Case: Dhagamwar Narsingh Vs. S. S. Grewal

1. On September 25, 1947, the appellant was appointed by respondent No. 2, the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., (hereafter called the Company) as the Chief Labour Officer of its collieries of which it appears to have a few, and he worked under the Company till the latter terminated his services by a notice dated December 5, 1955. On such discharge, the appellant, claiming to be a Welfare Officer of a mine within R. 74(2) of the Mines Rules, 1955, which rule we shall later set out, filed an appeal before respondent No. 1, the Chief Inspector of Mines in India, under that rule questioning the validity of his discharge by the Company. The Chief Inspector held that the appellant was not a Welfare Officer within that rule and refused to entertain his appeal2. The appellant then moved the High Court at Patna under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate writ directing the Chief Inspector to decide the appeal. The High Court dismissed the appellants petition agreeing substantially with the view taken by the Chief Inspector. The appellant has now appealed to this Court against the judgment of the High Court.

Reasoning: 5. We desire now to point out certain facts as to which there is no controversy. First, both the Act and the Rules came into force long after the appellant had been appointed by the Company. Secondly, no relaxation of qualifications had been sought from or granted by the Chief Inspector with respect to the appellant under the proviso to sub-r. (2) of R. 72 after the Rules came into force. Thirdly, no notice as contemplated in R. 72 (4) had been given concerning the appellant. It appears that the Chief Inspector found that the appellant "was performing duties akin to those of Welfare Officers contemplated by R. 73 and he was qualified to work as a Welfare Officer." We propose to deal with this appeal on the basis of these findingsWe do not it necessary to pronounce on this question in the present case. In our view, the appeal must fail even if Mr. Sens contention is right and that for another reason7. We observe that the Rules do not define the term "Welfare Officer. But we think it is beyond doubt-and indeed the contrary has not been contended-that the Welfare Officer mentioned in the proviso to R. 74(2) is the same officer as is mentioned in sub-r. (1) of R. 72. Now it is, in our view, perfectly plain that the Welfare Officer contemplated by R. 72 (1) is such an officer of one mine. The rule says that there shall be at least one Welfare Officer for every mine employing between 500 and 2000 persons and this makes any other view impossible. As we understood Mr. Sen, he also accepted that the Welfare Officer contemplated is one appointed in respect of one mine. Now, the appellant was, on his own case, the Welfare Officer of several mines of the Company and not of one of such mines only. Therefore, we think that he was not a Welfare Officer within R. 72(1) and hence not within the proviso to R. 74(2)We this that that would be an impossible view to take. One appointment cannot be treated as several appointments and it is not in dispute that the appellant had only one appointment for all the Companys collieries