Case: Santuram Khudai Vs. Kimatrai Printers &amp; Processors (P) Ltd. &amp; Ors

where the appearance is by any representative of employees other than a representative-union authorities under S. 32 can permit the employee to appear himself in all proceedings before them and further the employee is entitled to appear by any person in certain proceedings specified in S. 33. But whenever the representative-union has made an appearance, even the employee cannot appear in any proceedings under the Act and the representation must be confined only to the representative-union. The complete ban, therefore, laid by S. 27A on representation otherwise than through a representative of employees remains complete where the representative of employees is the representative-union that has appeared; but if the representative of employees that has appeared is other than the representative-union then Ss. 32 and 33 provide for exceptions with which we have already dealt. There can, therefore, be no escape from the conclusion that the Act plainly intends that where the representative-union appears in any proceeding under the Act even though that proceeding might have commenced by an employee under S.42(4) of the Act, the representative-union alone can represent the employee and the employee cannot appear or act in such proceeding."16. The following observations made by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Textile Labour Association Bhadra, Ahmedabad v. Ahmedabad Mill Owners Association, Ahmedabad, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 890 at p. 891, is also pertinent :"Reading these two sections (Ss.32 and 33 of the Act), we find that it is quite clearly stated in the provisos to the two sections that no individual is allowed to appear in any proceeding in which the representative-union has appeared as the representative of the employees".17. The second contention raised by Mr. Dutta is also, therefore, replied.18. The last contention of Mr. Dutta that in view of the fact that while appearing as the representative-union in respondent No. 1s aforesaid application No. 1455 of 1976, respondent No. 2 was not acting for and on behalf of the employees but was acting mala fide and against their interests, the appellant and his five other co-employees should have been allowed to be added as parties to the application and permitted to appear and act therein has also no force. It has to be remembered that mala fides or bona fides of a representative-union has no relevance while considering the provisions of S.27A and Ss.32 and 33 of the Act which taken together impose an absolute ban on the appearance of any individual employee in any proceeding under the Act where the representative-union chooses to appear or act as representative of the employees. In case, the employees find that the representative-union is acting in a manner which is prejudicial to their interest, their remedy lies in invoking the aid of the Registrar under Chapter III of the Act and asking him to cancel the registration of the union. The following observations made in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., (supra) are opposite in this connection :"But it is clear that bona fides or mala fides of the representative of employees can have nothing to do with the ban placed by S. 27A on the appearance of any one else except the representative of employees as defined in S. 30 and that if anyone else can appear in any proceeding we must find a provision in that behalf in either S. 32 or S. 33, which are the only exceptions to S. 27A. It may be noticed that there is no exceptions in S. 27A. It may be noticed that there is no exception in S. 27A in favour of the employees who might have made an application under S. 42(4), to appear on his own behalf and the ban which is placed by S. 27A will apply equally to such an employee. In order, however, to soften the rigour of the provisions of S. 27A, for it may well be that the representative of employees may not choose to appear in many proceedings started by an employee under S. 42(4), exceptions are provided in Ss. 32 and 33. The scheme of these three provisions clearly is that if the representative-union appears, no one else can appear and carry on a proceeding, even if it be begun on an application under S. 42(4) but where the representative-union does not choose to appear there are provisions in Ss. 32 and 33 which permits others to appear in proceedings under the Act."19. In view of the above quoted categoric and unequivocal observations, the contrary observations made in N. M. Naik v. Colaba Land Mills, [1960-I L.L.J. 448]; on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Dutta must be treated as overruled.20. We have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the view expressed by the Labour Court and the High Court and holding that neither the appellant nor his other co-employees had any locus standi to appear or act as individual employees in the aforesaid proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 in which respondent No. 2 which the representative-union in the industry in the local area had the right to appear and act as their representative of the employees in the industry and did appear or act as such. We may observe here in passing that even the new union to which the appellant and some of his co-employees belonged would have no right to appear or act on behalf of the appellant or his co-employees in the aforesaid proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 as it had not been registered and recognised as the representative-union of employees under the Act.21. In conclusion, we wish to make it clear that as learned counsel for the parties have abstained from addressing us regarding the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid strike in view of the fact that it was not open to the appellant to agitate that question because the Labour Court had refused to add him as a party to respondent No. 1s aforesaid application No. 1455 of 1976, we have refrained from making any observation in regard thereto.