Case: Rajammal And Anr Vs. Mookan @ Peria Perumal Theval &amp; Ors

existence at the time a donation was made its acceptance by the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar later on after the commencement of the Act, (as in the case in hand), by virtue of the deeming provision, the Act shall be deemed to be in existence on the date of the donation. Sub-section (4) had made a similar deeming provision for the grant made in favour of a grantee before the coming into force of the Bhoodan Act.9. Section 24 reads:"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every declaration and every grant of land made or deemed to have been made under this Act shall be and be deemed always to have been exempt from the payment of stamp duty an d of encumbrance certificate fee, registration fee or of the fee payable for the attestation of a power of attorney under section 33, sub-section (2), of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (Central Act XVI of 1908)." (emphasis added).The provision of this section also shows that donations and grants under the Bhoodan Act were exempted from the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Registration Act with retrospective effect.The above considerations leave no doubt at all that the provisions of the Bhoodan Act had retrospective effect and intended to include donations of land by any person to the Bhoodan Yagna made before the commencement of the Bhoodan Act, and such donations were also exempted fro m the relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Indian Registration Act with retrospective effect.10. Section 23 made the order of Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar under sub-section (4) of Section 17, final and not subject to appeal or revision. An aggrieved party however was not without remedy. Under the proviso of section 23, any person whose interest was affected as a result of the donation to the Bhoodan Yagna, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, might file a suit to set aside the order of the Tahsildar or the Deputy Tahsildar. The plaintiffs in the present suit (appellants before us) filed no such suit.11. Let us now turn to the relevant provisions of the Bhoodan (Amendment) Act of 1964. There was no material amendment to section 16 of the original Act. Only "The State Board" was substituted for "Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar". There was also no material amendment to Section 17. "Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar" was replaced by Inquiry Officer. Only with the substitution of Inquiry Officer for Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar, section 20 and section 23 have been retained. Section 24 as amended is as follows:-"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, every declaration and every grant of land made or deemed to have been made under this Act shall be and be deemed always to have been exempt from registration and payment of stamp duty and of encumbrance certificate fee."A comparison of the new section 24 with the old section 24 shows that there has been no change in the law so far as registration and stamp duty were concerned.12. Section 11 of the Bhoodan (Amendment) Act of 1964 is new and very important. Clauses (b) and (c) which are material for our purpose need be extracted:"Section 11-Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, no donation of any land for the Bhoodan Yagna or for Gramdan and no grant of any such land made or deemed to have been made under the principal Act as in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground only that the donation or the grant of land as aforesaid was not made in accordance with any law relating to transfer of property or registration, and any such donation or grant of land shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be and to have always been validly made and accordingly-(a) .....(b) no suit or other proceeding shall be maintained or continued in any Court for the declaration of title to, or the recovery of possession of, any land donated for the Bhoodan Yagna or for Gramdan on the ground that the donation was not made in accordance with the law relating to transfer of property or registration;(c) no Court shall enforce any decree o r order declaring any donation of land for the Bhoodan Yagna or for Gramdan to be invalid or directing the recovery of possession of any such land by the person who donated it or any other person claiming under him, on ground referred to in clause (b):Provided that..................Provided further that..................Provided also that.....................Explanation.................. .........."Clause (b) of section 11 of the Bhoodan (Amendment) Act puts a bar on the maintenance of a suit or other proceedings in any Court for the declaration of title to, or recovery of possession of, any land donated for the Bhoodan Yagna on the ground that the transfer (donation) was not in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or Indian Registration Act. Clause (c) to section 11 goes one step further and lays down that even if a decree has already been passed in such a suit, no court shall execute a decree in a suit referred to in clause (b).13. It is thus seen that the law both under the old and the new Acts so far as the operation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act is concerned, is the same. The law ingrained in section 11 is merely declaratory in express terms of the already existing law under the Bhoodan Act of 1958.14. The second appeal that was pending before the High Court fell within the mischief of clause (b) of section 11. Even if there had been no appeal by the defendants, the execution of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court could have been successfully objected to by the defendant or any other person as void on the ground that the suit itself was barred under section 23 of the old Act itself.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Section 23 made the order of Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar under sub-section (4) of Section 17, final and not subject to appeal or revision. An aggrieved party however was not without remedy. Under the proviso of section 23, any person whose interest was affected as a result of the donation to the Bhoodan Yagna, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, might file a suit to set aside the order of the Tahsildar or the Deputy Tahsildar. The plaintiffs in the present suit (appellants before us) filed no such suit.11.It is thus seen that the law both under the old and the new Acts so far as the operation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act is concerned, is the same. The law ingrained in section 11 is merely declaratory in express terms of the already existing law under the Bhoodan Act of 1958.The second appeal that was pending before the High Court fell within the mischief of clause (b) of section 11. Even if there had been no appeal by the defendants, the execution of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court could have been successfully objected to by the defendant or any other person as void on the ground that the suit itself was barred under section 23 of the old Acttwo are deeming provisions and are a complete answer to the appellants contention. The meaning of the proviso is that although the Bhoodan Act was not in existence at the time a donation was made its acceptance by the Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar later on after the commencement of the Act, (as in the case in hand), by virtue of the deeming provision, the Act shall be deemed to be in existence on the date of the donation.(4) had made a similar deeming provision for the grant made in favour of a grantee before the coming into force of the Bhoodan Act.It is thus seen that the law both under the old and the new Acts so far as the operation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act is concerned, is the same. The law ingrained in section 11 is merely declaratory in express terms of the already existing law under the Bhoodan Act of 1958.e second appeal that was pending before the High Court fell within the mischief of clause (b) of section 11. Even if there had been no appeal by the defendants, the execution of the decree passed by the First Appellate Court could have been successfully objected to by the defendant or any other person as void on the ground that the suit itself was barred under section 23 of the old Act