Case: Rt. Rev. Magr. Mark Netto Vs. Govt. Of Kerala &amp; Ors

v. S. C. Dorairajan, (1951) SCR 525 : (AIR 1951 SC 226 ); In re the Kerala Education Bill 1957, (1959) SCR 995 : (AIR 1958 SC 956 ); Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1963) 3 SCR 837 : (AIR 1963 SC 540 ); Katra Education Society v. State of U. P., (1966) 3 SCR 328 : (AIR 1966 SC 1307 ) ; Gujarat University, Ahmedabad v. Krishna Ranganath, (1963) Suppl (1) SCR 112 : (AIR 1963 SC 703 ) and W. Proost v. State of Bihar, (1969) 2 SCR 73 : (AIR 1969 SC 465 ). In the last case it was said that the right need not be enlarged nor whittled down. The Constitution speaks of administration and that must fairly be left to the minority institutions and no. more".In the case of St. Xavires College, Ahmedabad (supra) the majority decision although by separate judgments, has converged to the view that the right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions, similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderely, efficient and sound administration of the school in the matter of maintaing discipline, health, morality and so on and so forth. Even, the two learned Judges differing from the majority on some of the aspects of the matter under consideration before this Court in St. Xavires College case did not depart from this fundamental principle. The difference was mainly in the application of the principle in relation to some of the provisions of the impugned Statute. As summed up by Das C. J., in the Kerala Education Bill case (supra), the right to administer an educational institution of their choice by a minority cannot mean a right to maladminister. Of course in the application of the salient principles mentioned above opinions have differed from case to case and may differ.6. Let us examine the constitutionality of Rule 12 (iii) contained in Chapter VI of the Rules and the validity of the impugned orders contained in Exts. P-2 and P-4. The dominant object of the said Rule does not seem to be for the sake of discipline or morality. Any apprehension of deterioration in the moral standards of students if co-education is permitted in Secondary Schools does not seem to be the main basis of this Rule, although it may be a secondary one. The very fact that girls can be admitted into a boys school situated at a place where there are no. girls school in the town or the area leads to this conclusion. It is to be remembered that no. category of a school is specified in the Act or the Rules. Nor was our attention drawn to any provision enabling the educational authorities to force the school authorities to admit girls in a school where they dont want to admit them. The self imposed restriction by the management in vogue for a number of years restricting the admission for boys only, per se, is wholly insufficient to cast a legal ban on them not to admit girls. The ban provided in Rule 12 (iii) as already adverted to is of a very limited character and for a limited purpose. Perrmssion was granted to Dr. Pereira for opening the school in 1947 as a High School. No. resriction in terms was imposed for not admitting any girl students. If the successor school authorities wanted to depart from the self-imposed restriction, they could only be prevented from doing so on valid, legal and reasonable grounds and not otherwise. As is apparent from the impugned order dae 5-6-1973 of the Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction as also from the passage of the High Court judgment which we have extracted above the permission sought for by the appellant for admission of girls in the St. Vincents School was refused not on the ground of any apprehended deterioration of morality or discipline but mainly, or perhaps, wholly in the interest of the existing Muslim girls school, respondent No. 4, in the locality. The basis of the Rule, as remarked by the High Court, seems to be "that it will be better for the girls to get instruction in girls schools as far as possible. If that be so, then clearly the Rule violates the freedom guaranteed to the minority to administer the school of its choice. But, as already stated, in our opinion this is not the dominant object of the rule. The Christian community in the locality, for various reasons which are not necessary to be alluded to here, wanted the girls also to receive their education in this school and specially of their community. They did not think it in their interest to send them to the Mulsim girls school which is an educational institution run by the other minority community. In that view of the matter the Rule in question in its wide amplitude sanctioning the withholding of permission for admission of girls students in the boys minority school is violative of Article 30. If so widely interpreted it crosses the barrier of regulatory measures and comes in the region of interference with the administration of the institution, a right which is guaranteed to the minority under Article 30. The Rule, therefore, must be interpreted narrowly and is held to be inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a situation of the kind with which we are concerned in this case. We do not think it necessary or advisable to strike down the Rule as a whole but do restrict its operation and make it inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a situation like the one which arose in this case. It follows, therefore, that the impugned orders dated 5-6-1973 and 2-5-1974 passed by the Regional Deputy Director and the District Education Officer respectively are bad and invalid and must be quashed.