Case: Nasiruddin &amp; Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary

regarded as an instrument by which tolls of any description are let. In other words, by awarding such contract to the appellants, the Corporation had let their right to the appellants to collect the fees from a class of persons and for carrying on particular activity in the city.17. The expression "Lease" under the Stamp Act has a wider meaning as compared to its original meaning contained in Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act (for short "the T.P. Act"). If "Lease" under Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act includes therein four specified category of documents set out in clauses (a) to (d), we do not find any such inclusion in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is for this reason, we are of the view that the definition of "Lease" for the purpose of Stamp Act is extensive in nature. It is also clear from the use of the expression "and includes also" in Section 2 (16) of the Stamp Act.18. So by fiction, "any instrument by which tolls of any description are let" is considered as "Lease" for the purpose of payment of stamp duty under the Stamp Act.19. Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author in his book "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" in 13th edition - at pages 179 and 180 has dealt with this subject under the heading "Definition sections or interpretation clause". In its sub-heading (a) "Restrictive and extensive definition", the author has explained as to where the words "mean", "include", "includes", and "means and includes" are used in any definition clause in the Act then how such definition should be interpreted. The following passage is apposite to quote."(a) Restrictive and extensive definitionsThe Legislature has power to define a word even artificially. So the definition of a word in the definition section may either be restrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of the same. When a word is defined to `mean such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive; whereas, where the word defined is declared to `include such and such, the definition is prima facie extensive. When by an amending Act, the word `includes was substituted for the word `means in a definition section, it was held that the intention was to make it more extensive. Further, a definition may be in the form of `means and includes, where again the definition is exhaustive, on the other hand, if a word is defined `to apply to and include, the definition is understood as extensive. These meanings of the expressions `means, `includes and `means and includes have been reiterated in Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma, 2011(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 820 : 2011(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 296 : (2011) 2 SCC 54. The use of word `any e.g. any building also connotes extension for `any is a word of very wide meaning and prima facie the use of it excludes limitation."20. In our opinion, the aforesaid rule of interpretation applies while interpreting the definition of Lease under Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act.21. As mentioned above, the Corporation in these cases awarded the contract to the appellants to recover the tolls (fees) from squatters, vendors, kiosks etc. and for parking the vehicles in specified places. The contract was, therefore, for recovery of tolls and created rights and liabilities in favour of contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be disputed that the expression "tolls of any description" in clause (c) would include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation is entitled to charge under its Bye-laws (41). A fortiori, the fees in question would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act.22. In our opinion, the contract in question also satisfied the definition of the expression "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act because it created a right and liability and lastly, it also satisfied the definition of expression "executed" and "execution" as defined in Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act because it contained the signature of contracting parties.23. Learned counsel for the appellants, however, placed reliance on the decision of this Court in New Bus-Stand Shop Owners Association v. Corporaton of Kozhikode & Anr. 2010(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 404 : 2010(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 15 : [2009 (10) SCC 455 ] and contended that in the light of the law laid down in the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association (supra), the contract in question has characteristics of a "license" but not of a "lease" and, therefore, the contract would attract a stamp duty payable on a License Deed under the Stamp Act.24. In our view, the law laid down in the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association (supra) is not applicable to the case at hand and is distinguishable on facts.25. In the case of New Bus-stand Shop Owners Association (supra), the Corporation of Kozhikode had let out their shops to several persons and executed agreement in their favour. The question, however, arose as to the true nature of the agreement, whether it is a "license agreement" or a "lease agreement". Their Lordships on construction of the terms of agreement held that the agreement was a license and accordingly chargeable to stamp duty as "License" under the Kerala Stamp Act.26. Such is not the case here. The case at hand relates to the right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned. It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and partakes the character of a "Lease".27. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the contract in question is a "Lease" as defined in Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to payment of stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act as "Lease". The conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge in Mohammad Ali v. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is, therefore, correct which we support with our reasoning given supra.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in these appeals. In our opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in the case of Mohammad Ali v. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is just and proper calling for no interference for the reasons given by us hereinbelow.In our considered opinion, reading of the contract in question would show that it was meant to collect tolls (fees) called "Tehbazari" in local parlance from squatters, venders, kiosks etc. and was for collecting parking fees. Such contract, in our view, is regarded as an instrument by which tolls of any description are let. In other words, by awarding such contract to the appellants, the Corporation had let their right to the appellants to collect the fees from a class of persons and for carrying on particular activity in the city.17. The expression "Lease" under the Stamp Act has a wider meaning as compared to its original meaning contained in Section 105 of Transfer of Property Act (for short "the T.P. Act"). If "Lease" under Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act includes therein four specified category of documents set out in clauses (a) to (d), we do not find any such inclusion in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is for this reason, we are of the view that the definition of "Lease" for the purpose of Stamp Act is extensive in nature. It is also clear from the use of the expression "and includes also" in Section 2 (16) of the Stamp Act.In our opinion, the aforesaid rule of interpretation applies while interpreting the definition of Lease under Section 2(16) of the Stamp Act.21. As mentioned above, the Corporation in these cases awarded the contract to the appellants to recover the tolls (fees) from squatters, vendors, kiosks etc. and for parking the vehicles in specified places. The contract was, therefore, for recovery of tolls and created rights and liabilities in favour of contracting parties qua each other. It cannot be disputed that the expression "tolls of any description" in clause (c) would include all kinds of levy, charges, fees etc. which the Corporation is entitled to charge under its(41). A fortiori, the fees in question would also fall under Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act.22. In our opinion, the contract in question also satisfied the definition of the expression "Instrument" as defined in Section 2(14) of the Stamp Act because it created a right and liability and lastly, it also satisfied the definition of expression "executed" and "execution" as defined in Section 2 (12) of the Stamp Act because it contained the signature of contracting parties.In our view, the law laid down in the case of NewShop Owners Association (supra) is not applicable to the case at hand and is distinguishable on facts.Such is not the case here. The case at hand relates to the right to collect the tolls let by the Corporation to the person concerned. It squarely attracts Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and partakes the character of a "Lease".27. In the light of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the contract in question is a "Lease" as defined in Section 2(16)(c) of the Stamp Act and is accordingly chargeable to payment of stamp duty as per the rates prescribed in Article 35 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act as "Lease". The conclusion arrived at by the Single Judge in Mohammad Ali v. Board of Revenue, U.P. (supra) is, therefore, correct which we support with our reasoning given supra.