Case: Srinivasa Reddiar And Others Vs. N. Ramaswamy Reddiar And Another

the meaning of Art. 134-B can with equal justification, be said about introducing words of limitation in the said article which alone can exclude transfers made by the previous manager of the Hindu religious endowment on the basis that the property transferred belonged to him. Therefore, we must deal with the present appeal on the basis that Art. 134-B applies to the facts of the present case.22. Mr. Tatachari then contends that even on the application of Art. 134-B the decision of the High Court is erroneous, because on the facts proved in this case, the High Court should have drawn the legal inference that the transferor had been removed more than 12 years before the suit was filed. He contends that the question as to whether on facts proved in the present case, an inference can be drawn that the previous manager or trustee had been removed, is a mixed question of fact and law and the High Court was in error in reversing the decisions of the Courts below by holding that the title of temple had not been lost by adverse possession before the suit was filed. For deciding this question, it is necessary to refer to some material facts.23. The transferor is Pachaikandaswamiar. The appellants case before the trial Court was that Pachaikandaswamiar had resigned his position about 27 years ago, and that even if Art. 134-B applied, limitation should be held to have commenced from the date when the alien or either resigned his office or was removed from it. In dealing with this aspect of the matter, the learned trial Judge has examined the oral evidence led on behalf of the parties. He assumed that Pachaikandaswamiar and his son were alive at the date of the suit. Even so, he found that they had left the village and had taken no part whatever in the management of the worship of the temple. In fact almost all the properties belonging to the temple had in course of time, been alienated and the alienors were no longer interested either in the temple or in staying in the village itself. Raju Iyer, who was examined as a witness by the appellants, stated that he and Amirthalinga Iyer had been performing the worship of the temple for the past 27 years and he added that the alienor and his son had left the village more than 25 years ago and but for very casual visits to the village, they had never taken any interest in the temple or in the management of its affairs. In fact, Ranga Raju Reddiar, whom the respondents examined, admitted in reply to the questions put by the Court that since 25 years or so neither Pachaikandaswamiar nor Chinnaswami Iyer had performed any pooja in the temple. He substantially corroborated the statement of Raju Iyer that Raju Iyer and Amirthalinga Iyer had been performing the worship of the temple. Another witness, Chandrasekara Iyer by name, whom the respondents examined, also admitted that Pachaikanda had sold away all his properties and had left the village. Besides, when respondents 1 to 3 were appointed as trustees of the temple a notice was issued by the office of Assistant Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments, Tiruchirappalli, on the 19th June 1948, in which it was specifically averred that there were no legally constituted trustees for Shri. Pachaikantha Udayavar Temple, Eragudi, and it was mismanaged, and so, it was proposed to appoint legally constituted trustees for the said temple. This notice was served on witness Raju Iyer and Amrithalinga Iyer, Chinnasamy Iyer, and Rangaraja Reddiar who were performing the worship and acting as de facto managers of the temple. It is remarkable that this notice describes Amirthalinga Iyer and Chinnasamy Iyer as de facto trustees of the temple.24. It is on these facts that the learned trial Judge held that the alienor must be deemed to have resigned his office or left it. The lower appellate Court does not appear to have considered or made any specific or clear finding on this aspect of the matter. It, however, held that the transferor and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in the properties all along and that they were not holding the same as managers of the trust. That is why he confirmed the finding of the trial Judge on the question of adverse possession, though on a somewhat different ground.25. The High Court relied on the fact that the alienor is still alive, and so, it thought that the plea of adverse possession could not be sustained. Unfortunately, the question as to whether the facts proved in this case did not show that the alienor had been removed from office by other persons who were in management of the temple de facto, has not been discussed by the High Court.In our opinion, all the facts which have been brought on the record in relation to this aspect of the matter, clearly show not only that the alienor disposed of all the property and left the village, but also that for the last 25 years or so, the management has been taken over by other persons who are acting as de facto managers of the temple. This evidence appears to us to show that the alienors had been removed from management of the temple, and other persons have taken up the position as de facto managers; and this position has lasted for more than 25 years. If that be so, there is no escape from the conclusion that more than 12 years have elapsed since the date of the removal of the previous manager who transferred the properties in question; and so, if a suit were brought by respondents 1 to 3 on the date when they were appointed trustees by respondent No. 4, it would be barred under Art. 134-B. On that view of the matter, we must hold that the trial Judge and the lower appellate Court were right in decreeing the appellants suit in its entirety.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. The argument is that in cases falling under Art.the transfer made by the manager of a Hindu endowment is challenged by his successor on the ground that it was beyond the authority of the manger; and such a challenge necessarily postulates that the transfer was effected by the manager as manager purporting to deal with the property as belonging to the religious endowment. Where, however, the transfer is made by the manager not as manager, but as an individual, and he deals with the property not on the basis that it belongs to the religious endowment, but on the basis that it belongs to himself, considerations which would govern the application of limitation are substantially different; and in such a case, the transfer being void ab initio the possession of the transferee is adverse from the date of the transfer. That is how Mr. Tatachari has attempted to avoid the application of Art.in the present case. There can be no doubt that if the assumption made by Mr. Tatachari is well founded, the appellants title to the three transactions in question would have to be upheld.Reverting then to the question as to whether a transfer effected by the manager of a temple in regard to properties belonging to the temple falls outside the purview of Art.if it is shown to have been made on the basis that the transferor treated the properties as his own, it does appear that the two earlier Privy Council decisions in Ganasambandas and Damodar Dass cases (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC) and 37 Ind App 147 (PC) (supra) lend some support to the contention.It would thus be seen that the observations made by Mr. Justice Mukherjea on which Mr. Tatachari relies, really purport to extend the principle which has apparently been mentioned by the Privy Council in Gnanasambandas case, (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC). It does appear that Mr. Justice Mukherjea had expressed this view as a Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Hemanta Kumari v. Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 38: (AIR 1946 Cal 473  ), and had relied on the two Privy Councils decisions in Gnanasambandas and Damodar Das cases, (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC) and 37 Ind App 147 (PC) (supra). In the case of Hemanta Kumari Basu, ILR (1946) 2 Cal 38: (AIR 1946 Cal 473  ) (supra), the attention of Mukherjea, J. was drawn to the fact that in an earlier decision of the Calcutta High Court in Ronald Duncan Cromartic v. Ishwar Radha Damodar Jew, 62 LJ 10, D. N. Mitter, J., had made observations which were inconsistent with the view which Mukherjea, J., was disposed to take; but the learned Judge commented on the said observations by saying that they were open to criticism.18. Thus, on the question raised by Mr. Tatachari before us, there does appear to be some divergence of opinion in the Calcutta High Court itself. No other decision has been cited before us which has accepted the proposition that if any part of the property belonging to a Hindu religious endowment is transferred by its manager, the transfer is void and the possession of the transferee becomes adverse to the endowment from the very beginning. In fact, as we have already indicated, in the case of Gnanasambanda (1900) 27 Ind App 69 (PC) (supra) what had been transferred unauthorisedly was the religious office itself and all the properties appertaining thereto. It is open to doubt whether the said decision could lead to the inference that if a part of the property is transferred by the manager of a religious endowment on the basis that it belongs to him and not to the religious endowment the transfer is void ab initio, with the result that the possession of the transferee is adverse to the religious endowment from the very beginning and the succeeding managers right to challenge the said transfer would be lost if his predecessor who made the transfer lives for more than 12 years after effecting theis not easy to see why the successors right to challenge an unauthorised alienation made by his predecessor should be affected adversely if the alienation is made by his predecessor of the basis that the property belonged to him and not to the religious endowment.20. However, we do not think it necessary to decide this point in the present case, because, in our opinion, the plain words of Art.do not permit such a plea to be raised. Column 1 of Art.provides for suits brought, inter alia, by the manager of a Hindu religious or charitable endowment to recover possession of immovable property comprised in the endowment which has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. The period prescribed for such suit is 12 years, and the time from which the period begins to run is the death, resignation or removal of the transferor.our opinion, such limitation cannot be read in the words used by the said article Articleapplies to all case where it is shown that the immovable property was comprised in the endowment, and that it has been transferred by a previous manager for a valuable consideration. The successor has to prove three facts : (1) that the property belongs to the religious endowment; (2) that it was transferred by a previous manager, and (3) that the transfer was for a valuable consideration. The character of the representations made by the previous manager in regard to his relation with the property which is theof transfer, is irrelevant for the purpose of Art.All transfers made would fall within Art.if the three essential facts are proved by the successor of the transferor manager of the Hindu religious endowment. Therefore, we do not think that Mr. Tatachari is justified in contending that the transfers with which we are concerned in the present appeal fall outside the purview of Art.inasmuch as they are effected by the alienors on the representations that the properties transferred belonged to them as their separate properties. On the findings recorded by the High Court, it is clear that the properties belonged to the temple; that they have been transferred by persons who must be deemed to be the previous managers of the temple; and that they have been transferred for valuable consideration. The present suit has been brought against respondents 1 to 3 who are appointed trustees of the temple by respondent No. 4; and so, all the ingredients prescribed by the first column of Art.are satisfied. That is why we must reject the ingenious argument urged before us by Mr. Tatachari that Art.does not apply to the present case.It is on these facts that the learned trial Judge held that the alienor must be deemed to have resigned his office or left it. The lower appellate Court does not appear to have considered or made any specific or clear finding on this aspect of the matter. It, however, held that the transferor and his family had been claiming beneficial interest in the properties all along and that they were not holding the same as managers of the trust. That is why he confirmed the finding of the trial Judge on the question of adverse possession, though on a somewhat different ground.25. The High Court relied on the fact that the alienor is still alive, and so, it thought that the plea of adverse possession could not be sustained. Unfortunately, the question as to whether the facts proved in this case did not show that the alienor had been removed from office by other persons who were in management of the temple de facto, has not been discussed by the High Court.In our opinion, all the facts which have been brought on the record in relation to this aspect of the matter, clearly show not only that the alienor disposed of all the property and left the village, but also that for the last 25 years or so, the management has been taken over by other persons who are acting as de facto managers of the temple. This evidence appears to us to show that the alienors had been removed from management of the temple, and other persons have taken up the position as de facto managers; and this position has lasted for more than 25 years. If that be so, there is no escape from the conclusion that more than 12 years have elapsed since the date of the removal of the previous manager who transferred the properties in question; and so, if a suit were brought by respondents 1 to 3 on the date when they were appointed trustees by respondent No. 4, it would be barred under Art.On that view of the matter, we must hold that the trial Judge and the lower appellate Court were right in decreeing the appellants suit in its entirety.