Case: Badri Prasad Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr

rights of the petitioners which could support the petitions which were presented under Article 32 of the Constitution."8. The Court then construed the agreements in question and came to the conclusion that the agreements could not be said to be contracts of sale of goods simpliciter. Then the Court examined the provisions of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and came to the following conclusion:"From this, it is quite clear that forests and trees belonged to the proprietors, and they were items of proprietary rights. The first of the two questions posed by us, therefore, admits of none but an affirmative answer.If then the forest and the trees belonged to the proprietors as items in their proprietary rights it is quite clear that these items of proprietary rights have been transferred to the petitioners. The answer to the second question is also in the affirmative. Being a " proprietary right" it vests in the State under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act. The decision in Chhottabhais 1953 SCR 476 = (AIR 1953 SC 108 ) treated these rights as bare licenses, and it was apparently given per incuriam, and cannot therefore be followed."It seems to us that this decision concludes the controversy before us. This decision was followed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yakinuddin, (1963) 3 SCR 13 = (AIR 1962 SC 1916 ). Various agreements were constructed in that case; one agreement was to propagate lac, another agreement was to collect tendu leaves, and another agreement was with respect to a right to collect fruits and flowers of Mahua trees. It was contended that these rights were saved in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, but this connection was negatived, Sinha, C. J. speaking for the Court, observed that the distinction between a bare licence and a licence coupled with grant or profit a prendre was irrelevant because "whatever may have been the nature of the grant by the outgoing proprietors in favour of the respondents, those grants had not legal effect as against the State, except is so far as the State may have recognised them. But the provisions of the Act leave no manner of doubt that the rights claimed by the respondents could not have been enforced against the State, if the latter was not prepared to respect those rights and the rights created by the transactions between the respondent and their grantors did not come within any of the saving clauses of Section 5.Earlier he had observed that"any persons claiming some interest as a proprietor or as holding through a proprietor in respect of any proprietary interest in an estate has got to bring his interest within Section 5, because on the date of vesting of the estate, the Deputy Commissioner takes charge of all lands other than occupied lands and homestead, and of all interests vesting in the State under Section 3. Upon such taking over of possession, the State becomes liable to pay the compensation provided for in Section 8 and the succeeding sections. The respondents have not been able to show that their interest comes under any of the clauses aforesaid of Section 5."9. The last case in which this Act was construed was Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, Civil Appeal No. 393 of 1965, D/- 20-2-1968 = (reported in AIR 1968 SC 1218 ). In that case Mulamchand had purchased a right to pluck, collect and remove forest produce like lac, tendu leaves, etc., from the proprietors of the different Malguzari jungles. The Court followed (1963) 3 SCR 13 = (AIR 1962 SC 1916 ) and negatived the claim of Mulamchand to exercise his rights under the agreement.10. In view of the these cases it is too late in the day to contend that the forest and the trees did not vest in the State under the Act.11. There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel that under the contract the plaintiff had become owner of trees as goods. It is true that trees which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale are "goods" for the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act. But before they cease to be " proprietary" right or interest in proprietary rights within the meaning of Sections 3 and 4 (a) of the Act they must be felled under the contract. It will be noticed that under Clause 1 of the contract the plaintiff was entitled to cut teak trees of more than 12 inches girth. It had to be ascertained which trees fell within that description. Till this was ascertained, they were not " ascertained goods" within Section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. Clause 5 of the contract contemplated that stumps of trees, after cutting had to be 3 inches high. In other words, the contract was not to sell the whole of the trees. In these circumstances property in the cut timber would only pass to the plaintiff under the contract at the earliest when trees are felled. But before that happened the trees had vested in the State.12. This brings us to the last point, namely, whether a new contract was concluded between the Government and the plaintiff. It is extremely doubtful whether the letter dated February 1, 1955, is an offer. It seems to be an invitation to the plaintiff to make offer. Be that as it may, even if it is treated as an offer there was no unconditional acceptance by the letter dated February 5, 1955. The plaintiff expressly reserved his right to claim a refund of Rs. 17,000. According to the letter of the Divisional Forest Officer, dated February 1, 1955, the plaintiff had to give up his claim to Rs. 17,000 which he had already paid and had to pay a further sum of Rupees. 17,000. The High Court in our opinion, rightly held that the alleged acceptance of the offer made on February 1, 1955, was conditional and qualified.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]4. The Act and the rights of persons holding contracts to cut and take away timber and fruits of the trees have been the subject-matter of consideration by this Court on several occasions. But the learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that none of those cases cover the case of the plaintiff because, according to him none of those cases dealt with standing timber. He says that the plaintiffs contract is a contract for the sale of goods and the property in the goods had vested in him and, therefore, it stands on a different basis from the contracts construed in the earlier cases. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, maintains that the plaintiffs case is covered by the earlier decisions and all the arguments which he has advanced have been rejected by this Court in those cases.There is no force in the contention of the learned counsel that under the contract the plaintiff had become owner of trees as goods. It is true that trees which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale are "goods" for the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act. But before they cease to be " proprietary" right or interest in proprietary rights within the meaning of Sections 3 and 4 (a) of the Act they must be felled under the contract. It will be noticed that under Clause 1 of the contract the plaintiff was entitled to cut teak trees of more than 12 inches girth. It had to be ascertained which trees fell within that description. Till this was ascertained, they were not " ascertained goods" within Section 19 of the Sale of Goods Act. Clause 5 of the contract contemplated that stumps of trees, after cutting had to be 3 inches high. In other words, the contract was not to sell the whole of the trees. In these circumstances property in the cut timber would only pass to the plaintiff under the contract at the earliest when trees are felled. But before that happened the trees had vested in the State.12. This brings us to the last point, namely, whether a new contract was concluded between the Government and the plaintiff. It is extremely doubtful whether the letter dated February 1, 1955, is an offer. It seems to be an invitation to the plaintiff to make offer. Be that as it may, even if it is treated as an offer there was no unconditional acceptance by the letter dated February 5, 1955. The plaintiff expressly reserved his right to claim a refund of Rs. 17,000. According to the letter of the Divisional Forest Officer, dated February 1, 1955, the plaintiff had to give up his claim to Rs. 17,000 which he had already paid and had to pay a further sum of Rupees. 17,000. The High Court in our opinion, rightly held that the alleged acceptance of the offer made on February 1, 1955, was conditional and qualified.