Case: Nawab Usmanali Khan Vs. Sagar Mal

Ruler and his family including expenses of his residence, marriage and other ceremonies and neither be increased nor reduced for any reason whatsoever. Article XI (3) provided that the Rajpramukh would cause the amount to be paid to the Ruler in four equal instalments at the beginning of each quarter in advance. Article XI (4) provided that the amount would be free of all taxes whether imposed by the Government of the United States or by the Government of India. Article XIII of the Covenant secured to the Ruler of each Covenanting State all personal Privileges, dignities and titles then enjoyed by them. Article XIV guaranteed the succession, according to law and custom, to the gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal rights, privileges, dignities and titles of the Ruler. The Covenant was signed by all the Rulers of the Covenanting States. At the foot of the Covenant, it was Stated that "The Government of India hereby concur in the above Covenant and guarantee all its provisions." In confirmation of this consent and guarantee, the Covenant was signed by a Secretary to the Government of India. 10. On the coming into force of the Constitution of India the terrtories of Madhya Bharat became an integral part of India. Article 291 of the Constitution provide:"Where under any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of this Constitution, the payment of any sums, free of tax, has been guaranteed or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India to any Ruler of such State as privy purse. (a) such sums shall be charged on, and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India; and (b) the sums so paid to any Ruler shall be exempt from all taxes on income." In view of the guarantee by the Government of the Dominion of India to the Ruler of Jaora State in the covenant for the formation of the United State of Madhya Bharat the payment of the sums specified in the covenant as privy purse to the Ruler because charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, and became payable to him free from all taxes no income. Article 362 Provided that in the exercise of the legislative and executive powers. due regard shall be had to the guarantee given in any such covenant as is referred to in Art. 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. Article 363 (1) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution, the Court would have no jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision in any covenant entered into by any Ruler of an Indian State to which the Government of the Dominion of India was a party, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of the Constitution relating to any such covenant. Article 366 (22) provides that the expression "Ruler" in relation to an Indian State means a person by whom the covenant referred to in Art. 291(1) was entered into and who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Ruler of the State, and includes any person who for the time being is recognised by the President "as the successor of such Ruler. 11. Now, the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Madhya Bharat States was a treaty entered into by the Rulers of independent States by which they gave up their soveignty over their respective territories and vested it in the new United State of Madhya Bharat. The Covenant was an act of State, and any violation of its terms cannot form the subject of any action in any municipal courts. The Guarantee given by the Government of India was in the nature of a treaty obligation contracted with the sovereign Rulers of Indian States and cannot be enforced by action in municipal courts. Its sanction is political and not legal. On the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the guarantee for the payment of periodical sums as privy purse is continued by Act. 291 of the Constitution, but its essential periodical character is preserved by Art. 363 of the Constitution, and the obligation under this guarantee cannot be enforced in any municipal court. Moreover, if the President refuses to recognise the person by whom the Covenant was entered into as the Ruler of the State, he would not be entitled to the amount payable privy purse under Art. 291. Now, the periodical payment of money by the Government to a Ruler of a former Indian State as privy purse all political considerations and under political sanctions and not under a right legally enforceable in any municipal court is strictly a political pension within the meaning of S. 60 (1)(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The use of the expression "privy purse instead of the expression pension" is due to historical reasons. The privy purse satisfies all the essential characteristies of a political pension, and as such, is protected from execution under S. 60(1)(g), Code Civil Procedure. Moreover, an amount of the privy purse receivable from the Government cannot be said to be a debt or other property over which or the proceeds of which he has disposing power within the main part of S. 60 (1), Code of Civil Procedure. It follows that the third contention of Mr. Pathak must be accepted, and it must be held that the amounts of the privy purse are not liable to attachment or sale in execution of the respondents decree. The third contended is raised, in Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 arising out of Appeal No. 33 of 1953. It follows that Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 must be allowed. All the contentions raised in Civil Appeal No. 767 of 1963 arising from Appeal Nos. 81 and 82 of 1957 fail, and according this appeal must be dismissed.