Case: Ajmer Singh Vs. State Of Haryana

and Ors., [(1982) 2 SCC 101] . In that case it was held, that, in view of commutation of death sentence of one of the accused, who was similarly placed as that of appellant, award of death sentence to appellant was unjustified and, hence, the death sentence of the appellant was stayed till the decision of the President on commutation of sentence. An important observation of this Court on the point need to be noticed at this stage: "if will be a sheer travesty of justice and the course of justice will be perverted, if for the very same offence, the petitioner has to swing and pay the extreme penalty of death whereas the death sentence imposed on his co-accused for the very same offence is commuted to one of life imprisonment and the life of the co-accused is shared." 19) In the case of Akhil Ali Jehangir Ali Sayyed v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 2 SCC 708] , this Court maintained that as the second accused was placed on the same situation as the appellant, Article 21 of the Constitution would not permit this court to deny the same benefit to the second accused. 20) The Court of Appeal Albert, Canada in R. v. Christie [2004 Carswell Alta 1224 Alberta Court of Appeal, 2004] discussed the meaning of the principle in connection with sentencing in criminal cases. The Court of Appeal stated: "40. Parity is a principle which must be taken into account in any sentence, and particularly where the offence was a joint venture. There will, of course, be cases where the circumstances of the co-accused are sufficiently different to warrant significantly different sentences, such as where one co-accused has a lengthy related criminal record or played a much greater role in the commission of the offence." Thus, expressing its view on parity in sentencing the Court observed: "43. What we must strive for is an approach to sentencing whereby sentences for similar offences committed by similar offenders in similar circumstances are understandable when viewed together, particularly in cases involving joint ventures." Also the observation of the Court of Appeal Alberta in the case of Wahby v The Queen, [(2004) WASCA 308 2004 WL 3061388] whereby, the Court quoted the explanation given in the case of Goddard v The Queen, [(1999) 21 WAR 541], is relevant for the discussion in present case: "In considering the application of the principle, all the circumstances of the case are to be taken into account; those concerned with the commission of the offence and those which are personal to the offender before the court and the co-offender. Where there are differences, as almost inevitably there will be, true parity will be produced by different sentences, each proportionate to the criminal culpability of each offender, bearing in mind, as is often said but is worth repeating, that sentencing is not and should not be a process involving a search for mathematical precision, but is an act of discretion informed by the proper application of sentencing principles to the particular case. Inevitably there will be a range of appropriately proportionate sentences which maybe passed for the offence before the court." 21) The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, Australia in the case of R v Hildebrandt [187 A Crim R 42 2008 WL 3856330; [2008] VSCA 142] observed: "Judicial expositions of the meaning of the parity principle are not entirely uniform. The term "the parity principle" is used in at least two senses in the relevant authorities. First, to express the recognition that like cases should be treated alike (itself an amanation of equal justice). Secondly, the phrase is used to describe the requirement to consider the "appropriate comparability" of co-offenders, and in that sense, comprehends the mirror propositions that like should be treated alike, and that disparate culpability or circumstances may mandate a different disposition." 22) In the case Postiglione v The Queen [(1997) 189 CLR 295;94 A Crim R 397] Dawson and Gaudron JJ stated: "The parity principle upon which the argument in this Court was mainly based is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them. In the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability or their different circumstances. If so, the notion of equal justice is not violated ...Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the different circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality." The Court, therefore, concluded the principle to mean: "......it the concept simply is that, when two or more co-offenders are to be sentenced, any significant disparity in their sentences should be capable of a rational explanation" 23) What can be inferred from the above decision is, that for applying the principle of parity both the accused must be involved in same crime and must be convicted in single trial, and consequently, a co-accused is one who is awarded punishment along with the other accused in the same proceedings. However, we are unable to apply the principle of parity to the present case as the record show that the accused Randhir Singh was convicted vide a separate trial arising out of a separately registered F.I.R. Merely because the accused Randhir Singh happened to be searched on 24.1.1996 before the same gazetted officer i.e. D.S.P., Pehowa, Shri Paramjit Singh Ahalawat, he cannot be said to be a co-accused in the present case. Further, the sentence of accused Randhir Singh was altered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court vide a separate judgment dated 3.12.2002 arising out of a separate appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 855-57 of 1999. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]23) What can be inferred from the above decision is, that for applying the principle of parity both the accused must be involved in same crime and must be convicted in single trial, and consequently, a co-accused is one who is awarded punishment along with the other accused in the same proceedings. However, we are unable to apply the principle of parity to the present case as the record show that the accused Randhir Singh was convicted vide a separate trial arising out of a separately registered F.I.R. Merely because the accused Randhir Singh happened to be searched on 24.1.1996 before the same gazetted officer i.e. D.S.P., Pehowa, Shri Paramjit Singh Ahalawat, he cannot be said to be a co-accused in the present case. Further, the sentence of accused Randhir Singh was altered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court vide a separate judgment dated 3.12.2002 arising out of a separate appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 855-57 of 1999. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention canvassed by learned counsel for the appellant.