Case: Shree Sita Ram Sugar Co. Ltd., Vs. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court &amp; Others

to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. But having regard to the scheme of Section 6-G, read in the light of the other provisions referred to earlier, the section will have to be interpreted as giving to the State Government only a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court to another. When Section 6 makes it obligatory that an award has to be made by the Tribunal concerned and that it has to be published by the State Government within thirty days of its receipt and declare that the award on publication becomes final, it is idle to expect that the legislature intended to nullify the entire proceedings by conferring an absolute power of withdrawal on the State Government under Section 6-G. The proper way of reading Section 6-G is to limit the power of withdrawal, referred to therein, only for the purpose of transferring the proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. That the expression or in Section 6-G (1) interposed between withdraw any proceedings - or transfer a proceeding will have to be understood as and. So read, the power conferred under Section 6-G on the State Government is that of withdrawing any proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transferring the same to another.16. Mr. Pai drew our attention to Section 33-B of the Central Act and emphasised that the said section is worded differently from Section 6-G of the Act. According to him, the wording of Section 33-B clearly shows that the withdrawal of any proceedings is only for transferring the same to another Labour Court or Tribunal. On the other hand, the counsel pointed out that a different phraseology has been used in Section 6-G indicating the conferment of two distinct powers. We have already referred to this aspect and expressed the view that a superficial reading of Section 6-G will support the contention of Mr. Pai. If the expression or as mentioned earlier, is read as and the section does not present any difficulty. That having due regard to the scheme of the statute and the purpose sought to be served the expression or can be read under certain circumstances as and as has been laid down by this Court in Mazgaon Dock Ltd. v. Commr. of Income - tax and Excess Profits Tax, 1959 SCR 843 = ( AIR 1958 SC 861 ). Adopting the same principle and having due regard to the object of Section 6-G, which essentially is only to confer in the State Government a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another, the expression or has to be read in Section 6-G as and. If so read sub-section (1) of Section 6-G confers on the State Government only a power to withdraw a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transfer the same to another. It is needless to state that transfer of a proceeding can only be when it is pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal.17. Section 6-D, in our opinion, has no relevancy in construing S. 6-G. Section 6-D is enacted for a totally different purpose. For instance S. 6-B provides for conditions of service etc. to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceedings. Similarly under S. 6-F a question may arise whether an employer has contravened the provisions of Section 6-E during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal. It may be quite essential to consider whether any proceedings were pending, before a Labour Court or Tribunal. For the purpose of considering the question whether any proceedings were pending, the Act has created a fiction under Section 6-D by indicating the starting point of a proceeding before a Labour Court as well as its conclusion. The starting point of the proceedings has been fixed from the date of the reference and its termination has been fixed as the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A. During this period broadly it has to be considered that proceedings are pending before a Labour. Court or Tribunal. We need not refer to the other provisions of the Act where the duration of the pendency of proceedings may assume importance. Section 6-D can be invoked only in those cases. But it does not come into the picture, as mentioned earlier in construing Section 6-G.18. Mr. Pai referred us to the decision of this Court in the Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, (1964) 2 SCR 448 = (AIR 1964 SC 160 ) where the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the Central Act were read in harmony and the State Government was directed not to publish the award though its publication was mandatory. We are not faced with such a situation in the case before us. We have already referred to the fact that in Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of Reference No. II, respondents 4 to 6 herein had requested the Labour Court to exclude them from the said adjudication on the ground that they are already covered by Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960 arising out of Reference No. I. The Labour Court passed an order on February 21, 1961, excluding the said three workmen from Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960. That means the said three workmen had no further interest in the said Adjudication Case. If that is so, the award passed on February 26, 1961, in the case arising out of Reference No. I was perfectly correct and the publication of the said award on May 6, 1961, was also in pursuance of the mandatory provisions of the Act. There is no question of any conflict between the two awards. Hence the appellant cannot seek any assistance from the decision of this Court in (1964) 2 SCR 448 = (AIR 1964 SC 160 ) and it cannot ask for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to cancel the publication of the award.