Case: PRAVEEN KUMAR C.P Vs. KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION COMMISSION &amp; ORS

after the employment notifications were issued. But what we have to address in these appeals is as to whether the respective B.Ed. degrees of the appellants declared as equivalent to those of the concerned subjects as notified would operate from the dates of issue of the respective GOs or the same would relate back to the time when they obtained the degrees or at least to the date of the employment notification. The appellants have relied on a decision of a coordinate Bench in the case of Beena R. v. Kerala Public Service Commission and Ors. [(2017) 15 SCC 306] . In that case, however, there was no dispute in the case of appellant that she possessed equivalent qualification of KGTE (English typewriting) but she did not have separate certificate as far as the computer wordprocessing was concerned. In this judgment, a coordinate Bench examined the implication of the expression produced. This authority does not aid the appellants. 26. Note (v) of Clause 7 of the employment notification in the case PK and Note (vi) of Clause 7 of the employment notification in the case of AD required disclosure of the equivalency orders. A plain reading of the two GOs clearly reflect that their degrees were equivalent to the requisite qualifications contained in the eligibility criteria. In the case of Aarya K. Babu (supra), the disputed subject was recognized subsequently and introduced as part of the eligibility criteria. The principle of equivalency was not the main reasoning on the basis of which the said case was decided. The word equivalence in its plain meaning implies something which is equal to another. In the field of academics, application of the principle of equivalency in relation to degrees in two subjects would mean that they had the same standing or status all along, unless the official instrument according equivalency specifies a date from which the respective subjects would be treated as such, in express terms or by implication. 27. Whether a GO would have prospective effect or relate back to an earlier date is a question which would have to be decided on the basis of text and tenor of the respective orders. The GOs which declared appellants degrees to be equivalent to those required as per the applicable notifications were not general orders but these two orders were person specific, relating to the two appellants. Once the GOs specifically declared that their B.Ed. degrees were equivalent to the designated subject which formed part of the employment notification, the GOs in substance have to be interpreted as clarificatory in nature and these cannot be construed to have had elevated the status or position of the degree they already had after the declaration was made in the GOs. The subject GOs only recognised an existing state of affairs so far as the nature of the degrees were concerned and did not create fresh value for the degrees which the appellants possessed. Though these equivalent orders were not in existence on the dates of issue of employment notifications, the GOs in substance recognize such status from the dates of obtaining such degrees. The GOs do not reveal any intervening circumstances which could be construed to imply that the respective degrees acquired the equivalent status because of such circumstances occurring subsequent to grant of their B.Ed. degrees. The aforesaid Notes to Clause 7 of the employment notifications postulated disclosure of the number and date of the orders on equivalence. But the GOs to which we have referred treat the equivalency to be operating on the dates of obtaining such degrees. Thus, the defect, if any, on disclosure requirement, shall stand cured on issue of the University orders followed by the GOs. The GOs also specify the context in which these were issued and refer to the appellants being included in the list of KPSC. This being the case, we do not think treating the appellants degrees as equivalent to those required under the applicable notifications by the GOs issued in the year 2019 would result in change in the rules of the game midway. At best, it can be termed as interpreting the rules when the game was on, figuratively speaking. Such a course would, in our opinion, be permissible. For this reason, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the different authorities cited on the principle of change in the rule of the game midway. We have opined that the appellants degrees in B.Ed. were equivalent to those required by the employment notifications and the equivalency orders were merely clarificatory in nature. For this reason, we do not think there was any fundamental breach of Notes (v) and (vi) of Clause 7 of the respective employment notifications in the cases of the appellants. 