Case: National Highways Authority of India Vs. Sri P. Nagaraju @ Cheluvaiah &amp; Anr

than agriculture. Further while applying the guideline value fixed for Zunadu and City Greens to the acquired lands by discarding guideline value for the same survey number, necessary evidence to derive comparison between the lands so as to apply the value fixed in respect of another item of land in the same notification was necessary to be brought on record and was to be considered by the learned Arbitrator by assigning reasons. 38. In that background a perusal of the award passed by the learned Arbitrator would indicate that the only discussion worth noting, after narration of the facts is contained in para 8 of the award which reads as hereunder: 8. On perusal of the written statement and documents produced by the applicant as well as the written statement and documents produced by the respondents, it is seen that the land in dispute has been acquired for the purpose of expansion of National Highway-275 and while rendering the Award, the price of the land in question has been arrived at, by considering it as dry land. However, since the land in question, even prior to the issue of 3(A) Land Acquisition Notification, has been converted for residential purpose as per Official Memorandum No.BDS/ALN/SR/89/91-92 dated 20.06.1992 of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ramanagara Sub- Division, proper price has to be fixed by considering the lands in question as residential lands. This procedure has not been adopted. Further, by revising the market price, the Stamps and Registration Department has issued a Notification dated 28.03.2016 in respect of the lands belonging to City Greens situated in the Sy.Nos. coming under the said Mayaganahalli village wherein, the price of converted sites/sites of layouts approved by competent authority, has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- per Sq.Mtr. That their lands are more developed than the lands of Green City and has hence prayed for grant of compensation at a higher rate than the same. On perusal of the said Notification of the Stamps and Registration Department, it is seen that the price of the applicants converted lands situated in the survey numbers of Mayaganahalli village is fixed at Rs.8,000/- per Sq. Mtr. and the price of the converted lands of Green City in the same village has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- per Sq. Mtr. Section 26 of the said Act clearly defines the procedure for fixing the market price. Even then, it could be seen that the applicant has not been given the fair price. Therefore, it is opined that instead of the present price fixed for the lands in question, its price has to be fixed on par with the rates fixed by the Stamps and Registration Department on the basis of land conversion value in respect of the similarly situated lands of the same village and that compensation be awarded accordingly. Further, since the Award has been passed by fixing the value of the assets and structures existing on the lands in question as per the assessment of the concerned officers, the prayer of the applicant to enhance compensation for the same has been rejected and the following order is passed. 39. The above extracted portion of the award would demonstrate, prior to said finding being recorded, the learned Arbitrator has not referred to the manner in which the notification dated 28.03.2016 was brought on record and relied upon in the proceedings. The award, except for recording that the notification indicates the value fixed at Rs.8,000/- per sq.mtr in respect of converted land situate in the survey numbers of Mayaganahalli village and stating that the price of the converted lands of the Green City in the same village has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr has not referred to any evidence relating to the comparability with that land despite noting the guideline value of Rs.8000/- fixed for claimants land. The very fact that the layout is named as City Greens and Zunadu appears to be that the lands therein are situate in a self-contained and developed lay out with all civic amenities due to which it is separately indicated in the notification for specifically fixing the guideline value. Even if the lands belonging to the claimants is converted for residential purposes, value for the same was fixed in the notification by specifying the survey number. If the value as fixed under the guideline for City Greens and Zunadu was to be adopted as comparable land to the acquired land, necessary reasons ought to have been indicated in the award with reference to the evidence brought on record, with opportunity to NHAI to have their say on that aspect and reasons justifying such comparison should have been recorded. Further the manner in which the notification dated 28.03.2016 has been relied upon and the value fixed under the said notification in respect of two distinct layouts has been automatically made applicable to the lands in question despite noting the guideline value notified for the same survey number would indicate that the said exercise has been undertaken without sufficient opportunity to NHAI. Further, appropriate reasons have not been indicated by the learned Arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion to uniformly adopt the value of Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr fixed in respect of lands in