Case: UNION OF INDIA Vs. NARESHKUMAR BADRIKUMAR JAGAD

decision will be of any avail to the respondents (Trust). As already noted, it is not a case of subletting by the statutory tenant (Podar Mills Ltd.) but instead a case of involuntary transfer and vesting of rights and interest of the statutory or protected tenant in respect of the suit property in the Central Government by operation of law. In any case, if the Trust intends to proceed against the statutory tenant on the ground of unlawful subletting or such other ground, it will be obliged to initiate eviction proceedings against the Union of India before the competent jurisdictional Rent Court on that count. In the present case, the subject suit for eviction has been instituted against NTC only. Suffice it to observe that the subject suit not having been filed against the Union of India, the statutory tenant as on the date of filing of the suit; and not invoking the jurisdiction of the Rent Court for seeking eviction of the statutory tenant, the decree as passed by the civil court is rendered unenforceable against the Union of India and, in any case, inexecutable due to legal fiction. 48. The respondents (Trust) may be justified in pointing out that the judgment and decree rendered by this Court has not been nullified by the Validation Act 2014 as such. However, the said decree is not against the real tenant in whom the rights of the statutory tenant had vested and continue to vest. That right could be snapped only by resorting to the dispensation prescribed for in the rent legislation, as the concerned Rent Act continued to apply to the suit property – consequent to vesting of the rights and interest therein in the Central Government. 49. That takes us to the next argument of the respondents that Section 39 inserted in the 1995 Act operates prospectively and would not impact the judgment delivered by this Court on 5 th September, 2011. Second, the said provision applies to only subsisting leasehold rights. Taking the last argument first, the same needs to be rejected on the basis of the view already taken by us that the expression leasehold rights or leasehold property would include tenancy rights or tenanted property in occupation of a statutory or protected tenant as per the applicable municipal rent legislation at the relevant time. Be that as it may, Section 39 opens with a non obstante clause and makes it more explicit that the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2014 shall have and shall be deemed always to have effect for all purposes as if the provisions of the Act have been amended by the said Act, had been in force at all material times. It then predicates that no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any court for the enforcement of any decree or order or direction notwithstanding any undertaking filed by the NTC in any court. Having observed that Section 3 has been amended w.e.f. 1 st April, 1994 and upon giving full effect to the amendment, it must necessarily follow that the Central Government had acquired the status of protected or statutory tenant qua the suit property from that date and continue to remain so, and could be evicted only in the manner prescribed by the concerned rent legislation. The decree passed against NTC is on the assumption that the 1999 Act had no application to the suit property as the right had vested in NTC – which did not enjoy the protection of the 1999 Act. Resultantly, it must follow that the subject suit and the proceedings arising from or in relation thereto cannot proceed in law and moreso because NTC is not the real tenant. Further, as the tenancy rights in relation to the suit property continue to vest in the Central Government by operation of law, the provisions of the 1999 Act will be attracted, warranting suit for eviction to be filed against the Union of India before the jurisdictional Rent Court having exclusive jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the landlord and tenant. We must hasten to add that the validity of the provisions of the Validation Act 2014 is not put in issue in the present proceedings and we do not intend to deal with the same. All questions in that behalf are kept open. 50. Reliance was placed on State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala and Another (2014) 12 SCC 696 , (in paragraph Nos. 127, 148 and 149) to buttress the argument that a judicial decision rendered by recording a finding of fact cannot be made ineffective by enacting a validating law, thereby fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. On a bare perusal of relevant paragraphs of this decision, the Court unambiguously found that the judgment was given by this Court in the context of disputed factual position between the two States in respect of the safety of a Dam for raising the water level. The Court went on to observe that such decision must be binding upon the parties and enforceable according to the decision being a plain and simple decision on the fact 10 (2014) 12 SCC 696 which cannot be altered by the legislative decision. In that case, the validity of the amended Act was put in issue. In the present case, however, we are not called upon to examine the validity of the provisions of the Validation Act 2014.Whether such a legislation is valid or in excess of legislative competence can be examined in an appropriate proceeding. It is open to the respondents (Trust) to challenge the validity of the Validation Act 2014, if they so desire. For the same reason, the decisions in Madan Mohan Pathak and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.