Case: Hasan Nurani Malak Vs. S.M. Ismail, Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nagpur &amp; Others

public trusts irrespective of whether his finding is in the affirmative or in the negative. For the entry he has to make is the entry "in accordance with his finding" whatever that finding is.8. As regards the second contention urged before it, the High Court observed that if it was obligatory on the Registrar to cause an entry to be made in the register even if the finding was negative, the fact that he had not made such an entry would not deprive the appellant of his right and in, that event it would have held that the proceeding before the Registrar was still pending and respondents 2 to 5 would in that case have to have recourse to the M.P. Act. Rut the High Court on the ground that there was no obligation on the Registrar to make the entry rejected this contention. Let us see whether there was justification in the contention that the inquiry is still pending and that respondents 2 to 5 have to proceed under that Act and not under S. 19 of the Bombay Act.9. Mr. Desai for the appellant relied on sub-s (3) of S. 86 and urged that all the three sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) apply to the present case. He urged that the inquiry before the Registrar was a thing duly done under the M. P. Act and was, therefore, saved, that the Registrars finding had become final on the expiry of six months from the date of that finding and its finality vested a right in the appellant which is saved by the sub-section and lastly that the legal proceeding, that is the enquiry, was still pending and in spite of the cessation of the M. P. Act was saved. He contended that a fresh inquiry, therefore, could not be held as the proceeding before the Registrar was still pending and the competent authority to proceed with it was the Registrar and not the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The Assistant Charity Commissioner was, therefore, precluded from holding the impugned inquiry. Mr. Chatterjee, on the other hand, argued that no right can be said to have accrued to the appellant as no finality attached to the Registrars finding an entry of that finding not having been made by the Registrar. There was also no question of any legal proceeding being saved as the proceeding saved is the one in respect of a right, title or interest vested in a party. Therefore, sub-cls. (b) and (c) according to him would not in any case apply. As regards sub-cl. (a) he argued that the inquiry before the Registrar was over so soon as he gave his finding and, therefore, that inquiry also cannot be to have been saved.10. The words "anything duly done" in sub-cl. (a) are very often used by the legislature in saving clauses such as we have in S. 86 (3). Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal of an Act would not affect anything duly done or suffered thereunder. The object of such a saving clause is to save what has been previously done under the statute repealed. The result of such a saving clause is that the pre-existing law continues to govern the thing done before a particular date from which the repeal of such a pre-existing law takes effect. In universal Imports Agency v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports l961-1 SCR 305=(AIR 1961 SC 41 ), construing the words "things done" used in Para. 6 of the French Establishments (Application of Laws) Order, 1954 this Court held that on a proper interpretation the expression "things done" was comprehensive enough to take in not only the things done but also the effect of the legal consequences flowing therefrom. The inquiry held-by the Registrar under the M. P. Act was indisputably "a thing duly done" under that Act. The inquiry and its result having been saved by S. 86 (3) (a) they continue to be governed by the M. P. Act in spite of its ceasing to apply in Vidarbha. As we have already it was obligatory on the Registrar to have made an entry of his finding in the register of public trusts maintained by him under that Act though the finding was that the trust was not public truest. If any one was aggrieved by that finding he could have made the Registrar to cause an entry, to be made and thereafter file a suit to set aside the finding and have the entry corrected. Respondents 2 to 5 would be such persons as they claim to be interested in the trust and are, therefore, persons aggrieved by that finding and interested in challenging it. The contention that that inquiry was completed is not correct because the Registrar had yet to make the entry of his finding which he was bound to make under S. 7 of that Act. That being the position, the inquiry is saved by sub-cl. (a) of S. 86 (3) and it is still pending and is governed by the M. P. Act. In the result a fresh inquiry under the Bombay Act while the proceeding under the M. P. Act is still pending was not competent and the Assistant Charity Commissioner was precluded from entertaining it. In this view it is not necessary ho consider Mr. Desais contention that Cls. (b) and (c) also apply to the present case. Mr. Chatterjee however, drew our attention to a decision of the High Court of Bombay in Ramalal v. Charity Commissioner, (1960) 63 Bom LR 418. That decision cannot assist the respondents as the effect of a saving clause such as we have in S.86 (3) or in the Bombay General Clauses Act was not considered there and the question of the proceeding being a pending one was neither raised nor considered. For the reasons aforesaid it is not possible to sustain the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]7. As aforesaid the preamble of the M. P. Act shows