Case: Mohanlal Jain Vs. His Highness Maharaja Shri Sawai Man Singhji

sovereign Rulers of Indian States, handed over, after the foundation of the Republic, their States to the Nation in return for an annual Privy Purse and the assurance that their personal rights, privileges and dignities would be respected. The Constitution itself declared that these rights, etc., would receive recognition. A law made as a result of these considerations must be treated as based on a proper classification of such Rulers, who had signed the agreement of the character described above. It is based upon a distinction which can be described as real and substantial, and it bears a just relation to the object sought to be attained. 11. It is further contended that the Article speaks of privileges but not of immunities, and we were referred to certain other Articles of the Constitution where "immunities" are specifically mentioned. It is not necessary to refer to those articles. Immunity from civil action may be described also as a privilege, because the word privilege" is sufficiently wide to include an immunity. The Constitution was not limited to the choice of any particular words, so long as the intention was clearly expressed. In our opinion, the words personal rights and privileges" are sufficiently comprehensive to embrance an immunity of this character. It is, therefore, clear that the section cannot be challenged as discriminatory, because it arises from a classification based on historical facts. 12. It is next contended that S. 87 B only applies the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (3) of S. 86, that the words of the latter section are not retrospective, that the suit was filed before the enactment of S. 87-B, and that the substantive right of the plaintiff to continue his suit could not be taken away in the absence of express language or clear intendment. The words of S. 86 (1) are "No Ruler of a foreign State may be sued in any court......". This precludes, it is said, only the initiation of a suit and not the continuance of a suit already filed before the section was enacted. In our opinion these arguments cannot be accepted. The word "sued" means not only the filing of a suit or a civil proceeding but also their pursuit through Courts. A person is sued not only when the plaint is filed, but is sued also when the suit remains pending against him. The word "sued" covers the entire proceeding in an action, and the person proceeded against issued throughout the duration of the action. It follows that consent is necessary not only for the filing of the suit against the ex-Ruler but also for its continuation from the time consent is required. In view of the amplitude of the word "sued", it is not necessary to consider generally to what extent pending cases are affected by subsequent legislation or refer to the principles laid down in United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum. 1940 F C R l10 : (AIR 1941 F C 16), Venugopala Reddiar v. Krishnaswamy Reddiar, 1943 F C R 39 : (AIR 1943 F C 24) or Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, 1957 S C R 488 : ((S) AIR 1957 S C 540). If the language of S. 86 read with S. 87-B were applicable only to the initiation of a civil suit, these cases might have been helpful; but since the words "may sue" include not only the initiation of a suit but its continuation also, it is manifest that neither the suit could he filed nor maintained except with the consent of the Central Government. In Atiqa Begums case, 1940 F C R l10 : (AIR 1941. F C 16), Vardachriar, J., referred to the two principles applicable to cases where the question of retrospectivity of a law has to be considered. They are that vested rights should not be presumed to be affected, and that the rights of the parties to an action should ordinarily be determined in accordance with the law, as it stood at the date of the commencement of the action. But the learned Judge pointed out that the language of the enactment might be sufficient to rebut the first, and cited the case of the Privy Council in K. C. Mukherjee v. Mst. Ram Ratan Kuer, ILR 15 Pat 268 : (AIR 1936 PC 49 ). Here, the matter can be resolved on the language of the enactment. The language employed is of sufficient width and certainty to include even ponding actions, and the contrary rule apolies, namely, that unless pending actions are saved from the operation of the new law, they must be taken to be affected. The word "sued", as we have shown, denotes not only the start but also the continuation of a civil action, and the prohibition, therefore, affects not only a suit instituted after the enactment of S. 87-B but one which, though instituted before its enactment, is pending. In out judgment, the present suit was incompetent against the first defendant, the exRuler of Jaipur. 13. It is contended that defendants 2 and 3 acted as the agents of the ex-Ruler and placed the order with the appellant. The position of the Military Secretary (since dead) was on a different footing, but it is conceded that no cause of action against him survived, because the appeal has abated against him. Mohabat Singh, who is the third defendant, cannot be described as an agent of the ex-Ruler, because his connection with the orders placed was merely to sign the letters purporting to emanate from the Military Secretary. Those letters he signed "for the Military Secretary". He was not acting as the agent of the ex-Ruler but was performing the ministerial act of signing the letters on behalf of the military Secretary. This cannot be said to have constituted him an agent. The suit against him was, therefore, misconceived, whatever might have been said of the Military Secretary. 14. In our opinion, the dismissal of the suit was justified in the circumstances of the case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is easy to see that the ex-Rulers form a class and the special legislation is based upon historical considerations applicable to them as a class. The Princes who were, before integration, sovereign Rulers of Indian States, handed over, after the foundation of the Republic, their States to the Nation in return for an annual Privy Purse and the assurance that their personal rights, privileges and dignities would be respected. The Constitution itself declared that these rights, etc., would receive recognition. A law made as a result of these considerations must be treated as based on a proper classification of such Rulers, who had signed the agreement of the character described above. It is based upon a distinction which can be described as real and substantial, and it bears a just relation to the object sought to be attainedIn our opinion, the words personal rights and privileges" are sufficiently comprehensive to embrance an immunity of this character. It is, therefore, clear that the section cannot be challenged as discriminatory, because it arises from a classification based on historical factsHere, the matter can be resolved on the language of the enactment. The language employed is of sufficient width and certainty to include even ponding actions, and the contrary rule apolies, namely, that unless pending actions are saved from the operation of the new law, they must be taken to be affected. The word "sued", as we have shown, denotes not only the start but also the continuation of a civil action, and the prohibition, therefore, affects not only a suit instituted after the enactment of S. 87-B but one which, though instituted before its enactment, is pending. In out judgment, the present suit was incompetent against the first defendant, the exRuler of JaipurThe position of the Military Secretary (since dead) was on a different footing, but it is conceded that no cause of action against him survived, because the appeal has abated against him. Mohabat Singh, who is the third defendant, cannot be described as an agent of the ex-Ruler, because his connection with the orders placed was merely to sign the letters purporting to emanate from the Military Secretary. Those letters he signed "for the Military Secretary". He was not acting as the agent of the ex-Ruler but was performing the ministerial act of signing the letters on behalf of the military Secretary. This cannot be said to have constituted him an agent. The suit against him was, therefore, misconceived, whatever might have been said of the Military Secretary14. In our opinion, the dismissal of the suit was justified in the circumstances of the case.