Case: Helios &amp; Matheson Inform.Tech.Ltd.&amp;Ors Vs. Rajeev Sawhney &amp; Anr

documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240 of the Cr.P.C and that the Court could not quash the charges on the basis of documents which the accused may produce except in exceptional cases where the documents are of unimpeachable character and can be legally translated into evidence. The following passage is, in this regard, apposite: 7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out -- as has been done in the instant case the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence. 10. It is interesting to note that even in the present SLPs the petitioner has filed an unsigned copy of the alleged minutes of the meeting dated 19th July, 2005. We do not think that we can possibly look into that document without proper proof and without verification of its genuineness. There was and is no clear and unequivocal admission on the record, at least none was brought to our notice, regarding the genuineness of the document or its probative value. The complainant-respondent in this petition was also not willing to concede that the document relied upon could possibly result in the ratification of an act which was non est being a mere forgery. At any rate the document could not be said to be of unimpeachable character nor was there any judicial compulsion much less an exceptional or formidable one to allow its production in revisional proceedings or to accept it as legally admissible evidence for determining the correctness of the order passed by the trial Court. That apart whether or not document dated 19th July, 2005, could possibly have the effect of ratifying the resolution allegedly passed on 28th June, 2005 was also a matter that could not be dealt with summarily, especially when the former did not even make a reference to the latter. 11. The alternative contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that there was suppression of information by the complainant as regards filing of a previous complaint before the Magistrate at Bangalore is also without any substance. The fact that the complaint previously filed had been quashed by the High Court on account of filing of a comprehensive complaint out of which these proceedings arise is, in our opinion, a complete answer to the charge of suppression. As on the date the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, took cognizance of the offences in the complaint filed before him no other complaint was pending in any other Court, the complaint before the Magistrate at Bangalore having had been quashed without a trial on merits. Mere filing of a previous complaint could not in the above circumstances be a bar to the filing of another complaint or for proceedings based on such complaint being taken to their logical conclusion. So also the High Court was, in our opinion, correct in holding that there was no violation of the provision of Section 202 Cr.P.C. to warrant interference in exercise of revisional powers by the Sessions Judge. 12. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioners upon the decisions of this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate and Ors. (1998) 5 SCC 749 and State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 is of no avail. In the former case this Court simply recognized that taking of cognizance is a serious matter and that the magistrate must apply his mind to the nature of the allegations in the complaint, and the material placed before him while issuing process. The complaint in the present case, as noticed earlier, does make specific allegations which would call for a proper inquiry and trial and the magistrate had indeed recorded a prima facie conclusion to that effect. So also the decision in Debendra Nath Padhi (supra) does not help the petitioner. That was a case where the question was whether at the stage of framing of charge, the accused could seek production of documents to prove his innocence. Answering the question in the negative this Court held: The law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material. No provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) grants to the accused any right to file any material or document at the stage of framing of charge. That right is granted only at the stage of the trial. Satish Mehra case, (1996) 9 SCC 766 holding that the trial court has powers to consider even materials which the accused may produce at the stage of Section 227 of the Code has not been correctly decided. It is well settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. 13.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The fact that the complaint previously filed had been quashed by the High Court on account of filing of a comprehensive complaint out of which these proceedings arise is, in our opinion, a complete answer to the charge of suppression. As on the date the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Mumbai, took cognizance of the offences in the complaint filed before him no other complaint was pending in any other Court, the complaint before the Magistrate at Bangalore having had been quashed without a trial on merits. Mere filing of a previous complaint could not in the above circumstances be a bar to the filing of another complaint or for proceedings based on such complaint being taken to their logical conclusion. So also the High Court was, in our opinion, correct in holding that there was no violation of the provision of Section 202 Cr.P.C. to warrant interference in exercise of revisional powers by the Sessions Judge.