Case: Nilkanth Prasad And Others Vs. State Of Bihar

to Ratnapura, then six omnibuses plied by the appellant could be taken into account to turn the scale between the parties. Sir John Beaumont in expounding the meaning of the word "route" observed as follows:"If route has the same meaning as highway in the Ordinance this argument must prevail, since admittedly an omnibus running on the highway from Panadura to Badulla will pass over the whole of the highway between Colombo and Ratnapura, but in their Lordships opinion it is impossible to say that route and highway in the two Ordinances are synonymous terms........... A highway is the physical track along which an omnibus runs, whilst a route appears to their Lordships to be an abstract conception of a line of travel between one terminus and another, and to be something distinct from the highway traversed." 8. This distinction between "route" and "road" is relied upon by the appellants to show that the notified route, which we have called AB was a different route from the routes for which renewal of permits was demanded, even though route AB might have been a portion of the "road traversed by the omnibuses of the appellants plying on their "routes." The distinction made by the Privy Council is right; but it was made with reference to the words used in the Ordinances there under consideration. The question is whether a similar distinction can be made in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act. Mr. Viswanatha Sastri appearing for the appellants took us through Ss. 42 to 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act and drew our attention to those in which the word "route" has been used, contra-distinguished from the word "area," and contended that everywhere the word "route" is used in the sense of a notional line between two termini running a stated course, and is used in contradistinction to what may be conveyed by the word "area". In Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1961 S C 82, this Court, in dealing with the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, declined to make any such distinction between "route" and "area". This Court, speaking through Subba Rao J., observed at p. 93 :"Under S. 68-C of the Act the scheme may be framed in respect of any area or a route or a portion of any area or a portion of a route. There is no inherent inconsistency between an area and a route. The proposed route is also an area limited to the route proposed. The scheme may as well propose to operate a transport service in respect of a new route from point A to point B and that route would certainly be an area within the meaning of S. 68C." In any event, under S.68C it is provided that a scheme may notify a route or an area or a portion of a route or a portion of an area, and the exclusion of the private operators from the whole route or the whole area or a part of the route or a part of that area, as the case may be, may be either complete or partial, and under S. 68-F (2)(c) (iii), the Regional Transport Authority may modify the terms of any existing permit so as to"curtail the area or route covered by the permit, in so far as such permit relates to the notified area or notified route". This means that even in those cases where the notified route and the route applied for run over a common sector, the curtailment by virtue of the notified scheme would be by excluding that portion of the route or, in other words, the "road" common to both. The distinction between "route" as the notional line and "road" as the physical track disappears in the working of Chap. IVA, because you cannot curtail the route without curtailing a portion of the road, and the ruling of the Court to which we have referred, would also show that even if the route was different, the area at least would be the same. The ruling of the Judicial Committee cannot be made applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Chap. IV- A, where the intention is to exclude private operators completely from running over certain sectors or routes vested in State. Transport Undertakings. In our opinion, therefore, the appellants were rightly held to be disentitled to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. Those portions cannot be said to be different routes, but must be regarded as portions of the routes of the private operators, from which the private operators stood excluded under S. 68F (2) (c) (iii) of the Act. The decision under appeal was, therefore, correct in all the circumstances of the case. 9. This leaves over for consideration Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1961. There, the question which arose was decided in the same way in which we have disposed of the other appeals on merits. Ramaswami, C. J. and Kanhaiya Singh, J. referred to an earlier decision (M. J. C. No. 354 of 1960 decided on 13th May 1960) given by the Chief Justice and Chaudhuri, J., in which they had applied the Privy Council case, and made a distinction between a route which was longer than the notified route, though running for part of the way along the notified route and the notified route. In the judgment from which Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1961 arises, the learned Chief Justice has declined to follow his earlier ruling which, he considers, was given per incuriam, because the provisions of S. 68F (2) (c) (iii) of the Motor Vehicles Act were not taken into account. After considering the matter in the light of that section, the Divisional Bench has reached the same conclusion as we have, and along almost the same line of reasoning. In view of what we have said in Civil Appeal No. 534 of 1961, Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1961 must also fail.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In the former, the grant of renewal of the permits has been made without any objection, and in the latter, in spite of the objections filed by the Rajya Transport. The competency of the appeals before the Appeal Board is involved in both the groups, though on different grounds. The answer to the different objections is, however, the sameIn all the present cases, The State Transport Undertaking had already been granted a permit over route AB, and if the private operators, that is to say, the appellants, were not entitled, in law, to the renewal of their permits for routes which embraced also route AB, then the Regional transport Authority could not but refuse to renew the permitsIn our opinion, we should not interfere on this ground either. In this connection the difference between the two sets of cases arising from the fact whether the Rajya Transport, Bihar, had objected or not, completely disappearsIn any event, under S.68C it is provided that a scheme may notify a route or an area or a portion of a route or a portion of an area, and the exclusion of the private operators from the whole route or the whole area or a part of the route or a part of that area, as the case may be, may be either complete or partial, and under S. 68-F (2)(c) (iii), the Regional Transport Authority may modify the terms of any existing permit so as toThis means that even in those cases where the notified route and the route applied for run over a common sector, the curtailment by virtue of the notified scheme would be by excluding that portion of the route or, in other words, the "road" common to both. The distinction between "route" as the notional line and "road" as the physical track disappears in the working of Chap. IVA, because you cannot curtail the route without curtailing a portion of the road, and the ruling of the Court to which we have referred, would also show that even if the route was different, the area at least would be the same. The ruling of the Judicial Committee cannot be made applicable to the Motor Vehicles Act, particularly Chap. IV- A, where the intention is to exclude private operators completely from running over certain sectors or routes vested in State. Transport Undertakings. In our opinion, therefore, the appellants were rightly held to be disentitled to run over those portions of their routes which were notified as part of the scheme. Those portions cannot be said to be different routes, but must be regarded as portions of the routes of the private operators, from which the private operators stood excluded under S. 68F (2) (c) (iii) of the Act. The decision under appeal was, therefore, correct in all the circumstances of the caseAfter considering the matter in the light of that section, the Divisional Bench has reached the same conclusion as we have, and along almost the same line of reasoning. In view of what we have said in Civil Appeal No. 534 of 1961, Civil Appeal No. 434 of 1961 must also fail.