Case: Sardar Sarup Singh &amp; Others Vs. The State Of Punjab &amp; Others

Board as representative as possible, and because an Act passed by the Punjab legislature could not contain provisions for the election of members from constituencies outside the Punjab, there arose the necessity for nomination, designation and co-option. The designation of the head ministers of the five principal Sikh shrines may be also attributed to the reason that they were important functionaries who should be on the Board. In 1953, nomination was done away with and the number of co-opted members was increased to twenty-five, of whom at least twelve were to be residents of Pepsu. This was even before the principal Act was extended to the Pepsu area. When the amending Act of 1959 extended the principal Act to the Pepsu area, the problem at once arose as to how to give some representation to the Sikhs in the extended areas, for the intervening period before the next election of the Board, and also as a permanent measure: S.148-B gives representation to those areas as an interim measure and S. 43A as a permanent measure. Considering S. 148-B in the light of these circumstances, we are unable to hold that it violates the fundamental right of the Sikhs under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution.The method of representation for the extended areas during the interim period appears to us to be an arrangement dictated merely by considerations of convenience and expediency, and does not involve any principle of religion. The question before us is not whether a more satisfactory arrangement could have been made even for the interim period; perhaps, it could have been. Learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that many Sikhs of influence and standing in the Pepsu area will have no vote for the interim period. That may be unfortunate, but is not a relevant consideration for determining the question before us, namely, whether there has been interference with freedom of religion. 11. We now proceed to consider the specific grievances which the petitioners have made in respect of the persons who come into the Board under S. 148-B. As to the members of the Interim Board, Patiala, who under Cl. (a) of sub-s. (1) of S. 148-B are deemed to be members of the Board constituted under S. 43, it is argued that they were appointed under a Punjab Government notification dated 10-1-1958 and though they are Sikhs, they do not represent the Sikh community and are mere nominees of Government; furthermore, they are not subject to the disqualifications mentioned in Ss. 45 and 46 of the Act in respect of elected and co-opted members respectively.We have pointed out earlier that the principal Act contained a provision before 1953 or nomination of 12 members by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu; and after 1953, the co-opted members included twelve residents of Pepsu. By an order of the Maharaja of Patiala, the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, was constituted to look after certain gurdwaras of the Pepsu area, and after merger the appointment was made by the Governor of the Punjab. Under S. 148-A which was also added to the principal Act by the amending Act of 1959, the interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, has ceased to function, and under S. 148-B (1) (a) the members of the Interim Board, Patiala have become members of the Board constituted under S. 43. We are unable to hold that the designation of such members, as an interim measure, to represent those gurdwaras in the Pepsu area which they were actually managing is violative of any fundamental, right; nor do we think that the non-application of the disqualifications stated in Ss. 45 and 46 of the Act to these members advances the case of the petitioners any further.The principal Act did not contain any provisions as to disqualification of designated members; it contained provisions for disqualification of elected, nominated or co-opted members and after nomination had ceased in 1953, of elected or co-opted members only. It is permissible to presume that the legislature knows that the members it is designating do not suffer from any disqualifications; furthermore, the petitioners have not even suggested in their petition that the members of the Interim Board, Patiala, suffer from any of the disqualifications stated in S. 45 or S. 46. 12. With regard to the thirty-five Sikhs to be elected under cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of S. 148-B, there is a three-fold contention. It has been submitted that (1) the electorate detailed in sub-s- (2) of S. 148-B is not representative of all the Sikhs; (2) some of the members of the electorate like Sikh members of Parliament and Municipal Committees are in their turn elected by joint constituencies of Sikhs and non-Sikhs; and (3) some of the members of the electorate like Sikh Sarpanches and Sikh Naya Pradhans are in the service, and under the influence of Government. We do not agree that these considerations are determinative of the problem before us. We have already said that the method of representation to the Board for the extended areas as in interim measure is not a matter of religion.The circumstance that some members of the electorate are in their turn elected by constituencies consisting of Sikhs and non-Sikhs is far too remote and indirect to constitute an infringement of freedom of religion. The members of the electorate itself are all Sikhs and they have to elect thirty-five Sikhs. Unless one proceeds mechanically on mere abstract considerations, there is no real basis for the contention that non-Sikhs can in any way influence the Board. We do not agree that Sikh Sarpanches and Naya Pradhans are in the service of Government or that their inclusion as members of the electorate violates the right of the Sikhs under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution.It may not be quite irrelevant to point out here that the twelve members of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, plus thirty-five elected Sikhs from the Pepsu area will be a minority as against 132 elected members and twenty five co-opted members of the Board. 13.