Case: Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Vs. State of Punjab

In the State of Punjab, all recognised schools have got to follow the course of studies approved by the Education Department of the Government and the use, by the pupils of the text books prescribed or authorised by the Department is a condition precedent to the granting of recognition to a school.For a long period of time prior to 1950, the method adopted by the Government for selection and approval of text books for recognised schools was commonly known as the alternative method and the procedure followed was shortly this: Books on relevant subjects, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Education Department, were prepared by the publishers with their own money and under their own arrangements and they were submitted for approval of the Government. The Education Department after proper scrutiny selected books numbering between 3 and 10 or even more on each subject as alternative text books, leaving it to the discretion of the Head Masters of the different school, to select any one of the alternative books on a particular subject out of the approved list.The Government fixed the prices as well as the size and contents of the books and when these things were done it was left to the publishers to print, publish and sell the books to the pupils of different schools according to the choice made by their respective Head Masters. Authors, who were not publishers, could also submit books for approval and if, any of their books were approved, they had to make arrangements for publishing the same and usually they used to select some one of the publishers already on the line to do the work.This procedure, which was in vogue since 1905, was altered in material particulars on and from May 1950. By certain resolutions of the Government passed on or about that time, the whole of the territory of Punjab, as it remained in the Indian Union after partition, was divided into three Zones. The text book on certain subjects like agriculture, history, social studies, etc. for all the zones were prepared and published by the Government without inviting them from the publishers.With respect to the remaining subjects, offers were still invited from "publishers and authors" but the alternative system was given up and only one text book on each subject for each class in a particular zone was selected. Another change introduced at this time was that the Government charged, as royalty, 5 per cent. on the sale price of all the approved text books. The result therefore was that the Government at this time practically took upon themselves the monopoly of publishing the text books on some of the subjects and with regard to the rest also, they reserved for themselves a certain royalty upon the sale proceeds.Changes of a far more drastic character however were introduced in the year 1952 by a notification of the Education Department issued on the 9th of August 1952 and it is against this notification that the complaints of the petitioners are mainly directed. This notification omitted the word "publishers altogether and invited only the "authors and others" to submit books for approval by the Government. These "authors and others", whose books were selected, had to enter into agreements in the form prescribed by the Government and the principal terms of the agreement were that the copyright in these books would vest absolutely in the Government and the "authors and others" would only get a royalty at the rate of 5 per cent. on the sale of the text books at the price or prices specified in the list.Thus the publishing, printing and selling of the books were taken by the Government exclusively in their own hands and the private publishers were altogether ousted from this business. The 5 per cent royalty, in substance, represents the price for the sale of the copyright and it is paid to an author or any other person who, not being the author, is the owner of the copyright and is hence competent in law to transfer the same to the Government. It is against these notifications of 1950 and 1952 that the present petition under Article 32 of the Constitution is directed and the petitioners pray for withdrawal of these notifications on the ground that they contravene the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under the Constitution.

Reasoning: The opinion, whether right or wrong, turns upon the particular facts of the case and upon the pro- vision of section 61 of the Australian Act and it cannot and does not throw any light on the question that requires decision in the present case.It may not be possible to frame an exhaustive definition of what executive function means and implies. Ordinarily the executive power connotes the residue of governmental functions that remain after legislative and judicial functions are taken away.The Indian Constitution has not indeed recognised the doctrine of separation if powers in its absolute rigidity but the functions of the different parts or branches of the Government have been sufficiently differentiated and consequently it can very well be said that our Constitution does not contemplate assumption, by one organ or part of the State, of functions that essentially belong to another. The executive indeed can exercise the powers of departmental or subordinate legislation when such powers are delegated to it by the legislature.It can also, when so empowered, exercise judicial functions in a limited way. The executive Government, however, can never go against the provisions of the Constitution or of any law. This is clear from the provisions of Article 154 of the Constitution but, as we have already stated, it does not follow from this that in order to enable the executive to function there must be a law already in existence and that the powers of the executive are limited merely to the carrying out of these laws.The limits within which the executive Government can function under the Indian Constitution can be ascertained without much difficulty by reference to the form of the executive which our Constitution has set up.Our Constitution, though federal in its structure, is modelled on the British Parliamentary system where the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the exercise of this responsibility is its retaining the confidence of the legislative branch of the State.The executive function comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it into execution. This evidently includes the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, the promotion of social and economic welfare, the direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision of the general administration of thecannot say that such legislation is always necessary. If the trade or business involves expenditure of funds, it is certainly required that Parliament should authorise such expenditure either directly or under the provisions of a statute.It may be, as Mr. Pathak contends, that the Appropriation Acts are no substitute for specific legislation and that they