that the Act was enacted to regulate and to make better provision for the administration of public, religious and charitable trusts in the then State of Madhya Pradesh. With that end in view Section 5 of that Act provides for an inquiry to he held by the Registrar for ascertaining among other things Whether a trust under inquiry is a public trust or not. A public notice of such an inquiry was provided for under Section-5 (2) in order to enable persons interested- in such trust to participate therein. Sections 6 and 7 enjoin upon the Registrar to record his finding. Such a finding may either be that the trust is a public trust or it is not. Section 7 (1) enjoins upon him to cause entries to be made in the register "in accordance with the findings recorded by him under Section 6"and he is to publish the entries when made in the register. The register prescribed no doubt is a register of public trusts. It the finding of the Registrar is that a particular trust is not a public trust, does he not have to make an entry of his finding in the register or has he to make an entry in that register only when his finding is a positive one that the trust is a pubic trust?It will be noticed that there is nothing in Section 7 (1) to show that he is required to make an entry only if the finding, is in the affirmative. On the other hand sub-s (1) of Section 7 expressly provides that he shall cause entries to be made in accordance with the findings recorded by him under Section 6. Section 6 shows that he has to record his findings and the reasons therefor whatever the findings are, whether in the affirmative or in the negative. Since entries under Section 7 (1) are to be made in accordance with such findings, either positive or negative, it follows that entries have to be made irrespective of whether the trust is found to be a public trust or not. To say that he is required to make an entry of a finding only if the finding is that the trust is a public trust would be contrary to the express language of Sections 6 and 7 and would unnecessarily curtail the language and the scope of the two sections. This construction is also supported by Section 8. Under that section, though it is the entry made under S. 7 which has been given finality a right of suit is conferred on both the working trustee and all persons having interest in the trust or any property belonging to it and who is aggrieved by any finding. The section no doubt provides that such a suit has to be filed within six months from the date of the publication of the entry. But that provision is clearly one fixing limitation. That does not mean that the suit is to set aside the entry. The section in so many terms states that such a suit would be to set aside the finding given by the Registrar and where such a finding is set aside the Registrar has to correct the entry made in the register in accordance with his findings. The cause of action for such a suit thus is the finding and not the entry which is merely consequential. It is therefore not right to say that a suit cannot be filed unless the Registrar has made the entry. The legislature, besides, could not have left the right to file a suit on the mercy of the Registrar who may or may not make the entry. It is equally not correct to say that the Registrar has not to make an entry if his finding is in the negative. Suppose the Registrar in a given case gives his finding that the trust in question is not a public trust and does not make an entry on the ground that the register maintained by him is the register of public trusts and not of trusts which are not public trusts. What is a person interested in the trust or its properties to do if he is aggrieved by that finding? Does it mean that he has no remedy by way of a suit? That surely cannot be the meaning to be given to Sections 7 and 8. If the making of the entry is the condition precedent for such a suit such a person would have no remedy of a suit under Section 8. It is precisely to avoid such a result that the section provides in explicit language that any person, aggrieved by the finding and not the entry, has a right to file a suit and to have such a finding set aside, whether the finding is positive or negative. There is nothing in S. 8 which restricts the right of a suit in cases where the finding is in the affirmative. If that was so giving a right to sue to a person interested in the trust would be superfluous as he would never be aggrieved by a finding that the trust is a public trust. The High Court was, therefore, in error when it held that the Registrar was not obliged to make the entry as his finding was in the negative. In our view, reading Ss. 5,6,7 and 8 of the M. P. Act it is clear that the Registrar is enjoined upon to make an entry in the register of public trusts irrespective of whether his finding is in the affirmative or in the negative. For the entry he has to make is the entry "in accordance with his finding" whatever that finding is.8. As regards the second contention urged before it, the High Court observed that if it was obligatory on the Registrar to cause an entry to be made in the register even if the finding was negative, the fact that he had not made such an entry would not deprive the appellant of his right and in, that event it would have held that the proceeding before the Registrar was still pending and respondents 2 to 5 would in that case have to have recourse to the M.P. Act. Rut the High Court on the ground that there was no obligation on the Registrar to make the entry rejected this contention. Let us see whether there was justification in the contention that the inquiry is still pending and that respondents 2 