Case: Jain Exports (P) Ltd. &amp; Anr Vs. Union Of India &amp; Ors

The items mentioned therein are:—It is thus clear that if ‘coconut oil’ of the industrial variety was covered by paragraph 5 of Appendix 9, then it would not have been included in Appendix 10 and, therefore, could not have been imported under OGL.4. In Appendix 9, no classification of coconut oil is given and, therefore, all varieties of coconut oil should be taken as covered by the term. There is no warrant for the assumptions that item 1 of paragraph 5 of Appendix 9 covered only, the edible variety when ‘coconut oil’ as such has been mentioned. It is not disputed that ‘coconut oil’ without anything more could cover both the edible as also the non-edible (commercial or industrial) varieties. When a customer goes to the market and asks for coconut oil to buy, he is not necessarily supplied the edible variety. Coconut oil is put to less of edible use than non-edible. Reliance has been placed on the entry in the Import Policy of 1981-82 where in paragraph 5 of Appendix 9 it has been said thus:—“In the case of the following items, whether edible or non-edible, import will be made only by the S.T.C...............” (1) Coconut oil.......................................................... “All other oils/seeds, whether edible or non-edible, not specifically mentioned above or elsewhere in this policy, will also be imported only by S.T.C. under these provisions.” In our view no support can be had for the contention advanced by appel­lants’ learned counsel from the change in the language of paragraph 5 in the Import Policy of the subsequent year. Whatever may have been the reason for specifying ‘edible and non-edible’ classification in 1981-82, if ‘coconut oil’ takes within its fold all varieties of it, it must follow that in 1980-81, all varieties of coconut oil were included in paragraph 5 of Appendix 9. It is, in our opinion, unnecessary to refer to authorities and precedents to support such an obvious conclusion. 5. Similarly no support is available from the communication by way of reply received by the appellants from the S.T.C. to the effect that import of edible coconut oil alone was canalised through it. When the question before us is as to what exactly was the ambit of the entry No. 1 in para­graph 5 of Appendix 9, the letter of the S.T.C. has no light to throw and the matter has to be resolved with reference to broader aspects than the letter of the Corporation. Nor can that letter or the representation contained therein be used to build up a plea of estoppel. The S.T.C. was not competent to bind the Customs authorities in respect of their statutory functioning and if on actual interpretation it turns out that ‘coconut oil’ covered what the appellants have imported, the fact situation cannot take a different turn on account of the letter of the S.T.C. At the most, it may have some relevant when the quantum of redemption fine is considered by the Tribunal in terms of the direction of the High Court. 6. Massive arguments were built up by learned counsel for the appellants on the basis that the decision of the Central Board and the Central Government rendered in similar matters were binding on the collector and he could not have acted to the contrary. Several Precedents have been cited during the hearing. In a tier system, undoubtedly decisions of higher authorities are binding on lower authorities and quasi-judicial Tribunals are also bound by this discipline. 7.In Broome v. Cassell and Co. (1972) 1 All.ER 801, the Lord Chancellor delivering the opinion of the House observed: “I hope it will never be necessary to say so again that in the hierarchical system of Courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers.” This Court in Kaushalya Devi Bogra v. Land Acquisition Officer, (1984) 2 SCC 324 has clearly approved this position. There is abundance of authority that quasi-judicial Tribunals too are bound by this rule. 8. That, however, does not assist the appellants at all. It may be that the Collector of Customs should have felt bound by the decision of the Board or the Central Government but the matter has passed that stage. What we are now concerned with is not disciplining the Collector in his quasi-judicial conduct but to ascertain what the correct position in the matter is. Very appropriately, appellants’ learned counsel has not found fault with the High Court for not following the quasi-judicial opinion of the Board or the Central Government nor has he pleaded for acceptance of that by us as a precedent. Once on analysis we reach the conclusion that ‘coconut oil’ of every description was covered in paragraph 5 of Appen­dix 9, the quasi-judicial decision ceases to be relevant. We propose to say no more on this aspect of the submission. 9. What survives for consideration is the argument relating to the vice of breach of natural justice and the vice of collateral pressure of the Import Authorities in the making of the order. We must frankly state that this aspect of the argument has not at all impressed us. It has not been disputed that show cause notices were issued, cause was shown and consi­dered by the statutory authorities. It may be that more of opportunities than extended were expected by the appellants in view of the fact that large stakes were in issue. The observance of the Rules of Natural Justice is not referrable to the fatness of the stake but is essentially related to the demands of a given situation. The position here is covered by statutory provisions and it is well settled that Rules of Natural Justice do not supplant but supplement the law.10. We have not been able to find any breach in the compliance of the statutory procedure. We are not inclined to agree that the role played be Mr. Takht Ram vitiated the order of the Collector.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. What survives for consideration is the argument relating to the vice of breach of natural justice and the vice of collateral pressure of the Import Authorities in the making of the order. We must frankly state that this aspect of the argument has not at all impressed us. It has not been disputed that show cause notices were issued, cause was shown andby the statutory authorities. It may be that more of opportunities than extended were expected by the appellants in view of the fact that large stakes were in issue. The observance of the Rules of Natural Justice is not referrable to the fatness of the stake but is essentially related to the demands of a given situation. The position here is covered by statutory provisions and it is well settled that Rules of Natural Justice do not supplant but supplement the law.10. We have not been able to find any breach in the compliance of the statutory procedure. We are not inclined to agree that the role played be Mr. Takht Ram vitiated the order of the Collector.