Case: Ramesh Prasad Singh Vs. State Of Bihar &amp; Ors

to establish that the protection of the equal opportunity clause has been denied to them, it is not enough for the respondents to, say that they have been treated differently from others, not even enough that a differenti al treatment has been accorded to them in comparison with others similarly circumstanced. Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guaran tee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis. It was therefore incumbent on the respondents to plead and show that the classification of Assistant Engineers into those who hold diplomas and those who hold degrees is unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its purported object .... On the facts of the case, classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification .... Educational qualifications have been recognized by this Court as a safe criterion for determining the validity of classification. In State of Mysore v. P. Narasing Rao (supra) where the cadre of Tracers was reorganized into two, one consisting of matriculate Tracers with a higher scale of pay and the other of non- Matriculates in the lower scale, it was held that articles 14 and 16 do not exclude the laying down of selective tests nor do they preclude the Government from laying down qualifications for the post in question. Therefore, it was open to the Government to give preference to candidates having higher educational qualifications. In Ganga Ram v. Union of India (supra), it was observed that "the State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay down conditions of efficiency for promotion in its different departments". In the Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S. B. Kohli (supra), as refined a classification as between an F.R.C.S. in general surgery and an F.R.C.S. in Orthopaedics was upheld in relation to appointment to the post of a Professor of Orthopaedics on the ground that the classification made on the basis of requirement of a post graduate degree in particular speciality was not "without reference to the objectives sought to be achieved and there can be no question of discrimination".The following observations made in State of Mysore v. P. Narasing Rao (supra) will also amply repay perusal:-"it is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. Where any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of tile group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be sonic rational nexus between the basis of classification and tile object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 15 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of tile general rule of equality laid down in Art. 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured. Articles 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection."7. In the instant case, the qualifications required for the post of Executive Engineer (Tele-Communication) as demonstrably rejected in the proposal for creation of that post and the aforesaid recommendation of the Selection Committee setting out various factors which went in favour of the promotion of the appellant app ear to be founded oil reasonable classification having an intelligible differentia which distinguished the appellant from respondents 3 to 28 and the differentia had a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. It is, therefore, crystal clear that respondents 3 to 28 did not stand at par with the appellant and had no legal right which they could claim to have been denied to them by an authority which had a legal duty to do something. With all respect the High Court was in our judgment therefore, not right in issuing the writ of mandamus. It would be useful in this context to refer to the following observations made by this Court in Mani Subrat Jain &Ors. v. State of Haryana &Ors.([1977] 1 S.C.C. 486.)"It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable, right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something. [See Halsburys Laws of England, 4th Ed. Vol. 1, Paragraph 122; State of Haryna v. Subhash Chander Marwaha ([1974] 1. S.C.R. 165.) Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar Haji Bushuur Ahmmed([1976] 3 S.C.R. 58.) and Ferris: Extra-Ordinary Legal Remedies. paragraph 198]".8. In view of the foregoing, we, are unable to hold on the material, before us that the criterion employed by the concerned authority in promoting the appellant was arbitrary or capricious or was not intended to increase the efficiency in the functioning of the department or was based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations or suffered from any other vice.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]In the State of Jammu &Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosea &Ors. (supra) where after integration of diploma holder and degree holder Assistant Engineers in one class , it was provided by the J& Engineering (Gazetted) Service Rules, 1970 that only those Assistant Engineers who possessed a degree in Engineering would be eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer and the diploma holder Assistant Engineers who were rendered ineligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer filed a writ petition challenging the constitutionality of the rule and the classification on which it was claimed to be based on the ground that once the employees are integrated into one class, they cannot for purposes of promotion be classified again into two different classes on the basis of educational differences existing at the time of recruitment, the Constitution Bench held rejecting the contention of the diploma holder Assistant Engineers that formal education may not always produce excellence but a classification founded on variant educational qualifications is, for purposes of promotion to the post of an Executive Engineer, to say the least, not unjust on the face of it and the onus therefore cannot shift from where it originallyfollowing passages occurring in the leading judgment of our learned brother Chandrachud, J. in that case are worth quoting:-"In order to establish that the protection of the equal opportunity clause has been denied to them, it is not enough for the respondents to, say that they have been treated differently from others, not even enough that a differenti al treatment has been accorded to them in comparison with others similarly circumstanced. Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guaran tee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis. It was therefore incumbent on the respondents to plead and show that the classification of Assistant Engineers into those who hold diplomas and those who hold degrees is unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its purported object .... On the facts of the case, classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification .... Educational qualifications have been recognized by this Court as a safe criterion for determining the validity of classification. In State of Mysore v. P. Narasing Rao (supra) where the cadre of Tracers was reorganized into two, one consisting of matriculate Tracers with a higher scale of pay and the other of non- Matriculates in the lower scale, it was held that articles 14 and 16 do not exclude the laying down of selective tests nor do they preclude the Government from laying down qualifications for the post in question. Therefore, it was open to the Government to give preference to candidates having higher educational qualifications. In Ganga Ram v. Union of India (supra), it was observed that "the State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of circumstances is entitled to lay down conditions of efficiency for promotion in its different departments". In the Union of India v. Dr. (Mrs.) S. B. Kohli (supra), as refined a classification as between an F.R.C.S. in general surgery and an F.R.C.S. in Orthopaedics was upheld in relation to appointment to the post of a Professor of Orthopaedics on the ground that the classification made on the basis of requirement of a post graduate degree in particular speciality was not "without reference to the objectives sought to be achieved and there can be no question ofthe instant case, the qualifications required for the post of Executive Engineer (Tele-Communication) as demonstrably rejected in the proposal for creation of that post and the aforesaid recommendation of the Selection Committee setting out various factors which went in favour of the promotion of the appellant app ear to be founded oil reasonable classification having an intelligible differentia which distinguished the appellant from respondents 3 to 28 and the differentia had a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. It is, therefore, crystal clear that respondents 3 to 28 did not stand at par with the appellant and had no legal right which they could claim to have been denied to them by an authority which had a legal duty to do something. With all respect the High Court was in our judgment therefore, not right in issuing the writ of mandamus. It would be useful in this context to refer to the following observations made by this Court in Mani Subrat Jain &Ors. v. State of Haryana &Ors.([1977] 1 S.C.C. 486.)"It is elementary though it is to be restated that no one can ask for a mandamus without a legal right. There must be a judicially enforceable, right as well as a legally protected right before one suffering a legal grievance can ask for a mandamus. A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doingview of the foregoing, we, are unable to hold on the material, before us that the criterion employed by the concerned authority in promoting the appellant was arbitrary or capricious or was not intended to increase the efficiency in the functioning of the department or was based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations or suffered from any otheris, in our opinion, considerable force in these submissions.