Case: JOSEPH SHINE Vs. UNION OF INDIA

commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine. The action for committing suicide is also on account of mental disturbance caused by mental and physical cruelty. To constitute an offence under Section 306, the prosecution has to establish that a person has committed suicide and the suicide was abetted by the accused. The prosecution has to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased committed suicide and the accused abetted the commission of suicide. But for the alleged extra- marital relationship, which if proved, could be illegal and immoral, nothing has been brought out by the prosecution to show that the accused had provoked, incited or induced the wife to commit suicide. [Emphasis added] 51. In the context of Section 498-A, the Court, in Ghusabhai Raisangbhai Chorasiya v. State of Gujarat (2015) 11 SCC 753 , has opined that even if the illicit relationship is proven, unless some other acceptable evidence is brought on record to establish such high degree of mental cruelty, the Explanation (a) to Section 498-A IPC, which includes cruelty to drive the woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted. The relevant passage from the said authority is extracted below :- 21. …True it is, there is some evidence about the illicit relationship and even if the same is proven, we are of the considered opinion that cruelty, as envisaged under the first limb of Section 498-A IPC would not get attracted. It would be difficult to hold that the mental cruelty was of such a degree that it would drive the wife to commit suicide. Mere extra-marital relationship, even if proved, would be illegal and immoral, as has been said in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal, but it would take a different character if the prosecution brings some evidence on record to show that the accused had conducted in such a manner to drive the wife to commit suicide. In the instant case, the accused may have been involved in an illicit relationship with Appellant 4, but in the absence of some other acceptable evidence on record that can establish such high degree of mental cruelty, the Explanation to Section 498- A IPC which includes cruelty to drive a woman to commit suicide, would not be attracted. [Emphasis added] 52. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid authorities is to highlight how adultery has not been granted separate exclusive space in the context of Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. 53. In case of adultery, the law expects the parties to remain loyal and maintain fidelity throughout and also makes the adulterer the culprit. This expectation by law is a command which gets into the core of privacy. That apart, it is a discriminatory command and also a socio-moral one. Two individuals may part on the said ground but to attach criminality to the same is inapposite. 54. We may also usefully note here that adultery as a crime is no more prevalent in Peoples Republic of China, Japan, Australia, Brazil and many western European countries. The diversity of culture in those countries can be judicially taken note of. Non-criminalisation of adultery, apart from what we have stated hereinabove, can be proved from certain other facets. When the parties to a marriage lose their moral commitment of the relationship, it creates a dent in the marriage and it will depend upon the parties how they deal with the situation. Some may exonerate and live together and some may seek divorce. It is absolutely a matter of privacy at its pinnacle. The theories of punishment, whether deterrent or reformative, would not save the situation. A punishment is unlikely to establish commitment, if punishment is meted out to either of them or a third party. Adultery, in certain situations, may not be the cause of an unhappy marriage. It can be the result. It is difficult to conceive of such situations in absolute terms. The issue that requires to be determined is whether the said act should be made a criminal offence especially when on certain occasions, it can be the cause and in certain situations, it can be the result. If the act is treated as an offence and punishment is provided, it would tantamount to punishing people who are unhappy in marital relationships and any law that would make adultery a crime would have to punish indiscriminately both the persons whose marriages have been broken down as well as those persons whose marriages are not. A law punishing adultery as a crime cannot make distinction between these two types of marriages. It is bound to become a law which would fall within the sphere of manifest arbitrariness. 55. In this regard, another aspect deserves to be noted. The jurisprudence in England, which to a large extent, is adopted by this country has never regarded adultery as a crime except for a period of ten years in the reign of Puritanical Oliver Cromwell. As we see the international perspective, most of the countries have abolished adultery as a crime. We have already ascribed when such an act is treated as a crime and how it faces the frown of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Thinking of adultery from the point of view of criminality would be a retrograde step. This Court has travelled on the path of transformative constitutionalism and, therefore, it is absolutely inappropriate to sit in a time machine to a different era where the machine moves on the path of regression. Hence, to treat adultery as a crime would be unwarranted in law. 56. As we have held that Section 497 IPC is unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 CrPC which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional. When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision has to pave the same path.