Case: B. N. Mutto &amp; Anr Vs. T. K. Nandi

possession of the premises on the grounds specified in Clause (e) of the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or Section 14A. Under Section 14A(1)(e) the tenant may (1)(1977) 3 SCR 372 may resist the application on the grounds specified namely, that the premises are not let for residential purposes, that they are not required. So far as the fact which would disentitled the landlord from obtaining an order under Section 14A are concerned they can only be that the landlord is not a person in acception of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or that a general or special order has been made by the Government requiring him to vacate such residential accommodation on the terms specified in the section. Leave to contest an application under Section 14A(1) cannot be said to be analogous to the provisions of grant of leave to defend as envisaged in the Civil Procedure Code. Order XXXVII, Rule 2, Sub-rule (3), of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of Order XXXVII lays down the procedure to obtain leave. Under the provisions leave to appear and defend the suit is to be given if the affidavit discloses such facts as would make incumbent on the holder to prove consideration or such other facts as the Court may laid down sufficient to support the application. The scope of Section 25B(5) is very restricted for the leave to contest can only be given if the facts are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14A. 18. The learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the requirements of Section 14(1)(e) should also be satisfied before the landlord could take advantage of the procedure provided under Section 25B. The learned counsel drew our attention to Section 25C(1) and Section 25C(2) and submitted that the reading of these two Sub-sections would indicate that before an eviction could be ordered under and application under Section 14A(1) the requirement of Sections 14(6) and (7) should be satisfied. While Section 14(1) enumerates the grounds on which the landlord can get a decree for recovery of possession against a tenant Sub-sections (2) to (11) place certain restrictions. Sub-section (2) provides restriction as to right for recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(e). Restriction regarding the right to recover possession under Clause(e) is laid down in Sub-sections (6) and (7) of Section 14. Section 14(6) states that where a landlord acquired any premises by transfer no application for recovery of possession shall lie under Sub-section (1) on the ground specified in Clause(e) of the proviso the rate, unless as a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Sub-section (7) to Section 14 lays down that where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in Clause(e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitle to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. Section 25C makes an exception to the requirement of Section 14(6) to the effect that where a landlord is in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority and who fulfils the requirement of Section 14A(1) the requirement under Section 14(6) that he would not be entitled to possession unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of his acquisition of the premises is not applicable. In other words, he can straightway obtain possession without the impediment deposed under Section 14(6). Great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the tenant on Section 25C(2) which provides that is in the case of a landlord who, being a person of the category specified in Sub-section (), has obtained, on the ground specified in Clause(e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, or under Section 14-A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises, the provisions of Sub-section (7) of Section 14 shall have effect as if for the words ?six months?, occurring therein, the words ?two months? were substituted. The contention was that if Section 14A(1) stood by itself and if a landlord applying under Section 14A(1) would straightaway get the possession after tenant cannot contest the suit on the grounds specified in Section 25B(3) there is no need for mentioning the provisions of Section 14(1)(6) and Section 14(1)(7) and prescribing a lesser period for a prescribed period under Section 14(7). In other words, the submission was that an application for possession under Section 14A should also satisfy the requirements of Section 14(1)(a). The provisions of Section 25B and 25C are applicable to both applications under Section 14(1)(e) and under Section 14A. Applications under Section 14(1)(e) are governed by Section 14(6) and Section 17(7). By introduction of Section 25C the condition imposed in Section 14(6) in made not applicable to persons who satisfy the requirements under Section 14A meaning thereby that this restriction will be applicable only to an application under Section 14(1)(a). Section 25C(2) makes it clear that not only in the case of an application under Section 14(1)(e) but also under Section 14A the term of six months prescribed in Section 14(7) is reduced to two months. The reason for specifying the period of two months in the case of Section 14A would be entitled to possession immediately. By prescribing a specific period of two months under Section 25C(2) it is made clear that even an applicant under Section 14A would have to satisfy the condition laid down Section 25C i.e. a period of two months should elapse before the landlord is satisfied to obtain possession from the date of an order for recovery of possession. The submission also fails. 19.