Case: Ballarpur Collieries Co Vs. The Presiding Officeir, C.G.I.T. Dhanbad And Anr

omnibus or industrywise reference it is not necessary that the dispute must relate to each one of them or the cause of action must exist in all cases." that there was no dispute between the appellant and its workmen pending before Shri Palits Tribunal. 5. This view of the High Court was seriously assailed before us by Shri Phadke. According to him the reference under S. 36A of the Act requiring consideration of any provision of an earlier award or settlement must relate back to the earlier reference culminating in the award or settlement and, therefore, if the appellant was a party to the original reference which resulted in the "Majumdar Award", then the appellant must necessarily be considered to be a party to the later reference of which Shri Palit was seized. And if that be so, then, the appellant, in Shri Phadkes submission, must be considered to be a party to the reference under S. 36A, notwithstanding its desire not to take part in those proceedings or even an express application by it to the Tribunal for permission to withdraw therefrom. 6. In our view, there is force in Shri Phadkes submission and the High Court was wrong in holding that S. 23 (b) is inapplicable to the present case. Section 36A provides:"36A Power to remove difficulties: (1) If in the opinion of the appropriate Government, any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit. (2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which such question is referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties." Now, quite clearly proceedings for removing difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation of any provision of the Majumdar Award must be construed to have the effect of reviving those earlier proceedings for the limited purpose of considering the removal of such difficulty or doubt. It is only by virtually reopening the proceedings of the earlier reference that the purpose and object of correct interpretation of that Award and of the removal of difficulties or doubts arising therefrom could be achieved. The legal effect of reference under S. 36A must, therefore, in our opinion be to reopen the earlier reference proceedings which terminated in the Majumdar Award,though only for the limited purpose of the interpretation of the provisions of that Award in respect of such difficulties or doubts as required removal. Now, if that be the scope of S. 36A of the Act then there can be little doubt that all parties to the original reference which resulted in the Majumdar Award must as a matter of law be deemed necessarily to be parties to the proceedings to the reference under Section 36A as well. This seems to us to be implicit in the very scheme and object of this section as would be clear from the fact that the decision of the question referred under this section has been rendered final and binding on all parties who have been given an opportunity of being heard. This does not contemplate consideration of the question whether any party was in fact feeling interested in the particular subject matter of difficulty or doubt. In this connection it has to be borne in mind that proceedings of industrial adjudication are not considered as proceedings purely between two private parties having no impact on the industry as such. Such proceedings involve larger public interest in which the industry as such (including the employer and the labour) is vitally interested. The scheme of the law of industrial adjudication designed to promote industrial peace and harmony, so as to increase production and help the growth and progress of national economy has to be considered in the background of our constitutional set-up according to which the State has to strive to secure and effectively protect a social order in which social, economic and political justice must inform all institutions of national life and the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. The appellant could not, therefore, by merely expressing its desire even if that desire is expressed by presenting a formal application to withdraw from the proceeding?s cease to be a party to those proceedings so as to avoid the legal consequences which, according to legislative intendment, flow by reason of the pendency of those proceedings. The appellant, in our opinion, must therefore be held to have continued to remain party to the reference before the Tribunal presided over by Shri Palit, its application to withdraw and its non-participation in the proceedings notwithstanding. Even non-participation of workmen would not change the legal position. Once it is held that the appellant was a party to those proceedings then there can be no difficulty in holding that S. 23 (b) would be attracted to those proceedings and if that sub-section is attracted then obviously the strike has to be held to be illegal. The Reference (No. 27 of 1960), it may be recalled, was made in May, 1960, and the Award was published on November 22, 1960: the workmen went on strike on October 4, 1960 which was clearly during the pendency of those proceedings. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned strike was illegal and the High Court, speaking with respect, was not right in holding to the contrary. The appeal is accordingly allowed and reversing the judgment of the High Court we quash the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal dated April 16, 1960 as also the order of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Bombay dated November 19, 1960 which had held the strike of the workmen not to be illegal. Reversing all these orders we hold that the workmens strike was illegal being in violation of S. 23 (b) of the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The third point was very fairly not pressed by Shri Phadke because mere breach of a Standing Order could not render the strike illegal under Sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Only the first two points were pressed. In so far as Section 23 (c) is concerned Shri Phadke made a reference to the settlement, a copy of which was annexed with the writ petition in the High Court. It appears that the workers of the appellants colliery had gone on strike in the months of January/February, 1960 and efforts of the management had failed to persuade the workers to resume duty. The Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Bombay, thereupon wrote a D. O. letter dated February 4, 1960 to Shri Haldulkar, President of the Workers Union in reply to the said Presidents telegram of the same date in which the Labour Commissioner had stated that he was going to visit Nagpur on February 9, 1960 and would look into the matter. The Regional Labour Commissioner had in that letter requested Shri Haldulkar to make it convenient to see him at the office of the Conciliation Officer at Nagpur. The Regional Labour Commissioner then used his good offices in getting the matter resolved as a result of which the workers resumed their duty and got their dues etc., from the management. The report of what transpired at the time of the visit of the Regional Labour Commissioner was recorded in "annexure D", annexed