Case: M/S ALAGU PHARMACY  Vs. N MAGUDESWARI

be bound by the terms of the compromise. The terms of the compromise be incorporated in the decree- sheet....”24. As the tenant did not surrender possession of the properties within the time mentioned in the compromise memo, the landlord levied execution. It was resisted by the tenant on various grounds one of which was that the decree for eviction was a nullity, being in contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi Statute. This contention was accepted by the execution court, as well as by the High Court. This Court, after a reference to the 5 (1970) 3 SCC 181 provisions of Section 13, held that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the court concerned is satisfied that one or other of the grounds mentioned in the section is established. This Court, further observed:“From the facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity.”13. In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others 6 it was stated:-“17. It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act and the Madras Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant Sections of those statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not travel beyond the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13, and to the parties that they shall not contract out of those statutory grounds, is inherent in the public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act). 6 (1974) 1 SCC 242 18. In Rasiklal Chunilal case, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court has taken the view that in spite of the fact that there is no express provision in the Bombay Rent Act prohibiting contracting out, such a prohibition would have to be read by implication consistently with the public policy underlying this welfare measure. If we may say so with respect, this is a correct approach to the problem.19. Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of the Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeates the entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under these provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do. ….22. The mere fact that Order 23 Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the Bombay Rent Act, does not remove that fetter on the Rent Court or empower it to make a decree for eviction de hors the statute. Even under that provision of the Code, the Court, before ordering that the compromise be recorded, is required to satisfy itself about the lawfulness of the agreement. Such lawfulness or otherwise of the agreement is to be judged, also on the ground whether the terms of the compromise are consistent with the provisions of the Rent Act. ….27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”14. The common thread that runs through the aforesaid pronouncements of this Court is – in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated 28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent Act was made out.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]10. The order passed by the appellate court shows that compromisewas brought about on 29.01.2014 that is even before the eviction petition was filed by the respondent. Further, said compromisewas addressed to the Inspector of Police, City Crime Branch. The appellate court had further observed that complaintand compromise Exh.P11 were not disputed by the respondent and no document in rebuttal was filed. The complaintproceeds on a premise that the lease deed dated 22.02.2012 was a forged document and there was no relationship ofbetween the parties. Yet an eviction petition was filed, seeking eviction of the appellants under the concerned Rent Act. There is an inherent contradiction in the stand adopted by the Respondent. In the circumstances, the assertion made by the appellants that pressure was exerted through the police and they were compelled to enter into compromise is prima facie acceptable. In Ajad Singh v. Chatra and Others, compromise recorded in Police Station inter alia was not found to be acceptable by this Court and the matter was remanded. It wasappellate court ought to have taken note of the fact that the said compromise was recorded in the Police Station and during the pendency of theis true that there was a delay of 604 days in filing the appeal, but in cases where there is reasonable doubt that police may have forced a party to enter into compromise, the process of Court ought to weigh in favour of a party who alleges to be victim of such pressure. It may be pertinent to note that the order passed by the High Court does not even deal with this aspect nor was any submission made that the assessment made by the appellate court was in any way incorrect or imperfect.11. Further, eviction petition was filed seeking eviction of the appellants under Section 10(2)(ii)(a), 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Said Sections are as under: (paraA landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied……. (ii) that the tenant has after the 23rd October 1945 without the written consent of the landlord(a) transferred his right under the lease or sublet the entire building or any portion thereof, if the lease does not confer on him any right to do so, or ….. .…. (3) ……. (c) A landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential ormay, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be.The eviction in terms of the aforesaid provisions can be ordered only if the concerned Rent Controller or Court is satisfied that the ground seeking eviction is made out. It has been held by this Court that unless and until ground seeking eviction in terms of the concerned Rent Act is not made out, no eviction of a tenant can be ordered, even if the parties had entered into a compromise. For example, in K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadrithis Court considered its earlier decisions in three cases asThere are three decisions of this Court which require to be considered. In Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dassa decree for eviction passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties, was held, by this Court, to be a nullity as contravening Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The facts therein were astenant and the son of the landlord referred the disputes between them to arbitration. The landlord was not a party to this agreement. The arbitrators passed an award whereunder the tenant was to give vacant possession of the premises in favour of the landlord within a particular time. This award was made a decree of court. The landlord, who was neither a party to the award nor to the proceedings, which resulted in the award being made a decree of court, applied for eviction of the tenant on the basis of the award. The tenant resisted execution by raising various objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. One of the objections was that the decree for eviction based upon the award was a nullity as being opposed to the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. This Court held that the decree directing the tenant to deliver possession of the premises to the landlord was a nullity, as it was passed in contravention of Section 13(1) of the relevant statute. After quoting thethis Court further