Case: Neena Aneja &amp; Anr Vs. Jai Prakash Associates Ltd

4. A brief narration of the facts would assist with context. Upon the payment of an advance of Rs.3.50 lacs on 25 November 2011 by the appellants, the respondent provisionally allotted a residential unit in a real-estate project described as KRESCENT Homes admeasuring a super built area of 114.27 square metres which was being developed by the respondent at Jaypee Greens, Noida. The total consideration was fixed at Rs.56.45 lacs and possession was intended to be conveyed within a period of 42 months from the execution of the agreement of the provisional allotment letter. The appellants have stated that between December 2011 till date, they have paid an amount of Rs. 53.84 lacs out of the total consideration of Rs.56.45 lacs.5. On 13 June 2017 and 27 April 2020, the appellant sought a refund of the consideration together with interest at 18 per cent. On 18 June 2020, the appellants instituted a consumer complaint before the NCDRC for refund with interest. The consumer complaint has been dismissed by an order dated 30 July 2020 for want of pecuniary jurisdiction. A single member Bench of the NCDRC held that following the enforcement of the Act of 2019 on 20 July 2020, the limits of its pecuniary jurisdiction stands enhanced from rupees one crore to rupees ten crores and the complaint instituted by the appellants is consequently not maintainable. The appellants instituted a petition seeking a review of the order. The review petition was dismissed on 5 October 2020 leading to the institution of the appeal before this Court.

Reasoning: 15. The discussion on the law begins with the decision of the Federal Court in Venugopala Reddiar v. Krishnaswami Reddiar, alias Raja Chidambara Reddiar AIR 1943 FC 24 which considered the validity of a pending proceeding when the court had lost territorial jurisdiction. Before 1937, when Burma was a part of British India, it was permissible under Section 17 of the Civil Procedure Code to include immovable property situated in Burma as a part of the subject matter of a suit. The principal respondent instituted a suit for the recovery of certain properties. A large portion of these properties was situated in Rangoon, Burma. The suit had been instituted before the Trichinopoly Court. After Burma ceased to be a part of India on 1 April 1937, the contesting defendants objected to the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the Burma property. The Trial Judge upheld the objection that it no longer had jurisdiction over property situated in Burma. This was reversed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court. The Division Bench held that Article 10 of the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order 1937 provided that the powers exercisable by any authority, which in the view of the High Court would include a Court, before the separation came into force should continue to be exercised until a contrary provision was passed by the legislature. The High Court also held that a right to continue a duly instituted suit was in the nature of a vested right which cannot be taken away except by a clear legislative intent.Justice Srinivasa Varadachariar summed up the legal principle at page 48 by observing:..The true position, as we have already stated, is not whether there is an express provision permitting the continuance of pending proceedings, but whether there is any clear indication against the continuance of pending proceedings to their normal termination.In an earlier part of the judgment, the Court noted that paragraph (e) of sub- Section (2) of Section 38 of the Interpretation Act, 1889 provides that any legal proceedings in respect of any right acquired or accrued under the repealed enactment may continue as if the repealing Act had not been passed. Noting that the interpretation of this paragraph is not free from difficulty, Justice Varadachariar observed that the view has sometimes been taken that what is saved is a substantive right acquired under the repealed enactment and that the paragraph cannot be invoked in cases where the substantive right is not taken away by the repealing Act but the mere forum for, or the method of enforcing it is changed. On the other hand, the Court noted, it has been maintained that a right to obtain a relief in a suit pending at the time when the repealing enactment comes into operation is itself in the nature of a substantive right. Of the three grounds which had weighed with the High Court in affirming the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, the Federal Court rested its decision on the principle contained in the ruling of the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving (1905) AC 369 which held that a right to appeal is a substantive right whose amendment would generally be prospective:As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in question be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded. On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conceded that, in accordance with a long line of authorities extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is: was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to Their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, Their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. (emphasis supplied)The principle enunciated by the Privy Council in Colonial Sugar Refining was reiterated.23. The first decision of this Court that interpreted a mere change in forum, that did not impact any other substantive or vested right of the litigant, was a three judge bench decision of this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt Shanti Mishra New India Assurance; (1975) 2 SCC 840 . This case involved the jurisdiction of the Motor Vehicles Tribunal vis-à-vis the City Civil Court, in the case of a fatal accident. The accident had occurred on 11 September 1966 which gave rise to a cause of action for the legal heirs to claim compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act 1855. Under Article 82 of the Limitation Act 1963, a limitation of two years from the occurrence of the accident was stipulated. But in the meantime, a claims tribunal under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 was constituted by the State government on 18 March 1967 following which an application was filed by the claimant under Section 110A on 8 July 1967. Both the tribunal and the High Court overruled the objection of the insurer to jurisdiction. In appeal, Justice NL Untwalia speaking for the three judge Bench held:5…..It is a well-established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective. The expressions arising out of an accident occurring in sub-section (1) and over the area in which the accident occurred, mentioned in sub-section (2) clearly show that the change of forum was meant to be operative retrospectively irrespective of the fact as to when the accident occurred. To that extent there was no difficulty in giving the answer in a simple way… (emphasis supplied)Dealing with the bar of limitation under Section 110A(3), this Court held that it could be said that strictly speaking the bar would not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which had occurred prior to the constitution of the Tribunal. However, in directing the institution of claims before the Tribunal, this Court held:10. Apropos the bar of limitation provided in Section 110- A(3), one can say, on the basis of the authorities aforesaid that strictly speaking, the bar does not operate in relation to an application for compensation arising out of an accident which occurred prior to the constitution of the claims tribunal. But since in such a case there is a change of forum, unlike the fact of the said cases, the reasonable view to take would