Case: Kunjukutty Sahib &amp; Others Vs. State of Kerala &amp; Others

1. These are 43 appeals (C. As. Nos. 143, 274, 309 and 203 to 242 of 1971), 40 appeals (C. As. Nos. 203 to 242 of 1971) being by the State of Kerala and the Land Board and the remaining three by some of the writ petitioners in the High Court. Most of the material provisions of the amended Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act No. 1 of 1964 (hereinafter called the impugned Act) were challenged in the High Court as violative of Arts. 14, 19, 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution. Quite a number of Writ petitions, however, assailed the entire impugned Act on that score. The sole defence in sustaining the constitutional validity of the impugned Act was based on Article 31-A of the Constitution. The High Court struck down several provisions of the impugned Act. In the State appeals (C. As. Nos. 203 to 242 of 1971) the judgment of the High Court is questioned only in so far as it struck down Section 73 and explanation to Section 85 (1) of the impugned Act.

Reasoning: To reduce the indebtedness of the tenants appreciably is a reasonable restriction on the right of the creditors and the law thus providing for amelioration of indebtedness of tenants deserves to be upheld as constitutional. We grant that amelioration of indebtedness of tenants is a laudable and desirable object. But the person to whom the arrears of rent are due is also entitled to seek protection of his legitimate right and if the acquisition of arrears of rent is outside the protection of Art. 31-A then the impugned provision can not but be held invalid. It prima facie partakes of the character of forfeiture or confiscation of the discharged arrears. Article 39 of the Constitution to which reference was made can be implemented by other permissible means without violating or abridging the just and legitimate rights of those to whom the arrears of rents are due. Section 73, therefore, in our opinion, was rightly struck down by the majority opinionWe grant that amelioration of indebtedness of tenants is a laudable and desirable object. But the person to whom the arrears of rent are due is also entitled to seek protection of his legitimate right and if the acquisition of arrears of rent is outside the protection of Art. 31-A then the impugned provision can not but be held invalid. It prima facie partakes of the character of forfeiture or confiscation of the discharged arrears. Article 39 of the Constitution to which reference was made can be implemented by other permissible means without violating or abridging the just and legitimate rights of those to whom the arrears of rents are due. Section 73, therefore, in our opinion, was rightly struck down by the majority opinionIt is clear that by virtue of the second proviso to Art. 31-A (1) land within the ceiling limit is expressly protected against acquisition by the State unless the law relating to such acquisition provides for compensation which is not less than its market value. No attempt was made to take the impugned explanation out of this constitution inhibition. We, therefore, do not find any reason to differ from the conclusions of the High CourtIt was not disputed that the ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act was within the competence of the legislature to fix; nor was it contended that the ceiling fixed by the original unamended Act by itself debarred the legislature from further reducing the ceiling limit so fixed. Prior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within the ceiling limit fixed thereby could be acquired without payment of compensation according to the market value, but once ceiling limit was changed by the amended Act the second Proviso to Art. 31-A (1) must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act. The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future the moment it was replaced by the amended Act. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law at the given time. It is true that the new ceiling was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of that ceiling limit. But it was not contended that a law so fixing the ceiling limit and acquiring the land in excess would offend any provision of the Constitution. This submission must, therefore, be rejectedIt is agreed at the bar that there is no case before us on the facts and circumstances of which this rider can operate. It is also stated atTo encourage trespass by conferring rights on trespassers, even on trespassers against whom there is a decree for possession, cannot, it is said, be regarded as a measure of agrarian reform. That might well be so, but, we are not called upon to consider the validity of the proviso in question since, so far as the cases before us are concerned, the application of the proviso is a mere theoretical possibility. In none of the cases is it said that there is any person claiming the benefit of the proviso against the petitioner concerned, and the challenge to the proviso must be left to be decided in a case where the question actually arisesWe should, however, like to make it clear that we express no opinion where the provisions of this Act are utilised for lands which are not agricultural lands and do not constitute estates nor where the beneficiary happens to be a person not substantially connected with agriculture, occupying non-agricultural land or where the facts are not covered by the general test laid down in the case of Ranjit Singh (supra)This point was not canvassed even in the High Court. This Court, as a rule, does not decide questions which are not necessary for determining or resolving the actual controversy arising in the case.Such opinions partake of the nature of obiter. Without deciding any hypothetical question posed before us we consider it sufficient for our present purpose to point out that extinguishment or modification of landlords rights vis-a-vis the tenant would also be within the ambit of Article 31-A of the Constitution if otherwise it is related to agrarian reforms. Section 72 is accordingly not liable to be struck down on this ground.