Case: State Of Up  Vs. M/S P.N.C.Construction Co. Ltd.

states that the tax on sale or purchase of goods would include a tax on transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract. The emphasis is on the expression "transfer of property in goods (whether goods as such or in some other form)". Therefore, after the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution, the works contract which was an indivisible contract is, by a legal fiction, divided into two parts - one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services. Therefore, after the Forty-sixth Amendment, it became possible for the States to levy sales tax on the value of the goods involved in a works contract in the same way in which the sales tax was leviable on the price of the goods supplied in a building contract. This is where the concept of "Value Addition" comes in. It is on account of the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution that the State Government is empowered to levy sales tax on the contract value which earlier was not possible. In the present case, the assessee has paid the tax under the scheme of composition at a stipulated percentage of the contract value. The assessee has paid the tax as defined under Section 2(n) of the Act. As stated above, "works contract" has been defined under Section 2(m) of the Act to include any agreement for carrying out building construction, manufacture, processing or commissioning of any moveable or immoveable property. These two definitions have been inserted in the said Act in conformity with the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution [See: Builders Association of India and others v. Union of India and others - (1989) 2 SCC 645 ]. To the same effect is the ratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. and others v. State of Rajasthan and others - (1993) 1 SCC 364 , in which it has been held, vide para 36, that, if the legal fiction introduced by Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution is carried to its logical conclusion it follows that even in a single and indivisible contract there could be a "deemed sale" of the goods in the execution of a works contract. Such a deemed sale has all the incidents of a "sale" in cases where the contract is divisible into two parts - one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services. Similarly, in the case of State of Kerala and another v. Builders Association of India and others - (1997) 2 SCC 183 , it has been held that after the Forty-sixth Amendment goods transferred in the course of execution of the works contract is chargeable to tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. 15. In the present case, as stated above, the notifications issued by the State Government from time to time show that different rates were prescribed for declared goods and other raw-materials. Cement fell in the category of declared goods whereas sand, bitumen, furnace oil, HSD, Lubricant etc. fell in the category of other raw-materials. The said notifications also indicate notified goods. Hot Mix fell in the category of notified goods. Under Section 4-B(2) of the Act the recognition certificate enabled the assessee to buy the above raw-materials at concessional rate of duty provided they were used in the manufacture of notified goods and such notified goods were intended to be sold by the assessees in the State or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of India. Raw-materials came in the category of "goods" for the purposes of Section 4-B(2) of the Act. In the present case, the assessee has used cement, sand, bitumen, furnace oil, HSD, Lubricant etc. as raw-materials in the manufacture of Hot Mix. The show cause notice dated 9.5.01 impugned in the writ petition (before the High Court) proceeded on the basis that roads are not capable of being sold; that roads were not goods; and that roads were not moveables and, therefore, according to the Department the assessee was not entitled to the concessional rate of duty on purchase of raw-materials. In our view, the impugned show cause notice dated 9.5.01 was based on complete misreading of the provisions of the said Act. Under Section 2(h) of the Act the word "Sale" is defined to mean any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or for value consideration. The definition of the word "Sale" includes transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract. These words flow from the definition of the word "Sale" in the Act to Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution. The said words have been interpreted by this Court, as stated above, in the second Gannon Dunkerleys case (Supra) in following words vide para 36: "36. If the legal fiction introduced by Article 366(29-A) is carried to its logical end it follows that even in a single and indivisible works contract there is a deemed sale of the goods which are involved in the execution of a works contract. Such a deemed sale has all the incidents of a sale of goods involved in the execution of a works contract where the contract is divisible into one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services." 16. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was right in setting aside the above show cause notice dated 9.5.01 issued by the A.O. (issuing authority). The withdrawal of recognition certificate was erroneous as it was contrary to the definition of the word "sale" in Section 2(h) of the Act which had to be read with Section 4B(2) of the Act. Therefore, the aforestated two circulars dated 17.1.01 and 23.2.01 issued by the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., cannot constitute the basis for issuing the impugned show cause notice dated 9.5.01.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]12. We find no merit in the civil appeals filed by the State (Department). At the outset, we may state that there are no disputed facts which warrant adjudication. Assessee has entered into a contract to construct roads. In execution of the contract assessee is required to buy aforestated raw-materials which are used in the manufacture of Hot Mix. The said Hot Mix is used for construction of roads. The show cause notice dated 9.5.01 relies upon the aforestated two circulars dated 17.1.01 and 23.2.01 issued by the Commissioner. According to the Commissioner, if any contractor manufactures doors, windows, grills etc. from cement (one of the raw-materials herein) then such manufacturer would be entitled to avail of the facility of concessional rate of duty under Section 4-B of the Act. According to the Commissioner, doors, windows, grills and frames are self-manufactured goods which were taxable as sale and, therefore, Section 4-B(2) of the Act covers such type of goods and not roads. According to the Commissioner, if the contractor utilizes the said raw-materials for construction of the roads then the contractor-assessee would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 4-B of the Act. Further, according to the Commissioner, the contracted road is an