Case: Union of India and Another Vs. Avtar Singh and Another

may be reopened and therefore, by his representation he moved the Central Government to affirm or confirm the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961. We remain unimpressed. If every litigant in whose favour a competent authority has made an order can still approach the higher authority for the affirmance of the order without any rhyme of reason, the whole gamut of power of revisional jurisdiction would become a play thing for already successful party who may foreclose the decision and when needed can successfully urge that the power of revision is exhausted. Further, assuming Harnam Singh made the representation apprehending danger to his allotment, the letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does not record any decision of the Central Government. It merely says that it is not necessary to wait any more for response to the queries addressed to authorities in Pakistan and the matter should be finalize d on the basis of finding arrived at in the case. It further proceeds to aver that there is a feeling that there is no reason to differ from those judicial pronouncements at `this stage. Such expression of feeling could hardly tentamount to a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. It is not for a moment suggested that the decision of the Central Government has to be recorded in any particular form. In D.N. Roy and S.K. Bannerjee &Ors. v. State of Bihar &Or s. (1) a letter addressed by Under-Secretary to the Government of India to a particular person Stating therein `that with reference to the application of the addressee on the subject noted, he was directed to say that after careful consideration the Central Government by the letter rejects the revision application as being time- barred was treated as a decision of the Central Government. This calls for no comments because the letter is self- explanatory. There is nothing in Shri Dubes letter remotely comparable with the letter in the aforementioned case. On the contrary the Central Government informed the Government of Punjab that the record is returned with the request that the case may be finalised as indicated in the letter. The revisional power is the power of the Central Government and not of the Punjab Government. The decision was left to the Punjab Government. There was nothing pending with the Punjab Government for finalisation. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in treating the letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision of the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 33. There was no reason for decision nor any occasion for the Central Government to exercise power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it is not possible to agree with the High Court that the letter records the decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. If the letter of Shri Dube is not a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33 of the Act, as a necessary corollary, the impugned decision must be treated as one rendered for the first time in exercise of the revisional power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, the appeal will have to be allowed.Mr. Bindra, learned counsel who appeared for some of the respondents made a strenuous effort to persuade us to look into the equities of the case. In fact, we are wholly disinclined to undertake this exercise of evaluating facts or evidence in a petition for a writ of certiorari. Further in the impugned decision the facts as appearing from the record and submissions made by the learned counsel for claimants are exhaustively dealt with and no case for interference is made out. Only two aspects however may be referred to. 16. Harnam Singh claimed to be the owner of 225 acres of land situated in erstwhile Sind Province. In the first claim lodged by him, he clearly stated that he was the owner of 300 acres. He then modified it to 225 acres. In neither of the two claims, he ever suggested that there was a partition between him and his sons also giving a share to his wife. The story of partition clearly appears to b e an after thought because it is helpful in obtaining higher allotment. No documentary evidence has been placed on record to support the case of partition which clearly appears to have been an after thought. Earlier Jamabandi entries from Pakistan permitted a negative inference that there was no partition. The Central Governments while setting aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 recorded the finding that: (i) there is no writing or deed of partition: (ii) Revenue records show the name of Shri Harnam Singh alone on the basis of the sale deed in his exclusive name: (iii) there are no receipts indicating separate payment of land revenue by any one of the respondents after alleged partition; (iv) no objection was taken by the sons at the time of the filing of the claim by the father; (v) there is no mention of individuals share in the claim filed by the father; These are relevant considerations which would certainly throw doubt on the claim of oral partition alleged to have been effected by Harnam Singh. Once the allegation of oral partition is rejected, the respondents are not entitled to any consideration even on equitable grounds.In the concluding stages of the arguments the respondents contended that Harnam Singh has died and his heirs having not been substituted, the appeal has abated. There is no merit in this contention. Harnam singh was not the petitioner before the high Court. He was respondent No. 2. No relief was claimed against him. Further Harnam Singh was not asked to surrender the land. Petitioners before the High Court were adversely affected by the impugned decision. Death of Harnam Singh would therefore, have no impact on this appeal. Therefore, the contention is rejected.