Case: Madan Lal Vs. Bhai Anand Singh &amp; Others

Controller was not, strictly speaking, concerned at all with the question of ascertainment of the market value. The statutory power vested in Rent Controller by Sec. 13 of the Act is that of giving or not giving or conditionally giving a direction for the eviction of the tenant when certain statutory requirements are fulfilled. There was no objection by any party to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Controller to order eviction in the circumstances of a case in which the tenancy of premises demised had expired by efflux of time or to the entertainment of an application under Section 34 Arbitration Act. The lessors, by applying under Sec. 13 of the Act, had themselves invoked the jurisdiction of the Controller. And, the lessees had, by relying on Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act, asked for stay of proceedings only until the value of the building was ascertained and paid. Both sides thus proceeded on the assumption that the Rent Controller had jurisdiction, in the proceedings before him, to order eviction. The correctness of that assumption is not challenged by the appellant before us. 5. Learned Counsel for the appellant had sought to rely on Ethirajulu Naidu v. Ranganatham Chetty 72 Ind App 72 at p. 73 = (AIR 1945 PC 77) which was also cited before the High Court and the Rent Controller. In that case there was the following specific term in a lease of a limited duration."The lessee shall always and in any event be entitled to be paid the price of the superstructure built on the said plot of land before he surrenders possession of the land either on the expiry of the lease hereby granted or any other future lease or at any time. The price shall be fixed according to the market value of the buildings as at the time of ascertainment and payment". The Privy Council had held that this provision meant that possession was to be surrendered only on payment of the price of the building. The deed before us would, as we have already indicated, also have contained a similar provision if that had been the intention of the parties. We find that, in the lease deed under consideration, the condition that the lessor will have to pay 50% of the market value of the building imposes a liability upon the lessor only to pay the stipulated amount in any event.The use of the words "shall have to pay", in clause 6 of the deed before us, could not imply anything more than a future liability to pay. But, the time from which the rights of ownership, including that of actual physical possession, became exercisable was immediately upon the expiry of the tenancy itself and not in future when 50% of the market value was to be ascertained or paid.The case cited by learned Counsel for the appellant, where the terms of the lease were very obviously different, could not advance the lessees claim. 6. We may mention that the High Court had made an observation, in the course of recording its conclusions, which made it appear that what was made subject to the payment of 50% of the market value of the building was only the right of the lessor to sell the property. On a reading the judgment as a whole, it is evident that all that the High Court meant to convey was that the rights of ownership were subjected to a liability incurred by the lessor to pay the stipulated sum in any event. Any further liability to allow the lessee to retain possession until the sum payable was actually ascertained or any other event took place is not to be found here. The ascertainment of the exact amount of the liability undertaken was, in our opinion, a separable matter referable to arbitration. No sufficient ground has been made out for disturbing this interpretation of clause 6 of the deed by the High Court. 7. Another question argued by learned Counsel for the appellant was that the Respondents Lessors had themselves placed an interpretation upon the lease deed which ought, even if it does not affect our interpretation of the deed, to be taken into account by the Rent Controller before passing an order of eviction in the pending proceedings. The lessors had stated, in their application under Section 13 of the Act : "The petitioners have undertaken to abide by the terms of the lease agreed to between the parties relating to the compensation payable by them before getting actual possession of the picture house." No commas separate the term relating to liability to pay compensation from the right to get actual possession. 8. It may be that the application was rather loosely or inaccurately worded. We have not been shown any undertaking given to the Rent Controller, apart from the assertion quoted above from the application under Section 13 of the Act. And, no order of the Controller on any such supposed undertaking has been placed before us. The parties had hotly contested before the Controller as well as the High Court what the exact meaning of the clause under consideration was. It could, therefore, not be either expected or assumed that the application under Section 13 would contain an acceptance of the very interpretation put forward on behalf of the lessees and denied by the lessors. The language of the alleged undertaking was certainly not so clear and unequivocal as to lead to that inescapable inference. Moreover, no argument seems to have been advanced on the strength of this alleged undertaking before either the Controller or the High Court. We, therefore, refrain from deciding the question whether there was any such undertaking before the Controller which, quite apart from the contract embodied in the deed, should affect the discretion of the Controller in passing an eviction order. All we need say here is that the meaning of the terms of the lease, interpreted by us also, is not affected by the alleged undertaking.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]6. We may mention that the High Court had made an observation, in the course of recording its conclusions, which made it appear that what was made subject to the payment of 50% of the market value of the building was only the right of the lessor to sell the property. On a reading the judgment as a whole, it is evident that all that the High Court meant to convey was that the rights of ownership were subjected to a liability incurred by the lessor to pay the stipulated sum in any event. Any further liability to allow the lessee to retain possession until the sum payable was actually ascertained or any other event took place is not to be found here. The ascertainment of the exact amount of the liability undertaken was, in our opinion, a separable matter referable to arbitration. No sufficient ground has been made out for disturbing this interpretation of clause 6 of the deed by the High Court7. Another question argued by learned Counsel for the appellant was that the Respondents Lessors had themselves placed an interpretation upon the lease deed which ought, even if it does not affect our interpretation of the deed, to be taken into account by the Rent Controller before passing an order of eviction in the pending proceedings.The lessors had stated, in their application under Section 13 of the Act : "The petitioners have undertaken to abide by the terms of the lease agreed to between the parties relating to the compensation payable by them before getting actual possession of the picture house." No commas separate the term relating to liability to pay compensation from the right to get actual possession8. It may be that the application was rather loosely or inaccurately worded. We have not been shown any undertaking given to the Rent Controller, apart from the assertion quoted above from the application under Section 13 of the Act. And, no order of the Controller on any such supposed undertaking has been placed before us. The parties had hotly contested before the Controller as well as the High Court what the exact meaning of the clause under consideration was. It could, therefore, not be either expected or assumed that the application under Section 13 would contain an acceptance of the very interpretation put forward on behalf of the lessees and denied by the lessors. The language of the alleged undertaking was certainly not so clear and unequivocal as to lead to that inescapable inference. Moreover, no argument seems to have been advanced on the strength of this alleged undertaking before either the Controller or the High Court. We, therefore, refrain from deciding the question whether there was any such undertaking before the Controller which, quite apart from the contract embodied in the deed, should affect the discretion of the Controller in passing an eviction order. All we need say here is that the meaning of the terms of the lease, interpreted by us also, is not affected by the alleged undertaking.