Case: BASHEERA BEGAM Vs. MOHAMMED IBRAHIM &amp; ORS

should fully be established. The circumstances should be conclusive. The circumstances established should definitely point to the guilt of the accused, and not be explainable on any other hypothesis. The circumstances should exclude any other possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. 190. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharastra (1984) 4 SCC 116 the Supreme Court held that where there is no eye witness to the occurrence and the entire case is based upon circumstantial evidence, the normal principal is that the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn must be cogently and firmly established; these circumstances should be of a definite tendency, unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused; the circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that in all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and they should be incapable of any explanation or of any hypothesis other than or inconsistent with the guilt of the accused. The same view was reiterated in Bablu vs. State of Rajasthan 2006 (13) SCC 116 and in Vijay Shankar vs. State of Haryana 2015 (12) SCC 644. The judgment in Praful Sudhakar Parab vs. State of Maharashtra 2016 (12) SCC 783 cited by Mr. Tulsi was rendered in the particular facts and circumstances of the case where this Court found that the High Court had, after elaborately considering all the evidence on record, rightly affirmed the conviction. 191. In Satish Nirankari vs. State of Rajasthan 2017 (8) SCC 497 , this Court reiterated that criminal cases cannot be decided on the basis of hypothesis. It is for the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is for the prosecution to prove all circumstances which leave no doubt of the guilt of the accused. The chain of circumstances must be complete and must clearly point to the guilt of the accused. The chain cannot get broken in between. 192. It is well settled, suspicion however strong cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Enmity as a result of property related disputes may give rise to suspicion. However, conviction can never be based on suspicion unless the prosecution clearly proves circumstances conclusively and all circumstances proved should only point to the guilt of the accused. Possibility of any conclusion other than the conclusion of guilt of the accused would vitiate a conviction. 193. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the burden of proving an accused guilty beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. If upon analysis of evidence two views are possible, one which points to the guilt of the accused and the other which is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, the latter must be preferred. Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the Court might reverse an order of acquittal if the Court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be not guilty. When there is circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused, it is necessary to prove a motive for the crime. However, motive need not be proved where there is direct evidence. In this case, there is no direct evidence of the crime. 194. In Sadhu Saran Singh vs. State of U.P. 2016 (4) SCC 357 , this Court observed that an appeal against acquittal has always been on an altogether different pedestal from an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal, where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the Appellate Court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity. In this case, it cannot be said that the reasons given by the High Court to reverse the conviction of the accused are flimsy, untenable or bordering on perverse appreciation of evidence. 195. Before a case against an accused can be said can be said to be fully established on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must fully be established and the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. There has to be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable doubt for any conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 196. In Shanti Devi v. State of Rajasthan (2012) 12 SCC 158 this Court held that the principles for conviction of accused based on circumstantial evidence are :- 10.1 The circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be proved must be cogently or firmly established. 10.2 The circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. 10.3 the circumstances taken cumulatively must form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability, the crime was committed by the accused and none else. 10.4 the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. 197. Keeping the above test in mind we have no option but to hold that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. There is a strong possibility that the motorcycle which the deceased were riding, might have been hit by an unknown vehicle, killing the deceased. The death may have been accidental. The High Court has rightly set aside the judgment and order of conviction of the Trial Court and acquitted the accused.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]21. There can be no doubt, as argued by Mr. Tulsi, that even though the Supreme Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, such discretion has to be exercised in order to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice. If the decision of the High Court is mis-conceived and perverse, there is nothing in law which prevents the Supreme Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136 against an order of acquittal, as observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Islam & Ors. 2011 (6) SCC 343. When acquittal cannot be sustained at all, in view of the evidence on record, this Court is duty bound to set aside the acquittal29. There can be no doubt that direct evidence of conspiracy is almost never available and that existence of conspiracy has necessarily to be inferred from the circumstances of the crime, as held by this Court in Vijay Shankar vs. State of Haryana 2015 (12) SCC 644 , Praful Sudhakar Parab vs. State of Maharashtra 2016 (12) SCC 783  and Satish Nirankari vs. State of Rajasthan 2017 (8) SCC 497 cited by Mr. Tulsi. It is however doubtful, whether existence of conspiracy can at all be inferred from the circumstances in this case, considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution37. From his evidence, it appears that the motor cycle was identified at the place of occurrence. There were tyre marks of a four wheeler. Broken yellow glass pieces were found at the place of occurrence which appeared to be broken pieces from the side light of a