Case: M/s. Govind Impex (P) Ltd. &amp; Others Vs. Appropriate Authority, Income Tax Department

1. Appellants are the owners of property bearing No. B-68, Greater Kailash, Part-I, New Delhi and they let out the same at a monthly rental of Rs. 2,50,000/- with effect from 1st June, 1991 for a period of nine years renewable for a further period of nine years. The appropriate authority of the Income-tax Department, respondent herein issued show cause notice to the appellant dated 4th December, 1995, inter alia, alleging that since the lease is for a period of nine years extendable for a further period of nine years, it was a lease for a period of more than 12 years and hence the provision of Chapter XXC of the Income-tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the ?Act?) would be attracted and the lessor and the lessee were obliged to submit Form 37-1 within 15 days of the draft agreement. Appellants submitted their show cause on 12th January, 1996, inter alia, contending that the lessee had an option to renew the lease by giving three months? notice prior to the expiry of the lease and further a fresh lease deed was required to be executed and registered, hence the provision of Chapter XXC of the Act shall not be attracted. The show cause filed by the appellants was considered and finding no merit, the appropriate authority rejected the same by order dated 24th April, 2001 holding the appellants guilty of not complying with the provisions of Section 269UC of the Act. Accordingly, a complaint was laid on 30th April, 2001 under Section 267AB read with Section 278B of the Act before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate alleging contravention of Section 269UC of the Act. Learned Magistrate by its order dated 30th April, 2001 took cognizance of the offence and issued process against the appellants2. Appellants filed writ petition before the High Court for quashing the aforesaid order dated 24th April, 2001 of the appropriate authority rejecting their show cause and deciding to file criminal complaint. However, since the prosecution had already been launched against the appellants, the Division Bench of the High Court directed for treating the writ petition as an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code. Ultimately, the learned Single Judge by order dated 10th October, 2002 dismissed the same and while doing so observed as follows:?In the present case also, it is clearly stipulated in para 1 of the lease deed that the lease was extendable purely at the discretion and option of the Lessee on the second part for a further period of nine years. On a conjoint reading of paras 1 and 12 of the lease deed, it becomes clear that lessor intended the lease to last for 18 years. The lessor could not have refused to renew/extend the lease after first term if the lessee complied with the conditions for renewal/extensions. So in view of explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) of the Act, the total terms of the lease will be 18 years no matter whether it is for a single term of 18 years or two terms of nine years each or three terms of six years each or six terms of three years each. Whether the subsequent terms are described as extensions or renewals is immaterial for the purpose of Section 269UA(f)(i). If the aggregate of the original term and stiupulated extension/renewal comes to more than 12 years, such a lease will fall under the purview of explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) of the Act and it will be considered to be a lease for not less than 12 years thereby making the provisions of Chapter XXC of the Act application thereto.?3. Aggrieved by the same the appellants have preferred this appeal with the leave of the Court.

Reasoning: 7. Mr. Salve submits that statute providing for penal prosecution has to be construed strictly. He refers to Clause 12 aforesaid and contends that it shall govern the field. Mr. Bhatt submits that it is Clause 1 of the lease deed which shall govern the issue. We do not have the slightest hesitation in accepting the broad submission of Mr. Salve that Penal statute which make an act a penal offence or impose penalty is to be strictly construed and if two views are possible, one favourable to the citizen is to be ordinarily preferred but this principle has no application in the facts of the present case. There is no serious dispute in regard to the interpretation of explanation to Section 269UA(f) of the Act and in fact, we are proceeding on an assumption that it will cover only such cases where exists provision for extension in lease deed. In our opinion, what we are required to consider is the terms and conditions of lease. The terms of lease are not to be interpreted following strict rules of construction. One term of the lease cannot be taken into consideration in isolation. Entire document in totality has to be seen to decipher the terms and conditions of lease. Here in the present case, Clause 1 in no uncertain term provides for extension of period of lease for a further period of nine years and Clause 12 thereof provides for renewal on fulfilment of certain terms and conditions. Therefore, when the document is constructed as a whole, it is apparent that it provides for the extension of the term. If that is taken into account the lease is for a period of not less than twelve years. Once it is held so the explanation to Section 269UA(f)(i) is clearly attracted. We are of the opinion that the High Court is right in observing that ?on a conjoint reading of paras 1 and 12 of the lease deed, the lessor intended the lease to last for 18 years? and further the lessor could not have refused to renew/extend the lease after first term if the lessee complied with the conditions.