Case: Bombay Dyeing &amp; Mfg Co Ltd Vs. Bombay Environmental Action Group &amp; Others

only representative and approved trade union under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act for Greater Bombay. According to them, closure of the cotton mills affected 2,00,000 workers and because of the strike the mills defaulted in making payment of wages, provident funds dues, gratuity, etc. to the workers causing great hardship to them. It played an active role in the revival / rehabilitation of the NTC mills and other sick mills by representing the workers cause before BIFR. It also agrees with the reasons put forward by the appellants as regards the validity of DCR 58 of 2001. It highlights the policy/ objectives thereof in great details. It also states: (i) RMMS has entered into VRS Agreement with the management of several mills. (ii) Nearly 10,000 workers of the NTC mills and more than 25,000 workers of private mills, aggregating in all more than 35,000 workers stand to benefit by the VRS Schemes. (iii) As on date, the NTC mills have discharged their entire liabilities under the VRS Schemes by making payment to the extent of 398.76 crores payable to these workers. (iv) The Maharashtra State Textile Corporation has also cleared the outstanding dues of its workers to the extent of Rs. 22 crores. As regards the private mills, out of the total amount due to the workers under VRS Schemes amounting to 808.75 crores, approximately a sum of 631.05 crores has been paid. (v) However, approximately Rs. 373 crores remain outstanding to be paid to approximately 20,000 workers which payments are directly linked to the development of the lands by the mill owners. It further argues that if the judgment of the High Court is implemented, it would cause irretrievable injury and extreme prejudice to the workers. 279. Mr. Colin Gonsalves, learned Cousel appearing on behalf of GKSS, on the other hand, not only laid emphasis on the so-called defaults of the mill owners but had gone to the extent of urging that the workers dues have not been paid substantively. He further contended that revival scheme has not been given effect to and the amount required to be spent therefore had in fact not been spent. It has further been contended that no guidelines had at all been framed for the Monitoring Committee by the State for overseeing the disbursement of funds. According to it, in the case of Mafatlal center although the scheme was sanctioned in 2001, no payment has been made despite the fact that the company received a sum of Rs. 16 crores from the sale of the built up areas of Mafatlal center at Parel. The workers dues being to the extent of 93 crores, the same are in excess of the legal dues of the workers and only a paltry sum had been paid to them whereas the dues of the banks had been cleared. 280. In these appeals, we are not concerned with the said issues. We may, however, place on record that according to Mr. Sorabjee the statement of Mr. Colin Gonsalves that nothing had been paid to the workers is baseless and irresponsible. It was contended that the Union represented by Mr. Gonsalves impleaded itself in the writ petition filed by it before the High Court against the MCGM as regard non-disposal of layout plan, etc. wherein they categorically stated that it would have no objection to the development of their property subject to realization of the cheques given in favour of the workers. It is stated that the cheques had been fully realized and the workers have enjoyed the benefit of payment. 281. We have pointed out these factors only for the purpose of showing that this litigation was treated to be a platform for even championing the cause of the workers although neither the High Court nor this Court is concerned therewith. 282. In terms of the Regulations, the entire amount is to be deposited in the funds specially created therfor. It is the Committee appointed by the State alone which can spend the amount. The priority as regard disbursal of such amount has categorically been laid down in the regulation itself. If the fund created is not being expended for the purposes mentioned therein, a separate cause of action will arise therefore. It is, thus, not necessary for us to delve deep into the said contentions. Guidelines for the Committee are also not necessary to be laid down. In any event, we are not called upon nor is it necessary to make any attempt in that regard. However, if any occasion arises for any of the parties in this behalf, the aggrieved party indisputably would be at liberty to agitate the same before appropriate forums CONCLUSION 283. The upshot of our aforementioned discussions is: (i) The Public Interest Litigation was maintainable. (ii) DCR 58 is valid in law. DCR 58(1) applies also to closed mills but Sub-regulation (6) of DCR 58 does not apply to sick industries which have not been referred to BIFR. (iii) The clarification made by the State is neither ultra vires Section 37 of the MRTP Act nor is violative of the constitutional provisions. (iv) DCR 58, as inserted in 2001 and as clarified in 2003, is not contrary to the principles governing environmental aspects including the principles of sustainable and planned development vis--vis Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (v) Judicial review of DCR 58 was permissible in law. (vi) Sale of NTC mills was not contrary to the BIFR Scheme as also the orders passed by this Court. (vii) Although, delay and laches play an important role, as we have considered the merit of the matter, the writ petition filed by the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 is not being dismissed on that ground alone. (viii) It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether workers dues have been paid and also as to whether the committee had been applying the fund in terms of DCR 58 or not. However, all such contentions shall remain open.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]16. Section 2(27) defines regulations made u/s 159 of the MRTP Act and includes zoning and other regulations made as part of a regional plan, development plan or town planning scheme. The land-use maps and the development control rules/ regulations together comprise the development plan u/s 22. The land-use map indicates the zone in which a piece of land falls, in regard whereto the permissible uses are specified in the rules/ regulations. In each of such zonal plan, although the industrial areas have been delineated separately but existence of each of the cotton textile mills therein has specifically been shown which evidently shows that cotton textile mills had been given a special status.33. Regulation 57 of the 1991 Regulations provides for Special Industrial Zone known as I-3 Zone. Manufacture of textile goods do not come within the purview thereof. In terms of the said Regulation, similar restrictions on land user have been provided except service industries and service industrial estates. Change of user is allowed for lands other than lands of cotton textile mills. Regulation 57(4)(c) is in pari materia with Regulation 56(3)(c).46. