Case: Bd. Of Trustees For The Port Of Calcutta Vs. Engineers-De-Space-Age

General law of the land and the agreement(iv) Over the years, the English and Indian courts have acted on the submission that where the agreement does not prohibit and a party to the reference makes a claim for interest, the arbitrator must have the power to award interest pendente lite. The awards has not been followed in the later decisions of this Court. It has been explained and distinguished on the basis that in that case there was no claim for interest but only a claim for unliquidated damages. It has been said repeatedly that observations in the said judgment were not intended to lay down any such absolute or universal rules as they appear to, on first impression. Until Jenas case almost all the courts in the country had upheld the power of the arbitrator to award interest pendente lite. Continuity and certainly is a highly desirable feature of law(v) Interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the people anterior to reference (pre-reference period). For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred." 6. It will appears from what the Constitution Bench stated to be the legal position, that ordinarily a person who is deprived of his money to which he is legitimately entitled as of right is entitled to be compensated in deprivation thereof, call it by whatever name. This would be in terms of the principle laid down in Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships pointed out that there was no reasons or principle to hold otherwise in the case of an arbitrator. Pointing out that arbitrator is an alternative forum for resolution of disputes arising between the parties, it said that he must have the power to decide all disputes and differences arising between the parties and if he were to be denied the power to award interest pendente lite, the party entitled thereto would be required to go to a Court which would result in multiplicity of proceedings, a situation which the Court which endeavour to a void. Reliance was, however, placed on the observation in sub-para (iii) wherein it is pointed out that an arbitrator is a creature of an agreement and if the agreement between the parties prohibits the payment of interest pendente lite the arbitrator must act in accordance therewith. In other words, according to their Lordships the arbitrator is expected to act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land but subject to an agreement, provided, the agreement is valid and legal. Lastly, it was pointed out that interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference. Their Lordships concluded that where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite for the simple reason that in such a case it is presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties; it is then a matter of exercise of discretion by the arbitrator. The position in law has, therefore, been clearly stated in the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench7. We are not dealing with a case in regard to award of interest for the period prior to the reference8. We are dealing with a case in regard to award of interest by the Arbitrator post reference. The short question, therefore, is whether in view of sub-clause (g) of Clause 13 of the contract extracted earlier the Arbitrator was prohibited from granting interest under the contract. Now the term in sub-clause (g) merely prohibits the Commissioner from entertaining any claim for interest and does not prohibit the Arbitrator from awarding interest. The opening words no claim for interest will be entertained by the Commissioner clearly establishes that the intention was to prohibit the Commissioner from granting interest on account of delayed payment to the contractor. Clause has to be strictly construed for the simple reason that as pointed out by the Constitution Bench, ordinarily, a person who has a legitimate claim is entitled to payment within a reasonable time and if the payment has been delayed beyond reasonable time he can legitimately claim to be compensated for that delay whatever nomenclature one may give to his claim in that behalf. If that be so, we would be justified in placing a strict construction on the term of the contract on which reliance has been placed. Strictly construed the term of the contract merely prohibits the Commissioner from paying interest to the contractor for delayed payment but once the matter goes to arbitration the discretion of the Arbitrator is not, in any manner, stifled by this term of the contract and the Arbitrator would be entitled to consider the question of grant of interest pendente lite and award interest if he finds the claim to be justified. We are, therefore, of the opinion that under the clause of the contract the Arbitrator was in no manner prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite9. Looked at from another point, if there was a dispute as to whether under this term of the contract the Arbitrator was prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite, that was a matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, as the arbitrator would have to interpret sub-clause (g) of Clause 13 of the contract and decide whether that clause prohibits him from awarding interest pendente lite. In that case it cannot be said that the Arbitrator had wandered outside the contract to deny to him jurisdiction to decide the question regarding payment of interest pendente lite. Even if we were to accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on paragraphs 26 and 29 of the Associated Engineering Company case (supra) we think, that the Arbitrator was well within the jurisdiction in awarding interest pendente lite

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. It will appears from what the Constitution Bench stated to be the legal position, that ordinarily a person who is deprived of his money to which he is legitimately entitled as of right is entitled to be compensated in deprivation thereof, call it by whatever name. This would be in terms of the principle laid down in Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Their Lordships pointed out that there was no reasons or principle to hold otherwise in the case of an arbitrator. Pointing out that arbitrator is an alternative forum for resolution of disputes arising between the parties, it said that he must have the power to decide all disputes and differences arising between the parties and if he were to be denied the power to award interest pendente lite, the party entitled thereto would be required to go to a Court which would result in multiplicity of proceedings, a situation which the Court which endeavour to a void. Reliance was, however, placed on the observation in sub-para (iii) wherein it is pointed out that an arbitrator is a creature of an agreement and if the agreement between the parties prohibits the payment of interest pendente lite the arbitrator must act in accordance therewith. In other words, according to their Lordships the arbitrator is expected to act and make his award in accordance with the general law of the land but subject to an agreement, provided, the agreement is valid and legal. Lastly, it was pointed out that interest pendente lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference. Their Lordships concluded that where the agreement between the parties does not prohibit grant of interest and where a party claims interest and that dispute is referred to the arbitrator, he shall have the power to award interest pendente lite for the simple reason that in such a case it is presumed that interest was an implied term of the agreement between the parties; it is then a matter of exercise of discretion by the arbitrator. The position in law has, therefore, been clearly stated in the aforesaid decision of the Constitution Bench7. We are not dealing with a case in regard to award of interest for the period prior to the reference8. We are dealing with a case in regard to award of interest by the Arbitrator post reference. The short question, therefore, is whether in view of sub-clause (g) of Clause 13 of the contract extracted earlier the Arbitrator was prohibited from granting interest under the contract. Now the term in sub-clause (g) merely prohibits the Commissioner from entertaining any claim for interest and does not prohibit the Arbitrator from awarding interest. The opening words no claim for interest will be entertained by the Commissioner clearly establishes that the intention was to prohibit the Commissioner from granting interest on account of delayed payment to the contractor. Clause has to be strictly construed for the simple reason that as pointed out by the Constitution Bench, ordinarily, a person who has a legitimate claim is entitled to payment within a reasonable time and if the payment has been delayed beyond reasonable time he can legitimately claim to be compensated for that delay whatever nomenclature one may give to his claim in that behalf. If that be so, we would be justified in placing a strict construction on the term of the contract on which reliance has been placed. Strictly construed the term of the contract merely prohibits the Commissioner from paying interest to the contractor for delayed payment but once the matter goes to arbitration the discretion of the Arbitrator is not, in any manner, stifled by this term of the contract and the Arbitrator would be entitled to consider the question of grant of interest pendente lite and award interest if he finds the claim to be justified. We are, therefore, of the opinion that under the clause of the contract the Arbitrator was in no manner prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite9. Looked at from another point, if there was a dispute as to whether under this term of the contract the Arbitrator was prohibited from awarding interest pendente lite, that was a matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator, as the arbitrator would have to interpret sub-clause (g) of Clause 13 of the contract and decide whether that clause prohibits him from awarding interest pendente lite. In that case it cannot be said that the Arbitrator had wandered outside the contract to deny to him jurisdiction to decide the question regarding payment of interest pendente lite. Even if we were to accept the contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance on paragraphs 26 and 29 of the Associated Engineering Company case (supra) we think, that the Arbitrator was well within the jurisdiction in awarding interest pendente lite