Case: Sawarn Singh and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others

in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence, at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.14. Now in the case before us, as will be apparent from the passage extracted earlier from the order of the Special Collector, the finding in question was a finding of fact arrived at by him after an appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence on record. His finding that for the year 1952-53, Rattan Singh s/o Dalip Singh entered in the khasra girdawari as a tenant of the land was a misdescription of Rattan Singh son of Isher Singh could not be said to be patently wrong. According to the Collector, the tenancy of Rattan Singh son of Isher Singh continued without a break from 1948 to 1961, although after his death, from 1953-54 onwards the tenancy was in the name of his sons, Jagga and Meet. The Collector found that for the year 1952-53, due to a clerical error, in the khasra girdawari, the name of Rattan Singhs father was shown as Dalip Singh, instead of Isher Singh. This mistake, according to the Special Collector, occurred because Dalip Singh was, according to the pedigree table on record, the real brother of Isher Singh, the father of Rattna Singh.15. Before the Collector, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that for the year 1952-53, the land in dispute was, in fact, cultivated by Rattan Singh s/o Gulzar Singh. This Gulzar Singh, though alive, was not examined. In any case, it was common ground that the parentage of Rattan Singh as entered in the khasra girdawari for the year 1952-53, was erroneous. This being the case, even on facts, the finding of the Special Collector that on April 15, 1953, Rattan Singh son of Isher Singh, the father of Jagga and Meet respondents, was in occupation of this land as a tenant, could not be said to be patently wrong, much less could it be a finding based on no evidence or on inadmissible evidence.16. According to the scheme of the Act, the Collector has to fix separately the permissible areas of the landowner as well as the tenants as on April 15, 1953. Accordingly, the Collector put the land in dispute in the permissible area of the tenant, Rattan Singh s/o Isher Singh, and excluded it from the surplus area of the landowner. Thus, the order of the Collector did not suffer from any error of law or of jurisdiction.17. The contention that some evidence was allowed to be tendered at the back of the appellant, does not appear to be tenable. According to Mr. Garg, the evidence which was let in this manner, was a copy of the khatauni, and the examination of the patwari after the case had been heard and reserved for orders. There is no reference to this khatauni in the order of the Special Collector which is not based on it. The patwari was obviously examined in the presence of the parties or their Counsel. Indeed, he is said to have been cross-examined by the parties including the appellants. This belated examination of the patwari did not prejudice the appellants or any other party.18. It is true that the Commissioner at the outset misconceived the real point in issue and wrongly assumed that the appellants were claiming as protected tenants. But from a reading of his order as a whole, it appears that he did examine the evidence on record and towards the end of his order in the penultimate paragraph, did advert though briefly to the real point for determination and concurred with the Collector, that Jagga was an old tenant and as such the areas under his tenancy had to be excluded from the surplus area of the landowner. In any case, the Financial Commissioner in revision discussed the matter in controversy with sufficient reference to the documentary and oral evidence on record, and came to a well-considered conclusion that the finding of the Collector as to the father of Jagga and Meet being an old tenant in occupation of the land in the crucial year 1952-53, was correct. He found no reason to disturb that concurrent finding of fact.19. In view of this, the deficiency or reference to some irrelevant matters in the order of the Commissioner, had not prejudiced the decision of the case on merits either at the appellate or revisional stage. There is authority for the proposition that where the order of a domestic tribunal makes reference to several grounds, some relevant and existent, and others irrelevant and non-existent, the order will be sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of irrelevant or non-existing grounds could not have affected the ultimate decision [see State of Maharashtra v. B. K. Takkamore (supra); State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (1963 Supp 1 SCR 648 : AIR 1963 SC 779 : (1963) 1 LLJ 239 )].20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there was no justification for interference with the impugned orders in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]14. Now in the case before us, as will be apparent from the passage extracted earlier from the order of the Special Collector, the finding in question was a finding of fact arrived at by him after an appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence on record. His finding that for the yearRattan Singh s/o Dalip Singh entered in the khasra girdawari as a tenant of the land was a misdescription of Rattan Singh son of Isher Singh could not be said to be patently wrong. According to the Collector, the tenancy of Rattan Singh son of Isher Singh continued without a break from 1948 to 1961, although after his death, fromonwards the tenancy was in the name of his sons, Jagga and Meet. The Collector found that for the yeardue to a clerical error, in the khasra girdawari, the name of Rattan Singhs father was shown as Dalip Singh, instead of Isher Singh. This mistake, according to the Special Collector, occurred because Dalip Singh was, according to the pedigree table on record, the real brother of Isher Singh, the father of Rattna Singh.15. Before the Collector, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that for the yearthe land in dispute was, in fact, cultivated by Rattan Singh s/o Gulzar Singh. This Gulzar Singh, though alive, was not examined. In any case, it was common ground that the parentage of Rattan Singh as entered in the khasra girdawari for the yearwas erroneous. This being the case, even on facts, the finding of the Special Collector that on April 15, 1953, Rattan Singh son of Isher Singh, the father of Jagga and Meet respondents, was in occupation of this land as a tenant, could not be said to be patently wrong, much less could it be a finding based on no evidence or on inadmissible evidence.16. According to the scheme of the Act, the Collector has to fix separately the permissible areas of the landowner as well as the tenants as on April 15, 1953. Accordingly, the Collector put the land in dispute in the permissible area of the tenant, Rattan Singh s/o Isher Singh, and excluded it from the surplus area of the landowner. Thus, the order of the Collector did not suffer from any error of law or of jurisdiction.17. The contention that some evidence was allowed to be tendered at the back of the appellant, does not appear to be tenable. Accordingto Mr. Garg, the evidence which was let in this manner, was a copy of the khatauni, and the examination of the patwari after the case had been heard and reserved for orders.There is no reference to this khatauni in the order of the Special Collector which is not based on it. The patwari was obviously examined in the presence of the parties or their Counsel. Indeed, he is said to have beenby the parties including the appellants. This belated examination of the patwari did not prejudice the appellants or any other party.18. It is true that the Commissioner at the outset misconceived the real point in issue and wrongly assumed that the appellants were claiming as protected tenants. But from a reading of his order as a whole, it appears that he did examine the evidence on record and towards the end of his order in the penultimate paragraph, did advert though briefly to the real point for determination and concurred with the Collector, that Jagga was an old tenant and as such the areas under his tenancy had to be excluded from the surplus area of the landowner. In any case, the Financial Commissioner in revision discussed the matter in controversy with sufficient reference to the documentary and oral evidence on record, and came to aconclusion that the finding of the Collector as to the father of Jagga and Meet being an old tenant in occupation of the land in the crucial yearwas correct. He found no reason to disturb that concurrent finding of fact.19. In view of this, the deficiency or reference to some irrelevant matters in the order of the Commissioner, had not prejudiced the decision of the case on merits either at the appellate or revisional stage. There is authority for the proposition that where the order of a domestic tribunal makes reference to several grounds, some relevant and existent, and others irrelevant andthe order will be sustained if the Court is satisfied that the authority would have passed the order on the basis of the relevant and existing grounds, and the exclusion of irrelevant orgrounds could not have affected the ultimate decision [see State of Maharashtra v. B. K. Takkamore (supra); State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra (1963 Supp 1 SCR 648 : AIR 1963 SC 779   : (1963) 1 LLJ 239  )].20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of opinion that the High Court was right in holding that there was no justification for interference with the impugned orders in the exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.