Case: M. R. Patel Vs. State Of Bihar And Others

appellant to move the Excise Commissioner for reconsideration of his order dated November 14, 1956. On being moved by the appellant under the liberty so granted by the Board of Revenue, the Excise Commissioner by his order dated March 5, 1958 reviewed and set aside his previous order on a consideration of the general directions issued by the Board of Revenue, the Boards order dated March 20, 1957 and the special circumstances of the case. Neither the original order dated November 14, 1956 nor the subsequent order dated March 5, 1958 was passed by the Excise Commissioner under S. 35 on a consideration of the matters referred to in that Section. The finality of S. 35 did not attach to these orders and the Board of Revenue had ample power to revise them under S. 8. 4. Mr. Prasad next referred us to S. 40 of the Act and the standard form of license for the retail vend of country spirit, and contended that only the authority granting the license could fix the amount of the security, and one of the conditions of the license was that the licensee would be required to deposit only the amount so fixed but the Board of revenue by its order dated October 4, 1959 illegally and in excess of its powers altered the amount of the security so fixed and corresponding condition in the license for the deposit of the amount. This argument is based on a misreading of the order of October 4, 1959, and must be rejected. By that order, the Board expressly directed that there would be no change in the amount of the security during the currency of the license. The licenses were due to expire on March 31, 1960. The Board directed that if and when the licenses were renewed with effect from the next licensing year, the proper security should be demanded from the licensee as a condition of the renewal. No exception can be taken to this direction. The licensee had no vested right to a renewal of the license. Section 45 of the Act provides that he shall have no claim to its renewal. The licensing authority was not bound to renew the license. If, in its discretion, it granted a renewal, it could require the licensee to give proper security as a condition of the renewal. On a true construction of Ss. 38 and 91 of the Act it must be held that the Board, in exercise of its powers under S. 38 read with S. 91, could from time to time issue general directions with regard to the conditions of any license granted under the Act including the amount of the security to be deposited by the license. In exercise of its powers under Ss. 38 and 91, the Board had fixed the security deposit of an Excise shop working under the sliding scale system as equivalent to two months average license fees of the shop. The Board was entitled to direct, as it did by the order dated October 4, 1961, that the general directions issued by it under Ss. 38 and 91 should be observed and carried out by the licensing authority and the proper security in accordance with those directions should be demanded if and when the licenses were next renewed. 5. Mr. Prasad next contended that the direction for the increase of the security at the time of the renewal of the licenses is contrary to the instruction No. 101 (10) of the Board of Revenue at p. 39 of Vol. III of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Mannual, 1955 Edn. There is not substance in this contention. In its order dated October 4, 1959, the Board of Revenue exhaustively reviewed all the relevant instructions issued by it from time to time, and rightly pointed out that instruction No. 101 (10) read with the Boards circular letter No. 8624, dated September 9, 1956 did not prevent increase of the security at the time of the renewal of the licenses. 6. Mr. Prasad lastly argued that (a) the power of revision under S. 8 (3) of the Act could be exercised by the Board of Revenue only on an application by an aggrieved party, and (b) the proceedings in revision in the instant case were barred by limitation. There is no substance in these contentions. The Board of Revenue may exercise its powers of revision under S. 8 (3) suo motu. No period of limitation is prescribed by the Act for exercise of the power of revision under S. 8 (3). 7. Mr. Prasad drew our attention to paragraph 71, Chap, V of Part III of the Bihar Practice and Procedure Manual, 1958, pp. 99 and 100, which provides that where there is no provision of law as to the period within which an application for revision may be allowed, the application for revision should be preferred within one month of the date of the Commissioners order deducting the time occupied in obtaining a copy of the order, but the Board has a discretion to admit the application for revision preferred after one month. In the instant case, in its order, dated October 4, 1959, the Board stated that it would exercise its powers of revision suo motu. In a case where the Board exercises its power of revision of its own motion, no question of limitation arises. Moreover, the Board held that this was a fit case for interference even after the expiry of the ordinary period of limitation. 8. No other arguments were advanced before us. We see no reason to interfere with the Boards order. The learned Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the Board is not a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution. In view of our conclusion that the appellant has no case on the merits, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the preliminary objection. 9.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The finality of S. 35 did not attach to these orders and the Board of Revenue had ample power to revise them under S. 8On a true construction of Ss. 38 and 91 of the Act it must be held that the Board, in exercise of its powers under S. 38 read with S. 91, could from time to time issue general directions with regard to the conditions of any license granted under the Act including the amount of the security to be deposited by the license. In exercise of its powers under Ss. 38 and 91, the Board had fixed the security deposit of an Excise shop working under the sliding scale system as equivalent to two months average license fees of the shop. The Board was entitled to direct, as it did by the order dated October 4, 1961, that the general directions issued by it under Ss. 38 and 91 should be observed and carried out by the licensing authority and the proper security in accordance with those directions should be demanded if and when the licenses were next renewedThere is not substance in this contention. In its order dated October 4, 1959, the Board of Revenue exhaustively reviewed all the relevant instructions issued by it from time to time, and rightly pointed out that instruction No. 101 (10) read with the Boards circular letter No. 8624, dated September 9, 1956 did not prevent increase of the security at the time of the renewal of the licensesThere is no substance in these contentions. The Board of Revenue may exercise its powers of revision under S. 8 (3) suo motu. No period of limitation is prescribed by the Act for exercise of the power of revision under S. 8 (3).. Prasad drew our attention to paragraph 71, Chap, V of Part III of the Bihar Practice and Procedure Manual, 1958, pp. 99 and 100, which provides that where there is no provision of law as to the period within which an application for revision may be allowed, the application for revision should be preferred within one month of the date of the Commissioners order deducting the time occupied in obtaining a copy of the order, but the Board has a discretion to admit the application for revision preferred after one month. In the instant case, in its order, dated October 4, 1959, the Board stated that it would exercise its powers of revision suo motu. In a case where the Board exercises its power of revision of its own motion, no question of limitation arises. Moreover, the Board held that this was a fit case for interference even after the expiry of the ordinary period of limitationNo other arguments were advanced before us. We see no reason to interfere with the Boards order. The learned Attorney-General raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the Board is not a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 of the Constitution. In view of our conclusion that the appellant has no case on the merits, we do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the preliminary objection