Case: GARGI Vs. STATE OF HARYANA

this regard, it gets perforce reiterated that the prosecution has not produced any evidence which could displace the statement of DW-3 that he indeed informed the police at the asking of the appellant at about 9.30 p.m. on 01.05.1997 and did also inform the brother of the deceased. As noticed, PW-9 ASI Amar Singh did not specify as to how the information was received by him. Moreover, the person said to have divulged the information to the witness PW-7 was never examined. Given such omissions in the prosecution case, we find no reason to discard the testimony of DW-3. Once his testimony is accepted, several blocks of the prosecution story are knocked to the ground.Effect of the acquittal of co-accused persons31. There is yet another lacuna in the prosecution case that has magnified itself with acquittal of the co-accused, brothers of the appellant. It cannot be denied that if the appellant had been the killer, she, by herself, could not have hanged the dead body by the ceiling fan; and the act had definitely been performed by more than one person. That being the position, the Trial Court readily accepted the case against the brothers of the appellant as conspirators without cogent and convincing evidence. The High Court rightly acquitted them for want of evidence and even observed that the prosecution had failed to book the real culprit in place of the brothers of the appellant. However, the High Court yet considered it proper to maintain the conviction of the appellant as the principal culprit while failing to consider that an important link in the prosecution story was snapped as soon as brothers of the appellant were acquitted.31.1. We would hasten to observe that merely for the reason of acquittal of co-accused, another accused in a criminal case may not be acquitted if cogent evidence against him is available and his case could be segregated from the case against the acquitted co-accused. However, on the basic facts of the present case, it is evident that the gruesome act in question had not been the handiwork of one person and it would be rather preposterous to assume that the appellant hanged the dead body by ceiling fan all by herself. In the given circumstances, when the alleged collaborators of the appellant are acquitted, the already existing clouds of doubts on the prosecution story get congealed. The High Court has proceeded with over- simplification of the matter by leaving the missing link as merely a fault of the investigating agency. In our view, as soon as the brothers of the appellant were acquitted, the High Court ought to have examined the consequence of such acquittal that an important link in the prosecution theory was snapped and it was difficult to conclude that the prosecution has established its case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts.The prosecution case not established beyond reasonable doubt32. Thus, as regards the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, the position obtainable from the material placed on record and the surrounding factors is that (a) the death of deceased Tirloki Nath was homicidal in nature and had not been suicidal though it was sought to be projected as suicide by the culprits by hanging the dead body from a ceiling fan in his room; (b) there is no cogent and convincing evidence on record to come to a definite conclusion that the relations of the deceased and the appellant were strained or that the appellant was indulgent in illicit relations or she was insisting for transfer of property in her name; (c) it is also difficult to come to a definite conclusion that the deceased had expressed imminent danger to his life at the hands of the appellant; and (d) even if the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellant, the time gap between such last seen and finding of his dead body had been of about 2 to 3 days.33. Apart from the factors above, there are several other loopholes whereby the alleged circumstances sought to be relied upon by the prosecution lose their worth and force. As noticed, the investigating agency and the prosecution had not been forthright. The relevant aspects pertaining to the crime in question were not properly investigated and even the relevant witnesses were not examined. Moreover, as noticed, the prosecution case was framed in the manner that the appellant committed the crime with the help of her brothers who have been acquitted.33.1. In the given circumstances, the fact that the staircase from the ground floor was directly leading to the room in question where the dead body was found, acquires immense significance. Even if it be assumed that the deceased was putting up in the said room, some person or persons reaching there directly from the ground floor and carrying out the crime is not ruled out. In the alternative, some person or persons having executed the crime at some other place and then having brought the dead body and hanged it in the room in question is also the possibility which cannot be brushed aside as entirely improbable.34. In the given circumstances, when the prosecution has not been able to remove the aforesaid doubts and the motive as imputed on the appellant does not appear existing, the benefit of doubt, obviously, goes to the appellant.CONCLUSION35. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of the view that the Trial Court and the High Court have approached the case from an altogether wrong angle and have overlooked the major flaws and shortcomings in the prosecution case. In the given set of facts and circumstances, even if the prosecution has been able to create some suspicion against the appellant, it would be unsafe to accept that the implicating circumstances have been established by cogent evidence and such circumstances form a complete chain that rules out any other hypothesis except guilt of appellant. Hence, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained; she is entitled to the benefit of doubt.