Case: Union Of India Vs. T. R. Varma

on that date, among them being Sri C. B. Tawakley. If, as stated by the respondent, he asked for permission to cross-examine witnesses, and that was refused, it is surprising that he should not have put the complaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was continued. To one of the witnesses, Sri P. Govindan Nair, he did actually put a question in cross-examination, and it is difficult to reconcile this with his statement that permission had been refused to cross examine the previous witnesses. A reading of the deposition of the witnesses shows that the Enquiring Officer himself had put searching questions, and elicited all relevant facts. It is not suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross-examination could have been but was not directed. We think it likely that the respondent did not cross-examine the witnesses because there was nothing left for him to cross-examine. The learned Judges gave two reasons for accepting the statement of the respondent in preference to that of Mr. Byrne. One is that there was no record made in the depositions of the witnesses that there was no cross-examination. But what follows from this? That, in fact, there was no cross-examination, which is a fact; not that the request of the respondent to cross-examine was disallowed. Then again, the learned Judges say that the respondent was present at the hearing of the writ petition before them that they put questions to him, and formed the opinion that he was sufficiently intelligent, and that it was difficult to believe that he would not have cross-examined the witnesses. We are of opinion that this was a consideration which ought not to have been taken into account in a judicial determination of the question, and that it should have been wholly excluded. On a consideration of the record and of the probabilities, we accept the statement of Mr. Byrne as true, and hold that the respondent was not refused permission to cross-examine the witnesses, and that the charge that the enquiry was defective for this reason cannot be sustained.9. The respondent attached the enquiry on two other grounds which were stated by him in his petition in the following terms:"(C) That the petitioner was cross-examined and was not enabled to make an oral statement on his own behalf.(D) That the defence witnesses were not given an opportunity to tell their own version or to be examined by the petitioner as their depositions were confined to answers in reply to questions put by the Inquiry Officer."10. In substance, the charge is that the respondent and his witnesses should have been allowed to give their evidence by way of examination-in-chief, and that only thereafter, the officer should have cross-examined them, but that he took upon himself to cross-examine them from the very start and had thereby violated well- recognised rules of procedure. There is also a complaint that the respondent was not allowed to put questions to them.11. Now, it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court of Law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them. If these rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed.Vide the recent decision of this Court in New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., 1957 SCR 98 : ((S) AIR 1957 SC 232 ) (C) where this question is discussed.12. We have examined the record in the light of the above principles and find that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. The witnesses have been examined at great length, and have spoken to all relevant facts bearing on the question, and it is not suggested that there is any other matter, on which they could have spoken. We do not accept the version of the respondent that he was not allowed to put any questions to the witnesses. Indeed, the evidence of Sri Jai Narayan at p. 188 of the Paper Book shows that the only question on which the respondent wished this witness to testify was put to him by Mr. Byrne. The evidence of Sri Bhan and Sri Fateh Singh was, it should be noted, wholly in support of the respondent. The findings of Mr. Byrne are based entirely on an appreciation of the oral evidence taken in the presence of the respondent. It should also be mentioned that the respondent did not put forward these grounds of complaint in his explanation dated September 11, 1953, and we are satisfied that they are wholly without substance, and are an afterthought. We accordingly hold, differing from the learned Judges of the Court below, that the enquiry before Mr. Byrne was not defective, that the respondent had full opportunity of placing his evidence before him, and that he did avail him-self of the same. In this view, it becomes unnecessary necessary to express any opinion on the second question which was raised by the learned Solicitor-General.13

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is well-settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but, as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCR 566 : (AIR 1950 SC 163 ) (A) "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs": Vide also K. S. Rashid and Son v. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, 1954 SCR 738   at p. 747: (AIR 1954 SC 207  at p. 210) (B). And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art. 226, unless there are good grounds therefor. None such appears in the presentis a question on which there is a serious dispute, which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking evidence. It is not the practice of Courts to decide questions of that character in a writ petition, and it would have been a proper exercise of discretion in the present case if the learned Judges had referred the respondent to apropose to dispose of this appeal on a consideration of thehave thus before us two statements, one by Mr. Byrne and the other by the respondent, and they are in flat contradiction of each other.The question is which of them is to be accepted. When there is a dispute as to what happened before a court or tribunal, the statement of the Presiding Officer in regard to it is generally taken to be correct, and there is no reason why the statement of Mr. Byrne should not be accepted aswas admittedly an officer holding a high position, and it is not suggested that there was any motive for him to give false evidence. There are moreover, features in the record, which clearly show that the statement of Mr. Byrne must be correct. The examination of witnesses were examined on that date, among them being Sri C. B.as stated by the respondent, he asked for permission to cross-examine witnesses, and that was refused, it is surprising that he should not have put the complaint in writing on the subsequent dates on which the enquiry was continued. To one of the witnesses, Sri P. Govindan Nair, he did actually put a question in cross-examination, and it is difficult to reconcile this with his statement that permission had been refused to cross examine the previousreading of the deposition of the witnesses shows that the Enquiring Officer himself had put searching questions, and elicited all relevant facts. It is not suggested that there was any specific matter in respect of which cross-examination could have been but was not directed. We think it likely that the respondent did not cross-examine the witnesses because there was nothing left for him tolearned Judges gave two reasons for accepting the statement of the respondent in preference to that of Mr. Byrne. One is that there was no record made in the depositions of the witnesses that there was no cross-examination. But what follows from this? That, in fact, there was no cross-examination, which is a fact; not that the request of the respondent to cross-examine wasa consideration of the record and of the probabilities, we accept the statement of Mr. Byrne as true, and hold that the respondent was not refused permission to cross-examine the witnesses, and that the charge that the enquiry was defective for this reason cannot be sustained.substance, the charge is that the respondent and his witnesses should have been allowed to give their evidence by way of examination-in-chief, and that only thereafter, the officer should have cross-examined them, but that he took upon himself to cross-examine them from the very start and had thereby violated well- recognised rules of procedure. There is also a complaint that the respondent was not allowed to put questions to them.Now, it is no doubt true that the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses was not taken in the mode prescribed in the Evidence Act; but that Act has no application to enquiries conducted by tribunals, even though they may be judicial in character. The law requires that such tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a Court ofit broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explainingthese rules are satisfied, the enquiry is not open to attack on the ground that the procedure laid down in the Evidence Act for taking evidence was not strictly followed.Vide the recent decision of this Court in New Prakash Transport Co. v. New Suwarna Transport Co., 1957 SCR 98 : ((S) AIR 1957 SC 232 ) (C) where this question is discussed.We have examined the record in the light of the above principles and find that there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice. The witnesses have been examined at great length, and have spoken to all relevant facts bearing on the question, and it is not suggested that there is any other matter, on which they could have spoken. We do not accept the version of the respondent that he was not allowed to put any questions to thefindings of Mr. Byrne are based entirely on an appreciation of the oral evidence taken in the presence of theshould also be mentioned that the respondent did not put forward these grounds of complaint in his explanation dated September 11, 1953, and we are satisfied that they are wholly without substance, and are an afterthought. We accordingly hold, differing from the learned Judges of the Court below, that the enquiry before Mr. Byrne was not defective, that the respondent had full opportunity of placing his evidence before him, and that he did avail him-self of the same. In this view, it becomes unnecessary necessary to express any opinion on the second question which was raised by the learned Solicitor-General.