Case: Village Panchayat Of Kanhan Pipri Vs. Standing Committee, Zila Parishad, Nagpur, And Ors

cases enlarge the octroi limits or reduce the octroi limits and it would lead to great confusion if either of the things happens after the Panchayat had been collecting octroi duty within the octroi limits submitted by it to the Collector for approval.15.We may here deal with a minor point which was mentioned in the course of arguments. The High Court held that "R. 3 (b) must therefore be interpreted as requiring the Panchayat to notify to the public not only the proposal about the tax selected by it for levy, hut also the rules relating to that tax which must mean the action taken under the Act and the rules". On the language of R. 3 (b) we are unable to appreciate how action taken under the Act and the rules is required to be notified to the public. There is nothing in the language to warrant such a construction.16. In conclusion we hold that the octroi duty was validly levied and that it could be imposed and collected with effect from January 14, 1964.17. Mr. Sen raised another point not dealt with by the High Court. He urges that there was no proper publication under B. 4. We are unable to allow him to raise this point at this stage. He says that this point was raised before the High Court but it has not been dealt with by it. He points out a passage in the judgment of the High Court but we are unable to agree with him that the High Court has implied that this point was raised before it. He further says that this point was taken in the return filed on behalf of the Company. Para 2 of the return only alleged :"This respondent says that at that time no copy of the Rules required to be published by Rule 4 of the Rules was exhibited and long with the said Notice. This respondent is not aware and does not admit that the fact of publication of the Notice under Rule 4 was announced by beat of drum in the village."This allegation is reiterated in para 9 of the return. No such specific point was taken in the grounds of appeal to the Panchayat Samiti. It was broadly stated that the procedure required to be followed for imposing octroi had not been followed in imposing the same. Similarly, in the grounds of appeal to the Standing Committee, vague allegations were made that the village Panchayat has erred in law in not following the procedure contemplated by law in the matter of imposing the octroi and has acted contrary to the principles of natural justice on an assumption that the formalities contemplated by law were complied with." He relies on the notice which is on the record to show that as a matter of fact the publication was not in accordance with law. In the circumstances noted above we are unable to allow him to raise this point at this stage.18. Coming to the question of the vires of R. 5, it seems to us that the High Court has placed a wrong interpretation on R. 5, The High Court has held that as R..5 applies to all appeals under S. 124 (5) of the Panchayat Act, the fixing of the commencement of the period of limitation as the date of publication of the notice under R. 4 far all appeals is arbitrary and destructive of the right of appeal. But this interpretation, with respect is not correct, if R. 5 is read in the setting in which it occurs.Rule 5 follows immediately Rr. 3 and 4 and is headed "Appeal against levy of any tax or fee", and the period of Sixty days of limitation commences from the date of the publication of the notice under R. 4, i. e. the notice following the decision of a Panchayat to levy any tax or fee. This date shows that R. 5 is dealing only with appeals against levy of any tax and not with the assessment or imposition of a tax or any further appeals to the Panchayat Samiti under S. 124 It is true that the opening sentence makes a reference to an appeal under sub-s. (5) of S. 124, and this opening sentence would cover all appeals under sub-s. (5) of S. 124, but in the context and stating, the heading of R. 5 brings out the scope of the rule. Accordingly, the appeal of the Company to the Samiti was wrongly dismissed as time-barred.It follows from this that the Standing Committee was entitled to deal with the appeal on merits.19. The only point that remains is whether the Company brought tea into the octroi limits of the Panchayat for consumption, use or sale, therein. As we have pointed out, the High Court felt difficulty in dealing with the question because neither the Panchayat Samiti nor the Standing Committee had found sufficient facts to enable it to deal with the question. Mr. Sen says that he is willing to take the facts as stated at the bar by the learned counsel for the appellant. But we consider that it is an unsatisfactory way of dealing with questions of fact. Before this question can be dealt with satisfactorily, all the relevant facts must be found by the Standing Committee. It is true that the Standing Committee inspected the premises of the Company but in their order they have given very scanty facts. They do not say whether the tea is crushed, processed or treated chemically to convert it into a marketable commodity. The learned counsel for the Panchayat contends that these things are done and that the resultant product is completely different from the tea imported into octroi limits. It is also not quite clear whether the tea which is imported by the Company is known in trade circles as a different commodity form the tea actually sent out in boxes. In the circumstances we must also decline to deal with this point.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]It seems to us that the octroi duty has been levied in accordance withscheme of the Fees Rules accordingly seems to be that the general procedure for levying taxes or fees is laid down and then this procedure is made applicable to the levy of various taxes mentioned in the other parts of the Rules.Viewed in this background it seems to us that R 3 (b) does not require the Panchayat to fix the octroi limits in the resolution passed under R. 3 (b). It only deals with two items, (1) selection of the tax and the rate at which it is to be levied. Rule 3 (c) has to be similarly read. The Inhabitants of the village would be entitled to object only to these two matters, namely (1) the tax or fee imposed and the rate at which it is levied. Under R. 3 (d) what the panchayat does is to consider objections and suggestions and then finally make the choice as regards two things, i. e., the tax or fee to be imposed and the rate at which it is to be levied.13. This interpretation is reinforced by a propel reading of R. 4. Rule 4 requires a notice stating two things, (1) the tax or fee to be levied and (2) the rate.We are, however unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that before the octroi limits are approved octroi can be collected.We consider that the fixing of the octroi limits with the approval of the Collector is an essential condition precedent to the levy of octroiare unable to agree with this submission.Apart from the fact that it may in certain circumstances lead to illegal levies, there is nothing in the language of R. 21 which indicates that the Collector can regularise an imposition made without the authority of law. The Collector may in particular cases enlarge the octroi limits or reduce the octroi limits and it would lead to great confusion if either of the things happens after the Panchayat had been collecting octroi duty within the octroi limits submitted by it to the Collector forthe language of R. 3 (b) we are unable to appreciate how action taken under the Act and the rules is required to be notified to the public. There is nothing in the language to warrant such a construction.16. In conclusion we hold that the octroi duty was validly levied and that it could be imposed and collected with effect from January 14, 1964.Coming to the questionof the vires of R.5, it seems to us that the High Court has placed a wrong interpretation on R. 5, The High Court has held that as R..5 applies to all appeals under S. 124 (5) of the Panchayat Act, the fixing of the commencement of the period of limitation as the date of publication of the notice under R. 4 far all appeals is arbitrary and destructive of the right of appeal. But this interpretation, with respect is not correct, if R. 5 is read in the setting in which it occurs.Rule 5 follows immediately Rr. 3 and 4 and is headed "Appeal against levy of any tax or fee", and the period of Sixty days of limitation commences from the date of the publication of the notice under R. 4, i. e. the notice following the decision of a Panchayat to levy any tax or fee. This date shows that R. 5 is dealing only with appeals against levy of any tax and not with the assessment or imposition of a tax or any further appeals to the Panchayat Samiti under S. 124 It is true that the opening sentence makes a reference to an appeal under sub-s. (5) of S. 124, and this opening sentence would cover all appeals under sub-s. (5) of S. 124, but in the context and stating, the heading of R. 5 brings out the scope of the rule. Accordingly, the appeal of the Company to the Samiti was wrongly dismissed as time-barred.It follows from this that the Standing Committee was entitled to deal with the appeal onis true that the Standing Committee inspected the premises of the Company but in their order they have given very scanty facts. They do not say whether the tea is crushed, processed or treated chemically to convert it into a marketableis also not quite clear whether the tea which is imported by the Company is known in trade circles as a different commodity form the tea actually sent out in boxes. In the circumstances we must also decline to deal with this point.