to 5 have to proceed under that Act and not under S. 19 of the Bombayinquiry held-by the Registrar under the M. P. Act was indisputably "a thing duly done" under that Act. The inquiry and its result having been saved by S. 86 (3) (a) they continue to be governed by the M. P. Act in spite of its ceasing to apply in Vidarbha. As we have already it was obligatory on the Registrar to have made an entry of his finding in the register of public trusts maintained by him under that Act though the finding was that the trust was not public truest. If any one was aggrieved by that finding he could have made the Registrar to cause an entry, to be made and thereafter file a suit to set aside the finding and have the entry corrected. Respondents 2 to 5 would be such persons as they claim to be interested in the trust and are, therefore, persons aggrieved by that finding and interested in challenging it. The contention that that inquiry was completed is not correct because the Registrar had yet to make the entry of his finding which he was bound to make under S. 7 of that Act. That being the position, the inquiry is saved by sub-cl. (a) of S. 86 (3) and it is still pending and is governed by the M. P. Act. In the result a fresh inquiry under the Bombay Act while the proceeding under the M. P. Act is still pending was not competent and the Assistant Charity Commissioner was precluded from entertaining it. In this view it is not necessary ho consider Mr. Desais contention that Cls. (b) and (c) also apply to the present case.It is clear from the provisions of Section 8 that though the entries made by the Registrar are final and conclusive that finality is subject to the decision of the court in a suit challenging the findings of the Registrar. The cause of action for such a suit is thus the finding of the Registrar and not the entry. It is manifest that Section 7 requires the making of the entry and its notification in order that the findings given by the Registrar are recorded and are given publicity so that an aggrieved party whether he is a working trustee or a person interested in the trust may file a suit within the prescribed time. Under Section 35 of the Act the State Government framed rules prescribing inter alia for the maintenance of certain registers. Under the Act and the said Rules the Registrar had to maintain four registers. viz.. (1) a register of public trusts, (2) a register of the properties of public trusts, (3) a register relating to immovable properties belonging to the trusts and (4) a register of decisions of courts relating to public trusts. These being the only registers prescribed either under the Act or the said rules there was no obligation on the Registrar to maintain any other register or book.The words "anything duly done" in(a) are very often used by the legislature in saving clauses such as we have in S. 86 (3). Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 also provides that unless a different intention appears the repeal of an Act would not affect anything duly done or suffered thereunder. The object of such a saving clause is to save what has been previously done under the statute repealed. The result of such a saving clause is that thelaw continues to govern the thing done before a particular date from which the repeal of such alaw takes effect. In universal Imports Agency v. Chief Controller of Imports and ExportsSCR 305=(AIR 1961 SC 41  ), construing the words "things done" used in Para. 6 of the French Establishments (Application of Laws) Order, 1954 this Court held that on a proper interpretation the expression "things done" was comprehensive enough to take in not only the things done but also the effect of the legal consequences flowing therefrom. They the Registrar under the M. P. Act was indisputably "a thing duly done" under that Act. The inquiry and its result having been saved by S. 86 (3) (a) they continue to be governed by the M. P. Act in spite of its ceasing to apply in Vidarbha. As we have already it was obligatory on the Registrar to have made an entry of his finding in the register of public trusts maintained by him under that Act though the finding was that the trust was not public truest. If any one was aggrieved by that finding he could have made the Registrar to cause an entry, to be made and thereafter file a suit to set aside the finding and have the entry corrected. Respondents 2 to 5 would be such persons as they claim to be interested in the trust and are, therefore, persons aggrieved by that finding and interested in challenging it. The contention that that inquiry was completed is not correct because the Registrar had yet to make the entry of his finding which he was bound to make under S. 7 of that Act. That being the position, the inquiry is saved by(a) of S. 86 (3) and it is still pending and is governed by the M. P. Act. In the result a fresh inquiry under the Bombay Act while the proceeding under the M. P. Act is still pending was not competent and the Assistant Charity Commissioner was precluded from entertaining it. In this view it is not necessary ho consider Mr. Desais contention that Cls. (b) and (c) also apply to the present case.e however, drew our attention to a decision of the High Court of Bombay in Ramalal v. Charity Commissioner, (1960) 63 Bom LR 418.That decision cannot assist the respondents as the effect of a saving clause such as we have in S.86 (3) or in the Bombay General Clauses Act was not considered there and the question of the proceeding being a pending one was neither raised nor considered. For the reasons aforesaid it is not possible to sustain the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition.