Case: Suba Singh Vs. Mahendra Singh &amp; Others

the U. P. Land Revenue Act 1901, shall be final and conclusive. Of course, if the allottee is not able to take possession, the assistant consolidation officer is empowered to deliver such Then there is a comprehensive provision. Section 49, which bars the civil courts jurisdiction and runs as follows:"49. No person shall institute any suit or other proceedings in any civil court with respect to any matter arising out of consolidation proceedings or with respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of this Act.The anxiety of the legislature that the civil courts shall not unsettle what has been painstakingly settled by the consolidation authorities is understandable.5. The whole question in the present appeal turns on the ambit and limit of the Civil Courts jurisdiction in the light of Section 49. It is well-settled that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be easily inferred and any provision which takes it away must be construed strictly. We must have this principle in mind when interpreting Section 49. Analytically examined, it is clear that the two inhibitory clauses of Section 49, are not identical in their scope and effect.The first clause is confirmed to matters "arising out of consolidation proceedings under the act, while the second clause is limited to matters "in regard to which a suit or application could be filed under the provisions of this Act.6. In the present case, the question that had arisen was as to who were the heirs of Jagram. This question was not covered by the first clause, for two reasons: Firstly, it was not a matter arising out of consolidation proceedings but one arising from a vis major i.e. the death of Jagram. The words "out of in clause 1, must be given their full restrictive effect. They cannot be loosely interpreted and equated with "during. The Legislature appears to have advisedly used these words to restrict the operation of this clause to those matters which are directly connected with the consolidation proceedings and which, but for such proceedings, would not have arisen. Secondly, the question of inheritance to the estate of Jagram arose after the consolidation operations had been substantively completed.7. It is submitted that Jagram was alive when the proposal under Section 23 was finalised. Jagram was held to be a bhoomidar as per the scheme which was confirmed on 29-2-1956. In fact, he dies only in March that year. It is seen from the records that the possession of the various holdings was to be given to the bhoomidars and Jagram was to have taken possession on 26-2-1956 (vide annexure C. Form 23, which discloses that the date had been fixed by the District Magistrate for transferring possession as 29-2-1956 and that all the cultivators were told "that from today the cultivators are declared as agriculturists of the fields mentioned in form No. 25.This contained in annexure C dated 29-2-1956 itself.) it is thus plain that possession also had been given to Jagram and nothing substantial remained to be done in the shape of consolidation operations so far as his parcel of land was concerned. Title, conglomeration, allotment and occupation - practically the whole gamut of consolidation stages was thus covered.8. There is no provision in the Act for any dispute of title which arises sub-sequent to confirmation of the statement under Section 23 to be decided by way of arbitration or otherwise.9. Now let us examine whether the matter falls within the exclusionary ambit of clause (2) of S. 49. The question further resolves itself into, whether the consolidation authorities had the jurisdiction to determine finally this complicated question of title when the cause of action had arisen subsequently to the finalisation, publication and even implementation of the consolidation scheme so far as Jagram was concerned. In our opinion the answer to this question must be in the negative. Section 27(1) requires the Director of Consolidation to cause soon after the consolidation scheme has come into force, the preparation of the record of rights and other revenue records, but this, in terms of that sub-section, is to be done in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 190l. According to Section 27(3), after the records have been so prepared, their further maintenance will be the responsibility of the Collector, and this, too, is to be done under Section 33 of the U. P. Land revenue Act, 1901.It was thus abundantly clear that an application for mutation on the basis of inheritance when the cause of action arose, after the finalisation and publication of the scheme under Section 23, is not a matter in regard to which an application could be filed "under the provisions of this Act within the meaning of clause 2 of Section 49. Thus, the other limb of Section 49, also is not attracted. The result is that the plea of bar of the civil courts jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate upon the title to the land or the sonship of the plaintiff has no substance. Nothing done in consolidation proceedings is undone by that suit. To urge that the formal notification under Section 52 not having been published the court had no jurisdiction is to misread Section 49 and to exalt a ritual into a legal reality.10. We may mention here that the Allahabad High Court has consistently taken this view, See Smt. Natho v. Board of Revenue, U. P. Allahabad, 1966 All LJ 563 where this position has been explained. But more clinchingly has this matter been dealt within a recent judgment of that Court in Smt. Bhuri v. Sunder, 1973 All LJ 352. We approve of the reasoning therein, in so far as it is in accord with the above observations and hold that there is no merit in this appeal and dismiss it but with no order as to costs in this Court having regard to the totality of circumstances in the case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. Now let us examine whether the matter falls within the exclusionary ambit of clause (2) of S. 49. The question further resolves itself into, whether the consolidation authorities had the jurisdiction to determine finally this complicated question of title when the cause of action had arisen subsequently to the finalisation, publication and even implementation of the consolidation scheme so far as Jagram was concerned. In our opinion the answer to this question must be in the negative. Section 27(1) requires the Director of Consolidation to cause soon after the consolidation scheme has come into force, the preparation of the record of rights and other revenue records, but this, in terms of thatis to be done in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, 190l. According to Section 27(3), after the records have been so prepared, their further maintenance will be the responsibility of the Collector, and this, too, is to be done under Section 33 of the U. P. Land revenue Act, 1901.It was thus abundantly clear that an application for mutation on the basis of inheritance when the cause of action arose, after the finalisation and publication of the scheme under Section 23, is not a matter in regard to which an application could be filed "under the provisions of this Act within the meaning of clause 2 of Section 49. Thus, the other limb of Section 49, also is not attracted. The result is that the plea of bar of the civil courts jurisdiction to investigate and adjudicate upon the title to the land or the sonship of the plaintiff has no substance. Nothing done in consolidation proceedings is undone by that suit. To urge that the formal notification under Section 52 not having been published the court had no jurisdiction is to misread Section 49 and to exalt a ritual into a legal reality.10. We may mention here that the Allahabad High Court has consistently taken this view, See Smt. Natho v. Board of Revenue, U. P. Allahabad, 1966 All LJ 563 where this position has been explained. But more clinchingly has this matter been dealt within a recent judgment of that Court in Smt. Bhuri v. Sunder, 1973 All LJ 352. We approve of the reasoning therein, in so far as it is in accord with the above observations and hold that there is no merit in this appeal and dismiss it but with no order as to costs in this Court having regard to the totality of circumstances in the case.