Case: Union of India (UOI) and Ors Vs. Udai Bhan Singh

of the principles of natural justice. The submission found favour with the High Court in the impugned judgment. The question as to whether there was a failure of natural justice was dealt with by the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, the issue was considered by the appellate authority. The Tribunal, while dealing with the submission, came to the conclusion that the Respondent was attempting to take undue advantage of the non availability of cash receipts but the payment could be verified from other records and documents which were maintained in the Head Post Office, In other words, according to the Tribunal, the non availability of a particular document on the record did not make any difference to the charge of misconduct which was established by other materials which were available on the record. The High Court merely observed that the Respondent was not provided the documents which were relied upon and that there was an error apparent on the face of the record in the order of the Tribunal. The High Court did not consider which documents were not supplied, the relevance of those documents to the charge of misconduct and the prejudice, if any, that resulted to the Respondent by the non availability of the relevant documents. In fact, in the pleadings of the Respondent, the plea that there was a failure to supply documents was vague and there was no reference to which specific document ought to have been made available. Without analyzing this aspect of the case, the High Court interfered with the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Appellant on a vague plea that documents were not supplied. The High Court ought to have enquired into the question of prejudice. There is also substance in the submission which has been urged by Ms. Suri, learned Senior Counsel with regard to the erroneous reference to Rule 27 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules. Rule 27 has no bearing at all on the controversy in the present case. Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 deals with execution of the orders of the Tribunal.14. The aspect of delay must be considered in the context of the admitted facts. The inquiry had been concluded by the inquiry officer. Evidence was recorded during the course of the inquiry. The order of the disciplinary authority holding that all the three charges had been proved was without issuing a notice to the Respondent on the reasons for disagreement with the report of the inquiry officer. The appellate authority enhanced the punishment without indicating adequate reasons. The Tribunal restored the proceedings back to the disciplinary authority to enable the Appellants to issue a fresh notice to show cause to the Respondent and to arrive at a conclusion on the nature of the misconduct, if any, after furnishing an opportunity to the Respondent of making a representation. Neither was the inquiry required to be held afresh nor was fresh evidence to be recorded. After the order of the tribunal, a notice to show cause was issued to the Respondent after eight years. But it must equally be noted that the Respondent had been reinstated following the order of the tribunal setting aside the disciplinary action, pending the conclusion of the process by the disciplinary authority. Hence, the delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in issuing a show cause notice in the first instance and in passing a final order thereafter is not a matter of any prejudice to the Respondent.15. Now, it is well settled that the aspect of delay has to be dealt with on the facts of each case. In the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, the irregularities, which were the subject matter of an inquiry related to 1975-1977. Hence this Court held that it was not reasonable that the department had taken more than twelve years to initiate a disciplinary proceeding despite being aware of the irregularities. That was a case where there was an unexplained delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, Subsequently, the position of law has been clarified by the decisions of this Court in State of Punjab and Ors. v. Chaman Lal Goyal (1995) 2 SCC 570 , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan (1998) 4 SCC 154 and Secretary, Forest Department and Ors. v. Abdur Rasul Chowdhury (2009) 7 SCC 305. In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. V. Appala Swamy (2007) 14 SCC 49 , this Court after referring to the earlier decisions held thus:12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard-and-fast Rule can be laid down therefor. Each case roust be determined on its own facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are:(1) where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapses on the part of the employee:(2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the inquiry officer.13. This aspect of the matter is now squarely covered by the decisions of this Court in Secy. to Govt., Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivisan (1996) 3 SCC 157 ; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India (2006) 8 SCC 776 ; Registrar, Coop. Societies v. Sachindra Nath Pandey (1995) 3 SCC 134. 16. In the present case, the Appellants have not condoned the lapse on the part of the Respondent. The delay was not a matter of prejudice.17. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was in error in interfering with the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Appellants. The misconduct was proved. The penalty which has been imposed cannot be held to be disproportionate or arbitrary. The High Court was in error in setting aside the punishment and ordering reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The question as to whether there was a failure of natural justice was dealt with by the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, the issue was considered by the appellate authority. The Tribunal, while dealing with the submission, came to the conclusion that the Respondent was attempting to take undue advantage of the non availability of cash receipts but the payment could be verified from other records and documents which were maintained in the Head Post Office, In other words, according to the Tribunal, the non availability of a particular document on the record did not make any difference to the charge of misconduct which was established by other materials which were available on the record. The High Court merely observed that the Respondent was not provided the documents which were relied upon and that there was an error apparent on the face of the record in the order of the Tribunal. The High Court did not consider which documents were not supplied, the relevance of those documents to the charge of misconduct and the prejudice, if any, that resulted to the Respondent by the non availability of the relevant documents. In fact, in the pleadings of the Respondent, the plea that there was a failure to supply documents was vague and there was no reference to which specific document ought to have been made available. Without analyzing this aspect of the case, the High Court interfered with the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Appellant on a vague plea that documents were not supplied. The High Court ought to have enquired into the question of prejudice. There is also substance in the submission which has been urged by Ms. Suri, learned Senior Counsel with regard to the erroneous reference to Rule 27 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Rules. Rule 27 has no bearing at all on the controversy in the present case. Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 deals with execution of the orders of the Tribunal.The aspect of delay must be considered in the context of the admitted facts. The inquiry had been concluded by the inquiry officer. Evidence was recorded during the course of the inquiry. The order of the disciplinary authority holding that all the three charges had been proved was without issuing a notice to the Respondent on the reasons for disagreement with the report of the inquiry officer. The appellate authority enhanced the punishment without indicating adequate reasons. The Tribunal restored the proceedings back to the disciplinary authority to enable the Appellants to issue a fresh notice to show cause to the Respondent and to arrive at a conclusion on the nature of the misconduct, if any, after furnishing an opportunity to the Respondent of making a representation. Neither was the inquiry required to be held afresh nor was fresh evidence to be recorded. After the order of the tribunal, a notice to show cause was issued to the Respondent after eight years. But it must equally be noted that the Respondent had been reinstated following the order of the tribunal setting aside the disciplinary action, pending the conclusion of the process by the disciplinary authority. Hence, the delay on the part of the disciplinary authority in issuing a show cause notice in the first instance and in passing a final order thereafter is not a matter of any prejudice to the Respondent.Now, it is well settled that the aspect of delay has to be dealt with on the facts of each case.In the present case, the Appellants have not condoned the lapse on the part of the Respondent. The delay was not a matter of prejudice.For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion that the High Court was in error in interfering with the exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Appellants. The misconduct was proved. The penalty which has been imposed cannot be held to be disproportionate or arbitrary. The High Court was in error in setting aside the punishment and ordering reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service.