vehicle. There were also broken plastic pieces, which appeared to be the broken pieces of the indicator of a four wheeler41. It is true that no witness is likely to notice details such as the number of glass pieces found at the site of an accident which left human beings dead. Inability to recall such details does not in itself affect the credibility of the witness. However, in this case, there is nothing at all in the evidence of PW-1, to establish the guilt of the accused persons or any of them, and certainly not beyond reasonable doubt42. All that PW-1 has said is that there were disputes between A3 and D2 with regard to the properties of Sulaimaan Rowthar and his daughter. No specific reason for enmity between A1 and D2 or between A4 and D2 has emerged from the evidence of this witness43. The 2nd Prosecution Witness (PW-2) M. Nagoor Gani, stated that he had travelled to Arasarkulam from Aranthangi by the last MPTC bus. This witness deposed that on the way he had seen that there were two dead bodies lying at about a distance of one kilometer to the north of Paapankulam, some distance away from the railway gate. The dead bodies were of PW-1s sisters son and A4s son. There was a motorcycle nearby. The Driver stopped the bus at the roadside after which the passengers got down and saw the bodies. Thereafter PW-2 along with one Ganapathy, who had also been travelling in the same bus, went and informed PW-1 of the death. PW-2 said that the police had examined him 1½ years after the incident. Nothing has emerged from the evidence of this witness to establish the guilt of the accused45. PW-3 stated that on the date of the incident, D2 left Arasarkulam along with D1, saying he wanted to meet his lawyer in Aranthangi. He did not return. On 29th December, 1990, at about 8.00 a.m., she was told that her husband, that is D2, had been found dead near the railway level crossing near Paapankulam, on the road from Aranthangi. She said she told the police that she suspected the involvement of A3 and A4 in view of the disputes over family property. On her own admission what she deposed was based on suspicion. The evidence of PW-3 does not establish any motive to murder D247. The 5th Prosecution Witness, M. Shanmuga Sundaram, a practising advocate in Aranthangi (PW-5), said that he knew D2, who belonged to his neighbouring village. He deposed that PW-5 and A4 were in the same political party in 1990. He denied having conducted any civil case for D2, son of A4. He also asserted that he had not been in Aranthangi on the date of the incident. He had gone to Chennai. Nothing has emerged from the evidence of this witness to establish the guilt of the accused51. PW-6 said that he contacted Mayilsami (PW-7) through telephone, but he was not in the village. PW-6 took the lorry to the brokers shop. A few days later, the Police came in a car, went to the RVS lorry shed, where the lorry was parked, and seized the lorry. A5 had also come with the police. PW-6 said that he had not seen A1 after 20.12.1990, whereupon he was declared hostile and cross-examined. In his cross-examination he categorically denied having told the police that A1 had come to his house before 6.30 a.m. on 29.12.1990. PW-6 categorically denied as incorrect, the statements to the police attributed to him56. PW-8 stated that A1 had come in the said lorry and claimed to be the driver of the lorry. PW-8, had obviously not known the person who had brought the lorry, as otherwise that person would not have asserted that he was the driver of the lorry. PW-8 however, identified A1. It is incredible that PW-8 should be able to recognize the driver of the lorry as A1 after so many years, when he could not identify the lorry60. The evidence of PW-8, if accepted, would at best, establish that a lorry with a broken side light on the left, had been brought for repair to Arokyams workshop, early one morning before 4.00 a.m. in the year 199061. PW-8s evidence that A1 had brought the lorry cannot be accepted, because it is virtually impossible that A1 should be able to recognize A1 after so many years, and that too when he has himself said that he had been sleeping when the lorry was brought to the workshop. When confronted in cross-examination, PW-8 tried to improve upon his evidence by saying that the person who had brought the lorry was with him till the forenoon, thereby contradicting his answer to an earlier question, that he could not prepare the job card for repair because he had been sleeping when the lorry was brought. Moreover, if as deposed by PW-8 the driver of the lorry had given him Rs.100/- towards repair charges and instructed him that delivery of the lorry be given to PW-6, there was no reason for the driver to stay at the workshop till forenoon62. The 9th Prosecution Witness, Kuppusami (PW-9) denied knowledge of the death of D1 and D2 and stated that he was not in the village on the day of the incident. He said that he had not been examined by the police. This witness was declared hostile and permitted to be cross-examined. In cross-examination by the prosecution this witness refuted the suggestions put to him. He denied having made the statements to the police attributed to him. He denied his presence at the place of occurrence and also denied having been examined by the police. Nothing emerged from the cross examination of PW-9 to establish the guilt of the accused63. The 10th Prosecution Witness, M. Abdul Jaffar (PW-10) deposed that he knew A1 and A3 to A6, but did not know A2, A7 and A8. He stated that the prosecution wanted him to be a witness and say something about the death of two persons on the road. This witness was declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. He denied all the material suggestions put to him and denied having made to the police, the statements attributed to him. Nothing emerged from his cross-examination67. This witness deposed that he did not know A2. This witness was also declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. He denied having made to the police the statements attributed to him. In particular, he denied having told the police that a Leyland lorry was kept near National Battery Works from 24.12.1990. He denied that he had seen or spoken to A2. The material suggestions made to him have been denied. Nothing has emerged in his examination to establish the guilt of the accusedThe evidence of PW-17 only proves that the lorry was brought to the battery shop for getting its battery charged four days before the incident. His evidence is of no help to the ProsecutionThis witness stated that the lorry which had been seized was Parked outside the Court premises. This witness denied the suggestion made to him in course of