28. Once we hold so, we do not think relief can be denied to these two appellants on the ground that other similarly situated persons may not have had applied for the same posts and were being put to disadvantage. In the case of Aarya K. Babu (supra), that course was adopted by a coordinate Bench as it was a new subject which was added to a subsisting range of subjects in the qualification criteria. The principle of service jurisprudence that a candidate must possess the requisite qualification for a post on the date of issue of employment notification cannot be applied in the appellants cases, as in our view, they possessed equivalent qualifications when they applied for the posts. The GOs only confirmed the equivalency of their B.Ed. degrees. In our opinion, they shall be deemed to have had the equivalent qualification on the relevant date. As we have held that the respective GOs only clarified or confirmed an existing status of certain educational qualifications, in absence of specific instance of similarly situated but unspecified number of persons having not applied for the posts would be unfair to the ones who apply for the same and undergo three levels of litigations to establish that they had equivalent degrees.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]These decisions are mainly authorities on the point that the Rules prevailing on the date of issue of employment notifications ought to prevail under normal circumstances and new Rules or amendments coming midway through a selection process cannot be applied to that process. Such new Rules would operate prospectively. Certain judgments of the Kerala High Court have also been relied upon by the KPSC on the same proposition of law. But we do not consider it necessary to multiply the authorities in this judgment on the same point.This argument of the State is advanced on the ground that it would be in the interest of maintaining quality of education. But on a plain reading of the said clause, it is apparent that there is no specific subject in B.Ed. has been made to be the qualifying criteria in Clause 2(2)(a) of Chapter XXXI of the 1959 Rules. The graduation requirement in concerned subject is there, but going by the said Clause, it postulates B.Ed. degree simplicitor as the eligibility criteria. No other Rule has been shown to us by the learned counsel for the State of Kerala or the Commission from which it can be inferred that there was requirement of a candidate for the subject posts to hold B.Ed. degree in the concerned subject. So far as the present appellants are concerned, no dispute has been raised over their graduation being in the concerned subject.18. Clause 13 of the 1958 Rules permits the Commission to prescribe special qualifications in cases where appointments have to be made in consultation with it or by the State Government or by an appointing authority with approval of State Government in other cases. No specific notification or order issued by the KPSC has been brought to our notice under which the eligibility criteria of holding B.Ed. Degree had to be in the concerned subject for the posts of High School Assistants. KPSCs submission on this point is that the same was not raised at any earlier stage of the proceeding. But in our opinion, the appellants cannot take aid of this argument as the respective employment notifications had specified B.Ed. in concerned subject. The appellants having participated in the said selection process without raising any objection on that count, it would not be open to them to question the eligibility criteria specified in the employment notification. We shall, thus, proceed on the basis that the candidates for the posts in question were required to have B.Ed. degree in the concerned subject and it is not in dispute that B.Ed. degrees of the appellants were not in the concerned subjects. The two GOs, however, confer on the subjects in which the appellants obtained B.Ed. degrees, equivalency to the required subjects.19. There is support for adoption of principle of equivalency in Clause 10 (a)(ii) of the 1958 Rules.We have reproduced the said Clauses earlier in this judgment. There was requirement in Clause 7 that the candidates ought to disclose the dates of GOs declaring equivalency to the concerned subjects. But neither the KPSC nor the State has argued before us that there was any defect in the appellants applications. They were permitted to participate in the written test.The High Court particularly relied on a Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of A. Suma v. The Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors. reported in [(2011) 1 KLT1 (FB)]. In that judgment, referring to the 1958 Rules, it was held that the Commission was incompetent to deal with the question of equivalence of educational and other qualifications prescribed unless the subject rules provided for recognition of qualifications other than that prescribed as equivalent. But so far as these two appeals are concerned, we are not dealing with a question as regards the authority of Commission to deal with the question of equivalency. In this case, equivalency has been declared by the State Government, and prior to that, by two universities of the State of Kerala. The power of the State Government to make orders on the question of equivalence is not in dispute. Such power, inter alia, stems from Clause 10(a) (ii) of 1958 Rules. Thus, the case of A. Suma (supra) has no application as regards the appellants rights to be considered for the posts in question having regard to their B.Ed. degrees.24. The candidates who brought that action initially did not possess degree in any of the subjects specified therein, but their degrees were in Forestry. They were successful in the selection process but their selection was cancelled on the ground that they did not possess the prescribed qualification in terms of the notification. It transpired that there was no 4-year degree programme being offered in this country for Agro-Forestry. Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) had taken a view that definition of agriculture included forestry. It appears that on that basis the degrees of the respective candidates in that proceeding were accepted at the initial stage. In the month of November, 2015, an Office Memorandum was issued by the Ministry in which the fact of there being no 4-year bachelor programme in Agro-Forestry available in the country was taken note of. On the ground that Agro- Forestry was covered comprehensively as a subject in the ICAR approved syllabus for B.Sc. Forestry, it was suggested that it would be appropriate that degree in B.Sc. Forestry ought to be considered for the posts of Agricultural Field Officer in banks. A corrigendum was subsequently issued by the Indian Bank Personnel Selection (IBPS) on 16th January, 2016 in that regard. The cancellation order was successfully challenged by the terminated candidates in the High Court of Kerala, against which the Bank instituted the petition for special leave to appeal. Leave was granted in the Banks petition. It was held by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Aarya K. Babu (supra):-17. In that backdrop, though in the instant facts presently the qualification possessed by the private respondents is decided to be included for the purpose of recruitment to the post of Agricultural Field Officer, as on the date of the recruitment notification the same was not included therein, which cannot be substituted by the Court with retrospective effect for the reasons stated above. Therefore, in the said circumstance, in the present facts, the High Court was not justified in its conclusion. We, however, make it clear that though we have referred to the legal position and applied the same to the case of the parties who are before us, if in the case of similar recruitment, the employers themselves have permitted the equivalence and have continued such of those officers recruited, this decision shall not be applied to initiate action against such officers at this distant point of time. Subject to the above, the orders passed by the High Court of Kerala which are impugned herein are set aside.18. Having arrived at the above conclusion we also take note of the submission of the learned counsel for the private respondent in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 16567 of 2016, namely, Smt. Aarya K. Babu that she is placed in very difficult circumstances subsequent to the discharge from service which is also due to certain setback in her personal life. Though we do not wish to articulate the actual fact situation narrated we have no reason to disbelieve the same, hence, we find it appropriate that in her case it is necessary to exercise our discretion under Article 142 of the Constitution to serve the ends of justice and do complete justice without prejudicing either of the parties. In that view, we direct the appellant Bank of India to provide appointment to Smt. Aarya K. Babu as Agricultural Field Officer or such other equivalent post if the vacancy exists as on today or in the vacancy that would arise in future. In that regard it is made clear that the same will be considered as a fresh appointment from the date of appointment and no previous benefit can be claimed by her. Further, it is made clear that this direction is issued in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and the same shall not be treated as a precedent for any other case.25. So far as the present appeals are concerned, the facts are not identical or near similar also considering the factual background of the case of Aarya K. Babu (supra). In the two GOs which have been reproduced earlier, it has been specified that the respective B.Ed. degrees of the appellants through regular study were equivalent to B.Ed. degree in Natural Science. In the case of PK, his B.Ed. Degree in Biological Science was recognized as equivalent to B.Ed. Natural Science Degree of Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. In the case of AD, the GO stipulated that Double Main B.Ed. (Biological Science Education and Physical Science Education) degree obtained by her through regular mode was recognized as equivalent to B.Ed. Natural Science Degree of University of Calicut. It is a fact that these orders came much after the employment notifications were issued. But what we have to address in these appeals is as to whether the respective B.Ed. degrees of the appellants declared as equivalent to those of the concerned subjects as notified would operate from the dates of issue of the respective GOs or the same would relate back to the time when they obtained the degrees or at least to the date of the employment notification. The appellants have relied on a decision of a coordinate Bench in the case of Beena R. v. Kerala Public Service Commission and Ors. [(2017) 15 SCC 306]  . In that case, however, there was no dispute in the case of appellant that she possessed equivalent