Case: R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla Vs. The Union Of India(With Connected Petitions)

1. Pursuant to resolutions passed by the legislatures of several States under Art. 252 cl. (1) of the Constitution, Parliament enacted Prize Competitions Act, (42 of 1955), hereinafter referred to as the Act, and by a notification issued on 31-3-1956, the Central Government brought it into force on 1-4-1956. The petitioners before us are engaged in promoting and conducting prize competitions in different States of India, and they have filed the present petitions under Art. 32 questioning the validity of some of the provisions of the Act and the rules framed thereunder

Reasoning:
.In our judgment in that appeal, we have held that trade and commerce protected by Art.19 (1) (g) and Art.301 are only those activities which could be regarded as lawful trading activities, that gambling is not trade but res extra commercium, and that it does not fall within the purview of those Articles. Following that decision, we must hold that as regards gambling competitions, the petitioners before us cannot seek the protection of Art. 19 (1) (g), and that the question whether the restrictions enacted in SS. 4 and 5 and Rr. 11 and 12 are reasonable and in the interests of the public within Art. 19 (6) does not therefore arise for considerationTo decide the true scope of the present Act, therefore we must have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the legislation and the purposes thereof, the mischief which it intended to suppress and the other provisions of the statute, and construe the language of S. 2 (d) in the light of the indications furnished by them9.Having regard to the circumstances under which the resolutions came to be passed, there cannot be any reasonable doubt that the law which the State legislatures moved Parliament to enact under Art. 252 (1) was one to control and regulate prize competitions of a gambling character. Competitions in which success depended substantially on skill could not have been in the minds of the legislatures which passed those resolutions.Those competitions had not been the subject of any controversy in Court. They had done no harm to the public and had presented no problems to the States, and at no time had there been any legislation directed to regulating them. And if the State legislatures felt that there was any need to regulate even those competitions, they could have themselves effectively done so without resort to the special jurisdiction under Art. 252 (1). It should further be observed that the language of the resolutions is that it is desirable to control competitions. If it was intended that Parliament should legislate also on competitions involving skill, the word control would seem to be not appropriate. While control and regulation would be requisite in the case of gambling, mere regulation would have been sufficient as regards competitions involving skill. The use of the word control which is to be found not only in the resolution but also in the short title and the preamble to the Act appears to us to clearly indicate that it was only competitions of the character dealt with in the Bombay judgment, that were within the contemplation of the legislatureWe must accordingly exclude it from our consideration. But even apart from it, having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion that the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skillThere is nothing in these observations to support the contention of the petitioners that the doctrine of severability applies only when the legislation is in excess of the competence of the legislature quoad its subject-matter, and not when it infringes some constitutional prohibitionsthe principle of severability is applicable even when the partial invalidity of the Act arises by reason of its contravention of constitutional limitations. It is argued for the petitioners that in that case the legislature had through the rules framed under the statute classified medicinal and toilet preparations as a separate category, and had thus evinced an intention to treat them as severable, that no similar classification had been made in the present Act, and that therefore the decision in question does not help the respondent. But this is to take too narrow a view of the decision. The doctrine of severability rests, as will presently be shown, on a presumed intention of the legislature that if a part of a statute turns out to be void, that should not affect the validity of the rest of it, and that that intention is to be ascertained from the terms of the statute. It is the true nature of the subject-matter of the legislation that is the determining factor, and while a classification made in the statute might go far to support a conclusion in favour of severability, the absence of it does not necessarily preclude itThe weight to be attached to a classification of subjects made in the statute itself cannot, in our opinion, be greater than that of a severability clause. If the decision in 1951 S. C. R. 682: (A. I. R. 1951 5. C. 318) (F), is examined in the light of the above discussion, it will be seen that while there is a reference in the judgment to the fact that medicinal and toilet preparations are treated separately by the legislature, that is followed by an independent finding that they are severable. In other words, the decision as to severability was reached on the separability in fact of the subjects dealt with by the legislation and the classification made in the rules merely furnished support to itwill be useful for the determination of this question to refer to certain rules of construction laid down by the American Courts, where the question of severability has been the subject of consideration in numerous authorities. They may be summarised as follows:4. Likewise, when the valid and invalid parts of a statute are independent and do not form part of a scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated as to be in substance different from what it was when it emerged out of the legislature, then also it will be rejected in its entirety5. The separability of the valid and invalid provisions of a statute does not depend on whether the law as enacted in the same section or different section; (Vide Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, vol. 1, pp. 361-362); it is not the form, but the substance of the matter that is material, and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole and of the setting of the relevant provision therein6. If after the invalid portion is expunged from the statute what remains cannot be enforced without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck down as void, as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation. Vide Sutherland on Statutory Construction, vol. 2, p. 1947. In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to take into account the history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it. Vide Sutherland on Statutory Construction, vol. 2, pp. 177-178Applying these principles to the present Act, it will not be questioned that competitions in which success depends to a substantial extent on skill and competitions in which it does not so depend, form two distinct and separate categories. The difference between the two classes of competitions is as clear-cut as that between commercial and wagering contracts. On the facts there might be difficulty in deciding whether a given competitions falls within one category or not; but when its true character is determined, it must fail either under the one or the other. The distinction between the two classes of competitions has long been recognised in the legislative practice of both the United Kingdom and this country, and the Courts have, time and again, pointed out the characteristic features which differentiate them. And if we are now to ask ourselves the question would Parliament have enacted the law in question if it had known that it would fail as regards competitions involving skill, there can be no doubt, having regard to the history of the legislation, as to what our answer would be. Nor does the restriction of the impugned provisions to competitions of a gambling character affect either the texture or the colour of the Act; nor do the provisions require to be touched and re-written before they could be applied to them. They will squarely apply to them on their own terms and in their true spirit, and form a code complete in themselves with reference to the subject.The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the impugned provisions, assuming that they apply by virtue of the definition in S. 2 (d) to all kinds of competitions, are severable in their application to competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial extent on skill.