Case: Dr. J. P. Kulshreshtha and Others Vs. Chancellor, Allahabad University, Raj Bhawan and Others

hammer home the point that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that of academicians when the dispute relates to educational affairs. While there is no absolute ban, it is a rule of prudence that courts should hesitate to dislodge decisions of academic bodies. But university organs, for that matter any authority in our system, is bound by the rule of law and cannot be a law unto itself If the Chancellor or any other authority lesser in level decides an academic matter or an education al question, the Court keeps its hands off; but where a provision of law has to be read and understood, it is not fair to keep the Court out. In Govinda Raos case (1) Gajendragadkar, J (as he they was) struck the right note:"What the High Court should have considered is whether file appointment made by the Chancellor Had contravened any statutory or finding rule or ordinance, and in doing so, the High Court should have shown due regard to the opinions expressed b y the Board and its recommendations on which the Chancellor has acted." (Emphasis added) 16. The later decisions cited before us broadly conform to the rule of caution sounded in Govinda Rao. But to respect an authority is not to worship it unquestioningly since the bhakti cult is inept in the critical field of law. In short, while dealing with legal affairs which have an impact on academic bodies, the views of educational experts are entitled to great consideration but not to exclusive wisdom. Moreover, the present case is so simple that profound doctrines about academic autonomy have no place here. 17. A strange submission was mildly made that the Executive Council has also the power to make ordinances and so, by accepting a low second class has equal to a High second class in the case of the three respondents, the Council must be deemed to have amended the ordinance and implicitly re- written it to delete the adjective high before second class. This argument means that an illegal act must be deemed to be legal by reading a legislative function into an executive action. Were this dubious doctrine applied to governmental affairs and confusion between executive and legislative functions juris prudentially sanctioned, the consequences could Well be disastrous to the basics of our democracy We mention this facet of the argument not only to reject it but to emphasize that small gain in some case should not justify the urging of propositions which are subversive of our Constitution Be that as it may, we are satisfied that respondents 5, 6 and 8 do not possess a high second class in their Masters degree. 18. The second condition successfully urged before the single judge of the High Court relates to Dr. Bhattacharya (R. 9). The point is that R. 9 and petitioner No. 2 for selection the second Petitioner lost his chance of being considered because he did not appear for the interview and Dr. Bhattacharya avert ed that fate because he was sent for a second time. The equivocal version of Dr. Bhattacharya has not been accepted by the learned single Judge and we are unhappy that an academic has been put to the necessity of this dubiety which suggests that taking liberties with truth for getting a temporary advantage is a tendency which does not spare highly educated and gifted persons. In this connection, even the terminological inexactitude indulged in by Dr. Hem Lata Joshi (R. 5) is not complimentary, when she says that in her application she gave 54 marks as against the actual figure of 52.2 and when challenged, she excused herself by saying that her memory, working in a hurry, let her down. We are satisfied that if the Selection Committee had chosen to give an opportunity to the 2nd petitioner, even as they did to R. 9, he might well have turned up and having regard to his high marks, might also have stood a good chance of being selected. The criticism is not that the Selection Committees action was mala-fide or biassed, but that there has been unequal treatment between equals. For this reason, the selection of R. 9 deserves to be struck down as violative of Art. 14. 19. Other minor points which have been urged and countered do not deserve serious consideration and we decline to deal with them. The conclusion we reach is that the selection and appointments of respondents 7 and 10 are good; but the selection and appointment of respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 are bad in law. 20. The tragic sequel cannot be dismissed as none of our concern because the Court, by its process, must, as far as possible, act constructively, minimising the injury and maximising the benefit. Indifference to consequences upon institutions and individuals has an imperial flavour and we wish to make it clear that the fact that since 1973 the respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 have been functioning as Readers without blemish is a factor which distresses us when we demolish their appointments. They have gained experience of several years in the Readers post. They are otherwise well qualified on the academic side. The short-fall in the matter of a high second class, while some of them have been doctorates, should not have such disastrous consequences as to throw out the appointees 7 years after. We think that these special circumstances may well justify the appropriate authority in the University resorting to alternatives which may mitigate their misfortune. We have been informed by counsel Mr. Manoj Swarup that the University is inclined to take an accommodative attitude to mitigate the hardship that may flow from the adjudication. Of course, they are free to take such steps as they deem just and necessary. We do not think there was anything wrong in Dr. Bhattacharya having been persuaded to come to the interview, but we regard it as improper that such a facility was not extended to the 2nd petitioner. 