Case: Sunder Lal Vs. Paramsukhdas

a person on whom the title of the person interested has devolved be granted, there is no reason why the right to claim a reference of a dispute about the person entitled to compensation may not be exercised by the person on whom the title has devolved since the date of the award.The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act is that all disputes about the quantum of compensation must be decided by resort to the procedure prescribed by the Act; it is also intended that disputes about the rights of owners to compensation being ancillary to the principal dispute should be decided by the Court to which power is entrusted. Jurisdiction of the Court in this behalf is not restricted to cases of apportionment, but extends to adjudication of disputes as to the person who are entitled to receive compensation, and there is nothing in Sec. 30which excludes a reference to the Court of a dispute raised by a person on whom the title of the owner of land has, since the award, devolved."14. In Gola Khan v. Bholanath Marick, (1910) 12 Cal LJ 545 an attaching creditor was directed to be made a party to the reference under the Land Acquisition Act, before the Civil Court, Mookerjee, J., observed :"The petitioner was entitled to be added as a party not under Rule 10, but on the ground that he was a person interested in the subject-matter of the litigation and that no order ought to have been made for its disposal without any opportunity afforded to him to establish his claim."15. In Siva Pratapa Bhattadu v. A. E. L. Mission, AIR 1926 Mad 307 an attaching creditor was held to be a person interested within Section 3 (b) of the Act.16. Mr. Desai relies on AIR 1956 Cal 263 but in that case the point decided by the Court was different. It was held there that if a party to a land acquisition proceeding before the Collector had not obtained a reference under Section 18 of the Act, its representative could not do indirectly what they did not do directly, i. e. they could not be added a party in a reference pending at the instance of other parties in order that the nil award against the party might be reversed and in order that they might be awarded a share of the compensation money. Here no such point has been raised. It has not been urged before us that Paramsukhdas was a party before the Collector and that having not applied for a reference under Section 18 he is now debarred from being added as a party.17. The case of Govinda Kumar Roy v. Debendra Kumar, (1908) l2 Cal WN 98 was also decided on the same lines. Similar view was reiterated in Mahammad Safi v. Haran Chandra, (1908) 12 Cal WN 985. Both these cases had followed (1907) ILR 34 Cal 451 . Maclean, C. J., observed as follows in (1907) ILR 34 Cal 451 :"If we read that Section in connection with Section 20 and Section 18, I think it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the Legislature intended that all that the Court could deal with was objection which had been referred to it; and this seems to be a view consistent with common sense and with the ordinary method of procedure in civil cases. The zemindar here could, if he liked, have raised the objection as to the whole compensation for the trees being given to the tenants, but he did not do so. He must, therefore, be taken to have accepted the award in that respect; and it would be little less than dangerous if we were to hold that that the Judge to whom only one objection was referred could go into all sorts of questions and objections which had not been referred to him.".These three cases are distinguishable inasmuch as they are dealing with the cases of persons who having a right to seek a reference failed to claim that reference but sought to raise the point in a reference made at the instance of another party.18. The case of Karuna Sindhu Dhar v. Panna Lal Paramanik, (1961) 115 Cal WN 802 also does not assist the appellant. The High Court held in that case that as Raj mohan never claimed the entire compensation money before the Collector, the Land Acquisition Judge was not entitled to vary the awards by a declaration that Rajmohan alone was entitled to get the compensation.19. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections, within Section 21 He was accordingly entitled to be made a party. In the result we uphold the order made by the High Court in this respect.20. Mr. Desai says that at any rate direction should be given that Paramsukhdas should not be entitled to challenge the compromise entered into between Sunderlal and Khushal Singh. We are unable to accept this submission. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under Section 21 should be gone into by the Court.21. This leaves only the two points regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court. In our view, the High Court is quite right in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge dated April 9, 1962, were not awards within Section 54 of the Act. The awards had still to be made. If no appeal lay, then the revisions were competent and the High Court was right in entertaining the revisions because the Civil Judge had either refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is not necessary that in order to fall within the definition a person should claim an interest in land, which has been acquired. A person becomes a person interested if he claims an interest in compensation to be awarded. It seems to us that Paramsukhdas is a "person interested" within Section 3 (b) of the Act because he claims an interest in compensation.But before he can be made a party in a reference it has to be seen whether he comes within Section 20 (b) and Section 21 of the Act.11. The scheme of the Act seems to be to first deal with persons who are interested in land. These persons are heard under Section 5A of theprovisions of the Act, including Ss. 20 and 21, do not prescribe that his claim to an interest in compensation should be "as compensation", as urged by Mr. Desai. This is really a contradictory statement. For, a fortiori, he has no interest in land, and compensation is given for interests in land. He can never claim compensation qua compensation for what he claims is an interest in the compensation to be awarded. This is not to say that A person claiming an interest in compensation may not claim that the compensation awarded for the acquired land is low, if it affects hishas not been urged before us that Paramsukhdas was a party before the Collector and that having not applied for a reference under Section 18 he is now debarred from being added as athree cases are distinguishable inasmuch as they are dealing with the cases of persons who having a right to seek a reference failed to claim that reference but sought to raise the point in a reference made at the instance of another party.It seems to us that Paramsukhdas was clearly a person interested in the objections which were pending before the Court in the references made to it and that he was also a person whose interest would be affected by the objections, within Section 21 He was accordingly entitled to be made a party. In the result we uphold the order made by the High Court in thisare unable to accept this submission. Paramsukhdas is entitled to raise all points to protect his interests which were affected by the objections. It is also in the interest of justice that there should not be multifarious proceedings and all points arising which are not expressly barred under Section 21 should be gone into by the Court.21. This leaves only the two points regarding the jurisdiction of the High Court. In our view, the High Court is quite right in holding that the orders of the Civil Judge dated April 9, 1962, were not awards within Section 54 of the Act. The awards had still to be made. If no appeal lay, then the revisions were competent and the High Court was right in entertaining the revisions because the Civil Judge had either refused to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him or had acted with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction.