Case: G. V. Gunayya Chetty &amp; Anr Vs. V. Dasaratharamaiah &amp; Ors

3. The Government, by a notification issued under Section 3, sub-section (3) of the Act, declared the area comprised in Machilipatnam, Badar and Divi taluks to be notified area for the, purposes of the Act. This was followed by a notification dated 30th October, 1969, constituting a Market Committee for the notified area under Section 4, sub-section (1) of the Act. The Market Committee was to consist of twelve members to be appointed in the manner set out in Section 5, sub-section (1) of the Act. Six out of these twelve members were nominated by the Government from among the growers of Agricultural produce and owners of livestock under Section 5, subsection (1), clause (i), two were nominated by the Government from among traders under the proviso to Section 5, Subsection (1), clause (iv) and the Agriculture Extension Officer. Movva was nominated by the Government as departmental representative under Section 5, subsection (1), clause (iii) (a). It does not appear from the record whether the other three members were appointed as contemplated by Section 5, sub-section (1). clauses (ii) end (iii) (b). The Chairman of the Market Committee was elected on 24th January, 1970 and the term of office of the members of the Market Committee was, therefore, three years from that date as provided in Section 5, sub-section (3).4. It, however, appears that in the case of a market Committee constituted areas, writ petitions were filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of the nominations made by the Government under Section 5, subsection (1), clause (i) and clause (iv) proviso. The ground of challenge in regard to the nominations made under Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (i) was that the Government had not complied with the mandatory requirement of that provision which enjoined it to consult the Director of Marketing before nominating members from among the growers of agricultural produce and owners of live-stock in the notified area and in regard to nominations made under the proviso to Section 5, subsection (1), clause (iv), the challenge was based on the ground that the nominations made under the proviso to Section 5, subsection (1). clause (iv) the challenge was based on the ground that the nominations were made by the Government outside the panel of traders furnished by the Director of Marketing. These grounds of challenge were upheld by the High Court in a decision reported in Donda Rama Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh. AIR 1971 Andh Pra 353 and it that the nominations made under Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (i) and the proviso, to clause (iv) were in contravention of those respective provisions and were accordingly invalid. Though this decision was given in regard to the Market Committees of other notified areas, it equally applied to the Market Committee constituted for the notified area of Machilipatnam, Badar and Divi taluks and hence it was obvious that the nominations made by the Government from among the growers of agricultural produce and owners of livestock under Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (i) and from among traders under the proviso to Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (iv) were invalid. But that would leave only one or at the highest four validly appointed members on the Market Committee and the quorum for a meeting of the Market Committee under Rule 29 of the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural Produce and Livestock Markets Rules, 1969 made under Section 33 of the Act being seven, it would be incompetent to the Market Committee to exercise its powers and discharge its functions. The Government, therefore, after giving an opportunity to the existing members of the Market Committee to be heard, passed an order dated November 23, 1971, under Section 22, sub-section (1) of the Act superseding the Market Committee for a period of six months on the ground that it was not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by or under the Act The consequence of this supersession was that all the members of the Market Committee were deemed to have vacated their offices and all the assets vested in the Market Committee, subject to all its liabilities, became vested in the Government Vide sub-section (2) of Section 22. The Government by another order of the same date made under Section 22, sub-section (3), clause (a) appointed the Assistant Director of Marketing to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Market Committee during the period of its supersession. It may be stated that none of the persons affected challenged the order of supersession made by the Government and it does not form the subject-matter of challenge even in the present appeal.5. It appears that the initial period of six month for which the Market Committee was superseded was further extended and just before the expiration of the extended period of supersession, the Government made an order dated 7th December, 1972, constituting a new Market Committee by nominating six person out of growers of agricultural produce and owners of livestock under Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (i), the President of the Divisema Co-operative Marketing Society, Avanigadda under Section 5, subsection (1), clause (ii), the Agricultural Extension Officer, Movva as departmental representative under Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (iii) (a) and three persons representing traders under the proviso to sub-clause (iv) of Section 5, sub-section (1). Though Divi taluk formed part of the notified area, no grower or trader from Divi Taluk was nominated on the Market Committee; all the six representatives of growers be- representatives of traders belonged to Machilipatnam taluk. Respondents Nos.1 and 2, who were two of the traders from Divi Taluk, therefore, filed Writ Petn. No. 1963 of 1973 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the validity of the order dated 7th December, 1972, in so far as it nominated representatives of traders on the Market Committee under the Proviso to clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5. The argument of respondents Nos.1 and 2 was that it was the main part of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 which applied and not the Proviso and therefore, the Government was not entitled to nominate representatives of traders but they were liable to be elected by traders licensed under Section 7, sub-section (1) from amongst themselves. The appellant who was one of the representatives nominated by the Government, resisted this argument and defended the order dated 7th December, 1972. The learned Single Judge, who heard the writ petition in the first instance, rejected the contention of respondents Nos.1 and 2 and held that when the Government constituted the new Market Committee by issuing the order dated 7th December, 1972 it constituted the Market Committee for the first time, and therefore, under the proviso to Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (iv) the Government was entitled to nominate members from out of the panel of traders furnished by the Director of Marketing and the order dated 7 th December, 1972, did not suffer from any infirmity. On this view, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.6. Respondents Nos.1 and 2 being aggrieved by the order made by the learned Single Judge preferred an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench disagreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge and held that when the Government constituted the new Market Committee by its order dated 7th December, 1972 on the expiration of the period of supersession of the earlier Market Committee, it did not constitute a new Market Committee for the first time, and therefore, the case was governed, not by the proviso, but by the main part of Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (iv) and the order dated 7th December. 1972, was accordingly invalid in so far as it nominated three members front among traders purporting to act under the proviso to Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (iv). The appellant thereupon brought the present appeal with special leave obtained from this Court.

