Case: Sri Sarangadevar Peria Matam And Another Vs. Ramaswamy Gounder (Dead) By Legal Representatives

rights by the appointment of a receiver having authority to sue on its behalf, or by the institution of a suit in its name by a next friend appointed by the Court. With due diligence, the math or those interested in it may avoid the running of time. The running of limitation against the math under Art. 144 is not suspended by the absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi; clearly, limitation would run against it where it is managed by a de facto mathadhipathi. See Vithalbowa v. Narayan Daji, (1893) ILR 18 Bom 507 at p. 511, and we think it would run equally if there is neither a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi. 7. A mathadhipathi is the manager and custodian of the institution. See Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, 48 Ind App 302 at pp. 311, 315: (AIR 1922 PC 123 at pp. 126, 128).The office carries with it the right to manage and possess the endowed properties on behalf of the math and the right to sue on its behalf for the protection of those properties. During the tenure of his office, the mathadhipathi has also large beneficial interests in the math properties, see Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Srirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005 at pp. 1018-1020: (AIR 1954 SC 282 at pp. 288-289). But by virtue of his office, he can possess and enjoy only such properties as belong to the math. If the title of the math to any property is extinguished by adverse possession, the rights of all beneficiaries of the math in the property are also extinguished. On his appointment, the mathadhipathi acquires no right to recover property which no longer to the math. If before his appointment limitation under Art. 144 has commenced to run against the math, the appointment does not give either the math or the mathadhipathi a new right of suit or a fresh starting point of limitation under that Article for recovery of the property.In the instant case, the present mathadhipathi was elected in 1939 when the title of the math to the suit lands was already extinguished by adverse possession. By his election in 1939 the present mathadhipathi could not acquire the right to possess and enjoy or to recover properties which no longer belonged to the math. 8. In Jagadindra Roys case, (1904) ILT 32 Cal 129 (PC), the dispossession of the idols lands took place in April 1876. The only shebait of the idol was then a minor, and he sued for recovery of the lands in October 1889 within three years of his attaining majority. The Privy Council held that the plaintiff being a minor at the commencement of the period of limitation was entitled to the benefit of S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (Act XV of 1877) corresponding to S. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and was entitled to institute the suit within three years of his coming of age. This decision created an anomaly, for, as pointed out by Page, J. in ILR 51 Cal 953 at p. 958: (AIR 1925 Cal 140 at pp. 142-143), in giving the benefit of S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 to the shebait, the Privy Council proceeded on the footing that the right to sue for possession is to be divorced from the proprietary right to the property which is vested in the idol. We do not express any opinion one way or the other on the correctness of Jagadindra Nath Roys case, (1904) ILR 32 Cal 129 (PC). For the purposes of this case, it is sufficient to say that we are not inclined to extend the principle of that case. In that case, at the commencement of the period of limitation there was a shebait in existence entitled to sue on behalf of the idol, and on the institution of the suit he successfully claimed that as the person entitled to institute the suit at the time from which the period is to be reckoned, he should get the benefit of S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. In the present case, there was no mathadhipathi in existence in 1915 when limitation commenced to run. Nor is there any question of the minority of a mathadhipathi entitled to sue in 1915 or of applying S. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. 9. For these reasons, we hold that the time under Art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 commenced to run in 1915 on the death of the mathadhipathi, who granted the lease, and the absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi did not prevent the running of time under Art. 144.We therefore, agree with the answer given by the majority of the Judges to the third question referred to the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Venkateswaras case, ILR (1941) Mad 599 at pp. 614-615, 633-634: (AIR 1941 Mad 449 at pp. 455-456, 461). We express no opinion on the interpretation of Art. 134-B of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or Art. 96 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.Under Art. 96 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, the starting point of limitation in such a case would be the date of the appointment of the plaintiff as manager of the endowment, but this Article cannot be considered to be a legislative recognition of the law existing before 1929. 10. We hold that by the operation of Art. 144 read with S. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 the title of the math to the suit lands became extinguished in 1927, and the plaintiff acquired title to the lands by prescription. He continued in possession of the lands until January, 1950. It has been found that in January, 1950 he voluntarily delivered possession of the lands to the math, such delivery of possession did not transfer any title to the math. The suit was instituted in 1954 and is well within time.