Case: Major Gopal Singh And Others Vs. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjab

The question whether it could be rectified by any of the authorities constituted by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act or not was not canvassed before us and, therefore, there is no occasion for us to say anything about it.13. Mr. Achhru Ram contended that R. 74 of the Displaced Persons (compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules, 1955, stood in the way of the Custodian allotting the Raikot property to the respondents during the pendency of the proceedings before the Custodian-General. That rule reads as follows :"Allotments which are the subject-matter of dispute. - No property in a rural area in respect of which any case is pending in a Civil Court or before a Deputy Custodian, Custodian or custodian-General, shall be transferred to the allottee".The aforesaid rule is in Chapter X headed "Payment of compensation under S. 10 of the Act" and deals with a transfer of property to an allottee by way of final settlement of his claim to compensation and does not deal with the question of allotment on a quasi-permanent basis. Moreover, this rule applies to a proceeding before an authority created by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and not to an authority created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. There is, therefore, no sub- stance in this argument.14. Finally Mr. Achhru Ram referred to S. 17 of the 1954 Act and to R. 102 of the Rules framed thereunder and said that the powers of the managing officers appointed under the Act are confined only to properties which are entrusted to them for management and not with respect to any other property. Section 17 deals with the functions and duties of managing officers and managing corporation. Sub-section (1) provides that managing officers and managing corporations will performs such functions as may be assigned to them under the Act. Sub-section (2) provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder, a managing officer or a managing corporation may, among other things, take such measures as he or it considers it necessary or expedient for the purpose of securing, administering, preserving, managing or disposing of any property in the compensation pool entrusted to him or it... etc. The argument is that unless there is such "entrustment" the managing officer or managing corporation has no function to perform with respect to evacuee property. His contention appears to be that there is nothing to show that this property was "entrusted" to a managing officer. In the first place the section confers the particular powers on managing officers or managing corporations only and no one else. Therefore, even if no managing officer or managing corporation was appointed with respect to that property no one else could exercise the power of cancellation of allotment. Further, there is no ground in the special leave petition or in the statement of the case that there is no entrustment in fact of this property or this class of properties to a managing officer or managing corporation. He cannot, therefore, be permitted to make out a new case at this stage of argument. That apart, this argument assumes that the property, despite the publication of the notification under S. 12(1) of the Act continues to be evacuee property. Again this provision is a general provision and the particular provision regarding cancellation of allotment is S. 19(1) of the Act which does not refer to entrustment at all and it is this provision. He then contends that the provisions of S. 19(1) of the Act being subject to rules made under the Act must be read along with R. 102 which deals with cancellation of allotments of leases. That rule reads thus :"Cancellation of allotments and leases - A managing officer or a managing corporation may sell any property in the compensation pool entrusted to him or it, cancel an allotment or terminate a lease, or vary the terms of any such lease or allotment if the allottee or lessee, as the case may be-(a) has sublet or parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the property allotted or leased to him without the permission of a competent authority, or(b) has used or is using such property for a purpose other than that for which it was allotted or leased to him without the permission of a competent authority, or(c) has committed any act which is destructive of or permanently injurious to the property, or(d) for any other sufficient reason to be recorded in writing :Provided that no action shall be taken under this rule unless the allottee or the lessee, as the case may be, has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard."He points out that in the place, the rule speaks of land entrusted to the manager and, therefore, would operate only if entrustment is established. What we have said in regard to S. 17 would apply here also. He then says that this rule restricts the powers of a managing officer or a managing corporation in the matter of cancellation of allotment in the sense that it permits cancellation only on certain specified grounds and, therefore, it cannot be said that S. 19(1) of the Act is completely in conflict with S. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act in so far as the question of cancellation of allotment is concerned. We cannot accept the argument because, apart from the fact that the acquired properties have ceased to be evacuee properties, cl. (d) of R. 102 permits the managing officer or managing corporation to cancel allotment "for any other sufficient reason to be recorded in writing." The only effect of R. 102 is to permit cancellation of an allotment for reasons stated. That is all. In our opinion therefore, this rule does not help the appellants.15. Mr. Khanna had raised three other points but upon the view which we have taken as to the effect of Ss. 12 and 19 of the Act it is not necessary to consider them.