Case: Raja Jagaveera Rama Muthukumara Venkateswara Ettappa Naicker Ayyan Avergal, Zamindar of Ettayapuram,Tirunelvell District &amp; Others Vs. State of Madras &amp; Another

The appellants are landholders of Madras, holding zemindaries within that State, and in their applications under Art. 226 of the Constitution they prayed for writs in the nature of mandamus, directing the State of Madras to forbear from notifying and taking of over possession of the estates held by them and also to cancel the notifications already issued, in exercise of its powers under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (Act 26 of 1948).2. This Act, the constitutional validity of which has been assailed by the appellants, was passed by the Provisional Legislature of Madras functioning under the Government of India Act, 1935 and it received the assent of the Governor-General of India onThe avowed object of the Act is to abolish the zemindary system by repealing the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation of 1802, to acquire the rights of landholders in the permanently settled and other estates and to introduce the Ryotwari system in all such estates. After the advent of the Constitution, the Act was reserved for certification of the President and it was certified on 12-4-1950.In the petitions presented by the appellants, a large number of grounds were put forward by way of attacking the validity of the legislation which was characterised as confiscators in its character and subversive of the Fundamental Rights of property, which the petitioners had in the zemindaries held by them under the Permanent Settlement Regulation.Pending the disposal of these petitions, the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951 was passed on 1-6-1951 and this amendment introduced two new articles, namely, Arts, 31-A and 31-B in the Constitution, apparently with a view to protect the various laws enacted for acquisition of estates from being challenged under the relevant articles of Part III of the Constitution. Article 31-B specifically refers to a number of statutes mentioned in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and it declares expressly that none of them shall be deemed to be void on the ground that they contravened any of the Fundamental Rights, notwithstanding the decision of a court or tribunal to the contrary. It is not disputed that Madras Act 26 of 1948 is one of the statutes included in this schedule. It may be remembered that an attempt was made to impeach the validity of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act itself before this court in the case of Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 458  (A). The attempt failed and after the pronouncement of this court in --- Shankari Prasads case (A) the grounds upon which the writ petitions of the appellants were sought to be supported became for the most part unavailing.5. It appears that at the time of the final hearing of the applications, the arguments actually advanced on behalf of the petitioners were aimed not at invalidating the enactment as a whole, but only some of its provisions, firstly on the ground that there was no public purpose behind the acquisition of some of the items of property mentioned therein and secondly, that the provisions for compensation in certain aspects were colourable exercise of legislative powers and constituted a fraud upon the Constitution Act 1935. These arguments were sought to be supported entirely on the authority of the majority decision of this court in the case of --- State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252  (B) to the extent that it pronounced two of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 --- a legislation similar in type to the Madras Act of 1948 ---to be unconstitutional.These contentions did not find favour with the learned Judges of the High Court who heard the petitions and holding that the principles enunciated by the majority of this court in the Bihar case referred to above were not applicable to the impugned provisions of the Madras Act, they dismissed all the petitions. Certificates, however, were granted by the High Court to the petitioners under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution and it is on the strength of these certificates that the appeals have come before us.

Reasoning: It appears that in determining the amount of compensation, that is to be paid under the Act, in respect of an acquired estate, it is necessary, first of all, to ascertain what has been described as the basic annual sum in regard to that estate, The basic annual sum comprises several items or parts which have been set out in S. 27 and the subsequent sections of the Act, and it is upon the amount of the basic annual sum determined in accordance with the provisions of these sections that the total amount of compensation money payable to a proprietor is made to depend.