Case: Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union Of India And Others

the functions, properties etc. of the Society have passed under the Act. There are three reasons why this alternative submission cannot be accepted as ensuring the validity of the Act. The first is that the specific case taken by the respondents has been that the Act reconstitutes the Society and does not create a separate and independent body in the form of a new Sammelan Secondly, even if it be accepted that a new Sammelan has been constituted by the Act, the question will arise of the legislative competence of Parliament to pass such a law. Constitution of Societies is under list II of the Seventh Schedule Parliament purported to exercise legislative power under Entry 63 of List I on the basis of a declaration that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Allahabad was an institution of national importance. The Institution that was declared was the Society itself. It was not a case where the Society could be distinguished from some other institution which might have been declared as an institution of national importance. There can, of course, be cases where a Society may be running a college, a school or some other like Institution, in which case Parliament may declare that particular institution as of national importance, without declaring the Society as such. In the present case, what Section 2 of the Act did was to declare the Society itself as an institution of national importance and, consequently, Parliament became competent to legislate in respect of the Society. On the interpretation now sought to be put forward, the Act keeps that Society intact, but deprives it of all its functions and properties and transfers them to a newly constituted body viz, the Sammelan, as defined uncle the Act. This Sammelan is itself, body corporate, and that Sammelan has never been declared as an institution of national importance. The only institution that was declared as of national importance was the Society which, of course, earlier, carried the same name as the new Sammelan. Parliament was, therefore, not competent to legislate in respect of this newly constituted Sammelan which, at no stage, had been declared as an institution of national importance. The third reason why this submission must be rejected is that, if we were to hold that Parliament passed this Act so as to transfer all the properties and assets of the Society to the Sammelan, the Act would contravene Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. On this interpretation, what the Act purports to do is to take away all the properties of the Society, leaving the Society as an existing body, and give them the new Sammelan. This Sammelan is a new, separate and distinct legal entity from the Society. The Society is, thus, deprived of all its properties by the Act. Such a law depriving the Society of its properties altogether cannot be held to be a reasonable restriction in the public interest on the right of the Society to hold the property. The property, under Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, vested in the Governing Body of the Society. The members of the Governing Body, therefore. had the right to hold the property under Article 19 (1) (f) and they having been deprived of that property, have rightly approached the Courts for redress of their grievance. 14. In this connection, counsel for the respondents relied on the decision of this Court in Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi v. The State of Delhi (1962) Supp 1 SCR 156 = (AIR 1962 SC 458 ) where the Board of Trustees of the Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi was dissolved by the Tibia College Act, 1952, and the Property, which had vested in the Board of Trustees, passed to the newly constituted Board under the impugned Act. The Court held that there was no violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 (1) (f) or Article 31. That decision, however, proceeded on the basis that the property of the original Society registered under the Societies Registration Act had vested in the Board of Trustees which had been dissolved and the property, thereafter, did not vest in the members of the Society in view of the provisions of the Act of 1860. In these circumstances, it was held that no one could complain that his right to property under Article 31 or his right to hold the property under Article 19 (1) (f) had been violated by the impugned Act. In the present case, the applicability of Article 19 (1) (f) is being considered by us on the assumption that the old Society still exists as it was and, yet, all its properties have been transferred to the Sammelan. If the Society still exists so does its Governing Body in whom the property of the Society vested. The Act, thus, deprives the members of the Governing Body of the property, which still continued to vest in them in spite of the passing of the Act. This total deprivation of property instead of regulating the management of the affairs of the Society or its properties, cannot clearly be justified as a reasonable restriction in public interest. It is true that, at the time when the Act was passed, litigation was going on between the members of the Society, and the affairs of the Society were probably in a mess. The remedy however, could not lie in depriving the Society of its property altogether. Reasonable restrictions could have been imposed so as to ensure the proper preservation of the property of the Society and its proper management. If the law is passed not merely for ensuring proper management and administration of the property, but for totally depriving the persons, in whom the property vested, of their right to hold the property, the law cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (5). Consequently, even on this alternative position taken up by counsel for the respondents, the Act cannot be held to be valid. 15.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We consider it convenient to first deal with the case as was specifically put forward in the counter-affidavits. In these counter-affidavits, the position taken up is that, having declared the old Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, which was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, as an institution of national importance Parliament has proceeded to legislate in respect of it under Entry 63 of List I of the Seventh Schedule in order that its administration may not suffer as a result of the quarrels that were going on inter se between the members of the Society.It wasfor this purpose that a first Governing Body was constituted, to take over the management temporarily. The Act was designed to reconstitute the Sammelan in such manner that it could work successfully and without difficulties and, in making provision for this purpose, all members of the old Society were included as members of the Sammelan, so that their right of forming association may not be taken away from them. The Society was never dissolved, instead of the Society remaining a body registered under the Societies Registration Act, it was converted into a statutory Sammelan under the ActIt will, thus, be seen that the Sammelan, which has come into existence under the Act, is not identical with the Sammelan which was registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Certain persons have been added as members by the Act and by the Rules. Admission of future members is no longer at the choice of the original members who had formed the Association. Persons, in whose admission as members the members of the Society had no hand, can become members and get the right of associating with them in the Sammelan, without the original members having any right to object. This is clear interference with the right to form an association which had been exercised by the members of the Society by forming the Society with its constitution, under which they were members and future members could