Case: M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD Vs. MAHENDRA PAL BHATIA AND ORS

be seen from the vesting provision, what was transferred to and vested in the Central Government, were not corporate houses or business entities owning coal-mines. What was transferred to and vested in the Central Government were the coalmines. In other words this Nationalisation Act, was little different from the statutory enactments nationalizing institutions such as banks, insurance companies etc. Therefore, the ownership of the land was immaterial. If the land fell within the definition of the expression mine under the Nationalisation Act, the same stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government under Section 3(1). 14. The definition of the expression mine under Section 2(h) of the Nationalisation Act, is very wide. It reads as follows:- 2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-- xxx xxx xxx (h) mine means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, and includes— (i) all borings and bore holes; (ii) all shafts, whether in the course of being sunk or not; (iii) all levels and inclined planes in the course of being driven; (iv) all open cast workings; (v) all conveyors or aerial ropeways provided for bringing into or removal from a mine of minerals or other articles or for the removal of refuse therefrom; (vi) all lands, buildings, works, adits, levels, planes, machinery and equipments, instruments, stores, vehicles, railways, tramways and sidings in, or adjacent to, a mine and used for the purposes of the mine; (vii) all workshops (including buildings, machinery, instruments, stores, equipment of such workshops and the lands on which such workshops stand) in, or adjacent to, a mine and used substantially for the purposes of the mine or a number of mines under the same management; (viii) all coal belonging to the owner of the mine, whether in stock or in transit, and all coal under production in a mine; (ix) all power stations in a mine or operated primarily for supplying electricity for the purpose of working the mine or a number of mines under the same management; (x) all lands, buildings and equipments belonging to the owner of the mine, and in, adjacent to or situated on the surface of, the mine where the washing of coal obtained from the mine or manufacture, therefrom, of coke is carried on; (xi) all lands and buildings[ other than those referred to in sub- clause (x), wherever situated, if solely used for the location of the management, sale or liaison offices, or for the residence of officers and staff, of the mine; (xii) all other fixed assets, movable and immovable, belonging to the owner of a mine, wherever situated, and current assets, belonging to a mine, whether within its premises or outside. 15. As could be seen from clause (xi) of Section 2(h), even the lands and buildings used solely for the location of the management, sale or liaison offices or for the residence of officers and staff were also included in the definition of the word mine. Therefore, the contention that the property was the private property of Jamini Mohan Majumdar, and that his occupation as Manager of a colliery was irrelevant, would fall to the ground. The focus of Section 2(h) read with Section 3(1) is on the property and not on who the owner of the property is. 16. Similarly, the objection that the land in question was not used as a colliery is also irrelevant in view of the fact that clause (xi) of Section 2(h) uses the words wherever situated. In any case the contention that the property was not part of a colliery, may be factually incorrect. The sale deed dated 05.02.1945 by which Jamini Mohan Majumdar purchased the property in question contains a very specific recital which reads as follows: …This deed witnesseth that in the schedule land in view of the ongoing colliery workings the fertility of the schedule land has been reduced for that reason and for monetary reason being in special need and having no alternative when I offered for absolute sale of the land in schedule as receipt of consideration price of Rs.575/- on this day by way of absolute sale this sale deed is being executed in your favour. You are at liberty to carry on all nature of colliery work both underground and surface and enjoy the name TO HAVE AND HOLD the same to and upto the purchaser absolutely and forever in any manner whatsoever without any hindrance or interruption from us together with all right, benefit, easement, privileges, liberties which he hereto begins enjoyed… Therefore, the respondents cannot now rely upon the Report of a Court Commissioner who carried out inspection probably after two/three decades of nationalization. 17. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in New Satgram Engineering Works & Another vs. Union of India & Ors. (1980) 4 SCC 570, in support of his contention that the question whether something is a mine or not is essentially a question of fact and that when the facts are seriously controverted it was appropriate for the High Court to relegate the parties to the civil court. 18. Though paragraph 16 of the decision in New Satgram (supra) appears to support the contention of the respondents by highlighting the difference between the language employed in clauses (vii) and clause (xi) of Section 2(h), a subsequent decision of this Court (also of a 3 member bench) in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Madanlal Agrawal (1997) 1 SCC 177, steers clear any air of suspicion. In this case, this Court clarified that the extended meaning given to the word mine was to ensure that the activity of mining coal could be carried on in an uninterrupted fashion. This Court also cautioned that the Act should not be construed in a way to frustrate the working of the coal mines altogether, thereby stop or bring down production of coal by the nationalization of coal mines.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]12. But, unfortunately for the respondents, both the objections cannot stand in the light of the statutory prescriptions. Section 3(1) of the Nationalisation Act, declares that on the appointed day, which was 01.05.1973, the right, title and interest of the owners in relation to the coal-mines specified in the Schedule shall stand transferred to and shall vest absolutely in the Central government free from all encumbrances.13. As could be seen from the vesting provision, what was transferred to and vested in the Central Government, were not corporate houses or business entities owning coal-mines. What was transferred to and vested in the Central Government were the coalmines. In other words this Nationalisation Act, was little different from the statutory enactments nationalizing institutions such as banks, insurance companies etc. Therefore, the ownership of the land was immaterial. If the land fell within the definition of the expression mine under the Nationalisation Act, the same stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government under Section 3(1).15. As could be seen from clause (xi) of Section 2(h), even the lands and buildings used solely for the location of the management, sale or liaison offices or for the residence of officers and staff were also included in the definition of the word mine. Therefore, the contention that the property was the private property of Jamini Mohan Majumdar, and that his occupation as Manager of a colliery was irrelevant, would fall to the ground. The focus of Section 2(h) read with Section 3(1) is on the property and not on who the owner of the property is.16. Similarly, the objection that the land in question was not used as a colliery is also irrelevant in view of the fact that clause (xi) of Section 2(h) uses the words wherever situated. In any case the contention that the property was not part of a colliery, may be factually incorrect.Therefore, the respondents cannot now rely upon the Report of a Court Commissioner who carried out inspection probably after two/three decades of nationalization.18. Though paragraph 16 of the decision in New Satgram (supra) appears to support the contention of the respondents by highlighting the difference between the language employed in clauses (vii) and clause (xi) of Section 2(h), a subsequent decision of this Court (also of a 3 member bench) in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Madanlal Agrawal (1997) 1 SCC 177,  steers clear any air of suspicion. In this case, this Court clarified that the extended meaning given to the word mine was to ensure that the activity of mining coal could be carried on in an uninterrupted fashion. This Court also cautioned that the Act should not be construed in a way to frustrate the working of the coal mines altogether, thereby stop or bring down production of coal by the nationalization of coal mines.