Case: ARVIND SINGH Vs. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

who gave a tip to the other accused that there remains huge cash in the Dental Clinic of the PW-1. The accused, after they were released on bail, breached into the clinic of PW-1. Stolen goods such as cash, mobiles, camera and an ipad were recovered from the other accused. Therefore, it was argued that the accused has not left his activities even after the present case. 96. We do not wish to take into consideration the subsequent charge sheet filed against A-1 to avoid any prejudice in a trial which may proceed on the basis of charge sheet already filed against accused. We find that the accused have taken the life of a young school going boy of only 8 years of age to become rich by ransom and to take vengeance against Dr. Chandak. The argument is that since the accused are young, aged about 19 years, and have no criminal antecedents, the sentence of death imposed upon them is not warranted. It is argued that A-1 surrendered at the first available opportunity and he was fully cooperative with the investigation, therefore, there are the mitigating circumstances to absolve them from noose. We do not find any merit in the argument that being young or having no criminal antecedents are mitigating circumstances. What is required to be examined is whether there is a possibility of rehabilitation and whether it is the rarest of the rare case where the collective conscience of the community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of judicial power to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The manner of commission of murder when committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner are aggravating factors. 97. The circumstances which are required to be taken into consideration are by now well settled. We would not like to repeat such circumstances again. This court in Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 held that as part of the rarest of rare test, the court should address itself as to whether: (i) there is something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence; (ii) the circumstances are such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender. 98. Further, this Court ruled that: (SCC p. 489, para 38) (i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability. (ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the offender also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the crime. (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances. (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised. 99. Later this Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 , held that in, the interest of justice, the court could commute the death sentence imposed on the convict and substitute it with life imprisonment with a direction that the convict would not be released from prison for the rest of his life. This view stands approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 1 holding that the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convicts life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court. This Court held as under: 105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. T o put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convicts life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court. 106. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113 ] that a special category of sentence; instead of death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law and we specifically overrule the same. 100. The motive of the accused to take life was to become rich by not doing hard work but by demanding ransom after kidnapping a young, innocent boy of 8 years.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]54. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and find no reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the trial court and the High Court in the matter of conviction. The entire sheet anchor of the argument of learned counsel for A-1 is that A-1 was in Police custody from 18:50 hrs. on 1 st September, 2014 and such aspect has not been considered either by the trial court or by the High Court. In the written notes of the arguments submitted by A-1 before the trial court, nothing has been raised regarding A-1 being in custody from 18:50 hrs. on 1 st September, 2014. Such an argument was not raised for good reasons, which are delineated hereinafterA witness is required to be cross- examined to bring forth inconsistencies, discrepancies and to prove the untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his arrest on 1 st September, 2014 from 18:50 hrs., therefore, it was required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be arrested around 19:00 hrs. is an incorrect reading of the arrest form (Ex.17). In Col. 8, it has been specifically mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2 nd September, 2014 at 14:30 hrs. at Wanjri Layout, Police Station, Kalamna. The time i.e. 17:10 hrs. mentioned in Col. 2, appears to be when A-1 was brought to the Police Station, Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr. Chandak since the kidnapper was wearing red colour T-shirt which was given by Dr. Chandak to his employees. A- 1 travelled from the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2 nd September, 2014. Since, no cross-examination was conducted on any of the prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the arrest, such an argument that the accused was arrested on 1 st September, 2014 at 18:50 hrs. is not tenable63. Thus, the prosecution