Case: State Of Andhra Pradesh Vs. S. M. K. Parasurama Gurukul

questions of policy or expediency and if so whether in arriving at the decision, the statutory body has to consider proposals and objections and evidence; and(v) whether in arriving at its decision, the statutory body has only to consider policy and expediency and at no stage has before it any form of list"Subba Rao. J., who differed from the majority, after referring to the formulation of the principles in Advanis case, earlier referred to, as unexceptionable and also to the discussion in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, (1952) 2 QB 413 stated the principles, in his own words thus:"Every act of an administrative authority is not an administrative or ministerial act. The provisions of a statute may enjoin on an administrative authority to act administratively or to act judicially or to act in part administratively and in part judicially. If policy and expediency are the guiding factors in part or in whole throughout the entire process culminating in the final decision, it is an obvious case of administrative act.On the other hand, if the statute expressly imposes a duty on the administrative body to act judicially, it is again a clear case of a judicial act. Between the two, there are many acts, the determination of whose character creates difficult problems for the court. There may be cases where at one stage of the process the said body may have to act judicially and at another stage ministerially. The rule can be broadly stated thus: The duty to act judicially may not be expressly conferred but may be inferred from the provisions of the statute. It may be gathered from the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used the nature of the power conferred or the duty imposed on the authority and other indicia afforded by the statute. In short, a duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances and it is not possible or advisable to lay down a hard and fast rule or an inexorable rule of guidance."In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, 1959 (Supp)1 SCR 319 =(AIR 1959) SC 308 ), Subba Rao, J., after referring to the various decisions on this subject held:"....whether an administrative tribunal has a duty to act judicially should be gathered from the provisions of the particular statute and the rules made thereunder, and they clearly express the view that if an authority is called upon to decide respective rights of contesting parties or, to put it in other words, if there is a lis, ordinarily there will be a duty on the part of the said authority to act judicially."4. It is hardly necessary to say that in this case the respondent had no right to be appointed a trustee; nor had any of the other persons who were appointed trustees. There was no question of a proposition and an opposition. There is, therefore, no question of any list. Nor is here any question of contest between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it. Such a question will arise only if any right of the subject is affected. None of the other tests laid down above are satisfied in this case.5. An examination of the provisions of the statute, which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration and government of charitable and Hindu religious institutions and endowments does not show that in appointing trustees to temples the concerned authorities have to act judicially. Nor is the appointment of trustees under Section 15 left to the administrative authority without any guidelines laid down by the Legislature for being followed. Section 16 lays down the disqualifications for being appointed a trustee. Section 15 (4) lays down that in making the appointment of trustees due regard shall be had to the religious denomination or any section thereof to which the institution belongs or the endowment is made and the wishes of the founder. If the appointment satisfies the above tests and if the person appointed is not disqualified under any of the clauses of Section 16, the appointment will not be affected in any way. The administrative authority concerned does not have to weigh the relative merits of various candidates in making the appointment of trustees. Normally it would exercise its own discretion as to who is best fitted to discharge the duties and functions of a trustee. But that is not to say that it must set out the reasons as to why it has appointed somebody as trustee and not appointed somebody else as a trustee. The Legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the appointing authority subject to the guidelines that it has laid down in Sections 15 and 16.We do not consider that the fact that under Section 82 of the Act the Commissioner has got the power of revision in respect of orders passed by his subordinates and the Government in respect of orders passed by the Commissioner as well as his subordinates (there is no provision in the Act for a judicial review in respect of the orders passed by the Government) in anyway limits their powers under Section 15 (1) (a). We are of opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in so far as the implication of their observation is that in exercising their powers under Section 15 the administrative authorities concerned are exercising quasi-judicial functions and that it was necessary to have a speaking order. We find the Madras High Court in Commissioner., H. R. and C. E. v. B. R Venkatachalapathi, (l972) 85 Mad LW 349 after a very elaborate and instructive discussion has taken a similar view respect of the powers of appointment of non-hereditary trustees under Section 47 of the Madras Hindu Religion and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which more or less corresponds to Section 15 of this Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]4. It is hardly necessary to say that in this case the respondent had no right to be appointed a trustee; nor had any of the other persons who were appointed trustees. There was no question of a proposition and an opposition. There is, therefore, no question of any list. Nor is here any question of contest between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it. Such a question will arise only if any right of the subject is affected. None of the other tests laid down above are satisfied in this case.5. An examination of the provisions of the statute, which is an Act to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration and government of charitable and Hindu religious institutions and endowments does not show that in appointing trustees to temples the concerned authorities have to act judicially. Nor is the appointment of trustees under Section 15 left to the administrative authority without any guidelines laid down by the Legislature for being followed. Section 16 lays down the disqualifications for being appointed a trustee. Section 15 (4) lays down that in making the appointment of trustees due regard shall be had to the religious denomination or any section thereof to which the institution belongs or the endowment is made and the wishes of the founder. If the appointment satisfies the above tests and if the person appointed is not disqualified under any of the clauses of Section 16, the appointment will not be affected in any way. The administrative authority concerned does not have to weigh the relative merits of various candidates in making the appointment of trustees. Normally it would exercise its own discretion as to who is best fitted to discharge the duties and functions of a trustee. But that is not to say that it must set out the reasons as to why it has appointed somebody as trustee and not appointed somebody else as a trustee. The Legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the appointing authority subject to the guidelines that it has laid down in Sections 15 and 16.We do not consider that the fact that under Section 82 of the Act the Commissioner has got the power of revision in respect of orders passed by his subordinates and the Government in respect of orders passed by the Commissioner as well as his subordinates (there is no provision in the Act for a judicial review in respect of the orders passed by the Government) in anyway limits their powers under Section 15 (1) (a). We are of opinion that the learned Judges of the High Court were in error in so far as the implication of their observation is that in exercising their powers under Section 15 the administrative authorities concerned are exercising quasi-judicial functions and that it was necessary to have a speaking order. We find the Madras High Court in Commissioner., H. R. and C. E. v. B. R Venkatachalapathi, (l972) 85 Mad LW 349 after a very elaborate and instructive discussion has taken a similar view respect of the powers of appointment of non-hereditary trustees under Section 47 of the Madras Hindu Religion and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which more or less corresponds to Section 15 of this Act.