Case: M.V. Tongli Yantai Vs. Great Pacific Navication (Holdings) Corporation Limited

documents under the aforesaid Act and that Lloyds list would be analogous such documents being maintained as public documents containing the data of shipping companies. Of course, our observation would be subject to the decision in the appeal.Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner has produced the Terms and Conditions issued by Lloyds List International for consideration of the data produced by the said agency and the terms and conditions under which it could be used. It shows a disclaimer of the facts contained therein. This document would certainly be considered at the stage of trial, when presumption would be drawn upon the facts contained therein. However we do not feel it necessary to reconsider our judgment based upon the terms and conditions not relied upon though available to the Petitioner at the time of the hearing of the application before the learned single Judge or in appeal before us. We may mention that such a document would not fall within the ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 as a document which was newly discovered upon an important matter or evidence at this stage.11) The Petitioners have produced the Dictionary of International Trade showing the meaning of Lloyds list and Lloyds register. Lloyds list is shown to be the leading source of worldwide maritime news and information including coverage of world shipping insurance. Lloyds register is shown to be a register of vessels containing valuable information relating to their description and insurance. Lloyds list, therefore, appears to be wider than the Lloyds register and would contain matters relating to vessels and their description and insurance. From the Dictionary meanings of the two documents themselves the closeness to the relationship between the two is shown. The admissibility and acceptance of the documents alone would differ. Even if the statutory presumption was not to be drawn, the Lloyds list would be accepted in evidence as being the leading source of maritime information. The information in this case would be considered in the evidence in that light. We have made our prima facie observations upon the documentary evidence pending any further oral evidence in proof of the document.12) Finance of Far East Horizon Ltd. (FEHL):It was an admitted position that one Far East Horizon Ltd., (FEHL) was a financer who financed the Defendant ship to the extent of 60% of its purchase price. Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner would have it emphasised that FEHL financed the ship through Halcyon. We do not see the difference that it would make.13) The judgment in the case of Permina 3001 (1979 (1) LLR 327) : Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner contended that the paragraphs emphasised by the Petitioner during the arguments of the appeal were not considered or reproduced in our judgment. The judgment related to the beneficial ownership. We have considered that aspect. We need not articulate it as the Petitioner would desire.14) All the shares in the ship :The beneficial ownership was shown to be contained in the individual company which owned all the shares in the ship. That aspect has been set out in the plaint as also in the English statute and the English judgments. It is contended that thereafter the Plaintiff put forward a contrary case of the shares, but not all the shares, in the ship which were required for beneficial ownership. This aspect has been considered in our judgment upon minutely dissecting the case of Ohm Mariana referred to whilst taking an overall view of all the cases cited before us in paragraph 83. Whether or not all the shares of the ship or the person who had the right to sell, dispose of, or alienate the ship could be termed as the beneficial owner would be the question of law to be decided in an appeal from our judgment, we having decided in favour of the latter.15) Judgment in the case of Polestar Maritime Vs. Qi Li Men & Ors .:The judgment sets out the usual position which prevails with regard to limited companies. It lays down the correct state of law under the usual circumstances. The corporate veil is required to be lifted to see the position that actually prevails under unusual circumstances. Consequently, what the Petitioner considers our failure would be tested in appeal.16) The Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 :We have considered the provision of the Act as was shown to us by Counsel on behalf of the Plaintiff. Counsel on behalf of the Defendant had argued about his own interpretation of that law. Reiteration of that fact would be permissible only in appeal.17) Judgment in the case of Geetanjali Wollen Pvt. Ltd. Vs. m.v. Xpress Annapurna & Ors. (2005 (6) BCR 31):We are informed that our observation that the appeal from order in that case was dismissed is erroneously recorded in paragraph 93 of our judgment though it was stayed in that case. We shall make the necessary correction in that behalf.18) Observation of the learned single Judge with regard to the reason for not lifting the corporate veil:We have observed that the learned single Judge has observed that two of the companies whose veil was sought to be lifted were not sued. Paragraph 136 of the judgment of the learned single Judge shows that the question of law relating to lifting the corporate veil would arise in "proceedings between" the Plaintiff and those companies. That could only be if the companies were sued. We read the judgment accordingly.19) Points pressed which were not taken in the judgment :Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner has drawn our attention to the judgment in the case of Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs. Chief Election Officer & Ors (2008) 2 SCC 95 in which it was held that in such a case a review would lie. Upon this judgment Counsel of the Petitioner has raised before us the aforesaid points which have been considered.We may mention that other than the aforesaid, no other point has been pressed before us in arguments and we refrain from considering any other.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We have observed that the learned single Judge has observed that two of the companies whose veil was sought to be lifted were not sued. Paragraph 136 of the judgment of the learned single Judge shows that the question of law relating to lifting the corporate veil would arise in "proceedings between" the Plaintiff and those companies. That could only be if the companies were sued. We read the judgment accordingly.19) Points pressed which were not taken in the judgment :Counsel on behalf of the Petitioner has drawn our attention to the judgment in the case of Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs. Chief Election OfficerOrs (2008) 2 SCC 95     in which it was held that in such a case a review would lie. Upon this judgment Counsel of the Petitioner has raised before us the aforesaid points which have been considered.We may mention that other than the aforesaid, no other point has been pressed before us in arguments and we refrain from considering any other.