Case: State Of Assam &amp; Anr Vs. Gauhati Municipal, Board

natural justice required that the Board should have been given a personal hearing and an opportunity to produce materials in support of the explanation. We should have thought that when the Board is given a notice as required by S. 298 it would naturally submit its explanation supported by facts and figures and all relevant material in support thereof. However, we are definitely of opinion that the provisions of S. 298 being fully complied with it cannot be said that there was violation of principles of natural justice in this case when the Board never demanded what is called a personal hearing and never intimated to the Government that it would like to produce materials in support of its explanation at some later stage. Therefore where a provision like S. 298 is fully complied with as in this case and the Board does not ask for an opportunity for personal hearing or for production of materials in support of its explanation, principles of natural justice do not require that the State Government should ask the Board to appear for a personal healing and to produce materials in support of the explanation. In the absence of any demand by the Board of the nature indicated above, we cannot agree with the High Court that merely because the State Government did not call upon the Board to appear for a personal hearing and to produce material in support of its explanation it violated the principles of natural justice. This ground in support of the order of the High Court therefore fails.Re. (ii).8. Then we come to the finding of the High Court that the charges found proved in the notification were different from the charges levelled in the notice. We regret to say that the High Court did not carefully look into the matter. If it had done so, it would have found that there was no difference in substance between what wars charged and what was found proved. Eight charges were indicated in the notice of June 9, 1964. Six of them related to acts of omission and commission by the Board; the seventh and eighth charges were mere matters of inference from the first six charges and were not strictly speaking charges of which any explanation was necessary. In the notification superseding the Board the appellant found six charges proved. We have compared the notification of December 9, 1964 with the notice of June 9, l964 and find that the first charge found proved in the notification is the third charge in the notice; the second charge found proved in the notification is the fifth charge in the notice; the third charge found proved in the notification is the fourth charge in the notice; the fourth charge found proved in the notification is the second charge in the notice; the fifth charge found proved in the notification is the sixth charge in the notice and the sixth charge found proved in the notification is the first charge in the notice. It will thus be seen that though there was a change in the order in which charges were enumerated, the charges found proved were substantially the same as the charges leveled. We have already indicated that the seventh and eighth charges in the notice were really not charges and wore mere inferences and that is why we find no mention of them in the notification. The view of the High Court that the charges proved were different from the charges levelled therefore also fails.Re. (iii).9. Finally the High Court found that in the notice the State Government indicated its tentative conclusion to the effect that the Board should be superseded and thus it had made up its mind already even before considering the explanation of the Board that it should be superseded, and that the rest of the proceedings were a farce. The High Court thought that the appellant should not have indicated its tentative conclusion because S. 298 provides for two courses, i. e. supersession or dissolution, and the appellant could not decide between the two alternatives even tentatively before taking into consideration the explanation of the Board. In this connection the High Court relied on decision under Art. 311 of the Constitution relating to removal, dismissal and reduction in rank of public servants and was apparently of the view that the State Government should first have considered the explanation and then made up its mind as to which one of the two alternatives provided in S. 298 should be used and then presumably given a second notice to the Board to show cause why one of the alternatives tentatively decided upon should not be pursued. We are of opinion that it is not correct to use the analogy of Article 311 for the purpose of S. 298 of the Act. The issue of two notices under Article 311 is a very special procedure depending upon the language of that Article. We find no comparable words in S. 298. We also see no reason why when giving notice the State Government should not indicate to the Board tentatively which of the two alternatives it intends to pursue. Such tentative conclusion communicated to the Board does not mean that the State Government is not open to conviction at all and whatever the explanation it would pass an order in accordance with its tentative conclusion. There is therefore no reason to think that all proceedings subsequent to the issue of notice dated June 9, 1964 were in this case a farce. The third ground on which the High Court decided in favour of the respondent must fail.10. It appears that the respondent had secured a stay order and practically continued to function for the full period of four year under the cover of the stay order. Before, us, though the respondent has appeared, it did not seriously contest the appeal for the period of all members who took office on July 7, 1962 came to an end on July 6, 1966.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]6. We are of opinion that the appeal must succeed.