Case: M/S MAYAVTI TRADING PVT. LTD Vs. PRADYUAT BED MURMAN

also apply to sections 8 and 45 of the Act – since the scope and nature of judicial intervention should not change upon whether a party (intending to defeat the arbitration agreement) refuses to appoint an arbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement, or moves a proceeding before a judicial authority in the face of such an arbitration agreement. 32. In relation to the nature of intervention, the exposition of the law is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Shin Etsu Chemicals Co. Ltd. v. Aksh Optifibre, (2005) 7 SCC 234 , (in the context of section 45 of the Act), where the Supreme Court has ruled in favour of looking at the issues/controversy only prima facie. 33. It is in this context, the Commission has recommended amendments to sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The scope of the judicial intervention is only restricted to situations where the Court/Judicial Authority finds that the arbitration agreement does not exist or is null and void. In so far as the nature of intervention is concerned, it is recommended that in the event the Court/Judicial Authority is prima facie satisfied against the argument challenging the arbitration agreement, it shall appoint the arbitrator and/or refer the parties to arbitration, as the case may be. The amendment envisages that the judicial authority shall not refer the parties to arbitration only if it finds that there does not exist an arbitration agreement or that it is null and void. If the judicial authority is of the opinion that prima facie the arbitration agreement exists, then it shall refer the dispute to arbitration, and leave the existence of the arbitration agreement to be finally determined by the arbitral tribunal. However, if the judicial authority concludes that the agreement does not exist, then the conclusion will be final and not prima facie. The amendment also envisages that there shall be a conclusive determination as to whether the arbitration agreement is null and void. In the event that the judicial authority refers the dispute to arbitration and/or appoints an arbitrator, under sections 8 and 11 respectively, such a decision will be final and non-appealable. An appeal can be maintained under section 37 only in the event of refusal to refer parties to arbitration, or refusal to appoint an arbitrator.? 18. Pursuant to the Law Commission recommendations, Section 11(6A) was introduced first by Ordinance and then by the Amendment Act, 2015. The Statement of Objects and Reasons which were appended to the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015 which introduced the Amendment Act, 2015 read as follows: STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS xxx xxx xxx 6. It is proposed to introduce the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Bill, 2015, to replace the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, which inter alia, provides for the following, namely:- (i) to amend the definition of ?Court? to provide that in the case of international commercial arbitrations, the Court should be the High Court; (ii) to ensure that an Indian Court can exercise jurisdiction to grant interim measures, etc., even where the seat of the arbitration is outside India; (iii) an application for appointment of an arbitrator shall be disposed of by the High Court or Supreme Court, as the case may be, as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour should be made to dispose of the matter within a period of sixty days; (iv) to provide that while considering any application for appointment of arbitrator, the High Court or the Supreme Court shall examine the existence of a prima facie arbitration agreement and not other issues; (v) to provide that the arbitral tribunal shall make its award within a period of twelve months from the date it enters upon the reference and that the parties may, however, extend such period up to six months, beyond which period any extension can only be granted by the Court, on sufficient cause; (vi) to provide that a model fee Schedule on the basis of which High Courts may frame rules for the purpose of determination of fees of arbitral tribunal, where a High Court appoints arbitrator in terms of section 11 of the Act; (vii) to provide that the parties to dispute may at any stage agree in writing that their dispute be resolved through fast track procedure and the award in such cases shall be made within a period of six months; (viii) to provide for neutrality of arbitrators, when a person is approached in connection with possible appointment as an arbitrator; (ix) to provide that application to challenge the award is to be disposed of by the Court within one year. 7. The amendments proposed in the Bill will ensure that arbitration process becomes more user-friendly, cost effective and lead to expeditious disposal of cases. xxx xxx xxx? 19. A reading of the Law Commission Report, together with the Statement of Objects and Reasons, shows that the Law Commission felt that the judgments in SBP & Co. (supra) and Boghara Polyfab (supra) required a relook, as a result of which, so far as Section 11 is concerned, the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under Section 11(4) to 11(6) is to confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and leave all other preliminary issues to be decided by the arbitrator.? 10. This being the position, it is clear that the law prior to the 2015 Amendment that has been laid down by this Court, which would have included going into whether accord and satisfaction has taken place, has now been legislatively overruled. This being the position, it is difficult to agree with the reasoning contained in the aforesaid judgment as Section 11(6A) is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been laid down in the judgment Duro Felguera, S.A. (supra) – see paras 48 & 59.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]Section 3 of the amendment Act of 2019 insofar as it pertains to this omission has not yet been brought into force. The omission is pursuant to a High Level Committee Review regarding institutionalization of arbitration in India, headed by Justice B. N. Srikrishna. The Report given by this Committee is dated 30 th July, 2017. The omission of the sub-section is not so as to resuscitate the law that was prevailing prior to the amendment Act ofit can be seen that after the amendment Act of 2019, Section 11(6A) has been omitted because appointment of arbitrators is to be done institutionally, in which case the Supreme Court or the High Court under the old statutory regime are no longer required to appoint arbitrators and consequently to determine whether an arbitration agreement exists.Prior to Section 11(6A), this Court in several judgments beginning with SBP & Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Anr. (2005) 8 SCC 618  has held that at the stage of a Section 11(6) application being filed, the Court need not merely confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement but could also go into certain preliminary questions such as stale claims, accord and satisfaction having been reached etc.This being the position, it is clear that the law prior to the 2015 Amendment that has been laid down by this Court, which would have included going into whether accord and satisfaction has taken place, has now been legislatively overruled. This being the position, it is difficult to agree with the reasoning contained in the aforesaid judgment as Section 11(6A) is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been laid down in the judgment Duro Felguera, S.A. (supra) – see paras 48 & 59.On the facts of this case, we do not propose to interfere with the impugned decision of 12.03.2019 and, therefore, do not find it necessary to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.n the facts of this case, we do not propose to interfere with the impugned decision of 12.03.2019 and, therefore, do not find it necessary to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.