Case: Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal Vs. Rajiv Gandhi

to be true as stated in the various paras of the election petition do not constitute any corrupt practice. The petition was drafted in a highly vague and general manner. Various paras of the petition presented disjointed averments and it is difficult to make out as to what actually the petitioner intended to plead. At the conclusion of hearing of the appeal before us appellant made applications for amending the election petition, to remove the defects pointed out by the High Court and to render the allegations of corrupt practice in accordance with the provisions of S.33 read with S.123 of the Act. Having given our anxious consideration to the amendment applications, we are of the opinion that these applications cannot be allowed at this stage. It must be borne in mind that the election petition was presented to the Registrar of the High Court, at Lucknow Bench on the last day of the limitation prescribed for filing the election petition. The appellant could not raise any ground of challenge after the expiry of limitation. O.IV, Rule 17 no doubt permits amendment of an election petition but the same is subject to the provisions of the Act. S.87 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling in question, the election of a returned candidate. After the expiry of that period no election petition is maintainable and the High Court or this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. An order of amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time specified in S.81 would amount to contravention of those provisions and beyond the ambit of S.87 of the Act. It necessarily follows chat a new ground cannot be raised or inserted in an election petition by way of amendment after the expiry of the period of limitations. The amendments claimed by the appellant are not in the nature of supplying particulars instead those seek to raise new ground of challenge. Various paras of the election petition which are sought to be amended do not disclose any cause of action, therefore. it is not permissible to allow their amendment after expiry of the period of limitation. Amendment applications are accordingly rejected.32. Before we close we could like to express our anxiety on a feature which of late has assumed great proportion. In Parliamentary form of democracy political parties play vital role and occasionally they sponsor candidates of the election. But under the existing law it is open to any elector to contest election from any parliamentary constituency in the country and it is not necessary that the candidate should be sponsored by a political party. It is permissible for an elector to contest election on his own as an independent candidate. Some independent individuals contest election genuinely and some of them have succeeded also but experience has shown that a large number of independent candidates contest the election for the mere sake of contesting with a view to make out grounds for challenging the election. Presence of a number of independent candidates results in confusion, for the millions of the illiterate and ignorant electors who exercise their electoral right on the basis of symbols printed on the ballot papers. The presence of large number of independent candidates makes the ballot paper of unmanageable size and ordinary elector is confused in the election booth while exercising his franchise. This leads to confusion. In the instant case out of 14 candidates who contested the election 11 of them including the appellant contested as independent candidates and they all polled only paltry number of votes. This shows the genuineness of the candidature of independent candidates. The appellant is a resident of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh and he is a lawyer by profession. He contested election as an independent candidate and on the date of filing of nomination paper he insisted to file his nomination paper by stripping off himself completely and by putting on only a langot. This caused consternation in the office of the Returning Officer, and it has also been raised as a ground of attack in the election petition. In fact the appellant has filed certain photographs before us showing himself in a langot only. When this appeal came up for hearing before us the appellant insisted that he should be allowed to argue the case by putting on a crown (an artificial one) on his head. According to him without the crown he would not be able to make his submissions in a satisfactory manner. We refused to grant the permission to the great dissatisfaction of the appellant. A Court of law is a solemn place where proceedings are held in a solemn manner and the time of the Court especially in the apex Court is precious time which belongs to the people and it would be wholly obnoxious to judicial propriety to allow a litigant to appear in Court wearing a crown to argue the case. The Court cannot be converted into a dramatic or theatrical stage. We accordingly refused to grant the permission to the appellant to wear his crown. During the arguments the appellant glibly stated that he had contested the election for the offices of President and Vice President and that he would be contesting each and every election as an independent candidate with a view to reform the society and the election law. This is not uncommon as a number of other persons have been contesting elections as independent candidates for the high office and some of them filed election petition disputing the election. These factors have given cause for anxiety to us and we hope that the Parliament will take these matters into consideration to devise ways and means to meet the onslaught of independent candidates who are not quite serious about their business.33. In view of our discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court rightly exercised its power in rejecting this petition under O.VII. R.11. 