Case: G. Bassi Reddy Vs. International Crops Research Instt. &amp; Anr

it would not serve to make the body a State". 26. The facts which have been narrated earlier clearly show that ICRISAT does not fulfil any of these tests. It was not set up by the Government and it gives its services voluntarily to a large number of countries besides India. It is not controlled by not is it accountable to the Government. The Indian Governments financial contribution to ICRISAT is minimal. Its participation in ICRISATs administration is limited to 3 out of 15 members. It cannot therefore be said that ICRISAT is a State of other authority as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.27. It is true that a writ under Article 226 also lies against a person for any other purpose". The power of the High Court to issue such a writ to "any person" can only mean the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established principles, a writ lay. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III is clear enough from the language used. But the words "and for any other purpose" must mean "for any other purpose for which any of the writs mentioned would, according to well established principles issue [Carlshad M.W. Mfg. Co. V. H.M. Jagtiani AIR 1952 Cal 315 at 318]28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a person if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585 ; Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 , 698; VST Ind. Ltd. vs. VST Ind. Workers Union & Another (2001) 1 SCC 298 ). ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that the ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities. In Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.V. Imanual AIR 1960 SC 1306, this Court construed Article 226 to hold that the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus "to secure the performance on the duty or statutory duty" in the performance of which the one who applies for it has a sufficient legal interest". The Court also held that : "... an application for mandamus will not lie for an order of reinstatement to an office which is essentially of a private character nor can such an application be maintained to secure performance of obligations owed by a company towards its workmen or to resolve any private dispute (See Sohan Lal vs. Union of India, 1957 SCR 738 ). 29. We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable against ICRISAT.30. The second relief sought in the writ petition is against the Union of India. The prayer is that the Union should take action to fulfil clause 6 of the March agreement. The prayer is unsustainable as in substance the relief claimed is against ICRISAT. Furthermore it is doubtful whether the agreement between the Indian Government and ICRISAT is specifically enforceable as such in domestic Courts, particularly when the agreement does not form part of any domestic legislation. The case of Dadu vs. State of Maharashtra relied upon by the appellant has no bearing on the issues which arise for consideration in the case before us. In that case, the Constitutional validity of Section 32A of the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 which prohibited appellate Courts from suspending sentence despite the appeal being admitted, was questioned. The impugned section clearly ran contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which allowed the appellate courts discretionary powers to suspend sentences. One of the arguments raised by the Respondent State to justify this apparent contradiction was that the section had been enacted in discharge of the Government of Indias international obligations under the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic, 1988. The Court held that the Convention clearly and unambiguously showed that the Convention was made subject to "constitutional principles and the basic concept of its legal system prevalent in the polity of the member country". The States argument was rejected as it was found as a fact that there was no international agreement which obliged countries notwithstanding the constitutional principles and basic concept of its legal system, to put a blanket ban on the power of the Court to suspend the sentence awarded to a criminal under the Act. There was no conflict between the Governments international obligation and the domestic law. In the present case there is no question of any conflict. What is sought for on the other hand is an enforcement of a clause in an international agreement.31. In any event, it could not be said that the Personnel Policy Statement framed by ICRISAT dealing with internal discipline was not in terms of clause 6 (2) of the March agreement. It has not been shown how these guidelines (which were in fact followed in the appellants case) deviated from or did not approximate to the established disciplinary procedures followed by other private concerns in the country. 32. In these circumstances, we

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]25. A writ under Article 226 lies only when the petitioner establishes that his or her fundamental right or some other legal right has been infringed (Calcutta Gas Co. vs. State of W.B., AIR 1962 SC 1044 , 1047-1048). The claim as made by the appellant in his writ petition is founded on Articles 14 and 16. The claim would not be maintainable against ICRISAT unless ICRISAT were a State or authority within the meaning of Article 12. The tests for determining whether an organization is either, has been recently considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and others (2002) 5 SCC 111  at p.134 in which wequestion in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State".The facts which have been narrated earlier clearly show that ICRISAT does not fulfil any of these tests. It was not set up by the Government and it gives its services voluntarily to a large number of countries besides India. It is not controlled by not is it accountable to the Government. The Indian Governments financial contribution to ICRISAT is minimal. Its participation in ICRISATs administration is limited to 3 out of 15 members. It cannot therefore be said that ICRISAT is a State of other authority as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.27. It is true that a writ under Article 226 also lies against a person for any other purpose". The power of the High Court to issue such a writ to "any person" can only mean the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established principles, a writ lay. That a writ may issue to an appropriate person for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III is clear enough from the language used. But the words "and for any other purpose" must mean "for any other purpose for which any of the writs mentioned would, according to well established principles issue [Carlshad M.W. Mfg. Co. V. H.M. Jagtiani AIR 1952 Cal 315 at 318]28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a person if it is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty (Praga Tools Corporation vs. C.A. Imanual, (1969) 1 SCC 585 ; Andi Mukta Sadguru Trust vs. V.R. Rudani, (1989) 2 SCC 691 , 698; VST Ind. Ltd. vs. VST Ind. Workers Union & Another (2001) 1 SCC 298 ). ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct research and training programmes in the sphere of agriculture purely on a voluntary basis. A service voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities are designed to benefit people from all over the world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that the ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.We are therefore of the view that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the writ petition of the appellant was not maintainable against ICRISAT.30. The second relief sought in the writ petition is against the Union of India. The prayer is that the Union should take action to fulfil clause 6 of the March agreement. The prayer is unsustainable as in substance the relief claimed is against ICRISAT. Furthermore it is doubtful whether the agreement between the Indian Government and ICRISAT is specifically enforceable as such in domestic Courts, particularly when the agreement does not form part of any domesticwas no conflict between the Governments international obligation and the domestic law. In the present case there is no question of any conflict. What is sought for on the other hand is an enforcement of a clause in an international agreement.31. In any event, it could not be said that the Personnel Policy Statement framed by ICRISAT dealing with internal discipline was not in terms of clause 6 (2) of the March agreement. It has not been shown how these guidelines (which were in fact followed in the appellants case) deviated from or did not approximate to the established disciplinary procedures followed by other private concerns in the