Case: Chief Controlling Revenue Authorityandsuperintendent Of St Vs. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd

of a document arises, as a public servant it is his duty to make the reference. If he omits to do so it is within the power of the Court to direct him to discharge that duty and make a reference to the Court.(9) Mr. Daphtary on behalf of the appellant tried to distinguish this case on the ground that the scheme of the Income-tax Act was different from the scheme of the Stamp Act. In our opinion, the observations quoted above the and principles underlying the same are applicable to the duty cast on the appellant under S. 57, Stamp Act and minor points of distinction between the schemes of the two Acts are immaterial for the present discussion. In the words of Lord Cairns the very nature of the thing empowered to be done by the appellant and the conditions under which he has to fix the amount of the duty, couple the power with the duty to state a case for the opinion of the Court. The provisions of S. 51 (1) and (3) run on the same lines as S. 59, Stamp Act. Mr. Daphtary next pointed out that there was a difference in the scheme of the Act, because when the Collector issued a certificate under S. 32, even though his assessment might be faulty and against the interest of the State, the State or the appellant had no remedy. This overlooks the provisions of the section empowering the Collector to issue the certificate. The scheme of the Stamp Act may be briefly noticed. Chapter II contains provisions about the liability of the instrument to duty, of the time of stamping instruments, of values for duty and provisions as to the officer to whom duty is payable. Chapter III which contains only two sections deals with the adjudication as to stamps. The first (s. 31) is where an instrument, whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not, is brought to the Collector with an application to have his opinion as to the duty with which it is chargeable. For obtaining that opinion the applicant has to pay a fee. The Collector may call for information and take evidence. After he has done so he determines the amount of the stamp duty and certifies under S. 32 that the full duty with which it is chargeable has been paid. It is obvious that the party applying is interested in obtaining the opinion and therefore he cannot object to the certificate of the Collector. If the Collector himself is in doubt he has the power under S. 56(2) to ask for the opinion of the appellant. It is therefore clear that in respect of these two provisions under Chapter III no grievance could exist on either side. From S. 33 and Chapter IV onwards there are provisions in which the opinion of the Stamp Officer and of the party interested in pay the stamp duty may come in conflict. The sections in chaps. IV, V and VI ending with S. 61, deal with situations arising from such difference of opinion. S. 57(a) falls under this heading. In our opinion, therefore, this contention of the appellant fails.(10) The next point urged was whether the High Court has jurisdiction to order the Revenue Authority to state a case in face of the Provisions of s. 226, Government of India Act, 1935. The argument was urged in tow parts: Firstly, that this being a revenue matter, the jurisdiction of the Court was excluded. Secondly, that the matter had ceased to be in the stage of assessment but had reached to stage of collection of stamp duty. On that ground the present case was sought to be distinguished from Alcocks case,. In our opinion this argument of the appellant must also fail. A similar argument based on the wording of the corresponding s. 106 (2), Government of India Act, 1915, as mentioned above, was urged in Alcocks case,. On that point their Lordships observed as follows:"Upon the point thus broadly stated their Lordships have no difficulty in pronouncing a decision. To argue that if the Legislature say that a public officer, even a revenue officer, shall do a thing and he, without cause or justification, refused to do that thing, yet the Specific Relief Act would not be applicable and there would be no power in the Court to compel him to give relief to the subject is to state a proposition to which their Lordships must refuse assent."In dealing with the argument that because of S. 106(2), Government of India Act, 1915, the High Court had no jurisdiction to make the order, the Board observed as follows:"In their Lordships view the order of High Court to a revenue officer to do his statutory duty would not be the exercise of original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue. "(11) In our opinion, in the present case also, the respondent seeks the Courts intervention to make the appellant perform his statutory duty to state a case. That is not exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court in any matter concerning the revenue. It is only asking the appellant to perform his statutory duty. The further argument that the proceedings in this case had passed beyond the stage of assessment and had reached the stage of enforcing payment is again irrelevant because by the relief granted by the High Court no attempt is made to obstruct the Revenue Authority in the discharge of his duties. At one stage an injunction was granted against the appellant but that has been cancelled. (12) In fact, this aspect of the discussion is only academic because if payment of enforced and the opinion of the Court, on the statement of the case is against the appellant, he will have to act in conformity with that opinion under S. 59 (2), Stamp Act, and refund whatever may be held to be recovered in excess.(13) In our opinion therefore the contentions of the appellant fail and

