Case: Jagannath Behera And Others Vs. Raja Harihar Singhmardaraj Bhramarbara Roy

produce irrespective of the yield from the land, or (iv) produce or its estimated value partly in any one of the ways described above and partly in another; but shall not include ................ 21. It is urged that the tenants who were inducted by the respondent on these lands did not fulfil the terms of this definition and they were therefore not tenants and, as a logical corollary to that, the respondent could not be a landlord qua them. It is also contended that even though these lands were declared to be the private properties of the Respondent under the decision of the Adviser for the Orissa States, that was a recognition of the lands as such by the Dominion Government and not by the Provincial Government; which recognition was a condition precedent of the application of S. 7 (h) of the 1950 Act to these lands. Here also, the respondent is confronted with this difficulty that these questions were not mooted either before the Revenue Officer or the High Court in the manner in which it was sought to be done before us. It was all along assumed that the appellants had been the tenants of the respondent but had been ejected by him in the year 1951 and other tenants were inducted in their place some time in 1952. The lands in question were also assumed to have been recognised as the private lands of the respondent by the Government without making any distinction between the Dominion Government and the Provincial Government as was sought to be done before us. Reliance was mainly placed by the respondent in the High Court on his plea that the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer was barred under Art. 363 of the Constitution and it was nowhere urged that the appellant were not the tenants and he was not the landlord within the terms of the definitions contained in the 1948 Act or that in the absence of recognition of these private lands of his as such by the Provincial Government, the condition precedent to the application of S. 7 (h) of the 1950 Act was not fulfilled and that section has no application at all to these lands.The determination of these questions also requires evidence in regard to the same and it would not be legitimate to allow these questions to be agitated for the first time at this late stage. 22. The matter is, however, concluded by the provisions of S. 7 (a) of the 1950 Act. That section enacts a statutory extension of the definition of the terms landlord and tenant and provides that the expression landlord shall mean a person immediately under whom a tenant holds land, and the expression tenant shall mean a person who holds land under another person and is or, but for a special contract, would be liable to pay rent for that land to that person. Whatever may have been the definitions of the terms landlord and tenant in S. 2 (c) and (g) of the 1948 Act, this definition contained in the explanation to S. 7 (a) of the 1950 Act makes the appellants the tenants and the respondent a landlord in regard to the lands in question. This statutory extension of the definition of the terms landlord and tenant therefore is sufficient, in our opinion, to repel the last contention urged on behalf of the respondent before us. 23. The respondent further contends that in spite of S. 7 of the 1950 Act, enacting that all suits and proceedings between landlord and tenant as such shall be instituted and tried in revenue courts, the provisions of the 1948 Act in regard to the hierarchy of revenue courts and the procedure and the penalties provided therein are not attracted to the merged State of Khandapara. The contention is that the provisions contained in the 1950 Act are special provisions which eliminate the operation of the general provisions contained in the 1948 Act, and in so far as nothing more is stated in regard to how the revenue courts are to act in the matter of the institution and trial of all suits and proceedings between landlord and tenant, there is a lacuna and the revenue courts as envisaged by the 1948 Act, have no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings in question. 24. The simple answer to this contention of the respondent is that both these acts have to be read together. The 1950 Act is an act to extend certain acts and regulations to certain areas administered as part of the Province of Orissa. The merged State of Khandapara is one of such areas. By virtue of S. 4 of this Act the 1948 Act is inter alia extended to the merged State of Khandapara and the provisions thereof are made applicable in that area. The other sections of this Act enact further provisions which are applicable to these merged States including the merged State of Khandapara and S. 7, in particular, enacts the modification of the tenancy laws in force in those merged states. These provisions are therefore supplementary to those contained in the 1948 Act, and it follows that not only the provisions of the 1948 Act but also the provisions of the 1950 Act are applicable to the merged State of Khandapara. If both these Acts are thus read together, as they should be, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of these Acts and it is clear that the provisions of sub-ss. (a) and (h) of S. 7 of the 1950 Act which applied to the dispute which arose between the appellants and the respondent read together with the relevant provisions in regard to the procedure, penalties, etc., contained in the 1948 Act did give jurisdiction to the Revenue Officer to entertain the dispute between the parties. This contention of the respondent also therefore fails. 25. We are therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the High Court was clearly wrong and is liable to be set aside.