Case: Kasturi &amp; Sons Private Limited Vs. N. Salivateswaran &amp; Another

relevant for our purpose. Under S. 33-C, sub-s. (2), where any workman is entitled to receive from his employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit may be computed may, subject to any rules made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government, and the amount so determined should be recovered as provided for in sub-s. (1). Then follows sub-s. (3) which provides for an enquiry by the Labour Court into the question of computing the money value of the benefit in question. The Labour Court is empowered under this sub-section to appoint a commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the commissioner and other circumstances of the case. These provisions indicate that, where an employee makes a claim for some money by virtue of the benefit to which he is entitled, an enquiry into the claim is contemplated by the Labour Court, and it is only after the Labour Court has decided the matter that the decision becomes enforceable under S. 33C (1) by a summary procedure. 12. It is true that, in the present case, the Government of Bombay has specified the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act and the Industrial Disputes Act as specified authorities under S. 17 to deal with applications of newspaper employees whose wages are less than Rs. 200 per month or more respectively; but there can be no doubt that when the second respondent entertained the first respondents application, he was acting as the specific authority under S. 17 and not as an industrial tribunal. It is clear that, under S. 17, the State Government would be entitled to specify any person it likes for the purpose of holding an enquiry under the said section.The powers of the authority specified under S. 17 must be found in the provisions of he Act itself and they cannot be inferred from the accidental circumstance that the specified authority otherwise is a member of the industrial tribunal; since there is no provision in the Act which confers on the specified authority the relevant and adequate powers to hold a formal enquiry, it would be difficult to accept the position that various questions which may arise between the working journalists and their employers were intended to be dealt with a summary and an informal manner without conferring adequate powers on the specified authority in that behalf.The second respondent authority himself was impressed by this argument but he was inclined to hold that the necessary power could be assumed by him by implication because he thought that, in the absence of such implied power, his jurisdiction under S. 17 could not be effectively exercised. In our opinion, this approach really begs the question. If the legislature did not confer adequate powers on the specified authority under S. 17, a more reasonable inference would be that the nature and scope of the powers under S. 17 is very limited and the legislature knew that, for holding such a limited and narrow enquiry, it was unnecessary to confer powers invariably associated with formal and complicated enquiries of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. We must accordingly hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application at this stage. 13. It appears from the order made by the second respondent that he took the view that, though he had jurisdiction to deal with the application, it would have been open to him to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction and to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil Court. He however, thought that he need not exercise that power in the present case. We are satisfied that the second respondent was in error in both these conclusions.If he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under S. 17, it is difficult to appreciate how, in the absence of any provision in that behalf, he could have directed the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil Court. Such an order would clearly have amounted to the second respondents failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him.Besides, if S. 17 had really given him discretion in this matter as assumed by the second respondent, on the merits of this case it would obviously have been a case which should have been referred to the ordinary civil Court. This, however, is now a matter of purely academic interest. 14. The question which still remains to be considered is : What would be the proper order to make on the present petition in view of our conclusion that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application.The present petition purports to invoke our jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution and it was a valid and competent petition in so far as it challenged the vires of S. 17 itself; but, once S. 17 is held to be valid and in order, the competence of the petition under Art. 32 is naturally open to serious jeopardy. No question about the fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved and his grievance against the order passed by the second respondent cannot be ventilated by a petition under Art. 32. This position is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He, however, argued that, if we construe S. 17 in his favour, and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application, his purpose would be effectively served even though technically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not competent under Art. 32 of the Constitution.In our opinion, there is considerable force in this contention. We would accordingly hold that the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application; but, since the petition itself is not competent under Art. 32,

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]In our opinion, this approach really begs the question. If the legislature did not confer adequate powers on the specified authority under S. 17, a more reasonable inference would be that the nature and scope of the powers under S. 17 is very limited and the legislature knew that, for holding such a limited and narrow enquiry, it was unnecessary to confer powers invariably associated with formal and complicated enquiries of a judicial or quasi-judicial character. We must accordingly hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application at this stage13. It appears from the order made by the second respondent that he took the view that, though he had jurisdiction to deal with the application, it would have been open to him to refuse to exercise that jurisdiction and to direct the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil Court. He however, thought that he need not exercise that power in the present case. We are satisfied that the second respondent was in error in both these conclusions.If he had jurisdiction to deal with this matter under S. 17, it is difficult to appreciate how, in the absence of any provision in that behalf, he could have directed the first respondent to establish his claim in the ordinary civil Court. Such an order would clearly have amounted to the second respondents failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in him.Besides, if S. 17 had really given him discretion in this matter as assumed by the second respondent, on the merits of this case it would obviously have been a case which should have been referred to the ordinary civil Court. This, however, is now a matter of purely academic interestIn our opinion, there is considerable force in this contention. We would accordingly hold that the second respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application;; but,since the petition itself is not competent under Art. 32The present petition purports to invoke our jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution and it was a valid and competent petition in so far as it challenged the vires of S. 17; but,once S. 17 is held to be valid and in order, the competence of the petition under Art. 32 is naturally open to serious jeopardy. No question about the fundamental rights of the petitioner is involved and his grievance against the order passed by the second respondent cannot be ventilated by a petition under Art. 32. This position is fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner. He, however, argued that, if we construe S. 17 in his favour, and hold that the second respondent had no jurisdiction to entertain the first respondents application, his purpose would be effectively served even though technically his petition may ultimately be dismissed on the ground that it is not competent under Art. 32 of the Constitution.