Case: City &amp; Industrial Development Corporation (Cidco) Vs. Percival Joseph Pareira &amp; Others

country planning, an officer to be called the Town Planning Officer and Chief Executive Officer. The Chairman and the Vice-Chairman and all other members shall be appointed by the State Government.""113. (3A) Having regard to the complexity and magnitude of the work involved in developing any area as a site for the new town, the time required for setting up new machinery for undertaking and completing such work of development, and the comparative speed with which such work can be undertaken and completed in the public interest, if the work is done through the agency of a corporation including a company owned or controlled by the State as a new town, the State Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), require the work of developing and disposing of land in the area of a new town to be done by any such corporation, company or subsidiary company aforesaid, as an agent of the State Government; and thereupon, such corporation or company shall, in relation to such area, be declared by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to be the New Town Development Authority for that area.)""116. Acquisition of land by Development Authority constituted under section 113(2):- A Development Authority (constituted under sub-section (2) of section 113) shall have all the powers of a Planning Authority under this Act as provided in Chapter VII for the purpose of acquisition either by agreement or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) of-(a) any land within the area designated under this Act as the site of the new town;(b) any land adjacent to that area which is required for purposes connected with the development of the new town; and(c) any land whether adjacent to that area or not which is required for provision of services of amenities for the purposes of the new town." (emphasis supplied)"50. Acquisition of land at cost of a local authority or Company. -(1) Where the provisions of this Act are put in force for the purpose of acquiring land at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company, the charges of and incidental to such acquisition shall be defrayed from or by such fund or company.(2) In any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.Provided that no such local authority or company shall be entitled to demand a reference under section 18."17. From bare reading of Section 113(3-A) of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966 it is crystal clear that the New Town Development Authority is declared as an Agent of the State Government. This statutory status bestowed on the Appellant cannot be whittled down nor can be elevated to any other position by an administrative decision. Notably, the State Government by Government Resolution, dated 12th February, 2008 specifically stated that the entire costs of compensation for acquisition of land for CIDCO will be borne by the State Government. Not only that the State Government by Government Resolution dated 12th August, 2010 has merely authorized the CIDCO to appear on behalf of the State Government, to protect the interest of the State in the References under section 18 and/or 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This itself shows that the acquiring body is the State Government and it has appointed CIDCO as its Agent. Even bare reading of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shows that the Authority which bears the expenses of acquisition is entitled to appear and defend in Reference Application.In the present case, admittedly, the State Government is bearing the entire expenses of acquisition of the land. CIDCO is getting only Rs.5,00,000/- per year towards administrative expenses. Further, the Appellant - CIDCO on its own pleaded before the Income Tax Appellate Authority that it was acting as an Agent of the State Government and nothing more. On accepting that contention, it has been held that CIDCO was not liable to pay income tax on the income derived from the development activities. Thus, it is not open to the Appellant to now contend to the contrary, or for that matter, approbate and reprobate. In any way, considering the provisions of Section 113 (3-A) of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966 it is not possible to hold that the Appellant - CIDCO is the acquiring body. It is specifically stated in this section that such Company/Corporation or subsidiary company acts as an Agent of the State Government.18. It is to be noted that Government Resolution dated 12th February, 2008 does not support the case of CIDCO and in fact goes contrary to the CIDCOs case. The said Government Resolution makes it clear that payment to be made by CIDCO as compensation/enhancement of compensation will be on account of Government. Thus, the payment so made by CIDCO will be in the capacity of agent of the State Government. This position is consistent with the provisions of section 113(3A) and section 113-A of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966. In similar way, the Government Resolution dated 12th August, 2010 also supports the contention of Respondent no.1 - original claimant. This Resolution shows that the Government has accepted the judgment of the learned Single Judge and has authorised CIDCO to represent the Government in the References under section 18 and 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, the view taken by the Single Judge is correct.19. The authorities cited by the Appellant CIDCO and the Respondents, except the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Authority, have been considered by the learned Single judge and found the same not applicable to the facts of the present case. As we respectfully concur with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, it is not necessary for us to dilate on the same. Consequently, we find that the judgment of the learned Single Judge needs no interference.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In the present case, admittedly, the State Government is bearing the entire expenses of acquisition of the land. CIDCO is getting only Rs.5,00,000/per year towards administrative expenses. Further, the AppellantCIDCO on its own pleaded before the Income Tax Appellate Authority that it was acting as an Agent of the State Government and nothing more. On accepting that contention, it has been held that CIDCO was not liable to pay income tax on the income derived from the development activities. Thus, it is not open to the Appellant to now contend to the contrary, or for that matter, approbate and reprobate. In any way, considering the provisions of Section 113of the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966 it is not possible to hold that the AppellantCIDCO is the acquiring body. It is specifically stated in this section that such Company/Corporation or subsidiary company acts as an Agent of the State Government.18. It is to be noted that Government Resolution dated 12th February, 2008 does not support the case of CIDCO and in fact goes contrary to the CIDCOs case. The said Government Resolution makes it clear that payment to be made by CIDCO as compensation/enhancement of compensation will be on account of Government. Thus, the payment so made by CIDCO will be in the capacity of agent of the State Government. This position is consistent with the provisions of section 113(3A) and sectionof the Maharashtra Regional And Town Planning Act, 1966. In similar way, the Government Resolution dated 12th August, 2010 also supports the contention of Respondent no.1original claimant. This Resolution shows that the Government has accepted the judgment of the learned Single Judge and has authorised CIDCO to represent the Government in the References under section 18 and28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.Therefore, the view taken by the Single Judge is correct.19. The authorities cited by the Appellant CIDCO and the Respondents, except the judgment of the Income Tax Appellate Authority, have been considered by the learned Single judge and found the same not applicable to the facts of the present case. As we respectfully concur with the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, it is not necessary for us to dilate on the same. Consequently, we find that the judgment of the learned Single Judge needs no interference.