Case: Mahendra Rambhai Patel Vs. Controller Of Estate Duty, Gujarat

payable when Maubhai died on June 7, 1954. Section 5 of the Act, sub-s. (1), provides :"In the case of every person dying after the commencement of this Act, there shall save as hereinafter expressly provided, be levied and paid upon the principal value ascertained as hereinafter provided of all property, settled or not settled, * * * which passes on the death of such person, a duty called estate duty at the rates fixed in accordance with Section 35."The expression property is defined in S. 2 (15) as inclusive of-"any interest in property, moveable or immovable, the proceeds of sale thereof and any money or investment for the time being representing the proceeds of sale and also includes any property converted from one species into another by any method."Explanations 1 and 2 are not relevant. Section 2 (16) defines "property passing on the death" as inclusive of-"property passing either immediately on the death or after any interval, either certainly or contingently, and either originally or by way of substitutive limitation, and "on the death" includes "at a period ascertainable only by reference to the death"."Interest of Manubhai in the shares and in the accumulated income was property within the meaning of S. 2 (15). That property did, as we have already pointed out, vest in ownership in Manubhai immediately on the execution of the deed of trust. On Manubhai dying unmarried, the property as to the shares under Cl. 7 of the deed and as to the accumulated income under the law of inheritance devolved upon his brother Mahendra. On Manubhais death there was under the deed of trust a change in the person who was beneficially interested in the shares.6. Counsel for the appellant relied upon S. 23 of the Estate Duty Act, which insofar as it is material, provides:"In the case of settled property where the interest of any person under the settlement fails or determines by reason of his death before it becomes an interest in possession and one or more subsequent limitation under the settlement continue to subsist, the property shall not be deemed pass on his death by reason only of the failure or determination of that interest."That the 80 shares under the deed of trust were settled property is not disputed; and Manubhai had an interest in those 80 share. But the interest of Manubhai in the shares did not, for reasons already set out, fail or determine before it became an interest in possession. Section 23 therefore has no application to the present case.7. Counsel for the appellant relic upon an Irish case reported in The Attorney-General v. power, (1906) 2 Ir. Rep. 272. In that case under a settlement one H took a vested legal estate as tenant in common fee, with a limitation over on his dying under the age of twenty-one. The legal estate was subject to the proviso that during minority of H the trustees were to enter into receipt of the rents, providing thereout for his maintenance etc. and to accumulate the surplus upon trust, if H should attain his age, for him, and if H should die under-age for the persons who should ultimately become indefeasibly entitled. H died underage, and the defendants became indefeasibly entitled as tenants-in-common in fee of all the lands in the settlement, including Hs share. It was held that estate duty was not payable as on a property passing on Hs death, that Hs interest had not become beneficial interest in possession in the lands at his death, and that accordingly S. 5, sub-s. (3) of the Finance Act 1894, was inapplicable. Section 5 (3) of the Finance Act, 1894 which was latter amplified by S. 48 of the Finance Act, 1938, was substantially in the same terms as S. 23 of the Estate Duty Act. But Powers case, (l906) 2 Ir. Rep. 272 was decided on the footing that the settlors interest was not vested in H in possession during his minority. The Court held that mere possibility of receiving maintenance at the discretion ot the trustees was not per se an interest in possession for the purpose of S.5(3) of the Finance Act, 1894. An interest in property liable to be divested on the death before the beneficiary attains a certain age, coupled with a direction to accumulate the income in the meantime so far as it is not required for maintenance so as to make the accumulated income an accretion to the capital is in substance a contingent interest, and the property may be exempt from estate duty, if the beneficiary dies before he attains the age specified. But where, as in the present case, the income of the property absolutely belongs to the beneficiary and such part of the interest as is not applied for the benefit of the beneficiary, is liable to be accumulated for his benefit, and in the event of his death before he attains the age specified in the deed of trust, it is to devolve upon his heirs, creates in the beneficiary an interest in possession and not an interest in expectancy.8. The High Court was in our judgment, right in holding that though the shares were not to be delivered over to Manubhai until he attained the age of twenty-five years, the shares belonged to him since the execution of the deed of trust, and he was also beneficially entitled to the income from the shares; that his interest in the shares and the income was not an estate in remainder or reversion, nor was his interest a future interest; and that he was presently entitled to the whole income of his one-half share in the said 160 shares and after provision of maintenance and advancement, if any surplus remained, it was to be accumulated and he was the beneficial owner of the accumulation of such surplus income and but for Cl. 5 he could dispose it of as he willed, and if he died it was heritable by his heirs.