Case: Bhupendra Kumar Chimanbhai Kachiya Patel &amp; Others Vs. Divisional Controller GSRTC Nadiad

reads as under:“In reference to the representation made to delete the provision of the section 29 of the settlement dated 23/11/1984 and implement the provision of section 43 of the settlement dated 22/10/1964 it is determined that after preparing the Division wise list of the selected employees they will be given temporary/daily wager appointment against the permanent posts in the division/unit, and if such appointed temporary/daily wager has worked continuously for 180 days including the weekly holiday/paid holiday and authorize leave then they will be taken on time scale. This provision will not be applicable to the employees on work charge working in the Civil Engineering Department and such appointed temporary/daily wager has worked continuously for 180 days including the weekly holiday/paid holiday and authorized leave then they will be taken in time scale and they will be entitled to all benefits available to time scale employees. The absence due to authorized leave for the above purpose will not be considered break and these days will not be considered for 180 days service.As per permission of S.T.T. 1981, if the recruitment of the staff has been done as a temporary or badli kamdar then after completion of their 180 days of service on the permitted vacancies they would be taken on time scale serially.Such workers will be granted all benefits as per the Rules along with the notional increment with effect from 1.8.87 and there will not be any recoveries made from them nor there will be any arrears paid.The workmen taken into service are not required during the monsoon, therefore they can be retrenched as per the requirement and after the monsoon if their services are required then again as per seniority they will be taken in time scale. If there is any permanent post vacant then the appointment of the administrative staff will be made on time scale.”28. It is not in dispute that the Corporation has followed the procedure provided in clause 20 while granting the employees their permanent cadre and the time scale of conductor. In other words, all eligible “Badali Kamdars” were absorbed in the set up and accordingly granted benefit in terms of the procedure prescribed in clause 20 of the Settlement.29. It is also clear from the undisputed facts that firstly, the appellant (employee concerned) was appointed as "Badali Kamdar" in the set up of Corporation on 04.06.1999; Secondly, clear vacancy arose in the permanent cadre of Conductor in and around 27.08.2008; Thirdly, as per the seniority list of the “Badali Kamdars”, the appellant was accordingly absorbed in the permanent cadre at the time scale with effect from 27.08.2008 on completion of 180 days of his service in the cadre and, as a consequence thereof, was given all the benefits of the said post from the said date; and lastly, since then the appellant and all employees alike him are continuing on their respective post.30. In our considered opinion, in the light of what we have held above, there is no basis for the appellants (employees) to claim the aforesaid benefit from the date of their initial appointment as “Badali Kamdar”. Indeed, there is neither any factual foundation nor any legal foundation to claim such benefit.31. Learned counsel for the appellants was also not able to show any document, such as any term/condition in the appointment letter or in the settlement or any Rule/Regulation framed by the Corporation recognizing such right in appellants’ favour to enable them to claim such benefit from the date of their initial appointment.32. Clause 20 of the Settlement is the only clause which recognizes the appellant’s right for consideration of his case on individual basis and to grant him the benefit subject to his fulfilling conditions specified therein which, in appellant’s case, were found satisfied and accordingly, he was granted the benefit along with each such employees.33. It is pertinent to mention that the appellants neither challenged the settlement nor its applicability. In other words, the legality or/and binding nature of settlement dated 21.12.1989 was never questioned in these proceedings. In this view of the matter, the settlement is binding on both parties in terms of Section 18 of the Act.34. The concept of “Badli Kamdar” is statutorily recognized under the Act. Explanation to Section 25C defines the term “Badli Kamdar”. The appellant never questioned his status as “Badli Kamdar”. Indeed, it is due to the status of “Badli Kamdar”, which he enjoyed for few years in the service of Corporation, he got the benefit of absorption in permanent cadre.35. So far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on some previous judicial orders are concerned, in our view, they are of no help to the appellants inasmuch as those orders turned on the facts involved in the case and secondly, we find that in those cases, parties did not even lead any evidence (see Para-3 of the order dated 27.01.2000 passed in SCA No. 393/2000 page 45 