Case: Dindyal &amp; Anr Vs. Rajaram

period of limitation so prescribed shall be dismissed. Article 1 of the Second Schedule is as follows : Description of suit or Application. Period of limitation. Time from which period begins to run For possession of a holding by a person claiming to be a tenant from which he has been dispossessed or excluded from possession by any person. Three years. The date of dispossession or exclusion. 10. Admittedly the suit properties were held on tenancy right. Girdharilal was the protected tenant of those properties. Under the gift mentioned earlier, the plaintiffs became the tenants of those properties. In view of Article 1 of the Second Schedule read with Section 104(1) of the Act, the plaintiffs as tenants could not have sued for possession of the suit properties after June 1, 1954. It was urged on behalf of the appellants that in view of the principle underlying Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which principle is not confined to suits and applications for which limitation is prescribed under that Act but is of general application, the plaintiffs right to the suit properties must be held to have been extinguished. In other words, the contention was that in view of the aforementioned provisions, the plaintiffs had not merely lost their right to sue for possession of the suit properties, their right in the properties itself had been extinguished. It is well settled that the principle underlying Section 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (same as Section 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963) is of general application. It is not confined to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act. 10. Article 1 of the second schedule to the Act applies only to suits brought by a person claiming to be a tenant for possession of a holding from which he has been dispossessed or excluded from possession by any person. In other words before this Article can apply, the following conditions must be fulfilled.(1) The plaintiffs must claim to be the tenant of the holding which is the subject matter of the suit; (2) The suit must be one for possession and (3) The suit must be on the ground that he had been dispossessed or excluded from possession by any person. 11. Though the plaintiffs in this suit were at one time the tenants in the suit holding in view of the gift in favour of their mother, they have not brought the present suit as tenants of that holding. They have brought it on the strength of their title as the nearest reversioners to Girdharilal. Nor is their dispossession in 1951 a part of the cause of action for the present suit. This is not a suit for possession on the ground that the plaintiffs had been earlier dispossessed. This is a suit for possession on the strength of the new title acquired by the plaintiffs after the death of Ladli Bahu. Therefore Article 1 of the second schedule does not apply to the present suit. The limitation for this suit is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908. 12. Further it is one thing to say that a tenant who was in possession of the tenancy holding at the time of dispossession had lost his rights in the holding but it is another thing to say that a trespasser had become the tenant of that holding at the end of the prescribed period.It must be remembered that C. P. Tenancy Act is a special Act. It only governs those matters for which provisions is made therein. In other respects the general law continues to apply. The Act does say that a tenants right in respect of any property can be acquired by adverse possession. We do not think that the provisions of the Act enabled (The Act has been repealed) a trespasser to impose himself as a tenant on the landlord by means of adverse possession of the holding as against the tenant of a period of three years. Similarly, it is not possible to hold that a tenancy right could have been acquired in a holding so as to affect the rights of third parties by being in wrongful possession of that holding for a period of three years. If it is otherwise, valuable rights of third parties could have been jeopardised for no fault of theirs.Take the case of a widow, who was in possession of a tenancy holding. The prospective reversioners to her husbands estate would have had no right in that holding during her life time. Is it reasonable to hold that the reversioner would have lost his rights in the holding even before he acquired them because some one was in possession of that holding adversely to the widow for a period of three years? That would not have been the position even under Article 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908. It could not be different under the Act.A right cannot be barred even before it accrues. The fact that the tenant dispossessed happened to become the reversioner on the death of the widow cannot make any difference in law. 13. In 1951, the plaintiffs had two different rights over the suit properties - one under the gift referred to earlier and the other as reversioner. One was an existing right, the other was a prospective one. Their right under the gift must be held to have been extinguished under Article 1, "Sch. II read with Section 104 of the Act.But their right to those properties, as reversioners arose only after the death of Ladli Bahu. That right could not have been barred even before it accrued. As against the prospective reversioners Ladli Bahu was holding the suit properties as a trespasser. She had acquired no rights in those properties as against them. Till her death, it was not possible under law to predicate who would have been her husbands nearest revisioner on the date of her death. 14. In

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. The High Court and the courts below have come to the conclusion that the gift made by Ladli Bahu in favour of Nanni Bai is a valid gift and that Nanni Bai came into possession of the suit properties on the strength of that gift. Hence she must be held to have had no interest in those properties thereafter. Therefore when Ladli Bahu took possession of those properties in 1951, she did so as a trespasser. This conclusion, in our opinion, is unassailable.If we come to the conclusion that she continued as a trespasser on the date the Hindu Succession Act, came into force and even thereafter till her death then she cannot be held to have acquired any right under the Hindu Succession Act because before, any property can be said to be "possessed" by a Hindu woman, as provided in Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, two things are necessary (a) she must have had a right to the possession of that property and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively - See S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar, 1962 Supp (2) SCR 418 = (AIR 1962 SC 1493  ); Kuldip Singh v. Surain Singh, Civil Appeal No. 138 of 1964 D/- 1-5-1967 (SC)14. In1951, the plaintiffs had two different rights over the suit properties - one under the gift referred to earlier and the other as reversioner. One was an existing right, the other was a prospective one. Their right under the gift must be held to have been extinguished under Article 1, "Sch. II read with Section 104 of the Act.But their right to those properties, as reversioners arose only after the death of Ladli Bahu. That right could not have been barred even before it accrued. As against the prospective reversioners Ladli Bahu was holding the suit properties as a trespasser. She had acquired no rights in those properties as against them. Till her death, it was not possible under law to predicate who would have been her husbands nearest revisioner on the date of her death.