Case: Raghunath Rai Bareja  Vs. Punjab National Bank

2003 SC 1405 , State of Jharkhand & Anr. vs. Govind Singh JT 2004(10) SC 349 etc.. It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court vide State of Jharkhand & Anr. vs. Govind Singh JT 2004(10) SC 349 . In Jinia Keotin vs. K.S. Manjhi, 2003 (1) SCC 730 , this Court observed: "The Court cannot legislate under the grab of interpretation”. 48. Hence there should be judicial restraint in this connection, and the temptation to do judicial legislation should be eschewed by the Courts. In fact, judicial legislation is an oxymoron. In Shiv Shakti Co-operative Housing Society vs. Swaraj Developers AIR 2003 SC 2434 , this Court observed: "It is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intent." 49. In our opinion, Section 31 is plain and unambiguous and it clearly says that only those suits or proceedings pending before a Court shall stand transferred to the Tribunal which were pending on the date when the Tribunal was established.50. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that we have to see the legislative intent when we interpret Section 31. In our opinion, resort can be had to the legislative intent for the purpose of interpreting a provision of law when the language employed by the legislature is doubtful or ambiguous or leads to some absurdity. However, when the language is plain and explicit and does not admit of any doubt, the Court cannot by reference to an assumed legislative intent expand or alter the plain meaning of an expression employed by the legislature vide Ombalika Das vs. Hulisa Shaw, 2002 (4) SCC 539. 51. Where the language is clear, the intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the language used vide Grasim Industries Limited vs. Collector of Customs 2002 (4) SCC 297 and Union of India vs. Hamsoli Devi 2002 (7) SCC 273. In Union of India and another vs. Hansoli Devi and others 2002(7) SCC (vide para 9), this Court observed: "It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the grounds that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act." 52. The function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate vide District Mining Officer vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company 2002 (7) SCC 358. If we accept the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent we will really be legislating because in the guise of interpretation we will be really amending Section 31. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2001 SC 1980 , this Court observed: "It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the law-giver. The Courts are adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute". 53. The same view has been taken by this Court in S. Mehta vs. State of Maharashtra 2001 (8) SCC 257 (vide para 34) and Patangrao Kaddam vs. Prithviraj Sajirao Yadav Deshmugh AIR 2001 SC 1121 .54. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.55. We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also followed by the lay man in his ordinary life. To give an illustration, if a person says "this is a pencil", then he means that it is a pencil; and it is not that when he says that the object is a pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant. In other words, the literal rule of interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will become impossible, and we will not understand each other. If we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to communicate with each other. Life will become impossible. Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean.56. In the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that the literal rule applies, and the other rules have no application to interpreting Section 31, since the language of Section 31 is plain and clear, and cannot be said to be ambiguous or resulting in some absurdity.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]17. Admittedly, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh was established in 1993 and hence after 1993 the exclusive jurisdiction regarding recovery of debts pertaining to which the RDB Act applies is with the Tribunal.18. In our opinion, the impugned order of the High Court dated 26.5.2005, transferring the Execution Petition pending before it to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh was clearly beyond the scope of Section 31 of the RDB Act because Section 31 states that only suits or other proceeding pending before the Court immediately before the establishment of the Tribunal under the Act, stand transferred to the Tribunal. Since, admittedly the Tribunal in the present case, had been established in 1993, and no proceeding was pending before it on the date when it was established, no transfer could take place under Section 31 of the RDB Act. At any event, the third Execution Petition which was transferred by the impugned order was filed by the respondent-Bank on 11.1.1999, i.e. much after the Tribunal had been established. Hence obviously there could be no such transfer to the Tribunal under Section 31 of the RDB Act. Apart from Section 31, there is no other provision for transferring a suit or other proceeding pending before any Court to the Tribunal. Hence, the impugned order dated 26.5.2005 was clearly illegal and without jurisdiction.Since in the aforesaid decision this Court has held