Case: Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy

It is only after the issue and service of summons under Order XXIV and the filing of a written statement under Order XXV that the question of framing issues need arise in a case. However, as notice was issued and an affidavit in opposition was filed by Shri Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy himself in this case where preliminary objections to the maintainability of the election petition were taken, and the petitioner asked for issue to be framed, this Court framed issues on these, preliminary objections., They were as follows:(1) Has the petitioner a locus standi to maintain his election petition, or, in other words, is he a duly nominated candidate in accordance wit h provisions of section 5B and 5C Of the Presidential andl Elections, Act?(2) Is the petition maintainable ?(3) Is it open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of section 5B and 5C of the Act?(4) If so, are the two provisions mentioned in issue No. 3 valid?If, however, the petitioner could not get beyond the stage of the first issue on his locus standi, it was no use considering other issues. In this case, however, the four issues or questions in issue framed above are so interconnected that we propose to deal with them by means of a single judgment and order stating our reason s for coming to the conclusion that this petition is barred by the provisions of law so that it must be rejected on this ground. We are also of opinion that it is neither open to the petitioner to challenge the validity of section 5B an d 5C of the Act nor are these provisions in any way invalid. The petitioner went so far as to challenge the validity of the constitutional amendment introduced in 1974 by which the jurisdiction of any Court to question the validity of an Act made under Article 71(1) of the Constitution was barred. The relevant constitutional provisions and the provisions of the Act are set out below

Reasoning: It is clear to us that Article 58 only provides the qualifications or conditions for the eligibility of a candidate. It has nothing to do with the nomination of a candidate which requires ten proposers and ten seconders. We think that in the case of an election to such a high office as that of the President of India, it is quite reasonable to lay down the condition that a person who is allowed to contest the election as a candidate must have at least ten proposers and ten seconders from amongst hundreds of electors who ire legislators. We think that the subject matter of sections 5B and 5C is completely covered by the provisions of Article 71(1) of the Constitution set out above. We also think that there is no force in the contention that sections 5B and 5C of the Act are in conflict with Article 14 of the Constitution. The conditions laid down in sections 5B and 5C apply t o all persons who want to be candidates at a Presidential election without any discrimination. The Prima facie impose reasonable conditions to be observed by any person who wants seriously to contest at a Presidential election. Hence, this provision would be valid even apart from Article 71(3) of the Constitution.When Article 71(3) of the Constitution was pointed out to the petitioner, he contended that it was introduced by an amendment in 1974 which was invalid. When we questioned the petitioner about the grounds of its alleged invalidity, he maintained that it constituted an invasion of the basic structure of the Constitution, and contended that this Court had invalidated a similar amendment of the Constitution in the case of Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain([1976] 2 SCR 347.) . We think the provisions of the Constitutional amendment which was invalidated there cannot be said to be similar to Article 71(3) of the Constitution. In Shrimati Indira Nehru Gandhis case (supra), this Court had struck down Article 329A(4) of the Constitution mainly on the ground that it violated the basic structure of the Constitution in as much as Parliament, in exercise of its powers of amendment of the Constitution, under Article 368, could not exercise a judicial power of decision of election disputes pending before this Court. This Court had struck down a provision there which took away the jurisdiction of this Court to decide disputes pending in appeals before it, because Parliament had, , after practically deciding these disputes, directed this Court to carry out whatever was laid down in the form of a Constitutional amendment. This Court refused to accept as valid what amounted to an adjudication or what displaced adjudication, without following any judicial orl procedure, by resorting to what was essentially only a legislative power lodged in Parliament. The basic structure of the Constitution, resting on the doctrine of a Separation of Powers, seemed to have been shaken rather rudely by Article 329A(4) which was, therefore, declared void. In the case before us, the impugned amendment of the Constitution only refers to a law by which Parliament may regulate matters connected with the Presidential election, including those relating to election disputes arising out of such an election. It cannot be said to take away the jurisdiction of this Court to decide any matter which may be pending before this Court. All it does is to provide that the validity of any law falling under Article 71 (1) will not be called in question in any court. In as much as this Court has been constituted the authority of Tribunal before which the election of the President ca n be questioned the effect of Article 71 (3) is only to give effect to a well known general principle which is applied by this Court that a Court or Tribunal functioning or exercising its jurisdiction under an enactment will not question the validity of that very enactment which is the source of its powers. This Court functions here as an election tribunal set up under a law made by Parliament under Article 71 (1) of the Constitution. We are unable to see any force in the attack upon the validity of either section 5B or section 5C of the Act or of the amendment which introduced Article 71(3) of the Constitution.The result of a careful consideration by us of the provisions mentioned above is that we think that the procedure or manner for questioning the Presidential election having been laid down, the petitioner must come within the four comers of that procedure in order to have a locus standi to challenge the Presidential election an d to be able to maintain this petition. If he neither is nor can claim to be a candidate, on assertions made by him in his petition itself, he would be lacking the right to question the election of Shri Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy as President of India. The effect of the provision of section 14(1), 14(2) and 14(3) and 14A(1) of the Act, read with Order XXXIX, rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of this Court, is that the petition before us is barred because the petitioner has not got the required locus standi to maintain itFor the foregoing reasons, we decide issues(1) to (4) against the petitionerWe may mention here that in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India(1), this Court had dismissed suits filed in this Court under Article131 of the Constitution on a preliminary point without framing issues. It was pointed out there, by one of us (Beg, C.J.), that technically more correct order to pass in those cases may have been to reject the plaints in limine under Order XXIII, Rule 6 of the Rules of this CourtIn the case before us, however, it is quite. clear that the petition is barred by the provisions of Section 14(1) and (3) read with Section 5B and 5C and Sec. 14A of the Act and Order XXXIX, Rules 2 and 5 of the Rules of this Court framed under Part III mentioned in section 14(3) of the Act. 256) that, where a mode for doing something is laid down, any other mode is necessarily prohibited, this petition is barred by the provisions of law laying down the procedure for filing an election petition and indicating who arc entitled to maintain it. On such a view the petition could be rejected under Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court. On the other band, it could be said, where he is challenging the very validity of the provisions which bar him from coming to the Court, that he has the locus standi to do that until his case is thrown out on the question of validity. Consequently, we think it safer in the case before us to hold that the petition is not maintainable on the view taken by us.