Case: Varada Bhavanarayana Rao Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh &amp; Ors

the present Explanation 1 to Section 3 (2) (d) was added by the Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act II of 1945. There was a provision by which the amendment was to be deemed to have effect as from the date when the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, bridging in sub-cl. (d) of cl. (2) of S. 3 in its present form, came into force.Mr. Rama Reddy argues that the intention of the Amending Act 1945 was to restore fully the view taken in Narayanswamis Case, ILR 39 Mad 683: (AIR 1916 Mad 263) and that under the definition of an inam village as explained by the amendment a named village would be presumed to be an inam village, and so an "estate", notwithstanding the existence of certain minor inams.The presumption could however be rebutted by showing that these minor inams were created by the grantor of the major inam subsequent to the creation of the major inam. The argument is undoubtedly attractive. It also finds support from the observations of Subba Rao, J. in Janakiramaraju v. Appalaswami, ILR (1954) Mad 980: (AIR 1954 Mad 772 ) where the learned Judge stated that the amendment introduced by the Explanation was intended to restore the well settled law disturbed by the decision in T. Admmas case, 1943-2 Mad LJ 289: (AIR 1943 Mad 187 ). There are other observations in the judgment in Janakiramarajus case, ILR (1954) Mad 980: (AIR 1954 Mad 772 ) which appear to support even more clearly Mr. Rama Reddys argument that as soon as it was found that the inam grant was of a named village a rebuttable presumption will arise that it formed an estate. On closer examination of the question however we find that it would be reading too much into the Explanation to think that the legislature wanted to create such a presumption. There are a number of reasons which make us hesitate to accept the view that such a presumption was created. The first of these is that when adding the Explanation in 1945 the legislature did not think fit to make any change in S. 23 of the Act, under which it shall be presumed where it became necessary in any suit or proceeding to determine whether an inam village or a separated part of an inam village was or was not an estate within the meaning of the Act as it stood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, that such village was an estate. If when adding the explanation to S. 3 (3)(d) in 1945 the legislature had intended to bring into existence a presumption as suggested by Mr. Rama Reddy, nothing was easier than to give effect to such intention by omitting from S. 23 the words "as it stood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936" or by adding express terms that "where the grant was expressed to be of a named village the presumption will be that it is an estate until the contrary is shown."13. Another reason which makes it difficult for us to accept Mr. Rama Reddys argument is the actual language used in Explanation (1) The last portion of the Explanation clearly indicates that the conclusion that the area is an "estate" can be drawn even where the whole of the village is not included in the grant, only if it appears that the portion not included ha already been gifted was therefore lost to the tenure. The addition of the last clause in the Explanation brings out the fact that the legislature did not intend to go quite as far as the High Court had gone in the case of Narayanaswami Nayudu ILR 39 Mad 683: (AIR 1916 Mad 263).14. On a consideration of the history of the language used in the Explanation and also the circumstances in which the Explanation came to be added, we have come to the conclusion that the legislature being well aware of the difficulties of proving whether the minor grants had been granted prior to or subsequent to the grant of a named village, decided to leave the matter easy as between the contending parties created no presumption either way.15. That being the position, the question on which of the contending parties the burden of proof would lie has to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 101 of the Evidence Act provides that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Section 102 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Section 103 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the burden of proof of that fact shall he on any particular person.16. Applying these principles, we find that the plaintiff who asks the Court for a declaration that the area covered by the title deed 1082 is not an estate must prove that it is not an "estate". If no evidence were given on either side the plaintiff would fail. For, we have found that there is no presumption in law either that the area in question is an estate or that it is not an estate. It follows from this that the plaintiff who is to prove that the suit lands do not form an estate must show that the minor inams were granted subsequent to the date of the inam grant of the named village. The plaintiff has clearly failed to discharge this burden.17. We have therefore come to the conclusion, though for reasons different from what found favour with the High Court, that the plaintiffs suit has been rightly dismissed.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]13. Another reason which makes it difficult for us to accept Mr. Rama Reddys argument is the actual language used in Explanation (1) The last portion of the Explanation clearly indicates that the conclusion that the area is an "estate" can be drawn even where the whole of the village is not included in the grant, only if it appears that the portion not included ha already been gifted was therefore lost to the tenure. The addition of the last clause in the Explanation brings out the fact that the legislature did not intend to go quite as far as the High Court had gone in the case of Narayanaswami Nayudu ILR 39 Mad 683: (AIR 1916 Mad 263).14. On a consideration of the history of the language used in the Explanation and also the circumstances in which the Explanation came to be added, we have come to the conclusion that the legislature being well aware of the difficulties of proving whether the minor grants had been granted prior to or subsequent to the grant of a named village, decided to leave the matter easy as between the contending parties created no presumption either way.15. That being the position, the question on which of the contending parties the burden of proof would lie has to be decided on the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 101 of the Evidence Act provides that whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. Section 102 provides that the burden of proof in a suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all were given on either side. Section 103 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the burden of proof of that fact shall he on any particular person.16. Applying these principles, we find that the plaintiff who asks the Court for a declaration that the area covered by the title deed 1082 is not an estate must prove that it is not an "estate". If no evidence were given on either side the plaintiff would fail. For, we have found that there is no presumption in law either that the area in question is an estate or that it is not an estate. It follows from this that the plaintiff who is to prove that the suit lands do not form an estate must show that the minor inams were granted subsequent to the date of the inam grant of the named village. The plaintiff has clearly failed to discharge this burden.17. We have therefore come to the conclusion, though for reasons different from what found favour with the High Court, that the plaintiffs suit has been rightly dismissed.