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]6. At this stage, one aspect needs to be noted. At the time of initial hearing before the three-Judge Bench, the decision in Yusuf Abdul Aziz (supra) was cited and the cited Law Report reflected that the judgment was delivered by four learned Judges and later on, it was noticed, as is reflectible from the Supreme Court Reports, that the decision was rendered by a Constitution Bench comprising of five Judges of this Court.7. The said factual discovery will not detain us any further. In Yusuf Abdul Aziz (supra), the Court was dealing with the controversy that had travelled to this Court while dealing with a different fact situation. In the said case, the question arose whether Section 497 contravened Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitutionf India. In the said case, the appellant was being prosecuted for adultery under Section 497 IPC. As soon as the complaint was filed, the husband applied to the High Court of Bombay to determine the constitutional question under Article 228 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench referring to Section 497 held thus:-3. Under Section 497 the offence of adultery can only be committed by a man but in the absence of any provision to the contrary the woman would be punishable as an abettor. The last sentence in Section 497 prohibits this. It runs— In such case the wif e shall not be punishable as an abettor. It is said that this offendsThe portion of Article 15 on which the appellant relies is this:The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of ... sexBut what he overlooks is that that is subject to clause (3) which runs—Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for womenThe provision complained of is a special provision and it is made for women, therefore it is saved by clause (3)4. It was argued that clause (3) should be confined to provisions which are beneficial to women and cannot be used to give them a licence to commit and abet crimes. We are unable to read any such restriction into the clause; nor are we able to agree that a provision which prohibits punishment is tantamount to a licence to commit the offence of which punishment has been prohibiteds general and must be read with the other provisions which set out the ambit of fundamental rights. Sex is a sound classification and although there can be no discrimination in general on that ground, the Constitution itself provides for special provisions in the case of women and children. The two articles read together validate the impugned clause in Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code6. The appellant is not a citizen of India. It was argued that he could not invokeArticles 14 and 15 for that reason. The High Court held otherwise. It is not necessary for us to decide this question in view of our decision on the other issue.On a reading of the aforesaid passages, it is manifest that the Court treated the provision to be a special provision made for women and, therefore, saved by clause (3) of Article 15. Thus, the Court proceeded on the foundation of affirmative action.8. In this context, we may refer to the observation made by the Constitution Bench in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community and another v. State of Maharashtra and another (2005) 2 SCC 673  while making a reference to a larger Bench. The said order reads thus:-12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the above said decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms:(1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength(2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted(3)The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (dead) by Lrs. etc., (1989) 2 SCC 754  and Hansoli Devi Union of IndiaAnr. v. Hansoli DeviOrs., (2002) 7 SCC 273 . n the light of the aforesaid order, it was necessary to list the matter before a Constitution Bench consisting of five Judges. As noted earlier, considering the manner in which we intend to deal with the matter, it is not necessary to refer to a larger Bench11. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision, it is clear that the husband of the woman has been treated to be a person aggrieved for the offences punishable under Sections 497 and 498 of the IPC. The rest of the proviso carves out an exception as to who is entitled to file a complaint when the husband is absent. It may be noted that the offence is non-cognizable.13. In Sowmithri Vishnu (supra), a petition preferred undere 32 of the Constitutiond the validity of Section 497 IPC. We do not intend to advert to the factual matrix. It was contended before the three-Judge Bench that Section 497 confers upon the husband the right to prosecute the adulterer but it does not confer any right upon the wife to prosecute the woman with whom her husband has committed adultery; that Section 497 does not confer any right on the wife to prosecute the husband who has committed adultery with another woman; and that Section 497 does not take in cases where the husband has sexual relations with an unmarried woman with the result that husbands have a free licence under the law to have extramarital relationships with unmarried women. That apart, the submission was advanced that Section 497 is a flagrant instance of gender discrimination, legislative despotism and male chauvinism. At first blush, it may appear as if it is a beneficial legislation intended to serve the interests of women but, on closer examination, it would be found that the provision contained in the section is a kind ofromantic paternalism which stems from the assumption that women, like chattels, are the property of men.14. The Court referred to the submissions and held thus:-…..The argument really comes to this that the definition should be recast by extending the ambit of the offence of adultery so that, both the man and the woman should be punishable for the offence of adultery. Were such an argument permissible, several provisions of the penal law may have to be struck down on the ground that, either in their definition or in their prescription of punishment, they do not go far enough. For example, an argument could be advanced as to why the offence of robbery should be punishable with imprisonment for ten years under Section 392 of the Penal Code but the offence of adultery should be punishable with a sentence of five years only: Breaking a matrimonial home is no less serious a crime than breaking open a house. Such arguments go to the policy of the law, not to its constitutionality, unless, while implementing the policy, any provision of the Constitution is infringed. We cannot accept that in defining the offence of adultery so as to restrict the class of offenders to men, any constitutional provision is infringed. It is commonly accepted that it is the man who is the seducer and not the woman. This position may have undergone some change over