Case: JAGJIT SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

to the conclusion that soon before the death, the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassed for or in connection with demand for dowry. In this regard we have noticed that there is a material in the form of testimony of PW1 and PW3. The marriage between the accused-appellant and the deceased took place on 24.1.1998 and it survived only for a little over three (3) years. It is on 16.2.2001 that the deceased goes to the house of PW3, her elder sister, spent 5 to 7 minutes, according to the said witness, complained of cruelty or harassment by the accused and her own daughter was with her. On the same day, she goes to the PCO, phones her father PW1 and tells him about the harassment. PW4 the person working at the PCO has also stated that she was weeping and the she made a call. PW1 has spoken about the contents of the telephonic conversation namely, all the accused were maltreating and taunting her and that she was very much upset and the accused had thrown her out from their house with the daughter and that she will not be allowed to come back without a Maruti car or Rupees two lakhs. If he is to be believed (In fact, two courts have), this would amount to cruelty/harassment in connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, the law enjoins under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act drawing of the presumption that the accused has committed the dowry death. 27. Undoubtedly, the presumption is rebuttable at the hands of the accused by adducing evidence and discharging the reverse burden. Whether any such evidence in discharge with reverse burden has been successfully adduced and whether it has been considered, is the next question. The judgment of the trial Court would show that there is indeed a reference to the contents of the deposition of PW5, PW6 and PW8. 28. Power under Article 136 seemingly, transcends all limitations in regard to matters save where it is expressly excluded. However, by way of self imposed intrusions into such power, as also by way of deference to the scheme of the Constitution, the principles we have alluded to stand culled out. Apposite to the facts of this appeal, the following principles must inform us: 1. Credibility of witnesses as commended to Courts below is not ordinarily reappraised. 2. Is there misreading of evidence? 3. Is there any non-consideration of glaring inconsistency in the evidence which demolishes the prosecution’s case? 4. Are the findings inconsistent with the evidence? 5. Have the courts overlooked striking features in the evidence or is their failure to consider important piece of evidence? 6. Whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution fall short of the test of reliability and acceptability and it is therefore unsafe to act upon it? 29. The marriage took place on 24.1.1998. According to PW3 about 6 months after the marriage, demands were raised for dowry. Either a Maruti car or Rs.2 lakhs was the demand. There was physical cruelty according to PW1 father, and PW3 sister. In December, 2000 the deceased, meet both PW1 along with PW3 and complained about threats and beatings. The death took place in February, 2001. 30. The Troubling features - There is evidence, which establishes that the father of the appellant contributed to the continued higher education of the deceased. Is that compatible with treating his daughter-in-law with cruelty. The father-in-law stands acquitted by the trial Court. The mother-in-law even according to PW3 met her on 16.2.2001 and enquired about her daughter-in-law. PW3 told her that her sister was depressed and asked her to take her home. PW3 states that the deceased told her that on the night previous to 16.2.2001, the appellant had hurled abuse on her father and when she prevented the appellant from abusing her father, she was beaten even more. If this be true, indeed, it is cruelty near, in point of time and bearing a link proximate to the time of her death immediately thereafter. (The doctor has conducted post mortem on 28.2.2001. He has opined that the probable time which elapsed between death and post- mortem was about 12 days). This mean that the tragic death took place on the 16 th or 17 th of February, 2001. But PW1 does not depose a word about the telephone call made on the eve of 16.2.2001. There is evidence of PW3 that in their estimation the status of the appellant was lower and that they had represented that they had applied for an industrial connection and would start their own industry. That apart, Avtar Singh, the nephew of PW1, who is referred to by PW1, as having direct knowledge of certain aspects is not examined. 31. The trial Court has carefully discussed the two versions canvassed. The questions which we posed as troubling, most of them, was present in its mind. The High Court has also referred to the defence evidence including DW6 and DW8. 32. The trial Court, however, finds solace in rejecting the defence version on the score that it cannot be squared with the deceased visiting the home of PW3 on 16-02-2001, and it takes the view that she would have been the last person for her to visit. It is also found that the deceased did not go on being called by PW3. The trial Court had the advantage of watching the demeanor of the witnesses. We cannot hold that the view taken by the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court is not warranted as such by the materials on record. We cannot possibly hold that the view taken by the courts is manifestly perverse or that it is based on no evidence. Even if we are persuaded to take a different view as canvassed by the appellant we would not be justified in interfering. See the observations in Mst. Dalbir Kaurs case (supra). 33. The upshot of the above discussion is that we are not persuaded to interfere.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]12. We noticed that it was a case where the courts had acquitted all the accused for the offence under Sectionof the IPC.The Court noted that the case of the prosecution is that there is a demand for scooter and proceeded to hold inter alia as follows:18. Applying these principles to the instant case, we find that there is no evidence as to the demand of dowry or cruelty and that deceased Karamjit Kaur was subjected to dowry harassmentExcept the demand of scooter, there is nothing on record to substantiate the allegation of dowry demand. Assuming that there was demand of dowry, in our view, it can only be attributed to the husband Jagsir Singh who in all probability could have demanded the same for his use. In the absence of any evidence that the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowryby the appellants, the conviction of the appellants under SectionIPC cannot be sustained. The trial court and the High Court have not analysed the evidence in the light of the essential ingredients of SectionIPC and the conviction of the appellants under SectionIPC is liable to be set4. We have already noticed that the essential ingredients of SectionIPC as noticed by this Court in Major Singh & Another vs. State of Punjab (supra). Parliament has inserted Sectionin the Evidence Act. In order that the presumption therein has to be applied it must be established that soon before her death, such woman must have been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand of dowry. Upon this fact being established, undoubtedly, the court is mandated to assume that the person has indeed caused the dowry death as contemplated in SectionIPC. Therefore, the presumption cannot apply unless it is established that soon before her death, a woman has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry. The wordser death has also been considered in a large number of cases.In the perspective of aforesaid state of the law, two issues would arise. Whether there is material within the meaning of Sectionof the Evidence Act for the Court to have come to the conclusion that soon before the death, the deceased was treated with cruelty or harassed for or in connection with demand for dowry. In this regard we have noticed that there is a material in the form of testimony of PW1 and PW3. The marriage between theand the deceased took place on 24.1.1998 and it survived only for a little over three (3) years. It is on 16.2.2001 that the deceased goes to the house of PW3, her elder sister, spent 5 to 7 minutes, according to the said witness, complained of cruelty or harassment by the accused and her own daughter was with her. On the same day, she goes to the PCO, phones her father PW1 and tells him about the harassment. PW4 the person working at the PCO has also stated that she was weeping and the she made a call. PW1 has spoken about the contents of the telephonic conversation namely, all the accused were maltreating and taunting her and that she was very much upset and the accused had thrown her out from their house with the daughter and that she will not be allowed to come back without a Maruti car or Rupees two lakhs. If he is to be believed (In fact, two courts have), this would amount to cruelty/harassment in connection with demand for dowry. Therefore, the law enjoins under Sectionof the Evidence Act drawing of the presumption that the accused has committed the dowry death.The trial Court, however, finds solace in rejecting the defence version on the score that it cannot be squared with the deceased visiting the home of PW3 onand it takes the view that she would have been the last person for her to visit. It is also found that the deceased did not go on being called by PW3. The trial Court had the advantage of watching the demeanor of the witnesses. We cannot hold that the view taken by the trial Court as affirmed by the High Court is not warranted as such by the materials on record. We cannot possibly hold that the view taken by the courts is manifestly perverse or that it is based on no evidence. Even if we are persuaded to take a different view as canvassed by the appellant we would not be justified in interfering. See the observations in Mst. Dalbir