Case: Nayankumar Shivappa Waghmare Vs. State of Maharashtra

Deshmukh (complainant) wherein he has taken a somersault and told that the amount was not demanded by the accused. It is on the basis of the part of the statement on which benefit of reasonable doubt appears to have been given by the trial Court. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that demand of bribe is not proved on the record. 14. In our opinion, considering the fact that the statement of the key witness PW-9 Anant Deshmukh was recorded almost after three years of the incident, and the cross-examination was not done on the same day when the examination-in-chief was recorded, there was every reason to believe that the witness had lost the interest and won over by the accused. There is nothing on record as to why if the amount was not demanded and the papers relating to post retrial dues were being cleared by the accused, PW-9 Anant Deshmukh made a written complaint to the Anti Corruption Bureau on the date when his sister’s papers were being cleared. 15. In this connection we agree with the High Court that the trial Court while appreciating the prosecution evidence completely ignored the presumption required to be taken under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 provides that where, in any trial of an offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in Section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. Apart from this suggestion made on behalf of the accused to the PW-1 Uttam Bhutekar, PW-3 Sahebrao Wanve and PW-9 Anant Deshmukh, it is clear that the accused has admitted that three currency notes were recovered from his pocket by the raiding party. In such circumstances, in the present case, there was no question of giving benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused. 16. In Himachal Pradesh Administration V. Om Prakash, (1972) 1 SCC 249 explaining the expression “reasonable doubt”, this Court has observed as under:- “It is not beyond the ken of experienced able and abutted lawyers to raise doubts and uncertainties in respect of the prosecution evidence either during trial by cross-examination or by the marshalling of that evidence in the manner in which the emphasis is placed thereon. But what has to ho borne in mind is that the penumbra of uncertainty in the evidence before ft Court is generally due to the nature and quality it may be the witnesses as are lying or where they are honest and truthful, they are not certain. It is therefore, difficult to expect a scientific or mathematical exactitude while dealing with such evidence or arriving at a true conclusion. Because of these difficulties corroboration is sought wherever possible and the maxim that the accused should be given the benefit of doubt becomes pivotal in the prosecution of offenders which in other words means that the prosecution must prove its case against an accused beyond reasonable doubt by a sufficiency of credible evidence. The benefit of doubt to which the accused is entitled is reasonable doubt — the doubt which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain and not the doubt of a timid mind which fights shy—though unwittingly it may be — or is afraid of the logical consequences, if that benefit was not given. Or as one great Judge said it is “not the doubt of a vacillating mind that has not the moral courage to decide but shelters itself in a vain and idle scepticism”. It does not mean that the evidence must be so strong as to exclude even a remote possibility that the accused could not have committed the offence. If that were so the law would fail to protect society as in no case can such a possibility be excluded. It will give room for fanciful conjectures or untenable doubts and will result in deflecting the course of justice if not thwarting it altogether.” 17. In view of law laid down by this Court, as above, and after considering evidence on record in the light of Section 20 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, we hold that the trial Court did err in law in giving benefit of reasonable doubt in the present case relating to corruption. In the case of Niranjan Hemchandra Sashithal and another v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 4 SCC 642 this Court has discussed gravity of the corruption cases in following words: - “26. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that corruption is not to be judged by degree, for corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the conscience, jettisons the glory of the institutions, paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes the sense of civility and mars the marrows of governance. It is worth noting that immoral acquisition of wealth destroys the energy of the people believing in honesty, and history records with agony how they have suffered.” 18. For the reasons, as discussed above, after going through the record of the case, and considering the rival submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, we find no reasons to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court convicting and sentencing the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 19.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]12. The above argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, in the Present case is misconceived for the reason that if the same is accepted, there cannot be any case where appeal against acquittal can be allowed, and the error committed by the trial Court can beperusal of the imouoned judgment shows that after discussing the evidence on record, the High Court has come to a definite conclusion that the trial Court has erred in law in coming to the conclusion that the charge in respect of offence Punishable undeletions 7 and 13(1) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is established. The High Court has clearly held that the trial Court erred in law in giving benefit of reasonable doubt to the accused in the present case. After going through the evidence on record we are also of the opinion that it is not a case where two views are possible. As such, we do not find any illegality in the impugned order reversing the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.In our opinion, considering the fact that the statement of the key witnessAnant Deshmukh was recorded almost after three years of the incident, and thewas not done on the same day when thewas recorded, there was every reason to believe that the witness had lost the interest and won over by the accused.In this connection we agree with the High Court that the trial Court while appreciating the prosecution evidence completely ignored the presumption required to be taken under(1) of Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.For the reasons, as discussed above, after going through the record of the case, and considering the rival submissions of learned Counsel for the parties, we find no reasons to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court convicting and sentencing the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.