Case: State Of Bombay Vs. M/S. Jagmohandas And Another

It is apparent that the dealer cannot apply for refund under S. 13 till an order of assessment is passed. The prescribed form also shows the same thing. The scheme of s. 13 appears to be that the Sales Tax Officer would make first an order of assessment, arrive at the amount of tax due according to the order and then work out the excess, if any, paid by the dealer and refund that money. It seems to us that S. 13 does not contemplate objections being entertained regarding the constitutional validity of any payment made by the dealer. The Solicitor-General contended that an appeal would lie against an order made under s. 13. Assuming that it is so, the appeal would be only on the ground that the computation made by the Sales Tax Officer is erroneous and not on the ground that the tax paid by the dealer was not constitutionally payable at all, under the Act. Therefore, if S. 13 is understood in the manner mentioned above, it seems clear to us that no machinery is provided in S. 13 for dealing with the objection that the money paid was paid by virtue of a void provision of the Act.8. Further, we have held in K. S. Venkataraman v. State of Madras, Civil Appeal No. 618 of 1963, dated 18-10-1965; (reported in AIR 1966 SC 1089 ) that the Sales Tax Authorities created by the Madras General Sales Tax Act are not competent to entertain questions as to the ultra vires of a provision of the Act. Similarly the Commissioner appointed under the Bombay Sales Tax Act would not be competent to go into the question whether S. 6 of the Act under which the transactions were apparently taxable was ultra vires or not.9. Therefore, in our opinion, S. 13 of the Act does not create an implied bar and the High Court is right in holding that the suit was competent.10. This Court has recently held that Art. 96 applies to suits like the present. (See Civil Appeal No. 720 of 1963 (SC), State of Kerala v. Aluminium Industries Ltd., Kunda, dated 21-4-1965).11. The only point that remains is regarding the date of the knowledge of the plaintiff. Both Courts below have found that the plaintiff came to know of the mistake on December 22, 1952, the date of the promulgation of Governors ordinance. This is a concurrent finding of fact and the learned Solicitor-General has not shown us any good ground for disturbing this concurrent finding of fact.12. Accordingly, agreeing with the High Court, we hold that the suit is not barred. In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee.13. Shah, J.(With Ramaswami, J.)These appeals arise out of suits filed by the two respondents for recovery of sums of money paid by them as advanced sales-tax under a mistake of law. The suits were decreed by the Court of First Instance and the decisions were confirmed in appeals by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay.14. There were no orders of assessment made by the taxing authorities, but the taxpayers being of the view that the tax on their turnover was payable submitted returns under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946 and paid advanced tax. The sales were in respect of goods consigned to purchasers outside the State of Bombay and for consumption outside the State. These sales were apparently covered by the terms of Art. 286 (1) (a) before it was amended by the Sixth Amendment Act and could not be taxed under a statute enacted by a State. The taxpayers claimed that they had discovered their mistake when the Governor of Bombay promulgated Bombay Ordinance No. 2 of 1952 after the decision of the Bombay High Court in the United Motors (India) Ltd. v. The State of Bombay, (1953) 55 Bom LR 246. The Trial Court and the High Court have rejected the contention raised by the State that the suits were barred by Ss. 13 and 20 of the Bombay Sales tax Act, 1946, which were later replaced by Ss. 19 and 29 of the Bombay Sales tax Act, 1952, and that the suits were barred by the law of limitation.15. We agree with the judgment of our brother Sikri, J., that the suits were not barred either expressly by the provisions of S. 20 or impliedly by S. 13 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946. We also, agree with him that the suits were not barred by the law of limitation, since the suits were filed within the period prescribed by Art. 96 of the 1st Schedule of the Limitation Act 1908, i.e., within three years from the date on which the mistake became known to the taxpayers. We are unable, however, to agree with the observation that before the sales-tax authorities an objection that certain parts of the statute were ultra vires the Legislature could not be raised. As held by this Court in C. A. 481 of 1968, dated 23-4-1965: (reported in AIR 1965 SC 1942 ) the question whether a transaction which falls within the Explanation of Art. 286 (1) (a) before it was amended by the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act does not affect the jurisdiction of the taxing authority is merely a question of interpretation of the contract in the light of the statute and the sales-tax authorities are entitled to entertain the objection, if it be raised before them,. that the transaction was not taxable because the State had no power to legislate in respect of an Explanation sale. But in this case, that stage was never reached. The taxpayers in the belief that they were liable to pay tax paid advance tax before any orders of assessment were made. Thereafter realising that they had committed a mistake filed suits refund. Thereby they were seeking to obtain orders of refund of payments made under a mistake of law; they were not seeking to set aside any order of assessment.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are unable to appreciate how S. 20 expressly bars the suit. It is admitted that no assessment has been made under the Act and the plaintiff has not in his suit called into question any assessment or order made under the Act. In our opinion, this part of the argument is covered by the decision of this Court in the Tripura case, 1951 SCR 1(AIR 1951 SC 23)   and the High Court was right in sojudgment of Fazl Ali, J., who dissented in the Tripura case, clearly shows that the Court was fully aware of the existence of the machinery in the Act enabling an assessee to challenge an eventual assessment. But this Court, in spite of the existence of that machinery gave effect of the plain words of S. 65 of the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944. There is nothing in the Kamla Mills case, (1965) 16 STC 613  : (AIR 1965 SC 1942  ) which is inconsistent with the Tripura case, 1951 SCR 1: (AIR 1951 SC 23  ). Further Mr. Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent, pointed out that a section similar to S. 13 existed in the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act,are unable to read the word assessment in S. 20 to include a mere filing of return and payment by a registered dealer. In our opinion, the word assessment has reference to assessments made under Ss. 11 and 11-A of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946.Therefore, we must overrule the contention of the learned Solicitor-General that S. 20 expressly bars the presentseems to us that S. 13 does not contemplate objections being entertained regarding the constitutional validity of any payment made by the dealer. The Solicitor-General contended that an appeal would lie against an order made under s. 13. Assuming that it is so, the appeal would be only on the ground that the computation made by the Sales Tax Officer is erroneous and not on the ground that the tax paid by the dealer was not constitutionally payable at all, under the Act. Therefore, if S. 13 is understood in the manner mentioned above, it seems clear to us that no machinery is provided in S. 13 for dealing with the objection that the money paid was paid by virtue of a void provision of the Act.Therefore, in our opinion, S. 13 of the Act does not create an implied bar and the High Court is right in holding that the suit was competent.The only point that remains is regarding the date of the knowledge of the plaintiff. Both Courts below have found that the plaintiff came to know of the mistake on December 22, 1952, the date of the promulgation of Governors ordinance. This is a concurrent finding of fact and the learned Solicitor-General has not shown us any good ground for disturbing this concurrent finding of fact.