Case: The Project Director, Project  Implementation Unit Vs. P.V. Krishnamoorthy &amp; Ors

Section 3A of the 1956 Act until the grant or non-grant of permissions by the competent authorities under the environmental and forest laws, as the case may be, including until the stated permissions attain finality. In other words, time spent by the executing agency/Central Government in pursuing application before the concerned authorities for grant of permission/clearance under the stated laws need to be excluded because of stay by the Court of actions (limited to issue of notification under Section 3D), consequent to notification under Section 3A. Thus, the acquisition process set in motion upon issue of Section 3A notification can go on in parallel until the stage of publication of notification under Section 3D, which can be issued after grant of clearances/permissions by the competent authority under the environment/forest laws and attaining finality thereof. 73. In the present case, it is noticed that the NHAI being the executing agency, had soon submitted Terms of Reference to the MoEF after publication of notification under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act dated 1.3.2018, declaring the section - C-K-S (NC) as a national highway. That was submitted on 19.4.2018 and the approval in furtherance thereof was granted by the MoEF on 8.6.2018, consequent to the recommendation made by the EAC on 7.5.2018. Indeed, the NHAI thereafter submitted amendment to the Terms of Reference on 5.7.2018 and 21.8.2018. The EAC after examining the amendment in Terms of Reference, submitted its recommendation on 30.8.2018. It is also matter of record and stated on affidavit by the EAC that no lapses have been committed by the NHAI in complying with necessary formalities. Similarly, NHAI had submitted application on 12.5.2018 to Conservator of Forests for grant of permissions under the forest laws in respect of lands forming part of the notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act. That application was duly processed and the permission was granted by the competent authority under the forest laws on 8.6.2018. Concededly, these permissions/clearances have been issued by the concerned authorities under the environment and forest laws after notification under Section 3A and before issuance of declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act. In terms of this decision, therefore, the time spent for obtaining such clearances including till the pronouncement of this decision and until the stated permissions/clearances attain finality, whichever is later, as the matter had remained sub judice, need to be excluded. Even after excluding such period, if any notification under Section 3A impugned before the High Court is not saved from the deemed lapsing effect predicated in Section 3D(3), the Central Government may have to issue fresh notification(s) under Section 3A of the 1956 Act and recommence the process of acquisition, if so advised. We are not expressing any final opinion in that regard. However, such fresh notifications may be issued only in respect of land forming part of permissions/clearances given by the competent authority under the environment/forest laws, being site specific. OTHER CONTENTIONS 74. That takes us to the grievance regarding the same Consultant being continued for the changed section i.e. C-K-S (NC). Indeed, the eligibility of the Consultant was in reference to the originally conceived project concerning C-M (EC). It was found eligible to undertake the consultancy work for the said project and letter dated 29.9.2017 was also issued by NHAI. In the Committees meeting chaired by the Secretary of MoRTH on 19.1.2018, new alignment was finalised thereby deviating from the original project of C-M (EC). Instead, section - C-K-S (NC) was finalised. However, the same Consultant had been continued by execution of a contract agreement dated 22.2.2018 for the changed stretch/section. This was done as the terms and conditions were same. Indeed, it was vehemently contended before us that the authorities should have followed the procedure stipulated for appointment of Consultant for the changed project afresh. However, we find that in none of the writ petitions filed before the High Court, express declaration had been sought or for that matter, the contract agreement dated 22.2.2018 executed between NHAI and the Consultant came to be challenged. Moreover, the terms and conditions of appointment of the Consultant would have no financial ramifications, considering the fact that the consultancy charges were to be paid on per kilometre basis; and in fact due to change of alignment, the length of proposed national highway stood reduced to only around 277 kms. (instead of original stretch [C-M (EC)] of around 350 kms.) Further, no challenge is set forth regarding the qualification and eligibility of the Consultant as such. Notably, the decision to change the stretch/section from Economic Corridor to National Corridor was that of the Committee. It was not founded on the recommendation of the Consultant, as has been assumed by the writ petitioners and so propounded before the high Court. The decision of the Committee was backed by tangible reasons as recorded in the minutes and also intrinsic in it its vast experience about the efficacy of governing policies for developing seamless national highway connectivity across the country. In any case, irregularity, if any, in the appointment of the Consultant cannot be the basis to quash and set aside a well- considered decision taken by the Committee after due deliberations, much less the impugned notifications under Section 2(2) or Section 3A(1) of the 1956 Act. We therefore, hold that the High Court should have eschewed from expressing any opinion on the manner of appointment of the same Consultant for the changed section/stretch [C-K-S (NC)], as no relief challenging its appointment was sought and thus it was not the matter in issue before it; and for the same reason, we do not wish to dilate on this aspect any further. Thus understood, the dictum of this Court in decisions relied upon by the respondents/writ petitioners in K. Lubna (supra) and Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) will be of no avail in this case. 75. Having dealt with the merits of the controversy in extenso, it is unnecessary to dilate on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions being premature. CONCLUSION

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Notably, no declaration was sought by the writ petitioners in reference to the provisions of the 1956 Act, the 1988 Act and in particular, Section 2 of the 1956 Act, to be ultra vires as such.Indisputably, law made by the Parliament in the present case is the 1956 Act and the 1988 Act in reference to Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. If the stated law made by the Parliament is ascribable to Entry 23 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, the Parliament has the exclusive power to make law on that subject and for matters connected therewith. The fact that Entry 13 of List II bestows exclusive power upon the legislature of any State concerning subject roads, cannot be the basis to give restricted meaning to Entry 23 in List I, dealing with all matters concerning national highways. It is well-established position that if the law made by the Parliament is in respect of subject falling under Union List, then the incidental encroachment by the law under the State list, per se, would not render it invalid. The doctrine of pith and substance is well-established in India. The doctrine is invoked upon ascertaining