Case: Narendra  Vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh

the poor in an unequal fight, the adversarial process itself operates to the disadvantage of the weaker party. In such a situation, the Court has to be not only sensitive to the inequalities of parties involved but also positively inclined to the weaker party if the imbalance were not to result in miscarriage of justice. The Courts, in such situations, generally invoke the principle of fairness and equality which are essential for dispensing justice. Purposive interpretation is given to subserve the ends of justice particularly when the cases of vulnerable groups are decided. The Court has to keep in mind the `problem solving approach by adopting therapeutic approaches to the maximum extent the law permits rather than `just deciding cases, thereby bridging the gap between law and life, between law and justice. The notion of access to justice is to be taken in a broader sense. The objective is to render justice to the needy and that means fair solutions to the conflict thereby providing real access to `justice.11. Justice is a core value of any judicial system. It is the ultimate aim in the decision making process. In post-traditional liberal democratic theories of justice, the background assumption is that all humans have equal value and should, therefore, be treated as equal, as well as by equal laws. This can be described as `Reflective Equilibrium. The method of Reflective Equilibrium was first introduced by Nelson Goodman in `Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1955). However, it is John Rawls who elaborated this method of Reflective Equilibrium by introducing the concept of `Justice as Fairness. While on the one hand, we have the doctrine of `justice as fairness, as propounded by John Rawls and elaborated by various jurists thereafter in the field of law and political philosophy, we also have the notion of `Distributive Justice propounded by Hume which aims at achieving a society producing maximum happiness or net satisfaction. When we combine Rawlss notion of `Justice as Fairness with the notions of `Distributive Justice, to which Noble Laureate Prof. Amartya Sen has also subscribed, we get jurisprudential basis for achieving just results for doing justice to the weaker section of the society.12. From the human rights perspective, persons belonging to the weaker sections are disadvantaged people who are unable to acquire and use their rights because of poverty, social or other constraints. They are not in a position to approach the courts even when their rights are violated; they are victimized or deprived of their legitimate due. Here lies the importance of access to justice for socially and economically disadvantaged people. When such people are denied the basic right of survival and access to justice, it further aggravates their poverty. Therefore, even in order to eliminate poverty, access to justice to the poor sections of the society becomes imperative. In the instant case, it is the poverty which compelled the appellants to restrict the claim to Rs. 115/- per sq. yard, as they were not in a position to pay the court fee on a higher amount.13. It is the aforesaid weighty consideration which justify award of compensation to the appellants at the rate of Rs. 297/- per square yards. Though, the aforesaid reasons are enough to allow the appeals, in the present case, there is yet another additional circumstance which justifies this outcome.14. This Court in Civil Appeal No. 1506-1517 of 2016 titled Pardeep Kumar etc. etc. v. NOIDA which pertains to subsequent acquisition proceeding in the same village Makanpur, but falling under NOIDA, had on 16th February, 2016 set aside the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and remanded the matter back to the High Court for reconsideration in view of the judgments passed by the coordinate benches of the same High Court in Kashi Rams case as well as other cases. The High Court, after the remand vide its judgment dated 11th April, 2016 in First Appeal No. 522 of 2009 titled, Pardeep Kumar and Others v. State of U.P. & Anr. awarded the same enhanced compensation at the rate of Rs. 297/- per sq. Yard even in the same case also. The High Court while awarding the compensation at the same rate held:"27. Therefore, one of the questions which needs to be examined by us is, can the appellants be denied the same rate of compensation only because the filed by them before the reference court did not disclose the rate which they seek now in terms of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra). Kanshi Ram case.xxx xxx xxx29. It is settled law that the compensation under the Act, 1894 had to be fair and just. Fairness requires that all those similarly situated are treated similarly. Technicalities qua rate as per exemplars filed by poor farmers, who are illiterate, has to be given only such importance as may not defeat their right of fair and just compensation qua compulsory acquisition of land holdings.30. The determination of acquisition at the rate of Rs. 297/- per square yard in the case of Ghaziabad Development Authority (supra) Kashi Ram case has therefore, to be taken as the fair rate determined for the land situated in the village Makanpur with regard to the notification issued on 12th September, 1986 as well as under Notification dated 15th March, 1988."15. The High Court, in the process, also took aid of Section 28 of the Act. Thus, even those villagers whose land was acquired subsequently, are given compensation at the rate of Rs. 297/- per square yards. Depriving this rate to the appellants herein would be nothing but travesty of justice.16. Simply because the appellants had paid court fee on the claim at the rate of Rs. 115/- square yards could not be the reason to deny the compensation at a higher rate. This could be taken care of by directing the appellants to pay the difference in court fee after calculating the same at the rate of Rs. 297/- per square yards.