(2014) 12 SCC 696 ( in paragraph Nos. 9, 20, 21 and 31) and Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Broach Borough Municipality and Ors (1969) 2 SCC 283 , will be of no avail to the respondents.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]19. Reverting to the question of whether Union of India has locus to file the review petition, we must immediately advert to Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( CPC) which, inter alia, postulates that any person considering himself aggrieved would have locus to file a review petition. Order XLVII of CPC restates the position that any person considering himself aggrieved can file a review petition. Be that as it may, the Supreme Court exercises review jurisdiction by virtue of Article 137 of the Constitution which predicates that the Supreme Court shall have the power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it. Besides, the Supreme Court has framed Rules to govern review petitions. Notably, neither Order XLVII of CPC nor Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules limits the remedy of review only to the parties to the judgment under review. Therefore, we have no hesitation in enunciating that even a third party to the proceedings, if he considers himself an aggrieved person, may take recourse to the remedy of review petition. The quintessence is that the person should be aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by this Court in some respectIt is indisputable that the management of Podar Mills-Textile Undertaking was taken over by the Central Government after the commencement of the 1983 Act. The scope of management would obviously include possession and permissible use of the suit property of the Textile Undertaking so taken over. In due course, the 1995 Act came into force. As a consequence of Section 3 of this Act, the right, title and interest of the owners of the subject Textile Undertaking (Podar Mills Ltd.) including the statutory tenancy rights in relation to the suit property stood transferred to and vested absolutely in the Central Government. By the same provision, vide sub-section (2) thereof, the Textile Undertaking which stood vested in the Central Government immediately thereafter stood transferred to and vested in the National Textile Corporation. That included subsisting statutory tenancy rights in respect of the suit property enjoyed by the concerned Textile Undertaking. However, Section 3 stands amended by virtue of the 2014 Act. That amendment by a legal fiction is deemed to have been inserted into the 1995 Act w.e.f. 1 st January, 1994. The purport of the amended sub-sections (3) and (4), inserted in section 3 is that the leasehold rights of the Textile Undertaking would continue to remain vested in the Central Government and no Court could exercise jurisdiction to order divestment from the NTC of the property vested in it by the Central Government. In addition, the Amendment Act of 2014 has introduced Section 39 in the 1995 Act, titled as Validation. We shall dilate on the efficacy of these provisions a little later21. Suffice it to observe that since Union of India is asseverating that the suit property had vested absolutely in the Central Government and continues to so vest in it by virtue of a legal fiction in the Validation Act 2014, would be justified in contending that it is a person aggrieved and has locus to point out that the decree for possession of the suit premises against NTC could not have been passed and in any case, the same could not be enforced in law. It is an inexecutable decree and including the undertaking given by NTC, assuming that the concerned court had jurisdiction to pass such a decree24. The grounds for review are specified in clause (1) noted above. The factual scenario in the present case is certainly not ascribable to discovery of new or important matters or evidence which was available or existing at the time of the decree but could not be produced despite exercise of due diligence. In the present case, the asseveration of the review petitioner is about the mistake or error apparent on the face of the record committed by the Court and more particularly founded on the effect of the subsequent enactment of Validation Act 2014 which completely changes the status of the parties, namely, Union of India and NTC qua the suit property and bars the enforcement of any decree and including the undertaking given to the Court by NTC25. Ordinarily, enactment of a subsequent legislation by itself cannot be the basis to review the judgment already rendered by the Court. But the argument of the review petitioner proceeds on the premise that the subsequent legislation has completely altered the status of the parties retrospectively qua the suit property with effect from 1 st April, 1994 by a legal fiction, as a result of which the cause of action against NTC as referred to in the subject suit had become non¬ existent; and including any decree or order passed against NTC or for that matter, an undertaking filed