Case: State Of Gujarat Etc Vs. Vakhtsinghji Sursinghji Vaghela &amp; Ors. Etc

exceptional character, business premises in which the business could be carried on under special conditions or by means of a special licence) that there was no market or general demand for such property; and a market value deducted from the income derived would not constitute a fair basis in assessing the value to the owner."13. The measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 was their value to the owner. In spe cial cases reinstatement value enabling the owner to replace the lands or premises taken from him was taken to be the correct measure of this value. This principle was later enacted in Rule 5 of Section 2 of Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919 which is now replaced by Rule 5 of Section 5 of the Land Compensation Act, 1961. In Raja Vyricherla Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatnam, 66 Ind App 104 at p. 113 = (AIR 1939 PC 98 at p. 101), Lord Romer said that the general principles for determining compensation under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 did not differ in any material respect from those upon which compensation was awarded under the Lands Clauses Act of 1845. In Harish Chandra Neogy v. Secretary of State for India, (1907) 11 Cal WN 875 and Province of West Bengal v. Raja Jhargram, AIR 1955 Cal 392 it was suggested that in special cases the reinstatement value may be awarded as compensation under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act.For the purpose of this case it is sufficient to say that this method should not be adopted where the market value deduced from the income derived from the lands would fairly compensate the owner and in no case can reinstatement value be given unless reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended. The High Court found that there was no intention to reinstate the bunds. The owners could be fairly compensated by giving the market value deduced from the estimate yield. The High Court rightly rejected the reinstatement method. The value of irrigational bunds, tanks, and wells is not what they cost but what they paid in annual income. The High Court rightly adopted the yield basis of valuation. The Himayat assessment and water rates did not give the correct yield. The High Court therefore directed further inquiries into this claim.14. The next claim for compensation is with regard to river and river beds. The Collector and the Tribunal rejected this claim but the High Court allowed it and directed further inquiries. The State of Gujarat challenges this ruling. Now the taluqdars had no property in running water. They were the owners of the river beds but the submerged river beds were of no value to them.Counsel for the taluqdars therefore conceded that the High Courts ruling cannot be supported. Before us they confined their claim under this head to Bhathas formed in the rivers and other portions of the river beds where cross could be raised during some parts of the year particularly during summer. Counsel for the State did not oppose further inquiries into this limited claim for compensation. We therefore set aside the directions of the High Court in respect of river and river beds. We direct the Special Deputy Collector to inquire into the claim for compensation for Bhathas, if any, formed in the rivers, and other portions, it any, of the river beds where crops could be raised.15. Counsel for the taluqdars sought to challenge the findings of the High Court with regard to compensations for unbuilt village sites, trees, sim roads and non-irrigational tanks and wells. We find no error of principle in the award of compensation under these heads. There is no ground for our interference in respect of these claims.16. Mr. Bindra submitted that S. l2 of the Abolition Act makes the decision of the Tribunal final and conclusive and the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with this decision, particularly in respect of solatium of 15 per centum and non-irrigational bunds, tanks and wells. We are unable to accept this contention. Article 227 of the Constitution gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunal within the limits of their authority and seeing that they obey the law. It was the duty of the Revenue Tribunal to award compensation to the Taluqdars in accordance with the provisions of Sections 7 and 14 of the Act. The High Court had jurisdiction to revise the decision of the Tribunal where the Tribunal on a misreading of the provisions of Sections 7 and 14 declined to do what was by those provisions of law incumbent on it to do. Tested in this light it does not appear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 in revising the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the solatium and irrigational bunds tanks and wells. Numerous cases were pending before the Revenue Tribunal in respect of compensation payable to the taluqdars under the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act. To prevent miscarriage of justice it was necessary for the High Court to lay down general principles on which compensation should be assessed so that the Tribunal may act within the limits of their authority. On finding that the Tribunal had misconceived its duties under Ss. 7 and 14, the High Court could not only set aside its decision, but also direct it to make further inquiries after taking evidence.As pointed out in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 at p. 1120 -(AIR 1955 SC 233 at pp. 242-243) the High Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot only annul the decision of the Tribunal but can also issue further direction in the matter.17.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It will be noticed that the Zamindar in that case was bound to pay only the fixed land revenue for the period of 19 years and thereafter until a new settlement was made. The increase in land revenue made by the 1939 Act affected this right. Nevertheless it was held that the increase in land revenue did not involve any right in or over any immovable property.The case of the taluqdars in the present case is weaker. Their right to pay the jama only while the old settlements remained in force was not affected by Section 5. The increase in land revenue on the expiry of those settlements was not due to any change in ownership. The enhanced assessment did not affect any contractual or statutory right vested in them. Even assuming that it modified or extinguished any right, such modification or extinguishment did not amount to transference to public ownership of land or any right in or over land within the meaning of Section 14 of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act.The Collector, the Revenue Tribunal and the High