Case: State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Bhoop Singh Verma

This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated August 19, 1968 dismissing a second appeal arising out of a suit forrespondent w as appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police in a temporary post in 1955. He was discharged from service on July 13, 1957. A writ petition filed by him in the Allahabad High Court was allowed on August 4, 1959, and accordingly on December 15, 195 9 he was reinstated in service. Thereafter, on January 21, 1960 his services were terminated by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Agra Range,March 13, 1963 the respondent instituted a suit for a declaration that the order dated January 21, 1960 was illegal and void and that he continued as Sub-Inspector of Police in the Uttar Pradesh Police Service. It was alleged that on a false complaint made against him in respect of the custody and detention of one Smt. Phoolmati, an enquiry had been made in consequence of which the appellant had been arbitrarily and illegally discharged from service on July 13, 1957. It was pleaded that although he was reinstated on the success of his writ petition in the High Court, his services were terminated a mere five weeks later although no ground had arisen since for doing so. It was asserted that the order of January 21, 1960 was passed as a simple order of termination in order to avoid a departmental enquiry under section 7 of the Police Act, which enquiry if held would have enabled him to expose the falsity of the allegations levelled against him. The suit was contested by the appellant, who maintained that the termination of the respondents service s was not by way of punishment hor motivated by malice, and that it was a simple termination of the services of a temporary government servant on the ground that they were no longer required by the State. The suit was decreed by the learned Munsif, Etah and the decree was affirmed in appeal and second appeal. The High Court, in second appeal, took the view that where an enquiry was instituted by a superior authority into a misconduct alleged against a government servant, the resulting termination of service was by way of punishment because it attached a stigma or amounted to a reflection on the competence of the government servant and affected his future career. The High Court held that the findings recorded during t he enquiry on the original complaint against the respondent were responsible for the order terminating the respondents services, and it affirmed that the order was vitiated by mala fides.Attacking the findings of the High Court, learned counsel for the appellant contends that in the first place the order terminating the respondents services had not been made by way of punishment, but was an order of termination simpliciter passed in accordance with the rules applicable to temporary government servants. In the second place, it is said, if the order is attributed to the complaint against the respondent concerning his conduct relating to Smt. Phoolmati it was open to the Deputy Inspector General of Police to take the circumstances of the case into account for the purpose of considering the suitability of the respondent for continuing in service.

Reasoning: .Assuming, however, that the impugned order was made in the background of the allegations against the respondent concerning his behaviour with Smt. Phoolmati, we see no reason in law why a departmental enquiry should be necessary before the respondents services could be terminated. It appears from the material before us that it was merely a preliminary enquiry which was made by the Superintendent of Police into the allegations made against the respondents conduct concerning the woman. No departmental enquiry by way of disciplinary proceedings was instituted, no charge was framed, and the formal procedure characterising a disciplinary proceeding was neverHigh Court, it seems to us, did not have regard to all the facts and circumstance s of the case, and appears to have assumed that the respondents services were terminated as a measure of punishment. The High Court relied on The State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad(1) and Madan Gopal v. The State of Punjab(2). Both cases are distinguishable. In the former, the government servant was discharged from service because he was found to be corrupt and the order terminating his services branded him a dishonest and incompetent officer. In the latter, the government servant had been served with a charge-sheet that he had demanded and received illegal gratification and the Court found that the proceeding, consequent to which the termination order was made, was intended for the purpose of taking punitive action.We are satisfied that the considerations which prevailed with the High Court in reaching its findings on the application of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the bona fides of the superior authority in making the impugned order are not warranted in law and on the material before us.