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds].The petitioners have not specifically alleged in their petition that the State Government has acted in any mala fide manner; and whatever justification some people may feel in their criticisms of the political wisdom of a particular legislative or executive action, this Court cannot be called upon to embark on an enquiry into public policy or investigate into questions of political wisdom or even to pronounce upon motives of the legislature in enacting a law which it is otherwise competent to make.We do not say that in pronouncing on the rights of the parties before it, this Court must always stand aloof on the chill and distant heights of abstract logic and pay no heed to the great tides and currents which move society and men. If and when the occasion demands, for example, when there is violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, it will never hesitate to act. But it is well to remember that a fundamental right, such as freedom of religion, is of an enduring character and must stand beyond the sweep of changing and deflecting forces of current opinion9. Without a fuller and more detailed examination of the provisions of the principal Act we hesitate to pronounce finally on the larger question if any of the other provisions of the principal Act affect matters of religion; nor do we think it necessary to decide that larger question in the present case. We are of the view that the present petition can be decided on a shorter ground, even if we proceed on the assumption that some of the provisions of the principal Act relate to matters of religion and the Board, either acting in exercise of its power of control, direction and superintendence over other committees or in its capacity as the committee for certain gurdwaras, can pass orders about matters of religion. We may point out, however, that the preamble of the principal Act indicates that it is mainly a law to provide for the better administration of certain Sikh gurdwaras and it is admitted that in so far as the powers of the Board relate to mere administration of gurdwara properties in either of its two capacities, such administration must be in accordance with law, and the appropriate legislature can lay down what the law should beWe do not think that such a stand is correct or justified by Art. 26 of the Constitution; nor has any authoritative text been placed before us to show that a direct election by the entire Sikh community in the management of gurdwaras is part of the Sikh religion.The principal Act, as it stood before the amending Act of 1959, does not support any such contention. However great our respect may be for the democratic principle of direct election, we do not think that having regard to the provisions of the principal Act and the circumstances in which S. 148-B came to be added thereto, the principle of direct election on universal denominational suffrage can be raised to the pedestal of religion within the meaning of Art. 26(b) of the Constitution. If it were so raised, then the co-option of some members which has not been challenged by the petitioners would also be violative of their fundamental right; so also any restrictions which the principal Act or the rules made thereunder may impose in the matter of election or the exercise of the vote, such as, restrictions with regard to the age of the voter etc. Obviously, these are not matters of religion and we say without meaning any offence to anybody that to treat these as matters of religion is tantamount to confusing religion with current politics10. It is to be remembered that the principal Act constituted a Board representative of the Sikhs both inside Punjab and outside it; that is why in the constitution of the Board there was provision for election, nomination, designation of the head ministers of certain principal Sikh gurdwaras, and also co-option. The purpose obviously was to make the Board as representative as possible, and because an Act passed by the Punjab legislature could not contain provisions for the election of members from constituencies outside the Punjab, there arose the necessity for nomination, designation and co-option. The designation of the head ministers of the five principal Sikh shrines may be also attributed to the reason that they were important functionaries who should be on the Board. In 1953, nomination was done away with and the number of co-opted members was increased to twenty-five, of whom at least twelve were to be residents of Pepsu. This was even before the principal Act was extended to the Pepsu area. When the amending Act of 1959 extended the principal Act to the Pepsu area, the problem at once arose as to how to give some representation to the Sikhs in the extended areas, for the intervening period before the next election of the Board, and also as a permanent measure: S.148-B gives representation to those areas as an interim measure and S. 43A as a permanent measure. Considering S. 148-B in the light of these circumstances, we are unable to hold that it violates the fundamental right of the Sikhs under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution.The method of representation for the extended areas during the interim period appears to us to be an arrangement dictated merely by considerations of convenience and expediency, and does not involve any principle of religion. The question before us is not whether a more satisfactory arrangement could have been made even for the interim period; perhaps, it could have been. Learned counsel for the petitioners has pointed out that many Sikhs of influence and standing in the Pepsu area will have no vote for the interim period. That may be unfortunate, but is not a relevant consideration for determining the question before us, namely, whether there has been interference with freedom of religionWe are unable to hold that the designation of such members, as an interim measure, to represent those gurdwaras in the Pepsu area which they were actually managing is violative of any fundamental, right; nor do we think that the non-application of the disqualifications stated in Ss. 45 and 46 of the Act to these members advances the case of the petitioners any further.The principal Act did not contain any provisions as to disqualification of designated members; it contained provisions for disqualification of elected, nominated or co-opted members and after nomination had ceased in 1953, of elected or co-opted members only. It is permissible to presume that the legislature knows that the members it is designating do not suffer from any disqualifications; furthermore, the petitioners have not even suggested in their petition that the members of the Interim Board, Patiala, suffer from any of the disqualifications stated in S. 45 or S. 46.The circumstance that some members of the electorate are in their turn elected by constituencies consisting of Sikhs and non-Sikhs is far too remote and indirect to constitute an infringement of freedom of religion. The members of the electorate itself are all Sikhs and they have to elect thirty-five Sikhs. Unless one proceeds mechanically on mere abstract considerations, there is no real basis for the contention that non-Sikhs can in any way influence the Board. We do not agree that Sikh Sarpanches and Naya Pradhans are in the service of Government or that their inclusion as members of the electorate violates the right of the Sikhs under Art. 26(b) of the Constitution.It may not be quite irrelevant to point out here that the twelve members of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala, plus thirty-five elected Sikhs from the Pepsu area will be a minority as against 132 elected members and twenty five co-opted members of the Board.