Case: AGRA DIOCESAN TRUST ASSOCIATION Vs. ANIL DAVID AND ORS

then Article 17(iii) of Schedule II will not be applicable. On a comparison between the Court Fees Act and the U.P . Amendment Act, it is clear that Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P . Amendment Act covers suits for or involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring null and void decree for money or an instrument securing money or other property having such value. 14. The Court observed that the suit was filed after the death of the testator, and that the suit property covered by the will had to be valued. The court felt that since Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act specifically provided that payment of court fees in cases where the suit is for, or involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring null and void a decree for money or an instrument, Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act was inapplicable. The U.P. Amendment Act, therefore, was applicable despite the fact that no consequential relief had been claimed. Consequently, in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act, court fees were to be computed according to the value of the subject-matter. The trial court and the High Court correctly held it to be so. The court distinguished Suhrid Singhs case (supra) stating that: 10. We are of the view that the decision of this Court in Suhrid Singh (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. First of all, this Court had no occasion to examine the scope of the U.P . Amendment Act. That was a case in which this Court was dealing with Sections 7(iv)(c), (v) and Schedule II Article 17(iii), as amended in the State of Punjab. The position that we get in the State of Punjab is entirely different from the State of U.P . and the effect of the U.P . Amendment Act was not an issue which arose for consideration in that case. Consequently, in our view, the said judgment would not apply to the present case. 11. The Plaintiff, in the instant case, valued the suit at Rs. 30 lakhs for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction. However, for the purpose of court fee, the Plaintiff paid a fixed court fee of Rs. 200 Under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. The Plaintiff had not noticed the fact that the above mentioned Article stood amended by the State, by adding the words not otherwise provided for by this Act. Since Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P . Amended Act specifically provides for payment of court fee in case where the suit is for or involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring void or voidable an instrument securing property having money value, Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act shall not be applicable. 15. It is evident from the above discussion that it is undisputed that the point in issue was with respect to valuation for purposes of court fee; equally, it is not in issue that since the plaintiff (i.e. petitioner herein) sought, in addition to a declaration, in both the suits, decrees of cancellation, the crucial point was what the correct value for purposes of court fee was. Now, market value has been specifically defined, in the context of a litigation like the present one. According to Section 7 (iv-A), in case the plaintiff (or his predecessor-in-title) was not a party to the decree or instrument, the value was to be according to one-fifth of the value of the subject matter, and such value shall be deemed to be under Section 7 (iv-A), if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree is passed or the instrument executed . Importantly, the explanation to Section 7 (iv-A) created a deeming fiction as to what constitutes the value of the property by saying that in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with the sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B) as the case may be. 16. The plaintiff/petitioners contention was and continues to be that the value determinable is in terms of clause (v) of Section 7, by reason of Section 7 (iv-A). Section 7 (v) (i) contains two clauses- (a) and (b): both are in respect of revenue paying lands. The petitioner valued its suits on the basis of revenue which according to it, was payable. While so stating, the value (for purposes of court fee) was determined to be 3000/- in each of the suits. 17. A plain reading of the impugned judgment reveals that what weighed heavily with the High Court was the fact that the plaintiff valued the suits differently for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, and secondly that: no other market value has been proved by the petitioners/plaintiff that the settled revenue of the land is Rs. 3,000/- and in the absence of any evidence in this regard, the trial court has rightly considered the market value of the property in dispute in accordance with the market value fixed by the Collector in order to charge the stamp duty, which is the correct market value. In the opinion of this court, there was no compulsion for the plaintiff to, at the stage of filing the suit, prove or establish the claim that the suit lands were revenue paying and the details of such revenue paid. Once it is conceded that the value of the land [per explanation to Section 7 (iv-A)] is to be determined according to either sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of the Act, this meant that the concept of market value – a wider concept in other contexts, was deemed to be referrable to one or other modes of determining the value under sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of Section 7 (iv-A). This aspect was lost sight of by the High Court, in the facts of this case. The reasoning and conclusions of the High Court, are therefore, not sustainable.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]15. It is evident from the above discussion that it is undisputed that the point in issue was with respect to valuation for purposes of court fee; equally, it is not in issue that since the plaintiff (i.e. petitioner herein) sought, in addition to a declaration, in both the suits, decrees of cancellation, the crucial point was what the correct value for purposes of court fee was. Now, market value has been specifically defined, in the context of a litigation like the present one. According to Section 7 (iv-A), in case the plaintiff (or his predecessor-in-title) was not a party to the decree or instrument, the value was to be according to one-fifth of the value of the subject matter, and such value shall be deemed to be under Section 7 (iv-A), if the whole decree or instrument is involved in the suit, the amount for which or value of the property in respect of which the decree is passed or the instrument executed . Importantly, the explanation to Section 7 (iv-A) created a deeming fiction as to what constitutes the value of the property by saying that in the case of immovable property shall be deemed to be the value as computed in accordance with the sub-section (v), (v-A) or (v-B) as the case may be17. A plain reading of the impugned judgment reveals that what weighed heavily with the High Court was the fact that the plaintiff valued the suits differently for the purposes of court fees and jurisdiction, and secondly that:no other market value has been proved by the petitioners/plaintiff that the settled revenue of the land is Rs. 3,000/- and in the absence of any evidence in this regard, the trial court has rightly considered the market value of the property in dispute in accordance with the market value fixed by the Collector in order to charge the stamp duty, which is the correct market valueIn the opinion of this court, there was no compulsion for the plaintiff to, at the stage of filing the suit, prove or establish the claim that the suit lands were revenue paying and the details of such revenue paid. Once it is conceded that the value of the land [per explanation to Section 7 (iv-A)] is to be determined according to either sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of the Act, this meant that the concept of market value – a wider concept in other contexts, was deemed to be referrable to one or other modes of determining the value under sub clauses (v), (va) or (vb) of Section 7 (iv-A). This aspect was lost sight of by the High Court, in the facts of this case. The reasoning and conclusions of the High Court, are therefore, not sustainable.