Case: Gwalior Rayons Silk Manufacturing (Wvg) Company Limited Vs. Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat and Another

Act, 1949 (the MPPF Act) applied immediately before the appointed day; the second concerned is in relation to the remaining areas in the State of Kerala. The definition of private forest as is applicable to the Malabar district is not general in terms but limited to the areas and lands to which the MPPF Act applied and exempts therefrom lands described under sub-clauses (A) to (D). This significant reference to MPPF Act in the definition of private forest in the Vesting Act makes all the difference in the case. The MPPF Act was a special enactment. It was enacted by the erstwhile Madras State to preserve the private forests in the district of Malabar and erstwhile South Kannara District. The scheme of that Act has been explained by several decisions of the Kerala High Court and that scheme appears to be that if the land is shown to be private forest on the date on which the MPPF Act came into force, it would continue to be a forest, even if there was subsequent replantation. 10. It is not in dispute that the lands involved in this appeal were all forests as defined in the MPPF Act, 1949 and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971. In Malankara case this Court was not concerned with the lands covered by the MPPF Act, and denuded thereafter of forest growth and cultivated with fresh replantation. Therefore, it seems inappropriate to transplant the meaning accorded to private forest from the KLR Act to the Vesting Act. That wide concept cannot fit into the new legal source. 11. In State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. this Court while upholding the constitutional validity of the Vesting Act has observed that the forest lands in the State of Kerala has attained a peculiar character owing to the geography and climate and the evidence available showed that the vast areas of these forests are still capable of supporting large agricultural plantations. That much is clear from the following observations :(SCR p. 683 : SCC p. 726, para 30) "It is, therefore, manifest that when the legislature stated in the preamble that the private forests are agricultural lands, they merely wanted to convey that they are lands which by and large could be prudently and profitably exploited for agricultural purposes." * 12. There is thus a judicial recognition of the distinction between private forest in Travancore-Cochin area in Kerala State and the private forest in Malabar district. This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant. 13. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act.Garden means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same.Nilam means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit-bearing trees. It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term agricultural crop in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It may be significant to note that the legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have "associations, echoes and over-tones". While construing such words, judges must, as Felix Frankfurther, J., said "retain the associations, hear the echoes and capture the overtones" (at p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C) "any other agricultural crop" are quit wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptus plantations. 14. It is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1), private forests vest in government. Sub-clause (2) however, excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for this purpose "includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species". The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of trees, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-clause (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause (C). the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause (C) would have been in a different language. 15. In our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees. 16. This is also the conclusion of the High Court not only in the impugned judgment under appeal but also in the subsequent two decisions; Malayalam Plantation Limited and K. C. Moosa Haji cases.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]13. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act.Garden means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same.Nilam means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit-bearing trees. It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term agricultural crop in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-bearing or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It may be significant to note that the legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have "associations, echoes and over-tones". While construing such words, judges must, as Felix Frankfurther, J., said "retain the associations, hear the echoes and capture the overtones" (at p. 414). When so examined and construed, we do not discover any indication that the words in sub-clause (C) "any other agricultural crop" are quit wide enough to comprehend all species of trees including eucalyptusIt is said, indeed rightly, that in seeking legislative intention, judges not only listen to the voice of the legislature but also listen attentively to what the legislature does not say. Let us compare the wordings in Section 3 with those of sub-clause (C). Under Section 3 sub-section (1), private forests vest in government. Sub-clause (2) however, excludes from such vesting lands within the ceiling limits applicable to an owner if they are under his personal cultivation. Cultivation for this purpose "includes cultivation of trees or plants of any species". The explanation to sub-section (2) makes this aspect beyond doubt. The lands used for the cultivation of any kind of trees, fruit-bearing or yielding only timber or pulp are not vested under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-section (2). The legislature has thus excluded from vesting under Section 3 sub-clause (2) the trees of every variety. But while providing for exclusion under sub-clause (C). the legislature could not have again thought of trees or plants of all kinds. It seems to have considered only fruit-bearing trees and not of other species. If the intention was otherwise, the sub-clause (C) would have been in a differentIn our view as a matter of pure construction untrammelled by authority, the words used in the latter part of sub-clause (C) could not take within its fold all varieties of trees and it could exclude only fruit-bearing trees