Case: Chariman &amp; M.D.,Bharat Pet.Corpn.Ltd&amp;Ors Vs. T.K. Raju

do anything which could be unbecoming of its Management Staff. Clause 22 of Part II of the Rules categorically debars an employee from raising any loan in the following terms: No Management Staff of the Corporation shall, save in the ordinary course of business with a bank, the Life Insurance Corporation or a firm of standing, borrow money from or lend money to or otherwise place himself under pecuniary obligation to any person with whom he has or is likely to have official dealings or permit any such borrowing, lending or pecuniary obligation in his name or for his benefit or for the benefit of any member of his family. 11. The Respondent admittedly was not only charged under clause (4) of Part III of the Rules , he was also charged for various other misconducts enumerated in different clauses of Part II thereof. The High Court, therefore, was not justified in proceeding with the matter on the premise that some of the charges against the Respondent had been framed only in terms of clause (4) of Part II of the Rules. 12. In Kalra (supra), the misconduct alleged against the delinquent was trivial. Report against him was found to be on ipse dixit. It was held that Rule 4(1)(i) did not specify that its violation will constitute misconduct. It was opined that the delinquent did not commit any misconduct by violating Advance Rules. In that situation, it was observed that how did the question of integrity arises passes our comprehension. It was held: To sum up the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority is illegal and invalid for the reasons: (i) that the action is thoroughly arbitrary and is violative of Article 14, (ii) that the alleged misconduct does not constitute misconduct within the 1975 Rules, (iii) that the inquiry officer himself found that punishment was already imposed for the alleged misconduct by withholding the salary and the appellant could not be exposed to double jeopardy, and (iv) that the findings of the inquiry officer are unsupported by reasons and the order of the disciplinary authority as well as the Appellate Authority suffer from the same vice. Therefore, the order of removal from service as well as the appellate order are quashed and set aside. 13. Glaxo (supra) was also rendered in the fact situation obtaining therein. 14. It is not in dispute that misconduct is a generic term. 15. In State of Punjab and Others v. Ram Singh Ex. Constable [(1992) 4 SCC 54] it was stated: - Misconduct has been defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at page 999 thus: A transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, unlawful behavior, wilful in character, improper or wrong behavior, its synonyms are misdemeanor, misdeed, misbehavior, delinquency, impropriety, mismanagement, offense, but not negligence or carelessness. 16. Misconduct in office has been defined as: Any unlawful behavior by a public officer in relation to the duties of his office, wilful in character. Term embraces acts which the office holder had no right to perform, acts performed improperly, and failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to act. 17. In P. Ramanatha Aiyars Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition, at page 3026, the term Misconduct has been defined as under: The term misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment. Misconduct is not necessarily the same thing as conduct involving moral turpitude. The word misconduct is a relative term, and has to be construed with reference to the subject-matter and the context wherein the term occurs, having regard to the scope of the Act or statute which is being construed. Misconduct literally means wrong conduct or improper conduct. 18. More than one occasion, different courts have taken pains to explain that Kalra (supra) does not lay down any inflexible rule. [See Probodh Kumar Bhowmick v. University of Calcutta & Ors., 1994 (2) C.L.J. 456, Tara Chand v. Union of India and Ors. CWP 5552 /2000 disposed of on 27th August, 2002 (Delhi High Court), Secretary to Government and Others v. A.C.J. Britto, 1997) 3 SCC 387 and Noratanmal Chouraria v. M.R. Murli and Another (2004) 5 SCC 689 ]. 19. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court in our opinion committed a manifest error in relying upon Kalra (supra) and Glaxo (supra), as we have noticed hereinbefore, that the Respondent was not charged in terms of the Rules alone. He was charged for violation of several other clauses of the Rules. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in coming to the conclusion that as some of the charges were vague and indefinite, thus, no punishment could have been imposed on the basis thereof. 20. We also do not agree with the submission of Mr. Krishnamani that two of the eight charges have not been found to be proved. The charges levelled against the Respondent must be considered on a holistic basis. By reason of such an action, the Respondent had put the company in embarrassment. It might have lost its image. It received complaints from the Federation. There was reason for the Appellant to believe that by such an action on the part of the Respondent the Appellants image has been tarnished. In any event, neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench came to any finding that none of the charges had been proved. 21. The power of judicial review in such matters is limited. This Court times without number had laid down that interference with the quantum of punishment should not be done in a routine manner. [See V. Ramana v. A.P.SRTC and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 338 , and State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohammed Ayub Naz, 2006 (1) SCALE 79 ]. 22. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the quantum of punishment was wholly disproportionate to the charges levelled against the Respondent.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]19. In the aforementioned situation, the High Court in our opinion committed a manifest error in relying upon Kalra (supra) and Glaxo (supra), as we have noticed hereinbefore, that the Respondent was not charged in terms of the Rules alone. He was charged for violation of several other clauses of the Rules. The High Court, therefore, was not correct in coming to the conclusion that as some of the charges were vague and indefinite, thus, no punishment could have been imposed on the basis thereof20. We also do not agree with the submission of Mr. Krishnamani that two of the eight charges have not been found to be proved. The charges levelled against the Respondent must be considered on a holistic basis. By reason of such an action, the Respondent had put the company in embarrassment. It might have lost its image. It received complaints from the Federation. There was reason for the Appellant to believe that by such an action on the part of the Respondent the Appellants image has been tarnished. In any event, neither the learned Single Judge nor the Division Bench came to any finding that none of the charges had been proved21. The power of judicial review in such matters is limited. This Court times without number had laid down that interference with the quantum of punishment should not be done in a routine manner. [See V. Ramana v. A.P.SRTC and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 338 , and State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Mohammed Ayub Naz, 2006 (1) SCALE 79 ]22. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that it cannot be said that the quantum of punishment was wholly disproportionate to the charges levelled against the Respondent.