the years but it is for the Legislature to consider whether Section 497 should be amended appropriately so as to take note of the transformation which the society has undergone….Proceeding further, the three-Judge Bench held that the offence of adultery as defined in that Section can only be committed by a man, not by a woman. Indeed, the Section expressly provides that the wife shall not be punishable even as an abettor. No grievance can then be made that the Section does not allow the wife to prosecute the husband for adultery. The contemplation of the law, evidently, is that the wife, who is involved in an illicit relationship with another man, is a victim and not the author of the crime. The offence of adultery, as defined in Section 497, is considered by the Legislature as an offence against the sanctity of the matrimonial home, an act which is committed by a man, as it generally is. Therefore, those men who defile that sanctity are brought within the net of the law. In a sense, the same point is reverted to; who can prosecute whom for which offence depends, firstly, on the definition of the offence and, secondly, upon the restrictions placed by the law of procedure on the right to prosecute.15. The Court further held:-…..Since Section 497 does not contain a provision that she must be impleaded as a necessary party to the prosecution or that she would be entitled to be heard, the section is said to be bad. Counsel is right that Section 497 does not contain a provision for hearing the married woman with whom the accused is alleged to have committed adultery. But, that does not justify the proposition that she is not entitled to be heard at the trial. We have no doubt that if the wife makes an application in the trial court that she should be heard before a finding is recorded on the question of adultery, the application would receive due consideration from the court. There is nothing, either in the substantive or the adjectival criminal law, which bars the court from affording a hearing to a party, which is likely to be adversely affected, directly and immediately, by the decision of the court. In fact, instances are not unknown in criminal law where, though the prosecution is in the charge of the Public Prosecutor, the private complainant is given permission to oversee the proceedings. One step more, and the wife could be allowed a hearing before an adverse finding is recorded that, as alleged by her husband, the accused had committed adultery with her. The right of hearing is a concomitant of the principles of natural justice, though not in all situations. That right can be read into the law in appropriate cases. Therefore, the fact that a provision for hearing the wife is not contained in Section 497 cannot render that section unconstitutional as violating Article 21.After so stating, the Court placed reliance on Yusuf Abdul Aziz (supra) and held that the same does not offend Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution ans 14 and 15 of the Constitutiond opined that the stability of marriages is not an ideal to be scorned. Being of this view, the Court dismissed the petition.In Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others (2017) 9 SCC 1 , the majority speaking through Nariman, J., ruled thus :-60. Hard as we tried, it is difficult to discover any ratio in this judgment, as one part of the judgment contradicts another part. If one particular statutory enactment is already under challenge, there is no reason why other similar enactments which were also challenged should not have been disposed of by this Court. Quite apart from the above, it is a little difficult to appreciate such declination in the light of Prem Chand Garg (supra). This judgment, therefore, to the extent that it is contrary to at least two Constitution Bench decisions cannot possibly be said to be good law61. It is at this point that it is necessary to see whether a fundamental right has been violated by the 1937 Act insofar as it seeks to enforce Triple Talaq as a rule of law in the Courts in Indiaf India is a facet of equality of status and opportunity spoken of in the Preamble to the Constitution. The Article naturally divides itself into two parts- (1) equality before the law, and (2) the equal protection of the law. Judgments of this Court have referred to the fact that the equality before law concept has been derived from the law in the U.K., and the equal protection of the laws has been borrowed from the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America. In a revealing judgment, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, (1961) 1 SCR 14  at 34 further went on to state that whereas equality before law is a negative concept, the equal protection of the law has positive content. The early judgments of this Court referred to the discrimination aspect of Article 14, and evolved a rule by which subjects could be classified. If 347 the classification was in telligible having regard to the object sought to be achieved, it would pass muster unders anti- discrimination aspect. Again, Subba Rao, J., dissenting, in Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 SCR 353  at 395, warned that:50......Overemph asis on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the Article of its glorious contentHe referred to the doctrine of classification as a subsidia ry rule evolved by courts to give practical content to the said Article.63. In the pre-1974 era, the judgments of this Court did refer to the rule of law or positive aspect of Article 14, the concomitant of which is that if an action is found to be arbitrary and, therefore, unreasonable, it would negate the equal protection of the law contained in Article 14 and would be struck down on this ground. In S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, (1967) 2 SCR 703 , this Court held:In this context it is impor tant to emphasize that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, 348 discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. (See Dicey — Law of the Constitution — 10th Edn., Introduction cx). Law h as reached its finest moments, stated Douglas, J. in United States v. Wunderlick [342 US 98],9.....when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of some ruler…. Where discretion, is absolute, man has always suffered. It is in this sense that the rule of