Case: Hasmukhalal Dahayabhai &amp; Ors. Etc. Etc Vs. State Of Gujarat

in such a way "that the lands selected for such continuance shall be in the same proportion in which lands held by each spouse before furnishing the relevant statement were under sub-sect ion (1) of Section 10. The reduction in their holdings would, therefore, be proportionate to the areas of lands held separately but brought together only for the purposes of determining the: ceiling limit for the family. The whole object of the process prescribed seems to be that families, as contemplated by the Act, should be units for merely determination of ceilings for each member of a family.11. Appellants relied on Kunjukutty Sahib etc. etc. v. State of Kerala &Anr.([1973] 1 S.C.R.326 @ 341) where it was held by this Court (at p. 314):"It was not disputed that the ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act was within the competence of the legislature to fix; nor was it contended that the ceiling fixed by the original unamended Act by itself debarred the legislature from further reducing the ceiling limit so fixed. Prior to the amendment undoubtedly no land within the personal cultivation of the holder under the unamended Act within t he ceiling limit fixed thereby could be acquired without payment of compensation according to the market value, but once ceiling limit was changed by the amended Act the second Proviso to Art. 31A (1) must be held to refer only to the new ceiling limit fixed by the amended Act. The ceiling limit originally fixed ceased to exist for future the moment it was replaced by the amended Act. The prohibition contained in the second proviso operates only within the ceiling limit fixed under the existing law, at the given time. It is true that the new ceiling limit was fixed contemporaneously with the acquisition of the land in excess of that ceiling limit. But it was not contended that a law so fixing the ceiling limit and acquiring the land in excess would offend any provision of the Constitution".Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab &Ors.([1967] 2 S.C.R.p. 536.) was also cited on behalf of the appellants. Here the contention, amongst others, was repelled that, b y adding land transferred to certain relations to that held by a person under his person- al cultivation, for the purpose of determining his ceiling area and the surplus left, under the provisions of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, as amended by a subsequent Act, rights guaranteed by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) were contravened. This case certainly does not lay down that the ceiling limit applicable to each individual must be uniform or that it must be contained in a single statutory provision directly dealing with ceiling limits. It follows that the ceiling limit may vary from individual to individual. These varying limits may result from the combined effect of several provisions. The prescription of different ceiling limits for different individuals, differently circumstanced, could be enacted directly by a single provision dealing with individual celling limits, or, alternatively, it could be the consequence of several provisions dealing with differing sets of circum- stances. No law known to us has ever laid down that the intention of the law makers on a particular subject must necessarily transpire from a single statutory provision or statutory provisions dealing directly with a particular aspect. To read any such limit into the 2nd proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution would be to accept a novel restriction on legislative competence. We have no doubt that no such restriction could be found in the 2nd proviso to Article 31 A ( 1 ) of the Constitution.12. It was urged that Article 31A(1) and 3lB of the Constitution operate in different fields of legislation. Whereas Article 3 IA( 1 ) cures certain possible invalidities in ordinary legislation, arising from its. inconsistencies with Articles 14 or 19 or 31 of the Constitution, Article 3lB cures a wider range of infirmities arising from conflict with any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and necessitates a constitutional amendment so as to protect an impugned legislation by its inclusion in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution. Legislation protected by Article 31A o f the Constitution would fall under appropriate legislative entries in the 7th Schedule. But, to secure the protection of Article 3lB of the Constitution, resort to the provisions of Article 368 of the Constitution is imperative. These differences do not mean that legislation falling under any part of Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, including the provisos, cannot receive also the protection contemplated by Article 3lB of the Constitution. There is nothing in our Constitution to bar any statute from receiving a dual protection, so to speak, of both Article 31A(1) and 3lB of the Constitution if the conditions of each are satisfied.It is clear to us that the proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution confers certain rights upon individuals and protects them from -constitutionally illegal invasion. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the "protective umbrella" of Article 3lB does not shield the impugned provisions , against an attack based upon the limits imposed by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) on legisl ative power. The argument overlooks certain obvious answers: firstly, that limits on legislative powers, imposed by Part III of the Constitution, do have the direct result of protecting individual rights; and, secondl y, that no part of the second proviso to Article 31 (1) of the Constitution was, as already pointed out above, infringed by the impugned provisions; and, thirdly, even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that rights conferred on individuals by the 2nd proviso to Article 31 (1), were infringed in any way, pro. visions of Article 31B of the Constitution are enough to repel an attack based upon such an alleged infringement. Both Article 31A(1) and 31B are intended to operate as protections against consequences of what could otherwise be breaches of the Constitution.13.