Case: Secretary, Home (Endowments), Andhra Pradesh Vs. Digyadarsam Rajindra Ram Dasjee

conditions are necessary, viz., (a) a vacancy must have occurred, in the office of the trustee of a math; and (b) there must be a dispute, respecting the right of succession to such office. In this case, it is possible to say, in view of the claim made by Devendra Dass, and the litigations referred to, above, that there was a dispute respecting the right of succession to the office of the Mahant. But, in order to give jurisdiction to the appellant to take action, under the first contingency, referred to in sub-sec. (1), of Section 53, the two conditions adverted to above, will have to exist. In this case it is the claim of the appellant that there was a vacancy, in the office of the trustee of the Math, on March 18, 1962, when Chetam Doss died. On the other hand, according to the respondent, there was no vacancy in the office of the Mahant, at that time because on the death of Chetam Doss, the respondent succeeded to the office of the Mahant. Therefore, the point to be considered is, as to whether a vacancy, has occurred, in the office of the trustee of the Math, on March l8, 1962.That there must be an actual vacancy, unfilled, is clear, from the wording of Section 53 (1) when it deals with two different contingencies, providing for the assumption of management. Under the first contingency, a vacancy should have occurred in the office of a trustee of a Math and there is a dispute in respect of the succession to such office. That is, the office has not been filled in, by anybody having a prima facie legal right to assume management. Similarly, the second contingency, contemplated under Section 53 (1), when assumption of management can be made by the Department, is when a vacancy occurs in the office of a trustee of a Math and when such vacancy cannot be filled up immediately. This clearly shows that there must be a vacancy, as a fact in the sense that nobody with any legal right has assumed office of the trustee of a Math. 13. In this case, as we have pointed out earlier, the High Court has accepted the claim of the respondent that by virtue of the Panchayat agreement dated Oct. 29, 1947, and the compromise agreement, dated July 15, 1961 the respondent has succeeded to the office of the trustee of the Math, on March 18, 1962, on the death of Chetam Doss. The supreme authority, according to the High Court, the Akada Panchayat, has also approved of the said appointment, by resolution of the same date. We do not propose to consider the findings recorded in O. S. 50 of 1962, which are no doubt in favour of the respondent, because that decision is the subject of an appeal, in A. S. No. 476 of 1966.Nor do we propose to consider the claim of Bhagwan Doss, in O. S. 69 of 1965 which is still pending adjudication, at the hands of the Court. But even without reference to those litigations, the view of the High Court that there is no vacancy in the office of the trustee of the Math which alone will give jurisdiction to the appellant to take action under Section 58 (1), can he accepted as correct, for the other reasons, mentioned by us, earlier. 14. Mr. Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants, further points out that in this case, the respondent is in management of the Math, by virtue of the appointment made, by the State Government, on June 5, l962, and therefore the State Government is entitled to take disciplinary action against him for breach of conditions, under which he was holding that office Counsel also invited our attention to the averments made by the respondent himself, in Writ Petition No. 602 of 1962, that the State Government has appointed him as interim Mahant. The stand taken by the respondent, in Writ Petition No. 602 of 1962, cannot assist the appellant because he was interested then in fighting the claim made by Devendra Dass, in the said writ petition. In resisting such claim, he has, no doubt, made reference to the fact that his right to function, as Mahant, cannot be disturbed, as the State Government has appointed him as interim Mahant. Therefore, the stand taken by the respondent in the said writ petition, must be understood in the said context. 15. No doubt, normally, if it is established that the respondents only right to function as Manager of this institution, is exclusively on the basis of the Government order, dated June 5, 1962, there will be considerable force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the State Government has got jurisdiction to take disciplinary action, against the respondent. But the facts in this case show that the position is entirely different.If the respondent, as held by the High Court-with which view we are in agreement-has succeeded to the office of the trustee of the Math, on the death of Chetam Doss, on March 18, 1962, in his own right, the mere circumstance that the Government also passes an order appointing him as interim Mahant, or Manager, later, will (sic, not) take away the right of the respondent to function as trustee, on the basis of his original right. Once it is held that respondent is not holding the office of the Mahant, exclusively on the basis of the order of the Government, dated June 5, 1962, it follows that the appellant has no jurisdiction to pass an order, placing the respondent under suspension, as that virtually amounts to a removal of the trustee of a Math. The removal of a trustee of a Math can be done only in the manner, and in the circumstances mentioned in Section 52 of the Act. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the order of the Government, placing the respondent under suspension is not valid, is correct.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]That there must be an actual vacancy, unfilled, is clear, from the wording of Section 53 (1) when it deals with two different contingencies, providing for the assumption of management. Under the first contingency, a vacancy should have occurred in the office of a trustee of a Math and there is a dispute in respect of the succession to such office. That is, the office has not been filled in, by anybody having a prima facie legal right to assume management. Similarly, the second contingency, contemplated under Section 53 (1), when assumption of management can be made by the Department, is when a vacancy occurs in the office of a trustee of a Math and when such vacancy cannot be filled up immediately. This clearly shows that there must be a vacancy, as a fact in the sense that nobody with any legal right has assumed office of the trustee of a Math13. In this case, as we have pointed out earlier, the High Court has accepted the claim of the respondent that by virtue of the Panchayat agreement dated Oct. 29, 1947, and the compromise agreement, dated July 15, 1961 the respondent has succeeded to the office of the trustee of the Math, on March 18, 1962, on the death of Chetam Doss. The supreme authority, according to the High