that even with regard to execution the jurisdiction under the RDB Act is exclusive, we cannot agree with the view taken by the High Court merely because the appellant had given his consent to the transfer of the Execution Petition to the Tribunal. It is well settled in law that consent cannot confer jurisdiction.Since Section 24 of the RDB Act applies the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, to applications filed before the Tribunal, and since Article 136 of the Limitation Act provides a period of limitation of 12 years for filing an Execution Petition, hence now no such application can be filed since that period of 12 years expired on 15.1.1999. Hence, in our opinion the debt became time barred after 15.1.1999.In this connection, it may be mentioned that Section 446(3) of the Companies Act was omitted by Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002 and evidently the High Court has overlooked this Amendment. As a result in our opinion the High Court has no power to transfer the Execution Petition to the Debts Recovery Tribunal. At any event as held in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra), Section 446 has no application once the RDB Act applies because Section 34 expressly gives overriding effect to the provisions of the RDB Act. Also, the RDB Act is a special law and hence will prevail over the general law in the Companies Act as held in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra).27. In this connection, we may mention that in the impugned order dated 26.5.2005 the High Court has, while admitting that in view of the decision of this Court in Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Anr.(supra), it had no jurisdiction to deal with the execution application, it has, however, in the same order relied on the so called "inherent powers" of the Court. In our opinion there are no such inherent powers of the Court of transferring the Execution Proceedings to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Chandigarh. Whatever powers there are of transfer of proceedings to the Tribunal are contained in Section 31 of the RDB Act, and no transfer is permissible de hors Section 31. Hence, we respectfully disagree with the High Court that it has inherent powers apart from Section 31 for transferring the Execution Petition to the Debt Recovery Tribunal.In the present case, while equity is in favour of the respondent-Bank, the law is in favour of the appellant, since we are of the opinion that the impugned order of the High Court is clearly in violation of Section 31 of the RDB Act, and moreover the claim is time-barred in view of Article 136 of the Limitation Act read with Section 24 of the RDB Act. We cannot but comment that it is the Bank itself which is to blame because after its first Execution Petition was dismissed on 23.8.1990 it should have immediately thereafter filed a second Execution Petition, but instead it filed the second Execution Petition only in 1994 which was dismissed on 18.8.1994. Thereafter, again, the Bank waited for 5 years and it was only on 1.4.1999 that it filed its third Execution Petition. We fail to understand why the Bank waited from 1990 to 1994 and again from 1994 to 1999 in filing its Execution Petitions. Hence, it is the Bank which is responsible for not getting the decree executed well in time.In our opinion, Section 31 is plain and unambiguous and it clearly says that only those suits or proceedings pending before a Court shall stand transferred to the Tribunal which were pending on the date when the Tribunal was established.50.The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that we have to see the legislative intent when we interpret Section 31.The function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate vide District Mining Officer vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company 2002 (7) SCC 358. If we accept the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent we will really be legislating because in the guise of interpretation we will be really amending Section 31.54. The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.55. We may mention here that the literal rule of interpretation is not only followed by Judges and lawyers, but it is also followed by the lay man in his ordinary life. To give an illustration, if a person says "this is a pencil", then he means that it is a pencil; and it is not that when he says that the object is a pencil, he means that it is a horse, donkey or an elephant. In other words, the literal rule of interpretation simply means that we mean what we say and we say what we mean. If we do not follow the literal rule of interpretation, social life will become impossible, and we will not understand each other. If we say that a certain object is a book, then we mean it is a book. If we say it is a book, but we mean it is a horse, table or an elephant, then we will not be able to communicate with each other. Life will become impossible. Hence, the meaning of the literal rule of interpretation is simply that we mean what we say and we say what we mean.56. In the present case, we are clearly of the opinion that the literal rule applies, and the other rules have no application to interpreting Section 31, since the language of Section 31 is plain and clear, and cannot be said to be ambiguous or resulting in some absurdity.