Case: M/S. Asahi India Glass Limited Vs. The State of Maharashtra &amp; Others

it may be, and unscientific. But even such critism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void.... Next reliance was placed in the judgment in Union of India and another Versus Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 96. The Supreme Court observed as under: ............ The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to get at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. 11. We may consider the true scope of Rule 7 and 8. Rule 7 deals with the application for registration of dealers. Rule (a-1) sets out that the application for registration under section 22 shall be made within sixty days from the date of succession to the business as provided under sub section 6 of section 19. What would be the date of succession in business for the applicant to make the application. Section 19(6) sets out that an application shall be made within sixty days from the date of such succession. An ordinary reading therefore, after the scheme of amalgamation, if the order is made with an anterior date then on the literal construction, the application for registration must be made within sixty days from such anterior date. We can take judicial notice of the fact that a scheme for amalgamation in the company court is not normally disposed of within sixty days of it being filed in the company court on account of mandatory procedural provisions which have to be complied with and as such the order is normally beyond the period of sixty days set out in section 19(6) of the C.S.T. Act. In such circumstances, no company applying for scheme of amalgamation to the company court would be in a position to comply with the requirement of Rule 7(1)(a-1) if the date fixed by the company court is an anterior date from the date of the order. As such between the period of the anterior date and the date of the order and the date of the application, the company will have to be treated as URD. The date of succession to the business will be ordinarily the date of the order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. If however, the date is an anterior date, then it will normally not be possible to comply with rule 7(1)(a1). A company following the provisions of the Companies Act, cannot be disadvantaged because of procedural ambiguity or lacunae. Rule 8 speaks of grant of certificate of registration. Rule 8(2) is inapplicable, similarly Rule 3(a) refers to an application under Clause (a) of Sub Rule (1) of Rule 7. Similarly Rule 3(a-2) refers to an application under clause (b) of sub rule (1) of rule (7). In so far as Rule 8(a)(1) and (2) are concerned, it only takes note of applications made under rule (7)(1)(a) and rule l7(1)(b). No rule for grant of certificate of registration is made in so far as rule 7(1)(a-1) is concerned. Rule 7(1) (a-1) was introduced by an amendment and it appears that the delegate has made no provisions to cover that eventuality under rule 8(3). Rule 8(3)(a)(3) and (4) will also not be applicable. Thus though section 19(6) and Rule 7(1)(a-1) provides for the date of succession, it does not cover the eventualities of transfer of business under a scheme of amalgamation. 12. It is in these circumstances that this court must consider the date for the purpose of moving an application and the starting point of limitation under rule 7(1) (a-1). As earlier noted in so far as amalgamating company Floatglass India Limited, is concerned, considering the provisions, its certificate of registration was cancelled from 1.4.2002. In other words, M/s. Floatglass India Limited ceases to be company from that date and that must be date to give effect to section 19(6) and rule 7(1) (a-1). There is therefore, an omission on account of the failure by the delegates to provide a corresponding rule to rule 7(1)(a-1). In the absence of legislature providing and taking note of the fact that in such cases, the amalgamating company is not at fault. It will have to be construed that the time for making an application for registration will be 60 days from the date of the court passing the order. On such application being made, certificate of registration will have to be made effective from the anterior date given by the company court. This is only a procedural requirement. This would avoid hardship and give true effect to the mandate of the legislature both under BST and CST Act. No order of a court should visit a party with liabilities and or undesirable consequences in the matter of tax. The rule must be so read to give effect to the legislative mandate. The date for applying for registration under Section 19(6) for a company, can only be the date of the company courts under. If within 60 days of such order an application is made, then the expression succession to business in rule 7(1)(1-a) will also be so read. Under Rule 8(8)(a)(iii) then it will be the date the company court has ordered or the date provided in the scheme which will be the date of succession to business. This would obviate any difficulty to a party till such time the delegate makes a specific provision in Rule 8.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]In our opinion, reliance placed in the said section for the purpose of considering the issue in question is wholly irrelevant. Under section 33C when two or more companies are to be amalgamated by the Order of a Court or of the Central Government and the Order is to take effect from a date anterior to the date of the said Order and any two or more of such companies have sold or purchased any goods to or from each other during the period commencing on the date from which the Order is to take effect and ending on the date of the Order, then notwithstanding anything contained in the said amalgamation Order, such transactions of sale and purchase shall be included in the turnover of sales or, as the case may be, purchase of the respective companies and shall be assessed to tax accordingly, and for the purposes of this Act, the said two or more companies shall be treated as distinct companies and shall be treated as such for the entire period upto the date of the said Order, and the registration certificates of the said companies shall be canceled, or amended, where necessary, with effect from the date of the said amalgamation order. In other words it would be clear that section 33C was introduced with a view to avoid escapement of sales tax of transactions between the two or more companies seeking to amalgamate. Irrespective of the date of order of the company court, the two companies should be treated as distinct in respect of the transaction which they had done amongst themselves. In other words they cannot escape payment of tax on the ground that there is no sale tax imposable.Having so said, let us now consider the