Case: Jagdish Mitter Vs. Union Of India

would thus be noticed that the four cases which we have considered by way of illustration dealt with different aspects of the problem pertaining to temporary servants who are discharged or reverted and naturally, on each occasion, observations were made in relation to the particular aspect with which the Court was concerned. We are satisfied that the principles laid down in all these decisions are in no sense inconsistent. 20. Let us now revert to the facts of the present case. We have already stated that before the services of the appellant were terminated, some enquiry was held on the complaint of one Sham Lal and at this enquiry it transpired that Vishwa Mitter, the brother of the appellant, had used a reply-paid post card sent by Sham Lal without scoring the address of Sham Lal written on it by him. In fact, it appears that Vishwa Mitter admitted that he had illegally used the said card. But we do not know when this enquiry was held, how it commenced and what was the final order passed as a result of it. Unfortunately, the paper book filed by the appellant who has been allowed to appeal as a pauper does not include the relevant papers, and so, it would not be possible to hold that the enquiry in question was held with a view to take disciplinary action against the appellant, or that the order of discharge which was ultimately passed against him flowed from the finding made at the said enquiry. It is quite possible that even if the respondent intended to hold a formal enquiry with a view to take disciplinary action against the appellant, it may have thought that a preliminary investigation in that behalf may first be conducted and then a decision may be taken as to whether a formal enquiry should be held or not. If that was the scope of the enquiry which was apparently held in this case, the appellant cannot rely upon the said enquiry in support of his plea that his discharge amounts to dismissal. 21. However, the appellants contention that the order of discharge passed against him on the face of it shows that it is not discharge but dismissal, cannot be rejected. We have already observed that Art. 311 applies to temporary servants or probationers, so that if it is shown that instead of terminating their services by one months notice under the terms of the contract or the relevant rules, the authority proceeds to dismiss them, it is incumbent on the authority to afford to the said temporary servants or probationers the protection guaranteed by Art. 311 (2). The appellants contention is that in the present case, the order itself shows that it is not a discharge but a dismissal, and that naturally involves the question as to the construction of the order. The order reads thus: "Shri Jagdish Mitter, a temporary 2nd Division Clerk of this office having been found undesirable to be retained in Government service is hereby served with a months notice of discharge with effect from November 1, 1949. No doubt the order purports to be one of discharge and as such, can be referred to the power of the authority to terminate the temporary appointment with one months notice. But it seems to us that when the order refers to the fact that the appellant was found undesirable to be retained in government service, it expressly casts a stigma on the appellant and in that sense, must be held to be an order of dismissal and not a mere order of discharge. The learned Additional Solicitor-General attempted to argue that what the order really meant was that Government did not think it desirable or necessary to continue the appellant in its employment. He fairly conceded that the words used in the order were somewhat unfortunate, but he urged that the order should be liberally construed and should be held to have been passed by the authority by virtue of its power to terminate the services of the appellant on one months notice. We are not prepared to accept this argument. It is obvious that to say that it is undesirable to continue a temporary servant is very much different from saying that it is unnecessary to continue him. In the first case, a stigma attaches to the servant, while in the second case, termination of service is due to the consideration that a temporary servant need not be continued, and in that sense, no stigma attaches to him. It seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the appellant was found to be undesirable, and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part. When an authority wants to terminate the services of a temporary servant, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast an aspersion on the temporary servant, it would be idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of discharge. The test in such cases must be: does the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then notwithstanding the form of the order, the termination of service must he held, in substance, to amount to dismissal. That being so, we are satisfied that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had not been dismissed, but had been merely discharged. It is conceded that if the impugned order is construed as one of dismissal the appellant has been denied the protection guaranteed to temporary servants under S. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, and so, the order cannot be sustained.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]7. The true legal position in regard to the scope and effect of the provisions of Art. 311 in respect of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State on a temporary or probationary basis is now fairly well established. It is, however, necessary to state the said legal position briefly before dealing with the merits of the dispute between the parties in the present appeal10. It is true that the tenure held by a temporary public servant or a probationer is of a precarious character. His services can be terminated by one months notice without assigning any reason either under the terms of contract which expressly provide for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules governing temporary appointments or appointments of probationers. Such a temporary servant can also be dismissed in a punitive way; that means that the appropriate authority possesses two powers to terminate the services of a temporary public servant; it can either discharge him purporting to exercise its power under the terms of contract or the relevant rule, and in that case, it would be a straightforward and direct case of discharge and nothing more; in such a case, Art. 311 will not apply. The authority can also act under its power to dismiss a temporary servant and make an order of dismissal in a straightforward way; in such a case, Art. 311 will applyWe have already stated that before the services of the appellant were terminated, some enquiry was held on the complaint of one Sham Lal and at this enquiry it transpired that Vishwa Mitter, the brother of the appellant, had used a reply-paid post card sent by Sham Lal without scoring the address of Sham Lal written on it by him. In fact, it appears that Vishwa Mitter admitted that he had illegally used the said card. But we do not know when this enquiry was held, how it commenced and what was