Case: Delhi Development Authority Vs. Sukhbir Singh

of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Section 11A can have no application to cases of acquisitions under Section 17 because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said Act by which land statutorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. [para 15] 26. Satendra Prasad Jains case has been held in a subsequent judgment, namely, Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar, (2015) 10 SCC 241 , to have a limited ratio. The limited ratio has been said to be that it is not open to the beneficiary of an acquisition who has failed to make the necessary monies available, and who has been in occupation of the land since its possession was taken, to subsequently urge that such possession was taken illegally. It is clear that on the facts of that case, it was the land owners who filed a writ petition asking for a mandamus to complete the acquisition proceedings, and the State and the beneficiary of acquisition tried to resile from it by contending that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 11A of the Act. It was in these peculiar circumstances that the aforesaid judgment was delivered. 27. Even going by paragraph 15 of the Satendra Prasad Jains case, we find that the difference in phraseology between Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act really clinches the issue in favour of the land owners. The expression used in Section 24(2), namely, deemed to have lapsed is of great significance and differs from the use of the expression lapsed in Section 11A. As is well settled, a deeming fiction is enacted so that a putative state of affairs must be imagined, the mind not being allowed to boggle at the logical consequence of such putative state of affairs. Even if we are to agree with Shri Sharan that, post vesting, acquisition proceedings cannot be said to lapse, yet we have to give effect to the deeming fiction contained in Section 24(2). In fact, Section 24(2) uses the expression deemed to have lapsed because the Legislature was cognizant of the fact that, in cases where compensation has not been paid, and physical possession handed over to the State, vesting has taken place, after which land acquisition proceedings could be said to have ended. For this reason also, we are of the view that Pune Municipal Corporation does not require to be revisited. 28. It remains to deal with one submission of Shri A.K. Sanghi. According to Shri Sanghi, physical possession has not been taken of the land in dispute. We are afraid this may not be correct. The Panchnama dated 27th January, 2000 specifically records that possession of the land above stated was recovered and handed over to the representatives of the Office of Land and Buildings. The Panchnama is also signed by all the necessary officers. This piece of land admittedly being open land is governed by the ratio of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 792 in which it has been held: In Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal [(2011) 5 SCC 394 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 747] , the Court referred to the judgments in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat [(1976) 1 SCC 700] , Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab [(1996) 4 SCC 212] , P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka [(2005) 12 SCC 489] , NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta [(2009) 8 SCC 339 : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 375] , Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 10 SCC 501 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 268] and culled out the following propositions: (Banda Development Authority case [(2011) 5 SCC 394 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 747] , SCC p. 411, para 37) (i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken. [para 27] 29. As the present case will fall within sub-paragraph (ii), physical possession of the land can be said to have been taken on the facts of the present case. 30. Having regard to the law declared in the Pune Municipal Corporation case, as followed by the other judgments of this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court is correct and that the impugned judgment calls for no interference.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]20. On facts, it is clear that neither tender, that is offer to the original claimant nor payment has been made in the manner provided by Section 31 read with Standing Order No. 28 of 1909. In the present case, as has been admitted in the affidavit filed in this Court, the DDA was not ready with compensation payable on the day the award was pronounced, but only handed over such compensation to the Land Acquisition Collector five years after the award was pronounced, that is, in 2002. The Land Acquisition Collector, in its turn, did nothing whatsoever to offer the said sum or pay it to the original owners. On the contrary, by moving an application on the eve of the coming into force of the 2013 Act, and by depositing the said amount of compensation paid to it in the year 2002 only on 30th December, 2013, it is clear that the aforesaid mandatory provision and procedure were not followed by the authorities. The present original land owners lands were notified for acquisition on 24th October, 1961, of which possession was taken four decades later, in 2000; after which the land owners have yet to see the colour of the paltry amount of compensation offered which has neither been tendered nor paid to them. In the facts disclosed by this case, there could not be stronger facts to hold such acquisition non est in accordance with the object sought to be achieved by Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. This piece of land admittedly being open land is governed by the ratio of Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 792     in which it has been held:In Banda Development Authority v. Moti Lal Agarwal [(2011) 5 SCC 394   : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 747] , the Court referred to the judgments in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat [(1976) 1 SCC 700]   , Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab [(1996) 4 SCC 212]   , P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka [(2005) 12 SCC 489] , NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta [(2009) 8 SCC 339   : (2009) 3 SCC (Civ) 375] , Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) [(2009) 10 SCC 501   : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 268] and culled out the following propositions: (Banda Development Authority case [(2011) 5 SCC 394   : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 747] , SCC p. 411, para 37)(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to constitute taking of possession(iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land and take possession in the presence of independent witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the acquired land has not been taken(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such document(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken. [para 27]29. As the present case will fall within sub-paragraph (ii), physical possession of the land can be said to have been taken on the facts of the present case30. Having regard to the law declared in the Pune Municipal Corporation case, as followed by the other judgments of this Court, we are of the opinion that the High Court is correct and that the impugned judgment calls for no interference.