Case: Indu Bhusan Bose Vs. Rama Sundari Devi &amp; Anr

conflict between the powers conferred on the various Legislatures in Lists I, II and III has also no force, because the reservation of power for Parliament for the limited purpose of legislating in respect of cantonment areas only amounts to exclusion of this part of the legislative power from the general powers conferred on State Legislatures in the other two Lists. This kind of exclusion is not confined only to legislation in respect of house accommodation in cantonment areas. The same Entry gives Parliament jurisdiction to make provision by legislation for local self-government in cantonment areas which is clearly a curtailment of the general power of the State Legislature to make provision for local self-government in all areas of the State under Entry 5 of List II. That Entry 5 does not specifically exclude cantonment areas and, but for Entry 3 of List I, the State Legislature would be competent to make provision for local government, even in cantonment areas. Similarly, power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of: (i) education, including universities, under Entry 11 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III; (ii) regulation of mines and mineral development in Entry 23 of List II is made subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union; (iii) industries in Entry 24 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I; (iv) trade and commerce within the State in Entry 26 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; (v) production, supply and distribution of goods under Entry 27 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; and (vi) theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas in Entry 33 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List I. Thus, the Constitution itself has specifically put down entries in List II in which the power is expressed in general terms but is made subject to the provisions of entries in enther List I or List III. In these circumstances, no anomaly arises in holding that the exclusive power of Parliament for regulation of house accommodation including control of rents in cantonment areas has the effect of making the legislative powers conferred by Lists II and III subject to this power of Parliament. In this view, we are unable to affirm the decision of the Bombay High Court in A. C. Patels case, ILR (1954) Bom 434 = (AIR 1954 Bom 204 ) (supra) which is based on the interpretation that Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act only permitted laws to be made for requisitioning of property, acquiring of property and allocation of property only. The same High Court, in a subsequent case in F. E. Darukhanawalla v. Khemchand Lalchand, ILR (1954) Bom 544 = (AIR 1954 Bom 254 ), placed the same interpretation on Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. That decision was also based on the same interpretation of the scope of regulation of house accommodation as was accepted by that Court in the earlier case. 13. The Nagpur High Court in Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, ILR (1956) Nag 618 = (AIR 1956 Nag 268) proceeded on the assumption that the decision in the case of ILR (1954) Bom 434 = (AIR 1954 Bom 204 ) (supra) correctly defined the scope of Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, and considered the narrow question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant specially mentioned in Entry 21 in List II of that Act which covered the requirement of permission to serve a notice for eviction in regulating the relation of landlord and tenant and fell within the scope of Entry 21 in List II or in Entry 2 in List I of that Act. The Court held that it substantially fell in Entry 21 in List II and not in Entry 2 in List I. That Court did not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the question whether the expression regulating of house accommodation included something besides what Chagla, C. J., had said was its ambit in the case of ILR (1954) Bom 434 = (AIR 1954 Bom 204 ) (supra), but expressed the opinion that the expression could not be stretched to include the aspect of the relation of landlord and tenant involved in that particular case. It is clear that, in that case also, a narrow interpretation of the expression regulation of house accommodation was accepted, because it appears that there was no detailed discussion of the full scope of that expression. Similar is the decision of the Patna High Court in Babu Jagtanand v. Sri Satyanarayanji and Lakshmiji, ILR 40 Pat 625 = (AIR 1961 Pat 207 ). In fact, this last case merely followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of ILR (1954) Bom 544 = (AIR 1954 Bom 254 ) (supra). On the other hand, the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal, ILR (1961) 11 Raj 421 = (AIR 1962 Raj 190 ) held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List II, and that that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of List I. That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in appeal before us. We think that the decision given by the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]We are unable to accept this submission. The language of the entry itself does not justify any such interpretation.In the entry when power is granted to Parliament to make laws for the regulation of house accommodation in cantonment areas, there are no qualifying words to indicate that the house accommodation, which is to be subject to such legislation, must be accommodation required for military purposes, or must be accommodation that has already been acquired, requisitioned or allotted to the military.In fact, if a legislation in respect of any cantonment was to be undertaken by Parliament for the first time under this entry, there would be, at the time of that legislation, no house in the cantonment already acquired, requisitioned or allotted for military purposes; and, if the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant were accepted, the power of Parliament to pass laws cannot be exercised by Parliament at all. It is also significant that, in the entry, various items, which can be the subject-matter of legislation by Parliament, are mentioned separately, and these are:(i) Delimitation of cantonment areas;(ii) local self-government in such areas;(iii) the constitution and powers within such areas of cantonment authorities; and(iv) the regulation of house accommodation (including the control of rents) in such areas4. In none of these clauses there is any specification that the legislation is to be confined to areas or accommodation required for military purposes. When legislating in respect of local self-government in cantonment areas, it is obvious that Parliament will have to legislate for the entire cantonment area including portions of it which may be in possession of civilians and not military authorities or military officers. Similarly, the powers of the cantonment authorities, which could be granted by legislation by Parliament, cannot be confined to those areas or buildings which are in actual possession of military authorities or officers and must be in respect of the entire cantonment area including those buildings and lands which