Case: Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh &amp; Anr

strictly open to the aggrieved party ........ The aggrieved party will have a right of suit as he would have a good cause of action when proceedings are taken under colour of an Act which does not apply to the facts of the case."This correctly expresses the distinction between the two related questions and the effect of the decision on the preliminary condition.29. In the case before us, it has been found in dealing with the applicability of the Rent Reduction Act, that the shrotriem was an "inam village". The result therefore would be that the preliminary condition would have been satisfied and the Settlement Officer was therefore competent to record a finding that the "inam village" of East Thakkellapadu was an "inam estate" i.e., that "it was a village of which the land revenue without the Kudivaram had been granted in inam to a person not owning the Kudivaram thereof."30. As we have pointed out earlier, the Settlement Officer held an inquiry and by an order dated February 20, 1950 he held the shrotriem to be an "inam estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act. Thereafter the plaintiff the appellants predecessor filed the appeal to the Tribunal and that appeal was dismissed on June 25, 1951. It was one of the orders that was challenged before the High Court in the writ petition and, as already seen, the appellant was referred to a civil suit for the adjudication of his rights. In the civil suit that he filed the appellant challenged the proceedings before the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal and the dismissal of his appeal by the latter on two grounds : (1) that even if the original grant of the shrotriem comprised the entire village, still the same was not an "inam estate" within the Abolition Act, because the same was not an "estate" prior to the amendment effected in 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908. In the definition, as it then stood, as already seen a grant was brought within the terms of the definition of an estate only where the grant was of the land revenue or of the melvarma alone "to a person not owning the Kudivaram thereof." It was this definition that was altered by an amendment effected in 1936. It was submitted by the appellant that the grant in the present case was of the entire interest in the land and not of the melvaram alone and that such an inam, even though it be of an entire village, was not brought within the provisions of the Abolition Act. (2) The decision of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal was impugned as incompetent for the reason that whereas S. 8 provided for a tribunal consisting of three members, in the present case the appeal was heard and disposed of only by two. The Madras High Court had held in Kama Umi Isa Ammal v. Ramakadamban, 1952-2 Mad LJ 667 : (AIR 1953 Mad 129 ) that such a decision of the tribunal was null and void and therefore would not amount to a dismissal of the appeal by the tribunal. So far as the second point was concerned, the learned Judges accepted as correct the view of the Madras High Court in the decision referred to and held that the order of the tribunal dismissing the appellants appeal was a nullity, but the learned Judges further held that this would not automatically nullify or vacate the determination and decision of the Settlement Officer under S. 9 and his finding that the village in suit was an "inam estate" but that it had the effect merely of leaving the appeal where it stood at the time it was purported to be dismissed by the two members who could not function as the Tribunal. In other words, the result of applying the rule enunciated by the Madras High Court was that there were a valid order of the Settlement Officer followed by an appeal which had been filed to the Tribunal but which had not yet been disposed of validly by the Tribunal. Thus the effect in law of the void order of the Tribunal was held to be that the appeal was still pending before the tribunal. On this conclusion which is obviously correct the appellant could get no. benefit, so far as the present suit was concerned, by the invalid dismissal of his appeal, for invoking the jurisdiction of the civil Court to determine the question whether the "inam village" was an "inam estate" though it would be competent to him to further prosecute the appeal, if he considered that that would serve his interests.31. As regards the first point that is the case of the appellant on the merits, the learned Judges held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was impliedly excluded by the provision in the Abolition Act constituting the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal as the authorities to decide the issue and vesting them with the requisite jurisdiction and providing for the procedure to be followed by them in that regard. We have already expressed our agreement with these conclusions of the High Court. In this view we intimated to learned Counsel for the appellant that it would not be open to him to invite our attention to the evidence which was led before the Settlement Officer for proving that the original grant was of both the warams and that the Settlement Officer and the Subordinate Judge who tried the suit erred in recording that the shrotriem grant of the village was of the melvaram alone.32. Learned Counsel for the State pointed out that the legislature of Andhra Pradesh has in 1956 and 1957, effected amendments to the Abolition Act which would render any arguments about the merits of the original grant being of both the warms, wholly academic but we have not thought it necessary to refer to it as this is hardly relevant for the points arising for disposal in the appeal.