law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. Discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated it in classic terms in the case of John Wilkes [(1770) 4 Burr. 2528 at 2539],.....means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour : it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fancifulThis was in the context of service rules being seniority rules, which applied to the Income Tax Department, being held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 19. Thereafter, our learned brother referred to the authorities in State of Mysore v. S.R. Jayaram (1968) 1 SCR 349 , Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) Supp SCC 1, E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 , A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. (1984) 3 SCC 316 , Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722 , K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N. (1996) 2 SCC 226 and two other Constitution Bench judgments in Mithu v. State of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 277  and Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 494  and, eventually, came to hold thus:-It is, therefore, clear f rom a reading of even the aforesaid two Constitution Bench judgments that Article 14 has been referred to in the context of the constitutional invalidity of statutory law to show that such statutory law will be struck down if it is found to be arbitrary......The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14. 20. We respectfully concur with the said view.22. We may now proceed to test the provision on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles. On a reading of the provision, it is demonstrable that women are treated as subordinate to men inasmuch as it lays down that when there is connivance or consent of the man, there is no offence. This treats the woman as a chattel. It treats her as the property of man and totally subservient to the will of the master. It is a reflection of the social dominance that was prevalent when the penal provision was drafted.and the deeming definition of an aggrieved person, as we find, is absolutely and manifestly arbitrary as it does not even appear to be rational and it can be stated with emphasis that it confers a licence on the husband to deal with the wife as he likes which is extremely excessive and disproportionate. We are constrained to think so, as it does not treat a woman as an abettor but protects a woman and simultaneously, it does not enable the wife to file any criminal prosecution against the husband. Indubitably, she can take civil action but the husband is also entitled to take civil action. However, that does not save the provision as being manifestly arbitrary. That is one aspect of the matter. If the entire provision is scanned being Argus-eyed, we notice that on the one hand, it protects a woman and on the other, it does not protect the other woman. The rationale of the provision suffers from the absence of logicality of approach and, therefore, we have no hesitation in saying that it suffers from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution being manifestly arbitrary. 25. In Arun Kumar Agrawal and another v. National Insurance Company Limited and others (2010) 9 SCC 218 , the issue related to the criteria for determination of compensation payable to the dependents of a woman who died in road accident. She did not have a regular income. Singhvi, J. rejected the stand relating to determination of compensation by comparing a house wife to that of a house keeper or a servant or an employee who works for a fixed period. The learned Judge thought it unjust, unfair and inappropriate. In that context, the learned Judge stated:-26. In India the courts have recognised that the contribution made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. The gratuitous services rendered by the wife with true love and affection to the children and her husband and managing the household affairs cannot be equated with the services rendered by others. A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is in the constant attendance of the family throughout the day and night unless she is employed and is required to attend the employers work for particular hours. She takes care of all the requirements of the husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes, etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do the household work, such as cooking food, washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her husband and children.26. Ganguly, J., in his concurring opinion, referred to the Australian Family Property Law and opined that the said law had adopted a very gender sensitive approach. The learned Judge reproduced:-the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of a homemaker or parent.32. In Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 1 , one of us (Dipak Misra, J.), in his concurring opinion, stated that women have to be regarded as equal partners in the lives of men and it has to be borne in mind that they have equal role in the society, that is, in thinking, participating and leadership. The issue related to female foeticide and it was stated thus:-21 . When a female foeticide takes place, every woman who mothers the child must remember that she is killing her own child despite being a mother. That is what abortion would mean in social terms. Abortion of a female child in its conceptual eventuality leads to killing of a woman. Law prohibits it; scriptures forbid it; philosophy condemns it; ethics deprecate it, morality decries it and social science abhors it. Henrik Ibsen emphasised on the individualism of woman. John Milton treated her to be the best of all Gods work. In this context, it will be appropriate to quote a few lines from Democracy in America by Alexis de Tocqueville:If I were asked … to what the singular prosperity and growing strength of that people [Americans] ought mainly to be attributed, I should reply: To the superiority of their women22. At this stage, I may with profit reproduce two paragraphs from Ajit Savant Majagvai v. State of Karnataka (1997) 7 SCC 110 : (SCC pp. 113-14, paras 33. Social thinkers, philosophers, dramatists, poets and writers have eulogised the female species of the human race and have always used beautiful epithets to describe her temperament and personality