Case: NATIONAL CO-OPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION  Vs. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, DELHI-V

does not specify as to who should be the grantee; what should be amount to be granted. All that is prescribed is that the business of the appellant-Corporation is to provide loans or grants for the avowed object for which it has been set up. The decision with regard to who should get the grant is taken by the appellant-Corporation directly in the course of, and for the purpose of its business. Thus, the amount agreed to be given should be given as a loan or grant, or both is entirely at the business discretion of the appellant-Corporation. No grantee has a superior title to the funds. Hence, this is not a case of diversion of income by overriding title. 38. We may record here that income has to be determined on the principles of commercial accountancy. There is, thus, a distinction between real profits ascertained on principles of commercial accountancy. In the case of Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. CIT Bombay City (1965) 3 SCR 818 this Court has held that income tax is on the real income. In the case of a business, the profits must be arrived at on ordinary commercial principles. The scheme of the IT Act requires the determination of real income on the basis of ordinary commercial principles of accountancy. To determine the real income, permissible expenses are required to be set off. In this behalf, we may also usefully refer to the judgment in CIT, Gujarat v. S.C. Kothari (1972) 4 SCC 402 where the following principle was laid down: 6. …The tax collector cannot be heard to say that he will bring the gross receipts to tax. He can only tax profits of a trade or business. That cannot be done without deducting the losses and the legitimate expenses of the business... There is, thus, a clear distinction between deductions made for ascertaining real profits and thereafter distributions made out of profits. The distribution would be application of income. There is also a distinction between real profits ascertained on commercial principles and profits fixed by a statute for a specific purpose. Income tax is a tax on real income. 39. We may also note that even though in the own view of the appellant-Corporation for preceding years in question, it never claimed any such adjustments, but that of course does not preclude the right of the appellant-Corporation as they sought to make out a case of mistake at a subsequent date. 40. We may also note another statutory development. The Finance Act of 2003 added a provision in Section 36 of the IT Act as sub-clause (1) (xii) in the following terms: 36. Other deductions. – (1) The deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in section 28 – (i) to (xi) xxxx (xii) any expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) incurred by a corporation or a body corporate, by whatever name called, if, - (a) It is constituted or established by a Central, State or Provincial Act; (b) Such corporation or body corporate, having regard to the objects and purposes of the Act referred to in sub-clause (a), is notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette for the purposes of this clause; and (c) The expenditure is incurred for the objects and purposes authorised by the Act under which it is constituted or established; xxx 41. The amendment has to be appreciated in the context of the Departmental Circular No.7/2003 dated 5.9.2003, which provides for deduction for expenditure incurred by entities established under any Central, State or Provincial Act. Entities that are created under an Act of Parliament have the basic object and function of carrying on developmental activities in the areas as specified in the said Acts. By the Finance Act, 2001 and the Finance Act, 2002, tax exemption of certain bodies set up through an Act of Parliament was withdrawn. Subsequent to the removal of the tax shield, a doubt has arisen that some of the activities having no profit motive being carried on by such entities cannot be said to be business and therefore, expenditure incurred on such developmental activities may not be allowed as a deduction when computing the income under the head profits and gains of business or profession. 42. The Finance Act, 2003, thus, inserted a new clause mentioned aforesaid so as to provide that an expenditure not being capital expenditure incurred by a corporation or body corporate, by whatever name called, constituted or established by a Central, State or Provincial Act for the objects and purposes authorised by such Act under which such corporation or body corporate was constituted or established, shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income under the head profits and gains of business or profession. The amendment had been introduced into the Act with effect from 1.4.2002. (Chaturvedi & Pithisarias Income Tax Law, Volume 3, Sixth Edition (2014), Pg. 3310, published by LexisNexis). 