Case: Rai Ramkrishna &amp; Others Vs. State of Bihar

altogether ignored. Mr. Sastri contends that the two suits filed by the appellants and the passengers and the owners of goods respectively disclose a common design and can be treated as friendly suits actuated by the same motive and we do not think that this contention can be rejected as wholly unjustified. Apart from it, when the injunction was issued against the respondent in the appellants, suit, the appellants gave an undertaking in writing to levy the taxes payable on the Fares and freights as provided by the law in case their suit failed. As we have already seen, their suit was dismissed by the High Court on May 8, 1952, so that it was then open to the respondent to call upon the appellants to pay the taxes for the period covered by the orders of injunction and to require them to pay future taxes because the earlier Act under which the taxes were recovered was held to be valid by the High Court. It is no doubt suggested by Mr. Setalvad that the spirit of the undertaking required that no recovery should be made until the final disposal of the proceeding between the parties. We do not see how this argument about the spirit of the undertaking can avail the appellants.20. As soon as their suit against the respondent was dismissed, the respondent was at liberty to enforce the provisions of the Act and the dismissal of the suit made it possible for the respondent to claim the taxes even for the period covered by the order of injunction. We do not think that in the context, the dismissal of the suit can legitimately refer to the final disposal of the appeal filed by the appellants before this Court. In any event, having regard to the genesis of the two suits, the nature of the orders of injunction issued in them and the character of the undertaking given by the appellants, we do not think it would be possible to sustain Mr. Setalvads argument that for the period of the injunction the retrospective operation of the Act should be held to be invalid.21. In this connection, it would be relevant to refer to another fact which appears on the record. Along with the appellants, 18 other bus owners had filed writ petitions challenging the validity of the Act. These petitioners have not appealed to this Court presumably because their cases fall under the provisions of Section 23(a) of the Act. It is likely that they had paid the amounts, and since the amounts paid under the provisions of the earlier Act are now deemed to have been paid under the provisions of this Act, they did not think it worthwhile to come to this Court against the decision of the High Court. Apart from that, it is not unlikely that other bus owners may have made similar payments and the appellants have, therefore, come to this Court because they have made no payments and so, their cases do not fall under S. 23(a) or may be, their cases fall under Section 23(b). The position therefore, is that the retrospective operation of Section 23(a) and (b) covers respectively cases of payments actually made under the provisions of the earlier Act, and cases pending inquiry, and the retrospective operation of Section 3(3) read with Section 1(3) only applies to cases of persons who did not pay the tax during the whole of the period, or whose cases were not pending; and it is this limited class of persons whose interests are represented by the appellants before us.Having regard to the somewhat unusual circumstances which furnish the background for the enactment of the impugned statute, we do not think that we could accept Mr. Setalvads argument that the retrospective operation of the Act imposes restriction on the appellants which contravene the provisions of Article 19(1) (f) and (g). In our opinion, having regard to all the relevant facts of this case, the restrictions imposed by the said retrospective operation must be held to be reasonable and in the public interest under Article 19(5) and (6) and also reasonable under Article 304(b).22. There is only one more point to which reference must be made. We have already noticed that the High Court has rejected the argument urged on behalf of the State that the tax imposed by the Act is of a compensatory or regulatory character and therefore, is valid. Mr. Sastri wanted to press that part of the case of the State before us. He urged that according to the majority decision of this Court in the case of the Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd., AIR 1961 SC 1406 it must now be taken to be settled that"regulatory measures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution."23. On the other hand, Mr. Setalvad had argued that the doctrine of compensatory or regulatory taxation which is mainly based on Australian decisions cannot be extended to the present case, and he contends that if the doctrine of regulatory or compensatory taxes is very liberally construed, it would tend to cover all taxes, because in a loose sense, all taxes raised by the State can ultimately be said to be compensatory in a far-fetched manner, and in that way, the well-recognised constitutional difference between a tax and a fee will be obliterated and the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution will lose all their significance. Part XIII contains provisions which constitute a self-contained Code and we need not really travel outside the said provisions in determining the validity of the tax imposed by the Act. Since we have come to the conclusion that the challenge to the validity of the retrospective operation of the Act cannot be sustained, we do not think it necessary to pursue this matter any further.24.