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Under the terms of the deed of trust, each beneficiary was entitled to 80 shares of the Central Trading Company. The trustees were to hold 80 shares for each beneficiary till he attained the age of twenty-five years, and the trustees were to apply either the whole or part of the profits arising from the shares, as the trustees deemed "fit and proper", for the maintenance and advancement of the beneficiaries, and to invest the surplus in securities or concerns as they deemed proper. In the event of death of either beneficiary before he attained the age of twenty-five, the shares settled on him, but not the accumulated surplus income, were to devolve on the persons mentioned in Cls. 6 and 7. Till each beneficiary attained the age of twenty-five years, management of the shares was to remain with the trustees and provision for maintenance and advancement for the benefit of the beneficiary was to be made by the trustees. But the income which remained unused after providing for maintenance and advancement was not directed in the event of death of the beneficiary before he attained the age of twenty five years to go to the persons named in Cls. 6 and 7 and was to devolve upon the heirs of the beneficiary according to the personal law of succession and inheritance. This clearly indicates that the entire income accruing to each beneficiary in respect of his 80 shares belonged to him. Clause 5 also indicated that but for that clause the beneficiaries would have been entitled to exercise the right to mortgage or create any incumbrance or sell the shares and the accumulations thereof. By Cl. 4 it was expressly provided that on the attainment of the age of twenty five years by each beneficiary the trustees shall transfer 80 shares and the accumulations thereof or any other investment in lieu thereof as provided in Cls. 2 and 3 of the deed.4. On the clauses set out earlier, we are unable to accept the contention that each beneficiary, until he attained the age of twenty-five years, was enfield merely to receive maintenance and provision for advancement, and had no interest in the corpus of the shares. We are of the opinion that under the deed of trust the right to 80 shares and to the income thereof arose from the date on which the deed of trust became operative and it was not deferred till the beneficiary attained the age of twenty-fivethe 80 shares under the deed of trust were settled property is not disputed; and Manubhai had an interest in those 80 share. But the interest of Manubhai in the shares did not, for reasons already set out, fail or determine before it became an interest in possession. Section 23 therefore has no application to the presentinterest in property liable to be divested on the death before the beneficiary attains a certain age, coupled with a direction to accumulate the income in the meantime so far as it is not required for maintenance so as to make the accumulated income an accretion to the capital is in substance a contingent interest, and the property may be exempt from estate duty, if the beneficiary dies before he attains the age specified. But where, as in the present case, the income of the property absolutely belongs to the beneficiary and such part of the interest as is not applied for the benefit of the beneficiary, is liable to be accumulated for his benefit, and in the event of his death before he attains the age specified in the deed of trust, it is to devolve upon his heirs, creates in the beneficiary an interest in possession and not an interest in expectancy.8. The High Court was in our judgment, right in holding that though the shares were not to be delivered over to Manubhai until he attained the age of twenty-five years, the shares belonged to him since the execution of the deed of trust, and he was also beneficially entitled to the income from the shares; that his interest in the shares and the income was not an estate in remainder or reversion, nor was his interest a future interest; and that he was presently entitled to the whole income of his one-half share in the said 160 shares and after provision of maintenance and advancement, if any surplus remained, it was to be accumulated and he was the beneficial owner of the accumulation of such surplus income and but for Cl. 5 he could dispose it of as he willed, and if he died it was heritable by his heirs.