Case: Mangoo Singh Vs. The Election Tribunal, Bareillyand Others

was disqualified is disqualified also for nomination. The nomination is for this purpose an essential part of the election, and if there are no competitors it of itself constitutes the election by virtue of the express words of S. 56. A different construction might produce much confusion. On the nomination day no one could know whether the persons nominated will at the poll be effective candidates or not. It is true that in the case the disqualification may be removed before the election is completed; but what is to be the effect if the disqualification continues until the poll begins, or until the middle of the polling day, or until the close of the poll? Will votes given before the removal of the disqualification be valid? If not, how is the number of them to be ascertained? It seems to us unreasonable to hold that the Act means to leave the matter in such a state of uncertainty, and for these reasons we think that this petitioner was disqualified for nomination or election."The same state of uncertainty and confusion, to which a reference has been made in the aforesaid observations, will arise if the construction which learned counsel for the appellant has pressed for our acceptance is adopted in the case before us.7. Lastly, it has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the expression to which S. 166 applies in cl. (g) of S. 18-D means that a bill of the sum due must be presented to the person liable for it, as required by that section, before he can come within the mischief of the clause; furthermore, the use of the expression demand makes it essential that a demand notice must also be served as required by S. 168 of the Act. As on the finding of the Election Tribunal neither a bill was presented to the appellant, nor was he served with a demand notice, learned counsel contends that the appellant does not come within the mischief of the clause.8. Sections 166 and 168 are in these terms"Section 166: Presentation of bill - (1) As soon as a person becomes liable for the payment of -(a) any sum on account of a tax, other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable upon immediate demand, or(b) a sum payable under cl. (C) of S. 196 or S. 229 of S. 230 in respect of the supply or water, or payable in respect of any other municipal service or undertaking, or(c) any other sum declared by this Act or by rule (or bye-law) to be recoverable in the manner provided by this chapter, the board shall, with all convenient speed, cause a bill to be presented to the persons so liable.(2) Unless otherwise provided by rule, a person shall be deemed to become liable for the payment of every tax and licence fee upon the commencement of the period in respect of which such tax or fee is payable.""Section 168. Notice of demand. - If the sum for which a bill has been presented as aforesaid is not paid in municipal office, or to a person empowered by a regulation to receive such payments within fifteen days from the presentation thereof, the board may cause to be served upon the person liable for the payment of the said sum a notice of demand in the form set forth in Sch. IV, or to the like effect."We are clearly of the view that the expression to which S. 166 applies cannot bear the meaning sought to be given to it on behalf of the appellant. That expression merely describes the nature of the demand referred to in cl. (g). Section 166 refers to three types of dues; cl. (a) of sub-s (1) refers to any sum on account of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable under cl. (C) of S. 196 or S. 229 or S. 230 in respect of the supply of water etc., and cl, (C) refers to any other sum declared by the Act or by rule or bye-law to be recoverable in the manner provided by chap. VI. The demand to which S. 166 applies must be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in one or other of the aforesaid three clauses, and the demand referred to in cl. (g) of S. 13 D must be of that nature or type; this in our view, is the true meaning and effect if the expression to which S. 166 applies.9. Nor do we think that the word demand attracts the operation of S. 168. It may be readily conceded that the word demand ordinarily means something more than what is due; it means something which has been demanded called for or asked for. But the meaning of a word must take colour from the context in which it is used. In cl. (g) the context in which the word, demand is used has a very obvious and clear reference to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends; therefore, the expression used is - arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one years demand. The word demand in that context and in the collocation of words in which it has been used can only mean in excess of one years municipal tax or other dues. We have been referred to several meanings of the word demand in standard English dictionaries and Law lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of according to lexicographers. If it sufficient for our purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons, it is well recognised that the word demand may mean simply a claim or due, without importing any further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay claim or due.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We are clearly of the view that the expression to which S. 166 applies cannot bear the meaning sought to be given to it on behalf of the appellant. That expression merely describes the nature of the demand referred to in cl. (g). Section 166 refers to three types of dues; cl. (a) of sub-s (1) refers to any sum on account of a tax other than an octroi or toll or any similar tax payable under cl. (C) of S. 196 or S. 229 or S. 230 in respect of the supply of water etc., and cl, (C) refers to any other sum declared by the Act or by rule or bye-law to be recoverable in the manner provided by chap.demand to which S. 166 applies must be a demand of the nature or type mentioned in one or other of the aforesaid three clauses, and the demand referred to in cl. (g) of S. 13 D must be of that nature or type; this in our view, is the true meaning and effect if the expression to which S. 166 applies.9. Nor do we think that the word demand attracts the operation of S.It may be readily conceded that the word demand ordinarily means something more than what is due; it means something which has been demanded called for or asked for. But the meaning of a word must take colour from the context in which it iscl. (g) the context in which the word, demand is used has a very obvious and clear reference to the amount of arrears or dues on which the disqualification depends; therefore, the expression used is - arrears in the payment of municipal tax or other dues in excess of one years demand. The word demand in that context and in the collocation of words in which it has been used can only mean in excess of one years municipal tax or otherhave been referred to several meanings of the word demand in standard English dictionaries and Law lexicons. When the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of according toit sufficient for our purpose to state that even in standard dictionaries and law lexicons, it is well recognised that the word demand may mean simply a claim or due, without importing any further meaning of calling upon the person liable to pay claim or due.