Case: STATE OF M.P &amp; ORS.  Vs. RAKESH SETHI &amp; ANR.

and royalty. If this were not so, it would lead to the absurd result that when the government grants a mining lease, it is granted gratis to a person who wants to extract minerals and profit from them. Rules for regulating the grant of mining leases cannot be confined merely to rules providing for the form in which applications for such leases are to be made, the factors to be taken into account in granting or refusing such applications and other cognate matters. Such rules must necessarily include provisions with respect to the consideration for the grant. Under Section 15(1), therefore, the State Governments have the power to make rules providing for payment of surface rent, dead rent and royalty by the lessee to the government. 36. In Jaintia Hill Truck Owners Assn (Supra) , this court had pertinently observed in the context of services rendered by weighment, through third party, agencies, where the state enabled charging of fee, that: 28. Where the State or the State-controlled agencies render services for the purpose of effectuation of the provisions of a Central Act, it, in our opinion, is entitled to charge a reasonable amount in respect thereof. We may, in this behalf, refer to a decision of this Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem [AIR 1961 SC 276 : (1961) 1 SCR 750 ] . The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether in absence of any law regulating the appointment and succession of chiefs and headmen, a notice issued to the respondent therein to show cause as to why he should not be removed from his office, was valid. 37. The decision cited in Jaintia Hill (supra) – i.e., T. Cajee v U. Jormanik Siem 1961 (1) SCR 750. considered the validity of appointment of a village headman by an autonomous district council, under provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The High Court upheld the argument that a conferment of legislative power (conferred upon the District Council) if not exercised, did not empower the council to issue appointment in the absence of rules. This court disapproved the High Courts reasoning and held that: With respect, it seems to us that the High Court has read far more into Para 3(1)(g) than is justified by its language. Para 3(1) is in fact something like a legislative list and enumerates the subjects on which the District Council is competent to make laws. Under Para 3(1)(g) it has power to make laws with respect to the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen and this would naturally include the power to remove them. But it does not follow from this that the appointment or removal of a Chief is a legislative act or that no appointment or removal can be made without there being first a law to that effect. The High Court also seems to have thought that as there was no provision in the Sixth Schedule in terms of Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution, the administrative power of the District Council would not extend to the subjects enumerated in Para 3(1). Now Para 2(4) provides that the administration of an autonomous district shall vest in the District Council and this in our opinion is comprehensive enough to include all such executive powers as are necessary to be exercised for the purposes of the administration of the district… 38. The other decision, cited in Jaintia Hill (supra), i.e., Surinder Singh v. Central Government (1986) 4 SCC 667 states the proposition in the following terms: Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certain acts or exercise power in respect of certain matters, subject to rules, the exercise of power conferred by the statute does not depend on the existence of rules unless the statute expressly provides for the same. In other words framing of the rules is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power expressly and unconditionally conferred by the statute. The expression subject to the rules only means, in accordance with the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so conferred on authority could be exercised in accordance with these rules. But if no rules are framed there is no void and the authority is not precluded from exercising the power conferred by the statute. 39. This court therefore, holds that the assignment of distinctive marks i.e. registration numbers to motor vehicles (which includes the power to reserve and allocate them, for a specific fee) is a distinct service for which states or their authorities (such as the registering authorities, in this case) are entitled to charge a prescribed fee. Rule 55A of the MP Rules is not therefore, in excess of the powers conferred upon the state, by the Act or the Central Rules. 40. This court notices that the impugned judgment proceeded on the assumption that the state was not competent to make the legislation. The use of that expression, at best can be characterized as misconceived. In the present case, the state of M.P. derived its powers to frame the concerned rules, through the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act itself. The question, therefore, of repugnance as properly understood, did not arise; rather it was a case whether the state government, as one of the delegated authorities, was empowered through Parliamentary law to frame the rule that it did. At best, the issue that arose was whether the offending rule (Rule 55A) was ultra vires the Act or the Central Rules. In the opinion of this court, the impugned rule was within the ambit of the powers delegated to the state, and directly related to performance of its functions under Section 41(6), for which it could legitimately claim a fee, as was done through Rule 55A. 41. Before parting with this judgment, the court records its gratitude to Mr. Manoj Swaroop, Senior Advocate for acting as amicus and ably marshalling all arguments that could be mustered to assist this court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]26. Section 41(6) the interplay of which, with Section 41(2), is directly in issue – enacts that the registering authority shall assign to the vehicle for display thereon a distinguishing mark consisting of one of the groups of such of those letters and followed by such letters and figures as are allotted to the State by the Central Government from time to time . Now, this provision is divided into two parts. Although the duty of the