his cross examination on behalf of the accused, that his signatures in Exs. P4, P5 and P9, as also the confessional statement had been obtained at the Police Station77. The 20th Prosecution Witness Rajendran (PW-20), deposed that at the time of the occurrence he had been VAO Thoothukkudi. Early in the morning on 29.12.1990, his Assistant, Karuppan, came to him and told him that two dead bodies had been found near Paapankulam on the road. On hearing this, he immediately went to the place of occurrence with his Assistant, in a TVS 50 vehicle. He said that the dead bodies were lying on the tar road in Sendurayanendal village, north of Paapankulam and at a short distance there was a black coloured motor cycle. The deceased were PW-1s sisters son and elder son of A4. Bloodstains were spilt on the road. There were glass pieces. The rear view mirror was broken into pieces. To the north of the scene of occurrence, there was a mile stone with the number 8. There were broken teeth, a Reynold ball point pen and some coins on the road. This witness stated that they were at the place of occurrence by 6.00 a.m. in the morning. The police were also there. As it was dark, it was difficult to detect things. The Inspector came at around 8.00 a.m. and prepared a rough sketch. PW-20 said he had helped in preparing the sketch. The place of occurrence was photographed and an observation Mahazar prepared. By 3.00 p.m. the police seized the motor cycle, the glass and plastic pieces found on the road, the coins, broken teeth, a watch, a ball point pen and prepared a Mahazar which was signed by this witness. PW-20 said that he was with the police when they recovered the objects. By 5.00 p.m. the police collected bloodstained soil and small pieces of blood stained tar from the road. PW-20 identified the left side mirror of the motor cycle, left side indicator of the motor cycle, white plastic pieces, orange plastic pieces, ball point pen and other similar articles. Nothing has emerged in the evidence of this witness to establish the guilt of the accusedThis witness could not even say whether the pond was filled with water or not. He also could not identify A7. He, however, asserted that M.O.23 was the iron rod. He also stated that a Mahazar was prepared (Ex.P-14) which they signed. Significantly, no other witness examined so far has said anything about recovery of any iron rod from a pond at Maangudi84. Even though, PW-22 in effect opined that, it was possible that the injuries on the face could have been caused if the deceased had been beaten on the face with an iron rod similar to M.O.-23, he also said that some of these injuries (Injury Nos.1 and 3) were simple. Injuries 4 and 5 could also have been caused if a person had fallen after being thrown off and that there was no impression of the deceased being hit by M.O.-23. The evidence of this witness suggests the likelihood of D2 having been run over by a heavy vehicle, which caused his death88. From the evidence of this witness, it appears that the injuries found on the body of D1 could have been caused if D1 had been thrown off the motorcycle and landed on hard ground after collision with another vehicle. The injuries could also have been caused if D1 were hit by a rod similar to MO2. The opinion of this witness with regard to the cause of D1s death, is inconclusive89. The 24th Prosecution Witness Radhakrishnan (PW-24), who had been working as Motor Vehicle Inspector Grade-I, Palani, Dindigul district, described the damages on the motor cycle on which the deceased were riding. He opined that the damages could have been caused either if the motor cycle had been hit by another vehicle or if the motor cycle had fallen. His evidence is of no help to the Prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused93. PW-25 said that he did not have special knowledge of heavy vehicles other than lorries and buses. He said the head lights of a bus, lorry and a car were of the same size. The quality of the headlight as also the glass cover of the indicator would depend on the manufacturer94. This witness could not say whether the glass pieces at the place of occurrence were from a lorry, bus or car. This witness said the quality of the paint would depend on the company which manufactured the paint. He could not say which company had manufactured the paint collected in this case. He also could not say when a part of the front side of the lorry had been painted black and red95. The 26th Prosecution Witness, A. Subramanian (PW-26) only stated that he had taken photographs of two dead bodies. Nothing much has emerged from his examination96. The 27th Prosecution Witness, Thiyagarajan (PW-27) also a photographer, stated that he had taken photographs of the lorry at the Aranthangi Police station. His evidence is of no relevance99. The 29th Prosecution Witness, P. Govindarajan (PW-29), a constable in Manamelkudi Police Station deposed that on 30.4.1990, A4 had come to the Nagudi police station and complained against his son D1. The complaint was Ex.P-20. The police made inquiries and thereafter advised D2 not to pick quarrels with his father, whereupon D2 had promised that he would not fight with his father over family property. His evidence has no connection with the occurrence of 28/29 December, 1990100. The 30th Prosecution Witness, Sub-Inspector, G. Chinnadurai (PW-30) stated that he had worked as Sub-Inspector at Jagadapattinam from 14.9.1997 and sub-Inspector Nagudi from 8.7.1992. In 1989, Sivasubramanian (since deceased) who had then been serving as Inspector Aranthangi, had registered the case, Crime No.160/89 at Nagudi police station under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complaint which related to land involved One Alaguraj and Kasilingam on one aide and Perumal, Kumar Karuppiah and Rangan on the other. This witness said he knew Sivasubramanians handwriting and signature. In cross-examination this witness could not say if the complaint was lodged because of the refusal of Perumal and others to vacate disputed land. The evidence of this witness also has no bearing on the incident which took place on 28/29 December, 1990101. The 31st Prosecution Witness A. Hamsat (PW-31), a Head Constable of Avudayarkoil Police Station, stated that at the time of occurrence he had been a Grade-II constable at Aranthangi and had taken the dead body of D2 to the Government Hospital for post mortem and brought it back after the post mortem. His evidence is of no relevance to the guilt of the accused102. The 32nd Prosecution Witness R. Sethu (PW-32), who had been Sub-Inspector at Aranthangi police station on 29.12.1990, had registered the complaint lodged by PW-1, on the basis of which Crime No.668/90 