Case: Ajit Singh Vs. State of Punjab &amp; Another

the second proviso since their land is not acquired as contemplated therein. We cannot accept this argument.33. Article 31-A deals with a special subject, namely, the saving of laws providing for acquisition of estate. This article saves any law from an attack under Articles 14, l9 and 31 provided it is for the acquisition by the State of an estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. It will be noticed that here the article does not refer to property as such, but speaks of an estate as defined in the Article and also of rights in the estate. Estate is defined to include, among other things, "any land held or let for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, including waste land, forest land, land for pasture or sites of buildings and other structures occupied by cultivators of land, agricultural labourers and village artisans". Applying the definition, the lands under cultivation must be regarded as estate. Now the intention underlying Article 31-A is to give protection to State action against Articles 14, 19 and 31 so long as the acquisition is by the State of any estate or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights. To this protection there is only one exception and that is to be found in the second proviso. It is that land under the personal cultivation of any estate holder of any kind which is within the ceiling limit applicable to such person, shall not be acquired, unless at least market value of the land is given as compensation. Such land can be acquired but only on compensation which is not less than the market value. The word "acquisition" used in the proviso must take its colour from the same word used earlier and not from the word as used in the earlier article in juxtaposition with the word requisition. The word must denote not only the acquisition of ownership, that is to say, the entire bundle of rights but also acquisition of some rights particularly in acquisition which leaves the person an owner in name only.34. Article 31-A, it is submitted by the State, introduces two further concepts, viz., extinguishment of rights and modification of rights. In the case of extinguishment, if all the rights in the property are extinguished, the result would be nothing else than acquisition, for, no property can remain in suspense without the rights therein being vested in someone or the other. In this case the property goes to the Panchayat which is included in State. In the case of modification of rights all the rights of ownership remain in the owner except that they would be modified by some statutory provisions. In such a case the conception either of acquisition or requisition may not apply. In the present case bits of properties are being taken from the lands belonging to the appellants and others and are thrown in a common lot. The ownership is supposed to be vested in a proprietary body consisting of several proprietors. The statute provides that though ownership is vested in the said proprietary body the management of the land would be with the Panchayat. The only obligation thrown on the Panchayat is that the income arising from such land should be utilized for the common benefit not only of the proprietors but also of non-proprietors in the Panchayat area. The result of these provisions are (1) that a proprietor is undoubtedly deprived of his property howsoever small a proportion it may be thereof; (2) the ownership in such a property is transferred to another body which under the statute is an entity different from the proprietor himself; (3) though the ownership is vested in such a proprietary body all rights with regard to the management and income thereof are vested in as Panchayat; and (4) the benefit of the income from such lands goes not to the proprietor but to all the proprietors as well as non-proprietors in the Panchayat area. Although the property is not actually vested either in the State Government or the Panchayat a device is being made in the Act to escape the concept of acquisition to avoid the payment of compensation required under the second proviso to Article 31-A. In substance and in effect this is nothing but a colourable use of the provisions of Article 31-A by making out a case of modification of rights when there is in reality an acquisition, mainly for the sake of avoiding compensation.35. Therefore, when the State acquires almost the entire bundle of rights, it is acquisition within the second proviso and compensation at market rates must be given. It is not at all difficult to determine this compensation. The total land of the holder must be assessed at market value and the value of the dimunition of the area determined proportionately. The appellant is thus entitled to compensation and he cannot be deprived of land within his ceiling without payment of compensation calculated in the manner indicated. It is admitted that his land has been reduced to something less than the ceiling applicable to him.36. It is contended that what is acquired is a small bit from each landholder and that is not of much significance. We do not know what rule is in contemplation. If it is the de minimis rule, we can only say that it would be a most unsatisfactory mode of avoidance of the constitutional provision. What is a small bit is a very vague and uncertain expression. The safe rule is that the Constitution means what it says, that is, land within the ceiling is not to be touched unless compensation at market rate is given. We would, therefore, reject the plea that we should ignore these small bits of land especially as they will be used for the general good and will confer some benefit also upon those who will lose them.37. We would accordingly allow the appeal with costs.ORDER38.