Case: Mukesh K. Tripathi Vs. Sr.Divn.Manager, L.I.C.

and obligations under the statute.37. In case any person raises a contention that his status has been changed from apprentice to a workman, he must plead and prove the requisite facts. In absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought about, an apprentice cannot be held to be workman.38. It is true that the definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is exhaustive.39. The interpretation clause contained in a statute although may deserve a broader meaning having employed the word includes but therefor also it is necessary to keep in view the scheme of the object and purport of the statute, which takes him out of the said definition. Furthermore, the interpretation section begins with the words unless the context otherwise requires." 40. In Ramesh Mehta vs. Sanwal Chand, Singhvi and others reported in 2004 (5) SCC 409 , it was noticed: "A definition is not to be read in isolation. It must be read in the context of the phrase which would define it. It should not be vague or ambiguous. The definition of words must be given a meaningful application; where the context makes the definition given in the interpretation clause inapplicable, the same meaning cannot be assigned.In State of Maharashtra vs. Indian Medical Assn. one of us (V.N. Khare, CJ.) stated that the definition given in the interpretation clause having regard to the contents would not be applicable. It was stated: (SCC p.598, para 8)"8. A bare perusal of Section 2 of the Act shows that it starts with the words in this Act, unless the context otherwise require. Let us find out whether in the context of the provisions of Section 64 of the Act the defined meaning of the expression management can be assigned to the word management in Section 64 of the Act. In para 3 of the Regulation, the Essentially Certificate is required to be given by the State Government and permission to establish a new medical college is to be given by the State Government under Section 64 of the Act. If we give the defined meaning to the expression management occurring in Section 64 of the Act, it would mean the State Government is required to apply to itself for grant of permission to set up a government medical college through the University. Similarly it would also mean the State Government applying to itself for grant of Essentially Certificate under para 3 of the Regulation. We are afraid the defined meaning of the expression management cannot be assigned to the expression management occurring in Section 64 of the Act. In the present case, the context does not permit or requires to apply the defined meaning to the word management occurring in Section 64 of the Act." 41. In Sri Chittaranjan Das vs. Durgapore Project Limited and others (1995 (2) CLJ 388 ), it was opined: "In my opinion, it is not difficult to resolve the apparent conflict. Both in the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act, 1946 as also the certified Standing Order of the company the word including an apprentice occurs after the word person. In that view of the matter in place of the word person, the word apprentice can be substituted in a given situation but for the purpose of becoming a workman either within the meaning of the 1946 Act or the standing order framed thereunder, he is required to fulfil the other conditions laid down therein meaning thereby he is required to be employed in an industry to do the works enumerated in the said definition for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied." 42. The question as to who would answer the description of the term workman fell for consideration before this Court in Dharangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. vs. State of Saurashtra and others (AIR 1957 SC 264 ), wherein this Court held: "The essential condition of a person being a workman within the terms of this definition is that he should be employed to do the work in that industry, that there should be, in other words, an employment of his by the employer and that there should be the relationship between the employer and him as between the employer and employee or master and servant. Unless a person is thus employed there can be no question of his being a workman within the definition of the term as contained in the Act." 43. Yet again in Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate (AIR 1958 SC 353 ), this Court held: "A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression any person occurring in the third part of the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide would. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer- employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workman. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that -the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained." (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 9th Edition, p.55).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]20. The said reasons are, therefore, supplemental to the ones recorded earlier viz: (i) They were rendered per incurium; and (ii) May and Baker (supra) is still a good law.21. Once the ratio of May and Baker (supra) and other decisions following the same had been reiterated despite observations made to the effect that S.K. Verma (supra) and other decisions following the same were rendered on the facts of that case, we are of the opinion that this Court had approved the reasonings of May and Baker (supra) and subsequent decisions in preference to S.K. Verma (supra).22. The Constitution Bench further took notice of the subsequent amendment in the definition of workman and held that even the Legislature impliedly did not accept the said interpretation of this Court in S.K. Verma (supra) and other decisions:23. It may be true, as has been submitted by Ms. Jaisingh, that S.K. Verma (supra) has not been expressly overruled in H.R. Advanthaya (supra) but once the said decision has been held to have been rendered per incuriam, it cannot be said to have laid down a good law. This Court is bound by the decision of the Constitution Bench.24. From a perusal of the award dated 28.5.1996 of the Tribunal, it does not appear that the Appellant herein had adduced any evidence whatsoever as regard the nature of his duties so as to establish that he had performed any skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or operational duties. The offer of appointment dated 16.7.1987 read with the Scheme clearly proved that he was appointed as an apprentice and not to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or operational job. The onus was on the Appellant to prove that he is a workman. He failed to prove the same. Furthermore, the duties and obligations of a Development Officer of the Corporation by no stretch of imagination can be held to be performed by an apprentice.25. Even assuming that the duties and obligations of a Development Officer, as noticed in paragraph 8 of S.K. Verma (supra) are applicable in the instant case, it would be evident that the Appellant herein could not have organized or developed the business of the Corporation without becoming a full-fledged officer of the Corporation. Only an officer of the Corporation duly appointed can perform the functions of recruiting agents and take steps for organizing and developing the business of the Corporation. No area furtherance could be allotted to him for the purpose of recruiting active and reliable agents drawn from different communities and walks of life in view of the categorical findings of the Tribunal that he had been working as an apprentice. If organizing and developing the business of the Corporation and to act as a friend, philosopher and guide of the agents working within his jurisdiction were the primary duties and obligations of a Development Officer, an apprentice evidently cannot perform the same.26. We may consider the matter from another angle, viz., the appointment of the Appellant as an apprentice under the Scheme vis-a-vis the Apprentices Act, 1961.27. The expression Apprentice has been included in the definition of workman contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but by reason of a subsequent Parliamentary legislation, namely, Apprentices Act, 1961 (the 1961 Act), the term apprentice has been defined in Section 2(aa) to mean a person who is undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in pursuance of a contract of apprenticeship. Section 18 of the 1961 Act provides that apprentices are trainees and not workers save as otherwise provided in the Act.The term employee under various labour laws has been defined by different expressions but Section 18 of the 1961 Act carves out an exception to the applicability of labour laws in the event the concerned person is an apprentice as contra-distinguished from the expressions worker, employee and workman, used in different statutes.29. Apprentice under the general law means a person who is bound by a legal agreement to serve an employer for an agreed period and the employer is bound to instruct him.Apprentice, as noticed hereinbefore, is defined to mean a who is undergoing apprenticeship training pursuant to a contract apprenticeship. How a contract of apprenticeship would be entered into is to be found in sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the 1961 Act. The embargos placed in this regard are: (i) entering into a contract of apprenticeship with a minor in which event the contract must be executed by his guardian; and (ii) on such terms or conditions which shall not be inconsistent with any provision of the Act or any rule framed thereunder.31. Furthermore, the apprentice must satisfy the statutory requirements as regard qualification to be appointed as an apprentice.32. Training of apprenticeship by reason of sub-section (2) of Section 4 shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which the contract of apprenticeship has been entered into under sub-section (1) thereof.33. The provisions of the Scheme framed by the Corporation conform to the provisions of the Apprentices Act and Rules framed thereunder. It is worth noticing that Provident funds and insurance have been specified to be a designated trade within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Apprentices Act, 1961 by a notification No. G.S.R. 463(E) dated 23rd August, 1975.34. The definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 includes an apprentice, but a workman defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must conform to the requirements laid down therein meaning thereby, inter alia, that he must be working in one or the other capacities mentioned therein and not otherwise.35. We may further notice before the Tribunal a contention was raised by the Appellant that upon expiry of the period of one year he was appointed as a probationary officer but the said plea was categorically rejected by theA workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 must not only establish that he is not covered by the provisions of the Apprenticeship Act but must further establish that he is employed in the establishment for the purpose of doing any work contemplated in the definition. Even in a case where a period of apprenticeship is extended, a further written contract carrying out such intention need not be executed. But in a case where a person is allowed to continue without extending the period of apprenticeship either expressly or by necessary implication and regular work is taken from him, he may become a workman. A person who claims himself to be an apprentice has certain rights and obligations under the statute.37. In case any person raises a contention that his status has been changed from apprentice to a workman, he must plead and prove the requisite facts. In absence of any pleading or proof that either by novation of the contract or by reason of the conduct of the parties, such a change has been brought about, an apprentice cannot be held to be workman.38. It is true that the definition of workman as contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act is exhaustive.39. The interpretation clause contained in a statute although may deserve a broader meaning having employed the word includes but therefor also it is necessary to keep in view the scheme of the object and purport of the statute, which takes him out of the said definition. Furthermore, the interpretation section begins with the words unless the context otherwise requires."