Case: M/s. Ujagar Prints Vs. Union of India &amp; Others

goods for the purpose of excise must take into account only the manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit and it must not be loaded with post-manufacturing cost or profit arising from postmanufacturing operation ... .It may be noted that wholesale market in a particular type of goods may be in several tiers and the goods may reach the consumer after a series of wholesale transactions. In fact the more common and less expensive the goods, there would be greater possibility of more than one tier of wholesale transactions .. . . If excise were levied on the basis of second or subsequent wholesale price, it would load the price with a post-manufacturing element, namely, selling cost and selling profit of the wholesale dealer. That would be plainly contrary to the true nature of excise as explained in the Voltas case. Secondly, this would also violate the concept of the factory gate sale which is the basis of determination of value of the goods for the purpose of excise.There can, therefore, be no doubt that where a manufacturer sells the goods manufactured by him in wholesale to a wholesale dealer at arms length and in the usual course of business, the wholesale cash price charged by him to the wholesale dealer less trade discount would represent the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment of excise. 73. Explaining what really is the idea of "post-manufacturing profit" referred to in Atic case this court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. said : When it refers to post-manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profit arising from post-manufacturing operations, it clearly intends to refer not to the expenses and profits pertaining to the sale transactions effected by the manufacturer but to those pertaining to the subsequent sale transactions effected by the wholesale buyers in favour of other dealers. (emphasis supplied) The principles for the determination of assessable value are laid down under S. 4 of the Act. S. 4 of the Central Excise Act envisages that the value of an article for the purposes of duty shall be deemed to be ; (a) The wholesale cash price for which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or was capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article from the factory or premises of manufacture for delivery at the place of manufacture or ; (ft) Where such price was not ascertainable, the price at which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article chargeable with duty.74. The nature of the excise duty is not to be confused with, or tested with reference to, the measure by which the tax is assessed. The standard adopted as the measure of assessment may throw light on the nature of the levy but is not determinative of it. When a statutory measure for assessment of the tax is contemplated, it "need not contour along the lines which spell out the levy itself", and "a broader based standard of reference may be adopted for the purposes of determining the measure of the levy". Any statutory standard which maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of the tax.75. In the case of processing houses, they become liable to pay excise duty not because they are the owners of the goods but because they cause the manufacture of the goods. The dimensions of S. 4(l)(a) and (b) are fully explored in a number of decisions of this court. Reference may be made to the case of Bombay Tyres International.76. Consistent with the provisions of S. 4 and the central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975, framed under S. 37 of the Act, it cannot be said that the assessable value of the processed fabric should comprise only of the processing charges. This extreme contention if accepted, would lead to and create more problems than it is supposed to solve ; and produce situations which could only be characterised as anomalous. The incidence of the levy should be uniform, uninfluenced by fortuitous considerations. The method of determination of the assessable value suggested by the processors would lead to the untenable position that while in one class of grey fabric processed by the same processor on bailment, the assessable value would have to be determined differently dependent upon the consideration that the processing house had carried out the processing operations on job work basis, in the other class of cases, as it not unoften happens, the goods would have to be valued differently only for the reason the same processing house has itself purchased the grey fabric and carried out the processing operations on its own.77. It is to solve the problem arising out of the circumstance that goods owned by one person are "manufactured" by another that at a certain stage under Rule 174-A, a notification was issued by the central government exempting from the operation of the Rule 174-A ". ... every manufacturer who gets his goods manufactured account on his from any other person, subject to the conditions that the said manufacturer authorises the person, who actually manufactures or fabricates the said goods to comply with all procedural formalities under the central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944 and the rules made thereunder, in respect of the goods manufactured on behalf of the said manufacturer and, in order to enable the determination of value of the said goods under S. 4 of the said Act, to furnish information relating to the price at which the said manufacturer is selling the said goods and the person so authorised agrees to discharge all liabilities under the said Act and the rules made thereunder." On a consideration of the matter, the view taken in the matter in the Empire Industries case does not call for reconsideration. Contention (c) is also held and answered against the petitioner.