Case: Ku. Sonia Bhatia Vs. State Of U.P. &amp; Ors

concept of love and affection and this decision appears to be on all fours with the facts of the present case. Realising this predicament Mr. Kacker submitted that the words adequate consideration used in the Income-tax Act denote a different texture. Mr. Kacker argued that it is not permissible to interpret or use an expression in one Act as having the same meaning in another Act which is of a different kind. Of course, there can be no. dispute with this proposition but then the Act as also the Income-tax Act have both used the words adequate consideration which, as we have already held, are terms of well-known legal significance having a well recognised popular sense and hence they would convey the same meaning and import whenever used in other statutes unless a contrary intention appears from the language employed by the legislature in the statute. Moreover, the object of the Income-tax Act as also the present Act seems to be more or less identical. Whereas the object of the Income-tax Act in enacting Section 16 (3) (b) which is extracted below is to circumvent and prevent a growing tendency on the part of the assessees to avoid or reduce tax liability by means of settlements :"16 (3) ...............(a) ........................(b) so much of the income of any person or association of persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise than for adequate consideration to the person or association by such individual for the benefit of his wife or a minor child or both."In the instant case also the avowed object of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act is to prevent the large landholders from evading the ceiling law by executing transfers. instruments, or gift so as to reduce their surplus area. Where the two statutes have a common and identical object then the legal terms used in one statute must be given the same meaning in the other. It cannot be said that the words adequate consideration appearing in sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act do not take their colour from the context but are in conformity with the main object of the Act; to prevent evasion of the ceiling law by large tenure-holders in anticipation of the passing of the Ceiling Law. For these reasons, therefore, the argument of Mr. Kacker on this score must be rejected. We, therefore, hold that in view of the interpretation placed by this Court on the words adequate consideration which fully applies to the present case and to the same language employed in subsection (6) of Section 5 of the Act, a gift is not only impliedly but expressly excluded by the Act.27. In the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court referred to above Civil Writ Petn. No. 915 of 1975 D/- 10-7-1976, after a consideration of a large number of authorities the following observations were made :"The Legislature while enacting the U. P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. was alive to the provisions of the Transfer of property Act dealing with the transfer at immovable property. The terms transfer, sale, mortgage and lease have not been defined in the Act. Therefore, these terms must have been used only in the sense in which they have been used in the Transfer of Property Act. If the Legislature intended to use those terms in a different sense and with a different connotation, it would have defined those terms in the Act. But that has not been done............................................The legislature, however, thought that there may be genuine and bona fide transfers for consideration. To protect such tenure-holders and other transfers, proviso (b) to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act was enacted. It saved transfers for adequate consideration. Gift is a gratuitous transfer and there is no. consideration which obviously means valuable consideration. If transfer for love and affection is taken to be a transfer for consideration then the purpose of the Act would be completely defeated as the tenure-holders would transfer their land by gift after 24th January 1971."28. We fully endorse the observations made by the Division Bench which lay down the correct law on the subject and we overrule the decision of Banerji, J. in Fateh Singhs case, AIR 1978 NOC 101 (All) (supra).29. Lastly, it was urged by Mr. Kacker that this is an extremely hard case where the grandfather of the donee wanted to make a beneficial provision for his grand daughter after having lost his two sons in the prime of their life due to air crash accidents while serving in the Air Force. It is true that the District Judge has come to a clear finding that the gift in question is bona fide and has been executed in good faith but as the gift does not fulfil the other ingredients of the section namely, that it is not for adequate consideration, we are afraid. however laudable the object of the donor may have been, the gift has to fail because the genuine attempt of the donor to benefit his grand daughter seems to have been thwarted by the intervention of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act. This is undoubtedly a serious hardship but it cannot be helped. We must remember that the Act is a valuable piece of social legislation with the avowed object of ensuring equitable distribution of the land by taking away land from large tenure-holders and distributing the same among landless tenants or using the same for public utility schemes which is in the larger interest of the community at large. The Act seems to implement one of the most important constitutional directives contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India. If in this process a few individuals suffer severe hardship that cannot be helped, for individual interests must yield to the larger interests of the community or the country as indeed every noble cause claims its martyr.30. As this was the only point raised before us, we find no. merit in the same.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. It is manifest that if these conditions are satisfied and proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority then the burden which lies on the claimant under Explanation II would have been discharged and the transfer would not be ignored but would fall under the protective umbrella contained in Cl. (b) of the proviso. It may be noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has neither defined the word transfer in any of the definitions of the Act nor has clarified it. The primary object of the Act is to prevent the tenure holders from evading the Law of Ceiling by making fictitious transfers even by registered documents either before or after the duel date so as to evade the provisions of the Act and thus frustrate the very object and the social purpose for which the Act had been passed. In these circumstances, therefore, the word transfer has obviously been used by the legislature in the general sense of the term as defined in the Transfer of Property Act, which is the statute that governs all transfers of movable or immovable properties. In other