a layout which was separately indicated in the notification. As stated above, if there is evidence brought on record in the manner known to law with opportunity to the opposite side, it certainly would be open for the learned Arbitrator to adopt the said value. However, from the pleading in the claim petition and from the portion extracted from the award which is the only basis for the ultimate order made by the learned Arbitrator, it would indicate that the NHAI did not have sufficient opportunity before the learned Arbitrator to controvert the material sought to be relied upon by the learned Arbitrator nor has the learned Arbitrator indicated sufficient reasons which to that extent would indicate patent illegality in the award passed by the learned Arbitrator being contrary to Section28(2) and 31(3) of Act, 1996.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. From the narration of the sequence made above it would be clear that the factual aspects involved in the instant case are to be considered in the background of the legal contentions urged. While doing so, what is also to be borne in mind is that these appeals arise out of the proceedings whereunder an award had been passed by the learned Arbitrator in arbitration proceedings. In that light, the limited scope available under Act, 1996 to assail an award as provided under Section 34 of the said Act is also to be kept in view even in these appeals. While doing so, what cannot also be lost sight of is the fact that the arbitration was not initiated based on an agreement entered into between the contracting parties under a contract but is under a statutory provision which provides for such arbitration in lieu of reference under the regime for acquisition of land for public purpose. One of the parties to such arbitration proceedings would also be a land loser and the adjudication in the arbitration proceedings is not based on any definite terms of the contract providing for mutual obligations determinable under the contract but for determination of just compensation in respect of land which is compulsorily acquired for a public purpose. Notwithstanding the same, the broad perspective relating to the limited grounds to challenge an award under Section 34 of Act, 1996 also is to be kept in perspective since the arbitration is governed by Act, 1996.15. On this aspect, it would be appropriate to take note of the decision rendered by this Court in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304  relied on by both sides, wherein it has been held as hereunder:51. We were also referred to an order in Sunita Mehra v. Union of India, in which this Court held:5. The only point agitated before us by the learned Solicitor General is that in para 23 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, it has been held that landowners would henceforth be entitled to solatium and interest as envisaged by the provisions of Sections 23 and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the ultimate paragraph of the impugned judgment it has, however, been mentioned that in respect of all acquisitions made under the National Highways Act, 1956, solatium and interest in terms similar to those contained in Sections 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 will have to be paid.6. The learned Solicitor General has pointed out that there is an apparent inconsistency in the judgment, which needs to be clarified. It has also been submitted by the learned Solicitor General that the order of the High Court should be clarified to mean that the issue of grant of interest and solatium should not be allowed to be reopened without any restriction or reference to time. The learned Solicitor General has particularly submitted that to understand the order of the High Court in any other manner would not only seriously burden the public exchequer but would also amount to overlooking the delay that may have occurred on the part of the landowner(s) in approaching the Court and may open floodgates for en masse litigation on the issue.7. We have considered the submissions advanced. In Gurpreet Singh v. Union of India , this Court, though in a different context, had restricted the operation of the judgment of this Court in Sunder v. Union of India and had granted the benefit of interest on solatium only in respect of pending proceedings. We are of the view that a similar course should be adopted in the present case also. Accordingly, it is directed that the award of solatium and interest on solatium should be made effective only to proceedings pending on the date of the High Court order in Golden Iron and Steel Forging v. Union of India i.e. 28-3-2008. Concluded cases should not be opened. As for future proceedings, the position would be covered by the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (came into force on 1-1-2014), which Act has been made applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956 by virtue of notification/order issued under the provisions of the 2013 Act.52. There is no doubt that the learned Solicitor General, in the aforesaid two orders, has conceded the issue raised in these cases. This assumes importance in view of the plea of Shri Divan that the impugned judgments should be set aside on the ground that when the arbitral awards did not provide for solatium or interest, no Section 34 petition having been filed by the landowners on this score, the Division Bench