Case: Mohd-Ashfaq Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal U.P. and Others

application for renewal of a permit after the last date specified in subsection (2), "if the application is made not more than 15 days after the said last date and is accompanied by the prescribed fee. " Sub-section (3) thus vests a discretion in the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal of a permit even if it is beyond time, but in that case the delay should not be of more than fifteen days. The word used in sub-section (3) is "may" and not "shall" and the Regional Transport Authority is given a discretion to entertain , m application for renewal of a permit even where it is beyond time, though not more than 15 days. It may condone the delay or it may not, depending on the circumstances of each case. The discretion is be exercised not on any arbitrary of fanciful grounds or whim or caprice of the Regional Transport Authority, but it is to be a judicial discretion. It is true that the criterion which is to guide the Regional Transport Authority in the exercise of its discretion is not articulated in sub-section (3), but it i s implicit in every conferment of discretion on a judicial or quasi-judicial authority that the discretion is to be exercised in a judicial manner on well settled legal principles. would not be right to attribute to the Legislature an intention to confer unguided and unfettered discretion on the Regional Transport Authority which is quasi-judicial authority. The discretion is obviously to be exercised where sufficient cause for no t making the application for renewal within time is made out by the applicant. This criterion can legitimately be imported from section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which contains an allied provision for con donation of delay where an application is made beyond time. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that even where there is no sufficient cause for delay in making an application for renewal, the Regional Transport Authority should still be bound to entertain the application for renewal merely, on the ground that the delay is of not more than 15 days. Sub-section (3) enacts a provision for condonation of del ay in making an application for renewal and not provision extending the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) in all cases as a matter of course. If the intention of the Legislature were that in every case delay of not more than 15 days in making an application for renewal should be condoned as of course, there was no need for a separate provision in sub- section (3), but the Legislature could have very specified "one hundred and five days" instead of "one hundred and twenty days" in the proviso to sub-section (2).It is, therefore, dear that sub-section (3) of section 58 confers a discretion on the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in time. Now the question which arises is: does section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply so as to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient cause, to entertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more than 15 days? Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes section 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its applicability can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision of the Act. The only provision of the Act sought to be pressed into service for this purpose was sub-section (3). Does sub-section (3) expressly exclude further extension of time under section 5 ? If it does, then section 5 cannot be availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay. Sub-section (3) in so many terms says that the Regional Transport Authority may condone the delay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. This clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in sub-section (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of section 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This provision may seem harsh, but it has been deliberately and advisedly made because the question of renewal of a permit must obviously be decided before the expiration of the period of the permit and in view of the elaborate procedure set out in section 57 for dealing with an application for renewal, a certain minimum period before the expiration of the period of the permit must be provided within which this procedure can be completed so that the, renewal can, if at all, be granted well in time before the permit expires. If an application for renewal could be entertained even if made at any stage, it would dislocate the procedural machinery set out in section 57 and that is why the Legislature prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 58 that the delay in making an application for renewal may be condoned by the Regional Transport Authority only if it is of not more than 15 days. Here, the application made by the appellant for renewal of his permit was admittedly late by more than 15 days and hence the delay was not condonable and the Regional Transport Authority was right in rejecting the application for renewal as time barred.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]This argument is, in our opinion, manifestly wrong. The scheme of Chapter IVA is clear and it does not exclude the applicability of the provisions contained in section 57 and the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 68. Chapter IVA contains a fasciculus of sections commencing from section 68A and ending with section 68-B. Section 68-A defines certain expressions used in Chapter IVA. Section 68-B gives overriding effect to the provisions contained in Chapter IVA by saying that these provisions shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV or in any other law for the time being in force. Section 68-C provides that where any State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport service in relation to any route should be run and operated by the State Transport Undertaking, a scheme may be prepared by the S1ate Transport Undertaking giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the route proposed to be covered and other prescribed particulars and such scheme shall be duly published. Certain categories of persons are empowered by section 68-D sub-section (1) to file objections against th e scheme published under sect-ion 68-C and the State Government may then, after considering