Case: Jose @ Pappachan Vs. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Koyilandy &amp; Another

the one favourable to the accused ought to be adopted. 54. The facts as obtained in the present case present a jigsaw puzzle in which several frames are missing to permit an unreserved opinion of the complicity of the appellant. 55. The inalienable interface of presumption of innocence and the burden of proof in a criminal case on the prosecution has been succinctly expounded in the following passage from the treatise “The Law of Evidence” fifth edition by Ian Dennis at page 445: “The presumption of innocence states that a person is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. In one sense this simply restates in different language the rule that the burden of proof in a criminal case is on the prosecution to prove the defendants guilt. As explained above, the burden of proof rule has a number of functions, one of which is to provide a rule of decision for the factfinder in a situation of uncertainty. Another function is to allocate the risk of misdecision in criminal trials. Because the outcome of wrongful conviction is regarded as a significantly worse harm than wrongful acquittal the rule is constructed so as to minimise the risk of the former. The burden of overcoming a presumption that the defendant is innocent therefore requires the state to prove the defendants guilt.” 56. The above quote thus seemingly concede a preference to wrongful acquittal compared to the risk of wrongful conviction. Such is the abiding jurisprudential concern to eschew even the remotest possibility of unmerited conviction. 57. This applies with full force particularly in fact situations where the charge is the sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. These enunciations are so well entrenched that we do not wish to burden the present narration by referring to the decisions of this Court in this regard. 58. Addressing this aspect, however, is the following extract also from the same treatise “The Law of Evidence” fifth edition by Ian Dennis at page 483: “ Where the case against the accused depends wholly or partly on inferences from circumstantial evidence, factfinders cannot logically convict unless they are sure that inferences of guilt are the only ones that can reasonably be drawn. If they think that there are possible innocent explanations for circumstantial evidence that are not “merely fanciful”, it must follow that there is a reasonable doubt about guilt. There is no rule, however, that judges must direct juries in terms not to convict unless they are sure that the evidence bears no other explanation than guilt. It is sufficient to direct simply that the burden on the prosecution is to satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt, or so that they are sure. The very high standard of proof required in criminal cases minimises the risk of a wrongful conviction. It means that someone whom, on the evidence, the factfinder believes is “probably” guilty, or “likely” to be guilty will be acquitted, since these judgements of probability necessarily admit that the factfinder is not “sure”. It is generally accepted that some at least of these acquittals will be of persons who are in fact guilty of the offences charged, and who would be convicted if the standard of proof were the lower civil standard of the balance of probabilities. Such acquittals are the price paid for the safeguard provided by the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard against wrongful conviction.” 59. A reference in the passing however to the of quoted decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) construed to be locus classicus on the relevance and decisiveness of circumstantial evidence as a proof of the charge of a criminal offence would not be out of place. The relevant excerpts from paragraph 153 of the decision is extracted herein below. “153.(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused...they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.* * *(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 60. As recent as in Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam (2013) 12 SCC 406 , this Court also in the contextual facts constituting circumstantial evidence ruled that in judging the culpability of an accused, the circumstances adduced when collectively considered must lead to the only irresistible conclusion that the accused alone is the perpetrator of a crime in question and the circumstances established must be of a conclusive nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. 61. In Dhan Raj @ Dhand vs. State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 745 , one of us (Hon. Ghose,J.) while dwelling on the imperatives of circumstantial evidence ruled that the same has to be of highest order to satisfy the test of proof in a criminal prosecution. It was underlined that such circumstantial evidence should establish a complete unbroken chain of events so that only one inference of guilt of the accused would ensue by excluding all possible hypothesis of his innocence. It was held further that in case of circumstantial evidence, each circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by independent evidence excluding any chance of surmise or conjecture. 62. Judged on the above parameters, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution constituting circumstantial evidence in support of the charge does not furnish an unassailable basis to hold the appellant guilty of the charge of murder levelled against him. The facts and circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt in his favour. 63. The circumstances brought forth by the prosecution do not rule out in absolute terms the hypothesis of the innocence of the appellant. We thus consider it to be wholly unsafe to maintain his conviction as recorded by the courts below.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]On an overall consideration of the evidence available on record, it would be, in our view, wholly unsafe to hold the appellant guilty of the charge of murder of his wife by strangulating her with the nylon rope as seized and then hanging her from the roof with the saree to complete the act. The circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution in our assessment falls short of the requirement in law to return a finding of guilt against the appellant without any element of doubt whatsoever. The fact that both the accused persons had been exonerated of the charge of cruelty under Section 498A IPC and that the co-accused, who allegedly had assisted the appellant in the perpetration of the crime had been fully acquitted by the courts below of all the charges also takes away the wind from the sails of theis a trite proposition of law, that suspicion however grave, it cannot take the place of proof and that the prosecution in order to succeed on a criminal charge cannot afford to lodge its case in the realm ofbut has to essentially elevate it to the grade ofIn a criminal prosecution, the court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal proof and in a situation where a reasonable doubt is entertained in the backdrop of the evidence available, to prevent miscarriage of justice, benefit of doubt is to be extended to the accused. Such a doubt essentially has to be reasonable and not imaginary, fanciful, intangible or non-existent but as entertainable by an impartial, prudent and analytical mind, judged on the touch stone of reason and common sense. It is also a primary postulation in criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence available, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the one favourable to the accused ought to befacts as obtained in the present case present a jigsaw puzzle in which several frames are missing to permit an unreserved opinion of the complicity of theabove quote thus seemingly concede a preference to wrongful acquittal compared to the risk of wrongful conviction. Such is the abiding jurisprudential concern to eschew even the remotest possibility of unmeritedapplies with full force particularly in fact situations where the charge is the sought to be established by circumstantial evidence. These enunciations are so well entrenched that we do not wish to burden the present narration by referring to the decisions of this Court in thison the above parameters, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the evidence adduced by the prosecution constituting circumstantial evidence in support of the charge does not furnish an unassailable basis to hold the appellant guilty of the charge of murder levelled against him. The facts and circumstances admit of a reasonable doubt in hiscircumstances brought forth by the prosecution do not rule out in absolute terms the hypothesis of the innocence of the appellant. We thus consider it to be wholly unsafe to maintain his conviction as recorded by the courts below.