Case: Magathane Samyukta Sahakari Sheti Sanstha Vs. Trustees of Seth Mulraj Khatau Trust Settlement &amp; Others

argued that on the "tillers day" i.e., April 1, 1957, as prescribed by Section 32 of the Tenancy Act, every tenant must be deemed to have purchased from his landlord free of all encumbrances, the land held by him as a tenant. This deeming provision must, according to the Counsel, be taken to its logical end with the result that once the tenants in the present case had by fiction become the purchasers of the land there was no question of the tenants later expressing their unwillingness to purchase the same. We are unable to agree with this submission. Section 32(1) of the Tenancy Act on which reliance is placed for this argument itself states in express terms that this fiction is subject to the other provisions of Section 32 and to the provisions of the next succeeding sections of the Act. So far as the present case is concerned we need only refer to Section 32-G which requires the Tribunal soon after the tillers day to publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon : (a) all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands, (b) all landlords of such lands, and (c) all other persons interested therein, to appear before it on the specified date. Notices are also required to be issued individually to each such tenant and landlord and, as far as possible, to other persons to appear before it on such date. The Tribunal is then required to record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether or not he is willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. When a tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land the tribunal is enjoined to declare by a written order that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. These provisions which are contained in sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 32-G furnish a complete answer to the appellants contention. It is particularly noteworthy that where a tenant fails to appear, even in that event the Tribunal has to declare by a written order that the purchase is ineffective. 4. When confronted with this position the appellants learned Counsel submitted that the appellant Society had stepped into the shoes of the tenants and it was this Society which was entitled to claim the right to purchase the land. According to the arguments it was the Society which should have been called by means of a notice under Section 32-G(1) and asked whether it was willing to purchase the land. The tenants, Shri Patel contended, could not deprive the Society of this right. This submission is equally untenable. As observed by the Tribunal in the impugned order the Society had neither obtained possession of the land nor had it acquired any interest therein. In face of this conclusion it is not possible to hold that the Society had a right to purchase the land. This conclusion was arrived at after going through all the relevant evidence on the record and other material circumstances. Every aspect of the controversy appears to have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal. No error of law in the impugned order while dealing with this aspect was pointed out on behalf of the appellant and we are unable to find any cogent ground for interfering with this conclusion on appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. 5. As last resort Shri Patel submitted that the original pooling agreements by means of which the land in question was passed on to the Society were actually produced on the record of this case and they were either clandestinely removed by some one from the record or otherwise lost. He attempted to substantiate this submission by pointing out that in this Court the State, as a respondent, had intimated to the office to print the pooling agreements. In the list of documents to be printed on behalf of the State the agreements are entered at serial No. 70. It was further pointed out that the office of this Court had sought the state Counsel Shri Dhebars assistance in tracing those documents from the record. We are unable to hold on the basis of this entry in the list that the original pooling agreements had in fact been produced in the record. The finding of the Tribunal that the pooling agreements had not been produced is certainly indicative at least of the fact that they had not been brought to its notice during the arguments. It is not the appellants case before us that the Tribunals attention was in fact drawn to these agreements and the Tribunal was in error in not considering them on the erroneous assumption that they had not been produced. This aspect also militates against the appellants suggestion that the documents had actually been produced. But assuming they were, as observed by the Tribunal, that too would not show that the Society had acquired any interest in the land in question. Our attention was not drawn to any provision of the statute according to which the Society in the circumstances of the present case could be considered to have become a tenant so a : (1) to be deemed to have purchased the land on the "tillers day" and (2) to be entitled to notice under Section 32-G for the purpose of claiming title as purchaser to the land in question. On the view that we have taken it is unnecessary to go into the submission urged by Shri Patel that an enquiry should now be held by this Court or on remand by the Tribunal into the question whether or not the original pooling agreements were actually produced on the record and that they disappeared thereafter. The conclusions of Tribunal appear to us to be binding and not open to any valid criticism. 6.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are unable to agree with this submission. Section 32(1) of the Tenancy Act on which reliance is placed for this argument itself states in express terms that this fiction is subject to the other provisions of Section 32 and to the provisions of the next succeeding sections of the Act. So far as the present case is concerned we need only refer to SectionG which requires the Tribunal soon after the tillers day to publish or cause to be published a public notice in the prescribed form in each village within its jurisdiction calling upon : (a) all tenants who under Section 32 are deemed to have purchased the lands, (b) all landlords of such lands, and (c) all other persons interested therein, to appear before it on the specified date. Notices are also required to be issued individually to each such tenant and landlord and, as far as possible, to other persons to appear before it on such date. The Tribunal is then required to record in the prescribed manner the statement of the tenant whether or not he is willing to purchase the land held by him as a tenant. When a tenant fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to purchase the land the tribunal is enjoined to declare by a written order that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. These provisions which are contained ins (1) to (3) of SectionG furnish a complete answer to the appellants contention. It is particularly noteworthy that where a tenant fails to appear, even in that event the Tribunal has to declare by a written order that the purchase is ineffectiveThis submission is equally untenable. As observed by the Tribunal in the impugned order the Society had neither obtained possession of the land nor had it acquired any interest therein. In face of this conclusion it is not possible to hold that the Society had a right to purchase the land. This conclusion was arrived at after going through all the relevant evidence on the record and other material circumstances. Every aspect of the controversy appears to have been taken into consideration by the Tribunal. No error of law in the impugned order while dealing with this aspect was pointed out on behalf of the appellant and we are unable to find any cogent ground for interfering with this conclusion on appeal under Article 136 of the ConstitutionWe are unable to hold on the basis of this entry in the list that the original pooling agreements had in fact been produced in the record. The finding of the Tribunal that the pooling agreements had not been produced is certainly indicative at least of the fact that they had not been brought to its notice during the arguments. It is not the appellants case before us that the Tribunals attention was in fact drawn to these agreements and the Tribunal was in error in not considering them on the erroneous assumption that they had not been produced. This aspect also militates against the appellants suggestion that the documents had actually been produced. But assuming they were, as observed by the Tribunal, that too would not show that the Society had acquired any interest in the land in question. Our attention was not drawn to any provision of the statute according to which the Society in the circumstances of the present case could be considered to have become a tenant so a : (1) to be deemed to have purchased the land on the "tillers day" and (2) to be entitled to notice under SectionG for the purpose of claiming title as purchaser to the land in question. On the view that we have taken it is unnecessary to go into the submission urged by Shri Patel that an enquiry should now be held by this Court or on remand by the Tribunal into the question whether or not the original pooling agreements were actually produced on the record and that they disappeared thereafter. The conclusions of Tribunal appear to us to be binding and not open to any valid criticism.