Case: Mohan Lal Vs. Mohun Ram

he held that though the statutory right of a minor son to be maintained by his father under Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 78 of 1956 cannot invariably and in all cases be regarded as a means of livelihood of a minor, it could be taken into account on the facts and circumstances of the present case. These facts, according to him were : (1) the fact that the appellant was residing with and was being maintained by his father, (2) the admission made by the father that he had acquired other lands by purchasing them and had thus augmented the ancestral property held by him, (3) the price of Rs. 4000 for the land in question was in fact paid by him, and (4) it comprised of Rs. 2000 advanced earlier and the balance of Rs. 2000 paid by him at the time of the execution of the sale. Basing his conclusion on these facts, the Judicial Commissioner held that the appellant could not be said to be a minor, who had no means of livelihood except the land in question, that therefore, Section 11 (2) did not apply and the respondent-tenant was entitled under Section 11 (1) to acquire the proprietary rights in the land excluding the buildings and the trees standing thereon. 5. Section 11 reads as follows : "(1) Notwithstanding any law, custom or contract to the contrary a tenant other than a sub-tenant shall, on application made to the compensation officer at any time after the commencement of this Act, be entitled to acquire, on payment of compensation, the right, title and interest of the landowners in the land of the tenancy held by him under the landowner - xx xx xx xx (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to a landlord, if he has no other means of livelihood, and is a minor - In the case of a minor, sub-section (1) shall not apply during his minority-." 6. Counsel for the appellant did not contest the finding of the Judicial Commissioner that the respondent was inducted on the land as a tenant, and that though the lease period expired in 1960 he was still a tenant until he was evicted by a decree of a Court or had abandoned or otherwise relinquished the tenancy. That being so, there can be no doubt that the respondent was entitled to maintain the application under Section 11 (1). The only question, therefore, which he pressed before us was that the Judicial Commissioner was in error in holding that the obligation of a father to maintain his minor son under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act can be regarded as a means of livelihood of such a son other than the land in question as contemplated by Section 11 (2). 7. Reading the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner as a whole, it is clear that that was not what the Judicial Commissioner held. What he held was that the expression "means of livelihood" in Section 11 (2) had not been used in any artificial sense but in its ordinary meaning, that the said expression would mean resources of livelihood, that in ascertaining such resources each case would depend on its own facts and circumstances, that the statutory right of a minor to be maintained by his father cannot invariably and always be regarded as a means of livelihood of the minor, but that there may be facts on which such a right may be taken into consideration while deciding the question whether protection under sub-section (2) can be invoked. The Judicial Commissioner then considered the aforesaid four facts and came to the conclusion, that this was not a case where the appellant-minor could be said to be without any means of livelihood other than the land in question. 8. It is not necessary on the facts of the present case to decide whether the statutory right of maintenance of a minor can or cannot be treated as a means of livelihood. There are facts in this case which clearly show that even after the proprietary" rights of the minor in the land in question are acquired by the tenant there would be other means of livelihood left with the appellant . The first and the most obvious one is that there are standing on the land two houses the proprietary rights in which are not sought to be acquired by the respondent. The plan got prepared by the District Judge shows the two houses together with the portions of land appertaining thereto which would still remain with the appellant. The evidence of the appellants father was that the whole of the land together with the trees and the two houses standing thereon was acquired by him for the appellant for Rs. 4000 only. By 1964 when he gave his evidence, the value of the two houses alone was between Rupees 7000 to Rs. 8000. The fathers evidence further shows that he got land measuring 25 to 30 bighas on the death of his father, that he had since them purchased several other pieces of land, thus increasing the extent of the ancestral property held by him. Over and above these lands, he had planted a number of apple and other fruit bearing trees. The property held by him thus was, on his own admission, ancestral property in which the appellant has an interest as a coparcener in a Hindu joint family.It is thus manifest that the land in question is not the only means of the appellants livelihood and even when he is deprived of the proprietary rights therein there would be other properties, even besides the said two houses and the trees, in which he has an interest. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the Judicial Commissioner that the protection under Section 11 (2) could not be availed of by the appellant is correct without any regard being had to his right of maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. Counsel for the appellant did not contest the finding of the Judicial Commissioner that the respondent was inducted on the land as a tenant, and that though the lease period expired in 1960 he was still a tenant until he was evicted by a decree of a Court or had abandoned or otherwise relinquished the tenancy.That being so, there can be no doubt that the respondent was entitled to maintain the application under Section 11 (1)7. Reading the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner as a whole, it is clear that that was not what the Judicial Commissioner held. What he held was that the expression "means of livelihood" in Section 11 (2) had not been used in any artificial sense but in its ordinary meaning, that the said expression would mean resources of livelihood, that in ascertaining such resources each case would depend on its own facts and circumstances, that the statutory right of a minor to be maintained by his father cannot invariably and always be regarded as a means of livelihood of the minor, but that there may be facts on which such a right may be taken into consideration while deciding the question whether protection undern (2) can be invoked. The Judicial Commissioner then considered the aforesaid four facts and came to the conclusion, that this was not a case where ther could be said to be without any means of livelihood other than the land in question8. It is not necessary on the facts of the present case to decide whether the statutory right of maintenance of a minor can or cannot be treated as a means of livelihood. There are facts in this case which clearly show that even after the proprietary" rights of the minor in the land in question are acquired by the tenant there would be other means of livelihood left with the appellant . The first and the most obvious one is that there are standing on the land two houses the proprietary rights in which are not sought to be acquired by the respondent. The plan got prepared by the District Judge shows the two houses together with the portions of land appertaining thereto which would still remain with the appellant. The evidence of the appellants father was that the whole of the land together with the trees and the two houses standing thereon was acquired by him for the appellant for Rs. 4000 only. By 1964 when he gave his evidence, the value of the two houses alone was between Rupees 7000 to Rs. 8000. The fathers evidence further shows that he got land measuring 25 to 30 bighas on the death of his father, that he had since them purchased several other pieces of land, thus increasing the extent of the ancestral property held by him. Over and above these lands, he had planted a number of apple and other fruit bearing trees. The property held by him thus was, on his own admission, ancestral property in which the appellant has an interest as a coparcener in a Hindu joint family.It is thus manifest that the land in question is not the only means of the appellants livelihood and even when he is deprived of the proprietary rights therein there would be other properties, even besides the said two houses and the trees, in which he has an interest. Therefore, the conclusion reached by the Judicial Commissioner that the protection under Section 11 (2) could not be availed of by the appellant is correct without any regard being had to his right of maintenance under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.