Case: Maharaj Kumar Tokendra Bir Singh Vs. Secretary To The Government of India. Ministry of Home Affairs &amp; Another

purpose of avoiding unnecessary litigation, so in the case of applications made under S. 87B government may reasonably and legitimately try to see if the institution of the suits can be avoided by asking the Ruler of a former Indian State to consider the claim and settle it amicably without litigation. Section 80 is intended and may in some cases, lead to settlement of disputes where the government is satisfied that the claim intended to be made by the litigant is well-founded. Section 87B may also achieve the same result. It is, of course true that under S. 80 there is no question of any consent or sanction being given as there is in S. 87B; but we have referred to S. 80 in this context to indicate one possible purpose which S. 87B, like S. 80, may serve. That is another aspect of the matter which has to be borne in mind. 10. In the present case, however, the respondent appears to have adjudicated upon the merits of the petitioners claim. In the affidavit filed on its, behalf, it has been stated that the properties described in Schedules B, C, D, and X, are not partible and they belonged to the minor Maharaja. Apparently, the respondent took the view that the said properties were in the nature of private properties attached to the Rulership which devolved from one Ruler to another and that the other heirs of the Rulers have no share therein. That is why it was decided not to accord consent to the petitioner to file a suit in respect of the said properties. This part of the affidavit clearly indicates that the respondent virtually decided the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. 11. A similar approach of adjudicating upon the merits of the claim made by the petitioner appears to have been adopted by the respondent in respect of another matter. The petitioner in his intended plaint has alleged that when the Central Government accorded approval to the inventory made by the Maharaja of Manipur, it had specifically stated that the said approval was without prejudice to the rights of third parties, and the petitioner contends that the rights of third parties thus saved include the rights of the Maharajas coparceners like the petitioner. The respondents affidavit shows that it does accept this construction of the communication addressed by the Central Government to the Maharaja when approval was accorded to the inventory in question. The affidavit says that the rights of third parties mentioned therein do not refer to the coparceners, but only to outsiders who may claim any rights in respect of the said properties. That again is a matter which raises a substantial issue and it was inexpedient for the respondent and was not even open to it to decide that dispute when it considered the question as to whether consent should be accorded to the petitioners suit or not. 12. It is thus clear that the conditional and partial consent accorded by the respondent to the petitioners suit is substantially based on the fact that the Government attempted to adjudicate upon the merits of the petitioners claim, and that in our opinion introduces an infirmity in the impugned order. Section 87B authorises the Central Government either to accord consent or to refuse to accord such consent; it is not open to the Central Government to impose any condition on such consent, or to accord consent only in part, or to refuse it in part, particularly in cases where reliefs are claimed on one and the same cause of action. If it is held that the Central Government can impose conditions in granting consent, it would virtually be conferring jurisdiction on the Central Government to adjudicate upon the dispute; and that is not the object of S. 87B. Reading the order passed in the present case, we are inclined to hold that the Central Government has accorded consent to the petitioner to file his suit and when that is done, the power conferred on the Central Government by S. 87B has been exercised. The further direction contained in the order that consent would not be accorded in respect of properties mentioned in Schedules B, C, D and X, is clearly invalid. We feel no difficulty in reaching this conclusion, because the affidavit filed by the respondent in clear and unmistakable language has indicated the approach adopted by the respondent in dealing with this matter. In a sense, the affidavit is fair and thorough and has made no attempt to disguise the approach which was adopted by the respondent before it passed the impugned order. Having regard to the relevant statements made in the affidavit, we are satisfied that the Central Government would have accorded consent to the entire suit if only it had not persuaded itself to adjudicate upon the merits of the petitioners claim in respect of the properties described in Schedules B, C, D and X. The authority conferred on the Central Government under S. 87B is, as we have observed in the case of Narottam Kishore Deb Verma, W. P. No. 87 of 1962 D/- 6-3-1964 : (AIR 1964 SC 1950) out of tune with the equality before law which is guaranteed by Art. 14; and it may even affect the litigants fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g), and so, it would be necessary for the courts to examine the validity of the orders passed under S. 87B whereby consent has been refused in part only, with meticulous care. That is why we are disposed to hold that in the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the statements made in the affidavit filed by the respondent, the order passed by the respondent should be construed as an order according consent to the institution of the suit which the petitioner proposes to file and treat the latter portion of the order in regard to the properties described in Schedules B, C, D and X as being