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]10. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having scanned through the entire record with reference to law applicable, we are impelled to say at the outset of discussion that in this matter, several fundamental shortcomings in the investigation and several loopholes in the prosecution propositions got overlooked by the Trial Court as also by the High Court. In an overall comprehension of the matter, we are clearly of the view that it would not be safe to accept the projected propositions of the prosecution and to convict the appellant for the offence of murder of her husband.The manner of dealing with this case by the investigating agency, right at the inception, has left a few serious questions unanswered i.e., as to when did the police receive information about dead body of the husband of the appellant, by what mode, and through whom? PW-9 in his testimony before the Court conveniently stated that such an information was received through ?telephonic message? but did not state the particulars of such informant. No entry in the roznamcha or general diary has been produced to show that such an information was duly entered in the record before proceeding for investigation. Significantly, in the first note drawn up in the matter at 5.30 a.m. on 02.05.1997 (EX. PH/1), PW-9 only stated that ‘the information was received at the police station?. The fact that it had been a telephonic information is conspicuously missing in Ex.PH/1. This aspect has got a material bearing in the matter because the defence witness DW-3 specifically testified to the fact that he was the first person informed by the appellant about the demise of Tirloki Nath; and that he went to the police station at about 9.30 p.m. on 01.05.1997 and divulged the information. He further asserted having accompanied the police to the site and having conveyed the information to PW-7.15.2. It is also noteworthy that as per PW-7, he got the information from one T.R. Malhotra at about 11.30 p.m. who, in turn, had received the information on telephone from a colleague of the deceased. Neither any enquiry was made from the said T.R. Malhotra nor any other effort was made to find out the colleague of the deceased who had telephoned him.15.3. In the face of such a gap in the prosecution evidence, there appears no reason to disbelieve the testimony of DW-3 Surinder Kumar Bhat as regards the time of information to police and himself being the informant. In such a scenario, it remains absolutely inexplicable as to why the information given by DW-3 was not reduced in writing and the proceedings were not conducted on that basis. This question magnifies itself to tougher questions for the prosecution as to the time when PW-9 ASI Amar Singh reached the site and with whom. From the evidence on record and surrounding facts, it appears that the said ASI had reached the site at around 10.30 p.m. accompanied by DW-3 Surinder Kumar Bhat. The toughness of these questions further amplifies into the harder, and unanswered, question for the investigating agency as to why for a long period of about 4 to 5 hours at the site, the ASI (PW-9) did not carry out any investigation and did not record any statement.15.4. It is not the case of prosecution that the ASI (PW-9) was prevented by any reason to immediately attend on his duties after reaching the site. It is also not the case that he attempted to make any enquiry from any person until arrival of the complainant and other family members of the deceased. Even if it be assumed that the other family members of the deceased were on the way and the ASI knew about this fact, nothing had prevented him from attending on his duties of investigation. Strangely enough, even the first panchnama was prepared only after reaching of the complainant. It is also not clear as to why the statements of the children of the deceased were not taken when his daughter, 16 years of age, was very much present at the site. It is also not explained as to why in this kind of matter, carrying suspicious overtones, PW-9 did not make any enquiry from any of the neighbours, who were available at the site; and from the tenant, who was residing at the ground floor of the same building and whose washroom was allegedly being used by the deceased (as per the assertion of PW-8)? It is difficult to say that the conduct of this Investigating Officer (PW-9) had been totally free from doubt.15.5. Apart from the above-noted omissions at the very initial stage, we find absolutely no reason that the Investigating Officer PW-10, even after allegedly making enquiries in the locality regarding the character of the appellant from 5-10 persons, neither mentioned this fact in the investigation report nor recorded the statement of anyone of them. This Investigating Officer further stated to have joined the children of the appellant in the investigation but did not record their statements either. This Officer also did not bother to take the statement of the tenant, whose testimony would have been of immense significance, looking to the nature of accusations as also the factors related with the building in question.15.6. Moreover, in this matter, where it was prima facie appearing that the clues available at the site might play a significant role in reaching to the real culprits, it is also intriguing to notice that the Investigating Officer did not take even elementary care to obtain fingerprints from the