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is evident that as per the suggestion of Ranjit Deshmukh Committee the words or newly were omitted as according to it, it may give rise to a lot of confusion. From paragraph 18.8 of the report also, it appears that the said Committee suggested use of different language, namely, lands after demolition of structure. We find from the said report that the Committee suggested a draft in respect of DCR 58(1)(b) of the Regulations. It is in that context, we may have to consider the second affidavit affirmed by Shri Ramanand Tiwari when he stated that the Cabinet had approved the report albeit not in its entirety.47. The draft regulations thereafter were notified for considering the objections thereto, if any. Several objections were filed, they were considered by the appropriate authority including the planning authority. Evidently, the said two reports were considered by the Cabinet but it intended to give more to the mill owners than what was recommended inter alia by introducing Sub-regulation (6) of DCR 58. The intent and purport of the State is apparent from DCR 58. It accepted a major part of the recommendations of the Deshmukh Committee but thought that the mill owners should be given something more.48. While entertaining a public interest litigation of this nature several aspects of public interest being involved, the Court should find out as to how greater public interest should be subserved and for the said purpose a balance should be struck and harmony should be maintained between several interests such as (a) consideration of ecology; (b) interest of workers (c) interest of public sector institution, other financial institutions, priority claimed due to workers; (d) advancement of public interest in general and not only a particular aspect of public interest; (e) interest and rights of owners; (f) the interest of a sick and closed industry; and (g) schemes framed by BIFR for revival of the company.49. The courts in doing so would have to take into consideration a large number of factors, some of which may be found to be competing with each other. It may not be proper to give undue importance to one at the cost of the other which may ultimately be found to be vital and give effect to the intent and purport for which the legislation was made.53. This Court times without number, however, has laid down the law as regard limited scope of public interest litigation. It sounded note of caution for entertaining public interest litigation in service matters [See Dr. B. Singh Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , in questioning the validity or otherwise of a statute or when a statute is enacted in violation of the direction of a superior court [See Ashoka Kumar Thakur Vs. State of Bihar and others, . But, we cannot also shut our eyes to the fact that this Court has entertained a large number of public interest litigations for protection of environmental and/ or ecology. [See T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others,54. Public interest litigations, thus, have been entertained more frequently where a question of violation of the provisions of the statutes governing the environmental or ecology of the country has been brought to its notice in the matter of depletion of forest areas and/ or when the executive while exercising its administrative functions or making subordinate legislations has interfered with the ecological balance with impunity. The High Court of Bombay, therefore, cannot be faulted with for entertaining the writ petition as a public interest litigation.The golden rule of interpretation is that unless literal meaning given to a document leads to anomaly or absurdity, the principles of literal interpretation should be adhered to. [See Compack Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara, , Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, , Dayal Singh and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and Swedish Match AB and Another Vs. Securities and Exchange Board, India and Another, .57. We have also been asked by the learned Cousel for the parties to interpret the impugned legislation in the light of constitutional scheme and in particular Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the MRTP Act, the doctrine of sustainable development and various other principles. In the aforementioned situation, it is not possible for us to take recourse to the golden rule. As would appear from the discussions made hereinafter, we are, however, of the opinion that for correct interpretation of DCR 58, the principles of purposive interpretation should be applied.67. It is well-settled principle of law that in the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, the same meaning would be attached to the word used in the latter as is given to them in the earlier statute. It is trite that the words or expression used in a statute before and after amendment should be given the same meaning. When the legislature uses the same words in a similar connection, it is to be presumed that in the absence of any context indicating a contrary intention, the same meaning should attach to the words.68. In AIR 1932 92 (Privy Council) , it is stated that an Act should be interpreted having regard to its history and the meaning given to a word cannot be read in a different way than what was interpreted in the earlier repealed section. It is also a fundamental proposition of construction that the effect of deletion of words must receive serious consideration while interpreting a statute as this has been repeatedly affirmed by this Court in a series of judgments. [See Commissioner of Income Tax/excess Profits Tax, Bombay City Vs. Bhogilal Laherchand, , The Mangalore Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, , His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala, and Onkarlal Nandlal Vs. State of Rajasthan and Another, .69. It is furthermore well-known that when the statute makes a distinction between the two phrases and one of the two is expressly deleted, it is contrary to the cardinal principle of statutory construction to hold that what is deleted is brought back into the statute and finds place in words which were already there in the first place.71. It is also a well-settled principle of law that common sense construction rule should be taken recourse to in certain cases as has been adumbrated in Halsburys Laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 44(1) (Reissue).73. A statute, it is well known, is to be read as a whole. Subordinate legislation indisputably has to be read in the light of the provisions of the Act whereunder it has been made. It, however, must be read having regard to the purpose and object for which the statute is made. The MRTP Act provides for formulation of regional plans and development plan. The