qualification of KGTE (English typewriting) but she did not have separate certificate as far as the computer wordprocessing was concerned. In this judgment, a coordinate Bench examined the implication of the expression produced. This authority does not aid the appellants.26. Note (v) of Clause 7 of the employment notification in the case PK and Note (vi) of Clause 7 of the employment notification in the case of AD required disclosure of the equivalency orders. A plain reading of the two GOs clearly reflect that their degrees were equivalent to the requisite qualifications contained in the eligibility criteria. In the case of Aarya K. Babu (supra), the disputed subject was recognized subsequently and introduced as part of the eligibility criteria. The principle of equivalency was not the main reasoning on the basis of which the said case was decided. The word equivalence in its plain meaning implies something which is equal to another. In the field of academics, application of the principle of equivalency in relation to degrees in two subjects would mean that they had the same standing or status all along, unless the official instrument according equivalency specifies a date from which the respective subjects would be treated as such, in express terms or by implication.27. Whether a GO would have prospective effect or relate back to an earlier date is a question which would have to be decided on the basis of text and tenor of the respective orders. The GOs which declared appellants degrees to be equivalent to those required as per the applicable notifications were not general orders but these two orders were person specific, relating to the two appellants. Once the GOs specifically declared that their B.Ed. degrees were equivalent to the designated subject which formed part of the employment notification, the GOs in substance have to be interpreted as clarificatory in nature and these cannot be construed to have had elevated the status or position of the degree they already had after the declaration was made in the GOs. The subject GOs only recognised an existing state of affairs so far as the nature of the degrees were concerned and did not create fresh value for the degrees which the appellants possessed. Though these equivalent orders were not in existence on the dates of issue of employment notifications, the GOs in substance recognize such status from the dates of obtaining such degrees. The GOs do not reveal any intervening circumstances which could be construed to imply that the respective degrees acquired the equivalent status because of such circumstances occurring subsequent to grant of their B.Ed. degrees. The aforesaid Notes to Clause 7 of the employment notifications postulated disclosure of the number and date of the orders on equivalence. But the GOs to which we have referred treat the equivalency to be operating on the dates of obtaining such degrees. Thus, the defect, if any, on disclosure requirement, shall stand cured on issue of the University orders followed by the GOs. The GOs also specify the context in which these were issued and refer to the appellants being included in the list of KPSC. This being the case, we do not think treating the appellants degrees as equivalent to those required under the applicable notifications by the GOs issued in the year 2019 would result in change in the rules of the game midway. At best, it can be termed as interpreting the rules when the game was on, figuratively speaking. Such a course would, in our opinion, be permissible. For this reason, we do not consider it necessary to deal with the different authorities cited on the principle of change in the rule of the game midway. We have opined that the appellants degrees in B.Ed. were equivalent to those required by the employment notifications and the equivalency orders were merely clarificatory in nature. For this reason, we do not think there was any fundamental breach of Notes (v) and (vi) of Clause 7 of the respective employment notifications in the cases of the appellants.28. Once we hold so, we do not think relief can be denied to these two appellants on the ground that other similarly situated persons may not have had applied for the same posts and were being put to disadvantage. In the case of Aarya K. Babu (supra), that course was adopted by a coordinate Bench as it was a new subject which was added to a subsisting range of subjects in the qualification criteria. The principle of service jurisprudence that a candidate must possess the requisite qualification for a post on the date of issue of employment notification cannot be applied in the appellants cases, as in our view, they possessed equivalent qualifications when they applied for the posts. The GOs only confirmed the equivalency of their B.Ed. degrees. In our opinion, they shall be deemed to have had the equivalent qualification on the relevant date. As we have held that the respective GOs only clarified or confirmed an existing status of certain educational qualifications, in absence of specific instance of similarly situated but unspecified number of persons having not applied for the posts would be unfair to the ones who apply for the same and undergo three levels of litigations to establish that they had equivalent degrees.