Case: Zora Singh Vs. J.M. Tandon &amp; Others

allotted to him in Samundri.9. The High Court turned down the first two contentious outright. So far as the third contention was concerned, the High Court, on assessment of the evidence led before it, rejected that contention also and dismissed the writ petition.10. for the appellant raised the very same contentions before us which were raised before the High Court. As regards the first contention the judgement of the Division Bench clearly holds that in its earlier judgement the High Court did not conclude the question of genuineness of the said two copies, and that it remanded the case to the Commissioner only because the Commissioner, while considering the appellants case, had not called for the record of the Deputy Secretary (Rehabilitation) containing the copies which, according to the appellant, were copies endorsed to him by the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur. This is quite clear from the extract from its earlier judgement quoted earlier. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention. The second contention also was rejected, and in our view rightly. The High Court was right in holding that even if there were, amongst the reasons given by the Commissioner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant and could be considered sufficient, the Commissioners conclusions, would not be vitiated. The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfation if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid, or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior court would not interfere if the finding can. be sustained on the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of suf ficiency of evidence. There was, in our view, legal evidence before the Commissioner upon which he was entitled to rest his finding that the copies relied on by the appellant were not genuine.That takes us to the third contention which is now based on the addi tional evidence adduced before the High Court. It is amply clear from that evidence that whenever a gallantry award is granted it would be entered in the sheet-roll maintained by the company in which the awardee is serving, and the fact of such an award having been granted would be announced in the Government Gazette. There was no such entry and no such announcement in the Gazette in the case of the appellant. But apart from the gallantry award the military authorities also used to give awards for meritorious service. Realising that the appellants case for a gallantry award was unsustainable, counsel shifted his case and sought to argue that the appellant had been the recipient of an award for meritorious service and was granted the said land in Samundri in lieu thereof.11. There are, however, two major difficulties against such a contention. The first is that no record was produced showing such an award for meritorious service although the appellant got an opportunity to lead additional evidence before the High Court and some of the witness examined by him were military officers belonging to his company. The second difficulty is that according to the evidence of Lachhman Singh, the Senior Records Officer of the Sikh Regimental Centre of Meerut, whenever an award is given for meritorious service an entry regarding it would be made in the sheet-roll maintained by the company and a medal only, and not, land, is awarded. He was emphatic that no order withing his knowledge was ever passed during theWorld War II granting land to persons for meritorious service. Further, no award for meritorious service could have been granted to the appellant. Rule 543 of the Regulationd produceed by Subedar Mohan Singh of the Sikh Regimental Centre at Meerut lays down that an award for meritorious service can begiven only if the person to whom it is to be awarded has served for at least 18 years. The award in such a case is in the form of an annuity and not land. The appellant had not put in 18 years of service but only service for 14 years. That being so, no such award for meritorious service could have been granted to him. He could not produce any record because he could not have been granted such an award in view of the fact that he had not put in the requisite qualifying service. Besides, his service could not have been regarded as meritorious as the record of his service produced by Subedar Mohan Singh revealed that he had been given punishments on as many as seven occasions, some of which were on charges such as theft, insubbordination, absentism, etc.12. On this evidence, as also on the evidence that was before the Commissioner, it is clear that the appellant was not and could not have been a recipient either of a gallantry award or an award for meritorious service. Nor could be have been granted any land at Samundri in respect of which he had claimed land here after partition. The Commissioner, therefore, was right in cancelling the allotment made in his favour as also the permanent rights acquired by him in consequence of that allotment. The High Court consequently was right in refusing to quash the Commissioners order and dismissing the writ petition.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]10. for the appellant raised the very same contentions before us which were raised before the HighCourt. As regards the first contention the judgement of the Division Bench clearly holds that in its earlier judgement the High Court did not conclude the question of genuineness of the said two copies, and that it remanded the case to the Commissioner only because the Commissioner, while considering the appellants case, had not called for the record of the Deputy Secretary (Rehabilitation) containing the copies which, according to the appellant, were copies endorsed to him by the Deputy Commissioner, Lyallpur. This is quite clear from the extract from its earlier judgement quoted earlier. There is, therefore, no substance in the first contention. The second contention also was rejected, and in our view rightly. The High Court was right in holding that even if there were, amongst the reasons given by the Commissioner, some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant and could be considered sufficient, the Commissioners conclusions, would not be vitiated. The principle that if some of the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion turn out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its decision would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the conclusion is arrived at not on assessment of objective facts or evidence, but on subjective satisfaction. The reason is that whereas in cases where the decision is based on subjective satisfation if some of the reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be impossible for a superior court to find out which of the reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid, or invalid, had brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where the conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a difficulty would not arise. If it is found that there was legal evidence before the Tribunal, even if some of it was irrelevant, a superior court would not interfere if the finding can. be sustained on the evidence. The reason is that in a writ petition for certiorari the superior court does not sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdiction, and therefore, does not enter into the question of suf ficiency of evidence. There was, in our view, legal evidence before the Commissioner upon which he was entitled to rest his finding that the copies relied on by the appellant were not genuine.That takes us to the third contention which is now based on the addi tional evidence adduced before the High Court. It is amply clear from that evidence that whenever a gallantry award is granted it would be entered in themaintained by the company in which the awardee is serving, and the fact of such an award having been granted would be announced in the Government Gazette. There was no such entry and no such announcement in the Gazette in the case of the appellant. But apart from the gallantry award the military authorities also used to give awards for meritorious service. Realisingthat the appellants case for a gallantry award was unsustainable, counsel shifted his case and sought to argue that the appellant had been the recipient of an award for meritorious service and was granted the said land in Samundri in lieu thereof.There are, however, two major difficulties against such a contention. The first is that no record was produced showing such an award for meritorious service although the appellant got an opportunity to lead additional evidence before the High Court and some of the witness examined by him were military officers belonging to his company. The second difficulty is that according to the evidence of Lachhman Singh, the Senior Records Officer of the Sikh Regimental Centre of Meerut, whenever an award is given for meritorious service an entry regarding it would be made in themaintained by the company and a medal only, and not, land, is awarded. He was emphatic that no order withing his knowledge was ever passed during theWorld War II granting land to persons for meritorious service. Further, no award for meritorious service could have been granted to the appellant. Rule 543 of the Regulationd produceed by Subedar Mohan Singh of the Sikh Regimental Centre at Meerut lays down that an award for meritorious service can begiven only if the person to whom it is to be awarded has served for at least 18 years. The award in such a case is in the form of an annuity and not land. The appellant had not put in 18 years of service but only service for 14 years. That being so, no such award for meritorious service could have been granted to him. He could not produce any record because he could not have been granted such an award in view of the fact that he had not put in the requisite qualifying service. Besides, his service could not have been regarded as meritorious as the record of his service produced by Subedar Mohan Singh revealed that he had been given punishments on as many as seven occasions, some of which were on charges such as theft, insubbordination, absentism, etc.12. On this evidence, as also on the evidence that was before the Commissioner, it is clear that the appellant was not and could not have been a recipient either of a gallantry award or an award for meritorious service. Nor could be have been granted any land at Samundri in respect of which he had claimed land here after partition. The Commissioner, therefore, was right in cancelling the allotment made in his favour as also the permanent rights acquired by him in consequence of that allotment. The High Court consequently was right in refusing to quash the Commissioners order and dismissing the writ petition.