Case: Union Of India, Vs. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd

The respondent company was incorporated in the year 1932 with its registered office at Kamla Tower, Kanpur, in the State of Uttar Pradesh. The Company erected a sugar mill at Majhowlia, in the district of Champaran in the State of Bihar, and started manufacturing sugar in the year 1933. The bulk of sugarcane required for the manufacture of sugar was transported to the respondents mill from the sugarcane growing areas in the neighbourhood of Majhowlia by the appellant Railway. When the respondent started manufacture of sugar in the year 1933 the railway in that region was operated by the Bengal and North Western Railway Company Limited, which was later taken over by the Secretary of State in Council and is now owned and administered by the Government of India as the North Eastern Railway. By an agreement dated November 25, 1933, between the respondent and the Bengal and North Western Railway Company Limited the Railway agreed to provide an assisted siding at the Majhowlia railway station to afford better facilities for the delivery of goods consigned to the mill and for the despatch of goods sent out from the mill through the Railway. Under the agreement the respondent had to pay fixed half yearly charge amounting to Rs. 917.20, representing, 10 per cent of the capital invested by the railway in the construction of the assisted siding, for its use. This half-yearly payment continued till 1958 when the Railway gave a notice to the respondent on February 8, 1958, intimating that on the expiry of six months from the date of the receipt of the notice revised charges at the following rates would be levied in lieu of the fixed contribution that was being paid to the respondentRs. 779.56 towards interest on the capital and cost of maintenance of the permanent way, points and crossing and interlocking connected therewith; and(2) siding charge at the rate of Re. 1 per four-wheeled wagon hauled over the siding subject to a minimum of Rs. 7 pernew rates were, enforced on the expiry of the six months notice. In March 1960, the Railway desired that a fresh agreement be entered into with effect from April 1, l960. As the terms seemed onerous the respondent protested and some correspondence ensued. Ultimately the Railway by letter dated August 21, 1962, intimated to the respondent that with effect from March 1 1963, the old agreement dated November 25, 1933, would stand terminated and the siding facilities would be withdrawn. The respondent had no option but to pay the new charges claimed by the Railway and the new charges were asfixed charges of Rs. 779.56 for each half year; and(2) siding charges at the rate of Re. 1 per loaded four wheeled wagon subject to a minimum charge per trip arrived at by multiplying the average time taken per shunt by the cost of shunting engine per hour.On July 4, 1963, the respondent filed the complaint dated June 26, 1963, before the Tribunal. While the case was pending the Railway increased the fixed charge of Rs. 779.56 to Rs. 3134.88 per annum with effect from August 17, 1963.6. The description of the railway station and the lines is given by the Tribunal thus: Exhibit R. 2 is the sketch showing the position of the several lines at the Majhowlia station and also of the station buildings and goods shed. Lines numbers 1 and 2 marked in this sketch are the running lines. Lines numbers 3 and 4 are the transfer lines which constitute the assisted siding. Admittedly, lines numbers 3 and 4 are within railway premises and are completely on railway property. From the junction where these two lines meet there is another line proceeding to the complainants factory. This line is entirely within the property owned by the complainants and it is the private siding of the complainants.7. Coming to the first point raised by the learned counsel; this point was debated before the Tribunal. The Tribunal, after examining the original complaint, the amendments made in it, and the evidence led by the Railway, came to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled to raise the question of the revision of hauling charges. The Tribunal after reviewing the pleadingsseeking for such correction being made in the complaint the complainants were not obliged to attack the increase under the aforesaid item as unreasonable particularly in view of the fact that this increase was notified to the complainants only after the filing of the complaint and also of the fact that there was already the general allegation in the complaint that the increase in the siding charges had been abnormal and unreasonable. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the allegations made in the complaint would not cover the increase under the items of interest and maintenance charges also. It has also to be mentioned that the respondent was not, in any way, misled by the allegations contained in the complaint and that no surprise was sprung on the respondent by pressing the complainants case against the increase on account of interest and maintenance charges. The respondent was fully aware that the increase on account of interest and maintenance charges had also to be justified on the ground of increase in the cost of working the assisted siding. Even before the commencement of the recording of the evidence the respondent was ready with the required evidence in that direction and hence it cannot be said that the failture to single out the increase in the maintenance charge and to attack the same in the complaint as an unreasonable levy has caused any prejudice to the respondent. . . . . ..Accordingly, I hold that the reasonableness or, otherwise of all the charges levied by the respondent in respect of the assisted siding in question can and ought to be considered under issue number 4."

Reasoning: 9. In view of this decision we must overrule the contention, of the learned counsel on this point because the Tribunal has found that the Railway was ready with the required evidence and no prejudice had been caused to it.It is true that the argument sought to be raised now has not been dealt with before, but it seems to us that the answer to this is simple. The definition of "rate" cannot be applied to the expression "rates of any other charges". Here the word "rates" merely means the scale or amount of any other charges. The definition of the word "rate" cannot possibly be applied to Section 29 (2) of the Act.This is a finding of fact made by the Tribunal and no reason has been shown for displacing this pure finding of fact. The Tribunal has mentioned ample evidence from which it could reasonably come to the conclusion arrived at by it. It must be remembered that we are not sitting as a regular court of appeal from decision of the Tribunal, and in such cases we do not ordinarily go into questions of fact.