Case: Badri Pershad Vs. Smt. Kanso Devi

S. 14 (1) of the Act even though previously she was a limited a owner.4. Under section 3 (1) of Act XVIII of 1937 as amended by Act XI of 1938 when a Hindu governed by any School of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga School died intestate leaving separate property his widow was entitled to the same share as a son in respect of the property left by her husband. Under section 3 (2) when any such Hindu died having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu Joint Family property his widow was to have the same interest in the property as he himself had. Sub-s. (3) provided that any interest developing on a Hindu widow under the aforesaid provision was to be a limited interest known as Hindu womans estate but that the widow was to have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner.5. The case in the Courts below proceeded on the footing that all the properties left by Gajju Mal were his separate acquisition. It was apparently for that reason that the High Court gave a finding that before the partition effected by the arbitrator by means of the award, the five sons and the widow (respondent) of Gajju Mal enjoyed equal shares in the properties left by him.6. The point for our consideration is narrowed down to this. When a female acquires an interest under the provisions of Act XVIII of 1937 in the properties of her husband which are subsequently separated by means of a partition does she become an absolute owner under sub-s. (1) of S. 14 of the Act or does she get only a restricted estate under sub-s. (1) of S. 14 of the Act or does she get only a restricted estate under sub-s. (2) of that section? The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the court should first look at sub-s. (2) and if the case does not fall within its ambit and scope then alone sub-s. (1) will become applicable. This manner of reading of the section is not warranted either on principle or authority.The section has to be read as a whole and it would depend on the facts of each case whether the same is covered by the first sub-section or sub-s. (2). The critical words in sub-s. (1) are "possessed" and "acquired". The word "possessed" has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law.In the context in which it has been used in S. 14 it means the estate (state - Ed.) of owning or having in ones hand or power (see Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva, (1959) Supp 1 SCR 968 = (AIR 1959 SC 577 ).) In S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar, 1962 Supp 3 SCR 418 = (AIR 1962 SC 1493 ) it was held that 1/4 share of a female which had been declared by the preliminary decree passed before the enactment of the Act was possessed by her within the meaning of S. 14 and she became the full owner so that on her death the said property descended to her grandsons in accordance with the provisions of Ss. 15 and 16 of the Act.The word "acquired" in sub-s. (1) has also to be given the widest possible meaning. This would be so because of the language of the explanation which makes sub-s. (1) applicable to acquisition of property by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by a females own skill or exertion or by purchase or prescription or in any manner whatsoever. Where at the commencement of the Act a female Hindu has a share in joint properties which are later on partitioned by metes and bounds and she gets possession of the properties allotted to her there can be no manner of doubt that she is not only possessed of that property at the time of the coming into force of the Act but has also acquired the same before its commencement.7. Sub-section (2) Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of the property.The Madras High Court was right in the observations made in Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal, AIR 1964 Mad 387 that sub-section (2) made it clear that the object of Section 14 was only to remove the disability on women imposed by law and not to interfere with contracts, grants or decrees etc., by virtue of which a womans right was restricted. In Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, (1968) 1 SCR 476 = (AIR 1968 SC 365 ), one Kishan Devi had acquired in 1952 the same interest in the property of the joint family which her husband Hukum Singh had under the provisions of Act XVIII of 1937. The question arose, whether after the coming into force of the Act she got rights, of full ownership and could alienate the properties in which she had acquired a limited interest without the consent of the male members of the family. This court decided that she had become full owner by virtue of the provisions of S. 14 (1) of the Act. This case is quite apposite for our purpose and we must hold that the respondent became a full owner of the suit properties when the Act came into force. The mere fact that there was a partition by means of arbitration which resulted in an award and a decree based on it would not bring the matter within sub-s. (2) as the provisions of sub-s. (1) became fully applicable particularly in view of the express terms of the Explanation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. The case in the Courts below proceeded on the footing that all the properties left by Gajju Mal were his separate acquisition. It was apparently for that reason that the High Court gave a finding that before the partition effected by the arbitrator by means of the award, the five sons and the widow (respondent) of Gajju Mal enjoyed equal shares in the properties left bymanner of reading of the section is not warranted either on principle or authority.The section has to be read as a whole and it would depend on the facts of each case whether the same is covered by the first sub-section or sub-s. (2). The critical words in sub-s. (1) are "possessed" and "acquired". The word "possessed" has been used in its widest connotation and it may either be actual or constructive or in any form recognised by law.In the context in which it has been used in S. 14 it means the estate (state - Ed.) of owning or having in ones hand orat the commencement of the Act a female Hindu has a share in joint properties which are later on partitioned by metes and bounds and she gets possession of the properties allotted to her there can be no manner of doubt that she is not only possessed of that property at the time of the coming into force of the Act but has also acquired the same before itsword "acquired" in sub-s. (1) has also to be given the widest possible meaning. This would be so because of the language of the explanation which makes sub-s. (1) applicable to acquisition of property by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift or by a females own skill or exertion or by purchase or prescription or in any manner whatsoever.Sub-section (2) Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1). It can come into operation only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated therein is made for the first time without there being any pre-existing right in the female Hindu who is in possession of thecase is quite apposite for our purpose and we must hold that the respondent became a full owner of the suit properties when the Act came into force. The mere fact that there was a partition by means of arbitration which resulted in an award and a decree based on it would not bring the matter within sub-s. (2) as the provisions of sub-s. (1) became fully applicable particularly in view of the express terms of the Explanation.