Case: Orissa State Warehousing Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax

arise pertaining to that part of the income only which arises or is derived from the letting of godowns or the warehouses and for the purposes specified in Section 10(29) of the Act - as noticed above. The statute has been rather categorical and restrictive in the matter of grant of exemption: storage, processing or facilitating the marketing of the commodities are definitely regarded as three different forms of activities which are entitled to exemption in the event of their being any income therefrom. We do lend our concurrence to the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and record that in the event the letting of godowns or warehouses is for any other purpose or if income is derived from any other source, then and in that event such an income cannot possibly come within the ambit of Section 10(29) of the Act and is thus not exempt from tax. The facts in issue pertaining to the interest income on fixed deposit or ascribing the activities of the assessee being termed to be one integrated activity does not and cannot arise. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, Addl. Solicitor General rightly contended that the language being clear and there being no ambiguity, question of there being any integrated activity and reading the same in to the statue would be a violent departure from the intent of the legislature. 30. Let us however at this juncture consider some of the oft cited decision pertaining to the interpretation of fiscal statutes being the focal point of consideration in these appeals. Lord Halsbury as early as 1901, in Cooke v. Charles A Vogehar Company, 1901 A.C. 102 stated the law inthe manner following: "a court of law, has nothing to do with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a provision of a statute except so far as it may held it in interpreting what the legislature has said. If the language of a statute be plain, admitting of only one meaning, the legislature must be taken to have meant and intended what it has plainly expressed, and whatever it has in clear terms enacted must be enforced though it should lead to absurd or mischievous results. If the language of this Sub-section be not controlled by some of the other provisions of the statute, it must, since, its language is plain and unambiguous, be enforced, and your Lordships House sitting judicially is not concerned with the question whether the policy it embodies is wise and unwise, or whether it leads to consequences jut or unjust beneficial or mischievous." 31. The oft-quoted observations of Rowlatt, J. in the case of Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 1921(1) KB 64 ought also to be noticed at this juncture. The learned Judge observed: "In a taxing statute one has to look at what is clearly said. There is no equity about a tax, There is no intendment. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly on the language used." 32. The observations of Rowlatt, J. as above stand accepted and approved by the House of Lords in a later decision, in the case of Canadian Eagle Oil Company Limited v. The King, 1946 AC 119. Lord Thankerton also in a manner similar in Ingland Revenue Commissioner v. Ross & Coulter & Ors., Bladnoch Distillery Co. Ltd., 1948(1) AELR 616 at 625 observed : Observed: "If the meaning of the provision is reasonably clear, the Courts have no jurisdiction to mitigate such harshness". 33. The decision of this Court in Keshavji Raviji & Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, AIR 1991 SC 1806 also lends concurrence to the views expressed above. This Court observed: "As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language resort to any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes impermissible. The supposed intention of the legislation cannot then appealed to whittle down the statutory language which is otherwise unambiguous. If the intendment is not in the words used it is nowhere else. The need for interpretation arises when the words used in the statute are, on their terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intent of the legislature............Artificial and unduly latitudinarian rules of construction which, with their general tendency to `give the tax-payer the breaks are out of place where the legislation has a fiscal mission.Be it noted that individual cases of hardship and injustice do not and cannot have any bearing for rejecting the natural construction by attributing normal meanings to the words used since "hard cases do not make bad laws". 34. In fine thus, a fiscal statute shall have to be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. No words ought to be added and only the language used ought to be considered so as to ascertain the proper meaning and intent of the legislation. The Court is to ascribe natural and ordinary meaning to the words used by the legislature and the Court ought not, under any circumstances, to substitute its own impression and ideas in place of the legislative intent as is available from a plain reading of the statutory provisions. 35. In the premises, we do feel it expedient to record that by reason of the clarity of expression, question of there being any integrated activity being exempt within the meaning of Section 10(29) of the Act does not and cannot arise. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has correctly applied the law and the comparison effected with other provisions are pointers to the distinction and the same cannot but be termed to be in accordance with the golden rule of construction in the matter of interpretation of statutes. 36. We do herein record our acceptance of the same and observe that Section 10(29) is singularly singular in its application with its scope restrictive as is evident from the intent of the legislature and as evidenced form the language used therein. 37.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]In fine thus, a fiscal statute shall have to be interpreted on the basis of the language used therein and not de hors the same. No words ought to be added and only the language used ought to be considered so as to ascertain the proper meaning and intent of the legislation. The Court is to ascribe natural and ordinary meaning to the words used by the legislature and the Court ought not, under any circumstances, to substitute its own impression and ideas in place of the legislative intent as is available from a plain reading of the statutorythe premises, we do feel it expedient to record that by reason of the clarity of expression, question of there being any integrated activity being exempt within the meaning of Section 10(29) of the Act does not and cannot arise. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has correctly applied the law and the comparison effected with other provisions are pointers to the distinction and the same cannot but be termed to be in accordance with the golden rule of construction in the matter of interpretation ofdo herein record our acceptance of the same and observe that Section 10(29) is singularly singular in its application with its scope restrictive as is evident from the intent of the legislature and as evidenced form the language useddue regard to the language used question of exemption would arise pertaining to that part of the income only which arises or is derived from the letting of godowns or the warehouses and for the purposes specified in Section 10(29) of the Act - as noticed above. The statute has been rather categorical and restrictive in the matter of grant of exemption: storage, processing or facilitating the marketing of the commodities are definitely regarded as three different forms of activities which are entitled to exemption in the event of their being any income therefrom. We do lend our concurrence to the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court and record that in the event the letting of godowns or warehouses is for any other purpose or if income is derived from any other source, then and in that event such an income cannot possibly come within the ambit of Section 10(29) of the Act and is thus not exempt from tax. The facts in issue pertaining to the interest income on fixed deposit or ascribing the activities of the assessee being termed to be one integrated activity does not and cannot arise. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, Addl. Solicitor General rightly contended that the language being clear and there being no ambiguity, question of there being any integrated activity and reading the same in to the statue would be a violent departure from the intent of the legislature.