Case: Mohd. Ibrahim Khan Others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others

This appeal by special leave is directed against the order date 27th December 1977 made by the State of Madhya Pradesh granting a licence for a quasi-permanent cinema to respondent no. 3 Prem Narayan son of Ganpatlal Chouksey, proprietor, Chitra Talkies, Lalbagh, Burhanpur (M.P.) against which a petition226 of the Constitution by the petitioners was dismissed in limine by a speaking order by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur on 6th Marchrespondent made an application on 5th December 1975 for grant of a licence for a temporary cinema and the District Magistrate having jurisdiction issued a no objection certificate vide his order dated 10th February 1976 for a period of six months. This licence was renewed upto 30th June 1976 and there was a further renewal up to 30th September 1976. A subsequent application for renewal was turned down by the Distt. Magistrate by his order dated 29th June 1977 on the ground that Paras Talkies with permanent cinema licence which w as closed, has now been functioning in the locality and, therefore, a renewal of the licence for a temporary cinema in the same locality would not be proper. Respondent 3 carried the matter in appeal to the State Government which by its order dated 27th December 1977 granted a licence for a quasi-permanent cinema under the M.P. Cinemas Regulation Rules to the third respondent Present petitioners filed a petition under Article 226 questioning the validity of the aforementioned order of t he State Government conceding, inter alia, that they were the residents of the locality and that they had objected to the grant/renewal of licence on the ground that there is a mosque a madrasa and a temple in the vicinity or the place where the cinema house is to be constructed, and even though their objections were upheld by the licensing authority, the District Magistrate, they were not heard in the appeal preferred by the third respondent and, therefore the order of the first respondent State of Madhya Pradesh suffers, inter alia, from the vice of violation of the principles of natural justice. The High Court was of the opinion that District Magistrate was not influenced by the fact that there was a mosque, and a temp le in the vicinity of the place where the proposed cinema house was to be constructed but he was influenced by an extraneous consideration that a cinema having a permanent cinema licence having been re-opened in the locality there was no need for a cinema house with a temporary licence and that it being a matter left to the subjective satisfaction of the State Government, the State Government on being satisfied that there was no impediment to the grant of such a licence, was perfectly justified in granting the same and, therefore, it is not a fit case for the interference of the High Court. The appellants thereupon filed this appeal by special leave.

Reasoning: If after taking into consideration the objections. acertificate is granted, there ends the matter subject, of course, to any properly constituted legal proceedings, conceivably a writ petitions. (3 ) of s. 5 of the Act is unambiguous when it provides for an appeal only at the instance of a person aggrieved by the decision of the licensing authority refusing licence. A fortiori, every objector to renewal is not entitled to file an appeal if licence is granted rejecting his objections. Nor in an appeal by the aggrieved person within the meaning of s. 5(3) every objector to the grant ofcertificate is entitled to be joined as a party respondent or that each objector is entitled to notice of hearing of the appeal. however, the grievance of the appellants it without merits because initially whencertificate was applied for they did not object and one who has not objected cannot subsequently make a grievance [see Jashbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmedsecond fallacy is that rules 3 to 6 envisage an advertisement of an application for acertificate and inviting objections hereto and disposal of such an application. There is, however, nothing in the Act or the rules which requires the licensing authority to invite objections before grant of acinema licence. The right to object is at the initial stage when acertificate is applied for by the intending applicant for such a certificate. But there is no provision for inviting objections when the application is for a permanent orcinema licence or a touring cinema licence. There is no provision in the Act or Rules which requires advertisement of such an application inviting objections and consideration of the objections before grant of a cinema licence. In A this case the application which was turned down by the Distt. Magistrate was one for renewal of acinema licence. The application for a noobjection certificate and granting of the same had passed muster long before on 10th February 1976 and appellants had n ot raised any objection to the grant ofcertificate. When the present appellants objected to the renewal of acinema licence it was not the stage for grant of acertificate but it was the stage of renewal oflicence subsequent to the stage of granting of acertificate, when there was no statutory obligation on the licensing authority to invite objections nor were the appellants entitled to file objections and nor were they entitled to be heard. A right to notice by reason of any rule of natural justice, which a party may establish, must depend for its existence upon proof of an interest which is bound to be injured by not hearing the party claiming to be entitled to a notice and to be heard before an order is passed. If the duty to give notice and to hear the party is not mandatory, the actual order passed on a matter must be shown to have injuriously affected the interest of the party which was given no notice of the matter [see Cosmosteels Private Ltd. v. Jairam Das Gupta &Ors. There was no statutory or mandatory duty to hear the appellants. There fore, there is no substance in the grievance that before granting renewal of such licence the State Government in the appeal filed by the third respondent had not heard them and that such a decision was rendered in violation of the principles of naturalin the aforementioned case this Court in terms held that a rival in cinema business has no locus standi to question the validity of the order under which the other person has been granted a cinema licence, but as the only contention raised on behalf o f the appellants does not commend to us and, therefore, the appeal is likely to fail on that ground alone, it is not necessary to explore this contention advanced on behalf of the respondents.