34.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]it is apparent that those paras of a petition which do not disclose any cause of action, are liable to be struck off under O.VI, R.16, as the Court is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike out or delete pleading which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or suit. It is the duty of the court to examine the plaint and it need not wait till the defendant files written statement and points out the defects. If the court on examination of the plaint or the election petition finds that it does not disclose any cause of action it would be justified in striking out the pleadings. O.VI, R.16 itself empowers the Court to strike out pleadings at any stage of the proceedings which may even be before the filing of the written statement by the respondent or commencement of the trial. If the Court is satisfied that the election petition does not make out any cause of action and that the trial would prejudice, embarrass and delay the proceedings, the court need not wait for the filing of the written statement instead it can proceed to hear the preliminary objections and strike out the pleadings. If after striking out the pleadings the court finds that no triable issues remain to be considered, it has power to reject the election petition under. O.VI,election petition runs into 58 paras containing allegations of various corrupt practices known to the law. The averments contained in the various paras are in disjointed form and in order to ascertain true intention of the election petitioner, one has to read several paras and connect the same with the other to ascertain the correct import of the allegations. The allegations contained in paras 1 to 7 contain narration of facts as to when the election took place and the petitioners desire to file his nomination paper by wearing only a "langot" and the obstruction raised by the authorities and the allegation that the police were shadowing the appellant and two of them always kept company to him. These paras do not make out any ground under S.100 of the Act. In para 8, the appellant alleged that on 5th. 6th and 10th June he saw a number of jeeps plying in the Parliamentary Constituency of Amethi bearing flags of Congress (I ) which were being used for electioneering purposes in support of Rajiv Gandhi. The allegations further state that the appellant noticed that food was being given to the workers of Rajiv Gandhi at the kothi of Sanjay Singh at Amethi. Assuming the allegations to be true, these do not make out any case of corrupt practice or any other round of challenge under S.100 of the Act. During the course of arguments the appellant urged that the allegations contained in para 8 indicate that Rajiv Gandhi had been using a large number of vehicles and feeding workers and thereby he had been incurring expenses beyond the permissible limit. This inference is not permissible as each and every corrupt practice must be clearly and specifically pleaded and it should be complete in itself. No corrupt practice can be inferred from reading one sentence here and the other reading sentence here. A corrupt practice as contemplated by S.123(6) contemplates incur ring or authorising expenditure beyond the prescribed limit.Allegations contained in paras 22 to 26 relate to the relationship between the appellant and one Ram Pal Singh whom he had appointed his election agent. These allegations refer to matters which do not make out any ground under S.100 of the Act. In para 27 the appellant stated that he as well as his election agent both were being followed by police but it does not refer to any violation of law or rule or commission of any electoral offence by the returned candidate or his workers with his consent. In para 28 the appellant alleged that on the polling day a lady went to the polling booth along with a person, and the accompanying person affixed stamp on the ballot paper and returned with her. Even if that be so, we fail to understand as to how those facts would amount to any corrupt practice with consent of the returned candidate. Even assuming that this constitutes violation of provision of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, there is no pleading that it materially affected the result of the election. In fact the difference of votes between the petitioner and the returned candidate was of such great magnitude, that there could be no question of election being materially affected on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In para 29 the appellant stated that on the polling day drinking water and batashas were being distributed to the voters at the polling station in Amethi. There is no allegation that the water and batashas was being distributed with the consent of Rajiv Gandhi or that he spent money over it or that the said action influenced the voters or that it materially affected the result of the election. In the absence of any such allegations para 29 disclosed no cause of action.18. Allegations contained in paras 31 to 35 relate to