planning authority, before a plan is finalized, is required to see that the provisions thereof have been fully complied with. The MRTP Act provides for appointment of a town planning officer who possesses requisite qualification. The MRTP Act lays down the matters which are mandatorily required to be considered by the planning authority in all the stages, namely, survey, preparation, submission and sanction of development plan. While doing so, it is bound to take into consideration a large number of factors as specified therein. The State has been conferred with a special power to frame development control regulations in terms of Section 159(2) of the MRTP Act. Development Control Regulations have been framed in terms of the said provisions. The State has furthermore been given a power to supervise and maintain control over the planning authorities. Such control may be exercised in more than one manner. The planning authority is not only required to obtain statutory sanction and approval wherever applicable, but the State, has also been conferred with a special power to make a development plan subject, of course, to the condition that the same shall not change the character of such development plan.75. A planning authority, therefore, must take into consideration all the relevant factors, although in a given case, one gets priority over the other. Ordinarily, it would not be for the court to substitute its decision to that of the planning authority unless an appropriate case is made out therefore. When, however, question of public interest comes up, the court indisputably would try to delicately balance the different factors, if possible.Public interest, thus, would be a relevant factor also for interpretation of the statute. Public interest so far as maintenance of ecology is concerned pertains to a constitutional scheme comprising of Articles 14, 21, 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India, the other factors are no less significant. [See also T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad (through K.M. Chinnappa) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, , N.D. Jayal and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, and Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum Vs. Union of India and others, .The amendments in the regulation must be construed in furtherance of the legislative policy and not in derogation thereof. But, while doing so, the past experience of the State which paved the necessities for modifying the earlier regulation should not be forgotten.77. A statutory scheme herein also by way of Section 22 clearly speaks about open spaces. The Legislative Act confers guidelines which advocates the necessity of environmental impact assessment. The State, when it exercises its power u/s 37 of the MRTP Act is required to act within the four-corners of the Act. Any modification or amendment must address the environmental consequences together with other relevant factors.78. As a logical corollary, it must also be determined as to whether the amendments amounted to a minor modification or substantive one. Literal interpretation of the Act and the Rules would give rise to many anomalies. It would not advance the object and purport of the Act. It would also create difficulties in implementing the statutory scheme.79. Having said so, we have no other option but, as indicated hereinbefore, to take recourse to the principles of purposive construction and interpret DCR 58 in accordance with the scope and object of the Act.The amendment in 2001, therefore, must be interpreted having regard to the provisions of the MRTP Act which professed increase in the ecological interest by providing more open space and not decreasing the same, but again the question would be was there any reduction?Whether radical changes were made in the year 2003, when the State made the aforementioned clarification would again be a question which is required to be posed and answered. Was such a clarification in consonance with the reports of Charles Correa Committee and the Ranjit Deshmukh Committee? Did 2000 acres of vacant land which would have been otherwise available come down to 50 acres? Had any balance been struck between the original concept of sharing of lands by Bombay Municipal Corporation, MHADA and the mill owners? It is in the aforementioned backdrop, the nature of change must be considered.80. A policy decision, as is well known, should not be lightly interfered with but it is difficult to accept the submissions made on behalf of the learned Cousel appearing on behalf of the Appellants that the courts cannot exercise their power of judicial review at all. By reason of any legislation whether enacted by the legislature or by way of subordinate legislation, the State gives effect to its legislative policy. Such legislation, however, must not be ultra vires the Constitution. A subordinate legislation apart from being intra vires the Constitution, should not also be ultra vires the parent Act under which it has been made. A subordinate legislation, it is trite, must be reasonable and in consonance with the legislative policy as also give effect to the purport and object of the Act and in good faith.83. The parameters of judicial review in relation to a policy decision would depend upon the nature as also the scope and object of the legislation. No hard and fast rule can be laid down therefore. The court normally would not, however, interfere with a policy decision which has been made by experts in view of the fact that it does not possess such expertise. Divergent opinions, however, have been expressed by the authorities in this behalf. The scope and extent of judicial review of legislation, it is trite, would vary from case to case.84. Reliance has been placed by the Appellants on Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and Another Vs. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and Others, wherein this Court was concerned with a regulation laying down the terms and conditions for revaluating the answer papers. Indisputably, there exists a distinction between regulations, rules and bye-laws. The sources of framing regulations and bye-laws are different and distinct but the same, in our opinion, would not mean that the court will have no jurisdiction to interfere with any policy decision, legislative or otherwise.86. In BALCO Employees Union (Regd.) Vs. Union of India and Others, , this Court while dealing with new economic policies of the elected government held:Any such change may result in adversely affecting some vested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the court.Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicial review unless it can be demonstrated that the policy is contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution. In other words, it is not for the courts to consider relative merits of different economic policies and consider whether a wiser or better one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of a policy, the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts....The embargo as regard exercise of power of judicial review may not be beyond the aforementioned dicta.87. Here, however, we are not at all dealing with an economic policy of the State, but a special planning statute of which economic factor is only one of the components. Even then, it has no bearing with the economic policy affecting the State or general public. DCR 58 deals with only a class of people who owned and possessed cotton textile mills and want revival/ rehabilitation of their sick or closed textile mills or intend to modernize or shift their mills.89. Furthermore, interpretation of a town planning statute which has an environmental aspect leading to application of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India cannot be held to be within the exclusive domain of the executive. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever, that the validity and/or interpretation of a legislation must be resorted to within the parameters of judicial review, but it is difficult to accept the contention that it is totally excluded.90. Unreasonableness is certainly a ground of striking down a subordinate legislation. A presumption as to the constitutionality of a statute is also to be raised but it does not mean that the environmental factors can altogether be omitted from consideration only because the executive has construed the statute otherwise.91. It is interesting to note that the scope of judicial review is now being expanded in different jurisdictions. Even judicial review on facts has been held to be permissible in law. [See Manager, R.B.I., Bangalore Vs. S. Mani and Others, , Management of Sonepat Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. Ajit Singh, and Cholan Roadways Limited Vs. G. Thirugnanasambandam, .Interpretation and application of constitutional and human rights had never been limited by this Court only to the black letter of law. Expansive meaning of such rights had all along been given by the Courts by taking recourse to creative interpretation which lead to creation of new rights. By way of example, we may point out that by interpreting Article 21, this Court has created new rights including right to environmental protection.94. The Wednesbury principles to which reference has been made in The Trustees of the Port of Madras Vs. Aminchand Pyarelal and Others, in some jurisdiction are being held to be not applicable in view of the development in constitutional law in this behalf. [See e.g. Huang and Ors. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005) 3 All. ER 435, wherein referring to R. v. Secretary of State of the Home Department, ex. P Daly (2001) 3 All ER 433 , it was held that in certain cases, the adjudicator may require to conduct a judicial exercise which is not merely more intrusive than Wednesbury, but involves a full-blown merits judgment, which is yet more than Ex p. Daly requires on a judicial review where the court has to decide a proportionality issue. Law is never static; it changes with the change of time. [See Motor General Traders and Another Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, and John Vallamattom and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI), .95. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that in cases where constitutionality and/ or interpretation of any legislation, be it made by the Parliament or an executive authority by way of delegated legislation, is in question, it would be idle to contend that a court of superior jurisdiction cannot exercise the power of judicial review. A distinction must be made between an executive decision laying down a policy and executive decision in exercise of its legislative making power. A legislation be it made by the Parliament/ Legislature or by the executive must be interpreted within the parameters of the well-known principles enunciated by this Court. Whether a legislation would be declared ultra vires or what would be the effect and purport of a legislation upon interpretation thereof will depend upon the legislation in question visvis the constitutional provisions and other relevant factors.97. A bare comparison of the said provisions would show that in sub- regulation (1) of DCR 58, the language remains the same. However, in clause (a) thereof the words or newly have been omitted in the 2001 Regulations. Clause (a) of Sub-regulation (1) provides for change of user in relation to the existing built-up area, subject to the recommendations of BIFR as a package.96. For the purpose of interpretation of DCR 58, it may be beneficial to notice the changes effected by 2001 Regulations visvis 1991 Regulations:100. We have noticed hereinbefore that Regulation 56(3)(b) and Regulation 57(4)(c) also makes specific provisions for grant of change of user in respect of sick mills as a part of a package of measures recommended by BIFR. The drastic changes have, however, been made in clause (b) of Sub- regulation (1) of DCR 58. It refers to a case of redevelopment. In clause (b) the words after demolition of existing structures in case of a redevelopment scheme have been deleted.104. The effect of amendment in clause (b) must be seen from the Table appended thereto. In terms of the Old Regulation in respect of land covering more than 10 hectares, for green area 33% land was to be set apart, and for MHADA 37% thereof, whereas the owner retained 30%. Under the new DCR 58, admittedly the owner of the mill at least obtains construction rights over 63% of the land as the land in terms of Column 3 gets loaded in Column 5. The mill owner furthermore even according to the writ petitioners gets TDR of 37%. Open land in clause (b) is what is not covered by the built-up area. The balance FSI, indisputably, is not open area.105. The meaning of open land must be construed as land other than land required to sustain the built up area. We may now attempt to understand the effect of FSI having regard to a concrete example. If the area of a plot is 1000 sq. m., applying the FSI of 1.33, a person will be entitled to construct a built up area of 1330 sq. m. If he intends to build a two-storeyed building, he will utilize 665 sq. m. of land whereas in a case of ground plus four storeyed building, he will be using 266 sq. m. of land and in case of nine storeyed structure, he will be using only 133 sq. m.106. The greater the height of the building, more lands will be available either by way of public green or private green as also for MHADA. However, in such a case, the plinth area will vary significantly. Whereas in the first case, it would be 665 sq. m., in the third case, it would only be 133 sq.m. although the built up area remains the same.107. Taking the illustration as mentioned hereinbefore, the open land in each case shall vary. Thus, open land would not mean land occupied by the plinth but would mean land other than that is necessary to sustain the built up area. We do not accept the contention of Mr. Salve that clause (b) applies to open land as also lands after demolition of existing structure in case of a redevelopment scheme and only because the words and lands after demolition of existing structures had been deleted, the same may not be of much significance inasmuch as clause (b) of the new regulations will have to be construed in the light of clause (a). It will bear repetition to state that whereas clause (a) refers to change of user in relation to the existing built-up area, clause (b) provides for open lands. The manner in which the development and/ or redevelopment should take place has been clubbed in Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58 read with Sub-regulation (6) thereof. For proper interpretation, all the relevant provisions are required to be read harmoniously.109. Existing built-up area, in our view, would not be open land. We have also to take note of the fact that the newly built-up area, as existing in the old clause (a) of Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58 has been omitted, the effect whereof would be noticed a little later. We are not oblivious of the fact that the word and has been used twice in Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58. It ordinarily shall be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. However, for the purpose of giving effect to the said provisions, the rule of purposive construction is required to be taken recourse to. Sub-regulation (1) speaks of entire open land as well as built-up area. It speaks of the necessity of having the recommendation of BIFR as a package of measures. Such recommendations must be for the revival/rehabilitation of a potentially viable sick mill. The provisions, therefore, may not apply to a mill which is neither sick nor otherwise not potentially viable, subject, of course, to the explanation contained in Note (vi) appended thereto as also Sub-regulation (6) thereof.111. There is no change in Note (i) or Note (ii). Changes have been made in Note (iii) and Notes (iv), (v) and (vi) have been added. Interestingly, from Note (iii), after the words Transferable Development Rights as in Appendix VII and before the words in respect of the lands earmarked for open spaces in column (3), the expression only has been omitted. Thus, whereas earlier transferable development rights could be granted only for the purpose of the open lands which were to be handed over to MCGM, i.e., about 33%, now apart from that, development rights in respect of lands earmarked and handed over as per Column (3) have been made available to the mill owners for utilization thereof as per Column (5) as TDR as aforesaid. The mill owner, therefore, gets FSI of 1.33. He, furthermore, gets corresponding TDR to be utilized in the suburbs area or to sell the same. The idea appears to be to give more FSI and TDR to the person who surrenders the lands.112. Things, however, may be different in a case where the mill owner demolishes a portion of the existing structure and construct new areas so as to be called newly built-up area on that part of the land remaining the other part of the structure that it will come within the purview of clause (a) inasmuch as approval for development would be necessary for the newly built-up area for change of user. In such a case, requirements of clause (b) were not required to be complied with as it would squarely fall within the purview of clause (a).113. The omission of the words or newly from clause (a) provides for a guideline. If the entire structure is to be demolished, the newly built-up area will have to be in terms of clause (b) read with Sub-regulation (6). Such newly built-up structure, having regard to omission from clause (a) would have no role to play if no built-up area existed. Thus, all new constructions including constructions on lands after demolition of the existing structure and new constructions whether under a development or redevelopment scheme would be covered by clause (b) read with Sub-regulation (6) thereof. If new constructions are raised, FSI, in a case of such development or redevelopment, being covered by clause (b) would be for the entire plot, except the built-up area which was existing, FSI having regard to its statutory definition would, thus, have to be calculated having regard to the ratio of the total construction to the area of the plot except the land component of the existing built up area.114. There is no dispute as regard grant of better facility to the mill owners through TDR.In order to determine whether vital changes have been effected by way of the amendment of 2001, both the sub-clauses of Sub-regulation (1) would be necessary to be taken into consideration for construing the words balance FSI.115. The expression balance would mean apart from which in turn would mean apart from the area for which protection has already been given. Balance FSI would, thus, mean FSI which is available for construction after excluding the FSI relatable to an already consumed by the existing built-up structure. Both the phrases open lands as also balance FSI contained in DCR 58(1)(b) play significant role. The word balance is crucial which would naturally mean FSI which is available to be utilized upon open land. Such balance FSI must be apart from the existing FSI. Indisputably, the built-up area had consumed some FSI and, thus, when the expression balance FSI is used, the same would mean additional built-up area. It contemplates that where the entire plot has been used by existing built-up areas and some open land has been left out on the remaining non-built up area of the plot additionally unconsumed FSI could be used. It is in that sense separate. It is true that DCR 58(1) uses the word entire land but the said expression is followed by the expression built-up area. Balance FSI in the aforementioned situation would not mean the FSI which is involved for the purpose of construction of structures not only on the open land which had been existing but also the land which had become open by reason of the demolition of the existing structures. It is only in that sense, as would be amplified from the discussions made hereinafter that the State intended to give additional protection to the mill owners. If open land is given its natural or dictionary meaning, no distinction could be made in between DCR 58(1)(a) and DCR 58(1)(b), which ex facie would lead to an anomaly.116. In view of the fact that the built up area was to be protected in terms of Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58, afortiori the land component thereof could be protected under clause (b) thereof. Thus, the same land which was protected under clause (a) could not become shareable under clause (b) which would render the distinction between the said provisions otiose. Balance FSI on open lands or otherwise had also been used in Sub-regulation (5) of DCR 58. It also, thus, gives a