material objects and to get them analysed properly. The Investigating Officer (PW-10) has stated, rather with impunity, that he did not take any fingerprints at all, even while admitting that the fingerprint expert did visit the site. It is not stated that the so-called expert expressed inability to collect such prints for any reason. It is left only for one to wonder as to for what purpose did the so-called fingerprint expert visit the site, if no prints were to be taken at all!15.7. The above-mentioned unexplained shortcomings, perforce, indicate that in this case, the investigation was carried out either with pre-conceived notions or with a particular result in view. It is difficult to accept that the investigation in this case had been fair and impartial. From another viewpoint, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the omissions on the part of investigating agency cannot be ignored as mere oversight. These omissions, perforce, give rise to adverse inferences against the prosecution.16. In this case, it is also interesting to notice that though the prosecution had cited the other relations of the deceased as witnesses, including his mother and brother-in-law (husband of PW-8 - who had otherwise signed the inquest report) but did not examine them before the Court. Withholding of relevant witnesses could only lead to further adverse inference that if examined, they would not have supported the prosecution case. This is apart from the fact that the investigating agency avoided to include any independent witness in the investigation and did not carry out necessary enquires from the persons other than in-laws of the appellant.17. Hereinabove, we have only indicated a few broad aspects of shortcomings and lacunae in the prosecution case which is otherwise resting on circumstantial evidence and on the theory propounded by the brother of deceased (PW-7), as supported by his sister (PW-8). The upshot of the discussion foregoing is that the propositions projected by the prosecution require deeper scrutiny to find if the case against the appellant is established beyond reasonable doubt; and if the elements of adverse inferences do not materially affect the prosecutionTrial Court as also the High Court have returned concurrent findings that it had been a matter of homicidal death. Both the Courts came to this conclusion essentially with reference to the medical opinion that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation; and also with reference to some of the surrounding factors that the feet of the hanging dead body were touching the floor; the knees were bent; the slippers were not removed; and the room in question was wide open. Assailing such findings, it is contended on behalf of the appellant that as per medical jurisprudence, scratches, abrasions, bruises etc. are usually present and hyoid bone would be usually found broken in case of strangulation but, in the present case, there were no such marks nor hyoid bone was broken.18.1. We have closely examined the testimony of PW-1 Dr. Usha Bansal, who was one of members of the board that had conducted post-mortem. We have also taken into account the features noticeable from the site plan, the inquest report and the photographs placed on record. Having examined the relevant material, we find nothing of infirmity in the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court that it had been a case of strangulation, as could be seen from the post-mortem report that the dead body carried?well defined depressed ligature mark measuring 3 cm. wide seen encircling the neck around thyroid cartilage with a knot present on left side of neck and this ligature mark was anti-mortem inThe other ligature mark was on the left side of the neck measuring 1.5 cm wide and that was post-mortem in nature. The board had undoubtedly been of the opinion that the cause of death was ?asphyxia due to strangulation?. With such categorical medical opinion coupled with all the relevant features surrounding the suspended dead body in the room in question, it is difficult to say that it had been a case of suicide merely because hyoid bone was not broken or because the marks of resistance like abrasions/scratches were not reported. The presence of marks of resistance would depend on a variety of factors, including the method and manner of execution of the act of strangulation by the culprits; and mere want of such marks cannot be decisive of the matter. Equally, it is not laid down as an absolute rule in medical jurisprudence that in all cases of strangulation, hyoid bone would invariably be fractured. On the contrary, medical jurisprudence suggests that only in a fraction of such cases, a fracture of hyoid bone isother words, absence of fracture of hyoid bone would not lead to the conclusion that the deceased did not die of strangulation.18.2. For what has been discussed in preceding paragraphs, we have no hesitation in affirming the findings in the impugned judgments that the deceased Tirloki Nath was done to death by strangulation and thereafter, his dead body was hanged from the ceiling fan in the room.Before examining the circumstances brought on record by the prosecution, we may observe in the passing that the Trial Court as also the High Court have proceeded on the lines that once it was established that the deceased Tirloki Nath was killed by way of strangulation and the killer/s suspended his dead body from the fan so as to mislead; and since the dead body was found in the very house he was residing with the appellant who could not explain the reason of his death, she was to be held responsible for the crime. In other words, the Trial Court and the High Court have assumed that as soon as the