Case: Veruareddi Ramaraghava Reddy And Ors Vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy And 2 Ors

its own interests, they are not entitled to recover possession of the property improperly alienated by the Shebait, but they can be granted a declaratory decree that the alienation is not binding on the deity, (See for example, Kalyana Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar, ILR 40 Mad 212 : (AIR 1917 Mad 112 (FB)) and Chidambaranatha Thambiran v. Nallasiva Mudaliar, ILR 41 Mad 124 : (AIR 1918 Mad 464 ).It has also been decided by the Judicial Committee in Abdur Rehim v. Mahomed Barkat Ali, 55 Ind App 96: (AIR 1928 PC 16 ) that a suit for a declaration that property belongs to a wakf can be maintained by Mahomedans interested in the wakf without the sanction of the Advocate-General, and a declaration can be given in such a suit that the plaintiff is not bound by the compromise decree relating to wakf properties. 11. In our opinion, S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the Section. It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of S. 41 of the Specific Relief Act. 12. The next question presented for determination in this case is whether the compromise decree is invalid for the reason that the Commissioner did not represent the deity. The High Court has taken the view that the Commissioner could not represent the deity because S. 20 of the Hindu Religions and Charitable Endowments Act provided only that the administration of all the endowments shall be under the superintendence and control of the Commissioner. Mr. Babula Reddy took us through all the provisions of the Act but he was not able to satisfy us that the Commissioner had authority to represent the deity in the judical proceedings. It is true that under S. 20 of the Act the Commissioner is vested with the power of superintendence and control over the temple but that does not mean that he has authority to represent the deity in proceedings before the District Judge under S. 85 of the Act. As a matter of law the only person who can represent the deity or who can bring a suit on behalf of the deity is the Shebait, and although a deity is a judicial person capable of holding property, it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held. The possession and management of the property with the right to sue in respect thereof are, in the normal course, vested in the Shebait, but where, however, the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebati himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment to file suits for the protection of the trust properties. It is open, in such a case, to the deity to file a suit through some person as next friend for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated or for other relief. Such a next friend may be a person who is a worshipper of the deity or as a prospective Shebait is legally interested in the endowment. In a case where the Shebait has denied the right of the deity to the dedicated properties, it is obviously desirable that the deity should file the suit through a disinterested next friend nominated by the court.The principle is clearly stated in Pramath Nath v. Pradyumna Kumar, ILR 52 Cal 809: (AIR 1925 PC 139 ). That was a suit between contending she baits about the location of the deity, and the Judicial Committee held that the will of the idol on that question must be respected, and inasmuch as the idol was not represented otherwise than by shebaits, it ought to appear through a disinterested next friend appointed by the Court. In the present case no such action was taken by the District Court in O. P. No. 3 of 1950 and as there was no representation of the deity in that judicial proceeding it is manifest that the compromise decree cannot be binding upon the deity. It was also contended by Mr. P. Rama Reddy on behalf of respondent No. I that the compromise decree was beyond the scope of the proceedings in O. P. No. 3 of 1950 and was, therefore, invalid. In our opinion, this argument is well founded and must prevail. The proceeding was brought under S. 84 (2) of the old Act (Act II of 1927) for setting aside the order of the Board, dated October 5, 1949 declaring the temple of Shri Kodandaramaswami as a temple defined in S. 6, Cl. 17 of the Act and for a declaration that the temple was a private temple. After the passing of the new Act, namely Madras Act 19 of 1951, there was an amendment of the original petition and the amended petition included a prayer for a further declaration that the properties in dispute are the personal properties of the petitioners family and not the properties of the temple. Such a declaration was outside the purview of S. 84 (2) of Madras Act II of 1927 and could not have been granted. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention of respondent No. 1 is correct and that he is entitled to a declaratory decree that the compromise decree in O. P. No. 3 of 1950 was not valid and was not binding upon Shri Kodanaramaswami temple. 13. We have gone into the question of the validity of the compromise decree because both the parties to the appeal invited us to decide the question and said that there was no use in our remanding the matter to the trial court on this question and the matter will be unduly protracted.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The Judicial Committee observed that S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act did not apply to the case and that it was not a question of exercising a discretion under that Section; and they gave to the appellant a decree setting aside the decree complained of and declaring that the agreement of compromise and the decree complained of were not binding upon the appellants or either of them and that they were entitled to such rights as they had before the suit was dismissed on December 15, 1899In our opinion, the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad Singh, ILR 43 Cal 694: (AIR 1916 PC 78) should be explained on the ground that the will which was sought to be avoided had been affirmed by a Court exercising appropriate jurisdiction and as the propriety of that decision could not be impeached in subsequent proceedings, the plaintiffs could not sue, not being reversioners10. The legal position is also well-established that the worshipper of a Hindu temple is entitled, in certain circumstances, to bring a suit for declaration that the alienation of the temple properties by the de jure Shebait is invalid and not binding upon the temple. If a Shebait has