Case: City Montessori School Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Others

2. Appellant runs an educational institution situated at 11, Station Road in the town of Lucknow. The premises belong to one Smt. Urmila Bhalla and Smt. Sheela Kapoor. It measured 23,000 sq. ft. of land. The land together with constructions thereupon measuring about 16,000 sq. ft. was given in tenancy in favour of the appellant. The rest of the area, namely, 6,000 sq. ft. was given in tenancy to Late Mr. N.K. Bhargava (predecessor-in-interest of Respondent No.8.3. Allegedly, appellant became a defaulter in payment of rent. A suit for ejectment was filed by the landladies resulting in a decree for eviction passed against it by the learned Civil Judge, Lucknow by a judgment and decree dated 9.11.1970. A first appeal and a second appeal preferred there against were dismissed by orders 4.5.1971 and 13.7.1976. The school, however, sent a requisition before the State of Uttar Pradesh for acquiring the entire 23,000/- sq. ft. of land on or about 22.7.1976. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity called and referred to as ‘the said Act) was issued pursuant thereto on or about 7.9.1976 and published in the Official Gazette on 6.10.1979. A declaration in terms of Section 6 of the Act was issued in respect of the entire land measuring 23,000 sq. ft on 6.10.1979.4. Shri N.K. Bhargawa, predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents filed a writ petition challenging the legality and/or validity of the said notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. A Division Bench of the said Court, by a judgment and order dated 26.5.1998 found the said notifications under Sections 4 and 6 to be unsustainable and quashed the same, inter alia,learned counsel for the respondent Society submitted that since the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector does not have the character of judicial proceedings in the formal sense, therefore, it was for the petitioner to pursue his objections in the right earnest and demand a hearing. The submission is devoid of merit because it is for the Collector to accord a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the affected party and not for the later to demand it as held by the apex court in the matter of Farid Ahmed versus Ahmedabad Municipal Committee, AIR 1976 SC 2095 .In his bid to wriggle out of the embarrassing situation the learned counsel then submitted that since at a later stage the land owners, who should have been the primarily aggrieved party, themselves acquiesced in the acquisition by withdrawing the compensation in early 1987 without any objection and refrained from questioning the vires of the acquisition at any stage, therefore, the petition itself should be thrown out as having become redundant or infructuous. We are not impressed with the submission firstly because as discussed hereinbefore, independent of the landowners, the petitioner being a lawful lessee on a part of the acquired area had his own locus standi to challenge the acquisition and secondly because the subsequent acquiescence of the land owners to an acquisition conceived and executed in illegality would lead its beneficiary nowhere. Hence for the reasons recorded above, the impugned acquisition being unsustainable requires to be and is accordingly set aside. Resultantly, the petition is allowed and both the notifications u/ss. 4 as well as 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 9.10.1976 and 6.10.1979 respectively contained in annexures 1 and 5 are quashed.The landladies were, however, not impleaded as parties in the said writ application. They, in the meanwhile, entered into a settlement with the appellant. Three special leave petitions were filed against the said judgment and order dated 26.5.1998 before this Court by, i.e., (1) State of Uttar Pradesh; (2) City Montessori School; and (3) Uttar Pradesh Parents Association. An interim order was passed on 3.8.1998 directing the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the possession.6. Indisputably, during the pendency of the said special leave petitions, the State of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification denotifying the 6,000 square ft. of land in purported exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Act. There appears to be some dispute as to whether the said notification was issued at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh or on the basis of oral observations made by this Court. The proceeding-sheet dated 6.3.2003 reads is asRai Prakash Gupta, learned counsel started his arguments at 11.30 AM and concluded at 12.40 PM. Thereafter, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel addressed the Court upto 2.35 PM. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel started his arguments and was on his legs when the Court rose for the day. The matters remained part-heard.List on 21.04.2003 at 2.00 PM as part-heard.Learned counsel appearing for the State of U.P. is directed to make available the entire record of land acquisition on the adjourned date of hearing.Written submissions, if any, be filed on or before 15.04.2003.We may place on record that the contesting respondents herein contend that the matter was adjourned in view of oral observations made by this Court to the effect that ‘the contesting respondent should not have any objection if the High Courts judgment is affirmed to the extent of 6,000 sq. ft. of land. The State of Uttar Pradesh thereafter affirmed an affidavit stating therein that in terms of such observations made by this Court, a proposal was initiated for denotification of 6,000 sq. ft. of the total area of the land. It wasto file affidavit dated 18th March, 2002 shown to the Court wherein it is stated that the State Government is proposing to denotify the area occupied by the respondents from out of the total land acquired. We adjourn this matter to 20th July, 2004.As would appear from the affidavit affirmed by Shri Shashank Bhargava, the matter was listed on 21.7.2004 but was adjourned for two months. The matter was again adjourned on 21.9.2004 for a further period of three months taking note of the fact that the State Government had proposed to denotify the area occupied by the respondent from out of the total land acquired. In this connection, respondents havewas stated to us that the State Government was proposing to denotify the area occupied by the Respondents from out of the total land acquired. Even though decision has been taken, till date the denotification has not taken place. We grant one final opportunity and adjourn these Appeals for three months to enable the Government to denotify the area occupied by the Respondents. In the event if it is not denotified by the next date, the Chief Secretary to remain present in this Court personally.A notification was issued under Section 48 on 5.11.2004. The judgment of this Court in the Civil appeal since reported in [(2005) 3 SCC 444] was pronounced on 22.2.2005. Indisputably, however, appellant herein filed a writ application questioning the said notification dated 5.11.2004 before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said writ application has been dismissed.Appellant runs an educational institution situated at 11, Station Road in the town of Lucknow. The premises belong to one Smt. Urmila Bhalla and Smt. Sheela Kapoor. It measured 23,000 sq. ft. of land. The land together with constructions thereupon measuring about 16,000 sq. ft. was given in tenancy in favour of the appellant. The rest of the area, namely, 6,000 sq. ft. was given in tenancy to Late Mr. N.K. Bhargava (predecessor-in-interest of Respondent No.8.3. Allegedly, appellant became a defaulter in payment of rent. A suit for ejectment was filed by the landladies resulting in a decree for eviction passed against it by the learned Civil Judge, Lucknow by a judgment and decree dated 9.11.1970. A first appeal and a second appeal preferred there against were dismissed by orders 4.5.1971 and 13.7.1976. The school, however, sent a requisition before the State of Uttar Pradesh for acquiring the entire 23,000/- sq. ft. of land on or about 22.7.1976. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity called and referred to as ‘the said Act) was issued pursuant thereto on or about 7.9.1976 and published in the Official Gazette on 6.10.1979. A declaration in terms of Section 6 of the Act was issued in respect of the entire land measuring 23,000 sq. ft on 6.10.1979.4. Shri N.K. Bhargawa, predecessor-in-interest of the contesting respondents filed a writ petition challenging the legality and/or validity of the said notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. A Division Bench of the said Court, by a judgment and order dated 26.5.1998 found the said notifications under Sections 4 and 6 to be unsustainable and quashed the same, inter alia,learned counsel for the respondent Society submitted that since the proceedings before the Land Acquisition Collector does not have the character of judicial proceedings in the formal sense, therefore, it was for the petitioner to pursue his objections in the right earnest and demand a hearing. The submission is devoid of merit because it is for the Collector to accord a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the affected party and not for the later to demand it as held by the apex court in the matter of Farid Ahmed versus Ahmedabad Municipal Committee, AIR 1976 SC 2095 .In his bid to wriggle out of the embarrassing situation the learned counsel then submitted that since at a later stage the land owners, who should have been the primarily aggrieved party, themselves acquiesced in the acquisition by withdrawing the compensation in early 1987 without any objection and refrained from questioning the vires of the acquisition at any stage, therefore, the petition itself should be thrown out as having become redundant or infructuous. We are not impressed with the submission firstly because as discussed hereinbefore, independent of the landowners, the petitioner being a lawful lessee on a part of the acquired area had his own locus standi to challenge the acquisition and secondly because the subsequent acquiescence of the land owners to an acquisition conceived and executed in illegality would lead its beneficiary nowhere. Hence for the reasons recorded above, the impugned acquisition being unsustainable requires to be and is accordingly set aside. Resultantly, the petition is allowed and both the notifications u/ss. 4 as well as 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 9.10.1976 and 6.10.1979 respectively contained in annexures 1 and 5 are quashed.The landladies were, however, not impleaded as parties in the said writ application. They, in the meanwhile, entered into a settlement with the appellant. Three special leave petitions were filed against the said judgment and order dated 26.5.1998 before this Court by, i.e., (1) State of Uttar Pradesh; (2) City Montessori School; and (3) Uttar Pradesh Parents Association. An interim order was passed on 3.8.1998 directing the parties to maintain status quo with regard to the possession.6. Indisputably, during the pendency of the said special leave petitions, the State of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification denotifying the 6,000 square ft. of land in purported exercise of its power under Section 48 of the Act. There appears to be some dispute as to whether the said notification was issued at the instance of the State of Uttar Pradesh or on the basis of oral observations made by this Court. The proceeding-sheet dated 6.3.2003 reads is asi Prakash Gupta, learned counsel started his arguments at 11.30 AM and concluded at 12.40 PM. Thereafter, Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel addressed the Court upto 2.35 PM. Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel started his arguments and was on his legs when the Court rose for the day. The matters remained part-heard.List on 21.04.2003 at 2.00 PM as part-heard.Learned counsel appearing for the State of U.P. is directed to make available the entire record of land acquisition on the adjourned date of hearing.Written submissions, if any, be filed on or before 15.04.2003.e may place on record that the contesting respondents herein contend that the matter was adjourned in view of oral observations made by this Court to the effect that ‘the contesting respondent should not have any objection if the High Courts judgment is affirmed to the extent of 6,000 sq. ft. of land. The State of Uttar Pradesh thereafter affirmed an affidavit stating therein that in terms of such observations made by this Court, a proposal was initiated for denotification of 6,000 sq. ft. of the total area of the land. It waso file affidavit dated 18th March, 2002 shown to the Court wherein it is stated that the State Government is proposing to denotify the area occupied by the respondents from out of the total land acquired. We adjourn this matter to 20th July, 2004.s would appear from the affidavit affirmed by Shri Shashank Bhargava, the matter was listed on 21.7.2004 but was adjourned for two months. The matter was again adjourned on 21.9.2004 for a further period of three months taking note of the fact that the State Government had proposed to denotify the area occupied by the respondent from out of the total land acquired. In this connection, respondents haves stated to us that the State Government was proposing to denotify the area occupied by the Respondents from out of the total land acquired. Even though decision has been taken, till date the denotification has not taken place. We grant one final opportunity and adjourn these Appeals for three months to enable the Government to denotify the area occupied by the Respondents. In the event if it is not denotified by the next date, the Chief Secretary to remain present in this Court personally.A notification was issued under Section 48 on 5.11.2004. The judgment of this Court in the Civil appeal since reported in [(2005) 3 SCC 444] was pronounced on 22.2.2005. Indisputably, however, appellant herein filed a writ application questioning the said notification dated 5.11.2004 before the High Court. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said writ application has been dismissed.

Reasoning: It is now a well settled principle of law that it cannot be put in a straight jacket formula. The Court, despite opining that principle of natural justice was required to be followed, may, however, decline grant of a relief, inter alia, on the premise that the same would lead to a useless formality or that the person concerned, in fact, did not suffer any prejudice. It is trite that a party may waive his right of hearing by his conduct. It is furthermore well settled that a fact admitted need not be proved. Indisputably, the appellant was a party to the decision. The decision was based on the consent of the respondents which, in the facts and circumstances of this case, must be held to have included the appellants herein also.A judgment rendered by a court of law and in particular a consent order, it is trite, must not only be construed in its entirety but also having regard to the pleadings and conduct of the parties.t on consent in this case was passed only in view of Section 48(1) of the Act and not on any other premise. Appellant is the only beneficiary of the said order as by reason thereof, the judgment of the High Court in respect of 17,000 sq. ft. of land was set aside. By reason thereof, the possession of the appellant was protected as otherwise it was bound to hand over the vacant possession to the landladies pursuant to the order of eviction. For the aforementioned purpose, thus, the proceedings before this Court assume significance. We have noticed hereinbefore that the question as to whether such a notification can be issued was debated. The State of Uttar Pradesh has been given opportunity after opportunity therefor. The Chief Secretary was also asked to remain personally present.Only thereafter, the notification under Section 48 of the Act was issued. Appellants do not say nor does it appear from the record that at any point of time it raised any protest. In fact, it must be held to have accepted the suggestion whether emanating from this Court or from the State of Uttar Pradesh without any demur whatsoever. It is in the aforementioned situation, the doctrine that a person cannot be permitted to approbate or reprobate at the same time must be invoked.