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. It would be convenient to take up first the question whether the Shrotriem is an estate within the scope of the Rent reduction Act and this would turn upon the provisions of that enactment. The preamble to the Rent Reduction Act specifies, inter alia, that it was an Act to provide for the reduction of rents payable by ryots in estates governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, approximately to the level of the assessments levied on lands in ryotwari areas in the neighbourhood and for the collection of such rents exclusively by the State Government. In line with it S. 1 (2) of the Act makes provision for the application on the enactment to all "estates as defined in S. 3, cl. (2), of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Its second Section empowers the State Government to appoint a special officer for any estate or estates for the purpose of recommending fair and equitable rates of rent for the ryoti lands in such estate or "estates. After the Special Officer completes the enquiry he determines in accordance with the prescribed procedure the fair and equitable rates of rent payable by the ryot and fixes the amount of reduction which the rates theretofore prevailing in the estate should undergo. The Government thereafter considers the report of the officer and publishes in the official Gazette a notification determining the rates of rent which should prevail in particular estates and S. 3(2) of the Rent Reduction Act renders the rates so notified final and binding on the parties.8. In the case before us, the above procedure was followed and the State Government published a notification on May 2, 1950 under S. 3(2) of the Rent Reduction Act determining the rates of rent payable by ryots in the Shrotriem of East Thakkellapadu treating it as an estate.The remarks of the Deputy Collector extracted earlier tend strongly in favour of the view that the grant was of a named village of Thakkellapadu. Learned Counsel drew our attention to the heading in the Register of Inams in the village (Ex. A2) and pointed out that it purported to be a Register of Inams in the village, but obviously no. assistance can be derived from the use of the preposition "in as it is a well-known form of heading which is equally used even where an entire village is the subject of the grant (Vide e. g. the observations in District Board, Tanjore v. Noor Md., 1952-2 Mad LJ 586 at p. 592 : (AIR 1953 SC 446   at p.have already pointed out that in Column 3 of Ex. A2 both the dry as well as the Poramboke of a total extent of 686, 97 acres as set out in Columns 4 and 5 is shown as the extent of the inam. That the entirety of the dry lands in the village was granted was not disputed, but the argument was that the Poramboke was not. However, in the face of these entries in Columns 3 and 4 of the Inam Fair Register, it appears to us idle to contend that the Poramboke was not granted to the shrotriemdar but was reserved by the grantor. Even in cases where the words deduct poramboke were used, it has been held that these words were used not for the purpose of excluding Poramboke from the grant but merely for indicating that it was being deducted for ascertaining the assessment, since waste land is not assessed (vide Krishnaswami v. Perumal Goundan, AIR 1950 PC 105 at p. 108). The case before us is a fortiori because Column 3 shows that the Poramboke is comprised in theregard to these two minor inams it would be seen from the remarks of the Deputy Collector we have extracted, that the two inams which are called Desamadam were of immemorial origin and that the Shrotriemdars admitted in 1862 that they were older than the shrotriem. It is also stated that jodi was payable by them to the Shrotriemdars, and it goes on to say that this might have been imposed by the shrotriemdars themselves. These recitals would indicate that either these minor inams came into existence at a time anterior to the grant of the shrotriem but that the shrotriemdars extracted payment of jodi from them, or that they were the creations of the shrotriemdars themselves. In either event their existence would not detract from the shrotriem being an "estate within S. 3(2)(d) read with Explanation (1). On the facts therefore it is clear that there has been no. reservation of any land in the village at the time of the grant of the named village to the shrotriemdars but the entire village, subject to the small extent of the two minor inams which had already been created was granted as shrotriem. Therefore, the existence of these minor inams which are of an earlier date than the shrotriem grant does not indicate any reservation of lands by the grantor and does not therefore militate against the shrotriem grant constituting an inam within S. 3(2)(d) of the Estates Landwe have stated already, viz., that the entirety of the poramboke of 101.35 acres was the subject of grant, along with the dry land of the extent of 585.62 acres would be sufficient to dispose of this contention. Apart however from the entry in Column 3 read with Columns 4 and 5 on which we have based our conclusion, we might point out that it is unthinkable that the grantor while granting the dry lands in the village, reserved for himself for his enjoyment or for a grant on a future occasion the saline land wholly unfit for cultivation. We consider therefore that there is no. substance in this last contention either.17. It would therefore follow that the learned Judges of the High Court were right in holding that the notification by Government under the Rent Reduction Act wasagree that the judgment of the learned trial Judge on this point about the shrotriem being an inam estate is not very satisfactory and that if the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter, one of the two courses suggested by learned counsel should have been followed by the High Court. We are, however, of the opinion that the learned Judges were right in their view