Case: Mohan Singh Vs. Subhash Chander Julka

2. In the view that we take in the case, it is not necessary to give the facts in detail as they are already contained in the order of the Rent Controller. Thehad filed the petition for eviction of the appellant on the ground of his bona fide requirement in respect of the premises which consist of two rooms, oneopen verandah, courtyard, bathroom, latrine, kitchen on the first floor and barsati on the second floor with open terrace. The eviction was sought for in respect only of the first floor and a portion of the second floor, the ground floor being occupied by thehimself. The property in dispute was originally evacuee property but subsequently theappears to have acquired the property in dispute from the custodian. The appellant filed an application before the Rent Controller for leave to defend the suit under the provisions of Sectionof the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Rent Act) but the Rent Controller rejected the application as it found that no arguable points were raised in the defence by the appellants. Against that order, the appellant went up to the High Court in revision which set aside the order of the Rent Controller and the decree for eviction passed by him and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for permitting the appellant to defend the suit. Thereafter, the appellant filed his written statement and took various pleas challenging the title of the respondent as also the bona fide requirement alleged by the landlord. The Rent Controller, after taking the evidence of the parties as required under Sectionfound that the plaintiff respondent had proved his case of bona fide requirement and consequently passed a decree for eviction of the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal which having been dismissed, the appellant moved the High Court in revision which also was summarily dismissed and hence this appeal.

Reasoning: 6. The Controller has rightly pointed out that a mere clerical omission of the barsati in the second floor would not have the effect of wiping out the extent of the permission granted by the Controller in respect of the premises in dispute. The Controller has also pointed out that it was not disputed before him that the permission was actually sought before the competent authority only for the premises in dispute. Furthermore, the respondent has filed a plan of the premises in dispute which was filed before the Rent Controller and the one filed before the competent authority under the Slums Act, and on a comparison of the two plans, we find that they are absolutely identical. In these circumstances, therefore, the order of the competent authority has to be read in the light of the pleadings before him and the map filed regarding the premises for which permission for eviction was sought. If the competent authority mentioned in its order that the permission is granted for a portion of the property, what it really meant was that as the ground floor was occupied by the respondent himself, the premises in dispute constituted only a portion of the entire property. The order of the competent authority, therefore, in the circumstances, must be clearly relatable to the premises in dispute which only was for consideration before him and the competent authority did not give any finding that he wanted to confine or restrict his order to a part of the premises by splitting the premises into two parts so as to grant permission in respect of one and not to the other. Thus, in view of the finding of fact given by the Rent Controller which has not been shown to be incorrect before us, it is not possible for us to hold that the competent authority had given permission only for a portion of the premises in dispute and not for the entire premises. In this view of the matter, the contention raised by the appellant must fail and is accordingly overruled.