Case: Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvementtrust Board Vs. H. Narayanaiah Etc. Etc

The seven appeals by special leave arise out of land acquisition proceedings in which the 1st of the preliminary notifications, under Section 16 of the Bangalore Act, took place in the Mysore Gazette from 1960 onwards; and, the subsequent notifications, under Section 18 of the Bangalore Act, equated by Section 27(2) of the Bangalore Act with notifications under Section 6 of the Acquisition Act, were made in 1967. All the lands involved in these appeals are situated in Birmamangala Village, Bangalore North Taluk, and are .shown to have been acquired for the purposes of a scheme known as Bhinnamangala Lay Out II Stage or Indira NagarBangalore Act, as its preamble states, is really concerned with the "improvement and future expansion of the City of Bangalore and for the appointment of a Board of Trustees with special powers to carry out the aforesaid purposes;". As an incident of this improvement and expansion it provides for acquisition of land also.. It does not, however, contain a separate code of its own for such acquisitions. But, Section 27 of the Bangalore Act lays down:"27 . Provisions applicable by the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement.--The acquisition otherwise than by agreement of land within or without the City under this Act shall be regulated by the provisions, , so. far as they are applicable, of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and by the following further provisions,Upon the passing of a resolution by the Board that an improvement scheme under Section 14 is necessary in respect of any locality, it shall be lawful for any person either generally or specially authorised by the Board in this behalf and for his servants and workmen, to do all such acts on or in respect of land in that locality as it would be lawful for an officer duly authorised by the Government to act under Section 4(2) of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and for his servants and workmen to do thereunder; and the provision contained in Section 5 of the said Act shall likewise be applicable in respect of damage caused by any of the acts first mentioned.(2) The publication of a declaration under section 18 shall be deemed to be the publication of a declaration under section 6 of the Mysore, Land Acquisition Act, 1894.(3) For the purposes of section 50(2) of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Board shall be deemed to be the local authority concerned.(4) After the land vests in the Government under section 16 of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the Board agreeing to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the Board, and the land shall thereupon vested in theMysore Land Acquisition Act of 1894 exactly reproduces our Central Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894. Therefore, the term Acquisition Act in this judgment covers references to both the Mysore Land Acquisition Act as well as the Central Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894. It was stated by Counsel that the Mysore Land Acquisition Act was also correspondingly amended whenever provisions of the Central Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 were altered .so that the two could be treated as identical for our purposes.The judgment and orders of the Division Bench, under appeal before us, purports to follow a Full Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in Venkatamrna v. Special Land Acquisition Officer(A.I.R. 1972 Mysore 193.), where it was held that the relevant date for determining the market value of the property to be acquired is the date of notification under section 18 of the City of Mysore Improvement Act of 1903. It appears that the provisions of the last mentioned Mysore Act of 1903 largely correspond with the provisions of the Bangalore Act beforehas, however, to be remembered that the Act which the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court was interpreting was. enacted in 1903. It had, therefore, to be construed with reference to the provisions of the Acquisition Act as it stood in 1903. The Mysore Full Bench had observed that the Mysore Land Acquisition Act had been amended by the Mysore Act 1 of 1927 "so as to make compensation payable as on the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1) of that Act" instead of with reference to the date of notification under section 6 according to the unamended law. It said: "It is significant to note that the Mysore Legislature did not make any corresponding amendment in the Act" (that is to say, the City of Mysore Act of 1903). The Bangalore Act, even though it may Correspond substantially with the provisions of the Mysore Improvement Act 3 of 1903, was enacted in 1945. Hence, references in the Bangalore Act to the Acquisition Act, which had been amended considerably between 1903 and 1945, could not have the same effect as similar references to the Acquisition Act in the Mysore Act of 1903. We think that the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court overlooked this vitalFull Bench of the Mysore High Court expressed the view that the contention that a notification under Section 16 of the Mysore Act of 1903 could be equated with a notification under section 4 of the Acquisition Act was negatived by the provisions of Section 23 sub. s. (1) of the Mysore Act of 1903. It said (at p. 198):"Section 23 (1) of the Act states that upon the passing of a resolution by the Board that an improvement scheme under Section 14 is necessary, it would be lawful for any person authorised by the Board to enter upon the land carry out the several acts on the land in question as provided under section 4(2) of the Acquisition Act and the pro visions of section 5 of the Acquisition Act would likewise be applicable in respect of damage caused by any of the acts of servants or workmen of thetherefore, thought that what was sought to be achieved by notification under section 4( 1 ) of the Acquisition Act was done by a resolution under section 14 of the Mysore Act. Taking the view that such a resolution could only be anterior to the publication of the notification under section 16, it equated the notification under section 16 of the Mysore Act with a notification under section 6 of the Acquisition Act. Thus, the Mysore. Full Bench found in Section 23 (1) of the Mysore Act of 1903, a justification for equating