Case: Sukhvinder Pal Bipan Kumar Vs. State Of Punjab &amp; Ors

suspension is not exercisable unless there is a breach and the breach is of such a nature that it must entail cancellation of the li cence. The substantive provision contained in sub-cl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order provides for the power of cancellation or suspension, if any dealer commits any contravention of the terms and conditions of his licence or any provision of this order. The first proviso is in the nature of a limitation on the power contained in sub-cl. (1), and there can be no cancellation or suspension of a licence unless the licensee is afforded a reasonable opportunity of stating his case. The p roper function of the second proviso is to carve out an exception to the first proviso. It dispenses with the requirement of affording a reasonable opportunity to the licensee in case of suspension of his licence during the pendency or in conte mplation of the proceedings for cancellation. It must, however, be read along with the main enacting provision in sub-cl. (1), and, if so construed, the power of suspension during the pendency of an inquiry cannot be exercised unless there is contr avention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the provisions of the Order. Secondly, it provides for a reasonable safeguard, in that it limits the period of suspension. The period of suspension would necessa rily depend upon the nature of the breach, and in no case, can it exceed ninety days. During this period, the licensing authority is expected to complete the inquiry and take a decision as to the cancellation or otherwise of the licence. Thirdly , as a check upon possible injustice that might result from an improper exercise of the power of suspension of a licence by the licensing authority under the second proviso, there is an additional safeguard to a dealer by way of an appeal to t he Director, Food and Supplies, under cl. 13 of the Order. This Court has repeatedly laid down that where the discretion to apply the provisions of a particular statute is left with the Government or one of the highest officers, it will be presumed that the discretion vested in such highest authority will not be abused. It would, therefore, appear that the second proviso to sub-cl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order furnishes sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power of suspension of a l icence during the pendency of or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation thereof, and it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as already indic ated, it affords reasonable safeguards.There still remains the question whether the impugned orders of suspension are mala fide or motivated. We are unable to hold from the material on record that the licensing authorities acted with improper motives or were actuated with bias in directing the suspension of the licences held by the petitioners. All that is averred in para 9 is:"(Under oral instructions of the Punjab Government from the Civil Supplies and Food Department to all the Licensing Authorities, including the Food Department and Supplies Controllers, instructions were issued that if any one dealer is found exporting wheat to another State, there being no direct or indire ct ban on such movement, he should be punished at the spot by way of suspension of licences so that the dealer may not export wheat to any other State for which there are no restrictions imposed by any law or notified order or even the terms and conditions of the licence." The petitioners then go on to say in para 12:"Under oral instructions from the Secretary, Food and Supplies Department, the Director Food and Civil Supplies, and up to the District Food and supplies Controller, the Punjab Government has imposed restriction on inter-State movement of foodgrains. There are already restrictions on stock holding and dealer to dealer sale. The petitioners have never violated any conditions of the licence except that they have been, in exercise of their fundamental rights, exporting foodgrains to various destination outside the State of Punjab..." 8. In the case of M/s Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar in support of the petition, there is an affidavit of one Raj Kumar, claiming to be a partner, who asserts that the allegations in paras 9 and 12 are correct to the best of my knowledge. To say the least, this is no affidavit at all. Under order XIX, Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it was incumbent upon the deponent to disclose the nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient particularity. The allegations in the petition are, therefore, not supported by an affidavit as required by law. That being so, the State Government was fully justified in answer, Denied. There is no restriction on the movement of wheat. The Deputy Secretary in his counter affidavit has further denied that the impugned orders of suspension were passed on the direction of the State Government. In our view, the allegations in the writ petitions are not sufficient to constitute an averment of mala fides so as to vitiate the impugn ed orders of suspension. The Court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition. The burden of establi shing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned orders of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias or misuse by the Government of its powers. The impugned orders of suspension ex facie show breaches of conditions Nos. 4, 8 and 10 of the licence by the petitioners. The question whether or not, they committed the breaches is a matter for inquiry by the licensing authorities under sub-cl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are unable to accept any of these contentions.To make the point intelligible, it is necessary t o deal with the scheme of the Order. Cl. 3 of the Order provides that no person shall carry on business as a dealer except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence granted by the licensing authority. Cl. 7 (3) there of provides that where an application