Case: Brihanmumbai Mahanagarpalika  Vs. Willingdon Sports Club

regulating the places for use of hotels, eating houses, tea or coffee shops and restaurants within the Municipal Borough and in Part I, which contains definitions, "catering establishment" has been defined as meaning any place used for the business of sale of any article of food or drink for consumption on the premises and including hotel, eating house, tea or coffee shop or restaurant, pan bidi shops and sugarcane juice shop. This definition would clearly show that a catering establishment means any place used for the business of sale of articles of food or drink and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor (1960) 62 Bom. L.R. 558:...trade according to Halsbury, in its primary meaning, is exchange of goods for goods or goods for money, and in its secondary meaning it is any business carried on -with a view to profit whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal arts or learned professions and from agriculture; whereas business is a wider term not synonymous with trade and means practically anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure.It would thus be seen that the concept of earning profits is not a necessary appurtenant of the expression "business" and looked at from this point of view, a place used for the business of sale of any article of food or drink does not cease to be so merely because it is not being conducted with a view to earn profits. Anyway, the definition contained in the rules and by-laws of the Borough Municipality is an inclusive definition. After saying that a catering establishment means any place used for the business of sale of any article of food or drink for consumption, it further goes on to say that it includes a hotel or an eating house, etc. and in the same Supreme Court decision, to which a reference has already been made, it has been pointed out that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as restricted in any sense. Where the Courts are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation. Therefore, having regard to the inclusive definition in this case, it is clear that the definition of "catering establishment" does mean and include a cooperative canteen conducted without any motive of earning profits.If the object and scope of the rules and by-laws framed by the Borough Municipality are examined, there can be no difficulty in holding that a catering establishment does include any canteen, whether conducted for the purpose of earning profits or not. If we examine the rules and by-laws, it is clear that the object with which they have been framed is to promote and preserve sanitation and public health and to prevent the spread of disease within the municipal limits and if that was the object, it is difficult to see how canteens conducted on no loss and no profit basis could be excluded from the definition of a "catering establishment". It is as much necessary to preserve cleanliness, and public health in commercial establishments as in the establishments conducted by co-operative societies like the one in this case. In this connection, the following passage appearing at pages 58 and 59 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 1962 edn., may be quoted with advantage:It is in the interpretation of general words and phrases that the principle of strictly adapting the meaning to the particular subject-matter with reference to which the words are used finds its most frequent application. However wide in the abstract, they are more or less elastic and admit of restriction or expansion to suit the subject-matter. While expressing truly enough all that the legislature intended, they frequently express more in their literal meaning and natural force; and it is necessary to give them the meaning which best suits the scope and object of the statute without extending to ground foreign to the intention. It is, therefore, a canon of interpretation that all words, if they be general and not express and precise, are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter. They are to be construed as particular if the intention be particular; that is, they must be understood as used with reference to the subject- matter in the mind of the legislature, and limited to it.” (emphasis supplied) 25. In Balkrishna Karkera v. K.J. Mishra and another AIR 1979 (Bombay) 198, learned Single Judge interpreted Section 394(1)(e)(i) read with Section 471 of the Act and observed: “Now it is pertinent to note that although the expression "eating house" has been defined under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the expression "catering establishment" has not been defined. It is true that the staff canteen run by Accused No. 2 was not open to the members of the public at large and the admission was restricted solely to the employees of the said Company. To that extent Mr. Shrikrishna would be justified in his submission that the staff canteen could not be termed as an "eating house." However, what is significant is the fact that Accused No. 2 has not been charged with carrying on an "eating house" but he has been charged for carrying on a catering establishment. "Catering establishment" is an expression which is wider in its connotation than the expression "eating house" and whether a staff canteen was open to the public or restricted only to a section of the public, it would still fall within the definition of a "catering establishment". 26. In our view, the aforesaid judgments of the Bombay High Court lay down correct law and ratio thereof deserves to be applied for interpreting Section 394 (1) (e) read with Part IV of Schedule ‘M’ of the Act.27. As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the Bombay High Court was not right in relieving the respondents of the obligation to take licence under Section 394(1)(e) of the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]25. In Balkrishna Karkera v. K.J. Mishra and another AIR 1979 (Bombay) 198, learned Single Judge interpreted Section 394(1)(e)(i) read with Section 471 of the Act andit is pertinent to note that although the expression "eating house" has been defined under the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the expression "catering establishment" has not been defined. It is true that the staff canteen run by Accused No. 2 was not open to the members of the public at large and the admission was restricted solely to the employees of the said Company. To that extent Mr. Shrikrishna would be justified in his submission that the staff canteen could not be termed as an "eating house." However, what is significant is the fact that Accused No. 2 has not been charged with carrying on an "eating house" but he has been charged for carrying on a catering establishment. "Catering establishment" is an expression which is wider in its connotation than the expression "eating house" and whether a staff canteen was open to the public or restricted only to a section of the public, it would still fall within the definition of a "catering establishment".In our view, the aforesaid judgments of the Bombay High Court lay down correct law and ratio thereof deserves to be applied for interpreting Section 394 (1) (e) read with Part IV of Scheduleof the Act.27. As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the Bombay High Court was not right in relieving the respondents of the obligation to take licence under Section 394(1)(e) of the