Case: State of Gujarat Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and Others

a piece of such land not in any mans occupation but lying common.3. A devastated region."13. In the sequence in which the expression waste lands appears in the two relevant sections, it cannot but have its ordinary etymological meaning as given in the Shorter oxford Dictionary i.e.. land lying desolate or useless, without trees or grass or vegetation, not capable of any use. In Rajanand Bramha Shah v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors this Court, while discerning the meaning of waste and arable land in s. 17(4) Of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, observed t hat the expression waste land as contrasted to arable land, would mean land which is unfit for cultivation and habitation, desolate and barren land with little or no vegetation thereon. To the same effect is the decision in Ishwarlal Girdharilal Joshi etc. v. State of Gujarat &Anr.:14. It is clear that these grass-lands on hilly tracts were not waste lands. They were productive lands in the sense that grass grew naturally and so they were not desolate, abandoned or barren waste lands with no vegetation. The expression waste lands in the context would be clearly, in the original sense of the term waste as meaning barren or desolate lands which are unfit for any use or which are worthless. That test is not clearly fulfilled.The appellants alternative contention raises, primarily, the question whether upon a proper construction of s. 6 these grass-lands on hilly tracts were uncultivated lands. That depends upon the terms of the section. The expression uncultivated lands in s. 6, must, in the context in which it appears, mean cultivable but not cultivated i.e. fit for cultivation, but allowed to lie fallow. It is uncultivable or unfit for cultivation.15. The Explanation below s. 6 has a two-fold function. The purpose of the Explanation first is to explain the meaning of the expression uncultivated lands in the substantive provision. It then seeks to curtail the effect of the section. It is a key f or ascertaining the meaning of the expression uncultivated lands. Without the Explanation, any land lying uncultivated, on the date of the vesting, even for a year. i.e., allowed to lie fallow according to the normal agricultural practice, would vest in the Government. But then the Explanation steps in and seeks to mitigate the rigour. It says that the land allowed to lie fallow continuously for a period of three years, shall alone be deemed to be uncultivated land, meaning thereby that a piece of land allowed to lie fallow, intermittently, for a period of less than three years will not be deemed uncultivated lands.16. In that view of the matter, the grass-lands on hilly tracts which ere incapable of any cultivation could not, in law, be treated to be uncultivated lands within the meaning of s. 6, read with the Explanation thereto.17. There seems to be no doubt on the facts of the case that there were no such basic operations as tilling of the land, sowing or disseminating of seeds, and planting of grass. The subsequent operations i.e., operations performed after the grass grew on the land, e.g., the act of securing the income of this grass by engaging watchmen etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought on land or trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass but that it grew to full stature so as to give a fair and full yield, or when operations for cutting off the grass used to commence, the act of tending the stubs so that they were not cut off but were allowed to remain intact so that the next year after the rains, the grass would grow naturally again, by themselves would not be tantamount to cultivation of the land.In our opinion, the High Court as well as the Revenue Tribunal were, therefore, right in holding that the disputed lands did not vest in tile government under s. of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 7 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act.18. In reaching. that conclusion, we cannot but take into consideration the fact that the Acts make no provision whatever for payment of any compensation for the acquisition of the rights of the former taluqdars and inamdars in such lands. They are not entitled to any compensation either under s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 10.(1) (b) (i) of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. These provisions speak of the extinguishment of any right or interest in land which is waste or uncultivated but is culturable. The lands in question not being fit for cultivation, were not culturable and. therefore, they do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If the contention of the appellant were to prevail, it would lead to an anomalous position. It would have the effect of taking these lands out of the purview of s. 14 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 17 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act, though such lands are not governed by s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the former Act and s. 10 (1)(i) of the latter Act. This would result in deprivation of property without payment of compensation.19. Our attention was drawn to the decision in Ambabai Janhavibai v. State of Maharashtra. (1) That judgment proceeds on the footing that there was a conflict between s. S and s. 7 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. There is no basis for this assumption. Further, the observation that since it is admitted that no agricultural operations were carried out on the lands for the purpose of raising or growing grass on the lands, the contention that the lands on which grass grew naturally could not be said to be uncultivated, cannot be accepted, even though the inamdars were making use of these lands and were realising income by selling the grass which grew thereon, appears to proceed on a wrongful assumption that the sine qua non for the applicability of s. 5 was actual cultivation. This observation, in our view, cannot be supported.20. In

