Case: Church Of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai  and Others

entire world. 96. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others [(1995) 5 SCC 75] , this Court following Dhulabhai (supra) held that having regard to the provisions contained in the Industrial Disputes Act and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, the civil court will have no jurisdiction as enumerated in paragraph 35. 97. In Sahebgouda (Dead) By LRs. and Others Vs. Ogeppa and Others [(2003) 6 SCC 151] the allegations made in the plaint showed that the only right claimed by the Appellants was that of being ancestral pujaris of the temple. They did not claim to be the trustees of any trust. No declaration regarding the existence or otherwise of the trust or any particular property is the property of such trust had been claimed and in that view of the matter, it was held that the reliefs so claimed do not come within the purview of Section 19 or Section 79 of the Act wherefor the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner will have the exclusive jurisdiction to hold an inquiry and give a decision. 98. Ramesh Chand Ardawatiwa Vs. Anil Panjwani [(2003) 7 SCC 350] has no application in the present case as therein the Charity Commissioner took a specific objection that the civil courts jurisdiction is barred whereupon several additional issues were framed and determined. 99. In NDMC Vs. Satish Chand (Deceased) By LR. Ram Chand [(2003) 10 SCC 38] , this Court clearly held that Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 bar the jurisdiction of the civil court as the Act provided a complete remedy to the party at plea as also a remedy by way of an appeal. 100. In K. Shamrao and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner [(2003) 3 SCC 563] , this Court held: "17- Functions of the Assistant Charity Commissioner are predominantly adjudicatory. The Assistant Charity Commissioner has almost all the powers which an ordinary civil court has including power of summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents, examining witnesses on oath and coming to a definite conclusion on the evidence induced and arguments submitted." 101. In Yeshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge and Another Vs. Baburao Bala Yadav (Dead) By LRs. [(1978) 1 SCC 669] , this Court observed: "8. Mr Datar placed reliance upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dev Chavata v. Ganesh Mahadeo Deshpande in order to take advantage of Section 52-A of the Act. The ratio of the case has to be appreciated in the background of the facts found therein. The principles of law as enunciated cannot be fully and squarely applied. But yet the decision, if we may say so with respect, is correct. This would be on the footing that the decision given by the Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Act was conclusive and final. He had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the suit land belonged to the trust. He had so decided it on November 5, 1954. The suit was filed on July 21, 1955. In that view, the High Court was right in holding that a suit filed under Section 50 of the Act was not barred under Section 52-A because the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner given in 1954 had declared the property to be a trust property and which decision was final." 102. In Suresh Ramniwas Mantri and another Vs. Mohd. Iftequaroddin s/o Mohd. Badroddin [1999(2) Mh.L.J. 131] it was observed that a society although formed either for religious or charitable purposes or for both cannot be held to a public trust ipso facto although registered under the Societies Registration Act unless it is registered also under the BPT Act as the question whether such a trust was validly formed or not would come within the purview of Sections 18, 19 and 20 of the BPT Act. In that case the plaintiff was not registered as a public trust and in that situation it was held that Section 80 would operate. 103. In Mahibubi Abdul Aziz and others Vs. Sayed Abdul Majid and others [2001(2) Mh.L.J. 512], a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held that a civil suit cannot be entertained only because a complicated questions of title has been raised. 104. In Keki Pestronji Jamadar and Another vs. Khodadad Merwan Irani and Others [AIR 1973 (Bom) 130 ] the question was as to whether the author of a trust was the lawful owner of the property of which he has created the trust. The Full Bench of Bombay High Court held that the author of the trust has no title over the property and Section 80 would not operate as a bar. 105. In Nagar Wachan Mandir, Pandharpur vs. Akbaralli Abdulhusen and Sons and Others [(1994) 1 MhLJ 280] a question arose as regard power of a co-trustee to delegate a matter relating to grant or determination of lease to another co-trustee keeping in view of Section 47 of the Act which deprives the trustee from delegating his office or any of his duties to a co-trustee or a stranger unless conditions mentioned therein are complied with. 106. The principle enunciated in each of the decision laid down relate to the fact situation obtaining therein. In each case indisputably the lis arose for determination of a question relating to interpretation of one or the other clause enumerated in different provisions of the BPT Act which come either within the exclusive jurisdiction of the statutory authorities or otherwise. The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in relation to a matter, unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. In this case, having regard to the nature of the lis, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly barred. CONCLUSION:

