Case: Hansraj H. Jain Vs. State of Maharashtra &amp; Others

1. Leave granted in all these special leave petitions and the learned Counsels appearing for the respective parties made submissions. Since all these matters relate to common questions of law and fact, the matters were heard analogously and are disposed of by this common judgment. All these matters arise out of the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the Writ Petitions moved before the said High Court inter alia challenging the validity of acquisition of large tracts of land adjoining the city of Bombay for the purpose of setting up a new township to be known as New Bombay. The State of Maharashtra issued notices under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act between February, 1968 and February, 1970 for the purpose of acquiring huge tracts of lands covering 86 villages in Trans Harbour, Panvel and Trans Thane Creek area for the purpose of planned development and utilisation of the said lands for industrial, commercial and residential purposes. Declarations under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were also issued in 1971 and 1972. The acquisition proceedings were, however, concluded after a long lapse of time by giving awards in 1985 and 19862. Mr. G. Ramaswamy has appeared for the appellants in the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition Nos. 13719 and 13459 of 1992. Mr. U. Lalit has appeared for the appellants in the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 14710 of 1992. Mr A. K. Ganguli has appeared in the appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No, 15359 of 1992. Mr. Ganpule has appeared for the appellants in the rest of the appeals. As all these matters are disposed of by a common judgment, it is not proposed to refer individual arguments raised by the learned Counsels separately

Reasoning: 28. After giving our anxious consideration to the respective contentions made by the learned Counsels for the parties, it appears to us that on the basis of reports of the expert Committees as indicated here in before, the Government took a decision to set up a new township by acquiring large tracts of lands appertaining to 86 villages in Trans Harbour, Panvel and Trans Thane Creek area. In order to develop such huge urban complex. the M.R.T.P. Act was enacted and CIDCO was established. There is no manner of doubt that lot of deliberations were made by expert bodies before taking the decision to set up such huge urban complex to be known as New Bombay. It, therefore, cannot be contended with any seriousness that there was no planning for development of the acquired areas and the acquisition proceedings were initiated casually with the sole intention to peg down the prices by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act for a future project. The learned Solicitor has made submissions by drawing the attention of the Court to the finding of the Bombay High Court in the Writ Petitions that in view of the planning for development of the areas comprising Trans Harbour, Panvel and Trans Thane Creek area, price of the land in those areas started increasing. There is no difficulty in understanding the reason for such an increase in the prices because once it comes to the knowledge of the people concerned that some areas are going to be developed into a new township close to the city known as Greater Bombay, the land speculators will make all efforts in acquiring the lands in those areas so as to make substantial profit in the business of real estate. In the aforesaid circumstances, it appears to us that there was necessity to issue notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act so as to discourage the lands speculators in the area and to make the acquisition proceedings and the scheme of new township economically viable. The area proposed to be developed into New Bombay is admittedly a very large area and the lands appertained to about 86 villages. It is reasonably expected that substantial time would be required for detailed planning for the development of the area. Besides, about 25000 objection petitions had to be disposed of against the proposed acquisition. In a project of this magnitude, substantial time is required to complete the acquisition proceedings. Even then, we are not fully satisfied that the concerned authorities had acted with such promptitude as was required of them. We are rather inclined to hold that even such a big and delicate scheme could have been given proper shape earlier and the acquisition proceedings in our view could have been completed earlier if there had been proper diligence and concerted efforts at different levels. But simply on account of the proverbial slow pace with which the public authorities move in this country, we are not inclined to hold that there had been deliberate laches and utter lack of bona fide on the part of the acquiring authorities and the sole intention to initiate acquisition proceedings by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was to peg down the prices with a clear intention to sit over the matter for years just to deny to the land owners the reasonable price of the land. Such submission is not warranted or any firm foundation and the Bombay High Court has also not accepted such contention29. Before the amendment of Land Acquisition Act, there was no time limit to complete the land acquisition proceedings. The acquiring authorities were free to initiate the land acquisition proceedings in any manner they chose and were permitted to sit over such proceedings without any just cause for years together so as to deprive of the land owners the reasonable price of the land. There is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the Government are bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass the test of reasonableness and precisely for this reason, even when there was no time limit for completing the acquisition proceedings from the date of initiation of the proceedings by issuing notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Court had, in appropriate cases, looked into the reasonableness of the action undertaken by the acquiring authority and whenever action taken was found to be lacking in bona fide and made in colourable exercise of the power, the Court did not hesitate to strike drown unfair and unjust acquisition proceedings. We have, however, indicated that in the instant cases, there is no firm foundation for coming to the conclusion that the acquisition proceedings had been initiated casually without any precise objective and initiation of the acquisition proceedings by issuing notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was made with the sole intention to peg down the prices for acquisition in remote future, thereby causing loss and injury to the affected land owners. Despite lamentable delay in completing the