(i)7. It is not necessary in the present appeal to decide whether the proceedings resulting in an order under S. 298 of the Act are quasi-judicial proceedings or merely administrativeit is clear from these facts that the appellant acted in full compliance with the procedure provided in S. 298. Ordinarily therefore there is no reason why it should be held, when the procedure provided in S. 298 was complied with, that the principles of natural justice were violated. But the High Court was of the view that the appellant should have given an oral hearing to the Board which should also have been given an opportunity to produce materials before the appellant in support of the explanation. According to the High Court, the right of hearing includes the right to produce evidence in support of an explanation and this opportunity was not given to the Board. Here again it is unnecessary to decide whether S. 298 which merely says that the State Government should give opportunity to the Board for submitting an explanation in regard to the matter envisages production of evidence - oral or documentary - at some later stage by the Board in support of its explanation. The High Court has conceded that a personal hearing of the nature indicated above is not always a concomitant of the principles of natural justice. But it was of the view that in the present case principles of natural justice required that the Board should have been given a personal hearing and an opportunity to produce materials in support of the explanation. We should have thought that when the Board is given a notice as required by S. 298 it would naturally submit its explanation supported by facts and figures and all relevant material in support thereof. However, we are definitely of opinion that the provisions of S. 298 being fully complied with it cannot be said that there was violation of principles of natural justice in this case when the Board never demanded what is called a personal hearing and never intimated to the Government that it would like to produce materials in support of its explanation at some later stage. Therefore where a provision like S. 298 is fully complied with as in this case and the Board does not ask for an opportunity for personal hearing or for production of materials in support of its explanation, principles of natural justice do not require that the State Government should ask the Board to appear for a personal healing and to produce materials in support of the explanation. In the absence of any demand by the Board of the nature indicated above, we cannot agree with the High Court that merely because the State Government did not call upon the Board to appear for a personal hearing and to produce material in support of its explanation it violated the principles of natural justice. This ground in support of the order of the High Court therefore fails.Re. (ii).8. Then we come to the finding of the High Court that the charges found proved in the notification were different from the charges levelled in the notice. We regret to say that the High Court did not carefully look into the matter. If it had done so, it would have found that there was no difference in substance between what wars charged and what was found proved. Eight charges were indicated in the notice of June 9, 1964. Six of them related to acts of omission and commission by the Board; the seventh and eighth charges were mere matters of inference from the first six charges and were not strictly speaking charges of which any explanation was necessary. In the notification superseding the Board the appellant found six charges proved. We have compared the notification of December 9, 1964 with the notice of June 9, l964 and find that the first charge found proved in the notification is the third charge in the notice; the second charge found proved in the notification is the fifth charge in the notice; the third charge found proved in the notification is the fourth charge in the notice; the fourth charge found proved in the notification is the second charge in the notice; the fifth charge found proved in the notification is the sixth charge in the notice and the sixth charge found proved in the notification is the first charge in the notice. It will thus be seen that though there was a change in the order in which charges were enumerated, the charges found proved were substantially the same as the charges leveled. We have already indicated that the seventh and eighth charges in the notice were really not charges and wore mere inferences and that is why we find no mention of them in the notification. The view of the High Court that the charges proved were different from the charges levelled therefore also fails.Re. (iii).9. Finally the High Court found that in the notice the State Government indicated its tentative conclusion to the effect that the Board should be superseded and thus it had made up its mind already even before considering the explanation of the Board that it should be superseded, and that the rest of the proceedings were a farce. The High Court thought that the appellant should not have indicated its tentative conclusion because S. 298 provides for two courses, i. e. supersession or dissolution, and the appellant could not decide between the two alternatives even tentatively before taking into consideration the explanation of the Board. In this connection the High Court relied on decision under Art. 311 of the Constitution relating to removal, dismissal and reduction in rank of public servants and was apparently of the view that the State Government should first have considered the explanation and then made up its mind as to which one of the two alternatives provided in S. 298 should be used and then presumably given a second notice to the Board to show cause why one of the alternatives tentatively decided upon should not be pursued. We are of opinion that it is not correct to use the analogy of Article 311 for the purpose of S. 298 of the Act. The issue of two notices under Article 311 is a very special procedure depending upon the language of that Article. We find no comparable words in S. 298. We also see no reason why when giving notice the State Government should not indicate to the Board tentatively which of the two alternatives it intends to pursue. Such tentative conclusion communicated to the Board does not mean that the State Government is not open to conviction at all and whatever the explanation it would pass an order in accordance with its tentative conclusion. There is therefore no reason to think that all proceedings subsequent to the issue of notice dated June 9, 1964 were in this case a farce. The third ground on which the High Court decided in favour of the respondent must fail.10. It appears that the respondent had secured a stay order and practically continued to function for the full period of four year under the cover of the stay order. Before, us, though the respondent has appeared, it did not seriously contest the appeal for the period of all members who took office on July 7, 1962 came to an end on July 6, 1966.