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. A plain reading of the above section which was substituted for the original S.80 by the Bombay Act 49 of 1955 makes it clear that the Labour Court can permit the parties affected by the dispute to appear in the manner provided by Ss.80A to 80C of the Act but the discretion conferred on the Labour Court has specifically been made subject to the provisions of Chapter V which deals with "representation of employees and employers and appearance on their behalf" and contains amongst other provisions S.Now a combined reading of Ss. 80, 27A, 30 32, and 33 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that consistent with its avowed policy of preventing the exploitation of the workers and augmenting their bargaining power, the Legislature has clothed the representative-union with lenary power to appear or act on behalf of the employers in any proceedings under the Act and has deprived the individual employees or workmen of the right to appear or act in any proceeding under the Act where the representative-union enters appearance or acts as representative of employees. We are fortified in this view by a decision of this Court in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., [1962-II L.L.J. 369]; (1962) 2 S.C.R.The first contention advanced by Mr. Dutta is, therefore, overruled.15. The second contention raised by Mr. Dutta is also devoid of substance. Sections 32 and 33 of the Act no doubt engraft exceptions on the aforesaid general rule embodied in S.27A of the Act but they are not helpful to the appellant as the provisos appended thereto specifically preclude individual employees from appearing or acting in any proceeding under the Act where the representative - union enters appearance or acts as the representative of employees.The second contention raised by Mr. Dutta is also, therefore, replied.18. The last contention of Mr. Dutta that in view of the fact that while appearing as the representative-union in respondent No. 1s aforesaid application No. 1455 of 1976, respondent No. 2 was not acting for and on behalf of the employees but was acting mala fide and against their interests, the appellant and his five other co-employees should have been allowed to be added as parties to the application and permitted to appear and act therein has also no force. It has to be remembered that mala fides or bona fides of a representative-union has no relevance while considering the provisions of S.27A and Ss.32 and 33 of the Act which taken together impose an absolute ban on the appearance of any individual employee in any proceeding under the Act where the representative-union chooses to appear or act as representative of the employees. In case, the employees find that the representative-union is acting in a manner which is prejudicial to their interest, their remedy lies in invoking the aid of the Registrar under Chapter III of the Act and asking him to cancel the registration of the union. The following observations made in Girja Shankar Kashi Ram v. The Gujarat Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd., (supra) are opposite in this connectionit is clear that bona fides or mala fides of the representative of employees can have nothing to do with the ban placed by S. 27A on the appearance of any one else except the representative of employees as defined in S. 30 and that if anyone else can appear in any proceeding we must find a provision in that behalf in either S. 32 or S. 33, which are the only exceptions to S. 27A. It may be noticed that there is no exceptions in S. 27A. It may be noticed that there is no exception in S. 27A in favour of the employees who might have made an application under S. 42(4), to appear on his own behalf and the ban which is placed by S. 27A will apply equally to such an employee. In order, however, to soften the rigour of the provisions of S. 27A, for it may well be that the representative of employees may not choose to appear in many proceedings started by an employee under S. 42(4), exceptions are provided in Ss. 32 and 33. The scheme of these three provisions clearly is that if the representative-union appears, no one else can appear and carry on a proceeding, even if it be begun on an application under S. 42(4) but where the representative-union does not choose to appear there are provisions in Ss. 32 and 33 which permits others to appear in proceedings under the Act.In view of the above quoted categoric and unequivocal observations, the contrary observations made in N. M. Naik v. Colaba Land Mills, [1960-I L.L.J. 448]; on which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Dutta must be treated as overruled.20. We have, therefore, no hesitation in agreeing with the view expressed by the Labour Court and the High Court and holding that neither the appellant nor his other co-employees had any locus standi to appear or act as individual employees in the aforesaid proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 in which respondent No. 2 which the representative-union in the industry in the local area had the right to appear and act as their representative of the employees in the industry and did appear or act as such. We may observe here in passing that even the new union to which the appellant and some of his co-employees belonged would have no right to appear or act on behalf of the appellant or his co-employees in the aforesaid proceedings initiated by respondent No. 1 as it had not been registered and recognised as the representative-union of employees under the Act.21. In conclusion, we wish to make it clear that as learned counsel for the parties have abstained from addressing us regarding the legality or otherwise of the aforesaid strike in view of the fact that it was not open to the appellant to agitate that question because the Labour Court had refused to add him as a party to respondent No. 1s aforesaid application No. 1455 of 1976, we have refrained from making any observation in regard thereto.