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It may be noted at the outset that no question, has been raised in regard to the vires of the 1950 Act, which extended inter alia the 1948 Act to the areas merged in the absorbing Province of Orissa. That being so, S. 7 (h) of the 1950 Act in terms would apply to the appellants before us and they would not be liable to ejectmentThe lands in question were declared to be the private properties of the respondent and he was guaranteed under Art. 3 of the said Agreement full ownership, use and enjoyment thereof. Article 363 only ousted the jurisdiction of the courts in regard to the disputes arising out of any provisions of the Agreement entered into by the Rulers of Indian States with the Government of India. The dispute which had arisen between the appellants and the respondent in the present case could hardly be said to be a dispute arising out of any provisions of the said Agreement17. It is clear therefore that neither Art. 363 nor Art. 362 of the Constitution would avail the respondent and the courts would have jurisdiction to entertain the dispute between the appellants and him which arose out of his action in ejecting them from his private lands. The provisions of the said Agreement only protected his rights in the properties declared to be his private properties so that they could not be claimed at any time thereafter as State properties. The 1948 Act did not dispute his ownership over the same but proceeded on the basis that they were his private properties and sought to impose upon him certain obligations in order to protect the rights of the tenants whom he had inducted therein and there was no infringement of the guarantee or assurances which had been given to him under Art. 3 of the said Agreement. It could not also be urged that by imposing reasonable restrictions in the interests of the tenants on his right to acquire, hold and dispose of properties under Cl. 5 of Art. 19 of the Constitution, the 1948 Act affected his rights of full ownership, use and enjoyment of those properties. If anything was done by extending the 1948 Act to the merged State of Khandapara, it was done in the protection of the tenants who were inducted by him and such restrictions did not affect the full ownership, use and enjoyment of his private properties, any more than they did in the case of other owners of lands. As a matter of fact, under the terms of the 1950 Act, which extended the 1948 Act to the merged State of Khandapara, he was entitled to the payment by the tenants of such fair and equitable rent as may be fixed by any competent authority appointed in this behalf by the Revenue Commissioner or the Commissioner of the Northern Division as the case may be and so long as the tenants continued to pay such rent he was no worse off than were other proprietors of lands. The tenants would no doubt acquire rights of occupancy in respect of such lands but the acquisition of the occupancy rights by the tenants would not be calculated to affect his right to full ownership, use and enjoyment of his lands, because he would be entitled to eject the occupancy tenants also if the tenants used the lands comprised in their holdings in any manner which rendered them unfit for the purposes of the tenancy or committed a breach of conditions consistent with the provisions of the tenancy laws in force in the merged State concerned on breach whereof they were under the terms of the contract between themselves and the landlord liable to be ejected.As already stated these restrictions were for the protection of the tenants who were inducted on the lands by the erstwhile Rulers themselves and by the extension of the 1948 Act to the merged State Khandapara, the respondent was treated in the same manner as any other citizen of the Union.If at all there was any infringement of his rights to full ownership, use and enjoyment of his properties that was also in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution itself and whatever may have been the guarantee or assurance given to him under the terms of the said Agreement, it could not be absolute but would only by co-extensive with the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property which is guaranteed to all the citizens of the Union under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. These contentions of the respondent therefore are of no availIt is, however, to be observed that no such contention was ever taken in the proceedings before the Revenue Officer or before the High Court and it was urged for the first time in the course of the arguments before us.The question in one of fact, whether any such special laws or customs were prevailing in the merged State of Khandapara, and we cannot allow the respondent to urge this contention for the first time before usHere also, the respondent is confronted with this difficulty that these questions were not mooted either before the Revenue Officer or the High Court in the manner in which it was sought to be done before us. It was all along assumed that the appellants had been the tenants of the respondent but had been ejected by him in the year 1951 and other tenants were inducted in their place some time in 1952. The lands in question were also assumed to have been recognised as the private lands of the respondent by the Government without making any distinction between the Dominion Government and the Provincial Government as was sought to be done before us. Reliance was mainly placed by the respondent in the High Court on his plea that the jurisdiction of the Revenue Officer was barred under Art. 363 of the Constitution and it was nowhere urged that the appellant were not the tenants and he was not the landlord within the terms of the definitions contained in the 1948 Act or that in the absence of recognition of these private lands of his as such by the Provincial Government, the condition precedent to the application of S. 7 (h) of the 1950 Act was not fulfilled and that section has no application at all to these lands.The determination of these questions also requires evidence in regard to the same and it would not be legitimate to allow these questions to be agitated for the first time at this late stageWhatever may have been the definitions of the terms landlord and tenant in S. 2 (c) and (g) of the 1948 Act, this definition contained in the explanation to S. 7 (a) of the 1950 Act makes the appellants the tenants and the respondent a landlord in regard to the lands in question. This statutory extension of the definition of the terms landlord and tenant therefore is sufficient, in our opinion, to repel the last contention urged on behalf of the respondent before usIf both these Acts are thus read together, as they should be, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of these Acts and it is clear that the provisions of sub-ss. (a) and (h) of S. 7 of the 1950 Act which applied to the dispute which arose between the appellants and the respondent read together with the relevant provisions in regard to the procedure, penalties, etc., contained in the 1948 Act did give jurisdiction to the Revenue Officer to entertain the dispute between the parties. This contention of the respondent also therefore fails25. We are therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the High Court was clearly wrong and is liable to be set aside.