Case: ANEESH KUMAR V. S.&amp; ORS Vs. THE STATE OF KERALA &amp; ORS

of interim order passed by this Court on 3.11.2014, which stood vacated whilst allowing the Civil Appeal on 13.10.2015. The one-year period referred to in Rule 13 of the 1976 Rules, as per the general application, would have expired on 10.9.2014. There was no complete interdiction of the stated list until 3.11.2014 and for that reason, the KPSC was justified in issuing advice even after the interim order was passed by the Tribunal, namely, on 20.1.2014 (before the status quo order was passed by this Court for the first time on 3.11.2014). The final advice was admittedly issued on 11.11.2015 after the disposal of civil appeals by this Court on 13.10.2015. Pursuant to the final (third) advice, the last batch of 339 empanelled candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I) was sent for training on 1.5.2016, as a result of which the first Ranked List (RL-I) ceased to exist on expiry of one month therefrom i.e. on 1.6.2016. This conclusion has been justly arrived at by the Full Bench disregarding the decision of the KPSC, dated 26.10.2015 to treat the first Ranked List (RL-I) having ceased to exist due to publication of second Ranked List (RL-II) on 26.5.2015. 27. The Full Bench also took notice of the fact that the vacancies were reported after a gap of more than eight months on 12.7.2016 and that the last (third) advice was made on 11.11.2015. The Full Bench taking notice of the settled legal position, as expounded in S.S. Balu (supra), Kerala Public Service Commission vs. Shanil Kumar (2002) 1 KLT 604 , Lal Sudheer & Ors. vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. , (2003) 1 KLT 329 Secretary, Kerala Public Service Commission vs. Sheeja P.R. & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 56 and Nair Service Society vs. Distt. Officer, Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 10 , went on to hold that by now it is well established that the Commission (KPSC) cannot advise any candidate after the expiry of a Ranked List, even to an NJD vacancy, if such vacancies are reported after the expiry of the list in question. We agree with this opinion of the Full Bench. Admittedly, all the appellants were empanelled in the first Ranked List (RL-I), which, as aforementioned, had ceased to exist on 1.6.2016. Resultantly, the appellants cannot set up any claim in respect of vacancies reported thereafter. The NJD vacancies reported after 1.6.2016 must be filled up from amongst the empanelled candidates in the fresh Ranked List (i.e. the second Ranked List (RL-II) published on 26.5.2015 or the third Ranked List (RL-III) published on 14.3.2019, as the case may be). 28. We will revert to the third issue, which has now become a side issue and insignificant to the case on hand - as to whether the maxims - actus curiae neminem gravabit and lex non cogit ad impossibilia will come to the aid of the appellants. From the analysis of factual matrix of the case on hand, it becomes evident that there was no complete interdiction of the first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.9.2013 until the order of status quo was passed on 3.11.2014 by this Court. It is true that despite the order of status quo, the second Ranked List (RL-II) came to be published on 26.5.2015. According to the respondents, the order of status quo must be construed as only restraining the respondents from giving effect to the first Ranked List (RL-I) in any manner. 29. Notably, the issue pending consideration in the civil appeal in which the order of status quo was passed by this Court on 3.11.2014, was in reference to the directions given by the Tribunal on 20.2.2014 to re-cast the first Ranked List (RL-I) with main and supplementary lists, and to refrain from advising candidates who had secured less than 49 marks. As noted earlier, no candidate with less than 49 marks had been advised either from the final first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.9.2013 or the second Ranked List (RL-II) published on 26.5.2015. Furthermore, this Court while disposing of Civil Appeal No. 8536/2015 and connected appeal on 13.10.2015, to which the appellants were also party, did not issue any direction to the respondents to report about the existing NJD vacancies at the relevant time or otherwise, to KPSC, so as to accommodate the remaining empanelled candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I) before giving effect to the second Ranked List (RL-II) dated 26.5.2015. 