43. The question, thus, arises whether prior to this amendment such expenses were not allowable under the prevailing tax regime for such entitles which were not exempt from tax. In the years prior to the amendment, as we are dealing with AY 1976-77 onwards, the tax jurisprudence has evolved on the basis of ordinary principles of commercial accountancy for determining the taxable income. Thus, prior to insertion of this sub-clause, such expenses would be permissible under the general Section 37(1) of the IT Act, which provides for deduction of permissible expenses on principles of commercial accountancy. Post amendment, such expenses get allowed under the specific section, viz. Section 36(1)(xii) after the amendment by the Finance Act, 2003. 44. We would, thus, like to conclude that we are unable to agree with the findings arrived at by the AO, ITAT and the High Court albeit for different reasons and concur with the view taken by the CIT(A) for the reasons set out hereinbefore.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]In terms of Section 28 of the IT Act such profits and gains of any business or profession under the head D of Section 14 of the IT Act would be chargeable to income tax if the income is relatable to profits and gains of business or profession carried out by the assessee at any time during the previous year [Clause (i) of Section 28 of the IT Act]. Section 56 of the IT Act is in the nature of a residuary clause, i.e., if the income of every kind which is not to be excluded from total income under the IT Act would be chargeable under this head if it is not chargeable under Section 14 heads A to E.22. The aforesaid aspect did not form a part of the rationale of the view taken by the AO, but the CIT(A) opined that the grants made by the appellant-Corporation undisputedly fall within its authorised business activities and, thus, even the advancing of grants from the interest income would be a revenue expense as it had not resulted in acquisition of capital assets by the appellant-Corporation and, thus, would be adjustable under Section 37(1) of the IT Act. The ITAT, while reversing the order of the CIT(A), does not deal with this aspect but the impugned judgment of the High Court, once again, adverted to this aspect and came to the conclusion that the interest income would fall under head D of Section 14 of the IT Act and would not fall under the head of income from other sources under Section 56 of the IT Act.23. We are in agreement with this view taken by the High Court, as the only business of the appellant-Corporation is to receive funds and then to advance them as loans or grants. The interest income arose on account of the fund so received and it may not have been utilised for a certain period of time, being put in fixed deposits so that the amount does not lie idle. That the income generated was again applied to the disbursement of grants and loans. The income generated from interest is necessarily inter- linked to the business of the appellant-Corporation and would, thus, fall under the head of profits and gains of business or profession. There would, therefore, be no requirement of taking recourse to Section 56 of the IT Act for taxing the interest income under this residuary clause as income from other sources. In our view, to decide the question as to whether a particular source of income is business income, one would have to look to the notions of what is the business activity. The activity from which the income is derived must have a set purpose. The business activity of the appellant-Corporation is really that of an intermediary to lend money or give grants. Thus, the generation of interest income in support of this only business (not even primary) for a period of time when the funds are lying idle, and utilised for the same purpose would ultimately be taxable as business income. The fact that the appellant- Corporation does not carry on business activity for profit motive is not material as profit making is not an essential ingredient on account of self- imposed and innate restriction arising from the very statute which creates the appellant-Corporation and the very purpose for which the appellant- Corporation has been set up. Our view finds support from the judgment in The Sole Trustee, Lok Shikshana Trust v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore. (1976) 1 SCC 254. 25. The facts before us clearly set out that undoubtedly the amount received to be advanced as loans and grants by the appellant-Corporation from the Central Government are treated as capital receipts. In fact, if it was otherwise, they would have become taxable in the hands of the appellant-Corporation. Over this, there is no dispute. The line of argument on behalf of the appellant-Corporation was, however, predicated on a plea that assuming it to be so, the grants (and not loans) cannot be treated as a capital expenditure as neither any enduring advantage or benefit has accrued to the appellant-Corporation nor has any asset come into existence which belongs to or was owned by the appellant-Corporation. Thus, what may be a capital receipt in the hands of the appellant-Corporation may still be a revenue expenditure and it is in that context that the observations in Atherton v. British Insulated and Helsby Cables Ltd. (supra) referred to in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay v. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., Bombay (supra) were relied upon. The context was slightly different in those cases because if an expenditure was to bring into existence an asset or advantage for enduring benefit of the trade, it was opined that a case could be made out attributed not to revenue but to capital. In this case, of course, this proposition is really the reverse and advantage was sought to be taken of the aforesaid principle.27. No doubt the interest income is not directly received as a capital amount. It is actually generated by utilising the capital receipts when the fund is lying idle though the income so generated is then applied for the very objective for which the appellant-Corporation was set up, i.e., disbursement of grants and advancement of loans. The impugned judgment of the High Court appears to us to have dealt with both loans and grants, but the question of references framed, and which is a position accepted before us, is that the dispute related to only grants. It was not the appellant-Corporations case that the amounts advanced as loans, the same being payable with interest, could be adjusted as expenses against the business income generated by investing the amounts and consequently earning interest on the same. The argument was predicated on a reasoning that since the interest generated is treated as a business income, the grants made, which would never come back, should be adjustable as expenses against the same. In fact, to the extent grants were returned back, the CIT(A) did not allow the entire deduction as claimed for but only did so qua the amount which was disbursed as grant and never received back.28. To decide the aforesaid question, it would be appropriate to advert to the very purpose for which the statutory appellant-Corporation has been set up. It is in this context that we have set out the functions of the appellant-Corporation in para 3 hereinabove, i.e., to advance loans or grant subsidies to State Governments for financing cooperative societies, etc. There is no other function which the appellant-Corporation carries out nor does it generate any funds of its own from any other business. In a sense the role is confined to receiving funds from the Central Government and appropriately advancing the same as loans, grants or subsidies. In a larger canvas the appellant-Corporation plans, promotes and makes financial programmes for the benefit of these societies and other entities to which such loans, grants and subsidies are advanced. We may say it is really in the nature of an intermediary with expertise in the financial sector to carry forward the intent of the Central Government to assist State Governments, Cooperative Societies, etc. Since this is the business activity, that is what has persuaded us to opine that the income generated in the form of interest on the unutilised capital is in the nature of business income. The objectives are wholly socio-economic and the amounts received including grants come with a prior stipulation for the funds received to be passed on to the downstream entities. This is the reason they have been treated as capital receipts. However, we are unable to opine that since this is a pass-through entity on the basis of a statutory obligation, the advancement of loans and grants is not a business activity, when really it is the only business activity. Once it is business activity, the interest generated on the unutilised capital has been held by us to be the business income.29. We are unable to accept the contention of the Revenue Department that merely because the interest income received has merged with the monies in the common Fund it loses its revenue character and becomes a capital receipt. This line of argument is inconsistent with the position where interest money is received, it is held to be of revenue character, and chargeable to tax under the head Profits and Gains of Business or Profession. This amount while lying in the same fund cannot acquire the character of a capital receipt. The interest having been treated as revenue receipt on which taxes are paid, it must continue to retain the character of revenue receipt. If the nature of receipt is treated as capital receipt then consistent with the aforesaid approach, no taxes would have been payable on the amount. The corollary is that all expenses incurred in connection with the business are deductible.30. The legal position, which emerges is that if an assessee carries on business, all that is required to be seen is whether any outlay constitutes an expenditure for the purpose of business as used in Section 37(1) of the IT Act.The disbursement of grants has already been held to be the core business of the appellant-Corporation. Once that requirement is satisfied, the expenditure incurred in the course of business and for the purpose of business, would naturally be an allowable deduction under Section 37(1) of the IT Act. The source of funds from which the expenditure is made is not relevant. It is also not really relevant as to whether the expenditure is incurred out of the corpus funds or from the interest income earned by the appellant-Corporation.31. We are also unable to accept the contention of the respondent that the payouts constitute a mere application of income, which does not tantamount to expenditure. The disbursement of non-refundable grants is an integral part of business of the appellant-Corporation as contemplated under Section 13(1) of