Case: Chaube Jagdish Prasad And Another Vs. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi

Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras, 76 Ind App 67 at p. 73:(AIR 1949 P C 156 at p. 158).Therefore if an erroneous decision of a subordinate Court resulted in its exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acting with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction the case for the exercise of powers of revision by the High Court is made out.In Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, 76 Ind App 131 : (A I R 1949 P C 239) the subordinate Court gave an erroneous decision that the loan was a commercial loan and therefore refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law and the Privy Council held that it was open to the High Court to interfere in revision under S. 115. Sir John Beaumont said at p. 142 ( of Ind App):(at p. 242 of AIR): There have been a very large number of decisions of Indian High Courts on S. 115 to many of which their Lordships have been referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observation that High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in a decision of a subordinate Court does not by itself involve that the subordinate Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under sub-s. (c), nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate Court- exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested a case for revision arises under subs. (a) or sub-s. (b) and sub-s. (c) can be ignored. The cases of Babu Ram v. Munnalal, 49 All 454 : (A I R 1927 All 358) and Hari Bhikaji v. Naro Vishvanath, ILR 9 Bom 432 may be mentioned as cases in which a subordinate Court by its own erroneous decision (erroneous that is, in view of the High Court). In the one case on a point of limitation and in the other on a question of resjudicata, invested itself with a jurisdiction which in law it did not possess; and the High Court held, wrongly their Lordships think, that it had no power to interfere in revision to prevent such a result, in the present case their Lordships are of the opinion that the High Court, on the view which it took that the loan was not a commercial loan had power to interfere in revision under sub-s. (b) of 5, 115. In Keshardeo Chamria v.Radha Kissen, 1953 S C R 136 : (A I R 1953 S C 23), both these judgments of the Privy Council as also the previous judgments in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 Ind App 237 (P C), and Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, 44 Ind App 261 : (A I R 1917 P C 71), were reviewed and it was held that S. 115, Civil P. C., applies to matters of jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it. Thus if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make the order it made and has not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affected the ultimate decision, then the High Court has no power to interfere. But it on the other hand it decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of interference under S. 115, Civil P. C., becomes operative. 20. The appellant also relied on Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Show and Bros., 1951 S C R 145 : (A I R 1951 S C 115), where this Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Esher in 1888-21Q BD 313, (supra) and Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan, (1874) 5 P C 417, 443, where Sir James Colville said : Accordingly the authorities..............,establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject matter is, it no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein and that the Court of Queens Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential has been erroneously found. But these observations can have no application to the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge whose jurisdiction in the present case is to be determined by the provisions of S. 5 (4) of the Act. And the power of the High Court to correct questions of jurisdiction is to be found within the four corners of S. 115, Civil P. C. If there is an error which falls within this section the High Court will have the power to interfere, not otherwise. 21. The only question to be decided in the instant case is as to whether the High Court had correctly interfered under S. 115, Civil P. C., with the order of the Civil Judge. As we have held above, at the instance of the landlord the suit was only maintainable if it was based on the inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was the date of the construction of the accommodation and if the Court wrongly decided that fact and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess, it exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell within the rule laid down by the Privy Council in 76 Ind App 131 : (A I R 1949 P-C 239), ( supra).The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided.The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946 and therefore fell within S. 3-A.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]17. The High Court, in our view, approached the question quite correctly when it stated that the question for determination was whether the accommodation had been constructed before or after 30th June 1946, and that it was constructed before that date the suit was incompetent and it after, the suit would lie. The contention raised by the appellant in this Court was that the decision of the trial Court as to whether the accommodation was constructed before or after 1st July 1946, cannot be challenged in revision in the High Court and he relied on the following observation of Lord Esher M. R., in theWhen an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the Jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction on finding that a does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for there will be none. In the second of two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdictionThese observations which relate to inferior Courts or tribunals with limited jurisdiction show that there are two classes of cases dealing with the power of such a tribunal (1) where the legislature entrusts a tribunal with the jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts on which the exercise of its jurisdiction depends exists and (2) where the legislature confers jurisdiction on such tribunals to proceed in a case where a certain state of facts exists or is shown to exist. The difference is that in the former case the tribunal has power to determine the facts giving it jurisdiction and in the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of facts exists. In the present case the appellant asked for a determination of reasonable annual rent under S. 3-A on the ground that the accommodation was constructed after 30th June 1946, and the House Allotment Officer therefore had power to determine the reasonable annual rent18. In order to give jurisdiction to the civil Court there had to be in existence a reasonable annual rent as defined under S. 2(f) whether it fell within its first two clauses or was determined under S. 3-A. The reasonable annual rent could be varied at the instance of the landlord or the tenant on the ground of its inadequacy or excess but the landlord could not bring a suit to vary the agreed rent nor could the Court entertain such a suit although it was open to the tenant to do so and the Court could at his instance entertain such a suit. The proceedings before the civil Court are not by way of an appeal from any order under S. 3-A made by the District Magistrate19. Section 115, Civil P. C., empowers the High Court, in cases where no appeal lies, to satisfy itself on three matters: (a) that the order made by the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise its jurisdiction; (c) that in exercising the jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally, that is, in breach of some provision of law or with material irregularity that is by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision.Per Sir John Beaumont in Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowment Board, Madras, 76 Ind App 67 at p. 73:(AIR 1949 P C 156 at p. 158).Therefore if an erroneous decision of a subordinate Court resulted in its exercising jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise the jurisdiction so vested or acting with material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction the case for the exercise of powers of revision by the High Court is made out.In Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhury, 76 Ind App 131 : (A I R 1949 P C 239) the subordinate Court gave an erroneous decision that the loan was a commercial loan and therefore refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by law and the Privy Council held that it was open to the High Court to interfere in revision under S. 115. Sir John Beaumont said at p. 142 ( of Ind App):(at p. 242 of AIR):There have been a very large number of decisions of Indian High Courts on S. 115 to many of which their Lordships have been referred. Some of such decisions prompt the observation that High Courts have not always appreciated that although error in a decision of a subordinate Court does not by itself involve that the subordinate Court has acted illegally or with material irregularity so as to justify interference in revision under sub-s. (c), nevertheless, if the erroneous decision results in the subordinate Court- exercising a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failing to exercise a jurisdiction so vested a case for revision arises under subs. (a) or sub-s. (b) and sub-s. (c) can be ignored. The cases of Babu Ram v. Munnalal, 49 All 454 : (A I R 1927 All 358)   and Hari Bhikaji v. Naro Vishvanath, ILR 9 Bom 432 may be mentioned as cases in which a subordinate Court by its own erroneous decision (erroneous that is, in view of the High Court). In the one case on a point of limitation and in the other on a question of resjudicata, invested itself with a jurisdiction which in law it did not possess; and the High Court held, wrongly their Lordships think, that it had no power to interfere in revision to prevent such a result, in the present case their Lordships are of the opinion that the High Court, on the view which it took that the loan was not a commercial loan had power to interfere in revision under sub-s. (b) of 5, 115In Keshardeo Chamria v.Radha Kissen, 1953 S C R 136 : (A I R 1953 S C 23), both these judgments of the Privy Council as also the previous judgments in Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, 11 Ind App 237 (P C), and Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, 44 Ind App 261 : (A I R 1917 P C 71), were reviewed and it was held that S. 115, Civil P. C., applies to matters of jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it. Thus if a subordinate court had jurisdiction to make the order it made and has not acted in breach of any provision of law or committed any error of procedure which is material and may have affected the ultimate decision, then the High Court has no power to interfere. But it on the other hand it decides a jurisdictional fact erroneously and thereby assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or deprives itself of jurisdiction so vested then the power of interference under S. 115, Civil P. C., becomes operative20. The appellant also relied on Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Show and Bros., 1951 S C R 145 : (A I R 1951 S C 115), where this Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Esher in 1888-21Q BD 313, (supra) andColonial Bank of Australia v. Willan, (1874) 5 P C 417, 443,where Sir James Colville said :Accordingly the authorities..............,establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject matter is, it no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein and that the Court of Queens Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however essential has been erroneously foundBut these observations can have no application to the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge whose jurisdiction in the present case is to be determined by the provisions of S. 5 (4) of the Act. And the power of the High Court to correct questions of jurisdiction is to be found within the four corners of S. 115, Civil P. C. If there is an error which falls within this section the High Court will have the power to interfere, not otherwise