only come in as a result of their choice by being elected by their Working Committee. We are unable to agree with the High Court that the new Sammelan, as constituted under the Act, is identical with the Society and that all the rights of forming an association, which were being exercised by members of the Society, have been kept intact under the ActIt is true that it has been held by this Court that, after an Association has been formed and the right under Article 19 (1) (c) has been exercised by the members forming it they have no right to claim that its activities must also be permitted to be carried on in the manner they desire. Those cases are, however, inapplicable to the present case. The Act does not merely regulate the administration of the affairs of the Society; what it does is to alter the composition of the Society itself as we have indicated above. The result of this change in composition is that the members, who voluntarily formed the Association, are now compelled to act in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had no say. Such alteration in the composition of the Association itself clearly interferes with the right to continue to function as members of the Association which was voluntarily formed by the original founders. The right to form an association, in our opinion, necessarily implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the Association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the Voluntary Association without any option being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association. If we were to accept the submission that the right guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (c) is confined to the initial stage of forming an Association and does not protect the right to continue the Association with the membership either chosen by the founders or regulated by rules made by the Association itself, the right would be meaningless because, as soon as an Association is formed, a law may be passed interfering with its composition, so that the Association formed may not be able to function at all. The right can be effective only if it is held to include within it the right to continue the Association with its composition as voluntarily agreed upon by the persons forming the Association. This aspect was recognised by this Court, though not in plain words, in the case of G. K Ghosh v. E. X Joseph, (1963) Supp 1 SCR 789 = (AIR 1963 SC 812  )Article 19 (4), on the face of it; cannot be called in aid to claim validity for the Act. Under Article 19 (4), reasonable restrictions can be imposed only in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, or in the interests of public order or morality. It has not been contended on behalf of the respondent nor could it be contended that this alteration of the constitution of the Society in the manner laid down by the Act was in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, or in the interests of public order or morality. Not being protected under Article 19 (4), it must be held that the provision contained in the Act for reconstituting the Society into the Sammelan is void. Once that section is declared void, the whole Act becomes ineffective inasmuch as the formation of the new Sammelan is the very basis for all the other provisions contained in the ActThere are three reasons why this alternative submission cannot be accepted as ensuring the validity of the Act. The first is that the specific case taken by the respondents has been that the Act reconstitutes the Society and does not create a separate and independent body in the form of a new Sammelan Secondly, even if it be accepted that a new Sammelan has been constituted by the Act, the question will arise of the legislative competence of Parliament to pass such a law. Constitution of Societies is under list II of the Seventh Schedule Parliament purported to exercise legislative power under Entry 63 of List I on the basis of a declaration that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Allahabad was an institution of national importance. The Institution that was declared was the Society itself.It wasnot a case where the Society could be distinguished from some other institution which might have been declared as an institution of national importance. There can, of course, be cases where a Society may be running a college, a school or some other like Institution, in which case Parliament may declare that particular institution as of national importance, without declaring the Society as such. In the present case, what Section 2 of the Act did was to declare the Society itself as an institution of national importance and, consequently, Parliament became competent to legislate in respect of the Society. On the interpretation now sought to be put forward, the Act keeps that Society intact, but deprives it of all its functions and properties and transfers them to a newly constituted body viz, the Sammelan, as defined uncle the Act. This Sammelan is itself, body corporate, and that Sammelan has never been declared as an institution of national importance. The only institution that was declared as of national importance was the Society which, of course, earlier, carried the same name as the new Sammelan. Parliament was, therefore, not competent to legislate in respect of this newly constituted Sammelan which, at no stage, had been declared as an institution of national importance. The third reason why this submission must be rejected is that, if we were to hold that Parliament passed this Act so as to transfer all the properties and assets of the Society to the Sammelan, the Act would contravene Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. On this interpretation, what the Act purports to do is to take away all the properties of the Society, leaving the Society as an existing body, and give them the new Sammelan. This Sammelan is a new, separate and distinct legal entity from the Society. The Society is, thus, deprived of all its properties by the Act. Such a law depriving the Society of its properties altogether cannot be held to be a reasonable restriction in the public interest on the right of the Society to hold the property. The property, under Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, vested in the Governing Body of the Society. The members of the Governing Body, therefore. had the right to hold the property under Article 19 (1) (f) and they having been deprived of that property, have rightly approached the Courts for redress of their grievanceIn the present case, the applicability of Article 19 (1) (f) is being considered by us on the assumption that the old Society still exists as it was and, yet, all its properties have been transferred to the Sammelan. If the Society still exists so does its Governing Body in whom the property of the Society vested. The Act, thus, deprives the members of the Governing Body of the property, which still continued to vest in them in spite of the passing of the Act. This total deprivation of property instead of regulating the management of the affairs of the Society or its properties, cannot clearly be justified as a reasonable restriction in public interest. It is true that, at the time when the Act was passed, litigation was going on between the members of the Society, and the affairs of the Society were probably in a mess. The remedy however, could not lie in depriving the Society of its property altogether. Reasonable restrictions could have been imposed so as to ensure the proper preservation of the property of the Society and its proper management. If the law is passed not merely for ensuring proper management and administration of the property, but for totally depriving the persons, in whom the property vested, of their right to hold the property, the law cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (5). Consequently, even on this alternative position taken up by counsel for the respondents, the Act cannot be held to be valid.