is required to bring home the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It is open to an accused to raise such reasonable doubt by cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses to discredit such witness in respect of truthfulness and veracity. However, where the statement of prosecution witnesses cannot be doubted on the basis of the touchstone of truthfulness, contradictions and inconsistencies, and the accused wants to assert any particular fact which cannot be made out from the prosecution evidence, it is incumbent upon the accused to cross- examine the relevant witnesses to that extent. The witness, in order to impeach the truthfulness of his statement, must be cross- examined to seek any explanation in respect of a version, which accused wants to rely upon rather to raise an argument at the trial or appellate stage to infer a fact when the opportunity given was not availed of as part of fair play while appreciating the statement of the witnesses. Thus, we hold that a party intending to bring evidence to impeach or contradict the testimony of a witness must give an opportunity to explain or answer when the witness is in the witness box64. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses does not lead to any inference that A-1 was in Police custody from 18:50 hrs. He was only called for an inquiry for the reason that the employees engaged by Dr. Chandak used to wear a red colour T-shirt in his clinic and as the information at that stage was that one of the accused was wearing a red colour T-shirt, A-1 was called for information. His presence in the Police Station on 1 st September, 2014 was only as a suspect. He became an accused only when he was arrested on 2 nd September, 2014 at 14:30 hrs65. Mr. Chaudhary also pointed out that the CDR of A-1 (Ex.176/1) shows that his mobile phone was always in the range of Police Station Lakadganj from 18:50 hrs. The best witness to seek information of his arrest was the IO. He denied the arrest on 1 st September, 2014. The other witness who could be cross- examined was Manoj Thakkar (PW-4). But he was not cross examined in this respect. At this stage, it is not open to this Court to infer any such fact, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary on record. He had access to his mobile all through before his arrest on 2 nd September, 2014. An accused will not be provided access to mobile phone when in custody. He has called N.T. Gosawi (PW-25) at 19:49:06 hrs. on 1 st September, 2014. In fact, the statement of DW-1, the mother of the A-1, contradicts the entire argument of A-1 voluntary going to police station on 1 st September, 2014. She deposed that 4-5 policemen had taken A-1 from her house as per the information of Ankush, the juvenile. Thus, the accused has not been able to create doubt in respect of his arrest on 2 nd September 201468. We do not find any merit in the said argument as well. There is overwhelming evidence of A-1 having motive to cause damage to Dr. Chandak on account of payment of less salary, more work and scolding on account of over-charging customers. Such motive gets further strengthened by the desire in A-1 to get rich even by robbing employer of Sandeep Katre (PW-8), when he planned looting of cash. Such evidence is corroborated by Sonam Meshram (PW-19), the friend of A-1. The desire to get rich by whatever means was a driving force with A-1 to kidnap a young child of 8 years, who was a school going innocent child, who happened to be a son of well-to-do dentist couple. Initially, A-1 conspired with Sandeep Katre (PW-8) but on his developing cold-feet, he associated A-2 in his nefarious design to make money by the abduction of a young child. The conduct of A-1 in seeking assistance of Sandeep Katre (PW-8) and the calls exchanged between Sonam Meshram (PW-19) and A-1 shows the desperation of A-1 to kidnap for ransom. The intention to kidnap was only with a motive of becoming rich by obtaining a ransom. T o achieve that motive, A-1 had associated A-2, a fact deposed by Sandeep Katre (PW-8) and Sonam Meshram (PW-19). A-1 and A-2 were together at different stages of the commission of the crime from almost 16:00 hrs. till almost 18:00 hrs., and later till 18:33:59 hrs., when both of them were at the house of A-1 in Vinoba Bhave Nagar. Such facts have come on evidence from the testimony of Arun Meshram (PW-31); Rajan Tiwari (PW-2); Rupali (PW-23)-the neighbour of A-1; Ms. Madhuri Permanand Dhawalkar (PW-34)-the dispenser at the petrol pump; Divya Chandel (PW-9); Shriram Shankarrao Khadatkar (PW-10) and Namdeo Dhawale (PW-11) and the call details of both the accused. It has also come on record that A-1 and Sonam Meshram (PW-19) had earlier visited the area in question while on the way to visit the temple of Lord Ganesha. Thus A-1 was familiar with the area, therefore, he found it appropriate to achieve his nefarious design at that place70. From the CDR, A-1 was in the area of Patansaongi Lake from 17:36:53 hrs. to 17:50:49 hrs.; in Vinoba Bhave Nagar, i.e. from 18:31:46 hrs. to 18:33:59 hrs.; whereas, A-2 was in Vinoba Bhave Nagar area from 18:41:45 hrs. till 19:39:17 hrs. A-2 had called Ankush - the juvenile at 20:55:35 hrs., when he was on T akali Koradi Road i.e. the road between Patansaongi and Vinoba Bhave Nagar. The calls between A-1, A-2 and Dharmendra Yadav (PW-24) were exchanged between 19:28:15 hrs. to 19:32:50 hrs. Dharmendra Yadav (PW-24) was also in employment in the clinic of Dr. Chandak. He was acquainted with A-1 as he was also working in that clinic. He deposed that at about 