Case: State Of Rajasthan And Ors Vs. Sajjanlal Panjawat &amp; Ors

1. These five appeals are by certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution and have been heard together as common questions of law were raised in all these appeals.2. Civil Appeal No. 1083 of 1967 is an appeal by the State of Rajasthan against the respondents, while Civil Appeal No. 1092 of 1967 is the appeal by the respondents against the State of Rajasthan. These two appeals, which we may also refer as the first set of appeals, arise out of a writ petition filed by the respondents against the State of Rajasthan alleging that the temple of Shri Rikhebdevji, also known as Keshariyanathji temple, situated about 40 miles from Udaipur, is a Swetamber Jain temple which is under the ownership and management of Jain Shasan and has been recognized as such in official documents as well as in the firmans issued by the erstwhile State of Mewar. Notwithstanding, the position it was averred that the management of the said temple has been illegally usurped by the State of Rajasthan through the Devasthan Department for some years, and that the State of Rajasthan had applied certain provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 - hereinafter called the Act - to the said temple which contravened the fundamental rights of the respondents guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The respondents, therefore, prayed that the Court should refrain the State from enforcing provisions of the Act specified in the petition and declare them void being in contravention of the fundamental rights of the respondents guaranteed under Arts. 14, l9. 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution of India. They also challenged Section 17 (3) of the Act on the ground that the fee levied along with the application for registration of the public trust is a tax, and therefore beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The case of the State of Rajasthan, however, was that the temple in question was not a Jain temple, but is a Hindu temple where Jains of all sects as well as Hindus of all beliefs and sects including the Bhils worship. It denied that the provisions of the Act which had been enacted to regulate and to make better provisions for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Rajasthan were in any way violative of Arts. 25 and 26 or any other article of the Constitution. It asserted that the management of the temple was with the State of Rajasthan which had a valid and legal right to manage it, and that S. 17 (3) of the Act was valid. The High Court held that Rikhabdevji temple is a Swetamber Jain temple and is at present managed by the State of Rajasthan, that S. 17 (3) of the Act is invalid because under the Rules that have been framed under the Act an amount of Rs.5/-charged as registration fee goes to the Consolidated Fund, and is thus not a fee but a tax which the State Legislature was not competent to revs. Following the decision in another writ petition, which is the subject matter of the second set of appeals to which we shall refer presently, the High Court struck down S. 52 (1) (d) and (e) of the Act, but as the management of the temple had vested in the State prior to the Constitution, the case of Rikhabdevji was held to have been covered by S. 52 (i) (a) or (c) of the Act. In the petition relating to the second set of appeals the High Court had held that in cases of trust as are mentioned in sub-ss. (1) (a), (b) and (c) a secular State may not like to keep the management of public trusts belonging to various denominations with it and may like to transfer it to those who might be better equipped for managing it in accordance with the wishes of the founder or of the religious denomination to which the trust belongs. But that would not be violative of Art. 26 (b) and (d) of the Constitution in any way. It was of the view that S. 52 (1) (d) and (e) of the Act was invalid as S. 53 had not provided for proper safeguards for the administration of the property being left in the hands of the denomination. Even so it held that these clauses were not applicable to that case. In so far as the challenge to Ss. 30, 31, 38 to 43 of the, Act was concerned, it held them to be valid. In the result the High Court gave the directions which are contained in the following conclusion nowbeing our conclusion the question is what relief the petitioners (respondents) are entitled to. Since we have come to the conclusion that the management of the temple is with the State Government the case falls within Section 52 (1) (a) or (c) of the Act which has been held valid by us. Therefore, no question of depriving the denomination of the management of the temple arises in this case. But the Act contains a provision for tile transfer of the management even for those public trusts which fall under sub-sections (1) (a), (b) and (c) of Section 52 and the Government should therefore act accordingly and take early steps to transfer the management to a committee as envisaged by Section 53 of the Act and in doing so we hope the Government while constituting the committee shall have due regard to the wishes of the denomination as was done in the past by the Maharana of Udaipur in Sambat Yearthis view the High Court partly allowed the writ petition holding that the temple of Shri Rikhabdevji is a Swetamber Jain temple and is at present being managed by the State of Rajasthan and since it was being managed by the State of Rajasthan the High Court directed the State to constitute a Committee for its management as provided in the Act. As seen earlier S. 17 (3) of the Act was held ultra vires the State legislature. Both the parties, being aggrieved, have filed separate appeals as aforesaid.3. Civil Appeal No. 1110 (N) of 1967 is by the State of Rajasthan while appeal No. 1087 (N) of 1967 is by Shri Surajmal Singhvi. These appeals, which we may also term the second set of appeals, arise out of a writ petition filed by the respondent Surajmal Shinghvi who claims to be the Chairman of the Trust Committee of Shri Nakodaji Parasnath Tirath alleging that the