Case: N. S. Shethna Vs. Vinubhai Harilal Panchal

being one year only. In the first place we do not see how such a consequence must follow. The procedure for an action under R. 131 is not an elaborate one which would make an inquiry thereunder a prolonged one. In the second place, unless the Rules are found to be ambiguous we do not see how a particular consequence can affect the construction of the Rules. On the other handif we were to treat renewal as continuation of the licence previously granted in a case where a licence is renewed from year to year as it would be in a large number of cases, if a licensee has committed breach of one of the conditions of the licence in any particular year, action against him can be taken in any subsequent year and his licence would be liable to be cancelled or suspended during any such subsequent year for a breach committed by him several years ago. That in some cases penalty by way of suspension might be nullified by reason of expiry of the period of the licence cannot be allowed to affect the interpretation of plain and unambiguous words in a statute or a rule.8. In support of his contention that a renewal is no more than a continuation of the licence previously granted, Mr. Bindra heavily leaned on the decision in V. C. K. Bus Service Ltd v. The Regional Transport Authority, 1957 SCR 663 : (AIR 1957 SC 489): In that case a permit for stage carriage was granted to the appellant under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. The appellate authority at the instance of the unsuccessful applicant set aside that order and the government in revision approved the order of the appellate authority and dismissed the revision. The appellant then moved the High Court by a writ petition and during the pendency of that petition the High Court stayed the order, with the result that the appellant could run his buses notwithstanding the cancellation of the order granting him the permit. In the meantime the period fixed under that permit expired and the appellant applied for and got a renewal of the permit under S. 58(2) of the Act. The High Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition. The question arose as to whether the renewal was a continuation of the permit previously granted and whether such renewal went away along with the original permit on its cancellation. This Court held that the renewal was a continuation of the previously granted permit and not a fresh grant and the cancellation of the original permit resulted in the cancellation of the renewal also. The argument urged on behalf of the appellant was that under the Act an application for renewal had to be dealt with exactly in the same manner as an application for a new permit, that when renewal was granted it was on an independent consideration of the merits and further that the granting of renewal was not a matter of right for the authorities would be acting within their power if they were to refuse an application for renewal. It was also contended that though in the case of a lease renewal might mean continuation of the lease for a further period on the same terms and conditions contained in the lease and therefore a renewed lease would be treated as extension of the original lease that consideration was not available in the case of renewal of a licence as it was open to the Licensing Authority to impose new conditions, to alter the period during which it was to operate and generally to modify its terms. Therefore, the use of the word renewal would not lead to an inference that it was the original permit which was being continued. It is noteworthy that Venkatarama Ayyar J. who spoke for the Court said that there was force in these contentions. But he did not sustain them because in the context of S. 58 and the Rules made under the Act and in particular R. 185 the conclusion that renewal in that case was continuation of the original permit was inevitable. In dealing with the reasoning in Anjaiah v. R. T. O. Guntur 1956 Andh LT 347: (AIR 1957 Andh Pra 470) which was relied on and in which a contrary view was taken, the learned Judge again observed at p. 673 of SCR: (at p. 492 of AIR) thatthese considerations though not without force cannot, in our opinion, outweigh the inference to be drawn from the other provisions to which we have made reference ......."It is thus clear that the decision did not lay down a general rule that renewal in all cases must mean continuation of the grant previously made but was rested on the language of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. As already observed there are no such Rules in the Bombay Cinema Rules 1954 which led this Court to the conclusion in that case that the renewed permit for stage carriage was continuation of the permit previously granted and therefore this decision would not assist the appellant.9. In our view the fact that renewal is not a matter of course, the fact that the Licensing Authority can in proper circumstances refuse an application for renewal and is not precluded from imposing different conditions and can grant it for a different period coupled with the absence of any Rules for renewal are all indications leading, to the result that renewal is a fresh grant and is not merely continuation of the licence previously issued. The High Court was therefore correct in allowing the writ petition on a conclusion that the show cause notice relating to the licence for the year 1960 could not be regarded as a show cause notice in respect of the renewal for the next year and if the renewed licence was sought to be affected in the inquiry a fresh show cause notice relaing to the renewed licence was necessary.10.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]The Rules relating to the licence for sale of tickets provide as aforesaid that the maximum period for which such a licence can be issued is one year. Renewal of a licence is provided for but only indirectly and in a sort of an off-hand manner by cl. 4 of Form F. It appears therefrom that a licensee has to produce his licence, pay the renewal fee and get entries made on its reverse as to the date of renewal the period upto which it would be valid on such renewal and the fees having been paid therefor. Since the rules do not provide as to how much are the fees for renewal it must be presumed that the fees are the same as for the licence itself. It is clear from the Rules that they do not contain anything to show that the renewed licence is a continuation of the licence previously issued except the fact that the Authority has to make the said entries on the reverse of the licence. The fact that the Rules do not make any provision for the power to renew, the procedure for renewal and for its fees as is done in Chapter VII in the case of a cinema licence is an indication that the draftsman equated renewal of a licence with the issuance of a licence. It may also be observed that it is not as if renewal is automatic nor is it to be granted as a matter of course. If the Licensing Authority desires to impose any fresh conditions there is nothing in the Rules to prevent him from doing so. That being so, a renewal cannot, unless the context requires otherwise, be regarded as a continuation of the licence previously issued. There is also nothing in Chapter VIII or in Form F indicating that the renewal is such athe first place we do not see how such a consequence must follow. The procedure for an action under R. 131 is not an elaborate one which would make an inquiry thereunder a prolonged one. In the second place, unless the Rules are found to be ambiguous we do not see how a particular consequence can affect the construction of the Rules. On the other handif we were to treat renewal as continuation of the licence previously granted in a case where a licence is renewed from year to year as it would be in a large number of cases, if a licensee has committed breach of one of the conditions of the licence in any particular year, action against him can be taken in any subsequent year and his licence would be liable to be cancelled or suspended during any such subsequent year for a breach committed by him several years ago. That in some cases penalty by way of suspension might be nullified by reason of expiry of the period of the licence cannot be allowed to affect the interpretation of plain and unambiguous words in a statute or ais thus clear that the decision did not lay down a general rule that renewal in all cases must mean continuation of the grant previously made but was rested on the language of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. As already observed there are no such Rules in the Bombay Cinema Rules 1954 which led this Court to the conclusion in that case that the renewed permit for stage carriage was continuation of the permit previously granted and therefore this decision would not assist the appellant.In our view the fact that renewal is not a matter of course, the fact that the Licensing Authority can in proper circumstances refuse an application for renewal and is not precluded from imposing different conditions and can grant it for a different period coupled with the absence of any Rules for renewal are all indications leading, to the result that renewal is a fresh grant and is not merely continuation of the licence previously issued. The High Court was therefore correct in allowing the writ petition on a conclusion that the show cause notice relating to the licence for the year 1960 could not be regarded as a show cause notice in respect of the renewal for the next year and if the renewed licence was sought to be affected in the inquiry a fresh show cause notice relaing to the renewed licence was necessary.