Case: The State Of Bihar &amp; Others Vs. Sm. Charusila Dasi

expressed by Lord Selborne:"Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily resident within the territory while they are within it; but it does not follow them after they have withdrawn from it, and when they are living in another independent country. . .. . . .. . . .. In a personal action, to which none of these causes of jurisdiction apply, a decree pronounced in absentem by a foreign Court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not in any way submitted himself, is by international law an absolute nullity."The decision in ILR (1939) 1 Cal 462: (AIR 1939 Cal 648 ) proceeded on a construction of S. 70 of the Bengal Wakf Act which also had a section similar to S. 3 of the Act. Section 70 of the Bengal Wakf Act required notice to the Commissioner of Wakfs before any wakf property could be sold and the question was whether a court in Assam was under any obligation to send such a notice. It was held that the Bengal Act did not apply to Assam and S. 70 stood in a different category from the other sections of the Bengal Act. The ratio of the decision was thus explained:"So far as the status of the Commissioner is concerned, it is conferred by the Bengal Act to operate even outside the province. Therefore, the Commissioner may bring suits under S. 72 or S. 73 of the Bengal Act in courts outside the province. But S. 70 lies in a different category, because it imposes an obligation on the court to issue notice to the Commissioner in certain circumstances. . . . . .. . . . . Section 70 (1) refers to a suit or proceeding in respect of any wakf property, etc., and if this wakf property is situated outside the province, so that the court having jurisdiction over it is also outside the province, then the Act cannot operate beyond its extent, that is to say outside the province of Bengal."The decision in ILR 1948-2 Cal 455 : (AIR 1948 Cal 322), and the decision in AIR 1954 Pat 164 - both related to the interpretation. of some of the provisions of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act (U. P. Act 25 of 1934). In the former case the limited question for decision was if the decree-holder under a decree of the Original Side of the Calcutta High Court was precluded from executing the decree by reason of certain proceedings which had taken place before the Special Judge, Benaras under the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act, 1934. The answer given was that the decree-holder was not so precluded and the decision proceeded on a construction of S. 18 of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act, 1934 read with Ss. 7, 13 and 14 (7) of that Act. It was held that the exclusive jurisdiction intended to be conferred on the Special Judge in supersession of those of civil and revenue courts extended, as indicated by S. 7, only over debts enforceable through the courts within the province and the word "creditor" in S. 10 must be limited to those of them who would have to enforce their rights through such courts alone. In the Patna case the question for decision was if S. 14 (7) of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934 should be construed to mean that the decree of a Special Judge is to be deemed to be the decree of a civil court of competent jurisdiction even beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the State Legislature. It was held that the decree passed by the Special Judge of Banaras had not the effect of a decree of a civil court outside the territorial limits of the United Provinces and the Subordinate Judge of Purnea in Bihar had no jurisdiction to execute such a decree or to direct that the properties of a judgment - debtor in Purnea should be attached in execution of the decree. As we have said earlier, these decisions relate to an altogether different problem, namely, the proper construction of certain sections of the Bengal Wakfs Act or of the United Provinces Encumbered Estates Act. The problem before us is of a more general nature and the aforesaid decisions are no authorities for the solution of that problem.16. There is a decision of this Court to which our attention has been drawn (Petition No. 234 of 1953 decided on 18-3-1953). A similar problem arose in that case where the head of a math situate in Banaras made an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Charity Commissioner of that State directing them to forbear from enforcing against the petitioner the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 on the ground inter alia that the Bombay Act could have no application to the math situate in Banaras or to any of the properties or places of worship appurtenant to that math. In the course of the hearing of the petition the learned Attorney General who appeared for the State of Bombay made it clear that there was no intention on the part of the Government of Bombay or the Charity Commissioner to apply the provisions of the Bombay Act to any math or religious institution situated outside the state territory. The learned Attorney General submitted that the Bombay Act could be made applicable, if at all, to any place of religious instruction or worship which is a appurtenant to the math and is actually with the State territory. In view of these submissions no decision was given on the point urged. The case cannot, therefore, be taken as a final decision of the question in issue before us.17. For the reasons which we have already given the Act applies to the Charusila Trust which is in Bihar and its provisions cannot be struck down on the ground of extra-territoriality.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We have held therein that the provisions of the Act do not take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by that Part. In Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 in which also judgment has been pronounced today (Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, AIR l959 SC 951), we have considered the definition clause in S. 2 (1) of the Act and come to the conclusion that the Act does not apply to private endowments, and have further explained therein the essential distinction in Hindu law between private and public religious trusts We do not wish to repeat what we have said in those two decisions; but in the light of the observations made therein, thetwo questions which fall for decision in this appeal are(1) if on a true construction of the trust deed datedthe Charusila Trust is a private endowment created for the worship of a family idol in which the public are not interested, as found by the High Court and (2) if the answer to the first question is in the negative, does the Act apply by reason of S. 3 thereof to trust properties which are situate outside the State of Bihar.We say this with