Case: Sahib Ram Etc Vs. The Financial Commissioner, Punjab &amp; Others

any such limitation into cl. (i). Clause (iii) dealing with the third category of tenants admittedly relates to a tenant evicted from the property even before the date of the Act and who was not in possession on the day when the Act came into force. But, nevertheless, if such tenants had been in continuous possession for six years at the time of their ejectment which must be before the date of the Act, they are entitled to purchase the property, but that right must be exercised within a period of one year from the date of the commencement of the Act. If Mr. Iyengars contention that the tenants in category (i) should have completed the continuous period of six years on the date of the Act, is correct such tenants and tenants coming under category (iii) will be on a par in that both would have completed their period of six years before the date of the Act. Nevertheless in the case of tenants coming under category (iii), Legislature has specifically stated that they must exercise their right of purchase within a period of one year from the date of the Act whereas in the case of tenants coming under cl. (i) they could exercise the right at any time ; This itself clearly indicates that the tenants coming under category (i) are entirely different from the tenants coming under category (iii If both types of tenants coming under clause (i) and clause (iii) stand on the same footing the position would be that both would have completed the period of continuous occupation of six years prior to the Act and the Legislature would have provided that both should exercise the right of purchase within a period of one year. The distinction made regarding the period within which these two categories can exercise their right, clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature to the contrary. It stands to reason that the tenants coming under clauses (i) and (ii) who are in actual possession of the land have been given the option either to continue as tenants and pay rent or to exercise their right to purchase the land at any time. There is no question in their case of there being any timelag or doubt because, being in possession no other persons right will normally be affected; whereas in the case of a tenant coming under cl. (iii), he has already gone out of the land and therefore the Legislature has specifically provided a very short period of one year from the date of the Act for exercising, if he so chooses, his right to purchase the land provided he satisfies the other conditions mentioned in the section. The Legislature did not want the position to be kept nebulous and doubtful in respect of such a person who was not in possession as a tenant on the date of the Act. While coming to a tenant who satisfies the requirements of cl. (iii) of S. 18 (1) the Legislature has taken care to see that those types of tenants are made to take a decision to purchase the land within the shortest possible time so that other peoples rights may not be jeopardized.32. Nor is there any warrant for the contention of Mr. Iyengar that the person who claims the right under cl. (i) should have been a tenant on April 15, 1953. So far as we could see, there is no prohibition under the Act placing any restriction against the right of the landowner creating new tenancies after the date of the Act. In fact the second proviso to S. 9-A clearly indicates to the contrary. It deals with the contingency of tenancy coming into force after the commencement of the Act.33. Section 18 (1) (i) gives a right to a tenant to purchase the land; and that right has to be examined when an application under Section 18 is made and cannot be denied on the ground that he was not a tenant for more than six years on April 15, l953. There is no limitation placed under d (i) of Section 18 (l) that the tenant who exercises his right should be a tenant on the date of the Act or that he should have completed the period of six years on April 15, 1953 and there is no warrant for reading in Section 18 (1) (i) clauses which it does not contain. It is enough if the continuous period of six years has been completed on the date when the tenant files the application for purchase of the land.34. We were referred to three decisions: Ganpat v. Jagmal, (1963) 65 Pun LR 652; Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, ILR (1967) 2 Punj and Har 120, and Mam Raj v. State of Punjab, ILR {1969) 2 Punj and Har 680 = (AIR 1970 Punj and Har 23). In the first decision the question was whether a transfer by a landowner in excess of the reserved area has to be ignored when the rights of a tenant under section 18 are being considered. In the second and third decisions the question was whether an order for purchase passed in favour of a tenant under Section 18 can be ignored by the Collector when exercising his functions under Section 10-A of the Act. In none of the decisions the points now decided by us came up for consideration directly and therefore it is not necessary to deal with those decisions in detail.35. To conclude we are of opinion -that in order to claim a right of purchase as against the landowner under Section 18 (1) (i) of the Act, the minimum period of six years should have been completed at the time when the application for purchase by the tenant is made and it is not necessary that he should have been a tenant of the land on April 15, 1953. Provided the other conditions are satisfied, such a tenant will be entitled to purchase the land.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]29. In our opinion, having due regard to the scheme of the Act, there is no warrant for importing any such restriction in Section 18 (l) of the Act If the intention of the Legislature was that the tenant under S. 18 (1) (i) should have been in continuous occupation for a minimum period of six years on the date of the Act, it would have been specifically so provided for in the said clause.