alleged irregularities committed on the polling day, according to these allegations, workers of the respondent helped voters to cast their vote in favour of the respondent. The averments contained therein do not amount to any corrupt practice, instead if at all these allegations relate to irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been committed on the polling day which would at best be relevant if there was further allegation that it materially affected the result of the election. Since respondents term has already expired, and as his election cannot be set aside, these allegations do not survive a it is not necessary to consider them in detail. Similarly averments contained in paras 37-38 contain narration of facts which have no bearing on any corrupt practice. Allegations contained in paras 39 to 49 relate to the appointment of counting agents. In substance the appellant has alleged that neither he nor his election agent had appointed any counting agents but a number of persons had acted as the appellants counting agents in an unauthorised manner and complaints made by him were not considered and the Returning Officer failed to perform his duty. These allegations even if assumed to be true do not make out any case of commission of corrupt practice.19. Allegations contained in paras 50, 51 and 53 (1)(f) of the election petition purport to state that Rajiv Gandhi and his workers with his consent spent money on the election in excess of the ceiling limit and major port ion of which was not shown by him in his election expenses return. It was alleged that in all Rs. 3,15,500/- had been spent by Rajiv Gandhi in his election but he did not include the same in his return. Details of the expenditure is mentioned in the sub paras (A) to (G) of para DO. In these paras the appellant alleged that Rajiv Gandhi used at least 100 jeeps for thirty days and his workers with his consent used 40 jeeps and spent money on propaganda badges, leaflets, making arrangements for holding meetings for Smt. Indira Gandhi throughout the Amethi constituency and money was spent in providing food to 100 workers of Rajiv Gandhi, in all the returned candidate and his workers with his consent spent a sum of Rs. 3,15,500/- but the same as not accounted for in the election return. The allegations contained in these paras relate to the corrupt practice under S.123(6) of the Act read with S.77. S.123(6) provides that incurring or authorising of expenditure in contravention of S.77 is a corrupt practice. S.77 lays down that every candidate at the election shall keep a correct and separate account of all expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorised by him or by his election agent between the date of nomination and the date of declaration of result. The account shall contain such particulars as prescribed by Rules. Sub-section (3) lays down that expenditure shall not exceed such amount as may be prescribed. R.90, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, prescribed that the expenses shall not exceed a sum of Rs. 1 lakh for Lok Sabha election in the State of Uttar Pradesh. S.77 and the Rules therefore prescribed a ceiling limit for election expenses and if any candidate incurs or authorises expenses in excess of the ceiling limit, he would be guilty of corrupt practice under S.123(6) of the Act. The allegations contained in various sub paras of para 50 merely allege that a number of vehicles were plying with Congress (1) flags and food was served in connection with the election meetings, distribution of badges and leaflets. There is, however, no allegation that Rajiv Gandhi incurred or authorised incurring of expenditure for the aforesaid purposes. Any voluntary expense incurred by a political party, well wishers, sympathisers or association of persons does not fall within the mischief of S.123(6) of the Act, instead only that expenditure which is incurred by the candidate himself or authorised by him is material for the purpose of S.77.The aforesaid allegations do not amount to any corrupt practice as contemplated by S.123 of the Act. At best these allegations raise a grievance that the presiding officers did not perform their duties in accordance with law inasmuch as they failed in their duty to remove the posters and other propaganda material from the polling booth and the hand which was the election symbol of Rajiv Gandhi and the same was displayed within 100 meters of the polling booth in violation of the rules. The allegations do not make out any charge of corrupt practice. If at all the allegations could be a ground under S.100(l)(d)(iv) of the Act for setting aside election on the ground of it being materially affected but no such plea was raised. Paras 54 to 58 do not deal with any corrupt practice.31. The above scanning of the election petition would show that the appellant failed to plead complete details of corrupt practice which could constitute a cause of action as contemplated by S.100 of the Act and he further failed to give the material facts and other details of the alleged corrupt practices. The allegations relating to corrupt practice, even if assumed to be true as stated in the various paras of the election petition do not constitute any corrupt practice. The petition was drafted in a highly vague and general manner. Various paras of the petition presented disjointed averments and it is difficult to make out as to what actually the petitioner intended to plead. At the conclusion of hearing of the appeal before