validate only the expenses out of the consolidated funds for the particular years for which they are passed; but nothing more than that may be necessary for carrying on of the trade or business. Under Article 266 (3) of the Constitution no moneys out of the consolidated funds of India or the consolidated fund of a State shall be appropriated except in accordance with law and for the purposes and in the manner provided in this Constitution.The expression "law" here obviously includes the Appropriation Acts. It is true that the Appropriation Acts cannot be said to give a direct legislative sanction to the trade activities themselves. But so long as the trade activities are carried on in pursuance of the policy which the executive Government has formulated with the tacit support of the majority in the legislature, no objection on the score of their not being sanctioned by specific legislative provision can possibly be raised.Objections could be raised only in regard to the expenditure of public funds for carrying on of the trade or business and to these the Appropriation Acts would afford a complete answer.17. Specific legislation may indeed be necessary if the Government require certain powers in addition to what they possess under ordinary law in order to carry on the particular trade or business. Thus when it is necessary to encroach upon private rights in order to enable the Government to carry on their business, a specific legislation sanctioning such course would have to be passed.In the present case it is not disputed that the entire expenses necessary for carrying on the business of printing and publishing the text books for recognised schools in Punjab were estimated and shown in the annual financial statement and that the demands for grants, which were made under different heads were sanctioned by the State Legislature and due Appropriation Acts were passed.For the purpose of carrying on the business the Government do not require any additional powers and whatever is necessary for their purpose, they can have by entering into contracts with authors and other people. Thus power of contract is expressly vested in the Government under Art. 298 of the Constitution. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with Mr. Pathak that the carrying on of the business of printing and publishing text books was beyond the competence of the executive Government without a specific legislation sanction suchexecutive Government are bound to conform not only to the law of the land but also to the provisions of the Constitution. The Indian Constitution is a written; Constitution and even the legislature cannot override the fundamental rights guaranteed by it to the citizens. Consequently, even if the acts of the executive are deemed to be sanctioned by the legislature, yet they can be declared to be void and inoperative if they infringe any of the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.On the other hand; even if the acts of the executive ire illegal in the sense that they are not warranted by law, but no fundamental rights of the petitioners have been infringed thereby, the latter would obviously have no right to complain under Art. 32 of the Constitution though they may have remedies elsewhere if other heads of rights areit is for the school authorities to prescribe the text books that are to be used by the students and if these text books are available in the market the pupils can purchase them from any book-seller they like.There is no fundamental right in the publishers that any of the books printed and published by them should be prescribed text books by the school authorities or if they are once accepted as text books they cannot be stopped or discontinued in future.With regard to the schools which are recognised by the Government the position of the publishers is still worse. The recognised schools receive aids of various kinds from the Government including grants for the maintenance of the institutions, for equipment, furniture, scholarships and other things and the pupils of the recognised schools are admitted to the school final examination at lower rates of fees than those demanded from the students of non-recognised schools.Under the school code, one of the main conditions upon which recognition is granted by Government is that the school authorities must use as text books only those which are prescribed or authorised by the Government.Solong as this system was in vogue the only right which publishers, like the petitioners had, was to offer their books for inspection and approval by the Government. They had no right to insist on any of their books being accepted as text books.So the utmost that could be said is that there was merely a chance or prospect of any or some of their books being approved as text books by the Government. Such chances are incidental to all trades and businesses and there is no fundamental right guaranteeing them. A trader might be lucky in securing a particular market for his goods but if he loses that field because the particular customers for some reason or other do not choose to buy goods from him, it is not open to him to say that it was his fundamental right to have his old customers for ever.On the one hand, therefore there was nothing but a chance or prospect which the publishers had of having their books approved by the Government, on the other hand the Government had the undisputed right to adopt any method of selection they liked and if they ultimately decision that after approving the text books they would purchase the copyright in them from the authors and others provided the latter were willing to transfer the same to the Government on certain terms, we fail to see what right of the publishers to carry on their trade or business is affected by it.Nobody is taking away the publishers right to print and publish any books they like and to offer them for sale but if they have no right that their books should be approved as text books by the Government it is immaterial so far as they are concerned whether the Government approves of text books submitted by other persons who are willing to sell their copyrights in the books to them, or choose to engage authors for the purpose of preparing the text books which they take up on themselves to print andaction of the Government may be good or bad. It may be criticised and condemned in the Houses of the Legislature or outside but this does not amount to an infraction of the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of thethe petitioners have no fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the question whether the Government could establish a monopoly without any legislation under Article 19(6) of the Constitution is altogether immaterial.Again a mere chance or prospect of having particular customers cannot be said to be a right to property or to any interest in an undertaking within the meaning of Article 31(2) of the Constitution and no question of payment of compensation can arise because the petitioners have been deprived of the same.