Case: Poona Mazoor Sabha Vs. G.K. Dhutia &amp; Another

between the parties, does the fact that there is a binding settlement between the parties under S. 19(3) prevent one of the parties to that settlement from raising an industrial dispute It may be said that there is no specific provision in the Act which lays down that an industrial dispute cannot be raised with regard to a matter which is the subject of a settlement under S. 12 read with S. 19(2). But in our opinion what we have to consider is the effect of the Legislature providing that under S. 19(2) a settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months; and that section also provides for a proper notice being given terminating the settlement after the expiry of the period mentioned in the earlier part of the section.When the Legislature provides for a particular agreement being binding upon the parties to an industrial dispute, it clearly intends that there is industrial peace with regard to the subject matter of the agreement for the duration of that agreement, and it is obvious that if there is to be industrial peace for the period contemplated then neither party to that settlement can be allowed to raise an industrial dispute with regard to that settlement.5. Considerable light is also thrown upon the proper construction of S. 19(2) by the provisions contained in that section with regard to an award. An award is a super-imposed decision and the parties to the award have to abide by it whether they like the terms of the award or riot, and in the case of an award specific powers are given to Government to curtail its duration, to extend it, and in cases where Government considers that since the award was made there has been a material change in the circumstances on which it was based, to refer the award or part of it to a Tribunal for decision whether the period of operation should not by reason of such change be shortened.Therefore it is clear that but for this specific provision with regard to an award the position of an award in law would have been the same as that of a settlement. An award being as binding in its nature as a settlement, the Legislature had to give specific power to the Government to interfere with the finality of that award by empowering Government to refer it to a Tribunal under circumstances mentioned in S. 19(4).But the Legislature advisedly did not confer that power upon Government with regard to a settlement arrived at between the parties, and the reason for the Legislature not doing so in obvious. As already said, an award is not the result of an agreement between the parties. It is something super-imposed upon them by the force majeure off law. But a settlement is a purely voluntary matter and parties may or may not arrive at a settlement.But when parties do arrive at a settlement the law gives to it a greater sanctity than it gives to an award, and therefore the industrial law does not contemplate any interference with the finality of a settlement and it compels the settlement to run! on for the period mentioned in the settlement itself and neither party is permitted to challenge that settlement during its duration.If the subject matter of an award or a settlement could be raised as an industrial dispute, then it is clear that there was no reason for the Legislature specifically to confer power upon Government with regard to referring an award for adjudication.In the absence of any such specific provision, with regard to a settlement, it is clear in our opinion that neither any industrial dispute can be raised with regard to the settlement nor can matters covered by that settlement form the subject matter of conciliation proceedings under S. 12.6. In taking the view that we are, we are not deciding anything which is prejudicial to the rights of labour. If we were to accept the contention put forward by Mr. Bhandare, it would become extremely difficult for employer and employees to arrive at any settlement without first going to a conciliation officer.If the law was that a private settlement of an industrial dispute could not be arrived at which could be recorded by the conciliation officer and which could be made binding, then it would be very difficult to induce parties to arrive at any such settlement, because the whole of Mr. Bhandares argument revolves round this that it was open to the workers of the second opponent company the next day after they had arrived at this agreement, to resile from that agreement.Industrial peace demands that sanctity should be attached to agreements freely arrived at by the parties and if the view went abroad that private settlements have no sanctity whatsoever, then there would be little chance of disputes ending by settlement between the parties. It will indeed be extremely unfortunate from the point of view of labour.7. Mr. Seervai has also raised the point that under S. 12 it is discretionary with the conciliation officer to hold conciliation proceedings or not. It is only when the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under S. 22 has been given that there is a statutory duty cast upon him to hold conciliation proceedings.Although the conciliation officer has a discretion, it is obvious that that discretion cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised, and if we had agreed with the contention put forward by Mr. Bhandare then we would certainly have required the conciliation officer to consider the question on merits and exercise his discretion as required by the statute. But inasmuch we have taken the view that conciliation proceedings cannot be initiated when there is a settlement in force, the question of the exercise of the discretion of the conciliation officer does not arise.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We will assume for the sake of this argument that there was an agreement arrived at between the parties antecedent toand on this assumption we have to ask ourselves the question whether that would exclude the jurisdiction of the conciliation officer to record the settlement arrivedthe eye of the industrial law, in our opinion, an industrial dispute does not end until a settlement is arrived at which settlement has been given a binding effect under the provisions of S. 19(2), and such a settlement can only be arrived at when conciliation proceedings are held under S. 12.Therefore, it would not be true to say that the industrial dispute ended with the settlement arrived at between the parties onthat the conciliation officer had no jurisdiction to record the settlement, and that in raising another dispute in June 1955, the Union was raising a dispute which was not and could not be the subject matter of a settlement contemplated by S. 12 and S.the absence of any such specific provision, with regard to a settlement, it is clear in our opinion that neither any industrial dispute can be raised with regard to the settlement nor can matters covered by that settlement form the subject matter of conciliation proceedings under S. 12.In taking the view that we are, we are not deciding anything which is prejudicial to the rights of labour. If we were to accept the contention put forward by Mr. Bhandare, it would become extremely difficult for employer and employees to arrive at any settlement without first going to a conciliation officer.If the law was that a private settlement of an industrial dispute could not be arrived at which could be recorded by the conciliation officer and which could be made binding, then it would be very difficult to induce parties to arrive at any such settlement, because the whole of Mr. Bhandares argument revolves round this that it was open to the workers of the second opponent company the next day after they had arrived at this agreement, to resile from that agreement.Industrial peace demands that sanctity should be attached to agreements freely arrived at by the parties and if the view went abroad that private settlements have no sanctity whatsoever, then there would be little chance of disputes ending by settlement between the parties. It will indeed be extremely unfortunate from the point of view ofis only when the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under S. 22 has been given that there is a statutory duty cast upon him to hold conciliation proceedings.Although the conciliation officer has a discretion, it is obvious that that discretion cannot be arbitrarily or capriciously exercised, and if we had agreed with the contention put forward by Mr. Bhandare then we would certainly have required the conciliation officer to consider the question on merits and exercise his discretion as required by the statute. But inasmuch we have taken the view that conciliation proceedings cannot be initiated when there is a settlement in force, the question of the exercise of the discretion of the conciliation officer does not arise.