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It transpires from the bare reading of the aforesaid provision that even in the absence of exemplars and other evidence, higher compensation can be allowed for others whose land was acquired under the same Notification.7. The purpose and objective behind the aforesaid provision is salutary in nature. It is kept in mind that those land owners who are agriculturist in most of the cases, and whose land is acquired for public purpose should get fair compensation. Once a particular rate of compensation is judicially determined, which becomes a fair compensation, benefit thereof is to be given even to those who could not approach the court. It is with this aim the aforesaid provision is incorporated by the Legislature. Once we keep the aforesaid purpose in mind, the mere fact that the compensation which was claimed by some of the villagers was at lesser rate than the compensation which is ultimately determined to be fair compensation, should not be a ground to deny such persons appropriate and fair compensation on the ground that they claimed compensation at a lesser rate. In such cases, strict rule of pleadings are not be made applicable and rendering substantial justice to the parties has to be the paramount consideration. It is to be kept in mind that in the matter of compulsory acquisition of lands by the Government, the villagers whose land gets acquired are not willing parties. It was not their voluntary act to sell of their land. They were compelled to give the land to the State for public purpose. For this purpose, the consideration which is to be paid to them is also not of their choice. On the contrary, as per the scheme of the Act, the rate at which compensation should be paid to the persons divested of their land is determined by the Land Acquisition Collector. Scheme further provides that his determination is subject to judicial scrutiny in the form of reference to the District Judge and appeal to the High Court etc. In order to ensure that the land owners are given proper compensation, the Act provides for `fair compensation. Once such a fair compensation is determined judicially, all land owners whose land was taken away by the same Notification should become the beneficiary thereof. Not only it is an aspect of good governance, failing to do so would also amount to discrimination by giving different treatment to the persons though identically situated. On technical grounds, like the one adopted by the High Court in the impugned judgment, this fair treatment cannot be denied to them.8. No doubt the judicial system that prevails is based on adversarial form of adjudication. At the same time, recognising the demerits and limitations of adversarial litigation, elements of social context adjudication are brought into the decision making process, particularly, when it comes to administering justice to the marginalised section of the society.society.12. From the human rights perspective, persons belonging to the weaker sections are disadvantaged people who are unable to acquire and use their rights because of poverty, social or other constraints. They are not in a position to approach the courts even when their rights are violated; they are victimized or deprived of their legitimate due. Here lies the importance of access to justice for socially and economically disadvantaged people. When such people are denied the basic right of survival and access to justice, it further aggravates their poverty. Therefore, even in order to eliminate poverty, access to justice to the poor sections of the society becomes imperative. In the instant case, it is the poverty which compelled the appellants to restrict the claim to Rs. 115/per sq. yard, as they were not in a position to pay the court fee on a higher amount.13. It is the aforesaid weighty consideration which justify award of compensation to the appellants at the rate of Rs. 297/per square yards. Though, the aforesaid reasons are enough to allow the appeals, in the present case, there is yet another additional circumstance which justifies this outcome.The High Court, in the process, also took aid of Section 28 of the Act. Thus, even those villagers whose land was acquired subsequently, are given compensation at the rate of Rs. 297/per square yards. Depriving this rate to the appellants herein would be nothing but travesty of justice.16. Simply because the appellants had paid court fee on the claim at the rate of Rs. 115/square yards could not be the reason to deny the compensation at a higher rate. This could be taken care of by directing the appellants to pay the difference in court fee after calculating the same at the rate of Rs. 297/per square yards.