Case: Bar Council of India Vs. Union of India

1. Bar Council of India by means of this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has raised challenge to the vires of Sections 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, 1987 Act) as inserted by the Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002 (for short, 2002 Amendment Act)2. By 2002 Amendment Act, in Section 22 of the 1987 Act, the words Lok Adalat were substituted by Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat and a new Chapter VI-A entitled Pre-litigation Conciliation and Settlement comprising of Sections 22-A to 22-E came to be inserted. In Section 23 of the 1987 Act, the words members of the Lok Adalats were substituted by the words members of the Lok Adalats or the persons constituting Permanent Lok Adalats3. The challenge is principally on the ground that Sections 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E are arbitrary per se; violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are contrary to the rule of law as they deny fair, unbiased and even-handed justice to all.

Reasoning:
32. It is true that the award made by the Permanent Lok Adalat under 1987 Act has to be by majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat. In a given case, it may be that the two non-judicial members disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean that such majority decision lacks in fairness or sense of justice33. There is no inherent right of appeal. Appeal is always a creature of statute and if no appeal is provided to an aggrieved party in a particular statute, that by itself may not render that statute unconstitutional. Section 22-E(1) makes every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under 1987 Act either on merit or in terms of a settlement final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. No appeal is provided from the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat but that, in our opinion, does not render the impugned provisions unconstitutional. In the first place, having regard to the nature of dispute upto a specific pecuniary limit relating to public utility service and resolution of such dispute by the procedure provided in Section 22-C(1) to 22-C(8), it is important that such dispute is brought to an end at the earliest and is not prolonged unnecessarily. Secondly, and more importantly, if at all a party to the dispute has a grievance against the award of Permanent Lok Adalat he can always approach the High Court under its supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. There is no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that in that situation the burden of litigation would be brought back on the High Courts after the award is passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat on merits34. The challenge to the validity of the impugned provisions came up before this Court in S.N. Pandey (supra). A three-Judge Bench of this Court was not persuaded by the challenge and held as under:We have gone through the provisions of the said Chapter which contemplated the setting up of permanent Lok Adalats, for deciding disputes in which public utility services is one of the matters involved. It is quite obvious that the effort of the legislature is to decrease the work load in the Courts by resorting to alternative disputes resolution. Lok Adalat is a mode of dispute resolution which has been in vogue since over two decades. Hundreds of thousands of cases have been settled through this mechanism and is undisputedly a fast means of dispensation of justice. The litigation is brought to a quick end with no further appeals or anguish to the litigants. The constitution of the permanent Lok Adalats mechanism contemplate the judicial officer or a retired judicial officer being there alongwith other persons having adequate experience in the public utility servicesWe do not find any constitutional infirmity in the said legislationThe act ensures that justice will be available to the litigant speedily and impartially. We do emphasis that the persons who are appointed on the Permanent Lok Adalats should be person of integrity and adequate experience. Appropriate rules, inter alia in this regard, no doubt will have to be framed, if not already in place. We upheld the validity of the said Act and hope the Permanent Lok Adalats will be set up at an early date. The Lok Adalats are enacted to Primarily bring about settlement amongst the parties. The parties are normally required to be present in person and since the impugned provisions are in the interest of the litigating public, the Lok Adalats shall perform their duties and will function; even if members of the Bar choose not to appear35. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the disposal of the writ petition filed by S.N. Pandey was in limine and the order passed therein cannot be construed as a binding precedent. It was also submitted that the said decision does not declare any law under Article 141 of the Constitution since points now raised in the present matter, were neither argued nor discussed36. We are not persuaded by the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Although the disposal of writ petition in S.N. Pandey was in limine and the order is brief but the court has disposed of the same on merits. In B. Prabhakar Rao8 , O. Chinnappa Reddy ,J. did observe in para 22 that the dismissal in limine of a writ petition cannot possibly bar the subsequent writ petitions but at the same time he also observed that such a dismissal in limine may inhibit the discretion of the Court. V. Khalid, J. in his supplementing judgment in para 27(6) exposited the position that normally this Court would be disinclined to entertain or to hear petitions raising identical points again where on an earlier occasion, the matter was heard and dismissed. Not that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain such matters, but would normally exercise its discretion against it. We are in complete agreement with the above view of V. Khalid, J. It is against public policy and well defined principles of judicial discretion to entertain or hear petitions relating to same subject matter where the matter was heard and dismissed on an earlier occasion.