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Harnam Singh claimed to be the owner of 225 acres of land situated in erstwhile Sind Province. In the first claim lodged by him, he clearly stated that he was the owner of 300 acres. He then modified it to 225 acres. In neither of the two claims, he ever suggested that there was a partition between him and his sons also giving a share to his wife. The story of partition clearly appears to b e an after thought because it is helpful in obtaining higher allotment. No documentary evidence has been placed on record to support the case of partition which clearly appears to have been an after thought. Earlier Jamabandi entries from Pakistan permitted a negative inference that there was no partition. The Central Governments while setting aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 recorded the finding that: (i) there is no writing or deed of partition: (ii) Revenue records show the name of Shri Harnam Singh alone on the basis of the sale deed in his exclusive name: (iii) there are no receipts indicating separate payment of land revenue by any one of the respondents after alleged partition; (iv) no objection was taken by the sons at the time of the filing of the claim by the father; (v) there is no mention of individuals share in the claim filed by the father; These are relevant considerations which would certainly throw doubt on the claim of oral partition alleged to have been effected by Harnam Singh. Once the allegation of oral partition is rejected, the respondents are not entitled to any consideration even on equitable grounds.In the concluding stages of the arguments the respondents contended that Harnam Singh has died and his heirs having not been substituted, the appeal has abated. There is no merit in this contention. Harnam singh was not the petitioner before the high Court. He was respondent No. 2. No relief was claimed against him. Further Harnam Singh was not asked to surrender the land. Petitioners before the High Court were adversely affected by the impugned decision. Death of Harnam Singh would therefore, have no impact on this appeal. Therefore, the contention is rejected15. It needs to be recalled that the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 was wholly in favour of Harnam Singh and his sons. Atleast Harnam Singh and his sons could not be said to be persons aggrieved by the order so as to move the Central Government invoking its revisional power under Sec. 33. Mr. Rao however, contended that the representation Annexure `D dated March 13 of Harnam Singh reveals that he apprehended that the case may be reopened and therefore, by his representation he moved the Central Government to affirm or confirm the decision of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961. We remain unimpressed. If every litigant in whose favour a competent authority has made an order can still approach the higher authority for the affirmance of the order without any rhyme of reason, the whole gamut of power of revisional jurisdiction would become a play thing for already successful party who may foreclose the decision and when needed can successfully urge that the power of revision is exhausted. Further, assuming Harnam Singh made the representation apprehending danger to his allotment, the letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does not record any decision of the Central Government. It merely says that it is not necessary to wait any more for response to the queries addressed to authorities in Pakistan and the matter should be finalize d on the basis of finding arrived at in the case. It further proceeds to aver that there is a feeling that there is no reason to differ from those judicial pronouncements at `this stage. Such expression of feeling could hardly tentamount to a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. It is not for a moment suggested that the decision of the Central Government has to be recorded in any particular form. In D.N. Roy and S.K. Bannerjee &Ors. v. State of Bihar &Or s. (1) a letter addressed byy to the Government of India to a particular person Stating therein `that with reference to the application of the addressee on the subject noted, he was directed to say that after careful consideration the Central Government by the letter rejects the revision application as being timebarred was treated as a decision of the Central Government. This calls for no comments because the letter is selfexplanatory. There is nothing in Shri Dubes letter remotely comparable with the letter in the aforementioned case. On the contrary the Central Government informed the Government of Punjab that the record is returned with the request that the case may be finalised as indicated in the letter. The revisional power is the power of the Central Government and not of the Punjab Government. The decision was left to the Punjab Government. There was nothing pending with the Punjab Government for finalisation. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in treating the letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision of the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 33. There was no reason for decision nor any occasion for the Central Government to exercise power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it is not possible to agree with the High Court that the letter records the decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. If the letter of Shri Dube is not a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33 of the Act, as a necessary corollary, the impugned decision must be treated as one rendered for the first time in exercise of the revisional power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, the appeal will have to be allowedIn fact, we are wholly disinclined to undertake this exercise of evaluating facts or evidence in a petition for a writ of certiorari. Further in the impugned decision the facts as appearing from the record and submissions made by the learned counsel for claimants are exhaustively dealt with and no case for interference is made out. Only two aspects however may be referred to.