Case: Girja Prasad   Vs. State Of M.P

to come to its own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.28. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , dealing with a similar situation, a three Judge Bench speaking through V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. stated: ?Even at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro? the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly as a learned author has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicated persons and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that "a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent?." In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm far presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing enhance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.? (emphasis supplied)29. Recently, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : JT (2007) 3 SC 316 , after considering the relevant provisions of the old Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) and the present Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) and referring to decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) laid down certain general principles regarding powers of Appellate Court in dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal. In para 42 it was observed: ?42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;(3) Various expressions, such as, ?substantial and compelling reasons?, ?good and sufficient grounds?, ?very strong circumstances?, ?distorted conclusions?, ?glaring mistakes?, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ?flourishes of language? to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court?. 30. In the case on hand, as observed earlier, both the Courts below recorded a positive finding that the accused accepted an amount of Rs.200/-. In our opinion, therefore, Section 4 of the Act got attracted and presumption came into play against the accused. There was no rebuttal by the accused by leading any evidence whatsoever. The defence was of total denial and of false implication. Hence, the doctrine of ?preponderance of probability? also had no application. The Trial Court was, therefore, wrong in not invoking Section 4 and raising presumption. The Trial Court was also wrong in discarding the evidence of PW 1-Anup Kumar-Complainant and PW 10-S.K. Tiwari-Inspector observing that they were ?interested? witnesses and their testimony could not be relied upon. If it is so, in our judgment, the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of acquittal and in convicting the accused for the offences with which he was charged.31. We appreciate the anxiety of the learned counsel for the appellant that if the conviction of the deceased is upheld by this Court, the deceased may not be held entitled to pensionary and other benefits. We are, however, helpless. Once we are satisfied that the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court was not in consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside it and in convicting the accused, it is a mere ?consequence? which cannot be helped. The argument of ?sympathy?, therefore, does not impress us and cannot carry the case of the appellant-applicant herein further.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]16. Having anxiously considered the rival contentions of the parties and having gone through the record of the case meticulously, we are of the view that the High Court was wholly justified in setting aside acquittal of the accused and in recording an order of conviction against him. From what is stated above, it is clear that the Trial Court also believed the case of the prosecution that the amount of Rs.200/- was paid by PW1-Anup Kumar-Complainant to accused Girja Prasad which is clear form the following finding recorded in para 46 of thefrom the above evidence from Anup Kumar, it becomes clear that Anup Kumar entrusted Rs.200/- to the accused so that accused Girja Prasad may give it to Shri Rajoria?.17. The Court then proceeded to state;?Clearly the acceptance of Rs.200/- currency notes by accused Girja Prasad, he was only innocent scarifying goat in the hands of Mr. Rajoria?.18. The Trial Court also observed:?It goes without saying that accused Girja Prasad worked as innocent carrier to Rajoria misusing his post while performing his official duty or he adopted illegal means for that?.To us, the learned advocate for the respondent-State is right in submitting that once it is proved that the amount has been received by the accused, presumption under Section 4 of the Act would get attracted. Section 4 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (since repealed) provided for presumption where public servant accepted gratification other than legal remuneration. Sub-section (1) of the said section was relevant and read aswhere public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration.- (1) Where in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 161 or Section 165an Penal Code(45 of 1860) or of an offence referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of this Act punishable under sub-section (2) thereof, it is provided that an accused person has accepted or obtained, or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, for himself or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that he accepted or obtained, or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain, that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in the said Section 161, or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate.The Trial Court observed that the presumption is not ?absolute?, but is rebuttable and the accused can prove otherwise for getting rid of such presumption. This is true. But, in our view, the Trial Court lost sight of the fact that the case of the accused was of ?total denial? and of ?false involvement?. The presumption, in the circumstances, could not be said to have been rebutted by the accused.21. In our opinion, once the finding was recorded by the Trial Court that the accused had accepted the amount, it was wholly immaterial whether the said acceptance of amount was for him or for someone else. Even if an accused accepts the amount for ?someone else?, he commits an offence. In this connection, we may refer to both the provisions i.e. Section 161, IPC (before it was repealed by Sectionof the Prevention of Corruption Act,1988) and Section 5(1)(d)of the Prevention of Corruption Act,1947 (before the said Act was repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988).161. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.-Whoever, being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person, or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in section 21, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (emphasis supplied)5(1). Criminal misconduct.-(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct---(a) to (c) -.