the true character of the legislation. It may be useful to advert to Article 248 of the Constitution, bestowing legislative powers on the Parliament to make a law with respect to any matter not enumerated in the Concurrent List or the State List. Concededly, the expression highways as such, is not mentioned either in the State List or the Concurrent list. While making law on the subject falling under the Union List in terms of Entry 97 thereof, it is open to the Parliament to make law on any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists.28. Indisputably, the entries in the legislative lists are not sources of legislative powers, but are merely topics or fields in respect of which concerned legislative body is free to make a law. The entries must receive a liberal and expansive construction, reckoning the wide spirit thereof and not in a narrow pedantic sense. Entry 23 in List I refers generally to highways declared or to be declared by the Parliament as national highways and all matters connected therewith. This empowers the Parliament to declare any stretch/section across any State as a highway for being designated as a national highway. There is no indication in the Constitution to limit the exercise of that power of the Parliament only in respect of an existing highway. Further, whenever and wherever the question of legislative competence is raised, the test is whether the law enacted, examined as a whole, is substantially with respect to the particular topic of legislation falling under the concerned list. If the law made by the Parliament or the legislature of any State has a substantial and not merely a remote connection with the Entry under which it is made, there is nothing to preclude the concerned legislature to make law on all matters concerning the topic covered under the Union List or the State List, as the case may be. Reliance has been justly placed on the dictum of the Constitution Bench of this Court in K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. (supra), that the test is identicalness or diversity between dominant intention of the two legislations. Moreover, power of law-making itself would be rendered otiose if it does not provide for suitable coverage of matters that are incidental as well as intrinsically connected to the expressly granted power. Further, Chapter II of Part XI of the Constitution dealing with administrative relations between the Union and the States makes it amply clear that the executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which applied in that State, and the executive power of the Union shall extend to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. Article 257 expounds about the control of the Union over States in certain cases.29. Suffice it to observe that there is nothing in the Constitution which constricts the power of the Parliament to make a law for declaring any stretch/section within the State not being a road or an existing highway, to be a national highway. Whereas, the provisions in the Constitution unambiguously indicate that the legislative as well as executive power regarding all matters concerning and connected with a highway to be designated as a national highway, vests in the Parliament and the laws to be made by it in that regard. For the same reason, the complete executive power also vests within the Union.In the present case, we have to consider the sweep of the 1956 Act in light of the amended provisions, which came into force with effect from 24.1.1997. The 1956 Act extends to the whole of India and has come into force on 15.4.1957. Section 2(1) thereof is in the nature of declaration by the Parliament that each of the highways specified in the schedule appended to the 1956 Act to be a national highway. The Schedule appended in the end gives the description of such highways. Sub-Section (2) of Section 2, however, empowers the Central Government to declare any other highway to be a national highway by publishing a notification in the Official Gazette in that behalf and upon such publication, the highway shall be deemed to be specified in the stated Schedule. This provision contains a legal fiction.35. It is not necessary to dilate on the other provisions of the 1956 Act for the time being. As aforesaid, Sections 3A to 3J have been inserted by way of amendment of 1997. On close examination, the 1956 Act, as amended and applicable to the present case, is an Act to authorise Central Government to declare the notified stretches/sections in the State concerned as a highway to be a national highway; and for matters connected therewith including acquisition of any land for building or construction of a new highway (which need not be an existing road/highway). The substance of this Act is ascribable to Entry 23 of the Union List and matters connected therewith.36. Having said thus, we have no hesitation in concluding that the challenge to the notifications issued under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act on the argument of lack of legislative competence, is devoid of merits. The High Court justly negatived the same and we uphold that conclusion.37. A fortiori, even the challenge to the stated notifications on the ground of being ultra vires the Constitution derived executive powers of the Union, must fail. That challenge is founded on the purport of Article 257, which has been reproduced above. It is urged that Article 257 pointedly refers to the sphere of executive powers of the Union. Article 257 of the Constitution, as aforesaid, deals with administrative relations between the States and the Union. In the first place, having said that the Parliament has exclusive legislative competence to make a law in respect of national highways and all matters connected therewith, which includes declaring any stretch/section within the State (not being existing roads/highways) as a national highway, it must follow that the Central Government alone has the executive powers to construct/build a new national highway in any State and to issue directions to the Government of any State for carrying out the purposes of the 1956 Act. It is incomprehensible as to how the argument of lack of executive power of the Central Government despite such a law, can be countenanced. Concededly, the validity of Section 2 of the 1956 Act, which empowers the Central Government to notify any other highway (other than the scheduled national highways) as a national highway, has not been put in issue. No declaration is sought that the said provision is ultra vires the Constitution or the law. Therefore, the argument essentially requires us to examine the question as to whether Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act enables the Central Government to declare a national highway in respect of a non- existing road(s)/highway(s) and on open green-fields land within the State. Suffice it to observe that the challenge to notifications issued by the Central Government under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act on the ground of being ultra vires the Constitution derived executive powers, is also devoid of merits.Somewhat similar question was dealt with by the same High Court (Madras High Court) in reference to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Highways Act, 2001 in Jayaraman (supra). However, we are called upon to examine the question under consideration in reference to the 1956 Act and the 1988 Act.We have briefly adverted to the scope of sub-Section (1), which is in the nature of declaration by the Parliament that each of the highways specified in the Schedule appended to the 1956 Act shall be a national highway. For building