that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred by reason of the provisions of the Abolition Act to which we shall makewas urged that there was no. bar where the matter rested merely with the decision of a Settlement Officer and support was sought for this contention from the circumstance that S. 9(4) (c) in terms imparted finality solely to the orders of the Tribunal, and this could not be read so as to make the same provision applicable to the orders of the Settlement Officer. This argument entirely lacks substance. Clause (c) has to be read in conjunction with the positive provision in sub-sec. (6) with which it is closely related and under this the decision of the Tribunal is declared to be binding on all persons interested, and a precisely similar effect is predicated as regards the decisions of the Settlement Officer where no. appeal has been filed from his decision. The act thus never meant to draw any distinction between orders of Settlement Officers which were affirmed by Tribunals and other orders which by reason of their not being appealed against within the time prescribed, attained finality. This apart, if the submission of the appellant were correct, it would mean that when a Settlement Officer rendered his decision on the matter set out in S. 9(1), the aggrieved party had a right either to appeal to the Tribunal within the time prescribed or challenge it by a suit in Civil Court within the period of limitation which might be applicable to such suits under the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. If this were so, as there might conceivably be more than one party having a similar interest and raising a similar contention who might all feel aggrieved by the decision of a Settlement Officer, it would mean that one party might file a suit, while another resorted to the Tribunal by way of appeal. This result would be sufficient to demonstrate the impossibility of accepting the construction for which the appellant contends. The very provision setting up an hierarchy of judicial tribunals for the determination of the question on which the applicability of the Act depends, is sufficient in most cases for inferring that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the same matter is barred. "In addition we have the provision in S. 9(4)(c) read with S. 9(6) to which we have adverted. In these circumstances, we have no. hesitation in holding that to the extent of the question stated in Section 9(1), the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal are exclusive and that the Civil Courts are barred from trying or retrying the same question. We should, however, hasten to add that this exclusion of jurisdiction would be subject to two limitations. First is the reservation made by the Lord Thankerton in Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., 67 Ind App 222 at p. 236 : (AIR 1940 PC 105   at p. 110) where, after holding that the provisions of the Sea Customs Act setting up a special machinery for the adjudication of the correct duty leviable under the Act barred recourse to the Civil Courts to question the correctness of the decisions of the Authorities acting under that enactment added :"It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicialis only necessary to add that no. question envisaged by Lord Thankerton or referred to by Gajendragadkar, J. is raised in the appeal before us and it is therefore unnecessary for us to examine, in the present appeal either, the precise limits of this exception.27. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive, Lord Esher formulated the point thus in The Queen v. The Commissioner for Special purposes of the Income Tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313 at pp. 319-320 :"When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends, and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given, there is no. appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction."It is manifest that the answer to the question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors. In the present case, this is determined by the terms of S. 9(1) which prescribes and delimits the functions of the Settlement Officer and thus in effect, of the appellate forum. This sub-section enjoins on or empowers the Settlement Officer to determine whether "any inam village" is "an inam estate or not" and the object of the Act is to "abolish" only "inam estates". This determination involves two distinct matters in view of the circumstances that every "inam village" is not necessarily "and inam estate" viz., (1) whether a particular property is or is not an "inam village" and (2) whether such a village is "an inam estate" within the definition in S. 2(7). The first of these questions whether the grant is of an "inam village" is referred to in S. 9(1) itself as some extrinsic fact which must pre-exist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by that provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this appeal, makes no. provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer.28. Where therefore persons appearing in opposition to the proceedings initiated before the Settlement Officer under S. 9 question the character of the property as not falling within the description of an "inam village", he has of necessity to decide the issue, for until he holds that this condition is satisfied, he cannot enter on the further enquiry which is the one which by S. 9(1) of the Act he is directed to conduct. On the terms of S. 9(1) the property in question being an "inam village" is assumed as a fact on the existence of which the competency of the Settlement Officer to determine the matter within his jurisdiction rests and as there are no. words in the statute empowering him to decide finally the former, he cannot confer jurisdiction on himself by a wrong decision on this preliminary condition to his