Case: Attar Singh &amp; Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

The applicants are four brothers holding land in village Banat, tahsil Kairana, District Muzaffarnagar. A notification was issued under S. 4 of the Act in respect of 223 villages in tahsil Kairana, declaring that the State Government had decided to make a scheme of consolidation in that area. This was followed up by necessary action under the various provisions of the Act resulting in a statement of proposals under S. 19. Objections to these proposals were filed by the petitioners and others, which were decided in April 1956. The petitioners went in appeal to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which was decided in August 1957. It was thereafter that the present petition was filed in this Court.

Reasoning: There is no doubt that there is some difference between the procedure provided under the Act and that which the tenure-holders would have been entitled to if their village was not under consolidation. But if consolidation is a boon to the tenure-holders of a village, as we hold it is, and if it is to be put through within a reasonable period of time, it is necessary to have a procedure which would be shorter than the ordinary procedure under the U. P. Land Revenue Act or through a suit in a civil or revenue court. The procedure that has been provided cannot by any means be said to be arbitrary or lacking in the essentials of principles of natural justice.The Assistant Consolidation Officer gives notice to the persons affected, hears their objections and gives them an opportunity to produce evidence. Thereafter he decides the objections and one appeal is provided against his order. This should, in our opinion, be enough in the special circumstances arising under the Act to do justice to those who object to the correction ofthat has happened is that the number of appeals is cut down to one and that in our opinion is not such a violent departure from the ordinary procedure as to make us strike down the provisions contained in Ch. II of the Act as discriminatory, in the peculiar circumstances arising out of a scheme of consolidation which must, if it has to be of any value, be put through within a reasonable period ofdifference there may be well be supported as a permissible classification on an intelligible differentia having a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. Further S. 12 provides that where there is dispute as to title and such question has not already been determined by any competent Court, the Consolidation Officer has to refer the question for determination to the Civil Judge who there- after will refer it to the arbitrator. The arbitrator then proceeds in the manner provided by R. 73 and gives a hearing to the parties and takes evidence both oral and documentary before making his award; and S. 37 of the Act makes the Arbitration Act applicable to the proceedings before the arbitrator in the matter of procedure.Taking, therefore, the scheme of Ch. II and remembering that if consolidation is to be put through there must be a more expeditious procedure, there is in our opinion rational basis for classification which justifies the procedure under Ch. II of the Act read with the Rules in villages where consolidation scheme is to be effective. The attack, therefore, under Art. 14 of the Constitution on the provisions of Ch. IIif the consolidation scheme has to be put through in a reasonable period of time such a provision is, in our opinion, necessary; but for it the consolidation schemes may never be really put through for there will be little purpose in making consolidation where a large number of disputes are pending in the Courts.Reasons which we have given in dealing with the second point apply with equal force to these two points also, and we are of opinion that there is a rational basis for a classification which has a nexus with the object of the Act, and therefore, the attack under Art. 14 on the provisions of Chapter III also musthowever, think it unnecessary to go into these arguments for we have come to the conclusion that in the circumstances of this case the compensation provided under S. 29B isare of opinion that taking into account the peculiar conditions in cases of this kind and remembering that the land taken from each individual tenure-holder may be a small bit and it is then consolidated into a large area, by adding some other lands taken from other tenure-holders, and the whole is then used for the advantage of the whole body of tenure-holders, it cannot be said that the cash compensation, added to the advantages which the tenure holders get in the large area of land thus constituted and on account of getting a compact block for themselves, is inadequate. Therefore, assuming that Art. 31 (2) applies as it was before the Fourth Amendment, it cannot be said that the compensation which the tenure-holders will get under S. 29-B is inadequate in the circumstances.