Case: Jagdish Prasad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

various types of offences mentioned in it. Any interpretation which would not carry out the object of the Act would be unnatural. We, therefore, think that the words "second offence" mean any offence under the Act committed by a person after his conviction earlier for any one of the offences punishable under the Act.6. It was said that it would be strange if the Act intended to impose a heavier punishment for a second offence which might be of a trivial nature while the first offence which might have been of a serious nature entailed a lighter punishment. This contention is fallacious. There is no foundation in the Act for distinguishing between trivial and serious offences, for the Act provides the same punishment for each offence under it. If the punishment is the same, it would follow that the statute considered them to be of the same seriousness. The weakness of this argument will further appear if we consider a case where the first offence was of what is called a trival nature and the second, of a serious nature though constituted by different acts. It would be equally strange if the Act in such a case contemplated the same punishment for the subsequent and serious offence as would be the case if the subsequent offence was not a "second offence". This contention lends no support to the interpretation suggested by learned counsel for the appellant.7. Learned counsel then said that the word "offence" has to be understood as defined in S. 2(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and therefore means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. If we substitute this definition for the word "offence" in the provision now under consideration, it will mean an act made punishable by the law. That law must be the present Act. This does not assist learned counsels contention at all; it really goes against him.8. The word "offence" no doubt, refers to an offence under the Act. It cannot possibly mean any offence under any other Act. This view has invariably been taken in all the cases which have been cited to us: see City Board, Saharanpur v. Abdul Wahid, AIR 1959 All 695 , and Chuttan v. State, AIR 1960 All 629 . In In re, Authers, (1889) 22 QBD 345 at p. 349, it was said, "where the legislature passes a statute and imposes a penalty of 50 1. for a first offence, it must mean, in the absence of express words to the contrary, that the conviction for the first offence must be under that Act, and the second conviction under the same Act; if it were otherwise, it would be idle to introduce the warning of a lower penalty for the first offence, and to impose a higher penalty for the second." This case, supports our interpretation of the words "second offence" based on the object of the Act.9. Learned counsel for the appellant no doubt agrees that the second offence must refer to an offence under the Act but he says that since it would amount to adding the words "under the Act", it would justify the addition of further words implying that the second offence had to be of the same type as the first. This is a wholly unfounded contention. The offence contemplated in the expression "second offence" has to be under the Act because that arises from the object of the Act and, as we shall later show, from the necessary implication of the structure of the sub-section. There is no such reason to confine the second offence to an offence of the same type.10. We have so far been dealing only with that portion of sub-s. (1) of S. 16 which concerns the penalty for the second offence. Considering the sub-section as a whole we find that it supports the interpretation of the expression "second offence" which has appealed to us. It says that if any person does any of the acts mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) in it, he shall be punishable for the first offence with a certain penalty, for the second offence with a higher penalty and for the third a still higher penalty. It is clear that the acts or omissions mentioned in the different clauses constitute offences for which the penalties are provided. From this structure of the sub-section the implication necessarily arises that the penalties were imposed for offences under the Act only. Now Cl. (a) deals with a person importing, manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any article of food in contravention of the provisions of the Act or of any rule made thereunder. This clause contemplates the breaches of various provisions of the Act and the rules, which are numerous. It covers various types of conduct, act or omission, each of which is punishable and each of which is, therefore, an offence. Turning next to the part of the sub-section which prescribes penalties, we find it provides increasing degrees of punishment for the second offence and the third and subsequent offences. It follows that an offence contemplated in this part of the statute-and with it we are now directly concerned-would be constituted by any of the acts which would come within Cl. (a) and likewise within all the other clauses following it.We have pointed out that the acts and omissions contemplated there are of diverse kinds. The words "second offence" must, therefore, mean any act which is an offence under any of the clauses in the sub-section which has been done later in point of time after a conviction for an offence under the Act, no matter whether the acts or omissions constituting the two offences are of the same type or not. The appellant must, therefore, be held to have committed the second offence within the meaning of the sub-section on the present occasion and was liable to have the heavier punishment awarded to him. The sentence awarding such punishment is unexceptionable.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]Learned counsel for the appellant no doubt agrees that the second offence must refer to an offence under the Act but he says that since it would amount to adding the words "under the Act", it would justify the addition of further words implying that the second offence had to be of the same type as the first. This is a wholly unfounded contention.The offence contemplated in the expression "second offence" has to be under the Act because that arises from the object of the Act and, as we shall later show, from the necessary implication of the structure of theThere is no such reason to confine the second offence to an offence of the same type.10. We have so far been dealing only with that portion of(1) of S. 16 which concerns the penalty for the second offence. Considering theas a whole we find that it supports the interpretation of the expression "second offence" which has appealed to us. It says that if any person does any of the acts mentioned in Cls. (a) to (g) in it, he shall be punishable for the first offence with a certain penalty, for the second offence with a higher penalty and for the third a still higher penalty. It is clear that the acts or omissions mentioned in the different clauses constitute offences for which the penalties are provided. From this structure of thethe implication necessarily arises that the penalties were imposed for offences under the Act only. Now Cl. (a) deals with a person importing, manufacturing for sale, storing, selling or distributing any article of food in contravention of the provisions of the Act or of any rule made thereunder. This clause contemplates the breaches of various provisions of the Act and the rules, which are numerous. It covers various types of conduct, act or omission, each of which is punishable and each of which is, therefore, an offence. Turning next to the part of thewhich prescribes penalties, we find it provides increasing degrees of punishment for the second offence and the third and subsequent offences. It follows that an offence contemplated in this part of thewith it we are now directlybe constituted by any of the acts which would come within Cl. (a) and likewise within all the other clauses following it.We have pointed out that the acts and omissions contemplated there are of diverse kinds. The words "second offence" must, therefore, mean any act which is an offence under any of the clauses in thewhich has been done later in point of time after a conviction for an offence under the Act, no matter whether the acts or omissions constituting the two offences are of the same type or not. The appellant must, therefore, be held to have committed the second offence within the meaning of theon the present occasion and was liable to have the heavier punishment awarded to him. The sentence awarding such punishment is unexceptionable.