Case: Trust Mai Lachmi Sialkoti Bradri Vs. The Chairman, Amritsar Imppovementtrust

of India Act, the Act of 1947 expired and ceased to be in force.8. Based on the fact that the Act of 1949 practically reproduces the earlier Act of 1947 the contention urged before us was that the Act of 1947 was in effect repealed and reenacted by the Act of 1949, that by virtue of S. 22. of the Punjab General Clauses Act, which runs:"22. Where any Punjab Act is repealed and re-enacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any appointment notification, order, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, made or issued under the repealed Act, shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted, unless and until it is superseded by any appointment notification, order, scheme, rule, form of bye-law made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted" the notification issued under the Act of 1947 should be deemed to have been issued under the Act of 1949 and that in consequence the reference to a notification under the Act of 1949 in S. 2 (d) of the Act of 1951 would include the notification of 1948 made under the Act of 1947.We are unable to accept this argument. In the first place, there was no repeal of the Act of 1947 to attract the application of the rule of construction embodied in S. 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act. No doubt, even temporary enactments could be repealed and re-enacted so as to attract the operation of provisions like S. 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act vice, for instance, State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh, 1955-1 SCR 893 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 84 ). It is however conceded that here theres no express repeal of the Act of 1947. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that by reason of the very existence of the enactments of 1947 and 1949 on the Statute Book in terms identical with each other, the earlier statute should be held to have been impliedly repealed by the later enactment. If, as we have pointed out earlier, the first Act was temporary and its place was taken by a later enactment after the former ceased to be in force, it is obvious that there could be no scope for invoking the principle embodied in S. 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act. Further, apart from the larger question as to whether implied repeals are within the contemplation of S. 22 of the Punjab General Clauses Act or similar provisions in like enactments, we consider that there is no basis for invoking the doctrine of implied repeal in the present case for that assumes that there is an inconsistency between the two enactments such that the two cannot stand together. It is maxim of the law that implied repeals are not to be favored, and where two statutes are entirely affirmative and identical no question of inconsistency could arise. Where the operative terms of the two enactments are identical and the enactments, so to speak, run parallel to each other there would be no scope for the application of the doctrine of implied repeal and that would be so particularly in a case where the earlier enactment is one of temporary duration while the later is a permanent enactment, even ignoring the fact that Ss. 4 to 21 of the Act of 1949 were not in force during the life of the Act of 1947.9. Ultimately, the question would have to be decided on the proper interpretation of S. 2(d) of the Act of 1951 under which the impugned scheme was framed and proceedings for acquisition are sought to be taken. It is clear that besides the areas notified under the Act of l951 the only other areas contemplated are those which were notified under the Act of 1949 which on any normal and reasonable construction could only include the areas which were the subject of notification under S. 3 of the Act of -1949 and not those under the Act of 1947 but which are deemed to be areas notified under the Act of 1949 assuming every submission of the respondent to be correct. In this view we consider that the appellant is entitled to the relief sought because the acquisition was in respect of a scheme for an area which it was not within the power of the Improvement Trust to frame under S. 3 of the Act.10. Learned Counsel for the Improvement Trust made a further submission that the appellant was precluded from challenging the validity of the scheme by reason of the provisions of S. 5 (4) of the Act (already extracted) which imparted a conclusive effect as to the legality of the scheme which had received the approval of the government and had been published under S. 5 (3) of the Act. We are clearly of the opinion that there is no substance in this argument. The foundation of the jurisdiction of the Improvement Trust to frame a scheme and for the government to approve of the same depends upon the scheme relating to a "damaged area" and if, as we have held, the property now sought to be acquired is within an area which does not fall within the definition of a damaged area under S. 2 (d) of the Act, it follows that there was total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Improvement Trust or the government to frame a scheme for this area. The position is not very different from what it would have been if the Act itself had not been extended to an area in regard to which a scheme has been framed. The conclusive effect postulated by S. 5 (4) can only be in regard to the formalities prescribed by Ss. 3, 4 and 5 and does not touch a case where there is complete lack of jurisdiction in the authorities to frame a scheme.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]This definition therefore contemplates only two classes of areas as falling within it: (1) areas which the State Government may, by notification declare to be "a damaged area, i.e., which may be so declared in the future- after the comma into force of the Act, and (2) the areas already notified under the Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1949. It is common ground that the area in respect of which the scheme has been framed at present and in pursuance of which the impugned acquisition is sought to be made, falls neither under the one nor the other of these two classes. on a plain reading of the definition therefore it is manifest that the scheme is without legal foundation since it is in regard to an area which is not "a damaged area" within the definition for which alone schemes may be framed under Ss. 3 to 5 and in pursuance of which an acquisition may be made under the provisions following in the Act.Ultimately, the question would have to be decided on the proper interpretation of S. 2(d) of the Act of 1951 under which the impugned scheme was framed and proceedings for acquisition are sought to be taken. It is clear that besides the areas notified under the Act of l951 the only other areas contemplated are those which were notified under the Act of 1949 which on any normal and reasonable construction could only include the areas which were the subject of notification under S. 3 of the Act of -1949 and not those under the Act of 1947 but which are deemed to be areas notified under the Act of 1949 assuming every submission of the respondent to be correct. In this view we consider that the appellant is entitled to the relief sought because the acquisition was in respect of a scheme for an area which it was not within the power of the Improvement Trust to frame under S. 3 of thefoundation of the jurisdiction of the Improvement Trust to frame a scheme and for the government to approve of the same depends upon the scheme relating to a "damaged area" and if, as we have held, the property now sought to be acquired is within an area which does not fall within the definition of a damaged area under S. 2 (d) of the Act, it follows that there was total lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Improvement Trust or the government to frame a scheme for this area. The position is not very different from what it would have been if the Act itself had not been extended to an area in regard to which a scheme has been framed. The conclusive effect postulated by S. 5 (4) can only be in regard to the formalities prescribed by Ss. 3, 4 and 5 and does not touch a case where there is complete lack of jurisdiction in the authorities to frame a scheme.