administration and management of that temple was being carried on by the Trust Committee on behalf of the Swetamber Jain Sangh in which is vested the entire property of the temple consisting of buildings cash, ornaments of the idol and all other movable and immovable properties. It was claimed that according to the religious faith and belief of Jains, the properties of the said temple can only be utilised for the maintenance, upkeep and worship of the idol and for the purpose of different religious ceremonies, propagation of Jain faith and religion and for other analogous purposes which are pious, religious and charitable. It was, therefore, averred that inasmuch as the administration and management of the said temple and worship of the idol and other religious ceremonies are carried on according to the scriptures and tenets of Jain religion they do not brook any outside interference, and consequently the interference in the management of the temples and other religious institutions envisaged by the Act was against the usages and customs, principles and tenets of Jain religion. On these allegations the various provisions of the Act were challenged on the ground that they were in direct and flagrant breach of the fundamental right of religious freedom and freedom of conscience of the Jains and their right to freely profess, practice and propagate religion It was also contended that the impugned provisions imposed unreasonable restrictions on the religious denomination to maintain and manage religious institutions and to manage their own affairs in the matter of religion and to administer the property according to the Jain Shasan.4. The High Court held that Chapters V, VI and VII of the Act deal with the registration of public trusts and provide certain safeguards to protect them from dissipation. These provisions are analogous to those contained inthe Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - hereinafter called the Bombay Act which provisions regarding registration of public trusts were held to be valid by this Court in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, 1954 SCR 1055   = (AIR 1954 SC 388  ). The High Court, however, allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent as in its view proper safeguards were not provided in S. 53 of the Act for leaving the administration of the property in the hands of the denomination and that Ss. 17 (3) and 52 (1) (d) and (e) of the Act being ultra vires the State Legislature were invalid. The rest of the provisions of the Act were held constitutional and valid. Against this judgment, both parties have appealed as pointed out earlier.5. The fifth appeal is Civil Appeal No. 1647 (N) of 1967 arising out of a writ petition filed by one Pandit Ram Dayal against the State of Rajasthan challenging the constitutional validity of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder on the ground, inter alia, that they contravened his fundamental rights enshrined in Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, as they take away, limit or abridge his right to manage the affairs of the two temples known as Thakurji Vijay Govindj and Thakurji Shri Sireh Behariji in accordance with the tenets of the religion and the traditions of his family. The respondents case was that the temple of Thakurji Vijay Govindji is situated within the residential premises of the respondent in Ramganj Bazar, Jaipur City, and the temple of Thakurji Shri Sireh Behariji is situated near the first temple. Both these temples according to him, were his family temples and neither the public in general visited those temples for worship nor any offerings were made to the deities. Nevertheless it was admitted that certain properties were granted by the then Maharaja of Jaipur to his great grandfather for the maintenance and for providing Bhog, Pooja etc. of those temples. The respondent, therefore, challenged the constitutional validity of the several provisions of the Act specified therein on the ground that they contravene his fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution to freely profess, practice, propagate his religion and has placed unreasonable restrictions on his fundamental right to manage the affairs end to carry on the administration of the aforesaid temples in accordance with the tenets of his religion and the traditions of his family. He, therefore, prayed that the High Court should declare that the two temples in question were private temples and also to declare that the Act was not applicable to them.6. The appellant contested the claim of the respondent that the temples were his private temples. According to the State, these temples were public temples, that Shri Anandilal the great grand-father of the respondent was put in charge of Sewa-Pooja of the temples and that the land was granted by the Rulers of the former State of Jaipur for the maintenance of the temples. for the performance of Sewa-Pooja and for making offerings to the deities, and, therefore, they were public religious trusts within the meaning of S. 2 (11) of the Act. It denied that the respondent would be deprived of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, nor in its view do any of the provisions of the Act interfere with the religious freedom of any person much less the respondent, nor do any of those provisions impose unreasonable restrictions on the respondent. The High Court, following the decision in Surajmal Singhvis case, which is the subject-matter of the second set of appeals, held the provisions of the Act to be valid except those mentioned in sub-e. (3) of S. 17 and clauses (d) and (e) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 52 of the Act, which were, as already noticed, struck down as being ultra vires the State Legislature.The question whether the temples were private temples or public religious trusts does not seem to have been urged, as on the petitioners contention in view of the decision in Surajmal Singhvis case the State should be directed not to take any action the Court granted the relief referred to above. This appeal is against this judgment.