judgments that are impugned before us ought not to have allowed solatium and/or interest. Ordinarily, we would have acceded to this plea, but given the fact that the Government itself is of the view that solatium and interest should be granted even in cases that arise between 1997 and 2015, in the interest of justice we decline to interfere with such orders, given our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. We therefore declare that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act relating to solatium and interest contained in Sections 23(1-A) and (2) and interest payable in terms of Section 28 proviso will apply to acquisitions made under the National Highways Act. Consequently, the provision of Section 3-J is, to this extent, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, declared to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 9599 of 2019 is dismissed.17. The observations contained also in para 29, 30 and 31 in Tarsem Singh (supra) will make it more than evident that this Court was concerned about discrimination in determination of compensation under different enactments though in that case the issue was limited to solatium and interest. The said paras read as hereunder:-29. Both, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar and Nagpur Improvement Trust clinch the issue in favour of the Respondents, as has been correctly held by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Golden Iron and Steel Forging. First and foremost, it is important to note that, as has been seen hereinabove, the object of the 1997 Amendment was to speed up the process of acquiring lands for National Highways. This object has been achieved in the manner set out hereinabove. It will be noticed that the awarding of solatium and interest has nothing to do with achieving this object, as it is nobodys case that land acquisition for the purpose of national highways slows down as a result of award of solatium and interest. Thus, a classification made between different sets of landowners whose lands happen to be acquired for the purpose of National Highways and landowners whose lands are acquired for other public purposes has no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Amendment Act, i.e. speedy acquisition of lands for the purpose of National Highways. On this ground alone, the Amendment Act falls foul of Article 14.30. Even otherwise, in P. Vajravelu Mudaliar, despite the fact that the object of the Amendment Act was to acquire lands for housing schemes at a low price, yet the Amendment Act was struck down when it provided for solatium at the rate of 5% instead of 15%, that was provided in the Land Acquisition Act, the Court holding that whether adjacent lands of the same quality and value are acquired for a housing scheme or some other public purpose such as a hospital is a differentiation between two sets of landowners having no reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. More pertinently, another example is given – out of two adjacent plots belonging to the same individual one may be acquired under the principal Act for a particular public purpose and one acquired under the Amending Act for a housing scheme, which, when looked at from the point of view of the landowner, would be discriminatory, having no rational relation to the object sought to be achieved, which is compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes.31. Nagpur Improvement Trust has clearly held that ordinarily a classification based on public purpose is not permissible under Article 14 for the purpose of determining compensation. Also, in para 30, the Seven-Judge Bench unequivocally states that it is immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired, as, if the existence of these two Acts would enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another who is similarly situated, Article 14 would be infracted. In the facts of these cases, it is clear that from the point of view of the landowner it is immaterial that his land is acquired under the National Highways Act and not the Land Acquisition Act, as solatium cannot be denied on account of this fact alone.18. In that view of the matter, though Section 3G(7)(a) of the NH Act provides the parameters to be taken into consideration, it only provides the basic parameters to be taken note of, for determining the amount payable as compensation. While applying the said parameters for determination of compensation, since RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is also applicable as NH Act is contained in Fourth Schedule, the factors as provided under Section 26 and 28 RFCTLARR Act, 2013 including the seventh factor will also be applicable in appropriate cases for the determination of the market value as fair compensation for the acquired land. When land is acquired from a citizen, Articles 300A and 31A of the Constitution will have to be borne in mind since the deprivation of property should be with authority of law, after being duly compensated. Such law should provide for adequately compensating the land loser keeping in view the market value. Though each enactment may have a different procedure prescribed for the process of acquisition depending on the urgency, the method of determining the compensation cannot be different as the market value of the land and the hardship faced due to deprivation of the property would be the same irrespective