of Paper Book), and lastly, one case was based on clause 49 of 1956 settlement and clause 19 of 1985 settlement.36. In substance, in our view, those orders did not directly deal with the issues, which are the subject matter of these appeals and, even if, they deal with the issue in question, as urged by the learned counsel, then also, in our view, those cases turned on their own facts.37. In this view of the matter, those orders were rightly not relied on by the High Court and we find no good ground to take different view and accordingly reject this submission.38. Mr. Colin Gondsalves, learned senior counsel for the appellants then referred extensively to the evidence led by the parties to support his submission.39. We are afraid we cannot appreciate the evidence in the appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is more so when the Single Judge and Division Bench did not agree with the factual findings of the Tribunal and rightly reversed those findings. It is binding on this Court.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]23. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in the appeals.24. As rightly argued by the learned ASG, the issue in question has to be decided in the light of clause 20 of the Settlement.25. One cannot dispute the legal proposition that the settlement once arrived at between the employer and the employees as provided in Section 18 of the Act, it is binding on the employer and the employees.It is also clear from the undisputed facts that firstly, the appellant (employee concerned) was appointed as "Badali Kamdar" in the set up of Corporation on 04.06.1999; Secondly, clear vacancy arose in the permanent cadre of Conductor in and around 27.08.2008; Thirdly, as per the seniority list of the, the appellant was accordingly absorbed in the permanent cadre at the time scale with effect from 27.08.2008 on completion of 180 days of his service in the cadre and, as a consequence thereof, was given all the benefits of the said post from the said date; and lastly, since then the appellant and all employees alike him are continuing on their respective post.30. In our considered opinion, in the light of what we have held above, there is no basis for the appellants (employees) to claim the aforesaid benefit from the date of their initial appointment as. Indeed, there is neither any factual foundation nor any legal foundation to claim such benefit.31. Learned counsel for the appellants was also not able to show any document, such as any term/condition in the appointment letter or in the settlement or any Rule/Regulation framed by the Corporation recognizing such right infavour to enable them to claim such benefit from the date of their initial appointment.32. Clause 20 of the Settlement is the only clause which recognizes theright for consideration of his case on individual basis and to grant him the benefit subject to his fulfilling conditions specified therein which, incase, were found satisfied and accordingly, he was granted the benefit along with each such employees.33. It is pertinent to mention that the appellants neither challenged the settlement nor its applicability. In other words, the legality or/and binding nature of settlement dated 21.12.1989 was never questioned in these proceedings. In this view of the matter, the settlement is binding on both parties in terms of Section 18 of the Act.34. The concept ofis statutorily recognized under the Act. Explanation to Section 25C defines the term. The appellant never questioned his status as. Indeed, it is due to the status of, which he enjoyed for few years in the service of Corporation, he got the benefit of absorption in permanent cadre.35. So far as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on some previous judicial orders are concerned, in our view, they are of no help to the appellants inasmuch as those orders turned on the facts involved in the case and secondly, we find that in those cases, parties did not even lead any evidence (seeof the order dated 27.01.2000 passed in SCA No. 393/2000 page 45 of Paper Book), and lastly, one case was based on clause 49 of 1956 settlement and clause 19 of 1985 settlement.36. In substance, in our view, those orders did not directly deal with the issues, which are the subject matter of these appeals and, even if, they deal with the issue in question, as urged by the learned counsel, then also, in our view, those cases turned on their own facts.37. In this view of the matter, those orders were rightly not relied on by the High Court and we find no good ground to take different view and accordingly reject this submission.38. Mr. Colin Gondsalves, learned senior counsel for the appellants then referred extensively to the evidence led by the parties to support his submission.39. We are afraid we cannot appreciate the evidence in the appeals filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is more so when the Single Judge and Division Bench did not agree with the factual findings of the Tribunal and rightly reversed those findings. It is binding on this Court.