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]6. We are inclined to accept the respondents contention. Under Art. 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, limitation for a suit by a math or by any person representing it for possession of immovable properties belonging to it runs from the time when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff. The math is the owner of the endowed property. Like an idol, the math is a juristic person having the power of acquiring owning and possessing properties and having the capacity of suing and being sued. Being an ideal person, it must of necessity act in relation to its temporal affairs through human agency. See Babajirao v. Luxmandas, (1904) ILR 28 Bom 215 (223). It may acquire property by prescription and may likewise lose property by adverse possession. If the math while in possession of its property is dispossessed to if the possession of a stranger becomes adverse, it suffers an injury and has the right to sue for the recovery of the property. If there is a legally appointed mathadhipathi, he may institute the suit on its behalf; if not, the de facto mathadhipathi may do so, see Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti, 62 Ind App 47 at p. 51: (AIR 1925 PC 44 at p. 46), and where, necessary, a disciple or other beneficiary of the math may take steps for vindicating its legal rights by the appointment of a receiver having authority to sue on its behalf, or by the institution of a suit in its name by a next friend appointed by the Court. With due diligence, the math or those interested in it may avoid the running of time. The running of limitation against the math under Art. 144 is not suspended by the absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi; clearly, limitation would run against it where it is managed by a de facto mathadhipathi. See Vithalbowa v. Narayan Daji, (1893) ILR 18 Bom 507 at p. 511, and we think it would run equally if there is neither a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi7. A mathadhipathi is the manager and custodian of the institution. See Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, 48 Ind App 302 at pp. 311, 315: (AIR 1922 PC 123 at pp. 126, 128).The office carries with it the right to manage and possess the endowed properties on behalf of the math and the right to sue on its behalf for the protection of those properties. During the tenure of his office, the mathadhipathi has also large beneficial interests in the math properties, see Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Srirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005     at pp. 1018-1020: (AIR 1954 SC 282   at pp. 288-289). But by virtue of his office, he can possess and enjoy only such properties as belong to the math. If the title of the math to any property is extinguished by adverse possession, the rights of all beneficiaries of the math in the property are also extinguished. On his appointment, the mathadhipathi acquires no right to recover property which no longer to the math. If before his appointment limitation under Art. 144 has commenced to run against the math, the appointment does not give either the math or the mathadhipathi a new right of suit or a fresh starting point of limitation under that Article for recovery of the property.In the instant case, the present mathadhipathi was elected in 1939 when the title of the math to the suit lands was already extinguished by adverse possession. By his election in 1939 the present mathadhipathi could not acquire the right to possess and enjoy or to recover properties which no longer belonged to the math8. In Jagadindra Roys case, (1904) ILT 32 Cal 129 (PC), the dispossession of the idols lands took place in April 1876. The only shebait of the idol was then a minor, and he sued for recovery of the lands in October 1889 within three years of his attaining majority. The Privy Council held that the plaintiff being a minor at the commencement of the period of limitation was entitled to the benefit of S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (Act XV of 1877) corresponding to S. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and was entitled to institute the suit within three years of his coming of age. This decision created an anomaly, for, as pointed out by Page, J. in ILR 51 Cal 953 at p. 958: (AIR 1925 Cal 140   at pp. 142-143), in giving the benefit of S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 to the shebait, the Privy Council proceeded on the footing that the right to sue for possession is to be divorced from the proprietary right to the property which is vested in the idol. We do not express any opinion one way or the other on the correctness of Jagadindra Nath Roys case, (1904) ILR 32 Cal 129 (PC). For the purposes of this case, it is sufficient to say that we are not inclined to extend the principle of that case. In that case, at the commencement of the period of limitation there was a shebait in existence entitled to sue on behalf of the idol, and on the institution of the suit he successfully claimed that as the person entitled to institute the suit at the time from which the period is to be reckoned, he should get the benefit of S. 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877. In the present case, there was no mathadhipathi in existence in 1915 when limitation commenced to run. Nor is there any question of the minority of a mathadhipathi entitled to sue in 1915 or of applying S. 6 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908.