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]38. We have carefully considered these submissions. In the Empire Industries case ((1985) 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292), this Court considered similar submissions in an almost identical context and situation. Learned Judges referred to the observations of this Court in CST v. Harbilas Rai & Sons (21 STC 17 (SC)), in which the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hiralal Jitmal v. CST (8 STC 325, 326 (MP HC)) was held supportable on the reasoning that : (quoted at SCC p. 330, paradecision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court might perhaps be justified on the ground that a printed or dyed cloth is commercially a different article from the cloth which is purchased and printed or dyed.The Division Bench also referred to, with approval, the decision of the Bombay High Court in Kores (India) Limited v. Union of India (8 STC 325, 326 (MP HC)). The Division Bench noticed the question arising for decision : (SCC p. 331, paraitself means woven materials. It was contended that processing the manufactured fabric does not bring into existence any new woven material but the question is : does new and different goods emerge having a distinctive name, use and characterAnswering the bench said : (SCC p. 334, paraappears in the light of the several decisions and on the construction of the expression that the process of bleaching, dyeing and printing etymologically also means manufacturingThe prevalent and generally accepted test to ascertain that there is manufacture is whether the change or the series of changes brought about by the application of processes take the commodity to the point where, commercially, it can no longer be regarded as the original commodity but is, instead, recognised as a distinct and new article that has emerged as a result of the processes. The principles are clear. But difficulties arise in their application in individual cases. There might be borderline cases where either conclusion with equal justification be reached. Insistence on any sharp or intrinsic distinction between processing and manufacture, we are afraid, results in an oversimplification of both and tends to blur their interdependence in cases such as the present one. The correctness of the view in Empire Industries case ((1985) 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292) cannot be tested in the light of material - in the form of affidavits expressing the opinion of persons said to be engaged in or connected with the textile trade as to the commercial identity of the commodities before and after the processing - placed before the court in a subsequent case. These opinions are, of course, relevant and would be amongst the various factors to be taken into account in deciding the question.43. On a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to think that the view taken in Empire Industries case ((1985) 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292) that grey fabric after they undergo the various processes of bleaching, dyeing, sizing, printing, finishing etc. emerges as a commercially different commodity with its own price structure, custom and other commercial incidents and that there was in that sense a manufacture within the meaning of Section 2(f), even as unamended, is an eminently plausible view and is not shown to suffer from any fallacy. Indeed, on this point, the Referring Bench did not disagree or have any reservations either. It is to be noticed that if the amending law is valid, this aspect becomes academic.44. We think, we should reject contention (a).In Empire Industries ((1985) 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292) case a similar argument was urged but without success. Learned Judges were persuaded to the view that such processes which were referred to by the amendment were not so alien or foreign to the concept of manufacture that they could not come within that concept.48. Entries in the legislative lists, it must be recalled, are not sources of legislative power but are merely topics or fields of legislation and must receive a liberal construction inspired by a broad and generous spirit and not in a narrow pedantic sense. The expression "with respect to" in Article 246 brings in the doctrine of "Pith and Substance" in the understanding of the exertion of legislative power and wherever the question of legislative competence is raised the test is whether the legislation, looked at as a whole, is substantially with respect to the particular topic of legislation. If the legislation has a substantial and not merely a remote connection with the entry, the matter may well be taken to be legislation on the topic.49. In Empire Industries case ((1985 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292), it was held : (SCC p. 339, parahas been noted, processes of the type which have been incorporated by the impugned Act were not so alien or foreign to the concept of manufacture that these could not come within that concept.At all events, even if the impost on process is not one under entry 84, List I, but is an impost on "processing" distinct from "manufacture" the levy could yet be supported by entry 97, List I, even without the aid of the wider principle recognised and adopted in Dhillon case (Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon, (1971) 2 SCC 779 : AIR 1972 SC 1061 : (1972) 83 ITR 582 ). It was, however, contended that the levy of tax on an activity which cannot reasonably be regarded as an activity of manufacture cannot be described as a levy of duties of excise under entry 84, List I. If it is a nondescript tax under entry 