Case: M/s. J.K. Cotton Spinning &amp; Weaving Mills Co. Ltd Vs. The Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, IIIrd Branch, Lucknow &amp; Others

the purpose of manufacturing process carried on by the factory. In coming to this conclusion, the Labour Appellate Tribunal noticed the fact that the expression "industrial employees had not been defined, but it was disposed to derive assistance from the definition of the word "worker in the Factories Act in determining the scope of the expression "industrial employees. No doubt, it was urged before the Tribunal that expression "industrial employees should be understood in the same comprehensive sense as the word "industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, but this contention was rejected by the Tribunal. It seems to us that the Tribunal was in error in limiting the scope of the expression "industrial employees by reference to the definition to the word "worker prescribed by the Factories Act. Indeed, it would be relevant and appropriate to refer to the definition of the word "workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, because the G. O. in question has been issued under the Act and the definition of a "workmen prescribed by S. 2 of the Act as S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act would determine the true denotation of the expression "industrial employees. We must accordingly hold that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in accepting the very narrow construction of the expression "industrial employees used in the Government Order.18. The next point which has been urged before us by Mr. Pathak is in regard to the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal awarding the benefit of leave to the respondents on the same lines as S. 79 of the Factories Act. Mr. Pathak attempted to argue that the claim for leave had been made specifically on the basis of provisions of the Factories Act and the U. P. Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, and he suggested that as soon as it was found that these two Acts were inapplicable to the Malis, the said claim should have been rejected. The Labour Appellate Tribunal has, however, held that though the said two Acts do not apply, a claim for leave can be justified on the ground of social justice. Mr. Pathak objects to this decision on the technical ground that the claim itself was based on the provisions of the said two Acts and no other. This contention is not well founded. It does appear that in paragraph 10 of the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents reference is made to the said two Acts, but in the prayer clause the claim is made in general terms without reference to the Acts, and the reference itself is in general terms and makes no mention of the said two Acts. Therefore, the technical ground urged by Mr. Pathak that the relevant claim was made on the provisions of the two specified Acts and should be rejected solely on the ground that the said Acts do not apply, cannot be sustained, It was a general reference which the Adjudicator was called upon the decide and the fact that the said two Acts did not apply, cannot be said to rule out the said claim as to leave in limine.19. Then Mr. Pathak was driven to contend that the ground of social justice given by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in support of its award is really not sound in law, and he referred us to the observations made by this Court on some occasions that the considerations of social justice were "not only irrelevant but untenable vide J. K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, 1955-2 SCR 1315 : (AIR 1956 SC 231 ) and Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur , 1955-1 SCR 991 : ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 170 ). In our opinion, the argument that the considerations of social justice are irrelevant and untenable in dealing with industrial disputes, has to be rejected without any hesitation. The development of industrial law during the last decade and several decisions of this Court in dealing with industrial matters have emphasised the relevance, validity and significance of the doctrine of social justice: vide Messrs. Crown Aluminium Works v. Their Workmen, 1958 SCR 651 : (AIR 1958 SC 30 ) and State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, 1959 SCR 895 : (AIR 1958 SC 923 ).Indeed, the concept of social justice has now become such an integral part of industrial law that it would be idel for any party to suggest that industrial adjudication can or should ignore the claims of social justice in dealing with industrial disputes. The concept of social justice is not narrow, or one-sided, or pedantic, and is not confined to industrial adjudication alone. Its sweep is comprehensive. It is founded on the basic ideal to socio-economic equality and its aim is to assist the removal of socio-economic disparties and inequalities; nevertheless, in dealing with industrial matters, it does not adopt a doctrinaire approach and refuses to yield blindly to abstract notions, but adopts a realistic and pragmatic approach. It, therefore, endeavours to resolve the competing claims of employers and employees by finding a solution which is just and fair to both parties with the object of establishing harmony between capital and labour, and good relationship. The ultimate object of industrial adjudication is to help the growth and progress of national economy and it is with that ultimate object in view that industrial disputes are settled by industrial adjudication on principle of fair-play and justice. That is the reason why on several occasions, industrial adjudication has thought it fit to make reasonable provision for leave in respect of the workmen who may not strictly fall within the purview of the Factories Act or the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in the grievance made by Mr. Pathak that the Labour Appellate Tribunal should not have granted the demand of the respondents for leave on grounds of fair play and social justice.