for grant of a licence is not refused, the licensing authority shall grant a licence in Form B subject to the conditions specified therein. Condition No. 4 of the licence enjoins that the licensee shall s ubmit to the licensing authority concerned fortnightly returns in Form C of the stock receipts and deliveries. Condition No. 8 of the licence lays down that the licensee shall exhibit the price list of foodgrains held by him for sale and it shall indicate separately the prices of different varieties of foodgrains. Condition No. 10 thereof interdicts that the licensee shall give all facilities at all reasonable times to the licensing authority or any officer authorised by it or the State Government, for the inspection of his stocks and accounts at any shop, godown or other place used by him for the storage, sale or purchase of foodgrains etc. Cl. 11 of the Order provides for cancellation or suspension of a licen ce. The power of cancellation or suspension of a licence which was subject to the giving of a reasonable opportunity to the lincensee of stating his case was not adequate and sufficient to effectively check and control flagrant brea ches of the provisions of the order, during the pendency of the proceedings for cancellation of a licence. The State Government, therefore, inserted the second proviso to subcl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order. Cl. 11 of the Order, as amended, in so f ar as material, reads:6. It is plain upon the terms of. (1) of cl. 11 of the order that it deals with the substantive punishment of cancellation or suspension of a licence. The power of cancellation or suspension of a licence of a foodgrains deal er under. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order is, however, subject to the limitation contained in the first proviso. The power of cancellation or suspension of a licence is, therefore, not exercisable by the licensing authority until it affords a re asonable opportunity to the licensee of stating his case. This necessarily entails the holding of an inquiry into the question of the alleged breach. The making of an inquiry into the breach of licence conditions by a foodgrains dealer is a timeconsuming process which may many a time verily frustrate the purpose and object of the Order. The State Government was evidently of the opinion in the light of the experience gained in the recent past, that for effective control and regulation of the trade in foodgrains, it was necessary and expedient that the licensing authority should be clothed with powers to suspend a licence on the spot when it detects contravention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the provision s of the Order. Otherwise, a foodgrains dealer after committing flagrant breaches of the terms and conditions of his licence and the provisions of the Order, may, with impunity, carry on his trading activities without any check or control.The power of suspension conferred by the second proviso to. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order is by way of an interim measure, pending the holding of an inquiry as to whether there is any breach which must result in cancellation of the licence. It is true that the suspension of licence is a drastic measure, if taken without affording to the dealer a reasonable opportunity of stating his case, but it is a measure of social control in the interests of the community. The p ower of suspension is a necessary concomitant of the power to grant a privilege or a licence. By reason of cl. 3 of the Order, no dealer can engage in the business of purchase and sale of foodgrains except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued by the licensing authority in that behalf. The dealers are free to carry on their trade or business in foodgrains, subject to their complying with the terms and conditions of their licence and the provisi ons of the Order. But, if they commit a breach, they must face the consequence that their licence may be cancelled or suspended under subcl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order. They must face the further consequence of suspension of their licence during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of the licence, if the breach is of such a nature that it must result in the cancellation of a licence. As already stated, the power of suspension is a necessary adjunc t of the power to grant a licence. In view of the acute shortage of foodstuffs in the country, the Government is bound to take all effective steps to implement the provisions of the Act and the various orders issued under s. 3 thereof, from t ime to time. The conferral of the power of suspension of the licence of a foodgrains dealer under the second proviso to. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order during the pendency or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation of his licence, is an important step taken by the Government to subserve the object of the legislation and is in public interest. It cannot be said that the second proviso to. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order does not satisfy the test of reasonableness. It seeks to strike a proper balance between the freedom of trade or business guaranteed under Art. 19 (1) (g) and the social control permitted by cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the second proviso t o subcl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order is of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the interests of the general public.There is no warrant for the submission that the second proviso to. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order confers up on the licensing authority unguided, uncontrolled and uncanalised power to suspend a licence and is, therefore, void by reason of Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is urged that the impugned orders of suspension in these cases are for a pe riod of 89 days, and the licensing authority would, as in the past, pass fresh orders of suspension ad infinitum completely paralysing the business of the petitioners. There is no substance in the contention that repeated orders of suspension of a l icence can be passed under the second proviso in respect of the same breach. The second proviso expressly states that the licensing authority may suspend a licence for a period not exceeding ninety days. It, therefore, fixes the period of suspension. From its very terms, it is obvious that there cannot be repeated orders of suspension of a licence under the second provision in respect of the same breach. Normally, the order of suspension under the second proviso to subcl. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order after the expiry of the period of 90 days, would automatically lapse. However, if the licensee commits another breach, after the expiry of the period of suspension, there is nothing to prevent the lic ensing authority to suspend his licence afresh7. On a fair reading of the second proviso to. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order, it cannot be said that it commits to the unrestrained will of the District Food and Supplies Controller, who is the licensing authority, the power of suspension of a licence. It does not confer arbitrary and uncontrolled power because the suspension can only be for specified reasons and the second proviso lays down the circumstance or grounds on which the power may be exercised. Such guidelines are expressly and specifically stated. In the first place, the power of suspension is not exercisable unless there is a breach and the breach is of such a nature that it must entail cancellation of the li cence. The substantive provision contained in. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order provides for the power of cancellation or suspension, if any dealer commits any contravention of the terms and conditions of his licence or any provision of this order. The first proviso is in the nature of a limitation on the power contained in. (1), and there can be no cancellation or suspension of a licence unless the licensee is afforded a reasonable opportunity of stating his case. The p roper function of the second proviso is to carve out an exception to the first proviso. It dispenses with the requirement of affording a reasonable opportunity to the licensee in case of suspension of his licence during the pendency or in conte mplation of the proceedings for cancellation. It must, however, be read along with the main enacting provision in. (1), and, if so construed, the power of suspension during the pendency of an inquiry cannot be exercised unless there is contr avention of any of the terms and conditions of the licence or any of the provisions of the Order. Secondly, it provides for a reasonable safeguard, in that it limits the period of suspension. The period of suspension would necessa rily depend upon the nature of the breach, and in no case, can it exceed ninety days. During this period, the licensing authority is expected to complete the inquiry and take a decision as to the cancellation or otherwise of the licence. Thirdly , as a check upon possible injustice that might result from an improper exercise of the power of suspension of a licence by the licensing authority under the second proviso, there is an additional safeguard to a dealer by way of an appeal to t he Director, Food and Supplies, under cl. 13 of the Order. This Court has repeatedly laid down that where the discretion to apply the provisions of a particular statute is left with the Government or one of the highest officers, it will be presumed that the discretion vested in such highest authority will not be abused. It would, therefore, appear that the second proviso to. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order furnishes sufficient guidelines for the exercise of the power of suspension of a l icence during the pendency of or in contemplation of the proceedings for cancellation thereof, and it does not suffer from the vice of arbitrariness and is, therefore, not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as already indic ated, it affords reasonable safeguards.There still remains the question whether the impugned orders of suspension are mala fide or motivated. We are unable to hold from the material on record that the licensing authorities acted with improper motives or were actuated with bias in directing the suspension of the licences held by the petitioners8. In the case of M/s Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar in support of the petition, there is an affidavit of one Raj Kumar, claiming to be a partner, who asserts that the allegations in paras 9 and 12 are correct to the best of my knowledge. To say the least, this is no affidavit at all. Under order XIX, Rule 3, of theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908, it was incumbent upon the deponent to disclose the nature and source of his knowledge with sufficient particularity. The allegations in the petition are, therefore, not supported by an affidavit as required by law. That being so, the State Government was fully justified in answer, Denied. There is no restriction on the movement of wheat. The Deputy Secretary in his counter affidavit has further denied that the impugned orders of suspension were passed on the direction of the State Government. In our view, the allegations in the writ petitions are not sufficient to constitute an averment of mala fides so as to vitiate the impugn ed orders of suspension. The Court would be justified in refusing to carry out investigation into allegations of mala fides, if necessary particulars of the charge making out a prima facie case are not given in the petition. The burden of establi shing mala fides lies very heavily on the person who alleges it. The petitioners who seek to invalidate the impugned orders of suspension must establish the charge of bad faith or bias or misuse by the Government of its powers. The impugned orders of suspension ex facie show breaches of conditions Nos. 4, 8 and 10 of the licence by the petitioners. The question whether or not, they committed the breaches is a matter for inquiry by the licensing authorities under. (1) of cl. 11 of the Order.