registering authority to assign the distinguishing mark has been enacted as the first event, in reality, in sequence, the allotment of groups of letters followed by such letters and figures (which find mention in the latter part of the provision), that are allotted to the State by the Central Government would be an event that occurs prior to the assignment of such distinguishing mark and number. The notification of 12.06.1989 issued by the Central Government in exercise of this power to allocate numbers under Section 41(6) has allocated distinguished groups of letters to each individual State and UT. According to the notification, this group of letters is to be followed by the code number of the registering authority to be allocated by the State Government or the Administrator of the UT. The notification, after setting out the groups of letters, goes on to state that where four figures referred to earlier in it, (i.e. the notification) reaches 9999, the next series shall begin with the alphabet A followed by not more than four figures and thereafter with alphabet B, and so on. This notification from its facial reading clothes the state government or the UT administration, with the distinct task of allotting the code number and thereafter assigning the numerics (the four numbers in question).29. This Court is of the opinion that the High Court, in its impugned judgement, lost sight of the true import of Section 211. The existence of specific provisions empowering the State (such as Sections 41(13), 47(7), 49(4) and 50(5)), means that the power of the State to claim or charge amounts is specifically recognized by express provisions. Further, there are certain services and functions for which the State is empowered to levy fees. It is precisely to cover these contingencies, i.e. where the service is rendered or some function performed, that the State is empowered by a residual provision (much like the Central Government with which it shares the power concurrently) to levy fees. In this respect, it would be useful to note that Section 211 is cast in wide terms and that any rule which the Central Government or the State Government is empowered to make under this Act may, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision to that effect, provide for the levy of such fees in respect of applications, amendment of documents, issue of certificates, licences, permits, tests, endorsements, badges, plates, countersignatures, authorisation, supply of statistics or copies of documents or orders and for any other purpose or matter involving the rendering of any service. Clearly, therefore, the Parliament intended that contingencies not covered by a specific power to levy fees or amounts, which entailed some activity on the part of the State, including rendering of any service could be legitimately charged or subjected to the levy of fee or amounts.31. In addition to charging such fees, the registering authority is enjoined by Rule 55A(2) to follow the principle of first-come-first-serve in reserving particular numbers; and to allot the registration mark reserved upon production of the vehicle along with the application in Form-20 (of the Central Rules), provided the vehicle is compliant with the provisions of the Act and Rules. By Rule 55A(d), the reservation of the mark would be cancelled if the vehicle is not produced for allotment within three months from the date of allotment. Obviously, this is meant to avoid abuse of the reservation process by trafficking in numbers, by providing finite time within which such numbers can be used.32. Quite like in the case of fees for assignment of particular numbers, certain other services too are contemplated under the Act. Section 56(1) directs that no transport vehicle would be deemed to be validly registered unless it carries a certificate of fitness. Such fitness certificate is to be issued by authorized testing stations [by Section 56(2)]. Section 43 enables the owner of a motor vehicle to apply to any registering authority or other authority which may be prescribed by the State Government to have the vehicle temporarily registered. This provision contains a non-obstante clause. Various provisions of the Act deal with orders of higher authorities and appellate authorities. Implicit with this is the power to issue copies of such decisions. Further, in cases where individuals or parties interested seek to duplicate or acquire extra copies of such orders, a separate category of service is provided. Likewise, wherever duplicates of documents such as Registration Certificates etc. are issued, necessarily, a service is performed. Rule 62 of the M.P. Rules of 1994 provided for fees to be charged in respect of various such services (temporary registration or extension thereof in different classes of vehicles); copies of miscellaneous applications, duplicate certificate of fitness for different classes of vehicles and so on. An overall reading of the M.P. Rules and the Act therefore clearly establishes that besides the express authorization to levy fees or collect amounts, both the Central Government and the State Government are empowered – in fact duty bound to extend certain services in the performance of such duties. Both these bodies, i.e. the Central and State Governments would therefore, be acting within their authority to charge or levy fees.33. If there are any further doubts on this issue, the generality of the power under Section 65(1) to frame rules, in the opinion of this Court is sufficient along with Section 211, to conclude that the State Government has the authority to prescribe a fee for reserving certain numbers or distinguishing marks to be assigned as registration numbers. It has not been shown how the setting apart of or reservation of some numbers – here, a fraction of the large potential batch of numbers which the registering authority can otherwise assign to vehicles, is per se arbitrary or unreasonable. Neither were any such arguments urged before this Court.34. This Court has in the past observed that whenever a State confers rule making power or empowers delegated legislation, i.e. and where or wherever the statute first lays out a general provision authorizing subordinate legislation or the framing of separate legislation to carry out the purposes of that Act, and uses the expression in particular and without generality of the foregoing powers, followed by another delegation