Case: Strawboard Manufacturing Co., Ltd Vs. Gutta Mill Workers' Union.The State Of U. P: Intervener

time as may be specified" and not "within such time as may from time to time be specified." It is significant that the only occasion when the State Government can, under the U.P. Act, specify a fresh period of time is when it remits the award for reconsideration under sub-section (2) of S.6. for under sub-section (3) the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his award, after reconsideration. within such period as may be specified by the State Government. Even in this case, under section 6 (2) and (3) the State Government may in the order remitting the award specify a time within which the award, after reconsideration, must be filed. This gives power to the State Government to fix a fresh period of time to do a fresh act, namely, to reconsider and file the reconsidered award. It does not give the State Government any power to enlarge the time fixed originally for the initial making of the award. Therefore, except where the State Government under S. 6 (2) remits the award for reconsideration it has no power even to specify a fresh period of time and much less a power to extend the time for the initial making of the award under S. 6 (1). In exercise of the powers conferred by clauses (b), (c), (d) and (g) of S. 3 and S. 8 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Governor was pleased to make an order embodied in Notification No. 615 (LL) /XVIII-7 (LL)-1951, dated 15/03/1951. The proviso to rule 16 of that order authorised the State Government to extend from time to time the period within which the Tribunal or the adjudicator was to pronounce the decision. These rules were, however, not in force at the time material to the case before us. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent and for the State of Uttar Pradesh have not referred us to any similar rule which was in force in 1950. In view of the language of S. 6 of the U.P. Act and in the absence of a rule like the proviso to rule 16 referred to above it must follow that the State Government had no authority whatever to extend the time and the adjudicator became functus officio on the expiry of the time specified in the original order of reference and, therefore, the award which had not been made within that time must be held to be without jurisdiction and a nullity as contended by Dr. Tek Chand.(5) Learned counsel for the respondents refers us to the provisions of S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act, 1904 which provides that where by any Uttar Pradesh Act any power is conferred on the State Government then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. Sections 3 and 4 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 certainly confer power on the State Government to refer disputes to an adjudicator for decision and S. 6 (1) may be read as empowering the State Government to specify the time within which the adjudicator to whom an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication is to submit his award. The combined effect of S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act and S. 6(1) of the G. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is contended, is that the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his report "within such time as may from time to time be specified" and that this being the position, the principles laid down in the English decisions referred to above must be held to be applicable to the present case. We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Under S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act the State Government may exercise the power conferred on it by Ss. 3, 4 and 6, that is to say, it can from time to time make orders referring disputes to an adjudicator and, whenever such an order of reference is made, to specify the time within which the award is to be made. This power to specify the time does not and indeed cannot include a power to extend the time already specified in an earlier order. The legislative practice, as evidenced by the provisions of the different statutes referred to above, is to expressly confer the power of extension of time, if and when the Legislature thinks fit to do so. There is no question of any inherent power of the Court and much less of the Executive Government in this behalf. S. 14 of the U.P. General Clauses Act does not in terms, or by necessary implication, give any such power of extension of time to the State Government and, therefore, the respondents can derive no support from that section.(6) Learned advocate for the Intervener, the State of Uttar Pradesh, draws our attention to section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1904, and contends that the order of 26/4/1950 should be taken as an amendment or modification, within the meaning of that section, of the first order of 18/2/1950. It is true that the order of 26/4/1950 does ex facie purport to modify the order of 18/2/1950 but, in view of the absence of any distinct provision in S. 21 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the State Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of 26/4/1950 viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification, cannot, by virtue of S. 21, have that effect. If, therefore, the amending order operates prospectively, i. e. only as from the date of the order, it cannot validate the award which had been made after the expiry of the time specified in the original order and before the date of the amending order, during which period the adjudicator was, functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all. We do not think the respondents can derive any support from S. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Sections 3 and 4 of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 certainly confer power on the State Government to refer disputes to an adjudicator for decision and S. 6 (1) may be read as empowering the State Government to specify the time within which the adjudicator to whom an industrial dispute is referred for adjudication is to submit his award. The combined effect of S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act and S. 6(1) of the G. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, it is contended, is that the adjudicator is enjoined to submit his report "within such time as may from time to time be specified" and that this being the position, the principles laid down in the English decisions referred to above must be held to be applicable to the present case. We are unable to accept this line of reasoning. Under S. 14 of the U. P. General Clauses Act the State Government may exercise the power conferred on it by Ss. 3, 4 and 6, that is to say, it can from time to time make orders referring disputes to an adjudicator and, whenever such an order of reference is made, to specify the time within which the award is to be made. This power to specify the time does not and indeed cannot include a power to extend the time already specified in an earlier order. The legislative practice, as evidenced by the provisions of the different statutes referred to above, is to expressly confer the power of extension of time, if and when the Legislature thinks fit to do so. There is no question of any inherent power of the Court and much less of the Executive Government in this behalf. S. 14 of the U.P. General Clauses Act does not in terms, or by necessary implication, give any such power of extension of time to the State Government and, therefore, the respondents can derive no support from that section.(6) Learned advocate for the Intervener, the State of Uttar Pradesh, draws our attention to section 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1904, and contends that the order of 26/4/1950 should be taken as an amendment or modification, within the meaning of that section, of the first order of 18/2/1950. It is true that the order of 26/4/1950 does ex facie purport to modify the order of 18/2/1950 but, in view of the absence of any distinct provision in S. 21 that the power of amendment and modification conferred on the State Government may be so exercised as to have retrospective operation the order of 26/4/1950 viewed merely as an order of amendment or modification, cannot, by virtue of S. 21, have that effect. If, therefore, the amending order operates prospectively, i. e. only as from the date of the order, it cannot validate the award which had been made after the expiry of the time specified in the original order and before the date of the amending order, during which period the adjudicator was, functus officio and had no jurisdiction to act at all. We do not think the respondents can derive any support from S. 21 of the U. P. General Clauses Act.