Case: Krishanlal Ishwarlal Desai Vs. Bai Vijkor And Others

is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf and this overt act was, on the finding of the District Court done by the appellant on October 24, 1957. That means that the appellant occupied the premises beyond the period of one month prescribed by S. 17 (l).7. Does the stipulation about the period of one month apply to the case of a decree passed under S. 13 (1) (g) ? That is the next question to consider. It would be noticed that the first clause of S. 17 (1) deals with decrees passed under S. 13 (1) (g) and (i) and reading the clause, there appears to be no difficulty in holding that the requirement as to one month applies to both categories of decrees. On a fair and reasonable construction of that clause, there appears to be no escape from the conclusion that the period of one month applies as much to the case of occupation as to the case of erection of the work contemplated by Cls. 13 (1) (g) and (i), respectively.8. Besides, the scheme of S. 17 (1) clearly supports this construction, S. 13 (l) has allowed the landlord to eject the tenants from the premises in their possession for specified reasons and S. 17 (l) affords a protection to the tenants where a decree for ejectment has been passed against them under Cls. (g) or (i) of S. 13 (1). If the legislature thought it necessary to require the landlord to commence the work of erection if he has obtained a decree for possession under S. 13 (1) within one month, there is no reason why the legislature should not have provided for the same or similar period in respect of occupation which is referable to the decree passed under S. 13 (1) (g). Mr. Setalvad contends that the occupation could be effected within a reasonable time, for he suggests that no limitation having been prescribed in that behalf, the general rule would be that it should be done within a reasonable time. We think this construction cannot be accepted because it is extremely unlikely that the legislature should have provided the period of one month for one category of decrees and should have made no specific provision in that behalf in respect of decrees of the other category. Besides, the construction of the clause according to the rules of ordinary grammar is decisively against the appellants contention.9. The second clause of S. 17 (1) refers to a case where the landlord re-lets the premises within one year of the date on which he obtains possession in execution proceedings to any person other than the original tenant. In other words, this clause covers cases where the landlord obtains a decree for possession and instead of using the premises for purposes pleaded by him and on proof of which a decree was passed in his favour he proceeds to re-let them to a stranger: and it provides that if this re-letting takes place within one year of the date specified by it, the original tenant is entitled to claim possession of the said premises. This clause also shows that Section 17 (1) is intended to afford protection to the rights of tenants who have been ejected under S. 13 (1) (g) and (i).10. Similarly, a period of limitation is prescribed for the exercise of the rights conferred on the tenants by the last clause of S. 17 (1). This clause provides that the tenants who want to claim the protection of S. 17 (1) must apply within 13 months of the date on which possession was delivered to the landlord-decree-holder. The scheme of S. 17 (1) thus clearly proves that all the relevant clauses have prescribed respective periods of limitation, and so, it would be idle to suggest that the liability imposed on the landlord to occupy the premises possession of which had been decreed in his favour under S. 13 (1) (g) is without any relevant limitation.11. There is another consideration which supports this conclusion Section 17 (2) provides for penalty against a landlord who contravenes the provisions of S. 17 (1). This provision lays down, inter alia, that any landlord who recovers possession on the grounds specified under Cl. (g) or (i) of S. 13 (1) and keeps the premises unoccupied or does not commence the work of erection without reasonable excuse within the period of one month from the date on which he recovers possession, shall on conviction be punishable in the manner specified in the said provision. Similar penalty is imposed on a landlord or other person in occupation of the premises who fails to comply with the order of the Court under S. 17 (1). It is obvious that when the first clause of S. 17 (2) refers to the failure of the landlord either to occupy or to commence erection of the work without reasonable excuse within the period of one month; absence of reasonable excuse and the period of one month apply as much to cases falling under Cl (g) as to cases falling under Cl. (i) of S. 13 (1). The plea open to the landlord that he failed to occupy the premises or he failed to commence the work of construction within the specified period because of a reasonable excuse is available to him in both categories of cases and so, absence of reasonable excuse applies equally to both the said categories. If that is so, the period of one month which is the crucial point must govern both the categories of cases. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was right in agreeing with the decision of the District Court that the appellant in the present case had failed to comply with the first part of S. 17 (1) and so, the respondents were entitled to an order for possession of the premises in question.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is clear that when S. 17 (1) refers to the requirement that the premises must be occupied by the landlord, the occupation intended by the provision is different from possession because the first clause of Section 17 (1) makes a clear distinction between occupation and delivery of possession. The effect of this clause is that when a landlord who has obtained a decree for possession executes the decree and obtains possession of the premises in question he must occupy them in terms of the case made out by him under S. 13 (1) (g) and held proved at the trial. Whether or not the occupation by the landlord should be for the same purpose which he set out at the trial or can be for a different purpose, is a question which it is unnecessary to decide in the present appeal. What is, however, clear beyond any doubt is that when the possession is obtained in execution it must be followed by an act of occupation which must inevitably consist of some overt act in that behalf and this overt act was, on the finding of the District Court done by the appellant on October 24, 1957. That means that the appellant occupied the premises beyond the period of one month prescribed by S. 17 (l).The second clause of S. 17 (1) refers to a case where the landlord re-lets the premises within one year of the date on which he obtains possession in execution proceedings to any person other than the original tenant. In other words, this clause covers cases where the landlord obtains a decree for possession and instead of using the premises for purposes pleaded by him and on proof of which a decree was passed in his favour he proceeds to re-let them to a stranger: and it provides that if this re-letting takes place within one year of the date specified by it, the original tenant is entitled to claim possession of the said premises. This clause also shows that Section 17 (1) is intended to afford protection to the rights of tenants who have been ejected under S. 13 (1) (g) and (i).10. Similarly, a period of limitation is prescribed for the exercise of the rights conferred on the tenants by the last clause of S. 17 (1). This clause provides that the tenants who want to claim the protection of S. 17 (1) must apply within 13 months of the date on which possession was delivered to the landlord-decree-holder. The scheme of S. 17 (1) thus clearly proves that all the relevant clauses have prescribed respective periods of limitation, and so, it would be idle to suggest that the liability imposed on the landlord to occupy the premises possession of which had been decreed in his favour under S. 13 (1) (g) is without any relevant limitation.11. There is another consideration which supports this conclusion Section 17 (2) provides for penalty against a landlord who contravenes the provisions of S. 17 (1). This provision lays down, inter alia, that any landlord who recovers possession on the grounds specified under Cl. (g) or (i) of S. 13 (1) and keeps the premises unoccupied or does not commence the work of erection without reasonable excuse within the period of one month from the date on which he recovers possession, shall on conviction be punishable in the manner specified in the said provision. Similar penalty is imposed on a landlord or other person in occupation of the premises who fails to comply with the order of the Court under S. 17 (1). It is obvious that when the first clause of S. 17 (2) refers to the failure of the landlord either to occupy or to commence erection of the work without reasonable excuse within the period of one month; absence of reasonable excuse and the period of one month apply as much to cases falling under Cl (g) as to cases falling under Cl. (i) of S. 13 (1). The plea open to the landlord that he failed to occupy the premises or he failed to commence the work of construction within the specified period because of a reasonable excuse is available to him in both categories of cases and so, absence of reasonable excuse applies equally to both the said categories. If that is so, the period of one month which is the crucial point must govern both the categories of cases. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was right in agreeing with the decision of the District Court that the appellant in the present case had failed to comply with the first part of S. 17 (1) and so, the respondents were entitled to an order for possession of the premises in question.