Case: Krishna Ram Mahale (Dead), By His Lrs Vs. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao

and hence, the possession of the plaintiff even after the period of licence was not in any way unlawful or without authority of law 8. Mr. Tarkunde, learned counsel for defendant 3, the appellant herein, rightly did not go into the appreciation of the evidence either by the trial court or the High Court or the factual conclusions drawn by them. It was however, strongly urged by him that the period of licence had expired long back and the plaintiff was not entitled to the renewal of licence. It was submitted by him that in view of the licence having come to an end, the plaintiff had no right to remain in charge of the business or the premises where it was conducted and all that the plaintiff could ask for was damages for unlawful dispossession even on the footing of facts as found by the High Court. We find ourselves totally unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tarkunde. It is a well settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh ((1968) 2 SCR 203 , 208-210 : AIR 1968 SC 620 ). This Court in that judgment cited with approval the well known passage from the leading Privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindari Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy (51 IA 293, 299 : AIR 1924 PC 144 : 23 ALJ 76) where it has been observed (p. 208) "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." 9. The proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Rattan v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1977) 1 SCC 188 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 85 : (1977) 2 SCR 232 ). The Division Bench comprising of three learned Judges held that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. In the present case, we may point out that there was no question of the plaintiff entering upon the premises as a tresspasser at all, as she had entered into the possession of the restaurant business and the premises where it was conducted as a licensee and in due course of law. Thus, defendant 3 was not entitled to dispossess the plaintiff unlawfully and behind her back as has been done by him in the present case. It was pointed out by Mr. Tarkunde that some of the observations referred to above were in connection with a suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or analogous provisions in the earlier Specific Relief Act, 1877. To our mind, this makes no difference in this case as the suit has been filed only a few weeks of the plaintiff being unlawfully deprived of possession of the said business and the premises and much before the period of six months expired. In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by us, we do not propose to consider the question whether the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant 3 amounted to a licence or a sub-lease 10. Even apart from what we have observed above, we feel that in this case the conduct of defendant 3 is such that we should decline to entertain his appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. In the first place, he has unlawfully taken possession of the business and the premises thereof by collusion and behind the back of the plaintiff. He made every attempt to retrain this possession by every means, right or wrong. It is interesting to note that even after his appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, instead of complying with the decree or coming by way of a special leave immediately, in order to avoid compliance with the decree and to delay matters, he chose to file a suit, which can only be described as bogus, in the High Court being Suit No. 297 of 1974 for a declaration that the respondent herein (referred to by us "the plaintiff) who was a defendant in that suit had no right, title or interest in the said premises or the business as from May 1, 1965 and for a permanent injunction restraining her from executing the decree for possession obtained by her in the Bombay City Civil Court which was confirmed by the High Court. He took out a Notice of Motion for an interlocutory injunction in that suit which was dismissed by order dated April 23, 1974. He led evidence which has been totally disbelieved by both the Courts below. On a previous occasion when this appeal was taken up for hearing learned counsel for defendant 3, on instructions, made a statement that the plaintiff, who is the respondent before us, was dead. Without going into details as to how that statement came to be made, we can only say that, in any event instructions to make this statement seem to have been given recklessly and without any attempt to find out the truth thereof. The provisions of Article 136 are not intended to come to the assistance of such a party. In our opinion, this is certainly not an appeal in which any interference is called four under Article 136 of the Constitution

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. Even apart from what we have observed above, we feel that in this case the conduct of defendant 3 is such that we should decline to entertain his appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. In the first place, he has unlawfully taken possession of the business and the premises thereof by collusion and behind the back of the plaintiff. He made every attempt to retrain this possession by every means, right or wrong. It is interesting to note that even after his appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, instead of complying with the decree or coming by way of a special leave immediately, in order to avoid compliance with the decree and to delay matters, he chose to file a suit, which can only be described as bogus, in the High Court being Suit No. 297 of 1974 for a declaration that the respondent herein (referred to by us "the plaintiff) who was a defendant in that suit had no right, title or interest in the said premises or the business as from May 1, 1965 and for a permanent injunction restraining her from executing the decree for possession obtained by her in the Bombay City Civil Court which was confirmed by the High Court. He took out a Notice of Motion for an interlocutory injunction in that suit which was dismissed by order dated April 23, 1974. He led evidence which has been totally disbelieved by both the Courts below. On a previous occasion when this appeal was taken up for hearing learned counsel for defendant 3, on instructions, made a statement that the plaintiff, who is the respondent before us, was dead. Without going into details as to how that statement came to be made, we can only say that, in any event instructions to make this statement seem to have been given recklessly and without any attempt to find out the truth thereof. The provisions of Article 136 are not intended to come to the assistance of such a party. In our opinion, this is certainly not an appeal in which any interference is called four under Article 136 of the Constitution