Case: Aurangabad Municipal Corporation and Ors Vs. Jayant and Ors

4. The first Respondent was appointed as a Junior Engineer in the Engineering Department of Aurangabad Municipal Corporation on 27 July 1985. On 11 May 1988, he was transferred to the Planning Department on a temporary basis in the post of Planning Assistant. In the seniority list which was published on 12 July 1982 and 16 March 1992, the seniority of the first Respondent was shown as a Planning Assistant in the Town Planning Department with a remark that he had opted for the cadre of Planning Assistant from 11 May 1988.Recruitment Rules for various posts in the Municipal Corporation were published, on being approved by the State government Under Section 455(i) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 under a Government Resolution dated 16 May 1994.The Schedule to the recruitment rules, includes the post of Junior Engineer/Assistant Engineer/Sectional Engineer at serial No. 15 and the post of Town Planning Assistant at serial No. 36.The first Respondent was transferred from the Town Planning Department as a Junior Engineer in the Water Supply Department on 13 June 1995. Between July 1996 and September 1997 he was deputed to work with the Minister of Transport, He was repatriated to the Town Planning Department in September 1997. On 25 September 1997, the first Respondent was deputed as Assistant Town Planner in the Town Planning Department. After the Municipal Corporation converted the post of Administrative Officer to that of Town Planner, the first Respondent was promoted on 29 June 1998 on probation to the post. On 24 May 1999 he was confirmed as a Town Planner.A writ petition was filed before the Bombay High Court by Sakharam Dhondiba Panzade1 challenging the promotion which was granted to the post of Deputy Engineer in the Engineering Department. The Respondent was not a party to the proceedings. The High Court, by a judgment and order dated 3 August 2001, set aside the promotion orders of the second and third Respondents and issued the followingdirect the Municipal Corporation to reconstitute the selection committee to consider the case of the Petitioner along with all eligible Sectional/Junior Engineers as in August 1989, for the post of Dy. Engineer, on the basis of the principles of seniority cum merit afresh and all the vacant posts, at that time, shall be filled in accordingly. If any of the Respondents are not found to be eligible for promotion by the selection committee constituted pursuant to this order, no recovery shall be made from their salaries as they have already worked in the higher post. In case the Petitioner is found to be eligible for promotion, he shall be given a deemed date of promotion with effect from 3rd of August, 1989 and his seniority in the post of Dy. Engineer shall be counted from that date. The newly constituted selection committee to complete the selection process for the post of Dy. Engineer as expeditiously as possible and in any case within two months from today.A final seniority list of diploma holding engineers was published in which the first Respondent was shown at serial No. 13 as Sectional Engineer as on 1 January 1995 (w.e.f. 27 December 1990). Thereafter, on 13 August 2002 a provisional seniority list of Deputy Engineers was published in which the first Respondent was shown as a Deputy Engineer w.e.f. 7 December 1998. An objection was raised to the seniority list. The Municipal Commissioner by an order dated 27 August 2002 issued a final seniority list by deleting the name of the first Respondent on the ground that the Town Planning Department to which the first Respondent belonged is a separate department. However, on the very next day (27 August 2002), an order was passed by the Municipal Commissioner reverting the first Respondent to the post of Sectional Engineer. This purportedly was in compliance with the order passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 2156/1988.The order of reversion was challenged by the first Respondent before the High Court. On 29 September 2003; the High Court rejected the writ petition with the followingShri V.J. Dixit the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, who has assailed the order dated 28.8.2002, passed by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad, by which the promotion granted in favour of the Petitioner as per the General Body resolution No. 223/2, dated 20.04.2000 was cancelled and from the post of Town Planner he was brought back to the post of Sectionalthe resolution dated 20.4.2000 was in utter disregard to the principal of seniority-cum-merit for granting promotion to a post in Class II from a post in Class III. This was made known to the Corporation vide our judgment dated 3.8.2001 in Writ Petition No. 2156/1988. The Corporation has accordingly reconsidered all the promotions granted to Class II posts and as per our directions, fresh promotion orders have been issued, which were also challenged in Writ Petition No. 1535/2002. The said petition was decided by us on 1.8.2003. The prayer made in this petition is substantially challenging the impugned order datedare satisfied that the promotion granted to the Petitioner to the post of Town Planner was itself illegal inasmuch as it was in violation of the principle of seniority-cum-merit and, therefore, no fault could be found with the impugnedalso clarify that so far as the seniority of the Petitioner is concerned, the same has to be considered from the initial date of joining under the Corporation and in the respective categories along with other candidates holding the same qualifications and equivalent posts. If the Petitioner feels that he should be retained in the Town Planning Department in the post he held prior to the resolution dated 20.04.2000, he may make such a representation to the Commissioner and the same shall be considered on its own merits. Petition is rejected summarily save and except the directions set out earlier.A Special Leave Petition filed by the Respondent was dismissed on 17 October 2003 by this Court2. A review petition was filed by the first Respondent. The review petition was allowed by the High Court on 20 October 2012. Thereafter on 12 June 2014, the writ petition was allowed on merits. A petition by way of review which was moved by the Appellant was dismissed on 13 February 2015. This has given rise to the proceedings before this Court in these appeals.While issuing notice on the Special Leave Petitions, this Court had by an order dated 17 April 2015 stayed the operation of the order of the High Court.

Reasoning: 15. For the purpose of the present appeals, we have proceeded on the basis that the order passed by this Court in the Special Leave Petition on 17 October 2003 did not foreclose the avenue of a review petition which was open to the first Respondent. By the order passed by this Court, the Special Leave Petition was not entertained. Neither was leave granted nor was there any expression of reasons which would suggest that the view which weighed with the High Court was affirmed by this Court in the course of disposal of the Special Leave Petition. In that view of the matter, a petition by way of review was maintainable.The order passed by the Municipal Commissioner on 28 August 2002 suffers from a fundamental error. The Municipal Commissioners decision to revert the first Respondent from the post of Town Planner which he had held since his appointment on probation on 29 June 1998 and after his confirmation in service on the completion of probation on 29 May 1999 was without hearing the Respondent. Reversion of an employee is a matter of substantive prejudice. Hence there can be no gainsaying the fact that an opportunity of being heard is required to be afforded before an order or reversion is passed. The Municipal Commissioner on 27 August 2002 issued an order deleting the name of the first Respondent from the seniority list of Deputy Engineers, noting that the Town Planning Department to which the first Respondent belongs was a distinct department of the Municipal Corporation. The reversion of the first Respondent from the post of Town Planner was without furnishing either a notice to show-cause or an opportunity of being heard to the first Respondent. This is manifestly contrary to law. The order dated 28 August 2002 ought to have been set aside on that ground alone. In this view of the matter, it was unnecessary for the High Court to delve into several facets that have entered into the decision which has been ultimately rendered by the High Court.