Case: Savitri Sahay Vs. Sachidanand Prasad

trial Court therefore passed a decree for eviction.6. As Section 14(8) barred an Appeal, the Respondent-tenant filed a Revision in the High Court. The High Court after considering all the facts came to the conclusion that need of the Appellant cannot be said to be reasonable and in good faith as she had let out, during the pendency of the proceedings, three other flats in the same building even though they had fallen vacant and she could have occupied those flats. The High Court therefore, set aside the decree passed by the trial court and, by the impugned judgment, dismissed the Suit of the Appellant. Hence, this Appeal. 7. Mr. Sanyal submitted that under Section 14(8) the High Court only had revisional powers which were limited to satisfying itself that the order passed by the trial Court was in accordance with law. In support of this submission, he relied upon the case of Hiralal Kapur vs. Prabhu Choudhury reported in (1988) 2 SCC 172 , wherein it has been held, in the context of Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, that even though the powers were somewhat wider than similar powers under Section 115, yet the High Court was not entitled to enter into merits of factual controversy between the parties. Mr. Sanyal also relied upon the authority in the case of Sarla Ahuja vs. United Indian Insurance Company Ltd. reported in (1998) 8 SCC 119 , wherein again, in the context of section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, it has been held that even though the word "revision" is not used the powers of the Court under this Section are revisional in nature and a reappraisal of evidence can be made only for the limited purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding Court is wholly unreasonable. Relying on those authorities, Mr. Sanyal submitted that the High Court erred in re-appreciating the entire evidence and arriving at a different conclusion. 8. We are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Sanyal. We have perused the impugned judgment. The High Court did not re-appreciate evidence to arrive at a different conclusion. The High Court has merely set out the admitted facts and/ or facts which have been proved during the course of trial. On the admitted or proved facts the High Court felt that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court was unreasonable and perverse. Therefore the High Court recorded its own finding. This the High Court was entitled to do once it concluded that the findings of the trial Court were perverse. 9. The next question which, however, arises is whether the conclusion of the High Court that the findings of the trial Court were perverse can be said to be correct. Under normal circumstances if a landlord during the trial gets vacant possession of some other premises which are equally suitable and choose to let them out on higher rent then it may be arguable that the need of the landlord, made out in the Eviction Petition, was not reasonable or in good faith. However, as seen above, the said Act provides specifically, in Explanation II, that even though a landlord may have two or more premises which have been let out, it is for the landlord or choose which one would be preferable to him or her and the tenant could not question such preference. In this case, the Appellant had indicated a preference for the flat occupied by the Respondent. She had given a reason why she preferred this flat. She was an old lady. She therefore could not climb to the first floor and thus the two flats on the first floor were not suitable to her. The other flat on the Southern side of this building faced a road which was a very busy road and would therefore be noisy. This particular flat faced the Bungalow in which she has been residing for so many years and also faced an open piece of land belonging to her husband. That trial Court accepts these reasons. The High Court has merely set aside the decree on the ground that the Appellant had chosen not to occupy the three other flats which became available in the same building. In our view, Explanation II to Section 11(1)(c) permitted the landlord to ignore other premises and to prefer a particular premise. The Appellant having made a preference cannot be forced to occupy other premises which may become available. Further the Appellant was not required to keep those premises vacant because her Eviction Suit was pending, nor was there any duty cast on the Appellant, under any provision of law, to offer those other premises to Respondent. If the Respondent had so desired, he could have offered to vacate the flat preferred by the landlady and move into one of those other premises. If the Appellant had refused to accept such an offer, it possibly could have been said that the landlady was merely seeking to get vacant possession in order to get higher rents. In that case it could have been inferred that the need of the Appellant was not genuine and/ or in good faith. No such case has been made out. In view of the specific provision in the said Act the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained.10. It was next urged that the Appellant was merely evicting the Respondent in order to let out the premises at higher rent. It was urged that the Appellant came from a very affluent and well known family in Bhagalpur and was therefore not likely to shift into the said premises. In our view, Section 17 of the said Act, which has been set out hereinabove, is a complete answer to this submission. In case the Appellant does not shift into the said premises, it will be open to the Respondent to apply, under Section 17 of the said Act, for restoration of possession and for compensation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. We are unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Sanyal. We have perused the impugned judgment. The High Court did notevidence to arrive at a different conclusion. The High Court has merely set out the admitted facts and/ or facts which have been proved during the course of trial. On the admitted or proved facts the High Court felt that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court was unreasonable and perverse. Therefore the High Court recorded its own finding. This the High Court was entitled to do once it concluded that the findings of the trial Court were perverse.normal circumstances if a landlord during the trial gets vacant possession of some other premises which are equally suitable and choose to let them out on higher rent then it may be arguable that the need of the landlord, made out in the Eviction Petition, was not reasonable or in good faith. However, as seen above, the said Act provides specifically, in Explanation II, that even though a landlord may have two or more premises which have been let out, it is for the landlord or choose which one would be preferable to him or her and the tenant could not question such preference. In this case, the Appellant had indicated a preference for the flat occupied by the Respondent. She had given a reason why she preferred this flat. She was an old lady. She therefore could not climb to the first floor and thus the two flats on the first floor were not suitable to her. The other flat on the Southern side of this building faced a road which was a very busy road and would therefore be noisy. This particular flat faced the Bungalow in which she has been residing for so many years and also faced an open piece of land belonging to her husband. That trial Court accepts these reasons. The High Court has merely set aside the decree on the ground that the Appellant had chosen not to occupy the three other flats which became available in the same building. In our view, Explanation II to Section 11(1)(c) permitted the landlord to ignore other premises and to prefer a particular premise. The Appellant having made a preference cannot be forced to occupy other premises which may become available. Further the Appellant was not required to keep those premises vacant because her Eviction Suit was pending, nor was there any duty cast on the Appellant, under any provision of law, to offer those other premises to Respondent. If the Respondent had so desired, he could have offered to vacate the flat preferred by the landlady and move into one of those other premises. If the Appellant had refused to accept such an offer, it possibly could have been said that the landlady was merely seeking to get vacant possession in order to get higher rents. In that case it could have been inferred that the need of the Appellant was not genuine and/ or in good faith. No such case has been made out. In view of the specific provision in the said Act the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained.10. It was next urged that the Appellant was merely evicting the Respondent in order to let out the premises at higher rent. It was urged that the Appellant came from a very affluent and well known family in Bhagalpur and was therefore not likely to shift into the said premises. In our view, Section 17 of the said Act, which has been set out hereinabove, is a complete answer to this submission. In case the Appellant does not shift into the said premises, it will be open to the Respondent to apply, under Section 17 of the said Act, for restoration of possession and for compensation.