of the Act under which it is acquired or the purpose for which it is acquired. In that light, if Section 28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is held not applicable in view of Section 3J of NH Act, the same will be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In that circumstance, the observation in Tarsem Singh (supra) that Section 3J of NH Act is unconstitutional to that extent though declared so while on the aspect of solatium and interest, it is held so on all aspects relating to determination of compensation. In any event, the extracted portion of the notification dated 28.08.2015 is explicit that the benefits available to the land owners under RFCTLARR Act is to be also available to similarly placed land owners whose lands are acquired under the 13 enactments specified in the Fourth Schedule, among which NH Act is one. Hence all aspects contained in Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act for determination of compensation will be applicable notwithstanding Section 3J and 3G(7)(a) of NH Act.22. The case in Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Ltd. (supra) relied on by the learned Additional Solicitor General is also relied by the learned counsel for claimants to contend regarding limited scope. This Court, in that context has referred to the requirement to be complied in the proceedings before the arbitrator, which if not complied will be ground of challenge under Section 34(2)(a)(iii). We deem it appropriate to note the relevant observation which read as hereunder:-51. Sections 18, 24(3) and 26 are important pointers to what is contained in the ground of challenge mentioned in Section 34(2)(a)(iii). Under Section 18, each party is to be given a full opportunity to present its case. Under Section 24(3), all statements, documents, or other information supplied by one party to the Arbitral Tribunal shall be communicated to the other party, and any expert report or document on which the Arbitral Tribunal relies in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties. Section 26 is an important pointer to the fact that when an experts report is relied upon by an Arbitral Tribunal, the said report, and all documents, goods, or other property in the possession of the expert, with which he was provided in order to prepare his report, must first be made available to any party who requests for these things. Secondly, once the report is arrived at, if requested, parties have to be given an opportunity to put questions to him and to present their own expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue.52. Under the rubric of a party being otherwise unable to present its case, the standard textbooks on the subject have stated that where materials are taken behind the back of the parties by the Tribunal, on which the parties have had no opportunity to comment, the ground under Section 34(2)(a)(iii) would be made out.Permissibility of interference is on specific grounds of (i) arbitrator not adopting judicial approach (ii) breach of principles of natural justice (iii) contravention of statute not linked to public policy or public interest, as being patent illegality under Section 34(2A) and (iv) most basic notions of justice.The decision in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (2022) 1 SCC 131  is relied upon to indicate that there should be minimal interference in arbitral awards, save, it suffers from patent illegality. What is patent illegality is delineated in para 29 which is as hereunder: -29. Patent illegality should be illegality which goes to the root of the matter. In other words, every error of law committed by the Arbitral Tribunal would not fall within the expression patent illegality. Likewise, erroneous application of law cannot be categorized as patent illegality. In addition, contravention of law not linked to public policy or public interest is beyond the scope of the expression patent illegality. What is prohibited is for Courts to reappreciate evidence to conclude that the award suffers from patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as Courts do not sit in appeal against the arbitral award. The permissible grounds for interference with a domestic award under Section34(2-A) on the ground of patent illegality is when the arbitrator takes a view which is not even a possible one, or interprets a clause in the contract in such a manner which no fair-minded or reasonable person would, or if the arbitrator commits an error of jurisdiction by wandering outside the contract and dealing with matters not allotted to them. An arbitral award stating no reasons for its findings would make itself susceptible to challenge on this account. The conclusions of the arbitrator which are based on no evidence or have been arrived at by ignoring vital evidence are perverse and can be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Also, consideration of documents which are not supplied to the other party is a facet of perversity falling within the expression patent illegality.23. Having taken note of the rival contentions and while examining the scope available under Section 34 of Act 1996 in the backdrop of the precedents, what is also to be kept in perspective is the decision referred to in the case of NHAI vs. Sayedabad Tea Company Ltd. (2020) 15 SCC 16. In the said case, this Court while examining the question as to whether the land loser can seek the