Case: Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate Vs. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate

point was raised that they had ceased to be workmen and were therefore outside the scope of the Act. This argument was repelled. In my opinion, there is no justification for treating such cases as authorities for the wider proposition that a valid industrial dispute can be raised by workmen about the employment or non-employment of someone else who does not belong and never belonged to their class or category. My view therefore is that the Act does not apply to cases of non-workmen, or officers, if they may be so called." Both these views as also other decisions of High Court and awards of Industrial Tribunals, were considered by the Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and the Chairman of the Tribunal (Mr. J. N. Majumdar) acknowledged that his earlier view was not correct and expressed his opinion, concurred in by all the other members of the Tribunal, at p. 210-"I am, therefore, of opinion that the expression any person has to be interpreted in terms of workman. The words any person cannot have, in my opinion, their widest amplitude, as that would create incongruity and repugnancy in the provisions of the Act. They are to be interpreted in a manner that persons, who would come within that expression, can at some stage or other, answer the description of workman as defined in the Act." 20. It is necessary to state here that earlier a contrary view had been taken by the Calcutta High Court in Birla Brothers, Ltd. v. Modak, ILR (1948) 2 Cal 209 (H), by Banerjee, J. in Dalhousie Jute Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak, 1951-1 Lab LJ 145 (Cal) (I), and by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in East India Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1952-1 Lab LJ 122 (Mad) (J). It is necessary to emphasise here two considerations which have generally weighed with some of the learned Judges in support of the view expressed by them: these two considerations are that (1) normally workmen will not raise a dispute in which they are not directly or substantially interested and (2) Government will not make a reference unless the dispute is a real or substantial one. We think that these two considerations instead of leading to a strictly grammatical or etymological interpretation of the expression "any person" occurring in the definition clause should lead, on the contrary, to an interpretation which, to use the words of Maxwell, is to be found in the subject or in the occasion on which the words are used and the object to be attained by the statute. We are aware that anybody may be a potential workman and the concept of "a potential workman" introduces an element of indefiniteness and uncertainty. We also agree that the expression "any person" is not co-extensive with any workman, potential or otherwise. We think, however, that the crucial test is one of community of interest and the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Whether such direct or substantial interest has been established in a particular case will depend on its facts and circumstances. 21. Two other later decisions have also been brought to our notice: Prahlad Rai Oil Mills v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 NUC (all) 2664 (K), in which Bhargava, J. expressed the view that the expression any person in the definition clause did not mean a workman and the decision in 55 Bom LR 125: (AIR 1953 Bom 325 ) (A), being the decision of Chagla, C. J., and Shah, J. from which we have already quoted some extracts. 22. An examination of the decisions referred to above undoubtedly discloses a divergence of opinion: two views have been expressed, one based on the ordinary meaning of the expression any person and the other based on the context, with reference to the subject of the enactment and the objects which the legislature has in view. For the reasons which we have already given, we think that the latter view is correct. 23.To summarise. Having regard to the scheme and objects of the Act, and its other provisions, the expression any person in S. 2 (k) of the Act must be read subject to such limitations and qualifications as arise from the context; the two crucial limitations are (1) the dispute must be a real dispute between the parties to the dispute (as indicated in the first two parts of the definition clause) so as to be capable of settlement or adjudication by one party to the dispute giving necessary relief to the other, and (2) the person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour (as the case may be) the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. In the absence of such interest the dispute cannot be said to be a real dispute between the parties. Where the workmen raise a dispute as against their employer, the person regarding whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the dispute is raised need not be, strictly speaking, a workman within the meaning of the Act but must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest. 24. In the case before us, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a workman. He belonged to the medical or technical staff - a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act. 25.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]At first sight, it does appear that there is considerable force in the argument advanced on behalf of the appellants. It is rightly pointed out that the definition clause does not contain any words of qualification or restriction in respect of the expression "any person" occurring in the third part, and if any limitations as to its scope are to be imposed, they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provisions of the Act9. A little careful consideration will show, however, that the expression "any person" occurring in the third part of the definition clause cannot mean anybody and everybody in this wide world. First of all, the subject matter of dispute must relate to (i) employment or non-employment or (ii) terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person; these necessarily import a limitation in the sense that a person in respect of whom the employer-employee relation never existed or can never possibly exist cannot be the subject matter of a dispute between employers and workmen. Secondly, the definition clause must be read in the context of the subject matter and scheme of the Act, and consistently with the objects and other provisions of the Act. It is well settled that"the words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety or language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained."We think that there is no real difficulty with regard to the first two limitations. They are, we think, implicit in the definition clause itself. It is obvious that a dispute between employers and employers, employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen must be a real dispute capable of settlement or adjudication by directing one of the parties to the dispute to give necessary relief to the other. It is also obvious that the parties to the dispute must be directly or substantially interested therein, so that if workmen raise a dispute, it must relate to the establishment or part of establishment in which they are employed. With regard to limitation (3) ,while we agree that the expression any person cannot be completely equated with any workman as defined in the Act, we think that the limitation formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is much too widely stated and is not quite correct. We recognise that if the expression any person means any workman within the meaning of the Act. then it is difficult to understand why the legislature instead of using the expression any workman used the much wider expression any person in the third part of the definition clauseThe expression any person in the definition clause means, in our opinion, a person in whose employment, or non-employment, or terms of employment, or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest - with whom they have under the scheme of the Act, a community of interest. Our reason for so holding is not merely that the Act makes a distinction between workmen and non-workmen, but because a dispute to be a real dispute must be one in which the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. Can it be said that workmen as a class are directly or substantially interested in the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of persons who belong to the supervisory staff and are, under the provisions of the Act, non-workmen on whom the Act has conferred no benefit, who cannot by themselves be parties to an industrial dispute and for whose representation the Act makes no particular provision? We venture to think that the answer must be in the negative. Limitation (4) formulated by learned counsel for the appellants is also too generally stated. We recognise that solidarity of labour or general interest of labour welfare may furnish, in some cases, the necessary nexus of direct or substantial interest in a dispute between employers and workmen, but the principle of solidarity of the labour movement or general welfare of labour must be based on or correlated to the principle of community of interest; the workmen can raise a dispute in respect of those persons only in the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of whom they have a direct or substantial interest. We think that Chagla, C. J., correctly put the crucial test when he said in 55 Bom LR 125 at p. 131: (AIR 1953 Bom 325   at p. 327( (A)In the case before us, Dr. K. P. Banerjee was not a workman. He belonged to the medical or technical staff - a different category altogether from workmen. The appellants had no direct, nor substantial interest in his employment or non-employment, and even assuming that he was a member of the same Trade Union, it cannot be said, on the tests laid down by us, that the dispute regarding his termination of service was an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2 (k) of the Act.