19:00 hrs., A-2 called him and inquired about A-1. He also demanded the cellphone number of Dr. Chandak disclosing his name as Arvind, friend of A-1. He had not given him the cellphone number of Dr. Chandak as it was not available with him. After sometime, the phone was disconnected and within 5-10 minutes, he received another call from A-2 who sought the cellphone number of Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15). He had given cellphone number of Pankaj Khurpade (PW-15) to him71. The judgment in Abdul Subhan is not applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that A-1 was not proved to be arrested on 1 st September, 2014. In the reported judgment, the person who was said to have arrested the accused prior to the actual date of arrest, was examined before the High Court. It was on the basis of the additional evidence recorded, the High Court observed that the statement made by Punwan, accused, in his confession to the effect that he was apprehended on 1 st March, 1938 is very probably true. The IO in his statement before the High Court could not convince the Court that he had not arrested Punnu, accused, till 6 th March, 1938. But the facts in the present appeals does not lead to any inference of the arrest of A-1 on 1 st September, 201472. The argument that the conspiracy terminated the moment, A-1 surrendered in the Lakadganj Police Station at 18:50 hrs. on 1 st September, 2014, is again not tenable73. The said judgment was quoted with approval in Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. v. Mohd. Parvez Abdul Kayuum & Ors. (2019) 12 SCC 1 . Thus, it is not necessary that A-1 should participate till the end of conspiracy as some may quit from the conspiracy but all of them would be treated as conspirators. The common intention requires a pre-arranged plan and prior concert. Thus, there must be prior meeting of minds. The common intention must exist prior to the commission of the act in a point of time74. A-1 is the driving force behind the conspiracy to kidnap for ransom. Merely because A-1 was physically separated from co-conspirator either before or after the death of the victim will not absolve him of offence under Section 302 IPC or Section 364A as both A-1 and A-2 were acting in tandem with each other. It is so evident that A-1 received a phone call from A-2 when he was in Police Station at 19:04:17 hrs. when Dr. Chandak was also present in Police Station. Though, the ransom call was made by A-2 but in view of Section 34 IPC, the consequence of such ransom call will be equally borne by A-1 also, as the planning of kidnapping for the purpose of ransom was that of A-1. It is the A-1 who had the motive to harm Dr. Chandak and also to be rich at the earliest. We do not find any merit in the argument that to make out an offence under Section 302 IPC against A-1, the prosecution must prove the factum of death of the victim prior to 18:00 hrs. The medical evidence corroborates the time of death i.e. from 12 noon to midnight. The opinion of the expert can only suggest the time range, and not the precise time of death. The fact is that victim is proved to be in custody of A-1 and A-2 till 18:00 hrs. or so and, thus, in terms of provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it is for the accused to explain what happened to the victim before he was done to death. Since the victim was in custody of A-1 and A-2 and there is no evidence of any intervening factor to doubt that there could be a possibility of third person, it is for them to discharge the burden of such fact which is within their knowledge76. In the present appeals, the facts speak volumes about the common intention shared by both the appellants. Both the accused planned the kidnapping and executed it together. A-1 called Dharmendra Yadav (PW-24), even before the victim could be kidnapped to make sure that the parents of the child were not at home. A-2 is the one who picked up the child from the gate of the Apartment building. They were together till at least 18:33 hrs. whereas; the tower loca- tion of the mobile of A-2 was Vinoba Bhave Nagar till 19.39 hrs., which is the area of the House of A-1. The conspiracy never came to an end when A-2 called Dr. Chandak (PW-1) demanding ransom, which was the reason of kidnapping the boy. Thus, the facts prove that both the accused had a common intention to kidnap the childiii) Applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Actiii) Applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act77. The most important aspect in the present appeals is presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act81. The Judgments referred to by Mr. Chaudhary, Sawal Das v. State of Bihar (1974) 4 SCC 193 ,  Reena Hazarika and Gargi v. State of Haryana (2019) 9 SCC 738 ,  were to argue that the last seen evidence will not absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonableonly when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of consideration of facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. However, the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment are not applicable to the facts of the present case, when the prosecution has proved the act of kidnapping and the last seen evidence soon before the approximate time of death of victim. Therefore, the prosecution has discharged the onus of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It was then for the accused to rebut the presumption of any other intervening fact before the death of the victim. In fact, none of the prosecution witnesses have been