appointment of an Arbitrator in terms of Section 11 of Act, 1996, it was noted that such power would not be available in view of the provisions contained in Section 3G(5) of NH Act since Arbitrator is to be appointed by the Central Government to discharge its functions as per the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Having taken note of the said decision, though it is seen that it was held so while considering the maintainability of petition under Section 11 of the Act, 1996 to exclude the right of the land loser to seek the appointment of an Arbitrator keeping in view the statutory provision in the NH Act, the larger perspective of such limited right to the land loser in the process of arbitration is also to be kept in view. Unlike the arbitration in a contractual matter where the parties from the very inception at the stage of entering into a contract would mutually agree to refer any future dispute to an arbitrator, at that very stage are aware that in the event of any dispute arising between the parties the contours of the right, remedy, and scope from the commencement of the arbitration up to the conclusion through the judicial process. The terms of arbitration and the rights and obligations will also be a part of the agreement and a reference to the same in the award will constitute sufficient reasons for sustaining the award in terms of Section 31(3) of Act, 1996. Whereas, in the arbitration proceedings relating to NH Act, the parties are not governed by an agreement to regulate the process of arbitration. However, in the process of determination of just and fair compensation, the provisions in Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013 will be the guiding factor. The requirement therein being adverted to, should be demonstrated in the award to satisfy that Section 28(2) and 31(3) of Act, 1996 is complied. Therefore, what is also to be kept in perspective while noticing the validity or otherwise of an award regarding which the non-furnishing of reasons is contended as patent illegality is the reason assigned for determining just compensation in terms thereof. The situation which may arise in cases when a lesser compensation is determined in the arbitration proceedings and the land loser is complaining of the award is also to be kept in perspective since the requirement of reasons to be given by the learned Arbitrator in cases for determination of market value and compensation should indicate reasons since the same will have to be arrived at on a comparative analysis for which the reasons should be recorded and Section 26 to 28 of RFCTLARR Act will be relevant. Neither the land loser nor the exchequer should suffer in the matter of just and fair compensation. Hence the reasons under Section 31(3) is to be expected in that manner, the absence of which will call for interference under Section 34 of Act, 1996.26. Under the scheme of the Act 1996 it would not be permissible to modify the award passed by the learned Arbitrator to enhance or reduce the compensation based on the material available on record in proceeding emanating from Section 34 of Act, 1996. The option would be to set aside the award and remand the matter. In this regard it would be apposite to take note of the observation in M. Hakeem (supra), as hereunder:-42. It can therefore be said that this question has now been settled finally by at least 3 decisions of this Court. Even otherwise, to state that the judicial trend appears to favour an interpretation that would read into Section 34 a power to modify, revise or vary the award would be to ignore the previous law contained in the 1940 Act; as also to ignore the fact that the 1996 Act was enacted based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 1985 which, as has been pointed out in Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, makes it clear that, given the limited judicial interference on extremely limited grounds not dealing with the merits of an award, the limited remedy under Section 34 is coterminous with the limited right, namely, either to set aside an award or remand the matter under the circumstances mentioned in Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1996.30. Be that as it may, in our opinion the mere provision as contemplated under Section 3G(5) of NH Act providing for either of the parties to assail the determination made by the SLAO by itself does not provide a better status to the award passed by the SLAO. Even the award passed by the SLAO under the provisions of NH Act would still continue to remain as an offer of compensation by the Acquiring Authority to the land loser and the materials relied on by the SLAO even if discussed in detail does not provide the status of a judicially considered order so as to interfere with the same only if error is pointed out. It is not necessary to critically examine the award made by SLAO before considering enhancement. Notwithstanding the documents relied upon by the SLAO it would still be open for the learned Arbitrator to rely upon any additional material that may be brought before the learned Arbitrator not necessarily to point out an error in the consideration made by SLAO but such material could be considered despite the consideration made by the SLAO if such material aids in deciding just and fair compensation. Though, as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General it is seen that in Tarsem