Case: Chimandas Bagomal Sindhi Vs. Jogeshwar And Another

is made by the D.C. that obligation is imposed on the landlord to let the premises to the person anemd in the Order. Having regard to the words used in describing the persons and the categories, it seems plain that the provision contemplated that a person belonging to one of those categories may be entitled to claim its benefit on he ground that accommodation already available to him was patently insufficient or unsuitable. When such a plea is made, the D,C, may have to examine the contentions raised by the landlord against such a plea as well as the claim that the landlord may make for his own personal occupation. The enquiry which would thus become necessary would be in the nature of a quasi-judicial enquiry and the power conferred on the D.C. may have to be exercised in a fair and just manner. We do not think that c. 23(1) as well as cls. 24 and 24A necessarily exclude the cases of person specified in them on the ground that the said person already have an accommodation which they can call their own. Persons their specified would no doubt have a much better claim for accommodation it if is shown that they have no accommodation at all. But even if such persons have accommodation, their claims cannot be rules out on the preliminary ground that the very fact that they have accommodation takes them out of the provisions of the respective clauses. It is quite true that if a person belonging to the specified categories has suitable and sufficient accommodation, he would normally not be entitled to claim the benefit of cl. 23(1). That, however, is a matter to he considered by the Dy. Commissioner on the merits. We, are therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of cl. 23(1) and cls. 24 and 24A impliedly postulate that the persons belonging to the respective categories specified by them can receive allotment only if they have no previous accommodation of their own. That being so, we must hold that the appellants case cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that he had other accommodation by virtue of the fact that he was a partner in two concerns to which we have already referred. 16. This conclusion cannot, however, finally dispose of the appeal before us because it seems to us that after the remand Order was passed by Mr. Justice Bhutt, the addl. D.C. has not dealt with the matter in accordance with law as he was required to do. He appears to have taken the view that since a a provisional Order had already been passed, there was "no going back", upon it. He thought that after remand, the scope of the enquiry was confined to the examination of the question as to whether the respondent proved that he needed the premises for his own occupation. It is true that he has incidentally mentioned the fact that the appellant owned a -/4/- share in the business which was carried on in Nagpur, but he has added that the said fact does not preclude him from obtaining a shop for starting a business exclusively of his own. This observation shows that the Addl. D.C. did not properly appreciate the scope, and effect of the provision contained in the relevant clause. Besides, reading the Order as a whole, it is quite clear that he took an unduly narrow view of the limits of the enquiry which he was bound tot hold as a result of the remand Order and that has vitiated his final conclusion. We, therefore think that it is necessary that the matter should be sent back to the Addl. Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, with a direction that he should consider the case on the merits afresh. We wish to make it clear that the question as to whether the appellant should be given allotment of the premises in question should be determined by the Add. D.C. in the light of the position as it stood on July 15, 1955. We are making this observation because there has been some controversy before us as to whether the appellant has lost his right in the premises belonging to the partnership is alleged to have been dissolved on April 8, 1957. This learned Attorney-General has contended that if the matter has to go back, the Addl. C.D. should be free to confide the subsequent events that have taken place, and the appellant?s case should, therefore, be dealt with on the basis that he has no longer any shares in the said partnership. We are not inclined to accept this contention. The fact that the present proceedings have been protracted would not entitle the appellant to ask the Addl. D.C. to take subsequent events into account. It is clear that the dissolution of the partnership took place long after the appellant obtain the provisional allotment from the Add. D.C. and it is by no means clear that if the Addl D.C. had been then told that the appellant had a place of business Or his own, he would have granted accommodation to him in the present premises on the same day that he moved him in that behalf. We are satisfied that the question about the propriety and validity of the said provisional Order must be judged in the light of the facts as they obtained on that day. 17. Mr. Kherdekar for the respondent wanted to argue before us that under Cl. 2(2) the appellant was not a displaced person on that day and he has relied on the fact that the appellant had been carrying on business in several places in India since 1945. This point has not been considered either by the Addl. D.C or the High Court. If so advised, the respondent may take this point before the Addl. D.C. and we have no doubt that if raised, it would be dealt with by the Addl. D.C. in accordance with law.