Case: Bihar State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State Of Bihar &amp; Ors

that the reason for terminating the services of respondent 3 was that he had been found to have committed irregularities of a serious nature in the discharge of his duties. That being so, the termination of services of respondent 3 was on account of the aforesaid irregularities in the discharge of his duties and prima facie was by way of punishment and not termination simpliciter. As is well established, even though the order of termination may be couched in terms of an order of termination simpliciter, a Labour Court to which an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication is entitled to go behind the apparent language of the order in question and consider whether the order is termination simpliciter or is imposed by way of punishment. The Labour Court, with which also the High Court agreed, came to the conclusion that the order was not one of termination of services simpliciter, but was by way of penalty imposed upon respondent 3 for aforesaid irregularities. There is nothing to show that the said conclusion was either unreasonable or perverse, and consequently, the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with such a finding in a writ for certiorari. The High Court was, therefore, right in refusing to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court in exercise of its prerogative jurisdiction.7. It is quite clear from the record that the cause of respondent 3 was taken over and espoused by the respondent union before the conciliation officer.The dispute, therefore, was an industrial dispute referable under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Government of Bihar and the reference was a competent one.8. The next question is whether the appellant corporation was the successor-in-title of the said Rajya Transport Authority, and therefore, the obligations and liabilities of the said Authority devolved on the appellant corporation. The contention was that not such a successor-in-title and that once the Rajya Transport Authority ceased to carry on the said undertaking, the relationship of master and servant between that Authority and respondent 3 ceased, and therefore, whatever remedy respondent 3 had would be against that Authority and not against the appellant corporation. It was also contended that under the terms of the notification by which the appellant corporation was set up the corporation took over only the powers and functions of the said Authority and not its obligations and liabilities. Consequently, the order of reinstatement and compensation was contrary to law.9.The appellant corporation, as aforesaid, was set up by means of the Notification dated April 20, 1959 issued under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950. Under clause 2 of that notification the appellant corporation was empowered to exercise all the powers and perform, all the functions which were till then exercised and performed by the Rajya Transport Authority. It is manifest that the powers and functions of the Rajya Transport Authority were to carry on and conduct the transport undertaking. For that purpose its principal function would be the administration and management of that undertaking which would necessitate the employment of an adequate staff of employees. Employment of such a staff and regulating their conditions of service, including disciplinary action, would clearly be one of the powers or functions of the Rajya Transport Authority, which power or function was also to be exercised and performed by the appellant corporation under the said notification. Furthermore, in para 5 of the writ petition filed by the appellant corporation in the High Court, the corporation in clear terms averred that it had taken over as from May 1, 1959 such of the employees of the Rajya Transport Authority into its service who were on the rolls of the said Authority on the date it came into existence. As rightly observed by the High Court, on a proper construction of the said averment, if the termination of the services of respondent 3 was invalid, it never became operative and respondent 3, therefore, would be deemed to be continuing in the service of the Rajya Transport Authority on May 1, 1959, and therefore, on its rolls. In that view, the appellant corporation must be deemed to have taken over the services of respondent 3. The argument, however, was that the true meaning of the said averment was that only those of the employees of the Rajya Transport Authority who were actually on its rolls were taken over and not those who were deemed to be on its rolls. It is difficult to understand the distinction sought to be made between those whose names were actually on the rolls and those whose names, though not physically on the rolls, were deemed in law to be on the rolls. If respondent 3 continued in law to be in the service, it makes little difference whether his name actually figured in the rolls or not. The expression "on the rolls" must mean those who were on May 1, 1959 in the service of the Rajya Transport Authority. By reason of the order discharging him from service being illegal, respondent 3 was and must be regarded to be in the service of the said Authority, and therefore, he would be one of those whose services were taken over by the appellant corporation.10. Apart, therefore, from the question of the appellant corporation being the successor-in-title of the said Authority, respondent 3, in the absence of any valid termination of his services, continued and still continues to be in the service of the appellant corporation since May 1, 1959, and therefore,the corporation was bound to pay his wages including all the emoluments to which he was entitled as from May 1, 1959.For the period from February to April the Rajya Transport Authority was liable to pay his wages and other emoluments, if any, to which he was entitled. The corporation, as successor-in-title of the said Authority, became liable to pay the said wages for the said period and not from February to September 1959 as directed by the Labour Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The Labour Court, with which also the High Court agreed, came to the conclusion that the order was not one of termination of services simpliciter, but was by way of penalty imposed upon respondent 3 for aforesaid irregularities. There is nothing to show that the said conclusion was either unreasonable or perverse, and consequently, the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with such a finding in a writ for certiorari. The High Court was, therefore, right in refusing to interfere with the finding of the Labour Court in exercise of its prerogative jurisdiction.7. It is quite clear from the record that the cause of respondent 3 was taken over and espoused by the respondent union before the conciliation officer.The dispute, therefore, was an industrial dispute referable under Section 10 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act by the Government of Bihar and the reference was a competentrightly observed by the High Court, on a proper construction of the said averment, if the termination of the services of respondent 3 was invalid, it never became operative and respondent 3, therefore, would be deemed to be continuing in the service of the Rajya Transport Authority on May 1, 1959, and therefore, on its rolls. In that view, the appellant corporation must be deemed to have taken over the services of respondent 3. The argument, however, was that the true meaning of the said averment was that only those of the employees of the Rajya Transport Authority who were actually on its rolls were taken over and not those who were deemed to be on its rolls. It is difficult to understand the distinction sought to be made between those whose names were actually on the rolls and those whose names, though not physically on the rolls, were deemed in law to be on the rolls. If respondent 3 continued in law to be in the service, it makes little difference whether his name actually figured in the rolls or not. The expression "on the rolls" must mean those who were on May 1, 1959 in the service of the Rajya Transport Authority. By reason of the order discharging him from service being illegal, respondent 3 was and must be regarded to be in the service of the said Authority, and therefore, he would be one of those whose services were taken over by the appellant corporation.Apart, therefore, from the question of the appellant corporation being the successor-in-title of the said Authority, respondent 3, in the absence of any valid termination of his services, continued and still continues to be in the service of the appellant corporation since May 1, 1959, and therefore,the corporation was bound to pay his wages including all the emoluments to which he was entitled as from May 1, 1959.For the period from February to April the Rajya Transport Authority was liable to pay his wages and other emoluments, if any, to which he was entitled. The corporation, as successor-in-title of the said Authority, became liable to pay the said wages for the said period and not from February to September 1959 as directed by the Labour Court.