Case: Kishore Samrite Vs. State Of U.P.

but not even an iota of evidence has been placed on record of the writ petitions before the High Court or even in the appeal before this Court, which could even show the remote possibility of happening of the alleged rape incident on 3rd December, 2006. There is an affidavit by the police and report by the CBI to show that this incident never occurred and the three petitioners have specifically disputed and denied any such incident or making of any report in relation thereto or even in regard to the alleged illegal detention. Political rivalry can lead to such ill-founded litigation. In the case of Gosu Jayarami Reddy & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2011) 11 SCC 766] , this Court observed that political rivalry at times degenerates into personal vendetta where principles and policies take a back seat and personal ambition and longing for power drive men to commit the foulest of deeds to avenge defeat and to settle scores. These observations aptly apply to the facts of the present case particularly the writ petition preferred by the appellant. At one place, he claims to have acted as a public figure with good conscience but has stated false facts. On the other hand, he takes a somersault and claims that he acted on the directives of the political figures. It is unworthy of a public figure to act in such a manner and demonstrate a behaviour which is impermissible in law. Appellant as well as respondent No.8 filed Habeas corpus petitions claiming it to be a petition for attainment of public confidence and right to life. In the garb of doctrines like the Right to Liberty and access to justice, these petitioners not only intended but actually filed improper and untenable petitions, primarily with the object of attaining publicity and causing injury to the reputation of others. The term ‘person’ includes not only the physical body and members but also every bodily sense and personal attribute among which is the reputation a man has acquired. Reputation can also be defined to be good name, the credit, honour or character which is derived from a favourable public opinion or esteem, and character by report. The right to enjoyment of a good reputation is a valuable privilege of ancient origin and necessary to human society. ‘Reputation’ is an element of personal security and is protected by Constitution equally with the right to enjoyment of life, liberty and property. Although ‘character’ and ‘reputation’ are often used synonymously, but these terms are distinguishable. ‘Character’ is what a man is and ‘reputation’ is what he is supposed to be in what people say he is. ‘Character’ depends on attributes possessed and ‘reputation’ on attributes which others believe one to possess. The former signifies reality and the latter merely what is accepted to be reality at present. {Ref. Smt. Kiran Bedi v. The Committee of Inquiry & Anr. [(1989) 1 SCC 494] and Nilgiris Bar Association v. T.K. Mahalingam & Anr. [AIR 1998 SC 398 ]. The methodology adopted by the next friends in the writ petitions before the High Court was opposed to political values and administration of justice. In the case of Kusum Lata v. Union of India [(2006) 6 SCC 180] , this Court observed that when there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition should be dismissed by the Court. If such petitions are not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance as well. 52. In light of these legal principles, appellant and, in fact, to a great extent even respondent No.8 have made an attempt to hurt the reputation and image of respondent no.6 by stating incorrect facts, that too, by abusing the process of court. 53. Coming to the judgment of the High Court under appeal it has to be noticed that the appellant was deprived of adequate hearing by the High Court, but that defect stands cured inasmuch as we have heard of the concerned parties in both the writ petitions at length. The transfer of Writ Petition No. 111/2011 was not in consonance with the accepted canons of judicial administrative propriety. The imposition of such heavy costs upon the petitioner was not called for in the facts and circumstances of the case as the Court was not dealing with a suit for damages but with a petition for habeas corpus, even if the petition was not bona fide. Furthermore, we are unable to endorse our approval to the manner in which the costs imposed were ordered to be disbursed to the different parties. Moreover, the question of paying rewards to the Director General of Police does not arise as the police and the Director General of Police were only performing their duties by producing the petitioners in the Court. They, in any case, were living in their own house without restriction or any kind of detention by anyone. In fact, the three petitioners have been compulsorily dragged to the court by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 125/2011. They had made no complaint to any person and thus, the question of their illegal detention and consequential release would not arise. These three persons have been used by both the petitioners and it is, in fact, they are the ones whose reputation has suffered a serious setback and were exposed to inconvenience of being dragged to courts for no fault of their own. We hardly see any attributes of the Police except performance of their duties in the normal course so as to entitled them to exceptional rewards. Certainly, the reputation of respondent no.6 has also been damaged, factually and in law. Both these petitions are based on falsehood. The reputation of respondent no.6 is damaged and his public image diminished due to the undesirable acts of the appellant and respondent no.8. 54. For these reasons, we

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]53. Coming to the judgment of the High Court under appeal it has to be noticed that the appellant was deprived of adequate hearing by the High Court, but that defect stands cured inasmuch as we have heard of the concerned parties in both the writ petitions at length. The transfer of Writ Petition No. 111/2011 was not in consonance with the accepted canons of judicial administrative propriety. The imposition of such heavy costs upon the petitioner was not called for in the facts and circumstances of the case as the Court was not dealing with a suit for damages but with a petition for habeas corpus, even if the petition was not bona fide. Furthermore, we are unable to endorse our approval to the manner in which the costs imposed were ordered to be disbursed to the different parties. Moreover, the question of paying rewards to the Director General of Police does not arise as the police and the Director General of Police were only performing their duties by producing the petitioners in the Court. They, in any case, were living in their own house without restriction or any kind of detention by anyone. In fact, the three petitioners have been compulsorily dragged to the court by the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 125/2011. They had made no complaint to any person and thus, the question of their illegal detention and consequential release would not arise. These three persons have been used by both the petitioners and it is, in fact, they are the ones whose reputation has suffered a serious setback and were exposed to inconvenience of being dragged to courts for no fault of their own. We hardly see any attributes of the Police except performance of their duties in the normal course so as to entitled them to exceptional rewards. Certainly, the reputation of respondent no.6 has also been damaged, factually and in law. Both these petitions are based on falsehood. The reputation of respondent no.6 is damaged and his public image diminished due to the undesirable acts of the appellant and respondent no.8.