Case: D. N. Banerji Vs. P. R. Mukherjee And Others

been constituted in connection with municipal and shire councils, municipal trusts and similar industries. The organization made claims in respect of work done by its members employed by certain municipal corporations in respect of the making, maintenance, control and lighting of public streets. The original reference stated the dispute as one which "relates to such operations of the said municipal corporations as do not consist of municipal trading," but it was subsequently amended during argument by substituting for the words "as do not consist of municipal trading" the words "as consist of the making, maintenance, control and lighting of public streets or any of them." (20) Two points were argued before the High court. The first one raised the question of the existence and extent of the immunity of municipalities as instrumentalities of government of the States, but it has no relevance here. The second point which is material was whether the employees of municipalities could be said to be engaged in an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 61, Ss. 35 of the Constitution. The corporations contended that they were not carrying on any Industry but only the normal functions assigned to them under the statute, and that there was therefore no Industrial dispute that could be referred to the arbitration court. The meaning of the words " Industrial disputes " used in the said sub-section had therefore to be ascertained and adjudged. The majority of the learned judges-four against two-decided in Favour of the union. Bach side put forward an extreme contention. For the claimant it was urged that "industrial" meant simply relating to industry in the abstract," whether it be in the exercise of trade, commerce, science or learned professions. The corporations contended that "industrial dispute" meant a "trade dispute." and that "trade dispute" means "a dispute in trade carried only the employer for profit." A formula midway between these two extremes was postulated in these terms by Isaccs and Rich, JJ. who were two out of the four who constituted the majority : "Industrial disputes occur when, in relation to operations In which capital and labour are contributed in co-operation for the satisfaction of human wants and desires, those engaged in co-operation dispute as to the basis to be observed, by the parties engaged, respecting either a share of the product or any other terms and conditions of their co-operation." (21) After giving copious extracts from the report of the Royal Commission appointed in 1890 in England to deal with labour problems, they summed up their final conclusion in these words at page 564 : "The question, of profit-making may be Important from an income-tax point of view, as in many municipal cases in England but from an industrial dispute point of view, it cannot matter whether the expenditure Is met by fares from passengers or from rates." (22) Dealing with the insistence by the corporations of the need for the profit-making motive as an essential element before one can say that a trade dispute or industrial dispute has arisen, Powers. J., who was also the deputy president of the arbitration tribunal, observed: " So far as the question in this cases is concerned, as the argument proceeded the ground mostly relied upon (after the councils were held not to be exempt as State instrumentalities) was that the work was not carried on by the municipal corporations for profit in the ordinal sense of the the term, although it would generally speaking be carried on by the councils themselves to save contractors profits. If that argument, were sufficient, then a philanthropist who acquired a clothing factory and employed the same 202 employees as the previous owner had employed would not be engaged in an occupation about which an industrial dispute could arise, if he distributed the clothes made to the poor free of charge or even if he distributed them to the poor at the bare cost of production. If the contention of the respondents is correct, a private company carrying on a ferry would be engaged in an industrial occupation. If a municipal corporation carried It on, it would not be industrial. The same argument would apply to baths, bridge building, quarries, sanitary contracts, gas making for lighting streets and public halls, municipal building of houses or halls, and many other similar industrial undertakings. Even coal-mining for use on municipal railways or tramways would not be industrial work if the contention of the respondents is correct. If the works In question are carried out by contractors or by private individuals it is said to be industrial, but not industrial within the meaning of the Arbitration Act or Constitution if carried out by municipal corporations. I cannot accept that view." (23) Having regard to the definitions found in our Act, the aim or objective that the legislature had in view, and the nature, variety and range of, disputes that occur between employers and employees, we are forced to the conclusion that the definitions in our Act include also disputes that might arise between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying out of a trade or business. It is unnecessary to decide whether disputes arising in relation to purely administrative work fall within their ambit. After all whether there is an industrial dispute at all is for government primarily to find out, for It is only then it has jurisdiction to refer. Moreover, it is not every case of an industrial dispute that government Is bound to refer. They may refer some, but may not also. It is a question of expediency. (24) There was no ground urged before us or before the High court that the sanitary inspector and the head clerk of the municipality were officers and not "workmen" within the meaning of the Act. The dispute raised on their behalf by the workers union of which they were members is, in our view, an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds](4) Whether on the facts of a particular case the dismissal of an employee was wrongful or justified is a question primarily for the tribunal to decide, and here the tribunal held that the dismissals were clear cases of victimization and hence wrongful. Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention, it is not for the High court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere(23) Having regard to the definitions found in our Act, the aim or objective that the legislature had in view, and the nature, variety and range of, disputes that occur between employers and employees, we are forced to the conclusion that the definitions in our Act include also disputes that might arise between municipalities and their employees in branches of work that can be said to be analogous to the carrying out of a trade or business. It is unnecessary to decide whether disputes arising in relation to purely administrative work fall within their ambit. After all whether there is an industrial dispute at all is for government primarily to find out, for It is only then it has jurisdiction to refer. Moreover, it is not every case of an industrial dispute that government Is bound to refer. They may refer some, but may not also. It is a question of expediency(24) There was no ground urged before us or before the High court that the sanitary inspector and the head clerk of the municipality were officers and not "workmen" within the meaning of the Act. The dispute raised on their behalf by the workers union of which they were members is, in our view, an "industrial dispute" within the meaning of the Act.