such objections and hearing the parties, approve or modify the scheme under sub-section (2) of section 68-D. Section 68-D sub-section (3) provides that the scheme as approved or modified under sub-section (2) shall be Published in the Official Gazette and it shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the routes to which it relates shall be called the notified routes. Section 68-E provides for cancellation or modification of the scheme. Then follows section 68-F which is material for our purpose. Sub-section (1) of that section provides for issue of a permit to the State Transport Undertaking in respect of a notified route after publication of an approved scheme. But what is to happen during the period between the publication of a scheme under section 68-C and the publication of the approved scheme under sub-section (3) of section 68-D ? That is taken care of by sub-sections (1A) to (1-D) of section 68F. Sub-sect ion (1-A) provides that for this intervening period, the State Transport Undertaking may apply for a temporary permit in respect of a route specified in the scheme and where such application is made, the Regional Transport Authority shall, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to increase, in the public interest, the number of vehicles operating on such route, issue the temporary permit prayed for by the State Transport Undertaking. What shall be the duration of such temporary permit is laid down in sub-section (1-B). Sub-section (1-C) deals with the situation where no application for a temporary permit is made by the State Trans port Undertaking and it says that in such a case, the Regional Transport Authority may grant temporary permit to any person in respect of a route specified in the scheme. Sub-section (1-D) imposes a prohibition that "save as otherwise provided in sub-section (1-A) and sub-section (1-C), no permit shall be granted or renewed during the period intervening between the date of publication under section 68-C of any scheme and the date of publication of the approved or modified scheme, in favour of any person" in relation to a route covered by such scheme, but this is subject to a proviso that where the period of operation of a permit in relation to any route "specified in a scheme published under section 68-C expires after such publication, such permit may be renewed for a limited period". It will, therefore, be seen that where a scheme is published under section 68-C, no permit in respect of a route specified in the scheme can be granted or renewed during the intervening period between the publication of the scheme under section 68-C and the publication of the approved scheme, except a temporary permit to the State Transport Undertaking under sub-section (1-A) or failing that, a temporary permit to any other person under sub- section (1-C), with this qualification that an existing permit can be renewed for a limited period. The holder of an existing permit would obviously exnecessitas have to make an application, if he wants renewal of his permit and the application f or renewal would be considered by the Regional Transport Authority. The question is: can this application for renewal be made at any time and when it is made, what procedure would govern it. Section 57 lays down t he procedure to be followed in dealing with an application got grant of a permit and by reason of section 58 sub-section (2), that procedure is applicable also in relation to an application for renewal of a permit. There is also a time limit laid down in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 which says, in so far as relevant, that an application for renewal of a permit shall be made not less than 120 days before the date of expiry of the permit. These provisions in section 57 and the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 on their plain language apply to every application for renewal of a permit and it is indeed difficult to see what difference there is between an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F and any other application for renewal of a permit. An application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F is as much an application for renewal as any other. It had to be specially provided for in the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F, because sub-section (1-D) imposes a prohibition on grant or renewal of permit during the intervening period between the publication of a scheme under section 68-C and the publication of the approved scheme and, ii the proviso were not enacted, renewal of an existing permit expiring after the publication of the scheme under section 68-C would have been barred. This, the Legislature did not want and hence the proviso was introduced permitting renewal of an existing permit though for a limited period, despite the general prohibition enact- ed in sub-section (1-D). This renewal was not intended to be sore6 special kind of renewal different from any other ordinary renewal of a permit. There is, therefore, no reason in principle why the provisions enacted in section 57 and the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 should not apply in case of an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-section (1-D) of section 68-F. If the procedure set out in section 57 does not apply in such a case, there is no other procedure prescribed by the Act which can possibly be invoked and the result would be that them would be no procedure for dealing with such an application. for renewal and in that event, how would the objections be invited against the application for renewal and within what ti me and who would be entitled to be heard and when ? And equally if the time Limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 does not apply, there would be no time limit for making such an application for renewal and it would be possible to make it any time, even after the expiry of the period of the permit and the Regional Transport Authority would be bound to consider it. That surely could never have been the intention of the Legislature. Moreover, it is implicit in the enactment of section 68-B that Chapter IV-A is not a self-contained Chapter to which the other provisions of the Act are inapplicable. If Chapter IVA were a self-contained Code by itself, there would have been no need to give overriding effect to the provisions in that Chapter as against the other provisions of the Act. Section 68-F, sub-section (3) also proceeds on the assumption that, but for its enactment, an order made by the Regional Transport Authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 68-F would have been appealable under section 64 and it was to exclude the applicability of section 64 that sub-section (3 ) of section 68-F was enacted. These two circumstances dearly point to the conclusion that the other provisions of the Act, to the extent to which their language warrants, apply in relation to proceedings under Chapter IVA, save in so far as they may be, expressly or by reason of repugnance or inconsistency, overridden. We must, therefore, reject the first contention of the appellant which seeks to exclude the applicability of the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 58 to an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to subsection (1-D) of section 68-F.That takes us to the next question as to the applicability of section 5 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 to an application for renewal of aproviso to sub-section (2) requires that an application for renewal of a permit should be made not less than 120 days before the date of expiry of the permit. But, notwithstanding this provision, the Regional Transport Authority may, under sub-section (3), entertain an application for renewal of a permit after the last date specified in subsection (2), "if the application is made not more than 15 days after the said last date and is accompanied by the prescribed fee. " Sub-section (3) thus vests a discretion in the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal of a permit even if it is beyond time, but in that case the delay should not be of more than fifteen days. The word used in sub-section (3) is "may" and not "shall" and the Regional Transport Authority is given a discretion to entertain , m application for renewal of a permit even where it is beyond time, though not more than 15 days. It may condone the delay or it may not, depending on the circumstances of each case. The discretion is be exercised not on any arbitrary of fanciful grounds or whim or caprice of the Regional Transport Authority, but it is to be a judicial discretion. It is true that the criterion which is to guide the Regional Transport Authority in the exercise of its discretion is not articulated in sub-section (3), but it i s implicit in every conferment of discretion on a judicial or quasi-judicial authority that the discretion is to be exercised in a judicial manner on well settled legal principles. would not be right to attribute to the Legislature an intention to confer unguided and unfettered discretion on the Regional Transport Authority which is quasi-judicial authority. The discretion is obviously to be exercised where sufficient cause for no t making the application for renewal within time is made out by the applicant. This criterion can legitimately be imported from section 5 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 which contains an allied provision for con donation of delay where an application is made beyond time. It could never have been the intention of the Legislature that even where there is no sufficient cause for delay in making an application for renewal, the Regional Transport Authority should still be bound to entertain the application for renewal merely, on the ground that the delay is of not more than 15 days. Sub-section (3) enacts a provision for condonation of del ay in making an application for renewal and not provision extending the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2) in all cases as a matter of course. If the intention of the Legislature were that in every case delay of not more than 15 days in making an application for renewal should be condoned as of course, there was no need for a separate provision in sub- section (3), but the Legislature could have very specified "one hundred and five days" instead of "one hundred and twenty days" in the proviso to sub-section (2).It is, therefore, dear that sub-section (3) of section 58 confers a discretion on the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-section (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in time. Now the question which arises is: does section 5 ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 apply so as to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient cause, to entertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more than 15 days? Section 29, sub-section (2) ofthe Limitation Act, 1963 makes section 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its applicability can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision of the Act. The only provision of the Act sought to be pressed into service for this purpose was sub-section (3). Does sub-section (3) expressly exclude further extension of time under section 5 ? If it does, then section 5 cannot be availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay. Sub-section (3) in so many terms says that the Regional Transport Authority may condone the delay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. This clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in sub-section (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of section 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This provision may seem harsh, but it has been deliberately and advisedly made because the question of renewal of a permit must obviously be decided before the expiration of the period of the permit and in view of the elaborate procedure set out in section 57 for dealing with an application for renewal, a certain minimum period before the expiration of the period of the permit must be provided within which this procedure can be completed so that the, renewal can, if at all, be granted well in time before the permit expires. If an application for renewal could be entertained even if made at any stage, it would dislocate the procedural machinery set out in section 57 and that is why the Legislature prescribed in sub-section (3) of section 58 that the delay in making an application for renewal may be condoned by the Regional Transport Authority only if it is of not more than 15 days. Here, the application made by the appellant for renewal of his permit was admittedly late by more than 15 days and hence the delay was not condonable and the Regional Transport Authority was right in rejecting the application for renewal as time barred.