Case: The Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Co. Ltd Vs. Baliram Ukandaji And Another

appropriate Government, and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1).(3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labout Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case."The powers of the Government under the above section admittedly have been delegated to the Second Labour Court, Bombay. Section 31 of this Amending Act provides as follows:-"31. Act not to override State laws.(1) If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, there is in force in any State any Provincial Act or State Act relating to the settlement or adjudication of disputes, the operation of such an Act in that State in relation to matters covered by that Act shall not be affected by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as amended by this Act.(2) * * * * * ** * * * * *"4. From these sections, which we have quoted, certain conclusions indisputably arise. The first conclusion is that compensation for lay off can only be determined under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This follows from S. 25-J (2) as it is so stated there. The next is that the workmen are entitled under S. 33-C (1) to go before the second Labour Court to realise money due from their employers under Chapter V-A. This is clearly stated in S. 33-C. The contention on behalf of the Mills, however, is that the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 does not apply to the present matter but the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act does. This argument is put in two ways. By one argument the application of the Industrial Disputes Act is sought to be evaded and by the second the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Act is sought to be applied. We shall examine these two arguments in the same order. The attempt to oust the Central Act is based upon S. 31 of the 1956 (Amendment) Act and the opening part of S. 25-J. Section 31 can have no application because S. 33-C has been included for the purpose, among others, of enabling the workmen to claim any money due from their employers under the provisions of Chapter V-A. This is expressly so stated in that section. Chapter 5-A is the only Chapter in which there is provision regarding lay off or compensation for lay off. The C. P. and Berar Act contains no provision either for the recovery of money or for compensation for lay off. It is thus obvious that if a workman has a claim for lay off it can only come up for decision under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and, indeed, S. 25-J (2) says so in express terms. The attempt to keep out the provisions of the Industrial disputes Act, particularly Chapter V-A and S. 33-C must, therefore, fail. The next attempt, namely, that the C. P. and Berar Act applies is also ineffective. It is pointed out that the preamble of the C. P. and Berar Act shows that it was an Act for the promotion of peaceful and amicable settlement of industrial disputes by conciliation and arbitration, that industrial dispute means any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between an employer and between employers or employees and that industrial matter means any matter relating to pay, wages, reward, etc. It is submitted, therefore, that the dispute must come under the C. P. and Berar Act because of S. 31 of the 1956 (Amendment) Act and S. 25-J of the 1953 (Amendment) Act already quoted. The argument is the last one in another form. This argument is fallacious at the very start because lay off and compensation for lay off are to be found only in Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There is no mention of lay off or compensation for lay off as one of the matters over which the C. P. and Berar Act has any jurisdiction. Next, even if Ss. 31 and 25-J save the application of the C. P. and Berar Act they do so subject to the condition that question of lay off must be decided in accordance with Chapter V-A and S. 33-C clearly provides that a dispute for any money due under Chapter V-A has to go before the appropriate Government or its delegate. Here the delegate is the Second Labour Court. Bombay . The argument that this controversy is wrongly before the Second Labour Court, Bombay is, therefore, entirely erroneous and must be rejected.5. The next contention is that the claim for lay off is not a claim for money due because calculations have to be made before the money due can be found. This argument has been considered on more than one occasion and it was rejected recently by this Court in Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U. P. (C. As. 1108 and 1109 of 1963, D/ -26-11-1964: (AIR 1965 SC 1488 ). It is not essential that the claim which can be brought before the Government or its delegate under S. 33-C (1) must always be for a predetermined sum. The Government or the Labour Court may satisfy itself about the exact amount and then take action under that section. In the present case the dates of lay off are known and each workman will show to the Second Labour Court that he is qualified to receive compensation for lay off. That will be shown from the muster roll which the employer is required to maintain and it will then be a simple arithmetical calculation which, in our judgment, S. 33-C permits to be made. If there is any question whether there was lay off or not the Labour Court will decide it. This argument, therefore, has no force.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]4. From these sections, which we have quoted, certain conclusions indisputably arise. The first conclusion is that compensation for lay off can only be determined under Chapter V-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This follows from S. 25-J (2) as it is so stated there. The next is that the workmen are entitled under S. 33-C (1) to go before the second Labour Court to realise money due from their employers under Chapter V-A. This is clearly stated in S. 33-C. The contention on behalf of the Mills, however, is that the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 does not apply to the present matter but the C. P. and Berar Industrial Disputes (Settlement) Actis no mention of lay off or compensation for lay off as one of the matters over which the C. P. and Berar Act has any jurisdiction. Next, even if Ss. 31 and 25-J save the application of the C. P. and Berar Act they do so subject to the condition that question of lay off must be decided in accordance with Chapter V-A and S. 33-C clearly provides that a dispute for any money due under Chapter V-A has to go before the appropriate Government or its delegate. Here the delegate is the Second Labour Court. Bombay . The argument that this controversy is wrongly before the Second Labour Court, Bombay is, therefore, entirely erroneous and must beargument has been considered on more than one occasion and it was rejected recently by this Court in Kays Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of U. P. (C. As. 1108 and 1109 of 1963, D/ -26-11-1964: (AIR 1965 SC 1488 ). It is not essential that the claim which can be brought before the Government or its delegate under S. 33-C (1) must always be for a predetermined sum. The Government or the Labour Court may satisfy itself about the exact amount and then take action under that section. In the present case the dates of lay off are known and each workman will show to the Second Labour Court that he is qualified to receive compensation for lay off. That will be shown from the muster roll which the employer is required to maintain and it will then be a simple arithmetical calculation which, in our judgment, S. 33-C permits to be made. If there is any question whether there was lay off or not the Labour Court will decide it. This argument, therefore, has no force.