provisions of section 14 of that Act with, those of section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. But, we do not find either in section 23 of the Bangalore Act, which deals with an entirely different subject matter, or, anywhere, apart from sect ion 27, additional provision (1) of the Bangalore Act, a similar provision which could ;indicate that proceedings under a section other than those under section 16 of the Bangalore Act could possibly correspond wit h those under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. And, we think that to equate a resolution under section 14 of the Act with a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act, on a similar reasoning, would be to miss the very different purposes meant to be served by a resolution under section 14 of the Bangalore Act and a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. Such reasoning appears to us to be very far fetched.Another reason given by the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court, for holding that market value should be determined as on the date of notification under section 18 and not that of notification under section 1 6 of the City of Mysore Improvement Act (both these sections, correspond to section 16 and 18 of the Bangalore Act) was that a delay of 20 years between the two notifications would make the acquisition unconstitutional. We are unable to appreciate the bearing of this consideration on a decision of the statutory requirements as to the date on which market value is to be determined for purposes of compensation. If a particular acquisition becomes unconstitutional due to an unreasonable mode of exercising the statutory powers of acquisition, neither the provision which is so misused nor the meaning. of other provisions, which are relevant for determining the date of market value, is affected. We are constrained to observe that some of the reasons given by the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court as well as the Division Benches of t he Karnataka High Court have little connection with the date on which the market value has to be determined according to statutory provisions. A pure question of interpretation of fairly clearly expressed legislative intent which should not have been permitted to be fogged by adverting to irrelevantis true that the Bangalore Act has its own distinct purposes and prescribed modes in which they are to be carried out. Acquisition of land, as already observed, is a mere incident in the carrying out of those purposes. Section 26 of the Act gives, it the power to acquire land by agreement. Section 27 of the Act reproduced above, enables the procedure found in the Acquisition Act to be utilised except to the extent to which the procedure for compulsory acquisition in the Bangalore Act may differ from that contained in the Acquisition Act . Section 27 of the Bangalore Act gives certain "further provisions" indicated under four heads. Apparently. these are meant to displace corresponding actions under the Acquisition Act. We have to identify the corresponding provisions only for the purposes of applying Section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act.It is evident that the first of these additional provisions enables the Board of Trustees, by virtue of section 14, to undertake what could have been done under the Acquisition Act only after a notification under section 4(1 ) of the Acquisition Act. In other words, the deviation from the procedure laid down in the Acquisition Act is that, whereas the Agents of the Govt. could not undertake any- thing provided for by section 4(2) of the Acquisition Act without a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act, the Board of Trustees could do those very things without any notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act. Even if we could equate the resolution under section 14 of the Bangalore Act with a notification under section 4(1 ) of the Acquisition Act, we could not dispense with the requirements of section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act which is the only provision applicable for determining the date of the market value. The only result of equating a resolution under section 14 with a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act could be to shift the date of ascertainment of market value farther back. But, that is not what the respondents contendsecond additional provision under section 27(2) seems designed, by way of abundant caution, to clarify the meaning of provisions of section 18 of the Act, Obviously, it prevents any construction which could enable a notification under section 18 of the Bangalore Act to be equated with section 4(1) of the Act. To hold that a notification under section 18 of the Bangalore Act could be equated with section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act, in the face of this clear provision, equating it with a notification under section 6 of the Acquisition Act, is to countenance the obvious absurdity that there is no difference between a notification under section 4(1) and section 6 of the Acquisition Act.A possible line of argument, in view of the 1st additional provision in section 27 of the Bangalore Act, could be that, since the general procedure under the Acquisition Act applies, a notification under section 4(1) of the Acquisition Act itself should precede any action under section 14 of the Act which is to be equated with section 4(2) of the Acquisition Act. But, that has not been the argument of any side either in the Karnataka High Court or before us. Had that been necessary and no notification under section 4(1) of the Act h ad taken place, the validity of the whole acquisition proceedings could have been challenged, but, the validity of the Acquisition proceedings is not assailed before us at all. Such a line reasoning would be also shut out b y the principle that the particular and the especially provided procedure ;would exclude the more general if we hold, as we have to having regard to Section 16 of the Act, that the special procedure was meant to take the place of and to serve the same object as the general. The argument that an additional compliance with section 4(1) of-the Acquisition Act was necessary despite the special procedure in section 16 of the Act, which fulfils the same function, is also repelled by the correct view taken in M. Manicklal v. the State of Mysore (1967 (2) M.L.J.p.239) by the Mysore High court.