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The above section clearly indicates that when once an industrial dispute has been referred for adjudication, the Labour Court or Tribunal has to conduct its proceedings expeditiously and it has to submit its award to the State Government The award has to be published within thirty days of its receipt by the State Government. Power has no doubt been given to the State Government, before publication of an award, to remit the same for reconsideration. When the same is received after reconsideration, the State Government is bound to publish the same, as provided under sub-section (3). An award published under sub-section (3) is final subject to the provision of Section 6-A. The Labour Court or Tribunal has power to correct any clerical or arithmetical mistake in the award. But if any such correction is made, a copy of the order making the correction will have to be sent to the State Government. The provisions relating to publication of an award apply to the order making a correction in the award.We have already pointed out that Section 6 casts a duty on the Tribunal, when a dispute has been referred to it, to deal with it expeditiously and to submit its award to the State Government. The State Government has also an obligation to publish the award within thirty days of its receipt. No doubt sub-section (4) of Section 6 gives power to the State Government, before publishing the award, to remit the same for reconsideration. But still a duty is cast upon the State Government to publish the award as reconsidered by the Tribunal within thirty days of its receipt. Section 6-A also gives certain powers to the State Government regarding the award, which normally becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication.15. Section 6-G, in our opinion, deals only with the power of the State Government to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another and for purposes of such transfer to withdraw the proceedings from the Labour Court or Tribunal from whom it is being transferred. We are free to admit that the wording of sub-section (1) is capable of being construed as conferring in the State Government a power to withdraw any proceedings or to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. But having regard to the scheme of Section 6-G, read in the light of the other provisions referred to earlier, the section will have to be interpreted as giving to the State Government only a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court to another. When Section 6 makes it obligatory that an award has to be made by the Tribunal concerned and that it has to be published by the State Government within thirty days of its receipt and declare that the award on publication becomes final, it is idle to expect that the legislature intended to nullify the entire proceedings by conferring an absolute power of withdrawal on the State Government under Section 6-G. The proper way of reading Section 6-G is to limit the power of withdrawal, referred to therein, only for the purpose of transferring the proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another. That the expression or in Section 6-G (1) interposed between withdraw any proceedings - or transfer a proceeding will have to be understood as and. So read, the power conferred under Section 6-G on the State Government is that of withdrawing any proceedings from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transferring the same tohave already referred to this aspect and expressed the view that a superficial reading of Section 6-G will support the contention of Mr. Pai. If the expression or as mentioned earlier, is read as and the section does not present any difficulty. That having due regard to the scheme of the statute and the purpose sought to be served the expression or can be read under certain circumstances as and as has been laid down by this Court in Mazgaon Dock Ltd. v. Commr. of Income - tax and Excess Profits Tax, 1959 SCR 843 = ( AIR 1958 SC 861  ). Adopting the same principle and having due regard to the object of Section 6-G, which essentially is only to confer in the State Government a power to transfer a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal to another, the expression or has to be read in Section 6-G as and. If so read sub-section (1) of Section 6-G confers on the State Government only a power to withdraw a proceeding from one Labour Court or Tribunal and transfer the same to another. It is needless to state that transfer of a proceeding can only be when it is pending before a Labour Court or Tribunal.17. Section 6-D, in our opinion, has no relevancy in construing S. 6-G. Section 6-D is enacted for a totally different purpose. For instance S. 6-B provides for conditions of service etc. to remain unchanged in certain circumstances during the pendency of proceedings. Similarly under S. 6-F a question may arise whether an employer has contravened the provisions of Section 6-E during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal. It may be quite essential to consider whether any proceedings were pending, before a Labour Court or Tribunal. For the purpose of considering the question whether any proceedings were pending, the Act has created a fiction under Section 6-D by indicating the starting point of a proceeding before a Labour Court as well as its conclusion. The starting point of the proceedings has been fixed from the date of the reference and its termination has been fixed as the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 6-A. During this period broadly it has to be considered that proceedings are pending before a Labour. Court or Tribunal. We need not refer to the other provisions of the Act where the duration of the pendency of proceedings may assume importance. Section 6-D can be invoked only in those cases. But it does not come into the picture, as mentioned earlier in construing Sectionhave already referred to the fact that in Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960, arising out of Reference No. II, respondents 4 to 6 herein had requested the Labour Court to exclude them from the said adjudication on the ground that they are already covered by Adjudication Case No. 93 of 1960 arising out of Reference No. I. The Labour Court passed an order on February 21, 1961, excluding the said three workmen from Adjudication Case No. 98 of 1960. That means the said three workmen had no further interest in the said Adjudication Case. If that is so, the award passed on February 26, 1961, in the case arising out of Reference No. I was perfectly correct and the publication of the said award on May 6, 1961, was also in pursuance of the mandatory provisions of the Act. There is no question of any conflict between the two awards. Hence the appellant cannot seek any assistance from the decision of this Court in (1964) 2 SCR 448   = (AIR 1964 SC 160  ) and it cannot ask for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to cancel the publication of the award.