the NCDC Act and, thus, is for the purpose of its business. The purpose is direct; merely because the grants benefit a third party, it would not render the disbursement as application of income and not expenditure.32. In support of the aforesaid view, we may rely on the judgment of this Court in CIT Kerala, Ernakulam v. The Travancore Sugar & Chemicals Ltd., (1973) 3 SCC 274 (  more specifically para 23) which gave an occasion to examine the issue whether the discharge of an obligation paid to the Government was application of income or diversion of profits. This Court came to the conclusion that from any point of view, whether as revenue expenditure or as an overriding charge of the profit-making apparatus or laid out and expended wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade, this was an allowable revenue expenditure.33. The logical conclusion is that every application of income towards business objective of the appellant-Corporation is a business expenditure and nothing else. The endeavour of the Revenue Department to rely on the judgment in the Sitaldas Tirathdas case (supra) is not appreciable since that was a case dealing with the obligation of an individual who was compelled to apply a portion of his income for the maintenance of persons whom he was under a personal and legal obligation to maintain. The IT Act does not permit any deduction from the total income in such circumstances.34. We also find really no force in the submission of the Revenue Department that the direct nexus of monies given as outright grants from the taxable interest income cannot be distinctly identified. This is a question of fact. The plea of the respondents is based on a pure conjecture.In fact, CIT(A) allowed the business expenditure only to a certain amount on the basis of the facts and figures as emerged from the balance sheet. This is a burden which was to be discharged by the appellant-Corporation and the CIT(A) had been satisfied with the nexus of interest income with the disbursement of grants made, as having been established.35. We may also note another principle to test the proposition, i.e., of diversion by overriding title. This principle was originally set out in the Sitaldas Tirathdas case (supra) and the principle has been since followed. If a portion of income arising out of a corpus held by the assessee consumed for the purposes of meeting some recurring expenditure arising out of an obligation imposed on the assessee by a contract or by statute or by own volition or by the law of the land and if the income before it reaches the hands of the assessee is already diverted away by a superior title the portion passed or liable to be passed on is not the income of the assessee. The test, thus, is what amounts to application of income and what is the diversion by overriding title. The principle, in a sense would apply, if the Act or the Rules framed thereunder or other binding directions bind the institution to spend the interest income on disbursal of grants.36. The appellant-Corporation has devised a procedure of sanction/disbursal of its system for institutional development of cooperatives. The appellant-Corporation actually supplements the efforts of the State Governments. Thus, State Governments recommend proposals of individual societies/projects to the appellant-Corporation in a prescribed systematic format and that society may also avail direct funding of projects under various schemes of assistance on fulfillment of stipulated conditions. The formal sanction is thereafter conveyed to the State Government or the Society as the case may be and the release of funds depends on progress of implementation and is on a non- reimbursement basis. Part of the funds are advanced as loans ranging from a period 3 to 8 years with rate of interest varying from time to time, while another part is applied to grants, which are not received back naturally. This modus-operandi has also been set out as a stand of the appellant-Corporation as contained in para 5 of the assessment order.37. The NCDC Act does not specify as to who should be the grantee; what should be amount to be granted. All that is prescribed is that the business of the appellant-Corporation is to provide loans or grants for the avowed object for which it has been set up. The decision with regard to who should get the grant is taken by the appellant-Corporation directly in the course of, and for the purpose of its business. Thus, the amount agreed to be given should be given as a loan or grant, or both is entirely at the business discretion of the appellant-Corporation. No grantee has a superior title to the funds. Hence, this is not a case of diversion of income by overriding title.39. We may also note that even though in the own view of the appellant-Corporation for preceding years in question, it never claimed any such adjustments, but that of course does not preclude the right of the appellant-Corporation as they sought to make out a case of mistake at a subsequent date.The Finance Act of 2003 added a provision in Section 36 of the IT Act as sub-clause (1) (xii)41. The amendment has to be appreciated in the context of the Departmental Circular No.7/2003 dated 5.9.2003, which provides for deduction for expenditure incurred by entities established