us appellant made applications for amending the election petition, to remove the defects pointed out by the High Court and to render the allegations of corrupt practice in accordance with the provisions of S.33 read with S.123 of the Act. Having given our anxious consideration to the amendment applications, we are of the opinion that these applications cannot be allowed at this stage. It must be borne in mind that the election petition was presented to the Registrar of the High Court, at Lucknow Bench on the last day of the limitation prescribed for filing the election petition. The appellant could not raise any ground of challenge after the expiry of limitation. O.IV, Rule 17 no doubt permits amendment of an election petition but the same is subject to the provisions of the Act. S.87 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling in question, the election of a returned candidate. After the expiry of that period no election petition is maintainable and the High Court or this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. An order of amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time specified in S.81 would amount to contravention of those provisions and beyond the ambit of S.87 of the Act. It necessarily follows chat a new ground cannot be raised or inserted in an election petition by way of amendment after the expiry of the period of limitations. The amendments claimed by the appellant are not in the nature of supplying particulars instead those seek to raise new ground of challenge. Various paras of the election petition which are sought to be amended do not disclose any cause of action, therefore. it is not permissible to allow their amendment after expiry of the period of limitation. Amendment applications are accordingly rejected.32. Before we close we could like to express our anxiety on a feature which of late has assumed great proportion. In Parliamentary form of democracy political parties play vital role and occasionally they sponsor candidates of the election. But under the existing law it is open to any elector to contest election from any parliamentary constituency in the country and it is not necessary that the candidate should be sponsored by a political party. It is permissible for an elector to contest election on his own as an independent candidate. Some independent individuals contest election genuinely and some of them have succeeded also but experience has shown that a large number of independent candidates contest the election for the mere sake of contesting with a view to make out grounds for challenging the election. Presence of a number of independent candidates results in confusion, for the millions of the illiterate and ignorant electors who exercise their electoral right on the basis of symbols printed on the ballot papers. The presence of large number of independent candidates makes the ballot paper of unmanageable size and ordinary elector is confused in the election booth while exercising his franchise. This leads to confusion. In the instant case out of 14 candidates who contested the election 11 of them including the appellant contested as independent candidates and they all polled only paltry number of votes. This shows the genuineness of the candidature of independent candidates. The appellant is a resident of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh and he is a lawyer by profession. He contested election as an independent candidate and on the date of filing of nomination paper he insisted to file his nomination paper by stripping off himself completely and by putting on only a langot. This caused consternation in the office of the Returning Officer, and it has also been raised as a ground of attack in the election petition. In fact the appellant has filed certain photographs before us showing himself in a langot only. When this appeal came up for hearing before us the appellant insisted that he should be allowed to argue the case by putting on a crown (an artificial one) on his head. According to him without the crown he would not be able to make his submissions in a satisfactory manner. We refused to grant the permission to the great dissatisfaction of the appellant. A Court of law is a solemn place where proceedings are held in a solemn manner and the time of the Court especially in the apex Court is precious time which belongs to the people and it would be wholly obnoxious to judicial propriety to allow a litigant to appear in Court wearing a crown to argue the case. The Court cannot be converted into a dramatic or theatrical stage. We accordingly refused to grant the permission to the appellant to wear his crown. During the arguments the appellant glibly stated that he had contested the election for the offices of President and Vice President and that he would be contesting each and every election as an independent candidate with a view to reform the society and the election law. This is not uncommon as a number of other persons have been contesting elections as independent candidates for the high office and some of them filed election petition disputing the election. These factors have given cause for anxiety to us and we hope that the Parliament will take these matters into consideration to devise ways and means to meet the onslaught of independent candidates who are not quite serious about their business.33. In view of our discussion, we are of the opinion that the High Court rightly exercised its power in rejecting this petition under O.VII. R.11.