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]42. The question as regard ouster of a jurisdiction of a Civil Court must be construed having regard to the Scheme of the Act as also the object and purport it seeks to achieve. The law in this regard is no longer res integra43. A plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court must be considered having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said purpose, averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought for therein must be considered in their entirety. The Court may not be justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having regard to the reliefs claimed dehors the factual averments made in the plaint. The rules of pleadings postulate that a plaint must contain material facts. When the plaint read as a whole does not disclose material facts giving rise to a cause of action which can be entertained by a civil court, it may be rejected in terms of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure45. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not(c) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the tribunals(d) When the provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit(e) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies(f) Questions of the correctness of the assessment, apart from its constitutionality, are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry(g) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply[See also Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. Krishna Kant and Others (1995) 5 SCC 75 , Dwarka Prasad Agarwal vs. Ramesh Chand Agarwal - (2003) 6 SCC 220 , Sahebgouda vs. Ogeppa (2003) 6 SCC 151 , Dhruv Green Field Ltd. vs. Hukam Singh (2002) 6 SCC 416  and Swamy Atmananda & Ors. Vs. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors, [2005 (4) SCALE 116]46. The same, however, would not mean that in a given case if the court has the jurisdiction to determine a part of the relief claimed, it will not confine itself thereto and reject the plaint in its entirety. For the purpose of determination of question as to whether the suit is barred, the averments made in the plaint are germane. [See Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Others Vs. Assistant Charity Commissioner and Others, (2004) 3 SCC 137 ]61. We have noticed hereinbefore that as regard the correctness or otherwise of functioning of the congregation of Ankleshwar and Valsad had been the subject matter of complaints before the authorities under the BPT Act62. One of the causes of action for instituting the suit is said to be constitution of a special committee by the defendant Nos. 1 to 4; resolution dated 12th November, 1978 was passed and the obstructions created by them to the plaintiffs and other members of the Pastorates through the actions of the Plaintiffs and other members of the Pastorates in the name of the former Brethren Church63. The plaintiffs made their position clear when they categorically stated in paragraph 21 that the suit inter alia involved questions as to the rights of property of the former Brethren Church65. The plaint nowhere suggests that the society and the trust had ever been treated as two different entities. No case has been made in the plaint to the effect that the society as registered under the Societies Registration Act plays any role or discharges any function which is not done by the trustees of the trust. It also does not appear from a perusal of the plaint that the society and the trust comprises of different persons or for different functions to perform. In fact in paragraph 2 of the plaint it is accepted that the Church which was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act was a public trust as defined under Section 2(13) of the BPT Act. The ownership of movable and immovable properties at the places mentioned in the plaint is referable to the congregations under the Brethren Church. It is not alleged that whereas the properties belong to the trust it was managed by the society. The plaint furthermore does not disclose that the decision as regard dissolution of the churches and congregation of Brethren Church had been taken by anybody other than the trustees. The committees constituted for the aforementioned purpose, viz., Continuation Committee and Negotiating Committee, evidently were represented by the authorities of the congregations and not of any society. A decision, as would appear from the averments made in paragraph 6 of the plaint, to dissolve six uniting Churches and merge the same into one, viz., the Church of Northern India (C.N.I.) so as to make the latter a legal continuation and successor of the United Churches and all the properties, assets, obligations, etc. of these uniting churches would vest in or dissolve on C.N.I. The very fact that a decision having been taken as regard the properties, assets, obligations of the United Churches, the same would mean that they would vest in the trust to be created for the said purpose and not for the benefit of any society66. We are not oblivious of the fact that the Resolution adopted in the meeting held on 17th February, 1968 allegedly fulfilled all the requirements for such resolution as provided in the Societies Registration Act but it is now beyond any controversy that the society having not owned any property, their transfer in favour of a new society was impermissible in law. In terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration act, all properties would vest in the trustees and only in case in absence of vesting of such properties in trustees the same would be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such property. In this case, it is clear that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in the governing body of the society67. There is nothing on record to show that the concerned churches were being managed by the societies registered under the Societies Registration Act. In any event, it stands accepted that the dispute as regard dissolution of societies and adjustment of their affairs should have been referred to the principal court of original civil jurisdiction68. The suit in question also does not conform to the provisions of Section 13 of the Societies Registration Act68. Section 20 of the Act provides that the societies enumerated therein can only be registered under the said Act70. Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the Act, the Society is not dissolved. Even assuming that the society stands dissolved in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, the same would not ipso facto mean that the properties could be adjusted amongst the members of the society in terms of the provisions of the said Act. Concededly, the properties of the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested in such trust. Such a provision, we have noticed hereinbefore, also exist in the BPT Act. Thus, only because the society has been dissolved, ipso facto the properties belonging to the trust cannot be said to have been adjusted. The Appellants, thus, we have noticed hereinbefore, have averred in the plaint that the suit relates to the property of the trust and their administration. If the properties of the churches did not belong to the society, the Appellant herein cannot claim the same as their successor. The plaint has to be read meaningfully. So done, it leads to the only conclusion that the dispute was in relation to the management of the churches as religious trust and not as a society. Even if it is contended that the administration of the property would mean the properties of the Brethren Church both as a trust and as a society, still then having regard to the legal position, as discussed supra, the property belonging exclusively to the trust, the suit will not be maintainable74. The finding of the learned Trial Judge on that count is apparently wrong. The learned counsel for the Appellants also did not raise any contention before us that having regard to the provisions contained in Article 254 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the Societies Registration Act shall prevail over the BPT Act75. In fact the Appellants have categorically admitted that the Memorandum of Association of the Society itself became the deed of trust. It also stands admitted that only with a view to have one body to administer and manage the properties, the trust so created by the society was also registered. It is not a case where the trust was created for the benefit of the society. Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show the mode and manner of the management and control of the trust property. [See Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. State of Delhi (Now Delhi Administration) and another, AIR 1962 SC 458 , Dharam Dutt and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 712 , para 52 and Illachi Devi (Dead) By LRs. and Others Vs. Jain Society, Protection of Orphans India and Others, (2003) 8 SCC 413 , paras 21 and 22]76. In Athmanathaswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar [AIR 1965 SC 338 ], this Court did not permit a new question to be raised. In this case also, a new contention has been raised contrary to the pleadings that the society and the trust are different entities77. We have noticed hereinbefore that the BPT Act provides for finality and conclusiveness of the order passed by the Charity Commissioner in Sections 21(2), 22(3), 26, 36, 41(2), 51(4) and 79(2)78. In view of the decision of this Court in Dhulabhai (supra) such finality clause would lead to a conclusion that civil courts jurisdiction is excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a civil suit. In this case, we are not concerned with a dispute as regard absolute title of the trust property. We are also not concerned with the question as regard creation of any right by the trust in a third party which would be otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner. It is also not a case where the plaintiffs made a complaint that the provisions of the BPT Act were not complied with or the statutory tribunal had not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In fact no order has been passed on the Appellants application for changes in the entries made in the registers maintained under Section 17 of the Act. The BPT Act provides for express exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. It in various provisions contained in Chapter IV a power of inquiry and consequently a power of adjudication as regard the list of movable and immovable trust property, the description and particulars thereof for the purpose of its identification have been conferred. In fact, the trustee of a public trust is enjoined with a statutory duty to make an application for registration wherein all necessary descriptions of movable and immovable property belonging to the trust including their description and particulars for the purpose of identification are required to be furnished. Section 19 provides for an inquiry for registration with a view to ascertaining inter alia the mode of succession to the office of the trustee as also whether any property is the property of such trust. It is only when the statutory authority satisfies itself as regard the genuineness of the trust and the properties held by it, an entry is made in the registers and books, etc. maintained in terms of Section 17 of the Act in consonance with the provisions of Section 21 thereof. Such an entry, it will bear repetition to state, is final and conclusive. Changes can be brought about only in terms of Section 22 thereof79. A change notice having been given, it would now be for the appropriate authority to consider the matter