(d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. (emphasis supplied)22. It was, therefore, of no consequence whether the accused had accepted the amount for and on behalf of Ramnarain Rajoria-PW 4. Once it is proved that he accepted the amount of Rs.200/-, he cannot escape from criminal liability on a specious ground that he was made ?scapegoat? or was merely ?innocent carrier?. It was also immaterial whether the accused was or was not in a position to oblige the complainant by preventing or delaying his suspension. The case of the prosecution was that the complainant was asked to pay an amount of Rs.500/- by the accused and the said amount had been accepted by him in two installments, Rs.300/- at Dindori and Rs.200/- at Jabalpur where trap was successful.23. We are equally unable to uphold the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court was right in not relying upon PW 1-Anupr of Special Police Establishment. The trial Court, it may be stated, discarded the evidence of these two witnesses by laying down the following proposition ofgoes without saying that Anup Kumar and Shri S.re concerned only with the success of the trap and thus both these persons are interested witnesses. PW 10, Shri Tiwari is Inspector in Lokayukt Office therefore he is highly interested witness?.In our judgment, the above proposition does not lay down correct law on the point. It is well-settled that credibility of witness has to be tested on the touchstone of truthfulness and trustworthiness. It is quite possible that in a given case, a Court of Law may not base conviction solely on the evidence of Complainant or a Police Official but it is not the law that police witnesses should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence. The presumption that every person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a Police Official as any other person. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of Police Officials merely because they belong to Police Force. There is no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of Police Officials even if such evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence. But, if the Court is convinced that what was stated by a witness has a ring of truth, conviction can be based on such evidence.25. It is not necessary to refer to various decisions on the point. We may, however, state that before more than half-a-century, in the leading case of Aher Raja Khima v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 , Venkatarama Ayyar, J.presumption that a person acts honestly applies as much in favour of a police officer as of other persons, and it is not judicial approach to distrust and suspect him without good grounds therefor. Such an attitude could do neither credit to the magistracy nor good to the public. It can only run down the prestige of the police administration?.(emphasis supplied)26. In Tahir v. State (Delhi), (1996) 3 SCC 338, dealing with a similar question, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was)the evidence of the police officials, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is found to be trustworthy and reliable, it can form basis of conviction and the absence of some independent witness of the locality to lend corroboration to their evidence, does not in any way affect the creditworthiness of the prosecution case?.Regarding setting aside acquittal by the High Court, the learned counsel for the appellant relied upon Kunju Muhammed v. State of Kerala, (2004) 9 SCC 193 : JT (2003) 7 SC 114 , Kashi Ram v. State of M.P., (2002) 1 SCC 71 : JT (2001) 8 SC 650 and Meena v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 5 SCC 21 : JT 2000 (4) SC 521 . In our opinion, the law is well settled. An appeal against acquittal is also an appeal under the Code and an Appellate Court has every power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence as a whole before it. It is, no doubt, true that there is presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an order of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. But that is not the end of the matter. It is for the Appellate Court to keep in view the relevant principles of law, to reappreciate and reweigh the evidence as a whole and to come to its own conclusion on such evidence in consonance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.28. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , dealing with a similar situation, a three Judge Bench speaking through V.R. Krishna Iyer, J.at this stage we may remind ourselves of a necessary social perspective in criminal cases which suffers from insufficient forensic appreciation. The dangers of exaggerated devotion to the rule of benefit of doubt at the expense of social defence and to the soothing sentiment that all acquittals are always good regardless of justice to the victim and the community, demand especial emphasis in the contemporary context of escalating crime and escape. The judicial instrument has a public accountability. The cherished principles or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs thro? the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty men may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise any practical system of justice will then break down and lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly as a learned author has sapiently observed, goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard of the law, and this in turn leads to a public demand for harsher legal presumptions against indicated persons and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. Thus too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that "a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the conviction of the innocent?." In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm far presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing enhance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents.?(emphasis supplied)29. Recently, in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : JT (2007) 3 SC 316 , after considering the relevant provisions of the old Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) and the present Code (Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) and referring to decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) laid down certain general principles regarding powers of Appellate Court in dealing with appeal against an order of acquittal. In para 42 it wasFrom the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge;(1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded;(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law;(3) Various expressions, such as, ?substantial and compelling reasons?, ?good and sufficient grounds?, ?very strong circumstances?, ?distorted conclusions?, ?glaring mistakes?, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ?flourishes of language? to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.(4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court?.In the case on hand, as observed earlier, both the Courts below recorded a positive finding that the accused accepted an amount of Rs.200/-. In our opinion, therefore, Section 4 of the Act got attracted and presumption came into play against the accused. There was no rebuttal by the accused by leading any evidence whatsoever. The defence was of total denial and of false implication. Hence, the doctrine of ?preponderance of probability? also had no application. The Trial Court was, therefore, wrong in not invoking Section 4 and raising presumption. The Trial Court was also wrong in discarding theevidence of PWr observing that they were ?interested? witnesses and their testimony could not be relied upon. If it is so, in our judgment, the High Court was justified in setting aside the order of acquittal and in convicting the accused for the offences with which he was charged.31. We appreciate the anxiety of the learned counsel for the appellant that if the conviction of the deceased is upheld by this Court, the deceased may not be held entitled to pensionary and other benefits. We are, however, helpless. Once we are satisfied that the acquittal recorded by the Trial Court was not in consonance with law and the High Court was right in setting aside it and in convicting the accused, it is a mere ?consequence? which cannot be helped. The argument of ?sympathy?, therefore, does not impress us and cannot carry the case of the appellant-applicant herein further.