Case: General Motors (I) Private Limited Vs. Ashok Ramnik Lal Tolat

a complaint by a consumer to whom goods are sold or delivered but also any recognised consumer association or one or more consumers on behalf of and for the benefit of all consumers but still, a case has to be made out and the affected party heard on such issue. We are conscious that having regard to the laudable object of the social legislation to protect the interest of consumers, liberal and purposive interpretation has to be placed on the scheme of the Act avoiding hyper technical approach. At the same time, fair procedure is hall mark of every legal proceeding and an affected party is entitled to be put to notice of the claim with such affected party has to meet. 19. We may at this stage refer to the scheme of the Act with regard to claim against “unfair trade practice”. The background and scope of the provision was dealt with in Ludhiana Improvement Trust v. Shakti Coop. House Building Society Ltd. [(2009) 12 SCC 369] as follows : “18. Prior to the substitution of clause (r) in sub-section (1) of Section 2 of he Act with retrospective effect from 18-6-1993, there was no separate definition of the term “unfair trade practice” and the said term was given the same meaning as in Section 36-A of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (for short “the MRTP Act”). But now after the said amendment, the definition of the term has been specifically provided in Section 2(1)(r), although the definition is practically a verbatim reproduction of the definition in Section 36-A of the MRTP Act.19. The basic ingredients of “unfair trade practice” are:(i) it must be a trade practice;(ii) the trade practice must be employed for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provision of any service; and(iii) the trade practice adopts any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice including any of the practices enumerated in clauses (1) to (6) of Section 2(1)(r) of the Act.Therefore, any trade practice which is adopted for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or for the provision of any service, by adopting any unfair method or unfair or deceptive practice has to be treated as “unfair trade practice” for which an action under the provisions of the Act would lie, provided, the complainant is able to establish that he is a consumer within the meaning of Section 2(1)(d) of the Act.” In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. MRTP Commission [(2003) 1 SCC 129] this Court laid down five ingredients which have to be established before a trade practice can be said to be an “unfair trade practice”. The Court laid the ingredients in the following manner: “16. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly indicate that the following five ingredients are necessary to constitute an unfair trade practice:1. There must be a trade practice [within the meaning of Section 2(u) of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act].2. The trade practice must be employed for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods or the provision of any services.3. The trade practice should fall within the ambit of one or more of the categories enumerated in clauses (1) to (5) of Section 36-A.4. The trade practice should cause loss or injury to the consumers of goods or services.5. The trade practice under clause (1) should involve making a ‘statement’ whether orally or in writing or by visible representation.” Again in Godfrey Phillips India Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar [(2008) 4 SCC 504] , it was observed : “18. So far as Direction (iii) is concerned, it is to be noted that there was no prayer for any compensation. There was no allegation that the complainant had suffered any loss. Compensation can be granted only in terms of Section 14(1)(d) of the Act. Clause (d) contemplates award of compensation to the consumer for any loss or injury suffered due to negligence of the opposite party. In the present case there was no allegation or material placed on record to show negligence.” Thus, mere proof of “unfair trade practice” is not enough for claim or award of relief unless causing of loss is also established which in the present case has not been established. 20. We have already set out the relief sought in the complaint. Neither there is any averment in the complaint about the suffering of punitive damages by the other consumers nor the appellant was aware that any such claim is to be met by it. Normally, punitive damages are awarded against a conscious wrong doing unrelated to the actual loss suffered. Such a claim has to be specially pleaded. The respondent complainant was satisfied with the order of the District Forum and did not approach the State Commission. He only approached the National Commission after the State Commission set aside the relief granted by the District Forum. The National Commission in exercise of revisional jurisdiction was only concerned about the correctness or otherwise of the order of the State Commission setting aside the relief given by the District Forum and to pass such order as the State Commission ought to have passed. However, the National Commission has gone much beyond its jurisdiction in awarding the relief which was neither sought in the complaint nor before the State Commission. We are thus, of the view that to this extent the order of the National Commission cannot be sustained. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the direction but the aspect that in absence of such a claim being before the National Commission and the appellant having no notice of such a claim, the said order is contrary to principles of fair procedure and natural justice. We also make it clear that this order will not stand in the way of any aggrieved party raising a claim before an appropriate forum in accordance with law. 21.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We have already set out the relief sought in the complaint. Neither there is any averment in the complaint about the suffering of punitive damages by the other consumers nor the appellant was aware that any such claim is to be met by it. Normally, punitive damages are awarded against a conscious wrong doing unrelated to the actual loss suffered. Such a claim has to be specially pleaded. The respondent complainant was satisfied with the order of the District Forum and did not approach the State Commission. He only approached the National Commission after the State Commission set aside the relief granted by the District Forum. The National Commission in exercise of revisional jurisdiction was only concerned about the correctness or otherwise of the order of the State Commission setting aside the relief given by the District Forum and to pass such order as the State Commission ought to have passed. However, the National Commission has gone much beyond its jurisdiction in awarding the relief which was neither sought in the complaint nor before the State Commission. We are thus, of the view that to this extent the order of the National Commission cannot be sustained. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the direction but the aspect that in absence of such a claim being before the National Commission and the appellant having no notice of such a claim, the said order is contrary to principles of fair procedure and natural justice. We also make it clear that this order will not stand in the way of any aggrieved party raising a claim before an appropriate forum in accordance with law.