Case: A.C. Estates (Landlords) Vs. Serajuddin &amp; Company (Tenants)

2. It is not necessary to state the details except to mention only a few material facts which are relevant for the purpose of disposing of the point which has been raised. It appears that certain agreements were reached between the parties in the yearsfor leasing out the premises in question. In 1954 suits for specific performance were filed by the appellant against the respondent for enforcing the agreements relating to the leases. In March 1955 three applications were filed for fixing of standard rent by the respondent. These applications were preferred under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act 1950. By an order dated December 5, 1955 the Rent Controller acting under S. 9 (1) (e) of the said Act fixed the standard rent at figures much less than the agreed amounts in all the three cases. An appeal was taken to the Court of Small Causes by the appellant. The appellate judge dismissed the appeal relating to Block A, B and C and suite No. 12 but with respect to suit nos. 14 and 16 he partly allowed the appeal by slightly increasing the standard rent. He dismissed cross appeals filed by the respondent. Thereafter both the appellant and the respondent moved the High Court and obtained rules. The High Court by its judgment dated March 7, 1957 remanded the cases to the appellate judge for fresh consideration in accordance with the directions given by it. After recording further evidence the appellate judge dismissed all the appeals and confirmed the rents fixed by the Rent Controller. The appellant then moved the High Court under S. 32 (4) of the 1950 Act and obtained three rules. By a common judgment dated July 24, 1961 the High Court made certain increases in the rents in respect of Block A, B. and C and suites, 14 and 16 but declined to interfere in respect of the rent fixed for suite no. 12.

Reasoning: This court has taken the view that authorities under a taxing statute are not concerned with the validity of the taxing provisions and the question of ultra vires is foreign to the scope of their jurisdiction. Any point relating to the constitutional validity of a taxing provision could not be raised before the income tax authorities and therefore neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court could go into those matters in a revision or reference from the decision of those authorities. See K. S. Venkataraman and Co. v. State of Madras, (1966 2 SCR 229 (AIR 1966 SC 1089)  , Commissioner ofMadhya Pradesh v. M/s. Straw Products Ltd. Bhopal (1966) 2 SCR 881   = (AIR 1966 SC 1113  ), and C. T. Senthilnathan Chettiar v. State of Madras, (1968) 67 ITR 102 (SC).Although these decisions were given in provisions relating to taxing statutes we are of the opinion that the same rule would be applicable to a case of the present nature. In other words it can well be said that the question of ultra vires was wholly foreign to the scope and the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. As the appeals and the revisions which were later preferred were from the orders of the Rent Controller fixing the standard rent in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Control statute, we are unable to see any distinction between the present cases and those decided by this court arising out of a taxing statute. If the Rent Controller could not have decided the constitutional validity of the provisions which have been impugned in the same way as the taxing authorities could not have determined the constitutional validity of the taxing statute it would not be open either to the High Court or to this court to go into those questions in proceedings arising out of fixation of standard rent.