was started. He said that the FIR (Ex.P2) was sent to the Court of the Judicial Magistrate on the same day. His evidence is of no relevance. None of the accused except the A1 were even named in the FIR. Even so far as A1 is concerned, there is nothing concrete in the FIR. A finger of suspicion has only been pointed towards him103. Nothing significant has emerged from the examination of the 33rd Prosecution Witness P. Kannappan (PW-33) who had only sent a requisition (Ex P-22) to Court to forward material objects concerning the case for chemical analysis report from the Forensic Science Laboratory, Chennai. He was later transferred104. The 34th Prosecution Witness, A.S. Ramu, Chief Scientific Assistant of the Forensic Laboratory at Chennai (PW-34), a handwriting expert with experience of about 20 years in examination of questionable documents stated, that he had been required to compare the handwriting of the entries in Serial No. 942 at Page 54 of a Register belonging to Malar Lodge Hotel Karaikudi (Ex P-24) which he had numbered Q1 and Q2 with the specimen handwriting and signatures of one of the accused (A8). Even assuming, that the signature and handwriting of A8 was there in the register, it only establishes that the said accused may have visited the hotel six months before the incident108. The 38th Prosecution Witness M. Radhamani (PW-38), a Scientific Assistant Grade-I stated that the blood sent for examination was human blood, but grouping was not possible. The blood in two glass tubes, which were of D1 and D2 was examined but the grouping was inconclusive. Some items of the material objects being P1 contained human blood of O group. Grouping of blood found in some other articles was not possible. Her evidence has no relevance to the guilt of the accused111. The 40th Prosecution Witness, Alagappan (PW-40), who had worked as Manager, Malar Hotel, Karaikkudi from 1989 to 1991 denied that he knew A8. He said that he did not know A2. He said that there was lodging facility in Hotel Malar. The police came and made enquiries. He said that there was an admission register in the Malar Lodge Hotel. On 21.6.1991, the Receptionist had made an endorsement at Sl. 942 of the Register. He said that the Receptionist used to enter the particulars of the persons who used to come and stay in the hotel. This witness was also declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution. In crossexamination he denied all the suggestions made to him. He denied having made the statements to the police attributed to him. Nothing has emerged from the examination of this witness to establish the guilt of the accused.112. The 41st Prosecution Witness, Dr. S. Diwakar (PW-41), a Professor of Forensic Science of Vinayaka Medical College Hospital, Salem certified that the teeth examined by him were of a human body. His evidence is of no relevance to the guilt of the accusedIn his cross-examination PW-42 denied having made to the police, the statements attributed to him. He said that tinkering work had been done on the lorry. The headlights on the right had the word LUCAS but on the left side there was a new Diamond light. It was thus apparent that one of the headlights had been changed. This witness denied having told the police that the damages could have occurred due to an accident. This witness was unable to recollect whether the questions put to him by the prosecution in Court, had been put to him by the police118. In cross-examination PW-43 admitted that even though the FIR named P.L. Subbiah, Perumal, Kumar, Kulanthaiyan and a few others as suspects, PW-43 did not examine them. He said, he did not examine them because, the Inspector who had earlier been in charge of investigation, had examined them. This witness was unable to say when the persons named above were examined by his predecessor. He also could not recollect whether the persons were arrested, without going through all the files. He said that he had started the investigation after reading the relevant files. Dr. Usen Masthan (PW-22), Dr. Murugesan, PW-11 and PW-12 had been examined by his predecessor. In the FIR, the accused other than A3 were not named. A1 was named as as an accused on 4.2.1991 as also A4 to A8136. In cross-examination PW-44 said that after inspecting the place of occurrence he was of the view that the persons lying dead must have been murdered and he continued his investigation on that basis. PW-44 said that, even before examination of the doctors, who had conducted the post mortem, PW-44 had come to conclusion that the deceased had been murdered. After examining the doctors PW-44 became certain. He took up investigation on the basis that the case was of murder. After examining Mumtaz Begum, he arrived at the final conclusion that the deceased persons had been murdered. He added the offence of Section 120B of IPC on 4.2.1991. He said after examining PW-39 Farooq and PW-10 Abdul Jafar he knew that there was a conspiracy behind the murder, which had taken place on 21.6.1990 in the Malar Lodge Hotel at Karaikudi. Significantly both PW-39 and PW10 denied this and were declared hostile. PW-44 said that when he arrested the accused and recorded their confessional statement, the Village Administrative Officer and his Assistant concerned signed as witnesses. No signature was obtained from any uninterested and/or independent witness. In the case file PW44 did not state that no independent witness had come forward to sign the confessional statement. PW-44 said that he had not examined Sethu, the Sub-Inspector of Police. Nor had he asked him why he had straight away registered the case under Section 302 on the basis of the complaint of the PW-1. PW-44 denied the suggestion that he had conducted the investigation at the dictates of PW-1 and his supporters139. In cross-examination this witness said that the case files were with him from the date of commencement of investigation by him till date. He had examined S.I. Sethu (PW-32) who had received the complaint and registered the case being Crime Number 668/1990. This witness had not asked Sethu why he had registered the case under Section 302 IPC at the initial stage itself. This witness said he had not examined PW-39 Farooq and PW-10 about the conspiracy. He denied that he had supported PW-1 Sahul Hameed as he belonged to the ruling party and had colluded to implicate A2 to A8 in the offence of conspiracy. He said he had recorded the statements of those witnesses whom he had examined and not those who had been examined earlier. He said he had examined Fathima Beevi and recorded her statement. He said he had not recorded the statements of witnesses who had been examined earlier and re-examined by him. He denied that