Case: Indian Oil Corporation Vs. Indian Carbon Ltd

made their submissions as to what actually happened and what is the result in terms of their respective rights and liabilities. All this will be fresh in the arbitrators minds and there will be no need for further written submissions by the parties. No particular form of award is required. Certainly no one wants a formal "Special Case". All that is necessary is that the arbitrators should set out what, on their view of the evidence, did or did not happen and should explain succinctly why, in the light of what happened, they have reached their decision and what that decision is. This is all that is meant by a "reasoned award.". For example, it may be convenient to begin by explaining briefly how the arbitration came about - "X sold to Y 200 tons of soya bean meal on the terms of GAFTA Contract 100 at US $ Z per ton c.i.f. Bremen. X claimed damages for non-delivery and we were appointed arbitrators." The award could then briefly tell the factual story as the arbitrators saw it. Much would be common ground and would need no elaboration. But when the award comes to matters in controversy, it would be helpful if the arbitrators not only gave their view of what occurred, but also made it clear that they have considered any alternative version and have rejected it, e.g., "The shippers claimed that they shipped 100 tons at the end of June. We are not satisfied that this is so", or as the case may be, "We are satisfied that this was not the case". The arbitrators should end with their conclusion as to the resulting rights and liabilities of the parties. There is nothing about this which is remotely technical, difficult or time consumingIt is sometimes said that this involves arbitrators in delivering judgments and that this is something which requires legal skills. This is something of a half truth. Much of the art of giving a judgment lies in telling a story logically, coherently and accurately. This is something which requires skill, but it is not legal skill and it is not necessarily advanced by legal training. It is certainly a judicial skill, but arbitrators for this purpose are judges and will have no difficulty in acquiring it. Where a 1979 Act award differs from a judgment is in a fact that the arbitrators will not be expected to analyse the law and the authorities. It will be quite sufficient that they should explain how they reached their conclusion, e.g., "We regarded the conduct of the buyers, we have described it, as constituting a repudiation of their obligations under the contract and subsequent conduct of the sellers, also as described, as amounting to an acceptance of that repudiatory conduct putting an end to the contract. It can be left to others to argue that this is wrong in law and to a professional judge, if leave to appeal is given, to analyse the authorities. This is not to say that where arbitrators are content to set out their reasoning on questions of law in the same way as judges, this will be unwelcome to the courts. Far from it. The point which I am seeking to make is that a reasoned award, in accordance with the 1979 Act, is wholly different from an award in the form of a special case. It is not technical, it is not difficult to draw and above all it is something which an and should be produced promptly and quickly at the conclusion of the hearing. That is the time when it is easiest to produce an award with all the issues in mind". See the observations in Russel on Arbitration, Twentieth Edition, page 291 - Reasons for the Award and the decision referred to therein. 9. In a case of this nature, issues are simple, points are fresh and facts are clear, the reasons given by the arbitrator, in our opinion, meet the requirements of a reasoned award. It is apparent that the arbitrator has not acted irrelevantly or unreasonably. Arbitration procedure should be quick and that quickness of the decision can always be ensured by insisting that short intelligible indications of the grounds should be available to find out the mind of the arbitrator for his action. This was possible in the instant case. In the instant case the arbitrator has spoke his mind, and he is clear as to how he acted and why he acted in that manner. 10. The purpose of Section 12 of the English Tribunal and Inquiries Act which required the statutory tribunal to furnish a statement of the reasons if requested to do so before it gave its decision was to enable a person whose property or whose interests were affected to know if the decision was against him what the reasons were. Justice R. S. Bachawat in his Law of Arbitration, First Edition 1983, pages 320 and 321 states that the provision was read as meaning that proper and adequate reasons must be given. The reasons that are set out must be reasons which will not only be intelligible but also deal with the substantial points that have been raised. When the arbitration clause required the arbitrator to give a reasoned award and the arbitrator does give his reasons in the award, the sufficiency of the reasons depend upon the facts of the particular case. He is not bound to give detailed reasons. The court does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons. The court can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is not evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is erroneous. 11. Judged in that light, the award in question was unassailable in the instant case. 12. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. In a case of this nature, issues are simple, points are fresh and facts are clear, the reasons given by the arbitrator, in our opinion, meet the requirements of a reasoned award. It is apparent that the arbitrator has not acted irrelevantly or unreasonably. Arbitration procedure should be quick and that quickness of the decision can always be ensured by insisting that short intelligible indications of the grounds should be available to find out the mind of the arbitrator for his action. This was possible in the instant case. In the instant case the arbitrator has spoke his mind, and he is clear as to how he acted and why he acted in thatThe purpose of Section 12 of the English Tribunal and Inquiries Act which required the statutory tribunal to furnish a statement of the reasons if requested to do so before it gave its decision was to enable a person whose property or whose interests were affected to know if the decision was against him what the reasons were. Justice R. S. Bachawat in his Law of Arbitration, First Edition 1983, pages 320 and 321 states that the provision was read as meaning that proper and adequate reasons must be given. The reasons that are set out must be reasons which will not only be intelligible but also deal with the substantial points that have been raised. When the arbitration clause required the arbitrator to give a reasoned award and the arbitrator does give his reasons in the award, the sufficiency of the reasons depend upon the facts of the particular case. He is not bound to give detailed reasons. The court does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons. The court can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is not evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which isJudged in that light, the award in question was unassailable in the instantIn the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took.