97, Parliament, it is urged, has not chosen to enact any such law in this case. The charging section does not, it is urged, bring such a taxable event to charge. This argument was noticed in Empire Industries case (1985 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292) thus : (SCC p. 340, para 47)It was then argued that if the legislation was sought to be defended on the ground that it is a tax on an activity like processing and would be covered by the powers enumerated under entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule then it was submitted that there was no charging section for such an activity and as such the charge must fail, and there cannot be any levy.51. The contention was rejected holding : (SCC p. 340, paraargument proceeds on an entire misconception. The charging section is the charging Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. It stipulates the levy and charge of duty of excise on all excisable goods produced or manufactured. "Manufactured" under the Act after the amendment would be manufacture as amended in Section 2(f) and tariff items 19-I and 22 the charge would be on that basis. Therefore it is difficult to appreciate the argument that the levy would fail as their will be no appropriate charging section or machinery for effectuating the levy on the activity like the method of processing even if such an activity can be justified under entry 97 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no substance in this contention.We respectfully agree.53. If a legislation purporting to be under a particular legislative entry is assailed for lack of legislative competence, the State can seek to support it on the basis of any other entry within the legislative competence of the legislature. It is not necessary for the State to show that the legislature, in enacting the law, consciously applied its mind to the source of its own competence. Competence to legislate flows Articles from Articles 245, 246, and the other articles following, in Part XI of the Constitution. In defending the validity of a law questioned on ground of legislative incompetence, the State can always show that the law was supportable under any other entry within the competence of the legislature. Indeed in supporting a legislation sustenance could be drawn and had from a number of entries. The legislation could be a composite legislation drawing upon several entries. Such a "ragbag" legislation particularly familiar inHari Krishna Bhargav v. Union of India ((1966) 2 SCR 22 : AIR 1966 SC 619 : (1966) 59 ITR 243 ), this Court said : (SCR p.is no prohibition against the Parliament enacting in a single statute, matters which call for the exercise of power under two or more entries in List I of the Seventh Schedule. Illustrations of such legislation are not wanting in our statute book, and the fact that one of such entries is the residuary entry does not also attract any disability.So far as the exclusive competence of the Union Parliament to legislate is concerned all that is necessary is to find out whether the particular topic of legislation is in List II or List III. If it is not, it is not necessary to go any further or search for the field in List I. Union Parliament has exclusive power to legislate upon that topic or field. Of course, it has concurrent power also in respect of the subjects in List III.56. Contention (b) is, therefore, insubstantial.This pertains to the validity of levy of additional duties. The contention proceeds on the presupposition that processing does not amount to manufacture under Section 3(1) of the Additional Duties Act. If it does, as has been held on point (a), this argument does not survive at all.The contention was neatly and attractively presented and appeared, at first blush, to merit a serious consideration of the validity of the levy of additional duties. But on a closer examination of the concept of, and the scheme for, levy and collection of the additional duties and the specific statutory provisions, the tensile strength of the argument breaks down. There are at least two circumstances which render the definition of manufacture under Section 2(f) attracted to the additional levies. Section 3(3) of the Additional Duties Act provides levy and collection of the additional duties as they apply in relation to the levy and collection of the duties of excise on the goods specified in sub-section (1).It is plain that the statute expressly makes the provision in the "Central Excises Act" apply in relation to levy and collection of the additional duties. The question is whether this provision is sufficient to attract Section 2(f) of the main Act as amended. This, in turn, depends upon what the expression "levy" connotes and carries with it. The term levy it is held, is an expression of wide impart. It includes both imposition of a tax as well as its quantification and assessment. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. of India Ltd ((1972) 2 SCC 560 : (1973) 1 SCR 822 , 835). this Court held : (SCC p. 572, para 19)The term "levy" appears to us to be wider in its import than the term "assessment". It may include both "imposition" of a tax as well as assessment. The term "imposition" is generally used for the levy of a tax or duty by legislative provisions indicating the subject matter of the tax and the rates at which it has to be taxed.62. That apart, Section 4 of the Amending Act 6 of 1980 has amended the relevant items in the schedule to the Additional Duties Act. The expressions produce or manufacture in Section 3(1) of the Additional Duties Act must be read along with the entries in theSchedule must be attached to the body of the Act by words in one of the sections (known as inducing words). It was formerly the practice for