Case: East India Hotels Limited Vs. Syndicate Bank

the plaintiff bank who is admittedly a licensee and having become a trespasser after December 31, 1986 could claim recovery of possession against the owner 8. The only prohibition under the provisions of Section 6 of the Act is not to use force and not to use any unlawful means for dispossessing a person. Both these circumstances are taking in the present case. The ratio of the decided cases is that the Court in trying a suit under Section 6 of the Act will not go into the question of title. There cannot be any dispute with this settled proposition. However, in the present case the title of the company as well as the position of the plaintiff bank that its possession was as a licensee is an admitted case 9. Our answer in these circumstances is that the plaintiff being a licensee and having become a trespasser after December 31, 1986 has no right to claim possession from the company who is admittedly the owner of the premises 10. Even otherwise to grant or not to grant relief under the Specific Relief Act lies in the judicial discretion of the Court. I am thus clearly of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case which are admitted, the plaintiff bank is not entitled to any decree under Section 6 of the Act 11. If we look at the matter from another angle, the High Court itself has made the observations that it was most unfortunate that big corporations and public bodies (the Syndicate Bank here) who should be setting example to others, are taking advantage of delays of litigation and not abiding by their commitments, entered into with full knowledge of what the commitments were. Not only that the High Court indirectly suggested the defendant company to file a suit for possession based on title and in the view of the High Court this was the course which the defendants must adopt. The High Court further observed that while relief cannot be denied to the plaintiffs, some opportunity must be given to the defendants to obtain such orders as they may be advised to protect their rights in the property. We are told that after the decision of the High Court the company has already filed a suit for permanent injunction on the basis of title restraining the bank from obtaining possession and an application for temporary injunction has also been filed for an interim relief. That being the position the result of granting any decree in this litigation under Section 6 of the Act would not serve the ends of justice and at the same time it would unnecessarily prolong litigation between the parties which would be a waste of public money as well as the valuable time of the courts. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the plaintiff bank is an instrumentality of the State and it should honour its commitments and not indulge in futile litigation at the cost of public money 12. The cases cited at the bar do not deal with the situation and circumstances as arising in the case in hand before us. Those cases deal with tenants holding over after the expiry of the term of lease and such possession after holding over is entirely different from the case of a licensee remaining in occupation after the expiry of the term of licence. The position of such licensee is not better than a trespasser and if the true owner comes into possession of the premises without using any force or on account of fire or other act of vis major, in my view it would not be in the interest of justice to grant a decree for possession in favour of such licensee under Section 6 of the Act 13. The criminal cases dealing with the question of right of private defence allowed to a trespasser dispossessed by force will not lend any assistance in deciding the present case 14. In Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh [ 1968 (2) SCR 203 : 1968 AIR(SC) 620 ] (at SCR p. 208) this Court cited with approval the following observations made by Chagla, C.J. in K. K. Verma v. Union of India 1954 ILR(Bom) 950: 1954 AIR(Bom) 358 ] "Under the Indian law the possession of a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant is protected by law. Although he may not have a right to continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy his possession is juridical and that possession is protected by statute. Under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act a tenant who has ceased to be a tenant may sue for possession against his landlord if the landlord deprives him of possession otherwise than in due course of law, but a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to court under Section 9 and claim possession against the true owner." * In the above passage it has been clearly observed that a trespasser who has been thrown out of possession cannot go to court under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act (now Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963) and claim possession against the true owner 15. Anther case, very near to the facts of the case in hand, decided by a bench of three Judges of this Court is D. H. Maniar v. Waman Laxman Kudav [ 1976 (4) SCC 118 : 1977 (1) SCR 403 ]. It was held in the above case that a person continuing in possession of the premises after termination, withdrawal or revocation of the licence continues to occupy it as a trespasser or as a person who has no semblance of any right to continue in occupation of the premises. Such a person cannot be called a licensee at all 16. Thus in my view the plaintiff bank in the facts and circumstances of the present case is not entitled to any decree under Section 6 of the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is well settled that the plaintiff cannot be allowed to go against its own pleadings and the case as set up in the plaint. The agreement which is an admitted document also shows in unmistakable terms that it was an agreement of leave and licence. The High Court also has held that the plaintiff was a licensee in the premises and the period of licence had expired on December 31, 1986 and thereafter the company had not allowed any extension of the period of licence. It is also an admitted position in the case that the period of licence though had come to an end on December 31, 1986 but the company never took law into its own hands much less used any force in order to dispossess the bank from the premises. The company in a lawful manner served a legal notice asking the bank to vacate the premises on or before December 31, 1986. The company acted in a lawful manner and the bank though bound to hand over possession of the premises to the company before December 31, 1986, continued to remain in unlawful possession as aclearly goes to show that the bank was not doing any business in the premises on or after April 12, 1990 and in this manner had to vacate the suit premises on account of fire as the premises were no longer fit for continuing any business by the bank. Thereafter, according to the plaintiffs a new lock was fixed by the company on the main entrance in July 1990 and thereafter did not permit the officials of the bank to enter the premises. The plaintiff bank wrote a letter to the company on May 26, 1990. The aforesaid letter is reproduced inthe present case in our view the plaintiff has not been dispossessed by using any force. Admittedly the bank is a licensee and the period of such licence came to an end on December 31, 1986 and thereafter its possession was that of a trespasser. On account of fire having broken out on April 12, 1990 the bank had to stop its business and in fact it has started its business at some other place. In case the intention of the company would have been to dispossess the bank by force, it could have done so soon after the expiry of the period of licence, but admittedly nothing was done for more than three years till the fire broke out on April 12, 1990. The question now is whether the plaintiff bank who is admittedly a licensee and having become a trespasser after December 31, 1986 could claim recovery of possession against thecannot be any dispute with this settled proposition. However, in the present case the title of the company as well as the position of the plaintiff bank that its possession was as a licensee is an admittedEven otherwise to grant or not to grant relief under the Specific Relief Act lies in the judicial discretion of the Court. I am thus clearly of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case which are admitted, the plaintiff bank is not entitled to any decree under Section 6 of theare told that after the decision of the High Court the company has already filed a suit for permanent injunction on the basis of title restraining the bank from obtaining possession and an application for temporary injunction has also been filed for an interim relief. That being the position the result of granting any decree in this litigation under Section 6 of the Act would not serve the ends of justice and at the same time it would unnecessarily prolong litigation between the parties which would be a waste of public money as well as the valuable time of the courts. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the plaintiff bank is an instrumentality of the State and it should honour its commitments and not indulge in futile litigation at the cost of publicposition of such licensee is not better than a trespasser and if the true owner comes into possession of the premises without using any force or on account of fire or other act of vis major, in my view it would not be in the interest of justice to grant a decree for possession in favour of such licensee under Section 6 of theThus in my view the plaintiff bank in the facts and circumstances of the present case is not entitled to any decree under Section 6 of the Act.