conclusion about the homicidal death of Tirloki Nath in his own room is reached, all other aspects of the prosecution story about so-called strained relations of the deceased and the appellant, and the alleged threat perception of the appellant ipso facto come into operation; and the finding on homicidal death itself has been taken as the answer to other question as to whether homicide was to be imputed on the appellant or not. In our view, while examining the question as to whether the death in question was homicidal or suicidal, there was no justification to mix up the other circumstances projected by the prosecution, which indeed required separate assessment and analysis. Be that as it may, appropriate now it would be to examine the circumstances put forth in this case to find if the prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.Alleged last statement of deceased and motive of appellant21. The main plank of prosecution case against appellant has been that the relations between the deceased and the appellant were too strained; the appellant was having illicit relations and was ill-treating the deceased; the deceased had expressed even threat to his life at the hands of the appellant; and the deceased was all set to move out of the company of the appellant. These factors, imputing motive on the appellant to kill her husband (and even deceased perceiving threat to his life at the hands of the appellant), have been held proved by the Trial Court and the High Court with reference to the testimony of PW-7 Brij Bhushan (brother of the deceased) and PW-8 Radha Puri (sister of the deceased). As noticed, the Trial Court as also the High Court have relied upon these two witnesses and have accepted their assertions in toto. However, a close look at the testimony of these witnesses and the assessment of their evidence with reference of other factors on record bring forth several doubts, which have not been dispelled and which do operate against the prosecution.22. Though learned counsel of the appellant has attempted to suggest, with reference to additional documents placed on record, that PW-7 carried questionable antecedents and had been a proclaimed offender but we are ignoring such submissions for the reason that these aspects were not specifically put to the witness in his cross- examination. However, the question is as to whether his testimony inspires such confidence that all the facts and the circumstances suggested by him, and all his assertions, be accepted on their face value? In our view, the answer to this question could only be in the negative.A combined look at the testimony of PW-7 and PW-8 brings to the fore one of the significant facts that there had been an ancestral house belonging to the family that was sold by PW-7 alone and the sale proceeds were utilised by him to open a grocery shop, one of the multiple ventures he had tried, mostly resulting in closure or failure. The appellant had been categoric in her assertion that the property and money had been at the root of discord in the family and the same had been the cause for the family of the deceased implicating her. DW-3 has also testified to the effect that the deceased had his tense moments because of money demands of his brother i.e., PW-7. Unfortunately, the Trial Court as also the High Court have totally overlooked these factors and features hovering over the prosecution story.25. Going further deep into the prosecution story, it is clear that there is no direct and cogent evidence on record that the appellant was involved in illicit relations or was forcing the deceased to transfer the property. It had not been the assertion of PW-7 or PW-8 that the alleged illicit relations of the appellant and/or her pressurising the deceased to transfer the property had been the matters of their personal knowledge. No particulars of any person having illicit involvement with the appellant are to be found on record. Such assertions have been made by these witnesses on the basis of the statements allegedly made by the deceased to each of them individually and at different point of time. The High Court and the Trial Court have readily accepted the suggestions of PW-7 and PW-8 that the deceased made the statements to them as alleged; and have even labelled the statement allegedly made to PW-7 as being the dying declaration of the deceased. Strictly speaking, the alleged statement made to PW-7 could not have been taken as a ‘dying declaration? for the reason that at time of making of such statement, the deceased was not labouring under his imminent death and he was not recounting the circumstance of the transaction relating to his death. For the sake of arguments, and on the broad phraseology of the first part of Section 32 (1) of the Indian Evidence Act (32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by a person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.-Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense, which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:- (1) when it relates to cause of death.