the inducing words to say that the Schedule was to be construed and have effect as part of the Act. (See e.g., Ballot Act, 1872, Section 28.) This is no longer done, being regarded as unnecessary. If by mischance the inducing words were omitted, the Schedule would still form part of the Act if that was the apparent intentionThe Schedule is as much a part of the statues, and is as much an enactment, as any other part. (See also, to the like effect, Flower Freight Co. Ltd. v. Hammond ((1963) 1 QB 275), R. v. Legal Aid Committee No. 1 (London) Legal Aid Area, ex p. Rondel ((1967) 2 QB 482) Metropolitan Police Commr. v. Curran ((1976) 1 WLR 87).64. What appears, therefore, clear is that what applies to the main levy, applies to the additional duties as well. We find no substance in contention (c) either.There is really no substance in the grievance that the retroactivity imparted to the amendments is violative of Article 19(1)(g). A competent legislature can always validate a law which has been declared by courts to be invalid, provided the infirmities and vitiating factors noticed in the declaratory judgment are removed or cured. Such a validating law can also be made retrospective. If in the light of such validating and curative exercise made by the legislature - granting legislative competence - the earlier judgment becomes irrelevant and unenforceable, that cannot be called an impermissible legislative overruling of the judicial decision. All that the legislature does is to usher in a valid law with retrospective effect in the light of which the earlier judgment becomes irrelevant. (See Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. Broach Borough Municipality ((1969) 2 SCC 283 : (1970) 1 SCR 388 (1971) 79 ITR 136) ).66. Such legislative experience of validation of laws is of particular significance and utility and is quite often applied, in taxing statues. It is necessary that the legislature should be able to cure defects in statues. No individual can acquire a vested right from a defect in a defect in a statute and seek a windfall from the legislatures mistakes. Validity of legislations retroactively curing defects in taxing statues is well recognised and courts, except under extraordinary circumstances, would be reluctant to override the legislative judgment as to the need for and the wisdom of the retrospective legislation. In Empire Industries Ltd. v. Union of India ((1985) 3 SCC 314 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 416 : 1985 Supp 1 SCR 292), this Court observed : (SCR p. 327 : SCC p. 342, para 51)not only because of the paramount governmental interest in obtaining adequate revenues, but also because taxes are not in the nature of a penalty or a contractual obligation but rather a means of apportioning the costs of government amongst those who benefit from it.In testing whether a retrospective imposition of a tax operates so harshly as to violate fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g), the factors considered relevant include the context in which retroactivity was contemplated such as whether the law is one of validation of a taxing statute struck down by courts for certain defects; the period of such retroactivity, and the degree and extent of any unforeseen or unforeseeable financial burden imposed for the past period etc. Having regard to all the circumstances of the present case, this court in Empire Industries case held that the retroactivity of the amending provisions was not such as to incur any infirmity under Article 19(l)(g). We are in respectful agreement with that view.67. There is no merit in contention (d) either.Duties of excise are imposed on the production or manufacture of goods and are levied upon the manufacturer or the producer in respect of the commodity taxed. The question whether the producer or the manufacturer is or is not the owner of the goods is not determinative of the liability. The essential and conceptual nature of the tax is to be kept clearly distinguished from both the extent of the power to impose and the stage at which the tax is imposed. Though the levy is on the production or manufacture of the goods, the imposition of the duty could be at the stage which the law considers most convenient to impose as long as a rational relationship with the nature of the tax is maintained.This contention was considered in detail in Empire Industries case wherein it was heldthe textile fabrics are subjected to the processes like bleaching, dyeing and printing etc. by independent processes, whether on their own account or on job charges basis, the value for the purposes of assessment under S. 4 of the central Excise Act will not be the processing charges alone but the intrinsic value of the processed fabrics which is the price at which such fabrics are sold for the first time in the wholesale market. That is the effect of S. 4 of the Act. The value would naturally include the value of grey fabrics supplied to the independent processors for the processing. However, excise duty, if any, paid on the grey fabrics will be given pro forma credit to the independent processors to be utilised for the payment on the processed fabrics in accordance with the Rules 56-A or 96-D of the central Excise Rules, as the case maythe Referring bench did not doubt the correctness of the inclusion in the assessable value the cost of the grey fabric and the processing charges. The Referring bench heldcannot accept the contention of the learned counsel on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants that the value of the grey cloth which is processed by the processor should not be included in the assessable value of the processed fabric . . . . .Explaining what really is the idea of "post-manufacturing profit" referred to in Atic