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds](5) In our opinion the appellants contentions are unsound. The first contention then S. 57. Stamp Act, gives only a discretion and does not cast a duty on the appellant to make a reference overlooks the fact that the appellant has not to make a reference only when he is in doubt about his decision or conclusion . In his conclusion the party liable to pay the assessed stamp duty is materially interested. The appellants decision is not necessarily based only on the reading of the entries in the Schedule to the Stamp Act. As in the present case, the question under what item stomp duty is leviable may depend on the true construction of a document . It may also involve the decision of the question, as in the present case, as to what is the effect of the Courts order directing a rectification of the instrument. it does not appear, on principle, sound to hold that these difficult questions should be left under the Stamp Act to the final decision of the appellant, and if the party affected by the assessment has a grievance there is no relief at all in law for him. The construction of a document is not always an early matter and on the ground that it is a substantial question of law, parties have been permitted to take the matter up to the highest Court. If so, it appears difficult to start with the assumption that because this is a Revenue Act the decision of the appellant should be considered final and conclusive. The provisions of S. 56 (2) and S. 60 giving power to the Collector and the Court to send a statements of case to the appellant and the High Court respectively, in our opinion, instead of helping the appellant, go against his contention. In those two sections this power is given when the referring authority has a doubt to solve for himself. The absence of the words "feels doubt as to the amount of duty to be paid in respect of an instrument" in S. 57 supports the view that the reference contemplated under that section is not for the benefit of the appellant only but ensures also for the benefit of the party affected by the assessment. In our opinion, the power contained in S. 57 in the nature of an obligation or is coupled with an obligation and under the circumstances can be demanded to be used also by the parties affected by the assessment of the stampour opinion, the observations quoted above the and principles underlying the same are applicable to the duty cast on the appellant under S. 57, Stamp Act and minor points of distinction between the schemes of the two Acts are immaterial for the present discussion. In the words of Lord Cairns the very nature of the thing empowered to be done by the appellant and the conditions under which he has to fix the amount of the duty, couple the power with the duty to state a case for the opinion of the Court. The provisions of S. 51 (1) and (3) run on the same lines as S. 59, Stamp Act. Mr. Daphtary next pointed out that there was a difference in the scheme of the Act, because when the Collector issued a certificate under S. 32, even though his assessment might be faulty and against the interest of the State, the State or the appellant had no remedy. This overlooks the provisions of the section empowering the Collector to issue the certificate. The scheme of the Stamp Act may be briefly noticed. Chapter II contains provisions about the liability of the instrument to duty, of the time of stamping instruments, of values for duty and provisions as to the officer to whom duty is payable. Chapter III which contains only two sections deals with the adjudication as to stamps. The first (s. 31) is where an instrument, whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not, is brought to the Collector with an application to have his opinion as to the duty with which it is chargeable. For obtaining that opinion the applicant has to pay a fee. The Collector may call for information and take evidence. After he has done so he determines the amount of the stamp duty and certifies under S. 32 that the full duty with which it is chargeable has been paid. It is obvious that the party applying is interested in obtaining the opinion and therefore he cannot object to the certificate of the Collector. If the Collector himself is in doubt he has the power under S. 56(2) to ask for the opinion of the appellant. It is therefore clear that in respect of these two provisions under Chapter III no grievance could exist on either side. From S. 33 and Chapter IV onwards there are provisions in which the opinion of the Stamp Officer and of the party interested in pay the stamp duty may come in conflict. The sections in chaps. IV, V and VI ending with S. 61, deal with situations arising from such difference of opinion. S. 57(a) falls under this heading. In our opinion, therefore, this contention of the appellantIn our opinion therefore the contentions of the appellant fail