by NTC in any court or tribunal or authority has been rendered unenforceable by operation of law and cannot be continued or taken forward. In other words, even if a valid decree has been passed against NTC, the same had become inexecutable by operation of law27. Applying the underlying principle and as jurisdictional issues have been raised which are essentially founded on the law enacted by the Parliament with retrospective effect containing a legal fiction and for doing complete justice to the parties, besides the power of review under Article 137 of the Constitution, it is open to this Court to exercise its plenary power under Article 142 of the Constitution28. Reverting to the judgment under review, it is noticed that the provisions of the 1983 Act and 1995 Act have been generally adverted to while dealing with the plea taken by the appellant NTC that it was in possession of the suit property merely as an agent of the Central Government. However, the Court declined to entertain that plea of NTC as it was not so specifically pleaded in the written statement. The Court then concluded that the appellant NTC was neither the Government nor Government Department nor Agent of the Central Government in the context of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. That view has been taken in reference to the 1983 Act and the un-amended provisions of 1995 Act. Indeed, the review petitioners would argue that on a fair reading of the un-amended provisions contained in 1995 Act and juxtaposed with the provisions of 1983 Act, the inescapable conclusion is that the leasehold rights continued to vest in the Central Government. However, we are not inclined to countenance this argument29. The review petitioners may be justified in pointing out that this Court committed an error apparent on the face of the record in observing that the appellant had never raised the issue before the courts below that the Central Government was the tenant and the appellant was holding the premises merely as an agent; and that a vague plea was taken about the non¬joinder of the parties - which plea was not even pursued before the Trial Court. Those errors, in our opinion, would not affect the final conclusion recorded by this Court in the judgment under review, considering the effect of the provisions as were applicable at the relevant time in the form of un¬ amended Section 3 of the 1995 Act.35. Being a protected or statutory tenant, Podar Mills could be dispossessed from the suit premises by the Trust only on the grounds permissible under that Act by instituting eviction proceedings before the competent Rent Court having exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the landlord and tenant, who in turn would then have to record its satisfaction about the entitlement of the landlord to recover possession of the suit property. The right so enjoyed by the Podar Mills Ltd. stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government with effect from 1 st April, 1994. Further, by virtue of amended Section 3 of the 1995 Act, by operation of law, the rights of the Textile Undertaking, in respect of the suit property, of being a statutory or protected tenant, continued to vest in the Central Government even after the coming into force of the 1999 Act and repeal of the 1947 Act.36. As aforementioned, since the Central Government continued to remain as the protected or statutory tenant in respect of the suit property w.e.f. 1 st April, 1994, the fact that the appellant NTC was carrying on its activities therein would not extricate the landlord (Trust) from initiating eviction proceedings against the real tenant, namely, the Central Government or Union of India; and such eviction proceedings could be maintained only before the jurisdictional Rent Court having exclusive jurisdiction to decide any dispute between the landlord and tenant. The present suit, however, came to be filed only against the appellant NTC and that too before the jurisdictional civil court under the Transfer of Property Act. It is obvious that the Trust acted on the legal advice and instituted the present suit, despite having filed two suits (namely, TER Suit 680/1568 of 1995 and RAD Suit 955/1997) in earlier point of time, for possession of the suit property, in both of which Union of India was made party¬defendant. But those suits were eventually dismissed for non¬prosecution and withdrawn, respectively, during the pendency of the subject suit, for reasons best known to the Trust37. To put it differently, the present suit instituted by the Trust under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, which culminated with the decree of eviction, affirmed up to this Court vide judgment under review, has been rendered without jurisdiction, by operation of law. This being the position after coming into force of the Validation Act 2014 and in particular, the purport of Section 39 as inserted, the decree so passed or undertaking given by NTC cannot be continued or enforced38. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the amended provision introduced by the Validation Act 2014 has no application to the present case. This contention is founded on the interpretation of the expression leasehold rights of the Textile Undertaking. It is argued that this expression pre¬ supposes that there must be an existing or subsisting leasehold rights. Only such right would be governed by the amended provision. To buttress this submission, reliance is placed on Section 4 of the 1995 Act which explicitly adverts to different types of rights enjoyed by the Textile Undertaking. Leaseholds is one such right separately noted. Since there was no subsisting leasehold right enuring in favour of Podar Mills, inevitably no such right vested in the Central Government. Whereas, the right transferred to and vested in the Central Government under sub-section (1) is only that of a protected or statutory tenant enjoyed by Podar Mills at the relevant time i.e. 1 st April, 1994. That right vested in the Central Government is not saved in terms of sub¬section (3). Resultantly, the right of a protected or statutory tenant vested in Central Government stood transferred to and vested in NTC in terms of sub-section (2) and continued to remain so vested in the NTC. If so, the relief of eviction or possession could be pursued by the Trust only against NTC. Further, admittedly, NTC did not enjoy the status of a statutory or protected tenant after coming into force of the 1999 Act and repeal of the 1947 Act. In that situation, the subject suit for possession against the appellant NTC came to be justly filed before the civil court under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act39. This argument, in our opinion, is an attempt to over¬ simplify the purport of Section 3(3), if not indulging in hair¬ splitting of the contextual meaning of the expression leasehold rights therein and in Section 4(1) or elsewhere in the 1995 Act. Section 3(1) refers to right, title and interest of the owner of the Textile Undertaking generally. That encompasses all the rights as are spelt out in Section 4(1) of the Act. One such right can be leasehold rights. Concededly, the expression leasehold rights mentioned in the 1995 Act must be construed as referring to the rights under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as well as under the applicable Rent Act recognizing tenancy rights without exception.41. Indeed, if the matter in issue is to be decided dehors the provisions of the applicable Rent Act, then it is possible to say that the expression leasehold rights would be limited to a subsisting lease. However, in the present case, we are required to reckon the status of the Union of India and NTC qua the suit property in the context of the rights accrued in terms of the provision of the Rent Act of 1947 and 1999, respectively. The expression leasehold rights in 1995 Act, obviously, must receive wider meaning so as to encompass tenancy rights flowing from the applicable Rent Act. For, the expression tenancy rights accruing under the Rent Act is analogous to and interchangeable with the expression leasehold rights. There is no reason to exclude the expression statutory right so enjoyed by the owners of the Textile Undertaking from the expression leasehold rights referred to in sub¬section (3), so long as it has not been so expressly excluded42. Considering the legislative intent for enacting the 1995 Act and the Validation Act 2014 also, it is not possible to give a restricted meaning to the expression leasehold rights occurring in sub-section (3) of Section 3, as amended, or elsewhere in the said enactment. Thus, the expression leasehold rights in 1995 Act must include tenancy rights flowing from the provisions of the applicable rent legislation. Any other interpretation would be doing violence to the legislative intent and be a pedantic approach43. According to the respondents, the status of Podar Mills and resultantly, of the Union of India is that of a tenant at sufferance. We have already adverted to the provisions of the concerned Rent Act. From the scheme of the 1947 Act as also in the 1999 Act, it is indisputable that after determination of the lease period, the status of Podar Mills had become that of a protected or statutory tenant under the Rent Act. Thus, it would continue to enjoy tenancy rights stipulated under the concerned Rent Act. Once that status has been acquired by the Central Government by operation of law, the action of eviction, could be only as per the prescribed dispensation under the concerned Rent Act45. In the present case, admittedly, the Trust proceeded on a clear understanding that the rights enjoyed by Podar Mills Ltd. after determination of lease period was that of a protected or statutory tenant within the meaning of the rent legislation (1947 Act). That right had been transferred to and vested in the Central Government by virtue of Section 3(1) of the 1995 Act and continues to so vest in it in terms of Section 3(3) which had come into force w.e.f. 1 st April, 1994 and deemed always to have effect for all purposes as if it had been in force at all material timesWe fail to understand as to how the principle expounded in the reported decision will be of any avail to the respondents (Trust). As already noted, it is not a case of subletting by the statutory tenant (Podar Mills Ltd.) but instead a case of involuntary transfer and vesting of rights and interest of the statutory or protected tenant in respect of the suit property in the Central Government by operation of law. In any case, if the Trust intends to proceed against the