Case: Satyanarayana Sinha Vs. M/S S. Lal And Company (Pvt.) Ltd

to incur huge expense, it now wants to contend that the grant of the lease is invalid. Even the first respondent, once he found that the area for which he applied for a lease was not included in the appellants lease, seems to have preferred to remain absent in the case, but the State Government wants to challenge the validity of the lease which it did not do before the High Court.8. There is no doubt, as the High Court has pointed out, that where by relaxing the Rules the Central Government intends to authorise in any case the grant, renewal or transfer of any prospecting licence or mining lease, or the working of any mine for the purpose of searching for winning any mineral, on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the Rules made under S. 13 of the Act, it can do so for reasons to be recorded in writing. Whether any such reasons can be said to have been recorded in the order authorising the grant of the lease on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the Rules made under S. 13 of the Act need not concern us in this case, because, in our view, as the writ petition has been filed by a person who is not the person aggrieved, it is not maintainable.9. As already pointed out it is Admitted by respondents 2 and 3 that application made by the first respondent was not in respect of the area which is granted to the appellant and consequently the first respondent had interest in the subject-matter of the lease. Even though this contention was not urged before the High Court, and in the circumstances adverted to by us could not have been urged, as the appellant did not appear, this Court in an appeal cannot only determine the soundness of the decision, but has jurisdiction to determine any point raised before it,such as whether the appeal is competent, whether a party has locus standi to present the petition and whether the petition is maintainable etc. See Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property (1952) 3 SCR 696 = (AIR 1952 SC 319 ). In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India 1950 SCR 869 = (AIR 1951 SC 41 ) it was held by this Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Art. 32 must ordinarily be the right of the petitioner himself who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief. In respect of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution it was laid down in The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, (1952) 3 SCR 28 = (AIR 1952 SC 12 ) that the existence of the right is the foundation of the exercise of jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The right to which this Court had adverted as being the foundation for exercising the jurisdiction under Art. 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution,according to The Calcutta Gas Co. (Proprietary) Ltd. v. The State of West Bengal, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 1 - (AIR 1962 SC 1044 ) is ordinarily the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule may have to be relaxed or modified. Subba Rao, J. as he then was, observed in that case :"Article 226 confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. It is, therefore, clear that persons other than those claiming fundamenta1 rights can also approach the court seeking a relief thereunder."After citing the above passage in Godde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1966) 2 SCR 172 = (AIR 1966 SC 828 ) the learned Judge who delivered the judgment in this case also observed at p. 181:"A personal right need not be respect of a proprietary interest: it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart in exceptional cases as the expression "ordinary" indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject-matter thereof."In respect of persons who are strangers and who seek to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court, difficulty sometimes arises because of the nature and extent of the right or interest which is said to have been infringed, and whether the infringement in some way affects such persons. On this aspect there is no clear enunciation of principles on which the Court will exercise its jurisdiction.10. In England also the Courts have taken the view that when the application is made by a party or by a person aggrieved the Court will intervene ex debito justitiae, in justice to the applicant, and when it is made by a stranger the Court considers whether the public interest demands its intervention. In either case it is a matter which rests ultimately in the discretion of the Court: (see R. v. Thames Magistrates Court. ex. p. Greenbaum. (1967), 55 L. G. R. 129 -extracted in Yardley Source Book of English Administrative Law, 1970, p. 228)11. In this case, however, the first respondent has not challenged the grant of the lease on the ground of ex debito justitiae but has done so on the ground of direct infringement of his right to be granted" a mining lease over 280.62 acres for which the appellant was given a lease along with other area. Since it is now found that no such right of the first respondent has been affected, he has no locus standi. He is neither a party nor a person aggrieved or affected and consequently his writ petition in the High Court is not maintainable.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. There is no doubt, as the High Court has pointed out, that where by relaxing the Rules the Central Government intends to authorise in any case the grant, renewal or transfer of any prospecting licence or mining lease, or the working of any mine for the purpose of searching for winning any mineral, on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the Rules made under S. 13 of the Act, it can do so for reasons to be recorded in writing. Whether any such reasons can be said to have been recorded in the order authorising the grant of the lease on terms and conditions different from those laid down in the Rules made under S. 13 of the Act need not concern us in this case, because, in our view, as the writ petition has been filed by a person who is not the person aggrieved, it is not maintainable.9. As already pointed out it is Admitted by respondents 2 and 3 that application made by the first respondent was not in respect of the area which is granted to the appellant and consequently the first respondent had interest in the subject-matter of the lease. Even though this contention was not urged before the High Court, and in the circumstances adverted to by us could not have been urged, as the appellant did not appear, this Court in an appeal cannot only determine the soundness of the decision, but has jurisdiction to determine any point raised before it,such as whether the appeal is competent, whether a party has locus standi to present the petition and whether the petition is maintainable etc.In this case, however, the first respondent has not challenged the grant of the lease on the ground of ex debito justitiae but has done so on the ground of direct infringement of his right to be granted" a mining lease over 280.62 acres for which the appellant was given a lease along with other area. Since it is now found that no such right of the first respondent has been affected, he has no locus standi. He is neither a party nor a person aggrieved or affected and consequently his writ petition in the High Court is not maintainable.