Case: Kajori Lal Agarwal Vs. Union Of India And Others

1. The appellant Kajari Lal Agarwal was the owner-in-khas of 37.85 acres of land in Mauza Shibnath Das, J. L. No. 110 and Mauza Kholai Singh, J. L. No. 112 in Silliguri Town in the district of Darjeeling. The said lands were acquired by the Union of India, and the State of West Bengal, respondents 1 and 2, respectively, under the relevant provisions ofthe West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 (No. 2 of 1948) (hereinafter called the Act) for the Assam Rail Link Project. Respondent No. 3 is the Land Acquisition Officer, Darjeeling. In those proceedings, the appellant claimed compensation at a flat rate of Rs. 100 per cottah amounting to Rs. 2,27,100. He also pout in a claim for Rs. 8,000 on account of the severance and other grounds. Respondent No. 3 made an award under S. 7 of the Act on the 5th February 1951 directing the payment of Rs. 22,074 to the appellant in lieu of his lands at the rate of Rs. 600 per acre. After the award was pronounced, a notice was served on the appellant under S. 12 (2) ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No. 1 of 1894) (hereinafter called the Central Act) on the 21st March 1951, the appellant accepted the said amount as compensation money under protest.2. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application before respondent No. 3 on the 2nd February 1953 and claimed that a reference should be made by him to the Court for decision of his claim for a large amount of compensation under S. 8 of the Act. The appellant alleged in his application that having regard to the market value of the land at the relevant time, the amount awarded to him by respondent No. 3 was grossly inadequate. Respondent No. 3 rejected the appellants application for reference on the ground that it was barred by time.3. The appellant challenged the validity of this order by moving the Calcutta High Court in its revisional jurisdiction (Civil Revision Court Case No. 676 of 1954). On the 16th June 1955, a Divisional Bench of the Calcutta High Court allowed the appellants revisional application and sent the case to respondent No. 3 with a direction that the appellants application for reference should be dealt with in accordance with law. In remitting the case to respondent No. 3, the High Court observed that though, in its opinion, no limitation had been prescribed for making an application for reference, such an application must nevertheless be made within a reasonable time. On that view, the High Court left it to respondent No. 3 to consider whether the appellant had moved for reference within a reasonable time (vide Kajari Lal Agarwal v. Union of India, (1955) 59 Cal WN 935).4. After the appellants application was thus remanded to respondent No. 3, he filed an affidavit on the 27th August 1956 and explained in detail the reason for the delay made by him in filing his application for reference. On the 10th September 1956 respondent No. 3 rejected the appellants application on the ground that he had neglected to move for reference within a reasonable time.5. This order was challenged by the appellant again by moving the Calcutta High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution read with S. 115 of theCode of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule No. 3886 of 1956). On the 6th July, 1959, this case was heard by a Division Bench of the said High Court and the application made by the appellant was dismissed on the ground that the High Court saw no reason to interfere with the order passed by respondent No. 3. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.

Reasoning: 11. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in reading the clause "in respect of any reference made to the Court" in S. 8 (2) of the Act as referring to cases where reference has already been made. In the context, what the clause means is that the provisions of the Central Act shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of any reference intended, proposed, or asked, to be made, and not in respect of any reference already made. Having regard to the scheme of S. 8, considered in the light of the other provisions of the Act, it seems to us clear that the object of the Legislature in making the relevant provisions of the Central Act applicable to references was to take in all the relevant provisions of the Central Act which had reference to the making of reference; and naturally, these provisions would begin with S. 18 of the Central Act which is the first Section in Part III of the Central Act dealing with reference to Court and procedure thereon. It would, we think, be unreasonable to hold that until a reference is made, the said provisions do not apply and it is only after the reference is made that the said provisions begin toprovision also, in substance, is mandatory. If an applications is made by a person entitled to make such application, the Collector has no option in the matter; he has to refer it to the Court; but even this provision is subject to the limitation prescribed by sub-s. (2). The position with regard to the mandatory provision contained in S. 8 (1) of the Act is exactly similar. Therefore, the fact that S. 8 (1) uses the word, "shall" and imposes an obligation on the Collector to refer the matter to the decision of the Court, does not preclude the application of a provision for limitation prescribed in regard to the making of an application for reference.13. On principle, it seems extremely unlike that the Act which deals with acquisition and requisition of properties, could have intended to leave it to the sweet-will of the parties to make an application for reference at any time they like. The High Court no doubt realised the anomalies which would result in adopting such a construction; and so, while it upheld the appellants contention that there was no limitation prescribed for the making of an application for reference under S. 8 of the Act, it added the corollary that even though no limitation is prescribed, the application must nevertheless be made within a reasonable time. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to invoke such a general consideration, because S. 8 (2) of the Act, in terms, makes S. 18 (2) of the Central Act applicable, and there is no occasion to consider whether a particular application has been made within a reasonable time orwould be noticed that this amended provision has taken the precaution of expressly referring to S. 18 (2) of the Central Act along with other Sections as Sections which are applicable to the proceedings under the provisions of the Act. Even so, the clause that these provisions will apply "in respect of any reference made to the Court under sub-s. (1)"still occurs in the amended provision; and if it is held that the words "any reference made to the Court" speak about the proceedings that follow the making of the reference, then the same difficulty may arise as to the application of S. 18 (2) of the Central Act to an application made for reference under S. 8 (1) of the Act. This amended provision lends support to the view that the clause "in respect of any reference made to the Court" does not mean that the provisions have to apply after such a reference is made, but that it includes all cases where reference is intended, or proposed, or asked to be made; and that means that if a party wants to make an application for reference, he is not doubt entitled to require the Collector to make such a reference, but his application in that behalf must be made within the limitation prescribed by S. 18(2) of the Central Act. In our opinion, in regard to the application of S. 18 (2) of the Central Act in respect of applications made for reference under S. 8 (1) of the Act, no amendment was really necessary; but, of course, the Legislature thought it necessary to make the amendment in view of the decision of the Calcutta High Court on the application made by the appellant on the earlier occasion to that High Court.15. Since we hold that the application originally made by the appellant to respondent No. 3 under S. 8 (1) of the Act on the 2nd February 1953 for reference, was barred by time, it is not necessary to consider the appellants plea whether it was made within a reasonable time. Section 8 (2) of the Act read with S. 18 (2) of the Central Act specifically prescribes limitation for the making of such applications: and there is no doubt that having regard to the said provisions, the appellants application is barred by time.