Case: Khajamian Wakf Estates &amp; Others Vs. State of Madras &amp; Others

The provisions in these Acts reducing the tenants liability to pay the arrears of rent are also challenged on the ground that the legislature had no competence to enact those provisions. A few other minor contentions are also raised in these appeals to which reference will be made in the course of the judgment. All these contentions had been unsuccessfully urged before the High Court. Dealing with the allegation of infringement of Arts. 14, 19 and 31, the High Court in addition to holding that there has been no infringement of those Articles has further held that the challenge to the validity of these Acts on the basis of those Articles is precluded in view of Art. 31-A. Dealing with the contention relating to the reduction of rent the High Court came to the conclusion that the legislature had power to enact the impugned provisions. The High Court also has given reasons for rejecting the other contentions advanced before it. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court these appeals have been brought by special leave.

Reasoning: We have not thought it necessary to go into the question whether as a result of Madras Act 40 of 1956, certain Inams have ceased to be Inams, as in our opinion, whether they continued to be Inams or not they are still "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31-A because they fall either under sub-clauses (I) or (II) or (III) of Clause (a) of Art. 31-A (2) and that being so the provisions of the impugned Acts cannot be challenged on the ground that they infringe Arts. 14, 19 and 31.The contention that as the State purported to abolish Inams and not other intermediaries the law cannot be held to be valid if the intermediaries sought to be removed are not Inamdars is an untenable one. If the impugned legislation can be traced to a valid legislative power the fact that the legislature wrongly described some of the intermediaries sought to be removed does not make the law invalid. From the above observations, it should not be understood that we have come to the conclusion that the intermediaries concerned were not Inamdars. We have not gone into that question. From the provisions of the impugned Acts, it is quite clear that the intention of the legislature was to abolish all intermediaries including the owners of those "estates" that were subjected to full assessment by Act 40 ofcontention bears only on the provisions of the Madras Act 26 of 1963 Section 18 of that Act provides that compensation shall be determined for each Inam as a whole and not separately for each of the interests in the Inams. The validity of this section was not challenged before us. All that was urged was that for some of the properties included in the Inam, no compensation was provided. Even if we assume this contention to be correct, it cannot be said that no compensation was provided for the acquisition of the Inam as a whole. Hence Art. 31-A bars the plea that there was contravention of Art. 31 (2) in making the acquisition in question. One of the contentions taken on behalf of the appellants is that the impugned Acts to the extent they purport to acquire mining lands are outside the purview of Art. 31-A It is not known whether the lands in which mining operations are going on were let or held as estates". There is also no evidence to show that the owners of those lands are entitled to the mines Hence it is not possible to uphold the contention that lands concerned in some of the appeals have been acquired without payingcontention is again untenable. Those arrears are either arrears of rent or debts due from agriculturists. If they are treated as arrears of rent then the State legislature had legislative power to legislate in respect of the same under Entry 18 of List II of the VIIth Schedule. If they are considered as debts due from the agriculturists then the State legislature had competence to legislate in respect of the same under Entry 30 of the same list.11. In regard to the Inams belonging to the religious and charitable institutions, the impugned Acts do not provide for payment of compensation in a lump sum but on the other hand provision is made to pay them a portion of the compensation every year as Tasdik. This is only a mode of payment of the compensation. That mode was evidently adopted in the interest of the concerned institutions. We are unable to agree that the method adopted is violative of Art. 31 (2). At any rate that provision is protected by Artprovisions do not take away the right of the State to acquire property belonging to religious denominations. Those denominations can own, acquire properties and administer them in accordance with law. That does not mean that the properly owned by them cannot be acquired. As a result of acquisition they cease to own that property. Thereafter their right to administer that property ceases because it is no longer their property. Article 26 does not interfere with the right of the State to acquirethe material before us it is not possible to hold that any property under the personal cultivation of any of the appellants had been acquired. Further there is no material to show what ceiling is? Hence it is not possible for us to examine the correctness of that contention. If in any particular case, the second proviso to Art. 31-A has been breached, then to that extent, the acquisition will become invalid.We agree with the High Court that the contention in question can be more appropriately gone into in the manner suggested by the High Court.