Case: Jagriti Devi Vs. State of H.P

the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."18. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at p. 468): (AIR para 16)"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion."19. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case4 for the applicability of clause "thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.20. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case4 even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.21. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons -- being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.22. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages." 21. The aforesaid principles have been consistently applied by this Court in several decisions. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of this Court in Ruli Ram v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 691 ; Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 10 SCC 472 ; State of U. P. v. Virendra Prasad, (2004) 9 SCC 37; Chacko v. State of Kerala, (2004) 12 SCC 269 ; and S. N. Bhadolkar v. State of Maharasthra, (2005) 9 SCC 71. 22. That being the well settled legal position, when the factual background of the present case is tested on the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are unable to agree with the views taken by the trial court as also by the High Court. As already noted, it is quite clear from the record that there was an altercation preceding the incident of murder in which the accused-appellant was insulted by the deceased and by doing so the deceased provoked the accused-appellant. The deceased also took out the `Khukri which was under the pillow with the intention of assaulting the accused-appellant and the accused-appellant in order to save herself grappled with the deceased and during that process she also received injuries. The prosecution has failed to give any explanation with regard to those injuries received by the accused-appellant. Further, it is also established in evidence that the `Khukri used in the commission of offence was kept by the deceased under her pillow while she was sleeping in the veranda outside the house. Clearly, there was no intention on the part of the accused-appellant to kill the deceased. That being the position, we are of the considered view that the present case cannot be said to be a case under Section 302 IPC but it is a case falling under Section 304 Part II IPC. It is trite law that Section 304 Part II comes into play when the death is caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]16. We have examined the evidence of19 carefully and on a reading thereof, we are of the considered view that both19 came to the scene of occurrence when thehad assaulted the deceased with the `Khukri.came to the place of occurrence when he sawstanding in the veranda.was informed by18 went inside to informby that time the incident must have been over as it took only few minutes for theto give blows to the deceased and then running away from the scene of occurrence. Therefore, it is crystal clear thathas seen the entire incident from the starting point namely altercation taking place between theand the deceased and thereafterWe find no reason to disbelieve the statement ofIn our considered opinion both the trial court and the High Court discarded her evidence without any cogent reason. The trial court and the High Court took the view that the injuries received by thewere not explained by the prosecution in the trial. It is true that those injuries were received by thewhile there was a grappling going on between theand the deceased for snatching `Khukri which was the weapon of murder. On appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are satisfied that there was an altercation preceding the incident of murder in whichwas insulted by the deceased and by doing so the deceased provoked theant snatched away the `Khukri from the hands of the deceased due to which thealso received the injuries.18. Section 299 and Section 300 IPC deals with the definition of culpable homicide and murder respectively. Section 299 defines culpable homicide as the act of causing death; (i) with the intention of causing death or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or (iii) with the knowledge that such act is likely to cause death. The bare reading of the section makes it crystal clear that the first and the second clause of the section refer to intention apart from the knowledge and the third clause refers to knowledge alone and not intention. Both the expression "intent" and "knowledge" postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude which is of different degrees. The mental element in culpable homicide i.e. mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. If that is caused in any of the aforesaid three circumstances, the offence of culpable homicide is said to have been committed. Section 300 IPC, however, deals with murder although there is no clear definition of murder provided in Section 300 IPC. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that culpable homicide is the genus and murder is species and that all murders are culpable homicide but not vice versa. Section 300 IPC further provides for the exceptions which will constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder and punishable under Section 304. When and if there is intent and knowledge then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part I and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then the same would be a case of Section 304 Part II. The aforesaid distinction between an act amounting to murder and an act not amounting to murder has been brought out in the numerous decisions of this Court.That being the well settled legal position, when the factual background of the present case is tested on the principles laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, we are unable to agree with the views taken by the trial court as also by the High Court. As already noted, it is quite clear from the record that there was an altercation preceding the incident of murder in which thes insulted by the deceased and by doing so the deceased provoked theThe deceased also took out the `Khukri which was under the pillow with the intention of assaulting theant in order to save herself grappled with the deceased and during that process she also received injuries. The prosecution has failed to give any explanation with regard to those injuries received by theFurther, it is also established in evidence that the `Khukri used in the commission of offence was kept by the deceased under her pillow while she was sleeping in the veranda outside the house. Clearly, there was no intention on the part of theto kill the deceased. That being the position, we are of the considered view that the present case cannot be said to be a case under Section 302 IPC but it is a case falling under Section 304 Part II IPC. It is trite law that Section 304 Part II comes into play when the death is caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.