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is therefore, evident that the determination of the question whether a particular category of property belonging to a taluqdar in a taluqdari estate is vested in the Government or not, and the determination of the question whether the rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished or not, will depend upon the category of that property. The expression all waste lands has been joined by conjunctive and with the expression all uncultivated lands. They, therefore, indicate two distinct types of lands. If the legislature had intended that the aforesaid expression should indicate one class of lands, the expression rather would have been all waste and uncultivated lands as against the expression all waste lands and all uncultivated lands" were we have, therefore, two distinct categories of properties viz. ( 1 ) waste lands, and (2) uncultivated lands. The contention that the grass-lands on hilly tracts which are incapable of cultivation were waste lands or uncultivated lands within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be accepted.Now, the expression waste lands has a well-defined legal connotation. It means lands which are desolate, abandoned, and not f it ordinarily for use buildinga fair reading of the section, it would be evident that the vesting is in respect of properties which could be put to public use. It leaves the private properties of the taluqdar untouched. The legislative intent is manifested by clear enumeration of certain specific properties not situate within the wantas of a taluqdar. It begins by specifying All public roads, lanes, paths, bridges, etc. and ends up with all village site lands, al l waste lands and all uncultivated lands. and these being public properties situate in a taluqdars estate must necessarily vest in the Government because they are meant for public use. In spite of vesting of such property in the Government, however, the conferral of the rights of an occupant on a taluqdar under s. 5(1)(b) in respect of the lands in his actual possession, isthere, it is fair to observe that the words in parenthesis excluding lands used for building or other non-agricultural purposes, exemplify the intention of the legislature not to deprive a taluqdar of such land, even though such property is uncultivated land, due to its inherent character as well as by reason of theis therefore, evident that the determination of the question whether a particular category of property belonging to a taluqdar in a taluqdari estate is vested in the Government or not, and the determination of the question whether the rights held by a taluqdar in such property shall be deemed to have been extinguished or not, will depend upon the category of that property. The expression all waste lands has been joined by conjunctive and with the expression all uncultivated lands. They, therefore, indicate two distinct types of lands. If the legislature had intended that the aforesaid expression should indicate one class of lands, the expression rather would have been all waste and uncultivated lands as against the expression all waste lands and all uncultivated lands" were we have, therefore, two distinct categories of properties viz. ( 1 ) waste lands, and (2) uncultivated lands. The contention that the grass-lands on hilly tracts which are incapable of cultivation were waste lands or uncultivated lands within the meaning of s. 6 cannot be accepted.Now, the expression waste lands has a well-defined legal connotation. It means lands which are desolate, abandoned, and not f it ordinarily for use buildingis clear that these grass-lands on hilly tracts were not waste lands. They were productive lands in the sense that grass grew naturally and so they were not desolate, abandoned or barren waste lands with no vegetation. The expression waste lands in the context would be clearly, in the original sense of the term waste as meaning barren or desolate lands which are unfit for any use or which are worthless. That test is not clearlyseems to be no doubt on the facts of the case that there were no such basic operations as tilling of the land, sowing or disseminating of seeds, and planting of grass. The subsequent operations i.e., operations performed after the grass grew on the land, e.g., the act of securing the income of this grass by engaging watchmen etc. to see that unauthorised pasturing by cattle brought on land or trespassing on it did not destroy the growing grass but that it grew to full stature so as to give a fair and full yield, or when operations for cutting off the grass used to commence, the act of tending the stubs so that they were not cut off but were allowed to remain intact so that the next year after the rains, the grass would grow naturally again, by themselves would not be tantamount to cultivation of the land.In our opinion, the High Court as well as the Revenue Tribunal were, therefore, right in holding that the disputed lands did not vest in tile government under s. of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 7 of the Personal Inams Abolitionreaching. that conclusion, we cannot but take into consideration the fact that the Acts make no provision whatever for payment of any compensation for the acquisition of the rights of the former taluqdars and inamdars in such lands. They are not entitled to any compensation either under s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 10.(1) (b) (i) of the Personal Inams Abolition Act. These provisions speak of the extinguishment of any right or interest in land which is waste or uncultivated but is culturable. The lands in question not being fit for cultivation, were not culturable and. therefore, they do not fall within the ambit of these provisions. If the contention of the appellant were to prevail, it would lead to an anomalous position. It would have the effect of taking these lands out of the purview of s. 14 of the Taluqdari Abolition Act and s. 17 of the Personal Inams Abolition Act, though such lands are not governed by s. 7(1)(b)(i) of the former Act and s. 10 (1)(i) of the latter Act. This would result in deprivation of property without payment ofthe observation that since it is admitted that no agricultural operations were carried out on the lands for the purpose of raising or growing grass on the lands, the contention that the lands on which grass grew naturally could not be said to be uncultivated, cannot be accepted, even though the inamdars were making use of these lands and were realising income by selling the grass which grew thereon, appears to proceed on a wrongful assumption that the sine qua non for the applicability of s. 5 was actual cultivation. This observation, in our view, cannot be supported