Case: Ramanand Singh Vs. State of Bihar and Another

resides.(ii) Home Guards shall be enrolled by the District Magistrate on the recommendation of a Committee in each District consisting of the Commandant-General or in his absence Battalion Commandant, the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of police of the district, and a non-official Member nominated by the Provincial Government. The Chairman of the Committee shall be nominated from amongst its Members by the Provincial Government.(iii) After holding tests of the general knowledge, alertness, intelligence and physical fitness of the candidates under its supervision, the Committee shall interview all or such of the candidates as it thinks fit and recommend, in order of preference, to the District Magistrate, a number of candidates 50 per cent more than the number of vacancies.(iv) After such verification of character and antecedents of the candidates recommended by the Committee as may be necessary, the district Magistrate shall enrol the required number of Home Guards.(5) Seniority shall be determined by rank, and as between persons of the same rank by the date of promotion or appointment to the rank.4. Relying on this Rule the appellant contended that the power to appoint Company Commander was conferred by the Rules on the provincial Government and, therefore, Commandant-General would not be the appointing authority and was in fact not the appointing authority and, therefore, the order dismissing the appellant from service made by the Commandant-General is by an authority lower than the appointing authority and therefore Article 311 is violated. Now, this simple question could have been answered one way or the other if the appointment order of the appellant was placed on record before this Court. It is agonising or the judicial process that this order is not available. Appellant contends that appointment order given to him was taken out from his house during the search of his house. That the house of the appellant was searched is not in dispute. We fail to see why the appointment order of the appellant should be taken away during the search. It is equally true that the counterfoil or a copy of the order must be available in the records of the respondents. They pleaded their inability, not very convincing, to produce the same for the reasons here in before set out. The unfortunate fact remains that the order is not before us. But appellant contends that if the Rule is manifestly clear that the power to appoint Company Commander was conferred on the provincial Government unless otherwise shown, the court must proceed on the assumption that the rule has been complied with and the authorities acted according to law. There is considerable force in this submission but there are two aspects which preclude us from taking it to its logical conclusion; one being that the High Court noticed in its judgment that it was conceded before the High Court that Rule 5 was subsequently amended on December 27, 1949, whereby the Commandant-General was designated as the appointing authority for Company Commanders and this amended Rule was continued when Bihar Home Guards Rules, 1953 replaced the 1948 Rules. The appellant countered by saying that even if the submission about the amendment is correct, the amendment came into force on December 27, 1949, while he was appointed as company - Commander on March 1, 1949 and, therefore, unamended Rule 5 would be enforce and the conclusion is inevitable that the Provincial Government was the appointing authority. Again there is considerable force in the submission but out attention was drawn to an order dated May, 21, 1949, issued in the name of the Commandant-General making appointment of 16 persons as whole time Company Commanders in the Bihar Home Guards Organisation. The opening part of the order has some significance and it may be extracted :The following Honorary company commanders are appointed as whole time Company Commanders in the Bihar Home Guards on probation on the scale of pay of Rs. 100-160-E-B. 6-190 plus C.L.A. at the rate of Rs. 30 p.m. with effect from March 1, 1949 and are posted to districts noted against each.At serial No. 4 appears the name of the appellant and he is posted at Gaya. Now, according to the appellant this is not the appointment order but it is the posting order. The language of the order does not admit of this construction. If the appointing authority was someone other than the Commandant-General who was only the posting authority, the order would have read :The following Company Commanders who were appointed by the Provincial Government vide its order (No. sic) as whole time Company Commanders in the Bihar Home Guards on probation on the scale of pay of Rs. 100-5-160-E.B.-6-190 plus C.L.A. at the rate of Rs. 30 p.m. with effect from march 1, 1949 are posted to districts, etc.The order rather reads that it is not only an appointment order but on being appointed by the Commandant-General posting orders are also simultaneously issued. Shorn of the non-required details, the order reads the following Honorary Company Commanders are appointed and are posted. Therefore, the order is both an order of appointment and of posting. It is issued in the name of the Commandant-General. The appointment becomes effective from March 1, 1949, from which date even according to the appellant, he was appointed as Company Commander and this very order recited his name and his posting. Therefore, it would appear that the appointment was made by the Commandant-General even though Rule 5 conferred power on the Provincial Government to make such appointments. It is quite likely that the amendment referred to in the judgment of the High Court may have been made with retrospective effect. We are left to guess work but this positive order would show that the appellant was appointed as Company Commander by the Commandant-General. Therefore, the Commandant-General had the power to dismiss him. The dismissal order would not be void on the ground that it is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority. Therefore, the contention of the appellant must be negatived.

