Case: Nandkishor Savalaram Malu (Dead) Through Lrs.  Vs. Hanumanmal G.Biyani(D) By Lrs

failed to prove that they surrendered the vacant possession of the suit house to the plaintiffs on 12.05.1980.17. According to learned counsel, it was, therefore, a clear case where tenant having suffered a decree for eviction, all persons claiming through such tenant or/and those acting for and on behalf of the tenant-Firm, had to be dispossessed on the strength of the decree suffered by the tenant-firm.18. On these submissions, learned Counsel for the appellants prayed for reversal of the impugned order and restoration of the order of the first appellate Court.19. In reply, learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and contended for its upholding.20. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants as, in our opinion, it has a force.21. Indeed, we are constrained to observe that there was absolutely no legal basis for the High Court to have reversed the well-reasoned order of the first appellate Court which had rightly reversed the order of the Trial Court by passing decree for arrears of rent, eviction and mesne profits against all the defendants jointly and severally. The High Court, unfortunately, failed to apply the settled legal principles applicable to the case at hand as are enumerated herein below in the light of following factual findings of fact recorded by the two Courts below.22. Firstly, the Firm was held to be the tenant whereas defendant no.1 was held to be Firms employee. Secondly, the Firm failed to prove that they surrendered their possession to the appellants and cleared all arrears of rent and lastly, defendant no.1 was held to be in possession of the suit house as "trespasser" and not as " appellants tenant".23. With these concurrent findings of fact, we are of the considered opinion that neither the Firm nor their partners and nor defendant no.1 had any legal right to remain in possession of the suit house. The reason being that so far as the Firm and its partners were concerned (defendant Nos. 2 to 9), they being the tenant rightly suffered the decree for payment of arrears of rent and eviction under the Rent Act and so far as defendant no.1 was concerned, he was neither an owner of the suit house nor a tenant inducted by the appellants and nor a licensee but was held to be an employee of the Firm and a rank trespasser in the suit house.24. The legal effect of such eviction decree under the Rent Act was that the possession of the tenant-firm and persons claiming through such tenant became unauthorized. Since the tenant was a Firm, persons connected with the internal affairs of the Firm such as its partners and the employees working in the Firm were also bound by the eviction decree for the simple reason that all such persons were claiming through the tenant-Firm.25. An employee of a tenant is never considered to be in actual possession of tenanted premises much less in possession in his legal right. Indeed, he is allowed to use the tenanted premises only with the permission of his employer by virtue of his contract of employment with his employer. An employee, therefore, cannot claim any legal right of his own to occupy or to remain in possession of the tenanted premises while in employment of his employer or even thereafter qua landlord for want of any privity of contract between him and the landlord in respect of the tenanted premises.26. There was, therefore, no need for the appellant to file a separate suit to claim possession of the suit house against defendant no.1 under the general law as he was well within his legal right to execute the decree for eviction from the demised premises in this very litigation not only against the original tenant but also against all the persons who were claiming through such tenant. As mentioned above, defendant no.1 was such person who was held to be claiming through the tenant being its employee and was, therefore, bound by the decree once passed against his employer-tenant.27. A tenancy is a creation of contract between the two persons who are capable to enter into contract called lessor/landlord and the lessee/tenant. The two persons can be either living person or juristic persons such as Partnership Firm or a Company.28. Once the tenancy is created either orally or in writing with respect to a land or building then it is always subject to the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as "the TP Act") and the State Rent Acts. Sections 105 to 111 of the TP Act provide certain safeguards, create some statutory rights, obligations, duties whereas the State Rent Acts, inter alia, specify the grounds to enable the lessor to evict the lessee/tenant from the demised premises.29. If the lessee/tenant is a living person, then in such event, the tenant would also include his legal representatives in the event of his death together with his dependents living with the tenant in the tenanted premises. Likewise, if the lessee/tenant is a juristic person, i.e., partnership Firm then such tenant would represent the interest of all the partners of the Firm and the employees working in the Firm. Such persons since claim through the Firm, they have no right of their own in the tenancy and in the demised property qua landlord.30. As a matter of fact, in our view, it was not necessary for the appellants to have impleaded defendant no.1 in the present rent proceedings. The reason being that in rent proceedings the lessee/tenant is the only necessary or/and proper party and none else. A person, who claims through lessee/tenant, is not a necessary party.31. The aforementioned factors were completely overlooked by the High Court. It is for these reasons, the impugned order is not legally sustainable and, therefore, deserves to be set aside.32. In the light of foregoing discussion, the

Court's decision (1 = petition accepted / positive for appellant, 0 = rejected / negative): 1

Reasoning from the judgment:
1[ds]21. Indeed, we are constrained to observe that there was absolutely no legal basis for the High Court to have reversed the well-reasoned order of the first appellate Court which had rightly reversed the order of the Trial Court by passing decree for arrears of rent, eviction and mesne profits against all the defendants jointly and severally. The High Court, unfortunately, failed to apply the settled legal principles applicable to the case at hand as are enumerated herein below in the light of following factual findings of fact recorded by the two Courts below.22. Firstly, the Firm was held to be the tenant whereas defendant no.1 was held to be Firms employee. Secondly, the Firm failed to prove that they surrendered their possession to the appellants and cleared all arrears of rent and lastly, defendant no.1 was held to be in possession of the suit house as "trespasser" and not as " appellants tenant".23. With these concurrent findings of fact, we are of the considered opinion that neither the Firm nor their partners and nor defendant no.1 had any legal right to remain in possession of the suit house. The reason being that so far as the Firm and its partners were concerned (defendant Nos. 2 to 9), they being the tenant rightly suffered the decree for payment of arrears of rent and eviction under the Rent Act and so far as defendant no.1 was concerned, he was neither an owner of the suit house nor a tenant inducted by the appellants and nor a licensee but was held to be an employee of the Firm and a rank trespasser in the suit house.There was, therefore, no need for the appellant to file a separate suit to claim possession of the suit house against defendant no.1 under the general law as he was well within his legal right to execute the decree for eviction from the demised premises in this very litigation not only against the original tenant but also against all the persons who were claiming through such tenant. As mentioned above, defendant no.1 was such person who was held to be claiming through the tenant being its employee and was, therefore, bound by the decree once passed against his employer-tenant.As a matter of fact, in our view, it was not necessary for the appellants to have impleaded defendant no.1 in the present rent proceedings. The reason being that in rent proceedings the lessee/tenant is the only necessary or/and proper party and none else. A person, who claims through lessee/tenant, is not a necessary party.31. The aforementioned factors were completely overlooked by the High Court. It is for these reasons, the impugned order is not legally sustainable and, therefore, deserves to be set aside.