Case: Union Of India &amp; Anr Vs. Majur Mahajan Mandal &amp; Ors

award is made in pursuance of the settlement under the said section the settlement is inchoate and cannot be said to be effective, in law, prior to the making of the award which was done, in the instant case, between August and September, 1974. It is, therefore, submitted that the additional D.A. can be said to be sanctioned only under the award which was made admittedly after the appointed day, that is, after July 6, 1974. 8. We are unable to accept this contention. It is true that an agreement arrived at between the parties during the pendancy of an industrial dispute before the Industrial Court has to be placed before that court. It is also true that if the Industrial Court is satisfied that certain conditions enumerated in section 115A exist it will not recognise the settlement and dispose of the dispute in accordance with law. If, however, the conditions enumerated in section 115A do not exist the award "shall be made" in terms of the settlement. There is no other option.In this particular case the settlement was placed before the Industrial Court which ultimately passed the awards in conformity with the terms of the settlement. We are not required to consider to consider a case where the Industrial Court has not approved of the settlement under section 115A. 9. Once, therefore, the award is made in terms of the settlement, under section 75 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the award shall come into operation on the date specified in the award or where no such date is specified therein on the date on which it is published under section 74. We are informed that the awards have not yet been published but that should not detain us in this case. It is common ground that the awards were in terms of the settlement which had retrospective operation from January 1, 1974. 10. Since the settlement has merged in the awards the terms of the awards are those specified in the settlement. It is those dates which are, therefore, specified in the awards and, under section 75 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, the awards came into operation with effect from January 1, 1974. The sanction of the awards in such a case is the sanction under the settlement and since the settlement was prior to July 6, 1974, the additional D.A. cannot be said to be sanctioned after the appointed day. 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. will be payable to the workers with effect from January 1, 1974, and the sanction for that rise was on 28th June, 1974, the date of the settlement which was prior to the appointed day. 11. Sanction must have relevance to the reality of the transaction between the parties. The settlement of 28th June, 1974, makes the increased D.A. of 100% payable with effect from January 1, 1974. Hence, the said rate of increased D.A. which was payable to the workers between January 1, 1974, and July 5, 1974, was sanctioned prior to the appointed day.We have already noted the definition of additional D.A. in section 2(b) which is an integrated definition. The definition clause has twin components both of which will have to be satisfied in order that a particular amount can be held to be additional D.A. To put it clearly the two components are -"(1) additional D.A. is that part of the D.A. which is sanctioned after the appointed day; and (2) which is over and above what was payable immediately before the date from which sanction of the particular rise in D.A. is to take effect." With regard to the first component any unilateral decision to increase the D.A. or a bilateral settlement for its increase, to take only two instances, must take place after the appointed day. 12. It is manifest that if the sanction is after the appointed day it is then only the question of additional D.A. will arise within the meaning of section 2(b). Once it is found that the sanction of rise in D.A. is prior to the appointed day, section 2(b) will not at all be attracted. In that event it will not be necessary even to consider the second component of the definition mentioned above. In the instant case we have already held that the rise in D.A. to 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. was sanctioned under the settlement of 28th June, 1974, that is, before the appointed day. One of the principal components of the definition clause is, therefore, clearly absent in this case since there is no sanction for any rise in D. A. after the appointed day. 13. We should observe that this is not a case where Explanation I to section 2(b) is applicable. 14. Mr. Singhvi, for the appellants, submits that in view of the aim and object of the Act the count should lean in favour of an interpretation advancing the remedy by construing the word "sanctioned" in section 2(b) to mean sanctioned by the award and not by the settlement. We have already given our reasons for our inability to accept this submission. One other reason may be added.The Act recognises agreements and settlements and settlements is the same way as awards of Tribunals, vide section 2(c). The definition of "additional wages" under section 2(c) clearly points to that. Any wage revision "whether by or under an agreement or settlement between the parties or any award....." comes within the sweep of the aforesaid definition clause Agreements and settlements are separately and distinctly mentioned along with awards. Settlement is a type of sanction recognised under the Act. There is, therefore, sufficient warrant under the Act to give effect to the sanction by voluntary settlement in respect of D.A. when the same has never been repudiated by any of the concerned parties. When there is no ambiguity in the word "sanctioned" inspection 2(b), recourse to the aim and object of the Act is not even called for in this case. 15.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]In the instant case we have already held that the rise in D.A. to 100% of the Ahmedabad Rate of D.A. was sanctioned under the settlement of 28th June, 1974, that is, before the appointed day. One of the principal components of the definition clause is, therefore, clearly absent in this case since there is no sanction for any rise in D. A. after the appointed dayWe should observe that this is not a case where Explanation I to section 2(b) is applicableMr. Singhvi, for the appellants, submits that in view of the aim and object of the Act the count should lean in favour of an interpretation advancing the remedy by construing the word "sanctioned" in section 2(b) to mean sanctioned by the award and not by the settlement. We have already given our reasons for our inability to accept this submission. One other reason may be added.The Act recognises agreements and settlements and settlements is the same way as awards of Tribunals, vide section 2(c). The definition of "additional wages" under section 2(c) clearly points to that. Any wage revision "whether by or under an agreement or settlement between the parties or any award....." comes within the sweep of the aforesaid definition clause Agreements and settlements are separately and distinctly mentioned along with awards. Settlement is a type of sanction recognised under the Act. There is, therefore, sufficient warrant under the Act to give effect to the sanction by voluntary settlement in respect of D.A. when the same has never been repudiated by any of the concerned parties. When there is no ambiguity in the word "sanctioned" inspection 2(b), recourse to the aim and object of the Act is not even called for in this case.