case this court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. saidit refers to post-manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profit arising from post-manufacturing operations, it clearly intends to refer not to the expenses and profits pertaining to the sale transactions effected by the manufacturer but to those pertaining to the subsequent sale transactions effected by the wholesale buyers in favour of other dealers. (emphasisprinciples for the determination of assessable value are laid down under S. 4 of the Act. S. 4 of the Central Excise Act envisages that the value of an article for the purposes of duty shall be deemed to be ; (a) The wholesale cash price for which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or was capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article from the factory or premises of manufacture for delivery at the place of manufacture or ; (ft) Where such price was not ascertainable, the price at which an article of the like kind and quality was sold or capable of being sold at the time of removal of the article chargeable with duty.74. The nature of the excise duty is not to be confused with, or tested with reference to, the measure by which the tax is assessed. The standard adopted as the measure of assessment may throw light on the nature of the levy but is not determinative of it. When a statutory measure for assessment of the tax is contemplated, it "need not contour along the lines which spell out the levy itself", and "a broader based standard of reference may be adopted for the purposes of determining the measure of the levy". Any statutory standard which maintains a nexus with the essential character of the levy can be regarded as a valid basis for assessing the measure of the tax.75. In the case of processing houses, they become liable to pay excise duty not because they are the owners of the goods but because they cause the manufacture of the goods. The dimensions of S. 4(l)(a) and (b) are fully explored in a number of decisions of this court. Reference may be made to the case of Bombay Tyres International.76. Consistent with the provisions of S. 4 and the central Excise (Valuation) Rules, 1975, framed under S. 37 of the Act, it cannot be said that the assessable value of the processed fabric should comprise only of the processing charges. This extreme contention if accepted, would lead to and create more problems than it is supposed to solve ; and produce situations which could only be characterised as anomalous. The incidence of the levy should be uniform, uninfluenced by fortuitous considerations. The method of determination of the assessable value suggested by the processors would lead to the untenable position that while in one class of grey fabric processed by the same processor on bailment, the assessable value would have to be determined differently dependent upon the consideration that the processing house had carried out the processing operations on job work basis, in the other class of cases, as it not unoften happens, the goods would have to be valued differently only for the reason the same processing house has itself purchased the grey fabric and carried out the processing operations on its own.77. It is to solve the problem arising out of the circumstance that goods owned by one person are "manufactured" by another that at a certain stage under Rule 174-A, a notification was issued by the central government exempting from the operation of the Rule... every manufacturer who gets his goods manufactured account on his from any other person, subject to the conditions that the said manufacturer authorises the person, who actually manufactures or fabricates the said goods to comply with all procedural formalities under the central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944 and the rules made thereunder, in respect of the goods manufactured on behalf of the said manufacturer and, in order to enable the determination of value of the said goods under S. 4 of the said Act, to furnish information relating to the price at which the said manufacturer is selling the said goods and the person so authorised agrees to discharge all liabilities under the said Act and the rules madea consideration of the matter, the view taken in the matter in the Empire Industries case does not call for reconsideration. Contention (c) is also held and answered against theIn the argument, as presented, that the assessable value would include what is referred to as the "post-manufacturing profits", there is an obvious fallacy. In Atlc Industries Ltd. v. H. H. Dave, Assistant Collector of central Excise" Bhagwati, J. speaking for the court saidvalue of the goods for the purpose of excise must take into account only the manufacturing cost and the manufacturing profit and it must not be loaded with post-manufacturing cost or profit arising from postmanufacturing operation ... .It may be noted that wholesale market in a particular type of goods may be in several tiers and the goods may reach the consumer after a series of wholesale transactions. In fact the more common and less expensive the goods, there would be greater possibility of more than one tier of wholesale transactions .. . . If excise were levied on the basis of second or subsequent wholesale price, it would load the price with a post-manufacturing element, namely, selling cost and selling profit of the wholesale dealer. That would be plainly contrary to the true nature of excise as explained in the Voltas case. Secondly, this would also violate the concept of the factory gate sale which is the basis of determination of value of the goods for the purpose of excise.There can, therefore, be no doubt that where a manufacturer sells the goods manufactured by him in