Case: Dhiyan Singh &amp; Another Vs. Jugal Kishore &amp; Another

further forty years, and led Mt. Mohan Dei to believe that they also acknowledged her title to an absolute estate. We have no doubt that down to that time Kishan Lal was also estopped for the reasons given above. Had he questioned the award and reopened the dispute Mt. Mohan Dai would at once have sued and would then for forty years have obtained the benefit of property from which she was excluded because of her acceptance of the award on the faith of Brijlals assertion that he too accepted it. Kishan Lals inaction over these years with full knowledge of the facts, as is evident from the deposition of D. W. 2 Dhiyan Singh whose testimony is uncontradicted. and his acceptance of the estate with all its consequential benefits, unquestionably creates an estoppel in him. The witness tells us that:"Kishanlal always accepted this award and acted upon it."He qualifies this in cross-examination by saying that Kishan Lal had also objected to it but the witness did not know whether that was before or after Mt. Mohan Deis death. The documents file show it was after, so there is no reason why the main-portion of his statement which is uncontradicted, and which would could have been contradicted should not be accepted.19. In March 1929, Mt. Mohan Deis son Shri Kishan Das died and Kishan Lal thereupon became the next presumptive reversioner, and in October 1929 when the reversion opened out the estate vested in him, or rather would have vested in him but for the estoppel. The question, therefore, is did he continue to be bound by the estoppel when he assumed a new character on the opening out of the reversion? We have no doubt he did. The decision of the Judicial Committee which we have just cited, Kinhai Lal v. Brijlal,45 Ind. App 118, is we think, clear on that point. Although other reversioners who do not claim through the one who has consented are not bound, the consenting reversioner is estopped This is beyond dispute when there is an alienation by a limited owner without legal necessity. See Ramgouda Annagouda v. Bnausahab,54 Ind. App 396 at p. 408, where the ground of decision was:"..... but Annagouda himself being a party to and benefiting by the transaction evidenced thereby was precluded from questioning any part of it"In our opinion, the same principles apply to a case of the present kind.20. It was contended, however, on the strength of Bangaswami Gounden v. Nachiappa Gounden, 46 Ind. Ap 72 and Mt. Binda Kuer v. Lalitha Prasad, A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 304 at p. 308, that even if Kishan Lal did take possession in 1889 or 1890 on the strength of a title derived from his father that would not have precluded him from asserting his own rights in a different character when the succession opened out Reliance in particular was placed upon p. 308 of the latter ruling. In our opinion, that decision is to be distinguished.21. In that case the reversion did not fall in till 1916. Long before that, namely in 1868, the next presumptive reversioners entered into a compromise whereby the grandfather of one Jairam who figured in that case obtained a good deal more than be would have been entitled to in the ordinary way But for the compromise this grandfather would have got only one anna 12gundasshare, whereas due to the compromise he got as much as 2 annas 4gundas. The total taking of possession was however deferred under the compromise till the death of one Anandi. Kuer. She died in 1885 and on that date Jairam was entitled to his grandfathers share as both his father and grandfather were dead. Jairam accordingly reaped the benefit of the transaction. But it is to be observed that the extra benefit which he derived was only as to a 12gundasshare because he had an absolute and indefeasible right to 1 anna 12gundasin any event in his own right under a title which did not spring from the compromise.22. Jairam lost 1 anna 4gundasto a creditor Munniram and out of the one anna which he had left from the 2 anna 4 gundas he sold 13 gundas to the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 500 Now it is evident that on those facts it is impossible to predicate that the 13 gundas which the plaintiffs purchased came out of the extra 12 gundas which Jairam obtained because of the compromise rather than out of the 1 anna 12gundasto which he had a good and independent title anyway; and of course unless the plaintiffs 13 gundas could be assigned with certainty to the 12 gundas it would be impossible to say that they had obtained any benefit from the compromise. The Judicial Committee also added that even if it was possible to assign this 13 gundas with certainty to the 12 gundas it by no means followed that the plaintiffs admitted that fact nor would that necessarily have given them a benefit under the compromise. They had the right to contest the position and gamble on the possibility of being able to prove the