Case: Kalawati Devi Harlalka Vs. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, West Bengal &amp; Ors

the narrower meaning suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants In our view, the answer to this question must be in the negative.It seems to us that Section 297 is meant to provide as far as possible for all contingencies which may arise out of the repeal of the 1922 Act.It deals with pending appeals, revisions, etc. It deals with non-completed assessments pending at the commencement of the 1961 Act and assessments to be made after the commencement of the 1961 Act as a result of returns of income filed after the commencement of the 1961 Act, Then in Cl. (d) it deals with assessments in respect of escaped income; in Clauses (f) and (g) it deals with levy of penalties Clause (h) continues the effect of elections or declarations made under the 1922 Act; Cl. (i) deals with refunds; Clause (j) deals with recovery; Cl. (k) deals generally with all agreements, notifications, orders issued under the 1922 Act Clause (1) continues the notifications issued under Section 60 (1) of the 1922 Act and Clause (m) guards against the application of a longer period of limitation prescribed under the 1961 Act to certain applications, appeals, etc. It is hardly believable in this context that Parliament did not think of appeals and revisions in respect of assessment orders already made or which it had authorised to be made under Clause (a) of Section 297 (2).17. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that Parliament had S. 6 of the General Clauses Act in view, and therefore no express provision was made dealing with appeals and revisions, etc.In our view, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not apply because Section 297(2) evidences an intention to the contrary.In Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra, (1954) 24 ITR 58 = (AIR 1954 SC.158 ) while interpreting Section 13 of the Finance Act, 1950, already extracted above, this Court Observed at p. 68 (of ITR) = (at p. 162 of AIR) :"Nor can section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897, serve to keep alive the liability to pay tax on the income of the year 194950 assuming it to have accrued under the repealed State law, for a "different intention" clearly appears in sections a and 13 of the Finance Act read together as indicated above."It is true that whether a different intention appears or not must depend on the language and content of section 297 (2).It seems to us, however, that by providing for so many matters mentioned above some in accord with what would have been the result under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and some contrary to what have been the result wider Section 6, Parliament has clearly evidenced an intention to the contrary18. It Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is out of the way, there is no doubt that Parliament should not be credited with the intention of not providing for appeals and revisions, etc. against the assessment orders made under the 1922 Act. In this context, we must give the expression "proceedings for the assessment of that person" in Cl. (a) of Section 297 (2) a very comprehensive meaning.19. At any rate, if the Income Tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, is valid, para 4 of the said order clearly covers the present case and would give jurisdiction to the Commissioner to issue the impugned notice.20. Relying on Jalan Trading Co. (Private) Ltd. v. Mill Mazdoor Union, (1966) 2 Lab LJ 546 = (AIR 1987 SC 691) the learned counsel for the appellant urges that Section 298 is void. In our view, the present case is covered by the decision of this Court in Commr. of Income-tax v. Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd., (1961) 41 ITR 280 = (AIR 1961 SC 388) where a similar order called the Taxation Laws (Part B States (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, made under Sec. 12 of the Finance Act, 1950, was upheld. Section 12 read as follows :"If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of any of the Acts, rules or orders extended by section 3 or section 11 to any State or merged territory, the Central Government may, by order, make such provision, or give such direction, as appears to it to be necessary for removing the difficulty."21. S. K. Das, J., speaking for the Court observed at p. 288 (of ITR) = (at p. 340 of AIR) :"Furthermore, the true scope and effect of section 12 seems to be that it is for the Central Government to determine if any difficulty of the nature indicated in the section has arisen and then to make such order, or give such direction, as appears to it to be necessary to remove the difficulty. Parliament has left the matter to the executive; but that does not make the notification of 1956 bad. In Banarsi Das Bhanot v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1958) 9 STC 388 = (AIR 1958 SC 909 ) we said at p. 485 (of STC) = (at p. 913 of AIR):"Now the authorities are clear that it is not unconstitutional for the legislature to leave it to the executive to determine details relating to the working of taxation laws such as the selection of persons on whom the tax is to be laid, the rates at which it is to be charged in respect of different classes of goods, and the like. We are, therefore, of the view that the notification of 1956 was validly made under section 12 and is not ultra vires the powers conferred on the Central Government by that section."22. It is true that in that case the attack was on the notification and not on the section itself, but it seems to us that the ratio given by the Court is appropriate to cover the validity of the section itself. Furthermore, the terms of section 37 of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965 are different and the Bonus Act is not a taxing law.23.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]It seems to us that the High Court is right in holding that Section 297 (2) (a) of the 196l Act includes within its scope a proceeding under Section 33B of the 1922 Act. There is no doubt that the word "assessment" does have subject to the context a very wide meaning.It is quite clear from the authorities cited above that the word "assessment" can bear a very comprehensive meaning, it can comprehend the whole procedure for ascertaining and imposing liability upon the tax-payer.It There then anything in the context of Section 297 which compels us to give to the expression "proceedings for the assessment" the narrower meaning suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants In our view, the answer to this question must be in the negative.It seems to us that Section 297 is meant to provide as far as possible for all contingencies which may arise out of the repeal of the 1922 Act.It deals with pending appeals, revisions, etc. It deals with non-completed assessments pending at the commencement of the 1961 Act and assessments to be made after the commencement of the 1961 Act as a result of returns of income filed after the commencement of the 1961 Act, Then in Cl. (d) it deals with assessments in respect of escaped income; in Clauses (f) and (g) it deals with levy of penalties Clause (h) continues the effect of elections or declarations made under the 1922 Act; Cl. (i) deals with refunds; Clause (j) deals with recovery; Cl. (k) deals generally with all agreements, notifications, orders issued under the 1922 Act Clause (1) continues the notifications issued under Section 60 (1) of the 1922 Act and Clause (m) guards against the application of a longer period of limitation prescribed under the 1961 Act to certain applications, appeals, etc. It is hardly believable in this context that Parliament did not think of appeals and revisions in respect of assessment orders already made or which it had authorised to be made under Clause (a) of Section 297our view, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not apply because Section 297(2) evidences an intention to theis true that whether a different intention appears or not must depend on the language and content of section 297 (2).It seems to us, however, that by providing for so many matters mentioned above some in accord with what would have been the result under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and some contrary to what have been the result wider Section 6, Parliament has clearly evidenced an intention to theIt Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is out of the way, there is no doubt that Parliament should not be credited with the intention of not providing for appeals and revisions, etc. against the assessment orders made under the 1922 Act. In this context, we must give the expression "proceedings for the assessment of that person" in Cl. (a) of Section 297 (2) a very comprehensive meaning.At any rate, if the Income Tax (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1962, is valid, para 4 of the said order clearly covers the present case and would give jurisdiction to the Commissioner to issue the impugnedour view, the present case is covered by the decision of this Court in Commr. of Income-tax v. Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Ltd., (1961) 41 ITR 280   = (AIR 1961 SC 388) where a similar order called the Taxation Laws (Part B States (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, made under Sec. 12 of the Finance Act, 1950, wasis true that in that case the attack was on the notification and not on the section itself, but it seems to us that the ratio given by the Court is appropriate to cover the validity of the section itself. Furthermore, the terms of section 37 of the Payment of Bonus Act 1965 are different and the Bonus Act is not a taxing law.