Case: Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad &amp; Another Vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad &amp; Another

The Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad (briefly the Corporation) by its resolution of December 15, 1966, authorised its Commissioner under section 2841 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act 1949 (briefly the Bombay Act) to provide housing accommodation for the poorer classes. In pursuance of this authority of the Corporation the Commissioner passed the impugned order of compulsory acquisition on October 9, 1967, under section 284J of the Bombay Act in respect of 33, 357 sq. yds. of land final plots Nos. 11 to 25 of Town Planning Scheme No. V of Dariapur, Kazipur Ward.Out of this area the land belonging to the appellants measures about 1694 sq. yds. It is averred by the appellants that this area is "predominantly a commercial area and is almost fully built upon".The aforesaid order of compulsory acquisition was published in the official gazette of January 25, 1968 and in the local newspapers of February 10/11, 1968. Individual notices were also served on the concerned parties in accordance with law inviting objections from the owners including the appellants which were lodged in due course. These objections were submitted to the Standing Committee by the Commissioner with his suggestions and the Committee by its resolution No. 1942 of January 21, 1969, approved the said order of compulsory acquisition. The State Government thereafter confirmed the said order on January 6, 1972.The appellants had requested for a personal hearing with regard to their objections and their grievance is that the same was denied to them. It is common ground that no personal hearing was given to the appellants with regard to their objections by the Commissioner. Even so a period of nearly five years was taken in the process of finalising the order.After confirmation of the order of acquisition by the Government there is a provision for appeal under Schedule B to the Bombayappellants preferred an appeal to the City Civil Court at Ahmedabad and amongst several other grounds raised the question of the denial of personal hearing to them. The learned Judge of t he City Civil Court did not accede to the contention and by his order of April 10, 1974, held that the principles of natural justice were satisfied in this case inasmuch as they had been given an opportunity to submit their objections to theappellants then took the matter to the High Court of Gujarat under article 227 of the Constitution where the same grievance as to the denial of personal hearing was reiterated. The High Court by its order of March 31, 1975 refused to interfere with the order holding that section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act was duly complied with. The High Court also held that the City Civil Court Judge was right in rejecting the submission since "no oral hearing was ever claimed in the objection". Hence this appeal, by special leaye, which was ordered by this Court to bea perusal of the judgment of the City Civil Court as well as that of the High Court we are of opinion that there was no proper appraisal of the real issue in the matter. It appears that both the City Civil Judge and the High Court were only concerned with whether the rules of natural justice were complied with in the matter of acquisition of the land in question. We think, as will be shown below, that the City Civil Court and the High Court are no t right in their approach.We find that there is reference to section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act in the order of the High Court and it is apparently assumed by the High Court that the said section is applicable. All the same the High Court erroneously thinks that no personal hearing was necessary and the section is fully completed with by mere submission of the written objection particularly because "no oral bearing was ever claimed".

Reasoning: We are, therefore, unable to accept the submission that the appeal provided for under Schedule B is a complete substitute for a right to personal hearing and as such by necessary implication ousts the applicability of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act.Mr. Shroff further submits that under the Appendix I, inter alia, section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act is made applicale in an acquisition proceeding under the Bombay Act. It is, therefore, submitted that under section 284N, sub-section (4) any acqui sition under the Bombay Act is treated as an acquisition under section 17 ( 1 ) of the Land Acquisition Act and since section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act is also brought in under the said Appendix, section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, by necessary implication, should be held as excluded from the purview of the Bombay Act. We are unable to accept this submission. Even under section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act the appropriate Government has to direct, in a case of urgency, that the provisions of section 5A shall not apply. There is no automatic exclusion of section 5A even under the Land Acquisition Act. That being the position there is no substance in the contention that because of subsection (4) of section 284N, section 5A should be held inapplicable in the case of an acquisition proceeding under the Bombayare clearly of opinion that section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act is applicable in the matter of acquisition of land in this case and since no personal hearing had been given to the appellants by the Commissioner with regard to their written objections the order of acquisition and the resultant confirmation order of the State Government with respect to the land of the appellants are invalid under the law and the same are quashed. It should be pointed out, it is not a case of failure of the rules of natural justice as such as appeared to be the only concern of the High Court and also of the City Civil Court. It is a case of absolute non-compliance with a mandatory provision under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act which is clearly applicable in the matter of acquisition under the Bombay Act.We should also point out that the acquisition order must be an order valid under the law and the question of appeal arises only after confirmation of the order by the State Government. If the order is, at inception, invalid, its invalidity cannot be cured by its approval of the Standing Committee or by its confirmation of the Statehearing of objections under section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act to be given by the Commissioner under the Bombay Act cannot be replaced by a kind of appeal hearing by the City Civil Judge. The Bombay Act having assigned the duty of hearing objections to the Commissioner, he alone can hear them and not the City Civil Judge even assuming that all objections could be entertained by him in appeal. (See Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi &schemes under welfare legislation have to be executed in accordance with law which creates the schemes. The end does not always justify the means and it is no answer that the object of the scheme is such that it justifies the implementer of the law to be absolutely oblivious of the manner of enforcement even though t he manner is an integral part of the scheme, imposing under the law, restrictions on the rights of individuals. Beneficial laws have to be simple and self-contained. To introduce provisions of another Act referentially in vital matters creates avoidable difficulties and litigation highlighted by the case inis refreshing that this Court disposed of this matter within about four months of granting of special leave.