respect, but we consider that the learned Judges of the High Court have failed to give to several material clauses of the trust deed their due weight and these have an important bearing on the question in issue. It is true that the settlor said that she had installed the deity Iswar Srigopal in her house and she had been regularly worshipping the deity since such installation; if the trust had been created only for the purpose of continuing such family worship, the conclusion would no doubt be that the endowment was wholly of a private character in which the public had no interest. That was not, however, what was done. The settlor created the trust for the construction of two temples, in one of which was to be installed the deity Iswar Srigopal and in the other the marble image of her preceptor; the trustees consisted of persons three of whom were strangers to the family, though the settlor reserved to herself the power to remove in her absolute discretion any one or more of the trustees for misconduct by reason of change of religion etc. One of the relevant considerations is if by the trust deed any right of worship has been given to the public or any section of the public answering a particularour opinion, the answer to the question must be in the affirmative.It is to be remembered that with regard to an interest under a trust the beneficiaries only right is to have the trust duly administered according to its terms and this right can normally be enforced only at the place where the trust or religious institution is situate or at the trustees place of residence; see Diceys Conflict of Laws, 7th edition, p. 506. The Act purports to do nothing more. Its aim, as recited in the preamble, is to provide for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection of properties appertaining thereto. This aim is sought to be achieved by exercising control over the trustees in personam. The trust being situate in Bihar the State has legislative power over it and also over its trustees or their servants and agents who must be in Bihar to administer the trust. Therefore, there is really no question of the Act havingoperation.In any case, the circumstance that the temples where the deities are installed are situate in Bihar, that the hospital and charitable dispensary are to be established in Bihar for the benefit of the Hindu public in Bihar gives enough territorial connection to enable the legislature of Bihar to make a law with respect to such a trust. This Court has applied the doctrine of territorial connection or nexus tolegislation, sales tax legislation and also to legislation imposing a tax on gambling.In Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 452   at p. 461, the earlier cases were reviewed and it was pointed out that sufficiency of the territorial connection involved a consideration of two elements, namely, (a) the connection must be real and not illusory and (b) the liability sought to be imposed must be pertinent to that connection. It cannot be disputed that if the religious endowment is itself situated in Bihar and the trustees function there, the connection between the religious institution and the property appertaining thereto is real and not illusory; indeed, the religious institution and the property appertaining thereto form one integrated whole and one cannot be dissociated from the other. If, therefore, any liability is imposed on the trustees, such liability must affect the trust property.It is true that in the Tata Iron and Steel Co.s case, AIR 1958 SC 452   at p. 461, this Courtis not necessary for us on this occasion to lay down any broad proposition as to whether the theory of nexus, as a principle of legislation is applicable to all kinds of legislation. It will be enough for disposing of the point now under consideration, to say that this Court has found no apparent reason to confine its application tolegislation but has extended it to sales tax and to tax ondo not see any reason why the principles which were followed in State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala, 1957 SCR 874  : ((S) AIR 1957 SC 699  ), should not be followed in the present case. In R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalas case, 1957 SCR 874  : (AIR 1957 SC 699  ), it was found that the respondent who was the organiser of a prize competition was outside the State of Bombay; the paper through which the prize competition was conducted was printed and published outside the State of Bombay, but it had a wide circulation in the State of Bombay and it was found that "all the activities which the gambler is ordinarily expected to undertake" took place mostly, if not entirely, in the State of Bombay. These circumstances, it was held, constituted a sufficient territorial nexus which entitled the State of Bombay to impose a tax on the gambling that took place within its boundaries and the law could not be struck down on the ground ofWe proceed now to consider some of the decisions on which learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance. These are (1) Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, 21 Ind App 171 at p. 185 (PC); (2) Commissioner of Wakfs, Bengal v. Narasingh Chandra Daw and Co., ILR (1939) 1 Cal 462: (AIR 1939 Cal 648  ); (3) Madangopal Bagla v. Lachmidas, ILR (1948)2 Cal 455: (AIR 1948 Cal 322) and (4) Maharaj Kishore Khanna v. Raja Ram Singh, AIR 1954 Pat 164  . Those decisions, in our opinion, are not in point, as they related to different problems altogether. In Sirdar Gurdyal Singhs case, 21 Ind App 171(PC), a Faridkote court passed an ex parte money decree against a defendant who had been a treasurer of Faridkote, but who at the time of suit had ceased to be such and was resident in Jhind of which State he was a domiciled subject; it was held that the decree was a nullity by international law.There is a decision of this Court to which our attention has been drawn (Petition No. 234 of 1953 decided onA similar problem arose in that case where the head of a math situate in Banaras made an application under Art. 32 of the Constitution for a writ in the nature of mandamus against the State of Bombay and the Charity Commissioner of that State directing them to forbear from enforcing against the petitioner the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 on the ground inter alia that the Bombay Act could have no application to the math situate in Banaras or to any of the properties or places of worship appurtenant to thatview of these submissions no decision was given on the point urged. The case cannot, therefore, be taken as a final decision of the question in issue before us.17. For the reasons which we have already given the Act applies to the Charusila Trust which is in Bihar and its provisions cannot be struck down on the ground of