Case: D. L. F. Housing Construction Private Limited Vs. Delhi Municipal Corporation and Others

had to be taken over on payment of a price determined on no-profit no-loss basis. (Reliance for this contention has been placed on Union of India v. Indo-Afghan Agencies ((1968) 2 SCR 366 : AIR 1968 SC 718 ) and Century Spinning Co. v. Municipal Council ((1970) 3 SCR 854 : (1970) 1 SCC 582 ).)(4) The obligation of the parties in this case were contractual and were governed by the agreements which were appendages to the sanctions. The sanction orders-cum-agreements did not create any fiduciary relationship between the promises and the promisee. There was no transfer, no divesting and no vesting in the obligation created by these agreements. There was only an agreed restriction in the matter of land use and this could not amount to the creation of a trust nor to an undertaking to transfer the land free of cost. Clause (6) of an agreement shows that there was no automatic vesting but that the transfer could be directed to be made on the payment of a price. This clause (6) is in the nature of an agreement to sell for a particular purpose at a concessional or at no-profit price.16. On the point that a contractual obligation is different from an obligation amounting to a trust, reference has been made to Chhatra Kumari v. Mohan Bikram (AIR 1931 PC 196 : 58 IA 279) and Rama Rao v. Venkataratnam (AIR 1947 PC 88 ).17. In any event in a trust there should be a settled, a trustee and a beneficiary. According to the High Court it could not be said as to who were the beneficiaries.(5) The impugned notice dated June 24, 1965 requiring the appellant to hand over free of cost the plots in question in N.D.S.E. I and II is invalid on the face of it, because -(a) Section 313(1)(b) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, on the basis of which the automatic vesting of these plots, free of cost, in the municipal corporation is claimed, does not provide for such vesting. Section 313(1)(b) is concerned primarily with "streets" and has no application whatever to "open sites" reserved for public utility services such as schools, hospitals, etc.;(b) The sanction of the layout plans of the N.D.S.E. I and II was accorded in 1956 under Act 53 of 1955, when the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 was not on the statute book.18. Mr. Rameshwar Dayal appearing for the municipal corporation, has at the outset raised an objection that none of the documents now relied upon by the appellant was produced in the High Court. He stoutly opposes the entertainment of these documents for the first time in appeal. These documents, the admission of which is objected to by Counsel, include an affidavit dated August 14, 1969 purporting to be from one R. K. Jain, Secretary to the coloniser company, and a copy of a letter dated April 24, 1956, purporting to be signed by one "G. L. Mittal for the Secretary of the Authority", conveying to the coloniser the sanction of the authority to the layout plan submitted by the appellants for New Delhi South Extension colony on the conditions contained in the draft agreement annexed thereto. These documents, particularly the sanction letter and the agreement annexed thereto, constitute the factual basis of contentions Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 canvassed by for the appellant. The municipal corporation disputes the authenticity of these documents.19. Thus in these proceeding under Article 226 the Court has been called upon to decide disputed questions of fact and law relating to the precise nature and extent of right, title and interest of the parties in the plots in question. Even the basic documentary evidence, such as the orders granting the sanctions, the conditions of the sanctions, and the agreements in which they are said to have been incorporated, were not produced before the pronouncement of judgment in the High Court. Even the questions of law relating to the validity and effect of Regulation 5 (3) could not be properly decided in the absence of proof or admission of such primary facts. The High Court also felt this difficulty in reaching the finding that a fiduciary relationship in the nature of a trust came into existence in regard to the user of these open sites. It conceded that this matter was being considered "in the abstract without reference to the facts of any case", and had to leave undetermined the exact nature of the trust that had come into being and the person or persons in whom the beneficial interest in these open sites was supposed to vest under such trust. Nevertheless, it concluded thatthe petitioners had by their own conduct and operation of law ceased to be the full and complete plots and held them only as trustees.This "conduct" of the petitioners according to the High Court consisted of the acts of making applications for sanction of the layout plans to the authority and the execution of the requisite agreements. But the evidence of those agreements and the terms and conditions of the sanctions were conspicuous by their absence from the record. Again in the absence of relevant material on the record, the high Court found it difficult to record a categorical finding as to whether the provisions of Regulation 5(3) (iv) were only optional and could be waived, or had in fact been waived by the authority while granting sanction of the layout plans in case of any of these six colonies in question.20. In our opinion, in a case where the basis facts are disputed, and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The right course for the High Court to follow was to dismiss the writ petition on this preliminary ground, without entering upon the merits of the case. In the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation, it was hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]19. Thus in these proceeding under Article 226 the Court has been called upon to decide disputed questions of fact and law relating to the precise nature and extent of right, title and interest of the parties in the plots in question. Even the basic documentary evidence, such as the orders granting the sanctions, the conditions of the sanctions, and the agreements in which they are said to have been incorporated, were not produced before the pronouncement of judgment in the High Court. Even the questions of law relating to the validity and effect of Regulation 5 (3) could not be properly decided in the absence of proof or admission of such primary facts. The High Court also felt this difficulty in reaching the finding that a fiduciary relationship in the nature of a trust came into existence in regard to the user of these open sites. It conceded that this matter was being considered "in the abstract without reference to the facts of any case", and had to leave undetermined the exact nature of the trust that had come into being and the person or persons in whom the beneficial interest in these open sites was supposed to vest under such trust. Nevertheless, it concluded thatthe petitioners had by their own conduct and operation of law ceased to be the full and complete plots and held them only as trustees.This "conduct" of the petitioners according to the High Court consisted of the acts of making applications for sanction of the layout plans to the authority and the execution of the requisite agreements. But the evidence of those agreements and the terms and conditions of the sanctions were conspicuous by their absence from the record. Again in the absence of relevant material on the record, the high Court found it difficult to record a categorical finding as to whether the provisions of Regulation 5(3) (iv) were only optional and could be waived, or had in fact been waived by the authority while granting sanction of the layout plans in case of any of these six colonies in question.20. In our opinion, in a case where the basis facts are disputed, and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The right course for the High Court to follow was to dismiss the writ petition on this preliminary ground, without entering upon the merits of the case. In the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation, it was hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved.