Case: M. Ramesh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors

not been adversely affected by the selection process and therefore, the principle of promissory estoppel is not applicable. 18. The main attack against the decision of the Government is on the ground that the candidates had a legitimate expectation that pursuant to the written test and interview, their result would be declared and if found successful, they would be appointed. It is a well settled law that even if there is no vested right, the principle of legitimate expectation can be invoked. Legitimate expectation arises when the citizens expect that they will be benefited under some policy or decision, announced by the State. At the same time, the law is well settled that the Legislature and the Executive can change any policy for good reasons. These good reasons must be such which are not arbitrary, which are not mala fide and the decision has been taken in the public interest. If the decision to change the policy is arbitrary or capricious then it may be struck down. 19. Applying the aforesaid principle, we may test whether the action of the Government in deciding to scrap the recruitment process by the LCE is an arbitrary decision or not. The reasons given by the Government in support of its decision are as follows: 1. percentage of vacancies has gone down; 2. the selection process has been delayed by many years which will mean that the persons selected will be at least 5 years older than as expected; 3. that many petitions are still pending and the matter has not been finally decided, which could lead to further delay; and 4. it is apprehended that there would be a surfeit of litigation between candidates, if any, appointed through LCE and those who are recruited by direct recruitment or promotion during the years 2012 to 2018. 20. Both Mr. Dave and Mr. Venkatramani have attacked each ground invoked by the Union individually but we are of the view that it is the combined effect of all the grounds which will have to be taken into consideration. There is no manner of doubt that it was expected that the result would be declared in the year 2013 and the officers would be sent for training in the same year. We are in the year 2018 and some of the matters which have been transferred to this Court are still to be heard. It was urged that the dispute stands decided by the Gauhati High Court and the Delhi High Court. It may be true that these two Courts have upheld the validity of the Rules and the Union of India did not challenge the decisions in these two cases, but we cannot lose sight of the fact that there are various other petitions pending and neither this Court nor the other High Courts are bound by the decision rendered by the Gauhati High Court or the Delhi High Court. These cases will have to be decided, if we are not to accept the stand of the Central Government. This could delay the matter even further. 21. The officers, who may have been selected in the year 2013 at the upper age limit of 35 years or 36 years would now be 5 years older. No doubt, they are members of the State Police Service or the Central Police Organisation, but their induction or recruitment in the IPS is delayed by more than 5 years. When the Government laid down a policy that upper age limit was 35 years, it must have had some reason for fixing the upper age limit. That purpose is now defeated. 22. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that if the Union is compelled to make the appointments, this will lead to a plethora of litigation where the persons recruited to the IPS between 2013 and 2018 will claim seniority over the persons, who appear in the LCE. We are not going into the merits of the issue but, we can easily visualise the huge amount of litigation which will in all probability ensue, where members of the IPS would be litigating against each other. Such litigation would not be in public good and will achieve no higher purpose. In fact, such litigation may also affect the morale of the officers in the IPS. 23. The Union has also taken up a plea that though the fall in vacancies, when taken numerically, may not be much but when taken on percentage basis, there is a fairly large fall in the vacancies. At the time when the Kamal Kumar Committee was set up and till its report, 30% of the posts in the IPS were lying vacant. When the Rules were introduced, 22.61% posts were vacant. As on 01.01.2018, 15.65% posts are vacant and, therefore, definitely there is a fall in the percentage of vacancies. It was urged that even now there are large number of vacancies and, therefore, the decision of the Government is irrational. We cannot accept this submission. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the induction through LCE is mainly limited to persons belonging to the State Police Services and the Central Police Organisation. Any such induction would lead to a consequential shortage in these organisations. The gain, if any, in the IPS, would be set off by a consequent shortage in the State Police Services and the Central Police Organisation. 24. When we examine the decision taken by the Central Government in a holistic manner, we have no doubt that the decision to scrap the LCE recruitment has been taken in the larger public interest. The decision is definitely not mala fide. It is not actuated by extraneous reasons. It cannot be said that the decision is arbitrary. 