Case: The State Of Rajasthan Vs. Ram Saran

which permits a competent authority to pass in relation to such persons "any order affecting his continuance in such post or office."10. The contention that survives is merely whether the right to hold an officiating post is a legal right and whether it could be stated to be a condition of service that such an officer shall not be reverted except for proper reasons. In our opinion, the matter is concluded by the decision of this Court in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, 1958 SCR 828 : (AIR 1958 SC 36 ). There, as here, an officer who was appointed to officiate in Class II service as an Assistant Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs was reverted to his substantive Class III appointment. No doubt, the question there considered was whether on the facts of that case this order of reversion was passed as punishment so as to attract the constitutional protection guaranteed by Art. 311(2) but this Court had also to consider whether an officer appointed to an officiating post had any legal right to continue in that post. As to that Das, C. J. speaking for the majority observed :"The petitioner before us was appointed to a higher post on an officiating basis ..... .He had no right to continue in that post and under the general law the implied term of such appointment was that it was terminable at any time on reasonable notice by Government and therefore his reduction did not operate as a forfeiture of any right and cannot be described as reduction in rank by way of punishment."(Vide also the judgment of this Court in State of Bombay v. F. A. Abraham, C. A. No. 59 of 1961 D/- 12-12-1961 : (AIR 1962 SC 794 )).If he had no legal right to continue in that post it would rather appear that it was one of the conditions of his service that he could, for administrative reasons, be reverted to his substantive appointment. It therefore appears to us that there is no basis for the argument that mere reversion to a substantive post is a breach of the conditions of service. That is why we said that the proviso to sub-s. (7) of S. 115 on which stress is laid by the High Court really affords no assistance to the respondent. The above was, in general, the reasoning upon which the learned Judges of the High Court allowed the petition. We consider that they were in error in so doing and the appeal has accordingly to be allowed.11. It is necessary, now, to mention the first of the points we have set out earlier which learned Counsel for the respondent strenuously pressed upon us. He submitted that the respondent had alleged in his petition a violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution, in that the selection of officers for promotion was determined not on the basis of the seniority of the officers considering the State as a whole but regionwise and this was the gravamen of the charge in this respect made in the petition. In this connection he drew our attention to the terms of S. 2 of the Police Act 5 of 1861 which reads :"2. The entire police-establishment under a State Government shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be one police-force, and shall be formally enrolled; and shall consist of such number of officers and men, and shall be constituted in such manner as shall from time to time be ordered by the State Government..... .... .... ..............."He also pointed out that in the counter-affidavit filed by the State this splitting up of the State into regions and the determination of seniority and promotion on a regionwise, as distinguished from a Statewise basis, was defended as dictated by administrative considerations. The learned Judges, in their judgment have made a passing reference to this feature of the case and seem to express the opinion that the system of regionwise promotion was productive of inequality and hardship. The difficulty in the way of the respondent, however, is that the plea raised in regard to this matter is of the vaguest character and appears to be designed as affording some support for the main allegations and contentions we have dealt with and not as an independent and distinct ground for impugning the constitutional validity of the scheme of promotion. In consequence of this state of the pleadings the facts and details necessary for sustaining or repelling this contention were not brought into the record, so that admittedly the point could not be decided on the record as it stands. Realising this learned Counsel for the respondent urged that the matter should be remitted to the High Court for a consideration of this issue about the breach of Art. 14 of the Constitution and the constitutional validity of the regionwise seniority lists prepared for promotion, reversion etc. allowing liberty to the parties to lead further evidence on the matter. Having considered the suggestion carefully we have arrived at the conclusion that on the pleadings, as they stand, this question could not be determined satisfactorily. If the issue as to discrimination and a violation of Art. 14 has to be satisfactorily investigated and decided both the parties would have to file amended pleadings in order to focus attention on several details, with the result that this would virtually amount to the filing of a new petition. We consider therefore that if the respondent is so advised he should be at liberty to challenge the order now impugned on these other grounds and that for that purpose it would really be in his interest that he should be permitted to file a fresh petition making necessary allegations and setting forth the requisite facts when the State also would have an opportunity to make its answers to such a plea. It is in the light of this consideration that we have refrained from remanding the case to the High Court for the consideration of this point.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The learned Judges, in their judgment have made a passing reference to this feature of the case and seem to express the opinion that the system of regionwise promotion was productive of inequality and hardship. The difficulty in the way of the respondent, however, is that the plea raised in regard to this matter is of the vaguest character and appears to be designed as affording some support for the main allegations and contentions we have dealt with and not as an independent and distinct ground for impugning the constitutional validity of the scheme of promotion. In consequence of this state of the pleadings the facts and details necessary for sustaining or repelling this contention were not brought into the record, so that admittedly the point could not be decided on the record as it stands. Realising this learned Counsel for the respondent urged that the matter should be remitted to the High Court for a consideration of this issue about the breach of Art. 14 of the Constitution and the constitutional validity of the regionwise seniority lists prepared for promotion, reversion etc. allowing liberty to the parties to lead further evidence on the matter. Having considered the suggestion carefully we have arrived at the conclusion that on the pleadings, as they stand, this question could not be determined satisfactorily. If the issue as to discrimination and a violation of Art. 14 has to be satisfactorily investigated and decided both the parties would have to file amended pleadings in order to focus attention on several details, with the result that this would virtually amount to the filing of a new petition. We consider therefore that if the respondent is so advised he should be at liberty to challenge the order now impugned on these other grounds and that for that purpose it would really be in his interest that he should be permitted to file a fresh petition making necessary allegations and setting forth the requisite facts when the State also would have an opportunity to make its answers to such a plea. It is in the light of this consideration that we have refrained from remanding the case to the High Court for the consideration of this point.