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In order to appreciate the point that arises for consideration it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Delhi Rent Control Act (Act 59 of 1958) came into force on 31st December, 1958. By Chapter III the right of the landlord to evict the tenant was restricted, Section 14 prohibited any order or decree for recovery of possession of any of the premises being made by any Court in favour of a landlord except under certain circumstances. The landlord was required to make an application to the Controller for recovery of the possession on one of the grounds mentioned in Sub-clauses (a) to (1) in Section 14(1)A reading of Section 14A discloses that a right to recover immediate possession of premises accrues to certain persons if the requisite conditions are satisfied. The conditions are: (1) the landlord must be in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority; (2) such landlord is required by a general or special order made by the Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns in the Union Territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependant child. If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied a right shall accrue to such a landlord on and from the date of such order to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him. It may be noted that the section does not require that the person who is in occupation of the premises allotted by the Government should be a Government servant. It is necessary that the person is required by the Government or authority to vacate such accommodation imposing certain consequences in the event of his not vacating. The policy decision taken by the Government on 9th September, 1975 only related to Government servants who were in occupation of premises allotted to them by the Government. If the Government servant had another house in the locality he was to vacate within 3 months from the 1st October, 1975. This general order no doubt relates only to Government servants. After the decision was taken it was realised that some provisions should be made to enable the persons in occupation of buildings allotted to them by the Government to get possession of the houses they own but have been let to tenants. In order to enable them to get possession of the premises let by them expeditiously Section 14A(1) was enacted and the expeditious procedure under Section 25B was made applicable. It may also be noted that the order served on landlord on 9th December, 1975 mentions that all Government officials who own houses in Delhi and have also been allotted Government residence are to vacate Government accommodation. The general circular dated 9th September, 1975 as well as the notice served on the landlord thus support the view that the intention of the Government was to enable only those Government servants who are in occupation of Government accommodation and who own houses to get immediate possession, though Section 14A does not restrict the right to recover immediate possession to Government servants alone. In these circumstances the conclusion arrived at by the High Court that a Government servant who had retired before the date on which he had filed the application is not entitled to the benefits of Section 14(1) is understandable. This view was exercised by this Court in Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand Jain wherein it was observed:?There apears to be some force in the view taken by the High Court that the provision of Section 14A(1) was not intended for Government servants who have retired from Government service or who have been transferred outside Delhi…?.But the Court did not decide the issue because on the facts of the case it was of the view that the landlord was entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 14(A)(1) notwithstanding the fact that he had retired from Government service with effect from 30th November, 1975. In that case the notice was served on the appellant-landlord on 30th September, 1975 which was before the date of retirement which was on 31st November, 1975, on the ground that the right to evict the tenant accrued to the landlord when he was in service it was held that he was entitled to the rights conferred under Section 14A. In this case the notice was served on 9th December, 1975 and the officer had retired on 30th November, 1975. On the reasoning in the above case the appellant will not be entitled to the relief. The question, therefore, squarely arises in this case as to whether a Government servant who retired before the notice was served on him requiring to quit the Government accommodation is entitled to the benefit of Section 14A(1)It is not clear as to why the right to recover immediate possession is not confined to Government servants alone under Section 14A. It is clear that according to Government?s policy statement the intention was only to require the Government servants to vacate the premises allotted to them by the Government if they had their own houses in the area. It cannot be said that it was by inadvertence that the Legislature mentioned persons instead of Government servants and made the section applicable to persons other than Government servants. It is stated at the Bar that Government accommodation is provided not only to Government servants but also to Members of Parliament and other non-officials who occupy important position in public life. The Court will not be justified in resuming that wen the Government used the word ?persons? it meant only Government servants. The rule as to construction of the statutes is well known and has been clearly laid down. Craiss on Statute Law (6th Ed., p.66) relying on Tasmania v. Commonwealth has stated the rule as follows:—(1)?The cordinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Act themselves.?The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver. Taking into account the object of the Act there could be no difficulty in giving the plain meaning to the word ?person? as not being confined to Government servants for it is seen that accommodation has been provided by the Government not only to Government servants but to others also. In the circumstances, the Court cannot help giving the plain and unambiguous meaning to the section. It may be that the retired Government servants as well as others who are in occupation of