be that such an application can be filed within a reasonable time of the constitution of the tribunal, which ordinarily and generally, would be the time of limitation mentioned in sub-section (3). If the application could not be made within that time from the date of the constitution of the tribunal, in a given case, the further time taken in the making of the application may be held to be the reasonable time on the facts of that case for the making of the application or the delay made after the expiry of the period of limitation provided in sub-section (3) from the date of the constitution of the tribunal can be condoned under the proviso to that sub-section. In any view of the matter, in our opinion, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted as soon as the claims tribunal is constituted and the filing of the application before the tribunal is the only remedy available to the claimant. On the facts of this case, we hold that the remedy available to the respondents was to go before the claims tribunal and since the law was not very clear on the point, the time of about four months taken in approaching the tribunal after its constitution can be held to be either a reasonable time or the delay of less than 2 months could well be condoned under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A.The above decision conclusively held that a change of forum generally operates retrospectively, irrespective of whether the cause or right of action had accrued earlier. It directed that once the change in forum had been effected, the litigant would have to be directed to the new forum.24. A subsequent decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in Maria Cristina De Souza v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto Maria Cristina; (1979) 1 SCC 92 ,  enunciated the law relating to change of forum vis-à-vis the right of appeal. In that case, a suit was instituted in 1960 under the Portuguese Civil Procedure Code and decreed against the appellants in 1968. The appellants lodged an appeal before the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. Following the liberation of Goa in 1961, the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was extended to the territories of Goa, Daman and Diu with effect from 15 June 1966 by Act 30 of 1965 and the corresponding provision and the corresponding Portuguese Code were repealed. The legislative assembly of Goa enacted the Goa, Daman and Diu Civil Courts Act 1965 under which the suit which was pending before the Court at Margao was transferred to and decreed by the Senior Civil Judge. Since the suit was of a value exceeding Rs 10 lacs an appeal lay directly to the High Court which under Section 2(f) meant the Judicial Commissioners Court. Justice V D Tulzapurkar, speaking for the two judge Bench held:5. On the question as to where the appeal could be lodged we are clearly of the view that the forum was governed by the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Extension of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Arbitration Act, 1940) Act, 1965 (Central Act 30 of 1965) read with the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu civil court Act, 1965 (Goa Act 16 of 1965) both of which came into force simultaneously on June 15, 1966 and the appeal was required to be filed in the Judicial Commissioners Court. Under the Central Act 30 of 1965 with effect from June 15, 1966 the provisions of the Indian Civil Procedure Code were extended to the Union Territories of Goa, Daman and Diu and the corresponding provisions of the Portuguese Code were repealed while under the Goa Act 16 of 1965 the instant suit which was pending before the Comarca Court at Margao was continued and decreed by corresponding Court of the Senior Civil Judge, who ultimately decreed it on March 8, 1968. Under the Indian Civil Procedure Code read with Section 22 of the Goa Act since the property involved in the suit was of the value exceeding Rs 10,000 the appeal clearly lay to the Judicial Commissioners Court. The contention that since the right of appeal had been conferred by Portuguese Code, the forum where it could be lodged was also governed by the Portuguese Code cannot be accepted. It is no doubt well- settled that the right of appeal is a substantive right and it gets vested in a litigant no sooner the lis is commenced in the Court of the first instance, and such right or any remedy in respect thereof will not be affected by any repeal of the enactment conferring such right unless the repealing enactment either expressly or by necessary implication takes away such right or remedy in respect thereof. This position has been made clear by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of the Central Act 30 of 1965 which substantially correspond to clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This position, has also been settled by the decisions of the Privy Council and this Court (vide Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. v. Irving [1905 AC 369] and Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury [1957 SCR 488 ] but the forum where such appeal can be lodged is indubitably a procedural matter and, therefore, the appeal, the right to which has arisen under a repealed Act, will have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the repealing Act. That the forum of appeal, and also the limitation for it, are matters pertaining to procedural law will be clear from the following passage appearing at p. 462 of Salmonds Jurisprudence (12th Edn.):Whether I have a right to recover certain property is a question of substantive law, for the determination and the protection of such rights are among the ends of the administration of justice; but in what courts and within what time I must institute proceedings are questions of procedural law, for they relate merely to the modes in which the courts fulfil their functions.It is true that under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 4 of Central Act 30 of 1965 (which corresponds to Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897) it is provided that a remedy or legal proceeding in respect of a vested right like a right to an appeal may be instituted, continued or enforced as if this Act (meaning the repealing Act) had not been passed. But this provision merely saves the remedy or legal proceeding in respect of such vested right which it is open to the litigant to adopt notwithstanding the repeal but this provision has nothing to do with the forum where the remedy or legal proceeding has to be pursued. If the repealing Act provides new forum where the remedy or the legal proceeding in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act. We may point out that such a view of Section 6 (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Purshotam Singh v. Narain Singh and State of Rajasthan [AIR 1955 Raj 203 ] . It is thus clear that under the repealing enactment (Act 30 of 1965) read with Goa Enactment (Act 16 of 1965) the appeal lay to the Judicial Commissioners Court and the same was accordingly filed in the proper Court.25. The decision in Maria Cristina (supra) makes a distinction between a right of appeal, which is a substantive right that is vested in a litigant on the commencement of the lis in the court of first instance and the forum where an appeal can be lodged which is indubitably a procedural matter. Hence, in the view of the Court, the appeal would have to be lodged in a forum provided by the repealing Act though the right had arisen under the repealed Act. These observations of the Court must be read together with the subsequent observation that if the repealing act provides a new forum where the remedy or the legal proceeding in respect of such vested right can be pursued after the repeal, the forum