Case: Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Vs. Raja D. V. Appa Rao Bahadur

1. We have have heard both the learned counsel at length 2. We are clearly of the opinion that the judgment under appeal cannot be supported in law. For arriving at this decision, a few facts are required to be stated 3. On 1-11-1954, the property forming the subject-matter of civil appeal was leased in favour of Caltex (India) Limited (a foreign company). On 19-10-1976, the landlord filed a suit for ejectment against the said foreign company. On 30-12-1976, Ordinance No. 15 of 1976 came to be promulgated the Caltex [Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex (India) Limited] Ordinance, 1976. This Ordinance came to be replaced by Act 17 of 1977 on identical provisions. That need not concern us very much. However, which is important to notice is clause 7 of the said Ordinance is as under"7. (1) Every right or interest in respect of any property in India (including a right under any lease or under any right of tenancy or any right under any arrangement to secure any premises for any purpose) which Caltex (India) held immediately before the appointed day, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or in any agreement or instrument relating to such right or interest, vest in, and be held by, the Central Government on and after the appointed day on the same terms and conditions on which Caltex (India) would have held it, if no negotiations had taken place for the acquisition by the Central Government of the Undertakings of Caltex (India) in India or, as the ease may be, if this Ordinance had not been promulgated." * 4. On 24-1-1977, the defendants namely Caltex (India) Refinery (Indian Co.) came to be served with the suit summons. On 14-2-1977, the said Indian Company filed an application under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act for purchase of the property over which the superstructure had been put. The trial court allowed the application. On further appeal, that application was dismissed holding that the Indian Company was a transferee. Such a transferee could not get the right to purchase under Section 9. That judgment of the appellate court came to be confirmed in revision by the High Court 5. Mr Bhatt, learned counsel for the appellant justifiably argues that the learned Judge had gone wrong in his action. In fact he has in the decision reported in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. D.X. Francis [(1989) 2 LW 261] under similar circumstances had allowed the successor-in-interest the benefit of Section 96. That apart, this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Shyam Coop. Housing Society has held that the successor-in-interest, namely, the tenant could avail itself of all the benefits which the tenant had7. In opposing this, Mr K. Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent contended that the right of tenant to purchase the property would not amount of an interest in the property as held by this Court in Swami Motor Transport (P) Ltd. v. Sri Sankaraswamigal Mutt If that be so, clause 7 of the Ordinance cannot confer any right on the Indian Company. The High Court as in the decision reported in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. D.X. Francis [(1989) 2 LW 261] has referred to the impugned judgment itself which is distinguished on facts. That distinction is valid. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Shyam Coop. Housing Society will have no application to the facts of the case8. We do not think we need labour very much because clause 7 clearly points to the rights of the Indian Company. First of all, it contains a non obstante clause. Therefore, one will have to look at this clause and clause alone. Consequently, the statutory succession is not only in respect of the right or interest in any property but also their right under any lease or under right of tenancy which the foreign company had. Therefore, qua tenant, if the foreign company had a right to purchase the property that right will certainly enure to the benefit of the Indian Company. There cannot be denial of such a right. Of course, that will be subject to satisfying the condition laid down under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1976 (sic 1922) particularly Section 9. In this case, there is no dispute that it fulfils all the qualifications so as to entitle the foreign company to purchase under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. From this point of view, we are unable to see as to how Swami Motor could be pressed into it. Once this conclusion is arrived at, it matters very little as to how the distinction is sought to be made by the High Court in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [(1989) 2 LW 261]. The distinction is without any difference. Accordingly, we hold the appellant is entitled to succeed.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]8. We do not think we need labour very much because clause 7 clearly points to the rights of the Indian Company. First of all, it contains a non obstante clause. Therefore, one will have to look at this clause and clause alone. Consequently, the statutory succession is not only in respect of the right or interest in any property but also their right under any lease or under right of tenancy which the foreign company had. Therefore, qua tenant, if the foreign company had a right to purchase the property that right will certainly enure to the benefit of the Indian Company. There cannot be denial of such a right. Of course, that will be subject to satisfying the condition laid down under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act, 1976 (sic 1922) particularly Section 9. In this case, there is no dispute that it fulfils all the qualifications so as to entitle the foreign company to purchase under Section 9 of the City Tenants Protection Act. From this point of view, we are unable to see as to how Swami Motor could be pressed into it. Once this conclusion is arrived at, it matters very little as to how the distinction is sought to be made by the High Court in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [(1989) 2 LW 261]. The distinction is without any difference. Accordingly, we hold the appellant is entitled to succeed.