Case: Regionl P.F.Commissioner Vs. Hooghly Mills Co.Ltd

if there is a default in payment of the contribution to such a scheme it amounts to contravention of Section 6 punishable under Section 14(1A)”. (See page 517 of the report) 48. Following the same parity of reasoning, we hold if there is a default in payment of contribution to such a scheme it amounts to contravention of Section 14B and damages can be levied. The High Court, with great respect, erred by coming to a contrary conclusion. 49. Apart from that the High Courts interpretation of the expression “so far as may be” as limiting the ambit and width of Section 17(1A)(a) of the Act, in our judgment, cannot be accepted for two reasons as well. 50. The High Court is guided in the interpretation of the word “so far as may be” on the basis of the principle that statutes does not waste words. The High Court has also relied on the interpretation given to “so far as may be”. In the case of Dr. Pratap Singh and another v. Director of Enforcement, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act and others reported in AIR 1985 SC 989 : "It goes without saying that Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is a fiscal statute dealing with penal provisions whereas the aforesaid expression is to be construed in this Act which is eminently a social welfare legislation. Therefore, the parameters of interpretation cannot be the same. Even then in Pratap Singh (supra) this Court while construing “so far as may be” held “if a deviation becomes necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act........................ it would be permissible”. Of course the Court held that if such deviation is challenged before a Court of law it has to be justified. 51. In the instant case, the High Court failed to discern the correct principle of interpretation of a social welfare legislation. In this connection we may profitably refer to what was said by Chief Justice Chagla about interpretation of a social welfare or labour legislation in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Bombay reported in (1957) 2 LLJ 490. Justice Chagla unerringly laid down: “no labour legislation, no social legislation, no economic legislation, can be considered by a court without applying the principles of social justice in interpreting the provisions of these laws. Social justice is an objective which is embodied and enshrined in our Constitution......it would indeed be startling for anyone to suggest that the court should shut its eyes to social justice and consider and interpret a law as if our country had not pledged itself to bringing about social justice.” 52. We endorse the same view. In fact this has been endorsed by this Court in N.K. Jain (supra). 53. Reference in this connection may be made to what was said by Justice Krishna Iyyer in the same vein in the decision of Surendra Kumar Berma and others v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi and Anr., reported in 1980 (4) SCC 443 . The learned judge held that semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of bread and butter statutes. 54. Unfortunately, the High Court missed this well settled principle of interpretation of social welfare legislation while construing the expression “so far as may be” in interpreting the provision of Section 17 (1A)(a) of the Act and unduly restricted its application to the employer of an exempted establishment. 55. The interpretation of the expression “so far as may be” by this Court in its Constitution Bench decision in M. Ismail Faruqui (supra) was given in a totally different context. The said judgment on a Presidential Reference was rendered in the context of the well known Ram Janam Bhumi Babri Masjid controversy where a special Act, namely, Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act was enacted and sub- section (3) of Section 6 of the said Act provides that the provisions of Sections 4, 5 & 7 shall “so far as may be” apply in relation to such authority or body or trustees as they apply in relation to the Central Government. In that context this Court held that the expression “so far as may be” is indicative of the fact that all or any of these provisions may or may not be applicable to the transferee under sub-section (1). The objects behind the said enactment are totally unique and the same was a special law. Apart from this, this Court did not lay down any general principle of interpretation in the application of the expression “so far as may be”. Their being vast conceptual difference in the legal questions in that case, the interpretation of “so far as may be” in M. Ismail Faruqui (supra) cannot be applied to the interpretation of “so far as may be” in the present case. 56. The High Courts interpretation also was in error for not considering another well settled principle of interpretation. It is not uncommon to find legislature sometime using words by way of abundant caution. To find out whether the words are used by way of abundant caution the entire scheme of the Act is to be considered at the time of interpretation. In this connection we may remember the observation of Lord Reid in I.R. Commissioner v. Dowdall OMahoney & Co. reported in (1952) 1 All E.R. 531 at page 537, wherein the learned Law Lord said that it is not uncommon to find that legislature is inserting superfluous provisions under the influence of what may be abundant caution. The same principle has been accepted by this Court in many cases. The High Court by adopting, if we may say so, a rather strait jacket formula in the interpretation of the expression “so far as may be” has in our judgment, misinterpreted the intent and scope and the purpose of the Act. 57. For the reasons aforesaid, we are not inclined to accept the interpretation of the High Court and we are constrained to overrule the judgment of the Single Bench as also of the Division Bench.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]hold if there is a default in payment of contribution to such a scheme it amounts to contravention of Section 14B and damages can be levied.with great respect, erred by coming to a contrary conclusion.In the instant case,led to discern the correct principle of interpretation of a social welfare legislation. In this connection we may profitably refer to what was said by Chief Justice Chagla about interpretation of a social welfare or labour legislation in Prakash Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Bombay reported in (1957) 2 LLJ 490. Justice Chagla unerringly laid down:labour legislation, no social legislation, no economic legislation, can be considered by a court without applying the principles of social justice in interpreting the provisions of these laws. Social justice is an objective which is embodied and enshrined in our Constitution......it would indeed be startling for anyone to suggest that the court should shut its eyes to social justice and consider and interpret a law as if our country had not pledged itself to bringing about social justice.sed this well settled principle of interpretation of social welfare legislation while construing the expressionfar as mayin interpreting the provision of Section 17 (1A)(a) of the Act and unduly restricted its application to the employer of an exempted establishment.s interpretation also was in error for not considering another well settled principle of interpretation. It is not uncommon to find legislature sometime using words by way of abundant caution. To find out whether the words are used by way of abundant caution the entire scheme of the Act is to be considered at the time of interpretation. In this connection we may remember the observation of LordReid in I.R. Commissioner v. Dowdall OMahoney & Co. reported in (1952) 1 All E.R. 531 at page537, wherein the learned Law Lord said that it is not uncommon to find that legislature is inserting superfluous provisions under the influence of what may be abundant caution. The same principle has been accepted by this Court in many cases.by adopting, if we may say so, a rather strait jacket formula inthe interpretation of the expressionfar as mayhas in our judgment, misinterpreted the intent and scope and the purpose of the