a new highway, as in the present case, between stretch/section C-K-S (NC) NH-179A and NH-179B respectively, the Central Government can do so in exercise of power conferred upon it under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act. That empowers the Central Government to notify any other highway (not forming part of the Schedule appended to the Act) as a national highway and upon such publication of notification in the official gazette, the said highway is deemed to be specified in the Schedule as a national highway. This power is not constricted or circumscribed by any other inhibition, such as to declare only an existing road or highway within the State as a national highway. The requirement of a national highway within the country as a whole and State-wise, in particular, is to alleviate evolving socio-economic dynamics, for which such a wide power has been bestowed upon the Central Government. The Central Government is obliged to do so to facilitate it to discharge its obligations under Part IV of the Constitution. There is nothing in the Constitution of India or for that matter, the 1956 Act to limit that power of the Central Government only in respect of existing roads/highways within the State. To say so would be counter-productive and would entail in a piquant situation that the Central Government cannot effectively discharge its obligations under Part IV of the Constitution unto the remote inaccessible parts of the country until the concerned State Government constructs a road/highway within the State. On the other hand, if the concerned State, due to reasons beyond its control or otherwise, is unable/flounder to provision a road/highway in a given segment of the State; despite being imperative to do so to assuage the perennial difficulties faced by the locals in that belt due to lack of access, the Central Government may come forward and step in to construct a national highway and connect the area with the other parts of the country. By its very nomenclature, a national highway is to link the entire country and provide access to all in every remote corner of the country for interaction and to promote commerce and trade, employment and education including health related services. This approach would enhance and further the federal structure. This is because, the existence of a national highway in the neighbourhood paves way for the fulfilment of aspirations of the locals and their empowerment. It not only brings with it opportunity to travel across, but also propels the economy of that region and the country as a whole. It gives impetus to myriads of social, commerce and more importantly, access to other activities/facilities essential for the health, education and general well-being of the locals, in particular.41. The Central Government, whilst exercising power under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act creates a right in the locals of the concerned area to pass and repass along a highway from one marked town or inhabited place to another inhabited place for the purpose of legitimate travel. Such highway is dedicated for the ordinary and reasonable user of the road as a national highway from one designated town (Chennai) upto another town (Salem), which will be common to all the subjects. As expounded hitherto, the Central Government is fully competent to notify any land (not necessarily an existing road/highway) for acquisition, to construct a highway to be a national highway.The original Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna - Phase I) included section – C-M (EC), as approved by the CCEA in October, 2017. It is true that the Project (Bharamala Pariyojna Phase I) was conceived after a scientific study as a comprehensive project at the macro (national) level for 24,800 kms. in Phase I, spanning over a period of 5 years (2017-18 to 2021-22) at an estimated outlay of INR 5,35,000 crores with an objective to improve the efficiency of freight and passenger movement across the country by bridging critical infrastructure gaps through effective interventions like development of Economic Corridors, Inter Corridors and Feeder Routes (ICFR), National Corridor Efficiency Improvement, Border and International connectivity roads, Coastal and Port connectivity roads and Green-field expressways. This Project, being a macro level project, does not reckon the nuanced imperatives of a particular region or area, which may only be a miniature of the whole Project traversing across around 24,800 kms. in Phase I. For that reason, the approved Project itself bestows discretion upon the MoRTH to substitute/replace up to 15% length of 24800 kms., of the Project (Phase I), by other suitable projects.43. Be that as it may, one of the reasons recorded in the minutes is that instead of opting for expansion of the existing stretch/section [C-M (EC)], a crow-flight green-field alignment be preferred and developed between Chennai and Salem via Harur under National Corridor Efficiency Improvement, so as to reduce the distance between Chennai and Salem/Coimbatore by 40 kms. and also diversify the traffic from the congested Chennai- Krishnagiri section of Golden Quadrilateral and Chennai- Ulundurpet section of the C-M (EC). At the outset, it had been noted that the traffic from Chennai bound to Salem/Coimbatore and Pallakad (Kerala) currently uses the Chennai-Krishnagiri section of the Golden Quadrilateral (Chennai-Bengaluru) and the Krishnagiri-Salem section of the North-South corridor or the Chennai-Tindivanam-Ulundurpet section of the C-M (EC) and the Ulunderpet-Salem Inter-corridor route, thereby congesting Chennai-Krishnagiri section of Golden Quadrilateral and Chennai-Tindivanam (72,000 PCU) – Ulundurpet (47,000 PCU) section of the C-M (EC). It is well settled that the findings of expert bodies in technical and scientific matters would not ordinarily be interfered with by the Courts – as observed in paragraphs 59 to 62 of Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh (supra) - (also see – K. Vasudevan Nair & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. 1991 Supp (2) SCC 134 (paragraphs 19 and 20) and Systopic Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. Dr. Prem Gupta & Ors.1994 Supp (1) SCC 160). Again, in Kushala Shetty (supra), this Court analysed the provisions of the 1956 Act (Sections 3A to 3D) and opined that it is not open to the Court to castigate the reasons weighed with the competent authority. As we are dealing with this decision, we may note with approval dictum about the functions of the NHAI, as adverted to in paragraph 28 of the reported judgment. The same reads thus: -28. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a pro- fessionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of national highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for the development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and main- tenance of national highways after thorough study by ex-perts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relative factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the par- ticular alignment would subserve the larger public inter- est. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in the rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides. In the case in hand, neither has any violation of mandate of the 1956 Act been estab- lished nor has the charge of malice in fact been proved. Therefore, the order under challenge cannot be sustained.44. Thus understood, there is no substance in the argument that the change of stretch/section to C-K-S (National Corridor) was not based on any tangible material to sustain the stated decision of the Committee. Indeed, the necessity to enhance the existing section of Economic Corridor between Chennai-Madurai was taken note of in the principal Pariyojna. However, the Committee, as per the discretion bestowed in it in terms of the approved Pariyojna, whilst reckoning the imperatives of the region under consideration for micro level implementation, took a conscious decision to opt for C-K-S (National Corridor) being relatively more beneficial and to strengthen the National Corridor; and at the same time increase efficiency of the existing economic corridor. Such decision, obviously, partakes the colour of a policy decision of the Central Government, which is also backed by the guidelines issued on 26.2.2018 by the competent authority of the same Ministry of the Government of India, MoRTH (Planning Zone). This communication refers to the approval of the Project (Bharatmal Pariyojna Phase I) by the CCEA in October, 2017 recording obstructions/difficulties faced during upgradation of the existing road arteries.45. There is no challenge to these guidelines. Indeed, these guidelines have been issued after the decision was already taken on 19.1.2018 in respect of section - C-K-S (NC) in lieu of C-M (EC) section. However, it needs to be understood that the decision was taken by the broad-based Committee of experts, of which the Secretary of the same Ministry (MoRTH) which had issued the guidelines on 26.2.2018, was the Chairperson alongwith the other officials including the officials of NHAI. The decision regarding change is a policy decision. Moreso, keeping in mind that the change in alignment and the purpose of such a change is stated to be for strengthening the national corridor in preference to the economic corridor in the region, it is not open to disregard this opinion of the Central Government based on the recommendation of the Committee constituted by it for that singular purpose.46. This Court in Sooraram Pratap Reddy (supra) had held that it is the primary duty of the competent authority to decide whether there exists public purpose or not. The Courts may not ordinarily interfere with that unless the power is being exercised malafide or for collateral purposes or the decision is dehors the Act, irrational or otherwise unreasonable or so-called purpose is no public purpose at all and fraud of statute is manifest. Further, it is not for the Courts to sit over such decision as a Court(s) of appeal and to disregard it merely because another option would have been more beneficial. We may usefully advert to the dictum of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Somawanti (supra). In paragraph 36 (of SCCOnline), the Court observed thus: -36. Now whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legisla- tive competence of the State the declaration of the Govern- ment will be final subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of power the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. The power committed to the Government by the Act is a limited power in the sense that it can be exer- cised only where there is a public purpose, leaving aside for a moment the purpose of a company. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose but a private purpose or no purpose at all the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the Government will be final.In the present case, it is seen that the basis for taking such informed decision by the Committee is ascribable to tangible aspects referred to in the minutes of the meeting held on 19.1.2018 (as is manifest from the factual aspects recorded therein). The decision of this Court in Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons (supra) will be of no avail, because we find that the decision of the Committee was well-informed and backed by reasons guided by public interest. We must remind ourselves of the word of caution noted by this Court in Col. A.S. Sangwan (supra) that the Courts should be loath in dealing with policy and administrative reasons. The Court observed thus: -4. …. A policy once formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly within the competence of the Union of India to change it, rechange it, adjust it and readjust it according to the compulsions of circumstances and the impera- tives of national considerations. We cannot, as court, give directives as to how the Defence Ministry should function except to state that the obligation not to act ar- bitrarily and to treat employees equally is binding on the Union of India because it functions under the Constitu- tion and not over it. … So, whatever policy is made should be done fairly and made known to those concerned. So, we make it clear that while the Central Government is beyond the forbiddance of the court from making or changing its pol- icy in regard to the Directorate of Military Farms or in the choice or promotion of Brigadiers, it has to act fairly as every administrative act must be done.47. Be it noted that the notifications under Section 2(2) to declare the C-K-S (NC) section as NH-179A and NH-179B, as the case may be, were issued only after due deliberation by the broad-based committee of experts, which decision we find is also in conformity with the guidelines contemporaneously issued by the concerned department on the same subject matter. Such a decision cannot be labelled as manifestly arbitrary, irrational or taken in undue haste as such. As a result, it was not open to the High Court to interfere with the change so articulated in the meeting held on 19.1.2018 or the notifications issued under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act declaring C-K-S (NC) as a national highway (i.e. NH-179A and NH-179B). The declaration of a highway being a national highway is within the exclusive domain of the Central Government in terms of Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act. The argument of the land owners that prior approvals ought to have been obtained from the CCEA and regarding budgetary arrangement, is premised on the manuals which govern the functioning of the executing agency (NHAI). As the decision regarding change of stretch/section has been taken by the concerned department of the Central Government itself and the approved Project (Bharatmala Pariyojna - Phase I) also recognises that such change in the form of substitution/replacement of the stretch/section can be done by the Ministry upto 15% length of 24,800 kms., so long as it does not entail in incurring of additional costs, it becomes integral part of the originally approved project (for Phase I) for all purposes. In the present case, the costs for construction of C-K-S (NC) were bound to be less than the originally conceived C-M (EC), as the length of the road is reduced significantly. In other words, it would operate as minor change to the original plan with deemed approval thereof and get interpolated therein. Further, the minutes recorded on 19.1.2018 do indicate that the decision was to be placed before the CCEA in the ensuing biannual meeting, where it would be duly ratified. Suffice it to observe that the decision taken by the Committee which culminated with the issuance of notification under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act is in complete conformity with the governing provisions and guidelines and founded on tangible and objective facts noted in the minutes dated 19.1.2018. The Central Government had full authority to adopt such a change of stretch/section, by way of substitution/replacement whilst ensuring that there is no need for higher budgetary allocation than envisaged in the already approved programme for Phase I. Thus, there