acquisition proceedings in the instant cases, we are not inclined to hold that such acquisition proceedings were otherwise mala fide or invalid for the reasons indicated hereinbefore and the decisions cited by the learned Counsels for the parties for striking down the acquisition proceedings are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the cases30. The contentions of the learned Counsels for the appellants that although the proviso to SectionA of the Land Acquisition Act enables the acquiring authority to complete the acquisition proceedings within two years from the date of amendment of the said Section, such provision should not come in aid of the acquiring authority to complete these acquisition proceedings within the said extended time limit because such proceedings had already become stale and invalid on account of inordinate delay and negligence and also on account of colourable exercise of power and mala fide action. We have not accepted the case of mala fide action and colourable exercise of power for the reasons indicated. It also appears to us that in view of the provisions of SectionA of the Land Acquisition Act, it cannot be contended that the acquisition proceedings cannot be completed within time frame under SectionA even though when acquisition proceedings were initiated, there was no time frame for completing the acquisition proceedings. In our view the learned Solicitor is justified in contending by referring to the decision of this Court in Kaliyappan?s case (supra) and also the decision of this Court in Gujarat Corporation?s case (supra) that the Court will not be justified to set aside acquisition proceedings on account of delay even when acquisition proceedings are completed within the time frame under1 A and that it will be safer to rely upon the statute for guidance as regards the maximum time that can be taken to make an award. This Court has also indicated that when the statute prescribes time limit within which a certain power can be exercised, the prescription of time inheres a belief that the nature and quantum of power and the manner in which it is to be exercised would consume at least that much time which the statute prescribes as reasonable31. In Gujarat State Corporation?s case, this Court has indicated that in view of the history of Legislation in the context of compensation to the owner after the legislature has stepped in prescribing a sort of period of limitation it was not necessary to go in search of a further fetter on the power of the Government by raising the question of delay by implication. We, therefore, hold that acquisition proceedings completed within the time frame under SectionA cannot be negatived on the ground of inordinate delay. We may only add here that we have not accepted the contention of the petitioners that the acquisition proceedings were initially tainted with mala fide and deliberate laches and negligence thereby rendering such proceedings invalid before the amendment of the Act by incorporating Section 11=A. Hence, the contention that the proceedings which bad already become invalid could not be validated by resorting to SectionA of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be accepted32. So far as the acquisition of lands comprising Gaothan and hamlets against the avowed policy decision of the Government is concerned, it appears that there is a serious dispute on the factual existence of Gaothan and hamlets. The learned Solicitor has very strongly contended that the Government respected its policy in not acquiring Gaothan areas and hamlets as indicated in the policy decision and the contention that such areas are being acquired despite the policy decision is not factually correct. Such contention being a disputed question of fact cannot be decided in these proceedings and we may also indicate that the Bombay High Court has also not accepted such contention of the petitioners33. It has been submitted by the learned counsels for the appellants that although there is a policy decision of the Government of Maharashtra to offer alternative sites to the affected land owners, such policy is not being faithfully implemented and this Court should give suitable direction so that such policy is implemented in letter and spirit. We may indicate here that the learned Solicitor has categorically submitted before us that such policy decision will be faithfully implemented by the Government and there is no occasion of any apprehension on the part of the affected landowners. We, therefore, reasonably believe that such policy decision should be implemented properly so that the affected landowners do not suffer unmerited hardship for improper implementation of the policy decision34. On the question of price of the alternative site, the learned Solicitor has submitted that after acquisition the lands in New Bombay have been vested in CIDCO for development and disposal. All the costs incurred on the development are to be met by disposing the saleable land. In the process, the Corporation has to spend huge amounts on development of infrastructure in the form of roads, water supply, sewerage, electricity, transport, etc. For the purpose of disposal of saleable land, certain lands are required to be provided to the social institutions, project affected persons, economically weaker sections and lower income groups at nominal and subsidised rate and the shortfall accruing from such subsidised disposal has to be recovered by the sale of other lands. The commercial areas are sold by the Corporation by tender system and such areas draw much higher rate. The learned Solicitor has submitted before us that unfortunately the ratio of such disposal at higher rate in the entire process is around 1% only. He has, however, submitted that the concerned authorities are keen to give relief to the affected land owners by charging reasonable price as for as practicable. The learned Counsels for the appellants have, however, submitted that although the award for acquiring land was made at Rs. 4 per sq. mtr., the developed lands for alternative sites for building houses for the affected land owners are being offered @ Rs. 13,200 sq. mtr35. It is not difficult to imagine in the facts and circumstances of the case that many of the persons from whom lands have been acquired are persons without houses and if they are thrown out of their lands, they would be exposed to serious prejudice. This Court has considered such problem in the case of Smt. Pista Devi (supra) and it was indicated in the said decision that although Section 21(2) of the Delhi Development Act was not applicable to the acquisition proceedings involved in that case, the provision having contained a wholesome principle, should be followed by all Development Authorities throughout the country when they acquire large tracts of land for the purposes of land development in urban areas.