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 0

Reasoning from the judgment:
0[ds]4. Relying on this Rule the appellant contended that the power to appoint Company Commander was conferred by the Rules on the provincial Government and, therefore,would not be the appointing authority and was in fact not the appointing authority and, therefore, the order dismissing the appellant from service made by theis by an authority lower than the appointing authority and therefore Article 311 is violated. Now, this simple question could have been answered one way or the other if the appointment order of the appellant was placed on record before this Court. It is agonising or the judicial process that this order is not available. Appellant contends that appointment order given to him was taken out from his house during the search of his house. That the house of the appellant was searched is not in dispute. We fail to see why the appointment order of the appellant should be taken away during the search. It is equally true that the counterfoil or a copy of the order must be available in the records of the respondents. They pleaded their inability, not very convincing, to produce the same for the reasons here in before set out. The unfortunate fact remains that the order is not before us. But appellant contends that if the Rule is manifestly clear that the power to appoint Company Commander was conferred on the provincial Government unless otherwise shown, the court must proceed on the assumption that the rule has been complied with and the authorities acted according to law. There is considerable force in this submission but there are two aspects which preclude us from taking it to its logical conclusion; one being that the High Court noticed in its judgment that it was conceded before the High Court that Rule 5 was subsequently amended on December 27, 1949, whereby thewas designated as the appointing authority for Company Commanders and this amended Rule was continued when Bihar Home Guards Rules, 1953 replaced the 1948 Rules. The appellant countered by saying that even if the submission about the amendment is correct, the amendment came into force on December 27, 1949, while he was appointed as companyCommander on March 1, 1949 and, therefore, unamended Rule 5 would be enforce and the conclusion is inevitable that the Provincial Government was the appointing authority. Again there is considerable force in the submission but out attention was drawn to an order dated May, 21, 1949, issued in the name of themaking appointment of 16 persons as whole time Company Commanders in the Bihar Home Guards Organisation. The opening part of the order has some significance and it may be extracted :The following Honorary company commanders are appointed as whole time Company Commanders in the Bihar Home Guards on probation on the scale of pay of Rs.0 plus C.L.A. at the rate of Rs. 30 p.m. with effect from March 1, 1949 and are posted to districts noted against each.At serial No. 4 appears the name of the appellant and he is posted at Gaya. Now, according to the appellant this is not the appointment order but it is the posting order. The language of the order does not admit of this construction. If the appointing authority was someone other than thewho was only the posting authority, the order would have read :The following Company Commanders who were appointed by the Provincial Government vide its order (No. sic) as whole time Company Commanders in the Bihar Home Guards on probation on the scale of pay of Rs.plus C.L.A. at the rate of Rs. 30 p.m. with effect from march 1, 1949 are posted to districts, etc.The order rather reads that it is not only an appointment order but on being appointed by theposting orders are also simultaneously issued. Shorn of thedetails, the order reads the following Honorary Company Commanders are appointed and are posted. Therefore, the order is both an order of appointment and of posting. It is issued in the name of theThe appointment becomes effective from March 1, 1949, from which date even according to the appellant, he was appointed as Company Commander and this very order recited his name and his posting. Therefore, it would appear that the appointment was made by theeven though Rule 5 conferred power on the Provincial Government to make such appointments. It is quite likely that the amendment referred to in the judgment of the High Court may have been made with retrospective effect. We are left to guess work but this positive order would show that the appellant was appointed as Company Commander by theral had the power to dismiss him. The dismissal order would not be void on the ground that it is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority. Therefore, the contention of the appellant must be negatived.