is no legal basis to doubt the validity of the notification under Section 2(2) and ex consequenti Section 3A of the 1956 Act as well.48. The High Court has completely glossed over these crucial aspects and entered into the domain of sufficiency and adequacy of material including the appropriateness of the route approved by the competent authority. Such enquiry, in exercise of judicial review is forbidden. Furthermore, the High Court, despite noting that judicial interference in acquisition matters is limited, went on to interfere in the guise of extra-ordinary circumstances obtaining in this case. On a thorough perusal, the impugned judgment does not reveal any just circumstance for invoking the judicial review jurisdiction. In light of the above discussion, we hold that challenge to the decision of the Committee and ex consequenti of the Central Government, regarding change of section – C-M (EC) to C-K-S (NC) at the micro level for the implementation of the original Project as approved, ought not to have been doubted by the High Court. Notably, in the final conclusion and declaration issued by the High Court, it has justly not struck down the notifications under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act. In other words, so long as Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act was to remain in force and the decision regarding change of stretch/section to C-K-S (NC) being the foundation for issue of notification under Section 3A, would continue to bind all concerned and in particular, the officials of NHAI being the executing agency.This argument is based on the dictum of this Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (supra). In paragraph 100 of the said decision, a general direction came to be issued that in future, before acquisition of lands for development, the consequence and adverse impact of development on environment must be properly comprehended and the lands be acquired for development that they do not gravely impair the ecology and environment. Paragraphs 100 and 101 of the reported decision are extracted hereunder: -100. The importance and awareness of environment and ecology is becoming so vital and important that we, in our judgment, want the appellant to insist on the conditions em- anating from the principle of Sustainable Development:(1) We direct that, in future, before acquisi- tion of lands for development, the conse- quence and adverse impact of development on environment must be properly compre- hended and the lands be acquired for devel- opment that they do not gravely impair the ecology and environment.(2) We also direct the appellant to incorporate the condition of allotment to obtain clearance from the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board before the land is allotted for develop- ment. The said directory condition of allotment of lands be converted into a mandatory condi- tion for all the projects to be sanctioned in fu- ture.101. This has been an interesting judicial pilgrimage for the last four decades. In our opinion, this is a significant contri- bution of the judiciary in making serious endeavour to pre- serve and protect ecology and environment, in consonance with the provisions of the Constitution.Support is also drawn from the notification/Office Memorandum issued by the MoEF dated 14.9.2006 and 7.10.2014 respectively. Our attention is also invited to exposition in M. Velu (supra), following the aforementioned decision of this Court.50. The question as to whether the competent authority under the 1956 Act is obliged to take prior permission before issuing notification under Section 3A of the Act, must be answered primarily on the basis of the scheme of the enactments under consideration. As regards power to acquire land for the purpose of building, maintenance, management and operation of a national highway or part thereof, the same has been bestowed on the Central Government in terms of Section 3A of the 1956 Act. There is nothing in the 1956 Act, which impels the Central Government to obtain prior environment clearance before exercise of that power and in issuing notification under Section 2(2), much less Section 3A expressing its intention to acquire the designated land.51. The Central Government has framed rules in exercise of power under Section 9 of the 1956 Act, titled as the National Highways Rules, 1957(For short the 1957 Rules). These rules are required to be followed by the executing agency. There is nothing, even in these Rules, to remotely suggest that the Central Government is obliged to obtain prior permission(s) under environmental/forest laws before issuing notification under Section 3A. The executing agency is none else, but established under the 1988 Act, namely, the NHAI. Before NHAI commences the execution of any original work, it has to abide by the norms specified in the 1957 Rules regarding preparation of estimate of work etc. The Schedule of the 1957 Rules stipulates conditions for the issue of technical approval and financial sanction to plan and estimate for execution of any original work on a national highway costing an amount not exceeding Rs.50 lakhs by the executing agency concerned. Neither the 1956 Act, the Rules framed thereunder i.e. the 1957 Rules nor the 1988 Act and the Rules made thereunder have any bearing on the question under consideration. None of these enactments/rules specify any express condition requiring Central Government to obtain prior environmental/forest clearance before issuing notification under Section 2(2) declaring the stretch/section to be a national highway or Section 3A of the 1956 Act to express intention to acquire land for the purpose of building, maintenance, management or operation of a national highway, as the case may be.52. Reverting to the notification issued by the MoEF dated 14.9.2006, even this notification does not constrict the power of Central Government to issue notification under Section 2(2) or Section 3A of the 1956 Act. There is nothing to suggest that before expressing intention to acquire any land for the purpose of the 1956 Act, prior environmental/forest clearance is required. The environmental/forest clearance, however, is, required to be obtained by the executing agency in terms of this notification before commencing the actual work or executing the proposed work/project. That would happen only after the land is vested in the NHAI or the NHAI was to be entrusted with the development work of concerned national highway by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 5 of the 1956 Act read with Section 11 of the 1988 Act. The land would vest in the Central Government under the 1956 Act only after publication of declaration of acquisition under Section 3D. And until then, the question of Central Government vesting it in favour of NHAI under Section 11 of the 1988 Act would not arise. However, until the vesting of the land, the Central Government and its authorised officer can undertake surveys of the notified lands by entering upon it in terms of Section 3B of the Act. Pertinently, the activities predicated in Section 3B are of exploration for verifying the feasibility and viability of land for construction of a national highway. These are one-time activities and not in the nature of exploitation of the land for continuous commercial/industrial activities as such. There is remote possibility of irretrievable wide spread environmental impact due to carrying out activities referred to in Section 3B for assessing the worthiness of the land for using it as a national highway. Thus, the question of applying notification of 2006 at this stage does not arise, much less obligate the