21.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is common ground that none of them has a first class. It is undisputed that the Allahabad University awards first class to those who obtain 60 % and above and second class to those who secure anything between 48 % to 59. For the nonce, we are not concerned with the other qualifications itemized in ordinance 9. The marks obtained by the appellants show that they are recipients of first class or high second class. The controversy is not about their eligibility but that of the contesting respondents. Dr. Mrs. Joshi (R. S) has secured 52.2 marks; Shri Saxena (R. 6) has scraped through with 49 .3 marks; Dr. Dutt (R. 7) has, however, obtained a firs t class while Shri Agarwal (R.8) is slightly below the middle line in the second class range having got only 53 .8, marks; Dr. Bhattacharya (R9.) has fared a little better with 54 .5 marks. Dr. Upadhyaya (R. 10) also has a better performance record in the Masters degree examination since he has 55.1 marks to his credit. From these figures it is obvious that Dr. Dutt (R.7) has the distition of being the holder of a first class. It is beyond ones comprehension how his selection ca n be challenged on the score of ineligibility. Indeed, the appellants have accepted the findings of the learned single Judge who has disallowed the writ petitions R. 7 and R. 10. We agree. Even in regard to the conclusion arrive d at so far as R. 10, Dr. Upadhyaya, is concerned who has secured marks above the middle line in the range between 48 % and 59 %, we are not disposed to disagree with the single Judge. Thus, the appointments of. 7 and R.10 do not call for any interference. The rest will, right now, be exposed to the actinic light of legal scrutinyWe think not. Any administrative or quasi judicial body clothed with powers and left unfettered by procedures is free to devise its own pragmatic, flexible and functionally viable processes of transacting business subject, of course to the basics of natural justice fair play in action, reasonableness in collecting decisional materials, avoidance of arbitrariness and extraneous considerations and otherwise keeping with in the leading strings of the law. We find no flaw in the methodology of `interviews. Certainly, cases arise where the are of interviewing candidates deteriorates from strategy to stratagem and undetectable manipulation of results is achieved by remote control tactics masked as viva voce tests. This, if allowed, is surely a sabotage of the purity of proceedings, a subterfuge whereby legal means to reach illegal ends is achieved. So it is that courts insist, as the learned single Judge has, in this very case, suggested on recording of marks at interviews and other fair checks like guidelines for marks and remarks about candidates and the like. If the court is skeptical, the record of the Selection proceedings, including the notes regarding the interviews, may have to be made available. Interviews, as such, are not bad but polluting it to attain illegitimate ends is badThe High Court at the two tiers has taken contrary views. But we are inclined to hold that a high second class is a mandatory minimum. A glance at the relevant portion of ordinance 9 reveals that wherever relaxation of qualifications is intended, the ordinance specifically spells it out and by necessary implication, where it has not said so, the possession of such qualification is imperative. We must remember that a Reader is but next to a Professor and holds high responsibility in giving academic guidance toe students. He has to be a creative scholar himself capable of stimulating in his students a spirit of enquiry and challenge, intellectual ferment and thirst for research. If the teacher is innocent of academic excellence, the student, in turn, will be passive, mechanical, negative and memorizing where he should be innovative, imaginative and inventive. The inference is irresistible that a Reader who guides the students and raises his faculties into creative heights is one who himself has had attainments to his credit. Putting aside for a moment the value of examinations and marks as indicators of the students potential, we must agree that the ordinance has a purpose when it prescribes atleast a high second class for a Readers post. It is obligatoryFor any layman the meaning is clear. For any purposeoriented interpretation the decoding is simple. High is the antithesis of low and a high second class is, therefore, a contrast to a low second class. When the range of second class marks is wide, of the candidate who gets that class with marks within the lower half bracket you cannot say he gets a high second class. If he manages to get 48 marks he barely gets a secondt a high second class. And commonsense which is not an enemy of court sense, points clearly to the meaning of high second class as one where the marks fall a little short of first class marks and he narrowly misses first class. In the context of ordinance 9 and its purpose an d the collocating of words used viz. first class or a high second class, the interpretation will misfire if we disregard the intent and effect of the adjective high and indifferently read it to mean merely the minimum marks needed to b ring the candidate within the second class. High is high and a superior second