Case: M/S. Maruti Udyog Ltd Vs. Ram Lal

liberal construction but the same cannot be extended beyond the statutory scheme. [See Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda, II (2004) SLT 827=(2004) 5 SCC 385 ]. 40. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the liability of the erstwhile company. It stands accepted that the appellant has no monetary liability as regard the amount of compensation payable to the workmen in view of Section 5 of the said Act.Non-Obstante Clause — Effect of: 41. The said Act contains a non-obstante clause. It is well-settled that when both statutes containing non-obstante clauses are special statutes, an endeavour should be made to give effect to both of them. In case of conflict, the latter shall prevail. 42. In Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. and Others, II (2001) SLT 81=(2001) 3 SCC 71 , it is stated: “9. It is clear that both these Acts are special Acts. This Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that in such an event it is the later Act which must prevail. The decisions cited in the above context are as follows : Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd.; Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal; Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank and Ram Narain v. Simla Banking and Industrial Co. Ltd. 10. We may notice that the Special Court had in another case dealt with a similar contention. In Bhoruka Steel Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. it had been contended that recovery proceedings under the Special Court Act should be stayed in view of the provisions of the 1985 Act. Rejecting this contention, the Special Court had come to the conclusion that the Special Court Act being a later enactment would prevail. The headnote which brings out succinctly the ratio of the said decision is as follows: “Where there are two special statutes which contain non-obstante clauses the later statute shall prevail. This is because at the time of enactment of the later statute, the Legislature was aware of the earlier legislation and its non-obstante clause. If the Legislature still confers the later enactment with a non-obstante clause it means that the Legislature wanted that enactment to prevail. If the Legislature does not want the later enactment to prevail then it could and would provide in the later enactment that the provisions of the earlier enactment would continue to apply.” [See also Engineering Kamgar Union v. Electro Steels Castings Ltd. and Another, III (2004) SLT 597=(2004) 6 SCC 36 ]. 43. The right of the workmen to obtain compensation in terms of Section 25FFF has not been taken away under the said Act. The liability to pay compensation in the case of closure would be upon the employer which in this case would be the erstwhile company. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, only a special machinery has been carved out for payment of dues of all persons including workmen in terms of the provisions contained in Chapter VI of the said Act. If a workman contends that his lawful dues have not been paid, his remedy is to approach the Commissioner of Payments constituted under the provisions of the said Act and not to proceed against the appellant herein, in view of Section 5 of the Act. Sympathy: 44. While construing a statute, ‘sympathy’ has no role to play. This Court cannot interpret the provisions of the said Act ignoring the binding decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court only by way of sympathy to the concerned workmen. 45. In A. Umarani v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies and Others, IV (2004) SLT 947=(2004) 7 SCC 112 , this Court rejected a similar contention upon noticing the following judgments: “In a case of this nature this Court should not even exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on misplaced sympathy. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T. Chandigarh and Others, I (2004) SLT 563=(2004) 2 SCC 130 , it is stated: ‘We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not pass an order, which would be in contravention of a statutory provision.’ As early as in 1911, Farewell L.J. in Lathamv. Richard Johnson and Nephew Ltd., 1911-13 AER reprint p. 117, observed: ‘We must be careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a dangerous Will O’ the Wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.’ Yet again recently in Ramakrishna Kamat and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., II (2003) SLT 189=JT 2003 (2) SC 88 , this Court rejected a similar plea for regularization of services stating: ‘...We repeatedly asked the learned Counsel for the appellants on what basis or foundation in law the appellants made their claim for regularization and under what rules their recruitment was made so as to govern their service conditions. They were not in a position to answer except saying that the appellants have been working for quite some time in various schools started pursuant to resolutions passed by Zilla Parishads in view of the Government orders and that their cases need to be considered sympathetically. It is clear from the order of the learned Single Judge and looking to the very directions given a very sympathetic view was taken. We do not find it either just or proper to show any further sympathy in the given facts and circumstances of the case. While being sympathetic to the persons who come before the Court the Courts cannot at the same time be unsympathetic to the large number of eligible persons waiting for a long time in a long queue seeking employment....’” Conclusion:

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]14. The basic fact of the matter, as noticed hereinbefore, is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that although the services of the three respondents were terminated by the company as a result of the closure of the factory, the formal retrenchment came into being in terms of the order of the learned Company Judge. It is furthermore not in dispute that a settlement had been arrived at by and between the Official Liquidator and the workmen as regard the amount of compensation payable to the workmen of the said company.15. The closure of the undertakings of the company, thus, stands admitted. It also finds mention in the Award passed by the Labour Court. In the aforementioned factual backdrop, we may notice the salient feature of the said Act.The aforementioned provisions clearly carve out a distinction that although identical amount of compensation would be required to be paid in all situations but the consequence following retrenchment under Section 25F of the 1947 Act would not extend further so as to envisage the benefit conferred upon a workman in a case falling under Sections 25FF or 25FFF thereof. The distinction is obvious inasmuch as whereas in the case of retrenchment simpliciter a person looses his job as he became surplus and, thus, in the case of revival of chance of employment, is given the preference in case new persons are proposed to be employed by the said undertaking; but in a case of transfer or closure of the undertaking the workman concerned is entitled to receive compensation only. It does not postulate a situation where a workman despite having received the amount of compensation would again have to be offered a job by a person reviving the industry.We have noticed hereinbefore that the consequences other than payment of compensation envisaged in Section 25F of the Act do not flow in case of transfer or closure of the undertaking. Section 25H of the 1947 Act cannot, thus, be invoked in favour of the respondents in view of the fact that they were not in the employment of the company on the appointed day i.e. on 13.10.1980.34. The submission of Mr. Das to the effect that the Parliament having used the words ‘everyin Section 25FFF, which would include dismissed workmen in view of its definition contained in Section 2(s) of the 1947 Act, should be widely interpreted so as to hold that even those workmen who had received compensation would be entitled to the benefit of Section 25H of the 1947 Act, cannot be accepted. Such a construction is not possible keeping in view the statutory scheme of the 1947 Act. Section 25F vis-a-vis Section 25B read with Section 2(oo) of the 1947 Act contemplates a situation where a workman is retrenched from services who had worked for a period of not less than one year on the one hand and those workmen who are covered by Section 25FF and Section 25FFF on the other keeping in view the fact that whereas in the case of the former, a retrenchment takes place, in the latter it does not. The Parliament amended the provisions of the 1947 Act by inserting Section 25FF and Section 25FFF therein by reason of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment Act), 1957 with effect from 28.11.1956, as it was found that having regard to the helpless condition to which workman would be thrown if his services are terminated without payment of compensation and presumably on the ground that if a reasonable compensation is awarded, he may be able to find out an alternative employment within a reasonable time. In the case of closure of an industrial undertaking the Act contemplates payment of compensation alone.The interpretation of Section 25J of the 1947 Act as propounded by Mr. Das also cannot be accepted inasmuch as in terms thereof only the provisions of the said Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law including the Standing Orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, but it will have no application in a case where something different is envisaged in terms of the statutory scheme. A beneficial statute, as is well known, may receive liberal construction but the same cannot be extended beyond the statutory scheme.In the instant case, we are not concerned with the liability of the erstwhile company. It stands accepted that the appellant has no monetary liability as regard the amount of compensation payable to the workmen in view of Section 5 of the said Act.