30. Be it noted that grievance about publication of the second Ranked List (RL-II) during the pendency of appeal before this Court and despite the order of status quo, was not pursued before this Court on behalf of the appellants. We find force in the argument of the respondents that the order of status quo though interdicted processing of the first Ranked List (RL-I), that restriction stood lifted with setting aside of the decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court and allowing the appeal on 13.10.2015. Sans any direction by this Court and challenge to publication of the second Ranked List (RL-II) on 26.5.2015, nothing came in the way of the respondents to proceed with the final advice made on 11.11.2015 relating to 339 empanelled candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I), who in turn, commenced their training on 1.5.2016. 31. Considering the indisputable facts and unexceptionable finding recorded by the Full Bench which commends to us, it must follow that the appellants were not entitled to base their claim in reference to the first Ranked List (RL-I), which had ceased to exist on 1.6.2016, by filing writ petition(s) on 12.10.2017 for the stated reliefs. As the first Ranked List (RL-I), in law, ceased to exist from 1.6.2016, no relief could be granted to the appellants and the principles of actus curiae neminem gravabit and lex non cogit ad impossibilia will be of no avail, as it was not a case of any prejudice caused to the appellants on account of Court order as such.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Ordinarily, the Full Bench is expected to decide only those issues which are referred to it by the Division Bench and must eschew from examining merits of the case as such. We are fortified in so observing in light of the dictum of this Court in T.A. Hameed vs. M. Viswanathan (2008) 3 SCC 243 .   At the same time, we are also guided by the dictum of this Court in State of Punjab vs. Salil Sabhlok & Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 1.   In that case, the Full Bench of the High Court while deciding the Reference, adjudicated other mattersOn a plain reading of this provision, it is amply clear that the Full Bench is competent to finally decide the case itself. It is an enabling provision. Nevertheless, we may first advert to the nature of Reference made by the Division Bench in the present case vide order dated 16.11.2018. The Division Bench in its Reference Order, had articulated the question posed by the appellants herein as to whether the candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I) or from the second Ranked List (RL-II) have to be advised for the 93 (NJD) vacancies reported to the KPSC on 12.7.2016. From paragraph 5 onwards of the Reference Order, the Division Bench adverted to the relevant facts and noted that the candidates in the first Ranked List (RL-I) have to be advised for appointment to fill up the 93 NJD vacancies reported on 12.7.2016On perusal of the Reference Order, it appears that the Division Bench analysed the factual matrix of the case to opine that the candidates empanelled in the first Ranked List (RL-I) have to be advised for appointment to fill up the 93 NJD vacancies reported on 12.7.2016. However, it stopped short of issuing direction to the respondents on account of the exposition in Dr. Kesavankutty Nair (supra) and the purport of the governing rules. Further, the Reference Order had not formulated any specific question to be answered by the Full Bench, but an omnibus direction issued to the Registry to place the papers before the Honble Chief Justice for constitution of the Full Bench and an early resolution of the dispute . Such an omnibus reference would include exercise of jurisdiction by the Full Bench under Section 7 of the High Court Act, to finally decide the case itself. Ostensibly, it may appear as if Full Bench was sitting over in appeal on the findings of fact already recorded by the Division Bench. However, we find from the impugned judgment of the Full Bench that it was fully conscious about the limited scope of enquiry in Reference placed before it, but after due consideration of all aspects, deemed it necessary to analyse the factual matrix of the case in its correct perspective to justly answer the Reference. In the process, the Full Bench had to deviate from the observation made by the Division Bench that the candidates empanelled in the first Ranked List (RL-I) ought to be advised for appointment to fill up the 93 NJD vacancies reported on 12.7.2016, as, in its view, in law, the first Ranked List (RL-I) had expired on 1.6.2016. In other words, the Full Bench was fully conscious of the scope of its jurisdiction, as is evinced from the opening statement, in paragraph four of the impugned judgment. After recording the factual matrix and rival submissions, in paragraph 47 of the impugned judgment, the Full Bench noted that it was proceeding to answer the legal contentions within the parameters of the applicable law and after adverting to Rules 13 and 