immoveable property whereas under Section 4-B of the Act the facility of buying raw-materials was permissible only to the manufacturing who sold the manufactured commodity and since roads were not saleable the manufacture-assessee was not entitled to the benefit of Section 4-B13. In the present case, raw-materials are bought by the assessee which are used in the manufacture of Hot Mix which is utilized for road construction. These facts are not in dispute. The question before us is: whether on the said facts the Department was right in denying the benefit of Section 4-B of the Act to the assessee? Therefore, there was no need for adjudication14. "Value Addition" is an important concept which has arisen after the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution. Prior to the said Amendment this Court had taken the view in State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. - AIR 1958 SC 560 , that "works contract" was an indivisible contract and the turnover of the goods used in the execution of the works contract could not, therefore, become exigible to sales tax. To overcome the effect of the said decision, the concept of "deemed sale" was introduced by the Parliament by introducing sub-clause (b) of Clause 29A in Article 366 of the Constitution which states that the tax on sale or purchase of goods would include a tax on transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of works contract. The emphasis is on the expression "transfer of property in goods (whether goods as such or in some other form)". Therefore, after the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution, the works contract which was an indivisible contract is, by a legal fiction, divided into two parts - one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services. Therefore, after the Forty-sixth Amendment, it became possible for the States to levy sales tax on the value of the goods involved in a works contract in the same way in which the sales tax was leviable on the price of the goods supplied in a building contract. This is where the concept of "Value Addition" comes in. It is on account of the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution that the State Government is empowered to levy sales tax on the contract value which earlier was not possible. In the present case, the assessee has paid the tax under the scheme of composition at a stipulated percentage of the contract value. The assessee has paid the tax as defined under Section 2(n) of the Act. As stated above, "works contract" has been defined under Section 2(m) of the Act to include any agreement for carrying out building construction, manufacture, processing or commissioning of any moveable or immoveable property. These two definitions have been inserted in the said Act in conformity with the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution [See: Builders Association of India and others v. Union of India and others - (1989) 2 SCC 645 ]. To the same effect is the ratio of the judgment of this Court in the case of M/s. Gannon Dunkerley and Co. and others v. State of Rajasthan and others - (1993) 1 SCC 364 , in which it has been held, vide para 36, that, if the legal fiction introduced by Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution is carried to its logical conclusion it follows that even in a single and indivisible contract there could be a "deemed sale" of the goods in the execution of a works contract. Such a deemed sale has all the incidents of a "sale" in cases where the contract is divisible into two parts - one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services. Similarly, in the case of State of Kerala and another v. Builders Association of India and others - (1997) 2 SCC 183 , it has been held that after the Forty-sixth Amendment goods transferred in the course of execution of the works contract is chargeable to tax under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 196315. In the present case, as stated above, the notifications issued by the State Government from time to time show that different rates were prescribed for declared goods and other raw-materials. Cement fell in the category of declared goods whereas sand, bitumen, furnace oil, HSD, Lubricant etc. fell in the category of other raw-materials. The said notifications also indicate notified goods. Hot Mix fell in the category of notified goods. Under Section 4-B(2) of the Act the recognition certificate enabled the assessee to buy the above raw-materials at concessional rate of duty provided they were used in the manufacture of notified goods and such notified goods were intended to be sold by the assessees in the State or in the course of inter-State trade or commerce or in the course of export out of India. Raw-materials came in the category of "goods" for the purposes of Section 4-B(2) of the Act. In the present case, the assessee has used cement, sand, bitumen, furnace oil, HSD, Lubricant etc. as raw-materials in the manufacture of Hot Mix. The show cause notice dated 9.5.01 impugned in the writ petition (before the High Court) proceeded on the basis that roads are not capable of being sold; that roads were not goods; and that roads were not moveables and, therefore, according to the Department the assessee was not entitled to the concessional rate of duty on purchase of raw-materials. In our view, the impugned show cause notice dated 9.5.01 was based on complete misreading of the provisions of the said Act. Under Section 2(h) of the Act the word "Sale" is defined to mean any transfer of property in goods for cash or deferred payment or for value consideration. The definition of the word "Sale" includes transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract. These words flow from the definition of the word "Sale" in the Act to Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution. The said words have been interpreted by this Court, as stated above, in the second Gannon Dunkerleys case (Supra) in following words vide para 36:"36. If the legal fiction introduced by Article 366(29-A) is carried to its logical end it follows that even in a single and indivisible works contract there is a deemed sale of the goods which are involved in the execution of a works contract. Such a deemed sale has all the incidents of a sale of goods involved in the execution of a works contract where the contract is divisible into one for sale of goods and the other for supply of labour and services."16. For the aforestated reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was right in setting aside the above show cause notice dated 9.5.01 issued by the A.O. (issuing authority). The withdrawal of recognition certificate was erroneous as it was contrary to the definition of the word "sale" in Section 2(h) of the Act which had to be read with Section 4B(2) of the Act. Therefore, the aforestated two circulars dated 17.1.01 and 23.2.01 issued by the Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., cannot constitute the basis for issuing the impugned show cause notice dated 9.5.01