jurisdiction. Any determination by him of this question, therefore, is (subject to the result of an appeal to the Tribunal) binding on the parties only for the purposes of the proceedings under the Act, but no. further. The correctness of that finding may be questioned in any subsequent legal proceeding in the ordinary courts of the land where the question might arise for decision. The determination by him of the second question whether the "inam village" is an inam estate is, however, within his exclusive jurisdiction and in regard to it the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is clearly barred.In the case before us, it has been found in dealing with the applicability of the Rent Reduction Act, that the shrotriem was an "inam village". The result therefore would be that the preliminary condition would have been satisfied and the Settlement Officer was therefore competent to record a finding that the "inam village" of East Thakkellapadu was an "inam estate" i.e., that "it was a village of which the land revenue without the Kudivaram had been granted in inam to a person not owning the Kudivaram thereof."30. As we have pointed out earlier, the Settlement Officer held an inquiry and by an order dated February 20, 1950 he held the shrotriem to be an "inam estate" within the meaning of the Abolition Act. Thereafter the plaintiff the appellants predecessor filed the appeal to the Tribunal and that appeal was dismissed on June 25, 1951. It was one of the orders that was challenged before the High Court in the writ petition and, as already seen, the appellant was referred to a civil suit for the adjudication of his rights. In the civil suit that he filed the appellant challenged the proceedings before the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal and the dismissal of his appeal by the latter on two grounds : (1) that even if the original grant of the shrotriem comprised the entire village, still the same was not an "inam estate" within the Abolition Act, because the same was not an "estate" prior to the amendment effected in 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act 1 of 1908. In the definition, as it then stood, as already seen a grant was brought within the terms of the definition of an estate only where the grant was of the land revenue or of the melvarma alone "to a person not owning the Kudivaram thereof." It was this definition that was altered by an amendment effected in 1936. It was submitted by the appellant that the grant in the present case was of the entire interest in the land and not of the melvaram alone and that such an inam, even though it be of an entire village, was not brought within the provisions of the Abolition Act. (2) The decision of the Tribunal dismissing the appeal was impugned as incompetent for the reason that whereas S. 8 provided for a tribunal consisting of three members, in the present case the appeal was heard and disposed of only by two. The Madras High Court had held in Kama Umi Isa Ammal v. Ramakadamban, 1952-2 Mad LJ 667 : (AIR 1953 Mad 129  ) that such a decision of the tribunal was null and void and therefore would not amount to a dismissal of the appeal by the tribunal. So far as the second point was concerned, the learned Judges accepted as correct the view of the Madras High Court in the decision referred to and held that the order of the tribunal dismissing the appellants appeal was a nullity, but the learned Judges further held that this would not automatically nullify or vacate the determination and decision of the Settlement Officer under S. 9 and his finding that the village in suit was an "inam estate" but that it had the effect merely of leaving the appeal where it stood at the time it was purported to be dismissed by the two members who could not function as the Tribunal. In other words, the result of applying the rule enunciated by the Madras High Court was that there were a valid order of the Settlement Officer followed by an appeal which had been filed to the Tribunal but which had not yet been disposed of validly by the Tribunal. Thus the effect in law of the void order of the Tribunal was held to be that the appeal was still pending before the tribunal. On this conclusion which is obviously correct the appellant could get no. benefit, so far as the present suit was concerned, by the invalid dismissal of his appeal, for invoking the jurisdiction of the civil Court to determine the question whether the "inam village" was an "inam estate" though it would be competent to him to further prosecute the appeal, if he considered that that would serve his interests.31. As regards the first point that is the case of the appellant on the merits, the learned Judges held that the jurisdiction of the civil court was impliedly excluded by the provision in the Abolition Act constituting the Settlement Officer and the Tribunal as the authorities to decide the issue and vesting them with the requisite jurisdiction and providing for the procedure to be followed by them in that regard. We have already expressed our agreement with these conclusions of the High Court. In this view we intimated to learned Counsel for the appellant that it would not be open to him to invite our attention to the evidence which was led before the Settlement Officer for proving that the original grant was of both the warams and that the Settlement Officer and the Subordinate Judge who tried the suit erred in recording that the shrotriem grant of the village was of the melvaram alone.Learned Counsel for the State pointed out that the legislature of Andhra Pradesh has in 1956 and 1957, effected amendments to the Abolition Act which would render any arguments about the merits of the original grant being of both the warms, wholly academicbut we have not thought it necessary to refer to it as this is hardly relevant for the points arising for disposal in the appeal.