must be as provided in the repealing Act. The decisions in New India Assurance(supra) and Maria Cristina (supra) further the interpretation that a change in forum is indubitably in the realm of procedural law that applies retrospectively, unless the statute provides otherwise. The necessary corollary of these decisions, is that the forum for determination of a lis, whether in the case of an appeal [Maria Cristina (supra)] or in situations where the right of action had accrued [New India Assurance (supra)] is in the realm of procedural law.26. In Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra Hitendra Vishnu Thakur; (1994) 4 SCC 602 ,  one among the questions analyzed in a two judge Bench decision of this Court was whether clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act 1987(TADA) introduced by an amending legislation governing Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC) was in the realm of procedural law and if so, whether it would apply to pending cases. Dr Justice AS Anand (as he then was) held that amending Act 43 of 1993 was procedural and retrospective; and that clauses (b) and (bb) of Section 20(4) of the TADA would apply to cases which were pending investigation on the date when it came into force. In that context, the principles of law, that aligned with the position in New India Assurance(supra) and Maria Cristina(supra), were formulated in the following terms:26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication.27. In Sudhir G Angur v. M Sanjeev Sudhir G Angur; (2006) 1 SCC 141 ,  a three judge Bench of this Court considered the impact of a change in procedural law to pending proceedings before a particular forum. In this case, the Mysore Code was repealed in 2003 and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was to apply. This Court held that the relevant court was under a duty to take notice of the change in law relating to forum and apply it to a pending proceeding. In doing so, Justice SN Variava approved the following exposition of law of the Bombay High Court in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saroji v. Onkarmal Ishar Das (1952) 54 Bom LR 330:11. In our view, Mr G.L. Sanghi is also right in submitting that it is the law on the date of trial of the suit which is to be applied. In support of this submission, Mr Sanghi relied upon the judgment in Shiv Bhagwan Moti Ram Saraoji v. Onkarmal Ishar Dass [AIR 1952 Bom 365 : 54 Bom LR 330] wherein it has been held that no party has a vested right to a particular proceeding or to a particular forum. It has been held that it is well settled that all procedural laws are retrospective unless the legislature expressly states to the contrary. It has been held that the procedural laws in force must be applied at the date when the suit or proceeding comes on for trial or disposal. It has been held that a court is bound to take notice of the change in the law and is bound to administer the law as it was when the suit came up for hearing. It has been held that if a court has jurisdiction to try the suit, when it comes on for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it had no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date when it was instituted. We are in complete agreement with these observations. As stated above, the Mysore Act now stands repealed. It could not be denied that now the Court has jurisdiction to entertain this suit.28. It is trite law to state that all procedural law is retrospective, unless a contrary legislative intention can be observed. A two judge Bench in Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of Maharashtra Ramesh Kumar Soni; (2013) 14 SCC 696 considered a case where an FIR was registered under the provisions of Sections 408, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. On the date of the registration of the case, the offences were triable by the Magistrate of the First Class in terms of the First Schedule of the CrPC. As a result of Madhya Pradesh Act 2 of 2008, the First Schedule to the CrPC was amended. As a consequence, offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 were triable by a Court of Sessions instead of a JMFC. Consequent to the amendment, the JMFC committed the case to the Sessions Court. A reference was made to the High Court on whether the amendment would apply retrospectively and whether cases pending before the JMFC and committed to the Sessions Court should be tried de novo by the Sessions Judge or should be remanded back to the Magistrate for further trial. A Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that cases pending before the JMFC on 22 February 2008 were unaffected by the amendment and were triable by the JMFC since the amending Act did not contain a clear indication that such cases would be made over to the Court of Sessions. Justice TS Thakur (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the two judge Bench observed that the Madhya Pradesh Amendment had shifted the forum of trial from the Court of the Magistrate of the First Class to the Court of Sessions. The issue was whether the amendment to the forum was prospective or would govern cases that were pending on the date of the amendment. This Court noted that:9. Having said so, we may now examine the issue from a slightly different angle. The question whether any law relating to forum of trial is procedural or substantive in nature has been the subject-matter of several pronouncements of this Court in the past. We may refer to some of these decisions, no matter briefly.After adverting to the decisions in New India Assurance(supra), Hitendra Vishnu Thakur(supra) and Sudhir G Angur(supra), the Court observed:14. The amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code in the instant case has the effect of shifting the forum of trial of the accused from the Court of the Magistrate, First Class to the Court of Session. Apart from the fact that as on the date the amendment came into force no case had been instituted against the appellant nor had the Magistrate taken cognizance against the appellant, any amendment shifting the forum of the trial had to be on principle retrospective in nature in the absence of any indication in the Amendment Act to the contrary. The appellant could not claim a vested right of forum for his trial for no such right is recognized. The High Court was, in that view of the matter, justified in (sic not) interfering with the order passed by the trial court.This Court noted that the Full Bench of the High Court had however relied upon inter alia the decision in Manujendra Dutt(supra). This decision was distinguished on the ground that the suit had been instituted and concluded and no vested right could be claimed for a particular forum for litigation. This Court consequently overruled the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court, though prospectively, since many cases which had sent back from the Sessions Court to the JMFC may have in the meantime been concluded or would have reached an advanced stage. An exception to those cases was made as a change of forum at that stage would cause unnecessary and avoidable hardship to the accused, if they were committed to the Sessions Court for trial after the amendment and the view of this Court. However, the principle of change of forum being procedural, generally retrospective and applicable to pending proceedings was upheld.29. Now, in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to consider the 1992 decision of a two judge Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. Dhadi Sahu Dhadi Sahu;1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 257 and several decisions which adverted to it. This was a case where the assessee had preferred appeals to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeals and set aside the penalties holding that in view of the amendment made to Section 274(2) of the Income Tax Act 1961 with effect from 1 April 1971, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner(IAC) lost his jurisdiction. The power of the Income Tax Officer to impose a penalty under Section 271 was subject to Section 274. As a result of the amending Act which came into force on 1 April 1971, the amount of income allegedly concealed had to exceed twenty- five thousand rupees. The effect of this amendment was that the Assistant Commissioner did not have jurisdiction over the assessee as the concealed amount was lesser than the minimum amount prescribed by the subsequent amendment. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal speaking for the two judge Bench premised the judgment on the general principle of law that a change of forum does not affect pending actions unless a contrary intent is shown:18. It may be stated at the outset that the general principle is that a law which brings about a change in the forum does not affect pending actions unless intention to the contrary is clearly shown. One of the modes by which such an intention is shown is by making a provision for change-over of proceedings, from the court or the tribunal where they are pending to the court or the tribunal which under the new law gets jurisdiction to try them.This Court held that the amending Act did not make any provision that references validly pending before IAC shall be returned without passing any final order if the amount of income in respect of which particulars have been concealed did not exceed rupees twenty five thousand. This, in the view of the Court, supported the inference that the IAC continued to have jurisdiction to impose a penalty on pending references. The previous operation of Section 274(2) as it stood before 1 April 1971 and anything done under it, continued to have effect under Section 6(b) for the General Clauses Act enabling the IAC to pass orders imposing a penalty in a pending reference. If the reference was made before 1 April 1971, it would be governed by Section 274(2) as it stood before that date and the IAC would continue to have jurisdiction. However, in paragraph 21 of the decision, this Court observed:21. It is also true that no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the tribunal or the court of first instance and unless the legislature has by express words or by necessary implication clearly so indicated, that vested right will continue in spite of the change of jurisdiction of the different tribunals or forums.30. This Court then adverted to the decision in Manujendra Dutt(supra) and Mohd. Idris(supra) and observed that amending an Act does not show that the pending proceedings before the court on reference abate. Therefore, the decision of the two judge Bench in Dhadi Sahu(supra) held that a litigant had a crystallized right to a forum when proceedings have been initiated and are pending. Such a right vested, in the view of the Court, is distinct from a pure procedure to be followed before the forum concerned. In taking this view, the two judge Bench in Dhadi Sahu(supra) did not consider a three judge bench decision in New India Assurance(supra) as well as a previous co-ordinate Bench decision in Maria Cristina(supra), which relied on common law jurisprudence and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to hold that a change in forum is purely a procedural matter which operates retrospectively in the absence of a contrary legislative mandate. The latter principle has since been followed in the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur(supra); Sudhir G Angur(supra); Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar (1995) 4 SCC 392 ; Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand (2013) 15 SCC 460 and Ramesh Kumar Soni(supra).36. A two judge Bench of this Court in Videocon International Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India Videocon International; (2015) 4 SCC 33 dealt with the Appellate provisions contained in the Security and Exchange Board of India Act 1992. Following the insertion of Chapter 6B with effect from 25 January 1995, the remedy of an appeal was provided to the Securities Appellate Tribunal under Section 15 T to a person aggrieved by an order of the Board or by an Adjudicating Officer. Section 15 Z provided an appeal to the High Court against an order of the SAT on any question of fact or law. Section 15 Z was amended with retrospective effect from 29 October 2002 to provide an appeal against the orders of the SAT to the Supreme Court on any question of law. The forum of the second appellate remedy was changed from the High Court to the Supreme Court. Appeals against the order of the SAT which had been passed before 29 October 2002 (the date of amendment) were filed before the High Court which held that such appeals which have been instituted before the enforcement of amended Section 15 Z would not be affected by the amendment and that it would continue to have jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the appeals. The Amending Act had a repeal and savings provision in Section 32 which was in the following terms:32. Repeal and saving.—(1) The Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (Ord. 6 of 2002), is hereby repealed.(2) Notwithstanding the repeal of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 (Ord. 6 of 2002), anything done or any action taken under the principal Act as amended by the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the principal Act, as amended by this Act.37. The judgment of the High Court was assailed, citing the decisions in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur(supra) and Maria Cristina(supra) amongst others, and it was urged that the amendment by which the appellate forum was changed from the High Court to the Supreme Court must be treated as merely procedural. On the other hand, the Respondent relied on the decision in Dhadi Sahu(supra) and Ambalal Sarabhai(supra). Justice JS Khehar (as the learned Chief Justice then was) examined whether the amendment envisaged a mere change of forum.38. In this context, this Court noted that while under the un-amended Section 15 Z, an appeal lay before the High Court on any question of fact or law arising out of such order the amendment had curtailed and restricted the right of appeal since the appeal to this Court would now lie on any question of law arising out of such order. Consequently, this Court noted:41…. Accordingly, by the amendment, the earlier appellate package stands reduced, because under the amended Section 15-Z, it is not open to an appellant, to agitate an appeal on facts. That being the position, it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, that the amendment to Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act, envisages only an amendment of the forum, where the second appeal would lie. In our considered view, the amendment to Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act, having reduced the appellate package, adversely affected the vested appellate right of the litigant concerned….While noting that this position would be subject to an amendment providing to the contrary, this Court held that Section 32 which provided the repeal and savings clause did not indicate a contrary intent. Hence, the appellate remedy which was available prior to the amendment of Section 15 Z would, in the view of this Court continue to be available despite the amendment. Moreover, this Court held that neither the date of filing the appeal nor its hearing was of any relevance since the right to an appellate remedy becomes vested when the lis is initiated. The contention of the appellant that in the absence of a savings clause the pending