Case: PRATAP MEHTA Vs. SUNIL GUPTA

must stand dismissed with costs.? 31. The above decision in no manner support the case of the appellant rather it reiterates that the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can interfere with an arbitrary order passed by an authority. The next judgment relied by the appellant is Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Syed Yakoob (supra). This Court had elaborately considered the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution in the aforesaid case. This Court held that a writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. It was further held that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the High Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate court. 32. The findings of the fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. There cannot be any dispute to the above propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court. However, in the same judgment, in paragraph 8, following was laid down by this Court:- ?8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record……………………..? 33. Applying the above proposition in the present case, it was clear that High Court had referred to statutory provisions of Bar Council of India Rules and came to the conclusion that there was no notice of agenda for holding election of the State Bar Council member in the Bar Council of India for meeting dated 02.08.2014. An obvious error of law was committed by Bar Council of India in dismissing the election petition of Shri Sunil Gupta. The High Court was right in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction to set aside the erroneous order of the Bar Council of India. The High Court was, thus, well within its jurisdiction in deciding the writ petition and submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the writ petition. 34. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on K. Narasimhiah Vs. H.C. Singri Gowda and others, AIR 1966 SCC 330. In the above case, this Court held that three days clear notice to Councillors for holding a special general meeting is not mandatory. What was held that period of notice in the facts of that case was not mandatory. Present is not a case where any one has complained that there was no notice for meeting to be held on 02.08.2014. In the above case also, the notice was received by members, some of them have received three days notice, some of them had received notice of less than three days. In the above circumstances, this Court held that provision of three days notice was only directory and not mandatory. The said judgment has no application in the present case. 35. Another judgment relied by the appellant is P. Kasilingam Vs. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1981 SC 789 . In the said case, this Court was dealing with a question regarding effectiveness of resignation and consequence of withdrawal of resignation before the effective date. The said case has no application in the present case. Last case relied by the appellant is V.S. Krishnan and others Vs. Westfort Hi-tech Hospital Ltd. and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 363. In the above case, the Court held that when there are materials to show that notices were sent, the burden is on the addressee to rebut the statutory presumption. In paragraph 29, following has been held:- ?29. Section 172 as well as Section 53 emphasised ?giving notice?. We have already adverted to how notice should be given for AGM as per Section 172(2) and Sections 53(1) and (2) of the Act. In view of the fact that the Company has placed materials to substantiate that notices, in terms of the above provisions, were given, as rightly pointed out by learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondents, statutory presumption under Section 53 will apply though the said act is rebuttable. In view of the fact that there are materials to show that notices were sent, the burden is on the addressee to rebut the statutory presumption. The High Court, on verification of those materials, has concluded that ?postal receipt with post office seal was produced to show that notice was sent to all shareholders by certificate of posting in the correct address as per the report?.?