Singh (supra) it is held that there is a regime change and the stage to offer an amount by way of compensation is removed, it only means that the process of award notice etc. from Section 9 to 15A, before possession under Section 16 of L.A. Act is removed, which only alters the procedure and enables immediate vesting of the land with the acquiring authority but does not take away the character of the SLAO award from being an offer of compensation. Hence, in the present case, though the SLAO has taken note of the guideline dated 07.11.2014 it would be open for the learned Arbitrator to take note of any other evidence that would be more relevant than the said guideline to re-determine the compensation in terms of the parameters under Sections 26 and 28 of RFCTLARR Act, 2013.On that aspect it is necessary for us to clarify at this stage itself that such observation as contained in M. Hakeem (supra) is not made with reference to any provision of the Act. In contrast, a reference to Section 26(1)(a) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 indicates that the statutory provision itself provides for the market value specified in the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 for the registration of sale deeds or agreement to sell, in the area where the land is situated to be adopted by the Collector for assessing and determining the market value of the acquired land. In view of the said provision, it is open for the SLAO as well as the learned Arbitrator to rely upon the guideline and if the value provided therein is higher than the value of the property indicated from the other documents, it would be open to place reliance on the guideline issued for the purpose of the registration under the Stamp Act to determine the market value to be tendered as compensation for acquisition.As already noted, Section 3G(7)(a) of NH Act provides for determination of the market value on the date of publication of the acquisition notification under Section 3A. In a normal circumstance, for the determination of the market value, the rate prevailing prior to the date of the notification shall be the basis more particularly when the determination is made based on sale exemplars, as otherwise there is a likelihood of manipulation with escalated price being dishonestly indicated in the subsequent transactions. While taking note of the documents relied on for the purpose of determination of the market value, the existence of appropriate documents in the facts of each case would also become relevant. In circumstances where a document which is proximal to the date of acquisition is not available, it would be open to rely on a document which is much prior in point of time and if the time gap is more, determination could be made by providing for reasonable escalation depending on the area wherein the acquired property is situate and nature of property. Similarly, in a circumstance where no document which is prior to the date of the acquisition notification is available and the exemplars are subsequent to the date of acquisition notification, the value therein could be noted and reasonable de-escalation be considered to determine the appropriate value. Needless to mention that no strait-jacket formula can be applicable to all cases with arithmetical precision in the matter of determination of compensation.33. In that backdrop, in the instant case it is no doubt true that the notification issued by the Department of Stamps and Registration on 07.11.2014 is prior to the acquisition notification dated 01.02.2016. It is also to be noted that there was a time gap of more than one year between the two. In a normal circumstance, even if the notification dated 07.11.2014 was taken into consideration it would be open for the learned Arbitrator to consider certain amount of escalation to determine the market value. The said process could have been adopted if there was no other document. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the SLAO in fact had relied on the said notification dated 07.11.2014 and determined the market value but had ignored the fact that the lands regarding which the market value was to be determined had been converted for purposes other than agriculture. The SLAO had therefore taken into consideration the registration value which had been fixed in respect of the agricultural property. In that light, firstly it would have been open for the learned Arbitrator to take note of the value fixed for the commercial/industrial lands under that notification itself and provide certain amount of escalation.34. Notwithstanding such option of providing escalation to the already existing guideline value being available to the learned Arbitrator, what cannot be lost sight in the instant case is that, as evident from the notification dated 28.03.2016 the process for redetermining the guideline value had commenced through the notification bearing No.CBC-25/2014-15 dated 14.09.2015 and proceedings of the committee were also held during 2015-2016 which ultimately led to the notification dated 28.03.2016. Further, though the preliminary notification for acquisition was issued on 01.02.2016, the final notification under Section 3D of NH Act was issued on 23.09.2016. During the intervening period the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016, the process for which had commenced through the notification dated 14.09.2015, was already