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]4. There seems to be substance in the first two points. It seems to us clear that before a person can start acting as a Consolidation Officer he must be appointed as such. Before he is appointed he has no authority to exercise any of the functions of a Consolidation Officer. What he does purporting to act as a Consolidation Officer has no binding force on the owners and other persons affected in the estate. The Government cannot by appointing him retrospectively clothe him with authority retrospectively. This can he done only by the Legislature subject to the provisions of the Constitution.5. But the appellant cannot succeed on these grounds because the High Court in its discretion has held that the appellant is not entitled to rely on these objections because of laches.We cannot say that the discretion has been exercised wrongly. After the notification was published on May 11, l962. appointing Gurkirpal Singh retrospectively invite effect from November 4, 1961, it must have been clear to the appellant that Gurkirpal Singh had not been appointed Consolidation Officer before he started preparing consolidation proceedings.No adequate explanation has been given for the delay. Further it has not been shown that there has been any manifest injustice.It would be noticed that Article .31-A (1) (a) mentions four categories; first acquisition by the State of an estate; second, acquisition by the State of rights in an estate; third, the extinguishment of rights in an estate, and, fourthly, the modification of rights in an estate. These four categories are mentioned separately and are different. In the first two categories the State "acquires" either an estate or rights in an estate. In other words, there is a transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to the State.When there is a transference of an estate to State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of the estate have been extinguished. But if the result in the case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within the expression "acquisition by the State of an estate". Similarly, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a right in an estate it could also be said that the rights of the owner have been modified since one of the rights of the owner has been acquired.8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference between "acquisition by the State" on the one hand and "modification or extinguishment of rights" on the other that in the first case the beneficiary is the State while in the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment is not the State. For example, suppose the State is the landlord of an estate and there is a lease of that property, and law provides for the extinguishment of leases held in estate. In one sense ii would he an extinguishment of the rights of a lessee, hill it would properly fall under the category of acquisition by the State because the beneficiary of the extinguishment could be the State.Does such taking away of property then amount to acquisition by the State of any land? Who is the real beneficiary? Is it the Panchayat? It is clear that the title remains in the proprietary body and in the revenue records the land would be shown as belonging to `all the owners and other right holders in proportion to their areas." The Panchayat will manage it on behalf of the proprietors and use it for common purposes; it cannot use it for any other purpose. The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived from the use of land for common purposes. It is true that the non-proprietors also derive benefit but their satisfaction and advancement enures in the end to the advantage of the proprietors in the form of a more efficient agricultural community. The Panchayat as such does not enjoy any benefit. On the facts of this case it seems to us that the beneficiary of the modification of rights is not the State, and therefore there is no acquisition by the State within the second proviso.15. In the context of the 2nd proviso, which is trying to preserve the rights of a person holding land under his personal cultivation, it is impossible to conceive that such adjustment of the rights of persons holding land under their personal cultivation in the interest of village economy was regarded something to be compensated for in cash.16. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to deal with the fourth point raised by the learned, counsel for the appellant because it does not matter whether the acquisition is complete or not, as even if we hold that the acquisition is not complete and it has yet to be completed, the second proviso to Art. 31A (1) would not prevent the State from proceeding with the acquisition.To determine the correct meaning it is necessary to view Arts. 31 and 31-A together. The State seeks to establish a contrast between acquisition and requisition and contends that "acquisition" means a total deprivation of the property for all time and "requisition" means either a partial deprivation or deprivation for a time. It submits that by the former there is a change of ownership and by the latter a change in possession or enjoyment without a change in ownership. This contrast the State seeks to establish from the way in which the words "acquisition" and "requisition" and "acquired" and "requisitioned" are used in juxtaposition in the two Articles. We have, therefore, to examine the scheme of the two Articles to see if they throw any light upon the matter.