held that the decree for eviction passed according to an award, in a proceeding to which the landlord was not a party and without the court satisfying itself that a statutory ground of eviction existed, was a nullity and cannot be enforced in execution. It will be seen from this decision that the decree was held to be a nullity because the landlord was not a party thereto, and also because the court had not satisfied itself that a ground for eviction, as required by the statute, existed. This decision is certainly an authority for the proposition that a court ordering eviction has to satisfy itself that a statutory ground of eviction has been made out by a landlord. How exactly that satisfaction is to be expressed by the court or gathered from the materials, has not been laid down in this decision, as this court was not faced with such a problem.In Kaushalya Devi v. Shri K.L. Bansal 4 the question again rose under the same Delhi statute regarding the validity of a decree passed for eviction on compromise. The plaintiff therein filed a suit for eviction of the tenant on two grounds— (a) the premises were required for their own use; and (b)the tenant had committed default in payment of rent.22. The tenant filed a written statement denying both these allegations. He disputed the claim of the landlord regarding his requiring the premises for his own use bona fide and also the fact of his being in arrears. When the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant were in this state, both parties filed a compromise memo in and by which they agreed to the passing of a decree of eviction against the tenant. Representations to the same effect were also made by the counsel for both parties. The court passed the followingview of the statement of thecounsel and the written compromise, a decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff against thetenant did not vacate the premises within the time mentioned as per the compromise memo. On the other hand, 4 (1969) 1 SCC 59     he filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code pleading that the decree is void as being in contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi statute. The High Court held that the decree was a nullity, as the order was passed solely on the basis of the compromise without indicating that any of the statutory grounds mentioned in Section 13 existed. Following the decision in Bahadur Singh this Court upheld the order of the High Court. Here again, it will be seen that the manner in which thesatisfaction is to be expressed or gathered has not been dealt with.23. A similar question came up again before this Court in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal 5 . The landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground that he had sublet the premises without obtaining his consent in writing. Subletting, without the consent of the landlord in writing, was one of the grounds, under Section 13(1) of the Delhi statute entitling a landlord to ask for eviction. The tenant denied the allegation that he had sublet the premises. Both the landlord and the tenant entered into a compromise and the court, after recording the same, passed the followingAs the tenant did not surrender possession of the properties within the time mentioned in the compromise memo, the landlord levied execution. It was resisted by the tenant on various grounds one of which was that the decree for eviction was a nullity, being in contravention of Section 13 of the Delhi Statute. This contention was accepted by the execution court, as well as by the High Court. This Court, after a reference to the 5 (1970) 3 SCC 181 provisions of Section 13, held that a decree for recovery of possession can be passed only if the court concerned is satisfied that one or other of the grounds mentioned in the section is established. This Court, furtherthe facts mentioned earlier, it is seen that at no stage, the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question whether the alleged subletting is true or not. Order made by it does not show that it was satisfied that the subletting complained of has taken place, nor is there any other material on record to show that it was so satisfied. It is clear from the record that the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties. That being so there can be hardly any doubt that the court was not competent to pass the impugned decree. Hence the decree under execution must be held to be a nullity.In Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichharam alias Brijram and Others 6 it wasIt will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act and the Madras Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant Sections of those statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not travel beyond the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13, and to the parties that they shall not contract out of those statutory grounds, is inherent in the public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act). 6 (1974) 1 SCC 242  18. In Rasiklal Chunilal case, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court has taken the view that in spite of the fact that there is no express provision in the Bombay Rent Act prohibiting contracting out, such a prohibition would have to be read by implication consistently with the public policy underlying this welfare measure. If we may say so with respect, this is a correct approach to the problem.19. Construing the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 28 of the Bombay Rent Act in the light of the public policy which permeates the entire scheme and structure of the Act, there is no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Court under this Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which is de hors the Act or ultra vires the Act. The existence of one of the statutory grounds mentioned in Sections 12 and 13 is a sine qua non to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Court under these provisions. Even parties cannot by their consent confer such jurisdiction on the Rent Court to do something which, according to the legislative mandate, it could not do. ….22. The mere fact that Order 23 Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable to the proceedings in a suit under the Bombay Rent Act, does not remove that fetter on the Rent Court or empower it to make a decree for eviction de hors the statute. Even under that provision of the Code, the Court, before ordering that the compromise be recorded, is required to satisfy itself about the lawfulness of the agreement. Such lawfulness or otherwise of the agreement is to be judged, also on the ground whether the terms of the compromise are consistent with the provisions of the Rent Act. ….27. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.The common thread that runs through the aforesaid pronouncements of this Court is – in cases where protection under a Rent Act is available, no eviction can be ordered unless ground seeking eviction is made out, even if parties had entered into a compromise. Moreover, the invalidity on that count can even be raised in execution. In the present case, the order dated 28.03.2014 did not remotely note that any particular ground under the Rent Act was made out.