proceedings could not be deemed to have been saved was rejected by placing reliance on the decision in Ambalal Sarabhai(supra):44…. In the judgment rendered by this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. case [Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal and Co., (2001) 8 SCC 397 ] , it was held, that the general principle was, that a law which brought about a change in the forum, would not affect pending actions, unless the intention to the contrary was clearly shown. Since the amending provision herein does not so envisage, it has to be concluded, that the pending appeals (before the amendment of Section 15-Z) would not be affected in any manner…Furthermore, the instant contention is wholly unacceptable in view of the mandate contained in Sections 6(c) and (e) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. While interpreting the aforesaid provisions this Court has held, that the amendment of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not affect pending proceedings, except where the amending provision expressly or by necessary intendment provides otherwise. Pending proceedings are to continue as if the unamended provision is still in force. This Court has clearly concluded, that when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get crystallised on that date, and the mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, simply ensures, that pending proceedings under the unamended provision remain unaffected….As regards the decisions inter alia in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur(supra) and Maria Cristina(supra), this Court held that the principle that the forum is a procedural matter and that an amendment which alters the forum would apply retrospectively cannot be doubted but the same is not an absolute rule. On this aspect, the Bench relied upon the decision in Dhadi Sahu(supra) in support of the principle that an amendment of a forum would not necessarily be an issue of procedure.45. Having concluded in the manner expressed in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not necessary for us to examine the main contention, advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, namely, that the amendment to Section 15-Z of the SEBI Act, contemplates a mere change of forum of the second appellate remedy. Despite the aforesaid, we consider it just and appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, to delve on the above subject as well. In dealing with the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, on the subject of forum, we will fictionally presume, that the amendment to Section 15-Z by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Amendment) Act, 2002 had no effect on the second appellate remedy made available to the parties, and further that, the above amendment merely alters the forum of the second appeal, from the High Court (under the unamended provision), to the Supreme Court (consequent upon the amendment). On the above assumption, the learned counsel for the appellant had placed reliance on the decisions rendered by this Court in Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder [Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder v. Amria Zurana Pereira Pinto, (1979) 1 SCC 92 ] , Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087 ] and Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. [Thirumalai Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 739 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 458] cases to contend, that the law relating to forum being procedural in nature, an amendment which altered the forum, would apply retrospectively. Whilst the correctness of the aforesaid contention cannot be doubted, it is essential to clarify, that the same is not an absolute rule. In this behalf, reference may be made to the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, and more importantly to the judgment rendered in Dhadi Sahu case [CIT v. Dhadi Sahu, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 257] , wherein it has been explained, that an amendment of forum would not necessarily be an issue of procedure. It was concluded in the above judgment, that where the question is of change of forum, it ceased to be a question of procedure, and becomes substantive and vested, if proceedings stand initiated before the earlier prescribed forum (prior to the amendment having taken effect). This Court clearly declared in the above judgment, that if the appellate remedy had been availed of (before the forum expressed in the unamended provision) before the amendment, the same would constitute a vested right. However, if the same has not been availed of, and the forum of the appellate remedy is altered by an amendment, the change in the forum, would constitute a procedural amendment, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. Consequently even in the facts and circumstances of the present case, all such appeals as had been filed by the Board, prior to 29-10-2002, would have to be accepted as vested, and must be adjudicated accordingly.The conclusion of this Court was held to be in accordance with the mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The appeals which had been filed by SEBI before the High Court were therefore held to be maintainable.39. We have already noticed the earlier decision of Justice J S Khehar in Videocon International (supra). Subsequent to the aforesaid decision, in Securities and Exchange of Board of India v. Classic Credit Limited (2018) 13 SCC 1 ,  a two judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice Khehar, considered a claim for transfer of pending proceedings under the SEBI Act 1992. At the time when the complaints were filed under Section 26(2), the accused was required to be tried by a Metropolitan Magistrate (or a JMFC). Section 24(1) as it existed prior to the amendment read as follows:24. Offences.—(1) Without prejudice to any award of penalty by the adjudicating officer under this Act, if any person contravenes or attempts to contravene or abets the contravention of the provisions of this Act or of any rules or regulations made thereunder, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.(2) If any person fails to pay the penalty imposed by the adjudicating officer or fails to comply with any of his directions or orders, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one month but which may extend to three years or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees but which may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both.40. After the amendment Section 24(1) envisaged a punishment for a term of imprisonment which may extend to ten years or with fine which may extend to rupees 25 crores. As a result of the amendment of Section 26(2) it came to be stipulated that no court inferior to that of a Court of Sessions shall try any offence punishable under the Act. After the 2002 amendment all pending cases before the Metropolitan Magistrate or JMFC were committed to the Court of Sessions on the assumption that the amending Act retrospectively altered the forum for trial. When the issue of jurisdiction was being considered by the Bombay High Court, SEBI sought to rely upon a judgment of the Delhi High Court which had concluded that the amendment to Section 26 brought about only a change in forum and was only procedural. The Bombay High Court took a view contrary to the judgment of the Delhi High Court. During the pendency of the appeals before this Court, the SEBI Act was amended again by the omission of 26(2) and the insertion of Section 26 A to E from 18 July 2013. SEBI argued that since the impact of 2002 amendment had again been altered, all the pending cases would be required to be tried by a Special Court in terms of the 2014 Amendment. Section 26-B provided as follows:26-B. Offences triable by Special Courts.—Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under this Act committed prior to the date of commencement of the Securities Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014 or on or after the date of such commencement, shall be taken cognizance of and tried by the Special Court established for the area in which the offence is committed or where there are more Special Courts than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the High Court concerned.41. SEBI argued before this Court that a change of the forum for trial was a matter of mere procedure and would therefore be retrospective, there being no express or implied intent either in the 2002 and 2014 Amendments that the amendments were intended to be of prospective effect. Justice JS Khehar speaking for the two judge Bench of this Court adverted to the decisions inter alia in New India Assurance(supra), Ramesh Kumar Soni(supra) and Hitendra Vishnu Thakur(supra), and observed in that context:49…In our considered view, the legal position expounded by this Court in a large number of judgments including New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840 ] ; SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal [SEBI v. Ajay Agarwal, (2010) 3 SCC 765 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 491] and Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P. [Ramesh Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., (2013) 14 SCC 696 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 340] , is clear and unambiguous, namely, that procedural amendments are presumed to be retrospective in nature, unless the amending statute expressly or impliedly provides otherwise. And also, that generally change of forum of trial is procedural, and normally following the above proposition, it is presumed to be retrospective in nature unless the amending statute provides otherwise. This determination emerges from the decision of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra [Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087 ]; Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar [Ranbir Yadav v. State of Bihar, (1995) 4 SCC 392 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 728 ] and Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand [Kamlesh Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 15 SCC 460 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 489] , as well as, a number of further judgments noted above.42. The above observations indicate the clear view of this Court that:(i) In the absence of a contrary intent express or implied, procedural amendments are presumed to be retrospective;(ii) A change in the forum of a trial is a procedural matter; and(iii) Since a change of forum is procedural, a statute which brings about the change is presumed to be retrospective in the absence of a contrary intent.43. Hence, the Court went on to observe that it had also no doubt ...that change of forum being procedural the amendment of the forum would operate retrospectively, irrespective of whether the offence allegedly committed by the accused was committed prior to the amendment( At para 50, page 68).44. However, the Bench was conscious of the contrary view in Dhadi Sahu(supra) and the conflicting interpretations in the decisions in Manujendra Dutt(supra), Mohd. Idris(supra), Ambalal Sarabhai(supra), Ramesh Kumar Soni(supra) and Videocon International(supra) (which the Bench adverted to in paragraphs 51 to 53 of its decision). Dealing with this line of authority, Chief Justice J S Khehar observed:54. From a perusal of the conclusions drawn in the above judgments, we are inclined to accept the contention that change of forum could be substantive or procedural. It may well be procedural when the remedy was yet to be availed of but where the remedy had already been availed of (under an existing statutory provision), the right may be treated as having crystallized into a vested substantive right.The view which was formulated by the Court was that where a remedy has been availed of prior to the amendment then unless the amending provision mandates either expressly or by necessary implication, the transfer of proceedings to the forum introduced by the amendment, the forum as it exceeded prior to the amendment would continue to have jurisdiction:55. In the latter situation referred to (and debated) in the preceding paragraph, where the remedy had been availed of prior to the amendment, even according to the learned counsel for the private parties, unless the amending provision by express words, or by necessary implication, mandates the transfer of proceedings to the forum introduced by the amendment the forum postulated by the unamended provision, would continue to have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon pending matters (matters filed before amendment). In view of the above, we are of the considered view, that no vested right can be claimed with reference to forum, where the court concerned, had not taken cognizance and commenced trial proceedings, in consonance with the unamended provision.Where, however, proceedings had already commenced before the amendment, a change in the forum of the trial would not affect pending actions unless a contrary intent is shown. This Court then scrutinized whether the amendments which were made in 2002 and 2014 expressed a contrary intent. The Court held that Section 26, as amended in 2002, left no room for doubt that the erstwhile forum ceases to have adjudicating authority and the newly created forum - the Court of Sessions would deal with all pending matters as well. As a result, the 2002 Amendment diverted jurisdiction from the Metropolitan Magistrates and JMFCs to try offences under the SEBI Act after the amendment became operational. Similarly, the 2014 Amendment grouped all offences together by providing that they would be tried by a Special Court whether committed prior to or after the amendment; no segregation being permissible. By the 2014 amendment, the function of taking cognizance had been vested with the Special Courts. This Court held that all pending matters where cognizance had been taken and proceedings had commenced before the Court of Sessions would not be affected. In conclusion, this Court observed:79. In view of the consideration recorded hereinabove, we are of the view, that the forum for trial earlier vested in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate (or Judicial Magistrate of the First Class) was retrospectively amended, inasmuch as, the forum of trial after the 2002 Amendment Act was retrospectively changed to the Court of Session. In this view of the matter, the trials even in respect of offences allegedly committed before 29-10-2002 (the date with effect from which the 2002 Amendment Act became operational), whether in respect whereof trial had or had not been initiated, would stand jurisdictionally vested in a Court of Session. And likewise, trials of offences under the SEBI Act, consequent upon the 2014 Amendment Act (which became operational, with effect from 18-7-2013) would stand jurisdictionally transferred for trial to a Special Court, irrespective of whether the offence under the SEBI Act was committed before 29-10-2002 and/or before 18- 7-2013 (the date with effect from which the 2014 Amendment Act became operational), and irrespective of the fact whether trial had or had not been initiated.Accordingly, the view of the Delhi High Court in transferring pending proceedings was affirmed while that taken by the Bombay High Court was set aside.48. We will now advert to a few High Court decisions which have come to varying conclusions due to the ambiguity introduced in the position of law by Dhadi Sahu(supra) vis-à-vis Maria Cristina(supra) and New India Assurance(supra) by creating an exception to the rule that a change of forum is purely a procedural matter. In Delhi High Court Bar Association v. Court of Delhi ILR (1994) 1 Del 271, the original jurisdiction of the High Court was increased from Rs. 1 lakh to Rs. 5 lakhs. The appellants in that case sought to question the transfer of proceedings from the High Court to the lower court. The High Court noted that the Amending Acts object was to reduce the burden on the High Court and speedy disposal of cases. The High Court held that change of forum is a procedural matter and not a vested right. A Division Bench of the High Court speaking through Justice DP Wadhwa noted the ambiguity created by Dhadi Sahu(supra) and applied the principle in New India Assurance(supra) and Maria Cristina(supra) to direct transfer of pending proceedings as a change of forum owing to amendments to the pecuniary jurisdiction is a change in procedural law that is usually retrospective:29. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra ((1975) 2 SCC 840 : AIR 1976 S.C. 237)(9) the Supreme Court did express the opinion that change of forum is a change of procedural law and not a substantive law. In Maria Cristina De Souza Sodder v. Amria Zurana Percira Pinto, (1979) 1 SCC 92 (10), the court held that right of appeal though was a substantive right and got vested in the litigant no sooner the lis was commenced in the court of the first instance and such right would not be affected by any repeal of an enactment conferring such right unless the repealing Act either expressly or by necessary implication took away such right. The court also said that the forum where such appeal could be lodged was a procedural matter and therefore the appeal the right to which had arisen under the repealing Act would have to be lodged in a forum provided for by the repealing Act. In Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare, (1989) 2 SCC 95 : AIR 1989 S.C. 1247 (11), the Supreme Court said that even vested right could be taken away and said that where remedy is barred the right became unenforceable. The decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Orissa v. Shri Dhadi Sahu, JT 1992 (6) S.C. 714, would appear to be somewhat in conflict with its earlier decision but this judgment though holds that forum of appeal is a vested right to be followed before a particular forum and that right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated but that vested right would not continue if the legislature by express words or by necessary implications so indicates. The Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in Gordhan Das Baldev Das v. The Governor General in Council, AIR 1952 Punjab 103 (FB) (12), had also said that such a vested right of appeal to a particular forum could be taken away by a later statute if the intention of the legislature was clearly manifested in the later Act.53. In considering the myriad precedents that have interpreted the impact of a change in forum on pending proceedings and retrospectivity- a clear position of law has emerged: a change in forum lies in the realm of procedure. Accordingly, in compliance with the tenets of statutory interpretation applicable to procedural law, amendments on matters of procedure are retrospective, unless a contrary intention emerges from the statute. This position emerges from the decisions in New India Assurance(supra), Maria Cristina(supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur(supra), Ramesh Kumar Soni(supra) and Sudhir G Angur(supra). More recently, this position has been noted in a three judge Bench decision of this Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India(Writ Petition (C) No. 26 of 2020, decided on 19 January 2021 (Supreme Court of India)). However, there was a deviation by a two judge bench decision of this Court in Dhadi Sahu(supra), which overlooked the decision of a larger three judge bench in New India Assurance(supra) and of a co-ordinate two judge bench in Maria Cristina(supra). The decision in Dhadi Sahu(supra) propounded a position that no litigant has any vested right in the matter of procedural law but where the question is of change of forum it ceases to be a question of procedure only. The forum of appeal or proceedings is a vested right as opposed to pure procedure to be followed before a particular forum. The right becomes vested when the proceedings are initiated in the tribunal. In taking this view, the two judge bench did not consider binding decisions. Dhadi Sahu(supra) failed to consider that the saving of pending proceedings in Mohd. Idris(supra) and Manujendra Dutt(supra) was a saving of vested rights of the litigants that were being impacted by the repealing acts therein, and not because a right to forum is accrued once proceedings have been initiated. Thereafter, a line of decisions followed Dhadi Sahu(supra), to hold that a litigant has a crystallized right to a forum once proceedings have been initiated. A litigants vested right (including the right to an appeal) prior to the amendment or repeal are undoubtedly saved, in addition to substantive rights envisaged under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. This protection does not extend to pure matters of procedure. Repeals or amendments that effect changes in forum would ordinarily affect pending proceedings, unless a contrary intention appears from the repealing or amending statute.54. It is relevant to note in this context that the decision in Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) saved proceedings in relation to a benefit which although not vested, accrued to the landlord to evict the tenant by virtue of a proviso to a Section which accorded protection to the tenant from ejectment. This Court reasoned that since the right of the landlord flows from a Section which protects the tenant, it cannot be enlarged into a vested right. However, Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) did not enunciate an absolute proposition that the right to institute proceedings at a particular forum is an accrued right, let alone a vested right. The dictum that a change of forum is a procedural matter is not altered by the decision of this Court in Ambalal Sarabhai(supra) which sought to differentiate between vested rights and accrued rights, the latter being protected under Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, the proceedings in relation to which are protected under Section 6(e).64. Having stated the above position, we need to harmonize it with the principle that the right to a forum is not an accrued right, as discussed in Part C of this judgement. Simply put, while Section 6(e) of the General Clauses Act protects the pending legal proceedings for the enforcement of an accrued right from the effect of a repeal, this does not mean that the legal proceedings at a particular forum are saved from the effects from the repeal. The question whether the pending legal proceedings are required to be transferred to the newly created forum by virtue of the repeal would still persist. As discussed, this Court in New India Assurance(supra) and Maria Christina(supra) has held that forum is a matter pertaining to procedural law and therefore the litigant has to pursue the legal proceedings at the forum created by the repealing act, unless a contrary intention appears. This principle would also apply to pending proceedings, as observed in Ramesh Kumar Soni(supra), Hitendra Kumar Thakur(supra) and Sudhir G Angur(supra). In this backdrop, what is relevant to ascertain is whether a contrary intent to the general rule of retrospectivity has been expressed under the Act of 2019 to continue the proceedings at the older forum.65. Now, in considering the expression of intent in the