Court, the Akada Panchayat, has also approved of the said appointment, by resolution of the same date. We do not propose to consider the findings recorded in O. S. 50 of 1962, which are no doubt in favour of the respondent, because that decision is the subject of an appeal, in A. S. No. 476 of 1966.Nor do we propose to consider the claim of Bhagwan Doss, in O. S. 69 of 1965 which is still pending adjudication, at the hands of the Court. But even without reference to those litigations, the view of the High Court that there is no vacancy in the office of the trustee of the Math which alone will give jurisdiction to the appellant to take action under Section 58 (1), can he accepted as correct, for the other reasons, mentioned by us, earlierThe stand taken by the respondent, in Writ Petition No. 602 of 1962, cannot assist the appellant because he was interested then in fighting the claim made by Devendra Dass, in the said writ petition. In resisting such claim, he has, no doubt, made reference to the fact that his right to function, as Mahant, cannot be disturbed, as the State Government has appointed him as interim Mahant. Therefore, the stand taken by the respondent in the said writ petition, must be understood in the said context15. No doubt, normally, if it is established that the respondents only right to function as Manager of this institution, is exclusively on the basis of the Government order, dated June 5, 1962, there will be considerable force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the State Government has got jurisdiction to take disciplinary action, against the respondent. But the facts in this case show that the position is entirely different.If the respondent, as held by the High Court-with which view we are in agreement-has succeeded to the office of the trustee of the Math, on the death of Chetam Doss, on March 18, 1962, in his own right, the mere circumstance that the Government also passes an order appointing him as interim Mahant, or Manager, later, will (sic, not) take away the right of the respondent to function as trustee, on the basis of his original right. Once it is held that respondent is not holding the office of the Mahant, exclusively on the basis of the order of the Government, dated June 5, 1962, it follows that the appellant has no jurisdiction to pass an order, placing the respondent under suspension, as that virtually amounts to a removal of the trustee of a Math. The removal of a trustee of a Math can be done only in the manner, and in the circumstances mentioned in Section 52 of the Act. Therefore, the view of the High Court that the order of the Government, placing the respondent under suspension is not valid, is correctThe answer to the above question is to be decided, by reference to Section 53 of the Act. Section 52 of the Act occurs in Chapter IV, relating to Maths.n (1) of that Section, enables the Commissioner or any two or more persons, having interest and having obtained the consent, in writing of the Commissioner, to institute a suit, to obtain a decree for removing the trustee of a math or a specific endowment attached to a math, for any one or more of the grounds mentioned, in clauses (a) to (f), therein. Section 53, which is the material Section, and which relates to filling of vacancies, is as follows :53. (1) When a vacancy occurs in the office of the trustee of a math or specific endowment attached to a math and there is a dispute respecting the right of succession to such office or,when such vacancy cannot be filled up immediately, orwhen the trustee is a minor and has no guardian fit and willing to act as such or there is a dispute respecting the person who is entitled to act as guardian, orwhen the trustee is by reason of unsoundness of mind or other mental or physical defect or infirmity unable to discharge the functions of the trustee,the Assistant Commissioner may take such steps and pass such order as he thinks proper for the temporary custody and protection of the endowments of the math or of the specific endowment, as the case may be, and shall report the matter forthwith to the Commissioner(2) Upon the receipt of such report, if the Commissioner, after making such inquiry as he deems necessary, is satisfied that an arrangement for the administration of the math and its endowments or of the specific endowment, as the case may be, is necessary, he shall make such arrangement as he thinks fit until the disability of the trustee ceases or another trustee succeeds to the office as the case may be(3) In making any such arrangement, the Commissioner shall have due regard to the claims of the disciples of the math, if any(4) Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to affect anything contained in the Madras Court of Wards Act, 1902Section 53 (1) contemplates four contingencies, under which the Assistant Commissioner may take steps for the temporary custody and protection of the math. We are concerned, in this case, only with the first contingency, referred to in that. Before that provision can be invoked, two conditions are necessary, viz., (a) a vacancy must have occurred, in the office of the trustee of a math; and (b) there must be a dispute, respecting the right of succession to such office. In this case, it is possible to say, in view of the claim made by Devendra Dass, and the litigations referred to, above, that there was a dispute respecting the right of succession to the office of the Mahant. But, in order to give jurisdiction to the appellant to take action, under the first contingency, referred to in. (1), of Section 53, the two conditions adverted to above, will have to exist. In this case it is the claim of the appellant that there was a vacancy, in the office of the trustee of the Math, on March 18, 1962, when Chetam Doss died. On the other hand, according to the respondent, there was no vacancy in the office of the Mahant, at that time because on the death of Chetam Doss, the respondent succeeded to the office of the Mahant. Therefore, the point to be considered is, as to whethera vacancy, has occurred, in the office of the trustee of the Math, on March l8,t there must be an actual vacancy, unfilled, is clear, from the wording of Section 53 (1) when it deals with two different contingencies, providing for the assumption of management. Under the first contingency, a vacancy should have occurred in the office of a trustee of a Math and there is a dispute in respect of the succession to such office. That is, the office has not been filled in, by anybody having a prima facie legal right to assume management. Similarly, the second contingency, contemplated under Section 53 (1), when assumption of management can be made by the Department, is when a vacancy occurs in the office of a trustee of a Math and when such vacancy cannot be filled up immediately. This clearly shows that there must be a vacancy, as a fact in the sense that nobody with any legal right has assumed office of the trustee of a