Case: Municipal Council Raipur &amp; Anr Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

1. This appeal by special leave arises out of the following facts. Inspector Ahuja inspected the Municipal Council, Raipur, underthe Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 - hereinafter referred to as the Act - and found that 50 transport workers, including drivers, conductors, mechanics etc., had been employed by the Council but the Council had not been registered as required under S. 3 (1) of the Act. He filed a complaint before the Special Magistrate and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, who issued summons to the accused, namely, the Municipal Council and the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Raipur. The accused appeared by counsel and filed preliminary objections. Before the Magistrate two points were taken: (1) that the Municipal Council was not a motor transport undertaking within S. 2 (g) of the Act, and (2) that the Council was exempt under S. 38 of the Act insofar as it uses the vehicles for transporting sick or injured persons and for maintenance of public order, i.e., for transporting night soil and refuse of the town free of charges. The Magistrate accepted these contentions and dismissed the complaint and discharged the accused persons.2. The State of Madhya Pradesh filed a revision before the Sessions Judge, Raipur, who, agreeing with the findings of the Magistrate, dismissed the revision. The State then filed a revision under S. 439, Cr. P. C. Three points were debated before the High Court: (1) whether a revision lay under S. 439, Cr. P. C. The contention was that the accused had been acquitted and not discharged and, therefore, only an appeal under S. 417, Cr. P. C., lay: (2) that the Municipal Council does not fall within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking" in S. 2 (g); and (3) that the transport vehicles owned by the Municipal Council are exempt under S. 38 (1) of the Act.3. The High Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that a revision lay under S. 439, Cr. P. C., because the order passed by the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. On the second point the High Court held that the Municipal Council fell within the definition of the expression "motor transport undertaking". On the third point the High Court held that the vehicles of the Municipal Council did not come within the exemption under S. 38 of the Act.

Reasoning:
Coming to the first point, we agree with the High Court that the order of the Magistrate was an order of discharge and not of acquittal. It is true that it is a summons case and no formal charge is necessary to be framed under S. 242, Cr. P. C., but even so here when the accused appeared, before anything was done the accused filed a preliminary objection and no particulars of the offence of which the accused was charged were ever stated to him.5. Coming to the second point,it seems to us that the High Court was right in holding that the Municipal Council is a motor transport undertaking as defined in theIt seems to us that the accused fell within the definition of a "private carrier" inasmuch as the Council owned transport vehicles and used these vehicles solely for the carriage of goods which are its property. In this case we are not concerned with the second limb of the definition,and the authority cited by the learned counsel for the accused (Mohamed Zafrul v. Birendra Lall, (AIR 1965 Bom 120  )) which dealt with the second limb, is of no assistance to us.We are unable to accept this contention. First, the Act provides for the welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the conditions of their work. Such beneficial Acts are not, as a rule, construed strictly. Secondly, the words of the definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable limitation.It seems to us that by using the word "includes the legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression "motor transport undertaking". The words "private carrier" have been given a specific meaning inthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and it is difficult to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis. Further, S. 38 of the Act, which exempts certain transport vehicles, also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier who is carrying on activities which are not commercial would be included within the expression "motor transportis undoubtedly so but we are unable to appreciate how this would help theare unable to see any analogy between the two definitions. The definition there is quite different and the High Court was of the view that "the scheme of the Act itself shows that what was intended was to regulate, not religious institutions but religious institutions impressed with the character of a public trust."11.Coming to the last point, we agree with the High Court that the words "public order" in S. 38 (1) (ii) do not include the maintenance of publicsee no force in this contention and Ramesh Thappars case, 1950 SCR 594 = (AIR 1950 SC 124  ) does not say so. In our view "Public Order" in this context means public peace and tranquility.We agree with the High Court that the functions of the Municipal Council in carrying night soil and in distributing water do not fall within "maintenance of public order."