Case: Shri Bhagwan And Anr Vs. Ram Chand And Anr

before the date of commencement of this Act, shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him so long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3. This section emphatically brings out the main object of the Act which is to save the tenants from eviction. That is why it prescribes a bar against the execution of the decrees which may have been passed for the eviction of tenants before the Act came into force, unless the landlords are able to show one or the other ground mentioned in S. 3.15. A similar provision is made by S. 15 in regard to pending suits. It lays down that in all suits for eviction of tenants from any accommodation pending on the date of commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 3. This provision also emphasises the importance attached by the Act to the protection of the tenants from eviction. The right conferred on the tenants not to be evicted, except on the specified grounds enumerated by cls. (a) to (g) of S. 3 (1), is a statutory right of great significance, and it is this statutory right of which the tenants would be deprived when the landlord obtains the sanction of the District Magistrate. That is why we think the Act must be taken to require that in exercising their respective powers under S. 3 (2) and Section 3 (3), the appropriate authorities have to consider the matter in a quasi-judicial manner, and are expected to follow the principles of natural justice before reaching their conclusions.16. We have already indicated that the Allahabad High Court had consistently taken the contrary view and held that the functions discharged by the appropriate authorities under-S. 3 (2) and S. 3 (3) are administrative and an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice cannot be imposed on the said authorities, vide Narottam Saran v. Govt. of the State of U.P., AIR 1954 All 232 . Indeed, after the learned single Judge had held in the present proceedings that the view taken by the earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court was erroneous, a Division Bench of the said High Court considered the same question once again and re-affirmed its earlier view, vide Murlidhar v. State of U. P., AIR 1964 All 148 . We have carefully considered the reasons given by the learned Judges when they re-affirmed the earlier view taken by the High Court of Allahabad on this point. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision in Murlidhars case, AIR 1964 All 148 (supra).17. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkars case (1964) 1 SCR 200 : (Al R 1964 SC 436) (supra) on which the learned single Judge partly relied in support of his conclusion. In that case, this Court was called upon to consider the question whether the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the State Government under S. 19 of the Watar Act was purely administrative, and it came to the conclusion that in exercising the said revisional jurisdiction the State Government is not acting purely as an administrative authority; its decision is judicial or quasijudicial, and so, it is essential that the State Government should follow the principles of natural justice before reaching its conclusion under that section. The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Watan Act cannot, however, be said to be exactly similar to the scheme of the Act with which we are concerned; whereas S. 3 of the Act with which we are concerned in the present appeal deals with the statutory rights conferred on the tenants, the relevant sections of the Watan Act dealt with the right of possession of the Watan property itself. That being so, it cannot be said that the decision in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkars case (1964) 1 SCR 200 : (AIR 1964 SC 436 ) (supra) can be deemed to have overruled by necessary implication the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in regard to the nature of the power conferred on the appropriate authorities by Ss. 3 and 7-F of the Act.18. Before we part with this appeal, however, we ought to point out that it would have been appropriate if the learned single Judge had not taken upon himself to consider the question as to whether the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court needed to be pre-considered and revised. It is plain that the said decisions had not been directly or even by necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court, indeed, the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he was persuaded to re-examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantially recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkars case (1964) 1 SCR 200 : (AIR 1964 SC 436 ) (supra). It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself.19

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. We have already referred to the general policy of the Act. In that connection, we may mention two other sections of the Act. Section 14 provides that no decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act, shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him so long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in S. 3. This section emphatically brings out the main object of the Act which is to save the tenants from eviction. That is why it prescribes a bar against the execution of the decrees which may have been passed for the eviction of tenants before the Act came into force, unless the landlords are able to show one or the other ground mentioned in S. 3.15. A similar provision is made by S. 15 in regard to pending suits. It lays down that in all suits for eviction of tenants from any accommodation pending on the date of commencement of this Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on one or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 3. This provision also emphasises the importance attached by the Act to the protection of the tenants from eviction. The right conferred on the tenants not to be evicted, except on the specified grounds enumerated by cls. (a) to (g) of S. 3 (1), is a statutory right of great significance, and it is this statutory right of which the tenants would be deprived when the landlord obtains the sanction of the District Magistrate. That is why we think the Act must be taken to require that in exercising their respective powers under S. 3 (2) and Section 3 (3), the appropriate authorities have to consider the matter in a quasi-judicial manner, and are expected to follow the principles of natural justice before reaching their conclusions.16. We have already indicated that the Allahabad High Court had consistently taken the contrary view and held that the functions discharged by the appropriate authorities under-S. 3 (2) and S. 3 (3) are administrative and an obligation to follow the principles of natural justice cannot be imposed on the said authorities, vide Narottam Saran v. Govt. of the State of U.P., AIR 1954 All 232  . Indeed, after the learned single Judge had held in the present proceedings that the view taken by the earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court was erroneous, a Division Bench of the said High Court considered the same question once again and re-affirmed its earlier view, vide Murlidhar v. State of U. P., AIR 1964 All 148  . We have carefully considered the reasons given by the learned Judges when they re-affirmed the earlier view taken by the High Court of Allahabad on this point. With respect, we are unable to agree with the decision in Murlidhars case, AIR 1964 All 148   (supra).17. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkars case (1964) 1 SCR 200   : (Al R 1964 SC 436) (supra) on which the learned single Judge partly relied in support of his conclusion. In that case, this Court was called upon to consider the question whether the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the State Government under S. 19 of the Watar Act was purely administrative, and it came to the conclusion that in exercising the said revisional jurisdiction the State Government is not acting purely as an administrative authority; its decision is judicial or quasijudicial, and so, it is essential that the State Government should follow the principles of natural justice before reaching its conclusion under that section. The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Watan Act cannot, however, be said to be exactly similar to the scheme of the Act with which we are concerned; whereas S. 3 of the Act with which we are concerned in the present appeal deals with the statutory rights conferred on the tenants, the relevant sections of the Watan Act dealt with the right of possession of the Watan property itself. That being so, it cannot be said that the decision in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkars case (1964) 1 SCR 200  : (AIR 1964 SC 436  ) (supra) can be deemed to have overruled by necessary implication the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in regard to the nature of the power conferred on the appropriate authorities by Ss. 3 and 7-F of the Act.18. Before we part with this appeal, however, we ought to point out that it would have been appropriate if the learned single Judge had not taken upon himself to consider the question as to whether the earlier decisions of the Division Benches of the High Court needed to be pre-considered and revised. It is plain that the said decisions had not been directly or even by necessary implication overruled by any decision of this Court, indeed, the judgment delivered by the learned single Judge shows that he was persuaded to re-examine the matter himself and in fact he had substantially recorded his conclusion that the earlier decisions were erroneous even before his attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in Laxman Purshottam Pimputkars case (1964) 1 SCR 200  : (AIR 1964 SC 436  ) (supra). It is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. That is the proper and traditional way to deal with such matters and it is founded on healthy principles of judicial decorum and propriety. It is to be regretted that the learned single Judge departed from this traditional way in the present case and chose to examine the question himself.