Case: Nicholas Piramal India Ltd Vs. Harisingh

in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council.] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that ‘reasonableness’ of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the standpoint of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India (SCC at pp. 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India and U.P. Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. while judging whether the administrative action is ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14 (i.e. otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury review always.68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury principles applies.” 40. Additionally, the proportionality and punishment in service law has been discussed by this Court in Om Kumar case as follows:“69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect of Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of ‘arbitrariness’ of the order of punishment is questioned under Article 14.70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, this Court referred to ‘proportionality’ in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was ‘shockingly’ disproportionate to the misconduct proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, this Court stated that the Court will not interfere unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the conscience of the court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the other. However, in rare situations, the court could award an alternative penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham.”” Further, in the case of State of Mysore v. K. Manche Gowda (supra), this Court has held thus:- “8…….It is suggested that the past record of a government servant, if it is intended to be relied upon for imposing a punishment, should be made specific charge in the first stage of the enquiry itself and, if it is not so done, it cannot be relied upon after the enquiry is closed and the report is submitted to the authority entitled to impose the punishment. An enquiry against a government servant is one continuous process, though for convenience it is done in two stages. The report submitted by the Enquiry Officer is only recommendatory in nature and the final authority which scrutinizes it and imposes punishment is the authority empowered to impose the same. Whether a particular person has a reasonable opportunity or not depends, to some extent, upon the nature of the subject-matter of the enquiry. But it is not necessary in this case to decide whether such previous record can be made the subject matter of charge at the first stage of the enquiry. But, nothing in law prevents the punishing authority from taking that fact into consideration during the second stage of the enquiry, for essentially it relates more to the domain of punishment rather than to that of guilt. But what is essential is that the government servant shall be given a reasonable opportunity to know that fact and meet the same.” 24. Further, the Labour Court after adverting to the judgments of this Court referred to supra has rightly held that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate and interfered with the same by imposing the lesser punishment of denial of 50% back wages with reinstatement and the same has been examined and rightly upheld by the Appellate Court and the High Court in exercise of its judicial review power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 25. Having regard to the nature of judicial review power conferred upon the High Court, it has rightly accepted the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court which is affirmed by the Appellate Court by recording valid and cogent reasons in the impugned Award/judgment. The same can neither be termed as erroneous nor error in law.26. The workman’s wilful disobedience of lawful or reasonable order under Clause 12(1)(d) of the SSO and the wilful slowing down of the work performance by him has been held to be partially proved. Therefore, the Labour Court has imposed a lesser punishment as against the order of dismissal in exercise of its original jurisdiction and power under Section 107 of the M.P.I.R. Act as the Disciplinary Authority has failed to give any valid reasons for not imposing any one of the lesser punishments as provided under Clause 12 (3)(b)(i) to (v) of SSO. Hence, the denial of 50% back wages to the workman by the Labour Court is itself a punishment imposed upon the workman as held by this Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor (supra), upon which reliance has been rightly placed by the learned counsel for the respondent- workman. The contention urged on behalf of the appellant-Company that the award of back wages in the absence of any plea and evidence by the respondent-workman that he was not gainfully employed cannot be accepted by us in view of the decision in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) & Ors (2013) 10 SCC 324 ). delivered by this Court to which one of us, (Justice V. Gopala Gowda), is a party to the judgment.27. For the reasons stated supra, we do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and Awards of the High Court as well as the Appellate Court and the Labour Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]25. Having regard to the nature of judicial review power conferred upon the High Court, it has rightly accepted the impugned Award passed by the Labour Court which is affirmed by the Appellate Court by recording valid and cogent reasons in the impugned Award/judgment. The same can neither be termed as erroneous nor error in law.26. Thewilful disobedience of lawful or reasonable order under Clause 12(1)(d) of the SSO and the wilful slowing down of the work performance by him has been held to be partially proved. Therefore, the Labour Court has imposed a lesser punishment as against the order of dismissal in exercise of its original jurisdiction and power under Section 107 of the M.P.I.R. Act as the Disciplinary Authority has failed to give any valid reasons for not imposing any one of the lesser punishments as provided under Clause 12 (3)(b)(i) to (v) of SSO. Hence, the denial of 50% back wages to the workman by the Labour Court is itself a punishment imposed upon the workman as held by this Court in the case of Jitendra Singh Rathor (supra), upon which reliance has been rightly placed by the learned counsel for the respondentworkman. The contention urged on behalf of thethat the award of back wages in the absence of any plea and evidence by thethat he was not gainfully employed cannot be accepted by us in view of the decision in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) & Ors (2013) 10 SCC 324 ). delivered by this Court to which one of us, (Justice V. Gopala Gowda), is a party to the judgment.27. For the reasons stated supra, we do not find any good reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and Awards of the High Court as well as the Appellate Court and the Labour Court.The first point is required to be answered in favour of thefor the followingLabour Court at the first instance has erroneously failed to exercise its jurisdiction by notthe evidence on record after holding that the preliminary issue regarding the domestic enquiry conducted by theis legal and valid. The said erroneous finding was challenged by thein the Appellate Court after two remand orders were passed by the Industrial Court. Ultimately, the Labour Court has exercised its jurisdiction and onof the facts and the evidence on record and in accordance with the decision of this Court in The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company of India (P) Ltd. v. The Management and Ors. (AIR (1973) SC 1227 ), it has found fault with the findings of the Inquiry Officer which was endorsed by the Disciplinary Authority which has erroneously held that the workman was guilty of the misconduct. The Labour Court after the two remand orders has rightly come to the conclusion onof the evidence on record and held that the charge levelled against the respondent is partially proved and even then the order of dismissal imposed upon him by the Disciplinary Authority, has been done without notifying theabout his past service record, as required under Clause 12(3)(b)&(c) of the SSO, which aspect is rightly noticed and answered by the Labour Court at para 20 of its Award dated 29.10.2007. Thus, the order of dismissal of the workman from the service is disproportionate and severe to the gravity of the misconduct.Further, the Labour Court after adverting to the judgments of this Court referred to supra has rightly held that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate and interfered with the same by imposing the lesser punishment of denial of 50% back wages with reinstatement and the same has been examined and rightly upheld by the Appellate Court and the High Court in exercise of its judicial review power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.