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We would, therefore, deal with Civil Appeal No. 481/1962In this appeal Mr. Pathak has not disputed the correctness or propriety of the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in regard to the claim made by the respondents in respect of Badris dismissal. So, that part of the dispute need not detain us in the presentpresented, the argument is no doubt prima facie attractive; but as soon as we begin to examine it more carefully, it breaks down. If the construction for which Mr. Pathak contends is accepted without any modification, clerks employed in the factory would not be workmen, because on the test suggested by Mr. Pathak, they are not employed in the spinning or weaving operation carried on by the appellant and yet, there is no doubt that clerks employed by the appellant to do clerical work are workmen under S. 2(s),and so, the literal construction of the clause "employed in any industry cannot be accepted and that means that "employed in any industry must take in employees who are employed in connection with operations incidental to the main industry, and once we are compelled to introduce this concept of incidental connection with the main industry, the literal construction for which the appellant contends has to bewould be noticed that the incidental connection in the present illustration is one degree removed from the main industry; the workmen who work in the industry are intended to be brought to the factory by the buses and it is the these buses that the drivers run. Even so, it would not be easy to exclude drivers of buses engaged by the factory solely for the purpose of transporting its employees to the Mills from their respective homes and back, on the basis that they are not workmen under S. 2(s). Mr. Pathak was unable to resist the extension of the definition to such cases; but nevertheless, he attempted to argue that though sweepers who sweep the premises of the factory may be called workmen, sweepers who sweep the area around the factory may not be included under S. 2(s). Sweeping the area outside the factory, it is argued, may be incidentally connected with the main industry, but the incidental connection is indirect and remote, and so, this class of employees must be excluded from the definition. We are not prepared to accept this argument. In our opinion, an employee who is engaged in any work or operation which is incidentally connected with the main industry of the employer would be a workman provided the other requirements of S. 2(s) are satisfied.12. In this connection, it is hardly necessary to emphasise that in the modern world industrial operations have become complex and complicated and for the efficient and successful functioning of any industry, several incidental operations are called in aid and it is the totality of all these operations that ultimately constitutes the industry as a whole. Wherever it is shown that the industry has employed an employee to assist one or the other operation incidental to the main industrial operation, it would be unreasonable to deny such an employee the status of a workman on the ground that his work is not directly concerned with the main work or operation of the industry. Reverting to the illustration of the buses owned by the factory for the purposes of transporting its workmen if the bus-drivers can legitimately be held to assist operation incidental to the main work of the industry, we do not see why a Mali should not claim that he is also engaged in an operation which is incidental to the main industry.It is true that in matters of this kind it is not easy to draw a line, and it may also be conceded that in dealing with the question of incidental relationship with the main industrial operation, a limit has to be prescribed so as to exclude operations or activities whose relation with the main industrial activity may be remote, indirect and far-fetched. We are not prepared to hold that the relation of the work carried on by the Malis in the present case can be characterised as remote, indirect or far-fetched. That is why we think that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that Malis are workmen under the Act.14. Before we part with this point; we would like to add that industrial adjudication appears consistently to have taken the view that Malis looking after the gardens attached to the bungalows occupied by officers of any industrial concern are workmen under S.is remarkable that both these decisions which are directly in point, were under S. 2 of the Act with which we are concerned. In dealing with industrial dispute we are reluctant to interfere with the well established and consistent course of decisions pronounced by the Labour Appellate Court unless, of course, it is shown that the said decisions are plainlywill be noticed that the first paragraph makes it perfectly clear that the order binds all the industries affected by it and the workmen employed therein; so that as soon as it is held that the Malis are workmen under S. 2 of the Act, it would follow that the order would apply to the Malis. In considering the present point, it is necessary to bear in mind that this order has been issued in exercise of the