class denotes marks some where near first class marks. Assuming we relax, dilute and liberalize the rigour clearly imported by the draftsman by using the expression high second class, still it is impermissible to render the word high nugatory or make, by construction, that intensive adjective redundant. Nor are we impressed with the strange submission that the University has all these years treated a high second class to mean a male . second class, and, therefore English has lost its potency in the Allahabad University and high includes low. Such bathetic semantics must be rejected sucre continuing commission of wrong does not right itThe utmost we may reiuctantly accept is the construction that the learned single Judge has adopted. Draw a line at, and marks above and below that line will be high and LOW second class respectivelyHere we are concerned only with holders of second class from the Allahabad University and so the complication of other universities does not rise. Even otherwise, will reference to and particular university, the marks for second class may be from X to Y and high with reference to that university will be the superior half between X and Y. Lexically, logically, legally, teleologically, we, find the conclusion the same. We regretfully but respectfully disagree with the Division Bench and uphold the sense of high second class attributed by the learned single Judge. The mid line takes us to 54 and although it is unpalatable to be mechanical and mathematical, we have to hold that those who have not secured above 54 marks cannot claim to have obtained a high second class and are ineligible. In the instant case, Dr. Mrs. Joshi, Shri Saxena and Shri Agarwal do not fill the bill, their marks being below 54 in the Masters degree examination. We have earlier held that the power to relax, as the ordinance now runs, in so far as high second class is concerned, does not exist. Inevitably, the appointment of the 3 respondents violate the ordinance and are therefore, illegal. It is true, as counsel for the respondent urged, that the selection Committee is an expert body. But their expertise is not in law, but in other branches of learning and the final interpretation of an ordinance is a legal skill outside the academic orbitThis argument means that an illegal act must be deemed to be legal by reading a legislative function into an executive action. Were this dubious doctrine applied to governmental affairs and confusion between executive and legislative functions juris prudentially sanctioned, the consequences could Well be disastrous to the basics of our democracy We mention this facet of the argument not only to reject it but to emphasize that small gain in some case should not justify the urging of propositions which are subversive of our Constitution Be that as it may, we are satisfied that respondents 5, 6 and 8 do not possess a high second class in their Masters degreeThe equivocal version of Dr. Bhattacharya has not been accepted by the learned single Judge and we are unhappy that an academic has been put to the necessity of this dubiety which suggests that taking liberties with truth for getting a temporary advantage is a tendency which does not spare highly educated and gifted persons. In this connection, even the terminological inexactitude indulged in by Dr. Hem Lata Joshi (R. 5) is not complimentary, when she says that in her application she gave 54 marks as against the actual figure of 52.2 and when challenged, she excused herself by saying that her memory, working in a hurry, let her down. We are satisfied that if the Selection Committee had chosen to give an opportunity to the 2nd petitioner, even as they did to R. 9, he might well have turned up and having regard to his high marks, might also have stood a good chance of being selected. The criticism is not that the Selection Committees action wase or biassed, but that there has been unequal treatment between equals. For this reason, the selection of R. 9 deserves to be struck down as violative of Art. 14The conclusion we reach is that the selection and appointments of respondents 7 and 10 are good; but the selection and appointment of respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 are bad in lawThe tragic sequel cannot be dismissed as none of our concern because the Court, by its process, must, as far as possible, act constructively, minimising the injury and maximising the benefit. Indifference to consequences upon institutions and individuals has an imperial flavour and we wish to make it clear that the fact that since 1973 the respondents 5, 6, 8 and 9 have been functioning as Readers without blemish is a factor which distresses us when we demolish their appointments. They have gained experience of several years in the Readers post. They are otherwise well qualified on the academic side. Thel in the matter of a high second class, while some of them have been doctorates, should not have such disastrous consequences as to throw out the appointees 7 years after. We think that these special circumstances may well justify the appropriate authority in the University resorting to alternatives which may mitigate their misfortune. We have been informed by counsel Mr. Manoj Swarup that the University is inclined to take an accommodative attitude to mitigate the hardship that may flow from the adjudication. Of course, they are free to take such steps as they deem just and necessary. We do not think there was anything wrong in Dr. Bhattacharya having been persuaded to come to the interview, but we regard it as improper that such a facility was not extended to the 2nd petitioner.