significant clue to find out the meaning of balance FSI. Additional reason for the aforementioned conclusion is that development or redevelopment of entire open land and built up area of the premises referred to in DCR 58(1), in the event, the findings of the High Court are accepted, there would not be any necessity for the State to use two different words open land and built-up area separately and distinctly.Thus, no basic change had been effected in drafting the regulation to segregate newly built-up areas from existing built-up areas. It cannot be denied that the State intended to give more benefits to the mill owners by reason of 2001 Regulations and, thus, if after demolition of the entire structure the whole plot is treated to be open land and FSI is calculated on the basis thereof the purport and object of the amendment will be defeated. The fact that the State intended to consider the matter relating to amendment having regard to the fact that there had hardly been any takers for the 1991 Scheme as it failed to provide sufficient incentives, cannot be ignored.119. Indisputably, though, the Regulations made by the State which is a piece of subordinate legislation should be read in the light of the statutory scheme made under the legislative act as also having regard to the constitutional scheme as contained in Articles 14, 24, 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution of India, but while doing so the effect and purport for which such amendment were brought about cannot be lost sight of. The amendments carried out in the MRTP Act from time to time and clearly the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 26 of the MRTP Act point out that the State had been leaning towards environmental aspects but that was not the sole objective.120. The title of the regulation reads as a modification to DCR 58. It was, therefore, not in substitution of the resolution of 1991 nor was it framed by way of recasting thereof. In the marginal note, the expression development or redevelopment of land of cotton textile mills has been mentioned. What, therefore, in focus was the land of cotton textile mills. The expression land, thus, plays an important role. Although a marginal note may not be determinative of the content of the provision, it may act as an intrinsic aid to construction. [See Nandini Satpathy Vs. P.L. Dani and Another, .121. The expression development or redevelopment in the marginal note does not advance the contention of the writ petitioners that DCR 58 does not frame change of user to non-textile mill users. Indisputably, having regard to the provisions of the entire Regulation, DCR 58 is a special provision. It is a self-contained code. It provides for a large number of things. The State while making the said legislation was required to provide for almost all the eventualities in respect of the different categories of cotton textile mills. They could be, apart from the sick mills referred to BIFR; (a) closed, (b) non-closed mills intending to modernization, (c) non-closed mills intending to shifting, (d) sick mills which have not been referred to BIFR under SICA and, thus, no scheme wherefor was made. There were multiple options and one mill or the other may fall in more than one category. A closed mill may come within the purview of DCR 58(1)(a) or 58(1)(b) or 58(6). Some of the NTC mills also may come within one or more categories. It is possible and in fact some of the mill owners had opted for one or more of the multiple options of development/ redevelopment activity in terms of the said regulation. By way of example, Ruby Mill opted for both modernization and shifting and permission had been granted therefore. The fact that DCR 58 is a self-contained code is evident from Sub-regulation (8) which provides that funds accruing to a sick, closed or mill requiring modernization or shifting shall be credited to an escrow account, which shall be utilized only for revival/ rehabilitation, modernization or shifting of the industry. Sub- regulation (9) provides a mechanism for putting this into place. The State, not only endeavoured to take care of needs of various categories of cotton textile mills but also made attempts to find out a solution having regard to the fact that the 1991 Regulations did not work. By framing DCR 58, therefore, a mechanism was sought to be provided for achieving the purpose of providing some relief to all players in the field.122. The said Regulations were framed u/s 22(m) of the MRTP Act for controlling and regulating the use and development of land. They are not, and cannot be, treated to be provisions for compulsory acquisition of land. It also does not provide for reservation and/ or designation in a development plan.123. In Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58, the phrase lands of sick and/ or closed cotton textile mills has been used. The same phrase has been used in Regulations 58(6), 58(8)(a) and 58(9)(a). DCR 58(1) read with DCR 58 (4) although postulates recommendations by BIFR, the words closed mills also find place both in Regulations 58(1) and 58(6).124. DCR 58(1)(a) deals with existing structure which could have been subjected to modification internally. DCR 58(1)(b) deals with the rest of it, namely, open land. Under old regulation, the expression open land would mean such lands which were required to sustain built-up area. The concept finds place in DCR 58(6). In terms of DCR 58(1)(a), thus, no demolition is contemplated which in turn would mean that no sharing of land also is contemplated, i.e., the land owners are not required to surrender any land. However, it contemplates change of user. It contemplates:(i) the old cotton textile mills may continue to operate;(ii) Alternatively, it may take recourse to related user, i.e., user related to such mills.(iii) It could also take recourse to diversified industrial user, meaning thereby, user other than cotton textile mill and would include uses for other industries in terms of the industrial location.125. It is not in dispute that a long list of industries is contained in the said policy. It could further be used for commercial purpose and the same having regard to the regulations would also include residential purposes. In terms of DCR 58(1)(a), there could be no demolition and only the existing structures, namely, those which were existing prior to coming into force of the said Regulation should be developed by utilizing the existing structure which could not either be demolished or reconstructed or relocated.126. The contention of Mr. Salve that the word demolition brought about by reason of 1994 amendment in Section 2(7) of the MRTP Act plays a significant role also cannot be accepted for more than one reason. The amendment of 1994 appears to be clarificatory in nature, having regard to the fact that prior thereto the land owners could carry on demolition without prior intimation and/ or obtaining permission from the corporation. The High Court, therefore, in its judgment wrongly laid undue emphasis thereupon.127. Furthermore, in DCR 58 the word redevelopment had all along been used. By reason of the said amendment, no different meaning which would not be in consonance with the object should be attributed. Whatever that may mean, redevelopment contemplates in its ordinary parlance a renewal or substitution of development and involves pulling down of the structures. Development by way of demolition cannot mean that DCR 58(1) would permit not just the retention of the structure (shell) but also demolition of structure (shell). The purpose for introducing the said amendment, therefore, was for a different purpose and could not have been used for the purpose of construction of DCR 58.128. It has not been disputed that keeping in view of the fact that the structures of the mills had been built long long time back, they had sprawling existing structures. Ranjit Deshmukh Committee Report does not categorically state that the balance FSI has to be calculated only from the open land which was available before demolition and not from the land which became open by reason of demolition of structures existing thereon.129. It is true that the lands of different mills had different built-up areas. Balance FSI was required to be calculated on the basis thereof. The extent of vacant land available for the purpose of distribution would indisputably depend upon the extent of structures which had been standing on the lands but the same is a fortuitous circumstance. Only because in a given case, the extent of the area to be given to MHADA or MCGM would be comparatively less than the case of land belonging to other mills, the same by itself cannot be a ground for construing DCR 58 differently.130. Furthermore, in Note (iv) of DCR 58(1)(b) itself, it is categorically stated that land would become open by demolishing the existing structure which also points to the fact that the contentions of the Respondents Writ Petitioners are not correct in view of the fact that if the land after demolition was already subsumed under open land, it was not necessary to deal with the same subject specifically with land which had become open on demolition. It is also interesting to note that in DCR 58(6)(a) the words reconstruction after demolition of existing structures limited to the extent of the built up area of the demolished structure have been used with reference to development/ redevelopment of the entire open land and/ or built up area of premises which would also go to show that in the event, the interpretation as advocated by Mr. Salve is accepted, such detailed and specific references to the specific contingency of openness of land arising after and upon demolition or reconstruction done after demolition would become wholly meaningless.131. It is, thus, clear that the expression open lands is meant to connote lands other than lands available after demolition of existing structures. [See Lennon v. Gibson (1919) AC 709 , Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 141 and G.P. Singhs Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Ninth edition, page 258].DCR 58(6), thus, confers an additional benefit in respect of cases falling within DCR 58(1)(a) allowing inter alia:(a) demolition which it could not do under DCR 58(1)(a);(b) it does not require any sharing for which benefit was also available under DCR 58(1)(a);(c) built up area remaining the same, the shape, size and nature of the existing structure could be changed which could not be done under DCR 58(1)(a);(d) The second part of Sub-regulation (6) permits aggregation on the same single mill plot, which was not available under DCR 58(1)(a), subject of course to the existing built up area remaining the same.133. The contention of BEAG is that the implementation of DCR 58 would lead to a disastrous result and in this behalf our attention was drawn to a sanctioned plan in respect of Mill No. 4 to show that the consequences thereof would be that the share of MCGM and MHADA would come to 662.61 sq. m. and 542.13 sq. m. respectively, although the plot area of Mill No. 4 is 58,458.36 sq. m. We do not find any merit in the said contention as keeping in view of our finding aforementioned, the built up area was required to be deducted therefrom.134. For computing the extent of the land required to be shared, the plinth area will have no relevance. So far as Mill No. 4 is concerned, having regard to the existing built up area, the share of MCGM and MHADA would be on a low side, but it is evident that so far as Mill No. 1 is concerned, whereas the plot area was only 47,730.28 sq. m., having regard to the built up area, the share of MCGM and MHADA would come to 4,058.67 sq. m. and 3,320.73 sq. m. respectively. These are indicative of the fact that the extent of open land to be shared by the owners with MCGM and MHADA would depend upon the built up area of the structure which existed on site. The share of MCGM and MHADA, therefore, would vary from case to case and, thus, we cannot determine the question keeping in view only the case of one mill and not the others.135. We do not furthermore agree with the approach of the High Court in interpreting the aforementioned provisions having regard to certain other factors, namely, deluge in Bombay in the year 2005 as also the requirements of the entire population of Bombay from environmental aspect. Such factors cannot be taken into consideration for interpretation of a statute. We cannot look to a statute with a coloured glass, we have to consider the provisions as the legislature thought. The same should be subject, of course, to the constitutional and other limitations.136. No specific provision has been made for industries which are closed but for one reason or the other had not been referred to BIFR. A mill may be closed although the company which owns it and having other businesses or other properties is not sick company in terms of SICA. From its other resources, it can modernize or shift the industry. But, there may be a case where the mill is the only property, if it lies closed and no action is taken for its revival, the same may defeat the purpose for which DCR 58 was made, or the company although as such is not sick but finds it difficult to arrange funds for revival of the closed mill. The doctrine of purposive interpretation in such a case has to be applied. The expression sick and/ or closed used in Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58 must be read as disjunctive and not conjunctive.137. Furthermore, in this behalf the principles of common sense construction, as noticed hereinbefore, should be taken recourse to.137. Furthermore, in this behalf the principles of common sense construction, as noticed hereinbefore, should be taken recourse to.In Halsburys Laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 44(1) (Reissue), the law is stated in the following terms:1392. Commonsense Construction Rule. It is a rule