which enumerates specific powers preceded by expressions such as in particular and without the generality of the foregoing powers, the particularization is only illustrative and does not subsume the general power. The State had relied upon the decision in Academy of Nutrition (supra) which was to that effect.39. This court therefore, holds that the assignment of distinctive marks i.e. registration numbers to motor vehicles (which includes the power to reserve and allocate them, for a specific fee) is a distinct service for which states or their authorities (such as the registering authorities, in this case) are entitled to charge a prescribed fee. Rule 55A of the MP Rules is not therefore, in excess of the powers conferred upon the state, by the Act or the Central Rules.40. This court notices that the impugned judgment proceeded on the assumption that the state was not competent to make the legislation. The use of that expression, at best can be characterized as misconceived. In the present case, the state of M.P. derived its powers to frame the concerned rules, through the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act itself. The question, therefore, of repugnance as properly understood, did not arise; rather it was a case whether the state government, as one of the delegated authorities, was empowered through Parliamentary law to frame the rule that it did. At best, the issue that arose was whether the offending rule (Rule 55A) was ultra vires the Act or the Central Rules. In the opinion of this court, the impugned rule was within the ambit of the powers delegated to the state, and directly related to performance of its functions under Section 41(6), for which it could legitimately claim a fee, as was done through Rule 55A.30. The assignment of numbers by the registering authority, as seen earlier, through an official/agency or department notified by the State Government, cannot be seen as a mere step – albeit at the fag-end of the registration allotment process. In fact, though it is the culmination of the allotment process, it is nevertheless an important step. The state, in the opinion of this Court, is entitled to indicate its choice or manner of assigning by prescribing a particular set of procedures for the assignment of numbers. Thus, for instance, the assignment of the concerned code - to the individual registering authorities followed by the assignment of numerics may follow a predetermined pattern which may be district wise, state government department wise (in the case of publicly owned vehicles), different sequences for buses and heavy vehicles and so on. If such a predetermined choice can be made by prescribing the mode of assignment, it is both regulatory and at the same time indicative of State policy. Per se, the Court cannot brush aside the element of service which may be involved – especially if the general public or a sub-section of it, wishes to choose particular numbers for various considerations. Such fancy numbers or auspicious numbers may well therefore have to be set apart having regard to the peculiar socio-cultural needs of the people of the state. It is in such an event that the availability of such numbers and their reservation as a choice and the power of their assignment assumes importance. In the impugned Rule 55A in the present instance, introduced in 2001 through amendment by the State of M.P., prescribes four different fees – Rs. 15000/- for the registration marks 1 to 9 in any series prevalent within the jurisdiction of the registering authority; and Rs. 12000/- for reservation of marks from 10 to 100 in any series within the jurisdiction of the registering authority. For reservation of large series of numbers indicated in Rule 55A(c), Rs. 10000/- and Rs. 2000/- for reservation of any other number or numbers within 1000 from the last number assigned in the serial order.36. In Jaintia Hill Truck Owners Assn (Supra) , this court had pertinently observed in the context of services rendered by weighment, through third party, agencies, where the state enabled charging of fee, that:28. Where the State or the State-controlled agencies render services for the purpose of effectuation of the provisions of a Central Act, it, in our opinion, is entitled to charge a reasonable amount in respect thereof. We may, in this behalf, refer to a decision of this Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormanik Siem [AIR 1961 SC 276   : (1961) 1 SCR 750  ] . The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether in absence of any law regulating the appointment and succession of chiefs and headmen, a notice issued to the respondent therein to show cause as to why he should not be removed from his office, was valid.. The decision cited in Jaintia Hill (supra) – i.e., T. Cajee v U. Jormanik Siem 1961 (1) SCR 750.   considered the validity of appointment of a village headman by an autonomous district council, under provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India. The High Court upheld the argument that a conferment of legislative power (conferred upon the District Council) if not exercised, did not empower the council to issue appointment in the absence of rules. This court disapproved the High Courts reasoning and held that:With respect, it seems to us that the High Court has read far more into Para 3(1)(g) than is justified by its language. Para 3(1) is in fact something like a legislative list and enumerates the subjects on which the District Council is competent to make laws. Under Para 3(1)(g) it has power to make laws with respect to the appointment or succession of Chiefs or Headmen and this would naturally include the power to remove them. But it does not follow from this that the appointment or removal of a Chief is a legislative act or that no appointment or removal can be made without there being first a law to that effect. The High Court also seems to have thought that as there was no provision in the Sixth Schedule in terms of Articles 73 and 162 of the Constitution, the administrative power of the District Council would not extend to the subjects enumerated in Para 3(1). Now Para 2(4) provides that the administration of an autonomous district shall vest in the District Council and this in our opinion is comprehensive enough to include all such executive powers as are necessary to be exercised for the purposes of the administration of the district…