and have not deviated from that path even while speaking of her odd behaviour, at times. Even in sarcasm, they have not crossed the literary limit and have adhered to a particular standard of nobility of language. Even when a member of her own species, Madame De Stael, remarked =I am glad that I am not a man; for then I should have to marry a woman, there was wit in it. When Shakespeare wrote, =Age cannot wither her; nor custom stale, her infinite variety, there again was wit. Notwithstanding that these writers have cried hoarse for respect for =woman, notwithstanding that Schiller said =Honour women! They entwine and weave heavenly roses in our earthly life and notwithstanding that the Mahabharata mentioned her as the source of salvation, crime against =woman continues to rise and has, today undoubtedly, risen to alarming proportions4. It is unfortunate that in an age where people are described as civilised, crime against „female is committed even when the child is in the womb as the „female foetus is often destroyed to prevent the birth of a female child. If that child comes into existence, she starts her life as a daughter, then becomes a wife and in due course, a mother. She rocks the cradle to rear up her infant, bestows all her love on the child and as the child grows in age, she gives to the child all that she has in her own personality. She shapes the destiny and character of the child. To be cruel to such a creature is unthinkable. To torment a wife can only be described as the most hated and derisive act of a human being.3. In Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar (1996) 5 SCC 125  this Court had stated that Indian women have suffered and are suffering discrimination in silence8. … Self-sacrifice and self-denial are their nobility and fortitude and yet they have been subjected to all inequities, indignities, inequality and discrimination. (SCC p. 148, para 28)24. The way women had suffered has been aptly reflected by an author who has spoken with quite a speck of sensibility:Dowry is an intractabl e disease for women, a bed of arrows for annihilating self-respect, but without the boon of wishful death25. Long back, Charles Fourier had stated:The extension of womens rights is the basic principle of all social progress26. Recapitulating from the past, I may refer to certain sayings in the Smritis which put women in an elevated position. This Court in Nikku Ram case 4 had already reproduced the first line of the shloka. The second line of the same which is also significant is as follows:Yatra tastu na pujyante sarvastatraphalah kriyahA free translation of the aforesaid is reproduced below:All the actions become unproductive in a place, where they are not treated with proper respect and dignity27. Another wise man of the past had his own way of putting it:Bhartr bhratr pitrijnati swasruswasuradevaraih Bandhubhisca striyah pujyah bhusnachhadanasnaihA free translation of the aforesaid is as follows:The women are to be respected equally on a par with husbands, brothers, fathers, relatives, in-laws and other kith and kin and while respecting, the women gifts like ornaments, garments, etc. should be given as token of honour28. Yet again, the sagacity got reflected in following lines:Atulam yatra tattejah sarvadevasarirajam Ekastham tadabhunnari vyaptalokatrayam tvisaA free translation of the aforesaid is reproduced below:The incomparable valour (effulgence) born from the physical frames of all the gods, spreading the three worlds by its radiance and combining together took the form of a woman29. From the past, I travel to the present and respectfully notice what Lord Denning had to say about the equality of women and their role in the society:A woman feels as keenly, thinks as clearly, as a man. She in her sphere does work as useful as man does in his. She has as much right to her freedom — to develop her personality to the full as a man. When she marries, she does not become the husbands servant but his equal partner. If his work is more important in life of the community, hers is more important of the family. Neither can do without the other. Neither is above the other or under the other. They are equals.36. We have referred to the aforesaid as we are of the view that there cannot be a patriarchal monarchy over the daughter or, for that matter, husbands monarchy over the wife. That apart, there cannot be a community exposition of masculine dominance.37. Having stated about the dignity of a woman, in the context of autonomy, desire, choice and identity, it is obligatory to refer to the recent larger Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy and another v. Union of India and others (2017) 10 SCC 1  which, while laying down that privacy is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, lays immense stress on the dignity of an individual. In the said judgment, it has been held:-108. Over the last four decades, our constitutional jurisprudence has recognised the inseparable relationship between protection of life and liberty with dignity. Dignity as a constitutional value finds expression in the Preamble. The constitutional vision seeks the realisation of justice (social, economic and political); liberty (of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship); equality (as a guarantee against arbitrary treatment of individuals) and fraternity (which assures a life of dignity to every individual). These constitutional precepts exist in unity to facilitate a humane and compassionate society. The individual is the focal point of the Constitution because it is in the realisation of individual rights that the collective well-being of the community is determined. Human dignity is an integral part of the Constitution. Reflections of dignity are found in the guarantee against arbitrariness (Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right to life and personal liberty (Article 21)119. To live is to live with dignity. The draftsmen of the Constitution defined their vision of the society in which constitutional values would be attained by emphasising, among other freedoms, liberty and dignity. So fundamental is dignity that it permeates the core of the rights guaranteed to the individual by Part III. Dignity is the core which unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve for each individual the dignity of existence