Case: M/S:Modi Food Products Co. Limited Vs. Shri Faqir Chand Sharma &amp; Others

an employer is laid-off, he shall be paid by the employer for all days during which he is so laid-off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent. of the total of the basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid-off:Provided that -(a) the compensation payable to a workman during any period of twelve months shall not be for more than forty-five days except in the case specified in clause (b);(b) if during any period of twelve months, a workman has been paid compensation for forty-five days and during the same period of twelve months he is again laid-off for further continuous periods of more than one week at a time, he shall, unless there is any agreement to the contrary between him and the employer, be paid for all the days during such subsequent periods of lay-off compensation at the rate specified in this section."The appellant does not dispute the right of the respondents to compensation, and, in fact, they were informed by the very notice dated 12-7-1954 under which they were laid off, that compensation would be paid to them in accordance with S. 25-C. It is as regards the quantum of compensation payable under that section that the parties are disagreed. It will be remembered that the lay off commenced on 14-7-1954 and was to continue until the next groundnut season and that the workers were actually absorbed in batches from September, and that by the first week of December, they had all of them been employed. There was thus one continuous lay off for periods varying from 57 to 121 days. The contention of the appellant is that, on these facts, the workmen were entitled to compensation only in accordance with proviso (a) to S. 25-C, and that they would therefore be entitled to 50 per cent. of the basic wages and dearness allowance for the first 45 days and for the rest of the period, no compensation was payable. The respondents agree that proviso (a) to S. 25-C applies to the first period of 45 days; but they contend that for the remaining period of the lay off, the governing provision is proviso (b) S. 25-C, and that under that proviso, they would be entitled to compensation as provided in the body of the section i.e., 50 per cent. of the basic wages and dearness allowance, for the remaining period also. This contention was accepted by the Tribunal, and holding that the compensation awarded by the appellant was not in accordance with S.25-C, it decided, as already mentioned, that there was an alteration of conditions of service, and accordingly awarded compensation under S.23 of the Act.9. It is contended for the appellant that the construction which the Tribunal has put on S. 25-C is erroneous, and that the amount of compensation offered by the appellant was the correct amount payable under that section. As already stated, there is no dispute that the compensation payable for the first 45 days has to be determined in accordance with proviso (a) to S. 25-C. The dispute is only as to whether for the rest of the period of lay off the workmen are entitled to compensation under proviso (b) to S. 25-C. That proviso would apply only if the workmen had been paid compensation for 45 days, are were again laid off for further periods of more than one week at a time. On the wording of the section, it is clear that the lay off which falls within proviso (b) to S. 25-C must be distinct from that for which compensation had been paid in accordance with proviso (a) to S.25-C and subsequent thereto in point of time. And as, in the present case there was one continuous lay off for the entire period, proviso (b) could have no application.10. Counsel for the respondents contends that though there was only one lay off, it should notionally be split up into two, the first period being the 45 days covered by proviso (a) to the section and the rest of the period, by proviso (b). It is arguable that there could be a second and distinct lay off following the first without a break, as for example, when the management first notifys lay off for a period of 45 days and pays compensation therefor, and again issues a fresh notificaiton at the end of the period declaring a further lay off for a period exceeding seven days in continuation of the notified lay off, and that would fall within proviso (b). But, in the present case, there was only one notification, and the period specified therein was up to the next season.By no straining of the language of proviso (b) to S. 25-C can such a lay off be brought within its purview. These respondents rely in support of their contention on the decision inAutomobile Products of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen,(1955) 1 Lab L J 67 (Bom) (A).But that decision gives no effect whatever to the words "again laid off", and moreover, if the construction adopted therein is correct, there would be no need for the provisos (a) and (b), as what would be payable under them, according to the respondents, would become payable under the body of the section itself. If, as observed in the above decision, this conclusion leads to an anomalous position, it is for the legislature, if it thinks fit, to amend the section and not for the Tribunal to construe it otherwise than what it plainly means.We are accordingly of opinion that the respondents are entitled to compensation only for the 45 days as provided in proviso (a), and that as the appellant had offered to pay the same by its notice dated 12-7-1954, there was no alteration of the conditions of the service within S.22 of the Act, and that, in consequence, the petition of the respondents was liable to be rejected.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We are of opinion that both these contentions arecontention rests on the supposition that the conditions under which workmen could be laid off are conditions as to their service, and that when the employer lays off workmen without proper grounds therefor, it is a violation of the conditions of service within S. 22 (a) of thequestion is one of some importance, but it is unnecessary to express any opinion onmust, therefore, decide the question on the footing that the only condition which the parties might be taken to have agreed to is that the lay-off should be for adequate grounds and for a reasonable period. On this question, there is a clear finding in favour of the appellant. TheTribunal has found that groundnut and neem seeds were not available at parity prices, and that for that reason, the work had to beis not likely that businessmen would cut their profits to spite the workmen. The period of the lay-off was expressed to be until the next groundnut season, and we have been told that the season for groundnut begins sometime in November-December. In fact, all the respondents have been re-employed in relays from September onwards, and by the first week of December all of them had been absorbed. On the Finding of the Tribunal that the lay-off was justified, it follows that the application of the respondents under S. 23 of the Act was liable to be dismissed on the ground that there had been no contravention of S.22appellant does not dispute the right of the respondents to compensation, and, in fact, they were informed by the very notice dated 12-7-1954 under which they were laid off, that compensation would be paid to them in accordance with S. 25-C. It is as regards the quantum of compensation payable under that section that the parties are disagreed. It will be remembered that the lay off commenced on 14-7-1954 and was to continue until the next groundnut season and that the workers were actually absorbed in batches from September, and that by the first week of December, they had all of them been employed. There was thus one continuous lay off for periods varying from 57 to 121already stated, there is no dispute that the compensation payable for the first 45 days has to be determined in accordance with proviso (a) to S.proviso would apply only if the workmen had been paid compensation for 45 days, are were again laid off for further periods of more than one week at a time. On the wording of the section, it is clear that the lay off which falls within proviso (b) to S. 25-C must be distinct from that for which compensation had been paid in accordance with proviso (a) to S.25-C and subsequent thereto in point of time. And as, in the present case there was one continuous lay off for the entire period, proviso (b) could have nois arguable that there could be a second and distinct lay off following the first without a break, as for example, when the management first notifys lay off for a period of 45 days and pays compensation therefor, and again issues a fresh notificaiton at the end of the period declaring a further lay off for a period exceeding seven days in continuation of the notified lay off, and that would fall within provisoin the present case, there was only one notification, and the period specified therein was up to the next season.By no straining of the language of proviso (b) to S. 25-C can such a lay off be brought within its purview. These respondents rely in support of their contention on the decision inAutomobile Products of India Ltd. v. Their Workmen,(1955) 1 Lab L J 67 (Bom) (A).But that decision gives no effect whatever to the words "again laid off", and moreover, if the construction adopted therein is correct, there would be no need for the provisos (a) and (b), as what would be payable under them, according to the respondents, would become payable under the body of the sectionas observed in the above decision, this conclusion leads to an anomalous position, it is for the legislature, if it thinks fit, to amend the section and not for the Tribunal to construe it otherwise than what it plainly means.We are accordingly of opinion that the respondents are entitled to compensation only for the 45 days as provided in proviso (a), and that as the appellant had offered to pay the same by its notice dated 12-7-1954, there was no alteration of the conditions of the service within S.22 of the Act, and that, in consequence, the petition of the respondents was liable to be rejected.