published. Furthermore, when all these proceedings were in close proximity to the date of the preliminary notification for acquisition and the revision of the market value by the Department of Stamps and Registration itself was within a period of one year and 4 months from the earlier guideline value published on 07.11.2014, it would indicate that the escalation which was otherwise open for being worked out and applied by the learned Arbitrator on taking note of the notification dated 07.11.2014 was undertaken by the Department of Stamps and Registration and the benefit of considering such escalation was available to the learned Arbitrator by taking note of the guideline dated 28.03.2016, though technically published on a date subsequent to the preliminary notification dated 01.02.2016. In that view of the matter, in the present facts and circumstances, the reliance placed on the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 for reckoning the market value of the property acquired under the preliminary notification dated 01.02.2016, by itself cannot be accepted to be a patent illegality committed by the learned Arbitrator.35. It is also to be noted that though the notification is dated 01.02.2016 the award notice is dated 03.07.2017 by which time the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 was already in vogue.37. To consider this aspect of the matter what is necessary to be taken note is that the SLAO had determined the compensation by taking note of the market value assigned to agricultural property under the notification dated 07.11.2014. The claimants were before the learned Arbitrator in terms of Section 3G(5) of the NH Act, a copy of which is available at Annexure-P6 to the appeal papers. The grievance essentially put forth in the claim petition is that the preliminary notification is dated 01.02.2016 and the notice of award for fixing the amount of compensation for the acquired land has been issued on 03.07.2017. In that light, it was contended that the market value of the non-agricultural lands adjoining the Bengaluru Mysuru National Highway such as the one owned by the claimant has increased considerably after the acquisition of the schedule land and accordingly the Registration Department has revised the guideline value. However, there is no reference to any specific notification relating to the guideline value much less the notification dated 28.03.2016. Further, there is no other indication to the manner in which the notification dated 28.03.2016 was brought on record though the said notification is published in the gazette. Comparison with lands in Zunadu and City Greens is also not pleaded. Further, as pointed out by the learned Additional Solicitor General the land situate in Madhapura and Mayaganahalli have been notified at serial Nos. 519, 524 and 525 respectively with reference the same survey number as that of the acquired land. The land value for Zunadu and City Greens are notified separately at Serial Nos.250 and 529. In that circumstance not just to place reliance on the notification dated 28.03.2016 but also to apply the value notified for Zunadu and City Greens to the acquired lands, necessary pleading in claim petition and evidence with opportunity to NHAI to rebut the same should have been placed before the learned Arbitrator. Based on the same a consideration in that regard was required to be made by the learned Arbitrator to arrive at a conclusion with regard to the applicability of the guideline value fixed under notification dated 28.03.2016 for the lands that had been converted to purposes other than agriculture. Further while applying the guideline value fixed for Zunadu and City Greens to the acquired lands by discarding guideline value for the same survey number, necessary evidence to derive comparison between the lands so as to apply the value fixed in respect of another item of land in the same notification was necessary to be brought on record and was to be considered by the learned Arbitrator by assigning reasons.39. The above extracted portion of the award would demonstrate, prior to said finding being recorded, the learned Arbitrator has not referred to the manner in which the notification dated 28.03.2016 was brought on record and relied upon in the proceedings. The award, except for recording that the notification indicates the value fixed at Rs.8,000/- per sq.mtr in respect of converted land situate in the survey numbers of Mayaganahalli village and stating that the price of the converted lands of the Green City in the same village has been fixed at Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr has not referred to any evidence relating to the comparability with that land despite noting the guideline value of Rs.8000/- fixed for claimants land. The very fact that the layout is named as City Greens and Zunadu appears to be that the lands therein are situate in a self-contained and developed lay out with all civic amenities due to which it is separately indicated in the notification for specifically fixing the guideline value. Even if the lands belonging to the claimants is converted for residential purposes, value for the same was fixed in the notification by specifying the survey number. If the value as fixed under the guideline for City Greens and Zunadu was to be adopted as comparable land to the acquired land, necessary reasons ought to have been indicated in the award with reference