powers conferred by cls. (b) and (g) of S. 3 of the Act and that clearly means that persons who are workmen under S. 2 of the Act are referred to by paragraph 1 and there would be no escape from the conclusion that the order would apply to such workmen and industries that employedour opinion, this argument is wholly fallacious. It is clear that the second paragraph refers to industrial or clerical employees, because the table prescribing the minimum basic wages divides the employees into two categories, industrial and clerical. It is only because this division is made by the table that for the purpose of clarification, paragraph 2 mentions industrial or clerical in bracket after referring to the employees. Besides, it would be unreasonable to assume that when the order prescribed minimum basic wages for workmen to whom paragraph 1 expressly refers, it could have been intended that the said minimum basic wages should not be extended to some workmen falling under paragraph 1 because they do not fall under the category of industrial employees or clerical employees. The scheme of the order is plain and unambiguous, to all workmen falling under S. 2 the benefits of the order are intended to be extended. That is the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal and, in our opinion, that view is obviously right. If that be so, the validity of the order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal awarding the respondents claim for dear food allowance under paragraph 3 of the G. O. cannot be questioned.No doubt, it was urged before the Tribunal that expression "industrial employees should be understood in the same comprehensive sense as the word "industry as defined in the Industrial Disputes Act, but this contention was rejected by the Tribunal. It seems to us that the Tribunal was in error in limiting the scope of the expression "industrial employees by reference to the definition to the word "worker prescribed by the Factories Act. Indeed, it would be relevant and appropriate to refer to the definition of the word "workman under S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, because the G. O. in question has been issued under the Act and the definition of a "workmen prescribed by S. 2 of the Act as S. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act would determine the true denotation of the expression "industrial employees. We must accordingly hold that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in accepting the very narrow construction of the expression "industrial employees used in the Governmentcontention is not well founded. It does appear that in paragraph 10 of the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents reference is made to the said two Acts, but in the prayer clause the claim is made in general terms without reference to the Acts, and the reference itself is in general terms and makes no mention of the said two Acts. Therefore, the technical ground urged by Mr. Pathak that the relevant claim was made on the provisions of the two specified Acts and should be rejected solely on the ground that the said Acts do not apply, cannot be sustained, It was a general reference which the Adjudicator was called upon the decide and the fact that the said two Acts did not apply, cannot be said to rule out the said claim as to leave inour opinion, the argument that the considerations of social justice are irrelevant and untenable in dealing with industrial disputes, has to be rejected without any hesitation. The development of industrial law during the last decade and several decisions of this Court in dealing with industrial matters have emphasised the relevance, validity and significance of the doctrine of social justice: vide Messrs. Crown Aluminium Works v. Their Workmen, 1958 SCR 651   : (AIR 1958 SC 30  ) and State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, 1959 SCR 895 : (AIR 1958 SC 923  ).Indeed, the concept of social justice has now become such an integral part of industrial law that it would be idel for any party to suggest that industrial adjudication can or should ignore the claims of social justice in dealing with industrial disputes. The concept of social justice is not narrow, or one-sided, or pedantic, and is not confined to industrial adjudication alone. Its sweep is comprehensive. It is founded on the basic ideal to socio-economic equality and its aim is to assist the removal of socio-economic disparties and inequalities; nevertheless, in dealing with industrial matters, it does not adopt a doctrinaire approach and refuses to yield blindly to abstract notions, but adopts a realistic and pragmatic approach. It, therefore, endeavours to resolve the competing claims of employers and employees by finding a solution which is just and fair to both parties with the object of establishing harmony between capital and labour, and good relationship. The ultimate object of industrial adjudication is to help the growth and progress of national economy and it is with that ultimate object in view that industrial disputes are settled by industrial adjudication on principle of fair-play and justice. That is the reason why on several occasions, industrial adjudication has thought it fit to make reasonable provision for leave in respect of the workmen who may not strictly fall within the purview of the Factories Act or the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. We are, therefore, satisfied that there is no substance in the grievance made by Mr. Pathak that the Labour Appellate Tribunal should not have granted the demand of the respondents for leave on grounds of fair play and social justice.