Case: Ram Bharosey Lal Krishan Kumar Vs. State of U.P

goods specified therein, sales tax not exceeding the maximum rate for the time being specified in s. 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 can be levied by the State Government on the turnover in respect of sales by dealers to the consumers. From an analysis of this provision, we get the following :1. that tax to be levied is a sales tax;2. levy in question is a single point levy;3. the point of levy is the sale by the dealer to the consumer and4. the rate to be fixed by the State Government is not to exceed the maximum rate for the time being specified in sec. 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. 1956.10. If we hold that provisions contained in s. 3AA continue to be in force in respect of dealing in oil seeds than the appellants contention that the impugned levy is an invalid levy succeeds. But the question is whether that contention is correct.11. This takes us to s. 3-D. That section reads :"1. Except as provided in sub-section (2), there shall be levied and paid, for each assessment year or part thereof, a tax on the turnover, to be determined in such manner as may be prescribed, of first purchases made by a dealer or through a dealer, acting as a purchasing agent in respect of such goods or class of goods, and at such rates, not exceeding two paisa per rupee in the case of foodgrains, including cereals and pulses, and five paisa per rupee in the case of other goods and with effect from such date, as may, from time to time, be notified by the State Government in this behalf.Explanation :- In the case of a purchase made by a registered dealer through the agency of a licensed dealer, the registered dealer shall be deemed to be the first purchaser, and in every other case of a first purchase, made through the agency of a dealer, the dealer who is the agent shall be deemed to be the first purchaser.2. x x x3. x x x4. On the issue of a notification under this section no tax shall be levied under any other section in respect of the goods so notified.5. The provision of the second and third proviso to Section 3 and of Section 18, shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to the tax payable under this Section.6. x x x7. Unless the dealer proves otherwise to the satisfaction of the assessing authority, every purchase by or through a dealer shall, for the purposes of sub-section (1), be presumed to be the first purchase by such dealer and every sale through a dealer shall, for the purposes of sub-section (2), be presumed to be sale to a first purchaser."12. For our present purpose, it is not necessary to refer to the second and third provisos to s. 3 and s. 18. It may be noted that s. 3-D was incorporated into the Act on August 1, 1958.13. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that s. 3 AA is a special provision regarding certain specified class of goods including oil seeds whereas S. 3-D is a general provision. Hence dealings in respect of oil seeds must be held to be governed exclusively by s. 3AA. In support of his contention the learned for the appellant called into aid the rule of construction that a special provision excludes the application of a general provision. On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the Revenue that power was conferred on the State Government to levy purchase tax in place of sales tax in respect of any goods that may be notified under s. 3-D (1) subject only to the conditions mentioned therein. According to Dr. Singhvi, learned Counsel for the Revenue, the legislature left the questions whether in respect of a class of goods, the appropriate levy is sales tax or purchase tax as well as what is the appropriate point of levy, to the State Government because a decision on that question has to be taken on an assessment of various factors, some of which are not constant. According to him in view of the language employed in sub-s. (4) of s. 3-D, it is not possible to apply the rule of construction that special legislation in respect of any particular topic should exclude the application of general legislation.14. It may be noted that s. 3-D was incorporated into the Act much later than s. 3AA. As seen earlier s. 3AA was incorporated into the Act on April 1, 1956 whereas s. 3-D was added on August 1, 1958. At the time the legislature incorporated into the Act sec. 3-D. it must have been aware of the existence of sec. 3AA but yet in sub-s. (4) of s. 3-D, it declared that on the issue of a notification under that section, no tax shall be levied under any other section in respect of the goods so notified. The ambit of this provision is very wide and it clearly takes in goods mentioned in sec. 3AA.15. Now turning to s. 3AA, it is important to note that it begins by saying "notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 or 3-A". The non-obstents clause does not take in s. 3-D. If the legislature intended to exclude the operation of s. 3-D, in respect of matters covered by s. 3AA, nothing would have been easier than to say so. It could have said "notwithstanding anything contained in s. 3, 3-A and s. 3-D." But it did not choose to do that. Therefore there are no grounds to cut down the applitude of the power conferred on the State Government under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3-D.16. The High Court of Allahabad has consistently taken the view that it is open to the State Government to levy purchase tax in exercise of its powers under sec. 3-D even in respect of goods covered by sec. 3AA. We are in agreement with that view.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. It may be noted that s. 3-D was incorporated into the Act much later than s. 3AA. As seen earlier s. 3AA was incorporated into the Act on April 1, 1956 whereas s. 3-D was added on August 1, 1958. At the time the legislature incorporated into the Act sec. 3-D. it must have been aware of the existence of sec. 3AA but yet in sub-s. (4) of s. 3-D, it declared that on the issue of a notification under that section, no tax shall be levied under any other section in respect of the goods so notified. The ambit of this provision is very wide and it clearly takes in goods mentioned in sec. 3AA.15. Now turning to s. 3AA, it is important to note that it begins by saying "notwithstanding anything contained in section 3 or 3-A". The non-obstents clause does not take in s. 3-D. If the legislature intended to exclude the operation of s. 3-D, in respect of matters covered by s. 3AA, nothing would have been easier than to say so. It could have said "notwithstanding anything contained in s. 3, 3-A and s. 3-D." But it did not choose to do that. Therefore there are no grounds to cut down the applitude of the power conferred on the State Government under sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3-D.16. The High Court of Allahabad has consistently taken the view that it is open to the State Government to levy purchase tax in exercise of its powers under sec. 3-D even in respect of goods covered by sec. 3AA. We are in agreement with that view.We have considered the first ground of attack in Civil Appeals Nos. 362 and 1969 (M/s. Sita Ram Bishambhar Dayal etc. vs. State of U.P.) in which we have delivered judgment just now. For the reasons mentioned therein, the contention that sec.(1) is ultra vires the Constitution fails.If we hold that provisions contained in s. 3AA continue to be in force in respect of dealing in oil seeds than the appellants contention that the impugned levy is an invalid levy succeeds. But the question is whether that contention is correct.