to the writ petition filed in the High Court. It appears from "annexure D" that after discussing the matter with the appellant and the workmen, the Regional Labour Commissioner induced both sides to adopt a reasonable attitude and the strike was called off. The relevant portion of annexure D may here be reproduced:"..... .....It was on 10th February, 1960, that I visited Chanda and had talks with Shri Zallaram, Vice President of the Union and other important workers of the Colliery. A representative of the management Shri S. V. Kanade, Personnel Officer was also present at the time of discussion. I impressed upon the Union Officials and the workers that going on strike would not solve their problems but would on the other hand create complications and bitter relations between the Management and the workers. I also emphasised upon the Management that they should also see that the grievances of the workers were not allowed to accumulate and full justice was given to them. Considerable discussions continued on this issue and I asked the Union Officials that they would withdraw the strike immediately so that the relations between workers and management could be restored to normalcy ... ... ... The Union thereupon stated that owing to the strike the workers were likely to lose their bonus and continuity of service for purposes of annual leave. I told them that I would take up the matter with the management provided they call off the strike first to which they agree. I was also assured that they would see that such strikes are not resorted to in future and would adopt all constitutional means to get their grievances redressed5. This view of the High Court was seriously assailed before us by Shri Phadke. According to him the reference under S. 36A of the Act requiring consideration of any provision of an earlier award or settlement must relate back to the earlier reference culminating in the award or settlement and, therefore, if the appellant was a party to the original reference which resulted in the "Majumdar Award", then the appellant must necessarily be considered to be a party to the later reference of which Shri Palit was seized. And if that be so, then, the appellant, in Shri Phadkes submission, must be considered to be a party to the reference under S. 36A, notwithstanding its desire not to take part in those proceedings or even an express application by it to the Tribunal for permission to withdraw therefrom6. In our view, there is force in Shri Phadkes submission and the High Court was wrong in holding that S. 23 (b) is inapplicable to the present case. Section 36A provides:"36A Power to remove difficulties:(1) If in the opinion of the appropriate Government, any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, it may refer the question to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit(2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which such question is referred shall, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision shall be final and binding on all such parties."Now, quite clearly proceedings for removing difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation of any provision of the Majumdar Award must be construed to have the effect of reviving those earlier proceedings for the limited purpose of considering the removal of such difficulty or doubt. It is only by virtually reopening the proceedings of the earlier reference that the purpose and object of correct interpretation of that Award and of the removal of difficulties or doubts arising therefrom could be achieved. The legal effect of reference under S. 36A must, therefore, in our opinion be to reopen the earlier reference proceedings which terminated in the Majumdar Award,though only for the limited purpose of the interpretation of the provisions of that Award in respect of such difficulties or doubts as required removal. Now, if that be the scope of S. 36A of the Act then there can be little doubt that all parties to the original reference which resulted in the Majumdar Award must as a matter of law be deemed necessarily to be parties to the proceedings to the reference under Section 36A as well. This seems to us to be implicit in the very scheme and object of this section as would be clear from the fact that the decision of the question referred under this section has been rendered final and binding on all parties who have been given an opportunity of being heard. This does not contemplate consideration of the question whether any party was in fact feeling interested in the particular subject matter of difficulty or doubt. In this connection it has to be borne in mind that proceedings of industrial adjudication are not considered as proceedings purely between two private parties having no impact on the industry as such. Such proceedings involve larger public interest in which the industry as such (including the employer and the labour) is vitally interested. The scheme of the law of industrial adjudication designed to promote industrial peace and harmony, so as to increase production and help the growth and progress of national economy has to be considered in the background of our constitutional set-up according to which the State has to strive to secure and effectively protect a social order in which social, economic and political justice must inform all institutions of national life and the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good. The appellant could not, therefore, by merely expressing its desire even if that desire is expressed by presenting a formal application to withdraw from the proceeding?s cease to be a party to those proceedings so as to avoid the legal consequences which, according to legislative intendment, flow by reason of the pendency of those proceedings. The appellant, in our opinion, must therefore be held to have continued to remain party to the reference before the Tribunal presided over by Shri Palit, its application to withdraw and its non-participation in the proceedings notwithstanding. Even non-participation of workmen would not change the legal position. Once it is held that the appellant was a party to those proceedings then there can be no difficulty in holding that S. 23 (b) would be attracted to those proceedings and if that sub-section is attracted then obviously the strike has to be held to be illegal. The Reference (No. 27 of 1960), it may be recalled, was made in May, 1960, and the Award was published on November 22, 1960: the workmen went on strike on October 4, 1960 which was clearly during the pendency of those proceedings. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned strike was illegal and the High Court, speaking with respect, was not right in holding to the contrary. The appeal is accordingly allowed and reversing the judgment of the High Court we quash the order of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal dated April 16, 1960 as also the order of the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central) Bombay dated November 19, 1960 which had held the strike of the workmen not to be illegal. Reversing all these orders we hold that the workmens strike was illegal being in violation of S. 23 (b) of the Act.