Case: K.M. Viswanatha Pillai Vs. K.M. Shanmugham Pillai

and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement. (20) permit means the document issued by the commission or a State or Regional Transport Authority authorising the use of a transport vehicle as a contract carriage, or stage carriage, or authorising the owner as a private carrier or public carrier to use such vehicle. (22) private carrier means an owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub-section (2) of Section 42. (23) public carrier means an owner of a transport vehicle who transports or undertakes to transport goods, or any class of goods, for another person at any time and in any public place for hire or reward, whether in pursuance of the terms of a contract or agreement or otherwise, and includes any person, body, association or company engaged in the business of carrying the goods of persons associated with that person, body, association or company for the purpose of having their goods transported. Section 42 (1) on which the High Court has relied reads thus: 42 (1) No owner of a transport vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle in any public place, save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or the Commission authorising the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used;......... This section does not, in our view, on the language required that the owner himself should obtain the permit; it only requires the owner that the support vehicle shall not be used except in accordance with the conditions of the permit. The High Court would add the words to him after the words permit granted, but, in our view, there is no justification for inserting those words. The definition of the permit itself shows that all permits need not be in the name of the owner because the latter part of the definition shows that it is only in the case of a private carrier or a public carrier that a permit has to be in the owners name. The same inference follows from the definitions of private carrier and public carrier. This court came to the same conclusion in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman, 1952 SCR 583 = (AIR 1952 SC 192 ). 9. Some reliance was placed on the amendments made in S. 60 (1) (c). The section as amended reads: 60 (1) The transport authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit- (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to (own)*the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, .......... *Substituted by S. 54 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (100 of 1956) for possess (w. e. f. 16-2-1957). There has been a conflict of opinion between the different High Courts as to the inference following that amendment. It seems to us that the High Court of Allahabad in Khalil-ul-Rahman Khan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1963 All 383 at p. 388 rightly gives the effect of the amendment. Srivastava, J., observed: A reference was, however, made to Cl. (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 60 of the Act and on the basis of that clause it was urged that it assumed that the permit holder should be the owner of the vehicle. That clause provides for one of the contingencies in which a permit can be cancelled. According to it it is permissible for the Transport Authority to cancel a permit if the holder of it ceases to own the vehicle covered by the permit. It is only a permissive clause and the Transport Authority has only been given a discretion to cancel the permit in that contingency.It may or may not cancel it, even if the holder of the permit ceases to own the vehicle covered by it. But it is by no means necessary that Cl. (c) should be applicable to the case of every permit holder. There may be permit holders who own the vehicle covered by the permit and there may be permit holders who do not own the vehicle. This clause appears to apply only to the former case and not to the latter. On its basis, therefore, it cannot be held to be a requirement of the Act that in each case the person in whose favour a permit has been issued should necessarily be the owner of the vehicle covered by it. 10. We agree with these observations. The contrary view held in Varadarajulu Naidu v. Thavasi Nadar, 1963-2 Mad LJ 20 = (AIR 1963 Mad 413 ) that S. 42 (1) contemplates that only an owner will have a permit is erroneous. 11. The decision of the Andhra High Court in Chavali Venkataswami v. Chavali Kotavva, 1959-2 Andh WR 407 = (AIR 1962 Andh Pra 14) that S.60 (1) (c) of the Act envisages the grant of a permit to the owner alone must also be dissented from. 12. The learned counsel for the respondent says that at any rate the Act does not contemplate persons applying for permits benami. In India benami transactions are recognised and not frowned upon. (See Gur Narayan v. Sheolal Singh, ILR 46 Cal 566 = (AIR 1958 PC 140). In C.I.T. Gujarat v. Abdul Rahim and Co., 1965-55 ITR 651 = (AIR 1965 SC 1703 ) it was held by this court that the registration of the partnership deed under S.26-A of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, could not be refused on the ground that K was the benamidar of V.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]There has been a conflict of opinion between the different High Courts as to the inference following that amendment. It seems to us that the High Court of Allahabad in Khalil-ul-Rahman Khan v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1963 All 383   at p. 388 rightly gives the effect of the amendment10. We agree with these observations. The contrary view held in Varadarajulu Naidu v. Thavasi Nadar, 1963-2 Mad LJ 20 = (AIR 1963 Mad 413  ) that S. 42 (1) contemplates that only an owner will have a permit is erroneousThis section does not, in our view, on the language required that the owner himself should obtain the permit; it only requires the owner that the support vehicle shall not be used except in accordance with the conditions of the permit. The High Court would add the words to him after the words permit granted, but, in our view, there is no justification for inserting those words. The definition of the permit itself shows that all permits need not be in the name of the owner because the latter part of the definition shows that it is only in the case of a private carrier or a public carrier that a permit has to be in the owners name. The same inference follows from the definitions of private carrier and public carrier. This court came to the same conclusion in Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman, 1952 SCR 583   = (AIR 1952 SC 192  ).