position in law as to the date of amalgamation. Law has been succinctly set out in the case of Marshall Sons and Co. (India) Ltd. (supra). The Supreme Court after considering the provisions pertaining to amalgamation was pleased to hold that every scheme of amalgamation of companies has necessarily to provide a date with effect from which the amalgamation/transfer shall take place. While sanctioning the scheme, it is open to the company court to modify the said date and prescribe such date of amalgamation/transfer as it thinks appropriate on the facts and circumstances of the case. If the court specifies the date, such date will be the date of application/date of transfer. But where the court does not specify any specific date, but merely sanctions the scheme presented to it, the date of amalgamation and or the date of transfer is the date specified in the scheme as the transfer date. The law thus concluded is that irrespective of the date when the court passes the order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation, it the date fixed by the court or if the court does not fix the date, the date fixed in the scheme of amalgamation/transfer, which would be the date of amalgamation/date ofbehalf of the Revenue, the learned counsel has placed reliance in the case of Dr. (Mrs) Sushma Sharma etc. Versus State of Rajasthan and Others, AIR 1985 Supreme Court 1367 to contend that while interpreting a statute, the court must bear in mind that the wisdom or lack of wisdom in the action of the Government or legislature is not justiciable by court. The Supreme Court quoted with approval the observations of Mr. Justice Kc Kenna in Metropolis Theater Company Vs. City of Chicago and Ernest J. Magerstadt (1912) 57 Led.730 asmay seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations, illogical, it may be, and unscientific. But even such critism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible, the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declaredreliance was placed in the judgment in Union of India and another Versus Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 96. The Supreme Court observed asThe Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to get at naught legislative judgment is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities.We may consider the true scope of Rule 7 and 8. Rule 7 deals with the application for registration of dealers. Rulesets out that the application for registration under section 22 shall be made within sixty days from the date of succession to the business as provided under sub section 6 of section 19. What would be the date of succession in business for the applicant to make the application. Section 19(6) sets out that an application shall be made within sixty days from the date of such succession. An ordinary reading therefore, after the scheme of amalgamation, if the order is made with an anterior date then on the literal construction, the application for registration must be made within sixty days from such anterior date. We can take judicial notice of the fact that a scheme for amalgamation in the company court is not normally disposed of within sixty days of it being filed in the company court on account of mandatory procedural provisions which have to be complied with and as such the order is normally beyond the period of sixty days set out in section 19(6) of the C.S.T. Act. In such circumstances, no company applying for scheme of amalgamation to the company court would be in a position to comply with the requirement of Ruleif the date fixed by the company court is an anterior date from the date of the order. As such between the period of the anterior date and the date of the order and the date of the application, the company will have to be treated as URD. The date of succession to the business will be ordinarily the date of the order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. If however, the date is an anterior date, then it will normally not be possible to comply with rule 7(1)(a1). A company following the provisions of the Companies Act, cannot be disadvantaged because of procedural ambiguity or8 speaks of grant of certificate of registration. Rule 8(2) is inapplicable, similarly Rule 3(a) refers to an application under Clause (a) of Sub Rule (1) of Rule 7. Similarly Rulerefers to an application under clause (b) of sub rule (1) of rule (7). In so far as Rule 8(a)(1) and (2) are concerned, it only takes note of applications made under rule (7)(1)(a) and rule l7(1)(b). No rule for grant of certificate of registration is made in so far as ruleis concerned. Rule 7(1)was introduced by an amendment and it appears that the delegate has made no provisions to cover that eventuality under rule 8(3). Rule 8(3)(a)(3) and (4) will also not be applicable. Thus though section 19(6) and Ruleprovides for the date of succession, it does not cover the eventualities of transfer of business under a scheme of amalgamation.It is in these circumstances that this court must consider the date for the purpose of moving an application and the starting point of limitation under rule 7(1)As earlier noted in so far as amalgamating company Floatglass India Limited, is concerned, considering the provisions, its certificate of registration was cancelled from 1.4.2002. In other words, M/s. Floatglass India Limited ceases to be company from that date and that must be date to give effect to section 19(6) and rule 7(1)There is therefore, an omission on account of the failure by the delegates to provide a corresponding rule to ruleIn the absence of legislature providing and taking note of the fact that in such cases, the amalgamating company is not at fault. It will have to be construed that the time for making an application for registration will be 60 days from the date of the court passing the order. On such application being made, certificate of registration will have to be made effective from the anterior date given by the company court. This is only a procedural requirement. This would avoid hardship and give true effect to the mandate of the legislature both under BST and CST Act. No order of a court should visit a party with liabilities and or undesirable consequences in the matter of tax. The rule must be so read to give effect to the legislative mandate. The date for applying for registration under Section 19(6) for a company, can only be the date of the company courts under. If within 60 days of such order an application is made, then the expression succession to business in rulewill also be so read. Under Rule 8(8)(a)(iii) then it will be the date the company court has ordered or the date provided in the scheme which will be the date of succession to business. This would obviate any difficulty to a party till such time the delegate makes a specific provision in Rule 8.