Case: Sita Ram Bhau Patil Vs. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) By L. Rs. &amp; Anr

2. The appellant was owner of land covered by Survey Nos 201/2, 194/13. 200/29 and 194/15. The appellants wife sold this land to respondent No. 1 on 14 June 19463. On 12 April 1962 the appellant made an application under S. 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act (hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Act) for a declaration that he was a tenant of two of the four plots of land namely, Survey Nos. 194/15 and 200/29. This dispute between the appellant and the respondent in regard to alleged tenancy claim for these two survey numbers went up to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal by order dated 19 March, 1954 rejected the claim of the appellant to tenancy in respect of the land covered by Survey Nos. 200/29 ad 194/154. Thereafter the respondent filed an application on 24 January 1963 under Section 70 (b) of the Bombay Act for a declaration that the appellant was not tenant of the remaining two Survey Nos. 201/2 and 194/13. The respondent alleged that he never leased the land to the appellant. The respondent further said that he came to know about entry in the record or rights for the years 1955-56 on the strength of mutation alleged to have been made on 30 January 1956 and sanctioned on 13 November 1956. This application of the respondent was resisted by the appellant on the ground that he was tenant of these two survey Nos. 201/2 and 194/135. The matter was heard by the Mamlatdar. By an order dated 31 July 1963 the Mamlatdar rejected the claim of the appellant to be a tenant. Thereafter the matter was taken up to the District Deputy Collector. The Deputy Collector by his order dated 27 June 1966 upheld the Mamlatdars order. Before the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector the respondent examined himself. He was cross-examined and his attention was drawn in cross-examination towards an alleged admission about the appellant being his tenant in the deposition recorded by the Tenancy Aval Karkun in an earlier case on 10 September 1962. The respondent denied that he made any admission. The previous deposition was not shown to him on that day6. On 9 July 1963 a certified copy of the deposition in the earlier proceedings was placed on record. On that very day the appellant examination himself, saying that he was a tenant of the land and he had no. other evidence to show in support of his case except the certified copy of the statement which was produced on that day7. The appellant also relied on the extracts of the record of rights showing that the respondent was shown as "kabiedar" of Survey No. 201/2 and the appellant was shown as tenant of the same In regard to Survey No. 194/13 it also appeared from the record of rights that the respondent was shown as kabjedar and the appellant as a tenant8. On this evidence the Mamlatdar held that the appellant was not cultivating the lands as a tenant of the respondent and he declared that the appellant was not a tenant. The Deputy Collector affirmed the order of the Mamlatdar9. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal however by its order dated 19 January 1967 held that the appellant was proved to be a tenant of the land. The respondent thereupon took the matter to the High Court under Art. 227. The High Court set aside the order of the Revenue Tribunal. The appellant obtained special leave from this Court.

Reasoning: 16. If admission is proved and if it is thereafter to be used against the party who has made it the question comes within the provisions Section 145 of the Evidence Act. The provisions in the Indian Evidence Act that admission is not conclusive proof are to be considered in regard to two features of evidence. First, what weight is to be attached to an admission? In order to attach weight it has to be found out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and is a relevant piece of evidence. Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the evidence Act and if it is to be used against the party who has made it, "it is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity, if the documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a general salutary and intelligible rule" (see Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit, 42 Ind App 135 at p. 147 : (AIR 1915 PC 7 at p. 11)). The Judicial Committee in that case said, "it has to be observed with regret and with surprise that the general principle and the specific statutory provisions have not been followed". The general principle is that before any person is to be faced with any statement he should be given an opportunity to see that statement and to answer the same. The specific statutory provision is contained in Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act that "A witness may be cross examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him or being proved, but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him." Therefore, a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no. avail and cannot be utilised against him17. The third infirmity with regard to this admission is whether this is a clear and unequivocal admission. The High Court said that "a certified copy of the deposition was placed on record on 9 July 1973, on which day again it does not appear that the contents of the deposition were read out to the respondent or that any attempt was made to obtain leave of the Court to further cross examine the witness." The contents of the alleged admission to which reference has been made are not unambiguous and cannot be accepted as an admission. The contents are that he was not receiving any rent and the land was fallow. Therefore, the High Court was right in rejecting the contentions advanced by the appellants that there was any admission and in setting aside the decision of the Revenue TribunalThe High Court rightly accepted the contention of the respondent that after a careful consideration of the evidence on record the fact finding courts, i.e, the Mamlatdar and the Special Deputy Collector recorded a finding that the appellant had not cultivated the land in dispute as the tenant of the respondent. Therefore, the Revenue Tribunal had no. jurisdiction to interfere and set aside the finding of fact20. With regard to the record of rights counsel for the appellant said that presumption arises with regard to its correctness. There is no. abstract principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct when it is shown by evidence that the entries are not correct. Apart from the intrinsic evidence in the record of rights that they refer to facts which are untrue it also appears that the record of rights have reference to the mutation entry that was made by the Circle Officer on 30 January 1956. Counsel for the respondent rightly contended that no. presumption could arise for two principal reasons. First, the oral evidence in this case nullified the entries in the record of rights as showing a state of affairs opposed to the real state of affairs and, second no. notice was ever given to the respondent with regard to mutation proceedings. Therefore the respondent is right in contending that no. presumption can validly arise from the record of rights21. The third contention on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal was justified to interfere because of error of law is also unacceptable. The provisions contained in Sec. 76 of the Bombay Act enumerate the grounds on which there can be revision by the Revenue Tribunal. One of the grounds is that there is error of law.However, the authorities below have rejected the entries as well as the opponents (meaning thereby the respondent) admission on the ground that the applicant did not support the entries by producing the rent receipts. According to the authorities below the burden was on the applicant to prove his case by producing evidence to corroborate the entries. The appellate authority has also observed that the alleged admission of the opponent, made in the other case was rejected by the Revenue Tribunal. The authorities below arrived at the conclusion that the applicants possession was otherwise than lawful. This concurrent finding of the authorities below is being challenged by the applicant in this revision application22. The Revenue Tribunal seemed to consider the approached of the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector to be erroneous because according to the Revenue Tribunal the burden was shifted to the respondent to rebut the entry in the record of rights and that the respondent failed to discharge that burden. When the entire evidence is before the Court, it is well settled that the burden of proof becomes immaterial23. Further the Revenue Tribunal fell into error of entertaining the Revision when there was no. error of law on the face of the record. The presumption which was said to arise in the record of rights was before the Deputy Collector as well as the Mamlatdar. # If the authority entrusted with adjudication goes into the question and assesses the same, the decision may be right or wrong but that will not go to show that there is any error of law on the face of record.