Case: Nandganj Sihori Sugar Co. Ltd., Rae Bareli And Anr Vs. Badri Nath Dixit And Ors

of service in terms of or pursuant to an unknown scheme. Subject to certain well defined categories of exceptions, the law does not permit, and the Specific Relief Act does not contemplate, the enforcement of a contract of a personal nature by a decree for specific performance. The facts of this case do not fall within the exceptions. Assuming that the facts alleged by the plaintiff to be true - as stated earlier, there is no evidence whatever to support them - the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief other than damages in the event of his being in a position to prove that he has been damnified by reason of the defendants failure to carry out the obligations arising under what he calls a contract 8. In Halsburys Laws of England (4th edn. Volume 44, at para 407) it is stated "407. Contracts for personal work or services. - A judgment for specific performance of a contract for personal work or services is not pronounced, either at the suit of the employer or the employee. The court does not seek to compel persons against their will to maintain continuous personal and confidential relations. However, this rule is not absolute and without exception. It has been held that an employer may be restrained from dismissing an employee in breach of contract if there is no loss of confidence between employer and employee or if (at least in a contract of employment to carry out a public duty) the employee has been dismissed in a manner which does not comply with statutory or contractual regulations governing dismissal. No court may, whether by way of an order for specific performance of a contract of employment or an injunction restraining a breach or threatened breach of such contract, compel an employee to do any work or attend at any place for the doing of any workThis principle applies not merely to contracts of employment, but to all contracts which involve the rendering of continuous services by one person to another, such as a contract to work a railway line ..." 9. As stated by this Court in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain ( 1976 (2) SCC 58 : 1976 SCC(L&S) 176) : (SCC p. 71, para 18) "... a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would not give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions - (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of statute." * 10. A contract of employment cannot ordinarily be enforced by or against an employer. The remedy is to sue for damages. (See Section 14 read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act; see Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts by Pollock and Mulla, 10th edn., page 983). The grant of specific performance is purely discretionary and must be refused when not warranted by the ends of justice. Such relief can be granted only on sound legal principles. In the absence of any statutory requirement, courts do not ordinarily force an employer to recruit or retain in service an employee not required by the employer. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of a public servant dismissed from service in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution; reinstatement of a dismissed worker under the Industrial Law; a statutory body acting in breach of statutory obligations, and the like (S.R. Tiwari v. District Board, Agra 1964 AIR(SC) 1680 : 1964 (3) SCR 55 : 1964 (1) LLJ 1 ); Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation v. C.K. Tyagi ( 1969 (2) SCC 838 : 1970 (2) SCR 250 ); Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain ( 1976 (2) SCC 58 : 1976 SCC(L&S) 176); see Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edn., Volume 44, paragraphs 405 to 420) 11. On the facts of this case, the High Court was clearly wrong in issuing a mandatory injunction to appoint the plaintiff. Even if there was a contract in terms of which the plaintiff was entitled to seek relief, the only relief which was available in law was damages and not specific performance. Breach of contract must ordinarily sound in damages, and particularly so in the case of personal contracts. Assuming that a contractual relationship arose consequent upon the letters addressed by defendant 3 to defendant 1, the plaintiff was a total stranger to any such relationship, for, on the facts of this case, no relationship of a fiduciary character existed between the plaintiff and defendant 3 or other defendants. Neither on principles of law or equity nor under any statute did the plaintiff acquire an enforceable right by reason of the letters exchanged between defendants 1 and 3. The plaintiff had no privity of any kind to their relationship. No collateral contract to which the plaintiff was a party did arise on the facts of this case. At no time was defendant 3 acting as an agent of the plaintiff. There is no express or implied contract which is enforceable by the plaintiff. (See Halsburys Laws of England, 4th edn., Volume 9, paragraphs 334 to 342) 12. The plaintiffs counsel suggests that the claim is justifiable on the basis of legitimate expectations for appointment. There is no specific plea or evidence to support any such contention. Whatever expectations might have arisen from the letters of defendant 3, they could not have in law given rise to any right enforceable by specific performance

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. On the facts of this case, the High Court was clearly wrong in issuing a mandatory injunction to appoint the plaintiff. Even if there was a contract in terms of which the plaintiff was entitled to seek relief, the only relief which was available in law was damages and not specific performance. Breach of contract must ordinarily sound in damages, and particularly so in the case of personal contracts. Assuming that a contractual relationship arose consequent upon the letters addressed by defendant 3 to defendant 1, the plaintiff was a total stranger to any such relationship, for, on the facts of this case, no relationship of a fiduciary character existed between the plaintiff and defendant 3 or other defendants. Neither on principles of law or equity nor under any statute did the plaintiff acquire an enforceable right by reason of the letters exchanged between defendants 1 and 3. The plaintiff had no privity of any kind to their relationship. No collateral contract to which the plaintiff was a party did arise on the facts of this case. At no time was defendant 3 acting as an agent of the plaintiff. There is no express or implied contract which is enforceable by the plaintiff.The plaintiffs counsel suggests that the claim is justifiable on the basis of legitimate expectations for appointment. There is no specific plea or evidence to support any such contention. Whatever expectations might have arisen from the letters of defendant 3, they could not have in law given rise to any right enforceable by specific performance