Government accommodation may become entitled to a special advantage, but the purpose of the legislation being to enable the Government to get possession of accommodation provided by them by enabling the allottee to get immediate possession of the residential accommodation owned but let by them, the Court will not be justified in giving a meaning which the words used will not warrant. On this question, therefore, we find ourselves unable to concur with the view taken by the High CourtIt is admitted that the premises were left for residential as well as professional purposes. Section 14(1)(e) requires that in order to avail the provisions of Section 14(1)(a) the premises should be ?let for use as a residence?. It has been held that when premises are let for residential as well as commercial or for residential and professional purposes the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) will not apply. This Court in Dr. Gopal Bose Varma v. Dr. S.M. Bhardwaj and Anr 1962 (2) SCR 1678, in construing Section 13(1)(e) ofthe Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 held that premises let for residential purposes but used by the tenant with the consent of the landlord incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes can to be premises let for a residential purpose alone and as such the landlord would not be entitled to eject the tenant under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Section 12(1)(a) allowed a decree for ejectment to be passed if the Court is satisfied that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation. On the facts of the case it was found that right from the commencement of the tenancy a substantial part of the premises was used by respondent 1 for his professional purposes and they have also found that this has been done obviously with the consent of the landlord. The Court held that the professional use of a substantial part of premises with the consent of the appellant clearly takes the case outside Section 13(1)(e). The view expressed in the above case was reiterated by this Court in Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal & Ors. (1970) 1 SCR 9  , on the facts it was found that the premises had been taken for residential-cum-business or professional purposes. By the rent deed the owner inducted as a tenant Labha Mal Arora who was practising Advocate. Along with the rent deed a letter was written by the landlord to the tenant stating that he had no objection to the tenant having his professional office along with the residence. After the tenant?s death in 1952 the premises were used only for residence by his sons and widow till 1957. In August 1957 the first respondent who qualified himself as a legal practitioner started practising as a lawyer in the same premises some time later. The landlord served a notice on the sons and widow of the deceased for requiring them to vacate the premises. The Court found two rooms were used by the original tenant as his office, one room by his clerk and the premises had been let for residence-cum-business purposes. The plea that the tenant was only granted a licence to use the premises for residence-cum-profession which was personal to him and which came to an end on his death was not accepted. The Court agreed with the view expressed in Dr. Gopal Dass Verma?s Case (supra) that a tenant could not be ejected under Section 13(1)(h) because the tenancy of premises let out or used for residence and carrying on of profession could not be terminated merely by showing that the tenant had acquired a suitable residence. The Court rejected the contention that the tenant Labha Mal Arora, had been merely given a permission or licence which was of a personal nature to his office. It was also enable to find that any test of dominant intention was applied in Dr. Gopal Dass Varma?s case15. It is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the words ?let for residential purpose? would exclude premises let predominantly for residential purposes with a licence to use an insignificant part for professional purpose such as lawyer?s or doctor?s consulting room. The words used in Section 14A are clearly different. Section 14A contemplates the owning by the landlord in the Union Territory of Delhi a residential accommodation. If he owns a residential accommodation he has a right to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him. The emphasis is on residential accommodation. If the premises are one intended for residential accommodation it will not make any difference if the premises are let for residential as well as other purpose. Even though the residential accommodation is let for professional or commercial purpose the premises will not cease to be for residential accommodation. It is common ground that the premises let were put up under the Delhi Development Authority?s scheme for residential purposes. The only plea was that though it was put up for residential purposes it was let for residential as well as for professional purposes. The requirement in Section (14)(1)(a) that in order to enable the landlord to recover possession the premises ought to have been let for residential purposes is not there in Section 14(1)(1). In this view we agree with the High Court that it is not necessary in a petition for eviction under Section 14A to satisfy that it was let for residential purposes only. This view has been taken by this Court in Buaching Schmitz Private Ltd. v. P.T. Menghani and Anr. (1977) 3 SCR 312  The submission that as a previous application for possession by the landlord was pending this petition would not be permissible cannot be accepted as the grounds on which an application for possession is filed under Section 14A(1) are different and based on special rights conferred on the class of persons who occupied Government accommodationThe special procedure prescribed under Section 25B is made applicable in cases where the landlord applied for recovery of possession on any of the grounds specified in Clause (e) of