contrary. Their Lordships added:"Unless the plaintiffs individual conduct makes it unjust that they should have a place among Bajrangi Lals reversioners their legal rights should have effect."23. In the other case, Rangaswami Gounden v. Machiappa Gounden,46 Ind. App 72, their Lordships decision about this matter turned on the same sort of point : see p. 87.24. The present case is very different. When Kishan Lal took possession of his fathers property he held by virtue of the award and under no other title, and for forty years he continued to derive benefit from it. Accordingly, he would have been estopped even if he had claimed in a difference character as reversioner after the succession opened out.25. It was conceded that if the estoppel against Kishan Lal enured after October 1929, then the plaintiffs, who claim through Kishan Lal, would also be estopped.26.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. We do not thinkthese passages qualify the operative portion of the award and are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court who hold they do. In our opinion, the arbitrator was confused in his mind both as regards the facts as well as regards the law. His view of the law may have been wrong but the words used are, in our opinion, clear and, in the absence of anything which would unambiguously qualify them, we must interpret them in their usual sense.is neither here nor there whether the award was valid, whether the decision fell within the scope of the reference or whether it had any binding character in itself. Even if it was wholly invalid, it was still open to the parties to say: Never mind whether the arbitrator was right or wrong, his decision is fair and sensible, so instead of wasting further time and money in useless litigation. we will accept it and divide the estate in accordance with his findings. That would have been a perfectly right and proper settlement of the dispute, and whether it bound third parties or not it would certainly bind the immediate parties; and that in effect is what they did. By his conduct Brijlal induced . Mohan Dei to believe that this would be the case and on the faith of that representation, namely the acceptance of the award, he induced Mt. Mohan Dei to act greatly to her detriment and to alter her position by accepting the award and parting with an appreciables portion of the estate, and he himself obtained a substantial advantage to which he would not other wise have been entitled and enjoyed the benefit of it for the rest of his life; and to his credit be-it said, he never attempted to go behind his decision. In any event, we are clear that that created an estoppel as against Brijlal.In our opinion, the present case is very similar to the one which their Lordships of the Privy Council decided in Kanhai Lal v. Brif Lal,45 Ind. App 118 P. C. There also there was a dispute between a limited owner and a person who, but for an unproved claim (adoption) which he put forward, had no right to the estate. The dispute was taken to the Courts but was compromised and according to the agreement the property was divided between the two rival claimants and the agreement was given effect to and acted on for a period of twenty years. Later, the succession opened out and the other party to the compromise, who by then had stopped into the reversion, claimed the rest of the estate, which had been assigned to the limited owner. against her personalJudicial Committee rejected the claim on the ground of estoppel and held that even though the plaintiff claimed in a different character in the suit, namely as reversioner, he having been a party to the compromise and having acted on it and induced the other side to alter her position to her detriment, was estopped. We do not think the fact that there was a voluntary compromise whereas here there was the imposed decision of an arbitrator makes any difference because we are not proceeding on the footing of the award but on the actings of the parties in accepting it when they need not have done so if the present contentions arehave no doubt he did. The decision of the Judicial Committee which we have just cited, Kinhai Lal v. Brijlal,45 Ind. App 118, is we think, clear on that point. Although other reversioners who do not claim through the one who has consented are not bound, the consenting reversioner is estopped This is beyond dispute when there is an alienation by a limited owner without legal necessity.The present case is very different. When Kishan Lal took possession of his fathers property he held by virtue of the award and under no other title, and for forty years he continued to derive benefit from it. Accordingly, he would have been estopped even if he had claimed in a difference character as reversioner after the succession opened out.It was conceded that if the estoppel against Kishan Lal enured after October 1929, then the plaintiffs, who claim through Kishan Lal, would also be estopped.