Case: Pioneer Motors Private Ltd. &amp; Others Vs. Municipal Council, Nagercoil

that clear one months notice was necessary to be given, that is, both the first day and the last day of the month had to be excluded. To put it in the language used by Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, p. 351:-"When..............." not less than" so many days are to intervene, both the terminal days are excluded from the computation."That does not seem to have been done in the present case. But in order to decide whether this portion of the proviso is a mandatory provision, it is convenient to see the object for which it has been enacted. Under S. 78, the procedure is laid down for the levying of a new tax, which has to be done by a resolution. But in the proviso, it is stated that before such a resolution can be passed, a notice to that effect has to be published in the official gazette and also in one Malyalam or Tamil newspaper having circulation within the municipality. Then comes the period for inviting objections. The object of notifying in the Gazette and Local Newspaper is both to give notice to the public and particularly to the persons who are likely to be taxed and to invite their objections. For this purpose, the proviso requires a reasonable period of not less than one month to be given. The object of the provision is to give reasonable time and opportunity and it is given as a guidance that reasonable time would be a month. The use of the words "reasonable period" before the words "not being less than one month" is significant. If sufficient time has been given for the invitation of the objections which only just falls short of the period mentioned in the proviso, then it would serve the object of the legislature. The provision in regard to time in the context must be held to be directory and not mandatory.9. The cases under the Income Tax Act like the Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ekbal and Co., 1945-13 ITR 154: (AIR 1945 Bom 316 ) where the notice under S. 22 (2) of the Income-tax Act (which requires the furnishing of a return within suck period not being less than thirty days) of 30 days only was held to be bad, because it was not a notice of thirty clear days, were so decided because that notice is the basis of the jurisdiction to tax and a legal notice is an obligation imposed in order to tax an individual and it is a mandatory provision. Similarly, cases under Rent Act will also not apply. In Thompson v. Stimpson, 1960-3 All ER 500 the law required that not less than four weeks notice shall be given for vacation of premises on a weekly tenancy and only one weeks time was given. It was held there that it was a bad notice. It was further held that four weeks notice was a condition precedent and the words had been used which had been interpreted in the past as providing for four clear weeks and also it was construed as four clear weeks, so that there might be certainty in the matter. In other cases, that were relied upon and which related to taxing statutes, the Municipal Council, Cuddapah v. M. and S. M. Rly. Co., Ltd., ILR 52 Mad 779: (AIR 1929 Mad 746 ); Borough Municipality of Amalner v. Pratap Spinning Weaving and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Amalner, ILR (1952) Bom 918: (AIR 1932 Bom 401 and Firm of Kalu Karim v. City Municipality of Broach, ILR 51 Bom 764: (AIR 1927 Bom 527 ); it was held that taxing statutes have to be strictly construed and requirements which are precedent to the imposition of the tax have to be complied before tax can be legally imposed. In every case the words have to be construed in the context taking into consideration the language used and the object to be achieved. As we have said above, the use of the words "not being less than one month" implies the giving of a clear month excluding both the first and the last day of the month. There is no dispute as to the meaning of that expression alone which has been so construed and the observations of Lord Parker in 1960-3 All ER 500 will apply. But the question that arises in the present case is : what is the exact significance of these words when used in the context of the other words used in the proviso. The power of the municipality to levy the tax does not depend upon period prescribed for notice for objections. The power to tax is derived from the Statute; the provisions relating to the length of notice inviting objections and publication are merely procedural. The object of the notification is to inform the future rate payers and to invite objections from them. The proviso itself uses words "reasonable time." Reading "reasonable time" and "not being less than one month" together, it is clear that the time given must be reasonable and the legislature has only added a guide so that periods shorter than a month may not be fixed. In the present case the whole of the period except one day has been fixed and in view of the other facts it must be regarded as reasonable and to have complied with the provision which is directory in its later part.10. Counsel for the appellants in C. A. 499/501/58 wanted to raise a further objection to the legality of the tax levied and that ground was that the appellants were not carrying on a profession as they were only engaged in motor business and trade. This question was never raised at any previous stage and was not taken in the statement of the appellants case. Therefore it cannot be allowed to be raised. Besides it is without any substance in view of the definition of profession as given in S. 91 of the Act, which includes business.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]There is no dispute as to the meaning of that expression alone which has been so construed and the observations of Lord Parker in 1960-3 All ER 500 will apply. But the question that arises in the present case is : what is the exact significance of these words when used in the context of the other words used in the proviso. The power of the municipality to levy the tax does not depend upon period prescribed for notice for objections. The power to tax is derived from the Statute; the provisions relating to the length of notice inviting objections and publication are merely procedural. The object of the notification is to inform the future rate payers and to invite objections from them. The proviso itself uses words "reasonable time." Reading "reasonable time" and "not being less than one month" together, it is clear that the time given must be reasonable and the legislature has only added a guide so that periods shorter than a month may not be fixed. In the present case the whole of the period except one day has been fixed and in view of the other facts it must be regarded as reasonable and to have complied with the provision which is directory in its later part.10. Counsel for the appellants in C. A. 499/501/58 wanted to raise a further objection to the legality of the tax levied and that ground was that the appellants were not carrying on a profession as they were only engaged in motor business and trade. This question was never raised at any previous stage and was not taken in the statement of the appellants case. Therefore it cannot be allowed to be raised. Besides it is without any substance in view of the definition of profession as given in S. 91 of the Act, which includesno specific finding was given as regards the operation of S. 91, the suit was decreed and the question whether the trust followed a profession or not seems to have got lost at the subsequent stages of the proceedings, that is, in appeal in the court of the District Judge and in the High Court. It is this point which was urged by counsel for the trust; his plea was that his case was not covered by S. 91, as being a religious trust it had no profession and was carrying on none. That is a matter which, in our opinion, should have been decided, and as neither the District Judge nor the High Court has given a finding on that point, it is necessary to remit the case to the High Court with the direction that the appeal be reheard and that particular question be decided on the materials on the record. Nothing that has been said in this judgment must be taken to be an expression of opinion on the merits of this plea taken by the appellant Trust.