words, the word transfer being a term of wellknown legal significance having well ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it necessary to define the term transfer separately. Similarly, the word consideration also being a term commonly used to denote contracts, sales and transactions, has been used in the same sense, that is to say, as defined by S. 2 (d) of the Contract Act.10. It is well settled that whenever the legislature uses certain terms or expressions of well-known legal significance or connotation the courts must interpret them as used or understood in the popular sense.Against this background we have now to consider the real intention of the words "transfer for adequate consideration" as used in clause (b) of the proviso. The High Court has held that although the deed of gift is a transfer but as it is a transfer without any consideration, therefore such a transfer does not fulfil one of the essential ingredients mentioned in clause (b) of the proviso, namely, that it should be for consideration. The High Court has further held that its view is reinforced by the word adequate which qualifies the word consideration which completely rules out a transfer in the nature of a gift. The High Court was of the view that a transfer of property by way of a gift being a purely gratuitous transfer made out of love and affection or for the spiritual benefit of the donor, falls completely beyond the ambit of Cl. (b) of the proviso and, therefore, has to be ignored under the provisions of the said sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act.We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments put forward by Mr. Kacker and although the arguments are extremely attractive yet we find ourselves unable to agree with the same.From a conspectus, therefore, of the definitions contained in the dictionaries and the books regarding a gift or an adequate consideration the inescapable conclusion that follows is that consideration means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee similarly, when the word consideration is qualified by the word adequate, it makes consideration stronger so as to make it sufficient and valuable having regard to the facts, circumstances and necessities of the case. It has also been seen from the discussions of the various authorities mentioned above that a gift is undoubtedly a transfer which does not contain any element of consideration in any shape or form. In fact, where there is any equivalent or benefit measured in terms of money in respect of a gift the transaction ceases to be a gift and assumes a different colour. It has been rightly pointed out in one of the books referred to above that we should not try to confuse the motive or the purpose of making a gift with the consideration which is the subject matter of the gift. Love, affection, spiritual benefit and many other factors may enter in the intention of the donor to make a gift but these filial considerations cannot be called or held to be legal considerations as understood by law. It is manifest, therefore, that the passing of monetary consideration is completely foreign to the concept of a gift having regard to the nature, character and the circumstances under which such a transfer takes place. Furthermore, when the legislature has used the word transfer it at once invokes the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.It would thus appear that this Court clearly held that words adequate consideration completely exclude the concept of love and affection and this decision appears to be on all fours with the facts of the present case. Realising this predicament Mr. Kacker submitted that the words adequate consideration used in the Income-tax Act denote a different texture. Mr. Kacker argued that it is not permissible to interpret or use an expression in one Act as having the same meaning in another Act which is of a different kind. Of course, there can be no. dispute with this proposition but then the Act as also the Income-tax Act have both used the words adequate consideration which, as we have already held, are terms of well-known legal significance having a well recognised popular sense and hence they would convey the same meaning and import whenever used in other statutes unless a contrary intention appears from the language employed by the legislature in the statute. Moreover, the object of the Income-tax Act as also the present Act seems to be more or lessthe instant case also the avowed object of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act is to prevent the large landholders from evading the ceiling law by executing transfers. instruments, or gift so as to reduce their surplus area. Where the two statutes have a common and identical object then the legal terms used in one statute must be given the same meaning in the other. It cannot be said that the words adequate consideration appearing in sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act do not take their colour from the context but are in conformity with the main object of the Act; to prevent evasion of the ceiling law by large tenure-holders in anticipation of the passing of the Ceiling Law. For these reasons, therefore, the argument of Mr. Kacker on this score must be rejected. We, therefore, hold that in view of the interpretation placed by this Court on the words adequate consideration which fully applies to the present case and to the same language employed in subsection (6) of Section 5 of the Act, a gift is not only impliedly but expressly excluded by the Act.We fully endorse the observations made by the Division Bench which lay down the correct law on the subject and we overrule the decision of Banerji, J. in Fateh Singhs case, AIR 1978 NOC 101 (All)is true that the District Judge has come to a clear finding that the gift in question is bona fide and has been executed in good faith but as the gift does not fulfil the other ingredients of the section namely, that it is not for adequate consideration, we are afraid. however laudable the object of the donor may have been, the gift has to fail because the genuine attempt of the donor to benefit his grand daughter seems to have been thwarted by the intervention of sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act. This is undoubtedly a serious hardship but it cannot be helped. We must remember that the Act is a valuable piece of social legislation with the avowed object of ensuring equitable distribution of the land by taking away land from large tenure-holders and distributing the same among landless tenants or using the same for public utility schemes which is in the larger interest of the community at large. The Act seems to implement one of the most important constitutional directives contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India. If in this process a few individuals suffer severe hardship that cannot be helped, for individual interests must yield to the larger interests of the community or the country as indeed every noble cause claims its martyr.30. As this was the only point raised before us, we find no. merit in the same.