the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or under Section 14A. Sub-section (5) of Section 25B of says that the Controller shall give leave to the tenant to contest if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts that would disentitled the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified in Clause (e) of the Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 or Section 14A. Under Section 14A(1)(e) the tenant may (1)(1977) 3 SCR 372     may resist the application on the grounds specified namely, that the premises are not let for residential purposes, that they are not required. So far as the fact which would disentitled the landlord from obtaining an order under Section 14A are concerned they can only be that the landlord is not a person in acception of residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or that a general or special order has been made by the Government requiring him to vacate such residential accommodation on the terms specified in the section. Leave to contest an application under Section 14A(1) cannot be said to be analogous to the provisions of grant of leave to defend as envisaged in the Civil Procedure Code. Order XXXVII, Rule 2, Sub-rule (3), of theCode of Civil Procedure provides that the defendant shall not appear or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a Judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 of Order XXXVII lays down the procedure to obtain leave. Under the provisions leave to appear and defend the suit is to be given if the affidavit discloses such facts as would make incumbent on the holder to prove consideration or such other facts as the Court may laid down sufficient to support the application. The scope of Section 25B(5) is very restricted for the leave to contest can only be given if the facts are such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14AThe learned counsel for the tenant submitted that the requirements of Section 14(1)(e) should also be satisfied before the landlord could take advantage of the procedure provided under Section 25B. The learned counsel drew our attention to Section 25C(1) and Section 25C(2) and submitted that the reading of these twoSub-sectionswould indicate that before an eviction could be ordered under and application under Section 14A(1) the requirement of Sections 14(6) and (7) should besatisfied.While Section 14(1) enumerates the grounds on which the landlord can get a decree for recovery of possession against a tenantSub-sections(2) to (11) place certain restrictions. Sub-section (2) provides restriction as to right for recovery of possession under Section 14(1)(e). Restriction regarding the right to recover possession under Clause(e) is laid down inSub-sections(6) and (7) of Section 14. Section 14(6) states that where a landlord acquired any premises by transfer no application for recovery of possession shall lie under Sub-section (1) on the ground specified in Clause(e) of the proviso the rate, unless as a period of five years has elapsed from the date of the acquisition. Sub-section (7) to Section 14 lays down that where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in Clause(e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1), the landlord shall not be entitle to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. Section 25C makes an exception to the requirement of Section 14(6) to the effect that where a landlord is in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority and who fulfils the requirement of Section 14A(1) the requirement under Section 14(6) that he would not be entitled to possession unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date of his acquisition of the premises is not applicable. In other words, he can straightway obtain possession without the impediment deposed under Section 14(6).Great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the tenant on Section 25C(2) which provides that is in the case of a landlord who, being a person of the category specified inSub-section(), has obtained, on the ground specified in Clause(e) of the proviso toSub-section(1) of Section 14, or under Section, an order for the eviction of a tenant from any premises, the provisions ofSub-section(7) of Section 14 shall have effect as if for the words ?six months?, occurring therein, the words ?two months? were substituted. The contention was that if Section 14A(1) stood by itself and if a landlord applying under Section 14A(1) would straightaway get the possession after tenant cannot contest the suit on the grounds specified in Section 25B(3) there is no need for mentioning the provisions of Section 14(1)(6) and Section 14(1)(7) and prescribing a lesser period for a prescribed period under Section 14(7). In other words, the submission was that an application for possession under Section 14A should also satisfy the requirements of Section 14(1)(a).The provisions of Section 25B and 25C are applicable to both applications under Section 14(1)(e) and under Section 14A. Applications under Section 14(1)(e) are governed by Section 14(6) and Section 17(7). By introduction of Section 25C the condition imposed in Section 14(6) in made not applicable to persons who satisfy the requirements under Section 14A meaning thereby that this restriction will be applicable only to an application under Section 14(1)(a). Section 25C(2) makes it clear that not only in the case of an application under Section 14(1)(e) but also under Section 14A the term of six months prescribed in Section 14(7) is reduced to two months. The reason for specifying the period of two months in the case of Section 14A would be entitled to possession immediately. By prescribing a specific period of two months under Section 25C(2) it is made clear that even an applicant under Section 14A would have to satisfy the condition laid down Section 25C i.e. a period of two months should elapse before the landlord is satisfied to obtain possession from the date of an order for recovery of possession. The submission also fails.