- When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that persons death comes into question ) , even if it be assumed that the statement made by the deceased, before the cause of death had arisen, or before he had any reason to anticipate his killing, may also be taken as admissible (Vide Pakala Narayana Swami v. The King-Emperor: AIR 1939 PC 47 ) , such an alleged statement cannot be directly acted upon without concrete corroboration. In the present case, what to say of corroboration, even making of such statement by the deceased appears to be doubtful.For what has been discussed hereinabove, strong elements of doubts surface on record as regards reliability of these two witnesses PW-7 and PW-8. In the given circumstances, it is difficult to accept that the prosecution has been able to establish by cogent and reliable evidence that the appellant was involved in illicit relations or was pressurising the deceased to transfer the property in her name and that there had been strong acrimony between the deceased and the appellant. It is also difficult to accept, for want of cogent corroborative evidence, if the deceased had made any alleged statements about discord with his wife and threat perceptions to PW-7 and PW-8. In the given circumstances, the possibility of levelling of imputations on the appellant for intentions other than bringing the real culprit/s to the book is not ruled out altogether.Last seen theory: Proof and effect28.On the facts of the present case, it emerges that as per the version of PW-7, the deceased was lastly in his companywhen he allegedly expressed his dejection and fear as also his plan to return with luggage. The appellant has pointed out that the deceased was with her in the morning of 29.04.1997 when he pointed out his tour programme commencing that day with scheduled return on 03.05.1997. It is not in dispute that the deceased was regularly on tour for longer durations of about two weeks in connection with his duties. The dead body was recovered on 01.05.1997 and as per post-mortem report, the probable time that had elapsed between death and post- mortem (on 02.05.1997 at 12.30 p.m.) was 24 to 72 hours. On the basis of this opinion, it cannot be assumed by way of arithmetical calculation that the deceased might have met with his end on 29.04.1997. The possibility of it being a day later is not ruled out.28.3. In the given set of circumstances, the last seen theory cannot be operated against the appellant only because she was the wife of the deceased and was living with him. The gap between the point of time when the appellant and deceased were last seen together and when the deceased was found dead had not been that small that possibility of any other person being the author of the crime is rendered totally improbable.The Trial Court and the High Court have readily, and rather heavily, relied upon an assertion made by PW-8 in her statement that upon her reaching the site, the appellant was ‘enjoying tea? with her brothers and other relations on the first floor; and was not found stressed or perplexed or saddened. This part of the assertion on the part of PW-8 has its own shortcomings. Such an assertion was not made by her in the police statement; and is not even remotely corroborated by any other prosecution witness including PW-7. Moreover, it had been too unrealistic on the part of the Trial Court and the High Court to observe that the appellant ought to have been found sitting with the dead body. Admittedly, the corpse was emitting foul smell and DW-8 reached the spot at about 4.30 in the morning though the appellant had noticed the dead body the previous evening and had taken steps for informing the concerned through DW-3, Surinder Kumar Bhat. In the given circumstances, no fault could be foisted on the appellant if she did not remain with the dead body all through and until arrival of PW-8. The expression ‘enjoying tea? was coined by this witness PW-8 alone and for want of corroboration and for omission of such a fact in the police statement, there appears no reason to accept the same. If at all anything of subsequent conduct of appellant is to be taken into consideration, it is evident that she attended her office on 30.04.1997 and 01.05.1997. It is not the case of the prosecution that during these two days, any abnormality in her behaviour was noticed by anyone. The appellant neither concealed herself nor altered the scene of crime in any manner and there had not been any evidence about any oddity in her manners and demeanour.30. Another circumstance taken against the appellant had been that she allegedly did not send any information to the brothers and other relations of the deceased immediately after noticing his death. Such observations and findings have been recorded against the appellant while totally overlooking the statement of DW-3. In this regard, it gets perforce reiterated that the prosecution has not produced any evidence which could displace the statement of DW-3 that he indeed informed the police at the asking of the appellant at about 9.30 p.m. on 01.05.1997 and did also inform the brother of the deceased. As noticed, PW-9 ASI Amar Singh did not specify as to how the information was received by him. Moreover, the person said to have divulged the information to the witness PW-7 was never examined. Given such omissions in the prosecution case, we find no reason to discard the testimony of DW-3. Once his testimony is accepted, several blocks of the prosecution story are knocked to the ground.Effect of the acquittal of co-accused persons31.Thus, circumstantial evidence, in the context of a crime, essentially means such facts and surrounding factors which do point towards the complicity of the charged accused; and then, chain of circumstances means such unquestionable linking of the facts and the surrounding factors that they establish only the guilt of the charged accused beyond reasonable doubt, while ruling out any other theory or possibility orOn the facts of the present case, it emerges that as per the version of PW-7, the deceased was lastly in his company7 when heallegedly expressed his dejection and fear as also his plan to return with luggage. The appellant has pointed out that the deceased was with her in the morning ofted out his tour programme commencing that day with scheduled return on 03.05.1997. It is not in dispute that the deceased was