Reasoning: We do not think that such an argument could be advanced at all in the face of the provisions of section 27(2) which clearly equate a notification under section 18 of the Bangalore Act with the notification under section 6 of the Acquisition Act. We know the maxim that "equity follows t he law". We have not heard of the proposition that some transcendental Equity should be so used as to defeat or amend the law as it stands. Maitland said long ago that equity came to supplement and not to supplant the law. We think that, if we were to aquate a notification under section 18 with the notification under section 6 of the Act for purposes of determining the market value, which is to be awarded, we would be doing nothing short-of supplanting at least the law as found clearly laid own in section 27 of the Bangalore Act read with section 23 of the Acquisition Act. We think that the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had seriously misdirected itself in not giving effect to obvious meanings of the plain words used in statutes under consideration.Another contention which found favour in the Karnataka High Court was that a judgment filed by the respondents claimants m Civil Appeals Nos. 644-650 of 1974, when they appealed to the Karnataka High Court against the orders passed by a Civil Judge of Bangalore, on a reference made under the Acquisition Act, could be accepted as additional evidence under Order 41, Rule 27 C.P.C. on the ground that it. was relevant, evidence for the purpose of determining compensation of lands which were the subject matter of appeals before the High Court. The reasons given for admitting, at the appellate stage, a judgment of the High Court, which had not been filed before the Trial Court, were: firstly, that it was not available when the proceedings were pending in the Trial Court; and secondly, that lands dealt with by the judgment were adjacent to the lands the value of which needed determination, and that both sets of lands were acquired at different stages of what is known as the "layout scheme within the limits of Bhinnamangala village. The High Court overruled the objection that the judgment admitted as additional evidence was not final inasmuch as an appeal against it was pending in this Court. We find that the High Court did not consider it, for some reason, necessary to refer to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act which regulate the admissibility of all evidence including judgments. There could be no question of res judicata in such a case. The previous judgment was not between the same parties. Furthermore, the appellant was not given any opportunity of showing that the judgment related to land which was at some distance from the lands whose value was to be determined or that its site value was, for some reason, higher. Even the time at which the value of the other land was determined was not shown to be identical. Such judgments are not judgments in rem. They are judgments in personam. The general provision of law governing admissibility of all judgments, whether they are judgments in rem or judgments in personam operating as res judicata, is section 43 of the Evidence Act which reads as follows:"43. Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of thisis apparent that section 43 enacts that judgments other than those falling under sections 40 to. 42 are irrelevant unless they fall under some other provision of the Evidence Act; and, even if they do fall under any such other provision, all that is relevant, under section 43 of the Evidence Act, is "the existence" of such judgment, order, or decree provided it "is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act". An obvious instance of such other provision is a judgment falling under section 13 of the Evidence Act. The illustration to section 13 of the Evidence Act indicates the kind of facts on which the existence of judgments may beSpecial Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Lakhamsi Ghelabhai, (A.I.R. 1960 Bom. 78  .) Shelat J, held that judgments not inter partes, relating to land acquired are not admissible merely because the land dealt with n the judgment was situated near the land of which the value is to be determined. It was held there that such judgments would fall neither under section 11 nor under section 1 3 of the Evidence Act. Questions relating to value of particular pieces of land depend upon the evidence in the particular case in which those facts are proved. They embody findings or opinions relating to facts i n issue and investigated in different cases. The existence of a judgment would not prove he value of some piece of land not dealt within at all in the judgment admitted in evidence. Even slight differences in situation can, sometimes, cause considerable differences in value. We do not think it necessary to take so restrictive a view of the provisions of Sections 11 anti 13 of the Evidence Act as to exclude such judgments altogether from evidence even when good grounds are made out for their admission. In Khaja Fizuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (C.A. No. 176 of 1962, decided on 10-4-1963.) a bench of three Judges of this Court held such judgments to be relevant if they relate to similarly situated properties and contain determinations of value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date in a case.The Karnataka High Court had, however, not complied with provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of the C.P.C. which require that an Appellate Courts should be satisfied that the additional evidence is required to enable them either to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. It had recorded no reasons to show that it had considered the requirements of Rule 27, Order 41, of the C.P.C. we are of opinion that, the High Court should have recorded its reasons to show why it found the admission of such evidence to be necessary for some substantial reason. And if it found it necessary to admit it, an opportunity should have been given to the appellant to rebut any inference arising from its existence by leading other evidence.