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]11. It is also true that though the Legislature can pass a law and make its provisions retrospective, it would be relevant to consider the effect of the said retrospective operation of the law both in respect of the legislative competence of the Legislature and the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by it. In other words, it may be open to a party affected by the provisions of the Act to contend that the retrospective operation of the Act so completely alters the character of the tax imposed by it as to take it outside the limits of the entry which gives the Legislature competence to enact the law; or it may be open to it to contend in the alternative that the restrictions imposed by the Act are so unreasonable that they should be struck down on the ground that they contravene his fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (f) and (g).It is, of course, true that the power of taxing the people and their property is an essential attribute of the Government and Government may legitimately exercise the said power by reference to the objects to which it is applicable to the utmost extent to which Government thinks it expedient to do so. The objects to be taxed so long as they happen to be within the legislative competence of the Legislature can be taxed by the Legislature according to the exigencies of its needs because there can be no doubt that the State is entitled to raise revenue by taxation. The quantum of tax levied by the taxing statute, the conditions subject to which it is levied the manner in which it is sought to be recovered, are all matters within the competence of the Legislature, and in dealing with the contention raised by a citizen that the taxing statute contravenes Art. 19, Courts would naturally be circumspect and cautious. Where for instance it appears that the taxing statute is plainly discriminatory, or provides no procedural machinery for assessment and levy of the tax, or that it is confiscatory, Courts would be justified in striking down the impugned statute as unconstitutional. In such cases, the character of the material provisions of the impugned statute is such that the Court would feel justified in taking the view that, in substance the taxing statute is a cloak adopted by the Legislature for achieving its confiscatoryapart from that, it seems to us that the nature of the tax in the present case is the same both in regard to prospective and retrospective operations, and so, it is difficult to entertain the argument that the tax has ceased to be tax on passengers and is, therefore outside Entryargument that the retrospective operation of the Act is beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar legislature must, therefore, beposition therefore, appears to be well settled that if in its essential features a taxing statute is within the legislative competence of the Legislature which passed it by reference to the relevant entry in the List, its character is not necessarily changed merely by its retrospective operation so as to make (sic take) the said retrospective operation outside the legislative competence of the said Legislature, and so, we must hold that the challenge to the validity of the retrospective operation of the Act on the ground that the provision in that behalf is beyond the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature must be rejected.We do not think that such a mechanical test can be applied in determining the validity of the retrospective operation of the Act. It is conceivable that cases may arise in which the retrospective operation of a taxing or other statute may introduce such an element of unreasonableness that the restrictions imposed by it may be open to serious challenge as unconstitutional; but the test of the Length of time covered by the retrospective operation cannot, by itself, necessarily be a decisive test.We may have a statute whose retrospective operation covers a comparatively short period and yet it is possible that the nature of the restriction imposed by it may be of such a character as to introduce a serious infirmity in the retrospective operation.On the other hand, we may get cases where the period covered by the retrospective operation of the statute, though long, will not introduce any such infirmity. Take the case of a Validating Act. If a statute passed by The Legislature is challenged in proceedings before a Court and the challenge is ultimately sustained and the statute is struck down, it is not unlikely that the judicial proceedings may occupy a fairly long period and the Legislature may well decide to await the final decision in said proceedings before it uses its legislative power to cure the alleged infirmity in the earlier Act. In such a case, if after the final judicial verdict is pronounced in the matter the Legislature passes a validating Act, it may well cover a long period taken by the Judicial proceedings in Court and yet it would be inappropriate to hold that because the retrospective operation covers a long period, therefore, the restriction imposed by it is unreasonable. That is why we think the test of the length of time covered by the retrospective operation cannot be treated as a decisive test.18. Take the present case. The earlier Act was passed in 1950 and came into force on the 1st of April 1950, and the tax imposed by it was being collected until an order of injunction was passed in the two suits to which we have already referred. The said suits were dismissed on the 8th May, 1952, but the appeals preferred by the appellants were pending in this Court until the 12th December 1960. In other words between 1950 and 1960 proceedings were pending in Court in which this validity of the Act was being examined, and if a Validating Act had to be passed, the Legislature cannot be blamed for having awaited the final decision of this Court in the said proceedings. Thus, the period covered between the institution of the said two suits and their final disposal by this Court cannot be pressed into service for challenging the reasonableness of the retrospective operation of theposition therefore, is that the retrospective operation of Section 23(a) and (b) covers respectively cases of payments actually made under the provisions of the earlier Act, and cases pending inquiry, and the retrospective operation of Section 3(3) read with Section 1(3) only applies to cases of persons who did not pay the tax during the whole of the period, or whose cases were not pending; and it is this limited class of persons whose interests are represented by the appellants before us.Having regard to the somewhat unusual circumstances which furnish the background for the enactment of the impugned statute, we do not think that we could accept Mr. Setalvads argument that the retrospective operation of the Act imposes restriction on the appellants which contravene the provisions of Article 19(1) (f) and (g). In our opinion, having regard to all the relevant facts of this case, the restrictions imposed by the said retrospective operation must be held to be reasonable and in the public interest under Article 19(5) and (6) and also reasonable under Articlemeasures or measures imposing compensatory taxes for the use of trading facilities do not come within the purview of the restrictions contemplated by Article 301 and such measures need not comply with the requirements of the proviso to Article 304(b) of the Constitution.