Case: Lakhmi Chand Khemani Vs. Smt. Kauran Devi

think he is not, for S. 2(1) of the Act of 1958 must be read by itself and its meaning cannot be affected by any consideration derived from S. 19 of the Slum Areas Act.12. We may now refer to Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, 1962-2 SCR 125 : (AIR 1961 SC 1602 ) to which our attention was drawn. That case is, in our view, of no assistance. It deals with the contention whether the Slum Areas Act was unconstitutional as it affected fundamental rights of landlords. That is not a question that arises in this appeal. This Court in its judgment no doubt stated that to buildings in slum areas both the Slum Areas Act and the Act of 1958 would apply and also that the former Act afforded some protection to tenants against eviction. As we have earlier stated, we are not concerned in this appeal with any question as to the protection given by the Slum Areas Act to tenants, nor as to the result of the application of both the Acts to a particular case. This Court did not say that the result of applying both the Acts to a case was to make part of the definition of "tenant" in the Act of 1958 nugatory; that was not a question that arose. All that the Court said was that a tenant was entitled to all such benefits as each Act independently conferred on him. Again, when the judgment stated that the Slum Areas Act protected tenants, it did not purport to define the word "tenant" for the purpose of the Acts. This Court certainly did not say that notwithstanding the definition in S. 2(1) of the Act of 1958 a person would remain a tenant within the meaning of that Act in spite of the order of eviction. That question did not arise for decision. This case does not help the appellant at all.13. It was then pointed out that S. 50 of the Act of 1958 also provided that "no civil court shall entertain .... any proceeding in so far as it relates .... to any ....... matter which the Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide ...... It was said that S. 25 of that Act provided that when an order has been made by the Controller for recovery of possession of premises from a tenant, he will give vacant possession of the premises to the landlord by removing all persons in possession thereof. It was contended that in view of these two provisions the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondents suit. This argument seems to us to proceed on a misapprehension. First, we do not think that the argument correctly states the effect of S. 25. It seems to us that all that the section does is to state who shall be bound by an order of eviction passed by the Controller and how effect shall be given to it. It is unnecessary, however, to express a final opinion on the effect of S. 25, for, in any event, clearly S. 42 of the Act provides that the Controller shall have power to execute orders made under the Act. If the Controller has the power to execute orders made under the Act including orders for eviction - and that is all that learned counsel for the appellant now contends - all that will happen in view of that part of S. 50 of the Act of 1958 on which reliance is now placed is that a civil court will not be able to execute an order for eviction. This however has nothing to do with the point before us. The learned Subordinate Judge was not asked to execute any decree for eviction. He was asked to decide whether the appellant was a trespasser and so liable to eviction. It does not follow that because a civil court cannot execute a decree for eviction passed by the Controller, it cannot also decide the question whether a tenant against whom such an order has been passed has ceased to be a tenant and become a trespasser. The present contention, therefore, must be rejected.14. We are told that after the High Court had passed its order of May 12, 1964, remanding the case to the Subordinate Judge for trial on the merits, the Subordinate Judge heard the suit and passed a decree in favour of the respondent on August 12, 1964. This, if correct, must have happened because no order for stay of the proceedings pursuant to the order of remand had been obtained from the High Court. A plain copy of the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of August 12, 1964, was handed over to us by learned counsel for the appellant and from that it appears that he thought that since the High Court had held that the appellant was not a tenant within the meaning of the Act of 1958 after the decree in ejectment of October 11, 1956, it must be held that the respondents contention that the appellants possession of the rooms was unauthorised was correct. It is for this reason that the learned Subordinate Judge appears to have passed his decree for eviction of the appellant of August 12, 1964. We wish, however, to observe that we are not aware that the copy of the judgment is a correct copy. We have referred to it only to say that even if correct, it does not affect the question which we have to decide. We are also informed that the appellant has filed an appeal in the High Court from this judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge and that appeal is pending. It will be for the High Court now to decide the correctness of the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge of August 12, 1964, and it is not right that we should express any opinion on the question and we do not do so

