Case: Baldev Sahai Bangia Vs. R.C. Bhasin

dies and in order to resolve this anomaly the legislature immediately stepped in to amend certain provision of the Act and defined the actual connotation of the term ‘members of the family’. By virtue of Act 18 of 1976 the definition of "Tenant" was inserted so as to include various categories of persons. Sub-clause, (iii) of Clause (1) of Section 2 of the Act actually mentions persons who could be as regarded tenant even if main tenant dies. This sub-clause may be extracted thus:(1) "tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is, or, but for a special contract, would be, payable, and includes:(i) a sub-tenant;(ii) any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy; and(iii) in the event of the death of the person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy, subject to the order of succession and conditions specified, respectively, in Explanation I and Explanation II to this clause, such of the aforesaid person’s––(a) spouse,(b) son or daughter or, where there are both son and daughter, both of them,(c) parents,(d) daughter-in-law, being the widow of his predeceased son.as had been ordinarily living in the premises with such person as a member or members of his family up to the date of his death, but does not include..............."18. It would appear that parents were expressly included in Sub-clause, (iii). It has also been provided that apart from the heirs specified in Clauses (a) to (d) (extracted above), even those persons who had been ordinarily living in the premises with the tenant would be treated as members of the family. The statement of objects and reasons for this amendment may be extracted thus:"There has been a persistent demand for amendments to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with a view to conferring a right of tenancy on certain heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that they may be protected from eviction by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure for eviction of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his personal occupation. Further, Government decided on the 9th September, 1975 that a person who owns his own house in his place of work should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to him before the 31st December 1975. Government considered that in the circumstances, the Act required to be amended urgently."19. If this was the intention of the legislature then Clause (d) of Section 14 (1) of the Act could not be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat the very object of the Act. It is well settled that a beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act, and curing any lacuna or defect appearing in the same. There are abundant authorities to show that the term "family" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the head of the family.20. In Hira Lal v. Banarsi Dass, 15 DLT (1979) 300 even the learned Judge who decided that case had observed at page 472 that the term "members of the family" on the facts and circumstances of the case should not be given a narrow construction.21. In Govind Dass v. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1971 Delhi 151, a Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of H. R. Khanna, C. J. (as he then was) and Prakash Narain, J. while recognising the necessity of giving a wide interpretation to the word "family" observed as follows (at p. 153):"I hold that in the section now under consideration the word "family" includes brothers and sisters of the deceased living with her at the time of her death. I think that that meaning is required by the ordinary acceptation of the word in this connection and that the legislature has used the word "family" to introduce a flexible and wide term."22. In Mrs. G. V. Shukla v. Mr. Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass Ojha, (1963) 65 Pun LR 256 Mahajan, J. (as he then was) observed as follows:"Therefore, it must be held that the word ‘family’ is capable of wider interpretation, but that interpretation must have relation to the existing facts and circumstances proved on the record in each case."23. Even as far back as 1930, Wright, J. In Price v. Gould, (1930) 143 LT 333 (a King’s Bench decision) had clearly held that the word "family" included brothers and sisters and in this connection observed as follows:"I find as a fact that the brothers and sisters were residing with the deceased at the time of her death ...........It has been laid down that the primary meaning of the word "family" is children, but that primary meaning is clearly susceptible of wider interpretation, because the cases decide that the exact scope of the word must depend on the context and the other provisions of the will or deed in view of the surrounding circumstances."xx xx xx xx"Thus, in Snow v. Teed, (1870-23) LT 303; LR 9 Eg 622) it was held that the word "family" could be extended beyond not merely children but even beyond the statutory next of kin."24. In view, however, of the very clear and plain language of Clause (d) Section 14(1) of the Act itself, we do not want to burden this judgment by multiplying authorities.25. On a point of fact, we might mention that the Rent Controller had given a clear finding that the mother, younger brother (Davinder Kumar Bangia) and sister (Vijay Lakshmi) were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises along with the main tenant and continued to reside there even on the date when the action for rejectment was brought.26. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and cannot be supported. The landlord has miserably failed to prove the essential ingredients of Clause (d) of Section 14 (1) of the Act so as to entitle him to evict the members of the family of the main tenant.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. It is manifest that unless the aforesaid conditions are satisfied the landlord cannot succeed in getting a decree for ejectment. In the instant case, while it is the admitted case of the parties that the tenant had shifted to Canada along with his wife and children, yet he had left his mother, brother and sister in the house, hence the second essential condition of Clause (d) continues to apply with fullcoming to its decision, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the dominant purpose and the main object of the Act which affords several intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to show that the non-applicants were undoubtedly members of the family residing in the house and the migration of the main tenant to Canada would make no difference. The wordhas been defined in various legal dictionaries and several authorities of various Courts and no Court has ever held that mother or a brother or a sister who is living with the older member of the family would not constitute a family of the said member. Surely, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that when the tenant was living with his own mother in the house and after he migrated to Canada, he had severed all his connections with his mother so that she became an absolute stranger to the family. Such an interpretation is against our national heritage and, as we shall show, could never have been contemplated by the Act which has manifested its intention by virtue of a later amendment.A conspectus of the connotation of the termwhich emerges from a reference to the aforesaid dictionaries clearly shows that the wordhas to be given not a restricted but a wider meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all members or descendants from the common ancestors who are actually living with the same head. More particularly, in our country, blood relations do not evaporate merely because a member of the family—the father, the brother or the son—leaves his household and goes out for some time. Furthermore, in our opinion, the legislature has advisedly used the term that any member of the family residing therein for a period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the action would be treated as a tenant. The stress is not so much on the actual presence of the tenant as on the fact that the members of the family actually live and reside in the tenanted premises. In fact, it seems to us that Clause (d) of Section 14(1) of the Act is a special concession given to the landlord to obtain possession only where the tenanted premises have been completely vacated by the tenant if he ceased to exercise any control over the property either through himself or through his blood relations.In view, however, of the very clear and plain language of Clause (d) Section 14(1) of the Act itself, we do not want to burden this judgment by multiplying authorities.25. On a point of fact, we might mention that the Rent Controller had given a clear finding that the mother, younger brother (Davinder Kumar Bangia) and sister (Vijay Lakshmi) were undoubtedly residing in the disputed premises along with the main tenant and continued to reside there even on the date when the action for rejectment was brought.26. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the view taken by the High Court is legally erroneous and cannot be supported. The landlord has miserably failed to prove the essential ingredients of Clause (d) of Section 14 (1) of the Act so as to entitle him to evict the members of the family of the main tenant.