25. In view of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Government to scrap the process of recruitment to the IPS through the LCE cannot be termed to be arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. The decision is a reasonable one in the facts and circumstances of the case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]15. It is, thus, well settled that merely because a person has been selected, does not give that person an indefeasible right of claiming appointment. As far as the present cases are concerned, results have not been declared and even the selection process is not complete. As such, there is no manner of doubt that the Petitioners have no enforceable right to claim that the result should be declared or that they should be appointed if found meritorious16. Having held so, we must also note that the law is well settled that even though the candidates may not have a vested right of appointment and the State is not under any duty or obligation to fill up the vacancies, the State has to act fairly and it cannot act in an arbitrary manner. The decision, not to fill up the vacancies pursuant to the selection process, must be taken bona fide and for justifiable and appropriate reasons. In this regard, we may make reference to the case of Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47  17. On behalf of the candidates, who have appeared in the examination, a feeble attempt was made to invoke the principle of promissory estoppel. In our view, the said principle is not at all applicable to the present case. It is well settled law that the principle of promissory estoppel can only be invoked by a person who has changed his position to his detriment on the basis of the promise held out to him. This is not the position in the present cases. All the candidates are serving in the State Police or the Central Police Organisation or in the Army. Their position has not been adversely affected by the selection process and therefore, the principle of promissory estoppel is not applicable18. The main attack against the decision of the Government is on the ground that the candidates had a legitimate expectation that pursuant to the written test and interview, their result would be declared and if found successful, they would be appointed. It is a well settled law that even if there is no vested right, the principle of legitimate expectation can be invoked. Legitimate expectation arises when the citizens expect that they will be benefited under some policy or decision, announced by the State. At the same time, the law is well settled that the Legislature and the Executive can change any policy for good reasons. These good reasons must be such which are not arbitrary, which are not mala fide and the decision has been taken in the public interest. If the decision to change the policy is arbitrary or capricious then it may be struck down20. Both Mr. Dave and Mr. Venkatramani have attacked each ground invoked by the Union individually but we are of the view that it is the combined effect of all the grounds which will have to be taken into consideration. There is no manner of doubt that it was expected that the result would be declared in the year 2013 and the officers would be sent for training in the same year. We are in the year 2018 and some of the matters which have been transferred to this Court are still to be heard. It was urged that the dispute stands decided by the Gauhati High Court and the Delhi High Court. It may be true that these two Courts have upheld the validity of the Rules and the Union of India did not challenge the decisions in these two cases, but we cannot lose sight of the fact that there are various other petitions pending and neither this Court nor the other High Courts are bound by the decision rendered by the Gauhati High Court or the Delhi High Court. These cases will have to be decided, if we are not to accept the stand of the Central Government. This could delay the matter even further21. The officers, who may have been selected in the year 2013 at the upper age limit of 35 years or 36 years would now be 5 years older. No doubt, they are members of the State Police Service or the Central Police Organisation, but their induction or recruitment in the IPS is delayed by more than 5 years. When the Government laid down a policy that upper age limit was 35 years, it must have had some reason for fixing the upper age limit. That purpose is now defeated22. We cannot be oblivious to the fact that if the Union is compelled to make the appointments, this will lead to a plethora of litigation where the persons recruited to the IPS between 2013 and 2018 will claim seniority over the persons, who appear in the LCE. We are not going into the merits of the issue but, we can easily visualise the huge amount of litigation which will in all probability ensue, where members of the IPS would be litigating against each other. Such litigation would not be in public good and will achieve no higher purpose. In fact, such litigation may also affect the morale of the officers in the IPS23. The Union has also taken up a plea that though the fall in vacancies, when taken numerically, may not be much but when taken on percentage basis, there is a fairly large fall in the vacancies. At the time when the Kamal Kumar Committee was set up and till its report, 30% of the posts in the IPS were lying vacant. When the Rules were introduced, 22.61% posts were vacant. As on 01.01.2018, 15.65% posts are vacant and, therefore, definitely there is a fall in the percentage of vacancies. It was urged that even now there are large number of vacancies and, therefore, the decision of the Government is irrational. We cannot accept this submission. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the induction through LCE is mainly limited to persons belonging to the State Police Services and the Central Police Organisation. Any such induction would lead to a consequential shortage in these organisations. The gain, if any, in the IPS, would be set off by a consequent shortage in the State Police Services and the Central Police Organisation24. When we examine the decision taken by the Central Government in a holistic manner, we have no doubt that the decision to scrap the LCE recruitment has been taken in the larger public interest. The decision is definitely not mala fide. It is not actuated by extraneous reasons. It cannot be said that the decision is arbitrary25. In view of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Government to scrap the process of recruitment to the IPS through the LCE cannot be termed to be arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious. The decision is a reasonable one in the facts and circumstances of the case.