invalid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]This definition is clearly misconceived. This definition prescribed by Art. 366(22) is an inclusive definition and its latter part takes in successors of Rulers who satisfy the test of its first part and so, the minor Maharaja in question who has been recognised by the President as the successor of his deceased father, must be held to be a Ruler under Art. 366(22) and as such, is entitled to claim the status of a Ruler of the former State of Manipur under S. 87B (2) (b)In our opinion, if this is the approach which is invariably adopted by the Central Government in dealing with applications for consent under S. 87B, no serious grievance can be legitimately made. It is plain that S. 87B is intended substantially to save the Rulers of former Indian States from harassment which would be caused by the institution of frivolous suits; excepting cases where the claims appear to be frivolous prima facie, the Central Government should normally accord consent to the litigants who want to file suits against Rulers of former Indian States whenever it appears that the claims disclosed justifiable and triable issues between them and the Rulers sought to be sued. Normally, it is not the function of the Central Government to attempt to adjudicate upon the merits of the claim intended to be made by the litigants in their proposed suits; that is the function of civil courts of competent jurisdiction, and so, the Central Government should not attempt to assume the jurisdiction of a civil court and decide whether a claim is well-founded or not before according consent to the institution of the suit. That is one aspect of the matter which must be borne in mind in dealing with the petitioners grievance10. In the present case, however, the respondent appears to have adjudicated upon the merits of the petitioners claim. In the affidavit filed on its, behalf, it has been stated that the properties described in Schedules B, C, D, and X, are not partible and they belonged to the minor Maharaja. Apparently, the respondent took the view that the said properties were in the nature of private properties attached to the Rulership which devolved from one Ruler to another and that the other heirs of the Rulers have no share therein. That is why it was decided not to accord consent to the petitioner to file a suit in respect of the said properties. This part of the affidavit clearly indicates that the respondent virtually decided the merits of the claim made by the petitionerThe affidavit says that the rights of third parties mentioned therein do not refer to the coparceners, but only to outsiders who may claim any rights in respect of the said properties. That again is a matter which raises a substantial issue and it was inexpedient for the respondent and was not even open to it to decide that dispute when it considered the question as to whether consent should be accorded to the petitioners suit or not12. It is thus clear that the conditional and partial consent accorded by the respondent to the petitioners suit is substantially based on the fact that the Government attempted to adjudicate upon the merits of the petitioners claim, and that in our opinion introduces an infirmity in the impugned order. Section 87B authorises the Central Government either to accord consent or to refuse to accord such consent; it is not open to the Central Government to impose any condition on such consent, or to accord consent only in part, or to refuse it in part, particularly in cases where reliefs are claimed on one and the same cause of action. If it is held that the Central Government can impose conditions in granting consent, it would virtually be conferring jurisdiction on the Central Government to adjudicate upon the dispute; and that is not the object of S. 87B. Reading the order passed in the present case, we are inclined to hold that the Central Government has accorded consent to the petitioner to file his suit and when that is done, the power conferred on the Central Government by S. 87B has been exercised. The further direction contained in the order that consent would not be accorded in respect of properties mentioned in Schedules B, C, D and X, is clearly invalid. We feel no difficulty in reaching this conclusion, because the affidavit filed by the respondent in clear and unmistakable language has indicated the approach adopted by the respondent in dealing with this matter. In a sense, the affidavit is fair and thorough and has made no attempt to disguise the approach which was adopted by the respondent before it passed the impugned order. Having regard to the relevant statements made in the affidavit, we are satisfied that the Central Government would have accorded consent to the entire suit if only it had not persuaded itself to adjudicate upon the merits of the petitioners claim in respect of the properties described in Schedules B, C, D and X. The authority conferred on the Central Government under S. 87B is, as we have observed in the case of Narottam Kishore Deb Verma, W. P. No. 87 of 1962 D/- 6-3-1964 : (AIR 1964 SC 1950) out of tune with the equality before law which is guaranteed by Art. 14; and it may even affect the litigants fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g), and so, it would be necessary for the courts to examine the validity of the orders passed under S. 87B whereby consent has been refused in part only, with meticulous care. That is why we are disposed to hold that in the circumstances of this case, and having regard to the statements made in the affidavit filed by the respondent, the order passed by the respondent should be construed as an order according consent to the institution of the suit which the petitioner proposes to file and treat the latter portion of the order in regard to the properties described in Schedules B, C, D and X as being invalid.