Case: Narayan Bhondoo Pimputkar &amp; Another  Vs. Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar &amp; Ors

of all connections between the watandar and the watan land because of the abolition of patel watans and the extinguishment of incidents appertaining to such watans. A residual right was still there in the erstwhile watandar and that included the right to retain possession of watan land if the conditions mentioned in Section 6 were complied with. Section 7 of the Act contains provisions for regrant of watan lands to authorised holders, while Section 10 provides for eviction of unauthorised holders. Provision is also made for regrant of the land by the State Government to unauthorised holders if the Government forms the opinion that his eviction would cause undue hardship to him.9. It would follow from a combined reading of Sections 4, 6, 7 and 10 of the Act that a watandar on the abolition of patel watans and extinguishment of the incidents appertaining to the watans does not automatically lose his right to possession of the watan lands. The same is true of an authorised holder. Their right to retain possession of watan land as long as they comply with the prescribed conditions is statutorily recognised.The position of a watandar and an authorised holder is in marked contrast to that of an unauthorised holder who can be summarily evicted from the watan lands by the Collector under Section 10 of the Act. So far as quondam watandars are concerned, they are entitled to be in possession of the watan lands not in their capacity as watandars but by virtue of the operation of Section 6 of the Act.Likewise, the authorised holders are entitled to be in possession by virtue of Section 7 of the Act. If the respondent is entitled to be in possession of the land in dispute under Section 6 of the Act, the right to execute the decree for possession of the land can plainly be not denied to him on account of the provisions of the Act.10. According to Mr. Desai, if the appellants are not dispossessed from the land in dispute in execution of the decree obtained by the respondent against them, the appellants can approach the State Government for regrant of the land in dispute to them because their eviction would cause undue hardship to them. It is, in our opinion, not necessary for the purpose of the present case to go into the question whether the appellants can claim regrant of the land under Section 10 of the Act because this question does not materially affect the right of the respondent to execute the decree for possession of the land in dispute obtained by him against the appellants. If the respondent is entitled to execute the decree for possession of the land obtained against the appellants, in that event the question whether the appellants, if allowed to remain in possession, could have applied for regrant of the land to them, is hardly of any relevance.11. Reference has been made by Mr. Desai to the words "any decree or order of a court" in the opening clause of Section 4 of the Act. It is urged that those words indicate that the decree or order of a court can also be not executed with effect from the appointed day. This contention, in our opinion, is not well founded. What is contemplated by the opening clause of Section 4 of the Act is that notwithstanding any usage or custom or anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or any decree or order of a court or the existing law with effect from the appointed day, the results mentioned in the various clauses of that section would follow. The words "any decree or order of a court" are preceded by the words "anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad." It is a well-established rule in construction of statutes that general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature. In other words, the general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expressions, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended (see p. 297 of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition). In our opinion, the opening clause of Section 4 indicates that irrespective of any usage or custom and irrespective of any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or decree or order of a court or the existing watan law, which might have defined and declared the incidents appertaining to patel watans, the results contemplated by the various clauses of Section 4 would follow and nothing contained in the settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or decree or order of the court or the existing watan law would prevent the operation of that section.12. In view of what has been held above, it is, in our opinion, not necessary to deal with the alternative argument of Mr. Patel that the execution proceedings taken by the respondent to recover possession of the land were also protected by Section 22 of the Act.13. Reference has been made by Mr. Desai to a Full Bench decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedulla Khan, AIR 1953 Nag 361 (FB). It was held by the majority in that case that after the coming into force of the M. P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 the pre-emption decree obtained by landlords are no longer executable because the persons seeking to enforce them have lost their proprietary interest. The aforesaid case cannot be of any help to the appellants because it has been conceded by Mr. Desai that there were no provisions in the abovementioned Madhya Pradesh Act corresponding to Sections 6, 7 and 10 of the Act with which we are concerned. It is also consequently not necessary to express any opinion about the correctness of the view taken by the majority in the abovementioned Full Bench decision.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. The provisions of Section 4 of the Act have been reproduced above and it is manifest therefrom that with effect from the appointed day, viz., April 1, 1963 all patel watans are abolished and all incidents appertaining to the said watans are extinguished. It is further provided that as from the appointed day no office of patel shall be hereditary and that subject to the provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 10 all watan lands are resumed and would be subject to the payment of land revenue.The question with which we are concerned is whether the right to execute the decree for the possession of watan land which has been obtained by the watandar against other persons comes to an end because of the abolition of patel watans and the extinguishment of all incidents appertaining to the said watans. The answer to this question, in our opinion, should be in the negative. There is nothing in the language of Section 4 which renders such decrees for possession to be inexecutable. Had the legislature intended that the decrees for possession of the watan lands which had been obtained by the watandars against third persons should become inexecutable, the legislature would have indicated such an intention by incorporating some provision to that effect. In the absence of any such provision, it is not permissible to read a prohibition in Section 4 of the Act on the execution of a decree for possession of the watan land obtained in favour of the watandar.It would follow from a combined reading of Sections 4, 6, 7 and 10 of the Act that a watandar on the abolition of patel watans and extinguishment of the incidents appertaining to the watans does not automatically lose his right to possession of the watan lands. The same is true of an authorised holder. Their right to retain possession of watan land as long as they comply with the prescribed conditions is statutorily recognised.The position of a watandar and an authorised holder is in marked contrast to that of an unauthorised holder who can be summarily evicted from the watan lands by the Collector under Section 10 of the Act. So far as quondam watandars are concerned, they are entitled to be in possession of the watan lands not in their capacity as watandars but by virtue of the operation of Section 6 of the Act.Likewise, the authorised holders are entitled to be in possession by virtue of Section 7 of the Act. If the respondent is entitled to be in possession of the land in dispute under Section 6 of the Act, the right to execute the decree for possession of the land can plainly be not denied to him on account of the provisions of theis, in our opinion, not necessary for the purpose of the present case to go into the question whether the appellants can claim regrant of the land under Section 10 of the Act because this question does not materially affect the right of the respondent to execute the decree for possession of the land in dispute obtained by him against the appellants. If the respondent is entitled to execute the decree for possession of the land obtained against the appellants, in that event the question whether the appellants, if allowed to remain in possession, could have applied for regrant of the land to them, is hardly of anycontention, in our opinion, is not well founded. What is contemplated by the opening clause of Section 4 of the Act is that notwithstanding any usage or custom or anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or any decree or order of a court or the existing law with effect from the appointed day, the results mentioned in the various clauses of that section would follow. The words "any decree or order of a court" are preceded by the words "anything contained in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad." It is a well-established rule in construction of statutes that general terms following particular ones apply only to such persons or things as are ejusdem generis with those comprehended in the language of the Legislature.