Court therefore rightly rejected the claim of the taluqdars for compensation for the difference in the jama and the full assessment.9.Section 7 (1) gives compensation to taluqdars for extinguishment of rights in any property under Section 6. The Collector is required by Section 7 (1) (b) to make an award in the manner prescribed in Section 11 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Collector has to make an award of compensation under Section 11 and having regard to Sec. 15 in determining the amount of compensation, he is guided by the provisions of Sections 23 and 24. Section 23 (1) requires an award of the market value of the land. Section 23 (2) requires an additional award of a sum of fifteen per centum on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition.It follows that under Section 7 (1) (b) of the Abolition Act read with section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the taluqdars are entitled to receive as compensation the market value of all rights in any property extinguished under Section 6 and in addition a sum of 15 per centum on such market value. This right is subject to the conditions and exceptions enumerated in sub clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 7 (l) (b). In cases falling under clause (i) and in some cases under clause (ii) the amount of compensation is limited. In cases falling under Clause (iii) and in some cases under Clause (ii) the amount of compensation is the "market value" which according to the explanation to Section 7 (1) means the value estimated in accordance with Sections 23 and 24 of the, Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The value so determined includes the solatium of 15 per centum payable under sub-section (2) of Section 23. Where the legislature intended to exclude the application of sub-section (2) of Section 23, it has said so, as in section 14 (2) under which compensation is determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Sections 23 and 24. It follows that the taluqdar is entitled to the solatium of 15 per centum on the market value, (1) under the main part of Section 7 (1) (b) subject to the provisions the several sub-clauses thereof; (2) in cases falling under Clause (iii) of Section 7 (1) (b) and (3) in cases under Clause (ii) of S. 7 (1) (b) where market value is awarded. The direction of the High Court is modifiedour opinion both these contentions should be rejected. The duty of the Collector is to award the "market value".The market value is the amount which the land if sold in the open market by a willing seller might be expected to realise. In the case of land the market value is generally ascertained on a consideration of the prices obtained by sale of adjacent lands with similar advantages. Where there are no sales of comparable lands, the value must be found in some other way. One method is to take the annual income which the owner is expected to obtain from the land and to capitalise it by a number of years purchase. The capitalised value is then taken as the market value which a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing buyer.The measure of compensation for lands or premises taken under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 was their value to the owner. In spe cial cases reinstatement value enabling the owner to replace the lands or premises taken from him was taken to be the correct measure of this value. This principle was later enacted in Rule 5 of Section 2 of Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act, 1919 which is now replaced by Rule 5 of Section 5 of the Land Compensation Act, 1961. In Raja Vyricherla Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatnam, 66 Ind App 104 at p. 113 = (AIR 1939 PC 98   at p. 101), Lord Romer said that the general principles for determining compensation under Section 23 ofthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 did not differ in any material respect from those upon which compensation was awarded under the Lands Clauses Act of 1845. In Harish Chandra Neogy v. Secretary of State for India, (1907) 11 Cal WN 875   and Province of West Bengal v. Raja Jhargram, AIR 1955 Cal 392   it was suggested that in special cases the reinstatement value may be awarded as compensation under Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act.For the purpose of this case it is sufficient to say that this method should not be adopted where the market value deduced from the income derived from the lands would fairly compensate the owner and in no case can reinstatement value be given unless reinstatement in some other place is bona fide intended. The High Court found that there was no intention to reinstate the bunds. The owners could be fairly compensated by giving the market value deduced from the estimate yield. The High Court rightly rejected the reinstatement method. The value of irrigational bunds, tanks, and wells is not what they cost but what they paid in annual income. The High Court rightly adopted the yield basis of valuation. The Himayat assessment and water rates did not give the correct yield. The High Court therefore directed further inquiries into thisare unable to accept this contention. Article 227 of the Constitution gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunal within the limits of their authority and seeing that they obey the law. It was the duty of the Revenue Tribunal to award compensation to the Taluqdars in accordance with the provisions of Sections 7 and 14 of the Act. The High Court had jurisdiction to revise the decision of the Tribunal where the Tribunal on a misreading of the provisions of Sections 7 and 14 declined to do what was by those provisions of law incumbent on it to do. Tested in this light it does not appear that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 in revising the decision of the Tribunal in respect of the solatium and irrigational bunds tanks and wells. Numerous cases were pending before the Revenue Tribunal in respect of compensation payable to the taluqdars under the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act. To prevent miscarriage of justice it was necessary for the High Court to lay down general principles on which compensation should be assessed so that the Tribunal may act within the limits of their authority. On finding that the Tribunal had misconceived its duties under Ss. 7 and 14, the High Court could not only set aside its decision, but also direct it to make further inquiries after taking evidence.As pointed out in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 at p. 1120 -(AIR 1955 SC 233   at pp. 242-243) the High Court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot only annul the decision of the Tribunal but can also issue further direction in the matter.