Case: State Of Kerala  Vs. P.V. Neelakandan Nair

3. Detailed reference to the factual aspect is unnecessary as the basic feature in each of the appeals is that the concerned teachers were to retire on the date of attaining the age of superannuation. The said date in each case fell within academic year. In view of the provisions contained in Rule 62 of Chapter XIV (A) of the KER they continued till the last date of the month in which the academic year ends. Undisputedly the academic year in each case came to end on 31st March of the concerned year. The age of retirement in each case is 55 years, but benefit of continuance in service is granted till the end of the academic year. In each case, the concerned teachers were to superannuate on attaining the age of 55 on various dates between July, 1996 and March, 1997 i.e. during the course of academic year 1996-97. Irrespective of their due date of superannuation, they were allowed to continue in service by virtue of Rule 62 of the Chapter XIV (A) of KER. They retired from service on 31.3.1997. The Government of Kerala (Finance Department) by G. O. No. 3000/98/Fin dated 25.11.1998 had issued orders on acceptance of the recommendations of the Pay Revision Committee 1997 that the existing scales of pay will be revised and the revised scales will come into force with effect from 1.3.1997. Writ petitions were filed by the concerned teachers claiming benefit of the pay revision and for fixation of pensionary benefits on the basis of the revised pay. The Writ Petitions were allowed by several judgments passed by learned Single Judges. The State preferred Writ Appeals before the Division Bench. When the matter was placed before a Division Bench, it was noted that there appeared to be conflicting views expressed by different Division Benches. The matter was, therefore, referred to a Full Bench, which by its common judgment affirmed the view that the revised pay scale was to be given. Subject matter of challenge in the appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 17525-17527 of 2003 is the said common judgment. In the connected appeals the said judgment of the Full Bench was followed and the States appeals were dismissed.

Reasoning: 15. The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (See Greyv. Pearson (1857 (6) H.L. Cas.61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution. "if," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378).There is no dispute that the Service Rules are statutory. Chapter VIII deals with retirement from service and Rule 60 deals, with age of superannuation. Clause (c) deals with Teachers. Apart from Clause (c) of Rule 60 Clause (a) is also relevant. It reads asExcept as otherwise provided in these rules the date of compulsory retirement of an officer shall take effect from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years. He may be retained after this date only with the sanction of Government on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing. But he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in every special circumstances.A civil servant retires under the applicable rules in the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years. Similarly a teacher is normally to retire on completing the age of 55 years. But in the specifically prescribed cases the date of retirement is postponed "till the last day of month in which the academic year ends" so that the education of the students is not disturbed during the academic year. The legislature has denied the benefit of increment and promotion during the extended period. There is no scope for reading into the provision the benefits of pay revision. "Increment" has a definite concept in service laws. It is conceptually different from revision of pay scale. "Increment" is an increase or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. As noted by this Court in State Bank of India v. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad and Anr. (1972 (3) SCC 595 ), under the Labour and Industrial Laws, an "increment" is in the same scale. A promotion involves going to a higher grade. The pay of an employee is generally fixed with reference to a pay scale. On the other hand, in the case of revision, the pay scale is revised which may incidentally result into increment. Rule 60(c) does not refer to pay revisions which is conceptually different from annual increments within the prescribed pay scale. Therefore, entitlement of the concerned teachers for the benefits of pay revision cannot be doubted. The view taken by the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.On a bare reading of Rule 60(c) of the Service Rules the position is clear that the ineligibility indicated relates to increment or promotion. Learnedcounsel for the appellant submitted that the expression "increment" is conceptually capable of reading as "the enhanced amount received or receivable due to pay revision". His other submission is that even though same has not been specifically stated, it can be read into the provision being a case of casus omissus.It is well settled principle in law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent.10. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them". (See LenighValley Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981 ).Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus QB omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiouv. Procopiou (1966 1 QB878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available". Where to apply words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per Lord Reid inLuke v. IRC (1963 AC 557) where at p.577 he also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".At this juncture, it would be necessary to take note of a maxim " Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur" (The laws are adapted to those cases which more frequently occur). (See Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr. (2004 (6) SCC 672 ) and Prakash Nath Khanna and Anr. v. Commissioner of Income Tax and Anr. (2004 (9) SCC 686 ).17.There is no dispute that the Service Rules are statutory. Chapter VIII deals with retirement from service and Rule 60 deals, with age of superannuation. Clause (c) deals with Teachers. Apart from Clause (c) of Rule 60 Clause (a) is also relevant. It reads ast as otherwise provided in these rules the date of compulsory retirement of an officer shall take effect from the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years. He may be retained after this date only with the sanction of Government on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing. But he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in every specialA civil servant retires under the applicable rules in the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 55 years. Similarly a teacher is normally to retire on completing the age of 55 years. But in the specifically prescribed cases the date of retirement is postponed "till the last day of month in which the academic year ends" so that the education of the students is not disturbed during the academic year. The legislature has denied the benefit of increment and promotion during the extended period. There is no scope for reading into the provision the benefits of pay revision. "Increment" has a definite concept in service laws. It is conceptually different from revision of pay scale. "Increment" is an increase or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. As noted by this Court in State Bank of India v. The Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad and Anr. (1972 (3) SCC 595 ), under the Labour and Industrial Laws, an "increment" is in the same scale. A promotion involves going to a higher grade. The pay of an employee is generally fixed with reference to a pay scale. On the other hand, in the case of revision, the pay scale is revised which may incidentally result into increment. Rule 60(c) does not refer to pay revisions which is conceptually different from annual increments within the prescribed pay scale.