Case: Eurobond Industries Private Limited Vs. Euro Panel Products Private Limited &amp; Another

hardware; pipes and tubes of metal; safes; goods of common metal not included in other classes; ores.22. Perusal of the agreement would reveal that the agreement specifically records that the Defendant is in the business of manufacturing of Aluminum Panel Sheets. The licence, which is given by the Plaintiff No.2 for using the name EURO is solely in connection of the activities of the user. The activities of the user i.e. Defendant, of manufacturing Aluminum Panel Sheets are referable to only Class 6 of the Schedule IV. In that view of the matter, we find that the contention of the Appellant that the licence was only for the word EURO and not for the word/label EUROBOND, in our consideration is without substance. The licence agreement specifically provides granting licence to use the word EURO. It is only because of the licence given by the Plaintiff No.2 under the said agreement to use the word EURO, the Defendant could have incorporated the company under the name and style of EUROBOND.23. The licence further provides for termination of the agreement, if any of the eventualities mentioned in the agreement occur. Undisputedly, as per the agreement, the Plaintiff No.2 has reserved a sole and unfettered discretion to terminate the agreement notwithstanding anything contained in any part of the agreement, in the event the Plaintiff No.2 finds any change in the shareholding pattern or ownership pattern of the user or changes in voting powers of shares, or other change prejudicial to the interest of the proprietor or one or more companies to whom a similar name licence has been granted. The agreement further provides, as to what shall be consequences upon termination of the agreement. It provides that on the agreement being terminated, the Defendant would not be in a position to use the word EURO and will have to change its corporate name, trading style or trade name in such manner as to delete therefrom the name EURO.24. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Lupin Ltd. Vs. Johnson and Johnson (2015(1) Mh.L.J. 501), had an occasion to consider the situation when an injunction is sought against a registered proprietor of the trademark. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations:55. We are, therefore, of the view that while the registered proprietor of a trade mark would ordinarily be entitled to finding of the Civil Court in its favour that the trade mark registered in its name is prima facie valid, the jurisdiction of the Court is not barred for considering the plea of the Defendant at the interlocutory stage that the registration in the Plaintiffs favour is so fraudulent or is so apparently invalid that the Court should not grant an injunction in favour of the Plaintiff. Of course, a very heavy burden lies on the Defendant to rebut the strong presumption in favour of the Plaintiff at the interlocutory stage. The Civil Court obviously cannot give any final finding on this question as the jurisdiction to give such final finding is conferred on Appellate Board in the rectification proceedings, but it is not possible to accept the Plaintiffs contention that at the interlocutory stage the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is completely barred.25. Perusal of the aforesaid observations would reveal that the Full Bench has held that while the registered proprietor of a trade mark would ordinarily be entitled to finding of the Civil Court in its favour, that the trademark registered in its name is primafacie valid, the jurisdiction of the Court is not barred for considering the plea of the Defendant at the interlocutory stage, that the registration in the Plaintiffs favour is so fraudulent or so apparently invalid that the Court should not grant an injunction in favour of the Plaintiff. It has further been held that a very heavy burden lies on the Defendant to rebut the strong presumption in favour of the Plaintiff at the interlocutory stage. It has further been observed that the Civil Court cannot give final finding on this question as the jurisdiction to give such final finding is conferred on the Appellate Board in the rectification proceedings.26. It could thus be seen that, a registered proprietor of a trademark would ordinarily be entitled to finding of the Civil Court in its favour, that the trademark registered in its name is primafacie valid. Only in case where the Defendant is in position to establish that the registration in the Plaintiffs favour, is so fraudulent or is so apparently invalid, the Court would refuse to grant an injunction in favour of the proprietor of the registered trademark. For proving the same, a heavy burden lies on the Defendant. Undisputedly, the case as is sought to be made out by the Defendant does not fall in the aforesaid category. In that view of the matter, we find that no inference would be warranted in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Plaintiffs are entitled to injunction against the Defendant from using its registered trademark.27. Perusal of the impugned order would further reveal, that the learned Single Judge has granted sufficient period of three months to the Defendant to change its corporate name and trading style and also to dispose of the existing stock of goods bearing the trademark EUROBOND.28. Insofar as clause (iii) of the operative part is concerned, we find that learned Senior Counsel for the Defendant is justified in contending that the learned Single Judge could not have granted injunction in terms of clause (iii). For granting an order of injunction, when the action is based on passing of, various factors, which have been enumerated hereinabove are required to be taken into consideration. However, we find that there is no discussion in the order of the learned Single Judge, as to on what basis the injunction has been granted.29. In that view of the matter, we find that no interference is warranted with clauses (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of the operative part of the order.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is equally not permissible to interfere with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that, if the appellate court had considered the matter at the trial stage, it would have come to a different conclusion. It has further been held that if the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view, may not justify interference with the trial courts exercise ofthat view of the matter, we find that the contention of the Appellant that the licence was only for the word EURO and not for the word/label EUROBOND, in our consideration is without substance. The licence agreement specifically provides granting licence to use the word EURO. It is only because of the licence given by the Plaintiff No.2 under the said agreement to use the word EURO, the Defendant could have incorporated the company under the name and style ofthat view of the matter, we find that no inference would be warranted in the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Plaintiffs are entitled to injunction against the Defendant from using its registered trademark.27. Perusal of the impugned order would further reveal, that the learned Single Judge has granted sufficient period of three months to the Defendant to change its corporate name and trading style and also to dispose of the existing stock of goods bearing the trademark EUROBOND.28. Insofar as clause (iii) of the operative part is concerned, we find that learned Senior Counsel for the Defendant is justified in contending that the learned Single Judge could not have granted injunction in terms of clause (iii). For granting an order of injunction, when the action is based on passing of, various factors, which have been enumerated hereinabove are required to be taken into consideration. However, we find that there is no discussion in the order of the learned Single Judge, as to on what basis the injunction has been granted.29. In that view of the matter, we find that no interference is warranted with clauses (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) of the operative part of the order.