Case: Smt Sarla Dixit &amp; Anr Vs. Balwant Yadav &amp; Ors

that even after the accident he had not slowed down his vehicle and went on driving with great speed, is fully established by the further fact that even after the accident, his vehicle could not stop there and then but had travelled further and had gone upto 70 ft. further and had then stopped near the south-eastern side of the road after the collision. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that respondent No. 2 while driving the offending truck was in a position to see in the broad day light the scooterist Rama Kant who had already entered the intersection and was almost half way in it, still had continued to drive recklessly in a totally careless manner. Because respondent No. 2 was not having a driving licence, he was a novice trying to learn driving such heavy vehicle at the cost of such innocent victims like Rama Kant. Being a novice he went on driving fast before approaching intersection of road No. 7 and could not control his vehicle by stopping it or by slowing it down so as to avoid collision with the scooterist who had come across his way. Resultantly he dashed with the scooter in the centre of Road No. 7 with the left side of the scooterist Rama Kant and his scooter. As seen above having thrown off the scooterist and the pillion rider respondent No. 2 could not control his vehicle which was in such speed that he could bring it to a halt after travelling further to the extend of 70 ft. and then it proceeded towards the wrong side of the road and halted near the southern side of road No. 7 after the collision. All these tell-tale facts unequivocally point to one and only conclusion that it was the rash and negligent driving by respondent No. 2, a young boy aged 20, who was a novice driver without a licence to drive such heavy vehicle, that had caused this unfortunate accident. Deceased Rama Kant was not at all negligent and had not contributed to the accident save and except to the extent of bringing his body for being subjected to the impact of the on-coming truck. If at all, his only contribution was that he became a victim of this accident by being on spot on that fateful morning. It is, therefore, not possible for us to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that deceased Rama Kant had contributed to the accident by his own negligence to the extent of 75% or even to the extent of any lesser percentage. On this evidence the High Court was justified in reversing the finding of the Trial Court that deceased Rama Kant was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 75%. It must be held that deceased Rama Kant was not at all negligent and the entire cent per cent negligence rested on the shoulder of respondent No. 2, driver of the truck. It is also not possible to agree with the contention of learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that deceased Rama Kant was guilty of breach of Regulation (7) of Tenth Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939. That regulation read as under : "7. The driver of a motor vehicle shall, on entering a road intersection, if the road entered is a main road designated as such, give way to the vehicle proceeding along that road, and in any other case give way to all traffic approaching the intersection on his right hand." On the facts of the present case it is well established from the evidence of pillion rider Ramji Sharma, appellants-witness No. 7 that while entering the intersection from the northern side of road No. 7 deceased had already sounded the horn and had also given a hand signal to indicate that he intended to go across road No. 7. There was no occasion for him to halt and give way to the truck coming from the western side and proceeding towards the eastern side of Road No. 7 for the simple reason that Rama Kant had already entered the intersection and had travelled almost half way across the breadth of Road No. 7. In the meantime the offending truck came with great speed from the western side and dashed against the scooter. Regulation (7) could have been pressed in service against deceased Rama Kant if it was shown that while entering the intersection, having seen the on-coming truck from his right hand side he had not taken due precaution. Such a situation, on the facts of the present case, is found to be absent. On the other hand respondent No. 2 driving the offending truck on the main road No. 7 from west to east is shown to have committed breach of Regulation (6) of the very same Schedule which read as under : "6. The driver of a motor vehicle shall slow down when approaching a road intersection, a road junction or a road corner, and shall not enter any such intersection or junction until he has become aware that he may do so without endangering the safety of persons thereon." Respondent No. 2 was required to slow down while approaching the road intersection or junction and as he had not done so but went on driving with full speed the offending truck which threw off the scooterist who was already in the middle of the intersection, he was guilty of breach of Regulation (6) of Tenth Schedule and had endangered the safety of the persons crossing the said road at the relevant time. Consequently the recklessness and negligence in driving the offending truck at the relevant time wholly rest on the shoulder of respondent No. 2, Point No. 2 is, therefore, answered in the negative. Hence there is no question of slicing down any amount from the compensation held payable to the claimants as per our findings on point No. 1 above. Point No. 3

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In our view on the peculiar facts of that case the Court had adopted multiplier of 24. In paragraph 10 of the Report no special reasons were assigned for adopting thatWe are, aware that some decisions of the High Courts and of this Court as well have arrived at compensation on some such basis. These decisions cannot be said to have laid down a settled principle. They are merely instances of particular awards in individual cases. The proper method of computation is the multiplier-method. Any departure, except in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of uniformity and an element of unpredictability for the assessment of compensation. Some judgments of the High courts have justified a departure from the multiplier method on the ground that Section 110-B of the Motor Vehicles Act. 1939, insofar as it envisages the compensation to be just, the statutory determination of a just compensation would unshackle the exercise from any rigid formula. It must be borne in mind that the multiplier method is the accepted method of ensuring a just compensation which will make for uniformity and certainly of the awards. We disapprove these decisions of the High Courts which have taken a contrary view. We indicate that the multiplier method is the appropriate method, a departure from which can only be justified in rare and extraordinary circumstances and very exceptional cases.The multiplier represents the number of years purchase on which the loss of dependency is capitalised. Take for instance a case where annual loss of dependency is Rs. 10,000. If a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 is invested at 10% annual interest, the interest will take care of the dependency, perpetually. The multiplier