Case: Dinanath Pansari Vs. Collector &amp; D. M. Keonjhar &amp; Anr

by the District Magistrate from the failure of the petitioner to account for more than 21 out of 149 tyres, yet, this activity of the petitioner could not reasonably lead to the inference that it was necessary to detain the petitioner for the purpose of maintaining the supplies of the essential commodity in future. Reliance was placed upon Debu Mahto v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1974 SC 816 = (1974 Cri LJ 699) the facts of which have little connection with the facts of the case of the petitioner who must have appeared to the detaining authorities to be using his dual capacity, one as a licensed dealer of tyres and tubes and another as the Manager of the United Commercial Company, as a cover for systematic concealed illegal sale at exorbitant prices.7. As the Manager of the United Commercial Company, the petitioner was certainly not a licensed dealer. The 149 tyres had been obtained by the company for actual use on the trucks but most of them had, apparently, been disposed of in what is known as the "black market." The provisions relating to licensed dealers did not warrant such sales which were struck by the provisions of clause 2 of the Orissa Automobile Tyres and Tubes Control Order, 1973. This provides as follows:"2. Licensing of dealers - (1) No person shall obtain, attempt to obtain, or store for sale or distribution or offer for sal e or sell automobile tyres and tubes except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a license issued in this behalf by the Licensing Authority.(2) Every dealer who is doing business on the commencement of the order shall apply for the Licence within fifteen days of such commencement."8. The petitioner had not been detained for any irregularity or illegality committed as a licensed dealer, but as a person who seemed to have been diverting tyres from their pretended use, for which a large stock of tyres had been obtained directly from manufacturers, to sates in what is known as the "black market" as a regular side occupation. He was unable to repel the allegation that such a transaction with one Narayan Singh had been detected. He put forward what did not appear to be an honest plea - that be bad loaned two tyres to Narayan Singh who bad deposited Rs. 5,000/- as security. However, it is not for this Court to pronounce on possible inferences from evidence for or against the petitioner. It is for the detaining authorities to satisfy themselves about these matters and about the need to order to preventive detention and its duration. The Advisory Board had also indorsed the action of the detaining authorities.9. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that, after a direction given on 19-8-1974 by the Collector, Keonjhar, to the tyre manufacturing Companies not to supply tyres to the company as an owner of a fleet of trucks, the sources of supplies of tyres were dried up and there could be no necessity to detain the petitioner. We were referred to Pusparaj and Co. v. Collector of Balasore, ILR (1972) Cut 747 = (AIR 1973 Orissa 6) to show that such a direction was not legal. If that is so, the petitioner can obtain relief against the direction by appropriate proceedings. We cannot pronounce here upon its legality.10.The question whether the petitioner had satisfactorily accounted for the 149 tyres purchased from manufacturers from 14-2-1974 to 27-4-1974 was also one of fact. If the petitioners case was that all the 149 tyres had been actually used in this period on the ten trucks, as he would like to make out, he was in the best position to prove this fact. He could not take shelter behind the plea that the detaining authorities did not ask the manufacturers to give the numbers of tyres sold by them to the United Commercial Company when the petitioner, called upon to explain what had happened to the 149 tyres, could not himself give their numbers or show that he had them all fitted on to his trucks, or that he had to discard so many tyres in this period.No stock of discarded tyres was evidently strewn by the petitioner to the Magistrate who came to his premises to inquire into actual facts. However, such questions of sufficiency of evidence are not for this Court at all to determine. We mention them only as an attempt was made to raise them before us.11. We are unable to hold that the impugned detention order against the petitioner is either arbitrary or not connected with the purposes for which a detention may be ordered under Section 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act. In considering the legality of such an order we cannot function as a Court of Appeal. If there is any material to justify the passing of the detention order the necessity for it is a matter of subjective assessment and satisfaction by the detaining authority with which no Court would be ordinarily justified in interfering. It is only when the order is shown to be of such a nature that it could not possibly fall within the scope of the law conferring the power to make it that this Court would intervene to quash it.A reference to ILR (1972) Cut 747 = (AIR 1973 Orissa 6) (supra), itself shows that the need to take drastic steps for maintaining the supplies of an essential commodity, which had become scarce, was there in Orissa. This Court would not interfere even if two views about the existence of the need to detain for the object set out in Section 3 (l) (a) (iii) of the Act were possible. It was for the detaining authorities to determine the duration of the need to detain the petitioner provided they comply with the provisions of law whenever they do so. We are unable to find any legal flaw in the proceedings which resulted in the impugned detention order of 6-7-1974.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. The petitioner had not been detained for any irregularity or illegality committed as a licensed dealer, but as a person who seemed to have been diverting tyres from their pretended use, for which a large stock of tyres had been obtained directly from manufacturers, to sates in what is known as the "black market" as a regular side occupation. He was unable to repel the allegation that such a transaction with one Narayan Singh had been detected. He put forward what did not appear to be an honest plea - that be bad loaned two tyres to Narayan Singh who bad deposited Rs. 5,000/- as security. However, it is not for this Court to pronounce on possible inferences from evidence for or against the petitioner. It is for the detaining authorities to satisfy themselves about these matters and about the need to order to preventive detention and its duration. The Advisory Board had also indorsed the action of the detainingwere referred to Pusparaj and Co. v. Collector of Balasore, ILR (1972) Cut 747 = (AIR 1973 Orissa 6) to show that such a direction was not legal. If that is so, the petitioner can obtain relief against the direction by appropriate proceedings. We cannot pronounce here upon its legality.10.The question whether the petitioner had satisfactorily accounted for the 149 tyres purchased from manufacturers from 14-2-1974 to 27-4-1974 was also one of fact. If the petitioners case was that all the 149 tyres had been actually used in this period on the ten trucks, as he would like to make out, he was in the best position to prove this fact. He could not take shelter behind the plea that the detaining authorities did not ask the manufacturers to give the numbers of tyres sold by them to the United Commercial Company when the petitioner, called upon to explain what had happened to the 149 tyres, could not himself give their numbers or show that he had them all fitted on to his trucks, or that he had to discard so many tyres in this period.No stock of discarded tyres was evidently strewn by the petitioner to the Magistrate who came to his premises to inquire into actual facts. However, such questions of sufficiency of evidence are not for this Court at all to determine. We mention them only as an attempt was made to raise them before us.11. We are unable to hold that the impugned detention order against the petitioner is either arbitrary or not connected with the purposes for which a detention may be ordered under Section 3 (1) (a) (iii) of the Act. In considering the legality of such an order we cannot function as a Court of Appeal. If there is any material to justify the passing of the detention order the necessity for it is a matter of subjective assessment and satisfaction by the detaining authority with which no Court would be ordinarily justified in interfering. It is only when the order is shown to be of such a nature that it could not possibly fall within the scope of the law conferring the power to make it that this Court would intervene to quash it.A reference to ILR (1972) Cut 747 = (AIR 1973 Orissa 6) (supra), itself shows that the need to take drastic steps for maintaining the supplies of an essential commodity, which had become scarce, was there in Orissa. This Court would not interfere even if two views about the existence of the need to detain for the object set out in Section 3 (l) (a) (iii) of the Act were possible. It was for the detaining authorities to determine the duration of the need to detain the petitioner provided they comply with the provisions of law whenever they do so. We are unable to find any legal flaw in the proceedings which resulted in the impugned detention order of 6-7-1974.