Case: Moti Das Vs. S.P. Sahi, The Special Officer In Charge of Hindu Religious Trusts and Ors

1. This is a batch of five appeals which have been heard together and the principal question for decision in these appeals is the constitutional validity of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (Bihar I of 1951), hereinafter referred to as the Act. Four of these appeals arise out of writ proceedings then in the High Court of Patna on petition made under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. One of them, namely, Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1955, arises out of a suit which was originally, instituted in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Patna but was later transferred to the High Court by an order made by it under Art. 228 of the Constitution. The petitioners in the writ petitions and the plaintiffs in the suit challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on certain grounds to which we shall presently refer. The petitions and the suit were contested by the State of Bihar and/or the President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts; who are now respondents before us.The High Court in three separate judgments, two dated 5-10-1953, and the third dated 8-10-1953, held that the Act was a valid piece of legislation and on that main finding dismissed the writ petitions and the suit. The petitioners and the plaintiffs, appellants before us, applied for and obtained certificates from the High Court under Art. 132 of the Constitution to the effect that the cases involved substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution and the appeals have been brought to this Court in pursuance of those certificates.3. The facts lie within a very narrow compass. In Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1955 the appellant is Mahant Moti Das, and he alleged that he was the Mahant of a math or asthal situate in village Parbatta, District Monghyr, in Bihat that he was a follower of the religion founded by Sri Kabir Sahib, that the properties of the asthal were treated as private properties of the mahants and that the President of the Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts constituted under the Act had no authority to serve him with a notice under S. 59 of the Act, inasmuch as the Act was ultra vires and unconstitutional and, in any event, did not apply to his math or asthal. In Civil Appeal No. 226 of 1955 the appellant Mahant Ram Das similarly alleged that he was the Mahant of a math or asthal situate in village Bhuthari in the same district of Monghyr, that he was a "bairagi sadhu" and follower of Ramanandi Laskari Sri Vaishuava Sampradaya, that he was the absolute owner of the properties belonging to the math and that the President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, had no authority to issue a notice to him asking him to furnish statements and accounts of the properties in his possession. In Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1955 the appellants made similar allegations in their plaint and challenged the "vires" of the Act mentioning as their cause of action the date on which the assent of the President of India in the Act was first published in the Bihar Gazette. In Civil Appeal No. 229 of 1955 the appellant Mahant Mahabir Das stated that he was the Mahant of an asthal known as Bisanpur Asthal situate in the self-same district. He also received a notice from the President, Bihar State Board of Religious Trusts, to furnish statements and accounts, and he challenged the vires in the Act on similar grounds. In Civil Appeal No. 248 of 1955 Mahant Ram Krishna Das alleged that the temple in question, known as Bhikam Das Thakurbari in the town of Patna, was constructed by one Benidasji with his own money and he installed certain deities therein. The allegation was that the temple and the properties thereof did not constitute a religious trust within the meaning of that expression in the Act and further that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it infringed some of his fundamental rights. The defence in all these cases was that the Act was valid, and applied to the asthals or temple in question and the properties thereof.