repealing enactment in the present case, it is apparent that there is no express language indicating that all pending cases would stand transferred to the fora created by the Act of 2019 by applying its newly prescribed pecuniary limits. In deducing whether there is a contrary intent, the legislative scheme and procedural history may provide a relevant insight into the intention of the legislature.66. The Act of 2019, as indicated by its long title, is enacted to provide for protection of the interests of consumers. The Statement of Objects and Reasons took note of the tardy disposal of cases under the erstwhile legislation. Thus, the necessity of inducing speed in disposal was to protect the rights and interests of consumers. The Act of 2019 has taken note of the evolution of consumer markets by the proliferation of products and services in light of global supply chains, e- commerce and international trade. New markets have provided a wider range of access to consumers. But at the same time, consumers are vulnerable to exploitation through unfair and unethical business practices. The Act has sought to address the myriad and constantly emerging vulnerabilities of the consumers. The recurring theme in the new legislation is the protection of consumers which is sought to be strengthened by procedural interventions such as strengthening class actions and introducing mediation as an alternate forum of dispute resolution.67. In this backdrop, something specific in terms of statutory language - either express words or words indicative of a necessary intendment would have been required for mandating the transfer of pending cases. One can imagine the serious hardship that would be caused to the consumers, if cases which have been already instituted before the NCDRC were required to be transferred to the SCDRCs as a result of the alteration of pecuniary limits by the Act of 2019. A consumer who has engaged legal counsel at the headquarters of the NCDRC would have to undertake a fresh round of legal representation before the SCDRC incurring expense and engendering uncertainty in obtaining access to justice. Likewise, where complaints have been instituted before the SCDRC, a transfer of proceedings would require consumers to obtain legal representation before the District Commission if cases were to be transferred. Such a course of action would have a detrimental impact on the rights of consumers. Many consumers may not have the wherewithal or the resources to undertake a fresh burden of finding legal counsel to represent them in the new forum to which their cases would stand transferred.68. It would be difficult to attribute to Parliament, whose purpose in enacting the Act of 2019 was to protect and support consumers with an intent that would lead to financial hardship, uncertainty and expense in the conduct of consumer litigation. Ironically, the objection which has been raised in the present case to the continued exercise of jurisdiction by the NCDRC in regard to the consumer complaint filed by the appellant is by the developer who is the respondent herein. It is a developer who opposed the continuation of the proceedings before the NCDRC on the ground that under the new consumer legislation the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction exercisable by the NCDRC have been enhanced and the complaint filed by the appellant which was validly instituted under the erstwhile law should be transferred to the SCDRC. Such a course of action will result in thousands of cases being transferred across the country, from the NCDRC to the SCDRCs and from the SCDRCs to the District Commission.The above data indicates that as on 31 October 2019, 21,216 cases were pending before the NCDRC and 1,25,156 cases were pending before the SCDRC. Many of these cases would have to be transferred if the view which the developer propounds is upheld. This will seriously dislocate the interests of consumers in a manner which defeats the object of the legislation, which is to protect and promote their welfare. Clear words indicative of either an express intent or an intent by necessary implication would be necessary to achieve this result. The Act of 2019 contains no such indication. The transitional provisions contained in Sections 31, 45 and 56 expressly indicate that the adjudicatory personnel who were functioning as Members of the District Commission, SCDRC and NCDRC under the erstwhile legislation shall continue to hold office under the new legislation. Such provisions are necessary because persons appointed to the consumer fora under the Act of 1986 would have otherwise demitted office on the repeal of the legislation. The legislature cannot be attributed to be remiss in not explicitly providing for transfer of pending cases according to the new pecuniary limits set up for the fora established by the new law, were that to be its intention. The omission, when contextualized against the statutory scheme, portends a contrary intention to protect pending proceedings through Section 107(2) of the Act of 2019. This intention appears likely, particularly in light of previous decisions of the NCDRC which had interpreted amendments that enhanced pecuniary jurisdiction, with prospective effect. The NCDRC, in Southfield Paints and Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.(Consumer Case No. 286 of 2000 (NCDRC)) construed amending Act 62 of 2002 by which the pecuniary limits of jurisdiction were enhanced with effect from 15 March 2003 as prospective by relying on its earlier decision in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Dr Manoj Ramachandran(Revision Petitions Nos 400 to 402 of 1993 (NCDRC)), where the NCDRC held that the amendments enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction are prospective in nature [albeit on a reliance of the principle in Dhadi Sahu(supra)]. Parliament would be conscious of this governing principle and yet chose not to alter it in its application to the consumer fora.70. It is accepted, that in defining the jurisdiction of the District Commission, Section 34 of the Act of 2019 entrusts the jurisdiction to entertain complaints. A similar provision is contained in Section 47 and Section 58 in regard to the SCDRC and NCDRC. The expression entertain has been considered in a two judge Bench decision of this Court in Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu (Dead) Through Legal Representatives(Hindusthan Commercial Bank; (1971) 3 SCC 124 ), in the context of the provisions of Order XXI Rule 90 of the CPC. The Court has accepted that the expression entertain means to adjudicate upon or proceed to consider on merits. In Nusli Neville(supra), while considering the provisions of Section 9A of the CPC as inserted by a Maharashtra Amendment, a two judge Bench followed the exposition in Hindusthan Commercial Bank(supra). Undoubtedly, the expression entertain has been construed in the context of Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended in Maharashtra, by a three judge Bench of this Court in Nusli Wadia(supra) to mean to adjudicate upon or to proceed to consider on merits. Sections 34, 47 and 58 similarly indicate that the respective consumer fora can entertain complaints within the pecuniary limits of their jurisdiction. These provisions will undoubtedly apply to complaints which were instituted after the Act of 2019 came into force. However, the mere use of the word entertain in defining jurisdiction is not sufficient to counteract the overwhelming legislative intention to ensure consumer welfare and deliberately not provide for a provision for transfer of pending proceedings in the Act of 2019 or under Section 106 of the Act of 2019 which is a power to remove difficulties for a period of two years after the commencement of the Act of 2019.