and if a change has occurred, a finding is required to be arrived which must contain the reasons therefor. The defendants are disputing that any such change in accordance with law was effected. An order passed by Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is appealable. Yet again, when an amendment is made in the entry in the register, the same would be final and conclusive. Even a power exists for holding a further inquiry82. Prayer (a) in the plaint is for a declaration. Such declaration cannot be granted by a civil court as regard succession of the District Church of Brethren as the same was a religious trust registered under the BPT Act83. Prayer (b) of the plaint also could not have been granted, as the question as to whether the applicant is the legal continuation and successor of the First District Church of Brethren is a matter which would fall for exclusive determination of Charity Commissioner keeping in view the provisions of the deed of trust as regard its succession. It would necessarily follow that whether the First Appellant became a legal successor of the properties held by the First District Church of Brethren could not also have been granted. The decision and resolution purported to have been adopted by the Synod and Gujarat Diocesan Council are binding on all churches or not would again be a question which could have been gone into by the Charity Commissioner as the same had direct bearing not only with the administration and management of the Church registered with it but also related to the properties held by it. Such a decision of the Charity Commissioner is again final and conclusive subject to the decision of the appellate authority, viz., Bombay Revenue Tribunal84. Grant of prayer (c) for perpetual injunction would also give rise to adjudication on the question as to whether the Appellant herein had the legal right to own the properties of the First District Church of Brethren and administer or manage the same although at the relevant time it was not registered trust and although no amendment had been effected in the registers and books maintained by the Charity Commissioner in terms of Section 17 read with Sections 21 and 22 of the Act. The plaintiffs with a view to obtain an order of injunction furthermore were required to establish that they could file a suit for enforcement of right of the Appellant as a religious trust and such a legal right vests either in the plaintiff or in the Appellant herein indirectly. Such a prayer, related to the possession of the property, comes squarely within the purview of the BPT Act. If the question as regard recovery of possession of the property belonging to a public trust squarely falls within the purview of Section 50 of the Act, had such application been filed before the Charity Commissioner he was required to go into the question as to whether the plaintiffs are persons having interest in the trust and whether a consent should be given to them to maintain a suit. Only when, inter alia, such consent is granted, a suit could have been filed in terms of Section 51 of the Act. In the event of refusal to give consent, the persons interested could have preferred an appeal85. Yet again the question as regard existence of a trust is a matter which squarely falls within the purview of Section 79 of the Act86. We have no doubt in our mind that the Charity Commissioner was impleaded as a party at a later stage of the suit only with a view to fulfill the requirements of Sub-section (3) of Section 50 of the Act90. The provisions of the Act and the Scheme thereof leave no manner of doubt that the Act is a complete code in itself. It provides for a complete machinery for a person interested in the trust to put forward his claim before the Charity Commissioner who is competent to go into the question and to prefer appeal if he feels aggrieved by any decision. The bar of jurisdiction created under Section 80 of the Act clearly points out that a third party cannot maintain a suit so as to avoid the rigours of the provisions of the Act. The matter, however, would be different if the property is not a trust property in the eye of law. The civil courts jurisdiction may not be barred as it gives rise to a jurisdictional question. If a property did not validly vest in a trust or if a trust itself is not valid in law, the authorities under the Act will have no jurisdiction to determine the said question91. With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal, the court comes to the conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated. Section 26 of the Act must be read in that context as it specifically refers to those questions wherewith a court of competent jurisdiction can deal with and if the same is not expressly or impliedly barred. Once a decision is arrived at, having regard to the nature of the claim as also the reliefs sought for, that civil court has no jurisdiction, Section 26 per force will have no application whatsoever106. The principle enunciated in each of the decision laid down relate to the fact situation obtaining therein. In each case indisputably the lis arose for determination of a question relating to interpretation of one or the other clause enumerated in different provisions of the BPT Act which come either within the exclusive jurisdiction of the statutory authorities or otherwise. The Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities have the requisite jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a question arises, which is outside the purview of the Act or in relation to a matter, unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property, the Civil Court may have jurisdiction. In this case, having regard to the nature of the lis, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was clearly barred.