Case: State of Jammu &amp; Kashmir &amp; Others Vs. Thakur Ganga Singh &amp; Another

of classification. As we have pointed out, at no stage of the proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation of Art. 14 or the principles governing the doctrine of classification have been questioned by either of the parties. Indeed accepting the said doctrine, the appellants contended that there was a valid classification under the rule while the respondents argued contra.The learned Additional Solicitor General contended, for the first time, before us that the appeal raised a new facet of the doctrine of equality, namely, whether an artificial person and a natural person have equal attributes within the meaning of the equality clause, and, therefore, the case involves a question of interpretation of the Constitution. This argument, if we may say so, involves the same contention in a different garb. If analysed, the argument only comes to this: as an artificial person and a natural person have different attributes, the classification made between them is valid. this argument does not suggest a new interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, but only attempts to bring the rule within the doctrine of classification.We, therefore, hold that the question raised in this case does not involve any question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.8. Assuming that the case raises a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution, can it be said that the question raised is a substantial question of law within the meaning of cl. (2) of Art. 132. This aspect was considered by the Federal Court in T. M. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor General In Council 52 Cal WN (FB) 1: (AIR 1947 FC 37). That decision turned upon the provisions of S. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The material part of that section says:S. 205: "(1) An appeal shall be to the Federal Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or any Order in Council made there under........"The Madras High Court gave a certificate to the effect that the case involved a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of S. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. Under S. 240(3) of the said Act, no person who was a member of a civil service of the Crown in India or held any civil post under the Crown in India could be dismissed or reduced in rank until he had been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The High Court, on the facts found, held that the appellant therein had been offered a reasonable opportunity of showing cause within the meaning of the said section, but gave a certificate under S. 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935. In dealing with the propriety of issuing the certificate in the circumstances of that case, Zafrulla Khan, J., speaking on behalf of the Court, concisely and pointedly stated at p. 2(of Cal WN (FR)): (at p. 37 of AIR):"It was urged before us that the case involved a question relating to the interpretation of sub-sec. (3) of Section 240 of the Act .To the extent to which any guidance might have been needed for the purposes of this case on the interpretation of that sub-section that guidance was furnished so far as this Court is concerned in its judgment in Secy. of State v. I. M. Lall, (1945) FCR 103: (AIR 1945 FC 47). The rest was a simple question of fact. In our judgment no "substantial question of law" as to the interpretation of the Constitution Act was involved in this case, which could have formed the basis of a certificate under section 205(1) of the Act."On the question of interpretation of Art. 14 of the Constitution this Court in Budhan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, 1955-1 SCR 1045 at p; 1049: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 191 at p. 193) explained the true meaning and scope of that Article thus:"It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases: namely, geographical ,or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration."This is only a restatement of the law that has been enunciated by this Court in Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India, 1950 SCR 869 : (AIR 1951 SC 41 ) and in other subsequent decisions. The said principles were reaffirmed in the recent decisions of this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, (1959) SCR 279 : (AIR 1958 SC 538 ) and in Mohammed Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar, (1959) SCR 629 : (AIR 1958 SC 731 ). In view of the said decision there is no further scope for putting a new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution vis-_is the doctrine of classification.The interpretation of Art. 14 in the context of classification has been finally settled by the highest Court of this land and under Art. 141 of the Constitution that interpretation is binding on all the Courts with in the territory of India. What remained to be done by the High Court was only to apply that interpretation to the facts before it. A substantial question of law, therefore, cannot arise where that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Under cl. (2) of Art. 132 there is no scope for granting a special leave unless two conditions are satisfied: (i) the case should involve a question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution; and (iii) the said question should be a substantial question of law. The principle underlying the Article is that the final authority of interpreting the Constitution must rest with the Supreme Court. With that object the Article is freed from other limitations imposed under Art. S. 133 and 134 and the right of appeal of the widest amplitude is allowed irrespective of the nature of the proceedings in a case involving only a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.an interpretation of Art. 14, a series of decisions of this Court evolved the doctrine of classification. As we have pointed out, at no stage of the proceedings either the correctness of the interpretation of Art. 14 or the principles governing the doctrine of classification have been questioned by either of theis only a restatement of the law that has been enunciated by this Court in Charanjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India, 1950 SCR 869  : (AIR 1951 SC 41  ) and in other subsequent decisions. The said principles were reaffirmed in the recent decisions of this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, (1959) SCR 279  : (AIR 1958 SC 538  ) and in Mohammed Haneef Qureshi v. State of Bihar, (1959) SCR 629  : (AIR 1958 SC 731  ). In view of the said decision there is no further scope for putting a new interpretation on the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution vis-_is the doctrine of classification.The interpretation of Art. 14 in the context of classification has been finally settled by the highest Court of this land and under Art. 141 of the Constitution that interpretation is binding on all the Courts with in the territory of India. What remained to be done by the High Court was only to apply that interpretation to the facts before it. A substantial question of law, therefore, cannot arise where that law has been finally and authoritatively decided by this Court.