under any Central, State or Provincial Act. Entities that are created under an Act of Parliament have the basic object and function of carrying on developmental activities in the areas as specified in the said Acts. By the Finance Act, 2001 and the Finance Act, 2002, tax exemption of certain bodies set up through an Act of Parliament was withdrawn. Subsequent to the removal of the tax shield, a doubt has arisen that some of the activities having no profit motive being carried on by such entities cannot be said to be business and therefore, expenditure incurred on such developmental activities may not be allowed as a deduction when computing the income under the head profits and gains of business or profession.42. The Finance Act, 2003, thus, inserted a new clause mentioned aforesaid so as to provide that an expenditure not being capital expenditure incurred by a corporation or body corporate, by whatever name called, constituted or established by a Central, State or Provincial Act for the objects and purposes authorised by such Act under which such corporation or body corporate was constituted or established, shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income under the head profits and gains of business or profession. The amendment had been introduced into the Act with effect from 1.4.2002. (Chaturvedi & Pithisarias Income Tax Law, Volume 3, Sixth Edition (2014), Pg. 3310, published by LexisNexis).In the years prior to the amendment, as we are dealing with AY 1976-77 onwards, the tax jurisprudence has evolved on the basis of ordinary principles of commercial accountancy for determining the taxable income. Thus, prior to insertion of this sub-clause, such expenses would be permissible under the general Section 37(1) of the IT Act, which provides for deduction of permissible expenses on principles of commercial accountancy. Post amendment, such expenses get allowed under the specific section, viz. Section 36(1)(xii) after the amendment by the Finance Act, 2003.44. We would, thus, like to conclude that we are unable to agree with the findings arrived at by the AO, ITAT and the High Court albeit for different reasons and concur with the view taken by the CIT(A) for the reasons set out hereinbefore.4. The Central Government and the State authorities have been repeatedly emphasising that they have evolved a litigation policy. Our experience is that it is observed more in breach. The approach is one of bringing everything to the highest level before this Court, so that there is no responsibility in the decision-making process – an unfortunate situation which creates unnecessary burden on the judicial system. This aspect has also been commented upon in a judgment of this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Pirthwi Singh & Ors., (2018) 16 SCC 363 albeit between the Government and the private parties, where the question of law had been settled and yet the appeal was filed only to invite a dismissal. The object appears to be that a certificate for dismissal is obtained from the highest court so that a quietus could be put to the matter in the Government Departments. Undoubtedly, this is complete wastage of judicial time and in various orders of this Court it has been categorized as certificate cases, i.e., the purpose of which is only to obtain this certificate of dismissal.5. The 126 th Law Commission of India Report titled Government and Public Sector Undertaking Litigation Policy and Strategies debated the Government versus Government matters which weighed heavily on the time of the Courts as well as the public exchequer. This was as far back as in 1988. It was only in the year 2010 that the National Litigation Policy (for short NLP) was formulated with the aim of reducing litigation and making the Government an efficient and responsible litigant. Five (5) years later it reportedly saw a revision to increase its efficacy, but it has hardly made an impact. In the year 2018, the Central Government gave its approval towards strengthening the resolution of commercial disputes of Central Public Sector Enterprises (for short CPSEs)/ Port Trusts inter se, as well as between CPSEs and other Government Departments/Organisations. The aim was and is to put in place a mechanism within the Government for promoting a speedy resolution of disputes of this kind, however it excluded disputes relating to Railways, Income Tax, Customs and Excise Departments. It has now been made applicable to all disputes other than those related to taxation matters. This was pursuant an order passed in The Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) v. National Interest Exchange of India SLP (C) Diary No. 35567 of 2019 by a bench of which one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) was a part.6. Insofar as non-taxation matters are concerned, the Administrative Mechanism for Resolution of CPSEs Disputes was conceptualised to replace the Permanent Machinery of Arbitration and to promote equity through collective efforts to resolve disputes. It has a two-tiered structure.7. At the first level, commercial disputes will be referred to the Committee comprising Secretaries of the Administrative Ministries/Departments to which the disputing parties belong and the Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs. In