Reasoning: It is enough to say that it is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation, and in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases such as, geographical, or according to objects or occupations and the like. The decisions of this Court further establish that there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional guarantee; that it must be, presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; and further that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. It is not disputed before us, and this has been pointed out by the High Court, that there are some differences between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains in some of the essential details of the faith which they profess and the religious practices they observe; the Sikhs have no caste or priests, though they have grantis who officiate at marriages and other ceremonies; they do not believe in the Vedas, Puranas or Shastras, at least not in the same way as the Hindus believe in them.The Jains also do not recognise the divine authority of the Vedas and do not practise sradhs or ceremonies of the dead, nor do they recognise the spiritual authority of the Brahmins (Maines Hindu Law., 11th Edition, p. 82). It has been further pointed out that there are also organisational differences in the matter of religious trusts between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains. There are not many Sikh religious trusts in Bihar, and their organisation is essentially different. Jains consist of two main branches - Swetambar Jains and Digambar Jains - and each branch has a separate central organisation. Section 8 of the Act recognises these differences; for example, there is an assembly of Swetambar Jains known as Shree Sangh and under S. 8 (2) (c) of the Act the Shree Sangh is entitled to elect five persons to the Board of Swetambar lain Religious Trust. Similarly, Digambar Jains also have an assembly known as the Digambar Samaj and under S. 8 (3) (c) of the Act this assembly is entitled to elect five persons to the Board for Digambar Jain Religious Trust.In view of these differences it cannot be said that in the matter of religious trusts in the State of Bihar, Sikhs, Hindus and Jains are situated alike or that the needs of the Jains and Hindus are the same in the matter of the administration of their respective religious Trusts; therefore, according to the well established principles laid down by this Court with regard to legislative classification, it was open to the Bihar Legislature to exclude Sikhs who might have been in no need of protection and to distinguish between Hindus and Jains. Therefore, the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that the several provisions of the Act contravene Art. 14 is devoid of anyare other sections in the chapter which give the Board power to enter into contracts and to borrow money etc., for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act or to give effect to the provisions thereof. Under S. 58 every trustee must carry out all directions which may from time to time be issued to him by the Board under any of the provisions of the Act. The powers given under S. 28 include the power to prepare and settle the budget, to cause inspection to be made of the property and the office of any religious trust, to call for information, reports, returns etc., to give directions for the proper administration of a religious trust in accordance with the law governing such trusts and the wishes of the founder, to remove a trustee from his office in certain circumstances, and to control and administer the trust fund etc. The argument before us is that the position of a mahant or shebait of a Hindu religious trust is a combination of office and proprietary right and under the provisions of the Act the mahant or shebait practically loses his right of management and is reduced to the position of a mere servant of the Board; this, it is contended, is violative of the appellants fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (f)are of the view, in agreement with that of the High Court, that the restrictions imposed by the Act on the power of the trustees are really intended, as the preamble of the Act states, for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts. It is indeed true that the Act provides a better and more speedy remedy for the enforcement of the obligations and duties imposed on the trustees than the lengthy and cumbrous procedure of a suit under S. 92 of the Civil Procedureanswer to this submission is twofold : we have pointed out earlier that the power to alter the budget is subject to Cl. (6) of S. 60 of the Act and the Board is not authorised to alter or modify the budget in a manner or to an extent inconsistent with the wishes of the founder or with the provisions of the Act. The power to give directions to the trustee is also subject to a similar restrictions, namely, the directions must be for the proper administration of the religious trust in accordance with the law governing such trust and the wishes of the founder in so far as such wishes can be ascertained and are not repugnant to such law. The keynote of all the relevant provisions of the Act is the due observance of the objects of the religious trust and not its breach or violation. Secondly, as was observed in 1954 SCR 1005     at p. 1030 : (AIR 1954 SC 282   at p. 292),"an apprehension that the powers conferred . . .. .... may be abused in individual cases does not make the provision itself bad or invalid inthat matters of religion include practices which a religious denomination regards as part of its religion, none of the provisions of the Act interfere with such practices; nor do the provisions of the Act seek to divert the trust property or funds for purposes other than those indicated by the founder of the trust or those established by usage obtaining in a particular institution. On the contrary; the provisions of the Act seek to implement the purposes for which the trust was created and prevent mismanagement and waste by the trustee. In other words, the Act by its several provisions seeks to fulfil rather than defeat the trust.In our opinion, there is no substance in the argument that the provisions of the Act contravene Arts. 25 and 26 of thedo not think that S. 55 (2) of the Act overrides or is intended to override Art. 133 or any other Article of the Constitution relating to appeals to the Supreme Court. Such appeals must undoubtedly lie to the Supreme Court, provided the necessary requirements for such appeals are fulfilled. It is, we think, obvious that the Act cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Supremein these cases there are no materials on which the question as to the nature of the trust can be determined, though in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 : (AIR 1959 SC 951  ), in which also judgment is being delivered today, we have held that having regard to the preamble to the Act, the provisions in S. 3 and the provisions of(5) of S. 4 the definition cause of religious trust in the Act must mean public trusts express or constructive, recognised by Hindu law to be religious, pious or charitable. That finding, however, is of no assistance to the appellants in the present cases. The fate of these cases must depend on the sole question whether the Act is constitutionally valid or not. We have held that the Act is constitutionally valid.