wholesale to a wholesale dealer at arms length and in the usual course of business, the wholesale cash price charged by him to the wholesale dealer less trade discount would represent the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment of excise.g what really is the idea of "post-manufacturing profit" referred to in Atic case this court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd. saidt refers to post-manufacturing expenses and post-manufacturing profit arising from post-manufacturing operations, it clearly intends to refer not to the expenses and profits pertaining to the sale transactions effected by the manufacturer but to those pertaining to the subsequent sale transactions effected by the wholesale buyers in favour of other dealers. (emphasisReferential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier Act or some of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act. In this event, the provisions of the earlier Act or those so incorporated, as they stand in the earlier Act at the time of incorporation, will be read into the later Act. Subsequent changes in the earlier Act or the incorporated provisions will have to be ignored because, for all practical purposes, the existing provisions of the earlier Act have been re-enacted by such reference into the later one, rendering irrelevant what happens to the earlier statute thereafter. Examples of this can be seen in secretary of State v. Hindustan Cooperative Insurance Society, Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India. On the other hand, the later statute may not incorporate the earlier provisions. It may only make a reference of a broad nature as to the law on a subject generally, as in Bhajiya v. Gopikabai, or contain a general reference to the terms of an earlier statute which are to be made applicable.96. In this case any modification, repeal or re-enactment of the earlier statute will also be carried into in the later, for here, the idea is that certain provisions of an earlier statute which become applicable in certain circumstances are to be made use of for the purpose of the later Act also. Examples of this type of legislation are to be seen in Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chett, New central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of central Excise and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. City Improvement Trust. Whether a particular statute falls into the first or second category is always a question of construction. In the present case, in my view, the legislation falls into the second category. S. 3(3 of the 1957 Act does not incorporate into the 1957 Act any specific provisions of the 1944 Act. It only declares generally that the provisions of the 1944 Act shall apply -So far as may be", that is, to the extent necessary and practical, for the purposes of the 1957 Act as well.97. That apart, it has been held, even when a specific provision is incorporated and the case apparently falls in the first of the above categories, that the rule that repeals, modifications or amendments of the earlier Act will have to be ignored is not adhered to in certain situations. These have been set out in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan. In that case, the Supreme court was considering the question whether the amendment of S. 21 of the Penal Code by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, was also applicable for purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which by S. 2 incorporates, for the purposes of that Act, the definition of public servant in S. 21 of the Penal Code. Answering the question in the affirmative, the court outlined the following propositionsa subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases :(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia ;(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual ; and(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act.The present case falls within the scope of these exceptions, even if S. 3(3 is construed as incorporating certain specific provisions of the 1944 into itself. The legislation presently in question is clearly in pari materia with the 1944 Act. It is also merely supplemental. While the 1944 Act imposes a general levy of excise duty on all goods manufactured and produced, the aim of the present Act is to supplement the levy by an additional duty of the same nature on certain goods. The duration of the applicability is undefined but the statute is clearly enforceable as long as it is in the statute book side by side with the normal excise duties. The clear intention is that the same provisions shall govern both the levies except that the duty under the later Act is confined to certain goods only and its distributability among the States may perhaps follow a different pattern from the principal duty.99. There is no reason or logic why all the incidents attaching under the earlier legislation, insofar as they are not clearly inconsistent with the later one should not be extended to the later legislation as well. As has been pointed out earlier, the Finance Acts which levied special or regular or additional excise duties contained in themselves all the elements of charge of duty. The goods were mentioned and the duty as to be levied either at a percentage of the normal excise duty payable under the 1944 Act or at a percentage of the value of the assessable goods as determined under the 1944 Act. All that was further needed was the applicability of the procedural provisions of the 1944 Act. Here, however, the 1957 Act is incomplete as to the basis of the charge and its provisions would become totally unworkable unless the concepts of "manufacture" and "assessable value" as determined under the 1944 Act are carried into it.