Case: Orissa Cement Limited, Rajganpur Vs. Their Workmen &amp; Another

the validity or the propriety of the impugned order of discharge in the present proceedings. The tribunal has held that on earlier occasion the Appellate Tribunal had found that there was no contravention of S. 22 and that was really decisive of the proceedings. The alternative finding made in the said proceedings on the merits is no more than obiter and cannot be pleaded in support of the bar of res judicata. We are not prepared to hold that this view is erroneous. Therefore, in our opinion, the tribunal was justified in dealing with the merits of the present dispute.On the merits, the tribunal has found that there is no law or statutory rule which compelled the appellant to discharge the respondent on the ground that he has not obtained a permit, and according to it the appellant should have told the department that, in the absence of a statutory rule, it was not bound to comply with the requisition issued by the department that all wiremen should obtain a permit before the appellant employed them as such. The tribunal conceded that there is no mala fides about the action of the appellant; but it held that the appellant acted under a mistaken notion about the effect of the electricity rules, and so, in its opinion, the discharge of the respondent was not justified. It has also observed that the appellant might have given the respondent an alternative appointment as a telephone operator which did not require any permit. It is on these findings that the impugned order of reinstatement has been passed.4. It is perfectly true that there is no law or statutory rule which compelled the appellant to terminate the services of the respondent on the ground that he had not obtained a permit; but on the other hand, it seems to us that the department is fully justified in insisting upon all wiremen being duly qualified before they are appointed as such. Whether or not the statutory rule justifies such a request is really not material. The request is made in public interest because it is obviously desirable that wiremen should be duly qualified and one of the well recognized methods of testing such qualifications is to require the candidate concerned to appear for an examination held in that behalf. Therefore, even in the absence of a statutory rule, if the department desired that the appellant should appoint qualified wiremen and the appellant complied with the request we see nothing wrong or improper about it.It is not alleged or proved that the appellant has singled out the respondent and has kept other wiremen though they may not have obtained a permit by passing the examination. Such a plea appears to have been made in the earlier proceedings by the respondent but it was rejected; it had not been proved in the present proceedings either. Therefore, it is clear that the appellant had acted bona fide and in the interest of efficient work in that it has discharged all the wiremen who failed to obtain the necessary permit. We are unable to see how such conduct can be treated as anything but bona fide.5. It is not denied that the department was insisting that the appellant should require its wiremen to obtain the necessary permit; but it is urged that when the respondent was appointed on 5 July 1951, he should have been expressly told that he would not be confirmed unless he obtained the necessary permit after passing the examination; and in that connexion reference is made to the fact that the appellant must have already received a letter from the department in that behalf and yet it did not make it a condition of the respondents appointment. It is true that the letter in question which was addressed to the appellant by the department bears the date 3 July 1951, but it is not shown that the appellant had received it before 5 July when it appointed the respondent as a temporary wiremen, and so failure to provide for such a condition in the temporary appointment cannot be used against the appellant. Besides, the respondent was admittedly a temporary employee, and if it appeared that the department began to insist that every wireman must pass the examination and refused to grant exemption to anyone, the appellant cannot be blamed for asking the respondent to qualify himself in that behalf. In fact, it was at the appellants instance that the department allowed the respondent to take another chance and permitted him to appear at the second examination. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument that the appellant did not act bona fide in discharging the respondent.In dealing with the question of bona fides the tribunal appears to have lost sight of the fact that it is for the party alleging mala fides to lead reliable evidence in support of the said plea. In the present case, we see no trace of any such evidence, and so it is difficult to sustain the ultimate finding of the tribunal that the order of discharge should be set aside and the appellant should be ordered to reinstate the respondent.The tribunal has, no doubt observed that the respondent should have been taken as a telephone operator. We do not see how this can have a material bearing on the question with which the tribunal was concerned. The respondent was appointed as a wireman, and if the appellant was justified in discharging as such, there was no obligation on the appellant to give the respondent another employment on its staff. Besides, it is somewhat significant that on an earlier occasion when wireman were appointed as telephone attendants by rotation, the union itself had objected to such a course on the ground that a wireman would thereby lose his skill as a wireman. In any event, the failure to provide an alternative employment to the respondent cannot lead to the inference that the termination of his services as a wireman is unfair.6.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is perfectly true that there is no law or statutory rule which compelled the appellant to terminate the services of the respondent on the ground that he had not obtained a permit; but on the other hand, it seems to us that the department is fully justified in insisting upon all wiremen being duly qualified before they are appointed as such. Whether or not the statutory rule justifies such a request is really not material. The request is made in public interest because it is obviously desirable that wiremen should be duly qualified and one of the well recognized methods of testing such qualifications is to require the candidate concerned to appear for an examination held in that behalf. Therefore, even in the absence of a statutory rule, if the department desired that the appellant should appoint qualified wiremen and the appellant complied with the request we see nothing wrong or improper about it.It is not alleged or proved that the appellant has singled out the respondent and has kept other wiremen though they may not have obtained a permit by passing the examination. Such a plea appears to have been made in the earlier proceedings by the respondent but it was rejected; it had not been proved in the present proceedings either. Therefore, it is clear that the appellant had acted bona fide and in the interest of efficient work in that it has discharged all the wiremen who failed to obtain the necessary permit. We are unable to see how such conduct can be treated as anything but bonais not denied that the department was insisting that the appellant should require its wiremen to obtain the necessary permit; but it is urged that when the respondent was appointed on 5 July 1951, he should have been expressly told that he would not be confirmed unless he obtained the necessary permit after passing the examination; and in that connexion reference is made to the fact that the appellant must have already received a letter from the department in that behalf and yet it did not make it a condition of the respondents appointment. It is true that the letter in question which was addressed to the appellant by the department bears the date 3 July 1951, but it is not shown that the appellant had received it before 5 July when it appointed the respondent as a temporary wiremen, and so failure to provide for such a condition in the temporary appointment cannot be used against the appellant. Besides, the respondent was admittedly a temporary employee, and if it appeared that the department began to insist that every wireman must pass the examination and refused to grant exemption to anyone, the appellant cannot be blamed for asking the respondent to qualify himself in that behalf. In fact, it was at the appellants instance that the department allowed the respondent to take another chance and permitted him to appear at the second examination. Therefore, there is no substance in the argument that the appellant did not act bona fide in discharging the respondent.In dealing with the question of bona fides the tribunal appears to have lost sight of the fact that it is for the party alleging mala fides to lead reliable evidence in support of the said plea. In the present case, we see no trace of any such evidence, and so it is difficult to sustain the ultimate finding of the tribunal that the order of discharge should be set aside and the appellant should be ordered to reinstate the respondent.The tribunal has, no doubt observed that the respondent should have been taken as a telephone operator. We do not see how this can have a material bearing on the question with which the tribunal was concerned. The respondent was appointed as a wireman, and if the appellant was justified in discharging as such, there was no obligation on the appellant to give the respondent another employment on its staff. Besides, it is somewhat significant that on an earlier occasion when wireman were appointed as telephone attendants by rotation, the union itself had objected to such a course on the ground that a wireman would thereby lose his skill as a wireman. In any event, the failure to provide an alternative employment to the respondent cannot lead to the inference that the termination of his services as a wireman is unfair.