Case: L. D. Jaisinghani Vs. Naraindas N. Punjabi

to disciplinary proceedings being finally dropped after the advocate or somebody else on his behalf has made payments to the complainant litigants, and the prevaricating replies of the advocate, attempting to conceal or deny these proceedings, may have been justified, yet, there very features of the case were also likely to create a prejudice against the accused advocate who may, in the particular instance now before us, not have been really so blameworthy as one may, with his background, be inclined to believe. After having been taken through the evidence, we are not convinced that the complainant was really so truthful and reliable as the members of the Disciplinary Committee considered him to be. There are several features in his evidence which makes his version difficult to rely upon implicitly. We mention these below.5. Firstly, the complainants evidence shows that he was not the kind of person who could swallow so easily detectable a fraud of which he claimed to be the victim for so long a period of time. He admits that the advocate had appeared in about six or seven suits on his behalf. There had been proceedings against him for malicious prosecution. He had denied that he wanted the appellant to give evidence, but, when confronted by documentary evidence, he was forced to admit that this was true.6. Secondly, although the complainant stated that Rs. 350 included the court fee in respect of the suit, yet, he stated, after that, the advocate had told him that the deficit court fee would be realised from him afterwards. If, as we find from evidence, the court fee alone came to about Rs. 400, it was difficult to believe that any suit could have been agreed to be filed without realising the deficit court fee. The statement of the complainant, that the appellant used to file suits for him and then realise the court fee, if true indicated that the appellant would be expected to make a demand for further payment after alleging that he had filed the suit. But, the complainant not merely does not speak of any such further demand but says that no charge was made even for taking out the notice of motion on the alleged copy of which the number of the suit given is 840, which does not tally with No. 1040 given by the complainant. Suit No. 840 had been withdrawn long before.7. Thirdly, the copy of the plaint which was sought to be used by the complainant as proof of what, according to him, the advocate alleged was the plaint of the suit already filed, had significant blanks in it. Even the number 1040 and the amount claimed had been admitted by the complainant to have been subsequently filled in, in his own hand. But, in his complaint, it was stated that No. 1040 was already on the plaint which had been filed. This shows that the complainant had not come with an entirely truthful version. He has made interpolations in the documents to fit in with his version.8. Fourthly, the complainant was, apparently, sufficiently acquainted with the requirements of litigation to know that no plaint could be filed on his behalf and on behalf of his co-owners without the signatures of his co-owners. When asked whether the co-owners had signed the plaint, he pretended to be ignorant. There are other defects also in his evidence which we need not deal with.9. It is true that the advocate had not fared well under cross-examination. He had tried to conceal similar complaints against him in the past. It is, however, equally true that the complainant was no greenhorn. At any rate, he was not so gullible as he tried to make himself out to be. After going through the relevant evidence, we doubt whether both sides have come out with full and true facts. It is more likely that there was some dispute over the payment of Rs. 350 which the advocate appellant claimed as his fee for work done, but, the complainant seems to have considered himself entitled to demand the payment back. It is possible that there may have been other reasons too for friction between the two so as to lead to a disruption between the complainant and the whom he had been frequently engaging in addition to others. In any case, we are left in doubt whether the complainants version, with which he had come forward with considerable delay, was really truthful. We think that, in a case of this nature, involving possible disbarring of the advocate concerned, the evidence should be of a character which should leave no reasonable doubt about guilt. The Disciplinary Committee had not only found the appellant guilty but had disbarred him permanently.10. The complainant has no doubt produced Tendolkar and D. D. Nalavade to show what enquiries were made relating to Suit No. 1040 of 1964 by the respondent complainant. It is, however, not disputed that the respondent did make those enquiries. The case of the appellant was that these enquiries were made in an attempt to bolster up a weak case. These enquiries merely prove a much too belated conduct of the complainant. They could be the result of an attempt to give a semblance of truth to coloured and exaggerated version. It is also true that the appellant had been most unwise in not sending a registered letter in reply to the registered notice received by him on January 8, 1971 by the complainant. His version that he spoke to the complainant on the telephone and sent a letter in reply on January 15, 1971, of which a copy was Ex. R1, had been rejected by the committee on the ground that the advocates conduct did not appear to be above board. We cannot help thinking that the committee had been unduly swayed by the unsavory background of the appellant so that it could not see its way to giving the appellant even the benefit of doubt in the instant case.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]9. It is true that the advocate had not fared well underHe had tried to conceal similar complaints against him in the past. It is, however, equally true that the complainant was no greenhorn. At any rate, he was not so gullible as he tried to make himself out to be. After going through the relevant evidence, we doubt whether both sides have come out with full and true facts. It is more likely that there was some dispute over the payment of Rs. 350 which the advocate appellant claimed as his fee for work done, but, the complainant seems to have considered himself entitled to demand the payment back. It is possible that there may have been other reasons too for friction between the two so as to lead to a disruption between the complainant and the whom he had been frequently engaging in addition to others. In any case, we are left in doubt whether the complainants version, with which he had come forward with considerable delay, was really truthful. We think that, in a case of this nature, involving possible disbarring of the advocate concerned, the evidence should be of a character which should leave no reasonable doubt about guilt. The Disciplinary Committee had not only found the appellant guilty but had disbarred him permanently.10. The complainant has no doubt produced Tendolkar and D. D. Nalavade to show what enquiries were made relating to Suit No. 1040 of 1964 by the respondent complainant. It is, however, not disputed that the respondent did make those enquiries. The case of the appellant was that these enquiries were made in an attempt to bolster up a weak case. These enquiries merely prove a much too belated conduct of the complainant. They could be the result of an attempt to give a semblance of truth to coloured and exaggerated version. It is also true that the appellant had been most unwise in not sending a registered letter in reply to the registered notice received by him on January 8, 1971 by the complainant. His version that he spoke to the complainant on the telephone and sent a letter in reply on January 15, 1971, of which a copy was Ex. R1, had been rejected by the committee on the ground that the advocates conduct did not appear to be above board. We cannot help thinking that the committee had been unduly swayed by the unsavory background of the appellant so that it could not see its way to giving the appellant even the benefit of doubt in the instant case.