14 of the 1976 Rules, it analysed the factual matrix to conclude that since the last batch was advised by the KPSC from the first Ranked List (RL-I) on 11.11.2015 and it had joined training on 1.5.2016 in terms of first proviso to Rule 13, the first Ranked List (RL-I) ceased to operate from 1.6.2016 (namely, on completion of one month from 1.5.2016)23. Thus understood, in the peculiar facts of this case, the Full Bench had no other option but to analyse the factual matrix for ascertaining the applicability of extant rules and to answer the matters in issue involved in Reference appropriately. Suffice it to observe that the impugned judgment cannot be overturned on the basis of threshold (technical) plea under consideration. We are inclined to say so also because this is the second round of proceedings emanating from the selection process which had commenced with issuance of notification as back as 28.9.2007, for appointment to the post of Sub-Inspector of Police (Trainee). We are of the considered opinion that no fruitful purpose will be served by relegating the parties before the High Court on technicality. That objection, for the reasons already recorded, does not commend to us. Instead, in the peculiar facts of this case, we deem it necessary to answer the merits of the controversy so as to give quietus thereto concerning selection process commenced as back as in 2007 vide notification dated 28.9.2007On a plain reading of Rule 13, it is amply clear that the Ranked List published by the Commission (KPSC) would remain in force for a period of one year from the date on which it was brought into force. It further envisages that the said list will continue to be in force until the publication of a new list after the expiry of the minimum period of one year or till the expiry of three years, whichever is earlier. The first proviso is an exception to the general rule. It predicates that the general rule shall not apply in respect of Ranked List of candidates for admission to training courses that leads to automatic appointment to services or posts and that in such cases, the Ranked Lists shall cease to be in force after one year from the date of finalization of the Ranked Lists or after one month from the date of commencement of the course in respect of the last batch selected from the list within a period of one year from the date of finalisation of the Ranked Lists, whichever is later. It is only this excepted eventuality which may elongate the tenure of the Ranked List published by the Commission (KPSC) beyond one year. The first Ranked List (RL-I) was published on 11.9.2013, but because of fortuitous situation, the final (third) advice from the first Ranked List (RL-I) was made by the KPSC on 11.11.2015 and the last batch of 339 candidates so advised was sent for training on 1.5.2016. Resultantly, the consequence provided by the first proviso to Rule 13 got triggered, whereby the first Ranked List (RL-I) ceased to operate in law, with effect from 1.6.2016We are in agreement with the analysis of factual matrix of the case undertaken by the Full Bench. Having said that, we must affirm the conclusion and application of Rule 13 by the Full Bench, to hold that the first Ranked List (RL-I) expired on 1.6.201626. The interim order passed by the Tribunal on 5.12.2013, in no way interdicted the operation of the first Ranked List (RL-I). As a matter of fact, none of the advised candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I) had secured less than 49 marks in the preliminary examination. In any case, the original application(s) filed by the appellants before the Tribunal came to be disposed of on 20.2.2014, which order eventually became subject matter of Civil Appeal No. 8536/2015 and connected appeal before this Court. The operation of the first Ranked List (RL-I) was in a way interdicted for the first time on account of interim order passed by this Court on 3.11.2014, which stood vacated whilst allowing the Civil Appeal on 13.10.2015. The one-year period referred to in Rule 13 of the 1976 Rules, as per the general application, would have expired on 10.9.2014. There was no complete interdiction of the stated list until 3.11.2014 and for that reason, the KPSC was justified in issuing advice even after the interim order was passed by the Tribunal, namely, on 20.1.2014 (before the status quo order was passed by this Court for the first time on 3.11.2014). The final advice was admittedly issued on 11.11.2015 after the disposal of civil appeals by this Court on 13.10.2015. Pursuant to the final (third) advice, the last batch of 339 empanelled candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I) was sent for training on 1.5.2016, as a result of which the first Ranked List (RL-I) ceased to exist on expiry of one month therefrom i.e. on 1.6.2016. This conclusion has been justly arrived at by the Full Bench disregarding the decision of the KPSC, dated 26.10.2015 to treat the first Ranked List (RL-I) having ceased to exist due to publication of second Ranked List (RL-II) on 26.5.201527. The Full Bench also took notice of the fact that the vacancies were reported after a gap of more than eight months on 12.7.2016 and that the last (third) advice was made on 11.11.2015. The Full Bench taking notice of the settled legal position, as expounded in S.S. Balu (supra), Kerala Public Service Commission vs. Shanil Kumar (2002) 1 KLT 604 , Lal Sudheer & Ors. vs. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. , (2003) 1 KLT 329 Secretary, Kerala Public Service Commission vs. Sheeja P.R. & Anr. (2013) 2 SCC 56     and Nair Service Society vs. Distt. Officer, Kerala Public Service Commission & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 10   , went on to hold that by now it is well established that the Commission (KPSC) cannot advise any candidate after the expiry of a Ranked List, even to an NJD vacancy, if such vacancies are reported after the expiry of the list in question. We agree with this opinion of the Full Bench. Admittedly, all the appellants were empanelled in the first Ranked List (RL-I), which, as aforementioned, had ceased to exist on 1.6.2016. Resultantly, the appellants cannot set up any claim in respect of vacancies reported thereafter. The NJD vacancies reported after 1.6.2016 must be filled up from amongst the empanelled candidates in the fresh Ranked List (i.e. the second Ranked List (RL-II) published on 26.5.2015 or the third Ranked List (RL-III) published on 14.3.2019, as the case may be)From the analysis of factual matrix of the case on hand, it becomes evident that there was no complete interdiction of the first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.9.2013 until the order of status quo was passed on 3.11.2014 by this Court. It is true that despite the order of status quo, the second Ranked List (RL-II) came to be published on 26.5.2015. According to the respondents, the order of status quo must be construed as only restraining the respondents from giving effect to the first Ranked List (RL-I) in any manner29. Notably, the issue pending consideration in the civil appeal in which the order of status quo was passed by this Court on 3.11.2014, was in reference to the directions given by the Tribunal on 20.2.2014 to re-cast the first Ranked List (RL-I) with main and supplementary lists, and to refrain from advising candidates who had secured less than 49 marks. As noted earlier, no candidate with less than 49 marks had been advised either from the final first Ranked List (RL-I) published on 11.9.2013 or the second Ranked List (RL-II) published on 26.5.2015. Furthermore, this Court while disposing of Civil Appeal No. 8536/2015 and connected appeal on 13.10.2015, to which the appellants were also party, did not issue any direction to the respondents to report about the existing NJD vacancies at the relevant time or otherwise, to KPSC, so as to accommodate the remaining empanelled candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I) before giving effect to the second Ranked List (RL-II) dated 26.5.201530. Be it noted that grievance about publication of the second Ranked List (RL-II) during the pendency of appeal before this Court and despite the order of status quo, was not pursued before this Court on behalf of the appellants. We find force in the argument of the respondents that the order of status quo though interdicted processing of the first Ranked List (RL-I), that restriction stood lifted with setting aside of the decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court and allowing the appeal on 13.10.2015. Sans any direction by this Court and challenge to publication of the second Ranked List (RL-II) on 26.5.2015, nothing came in the way of the respondents to proceed with the final advice made on 11.11.2015 relating to 339 empanelled candidates from the first Ranked List (RL-I), who in turn, commenced their training on 1.5.201631. Considering the indisputable facts and unexceptionable finding recorded by the Full Bench which commends to us, it must follow that the appellants were not entitled to base their claim in reference to the first Ranked List (RL-I), which had ceased to exist on 1.6.2016, by filing writ petition(s) on 12.10.2017 for the stated reliefs. As the first Ranked List (RL-I), in law, ceased to exist from 1.6.2016, no relief could be granted to the appellants and the principles of actus curiae neminem gravabit and lex non cogit ad impossibilia will be of no avail, as it was not a case of any prejudice caused to the appellants on account of Court order as such.