statutory tenant on the ground of unlawful subletting or such other ground, it will be obliged to initiate eviction proceedings against the Union of India before the competent jurisdictional Rent Court on that count. In the present case, the subject suit for eviction has been instituted against NTC only. Suffice it to observe that the subject suit not having been filed against the Union of India, the statutory tenant as on the date of filing of the suit; and not invoking the jurisdiction of the Rent Court for seeking eviction of the statutory tenant, the decree as passed by the civil court is rendered unenforceable against the Union of India and, in any case, inexecutable due to legal fiction48. The respondents (Trust) may be justified in pointing out that the judgment and decree rendered by this Court has not been nullified by the Validation Act 2014 as such. However, the said decree is not against the real tenant in whom the rights of the statutory tenant had vested and continue to vest. That right could be snapped only by resorting to the dispensation prescribed for in the rent legislation, as the concerned Rent Act continued to apply to the suit property – consequent to vesting of the rights and interest therein in the Central Government49. That takes us to the next argument of the respondents that Section 39 inserted in the 1995 Act operates prospectively and would not impact the judgment delivered by this Court on 5 th September, 2011. Second, the said provision applies to only subsisting leasehold rights. Taking the last argument first, the same needs to be rejected on the basis of the view already taken by us that the expression leasehold rights or leasehold property would include tenancy rights or tenanted property in occupation of a statutory or protected tenant as per the applicable municipal rent legislation at the relevant time. Be that as it may, Section 39 opens with a non obstante clause and makes it more explicit that the provisions of the Amendment Act, 2014 shall have and shall be deemed always to have effect for all purposes as if the provisions of the Act have been amended by the said Act, had been in force at all material times. It then predicates that no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any court for the enforcement of any decree or order or direction notwithstanding any undertaking filed by the NTC in any court. Having observed that Section 3 has been amended w.e.f. 1 st April, 1994 and upon giving full effect to the amendment, it must necessarily follow that the Central Government had acquired the status of protected or statutory tenant qua the suit property from that date and continue to remain so, and could be evicted only in the manner prescribed by the concerned rent legislation. The decree passed against NTC is on the assumption that the 1999 Act had no application to the suit property as the right had vested in NTC – which did not enjoy the protection of the 1999 Act. Resultantly, it must follow that the subject suit and the proceedings arising from or in relation thereto cannot proceed in law and moreso because NTC is not the real tenant. Further, as the tenancy rights in relation to the suit property continue to vest in the Central Government by operation of law, the provisions of the 1999 Act will be attracted, warranting suit for eviction to be filed against the Union of India before the jurisdictional Rent Court having exclusive jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the landlord and tenant. We must hasten to add that the validity of the provisions of the Validation Act 2014 is not put in issue in the present proceedings and we do not intend to deal with the same. All questions in that behalf are kept open50. Reliance was placed on State of Tamil Nadu Vs. State of Kerala and Another (2014) 12 SCC 696 , (in paragraph Nos. 127, 148 and 149) to buttress the argument that a judicial decision rendered by recording a finding of fact cannot be made ineffective by enacting a validating law, thereby fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. On a bare perusal of relevant paragraphs of this decision, the Court unambiguously found that the judgment was given by this Court in the context of disputed factual position between the two States in respect of the safety of a Dam for raising the water level. The Court went on to observe that such decision must be binding upon the parties and enforceable according to the decision being a plain and simple decision on the fact 10 (2014) 12 SCC 696  which cannot be altered by the legislative decision. In that case, the validity of the amended Act was put in issue. In the present case, however, we are not called upon to examine the validity of the provisions of the Validation Act 2014.Whether such a legislation is valid or in excess of legislative competence can be examined in an appropriate proceeding. It is open to the respondents (Trust) to challenge the validity of the Validation Act 2014, if they so desire. For the same reason, the decisions in Madan Mohan Pathak and Ors. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.(2014) 12 SCC 696 ( in paragraph Nos. 9, 20, 21 and 31) and Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Broach Borough Municipality and Ors (1969) 2 SCC 283 , will be of no avail to the respondents.