Reasoning: In our view, the question whether the temple is a Swetamber Jain temple or a Digamber Jain temple as contended by. the interveners does not arise for decision in these appeals firstly. because, if the management had vested in the State of Rajasthan under a preconstitution law and that law cannot be challenged under the Constitution, the right of the State to administer and manage the temple is unassailable; secondly, even if the right of the State to manage the temple after the Constitution came into force can be successfully challenged as offending the provisions of Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, the management of the temple by the State will be held to be ultra vires sad illegal. And in that event the Court need not go further.In our view, however without going into the question whether the temple is a Swetamber or a Digamber Jain temple, it will be sufficient for us to consider whether the temple is a Jain temple, or as alleged by the State a Hindu temple, on a consideration of all the documents admitted, which the State has not, and cannot challenge, we have no doubt that Shri Rikhabdevji temple is a Jain temple and the State of Rajasthan has produced no evidence to the contrary to show that it is a Hindu temple where Jains of all sects as well as Hindus of all sects including the Bhils are allowed tosubmission, in our view, is not justified, because not only was it specifically Proclaimed that the Constitution was being promulgated, but by the notification of October 11, l947, it was further declared that the Constitution that was proclaimed on May 23, 1947, was amended that day, namely on October 11, 1947. It may further be pointed out that pursuant to the amendment an Advisory Body was constituted on March 20, 1948, with the Maharana as its President, Major General Rao Manohar Sinhaji as Vice-President and eight other members; named therein.From evidence it appears clear that for quite some time before the promulgation of these Constitutions the management of Shri Rikhabdevji temple had been taken over by-the erstwhile Ruler of Udaipur State, and by virtue of the Constitutions it had finally vested in the-State and was-being managed by the Maharana with the Advisory Body.The Constitutions under which the properties and management of the temple had vested in the Ruler, and thereafter in the State continued to be law by virtue of Art. 372 of the Constitution till it was repealed by the impugned Act. Since the respondents lost the right to manage and administer the temple and its properties prior to the Constitution by a valid law, they cannot now regain that right on the plea that that law contravenes the right guaranteed under Art. 26 (d) of the Constitution.Bearing in mind the scope of clauses (b) and (d) of Art. 26 as expounded in the decisions of this Court if, as we have held, the right of management of Rikhabdevji temple is lost as it is vested in the State, the respondents cannot complain of any infringement of their fundamental rights to manage and administer its affairs, and as such the High Court was in error in giving the impugned directions. In the view we have taken, the validity of the provisions of the Act which have been challenged does not fall for consideration in the first set of appeals and it has also been so held by the Highthe above text it appears to us clear that there is no prohibition from increasing the Deva-Dravya. On the other hand it permits the increase of Deva-Dravya though not by the methods specifically enumerated therein. Even in respect of these prohibited methods exceptions have been permitted. The State can, therefore, by law relating to the administration of the public trusts direct the investment of properties of the trust in a specified manner and in specific investments so as to protect the corpus from being dissipated or depreciated and to assure a regularour view, this contention has no validity. What was injuncted was that investments will no be made by the trustees themselves for the purposes forbidden in the scriptures.From this it cannot be inferred that the Jain religion has forbidden the deposit in banks or any institutions mentioned in S. 30 of the Act. We think that such an argument is far-fetched.This rule provides that for the purpose of ascertaining the wishes of the persons interested under sub-sec. (5) of Section 53, the State Government shall direct the Assistant Commissioner to issue a public notice in such manner as he may think proper for inviting suggestions for the constitution of the Committee of management. The Assistant Commissioner, shall forward the suggestions so received along with his comments, to the State Government through the Commissioner. The State Government may thereafter vest the management of a public religious trust under subs. (1) of Section 53 in a Committee so appointed under sub-s. (5) of that section. We are not relying on this rule for testing the constitutionality of S. 53 (5).In our view, the hypothesis on which the High Court has based its conclusions is not warranted by the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 53 of the Act. In the first category, apart from the Committee being constituted from amongst the trustees of public trusts representing the same religion the Committee can also be constituted from amongst the trustees of the same persuasion. The significance of the word persuasion and what it connotes does not seem to have been considered by the High Court. The word persuasion is a synonym of faith, creed, denomination religion etc. Websters Third New International Dictionary Vol. II, p. 1688, gives the meaning of "persuasion" among others (a) as "a system of religious or other beliefs (the several protestants.......... );(b) a group, faction, sect, or party that adheres to a particular system of beliefs or ideas or promotes a particular view, theory, or cause...". The same dictionary in Vol. I gives the meaning of "denomination" at p. 602 as "a religious