Case: Rajendra Jha Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, District

the proceedings. And, it is thereafter that the appellant filed an application in the Labour Court contending that the employers should not be allowed to lead evidence.7. Thus, the order passed by the Labour Court allowing the employers to lead evidence has been accepted and acted upon by the appellant. He has already given a list of his own witnesses and has cross-examined the witnesses whose evidence was led by the employers. It would be wrong, at this stage, to undo what has been done in pursuance of the order of the Labour Court. Besides, the challenge made by the appellant to the order of the Labour Court has failed and the order of the Patna High Court dismissing the appellant s writ petition has become final.In order to get over these difficulties, it is urged by the appellant that there can be no estoppel against law and therefore, it is open to him to argue even at this stage that the Labour Court ought not to have passed the particular order. In support of this contention reliance is placed by the appellant on two judgments of this Court.8. In Chitturi Subbanna v. Kudapapa Subbanna, it was held by the majority that pure questions of law, not dependent on the determination of any questions of fact, should be allowed to be raised for the first time even at later stages of a litigation.9. In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, this Court held that the question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If, by an erroneous decision, the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does not possess its decision cannot operate as res judicata between the parties. In this regard, the Court made a distinction between the decision of a question of fact and the decision of a question as regard the jurisdiction of the Court. In so far as question of fact are concerned, the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment while determining the application of the rule of res judicata. Where, however, the question is purely of law and relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or where the decision of the Court sanctions something which is illegal, the party affected by that decision will not be precluded by the rule of res judicata from challenging the validity of the earlier decision. The reason is, that the rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.10. We do not consider that either of these decisions can help the appellant. A question of law which does not require fresh investigation into facts may be allowed to be raised at a later stage of a proceeding but, that is subject to the qualification that the question is not concluded by a decision between the same parties. In this case, the question as to whether the Labour Court was right in giving an opportunity to the employers to lead evidence, is not being raised by the appellant for the first time in this Court. It was raised by him in the writ petition which he had filed in the Patna High Court and that writ petition was dismissed. In so far as the question of res judicata is concerned, if an erroneous decision on a question of law is rendered by a Court by assuming jurisdiction which it does not possess, it may be possible to argue that the decision cannot operate as res judicata even between the same parties. But, in the case before us, the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to decide whether to allow the employers to lead evidence or not. It may have acted irregularly in the exercise of that jurisdiction but that is to be distinguished from cases in which the Court inherently lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding or to pass a particular order. Besides, as we have stated earlier, though it would be true to say that the employers did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence simultaneously with the filing of the application under section 33(2) (b) of the Act, it is not possible to hold on the basis of the data placed before us that they asked for such an opportunity after the proceedings had terminated. What seems to have happened is that the application filed by the employers under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act was taken up for consideration first. When the hearing of that application was nearing completion, but before the final orders were passed therein, the employers asked for an opportunity to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The Labour Court disposed of both the matters together by a common judgment which is dated November 16, 1976. It held by one and the same order that the departmental inquiry was vitiated but that the employers should be allowed to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The appellants contention that the employers did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence at all and that the Labour Court acted gratuitously is not possible to accept. Thus, in passing the order allowing the employers to lead evidence, the Labour Court cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction.For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal and hold that the employers may lead evidence to justify the order whereby the appellant was dismissed from service on March 1, 1975. There will be no order as to costs.11. A longtime has gone by since the appellant was dismissed. Nine years is frightful delay. A large part of that period was wasted in dealing with several obstacles raised by the appellant himself in the disposal of the matter, including the allegations which he made against the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. Twice , he obtained orders staying further proceedings in the Labour Court: once from the High Court in Writ Petition No. 336 of 1976 and then in this appeal. A

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. We do not consider that either of these decisions can help the appellant. A question of law which does not require fresh investigation into facts may be allowed to be raised at a later stage of a proceeding but, that is subject to the qualification that the question is not concluded by a decision between the same parties.In this case, the question as to whether the Labour Court was right in giving an opportunity to the employers to lead evidence, is not being raised by the appellant for the first time in this Court.It was raised by him in the writ petition which he had filed in the Patna High Court and that writ petition was dismissed. In so far as the question of res judicata is concerned, if an erroneous decision on a question of law is rendered by a Court by assuming jurisdiction which it does not possess, it may be possible to argue that the decision cannot operate as res judicata even between the same parties. But, in the case before us, the Labour Court had the jurisdiction to decide whether to allow the employers to lead evidence or not. It may have acted irregularly in the exercise of that jurisdiction but that is to be distinguished from cases in which the Court inherently lacks the jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding or to pass a particular order. Besides, as we have stated earlier, though it would be true to say that the employers did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence simultaneously with the filing of the application under section 33(2) (b) of the Act, it is not possible to hold on the basis of the data placed before us that they asked for such an opportunity after the proceedings had terminated. What seems to have happened is that the application filed by the employers under section 33 (2) (b) of the Act was taken up for consideration first. When the hearing of that application was nearing completion, but before the final orders were passed therein, the employers asked for an opportunity to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The Labour Court disposed of both the matters together by a common judgment which is dated November 16, 1976. It held by one and the same order that the departmental inquiry was vitiated but that the employers should be allowed to lead evidence to justify the order of dismissal. The appellants contention that the employers did not ask for an opportunity to lead evidence at all and that the Labour Court acted gratuitously is not possible to accept. Thus, in passing the order allowing the employers to lead evidence, the Labour Court cannot be said to have acted without jurisdiction.For these reasons, we dismiss this appeal and hold that the employers may lead evidence to justify the order whereby the appellant was dismissed from service on March 1, 1975. There will be no order as to costs.11. A longtime has gone by since the appellant was dismissed. Nine years is frightful delay. A large part of that period was wasted in dealing with several obstacles raised by the appellant himself in the disposal of the matter, including the allegations which he made against the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court. Twice , he obtained orders staying further proceedings in the Labour Court: once from the High Court in Writ Petition No. 336 of 1976 and then in this