Case: M/S.Soorajmull Nagarmull Vs. State Of Bihar

447 and Bhimandas Ambwani vs Delhi Power Company Limited (2013) 14 SCC 195 , the 1981 acquisition stood superseded upon the issuance of the fresh Notifications in 1996. This Court has consistently held that old notifications are superseded and obliterated by subsequent ones, as the subsequent acquisition proceeding manifest and indicate the intention of the State to abandon the preceding one. This is particularly clear in the case at hand, where the Respondent State, in its Counter Affidavit in previous litigation, had asserverated that it believed that the 1981 acquisition had lapsed. We find no reason or basis to allow the Respondent State to revive the lapsed acquisition. 8 We therefore conclude that the actions of the Respondent State have denied the Appellant just and fair compensation as envisaged and postulated in the L.A. Act, for its land from which it was dispossessed well over three decades ago. The 1981 acquisition is accordingly set aside for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. We must hasten to reiterate the submission made by the learned Solicitor General to the effect that Section 11A, or the necessity to pass an Award, is not necessary in view of the exposition of the law in Satendra Prasad Jain. We may adumbrate, since it already been discussed by us in detail in Laxmi Devi, that the ratio of the Three judge bench in Satendra Prasad Jain is confined to the proposition that the errant Respondent State is precluded from endeavouring to have the acquisition set aside for its own failure to carry out compliance with Section 11A, and that once possession has been taken by the State under Section 17 of the L.A. Act, it is no longer open to the State to relinquish or return the land to the legal entity who had been dispossessed from it. Accordingly, we refrain from passing any orders or directions interfering with the possession of the Respondent State over the subject land. 9. In this situation the current acquisition law needs to be analysed. We have already concluded that the 1981 acquisition had lapsed because of the failure of the Respondent State to pass an Award and secondly because it had launched upon a fresh acquisition in 1996. Section 24 of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereafter 2013 Act) deserves to be placed here – “24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. –(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), -(a) Where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or(b)Where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been replealed”.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:" Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 10. At first perusal, there seems to be an unexplained inconsistency between Section 24(1)(a), which allows an acquisition to stand despite a failure to pass an award while only requiring the compensation to be determined under the 2013 Act, and Section 24(2), which deems the acquisition to have lapsed for a failure to pay compensation or take physical possession of the land where an award has been passed over five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It appears that the State is in a better position in situations where it has been remiss in taking any action, towards publication of an award than in situations where it has taken partial steps towards the completion of the acquisition proceedings. However, it is possible that the reason behind this differentiation is that Section 24(2) gives the State the option to initiate fresh proceedings, as opposed to placing an obligation upon it to do so. To give the State the discretion to set aside an acquisition for its own error in not passing an award would be in the face of the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain. The Parliament has therefore sought to give the erstwhile landowner the benefit of enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act, while restraining the State from taking advantage of its own wrong. Section 24(2), on the other hand, seeks to allow the land to be returned to the landowner party in situations where there is genuinely no need for it, thus benefiting both the dispossessed landowner and the State. There still remains an incongruity, but which presently we are not burdened to unravel. Which provision in the 2013 Act governs a situation where the State has not progressed beyond making a Declaration under Section 6; where possession of the land has not assumed by the State; where neither part nor whole of the compensation has been paid or tendered! However, since in this Appeal we do not have to traverse this legal labyrinth, we shall refrain from indulging in a more detailed discussion of it.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Since the acquisition was initiated in 1981, there was no statutory obligation to pass an award within two years, as Section 11A came to be introduced by way of an amendment in 1984. However, upon Section 11A coming into force on 24.9.1984, the Respondent State was under a statutory obligation to pass an Award within two years of its commencement. No Award was passed in 1986 (i.e. within two years), or in fact even till 2006, causing grave prejudice to, nay deracinating, the Constitutional rights of the Appellant landowner. It seems to us that the realization by the Respondent State that the failure to pass an Award for over a decade was likely to render the acquisition void, is the reason that prompted it to once again initiate steps to acquire the land, in terms of the Notification dated 13.8.1996. under Section 4 and 17(4) of the L.A. Act.6. It is thus clear that the validity of the 2005 revival and the 2006 Award is immaterial, as the 1981 acquisition in itself cannot be allowed to stand for its abject failure to comply with the requirements of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. The Respondent State has argued that the Appellant has not challenged the 1981 acquisition proceeding, or indeed the 2006 Award, till today. While it is true that the Appellant had initially prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Respondent State to hand over possession of the land, the restricted nature of that demand was because thecase was predicated on the premise that the 1981 acquisition had lapsed, as is clear from a perusal of theAffidavit filed before this Court. We shall therefore not be prejudiced by the fact that the Appellant has not directly challenged the 1981 proceedings, but has instead done so indirectly. To penalize the Appellant for a viewpoint that the Respondent State clearly adhered to as well, till the time of initiating the 2005 revival of the acquisition, would be patentlyWe therefore conclude that the actions of the Respondent State have denied the Appellant just and fair compensation as envisaged and postulated in the L.A. Act, for its land from which it was dispossessed well over three decades ago. The 1981 acquisition is accordingly set aside forwith the provisions of Section 11A of the L.A. Act. We must hasten to reiterate the submission made by the learned Solicitor General to the effect that Section 11A, or the necessity to pass an Award, is not necessary in view of the exposition of the law in Satendra Prasad Jain. We may adumbrate, since it already been discussed by us in detail in Laxmi Devi, that the ratio of the Three judge bench in Satendra Prasad Jain is confined to the proposition that the errant Respondent State is precluded from endeavouring to have the acquisition set aside for its own failure to carry out compliance with Section 11A, and that once possession has been taken by the State under Section 17 of the L.A. Act, it is no longer open to the State to relinquish or return the land to the legal entity who had been dispossessed from it. Accordingly, we refrain from passing any orders or directions interfering with the possession of the Respondent State over the subject land.At first perusal, there seems to be an unexplained inconsistency between Section 24(1)(a), which allows an acquisition to stand despite a failure to pass an award while only requiring the compensation to be determined under the 2013 Act, and Section 24(2), which deems the acquisition to have lapsed for a failure to pay compensation or take physical possession of the land where an award has been passed over five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It appears that the State is in a better position in situations where it has been remiss in taking any action, towards publication of an award than in situations where it has taken partial steps towards the completion of the acquisition proceedings. However, it is possible that the reason behind this differentiation is that Section 24(2) gives the State the option to initiate fresh proceedings, as opposed to placing an obligation upon it to do so. To give the State the discretion to set aside an acquisition for its own error in not passing an award would be in the face of the decision in Satendra Prasad Jain. The Parliament has therefore sought to give the erstwhile landowner the benefit of enhanced compensation under the 2013 Act, while restraining the State from taking advantage of its own wrong. Section 24(2), on the other hand, seeks to allow the land to be returned to the landowner party in situations where there is genuinely no need for it, thus benefiting both the dispossessed landowner and the State. There still remains an incongruity, but which presently we are not burdened to unravel. Which provision in the 2013 Act governs a situation where the State has not progressed beyond making a Declaration under Section 6; where possession of the land has not assumed by the State; where neither part nor whole of the compensation has been paid or tendered! However, since in this Appeal we do not have to traverse this legal labyrinth, we shall refrain from indulging in a more detailed discussion of it.