case the two disputing parties belong to the same Ministry/Department, the Committee will comprise Secretary of Administrative Ministry/Department concerned; the Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs and the Secretary, Department of Public Enterprises. If a dispute is between a CPSE and a State Government Department/Organisation, the Committee will comprise of the Secretary of the Ministry Department of the Union to which the CPSE belongs, the Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs and the Chief Secretary of the State concerned. Such disputes are ideally to be resolved at the first level itself within a time schedule of three (3) months, and in the eventuality of them remaining unresolved, the same may be referred to the Cabinet Secretary at the second level, whose decision will be final and binding on all concerned.8. We are of the opinion that one of the main impediments to such a resolution, plainly speaking, is that the bureaucrats are reluctant to accept responsibility of taking such decisions, apprehending that at some future date their decision may be called into question and they may face consequences post retirement. In order to make the system function effectively, it may be appropriate to have a Committee of legal experts presided by a retired Judge to give their imprimatur to the settlement so that such apprehensions do not come in the way of arriving at a settlement. It is our pious hope that a serious thought would be given to the aspect of dispute resolution amicably, more so in the post-COVID period.9. In most countries, mediation has proved to be an efficacious remedy and here we are talking about mediation inter se the Government authorities or Government departments. India is now a signatory to the Singapore Convention on Mediation and we understand that a serious thought is being given to bring forth a comprehensive legislation to institutionalise mediation, in furtherance of this function to which India has committed itself.11. In our opinion, a vibrant system of Advance Ruling can go a long way in reducing taxation litigation. This is not only true of these kinds of disputes but even disputes between the taxation department and private persons, who are more than willing to comply with the law of the land but find some ambiguity. Instead of first filing a return and then facing consequences from the Department because of a different perception which the Department may have, an Advance Ruling System can facilitate not only such a resolution, but also avoid the tiers of litigation which such cases go through as in the present case. In fact, before further discussing this Advance Ruling System, we can unhesitatingly say that, at least, for CPSEs and Government authorities, there would be no question of taking this matter further once an Advance Ruling is delivered, and even in case of private persons, the scope of any further challenge is completely narrowed down.s. The scope of the transactions on which an advance ruling can be sought from the AAR has gradually increased to now include both residents and non-residents, who can seek the same for issues having a substantial tax impact. Chapter XIX-B of the IT Act deals with advance rulings and it has been defined in Section 245N(a) of the IT Act. These rulings are binding both on the Income Tax Department and the applicant, and while there is no statutory right to appeal, the Supreme Court has held in Columbia Sportswear Company v. Director of Income Tax Bangalore (2012) 11 SCC 224   that a challenge an advance ruling first lies before the High Court, and subsequently before the Supreme Court. The advance ruling may be reversed in the event a substantial question of general public importance arises or a similar question is already pending before the Supreme Court for adjudication.13. The ground level situation is that this methodology has proved to be illusionary because there is an increasing number of applications pending before the AAR due to its low disposal rate and contrary to the expectation that a ruling would be given in six (6) months (as per Section 245R(6) of the IT Act), the average time taken is stated to be reaching around four (4) years! (See Deloitte Report on Advance Rulings in India: Delivering Greater Tax Certainty (Deloitte Tax Policy Paper 5, 2019)) There is obviously lack of adequate numbers of presiding officers to deal with the volume of cases. Interestingly, the primary reason for this is the large number of vacancies and delayed appointments of Members to the AAR. (ibid.) In view of the time taken, the very purpose of AAR is defeated, resulting in the mechanism being used infrequently as is evident from the ever- increasing tax related litigation.14. We may notice a significant development in Section 245N of the IT Act. It was through Notification No.11456 dated 3.8.2000 that public sector companies were added to the definition of applicant, and in 2014, it was made applicable to a resident who had undertaken one or more transactions of the value of Rs. 100 crore or more.15. Insofar as a resident is concerned, the limit is so high that it cannot provide any solace to any individual, and we do believe that it is time to reconsider and reduce the ceiling limit, more so in terms