Case: State Of Assam And Another Vs. Deva Prasad Barua &amp; Another

(2) of the Act on the respondents and therefore the reasoning of the High Court was based on an erroneous assumption that no such notice had been served. According to him in the return filed in the High Court it had been clearly asserted that such notices had been issued followed by reminders. No counter-affidavit, however, had been filed by the respondents in the High Court contradicting the statement in the return. Counsel further points out that the statement in the judgment of the High Court "but it is not disputed that the notices under Section 19 (2) of the Act had not, in fact, been serve on the petitioners", is based on some misunderstanding or misapprehension. The counsel for the appellant did not make any concession on the point before the High Court and at the earliest opportunity, in the petition which was filed for leave under Article 133 of the Constitution, this matter was raised and the same assertions which were made in the return were reiterated. It seems to us that it is futile to go into this question because (a) it is substantially a question of fact and (b) the present appeal can be decided on another ground which arises out of the second contention raised before us. On the admitted fact that the general notice under Section 19 (1) was published and that a return was filed by the respondents in respect of each of the two assessment years in question it is not possible to see how Section 30 would become applicable at all. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 says in categorical terms that if any person has not furnished a return within the time allowed by or under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) he may furnish a return at any time before the assessment is made and any return so made shall be deemed to be made in due time under the section . In The Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay v. Ranchhodddas Karsondas, Bombay, (1960) 1 SCR 114 = (AIR 1959 SC 1154 ) a public notice under Section 22 (1) of the Income-tax Act was published on May 1, 1945. On January 5, 1950 the assessee submitted a voluntary return showing an income of Rs. 1,935 for the assessment year 1945-46 and added a footnote to his return that his wife had sold her old ornaments and deposited a sum of Rs. 59,026 with some syndicate in which he was a partner. The Income-tax Officer ignored the voluntary return and in February 1950 issued a notice under Section 34 (1) of that Act pursuant to which the assessee submitted a return in March, 1950. The Income-tax Officer made the assessment in February 1951 including the sum of Rs. 59,026 in the total income of the assessee. The assessee contended that the assessment was invalid as it was completed more than four years after the end of the assessment year in violation of Sec. 34 (1) (b). The department contended that the voluntary return was not return as it did not disclose any taxable income and the assessment was valid under the proviso to Section 34 (3). It was held that the voluntary return filed by the assessee even though it did not disclose any taxable income was a good return. As such no question arose under Section 34 (1) of income escaping assessment and the Income-tax Officer was not justified in issuing a notice under Section 34 (1) of The assessment which was therefore made purusant to the notice under that Section was barred by time, having been made beyond the period prescribed.The principle which has been settled by this decision is that where a voluntary return has been filed pursuant to a general notice even after the expiry of the period mentioned in that notice, the Income-tax Officer must proceed to assess the income by taking up that return. He cannot ignore that return and save on the assessee a notice under the provisions relating to escaped income which was Section 34 in the Income-tax Act.This view also finds support from the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. S. Raman Chettiar, (1965) 1 SCR 883 = (AIR 1965 SC 1031 ) in which it was laid down, inter alia that Section 22 (3) of the Income-tax Act 1922 permitted an assessee to furnish a return at any time before the assessment was made, namely, before the time mentioned in Section 34 (3) of that Act. In the present case it is not disputed and cannot indeed be disputed that if the words "at any time" in sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act have not to be limited to the year of assessment as has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the present case would be governed by the principles laid down by this Court in the above decisions. It has been urged that the words "at any time" should be given a limited meaning and should be confined to the year of assessment, namely, that the return should be made at any time within the year of assessment and not later in which case sub-section (3) would not apply and the provision of Sec. 30 would be at once attracted.This contention has only to be stated to be rejected. In the first place if sub-section (3) has to be read in the manner suggested it would become ambiguous and almost unintelligible. Secondly according to the ordinary canons of interpretation the words employed must be given their proper and plain meaning. Moreover Section 19 is in pari material with Section 22 of the Income-tax Act and the law which has been laid down by this Court, which interpreting the provisions of that Section must govern the construction of the provisions of Section 19 as well.The High Court in giving the reasons on which the petitions were allowed was not alive to all these matters and the view taken by it is clearly unsustainable.6.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The counsel for the appellant did not make any concession on the point before the High Court and at the earliest opportunity, in the petition which was filed for leave under Article 133 of the Constitution, this matter was raised and the same assertions which were made in the return were reiterated. It seems to us that it is futile to go into this question because (a) it is substantially a question of fact and (b) the present appeal can be decided on another ground which arises out of the second contention raised before us. On the admitted fact that the general notice under Section 19 (1) was published and that a return was filed by the respondents in respect of each of the two assessment years in question it is not possible to see how Section 30 would become applicable at all. Sub-section (3) of Section 19 says in categorical terms that if any person has not furnished a return within the time allowed by or under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) he may furnish a return at any time before the assessment is made and any return so made shall be deemed to be made in due time under thethe present case it is not disputed and cannot indeed be disputed that if the words "at any time" in sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Act have not to be limited to the year of assessment as has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, the present case would be governed by the principles laid down by this Court in the above decisions.It has been urged that the words "at any time" should be given a limited meaning and should be confined to the year of assessment, namely, that the return should be made at any time within the year of assessment and not later in which case) would not apply and the provision of Sec. 30 would be at oncecontention has only to be stated to be rejected. In the first place if sub-section (3) has to be read in the manner suggested it would become ambiguous and almost unintelligible. Secondly according to the ordinary canons of interpretation the words employed must be given their proper and plain meaning. Moreover Section 19 is in pari material with Section 22 of the Income-tax Act and the law which has been laid down by this Court, which interpreting the provisions of that Section must govern the construction of the provisions of Section 19 as well.The High Court in giving the reasons on which the petitions were allowed was not alive to all these matters and the view taken by it is clearly unsustainable.