group of a community of believers called by the same name." In other words in the first category also a Committee can be appointed from persons of the denomination to which the trust belongs as in the second category with this difference that in the first category if the State Government chooses, it can appoint it from the trustees representing that denomination or persuasion while in the third category from amongst the persons who belong to the said denomination who may not be trustees as such. It is significant to note that persons interested falling in the second category have been defined by sub-s. (9) of Section a as including for the purposes of temples and maths in clauses (a) and (b), namely; (a) in the case of a temple, a Person who is entitled to attend or is in the habit of attending the performance of worship or service in the temple or who is entitled to partaking or is in the habit of partaking in the distribution of gifts thereof, (b) in the case of a math, a disciple of the math or a person of the religious persuasion to which the math belongs". Even where the persons interested satisfy the above requirements the additional requirement of clause (b) of sub-e. (5) of S. 53 is that such persons must be also persons for whose benefit the trust was founded.A reading of clause (a) of sub-s. (5) clearly indicates that the trustees must represent the concerned religion or persuasion, which includes a denomination. It could not have been the intention to appoint a Committee of management comprising trustees of a public trust of a particular religion or persuasion who do not belong to that religion or persuasion or denomination. Nor does clause (b) of sub-e. (5) of Section 53 empower persons who do not belong in a denomination to be appointed to a public trust of that denomination. Again the word "denomination" is wide enough to include sections thereof, and it cannot therefore be said. as the High Court seems to assume, that a section of the denomination managing the property may not be the same as trustees of public trusts representing the same religion, even if the public trust has the same object as that of the public trust the management of which is being transferred to the Committee. If Section 53 (5) (a) is read in the manner suggested by us, as it should be, the difficulties pointed out by the High Court would not arise at all.37. It appears to us, therefore that merely because the provisions of sub-e. (5) of Section 53 enable the Government to appoint a Committee from the two categories specified in that clause. it does not mean that the Government wiI1 appoint or can appoint persons who are not constitutionally entitled to be appointed to that particular trust. If the temple is a Swetamber temple, merely - because the Digambers, like Swetambers, are also Jains, it does not empower the Government to appoint them as a Chairman and members of the Committee of management. The very fact that the Legislature has provided fort the ascertainment of the general wishes of the persons interested is a positive direction to the State Government to take those wishes into consideration in the manner to be prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. This provision furnishes, in our view, a safeguard against the appointment of the Chairman and the members of the Committee to manage the trusts, who do not subscribe or adhere to the tenants of a particular religion or denomination to which the trust belongs. No such appointment can be made which contravenes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and if any such appointment is made, those who have a right to challenge it can do so and have the appointment struck down. In this view clause (e) of sub-s. (1) of S. 52 read with sub- s. (5) of S. 53 as interpreted by us cannot be held to becase of the State in this case is that the fee is a sort of contribution levied on public trusts towards meeting the expenses incurred by the State Government in rendering services to the public trusts through the agency of the Devasthan Department and that according to the budget provisions for the year 1964-65 the expenditure on the Devasthan Department was Rs. 2,76,715/- as against the income of only Rupees 3,000/for the same year from the registration fee. This averment in the reply of the Commissioner.Devasthan Department was not controverted by the petitioners either by a reply thereto or by any other material produced by them.In these circumstances, the mere fact that She amount was paid under R. 18 into the Consolidation Fund is by itself not sufficient to hold that the levy under Section 17 (3) of the Act is tax the income by way of fees is far below the expenditure incurred on the Devasthan Department, the levy would be a fee. In this view, Section 17 (3) cannot be held to be invalid and ultra vires the powers of State Legislature. We express no opinion on the question whether Section 17 (3) can be declared to be invalid on account of Rule 18 requiring the fee to be deposited in the State Consolidated Fund.42. In Civil Appeal No. 1647 of l967 the Act has been challenged on the grounds similar to these in the other appeals and no separate arguments were addressed, except those advanced by the respondents Advocate in the other appears this appeal also will be decided accordingly. The question whether the two temples which the State contended were public trusts and the Petitioner averred were his private property was not agitated before the High Court, as the petitioner was then content to have the matter disposed of in accordance with the decision in the Writ Petition which is the subject matter of the second set of appeals. It was open to him to have invited the High Court to give a finding on the question whether the two temples were his private property, but since he has not done so the question cannot be gone into in this appeal. The appropriate authority under the Act will however decide this question before applying the Act to these temples.