Case: A K Srivastava Vs. National Insurance Co

of that proceeding." 15. Thus, the legal position is clear and the respondent cannot now re-agitate the question regarding maintainability of the suit under Section 34 of the Act. However, learned counsel adopted an alternative contention before us that the suit is in effect one for specific enforcement of a contract and such a suit is not conceived under Section 14 of the Act and hence it is not maintainable. According to the learned counsel, the reliefs claimed in the suit, if granted, would result in specific enforcement of a contract of employment. Section 14(1)(a) of the Act makes it clear that a contract of employment is not specifically enforceable since non-performance of it can be compensated by money, contended the counsel. 16. The said contention is based on a fallacious premise that the suit was for enforcement of a contract of employment. Respondent was appointed on certain terms and pursuant to such appointment he worked within the scope of such employment. Termination of his employment purportedly in terms of the same contract is challenged by him by praying for a declaration that such termination is invalid and therefore, he continues in the same employment. Maintainability of a suit cannot be adjudged from the effect which the decree may cause. It can be determined on the basis of the ostensible pleadings made and the stated reliefs claimed in the plaint. 17. Though Specific Relief Act widens the spheres of the civil court its preamble shows that the Act is not exhaustive of all kinds of specific reliefs. " An Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief." It is well to remember that the Act is not restricted to specific performance of contracts as the statute governs powers of the court in granting specific reliefs in a variety of fields. Even so, the Act does not cover all specific reliefs conceivable. Its preceding enactment (Specific Relief Act, 1877) was held by the courts in India as not exhaustive. Vide Ramdas Khatavu v. Atlas Mills, AIR 1931 Bom, 151. In Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd. v. Haridas Mundhra and others, 1972(3) SCC 664, this Court observed that Specific Relief Act, 1963, is also not an exhaustive enactment and it does not consolidate the whole law on the subject. "As the preamble would indicate, it is an Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief. It does not purport to lay down the law relating to specific relief in all its ramifications." 18. Chapter II contains a fasciculus of rules relating to specific performance of contracts. Section 14 falls within that Chapter and it points to contracts which are not specifically enforceable. Powers of the Court to grant declaratory reliefs are adumbrated in Section 34 of the Act which falls under Chapter VI of the Act. It is well to remember that even the wide language contained in Section 34 did not exhaust the powers of the court to grant declaratory reliefs. In Veruareddi Ramaraghava Reddy and others v. Konduru Seshu Reddy and others, 1966 Supple. SCR 270, and in M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo of Maihar and others, 1975(2) SCC 530, this Court while interpreting the corresponding provision in the preceding enactment of 1877 (Section 42) has observe that "Section 42 merely gives statutory recognition to a well- recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe the jurisdiction of courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42." 19. The position remains the same under the present Act also. Hence the mere fact that a suit which is not maintainable under Section 14 of the Act is not to persist with its disability of non-admission to civil courts even outside the contours of Chapter II of the Act. Section 34 is enough to open the corridors of civil courts to admit suits filed for a variety of declaratory reliefs. 20. Now the more important question is, whether appellant is entitled to declaration that he continues to be in the employment of respondent-company. High Court held that he is not because the contract of employment does not entitle him to continue. 21. Terms and conditions of employment of the appellant have been incorporated in the letter of appointment dated 2.12.1980. It contains the following: (1) Initially he would be on probation for a period of 12 months and during that period he has to achieve a premium of at least Rs. 75,000/- to become eligible for promotion as Probationary Inspector, Grade I.(2) If appellant falls short of the said target, respondent-company reserved its right to extend the period of probation by another 12 months provided the following conditions are satisfied:(a) He should have produced a premium amount of Rs. 50,000/- during the first 12 months period.(b) A request should be made by the appellant in writing for the purpose of getting extension of the period of probation.(c) the company has discretion to decide whether such request should be granted or not.(3) Unless a letter appointing him as Probationary Inspector (Grade-I) is issued by the company, before the expiry of the initial probationary period or the extended probationary period (as the case may be) his service shall stand automatically terminated.(4) His service is also liable to be terminated without assigning any reason during probationary period and/or extended period. 22. Appellant has no case that respondent-company has issued any letter appointing him as "Probationary Inspector (Grade-I)" before the expiry of the initial period of 12 months nor has he a case that initial period of probation was further extended at any time. 23. The above being the admitted position, appellant cannot get a declaration that he continues to be in service. Hence the conclusion of the High Court that the suit is liable to be dismissed does not warrant any interference. 24.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. It is well nigh settled that a decision on an issue raised in a writ petition under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution would also operate as res judicata between the same parties in subsequent judicial proceedings. The only exception is that the rule of res judicata would not operate to the detriment or impairment of a fundamental right.Though the said explanation may not stricto sensu apply to the trial stage, the principal couched in it must gain application thereto. It is immaterial that the writ petition was filed only subsequently because the findings made therein became final as no appeal was filed against the judgment.Thus, the legal position is clear and the respondent cannot now re-agitate the question regarding maintainability of the suit under Section 34 of the Act. However, learned counsel adopted an alternative contention before us that the suit is in effect one for specific enforcement of a contract and such a suit is not conceived under Section 14 of the Act and hence it is not maintainable. According to the learned counsel, the reliefs claimed in the suit, if granted, would result in specific enforcement of a contract of employment. Section 14(1)(a) of the Act makes it clear that a contract of employment is not specifically enforceable since non-performance of it can be compensated by money, contended the counsel.Though Specific Relief Act widens the spheres of the civil court its preamble shows that the Act is not exhaustive of all kinds of specific reliefs. " An Act to define and amend the law relating to certain kinds of specific relief." It is well to remember that the Act is not restricted to specific performance of contracts as the statute governs powers of the court in granting specific reliefs in a variety of fields. Even so, the Act does not cover all specific reliefs conceivable.