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]14. It may be conceded that prima facie facie the view taken by the High Court appears to be attractive. It does appear to be reasonable that provisions of the kind contained in Chapter III would normally be excepted to assist persons of specified categories to obtain accommodation and that would impliedly postulate that such person have no accommodation which they can claim their own. If the words of the relevant provision are ambiguous, or if their effect can reasonably be said to be a matter of doubt, it may be permissible to construe the said provisions in the light of the assumption made by the High Court. But, are the words of the relevant provision in any sense ambiguous, or is the effect of those words doubtful. In our opinion, the answer to these questions must be in the negative15. Clause 23 (1) refers to the person in the specified categories, and empowers the D.C. to make an Order of allotment in their favour. There are no terms of limitation qualifying the said person, and the scheme of the relevant provisions does not seem to contemplate any such limitation. It is significant that the said person are not entitled as a matter of right to an Order of allotment. What cl. 23(1) does is to confer power on the D.C. to make an Order of allotment if he thought is expedient, just or fair to do so in a particular case, it is only where an Order is made by the D.C. that obligation is imposed on the landlord to let the premises to the person anemd in the Order. Having regard to the words used in describing the persons and the categories, it seems plain that the provision contemplated that a person belonging to one of those categories may be entitled to claim its benefit on he ground that accommodation already available to him was patently insufficient or unsuitable. When such a plea is made, the D,C, may have to examine the contentions raised by the landlord against such a plea as well as the claim that the landlord may make for his own personal occupation. The enquiry which would thus become necessary would be in the nature of a quasi-judicial enquiry and the power conferred on the D.C. may have to be exercised in a fair and just manner. We do not think that c. 23(1) as well as cls. 24 and 24A necessarily exclude the cases of person specified in them on the ground that the said person already have an accommodation which they can call their own. Persons their specified would no doubt have a much better claim for accommodation it if is shown that they have no accommodation at all. But even if such persons have accommodation, their claims cannot be rules out on the preliminary ground that the very fact that they have accommodation takes them out of the provisions of the respective clauses. It is quite true that if a person belonging to the specified categories has suitable and sufficient accommodation, he would normally not be entitled to claim the benefit of cl. 23(1). That, however, is a matter to he considered by the Dy. Commissioner on the merits. We, are therefore, satisfied that the High Court was in error in assuming that the provisions of cl. 23(1) and cls. 24 and 24A impliedly postulate that the persons belonging to the respective categories specified by them can receive allotment only if they have no previous accommodation of their own. That being so, we must hold that the appellants case cannot be thrown out merely on the ground that he had other accommodation by virtue of the fact that he was a partner in two concerns to which we have already referred16. This conclusion cannot, however, finally dispose of the appeal before us because it seems to us that after the remand Order was passed by Mr. Justice Bhutt, the addl. D.C. has not dealt with the matter in accordance with law as he was required to do. He appears to have taken the view that since a a provisional Order had already been passed, there was "no going back", upon it. He thought that after remand, the scope of the enquiry was confined to the examination of the question as to whether the respondent proved that he needed the premises for his own occupation. It is true that he has incidentally mentioned the fact that the appellant owned a -/4/- share in the business which was carried on in Nagpur, but he has added that the said fact does not preclude him from obtaining a shop for starting a business exclusively of his own. This observation shows that the Addl. D.C. did not properly appreciate the scope, and effect of the provision contained in the relevant clause. Besides, reading the Order as a whole, it is quite clear that he took an unduly narrow view of the limits of the enquiry which he was bound tot hold as a result of the remand Order and that has vitiated his final conclusion. We, therefore think that it is necessary that the matter should be sent back to the Addl. Dy. Commissioner, Nagpur, with a direction that he should consider the case on the merits afresh. We wish to make it clear that the question as to whether the appellant should be given allotment of the premises in question should be determined by the Add. D.C. in the light of the position as it stood on July 15, 1955. We are making this observation because there has been some controversy before us as to whether the appellant has lost his right in the premises belonging to the partnership is alleged to have been dissolved on April 8, 1957. This learned Attorney-General has contended that if the matter has to go back, the Addl. C.D. should be free to confide the subsequent events that have taken place, and the appellant?s case should, therefore, be dealt with on the basis that he has no longer any shares in the said partnership. We are not inclined to accept this contention. The fact that the present proceedings have been protracted would not entitle the appellant to ask the Addl. D.C. to take subsequent events into account. It is clear that the dissolution of the partnership took place long after the appellant obtain the provisional allotment from the Add. D.C. and it is by no means clear that if the Addl D.C. had been then told that the appellant had a place of business Or his own, he would have granted accommodation to him in the present premises on the same day that he moved him in that behalf. We are satisfied that the question about the propriety and validity of the said provisional Order must be judged in the light of the facts as they obtained on that day.