Case: I.T.C. Ltd. Workers Welfare Association and Anr Vs. The Management of I.T.C. Ltd. and Ors

of life pension cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational as such fixation becomes imperative from financial point of view and moreover the date coincided with the Platinum Jubilee Celebrations of the Company. The date was not picked up from the hat, the High Court observed. The High Court approached the issue more from the angle of Article 14 and referred to the decisions in which the States action in making the classification for the purpose of extending the pensionary benefits or additional benefits fell for consideration of this Court. Strictly speaking, such approach is not apt and appropriate. The present case is one where Article 14 cannot be applied as the respondent is not State or other Authority. On this, there is practically no dispute. If so, the approach should be as we indicated earlier; that is to say, whether the settlement can be said to be unjust, unfair or vitiated by mala fides. No mala fides is imputed to anyone. What remains to be consideration is whether it is fair and just, viewed from a broader angle and taking a holistic view of the matter. It is true that certain considerations germane to Article 14 may also be germane while deciding the issue whether the settlement is just and fair. But, it does not follow that the doctrine of classification and the principles associated with it should be projected wholesale into the process of consideration of justness and fairness of the settlement. There may be some overlapping and there may be some facets which apply in common to determine the crucial issue whether the settlement on the whole is just and fair, but that is not to say that the settlement is liable to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14, more so when it has no application in the instant case. Keeping this distinction in mind and considering the grounds of attack on the particular clause of settlement, we are unable to hold that it is vulnerable to challenge on any well-recognised grounds. The facts on record do not establish that the settlement which was reached was palpably unjust or unfair from the point of the entire body of workmen. The preponderence of circumstances and the material on record do not in our view displace the presumption attached to the settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation. 25. Firstly, it is to be borne in mind that there was no challenge at any time to any of the terms of the settlement other than the clause relating to pension in so far as it confines the benefit of life-long pension only to those who retire on or after 24.08.1986. Secondly, we must give due weight to the fact that the settlement was reached as a result of collective bargaining and with the assistance of Conciliation officer. Invariably, there would be an element of give and take in the deal leading to the settlement. Granting the benefit of life-long pension prospectively or with limited retro-active effect does not make the settlement unjust or unfair. It is certainly beneficial to the workmen in service and those who retired few months earlier. The mere fact that the Management did not go the whole hog to extend the benefit to all the retired employees does not impart an element of unjustness or unreasonableness to the settlement. Financial implications apart, the benefits granted to workmen under various other clauses of settlement have to be kept in view. This particular clause relating to pension cannot be considered in isolation. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners argued that there was no justification in making a sub-classification amongst the retired employees by giving the benefit to those who retired only between 24.08.1986 and the date of settlement. In our view, conferment of such additional benefit to workmen who retired after the date of platinum jubilee celebration and before the date of culmination of settlement, far from making it unjust or irrational, tantamounts to extending benefit to some more workmen who would not have got it otherwise, if the decision was implemented prospectively. Apparently, such decision was taken to arrive at an amicable settlement and to comply with the demands of the workmen to the extent feasible and practicable. The argument that either all the retired employees should be given the benefit or none at all cannot cut ice if the principles of collective bargaining and justness of the settlement viewed as a whole is kept in view. There is nothing which is palpably unjust or irrational in giving the benefit only to those who retired during and after the platinum jubilee year. Though there was some dispute as to the correctness of the date on which the platinum jubilee falls, on material has been placed before us excepting the date of incorporation of the Company to establish the version of the appellants in this regard. Picking up that date by going a little backwards from the date of settlement cannot be regarded as a whimsical or arbitrary step, more so when it was down with the consent of large majority of workmen. The Tribunal while adjudicating the dispute and the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226/227 should be circumspect and cautious in disturbing the terms of settlement founded on collective bargaining and conciliation. The adjudicator or industrial dispute could not have directed the benefit to be extended to all the retired employees by substituting its own views to those reflected in the settlement, on an application of the usual principles governing industrial adjudication.26. Another factor to be taken into account is that the recognised union of workmen which espoused the cause of the retired employees and contested the issue before the Industrial Tribunal did not pursue the matter further obviously because the felt that in the larger interests of maintaining industrial harmony and peace, the matter should be left off at that state. A member of that recognised union had taken up the issue before the High Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. In answering the reference the industrial adjudicator has to keep in the forefront of his mind the settlement reached under Section 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Once it is found that the terms of the settlement operate in respect of the dispute raised before it, it is not open to the Industrial Tribunal to ignore the settlement or even belittle its effect by applying its mind independent of the settlement unless the settlement is found to be contrary to the mandatory provisions of the Act or unless it is found that there isto the norms by which the settlement could be subjected to limited judicial scrutiny. This is infact the approach of the Tribunal in the instant case. The High Court which examined the issue from a different angle as well was, in our view, justified in affirming the award of the Tribunal.Admittedly, the settlement arrived at in the instant case was in the course of conciliation proceedings and therefore it carries a presumption that it is just and fair. It becomes binding on all the parties to the dispute as well as the other workmen in the establishment to which the disputed relates and all other persons who may be subsequently employed in that establishment. An individual employee cannot seek to wriggle out of the settlement merely because it does not suit him.Having noted that the only objectionable feature of the settlement as found by the Tribunal was reduction of dearness allowance from cent per to 85 per cent, it was held that, that part of the settlement cannot be held to be invalid or inoperative. This proposition laid down in Herbertsons case was reiterated in K.C.P. Ltd. case (supra), approvingly citing the said decision. The passages in Herbertsons case were quoted in extenso and approved by thebench in TELCO case (supra) as well.22. What follows from a conspectus of these decisions is that a settlement which is a product of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration, more so when a settlement is arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings. The settlement can only be ignored in exceptional circumstances viz. if it is demonstrably unjust, unfair or the result of mala fides such as corrupt motives on the part of those who were instrumental in effecting the settlement. The apart, the settlement has to be judged as a whole, taking an overall view. The various terms and clauses of settlement cannot be examined in piecemeal and in vacuum.23. Viewed in the light of these principles, it cannot be said that the settlement in the present case which is otherwise valid and just suffers from any legal infirmity merely for the reasons that one of the clauses in the settlement extends the benefits of life pension scheme only of the employees retiring after a particular date i.e. 24.8.1986. Exclusion of workmen retiring before that date is no ground to characterise the settlement an unjust or unfair. Of course, the allegations of mala fides such as corrupt motives have not been levelled against anyone and that aspect becomes irrelevantpresent case is one where Article 14 cannot be applied as the respondent is not State or other Authority. On this, there is practically no dispute. If so, the approach should be as we indicated earlier; that is to say, whether the settlement can be said to be unjust, unfair or vitiated by mala fides. No mala fides is imputed to anyone. What remains to be consideration is whether it is fair and just, viewed from a broader angle and taking a holistic view of the matter. It is true that certain considerations germane to Article 14 may also be germane while deciding the issue whether the settlement is just and fair. But, it does not follow that the doctrine of classification and the principles associated with it should be projected wholesale into the process of consideration of justness and fairness of the settlement. There may be some overlapping and there may be some facets which apply in common to determine the crucial issue whether the settlement on the whole is just and fair, but that is not to say that the settlement is liable to be tested on the touchstone of Article 14, more so when it has no application in the instant case. Keeping this distinction in mind and considering the grounds of attack on the particular clause of settlement, we are unable to hold that it is vulnerable to challenge on anygrounds. The facts on record do not establish that the settlement which was reached was palpably unjust or unfair from the point of the entire body of workmen. The preponderence of circumstances and the material on record do not in our view displace the presumption attached to the settlement arrived at in the course ofour view, conferment of such additional benefit to workmen who retired after the date of platinum jubilee celebration and before the date of culmination of settlement, far from making it unjust or irrational, tantamounts to extending benefit to some more workmen who would not have got it otherwise, if the decision was implemented prospectively. Apparently, such decision was taken to arrive at an amicable settlement and to comply with the demands of the workmen to the extent feasible and practicable. The argument that either all the retired employees should be given the benefit or none at all cannot cut ice if the principles of collective bargaining and justness of the settlement viewed as a whole is kept in view. There is nothing which is palpably unjust or irrational in giving the benefit only to those who retired during and after the platinum jubilee year. Though there was some dispute as to the correctness of the date on which the platinum jubilee falls, on material has been placed before us excepting the date of incorporation of the Company to establish the version of the appellants in this regard. Picking up that date by going a little backwards from the date of settlement cannot be regarded as a whimsical or arbitrary step, more so when it was down with the consent of large majority of workmen. The Tribunal while adjudicating the dispute and the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226/227 should be circumspect and cautious in disturbing the terms of settlement founded on collective bargaining and conciliation. The adjudicator or industrial dispute could not have directed the benefit to be extended to all the retired employees by substituting its own views to those reflected in the settlement, on an application of the usual principles governing industrial adjudication.26. Another factor to be taken into account is that the recognised union of workmen which espoused the cause of the retired employees and contested the issue before the Industrial Tribunal did not pursue the matter further obviously because the felt that in the larger interests of maintaining industrial harmony and peace, the matter should be left off at that state. A member of that recognised union had taken up the issue before the High Court.