he had not seen A2 till the chargesheet was filed. He denied that A2 was not in India at the time of the conspiracy140. As stated above, no defence witness was examined on behalf of the accused. All the accused persons offered themselves for examination under Section 313 of the Code of the Criminal Procedure Code. They denied their guilt and claimed to be innocent141. The Prosecution was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that pursuant to a conspiracy between A1 to A8, A1, A2 and A3 murdered D2 and D1. A1 driving his lorry No.TSL 6579, dashed against the motor cycle which D2 and D1 were riding, and thereafter A-2 and A-7 beat them to death with iron rods142. The Prosecution has only been able to conclusively establish that, on 28.12.1990 at around 8.30 p.m., D2 rode out of Arsarkulam, towards Aranthangi on Motorcycle No. TN 55/1406 owned by his father, A-4, with D1 on the pillion. The two were seen lying dead on the road, in a pool of blood, a few furlongs away from the level crossing at Sarayanenthal, Pappakulam and their motorcycle was lying close by143. The evidence of PW-22 and PW-23, who performed the post mortem examination of the dead bodies of D2 and D1 respectively, proves that D2 and D1 both died of injuries, and consequential loss of blood and shock144. From the evidence of PW-22 and PW-23, being the two post mortem doctors, and the evidence of PW-1, PW-20, PW-24, PW-25 and PW-35, it may reasonably be inferred that there was a collision between the motorcycle, which the deceased were riding, and some other vehicle. The broken glass and plastic pieces recovered from the scene of occurrence confirm that there was a collision. However, there being no ocular evidence, it is not known whether the collision was head on or whether the motor cycle was hit from the back. There is also no expert opinion in this regard145. The evidence of PW-22 indicates that D2 fell off his motorcycle on hard ground, after a collision and got run over by a vehicle. He may also have hit a solid blunt object. Some of the injuries were caused by the impact of the collision or fall and others due to being run over. The post mortem doctor said that the dead body of D2 did not bear any impression of being hit by the rod being MO 23146. This witness, however, stated that it was also possible, that some of the fatal injuries might have been inflicted on D2 by hitting him hard with a rod similar to MO.23. The opinion of the post mortem doctor, PW-22, on the cause of the injuries in the body of D2 is not conclusive. The prosecution has not been able to establish that D2 had been beaten to death by a rod147. Similarly, PW-23 opined that D1 is likely to have died of injuries sustained in the head, brain and other vital parts of the body, as a result of collision of the motorcycle with some other vehicle, and of shock and haemorrhage. It is likely that the impact of collision with a fast-moving vehicle might have flung D1 off the motorcycle on which he was pillion rider, and caused him to fall on hard ground or hit some hard object. He might also have been run over148. PW-23 said that one of the injuries which caused instantaneous death may have been inflicted by a rod similar to MO-23, but in his cross examination he stated that the injury/injuries may have been caused as a result of collision between two vehicles. D1 may have incurred the injury/injuries by getting flung off the motor cycle and hitting hard ground or some blunt object, or by getting run over by a vehicle. The opinion of PW-23 on the cause of the injuries in the body of D1 is also not conclusive149. On a careful analysis of the post mortem reports and the oral evidence of the post mortem doctors, we find it unlikely that the deceased were beaten to death with an iron rod. PW-22 was of the opinion D2 fell off the motor cycle after a collision and got run over. The Prosecution has miserably failed to prove that the deceased were beaten to death with a rod. The Prosecution has also not been able to rule out the possibility of D1 and D2 being killed in a hit and run accident involving some unknown vehicle150. There are also inherent improbabilities and inconsistencies in the evidence which demolishes the case of the Prosecution that the deceased were beaten to death with iron rods by A2 and A7. It does not stand to reason why A2 and A7 should have risked getting off the lorry and beating D2 and D1 with iron rods, when A1 had dashed his lorry against their motor cycle, fatally injured them and run at least one(D2), if not both of them over. It is not the case of the Prosecution that the accused had any motive to kill D1151. Moreover, while it is alleged that A2 and A7 had hit both the deceased with iron rods, only one iron rod has allegedly been recovered from an open, easily accessible pond, over a month after the incident on the alleged confession of A7 made before the police after arrest. There is no whisper in the evidence of any other iron rod. PW-29, the sole witness who testified that A2 made a confession to the police in his presence, took the police to Maangudi and brought the iron rod out of a pond in his presence, could not even remember if there was any water in the pond. Nor could he identify A7. The rod was never sent for forensic examination. It would be dangerous to convict A2 or A7 on the basis of the testimony of PW-29 or for that matter, any other witness. There can be no question of interference with the acquittal of A2 and A7 from the charges against them152. There was no eyewitness to the incident. The Prosecution has made an attempt to connect the lorry No. TSL 6579 to the incident through circumstantial evidence, by examining PW-6, PW-7, PW-8, PW-11, PW-12, PW-14, PW-15, PW-16, PW-17, PW-19, PW-25, PW-27, PW-35, PW-42, PW-43, PW-44 and PW-45 and also relying on material objects such as broken glass pieces, broken plastic pieces, paint scrapings seized from the place of occurrence as also the number plate of a lorry with the number TSL 6579, an indicator with bulb and a partly orange and partly transparent plastic cover, an indicator without bulb and cover, a circular lamp 14.5 cm in diameter with lamp and yellow glass cover and a circular lamp holder 14.5 cm in diameter without lamp and cover. The number plate, indicators and lamps were not seized from the place of occurrence153. The evidence of PW-6, PW-7 and PW-17 only establishes that A1 purchased lorry No. TSL 6579 through brokers PW-6 and PW-7 with the assistance of A5 and A6 about 7/8 days before the incident. About four days before the incident, the lorry had been brought to Karaikuddi National Battery company for getting its battery charged. Since the battery needed replacement, but a new battery was not in stock, a serviced battery was fitted in the lorry, which was never returned154. Significantly, the evidence of PW-6 reveals that A1 had earlier, long before the alleged conspiracy at the Malar Lodge Hotel on 21.6.1990 purchased a lorry with the Registration No TDB 9635 for which A5 had stood guarantor. This lorry was sold some time in October, 1990, about four months after the date of the alleged conspiracy, and in less than two months, on or about 20/21 December, 1990 Lorry No.TSL 6579 was purchased. It is, therefore, evident that A1 used to have a lorry, or at least had one since January 1990 with a short break, possibly for the purpose of his business. It would be preposterous to attribute the purchase of the lorry to the sinister motive of murdering D2. The Prosecution has made no attempt to explain why A1 should have sold the lorry he already had if there were a conspiracy to kill D2 by hitting him or running him over with a lorry155. From the evidence of aforesaid witnesses as also the evidence of PW-8, PW-14, PW-15, PW-16 and PW-17 it transpires that the lorry was brought to Arokyams workshop at Mannaparai on 29.12.1990 for minor repairs. After the repairs were done PW-6 took delivery of the same and left it at a lorry shed near the office of A7, who had sold the lorry to A1 through A6. PW-14, the owner of the workshop deposed that PW-6 had instructed him to repair a minor dent. There is nothing in the evidence of PW-6 or PW-7 to link the lorry with the death of D2 and D1. Incidentally, PW-6 said he had not seen A1 after 20.12.1991, whereupon he was declared hostile and subjected to cross-examination. PW-6 said the lorry had been seized by the police156. Much emphasis has been placed by the Appellants, on the evidence of PW-8, an employee of workshop of Arokyam, who deposed that a lorry had been brought to the workshop for repair one morning in 1990 before 4.00 a.m. PW-8 could not say what was the Registration Number of the lorry. He, however, said that A1, had brought the lorry claiming to be its driver. PW-8 also stated that A1 had told him that the lorry had been hit by a bull157. There is serious lacuna in the evidence of this witness who seems to have been tutored. It is incredible that this witness should be able to recognize and identify A1 whom he obviously did not know, and that too when he had seen him only once, before 4.00 a.m. in the morning, on being woken up from his sleep. If PW-8 had known A1 from before, it would not have been necessary for A1 to introduce himself to PW-8 as the driver of lorry No. TSL 6579. Moreover, PW-8 has not, in his evidence, stated that he recognized A1 as had had known him from before158. There are other notable inconsistencies in the evidence of PW-8. He said that ordinarily a job card is prepared when a lorry is brought for repair. In this case no job card had been prepared as he had been sleeping when the lorry had been brought. In crossexamination he said that the person who had brought the lorry was with him till the forenoon. This was obviously an improvement in evidence, in cross-examination, to explain how he could recognize A1159. Through the evidence of this witness and through PW Nos. PW-8, PW-25 and PW-35 the Prosecution has made a desperate attempt to link lorry No. TSL 6579 to the death of D1 and D2. From the evidence of PW-8 read with the evidence of PW-14, the Prosecution has tried to show that A1 brought the lorry for repair early in the morning before 4.00 a.m. on 29.12.1990 suggesting that the lorry had been involved in the incident which took place the previous night, of which of course, there is no direct evidence. The lorry was damaged on the left side. This in itself does not establish any link between lorry and the incident. Incidentally, this witness also stated that A1 had told him that the lorry had been hit by a Bull. There is no evidence to suggest that the damage that was found on lorry TSL 6579 could not have been caused by a bull160. PWs 11, 12 and 13 were all declared hostile. Nothing has emerged from their cross-examination to link lorry No. TSL 6579 with the death of D2 and D1. PW-11 said that he did not know A1, A3 or A4. He had never seen A7 before. He denied having seen A1 and two others get off from the lorry and go to a tea shop. PW12 said that he was not in town on the date of the incident. He had gone to Pondicherry to buy a car. He denied having told the police that a Leyland lorry had been kept parked near National Battery Works from 24.12.1990, which statement, even if made, does not connect the lorry to the incident which occurred on 28.12.1990. This witness also denied having seen or spoken to A2. PW-13 stated that he had fixed his thumb impression on certain documents as the police asked him to do so161. PW-14 the owner of a workshop identified PW-8 who had worked as a tinker at his shop. He said he had gone to Trichy on 28.12.1990 and came back to Mannaparai on 29.12.1990. When he returned, he saw that the lorry TSL 6579 had been kept in his workshop for repair. PW-6 had requested him to repair the lorry. There was a small dent in the front left side of the lorry, and the bolts and nuts were loose. The repairs were carried out. However, nobody came to take the lorry. After 4 or 5 days he met PW-6 at a bus stand at Trichy, and told him the lorry had been repaired. PW6 took the lorry away after paying him the balance repair charges. This witness did not say that the lorry was left at the workshop at 4.00 a.m. The 6th and 7th Prosecution Witnesses only identified the Cash Memos/bills issued by them for lorry No. TSL 6579 and confirmed, deposed that they had sold side lights/lamps for the front side of a lorry under those cash memos/bills162. PW-25 only stated that the left side of the lorry No. TSL 6579 was tinkered with a light coating of a black and red. The yellow light on the right was found in good condition. The yellow light on the left was found broken. However, the cash memos indicate that the bulbs and side lights was sold on 3.1.1991. Arokyam (PW-14), deposed that the lorry had been delivered to PW-6 after repair work had been carried out. The lorry was seized from the lorry shed near PW-7s office on 8.2.1991. The evidence of PW-42 indicates there were dents in the lorry and in particular its grill in front. If on 9.2.1991 any sidelights or lamps of the lorry were damaged or any part of the lorry were found dented, the damage must have occurred subsequently. An attempt was made to relate the lorry to the incident by comparison of glass pieces, plastic pieces, paint scraping etc. In cross-examination, PW-25 could not even say whether the glass pieces found at the scene of occurrence were from a lorry, bus or a car. He could not conclusively say that paint scrapings found at the place of occurrence were of lorry No. TSL 6579. There was never any comparative analysis of the width, volume, quality etc. of the glass and plastic pieces recovered from the place of occurrence with the side light, indicator or headlight covers found on the lorry, as admitted by PW-25163. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the lorry TSL 6579 had been brought to the workshop for repair with minor dent and a broken sidelight or lamp and the colour of some broken glass pieces at the scene of occurrence matched the colour of the side light and or indicators of the lorry, that does not prove involvement of the lorry in the same incident. Many lorries have the same kind of lamp/indicator covers. Moreover the lorry was purchased second hand and there is no evidence at all of the condition of the lorry at the time of its delivery to A1164. Significantly the accident took place on the night of 28/29.12.1990. The tenor of the evidence suggests that the lorry had been lying at the workshop for 4 to 5 days. The repairs had been completed. Both the bills/cash memos in respect of bulbs and side lights with the number of the lorry are dated 3.1.1991. PW-35 has in his evidence stated that the vehicle was seized as late as on 8.2.1991. If the lorry was found with any broken lamps, loose screws and bolts or dents almost a month and a half after the incident, long after purchase of replacement parts, the lorry in all probability got damaged while it was parked at the shed from which it was seized or may be afterwards165. In any case, even assuming for the sake of argument that lorry No. TSL 6579 was the lorry, which knocked down the motorcycle which the deceased were riding, and ran over the deceased, that in itself cannot lead to the conviction of any of the accused under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There is not an iota of evidence to establish that A1, A2 or A7 were in the lorry, except for the alleged extra judicial confession of A7 made in the presence of the police, which cannot be accepted for the reasons discussed. The mere fact that A1 might have been driving the lorry also does not establish that he committed murder166. To establish motive for the murder the Prosecution has tried to build up a case of enmity between A3 and D2 and also of disputes between A1 and A3 and D2. A3 was named as a possible suspect in the FIR. There may have been enmity between D2 and A-3, but A-3 was not there at the scene of occurrence. It is not the case of the Prosecution that A3 committed the murder. There is no evidence of his involvement in the murder of D2 and D1. In any case, he could not have had any motive to kill D1. Furthermore, the evidence of PW-1 indicates that disputes with A3 were compromised with the intervention of the District Collector167. The allegations of disputes between A1 and D2, his own brother, are totally vague and devoid of any particulars. There is no evidence at all, of any specific reason for discord between A1 and D2, not to speak of evidence of dispute of a kind that could lead to a murder168. There is some evidence of differences between D2 and his father A4. PW-3, widow of D2 deposed that D2 and his father A4 had not been on talking terms for about 2 years, since A4 had not agreed to partition family properties as demanded by D2, or to make over his petrol bunk to D2169. A4 had also made a complaint to the police. The dispute was apparently settled on 30.4.1990 on the advice of PW-29, and D2 promised not to quarrel with his father over property matters. There is no evidence that he breached such promise170. Even assuming that there were some differences between D2 and his father A4 over D2s demand for partition of family properties, to which A4 did not accede, no compelling reason has been made out by the Prosecution for A4 to plot the murder of his own son171. Property disputes amongst family members is not uncommon. There may also be quarrels between members of a family. They may not be on talking terms. However, to attribute motive to a father to plot the murder of his own son, there would have to be more compelling reasons. The case made out by the Prosecution is speculative and unsubstantiated172. In any event, it is not the case of the Prosecution that either A3 or A4 committed the murder, or was even present at the place of occurrence. Furthermore, it is nobodys case that A2, A5, A6, A7 and A8 or any of them had any enmity with D2173. To implicate the accused, the Prosecution has propounded the case of conspiracy hatched by all the accused at Malar Lodge Hotel on the night of 21.6.1990, to bump off D2, by using a lorry174. The Prosecution has miserably failed to prove that there was any conspiracy to kill D2 at the Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi, or anywhere else. Mr. Tulsis submission that there was evidence that on 21.6.1990, the accused had booked a room at Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi, and conspired to kill D2 with the help of a lorry, cannot be sustained175. The only evidence with regard to the alleged conspiracy is the absolutely inadmissible hearsay evidence of PW-44, a police officer who investigated the crime. PW-44 stated that he had examined PW-39, who had in course of his examination stated that A1 had asked PW-39 and PW-10 to accompany him to Karaikudi for purchase of lorry spare parts177. According to PW-44, PW-39, had told him that PW-39 could not sleep all night. The next day PW-39 and PW-10 went to the house of A3 and told A3 about what had happened at the Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi. A3 advised them not to disclose what had happened to anyone178. Significantly, PW-10 has in his evidence denied that he knew A2, A7 or A8. He said he knew A1 and A3 to A6. PW-10 deposed that he only knew that D2 and D1 had died but nothing further. He said that Police had examined him. He deposed that the Police wanted him to be a witness to depose about the death of D2 and D1 on the road. This witness, as stated above, was declared hostile and cross-examined. In his cross-examination he categorically denied knowing A2, A7 A8 or of their alleged contact with A-3. He categorically denied having gone to Karaikudi with any of the accused. He also categorically denied that he had told the police about any conspiracy179. PW-39, Farooq deposed that he knew A2 and A7 but he did not know A8. He said A2 and A7 used to come to the house of A3. In Court he deposed that the police had not examined him whereupon he was declared hostile and cross-examined. In his cross-examination he denied having told the police that he