Case: Pannalal Vs. Murarilal

1. One Ramji Dass died leaving behind a widow, Smt. Bhagwani. At the time of his death, he owned some land and a house. 4 bighas and 17 biswas of the land were mortgaged by Smt. Bhagwani on 2nd May, 1948 in favour of respondent No. 3, Babu Ram. Later, on 22nd August 1949, she executed a deed of gift in respect of the house and the land covering an area of 50 bighas and 14 biswas in favour of Smt. Kala wanti who was related to her as a grand-niece. Sawan Ram appellant instituted a suit for a declaration that both these alienation were without legal necessity and were not binding on him claiming that he was the nearest reversioner of Ramji Dass, being his collateral. In that suit, Smt. Bhagwani the donee, Smt. Kala Wanti, respondent No. 1, and the mortgagee, Babu Ram, respondent No. 3, were impleaded as defendants. That suit was decreed and Smt. Bhagwani went up in appeal to the High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, Smt. Bhagwani adopted respondent No. 2. Deep Chand, the son of Brahmanand and his wife, respondent No. 1. Smt. Kala Wanti. A deed of adoption was executed by her in that respect on 24th August 1959. The appeal was dismissed in spite of this adoption.2. Smt.. Bhagwani died on S1st October 1959, and thereupon, the appellant brought a suit for possession of the house and the land which had been gifted by Smt. Bhagwani to respondent No. 1 as well as for possession of the land which she had mortgaged with respondent No. 3. It was claimed that Smt. Bhagwani had only a life interest in all these properties, because she had divested herself of all the rights in those properties on 22nd August 1949, beforethe Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (No. 30 of 1956) came into force. The adoption of Deep Chand was also challenged as fictitious and ineffective. It was further urged that even if that adoption was valid Deep Chand became the adopted son of Smt. Bhagwani and could not succeed to the properties of Ramji Dass. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court, holding that the adoption of Deep Chand was valid and that, though Smt. Bhagwani had not become the full owner of the property underthe Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Deep Chand was entitled to succeed to the property of Ramji Dass in preference to the appellant, so that the appellant could not claim possession of these properties. That order was upheld by the High Court of Punjab, and the appellant has now come up to this Court in appeal by special leave.

Reasoning:
3. This point raised on behalf of the appellant is negatived by the evidence on the record. There is oral evidence of the adoption which has been accepted by the lower Courts, and it shows that Deep Chand was given in adoption by both the parents to Smt. Bhagwani. Even the deed of adoption, dated 24th August 1959, on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant in support of this argument, does not bear out the suggestion that Deep Chand was given in adoption by his mother and not by his father. The deed clearly mentions that "the parents of Deep Chand have, of their own free will, given Deep Chand to me, the executant, today as my adopted son." This recitation is followed by a sentence which states: "Mst. Kala Wanti, mother of Deep Chand, has put her thumb-mark hereunder in token of her consent." It was from this solitary sentence that inference was sought to be drawn that Deep Chand had been given in adoption by his mother, Kala Wanti and not by the father. The deed, in the earlier sentence quoted above, clearly mentions that Deep Chand had been given in adoptions by his "parents" which necessarily includes the father. This later sentence, it appears, was put in the deed, because S. 9 (2) of the Act mentions that the father is not to exercise his right of giving his child in adoption, save with the consent of the mother. "The consent of the mother" having been used in the Act which was applicable, the draftsmen of the deed included in it the fact that Deep Chands mother had actually given her consent and obtained her thumb impression in token thereof.This mention of the consent, in these circumstances, be held to show that it was mother who, in fact, gave the child in adoption and not the father.Under the Shastric Hindu Law, no doubt, if a Hindu widow made an adoption after the death of her husband on the basis of consent obtained from him in his life-time, the adopted son was deemed to be the son of the deceased husbandWe are unable to accept this interpretation of the provisions of the Act by the Andhra Pradesh High Court as it appears to us that the High Court ignored two important provisions of the Act and did not consider their effect when arriving at itsis significant that, in this section, the adoption to be made is mentioned as "by or to a Hindu". Thus, adoption is envisaged as being of two kinds. One is adoption by a Hindu, and the other is adoption to a Hindu. If the view canvassed on behalf of the appellant be accepted, the consequence will be that there will be only adoptions by Hindus and not to Hindus. On the face of it, adoption to a Hindu was intended to cover oases when an adoption is by one person, while the child adopted becomes the adopted son of another person also. It is only in such a case that it can be said that the adoption has been made to that other person. The most common instance will naturally be that of adoption by a female Hindu who is married and whose husband is dead, or has completely and finally renounced the world, or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. In such a case, the actual adoption would be by the female Hindu, while the adoption will be not only to herself, but also to her husband who is dead, or has completely and finally renounced the world or has been declared to be of unsound mind.8. The second provision, which was ignored by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, is one contained in S. 12 itself. The section, in its principal clause, not only lays down that the adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption but, in addition, goes on to define the rights of such an adopted child. It lays down that from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall he deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family. A question naturally arises what is the adoptive family of a child who is adopted by a window, or by a married woman whose husband has completely and finally renounced the world or has been declared to be of unsound mind even though alive. It is well recognised that, after a female is married, she belongs to the family of her husband. The child adopted by her must also, therefore, belong to the same family. On adoption by a widow, therefore, the adopted son is to be deemed to be a member of the family of the deceased husband of the widow. Further still, he loses all his rights in the family of his birth and those rights are replaced by the rights created by the adoption in the adoptive family. The right, which the child had, to succeed to property by virtue of being the son of his natural father, in the family of his birth. is, thus, clearly to be replaced by similar rights in the adoptive family, and, consequently, he would certainly obtain those rights in the capacity of a member of that family as an adopted soil of the deceased husband of the widow, or the married female, taking him in adoption. This provision in S. 12 of the Act. thus itself makes it clear that, on adoption by a Hindu female who has been married, the adopted son will, in effect, be the adopted son of her husband also. This aspect was ignored by the Andhra Pradesh High Court when dealing with the effect of the language used in other parts of this section.9. It may, however, be mentioned that the conclusion which we have arrived at does not indicate that the ultimate decision given by the Andhra Pradesh High Court was in any way incorrect. As we have mentioned earlier, the question in that case was whether E, after the adoption by D, the window of B, could divest C of the rights which had already vested in C before the adoption. It is significant that by the year 1936 C was the sole male member of the Hindu joint family which owned the disputed property. B died in the year 1924 and A died in 1936. By that time, the Hindu Womens Rights to Property Act had not been enacted and, consequently, C. as the sole male survivor of the family, became fully owner of that property. In these circumstances. it was clear that after the adoption of E by D, E could not divest C of the rights already vested in him in view of the special provision contained in Cl. (c) of the proviso to S. 12 of the Act. It appears that, by making such a provision, the Act has narrowed down the rights of an adopted child as compared with the rights of a child born posthumously. Under the Shastric law, if a child was adopted by a widow, he was treated as a natural-born child and, consequently, he could divest other members of the family of rights vested in them prior to his adoption. It was only with the limited object of avoiding any such consequence on the adoption of a child by a Hindu window that these provisions in Cl. (c) of the proviso to S. 12, and S. 13 of the Act were incorporated. In that respect. the rights of the adopted child were restricted. It is to be noted that this restriction was placed on the rights of a child adopted by either a male Hindu or a female Hindu and not merely in a case of adoption by a female Hindu. This restriction on the rights of the adopted child cannot, therefore, in our opinion, lead to any inference that a child adopted by a window will not be deemed to be the adopted son of her deceased husband. The second ground taken on behalf of the appellant also, therefore, fails.