Case: Harinagar Cane Farm &amp; Another Vs. State of Bihar &amp; Others

An industrials dispute raised by the workmen of the two respective appellants had been referred for adjudication by respondent No. 1 the State of Bihar, to an Industrial Tribunal under S. 10(1) of the Act. Both the appellants then moved the Patna High Court for an appropriate writ under Art 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the agricultural operations carried on by them did not constitute an industry under the Act and so, respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to make the impugned orders of reference under S. 10 of the Act. The High Court has repelled this contention and has held that the agricultural operations carried on by the appellants respectively constitute an industry, and so, the two impugned orders of reference are perfectly valid under S. 10. It is against these orders passed by the Patna High Court in the two petitions filed by the respective appellants that they have come to this Court by special leave; and the short question which falls for our decision is in regard to the applicability of S. 2(j) of the act to the appellants operations in question.2. M/s Motipur Zamindari Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. which is the appellant in C. A. No. 31 of 1961 is a private limited company registered under the Indian Companies Act. It mainly produces sugar cane for sale to Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd., Motipur, Muzafarpur, in pursuance of an agreement under the provisions of the Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act, 1937, and the rules framed thereunder. It also produced wheat paddy and other articles for sale in the market either to the consumers or to wholesale dealers. Besides, it undertakes contract work of the Motipur Sugar Factory, such as maintaining tram-lines, maintaining weigh bridge at Paharchak, operating lake pumps, loading and unloading of canes and letting buildings on hire.3. M/s Harinagar Cane Farm which is the appellant in C. A. No. 349 of 1962 had been purchased by the Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd., in March, 1956 and since then is functioning as a department of the said Mills. It is a subsidiary concern of the Mills and a part of the organization of the Mills itself. Thus, the Mills through this section produces sugar for its own purpose. It is in the background of this character of the respective appellants that the question raised by the present appeals has to be determined.

Reasoning: In D. N. Banerji v. P. R. Mukherjee, 1953 SCR 302     at p. 307: (AIR 1953 SC 58   at p. 60) this Court had occasion to examine the full significance and import of the words industry and industrial dispute as defined by S. 2(j) and (k) of the Act. It has been urged by the respondents that this decision supports their argument that S. 2(j) includes all agriculture and agricultural operations, and in support of this proposition, they have invited our attention to the statement in the judgment delivered by Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., where it is observed that the concept of industry in the ordinary non-technical sense applies even to agriculture horticulture, pisciculture and so on and so forth. We are not impressed by this argument. The context in which this sentence occurs shown that the Court was there dealing with the ordinary non-technical sense according to what is understood by the man in the street as the denotation of the word industry or business, and so, the observations made in that connection cannot be taken to amount to the broad and unqualified proposition that agriculture of all kinds is included in S. 2(j).The decision in that case was that disputes that might arise between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business, fall under S. 2(k) of the Act. It is in the light of this decision that the observations on which the respondents rely must be read.11. In the State of Bombay v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha (1960) 2 SCR 866     at p. 880: AIR 1960 SC 610   at p. 616) this Court has had occasion to examine elaborately the implications of the concept of industry as defined by S. 2(j). But it may be point out that one of the considerations which weighed with this Court in dealing with the dispute raised by the appellant in that case was that in the First Schedule to the Act which enumerates industries which may be declared as public utility service under S. 2(a) (vi), three entries had been added by Act 36 of 1956. One of these was services in hospitals and dispensaries, and so, it was clear that after the addition of the relevant entry in the First Schedule it would not have been open to anybody to suggest that service in hospital does not fall under S. 2(j).12. In The Ahmedabad Textile Industrys Research Association v. The State of Bombay, (1961) 2 SCR 480   : (AIR 1961 SC 484  ) this Court held that the activities of the Research Association amounted to an industry, because the manner in which the Association had been organised showed that the undertaking as a whole was in the nature of business and trade organised with the object of discovering ways and means by which member-mills may obtain larger profits in connection with their industries. In other words, though the work was one of research and in that sense of an intellectual type, it had been so organised as to form part of or a department of the textile industry itself. That is why it was held that the appellant in that case was an employer and his activity was an industrial activity within the meaning of S. 2(j).13. On the other hand, the decision in the case of National Union of Commercial Employees v. M. R. Mehar, Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1962) 2 SCA 587 : (AIR 1962 SC 1080  ) was cited where this Court was called upon to consider whether the office of a solicitors firm was an employer and the work carried on in his office an industry under S. 2(j) : it was held that though the work of a solicitor is, in a loose sense, business, it could not be treated as an industry under S. 2(j) because the essential attribute of an industrial dispute was lacking in such a case; the essential basis of an industrial dispute, it was observed is that it is a dispute arising between capital and labour in enterprises where capital and labour combine to produce commodities or to render service and that could hardly be predicated about liberal profession like that of a Solicitor. A person following a liberal profession cannot be said to carry on his profession in any rational sense with the active co-operation of his employees, because it is well known that the man capital which a person following a liberal profession contributes is his special or peculiar intellectual and educational equipment. It is on these grounds that the Act was held to be inapplicable to a solicitors firm. We have referred to these decisions only to emphasise the point that this Court has consistently refrained from laying down unduly broad or categorical propositions in dealing with the somewhat difficult disputes which the definition contained in Section 2(j) raises before industrial adjudication. In the present case the dispute raised lies within a narrow compass and it is on that narrow basis that we have decided it.