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We do not find any fixed concept of "person" anywhere. No .doubt the concept is wide so that it could be contended that it should not be narrowed down or confined, But does Section 6 (2) do that? Section 6 (2) does not either disable a husband or wife from owning or holding their separate properties separately. It does not merge or destroy their separate legal personailties. It requires their separate holdings to be grouped together as though they were held by one person only for the purpose of determining the ceiling limit for each member of a family. It may indirectly have the effect of disabling a member of a family from holding land upto the prescribed ceiling limit for a person holding as an individual. In other words, the result is that such a member of a family will have to be content with a holding less than that of an unmarried individual. It has the effect of making it clear that what have to be grouped together are the separate properties of individuals belonging to families other than what are "joint families", in law. It takes in and applies to members of families other than undivided Hindu families. It means that married persons and their minor children will have to be viewed as though they hold one lot together even though they retain their separate legal personalities and remain competent owners of their separate holdings. It does not affect either their legal status or competence. It does reduce their individual holdings. But, we do not find any prohibition enacted by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) against different ceiling limits prescribed for various individuals or classes of individuals differently situated. Nor does the second proviso to Article 31A(1) prescribe any particular or direct more of imposing different ceilings on individuals differently circumstanced.A glance at the provisions of Section 20 of the Act shows that separate rights to properties grouped together for purposes of computation only do not vanish. On the other hand, each holder of such separate rights above the ceiling , limit is permitted to select the property he or she wishes to continue to hold in such a way "that the lands selected for such continuance shall be in the same proportion in which lands held by each spouse before furnishing the relevant statement were under sub-sect ion (1) of Section 10. The reduction in their holdings would, therefore, be proportionate to the areas of lands held separately but brought together only for the purposes of determining the: ceiling limit for the family. The whole object of the process prescribed seems to be that families, as contemplated by the Act, should be units for merely determination of ceilings for each member of awas urged that Article 31A(1) and 3lB of the Constitution operate in different fields of legislation. Whereas Article 3 IA( 1 ) cures certain possible invalidities in ordinary legislation, arising from its. inconsistencies with Articles 14 or 19 or 31 of the Constitution, Article 3lB cures a wider range of infirmities arising from conflict with any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution and necessitates a constitutional amendment so as to protect an impugned legislation by its inclusion in the 9th Schedule to the Constitution. Legislation protected by Article 31A o f the Constitution would fall under appropriate legislative entries in the 7th Schedule. But, to secure the protection of Article 3lB of the Constitution, resort to the provisions of Article 368 of the Constitution is imperative. These differences do not mean that legislation falling under any part of Article 31A(1) of the Constitution, including the provisos, cannot receive also the protection contemplated by Article 3lB of the Constitution. There is nothing in our Constitution to bar any statute from receiving a dual protection, so to speak, of both Article 31A(1) and 3lB of the Constitution if the conditions of each are satisfied.It is clear to us that the proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution confers certain rights upon individuals and protects them from -constitutionally illegal invasion. We are, therefore, unable to accept the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants that the "protective umbrella" of Article 3lB does not shield the impugned provisions , against an attack based upon the limits imposed by the second proviso to Article 31A(1) on legisl ative power. The argument overlooks certain obvious answers: firstly, that limits on legislative powers, imposed by Part III of the Constitution, do have the direct result of protecting individual rights; and, secondl y, that no part of the second proviso to Article 31 (1) of the Constitution was, as already pointed out above, infringed by the impugned provisions; and, thirdly, even if one were to assume, for the sake of argument, that rights conferred on individuals by the 2nd proviso to Article 31 (1), were infringed in any way, pro. visions of Article 31B of the Constitution are enough to repel an attack based upon such an alleged infringement. Both Article 31A(1) and 31B are intended to operate as protections against consequences of what could otherwise be breaches of the Constitution.