Case: Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan Vs. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu &amp; Others

For the purposes of these appeals, it is only necessary to state that thet who was the appellant in the High Court, had instituted a suit on 31st January 1929, the very last day of limitation, in the Munsiffs Court at Miraj. This suit was registered as Original Suit No. 724 of 1930, in that Court. The plaintiff prayed in the plaint for possession and mesne profits in respects of lands at Malgaon and Takli, on the ground that the then State of Miraj had wrongfully resumed those lands in 1910, as part of the StateSheri Khata, which, after inquiry, was ordered on 31st July 1915, to be recorded as such lands, the usufruct thereof during that period to be appropriated to theKhasgi Khataof the State. The plaintiff impleaded the State of Miraj as the first defendant. Defendants 2 and 3 are plaintiffs brothers who are said to have relinquished their interest in the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant 4 to 7 belong to the family of Narso who was, until his death in 1910, recorded in respect of the suit properties, but they did not appear and contest the plaintiffs claim. The suit was valued at Rs., being 5 times the assessment on the disputed lands for the purposes of. No valuation was given in the plaint for the purposes of jurisdiction with reference to the value of the properties claimed. A similar suit had been instituted by the plaintiff in the same Court in respect of lands in another village called Tikoni. That had been registered as Original Suit No. 443 of 1928 in the Munsiffs Court at Miraj, and we shall refer to that suit as the Tikoni suit. It appears that the two suits proceeded in that Court in a very leisurely fashion until 29th November 1939, when the Tikoni suit was dismissed. After the dismissal of that suit, the plaintiff made an application on 21st June, 1940, drawing the attention of the Court to the fact that the value of ther of the suit had not been mentioned in the plaint, and that, on a moderate valuation, the disputed land should not be worth less than a minimum of 8 to 10 thousand rupees, and that, therefore, the Court had no pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the suit. The Court allowed the application and directed the plaint to be returned to be presented to the proper Court, on 4th July 1940. The plaint was accordinglyon that very date to the Court of District Judge at Miraj, and the same was numbered as Suit No. 2 of 19403. The original first defendant only contested the suit on a number of grounds including the plea of limitation. By a petition dated 27th October 1942, the defendant brought it to the notice of the Court that the plaintiff despite his knowledge that the value of ther of the suit was far in excess of the amount of jurisdiction of the Munsiffs Court filed the suit in the said Court. The said act of the plaintiff was not at all bona fide .... The facilities as regards limitations etc. which a bona fide suitor would be entitled to cannot, therefore, be afforded to the plaintiff4. After recording evidence and hearing the parties, the larding District Judge, by his judgment and decree dated 12th December 1945 dismissed the suit with costs. On appeal by the defeated plaintiff, during the pendency of the appeal, the State of Bombay was added as the 6th respondent, and the Yuvaraj of Miraj, Madhavrao Narayanrao, son of the Raja Sahib of Miraj, was added as the 7th respondent, as the latter had acquired an interest in the disputed properties by virtue of a grant in his favour. The appeal was ultimately registered as First Appeal No. 104 of 1950, in the High Court of Bombay. A Division Bench of that Court, by its judgment and decree dated 30th November 1951, allowed the appeal and decreed the suit with costs against the first and the 7th respondents. The respondents 6 and 7 aforesaid applied for and obtained the necessary certificate for coming up in appeal to this Court. Hence, these two appeals.

Reasoning:
6. In our opinion, the appellants, contentions based on the provisions of S. 14 of the Limitation Act, are, and the decision of the courts below, granting thet the benefit of that section, must be reversed for the following reasons: Before the promulgation, on 1st January 1926, of the Proclamation by StateKarabhari,Miraj State, the law of limitation in that State, it is common ground, was that the plaintiff had the benefit of the period of 20 years as the period during which a suit for possession after dispossession, could be instituted. By that Proclamation, the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) was made applicable to that State with effect from 1st February 1926, subject to this modification that all suits which would have been in time according to the old law of the State, but would have become barred by limitation as a result of the introduction of the Indian Limitation Act, could be filed upto 31st January 1929, by virtue of certain notification extending the last date for the institution of such suits. Hence the suit filed on that date in the Munsiffs court at Miraj, was admittedly within time, and was subject to the law of limitation under the Indian Limitation Act. When the plaint was returned by the Munsiffs court at Miraj, at the instance of the plaintiff himself on the ground of want of pecuniary jurisdiction, andto the court of the District Judge at Miraj on 4th July 1940, it was, on the face of it, barred by limitation, whether the period of limitation started to run in 1910 or 1915, unless the case is brought within S. 14 of the Limitation ActIt has to be remembered that it is not one of those cases which usually arise upon a revision of the valuation as given in the plaint, on an objection raised by the defendant contesting the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Curiously enough, the defendant had not raised any objection in his written statement to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Apparently, the plaintiff was hard put to it to discover reasons for having the case transferred to another courtThe court, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff himself was responsible for drafting the plaint and for presenting it in court, and that no pleader had any responsibility in the matter. No reason was adduced why, in these circumstances, the value of ther of the suit, was mentioned in the plaint in the Tikoni suit but not in the plaint in respect of the present suit8. There is another serious difficulty in the way of the plaintiff. He has not brought on the record of this case any evidence to show that he was prosecuting the previously instituted suit with due diligence as required by S. 14. He has not adduced in evidence thet or some equivalent evidence of the proceedings in thes court at Miraj, to show that in spite of his due diligence, the suit remained pending for over ten years in that court, before he thought of having the suit tried by a court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, all the conditions necessary to bring the case within S. 14 have not been satisfied by the plaintiff.There could be no doubt about the legal position that the burden lay on the plaintiff to satisfy those conditions in order that he may entitle himself to the deduction of all that period between 31st January 1929, and 4th July 1940. It is also clear that the courts below were in error in expecting the contesting defendant to adduce evidence to the contrary. When the plaintiff has not satisfied the initial burden which lay upon him to bring his case within S. 14, the burden would not shift, if it ever shifted, to the defendant to show the contrary.In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the other contention raised on behalf of the appellants that, even after giving the benefit of S. 14, the suit is still barred under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. This is a serious question which may have to be determined if and when it becomes necessary.