Central Government to follow directives thereunder.54. It is indisputable that NHAI is an authority appointed by the Central Government under the 1988 Act. This authority is a functional body constituted under Section 3 of the 1988 Act. Chapter III of the 1988 Act provides for the manner of dealing with the contracts to be entered into by NHAI. Sections 11 to 13 deal with the power of the Central Government to vest in or entrust to the Authority (NHAI), transfer of assets and liabilities of the Central Government to the Authority (NHAI) and the compulsory acquisition of land for the Authority.55. On plain and harmonious construction of the provisions of the two enactments (i.e. the 1956 Act and the 1988 Act), it is amply clear that at the stage of issuing notifications under Section 2(2) or for that matter, Section 3A of the Act, there is no need to seek prior permission (by the Central Government) under environmental laws or the forest laws, as the case may be. Further, the purpose of public hearing in the concerned enactments (namely, the 1956 and 1988 Acts on the one hand and the 1986 Act or forest laws, on the other) is qualitatively different and contextual to matters relevant under the concerned enactment. The competent authority in the former, may be satisfied that the acquisition of land in question is for public purpose, but if the competent authority under the latter legislations is of the view that the execution of the project in question (construction of a national highway) or any portion thereof may cause irretrievable comprehensive impact on the environment or the forests, as the case may be, would be competent to deny permission to such a project as a whole or part thereof. That decision must then prevail, being in public interests. This is not to say that one competent authority is superior to the other, but such balancing becomes essential to effectuate the public purposes under the stated enactments. It is quite possible that the executing agency (NHAI) may be able to convince the competent authority under the latter enactments that certain remedial steps can minimise or mitigate the environmental impact or to the forest, as the case may be, and commend it to accord conditional approval/permission to execute the project so as to conform to the tenets of sustainable development. If that suggestion commends to the competent authority under the environmental/forest laws, such clearance/permission can be granted after the public hearing.56. As regards the decision in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (supra), the same may have relevance at the time of considering the objections to be dealt with by the competent authority under the 1956 Act during the public hearing under Section 3C. The dictum in this decision cannot be the basis to doubt the well- considered decision dated 19.1.2018 nor the notification issued by the Central Government under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act declaring the stretch between C-K-S (NC) as a national highway.57. Even in the case of R.S. Nanji (supra), the Constitution Bench highlighted the sweep of expression public purpose in the context of challenge to the order of the competent authority to requisition the premises. As noted earlier, the satisfaction regarding public interests or necessity to acquire the land in question for public purpose for construction of a new national highway, is a matter which needs to be considered by the competent authority during the public hearing under Section 3C of the 1956 Act. The challenge before the High Court in the present case was before that stage had reached, for which reason we do not wish to dilate on this reported decision any further.58. Suffice it to observe that the subject notification of 2006 and Office Memorandum dated 7.10.2014 ordain that such permission is required to be obtained (only) before commencement of the work of the new project or activities or on the expansion or improvisation of the project or activities based on their potential environment impact.59. The view that we have taken is reinforced from the opening part of this notification. It expounds that no project involving potential environmental impact shall be undertaken or commenced in any part of India without obtaining prior environmental clearance in the manner provided for. Same position obtains from the recitals of this notification, namely, prior environmental clearance is required before any construction work or preparation of land by the project management, except for securing the land, is started on the project or the activity. A priori, the decision in Delhi Development Authority (supra), does not take the matter any further in the present case. Therefore, no interference is warranted with the decision of the Committee regarding the change of stretch/section to be implemented during Phase I between C-K-S (NC); including the impugned notifications under Sections 2(2) and 3A of the 1956 Act.60. Be it noted that the notification of 2006 is in the nature of guidelines/directives issued by the Central Government in exercise of its statutory powers. These directions need to be adhered by the executing agency (NHAI) whilst undertaking the work in furtherance of the approved project. To put it differently, it is incomprehensible that the stated 2006 notification obliges the Central Government to take prior permission even before the stage of planning and finalisation of the project(s) such as in terms of the minutes dated 19.1.2018 followed by notifications under Sections 2(2) and 3A of the 1956 Act, as the case may be.We reject this plea. In our view, the activities required to be undertaken in furtherance of notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act, referred to in Section 3B of the same Act are only to explore the feasibility and viability of the stretch/section to be used as a national highway and no further. These activities are outside the purview of notification of 2006.62. The High Court had adverted to decisions of other jurisdictions, namely, of American Courts, to buttress the view that prior permission ought to be taken even before issuing notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act. Considering the legislative scheme and upon giving proper meaning and perspective to the directives issued by the Central Government in the form of 2006 notification, we are of the considered opinion that the dictum in those decisions will be of no avail. For, we are of the view that it is not necessary for the Central Government or for that matter, NHAI, to apply for prior environmental/forest clearances or permissions, as the case may be, at the stage of planning or taking an in-principle decision to formalize the Project of constructing a new national highway manifested in notification under Section 2(2), including until the stage of issuing notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act.63. If we accept the argument of the writ petitioners that the Central Government must follow comprehensive procedure under the environmental laws and forest laws articulating its final decision and to issue notification under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act to declare any stretch/land not being a highway as a national highway, such approach would be counter-productive and the functioning of the departments responsible for timely execution of such projects would be completely paralysed and depend solely on the outcome of the processes under the environmental laws or forest laws, as the case may be. It cannot be overlooked that the role of the competent authority under the environmental law or forest law