Case: Smt. Rukmanibai Gupta Vs. Collector Jabalpur and Others

payment of rent or royalty payable under the lease deed. Therefore, Clause 15 read as a whole provides for referring future disputes to the arbitration of the Governor. Arbitration agreement is not required to be in any particular form. What is required to be ascertained is whether the parties have agreed that if disputes arise between them in respect of the subject-matter of contract such dispute shall be referred to arbitration, then such an arrangement would spell out an arbitration agreement, a passage from RUSSELL ON ARBITRATION, 19th Edn., p. 59, may be referred to with advantageIf it appears from the terms of the agreement by which a matter is submitted to a persons decision that the intention of the parties was that he should hold an inquiry in the nature of a judicial inquiry and hear the respective case of the parties and decide upon evidence laid before him, then the case is one of an arbitration In the clause under discussion there is a provision for referring the disputes to the lessor and the decision of the lessor is made final. On its true construction it spells out an arbitration agreement 7. A feeble attempt was made to contend that Clause 15 provides a departmental appeal but does not provide for dispute by arbitration. There was no question of providing for an appellate forum by the terms of the lease. On the contrary, the language of Clause 15 leaves no room for doubt that it spell out an arbitration agreement. In this connection reference may be made to Chief Conservator of Forests v. Rattan Singh (1966 Supp SCR 158 : AIR 1967 SC 166 ), where an identical clause in a forest contract entered into between the forest contractor and the governor of Madhya Pradesh came in for consideration. Relevant clause was as under 9. In the event of any doubt or dispute arising between the parties as to the interpretation of any or the conditions of this contract or as to the performance or breach thereof, the matter shall be referred to the Chief Conservator of Forests, Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, whose decision shall be final and bindings on the parties hereto This Court, interpreting this clause, held that it spells out an arbitration agreement and it confers authority on the Chief Conservator of Forests to adjudicate upon disputes, inter alia, as to the performance or breach of the contract. Apart from this, appellant herself has unreservedly accepted Clause 15 spelling out an arbitration agreement. In para 10 of her submission to respondent 4 it was stated as under 10. That as laid down in Clause 15 of lease deed read with Rule 50(XVI) of the Mining Manual substantial dispute and difference arise touching the construction of these presents of lease deed on the question of payment of royalty. The matter in dispute is, therefore, being referred to State Government for decision We, therefore, need not dilate on this aspect any more and hold in agreement with the High Court that Clause 15 spells out an arbitration agreement 8. There is no dispute between the parties that adequate hearing was giving to the appellant. Appellant was represented before respondent 4, the arbitrator, by her Advocate Shri L. V. Lele and her agent Shri L. P. Choubey. After noting the admission and objection raised on behalf of the appellant by her advocate and agent, fresh calculation were called for by respondent 4 from respondent 6 the officer in charge of royalty accounts. In fact, the dispute was considerably narrowed down because appellant through her advocate in terms admitted that there was no dispute about the calculations of royalty for the period from January 1, 1958 to June 30, 1961, and the dispute was only with regard to the calculations from July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1961. Some attempt was made by the appellant to go back upon the admission recorded in the order made by respondent 4, but the High Court discouraged the attempt. And with regard to the difference in the calculations were called for from the Mining Officer but thereafter a further hearing was given to the appellant and an award was made. Therefore, the arbitrator has acted in accordance with the principles of natural justice 9. If respondent 4 was an arbitrator and his decision an award, the next question is whether such an award can be questioned by way of a writ petition in the High Court 10. Arbitration Act, 11940, is a self-contained and exhaustive code. It provides for filing arbitration agreement to the jurisdiction of court, appointment and removal of arbitrator by court, making award a rule of court, remitting or setting aside an award, it can be questioned under Section 33. Section 32 bars a suit on any ground whatsoever for contesting an award and further provides that no award shall be enforced, set aside, amended, modified or in any way affected otherwise than as provided in the Arbitration Act itself. Thus, Arbitration Act, 1940, is a self-contained exhaustive code. Relief sought by the appellant by involving extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 could have been obtained by proceeding in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act. In this situation, if the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition, no exception can be taken to it. Further the indenture of lease constitutes a contract between the parties. Right to excavate limestone from leased area and obligation to pay royalty under the relevant Minor Mineral Rules arise from the contract. The contract provided for resolution of dispute arising out of the carrying out of contract. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. (See Har Shankar v. Dy. Excise & Taxation Commissioner (1975 3 SCR 254 : 1975 1 SCC 737 : 1975 Tax LR 1569)) 11. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, rightly declined to entertain the writ petition.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]A quarry lease is granted under the relevant Minor Mineral Rules by the State Government. The State is thus the lessor and the one who takes the quarry lease is the lessee. As required by Article 299 of the Constitution, all contracts made in exercise of the executive power of the State shall be expressed to be made by the Governor of the State and shall be executed on behalf of the Governor by such accordingly executed. It is thus a contract. This contract incorporates Clause 15 which we have extracted hereinaboveClause 15 provides that any doubt, difference or dispute, arising after the execution of the lease deed touching the construction of the terms of the lease deed or anything therein contained or any matter or things connected with the said lands or the working org thereof or the amount or payment of any rent or royalty reserved or made payable thereunder, the matter in difference shall be decided by the lessor whose decision shall be final. The reference has to be made to the lessor and the lessor is the Governor. His decision declared final by the terms of the contract. His decision has to be in respect of a dispute or difference that may arise either touching the construction of the terms of the lease deed or disputes or difference arising out the working org of the lease or any dispute about the payment of rent or royalty payable under the lease deed. Therefore, Clause 15 read as a whole provides for referring future disputes to the arbitration of the GovernorIn the clause under discussion there is a provision for referring the disputes to the lessor and the decision of the lessor is made final. On its true construction it spells out an arbitration agreementApart from this, appellant herself has unreservedly accepted Clause 15 spelling out an arbitration agreementWe, therefore, need not dilate on this aspect any more and hold in agreement with the High Court that Clause 15 spells out an arbitration agreementIn fact, the dispute was considerably narrowed down because appellant through her advocate in terms admitted that there was no dispute about the calculations of royalty for the period from January 1, 1958 to June 30, 1961, and the dispute was only with regard to the calculations from July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1961. Some attempt was made by the appellant to go back upon the admission recorded in the order made by respondent 4, but the High Court discouraged the attempt. And with regard to the difference in the calculations were called for from the Mining Officer but thereafter a further hearing was given to the appellant and an award was made. Therefore, the arbitrator has acted in accordance with the principles of natural justiceIn fact, the dispute was considerably narrowed down because appellant through her advocate in terms admitted that there was no dispute about the calculations of royalty for the period from January 1, 1958 to June 30, 1961, and the dispute was only with regard to the calculations from July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1961. Some attempt was made by the appellant to go back upon the admission recorded in the order made by respondent 4, but the High Court discouraged the attempt. And with regard to the difference in the calculations were called for from the Mining Officer but thereafter a further hearing was given to the appellant and an award was made. Therefore, the arbitrator has acted in accordance with the principles of natural justice11. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, rightly declined to entertain the writ petition.