Case: State of Bihar &amp; Another Vs. Arvind Kumar &amp; Another

to clause 6(a) of the Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2001 issued under Section 3 of the EC Act. Respondent also referred to the said Control Order 2001 in Para 3 of the Crl.W.J.C. No. 215 of 2011 filed by them. More so, the question of ownership of the goods seized is a question of fact which ought not to have been gone into by the High Court in its revisional or extra-ordinary jurisdiction. Further, there is nothing on record on the basis of which the issue of ownership has been decided by the High Court. There was no cogent material on record before the High Court on the basis of which direction to release the goods so seized could be issued. We are at pains to observe that the High Court has dealt with the issue in most casual and caviler manner without any application of mind showing complete disregard of the legislature enacting the provisions for general welfare. 9. This Court while dealing with a similar issue in Shambhu Dayal Agarwala v. State of West Bengal & Anr., (1990) 3 SCC 549 , held that whenever any essential commodity is seized, pending confiscation under Section 6-A, the Collector has no power to order release of the commodity in favour of the owner. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, the object and purpose of the statute and the mischief it seeks to guard, it was further held that the word “release” in Section 6-E is used in the limited sense of release for sale etc. so that the same becomes available to the consumer public. The court held as under: “… No unqualified and unrestricted power has been conferred on the Collector of releasing the commodity in the sense of returning it to the owner or person from whom it was seized even before the proceeding for confiscation stood completed and before the termination of the prosecution in the acquittal of the offender. Such a view would render Clause (b) of Section 7(1) totally nugatory and would completely defeat the purpose and object of the Act. The view that the Act itself contemplates a situation which would render Section 7(1)(b) otiose where the essential commodity is disposed of by the Collector under Section 6-A(2) is misconceived. Section 6-A does not empower the Collector to give an option to pay, in lieu of confiscation of essential commodity, a fine not exceeding the market value of the commodity on the date of seizure, as in the case of any animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance seized along with the essential commodity. Only a limited power of sale of the commodity in the manner prescribed by Section 6-A(2) is granted. The power conferred by Section 6- A(2) to sell the essential commodity has to be exercised in public interest for maintaining the supplies and for securing the equitable distribution of the essential commodity.” The said judgment was followed and approved by this Court after explaining the scope of the statutory provisions in Oma Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (2008) 5 SCC 502. 10. What we found shocking in the instant case is that the petition was filed before the High Court for quashing of the FIR and alternatively for releasing the seized items and the High Court without giving any reason whatsoever disposed of the petition observing as under: “Considering the submissions of the parties, in the opinion of the court, continuing the seizure of the seized items for a long time may not be justified at least the seizure of the wheat.” This is the only reason given by the High Court without even considering what were the averments on behalf of the parties and without considering the requirement of the statutory provisions. 11. In the subsequent order dealing with the ownership of the wheat the High Court has only taken note of the fact that as the respondents herein were prepared to furnish adequate/sufficient security to the satisfaction of the court below for release of the wheat in question, the wheat could have been released by the CJM. In case the learned CJM came to the conclusion after appreciating the evidence on record that the respondents/applicants were not in a position to show any document which may show their ownership to the wheat, there was no justification for the High Court to issue directions for release of such material merely because applicant could furnish the security. If it is so, any stranger or third party may give sufficient security and get the seized goods release in his favour. Such a course is not permissible even while deciding the application under Section 451/457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A person having no title/ownership over the seized material may get the same released on furnishing security and sell it in black market and earn profit several times more than the amount of security furnished by him. We fail to understand as how such an order of release which defeat the very purpose for which the EC Act was enacted, could be passed.12. The High Court has totally ignored the fact that any order passed under Section 6-A is appealable under Section 6-C of the EC Act. Therefore, to consider such an application for release of the goods was totally unwarranted at least at that stage. 13. In Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, AIR 2010 SC 1099 , this Court has held that generally, no Court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor the Court can direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions. The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has been injected by law. (See also: Vice Chancellor, University of Allahabad & Ors. v. Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra & Ors., (1997) 10 SCC 264 ; and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Ashrafulla Khan & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 629 ). 14. Learne

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. In the subsequent order dealing with the ownership of the wheat the High Court has only taken note of the fact that as the respondents herein were prepared to furnish adequate/sufficient security to the satisfaction of the court below for release of the wheat in question, the wheat could have been released by the CJM. In case the learned CJM came to the conclusion after appreciating the evidence on record that the respondents/applicants were not in a position to show any document which may show their ownership to the wheat, there was no justification for the High Court to issue directions for release of such material merely because applicant could furnish theit is so, any stranger or third party may give sufficient security and get the seized goods release in his favour. Such a course is not permissible even while deciding the application under Section 451/457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. A person having no title/ownership over the seized material may get the same released on furnishing security and sell it in black market and earn profit several times more than the amount of security furnished by him. We fail to understand as how such an order of release which defeat the very purpose for which the EC Act was enacted, could be passed.12. The High Court has totally ignored the fact that any order passed under Section 6-A is appealable under Section 6-C of the EC Act. Therefore, to consider such an application for release of the goods was totally unwarranted at least at that stage.Learned counsel for the parties are not in a position to reveal the status of the criminal proceedings initiated against the respondents. In such a fact-situation, as has been suggested by learned counsel for the parties we set aside the aforesaid judgments and orders dated 15.3.2011 and 29.4.2011 and remand the case back to the High Court to consider afresh after examining all factual and legal issues involved in the case. Till the disposal of the case afresh, interim order passed by this Court on 31.10.2011 shall remain operative.