is limited to scrutiny of the formalized project brought before it prior to its implementation by the executing agency, to ascertain whether it may have any environmental impact and if so, to impose such conditions by way of remedial steps to minimise and mitigate the impact while keeping in mind the need to fulfil the States obligation of sustainable development.64. Be that as it may, one cannot be oblivious of the qualitative difference between a project necessitating acquisition of a large chunk of land at one place for continual commercial/industrial activities to be carried out thereon as opposed to acquisition of a small strip of land in the area for construction of a road/highway. The purpose of road/highway is merely to facilitate free passage through the same. It would have a floating population unlike in the case of a big project at one place occupying several square metres of land and engaging in continual commercial/industrial activities thereon. The environmental impact would be and ought to be measured in relative terms and at the local level and site specific. Whereas, the requirement for road/national highway would essentially be in larger national interest.65. For the purpose of considering the question posed before us, suffice it to observe that the prior environmental clearance in terms of 2006 notification issued under Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 Act read with Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, is required to be taken before commencement of the actual construction or building work of the national highway by the executing agency (NHAI). That will happen only after the acquisition proceedings are taken to its logical end until the land finally vests in the NHAI or is entrusted to it by the Central Government for building/management of the national highway.Applying the tenet underlying this notification, it is amply clear that before the process of acquisition of land is ripe for declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act, it would be open to the executing agency (NHAI) to make an application to the competent authority for environmental clearance. That process can be commenced parallelly or alongside the acquisition process after a preliminary notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act, for acquisition is issued.66. As in this case, after notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act came to be issued, NHAI must have, and in fact has, moved into action by making application to the competent authorities under the environmental laws, as well as, forest laws to accord necessary permissions.67. Considering the provisions of the 1956 Act and the 1988 Act, NHAI can take over the work of development and maintenance of the concerned national highway only if the notified land is vested in it or when the same is entrusted to it by the Central Government. From the scheme of the enactments in question, as soon as notification under Section 3A is issued, it is open to the Central Government to issue direction/notification in exercise of power under Section 5 of the 1956 Act read with Section 11 of the 1988 Act so as to entrust the development of the proposed national highway to NHAI. Upon such entrustment, NHAI assumes the role of an executing agency and only thenceforth can move into action to apply for requisite permissions/clearances under the environmental/forest laws including as provided in terms of notification/Office Memorandum dated 14.9.2006 and 7.10.2014 respectively.68. It is not in dispute that environmental/forest clearance is always site specific and, therefore, until the site is identified for construction of national highways manifested vide Section 3A notification, the question of making any application for permission under the environmental/forest laws would not arise, as predicated in Office Memorandum dated 7.10.2014. The site is identified only in reference to the notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act, giving description of the land which is proposed to be acquired for public purpose of building, maintenance, management or operation of the national highway or part thereof.69. Considering the interplay of provisions empowering the Central Government coupled with the purport of the notification/Office Memorandum issued by the MoEF dated 14.9.2006 and 7.10.2014 respectively, it will be paradoxical to countenance the argument that the Central Government is obliged to seek prior approval/permission of the competent authorities under the environment/forest laws, as the case may be, even before issuing notification under Section 2(2) or for that matter, Section 3A of the 1956 Act.70. Reverting to the dictum of this Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (supra), it must be understood to mean that the declaration under Section 3D regarding acquisition of notified land, be made only after environmental/forest clearance qua the specific land is granted. To put it differently, the necessity of prior environmental/forest clearance would arise only if finally, the land in question (site specific) is to be notified under Section 3D, as being acquired for the purposes of building, maintenance, management or operation of the national highway or part thereof. Such interpretation would further the cause and objective of environment and forest laws, as also not impede the timeline specified for building, maintenance, management or operation of the national highway or part thereof, which undeniably is a public purpose and of national importance. This would also assuage the concerns of the land owners that even if eventually no environment permission or forest clearance is accorded, the land cannot be reverted to the original owner as it had de jure vested in the Central Government upon issue of notification under Section 3D of the 1956 Act and no power is bestowed on the Central Government under this Act to withdraw from acquisition.71. We are conscious of the fact, as has been rightly argued by the appellants-authorities, that it is essential to issue a declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act within a period of one year from the date of publication of the notification under Section 3A in respect of the notified land, failing which notification under Section 3A ceases to have any effect. It is possible that whilst pursuing the proposal for environmental/forest clearance after notification under Section 3A, some time may be lost, even though the process under the 1956 Act for acquisition of the land had become ripe for issue of declaration of acquisition under Section 3D. It is also true that time spent for obtaining environmental clearance or permission under the forest laws has not been explicitly excluded from the period of one year to be reckoned under Section 3D(3) of the Act. The extension of time or so to say suspension of time is only in respect of period during which the action of the proceedings to be taken in pursuance of notification under Section 3A(1) is stayed by an order of Court. In other words, there is no express provision in the 1956 Act, which excludes the time spent by the Central Government or the executing agency in obtaining prior environmental clearance or permission under forest laws, as the case may be. To get over this predicament, by an interpretative process and also by invoking plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, we hold that the dictum in paragraph 100(1) of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (supra), shall operate as a stay by an order of the Court for the purposes of Section 3D(3) in respect of all projects under the 1956 Act, in