Case: Kannan Devan Hills Produce Company Limited Vs. State of Kerala &amp; Another

in the city of Madras, though of great social and economic importance, was not included in the concept of agrarian reform by this Court in P. Vajravalu Mudaliar v. Special Deputy Collector, Madras (1965) 1 SCR 614 = (AIR 1965 SC 1017 ). But a wide meaning was given to the concept in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (1965) 1 SCR 82 at p. 94 = (AIR 1965 SC 632 ). The transfer of Shamlat deh owned by the proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purpose of management in the manner stated in the Consolidation of Holdings Act and conferment of proprietary rights in respect of lands in the Abadi deh was treated as effecting agrarian reforms. Hidayatullah J., as he then was, observed: The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few on the other, but envisages also the raising of economic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning grounds etc. endure for the benefit of rural population must be considered to be an essential part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands to which do objection is apparently taken. If agrarian reforms are to succeed, mere distribution of land to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village Panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than individual owners of small portions of lands. 62. The definition of common purpose is reproduced below for convenience: Common purpose means any purpose in relation to any common need, convenience or benefit of the village and includes the following purposes: (i) extension of the village Abadi; (ii) providing income for the Panchayat of the village concerned for the benefit of the village community. (iii) village roads and paths; village drains; village wells, ponds or tanks; village water courses or water channels; village bus stands and waiting places; manure pits; had rori; public latrines; cremation and burial grounds; panchayat ghar; Janj Ghar, grazing grounds; tanning places; mela grounds; public places of religious or charitable nature; and (iv) schools and play-grounds, dispensaries, hospitals and institutions of like nature, water-works or tube-wells whether such schools, play-grounds, dispensaries, hospitals, institutions, water-works or tube-wells may be managed and controlled by the State Government or not. We are bound by the judgment. What are the implications of this judgment? All the purposes mentioned above were held to be comprised within the concept of agrarian reform. 63. It is urged that the wording of the first two purposes in S.9 is too wide. But if we look at the definition of common purpose, which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singhs case, (1965) 1 SCR 82 = (AIR 1965 SC 632 ), it shows that the purposes sustained thereby would come under either the expression promotion of agriculture or welfare of agricultural population in S.9. Indeed some would fall under both. For instance, reservation of lands for manure pits, water-works or wells, village water courses or water channels and grazing grounds would promote agriculture; schools and play-ground, dispensaries, public latrines etc. would be for the welfare of agriculturists. 64. If the State were to use lands for purposes which have no direct connection with the promotion of agriculture or welfare of agricultural population the State could be restrained from using the lands for those purposes. Any fanciful connection with these purposes would not be enough. 65. It seems to us that if we read these two purposes to mean that these include only common purposes, which were sustained by this Court and purposes similar thereto it would be difficult to say that they are not for agrarian reform. In a sense agrarian reform is wider than land reform. It includes besides land reform something more and that something more is illustrated by the definition of common purpose, which was sustained by this Court in Ranjit Singhs case, (1965) 1 SCR 82 = (AIR 1965 SC 632 ). 66. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raja Anand, (1967) 1 SCR 362 at p. 372 = (AIR 1967 SC 661 ) the acquisition of a grant in the nature of Jagir was upheld. It was observed: Mr. A. K. Sen further urges that the acquisition of the estate was not for the purposes of agrarian reforms because hundreds of square miles of forest are sought to be acquired. But as we have held that the area in dispute is a grant in the nature of Jagir or inam, its acquisition like the acquisition of all Jagirs, inams, or similar grants, was a necessary step in the implementation of the agrarian reforms and was clearly contemplated in Article 31-A. 67. These observations must be understood in the light of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the impugned Act in that case (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1964) had amended Section 3 (8) of that Act of 1950. This grant in the nature of the jagir stood in the same position as all the big zamindaris and jagirs in Uttar Pradesh. It has never been urged that the Act of 1950 was not a measure of agrarian reform. 68. The third object - settlement of agriculturists and agricultural labour - it seems to us, is clearly covered by the expression agrarian reforms. The main object of agrarian reforms has been to acquire excess land and settle landless labourers and agriculturists. 69. We are accordingly of the opinion that the three purposes - the first two read as we have indicated - are covered by the expression agrarian reform and the legislation is protected from challenge by Article 31-A.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]29. It seems to us clear that the State has legislative competence to legislate on Entry 18, List II and Entry 42 List III. This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on an industry controlled under Entry 52, List I. Effect is not the same thing as subject-matterIf a State Act, otherwise valid, has effect on a matter in List I does not cease to be a legislation with respect to an entry in List II or List III.The object of Sections 4 and 5 seems to be to enable the State to acquire all the lands which do not fall within the categories (a), (b) and (c) of S.4 (1). These provisions are really incidental to the exercise of the power of acquisition. The State cannot be denied a power to ascertain what land should be acquired by it in the public interest35. The fact that the plantation is run as an integrated unit was strongly relied on but this cannot impinge upon and take away the legislative power of the State in respect of List II, Entry 1844. For the reasons mentioned above we have come to the conclusion that the State Legislature was competent to enact the impugned Act and that it is not repugnant to the Tea Act52.It seems to us that on the material placed before us it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the lands in dispute all within the expression janmam right.If, as stated in Travancore Land Revenue Manual Vol. IV, there are no lands that do not belong to a Janmi and the Sircar becomes a Janmi by gift, escheat, confiscation or otherwise, the effect of the Royal Proclamation of 1899 must be that the Sircar became the Janmi. We are not concerned here with lands which were held by the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Sukapuram Sabhayogam v. State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Kerala 101 to be held under Ryotwari tenure after the introduction of the Ryotwari Settlement in the Malabar area of Kerala State58. It seems that if it is held that the land does not fall within the expression janmam right it may possibly be covered by the decision of this Court in Purshothaman Nambudiris case, (1962) Supp 1 SCR 753 = (AIR 1962 SC 694  ) but as arguments were not addressed to us on this point we do not express our final opinion64. If the State were to use lands for purposes which have no direct connection with the promotion of agriculture or welfare of agricultural population the State could be restrained from using the lands for those purposes. Any fanciful connection with these purposes would not be enough65. It seems to us that if we read these two purposes to mean that these include only common purposes, which were sustained by this Court and purposes similar thereto it would be difficult to say that they are not for agrarian reform. In a sense agrarian reform is wider than land reform. It includes besides land reform something more and that something more is illustrated by the definition of common purpose,67. These observations must be understood in the light of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, for the impugned Act in that case (U. P. Act No. 1 of 1964) had amended Section 3 (8) of that Act of 1950. This grant in the nature of the jagir stood in the same position as all the big zamindaris and jagirs in Uttar Pradesh. It has never been urged that the Act of 1950 was not a measure of agrarian reform68. The third object - settlement of agriculturists and agricultural labour - it seems to us, is clearly covered by the expression agrarian reforms. The main object of agrarian reforms has been to acquire excess land and settle landless labourers and agriculturists69. We are accordingly of the opinion that the three purposes - the first two read as we have indicated - are covered by the expression agrarian reform and the legislation is protected from challenge by Article 31-A.