as being timebarred was treated as a decision of the Central Government. This calls for no comments because the letter is selfexplanatory. There is nothing in Shri Dubes letter remotely comparable with the letter in the aforementioned case. On the contrary the Central Government informed the Government of Punjab that the record is returned with the request that the case may be finalised as indicated in the letter. The revisional power is the power of the Central Government and not of the Punjab Government. The decision was left to the Punjab Government. There was nothing pending with the Punjab Government for finalisation. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in treating the letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision of the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 33. There was no reason for decision nor any occasion for the Central Government to exercise power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it is not possible to agree with the High Court that the letter records the decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. If the letter of Shri Dube is not a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33 of the Act, as a necessary corollary, the impugned decision must be treated as one rendered for the first time in exercise of the revisional power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, the appeal will have to be allowedIn fact, we are wholly disinclined to undertake this exercise of evaluating facts or evidence in a petition for a writ of certiorari. Further in the impugned decision the facts as appearing from the record and submissions made by the learned counsel for claimants are exhaustively dealt with and no case for interference is made out. Only two aspects however may be referred to.