improperly alienated trust property a suit can be brought by any person interested for a declaration that such alienation is not binding upon the deity but no decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the plaintiff in the suit has the present right to the possession. Worshippers of temples are in the position of cestui que trustent (sic) or beneficiaries in a spiritual sense11. In our opinion, S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the Section. It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of S. 41 of the Specific Relief ActThe High Court has taken the view that the Commissioner could not represent the deity because S. 20 of the Hindu Religions and Charitable Endowments Act provided only that the administration of all the endowments shall be under the superintendence and control of the Commissioner. Mr. Babula Reddy took us through all the provisions of the Act but he was not able to satisfy us that the Commissioner had authority to represent the deity in the judical proceedings. It is true that under S. 20 of the Act the Commissioner is vested with the power of superintendence and control over the temple but that does not mean that he has authority to represent the deity in proceedings before the District Judge under S. 85 of the Act. As a matter of law the only person who can represent the deity or who can bring a suit on behalf of the deity is the Shebait, and although a deity is a judicial person capable of holding property, it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held. The possession and management of the property with the right to sue in respect thereof are, in the normal course, vested in the Shebait, but where, however, the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebati himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment to file suits for the protection of the trust properties. It is open, in such a case, to the deity to file a suit through some person as next friend for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated or for other relief. Such a next friend may be a person who is a worshipper of the deity or as a prospective Shebait is legally interested in the endowment. In a case where the Shebait has denied the right of the deity to the dedicated properties, it is obviously desirable that the deity should file the suit through a disinterested next friend nominated by the court.The principle is clearly stated in Pramath Nath v. Pradyumna Kumar, ILR 52 Cal 809: (AIR 1925 PC 139  ). That was a suit between contending she baits about the location of the deity, and the Judicial Committee held that the will of the idol on that question must be respected, and inasmuch as the idol was not represented otherwise than by shebaits, it ought to appear through a disinterested next friend appointed by the Court. In the present case no such action was taken by the District Court in O. P. No. 3 of 1950 and as there was no representation of the deity in that judicial proceeding it is manifest that the compromise decree cannot be binding upon the deityThe proceeding was brought under S. 84 (2) of the old Act (Act II of 1927) for setting aside the order of the Board, dated October 5, 1949 declaring the temple of Shri Kodandaramaswami as a temple defined in S. 6, Cl. 17 of the Act and for a declaration that the temple was a private temple. After the passing of the new Act, namely Madras Act 19 of 1951, there was an amendment of the original petition and the amended petition included a prayer for a further declaration that the properties in dispute are the personal properties of the petitioners family and not the properties of the temple. Such a declaration was outside the purview of S. 84 (2) of Madras Act II of 1927 and could not have been granted. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the contention of respondent No. 1 is correct and that he is entitled to a declaratory decree that the compromise decree in O. P. No. 3 of 1950 was not valid and was not binding upon Shri Kodanaramaswami temple13. We have gone into the question of the validity of the compromise decree because both the parties to the appeal invited us to decide the question and said that there was no use in our remanding the matter to the trial court on this question and the matter will be unduly protracted8. Upon this argument we think that there is both principle and authority for holding that the present suit is not governed by S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. In Fischer v. Secy of State for India in Council, (1899) 26 Ind App l6 (PC) Lord Macnaghten said of this Section :"Now, in the first place it is at least open to doubt whether the present suit is within the purview of S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. There can be no doubt as to the origin and purpose of that Section. It was intended to introduce the provisions of S. 50 of the Chancery Procedure Act of 1852 (15 and 16 Vict. c. 86) as interpreted by judicial decision. Before the Act of 1852 it was not the practice of the Court in ordinary suits to make a declaration of right except as introductory to relief which it proceeded to administer. But the present suit is one to which no objection could have been taken before the Act of 1852. It is in substance a suit to have the true construction of a statute declared, and to have an act done in contravention of the statute rightly understood pronounced void and of no effect. That is not the sort of declaratory decree which the framers of the Act had in their mind."In Partab Singh v. Bhabute Singh, (1913) 40 Ind App 182 (PC) the appellants sued for a declaration that a compromise of certainn suits and decrees passed thereunder made on their behalf when they were minors were not binding on them, having been obtained by fraud and in proceedings in which they were practically unrepresented. The Subordinate Judge having decreed the suit on appeal the members of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner differed upon the question whether the declaration sought should be refused as a matter of discretion under S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Before the Judicial Committee it was contended for the respondent that the suit having been filed for the purpose of obtaining a declaratory decree only was bad in form inasmuch as it did not pray that the decree should be set aside; but that, assuming that it was rightly framed in asking only for a declaratory decree, the Court had a discretion as to the granting or refusing such a declaration.