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. We find no justification for changing the definition of tenant in the Act of 1958 by drawing upon the provisions of the Slum Areas Act as the learned Subordinate Judge did. The last mentioned Act is not concerned with relations between landlords and tenants as such; it does not purport to interfere directly with the ordinary contractual right of landlords and tenants either as to rent or as to recovery of possession. However that may be, we find nothing in S. 19 of the Slum Areas Act to which alone we were referred by learned counsel for the appellant for the purpose, to warrant the view suggested that a tenant within the Act of 1958 would include a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed. Section 19 only says that a person who has obtained a decree in ejectment against a tenant shall not be entitled to execute it without the previous permission of the prescribed authority. It does not say that a tenant suffering the decree still continues to be a tenant for any purpose. The section does not purport to define the word tenant in any way. It assumes that a decree of eviction has been passed against a tenant. The expression "decree or order for the eviction of a tenant" in S. 19 necessarily contemplates a person who was prior to the decree a tenant within the meaning of the Rent Act of 1958 or any of its predecessors. The section is not in any way concerned with the question whether the tenants suffering a decree in ejectment still continue to be such tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act. It is of some importance to point out in this connection that the Slum Areas Act making ejectment decrees against tenants inexecutable without the requisite permission came into existence before the Act of 1958.It is pertinent to observe that notwithstanding this, the latter Act excluded from the definition of "tenant" one who had suffered an ejectment decree. Obviously, the Act of 1958 did not contemplate that the Slum Areas Act would in any was affect the definition of tenant contained in it. No question as to what the rights of a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed in view of S. 19 of the Slum Areas Act are, arises in this appeal the only point being whether he is a tenant within the Act of 1958 so as to oust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to entertain the suit. We think he is not, for S. 2(1) of the Act of 1958 must be read by itself and its meaning cannot be affected by any consideration derived from S. 19 of the Slum Areas Act.12. We may now refer to Jyoti Pershad v. Administrator for the Union Territory of Delhi, 1962-2 SCR 125 : (AIR 1961 SC 1602 ) to which our attention was drawn. That case is, in our view, of no assistance. It deals with the contention whether the Slum Areas Act was unconstitutional as it affected fundamental rights of landlords. That is not a question that arises in this appeal. This Court in its judgment no doubt stated that to buildings in slum areas both the Slum Areas Act and the Act of 1958 would apply and also that the former Act afforded some protection to tenants against eviction. As we have earlier stated, we are not concerned in this appeal with any question as to the protection given by the Slum Areas Act to tenants, nor as to the result of the application of both the Acts to a particular case. This Court did not say that the result of applying both the Acts to a case was to make part of the definition of "tenant" in the Act of 1958 nugatory; that was not a question that arose. All that the Court said was that a tenant was entitled to all such benefits as each Act independently conferred on him. Again, when the judgment stated that the Slum Areas Act protected tenants, it did not purport to define the word "tenant" for the purpose of the Acts. This Court certainly did not say that notwithstanding the definition in S. 2(1) of the Act of 1958 a person would remain a tenant within the meaning of that Act in spite of the order of eviction. That question did not arise for decision. This case does not help the appellant at all.13. It was then pointed out that S. 50 of the Act of 1958 also provided that "no civil court shall entertain .... any proceeding in so far as it relates .... to any ....... matter which the Controller is empowered by or under this Act to decide ...... It was said that S. 25 of that Act provided that when an order has been made by the Controller for recovery of possession of premises from a tenant, he will give vacant possession of the premises to the landlord by removing all persons in possession thereof. It was contended that in view of these two provisions the learned Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondents suit. This argument seems to us to proceed on a misapprehension. First, we do not think that the argument correctly states the effect of S. 25. It seems to us that all that the section does is to state who shall be bound by an order of eviction passed by the Controller and how effect shall be given to it. It is unnecessary, however, to express a final opinion on the effect of S. 25, for, in any event, clearly S. 42 of the Act provides that the Controller shall have power to execute orders made under the Act. If the Controller has the power to execute orders made under the Act including orders for eviction - and that is all that learned counsel for the appellant now contends - all that will happen in view of that part of S. 50 of the Act of 1958 on which reliance is now placed is that a civil court will not be able to execute an order for eviction. This however has nothing to do with the point before us. The learned Subordinate Judge was not asked to execute any decree for eviction. He was asked to decide whether the appellant was a trespasser and so liable to eviction. It does not follow that because a civil court cannot execute a decree for eviction passed by the Controller, it cannot also decide the question whether a tenant against whom such an order has been passed has ceased to be a tenant and become a trespasser. The present contention, therefore, must be rejected.