Case: Awadesh Kumar Bhatnagar Vs. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Weaving Limited &amp; Another

of the appellant for having certain slips produced is an after-thought. The Labour Court has also held that the plea of the appellant that he issued the additional slips by mistake cannot be believed. This finding has been recorded by the Labour Court after independently going through the materials on record. The Labour Court has further found that an attempt was made by the appellant to induce Jodha Ram to destroy certain pages in the daily work register. This conduct clearly shows that the appellant tried to destroy the evidence that may be used against him and that conduct clearly reveals a guilty mind. Having recorded such a finding against the workman, it is difficult for us to appreciate as to how the Labour Court came to record a finding that by mere non-production of the slips, as required by the workman, the enquiry proceedings have been held in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Industrial Court, under those circumstances was, perfectly justified in holding that the approach made by the Labour Court was erroneous. We are of the view that the finding of the Industrial Court that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice is correct. Therefore, the first contention of Mr. Naunit Lal has to be rejected.17. Coming to the second contention, we have already referred to the fact that the Labour Court has found that Abde Ali was competent to hold the enquiry against the appellant. The order of discharge has been held to be invalid by the Labour Court on the ground that it has not been signed by the manager, namely, Shri Srivastava. So far as this is concerned, the Industrial Court has held that the order has been signed both by Abde Ali as well as by Bhagrodia, who was the secretary of the mills and who had the power to appoint and dismiss an employee of the company. According to Mr. Naunit Lal, though Abde Ali may be competent to conduct an enquiry, the order of discharge has to be passed only by the manager or other officer authorised as required by cl. 12(4)(f). In this case as the manager Shri Srivastava has not signed the order, it is invalid.18. We are not inclined to accept the above contention of Mr. Naunit Lal. The matter can be considered from two points of view. We will proceed on the basis that Abde Ali alone has signed the order. Even according to the appellant, he is a person competent to hold the enquiry. The question is whether he is also competent to pass an order punishing an employee under cl. 12(4)(f). We have already referred to the definition of "Manager" as well as cl. 12. (4)(a) and (f) of the Standing Orders. A person authorised by the manager is himself a manager under cl. (1)(a). Under Ext.D 39A, Abde Ali has been authorised by Shri Srivastava to conduct all enquiries under the Act in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workman and also to conduct all proceedings in respect of the enquiry. The authorisation given under Ext.D 39A to Abde Ali is comprehensive enough to constitute him as a person authorised by the manager and as such he is a manager under cl. (1)(a) of the Standing Orders. If so, he is person competent under cl. 12(4)(f) to pass an order discharging the appellant by way of punishment.19. The Industrial Court has found that the order has been also signed by Bhagrodia, who was the secretary of the mills, Admittedly, he is an officer, superior in rank to that of the manager and he is the appointing and dismissing authority for all clerical and other staff. When an authority higher than the manager has passed the order or discharge, it cannot certainly be held to be invalid. A reasonable interpretation of cl. 12(4)(f) of the Standing Orders is that an authority lower in rank to that of a manager or other officer authorised under Standing Order 1(a), cannot pass an order of punishment. Therefore, on this ground also the order can be held to be valid.20. There is an additional circumstance which has not been noted by the Labour Court. Bhagrodia has given evidence to the effect that the Factory Manager Shri Srivastava was subordinate to him. He has further deposed that whenever Shri Srivastava went out of station, he used to authorise him to exercise all powers of the manager under the standing orders of the company. During the enquiry proceedings against the appellant, Shri Srivastava went on leave and he authorised the witness to pass the necessary orders on the basis of the enquiry. The witness has further deposed that after considering the enquiry proceedings, he passed the order discharging the appellant from service. This evidence has not been challenged in cross-examination. If so, it follows that even by giving a strict meaning to the expression "manager" under the Standing Orders, Bhagrodia is a person who has been authorised by the manager for the purpose of the standing orders and as such he is a manager under the definition and as such competent to pass the order under cl. 12(4)(f) of the Standing Orders. Considering the matter from any point of view, it follows that the view of the Industrial Court, that the order of discharge has been passed by the competent officer is correct.21. The above aspects referred to by us, have not been referred to by the Labour Court when it held that the order is invalid as having been passed by a person without authority. Therefore, the second contention of Mr. Naunit Lal also fails.22. Coming to the last contention, we are not satisfied that the Industrial Court has in any manner exceeded its jurisdiction under Ss.66 and 67 of the Act. We have pointed out the very serious mistakes committed by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court has acted well within its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the Labour Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]16. Coming to the first contention of Mr. Naunit Lal, the finding of the Labour Court and accepted by the Industrial Court is that both Abde Ali as well as Trivedi, who conducted the enquiry, were persons empowered to do so. The authority letter Ext. D 39A clearly shows that both these officers have been authorised by the Factory Manager Shri Srivastava to conduct all enquiries under the Act and the standing orders and they have also been authorised to do all things necessary in connection with the enquiry. In view of the concurrent findings of these two authorities, it must be held that the enquiry proceedings have been properly conducted by the officers, competent under the standing orders. The plea that the enquiry proceedings suffer from violation of the principles of natural justice is based upon the circumstance that certain slips that were required to be summoned by the workmen were not made available. It is no doubt true that the appellant filed an application before the enquiry officer on May 2, 1963, requesting him to make available certain gate passes. The purpose was stated to be to enable the appellant to furthertwo witnesses Devidattaji and Jamadar Govardhan. The enquiry officer has made a note that this application was received after the said two witness had been examined on May 3, 1963. The enquiry officer passed an order that the two witnesses had been examined long ago and there is no justification for recalling them. On this ground the application filed by the appellant for production of slips was rejected. Prima facie it may appear that When an employee who is facing an enquiry for misconduct requires certain materials in the possession of the company to be produced and they were not made available, the workman may be prejudiced in properly placing his defence. But in the circumstances of this case, the finding of the Industrial Court that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant is justified. The Labour Court itself has recorded a finding to the effect that the appellant is responsible for not having applied for production of the slips in question and that he never put any question to the witnesses concerned regarding those slips. The reasoning of the Labour Court itself clearly shows that this plea of the appellant for having certain slips produced is anThe Labour Court has also held that the plea of the appellant that he issued the additional slips by mistake cannot be believed. This finding has been recorded by the Labour Court after independently going through the materials on record. The Labour Court has further found that an attempt was made by the appellant to induce Jodha Ram to destroy certain pages in the daily work register. This conduct clearly shows that the appellant tried to destroy the evidence that may be used against him and that conduct clearly reveals a guilty mind. Having recorded such a finding against the workman, it is difficult for us to appreciate as to how the Labour Court came to record a finding that by mereof the slips, as required by the workman, the enquiry proceedings have been held in violation of the principles of natural justice. The Industrial Court, under those circumstances was, perfectly justified in holding that the approach made by the Labour Court was erroneous. We are of the view that the finding of the Industrial Court that there is no violation of the principles of natural justice is correct. Therefore, the first contention of Mr. Naunit Lal has to be rejected.17. Coming to the second contention, we have already referred to the fact that the Labour Court has found that Abde Ali was competent to hold the enquiry against the appellant. The order of discharge has been held to be invalid by the Labour Court on the ground that it has not been signed by the manager, namely, Shri Srivastava. So far as this is concerned, the Industrial Court has held that the order has been signed both by Abde Ali as well as by Bhagrodia, who was the secretary of the mills and who had the power to appoint and dismiss an employee of the company. According to Mr. Naunit Lal, though Abde Ali may be competent to conduct an enquiry, the order of discharge has to be passed only by the manager or other officer authorised as required by cl. 12(4)(f). In this case as the manager Shri Srivastava has not signed the order, it is invalid.18. We are not inclined to accept the above contention of Mr. Naunit Lal. The matter can be considered from two points of view. We will proceed on the basis that Abde Ali alone has signed the order. Even according to the appellant, he is a person competent to hold the enquiry. The question is whether he is also competent to pass an order punishing an employee under cl. 12(4)(f). We have already referred to the definition of "Manager" as well as cl. 12. (4)(a) and (f) of the Standing Orders. A person authorised by the manager is himself a manager under cl. (1)(a). Under Ext.D 39A, Abde Ali has been authorised by Shri Srivastava to conduct all enquiries under the Act in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workman and also to conduct all proceedings in respect of the enquiry. The authorisation given under Ext.D 39A to Abde Ali is comprehensive enough to constitute him as a person authorised by the manager and as such he is a manager under cl. (1)(a) of the Standing Orders. If so, he is person competent under cl. 12(4)(f) to pass an order discharging the appellant by way of punishment.19. The Industrial Court has found that the order has been also signed by Bhagrodia, who was the secretary of the mills, Admittedly, he is an officer, superior in rank to that of the manager and he is the appointing and dismissing authority for all clerical and other staff. When an authority higher than the manager has passed the order or discharge, it cannot certainly be held to be invalid. A reasonable interpretation of cl. 12(4)(f) of the Standing Orders is that an authority lower in rank to that of a manager or other officer authorised under Standing Order 1(a), cannot pass an order of punishment. Therefore, on this ground also the order can be held to be valid.There is an additional circumstance which has not been noted by the Labour Court. Bhagrodia has given evidence to the effect that the Factory Manager Shri Srivastava was subordinate to him. He has further deposed that whenever Shri Srivastava went out of station, he used to authorise him to exercise all powers of the manager under the standing orders of the company. During the enquiry proceedings against the appellant, Shri Srivastava went on leave and he authorised the witness to pass the necessary orders on the basis of the enquiry. The witness has further deposed that after considering the enquiry proceedings, he passed the order discharging the appellant from service. This evidence has not been challenged inIf so, it follows that even by giving a strict meaning to the expression "manager" under the Standing Orders, Bhagrodia is a person who has been authorised by the manager for the purpose of the standing orders and as such he is a manager under the definition and as such competent to pass the order under cl. 12(4)(f) of the Standing Orders. Considering the matter from any point of view, it follows that the view of the Industrial Court, that the order of discharge has been passed by the competent officer is correct.21. The above aspects referred to by us, have not been referred to by the Labour Court when it held that the order is invalid as having been passed by a person without authority. Therefore, the second contention of Mr. Naunit Lal also fails.22. Coming to the last contention, we are not satisfied that the Industrial Court has in any manner exceeded its jurisdiction under Ss.66 and 67 of the Act. We have pointed out the very serious mistakes committed by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court has acted well within its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the Labour Court.