Case: Union of India (UOI) and Ors Vs. Krishna Kumar and Ors

fundamental rights Under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel submits that under the Rules, as they prevailed prior to the restructuring of Assam Rifles, promotion for Havildars lay to the post of Warrant Officer. While the Respondents have not challenged the Recruitment Rules, as noted by the High Court, they urge that vacancies which have arisen prior to 2011 must be filled up by promoting Havildars eligible for promotion to the post of Naib Subedars.11. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that it is well-settled that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. This Court has held that there is no Rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled in on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose. The decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284 has been construed in subsequent decisions as a case where the applicable Rules required the process of promotion or selection to be completed within a stipulated time frame. Hence, it has been held in H.S. Grewal v. Union of India (1997) 11 SCC 758 that the creation of an intermediate post would not amount to an interference with the vested right to promotion. A two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus:"...Such an introduction of an intermediate post does not, in our opinion, amount to interfering with any vested rights cannot be interfered with, is to be accepted as correct. What all has happened here is that an intermediate post has been created prospectively for future promotions from Group-B Class-II to Group-A Class-I. If, before these Rules of 1981 came into force, these officers were eligible to be directly promoted as Commandant under the 1974 Rules but before they got any such promotions, the 1981 Rules came in obliging them to go through an intermediate post, this does not amount to interfering with any vested rights."12. In Deepak Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 6 SCC 725 , this Court observed thus:"26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the rules in force on the date the consideration took place. There is no Rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old Rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiahs case (supra) lays down any particular time frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the Appellants have been taken away by the amendment. The judgments cited by learned Counsel for the Appellants namely B.L. Gupta v. MCD (supra), P. Ganeshwar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and N.T. Devin Katti and Ors. v. Karnataka Public Service Commission and Ors. (supra) are reiterations of a principle laid down in Y.V. Rangaiahs case (supra)."13. Recently, in State of Tripura v. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (2017) 3 SCC 646 , another two-Judge Bench of this Court held thus:"The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, "rules in force on the date" the consideration takes place and that there is no Rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably be filled by the law existing on the date when they arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ Petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24.11.2011."14. In view of this statement of the law, it is evident that once the structure of Assam Rifles underwent a change following the creation of the intermediate post of Warrant Officer, persons holding the post of Havildar would be considered for promotion to the post of Warrant Officer. The intermediate post of Warrant Officer was created as a result of the restructuring exercise. The High Court was, in our view, in error in postulating that vacancies which arose prior to the amendment of the Recruitment Rules would necessarily be governed by the Rules which existed at the time of the occurrence of the vacancies. As the decided cases noted earlier indicate, there is no such Rule of absolute or universal application. The entire basis of the decision of the High Court was that those who were recruited prior to the restructuring exercise and were holding the post of Havildars had acquired a vested right of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar. This does not reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. In considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that it is well-settled that there is no vested right to promotion, but a right be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules which prevail on the date on which consideration for promotion takes place. This Court has held that there is no Rule of universal application to the effect that vacancies must necessarily be filled in on the basis of the law which existed on the date when they arose. The decision of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. Sreenivasa Rao (1983) 3 SCC 284   has been construed in subsequent decisions as a case where the applicable Rules required the process of promotion or selection to be completed within a stipulated time frame. Hence, it has been held in H.S. Grewal v. Union of India (1997) 11 SCC 758   that the creation of an intermediate post would not amount to an interference with the vested right to promotion. A two-Judge Bench of this Court heldan introduction of an intermediate post does not, in our opinion, amount to interfering with any vested rights cannot be interfered with, is to be accepted as correct. What all has happened here is that an intermediate post has been created prospectively for future promotions from Group-B Class-II to Group-A Class-I. If, before these Rules of 1981 came into force, these officers were eligible to be directly promoted as Commandant under the 1974 Rules but before they got any such promotions, the 1981 Rules came in obliging them to go through an intermediate post, this does not amount to interfering with any vested rights.In view of this statement of the law, it is evident that once the structure of Assam Rifles underwent a change following the creation of the intermediate post of Warrant Officer, persons holding the post of Havildar would be considered for promotion to the post of Warrant Officer. The intermediate post of Warrant Officer was created as a result of the restructuring exercise. The High Court was, in our view, in error in postulating that vacancies which arose prior to the amendment of the Recruitment Rules would necessarily be governed by the Rules which existed at the time of the occurrence of the vacancies. As the decided cases noted earlier indicate, there is no such Rule of absolute or universal application. The entire basis of the decision of the High Court was that those who were recruited prior to the restructuring exercise and were holding the post of Havildars had acquired a vested right of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar. This does not reflect the correct position in law. The right is to be considered for promotion in accordance with the Rules as they exist when the exercise is carried out for promotion.