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. There is no specific provision in this Act to the effect that after its commen-cement the jurisdiction of the various authorities created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to deal with the allotment or cancellation of allotment of evacuee property shalldoubt, under S. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act the Custodian in empowered to manage evacuee property and in exercise of his power he will be competent to allot such property to any person or to cancel an allotment or lease made in favour of a person. Apart from the fact that subsequent to the issue of the notification under S. 12 (1) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation ) Act, the property would cease to be evacuee property, the aforesaid powers of the Custodian would be in conflict with those conferred by S. 19 of the 1954 Act on a managing officer or a managing corporation constituted under that Act. In other words, to that extent the provisions of S. 10 of the 1950 Act and S. 19 of the 1954 Act cannot stand together. As already stated the powers conferred by sub-sec (1) of S. 19 of the 1954 Act are to prevail notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force. Therefore, they must prevail over the provisions of S. 10 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. It is true that there is nothing on record to show that a managing officer was appointed with respect to the Raikot properties acquired under the notification dated March 24. 1955.But it is not necessary to ascertain that fact. The point is who after the coming into force of the 1954 Act, could cancel an allotment. Section 10 says that only a managing officer or a managing corporation can do so even though some other law may have authorised another person or authority to cancel anis no doubt true that the Raikot lands were allotted to the appellants under the notification referred to in cl. (a) of this section and, therefore, they would be entitled to the benefits conferred by this section provided they satisfied all the other requirements of this section, express or implied. It is implicit in this section that the displaced person to whom land was allotted "held" the land and was in possession of such property at the date of the notification. It is not disputed that the appellants ceased to hold and had lost possession of the Raikot lands before the publication of this notification. Even assuming that the order of the Custodian cancelling the allotment in their favour was erroneous there will be no difference in the result because what is essential is the facts of holding and possession of the land on the date of thewould repeat that the appellants had lost their possession before the publication of the notification and are thus not entitled to the protection of the section. Moreover, the Custodian, by reason of the divesting of the property, as from March 24, 1955, had become functus officio with respect to it and could not rectify any error made by him in the past in the matter of cancellation of allotment. It is true that had the appellants been in possession at the critical time they would have had the right to obtain a permanent transfer in their favour of the Raikot lands and by virtue of what happened and without any fault on their part they have been deprived of that right. That is indeed unfortunate but none of the authorities created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act could rectify the wrong that has been done by them to the appellant. The question whether it could be rectified by any of the authorities constituted by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act or not was not canvassed before us and, therefore, there is no occasion for us to say anything aboutaforesaid rule is in Chapter X headed "Payment of compensation under S. 10 of the Act" and deals with a transfer of property to an allottee by way of final settlement of his claim to compensation and does not deal with the question of allotment on a quasi-permanent basis. Moreover, this rule applies to a proceeding before an authority created by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act and not to an authority created by the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. There is, therefore, no sub- stance in thiscontention appears to be that there is nothing to show that this property was "entrusted" to a managing officer. In the first place the section confers the particular powers on managing officers or managing corporations only and no one else. Therefore, even if no managing officer or managing corporation was appointed with respect to that property no one else could exercise the power of cancellation of allotment. Further, there is no ground in the special leave petition or in the statement of the case that there is no entrustment in fact of this property or this class of properties to a managing officer or managing corporation. He cannot, therefore, be permitted to make out a new case at this stage of argument. That apart, this argument assumes that the property, despite the publication of the notification under S. 12(1) of the Act continues to be evacuee property. Again this provision is a general provision and the particular provision regarding cancellation of allotment is S. 19(1) of the Act which does not refer to entrustment at all and it is thiswe have said in regard to S. 17 would apply herecannot accept the argument because, apart from the fact that the acquired properties have ceased to be evacuee properties, cl. (d) of R. 102 permits the managing officer or managing corporation to cancel allotment "for any other sufficient reason to be recorded in writing." The only effect of R. 102 is to permit cancellation of an allotment for reasons stated. That is all. In our opinion therefore, this rule does not help the appellants.15. Mr. Khanna had raised three other points but upon the view which we have taken as to the effect of Ss. 12 and 19 of the Act it is not necessary to consider them.