Case: Ram Gopal Vs. Nand Lal And Others

Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, was in occupation of the double-storied shop from long before the Tamliknama was executed and Meria got any legal title to it. It appears from the record that in 1920 a suit was instituted on behalf of the infant Nand Lal for evicting Sunder Lal from the shop and the allegation in the plaint was that Sunder Lal was occupying the property as a tenant since the time of Mt. Mithani by taking a settlement from her. Sunder Lal in his written statement filed in that suit expressly repudiated the allegation of tenancy and also the title of Nand Lal and openly asserted that it was Mt. Meria who was the actual owner of Mangal Sens estate. The suit ended in and compromise arrived at through the medium of arbitrators and the result was that although Sunder Lal admitted the title of the pltf; the latter had to abandon the claims which were made in the plaint for rents, costs and damages. Sunder Lal continued to be in occupation of the shop and executed a rent agreement in respect of the same in favour of Nand Lal promising to pay a rent of Rs. 12 p. m. A few months later, the Tamliknama was executed and this shop along with the residential house were given to Meria inmalikiright. The recitals in both the Tamliknama and the deed of relinquishment clearly indicate that the supreme anxiety on the part of Babu Ram, who was trying his best to safeguard the interests of the minor, was to put an end to all further disputes that might be raised by or on behalf of Mt. Meria with regard to the rights of Nand Lal to the properties of Mangal Sen and to make his title to the same absolutely impeccable. That seems to be the, reason why Meria was given a comparatively large portion of the properties left by Mangal Sen which would enable her to live in comfort and her interest was not limited to a bare right of maintenance. It is significant to note that the shop room, which was all along in possession of Sunder Lal, was included in this Tamliknama and soon after the grant was made Sunder Lal executed a rent agreement in respect of the shop in favour of Mt. Meria acknowledging her to be the owner of the property.18. It is true that the document does not make any reference to the heirs of Meria, but that is not at all necessary, nor is it essential that any express power of alienation should be given. The word "Malik" is too common an expression in this part of the country and its meaning and implications were fairly well settled by judicial pronouncements long before the document was executed. If really the grantee was intended to have only a life interest in the properties, there was no lack of appropriate words, prefectly well known in the locality, to express such intention.19. The H. C. seems to have been influenced to some extent by the fact that in the Tamliknama there was a guarantee given by Babu Ram to Meria herself and to no one else agreeing to compensate her in case she was dispossessed from the properties at the instance of Nand Lal. This covenant in the document was in the nature of a personal guarantee given by Babu Ram to Mt. Meria for the simple reason that the property belonged to an infant and it was as guardian of the minor that Babu Ram was purporting to act. It was too much to expect that Babu Ram would bind himself for all time to come and give a guarantee to the future heirs of Meria as well. Probably no such thing was contemplated by the parties and no such undertaking was insisted upon by the other side. But whatever the reason might be which led to the covenant being expressed in this particular form, I do not think that it has even a remote bearing on the question that arises for our consideration in the present case. It is of no assistance to the pltf. in support of the construction that is sought to be put upon the document on his behalf.20. I am also not at all impressed by the other fact referred to in the judgment of the H. C. that if the properties were given to Meria in absolute right, there was no necessity for including them again in the schedule to the deed of relinquishment which Meria executed. I fail to see how the inclusion of the properties in the deed of relinquishment would go to indicate that Merias rights to these properties were of a restricted and not an absolute character. It is after all a pure matter of conveyancing and the two documents have to be read together as parts of one and the same transaction. Under the Tamliknama, Meria got two properties in absolute right out of the estate of Mangal Sen. By the deed of relinquishment, she renounced her claim for maintenance in respect of all the properties left by Mangal Sen including the two items which she got under the Tamliknama. After the Tamliknama was executed in her favour there was no further question of her claiming any right of maintenance in respect of these two items of property. She became the absolute owner thereof in exchange of her rights of maintenance over the entire estate and this right of maintenance she gave up by the deed of relinquishment. On a construction of the entire document, my conclusion is that there is nothing in the context of the document, or in the surrounding circumstances which would displace the presumption of full proprietary rights which the use of the word "Malik" is apt ordinarily to convey. The first contention of the applt. therefore succeeds and in view of my decision on this point, the second question does not arise for determination at all.21.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. It may be taken to be quite settled that there is no warrant for the proposition at law that when a grant at an immovable property made to a Hindu female, she does not get an absolute or alienable interest in such property, unless such power is expressly conferred upon her.The reasoning adopted by Mitter J. of the Calcutta H. C. in Mt. Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Prasad,24 W. R. 395 which was approved at and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable. It was held by the P. O, as early as in the case of Tayore v. Tagore, I. A. Sup. Vol. 47 at p. 65 : (9 Beng. L. R. 377 (P. C.) ) that if an estate were given to a man without express words at inheritance, it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry, by Hindu law, an estate at inheritance. This is the general principle of law which is recognised and embodied in S. 8, T. P Act and unless it is shown that under Hindu law a gift to a female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those that exist in a widows estate, there is no justification for departing from this principle. There is certainly no such provision in Hindu law and no text could be supplied in support of the same.9. The position, therefore, is that to convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given ; it is enough if words are used at such amplitude as would convey full rights of ownership.I do not think that the mere fact that the gift of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation could be taken to be a prima facie indication at the intention at the donor, that the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life-time. The extent at interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the intention at the donor as expressed by the language used, and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and un-ambiguos and import absolute ownership, the purpose at the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interest. The desire to provide maintenance or residence for the donee would only show the motive which prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a measure of the extent of themy opinion, the decision cited is no authority for the general proposition as is contended for by the learned counsel for the resp., and it is to be read in the context at the actual facts of the case which relate to grants at a particular type with special features at its own. It was a case where a Talukdar made a grant at certain villages to a junior member of the joint family for maintenance at the latter. The family was governed by the law at primogeniture and the estate descended to a single heir. In such cases the usual custom is that the junior members at the family, who can get no share in the property, are entitled to provisions by way of maintenance for which assignments at lands are generally made in their favour. The extent of interest taken by the grantee in the assigned lands depends entirely upon the circumstances at the particular case, or rather upon the usage that prevail in the particular family. In the case before the P. C. there was actually no deed at transfer. It was an oral assignment made by the Talukdar, and the nature of the grant had to be determined upon the recitals at a petn, for mutation of names made to the Revenue Department by the grantor after the verbal assignment was made and from other facts and circumstances at thedo not think that, on the facts of this case, any weight could be attached to this argument. In the first place, it is to be noted that whatever might have been the actual market value of the properties, what the widow got under the Tamliknama was a residential house and a shop, and the shop was the only property which fetched any income. This shop, it appears, was all along in possession of Sunder Lal, the brother of Meria, and the rent, which he paid or promised to pay in respect of the same, was only Rs. 12 a month. So from the income of this property it was hardly possible for Meria to have even a bare maintenance and this would rather support the inference that the properties were given to her absolutely and not for enjoyment merely, so long as she lived.17.It is true that the document does not make any reference to the heirs of Meria, but that is not at all necessary, nor is it essential that any express power of alienation should be given. The word "Malik" is too common an expression in this part of the country and its meaning and implications were fairly well settled by judicial pronouncements long before the document was executed. If really the grantee was intended to have only a life interest in the properties, there was no lack of appropriate words, prefectly well known in the locality, to express such intention.19.I am also not at all impressed by the other fact referred to in the judgment of the H. C. that if the properties were given to Meria in absolute right, there was no necessity for including them again in the schedule to the deed of relinquishment which Meria executed. I fail to see how the inclusion of the properties in the deed of relinquishment would go to indicate that Merias rights to these properties were of a restricted and not an absolute character. It is after all a pure matter of conveyancing and the two documents have to be read together as parts of one and the same transaction. Under the Tamliknama, Meria got two properties in absolute right out of the estate of Mangal Sen. By the deed of relinquishment, she renounced her claim for maintenance in respect of all the properties left by Mangal Sen including the two items which she got under the Tamliknama. After the Tamliknama was executed in her favour there was no further question of her claiming any right of maintenance in respect of these two items of property. She became the absolute owner thereof in exchange of her rights of maintenance over the entire estate and this right of maintenance she gave up by the deed of relinquishment. On a construction of the entire document, my conclusion is that there is nothing in the context of the document, or in the surrounding circumstances which would displace the presumption of full proprietary rights which the use of the word "Malik" is apt ordinarily to convey. The first contention of the applt. therefore succeeds and in view of my decision on this point, the second question does not arise for determination at all.