Case: M/S. Castrol India Ltd Vs. Comnr. Of Central Excise, Calcutta-I

oils or by blending or compounding of mineral oils with any other ingredients, from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon under Section 3 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944).Explanation - The expression "mineral oil" has the meaning assigned to it in Explanation 1 to Item No.6 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944)."Entry no.11B reads as follows:"11B - Blended or compounded lubricating oils and greases:"Blended or compounded lubricating oils and greases" means lubricating oils and greases obtained by straight blending of mineral oils or by blending or compounding of mineral oils with any other ingredients.Explanation - The expression "mineral oil" has the meaning assigned to it in Explanation 1 of Item No.6." 11. Chapter 27 so far as relevant for the purpose of present dispute contains sub-headings 2710.60 and 2710.99 which read as follows: "2710.60 - Lubricating oil, that is to say, any oil as is ordinarily used for lubrication, excluding any hydrocarbon oil which has it s flash point below 94ÂºC.2710.99 - Others." 12. In Collector of Customs, Bangalore vs. Maestro Motors Ltd. (2004 (174) ELT 289 (SC) , this Court held as follows: "It is settled law that to avail the benefit of a notification a party must comply with tall the conditions of the Notification. Further, a Notification has to be interpreted in terms of its language. If in the Notification exemption is granted with reference to tariff items in the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, then the same Rules of Interpretation must apply. In that case the goods will be classified, even for the purposes of the Notification, as they are classified for purposes of payment of duty. But where the language is plain and clear effect must be given to it. In this Notification what is exempted is components, including components of fuel efficient motor cars in semi-knocked down packs and completely knocked down packs. Undoubtedly, for purposes of levy of custom duty, by virtue of Interpretative Rule 2(a), the components in a completely knocked down pack would be considered to be cars. But in view of the clear language of the Notification the components including components in completely knocked down packs are exempted. Effect must be given to the wording of the Notification. Thus components in completely knocked down packs would get the exemption under this Notification, even though for purposes of classification they may be considered to be cars." Section 5A(4) of the Act reads as under: "Every notification issued under sub-rule (1), and every order made under sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, and in force immediately before the commencement of the Customs and Central Excise Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 shall be deemed to have been issued or made under the provisions of this Section and shall continue to have the same force and effect after such commencement until it is amended, varied, rescinded or superseded under the provisions of this Section." 13. Undisputedly in the present case there was no reference to any tariff entry in the Notification. Therefore, the majority view is clearly unsustainable. Additionally, we find that CEGAT had in some other cases taken the same view as the minority view. It is fairly accepted by learned Additional Solicitor General that there has been no challenge to the said decisions one of which is Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-I (2003 (154) ELT 698 (Tri -Kolkata) decided on 30.10.2002.14. Exemption Notification 120/84-CE dated 11.5.1984, in view of what is prescribed in Section 5A(4) of the Act, continued to be operative and effective as it was not amended, varied, rescinded or superseded under the provisions of Section 5A of the Act.15. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, Vol.5, at page 2753, we find: "That is to say" is the commencement of an ancillary clauses, which explains the meaning of the principal clause. It has the following properties : (1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause; (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the physical clause is general in terms it may restrict it; see this explained with many examples, Stukeley vs. Butler Hob. 1971". The quotation, given above, from Strouds Judicial Dictionary shows that, ordinarily the expression "that is to say" is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word "includes" is generally employed. In unusual cases, depending upon the context of the words "that is to say", this expression may be followed by illustrative instances. (See State of T.N. vs. Pyare Lal Malhotra (1976 (1) SCC 834 ), Mahindra Engineering and Chemical Products Ltd. vs. Union of India (1992(1) SCC 727); Sait Rikhaji Furtarnal vs. State of A.P. (1991 Supp (1) SCC 202); and R. Dalmia vs. C.I.T. (1977 (2) SCC 467 ).16. The expression "that is to say" is descriptive, enumerative and exhaustive and circumstances to a great extent the scope of the entry. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. vs. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 511 ).17. The expression "that is to say" in sub-heading 2710.60 has to be interpreted to be words of limitation. The fact that sub-heading 2710.60 contains an exclusion clause goes to show that there may be other lubricating oils which may fall in the residuary heading "others".18. The sub-heading 2710.60 significantly uses two expressions. They are (i) "that is to say" and (ii) "excluding". The first expression is used in description, enumerative and exhaustive sense and to a great extent circumstances the scope of the entry. But the second expression dilutes the pervasiveness by carving out an exception for the purpose of the particular sub-heading a particular type of lubricating oil. All other types of lubricating oil are covered by the residuary entry i.e. 2710.99.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]13. Undisputedly in the present case there was no reference to any tariff entry in the Notification. Therefore, the majority view is clearly unsustainable. Additionally, we find that CEGAT had in some other cases taken the same view as the minority view. It is fairly accepted by learned Additional Solicitor General that there has been no challenge to the said decisions one of which is Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-I (2003 (154) ELT 698 (Tri -Kolkata) decided on 30.10.2002.14. Exemption Notification 120/84-CE dated 11.5.1984, in view of what is prescribed in Section 5A(4) of the Act, continued to be operative and effective as it was not amended, varied, rescinded or superseded under the provisions of Section 5A of the Act.15. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, Vol.5, at page 2753, we find: "That is to say" is the commencement of an ancillary clauses, which explains the meaning of the principal clause. It has the following properties : (1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause; (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the physical clause is general in terms it may restrict it; see this explained with many examples, Stukeley vs. Butler Hob. 1971". The quotation, given above, from Strouds Judicial Dictionary shows that, ordinarily the expression "that is to say" is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word "includes" is generally employed. In unusual cases, depending upon the context of the words "that is to say", this expression may be followed by illustrative instances. (See State of T.N. vs. Pyare Lal Malhotra (1976 (1) SCC 834 ), Mahindra Engineering and Chemical Products Ltd. vs. Union of India (1992(1) SCC 727); Sait Rikhaji Furtarnal vs. State of A.P. (1991 Supp (1) SCC 202); and R. Dalmia vs. C.I.T. (1977 (2) SCC 467 ).16. The expression "that is to say" is descriptive, enumerative and exhaustive and circumstances to a great extent the scope of the entry. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. vs. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 511 ).17. The expression "that is to say" in sub-heading 2710.60 has to be interpreted to be words of limitation. The fact that sub-heading 2710.60 contains an exclusion clause goes to show that there may be other lubricating oils which may fall in the residuary heading "others".18. The sub-heading 2710.60 significantly uses two expressions. They are (i) "that is to say" and (ii) "excluding". The first expression is used in description, enumerative and exhaustive sense and to a great extent circumstances the scope of the entry. But the second expression dilutes the pervasiveness by carving out an exception for the purpose of the particular sub-heading a particular type of lubricating oil. All other types of lubricating oil are covered by the residuary entry i.e. 2710.99.