Case: State of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Others Vs. Ram Naresh Lal

only the appointing authority who would be competent to pass the order of dismissal. He held that the appointing authority was the Superintending Engineer and not the Development Commissioner. 8. The learned Single Judge then dealt with the other points raised before him, but those points have not been raised before us and we need not consider them. The learned Single Judge, accordingly, held that the order of dismissal had been passed by an authority which was not competent to dismiss the respondent. 9. In the special appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh the Division Bench came substantially to the same conclusion. The Division Bench held that he respondent held a permanent post as a junior clerk in the Irrigation Department with effect from April 1, 1955, and as no formal order was issued by the Development Commissioner appointing the respondent to the Planning Department on a permanent basis the lien of the respondent in the Irrigation Department continued. The Division Bench further held that being an employee of the Irrigation Department, the respondent could not be dismissed by the Development Commissioner. They relied on the notification dated August 3, 1932, which reads."In exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 54 of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules made by the Secretary of State in Council .... the Government of the United Provinces hereby delegate, without prejudice to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, power to inflict the following punishments on members of the subordinate services to every officer who is competent under existing orders to appoint them with or without reference to or with or without the sanction of higher authority." The Division Bench further held that the notification dated March 4, 1960, had no direct bearing on the competence of the Development Commissioner to dismiss an official from service. The Division Bench further relied on clause (a) of Rule 14-A of the Fundamental Rules which read:"A government servants lien on a post may in no circumstances be terminated, even with his consent if the result will be to leave him without a lien or a suspended lien upon a permanent post." The Division Bench observed that"the notification dated 3-8-1932 must be read subject to R. 14-A of the Fundamental Rules. It was not open to the Development Commissioner to put an end to the lien held by R. N. Lal to a post in the Irrigation Department." 10. The learned Counsel for the appellant, Mr. G. N. Dixit, contends (1) that the respondent was permanently transferred to the Planning Department by virtue of the order of Government dated May 21 1958 and the option exercised by the respondent not to go back to his parent department, and (2) that, at any rate by virtue of the order dated March 4, 1960, read with the notification dated August 3, 1932, and May 21, 1958, the Development Commissioner was the competent authority to dismiss the respondent. 11. Regarding the first point, it seems to us that it was not necessary that the Development Commissioner should have issued a fresh order for appointment of the respondent. The respondent was a member of the Subordinate Service and by having been transferred to the Planning Department he had not ceased to be a member of the service. If a person is a member of the service and he is transferred from one department to another it is not necessary that he should be reappointed to the service or he should be appointed to the department to which he is transferred. As soon as he is transferred permanently he begins to hold the permanent post which he starts holding in the transferee department.It is true that the letter dated May 21, 1958, contemplated that a fresh appointment of staff who elected to remain in the Planning Department would be made but apparently later on the Government realised that it was not necessary to pass such an order of reappointment.It seems to us that the respondent, having elected not to go back to his parent department, became an employee in the Planning Department and, therefore, the Development Commissioner was entitled to dismiss the respondent. 12. Assuming that the respondent had not been permanently transferred and further assuming that he was still on deputation in the Planning Department, even then the Development Commissioner was entitled to dismiss the respondent by virtue of various orders. The order dated May 21, 1958, which has been extracted above, clearly places the control over the entire staff on deputation from the Irrigation Department to the Planning Department with the Development Commissioner.The word "control" is a wide word and includes disciplinary jurisdiction. In the context there is no doubt that it was the intention to give disciplinary jurisdiction over the entire staff on deputation to the Development Commissioner. The previous order dated July 15, 1956, had vested the power of transfer and punishment in the Development Commissioner. It seems to us that the later order in no way confers lesser powers on the Development Commissioner. There is nothing in the Constitution which debars the Government from conferring powers on an officer other than the appointing authority to dismiss a Government servant provided he is not subordinate in rank to the appointing officer or authority.These three orders, (viz., D/- August 3, 1932, May 21, 1958 and March 4, 1960) which we have mentioned above, read together clearly confer powers on the Development Commissioner to dismiss person on deputation in the Planning Department. 13. In considering this question we have not been able to appreciate the relevance of clause (a) of Rule 14A of the Fundamental Rules relied on by the Division Bench. Whether a person has a lien in one department or in other department, the Government is entitled, subject to the provisions of Article 311 (1), to delegate power of dismissal to any officer. We are unable to understand how Rule 14-A has the effect of modifying the notification dated August 3, 1932.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. Regarding the first point, it seems to us that it was not necessary that the Development Commissioner should have issued a fresh order for appointment of the respondent. The respondent was a member of the Subordinate Service and by having been transferred to the Planning Department he had not ceased to be a member of the service. If a person is a member of the service and he is transferred from one department to another it is not necessary that he should be reappointed to the service or he should be appointed to the department to which he is transferred. As soon as he is transferred permanently he begins to hold the permanent post which he starts holding in the transferee department.It is true that the letter dated May 21, 1958, contemplated that a fresh appointment of staff who elected to remain in the Planning Department would be made but apparently later on the Government realised that it was not necessary to pass such an order of reappointment.It seems to us that the respondent, having elected not to go back to his parent department, became an employee in the Planning Department and, therefore, the Development Commissioner was entitled to dismiss the respondent12. Assuming that the respondent had not been permanently transferred and further assuming that he was still on deputation in the Planning Department, even then the Development Commissioner was entitled to dismiss the respondent by virtue of various orders. The order dated May 21, 1958, which has been extracted above, clearly places the control over the entire staff on deputation from the Irrigation Department to the Planning Department with the Development Commissioner.The word "control" is a wide word and includes disciplinary jurisdiction. In the context there is no doubt that it was the intention to give disciplinary jurisdiction over the entire staff on deputation to the Development Commissioner. The previous order dated July 15, 1956, had vested the power of transfer and punishment in the Development Commissioner. It seems to us that the later order in no way confers lesser powers on the Development Commissioner. There is nothing in the Constitution which debars the Government from conferring powers on an officer other than the appointing authority to dismiss a Government servant provided he is not subordinate in rank to the appointing officer or authority.These three orders, (viz., D/August 3, 1932, May 21, 1958 and March 4, 1960) which we have mentioned above, read together clearly confer powers on the Development Commissioner to dismiss person on deputation in the Planning Department13. In considering this question we have not been able to appreciate the relevance of clause (a) of Rule14A of the FundamentalRulesrelied on by the Division Bench. Whether a person has a lien in one department or in other department, the Government is entitled, subject to the provisions of Article 311 (1), to delegate power of dismissal to any officer. We are unable to understand how Rule14Ahas the effect of modifying the notification dated August 3, 1932.