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]18. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid Rules indicate that for holding election of a member of Bar Council of India to be elected by State Bar Council, notice and agenda has to be issued by the Secretary of the State Bar Council, which is a statutory requirement. There is no issue between the parties regarding the fact that agenda dated 09.06.2014 was issued for the meeting of the members of the State Bar Council on 29.06.2014 including the agenda for electing a member from the State Bar Council to the Bar Council of India as noticed above. Minutes of the meeting dated 29.06.2014 has been brought on the record in Civil Appeal Nos. 8174-8177 of 2018 as Annexure A4. A perusal of the proceeding indicates that all 25 elected members and learned Advocate General, who is Ex-officio member was present and meeting started at 11.00 am and by 12.00 noon, the election of the Chairman was completed. The Minutes record that for greeting the newly elected Chairman and to see-off learned Advocate General, the proceeding of the meeting were stayed/adjourned and thereafter again the meeting started in presence of members for election of rest of the office bearers and members of the Committees.It is clear from the aforesaid that notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 were issued not for convening any adjourned meeting rather special meeting was convened to consider two set of letters given by members of the Council requesting for convening a meeting for holding elections of office bearers and the members of different Committees including representative to Bar Council of India and for considering no confidence motion against the Chairman of the State Bar Council. In the notice dated 16.07.2014 as well as notice dated 19.07.2014, the subject of special meeting was thus for disposal of letters received by the members of the Council. It is to be noted that the minutes of the proceeding dated 29.06.2014 has recorded and signed by Chairman containing the election of not only the Chairman rather election of other office bearers and different representatives, which is clear from the proceedings brought on the record by Bar Council of India itself as Annexure A4. It is a well established principle that minutes of the proceeding signed by the Chairman are prima facie evidence of proceeding and decisions recorded therein are deemed to be valid until contrary is proved.Thus, the letters issued by the members on 29.06.2014 and 13.07.2014 raised a dispute containing allegations disputing minutes of the proceeding of the meeting dated 29.06.2014. Thus, it was a disputed matter as to what actually happened on 29.06.2014, i.e. as to whether the election of other office bearers and representatives were validly completed on 29.06.2014 or after the election of the Chairman, the meeting was adjourned. This dispute was to be resolved in the special meeting dated 02.08.2014, which was clearly indicated by notice dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 as indicated above. The issue of agenda alongwith the notice is requirement of a valid meeting and it is only in context of adjourned meeting that no fresh agenda need to be issued. The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 having not contained any agenda and the meeting also not being described as adjourned meeting, issuance of agenda for the meeting was necessary. Issuance of an agenda, if any election was to be conducted on 02.08.2014 was necessary.We, thus, do not find any infirmity in the view of the High Court - both of learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench that no election could have been conducted on 02.08.2014 for electing member to the Bar Council of India from the State Bar Council. Further, the election of the member to the Bar Council of India is statutorily regulated by Bar Council of India Rules and Rule 7 require notice by the Secretary of the State Council fixing a date for the election of the member to the Council. The notices dated 16.07.2014 and 19.07.2014 cannot be read as notice as required under Rule 7 for holding election of a member to the Bar Council of India from the State Bar Council, hence, the conduct of election of a member as a representative from State Bar Council to Bar Council of India in the meeting dated 02.08.2014 cannot be said to be in conformity with Rule 7 of Bar Council of India Rules. The High Court was, thus, clearly right in its view that election of Shri Pratap Mehta on 02.08.2014 as member of the Bar Council of India was not a valid election. The learned Single Judge having already taken a view that election dated 29.06.2014 electing Shri Sunil Gupta as the representative to the Bar Council of India was not a valid election, which issue was not, however, agitated either by the State Council or by Shri Sunil Gupta, there is no need to ponder over the above election. Both the elections dated 29.06.2014 and 02.08.2014 to elect a member in the Bar Council of India having been held to be invalid, the High Court was right in issuing directions for conducting a fresh election to elect a member in the Bar Council of India, which was necessary and just.Applying the above proposition in the present case, it was clear that High Court had referred to statutory provisions of Bar Council of India Rules and came to the conclusion that there was no notice of agenda for holding election of the State Bar Council member in the Bar Council of India for meeting dated 02.08.2014. An obvious error of law was committed by Bar Council of India in dismissing the election petition of Shri Sunil Gupta. The High Court was right in exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction to set aside the erroneous order of the Bar Council of India. The High Court was, thus, well within its jurisdiction in deciding the writ petition and submission of the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding the writ petition.Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on K. Narasimhiah Vs. H.C. Singri Gowda and others, AIR 1966 SCC 330. In the above case, this Court held that three days clear notice to Councillors for holding a special general meeting is not mandatory. What was held that period of notice in the facts of that case was not mandatory. Present is not a case where any one has complained that there was no notice for meeting to be held on 02.08.2014. In the above case also, the notice was received by members, some of them have received three days notice, some of them had received notice of less than three days. In the above circumstances, this Court held that provision of three days notice was only directory and not mandatory. The said judgment has no application in the present case.