Case: Parry &amp; Co. Ltd Vs. Commercial Employees' Association,Madras

a day or 48 hours a week, wages at twice the ordinary rates should be paid as required by the proviso to Section 14 (1) and Section 31 of the Act. The conclusion reached by the Commissioner with regard to this issue is expressed by him in the following words:"I hold that the case of Messrs. Parry and Companys employees falls under the former category and that the employees in this company will be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours are exceeded,"8. This order, as said above was made on 29th January, 1949 and on 16th of February following the respondent association filed a petition before the High Court at Madras, praying for a writ of certiorari to quash the same. This application was heard by a Bench of two Judges and by the judgment dated 1st of April, 1949 the learned Judges allowed the petition in part and quashed the order of the Labour Commissioner in so far as it decided that the employees of the appellant will be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours were exceeded. It is the propriety of this decision that has been challenged before us in this appeal.9. It is somewhat unfortunate that the respondent remained unrepresented before us and the appeal had to be heard ex parte. Mr. Isaacs, who appeared on behalf of the appellant, has, however, rendered every assistance that he possibly could and has placed before us all the material facts and relevant provisions of law. Having given the matter our best consideration, we are of the opinion that the order of the High Court cannot be supported and that this appeal should be allowed.10. The High Court seems to have based its decision on the ground that the Commissioner of Labour failed to answer the question raised by the association as to whether the company was entitled to require the employees to work more than six and half hours a day. According to the learned Judge, the Labour Commissioner was not right in holding that even if the working hours were fixed at six and half hours a day, the employees would be entitled to overtime wages only when the statutory hours are exceeded.11. As has been pointed out already, the Labour Commissioner did decide that if the normal hours of work were previously fixed and rigidly adhered to, the employees would be entitled to seek protection under S. 50 of the Act against imposition of longer hours of work without a corresponding increase in their emoluments. The increase in such cases, according to the Labour Commissioner, should be on the scale of compensatory wages allowed under R. 10 of the Madras Shops and Establishment Rules. If, however, the increase is more than the statutory period, the employees will be entitled to wages at double rate under S. 31 of the Act. This decision may or may not be right, but it has not been and cannot be suggested that the Labour Commissioner acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his powers. Under S. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, the Labour Commissioner is the only proper and competent authority to determine the questions referred to it in that section; and there is an express provision in it that the decision of the Labour Commissioner shall be final and not liable to be challenged in any Court of law. It was the respondent who took the matter before the Labour Commissioner in the present case and invited his decision upon the questions raised in the petition. The Commissioner was certainly bound to decide the questions and he did decide them. At the worst, he may have come to an erroneous conclusion, but the conclusion is in respect of a matter which lies entirely within the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner to decide and it does not relate to anything collateral, an erroneous decision upon which might affect his jurisdiction. The records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Labour Commissioner which goes contrary to the principles of natural justice. Thus there was absolutely no ground here which would justify a superior Court in issuing a writ of certiorari for removal of an order or proceeding of an inferior tribunal vested with powers to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise the powers of an appellate Court and correct what is considered to be an error in the decision of the Labour Commissioner. This obviously it cannot do. The position might have been different if the Labour Commissioner had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to determine questions which if left undecided: vide BOARD OF EDUCATION v. RICE 1911 A. C. 179, but no certiorari is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable. In the view which we have taken, it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether certiorari has been taken away- if it can be taken away at all under our Constitution-by the provision of S. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act which lays down that the decision of the Labour Commissioner would be final and incapable of being challenged in any Court of law. It was conceded by Mr. Isaacs that in spite of such statutory provisions the superior Court is not absolutely deprived of the power to issue a writ, although it can do so only on the ground of either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or of a manifest fraud in the party procuring it vide COLONIAL BANK OF AUSTRALASIA v. ROBERT WILLAN,5 P C Appeals 417.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. As has been pointed out already, the Labour Commissioner did decide that if the normal hours of work were previously fixed and rigidly adhered to, the employees would be entitled to seek protection under S. 50 of the Act against imposition of longer hours of work without a corresponding increase in their emoluments. The increase in such cases, according to the Labour Commissioner, should be on the scale of compensatory wages allowed under R. 10 of the Madras Shops and Establishment Rules. If, however, the increase is more than the statutory period, the employees will be entitled to wages at double rate under S. 31 of the Act. This decision may or may not be right, but it has not been and cannot be suggested that the Labour Commissioner acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his powers. Under S. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act, the Labour Commissioner is the only proper and competent authority to determine the questions referred to it in that section; and there is an express provision in it that the decision of the Labour Commissioner shall be final and not liable to be challenged in any Court of law. It was the respondent who took the matter before the Labour Commissioner in the present case and invited his decision upon the questions raised in the petition. The Commissioner was certainly bound to decide the questions and he did decide them. At the worst, he may have come to an erroneous conclusion, but the conclusion is in respect of a matter which lies entirely within the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner to decide and it does not relate to anything collateral, an erroneous decision upon which might affect his jurisdiction. The records of the case do not disclose any error apparent on the face of the proceeding or any irregularity in the procedure adopted by the Labour Commissioner which goes contrary to the principles of natural justice. Thus there was absolutely no ground here which would justify a superior Court in issuing a writ of certiorari for removal of an order or proceeding of an inferior tribunal vested with powers to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. What the High Court has done really is to exercise the powers of an appellate Court and correct what is considered to be an error in the decision of the Labour Commissioner. This obviously it cannot do. The position might have been different if the Labour Commissioner had omitted to decide a matter which he was bound to decide and in such cases a mandamus might legitimately issue commanding the authority to determine questions which if left undecided: vide BOARDOF EDUCATION v. RICE 1911 A. C.179, but no certiorari is available to quash a decision passed with jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal on the mere ground that such decision is erroneous. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion, is plainly unsustainable. In the view which we have taken, it is unnecessary to express any opinion as to whether certiorari has been taken away- if it can be taken away at all under our Constitution-by the provision of S. 51 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act which lays down that the decision of the Labour Commissioner would be final and incapable of being challenged in any Court of law. It was conceded by Mr. Isaacs that in spite of such statutory provisions the superior Court is not absolutely deprived of the power to issue a writ, although it can do so only on the ground of either a manifest defect of jurisdiction in the tribunal that made the order or of a manifest fraud in the party procuring it vide COLONIALBANK OF AUSTRALASIA v. ROBERT WILLAN,5 P C Appeals