and PW-10 had been taken to Karaikudi for purchasing lorry spare parts. He denied having told the police that he had gone to Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi. He also denied having told the police anything about any conspiracy. He categorically denied having told the police that he and PW-10 had sat in the last row while the others conspired to murder D2180. PW-39 denied that A2 and A7 had asked A-1 to arrange for a lorry. In any case, there could be no need for A-1 to arrange a lorry, since already A1 had a lorry TDB 9635, which was sold about four months later181. PW-39 categorically denied knowledge of conspiracy. He even denied having gone to Karaikudi at the request of A1182. Apart from the fact that PW-10 and PW-39 have categorically denied their presence at Karaikudi on 21.6.1990, there are patent inconsistencies in the evidence of PW-44 in this regard. If A3 was present at the Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi at the time of the conspiracy on 21.6.1990, there could be no reason for PW-10 or PW-39 to go to A3s house and tell him about the conspiracy. Nor would A3 advise PW-10 and PW-39 not to divulge the conspiracy to others183. Even otherwise, it is inconceivable that the accused should hatch a conspiracy to commit murder, in the presence of witnesses who were not part of the conspiracy184. It is also difficult to fathom why PW-10 and PW-39 were never arrayed as co-accused, if they were present at the time of the conspiracy and they chose to keep quiet about the conspiracy. No credence can be given to the evidence of PW-44185. It is well settled that statements made to the police under Section 161 of the the Criminal Procedure Code in course of investigation are inadmissible in evidence. The evidence of PW-44 with regard to what two witnesses namely, Abdul Jafar (PW-10) and Farooq (PW-39) told him in course of investigation is inadmissible in evidence, and of no value. Significantly, both PW10 and PW-39 categorically denied having made to the police, the statements attributed to them186. PW-40 who had worked as Manager, Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi from 1989 to 1991 denied knowing A8 or A2. He said that the endorsement at Sl.942 of the Register had been made by the Receptionist of the hotel. It was the Receptionist who used to enter particulars of persons who stayed in the hotel. The Manager of the hotel was also declared hostile and crossexamined by the witness. In cross-examination he denied all the suggestions made to him. In particular, he denied having made the statements to the police, attributed to him187. The appellants have relied on the evidence of PW-34, a handwriting expert, to prove that the accused had taken part in a conspiracy at the Malar Lodge Hotel on 21.6.1990. Evidence of experts is not always conclusive. As observed by this Court in Murari lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1980 (1) SCC 704  there is hazard in accepting the opinion of an expert, not because an expert is not reliable as a witness, but because human judgment is fallible. While the science of identification of finger-prints has attained perfection, with practically no risk of an incorrect opinion, the science of identification of handwriting is not so perfect. In this case the evidence of PW-40, manager of Malar Lodge Hotel contradicts the evidence of PW-34188. In any case, the evidence of the hand writing expert (PW-34) establishes at the highest, that one of the accused that is A-8, who had no enmity with the deceased, had made entries in and signed the admission register of the Malar Lodge Hotel. The evidence of PW-34, at best proves that A8 may have checked into Malar Lodge Hotel, Karaikudi on 21.6.1990, six months before the incident and nothing more. There could be numerous reasons for A8 to go to Karaikudi. The Prosecution has not been able to satisfactorily explain the gap of over six months between the incident and the date on which the alleged meeting took place at the Malar Lodge189. It is well settled that under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in this country an accused is presumed innocent, unless proved guilty beyond all reasonable doubt192. It is well settled, suspicion however strong cannot substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Enmity as a result of property related disputes may give rise to suspicion. However, conviction can never be based on suspicion unless the prosecution clearly proves circumstances conclusively and all circumstances proved should only point to the guilt of the accused. Possibility of any conclusion other than the conclusion of guilt of the accused would vitiate a conviction193. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the burden of proving an accused guilty beyond all reasonable doubt lies on the prosecution. If upon analysis of evidence two views are possible, one which points to the guilt of the accused and the other which is inconsistent with the guilt of the accused, the latter must be preferred. Reversal of a judgment and order of conviction and acquittal of the accused should not ordinarily be interfered with unless such reversal/acquittal is vitiated by perversity. In other words, the Court might reverse an order of acquittal if the Court finds that no person properly instructed in law could have upon analysis of the evidence on record found the accused to be not guilty. When there is circumstantial evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused, it is necessary to prove a motive for the crime. However, motive need not be proved where there is direct evidence. In this case, there is no direct evidence of the crimeIn this case, it cannot be said that the reasons given by the High Court to reverse the conviction of the accused are flimsy, untenable or bordering on perverse appreciation of evidence195. Before a case against an accused can be said can be said to be fully established on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn must fully be established and the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. There has to be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable doubt for any conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.197. Keeping the above test in mind we have no option but to hold that the prosecution has miserably failed to establish the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. There is a strong possibility that the motorcycle which the deceased were riding, might have been hit by an unknown vehicle, killing the deceased. The death may have been accidental. The High Court has rightly set aside the judgment and order of conviction of the Trial Court and acquitted the accused.