Reasoning: The answer to the question depends upon whether the Market Committee was constituted for the first time when the Government made the order dated 7th December, 1972. The main part of Cl. (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 enacts that, as a general rule, members representing traders are to be elected "by the persons licensed under sub-section (1) of Section 7 in the notified area from among themselves". But the licence contemplated under Sub-section(1) of Section 7 is a licence to be granted by the Market Committee and therefore, it must follow a fortiori that when a market committee is to be constituted for the first time, there would be no "persons licensed under subsection (1) of Section 7 in existence who could elect members on the Market Committee under the main part of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5. That is why the proviso was enacted to deal with such a situation. It says that when a Market Committee being constituted for the first time, the elective method being obviously inapplicable, members representing traders shall be nominated by the Government in the manner set out there.Let is first take a case where a market committee has been constituted for a notified area for first time and the term of office of its members, whether original or extended, expires. The Government is then required to reconstitute the market committee under S. 5. Reconstitute, according to its plain natural connotation means nothing else than constitute again. The Government has, therefore, to constitute the market committee again. That would clearly be a new market committee, but it would not be a market committee constituted for the first time, for there was already an earlier market committee of which the term of office of membership came to an end by efflux of time. The proviso to clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 can, therefore, obviously, on its plain language have no application in such a case. The raison detre for the necessity of nomination under the proviso would also not bemarket committee which is constituted by the Government on the expiration of the period of supersession must necessarily be a new market committee vis-a-vis the earlier one which is superseded. But that does not mean that it is a market committee constituted for the first time. It would indeed be doing violence to the language of the proviso to say that such a market committee is one constituted for the first time for a notified area, when there was already an earlier market committee constituted for the same notified area, though it was subsequently superseded. There is no scope here for verbalthis question is asked, the answer is simple and self-evident. When there is a market committee constituted for a notified area and it is superseded and on the expiry of its supersession, a new market committee is constituted by the Government, it is impossible to see how it can be said that the new market committee is a market committee constituted for the first time for this notified area. Whether a market committee is constituted for the first time or not would depend off the question whether there was an earlier market committee for the same notified area or not and not on the question whether it is a new market committee constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 4, or a market committee reconstituted under Section 6.10. Here in the present case, there was a market committee constituted by the Government for the notified area of Machilipatnam Bandar and Divi taluka under the notification dated 30th October, 1969 and this market committee functioned, until it was superseded by the order dated 23rd November, 1971. It may be reiterated once again that the supersession of this market committee on the ground that by reason of want of sufficient members to constitute quorum, it was not competent to perform the duties imposed on it by or under the Act, was not challenged before us and we must therefore, proceed on the basis that it was a market committee which had existence until it was superseded and it was not non- est ab initio. When, therefore, the Government made the order dated 7th December,1972 on the expiration of the period of supersession of this market committee, it undoubtedly constituted a new market committee - new vis-a-vis the old which was superseded - but that was not a market committee constituted for the first time for the notified area of Machilipatnam, Bandar and Divi taluka. There were already an earlier market committee for this notified area which was superseded and this was a second market committee constituted for this notified area on the expiration of the period of supersession of the earlier one The Proviso to clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 had, therefore no application and the Government was not entitled to nominate members representing traders on the market committee constituted by it under the order dated 7th December, 1972. It was the main part of clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 which applied and so far as representation of traders was concerned, "persons licensed under sub-section (1) of Section 7 in the notified area" were entitled to elect members from among themselves. We must, therefore, hold that the Division Bench of the High Court was right in taking the view that the order dated 7th December, 1972, was invalid in so far as it purported to nominate three members from among traders under the proviso to clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5.