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In the case of St. Xavires College, Ahmedabad (supra) the majority decision although by separate judgments, has converged to the view that the right conferred on the religious and linguistic minorities to administer educational institutions of their choice is not an absolute right. This right is not free from regulation. Just as regulatory measures are necessary for maintaining the educational character and content of minority institutions, similarly regulatory measures are necessary for ensuring orderely, efficient and sound administration of the school in the matter of maintaing discipline, health, morality and so on and so forth. Even, the two learned Judges differing from the majority on some of the aspects of the matter under consideration before this Court in St. Xavires College case did not depart from this fundamental principle. The difference was mainly in the application of the principle in relation to some of the provisions of the impugned Statute. As summed up by Das C. J., in the Kerala Education Bill case (supra), the right to administer an educational institution of their choice by a minority cannot mean a right to maladminister. Of course in the application of the salient principles mentioned above opinions have differed from case to case and maydominant object of the said Rule does not seem to be for the sake of discipline or morality. Any apprehension of deterioration in the moral standards of students if co-education is permitted in Secondary Schools does not seem to be the main basis of this Rule, although it may be a secondary one. The very fact that girls can be admitted into a boys school situated at a place where there are no. girls school in the town or the area leads to this conclusion. It is to be remembered that no. category of a school is specified in the Act or the Rules. Nor was our attention drawn to any provision enabling the educational authorities to force the school authorities to admit girls in a school where they dont want to admit them. The self imposed restriction by the management in vogue for a number of years restricting the admission for boys only, per se, is wholly insufficient to cast a legal ban on them not to admit girls. The ban provided in Rule 12 (iii) as already adverted to is of a very limited character and for a limited purpose. Perrmssion was granted to Dr. Pereira for opening the school in 1947 as a High School. No. resriction in terms was imposed for not admitting any girl students. If the successor school authorities wanted to depart from the self-imposed restriction, they could only be prevented from doing so on valid, legal and reasonable grounds and not otherwise. As is apparent from the impugned order dae 5-6-1973 of the Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction as also from the passage of the High Court judgment which we have extracted above the permission sought for by the appellant for admission of girls in the St. Vincents School was refused not on the ground of any apprehended deterioration of morality or discipline but mainly, or perhaps, wholly in the interest of the existing Muslim girls school, respondent No. 4, in the locality. The basis of the Rule, as remarked by the High Court, seems to be "that it will be better for the girls to get instruction in girls schools as far as possible. If that be so, then clearly the Rule violates the freedom guaranteed to the minority to administer the school of its choice. But, as already stated, in our opinion this is not the dominant object of the rule. The Christian community in the locality, for various reasons which are not necessary to be alluded to here, wanted the girls also to receive their education in this school and specially of their community. They did not think it in their interest to send them to the Mulsim girls school which is an educational institution run by the other minority community. In that view of the matter the Rule in question in its wide amplitude sanctioning the withholding of permission for admission of girls students in the boys minority school is violative of Article 30. If so widely interpreted it crosses the barrier of regulatory measures and comes in the region of interference with the administration of the institution, a right which is guaranteed to the minority under Article 30. The Rule, therefore, must be interpreted narrowly and is held to be inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a situation of the kind with which we are concerned in this case. We do not think it necessary or advisable to strike down the Rule as a whole but do restrict its operation and make it inapplicable to a minority educational institution in a situation like the one which arose in this case. It follows, therefore, that the impugned orders dated 5-6-1973 and 2-5-1974 passed by the Regional Deputy Director and the District Education Officer respectively are bad and invalid and must be quashed.