cross- examined on that possibility at alliv) Changing version of the prosecution case82. The Judgments of this court reported as Karanpura Development Co. Ltd. and Sri Venkataramana Devaru have been relied upon to argue that an argument of fact cannot be raised for the first time before thisThe reliance on such judgments is not tenable. In both the Judgments, no fact sought to be raised in appeal before this court, was pleaded in civil proceedings. The reference to such judgments is inappropriate. In the present appeals, the arguments raised by the prosecution are on the basis of evidence led and available on recordv) Recovery of dead body at the instance of A-1 cannot be believed83. The dead body was recovered on the basis of disclosure statement of A-1. The body was lying concealed under a bridge constructed over a Rivulet. The body could not be visible to any person passing through that road. The photograph (Ex. Art./6) produced by the prosecution shows that the compartment under the bridge was more than 6 feet of diameter in which, one person could stand erect. Since the body was recovered from a concealed area covered by leaves and sand, it is the A-1 alone who could point out the concealment of dead body83. The dead body was recovered on the basis of disclosure statement of A-1. The body was lying concealed under a bridge constructed over a Rivulet. The body could not be visible to any person passing through that road. The photograph (Ex. Art./6) produced by the prosecution shows that the compartment under the bridge was more than 6 feet of diameter in which, one person could stand erect. Since the body was recovered from a concealed area covered by leaves and sand, it is the A-1 alone who could point out the concealment of dead body84. It is wholly immaterial whether the death was caused before 18:00 hrs. or afterwards as both the accused were seen with the victim together and the victim was in an inert condition. The injuries and the placement of the boulder/stone on the face of the victim was to hide the identity of the victim. As per Dr. Avinash Waghmode (PW-27), the injuries were perimortem i.e. when the vitals of the victim were functioning. That part of the statement corroborates the oral evidence led by the prosecution about the inert condition of the victim and the fact that he was carried on the shoulder by A- 1 as deposed by Shriram Shankarrao Khadatkar (PW-10) near Patansaongi Lake. It is matter of conjectures that such injuries could be caused by one person or two persons as the injuries could be caused even without any resistance by the victim in view of his inert condition. In fact, the statement of Dr. Avinash Waghmode (PW-27) is to the effect that the injuries caused to the victim occurred when the vitals were functioning, but the victim may not be in position to resist the physical assault on him85. The argument that the disclosure statement was not recorded in the exact language of the accused since the manner of killing is not recorded in such disclosure statement, is immaterial. In terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the discovery of facts alone is admissible evidence when the accused is in police custody. The manner of killing is inculpatory and, therefore, not admissible in evidence. In such a case, the mere fact that the disclosure statement does not record the manner of killing of the victim is wholly inconsequential. Thus, we do not find any merit in the argument raised by the learned counsel for A-186. The reliance of Mr. Chaudhary on the Judgment of this court in Bakhshish Singh v. State of Punjab (1971) 3 SCC 182 is clearly erroneous. In the said case, the recovery of dead body was not believed as it was found to be possible for the accused to know the place where dead body was thrown in the river as broken teeth and parts of human body was lying near the place of recovery. In the present case, the dead body was lying in a concealed place and that there was no possible explanation on behalf of the accused as to how the body came to be concealed at that particular place, when the prosecution evidence proves that the accused were near the place of recovery of dead body almost at the probable time of deathvi) The effect of putting of incriminating evidence to the accused under Section 313 of the CodeFactually, in this case, A-1 and A-2 have not taken any defense except the statement that they have been implicated falsely. A-1 has been put as many as 848 questions whereas A-2 has been put as many as 754 questions but the accused have not taken any other stand except of denial of material facts. In fact, A-1 admitted to Question No. 54 that all the staff of Dr. Chandaks clinic were called in to the police station. Dr. Chandak received calls of ransom when he was in the police station. Therefore, the said judgment is of no help to the accused. An accused, as mentioned earlier, is required to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses to give him an opportunity to make any explanation which is open to him. It is a rule of professional practice in the conduct of a case. However, in the absence of any cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, an argument cannot be built, in the absence of any evidence to that effect88. The judgments in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh and Sharad Birdhichand Sarda are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Therein, it has been laid down that in a prosecution based upon a circumstantial evidence, the prosecution is required to rule out all other probabilities except that the offence was committed by the accused and no one else. In the present case, there is overwhelming evidence that shows the victim to be in company of the accused at five different places from 16:00 hrs. to 17:30 hrs –18.00 hrs. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the accused to explain the circumstances which occurred thereafter till the time of the recovery of dead body. There is no evidence to create a doubt on the prosecution version that somebody else had access to the victim before he died. The fact that the child was carried on shoulder by A-1 shows that the child was not in a position to move and was done to death in that condition which is corroborated by medical evidence of injuries being perimortemArguments on behalf of A-2However, such an argument is wholly untenable as he is the one who picked up the child from the gate of the Apartment where the family of the child used to stay and had been seen by a number of persons up to 17:30 hrs. It is thereafter that a ransom call is proved to have been made by A- 2 on the basis of statement of Mohandas Mitharam Balani (PW-16) from whose PCO, A-2 made the call. He was an active participant in the orchestration of the crime with A-1. Still further, the blue T- shirt worn by the victim was recovered on the basis of disclosure statement of A-2. Such disclosure statement corroborates that it is he who had taken off the shirt and thrown it in a rivulet/nullah which was at a distance of 5 kms. from the place of occurrence94. This Court following the principle of residual doubt in a judgment reported as Ravishankar v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 9 SCC 689 ,  held that another nascent evolution in the theory of death sentencing can be distilled. This Court has increasingly become cognizant of residual doubt in many recent cases which effectively create a higher standard of proof over and above the beyond reasonable doubt standard used at the stage of conviction, as a safeguard against routine capital sentencing, keeping in mind the irre- versibility of death96. We do not wish to take into consideration the subsequent charge sheet filed against A-1 to avoid any prejudice in a trial which may proceed on the basis of charge sheet already filed against accused. We find that the accused have taken the life of a young school going boy of only 8 years of age to become rich by ransom and to take vengeance against Dr. ChandakWe do not find any merit in the argument that being young or having no criminal antecedents are mitigating circumstances. What is required to be examined is whether there is a possibility of rehabilitation and whether it is the rarest of the rare case where the collective conscience of the community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of judicial power to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty. The manner of commission of murder when committed in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly manner are aggravating factors97. The circumstances which are required to be taken into consideration are by now well settled. We would not like to repeat such circumstances again. This court in Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 held that as part of the rarest of rare test, the court should address itself as to whether:(i) there is something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence;(ii) the circumstances are such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender98. Further, this Court ruled that: (SCC p. 489, para 38)(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the offender also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the crime(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised99. Later this Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008) 13 SCC 767 ,  held that in, the interest of justice, the court could commute the death sentence imposed on the convict and substitute it with life imprisonment with a direction that the convict would not be released from prison for the rest of his life. This view stands approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India v. V. Sriharan & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 1 holding that the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convicts life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court. This Court held as under:105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. T o put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convicts life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court106. Viewed in that respect, we state that the ratio laid down in Swamy Shraddananda (2) [Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 113 ] that a special category of sentence; instead of death; for a term exceeding 14 years and put that category beyond application of remission is well founded and we answer the said question in the affirmative. We are, therefore, not in agreement with the opinion expressed by this Court in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [Sangeet v. State of Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 452 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 611] that the deprival of remission power of the appropriate Government by awarding sentences of 20 or 25 years or without any remission as not permissible is not in consonance with the law and we specifically overrule the same100. The motive of the accused to take life was to become rich by not doing hard work but by demanding ransom after kidnapping a young, innocent boy of 8 years.