particular for excluding the time spent after issue of Section 3A notification, in obtaining the environmental clearance as well as for permissions under the forest laws. Only this approach would further the cause of environment and forest laws, as also, the need to adhere to the timeline specified under Section 3D(3) for speedy execution of the work of construction of national highway, which is also for a public purpose and of national importance. In other words, balancing of competing public interests/public purposes need to be kept in mind as being the only way forward for accomplishing the goal of sustainable development.72. The argument of the writ petitioners that the expression shall occurring in Section 3D(1) be interpreted as may, though attractive on the first blush, deserves to be rejected. If that interpretation is accepted, it would render the efficacy of Section 3D(3) of lapsing of the acquisition process otiose. It is a mandatory provision. Instead, we have acceded to the alternative argument to give expansive meaning to the proviso in Section 3D(3) of the 1956 Act by interpretative process, including by invoking plenary powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to hold that the dictum of this Court in Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (supra) be regarded as stay granted by the Court to all notifications issued under Section 3A of the 1956 Act until the grant or non-grant of permissions by the competent authorities under the environmental and forest laws, as the case may be, including until the stated permissions attain finality. In other words, time spent by the executing agency/Central Government in pursuing application before the concerned authorities for grant of permission/clearance under the stated laws need to be excluded because of stay by the Court of actions (limited to issue of notification under Section 3D), consequent to notification under Section 3A. Thus, the acquisition process set in motion upon issue of Section 3A notification can go on in parallel until the stage of publication of notification under Section 3D, which can be issued after grant of clearances/permissions by the competent authority under the environment/forest laws and attaining finality thereof.73. In the present case, it is noticed that the NHAI being the executing agency, had soon submitted Terms of Reference to the MoEF after publication of notification under Section 2(2) of the 1956 Act dated 1.3.2018, declaring the section - C-K-S (NC) as a national highway. That was submitted on 19.4.2018 and the approval in furtherance thereof was granted by the MoEF on 8.6.2018, consequent to the recommendation made by the EAC on 7.5.2018. Indeed, the NHAI thereafter submitted amendment to the Terms of Reference on 5.7.2018 and 21.8.2018. The EAC after examining the amendment in Terms of Reference, submitted its recommendation on 30.8.2018. It is also matter of record and stated on affidavit by the EAC that no lapses have been committed by the NHAI in complying with necessary formalities. Similarly, NHAI had submitted application on 12.5.2018 to Conservator of Forests for grant of permissions under the forest laws in respect of lands forming part of the notification under Section 3A of the 1956 Act. That application was duly processed and the permission was granted by the competent authority under the forest laws on 8.6.2018. Concededly, these permissions/clearances have been issued by the concerned authorities under the environment and forest laws after notification under Section 3A and before issuance of declaration under Section 3D of the 1956 Act. In terms of this decision, therefore, the time spent for obtaining such clearances including till the pronouncement of this decision and until the stated permissions/clearances attain finality, whichever is later, as the matter had remained sub judice, need to be excluded. Even after excluding such period, if any notification under Section 3A impugned before the High Court is not saved from the deemed lapsing effect predicated in Section 3D(3), the Central Government may have to issue fresh notification(s) under Section 3A of the 1956 Act and recommence the process of acquisition, if so advised. We are not expressing any final opinion in that regard. However, such fresh notifications may be issued only in respect of land forming part of permissions/clearances given by the competent authority under the environment/forest laws, being site specific.74. That takes us to the grievance regarding the same Consultant being continued for the changed section i.e. C-K-S (NC). Indeed, the eligibility of the Consultant was in reference to the originally conceived project concerning C-M (EC). It was found eligible to undertake the consultancy work for the said project and letter dated 29.9.2017 was also issued by NHAI. In the Committees meeting chaired by the Secretary of MoRTH on 19.1.2018, new alignment was finalised thereby deviating from the original project of C-M (EC). Instead, section - C-K-S (NC) was finalised. However, the same Consultant had been continued by execution of a contract agreement dated 22.2.2018 for the changed stretch/section. This was done as the terms and conditions were same. Indeed, it was vehemently contended before us that the authorities should have followed the procedure stipulated for appointment of Consultant for the changed project afresh. However, we find that in none of the writ petitions filed before the High Court, express declaration had been sought or for that matter, the contract agreement dated 22.2.2018 executed between NHAI and the Consultant came to be challenged. Moreover, the terms and conditions of appointment of the Consultant would have no financial ramifications, considering the fact that the consultancy charges were to be paid on per kilometre basis; and in fact due to change of alignment, the length of proposed national highway stood reduced to only around 277 kms. (instead of original stretch [C-M (EC)] of around 350 kms.) Further, no challenge is set forth regarding the qualification and eligibility of the Consultant as such. Notably, the decision to change the stretch/section from Economic Corridor to National Corridor was that of the Committee. It was not founded on the recommendation of the Consultant, as has been assumed by the writ petitioners and so propounded before the high Court. The decision of the Committee was backed by tangible reasons as recorded in the minutes and also intrinsic in it its vast experience about the efficacy of governing policies for developing seamless national highway connectivity across the country. In any case, irregularity, if any, in the appointment of the Consultant cannot be the basis to quash and set aside a well- considered decision taken by the Committee after due deliberations, much less the impugned notifications under Section 2(2) or Section 3A(1) of the 1956 Act. We therefore, hold that the High Court should have eschewed from expressing any opinion on the manner of appointment of the same Consultant for the changed section/stretch [C-K-S (NC)], as no relief challenging its appointment was sought and thus it was not the matter in issue before it; and for the same reason, we do not wish to dilate on this aspect any further. Thus understood, the dictum of this Court in decisions relied upon by the respondents/writ petitioners in K. Lubna (supra) and Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) will be of no avail in this case.75. Having dealt with the merits of the controversy in extenso, it is unnecessary to dilate on the question of maintainability of the writ petitions being premature.