in this case works out to 10. If the rate of interest is 5% per annum and not 10% then the multiplier needed to capitalise the loss of the annual dependency at Rs. 10,000 would be 20. Then the multiplier, i. e., the number of years purchase of 20 will yield the annual dependency perpetually. Then allowance to scale down the multiplier would have to be made taking into account the uncertainties of the future, the allowances for immediate lump sum payment, the period over which the dependency is to last being shorter and the capital feed also to be spent away over the period of dependency is to last etc. Usually in English Courts the operative multiplier rarely exceeds 16 as maximum. This will come down accordingly as the age of the deceased person (or that of the dependants, whichever is higher) goesfar as the adoption of the proper multiplier is concerned, it was observed that the future prospects of advancement in life and career should also be sounded in terms of money to augment the multiplicand. While the chance of the multiplier is determined by two factors, namely, the rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy and the age of the deceased or of the claimant whichever is higher, the ascertainment of the multiplicand is a more difficult exercise. Indeed, many factors have to be put into the scales to evaluate the contingencies of the future. All contingencies of the future need not necessarily be baneful. Applying these principles to the facts of the case before this Court in the aforesaid case it was observed that the deceased in that case was of 39 years of age. His income was Rs. 1,032/- per month. He was more or less on a stable job and considering the prospects of advancement in future career the proper higher estimate of monthly income of Rs. 2,000/- as gross income to be taken as average gross future income of the deceased and deducting at least 1/3rd therefrom by way of personal living expenses, had he survived the loss of dependency, could be capitalised by adopting the multiplicand of Rupees 1,400/- per month or Rs. 17,000/- per year and that figure could be capitalised by adopting multiplier of 12 which was appropriate to the age of deceased being 39 and to that amount was added the conventional figure of Rupees 15,000/- by way of loss of consortium and loss of estate. Adopting the same scientific yardstick as laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the computation of compensation in the present case can almost be subjected to a well settled mathematical formula. Deceased in the present case, as seen above, was earning gross salary of Rs. 1,543/- per month. Rounding it up to figure of Rs. 1,500/- and keeping in view all the future prospects which the deceased had in stable military service in the light of his brilliant academic record and performance in the military service spread over 7 years, and also keeping in view the other imponderable like accidental death while discharging military duties and the hazards of military service, it will not be unreasonable to predicate that his gross monthly income would have shot up to at least double than what he was earning at the time of his death, i. e., up to Rs. 3,000/- per month had he survived in life and had successfully completed his future military career till the time of superannuation. The average gross future monthly income at the time of death, namely, Rs. 1,500/- per month to the maximum which he would have otherwise got had he not died a premature death, i. e. Rs. 3,000/- per month and dividing that figure by two. Thus the average gross monthly income spread over his entire future career, had it been available, would work out to Rs. 4,500/- divided by 2, i. e. Rs. 2,200/-. Rs. 2,200/- per month would have been the gross monthly average income available to the family of the deceased had he survived as a bread winner. From that gross monthly income at least 1/3rd will have to be deducted by way of his personal expenses and other liabilities like payment of Income-tax etc. That would roughly work out of Rs. 730/- per month but even taking a higher figure of Rs. 750/- per month and deducting the same by way of average personal expenses of the deceased from the average gross earning of Rs. 2,200/- per month balance of Rs. 1,450/- which can be rounded up to Rs. 1,500/- per month would have been the average amount available to the family of the deceased, i. e., his dependents, namely appellants herein. It is this figure which would be the datum figure per month which on annual basis would work out to Rs. 18,000/-. Rs. 18,000/- therefore, would be the proper multiplicand which would be available, for capitalisation for computing the future economic loss suffered by the appellants on account of untimely death of the bread winner. As the age of the deceased was 27 years and a few months, at the time of his death the proper multiplier in the light of the aforesaid decision of this Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Trivandrum, (1994 AIR SCW 1356) (supra), would be 15. Rs. 18,000/- multiplied by 15 will work out to Rs. 2,70,000/-. To this figure will have to be added the conventional figure of Rs. 15,000/- by way of loss of estate and consortium etc. That will lead to a total figure of Rs. 2,85,000/-. This is the amount which the appellants would be entitled to get by way of compensation from respondents Nos. 1 and 2 subject to our decision on point No. 2.Point No.the facts of the present case it is well established from the evidence of pillion rider Ramji Sharma, appellants-witness No. 7 that while entering the intersection from the northern side of road No. 7 deceased had already sounded the horn and had also given a hand signal to indicate that he intended to go across road No. 7. There was no occasion for him to halt and give way to the truck coming from the western side and proceeding towards the eastern side of Road No. 7 for the simple reason that Rama Kant had already entered the intersection and had travelled almost half way across the breadth of Road No. 7. In the meantime the offending truck came with great speed from the western side and dashed against the scooter. Regulation (7) could have been pressed in service against deceased Rama Kant if it was shown that while entering the intersection, having seen the on-coming truck from his right hand side he had not taken due precaution. Such a situation, on the facts of the present case, is found to be absent. On the other hand respondent No. 2 driving the offending truck on the main road No. 7 from west to east is shown to have committed breach of Regulation (6) of the very sameNo. 2 was required to slow down while approaching the road intersection or junction and as he had not done so but went on driving with full speed the offending truck which threw off the scooterist who was already in the middle of the intersection, he was guilty of breach of Regulation (6) of Tenth Schedule and had endangered the safety of the persons crossing the said road at the relevant time. Consequently the recklessness and negligence in driving the offending truck at the relevant time wholly rest on the shoulder of respondent No. 2, Point No. 2 is, therefore, answered in the negative. Hence there is no question of slicing down any amount from the compensation held payable to the claimants as per our findings on point No. 1