of the common law, which may be referred to as the commonsense construction rule, that when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment would give effect to the legislative intention, the court should presume that the legislator intended common sense to be used in construing the enactment.1477. Nature of presumption against absurdity. It is presumed that Parliament intend that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find against a construction which produces an absurd result, since this is unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. Here absurd means contrary to sense and reason, so in this context the term absurd is used to include a result which is unworkable or impracticable, inconvenient, anomalous or illogical, futile or pointless, artificial or productive of a disproportionate counter- mischief.1480. Presumption against anomalous or illogical result. It is presumed that Parliament intends that the Court, when considering, in relation to the facts of the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of an enactment corresponds to its legal meaning, should find against a construction that creates an anomaly or otherwise produces an irrational or illogical result. The presumption may be applicable where on one construction a benefit is not available in like cases, or a detriment is not imposed in like cases, or the decision would turn on an immaterial distinction or an anomaly would be created in legal doctrine. Where each of the constructions contended for involves some anomaly then, in so far as the court uses anomaly as a test, it has to balance the effect of each construction and determine which anomaly is greater. It may be possible to avoid the anomaly by the exercise of a discretion. It may be, however, that the anomaly is clearly intended, when effect must be given to the intention. The court will pay little attention to a proclaimed anomaly if it is purely hypothetical, and unlikely to arise in practice.138. If such an interpretation is not given, a very valuable asset would be rendered sterile. If it is to be construed that a scheme made by BIFR is the condition precedent for applicability of DCR 58 by reason whereof the benefit conferred thereunder would not be available in like cases for no apparent reasons whatsoever particularly when it was the intention of the State that all categories of the mills which require rehabilitation, revival or modernization should be brought within the purview of DCR 58.139. It is, thus, not possible to accept Mr. Salves submission that even a closed mill although not covered under DCR 58 may be utilized for purposed mentioned in Regulation 56. Indisputably, there may be closed mills which have not been referred to BIFR or otherwise not capable of being referred to. The spirit of making DCR 58 was to revival and/ or rehabilitation of the cotton textile mills. Revival of closed mill was also, thus, a component part of the scheme behind framing of DCR 58. It may be true that in terms of Sub-regulation (1) of DCR 58 recommendation of the BIFR is contemplated but recommendation of BIFR would be necessary where it is otherwise available. If it is insisted that the recommendation by BIFR was mandatory even for closed mill, much of the significance for using the words `and/or closed after the word `sick is lost. A closed mill would mean a mill in respect whereof closure has been effected in accordance with law. Such closure can be effected in accordance with law in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Before effecting a closure under the Industrial Disputes Act, notice has to be given to the State and in certain cases its prior permission is also required to be obtained. Thus, all cases, which entail closure of an industry, would be within the knowledge of the State. The State through its machinery can furthermore verify the genuineness or otherwise of such closure. In such a case, even in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act having regard to the purport and object for which the same had been enacted, the authorities thereunder as also for the State a duty is cast to restore back the industrial peace. [See State of Rajasthan and Another Vs. Mohammed Ayub Naz, .140. SICA is a special statute. It is an Act made by the Parliament.SICA was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It would prevail over other statutes including MRTP and the Regulations framed thereunder.DCR 58(6) is adjunct to the other provisions. Although on some occasions, DCR 58(2) may apply without DCR 58(6). However, there is no such machinery so far as sick mills are concerned, it is, therefore, difficult to comprehend that those mills which are sick but not referred to BIFR also can take advantage of Sub-regulation (6). How an industrial undertaking belonging to a company which is sick should be determined to be so as laid down under the provisions of SICA. Only in a case where a company is sick in terms of the 1985 Act, an industrial undertaking belonging to it may be subject matter of the provisions thereof. The State for that matter neither has any statutory power or competence to deal with sick undertakings. Furthermore, the extent to which such sick company requires protection to the extent of the sickness of the industrial undertaking cannot also be gone into by the State or for that matter by any other authority apart from BIFR.143. Sub-regulation (2) of DCR 58 deals with cases requiring modernization. For invoking the said provision, certain steps are required to be taken which are as under:(i) Application for Scheme of Modernization to Government (Competent Authority i.e. Corporation and Textile Department, Government of Maharashtra) as per DCR 58(2) read with 58(6)(a)(b) as the case may be.(ii) Scrutiny by the Department of Textiles.(iii) Approval to Scheme by Government (with direction to approach MCGM for further approval as per Regulation 58(2) read with 58(6)(a)(b).(iv) Application by Owner to Municipal Commissioner for a layout prepared for development or redevelopment of the entire open land and/ or built up areas of the premises of mill. With regard to the utilization of built up area (if reconstruction, aggregation is proposed then it has to be read with 58(6)(a)(b) as the case may be), the provisions of clause (a) of Sub-regulation 1 of these regulations shall apply and if the development of open lands and balance FSI exceeds 30% of the open land and balance FSI, the provision of clause (b) sub- regulation 1 of this regulation shall apply.As per Notes (ii) in case of more than one cotton textile mills owned by the same company, the exemption of 30%, as specified above, may be permitted to be consolidated. Permission for development or redevelopment granted as per 58(2) read with 58(6)(a)(b).(v) Ready for Implementation for Scheme of Modernization.(vi) As per 58(8)(a)(b) Funds accruing in ESCROW Account, monitored by Monitoring Committee as per DCR 58(9)(a).