regularly on tour for longer durations of about two weeks in connection with his duties. The dead body was recovered on 01.05.1997 and as per post-mortem report, the probable time that had elapsed between death and post- mortem (on 02.05.1997 at 12.30 p.m.) was 24 to 72 hours. On the basis of this opinion, it cannot be assumed by way of arithmetical calculation that the deceased might have met with his end on 29.04.1997. The possibility of it being a day later is not ruled out.There is yet another lacuna in the prosecution case that has magnified itself with acquittal of the co-accused, brothers of the appellant. It cannot be denied that if the appellant had been the killer, she, by herself, could not have hanged the dead body by the ceiling fan; and the act had definitely been performed by more than one person. That being the position, the Trial Court readily accepted the case against the brothers of the appellant as conspirators without cogent and convincing evidence. The High Court rightly acquitted them for want of evidence and even observed that the prosecution had failed to book the real culprit in place of the brothers of the appellant. However, the High Court yet considered it proper to maintain the conviction of the appellant as the principal culprit while failing to consider that an important link in the prosecution story was snapped as soon as brothers of the appellant were acquitted.31.1. We would hasten to observe that merely for the reason of acquittal of co-accused, another accused in a criminal case may not be acquitted if cogent evidence against him is available and his case could be segregated from the case against the acquitted co-accused. However, on the basic facts of the present case, it is evident that the gruesome act in question had not been the handiwork of one person and it would be rather preposterous to assume that the appellant hanged the dead body by ceiling fan all by herself. In the given circumstances, when the alleged collaborators of the appellant are acquitted, the already existing clouds of doubts on the prosecution story get congealed. The High Court has proceeded with over- simplification of the matter by leaving the missing link as merely a fault of the investigating agency. In our view, as soon as the brothers of the appellant were acquitted, the High Court ought to have examined the consequence of such acquittal that an important link in the prosecution theory was snapped and it was difficult to conclude that the prosecution has established its case against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubts.The prosecution case not established beyond reasonable doubt32. Thus, as regards the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, the position obtainable from the material placed on record and the surrounding factors is that (a) the death of deceased Tirloki Nath was homicidal in nature and had not been suicidal though it was sought to be projected as suicide by the culprits by hanging the dead body from a ceiling fan in his room; (b) there is no cogent and convincing evidence on record to come to a definite conclusion that the relations of the deceased and the appellant were strained or that the appellant was indulgent in illicit relations or she was insisting for transfer of property in her name; (c) it is also difficult to come to a definite conclusion that the deceased had expressed imminent danger to his life at the hands of the appellant; and (d) even if the deceased was last seen alive in the company of the appellant, the time gap between such last seen and finding of his dead body had been of about 2 to 3 days.33. Apart from the factors above, there are several other loopholes whereby the alleged circumstances sought to be relied upon by the prosecution lose their worth and force. As noticed, the investigating agency and the prosecution had not been forthright. The relevant aspects pertaining to the crime in question were not properly investigated and even the relevant witnesses were not examined. Moreover, as noticed, the prosecution case was framed in the manner that the appellant committed the crime with the help of her brothers who have been acquitted.33.1. In the given circumstances, the fact that the staircase from the ground floor was directly leading to the room in question where the dead body was found, acquires immense significance. Even if it be assumed that the deceased was putting up in the said room, some person or persons reaching there directly from the ground floor and carrying out the crime is not ruled out. In the alternative, some person or persons having executed the crime at some other place and then having brought the dead body and hanged it in the room in question is also the possibility which cannot be brushed aside as entirely improbable.34. In the given circumstances, when the prosecution has not been able to remove the aforesaid doubts and the motive as imputed on the appellant does not appear existing, the benefit of doubt, obviously, goes to the appellant.CONCLUSION35. For what has been discussed hereinabove, we are clearly of the view that the Trial Court and the High Court have approached the case from an altogether wrong angle and have overlooked the major flaws and shortcomings in the prosecution case. In the given set of facts and circumstances, even if the prosecution has been able to create some suspicion against the appellant, it would be unsafe to accept that the implicating circumstances have been established by cogent evidence and such circumstances form a complete chain that rules out any other hypothesis except guilt of appellant. Hence, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained; she is entitled to the benefit of doubt.