to the evidence brought on record, with opportunity to NHAI to have their say on that aspect and reasons justifying such comparison should have been recorded. Further the manner in which the notification dated 28.03.2016 has been relied upon and the value fixed under the said notification in respect of two distinct layouts has been automatically made applicable to the lands in question despite noting the guideline value notified for the same survey number would indicate that the said exercise has been undertaken without sufficient opportunity to NHAI. Further, appropriate reasons have not been indicated by the learned Arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion to uniformly adopt the value of Rs.15,400/- per sq.mtr fixed in respect of lands in a layout which was separately indicated in the notification. As stated above, if there is evidence brought on record in the manner known to law with opportunity to the opposite side, it certainly would be open for the learned Arbitrator to adopt the said value. However, from the pleading in the claim petition and from the portion extracted from the award which is the only basis for the ultimate order made by the learned Arbitrator, it would indicate that the NHAI did not have sufficient opportunity before the learned Arbitrator to controvert the material sought to be relied upon by the learned Arbitrator nor has the learned Arbitrator indicated sufficient reasons which to that extent would indicate patent illegality in the award passed by the learned Arbitrator being contrary to Section28(2) and 31(3) of Act, 1996.46. Insofar as the learned Arbitrator having adopted the guideline issued in 2014, the same is prior to the date of the notification for acquisition and the aspects considered relating to date of notification in the earlier set of cases does not arise. Hence, it is justified. The value indicated at serial no.51 in the notification is for Kumbalagodu Industrial Area, but the value stated therein is for residential sites, the approval for which was obtained from the different authorities. Though reference is to Kumbalagodu Industrial Area, the value of the industrial plot has not been specified. It cannot also be assumed that the value indicated therein itself is for industrial site, since in the same entry in Serial No.51, the value of residential buildings is also indicated. Hence, in the absence of the SLAO undertaking the exercise for determining the market value of the industrial land which was acquired, the learned Arbitrator was required to do so.48. Firstly, when we are of the opinion that the learned Arbitrator has committed patent illegality in applying two different notifications in determining the market value, keeping in view the scope available under Section 34 of Act, 1996 it would not be open for this Court to substitute our view to that of the learned Arbitrator and modify the award. Further, the learned Additional Solicitor General sought to refer to Special Instruction No.6 in the notification of 2014 to arrive at the market value even if it is accepted that the value of industrial land is not indicated in the notification. These are aspects to which the learned Arbitrator is required to advert so as to arrive at the conclusion. In the circumstance where we have opined that the award passed by the learned Arbitrator suffers from patent illegality and appropriate consideration is necessary, the only course open is to set aside the award and allow the learned Arbitrator to reconsider the matter on that aspect.49. From the conclusion reached above, in both the set of cases it is evident that awards passed by the learned Arbitrator is to be set aside and the matters be remanded in terms of Section 34(4) of Act, 1996 so as to enable the learned Arbitrators to assign reasons to arrive at their conclusion. In this regard, it is made clear that we have approved the guideline value notification dated 28.03.2016 being reckoned for determining the market value. Hence, the claimants in any event would be entitled to determination of market value at the guideline value indicated vide notification dated 28.03.2016 for the respective properties in Madhapura, Mayaganahalli etc. as against what is awarded by SLAO if there is no other evidence indicating higher market value. The consideration to be made by the learned Arbitrator however is as to the material and evidence if any available to treat the acquired land as comparable to the lands situate in City Greens and Zunadu layout and award the compensation based on the guidance value indicated for the lands in the said layout if found comparable. The reason for not applying the guideline value indicated for the lands in the very survey number of the acquired lands is to be disclosed on such consideration. Needless to mention that any other sale transaction if higher than the guideline value can also be considered to arrive at just and fair compensation. Since in any event the claimants would be entitled to higher amount than what was awarded by SLAO, the part of the amount awarded by the learned Arbitrator which was deposited before this Court and disbursed to the claimants will be subject to adjustment based on the quantum of compensation that would ultimately be decided by the learned Arbitrator. In the matter arising out of SLP No.2503/2022 the applicability of the appropriate special instruction, if any, is to be considered.