Case: Babulal Badriprasad Varma Vs. Surat Municipal Corpn.

said:"Here there is abundant evidence of waiver, and it is quite clear that a man may by his conduct waive a provision of an Act of Parliament intended for his benefit. The caveator was not brought into Court in any way until the caveat had lapsed. And now the applicant, after all these proceedings have been taken by him, after doubtless much expense has been incurred on the part of the caveator, and after lying by and hoping to get a judgment of the Court in his favour, asks the Court to do that which but for some reasons known to himself he might have asked the Court to do before any other step in the proceedings had been taken. I think he is altogether too late. It is to my mind a clear principle of equity, and I have no doubt there are abundant authorities on the point, that equity will interfere to prevent the machinery of an Act of Parliament being used by a person to defeat equities which he has himself raised, and to get rid of a waiver created by his own acts."The legal principle emerging from these decisions is also stated in Craies on Statute Law (6th Edn.) at page 369 as follows:"As a general rule, the conditions imposed by statutes which authorise legal proceedings are treated as being indispensable to giving the court jurisdiction. But if it appears that the statutory conditions were inserted by the legislature simply for the security or benefit of the parties to the action themselves, and that no public interests are involved, such conditions will not be considered as indispensable, and either party may waive them without affecting the jurisdiction of the court." [Emphasis supplied] Applying the above principles to the present case, it must be held that the benefit of notice provided under the Act and Rules being for the benefit of the Appellant in which no public interests are involved, he has waived the same. 34. Significantly, a similar conclusion was reached in the case of Krishna Bahadur v. Purna Theatre [(2004) 8 SCC 229] , though the principle was stated far more precisely, in the following terms: "9. The principle of waiver although is akin to the principle of estoppel; the difference between the two, however, is that whereas estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence; waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to assert a right for a consideration.10. A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions had been provided for by a statute subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein. Whenever waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the same to show that an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct." [Emphasis supplied] [See also Bank of India v. O.P. Swarnakar (2003) 2 SCC 721 ] 35. In Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel and Ors. [2006 (8) SCALE 631 ], this Court observed: "The matter may be considered from another angle. If the first respondent has expressly waived his right on the trade mark registered in the name of the appellant-Company, could he claim the said right indirectly? The answer to the said question must be rendered in the negative. It is well-settled that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The term Waiver has been described in the following words: "Waiver is the abandonment of a right in such a way that the other party is entitled to plead the abandonment by way of confession and avoidance if the right is thereafter asserted, and is either express or implied from conduct. A person who is entitled to rely on a stipulation, existing for his benefit alone, in a contract or of a statutory provision may waive it, and allow the contract or transaction to proceed as though the stipulation or provision did not exist. Waiver of this kind depends upon consent, and the fact that the other party has acted upon it is sufficient consideration It seems that, in general, where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, so as to alter his position, the party who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relationship as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him, but he must accept their legal relations subject to the qualification which he has himself so introduced, even though it is not supported in point of law by any consideration. [See 16 Halsburys Laws (4th edn) para 1471] " In this view of the matter, it may safely be stated that the appellant, through his conduct, has waived his right to an equitable remedy in the instant case. Such conduct precludes and operates as estoppel against him with respect to asserting a right over a portion of the acquired land in a situation where the scheme in question has attained finality following as a result of the appellants inaction. 36. Mr. Lalit submits that his client is ready and willing to pay some reasonable amount to the respondent No. 3 in whose favour plot No. 165 has been finally allotted. Issuance of any such direction, in our opinion, is legally impermissible.37. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in this case, no relief can be granted to the appellant. He may, however, take recourse to such remedy which is available with him in law including one by filing a suit or making a representation before the State.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]20. Appellant was a tenant in respect of plot No. 17/8. Plot No. 17/7 was not a plot contiguous thereto. They were separated not only by a road but also by various other plots.21. It is also not in dispute that the appellant filed an objection in regard to the draft scheme but did not eventually pursue the same. The draft scheme was approved. 867 sq. m. of land had been acquired for public purpose out of the said plot No. 17/8. While the proceedings relating to allotment of final plot were in progress, he even did not file any objection thereto. If he intended to claim any interest in a portion of plot No. 17/8 either for the purpose of obtaining compensation for acquisition of a part of the land or to continue to have possession over 200 sq. m. of land in plot No. 17/8, it was obligatory on his part to take part in the proceedings. Whether irrespective of Rule 26 of the Rules which prescribes for issuance of a general public notice, any special notice upon the appellant was required to be served by the State or by the authority, in our opinion, cannot be gone into by us in these proceedings for the first time. Validity of Rule 26 of the Rules had never been questioned. It had also not been contended that the said Rule is ultra vires Section 52 of the Act.A person may waive a right either expressly or by necessary implication. He may in a given case disentitle himself from obtaining an equitable relief particularly when he allows a thing to come to an irreversible situation.We have referred to the said decisions only to show that the requirements in regard to the manner of service of notice varies from statute to statute and there exists a difference between the Bombay Rules and the Rules.27. We are, however, not unmindful of the fact that a statute of town planning ex facie is not a statute for acquisition of a property. An owner of a plot is asked to part therewith only for providing for better facilities of which he would also be a beneficiary. Every step taken by the State does not involve application of the doctrine of eminent domain.We are, however, not oblivious that in a given situation, a question may also arise as to whether the restrictions imposed by a statute are reasonable or not.31. It is not a case where the State by its acts of omissions and commissions was unjustly enriching itself. It was a dispute between two private parties as regards the right to obtain final allotment; the principles underlying the same are not in dispute. What is in dispute is the distribution of quantum thereof between two competing claimants, viz., landlord and tenant. We do not mean to say that under no circumstances the appellant was entitled to allotment of a portion of the property or mandatory compensation in lieu thereof from the landlord. But, we intend to emphasise that he has lost his right to enforce the same in a public law forum. He has no enforceable claim against the State at this juncture. He may pursue his claim only against the respondent No. 4 in an appropriate proceedings wherein for certain purposes the State or the authorities may also be impleaded as a party. Even if he had a claim he would be deemed to have waived the same for the reasons stated hereinafter.32. It is not in dispute that:(a) Appellant although filed an objection with regard to the draft scheme, did not choose to pursue it.(b) He did not file objections for re-allotment and did not participate in the proceedings following acquisition instituted by the authorities under the Act.In view of the above, the issue is whether it was open to him to assert his purported right to special notice in respect of the final allotment in the instant case given the fact that he did not pursue his objections to the draft scheme and subsequently did not object/ participate during the proceedings for re-allotment.33. It has been noticed by us hereinbefore that under Rule 26 of the Rules applicable in the instant case, as distinguished from the Bombay Rules (wherein special notice is required), no special notice is mandatorily required to be served. Assuming, however, that it was obligatory for the State to issue notice to the appellant, the question is whether the principle of waiver precludes him from claiming equitable relief in this case due to his earlier conduct which allowed the entire process of acquisition and allotment to become final. We are of the opinion that even if he had any such right, he waived the same.Mr. Lalit submits that his client is ready and willing to pay some reasonable amount to the respondent No. 3 in whose favour plot No. 165 has been finally allotted. Issuance of any such direction, in our opinion, is legally impermissible.37. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in this case, no relief can be granted to the appellant. He may, however, take recourse to such remedy which is available with him in law including one by filing a suit or making a representation before the