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]5a. The first contention raised by Mr. Pathank must be rejected. The award stated that the existing documents relating to debts obtained on lands would remain as before, and they would remain as securities till payment of the debts and the appellants would have no right to transfer the land. This portion of the award stated an existing fact. It did not create, or of its own force declare any interest in any immoveable property. Consequently, the document did not come within the purview of Section 17 ofthe Indian Registration Act, 1908, and was not required to be registered6. The second contention of Mr. Pathak raises question of construction of Ss. 86 and 87 B of theCode of CivilProcedure.By reason of S. 86 (1) read with S. 87B, no Ruler of any former Indian State "may be sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central Government."Section 86 (2) provides that the requisite consent may be given with respect to a specified suit or with respect to several specified suits or with respect to all suits of any specified class or classes. Section 86 plainly deals with a special class of suits, and this conclusion is reinforced by the heading of Part IV, Suits in Particular Cases, in which Ss. 86 and 87B appear. Order 4, R. 1,Code of CivilProcedureprovides that every suit shall be instituted by presenting a plaint to the Court or such other officer as it appoints in this behalf. In the context of S. 176 ofthe Government of India Act, 1935, Mahajan and Mukherjea, JJ. observed that the expression "sue" means the "enforcement of a claim or civil right by means of legal proceedings, see Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, 1950 SCR 621   at pp. 661, 697, : (AIR 1950 SC 222   at pp. 236, 249). But in the context of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Lord Russell of Killowen observed in Hansraj Gupta v. Officcial Liquidator, Dehra Dun Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co., 60 Ind App 13 at p. 19: (AIR 1933 PC 63   at P. 64):"The word suit ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint."And construing S. 86 of theCode of Civil, Shah, J. speaking on behalf of this Court observed in Bhagwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1964 SC 444   at pp. 445, 446;The appellant is recognised under Article 866(22) of the Constitution as a Ruler of an Indian State, but S. 86 in terms protects a Ruler from being sued and not against the institution of any other proceeding which is not in the nature of a suit. A proceeding which does not commence with a plaint or petition in the nature of plaint, or where the claim is not in respect of dispute ordinarily triable in a Civil Court, would prima facie not be regarded as falling within S. 86,7. Now, a proceeding under S. 14 read with S. 17 of the Indian Arbitration. Act, 1940 for the passing of a judgment and decree on an award does not commence with a plaint or a petition in the nature of a plaint, and cannot be regarded as a suit and the parties to whom the notice of the filing of the award is given under S. 14(2) cannot be regarded as "sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit, within the meaning of S. 86 (1) read with S. 87B,Code of Civil. Accordingly, the institution of this proceeding against the Ruler of a former Indian State is not barred by S. 86(1) read with S. 87B. Section 141,Code of CivilProceduredoes not attract the provisions of Section 86(1) read with S. 87B to the proceedings under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, Section 86(1) read with S. 87B confers upon the Ruler of former Indian States substantive rights of immunity from suits. Section 141 makes upplicable to other proceedings only those provisions of the Code which deal with procedure and not those which deal with substantive rights. Nor does S. 41(a) of the Indian Arbitration Act 1940 carry the matter any further. By that section, the provisions of theCode of Civil, 1908 are made applicable to all proceeding before the Court under the Act. Now, by its own language S. 86(1) applies to, and S. 141,Code of CivilProceduredoes not attract the provisions of S. 86(1) to proceedings other than suits. Accordingly, by the conjoint application of S. 41(a) of the Indian Arbitration Act and Ss. 86(1) and 141 of theCode of Civil, the provisions of S.86 (1) are not attracted to a proceeding under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940. It follows that the Court was competent to entertain the proceedings under S. 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and to pass a decree against the appellant in those proceedings, though no consent to the institution of those proceedings had been given by the Central Government. A sovereign foreign State and a Ruler of such State may enjoy a winder immunity from legal proceedings other than suits under the rules of International Law recognised by our Courts. but the appellant is not now a Ruler of a sovereign State, and cannot claim immunity from proceedings other than suits.The second contention of Mr. Pathak must, therefore, be rejected11. Now, the Covenant entered into by the Rulers of Madhya Bharat States was a treaty entered into by the Rulers of independent States by which they gave up their soveignty over their respective territories and vested it in the new United State of Madhya Bharat. The Covenant was an act of State, and any violation of its terms cannot form the subject of any action in any municipal courts. The Guarantee given by the Government of India was in the nature of a treaty obligation contracted with the sovereign Rulers of Indian States and cannot be enforced by action in municipal courts. Its sanction is political and not legal. On the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the guarantee for the payment of periodical sums as privy purse is continued by Act. 291 of the Constitution, but its essential periodical character is preserved by Art. 363 of the Constitution, and the obligation under this guarantee cannot be enforced in any municipal court. Moreover, if the President refuses to recognise the person by whom the Covenant was entered into as the Ruler of the State, he would not be entitled to the amount payable privy purse under Art. 291. Now, the periodical payment of money by the Government to a Ruler of a former Indian State as privy purse all political considerations and under political sanctions and not under a right legally enforceable in any municipal court is strictly a political pension within the meaning of S. 60 (1)(g) of theCode of Civil. The use of the expression "privy purse instead of the expression pension" is due to historical reasons. The privy purse satisfies all the essential characteristies of a political pension, and as such, is protected from execution under S. 60(1)(g), Code Civil. Moreover,an amount of the privy purse receivable from the Government cannot be said to be a debt or other property over which or the proceeds of which he has disposing power within the main part of S. 60 (1),Code of Civil. It follows that the third contention of Mr. Pathak must be accepted, and it must be held that the amounts of the privy purse are not liable to attachment or sale in execution of the respondents decree. The third contended is raised, in Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 arising out of Appeal No. 33 of 1953. It follows that Civil Appeal No. 568 of 1963 must be allowed. All the contentions raised in Civil Appeal No. 767 of 1963 arising from Appeal Nos. 81 and 82 of 1957 fail, and according this appeal must be dismissed.