the final order passed as a result of it. Unfortunately, the paper book filed by the appellant who has been allowed to appeal as a pauper does not include the relevant papers, and so, it would not be possible to hold that the enquiry in question was held with a view to take disciplinary action against the appellant, or that the order of discharge which was ultimately passed against him flowed from the finding made at the said enquiry. It is quite possible that even if the respondent intended to hold a formal enquiry with a view to take disciplinary action against the appellant, it may have thought that a preliminary investigation in that behalf may first be conducted and then a decision may be taken as to whether a formal enquiry should be held or not. If that was the scope of the enquiry which was apparently held in this case, the appellant cannot rely upon the said enquiry in support of his plea that his discharge amounts to dismissal21. However, the appellants contention that the order of discharge passed against him on the face of it shows that it is not discharge but dismissal, cannot be rejected. We have already observed that Art. 311 applies to temporary servants or probationers, so that if it is shown that instead of terminating their services by one months notice under the terms of the contract or the relevant rules, the authority proceeds to dismiss them, it is incumbent on the authority to afford to the said temporary servants or probationers the protection guaranteed by Art. 311 (2). The appellants contention is that in the present case, the order itself shows that it is not a discharge but a dismissal, and that naturally involves the question as to the construction of the orderNo doubt the order purports to be one of discharge and as such, can be referred to the power of the authority to terminate the temporary appointment with one months notice. But it seems to us that when the order refers to the fact that the appellant was found undesirable to be retained in government service, it expressly casts a stigma on the appellant and in that sense, must be held to be an order of dismissal and not a mere order of discharge. The learned Additional Solicitor-General attempted to argue that what the order really meant was that Government did not think it desirable or necessary to continue the appellant in its employment. He fairly conceded that the words used in the order were somewhat unfortunate, but he urged that the order should be liberally construed and should be held to have been passed by the authority by virtue of its power to terminate the services of the appellant on one months notice. We are not prepared to accept this argument. It is obvious that to say that it is undesirable to continue a temporary servant is very much different from saying that it is unnecessary to continue him. In the first case, a stigma attaches to the servant, while in the second case, termination of service is due to the consideration that a temporary servant need not be continued, and in that sense, no stigma attaches to him. It seems that anyone who reads the order in a reasonable way, would naturally conclude that the appellant was found to be undesirable, and that must necessarily import an element of punishment which is the basis of the order and is its integral part. When an authority wants to terminate the services of a temporary servant, it can pass a simple order of discharge without casting any aspersion against the temporary servant or attaching any stigma to his character. As soon as it is shown that the order purports to cast an aspersion on the temporary servant, it would be idle to suggest that the order is a simple order of discharge. The test in such cases must be: does the order cast aspersion or attach stigma to the officer when it purports to discharge him? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then notwithstanding the form of the order, the termination of service must he held, in substance, to amount to dismissal. That being so, we are satisfied that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had not been dismissed, but had been merely discharged. It is conceded that if the impugned order is construed as one of dismissal the appellant has been denied the protection guaranteed to temporary servants under S. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution, and so, the order cannot be sustainedIt is thus clear that every order terminating the services of a public servant who is either a temporary servant, or a probationer, will not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Art. 311. It is only when the termination of the public servants services can be shown to have been ordered by way of punishment that it can be characterised either as dismissal or removal from service13. But since considerations of motive operating in the mind of the authority have to be eliminated in determining the character of the termination of services of a temporary servant, it must be emphasised that the form in which the order terminating his services is expressed will not be decisive. If a formal departmental enquiry has been held in which findings have been recorded against the temporary servant and as a result of the said findings, his services are terminated, the fact that the order by which his services are terminated, ostensibly purports, to be a mere order of discharge would not disguise the fact that in substance and in law the discharge in question amounts to the dismissal of the temporary servant. That is why the form of the order is inconclusive: it is the substance of the matter which determines the character of the termination of services. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, we must bear in mind that the real character of the termination of services must be determined by reference to the material facts that existed prior to the order. Take a case where a temporary servant attacks the validity of his discharge on the ground of mala fides on the part of the authority. If in resisting the plea of mala fides, the authority refers to certain facts justifying the order of discharge and these facts relate to the misconduct, negligence or in efficiency of the said servant, it cannot logically be said that in view of the plea thus made by the authority long after the order of discharge, it should be held that the order of discharge was the result of the considerations set out in the said plea. What the court will have to examine in each case wound be, having regard to the material facts existing up to the time of discharge, is the order of discharge in substance one of dismissal? If the answer is that notwithstanding the form which the order took, the appointing authority, in substance, really dismissed the temporary public servant, Art. 311 would be attracted14. It would thus be noticed that the problem raised by complaints made by temporary public servants who have been discharged, presents several facts, and in dealing with one fact or the other presented to the court by the special facts in each case, emphasis has naturally shifted. But the main principles which have been accepted by this Court and applied in dealing with cases of temporary servants who have been discharged, are no longer in doubt.