Case: Kamgaranchao Ekvott Vs. Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha &amp; Others

are in respect of the same charter of demands which were served but Kamgar Sabha on the employer and which demands are the subject matter of the present reference as can be seen from the reply filed by the company Ciba Speciality Chemicals (India) Ltd., as well as the settlement dated 30th August 2000 produced by the said company. It is clearly mentioned in the said settlement that the said settlement is in respect of the demands raised by the workmen through Kamgar Sabha vide letters dated 11.5.93, 7.6.95 and 26.6.95 and the said demands are the subject matter of the present dispute. Since the settlement is in respect of the demands already raised by the workmen earlier through Kamgar Sabha and which is the subject matter of the present dispute the judgment of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Village Papers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) relied upon by Adv. Shri Shaikh the learned counsel for the Kamgar Sabha that there is no industrial dispute because there is no demand on the employer has no application. In my view the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of V.V.F. Employees Union is not applicable mainly for the reason that in that case separate demands were raised by the two unions against the employer and a settlement was signed by the employer with the one union in respect o the demand raised by it and that union wanted to be impleaded as a party to the dispute which was referred to the Tribunal in respect of the demands of the other union which were not settled. The High Court held that since the demands of the union who wanted to be impleaded as party were settled it has no legitimate right to be impleaded as a party to the dispute. It is therefore evident that the facts in the case before the Bombay High Court were different from the one in the present case, as the settlements signed by the applicant union are on behalf of the workmen not in respect of its any separate charter of demands but they are in respect of the same demand which were raised by the workmen through Kamgar Sabha. 17. The Tribunal then stated;I have gone through the settlement dated 30th August, 2000 produced by the Company Ciba Speciality Chemicals (India) Ltd., which is signed by the said company with applicant Union. Clause 30.2 (sic 35.2) of the said settlement states that the parties are entitled to approach this Tribunal in this reference for Award in terms of the said settlements. The said settlement is entered into by the majority of the workmen through the applicant union and therefore the said settlement has direct bearing on the dispute in the present case. Whether the settlement is valid and binding or whether award can be passed in terms of the settlement are the matters incidental to the main issue which is the charter of demands and in respect of which according to the applicant union the said settlements have been arrived at. These issues cannot be decided in the absence of the workmen who are represented by the applicant union. I may mention here that it is within the right of the parties in the reference to settle their disputes by entering into settlements and it is the duty of the Tribunal to ascertain whether the settlement is reasonable or not. This cannot be done unless the parties are given; the opportunity of being heard. It is therefore necessary that the workmen who have resigned from the Kamgar Sabha be allowed to be represented by their union which is the applicant union in the present case. In view of what is discussed above, I am of the view that the applicant union is a necessary party to the present dispute/reference and it is required to be impleaded so as to make the adjudication effective and enforceable. I, therefore hold that the applicant union has made out a case for adding it as a party to the present dispute/reference and hence the applications dated 11.9.2000 and 29.9.2000 filed by it are liable to be allowed . (Emphasis supplied)There is no doubt in our minds that it is the duty of the Tribunal to ascertain whether the settlement arrived at between the appellant union and the company is just and reasonable and it cannot be decided unless the appellant union is afforded an opportunity to have its say. The prayer of the appellant union to be joined as party, hence, could not be rejected.18. The learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was not right in interfering with the discretionary order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Though conscious of the fact that normally the High Court should not interfere with such order and though the learned Single Judge observed in the order that while deciding Reference IT/38/95, the Tribunal has to consider whether the settlement arrived at by the appellant union with the Company was just, fair and reasonable, he held that the presence of the appellant union for that purpose was not necessary. In the opinion of the learned single Judge, whether the settlement was just, fair and reasonable or not could be decided even in absence of the appellant union and necessary witnesses can be examined. In our opinion, however, when that question is required to be decided in Reference IT/38/95 and when Clause 35.2 made it clear that the settlement excluded demand pertaining to permanency of temporary workmen which is subject matter of Reference IT/38/95, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order passed by the Tribunal.19. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be confirmed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge therefore, is hereby set aside and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Goa at Panaji is restored.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]From the above clause, it is clear that the management and the workmen agreed that the settlement was full and final excluding that the demand pertaining to the temporary workmen which is the subject matter of Reference IT/38/95 which is pending. It is thus clear that the settlement which has been arrived at specifically refers to Reference IT/38/95. It also mentions a demand pertaining to temporary workmen which is the subject matter of Reference IT/38/95 which is pending. The industrial Tribunal, therefore, in our opinion, rightly relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in Hochtier Gammon vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa,7 SCLJ 653 (SC) and Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen, (1981) II LLJ 429 (SC). To us, the Tribunal was also right in distinguishing a decision of this Court in V.V.F. Employees Union vs. S.M. LimayeOthers, (1990) I CLR 359 (Bom). In V.V.F. Employees Union, as rightly observed by the Tribunal, there were two disputes and two references. The workmen represented by one union settled its dispute in respect of demands made by it covered by the settlement and the dispute thus came to an end. So far as the other union was concerned, certain demands were raised which did not result into a settlement. Obviously, therefore, the first union which had settled its dispute was neither necessary nor proper party to the second dispute which was raised by another union. This Court also observed that there was no dispute in existence so far as the first union was concerned, in view of settlement arrived at between the parties. The dispute raised by another union was totally different, distinct and independent. The said dispute concerned the members of the other union and the union which had settled the matter had no interest therein. A prayer by that union to be joined as party in respect of demands made and dispute raised by the second union, therefore, was totally8. The learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was not right in interfering with the discretionary order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Though conscious of the fact that normally the High Court should not interfere with such order and though the learned Single Judge observed in the order that while deciding Reference IT/38/95, the Tribunal has to consider whether the settlement arrived at by the appellant union with the Company was just, fair and reasonable, he held that the presence of the appellant union for that purpose was not necessary. In the opinion of the learned single Judge, whether the settlement was just, fair and reasonable or not could be decided even in absence of the appellant union and necessary witnesses can be examined. In our opinion, however, when that question is required to be decided in Reference IT/38/95 and when Clause 35.2 made it clear that the settlement excluded demand pertaining to permanency of temporary workmen which is subject matter of Reference IT/38/95, the learned Single Judge ought not to have interfered with the order passed by the Tribunal.19. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed by the learned Single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal deserves to be confirmed. The order passed by the learned Single Judge therefore, is hereby set aside and the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Goa at Panaji is restored.