of the recent announcement stated to be in furtherance of a tax friendly face-less regime!19. The aim of any properly framed advance ruling system ought to be a dialogue between taxpayers and revenue authorities to fulfil the mutually beneficial purpose for taxpayers and revenue authorities of bolstering tax compliance and boosting tax morale. This mechanism should not become another stage in the litigation process.22. In the end before parting we may refer to the legal legend Mr. Nani A. Palkhivala, who while addressing a letter of congratulations to Mr. Soli J. Sorabjee on attaining his appointment as the Attorney General on 11.12.1989 referred to the greatest glory of Attorney General as not to win cases for the Government but to ensure that justice is done to the people. In this behalf, he refers to the motto of the Department of Justice in the United States carved out into the Rotunda of the Attorney General Office:The United States wins its case whenever justice is done to one of its citizens in the courts.The Indian citizenry is entitled to a hope that the aforesaid is what must be the objective of Government litigation, which should prevail even within the Indian legal system. In the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., We must accept finite disappointment, but never lose infinite hope.16. We may refer to the international scenario where there has been an incremental shift towards mature tax regimes adopting advance ruling mechanisms. The increase in global trade puts the rulings system at the centre-stage of a robust international tax cooperation regime. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (for short OECD) lists advance rulings as one of the indicators to assess trade facilitation policies, making it an aspirational international best practice standard. For example, Australia and New Zealand have a robust system of advance rulings wherein the decisions (which are public rulings affecting a large number of taxpayers) are given teeth by being made binding on the revenue authorities. New Zealand has gone a step further and innovated status rulings under which a taxpayer can apply to the Commissioner for a ruling on how a change in the law impacts an existing ruling.17. In the United States, there is a mechanism for the Treasury to authorise guidance in the form of revenue rulings, procedures and notices. The mechanism again, has been bolstered by subsequent practice and interpretations of the United States courts, where rulings have indicated that taxpayers may be penalised if they act inconsistently with legal interpretations set out in the revenue rulings, procedures or notices.18. Tax transparency has been a hallmark trait of the Swedish legal system. Swedish law requires public disclosure of ex ante tax administration such as advance rulings. Both the taxpayer as well as the Swedish Tax Agency can request an advance tax ruling, these rulings are published without information identifying the taxpayer that requested them. The Skatterättsnämnden, or the Council for Advance Tax Rulings is the Swedish Government agency which is vested with this power. The advance ruling system has played a crucial role in Swedens position as a country with one of the highest tax compliance rates in the world.19. The aim of any properly framed advance ruling system ought to be a dialogue between taxpayers and revenue authorities to fulfil the mutually beneficial purpose for taxpayers and revenue authorities of bolstering tax compliance and boosting tax morale. This mechanism should not become another stage in the litigation process.21. We have been persuaded to write two postscripts on account of the backbreaking dockets which are ever increasing and as a move towards a trust between the Tax Department and the assessee, and we hope that both the aspects meet consideration at an appropriate level.38. We may record here that income has to be determined on the principles of commercial accountancy. There is, thus, a distinction between real profits ascertained on principles of commercial accountancy. In the case of Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. CIT Bombay City (1965) 3 SCR 818   this Court has held that income tax is on the real income. In the case of a business, the profits must be arrived at on ordinary commercial principles. The scheme of the IT Act requires the determination of real income on the basis of ordinary commercial principles of accountancy. To determine the real income, permissible expenses are required to be set off. In this behalf, we may also usefully refer to the judgment in CIT, Gujarat v. S.C. Kothari (1972) 4 SCC 402   where the following principle was laid down:6. …The tax collector cannot be heard to say that he will bring the gross receipts to tax. He can only tax profits of a trade or business. That cannot be done without deducting the losses and the legitimate expenses of the business...There is, thus, a clear distinction between deductions made for ascertaining real profits and thereafter distributions made out of profits. The distribution would be application of income. There is also a distinction between real profits ascertained on commercial principles and profits fixed by a statute for a specific purpose. Income tax is a tax on real income.