may be in actual ownership as well as occupation of civilians. In these circumstances, there is no reason to narrow down the scope of legislation on regulation of house accommodation and confine it to houses which are required or are actually in possession of military authorities or military officers. The power to regulate house accommodation by law must extend to all house accommodation in the cantonment area irrespective of its being owned by, or in the possession of, civilians. In fact, if a law were to be made for the first time under this entry, all the houses would be either vacant or occupied by owners or occupied by tenants of owners under private agreements and the law, when first made, will have to govern such houses. The scope of the expression regulation of house accommodation in this entry cannot, therefore, be confined as urged on behalf of the appellantWe cannot accept that the word regulation can be so narrowly interpreted as to be confined to allotment only and not to other incidents, such as termination of existing tenancies and eviction of persons in possession of the house accommodation. The dictionary meaning of the word regulation in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is the act of regulating and the word regulate is given the meaning to control, govern or direct by rule or regulation.This entry, thus, gives the power to Parliament to pass legislation for the purpose of directing or controlling all house accommodation in cantonment areas. Clearly, this power to direct or control will include within it all aspects as to who is to make the constructions under what conditions the construction can be altered, who is to occupy the accommodation and for how long, on what terms it is to be occupied, when and under what circumstances the occupant is to cease to occupy it, and the manner in which the accommodation is to be utilised. All these are ingredients of regulation of house accommodation and we see no reason to hold that this word regulation has not been used in this wide sense in this entry6. It appears that, in the Government of India Act, 1935, the corresponding entry No.2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to that Act was similar to this entry No.3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but the expression including control of rents which is now in Entry No. 3 of List I within brackets did not exist. An argument was sought to be built on it that regulation of house accommodation was not intended to cover control of rents when that expression was used in the corresponding entry in the Government of India Act, and that this expression used in the Constitution should also be interpreted to cover the same field, so that, but for the addition made within brackets, Parliament could not have legislated for control of rents of house accommodation within cantonment areas. It is further urged that, if the expression regulation of house accommodation is interpreted as not including within it regulation or control of rents, it should also be held that it will not include regulation of eviction of private tenants. This argument is based on the premises that the words including control of rents was introduced in entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution for the purpose of enlarging the scope of the legislative authority of Parliament and making it wider than that of the Federal Legislature under the Government of India Act. Such an assumption is not necessarily justified. It may be that the words including the control of rents were introduced by way of abundant caution or to clarify that the regulation of house accommodation is wide enough to include control of rents. The addition may have been made so as to concentrate attention on the fact that legislation was needed for control of rents in the situation that existed at the time when the Constitution was passed by the Constituent Assembly. It has to be remembered that cantonments are intended to be and are, in fact, military enclaves and regulation of occupation of house accommodation in the cantonment areas by Parliamentary law is necessary from the point of view of security of military installations in cantonments and requirements of military authorities and personnel for accommodation in such areas. Such a purpose could only be served by ensuring that Parliament could legislate in respect of house accommodation in cantonment areas in all its aspect, including regulation of grant of leases, ejectment of lessees, and ensuring that the accommodation is available on proper terms as to rents. On an interpretation of the contents of the entry itself, therefore, we are led to the conclusion that Parliament was given the exclusive power to legislate in respect of house accommodation in cantonment areas for regulating the accommodation in all its aspectsAll these three cases clearly show that whenever any legislation is passed relating to control of rents, that legislation can be effective and can serve its purpose only if it also regulates eviction of tenants. Consequently, when in Entry 3 of List I the power is granted to Parliament specifically to legislate on control of rents, that power cannot be effectively exercised unless it is held that Parliament also has the power to regulate eviction of tenants whose rents are to be controlled. Such power must, therefore, be necessarily read in the expression regulation of house accommodation. Of course, it has to be remembered that this power reserved for Parliament is to be exercised in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas only and not other areas the legislative power in respect of which is governed by entries either in List II or in List III10. This view that we are taking is also borne out by the historical background provided by the legislation relating to cantonments and house accommodation in cantonments in India11. Another aspect that strengthens our view is that if we were to accept the interpretation sought to be put on behalf of the appellant that the power of Parliament in confined to legislation for the purpose of obtaining house accomodation in cantonment areas for military purposes and excludes legislation in respect of house accommodation not immediately required for military purposes, all that Parliament will be able to do will be to make provision for acquisition or requisition of house accommodation. On the house accommodation being acquired or requisitioned, it will be available for use by military authorities. Such power, obviously, could not be intended to be conferred by Entry 3 in List I when the same power is specifically granted concurrently to both Parliament and the State Legislature under Entry 42 of the List III of the Seventh Schedule to the ConstitutionWe have felt considerable doubt whether the power of legislating on relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation or buildings would appropriately fall in Entry 21 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, or in the ocrresponding Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. These Entries permit legislation in respect of land and explain the scope by equating it with rights in or over land, land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents. It is to be noted that the relation of landlord and tenant is mentioned as being included in land tenures and the expression land tenures would not, in our opinion, appropriately cover tenancy of buildings or of house accommodation. That expression is only used with reference to relationship between landlord and tenant in respect of vacant lands. In fact, leases in respect of non-agricultural property are dealt with in the Transfer of Property Act and would much more appropriately fall within the scope of Entry 8 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act read with Entry 10 in the same List, or within the scope of Entry 6 of List III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution read with Entry 7 in the same List. Leases and all rights governed by leases, including the termination of leases and eviction from property leased, would be covered by the field of transfer of property and contracts relating thereto.However, it is not necessary for us to express any definite opinion in this case on this point because of our view that the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas is clearly covered by the Entries in List I. In the Constitution, the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to the matters contained in that Entry, notwithstanding the fact that a similar power may also be found in any Entry in List II or List III.Article 246 of the Constitution confers exclusive power on Parliament to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I, notwithstanding the concurrent power of Parliament and the State Legislature, or the exclusive power of the State Legislature in Lists III and II respectively. The general power of legislating in respect of relationship between landlord and tenant exercisable by a State Legislature either under Entry 18 of List II or Entries 6 and 7 of List III is subject to the overriding power of Parliament in respect of matters in List I, so that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that, on the subject of relationship between landlord and tenant insofar as it arises in respect of house accommodation situated in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislatures.The submission made that this interpretation will lead to a conflict between the powers conferred on the various Legislatures in Lists I, II and III has also no force, because the reservation of power for Parliament for the limited purpose of legislating in respect of cantonment areas only amounts to exclusion of this part of the legislative power from the general powers conferred on State Legislatures in the other two Lists. This kind of exclusion is not confined only to legislation in respect of house accommodation in cantonment areas. The same Entry gives Parliament jurisdiction to make provision by legislation for local self-government in cantonment areas which is clearly a curtailment of the general power of the State Legislature to make provision for local self-government in all areas of the State under Entry 5 of List II. That Entry 5 does not specifically exclude cantonment areas and, but for Entry 3 of List I, the State Legislature would be competent to make provision for local government, even in cantonment areas. Similarly, power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of: (i) education, including universities, under Entry 11 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I and Entry 25 of List III; (ii) regulation of mines and mineral development in Entry 23 of List II is made subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union; (iii) industries in Entry 24 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I; (iv) trade and commerce within the State in Entry 26 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; (v) production, supply and distribution of goods under Entry 27 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 33 of List III; and (vi) theatres and dramatic performances; cinemas in Entry 33 of List II is made subject to the provisions of Entry 60 of List I. Thus, the Constitution itself has specifically put down entries in List II in which the power is expressed in general terms but is made subject to the provisions of entries in enther List I or List III. In these circumstances, no anomaly arises in holding that the exclusive power of Parliament for regulation of house accommodation including control of rents in cantonment areas has the effect of making the legislative powers conferred by Lists II and III subject to this power of Parliament. In this view, we are unable to affirm the decision of the Bombay High Court in A. C. Patels case, ILR (1954) Bom 434   = (AIR 1954 Bom 204  ) (supra) which is based on the interpretation that Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act only permitted laws to be made for requisitioning of property, acquiring of property and allocation of property only13. The Nagpur High Court in Kewalchand v. Dashrathlal, ILR (1956) Nag 618 = (AIR 1956 Nag 268) proceeded on the assumption that the decision in the case of ILR (1954) Bom 434   = (AIR 1954 Bom 204  ) (supra) correctly defined the scope of Entry 2 in List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, and considered the narrow question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant specially mentioned in Entry 21 in List II of that Act which covered the requirement of permission to serve a notice for eviction in regulating the relation of landlord and tenant and fell within the scope of Entry 21 in List II or in Entry 2 in List I of that Act. The Court held that it substantially fell in Entry 21 in List II and not in Entry 2 in List I. That Court did not consider it necessary to express any opinion on the question whether the expression regulating of house accommodation included something besides what Chagla, C. J., had said was its ambit in the case of ILR (1954) Bom 434   = (AIR 1954 Bom 204  ) (supra), but expressed the opinion that the expression could not be stretched to include the aspect of the relation of landlord and tenant involved in that particular case. It is clear that, in that case also, a narrow interpretation of the expression regulation of house accommodation was accepted, because it appears that there was no detailed discussion of the full scope of that expression. Similar is the decision of the Patna High Court in Babu Jagtanand v. Sri Satyanarayanji and Lakshmiji, ILR 40 Pat 625 = (AIR 1961 Pat 207  ). In fact, this last case merely followed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of ILR (1954) Bom 544   = (AIR 1954 Bom 254  ) (supra). On the other hand, the Rajasthan High Court in Nawal Mal v. Nathu Lal, ILR (1961) 11 Raj 421 = (AIR 1962 Raj 190  ) held that the power of the State Legislature to legislate in respect of landlord and tenant of buildings is to be found in Entries 6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and not in Entry 18 of List II, and that that power was circumscribed by the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate on the same subject under Entry 3 of List I. That is also the view which the Calcutta High Court has taken in the judgment in appeal before us. We think that the decision given by the Calcutta High Court is correct and must be upheld.