Case: Anupama Sen Gupta and Others Vs. Deb Kumar Sen Sarma and Others

includes an employee of the Central or State Government or any local authority.7. The first question which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the first respondent was entitled to get possession of the premises in question under Section 29-B of the Act at all. This contention is raised by the appellants on the ground that the premises in question which stood in the name of his wife actually belonged to her and that Section 29-B was applicable only to cases where the residential accommodation in question truly belongs to the government employee and is standing in his own name or nominally in the name of his wife or dependent child. It is urged on behalf of the appellants that since the finding of the High Court is that the premises in question belonged to the wife of the first respondent, the eviction petitions filed were liable to be dismissed. On the other hand it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the question of title to the property in question of foreign to the scope of a proceeding before a Controller who has to dispose of the matter in a summary way and that the government employee acquires a right to resort to Chapter VI of the Act by mere service of a notice on him by his employer requiring him to vacate any residential accommodation provided for by the employer or in default to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns a residential accommodation in his name, or in the name of his wife or dependent child, near the place where he is posted. It is urged that since in this case a notice containing a statement which satisfies the requirements of sub-section (1) of Section 29-B of the Act had been served on the first respondent, no enquiry is called for on the question of title. In the alternative, it is urged on behalf of the respondents that even granting that the issue relating to title can be raised, the respondents have established that the premises in question belonged to the first respondent though it stood in the name of his wife. It is further urged that the finding of the High Court on the question of title is not sustainable and that they are entitled to raise that plea in support of the judgment of the High Court which has gone in their favour. In the circumstances of this case we feel that it is not necessary to go into the questions whether the question of title to the premises is relevant at all and if it is relevant, whether it can be gone into by the Controller. We shall assume for purposes of these appeals (but without deciding) that as contended on behalf of the appellants, a government employee can succeed, where the building stands in the name of his wife or dependent child, only if the establishes that he is himself its true owner and that the building is only nominally standing in the name of his wife or dependent child, as the case may be. In the instant case it is to be noted that on the date of the petitions before the Controller, the wife of the first respondent had died. Even granting that she was the owner of the building in question, the first respondent had become its co-owner along with his children. The order asking him to vacate the government accommodation issued earlier had not been withdrawn and was still in force even on the date of the petition. He was, therefore, entitled to maintain the petitions as he otherwise satisfied the requirements of the law. Such a petition had to be filed before the Controller as the civil court had no jurisdiction to try it. As held by this Court in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak [(1977) 3 SCR 412 : (1977) 2 SCC 814 ] even though the first respondent was a co-owner, he was as such an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property and owned every part of the composite property along with others and he could file the petitions. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [(1977) 1 SCR 395 : (1976) 4 SCC 184 : AIR 1976 SC 2335 ] which was a case arising under the Act this Court had expressed the same view. The first respondent as an heir could avail of the benefit of the notices issued in the name of his wife under Section 13(6) of the Act which she was entitled to issue the object of which was only to give previous intimation to the tenants that eviction petitions would be filed against them. There was no need to issue fresh notices after her death. Having regard to the peculiar features of the case, we do not consider that there is any infirmity in the petitions filed for the eviction of the appellants. Any other wise would defeat the very object of Chapter VIA of the Act.8. The only other ground urged on behalf of the appellants is that since the first respondent had retired during the pendency of these proceedings, he had lost his right to prosecute the petition under Section 29-B of the Act as he was no longer a government employee. This contention again is untenable as a petition duly filed under the circumstances stated above cannot be defeated on the ground that the government employee has retired subsequently. (See Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand Jain [(1978) 2 SCR 183 : (1978) 1 SCC 49 ] per Tulzapurkar, J. which was a case under Section 14-A of the Delhi Rent Control Act.)9. It is not the contention of the appellants that the respondents had not established that the premises were reasonably required by them for their own occupation and they were not in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. It is unfortunate that even the so-called summary remedy provided by the statute has taken nearly four years.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]n the circumstances of this case we feel that it is not necessary to go into the questions whether the question of title to the premises is relevant at all and if it is relevant, whether it can be gone into by the Controller. We shall assume for purposes of these appeals (but without deciding) that as contended on behalf of the appellants, a government employee can succeed, where the building stands in the name of his wife or dependent child, only if the establishes that he is himself its true owner and that the building is only nominally standing in the name of his wife or dependent child, as the case may be. In the instant case it is to be noted that on the date of the petitions before the Controller, the wife of the first respondent had died. Even granting that she was the owner of the building in question, the first respondent had become itsalong with his children. The order asking him to vacate the government accommodation issued earlier had not been withdrawn and was still in force even on the date of the petition. He was, therefore, entitled to maintain the petitions as he otherwise satisfied the requirements of the law. Such a petition had to be filed before the Controller as the civil court had no jurisdiction to try it. As held by this Court in Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak [(1977) 3 SCR 412  : (1977) 2 SCC 814 ] even though the first respondent was ahe was as such an owner of the entire property as any sole owner of the property and owned every part of the composite property along with others and he could file the petitions. In Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [(1977) 1 SCR 395  : (1976) 4 SCC 184  : AIR 1976 SC 2335 ] which was a case arising under the Act this Court had expressed the same view. The first respondent as an heir could avail of the benefit of the notices issued in the name of his wife under Section 13(6) of the Act which she was entitled to issue the object of which was only to give previous intimation to the tenants that eviction petitions would be filed against them. There was no need to issue fresh notices after her death. Having regard to the peculiar features of the case, we do not consider that there is any infirmity in the petitions filed for the eviction of the appellants. Any other wise would defeat the very object of Chapter VIA of thecontention again is untenable as a petition duly filed under the circumstances stated above cannot be defeated on the ground that the government employee has retired subsequently. (See Nihal Chand v. Kalyan Chand Jain [(1978) 2 SCR 183  : (1978) 1 SCC 49 ] per Tulzapurkar, J. which was a case under Sectionof the Delhi Rent Control Act.)9. It is not the contention of the appellants that the respondents had not established that the premises were reasonably required by them for their own occupation and they were not in possession of any other reasonably suitable accommodation. It is unfortunate that even thesummary remedy provided by the statute has taken nearly four years.