Case: Commissioner of Income Tax, Poona Vs. M/s. Manna Ramji &amp; Company

of a business" in respect of a business carried on by him. As the assessee had not carried on any business at all the compensation received by the assessee was held to be not profit of business. This case, in our opinion cannot be of much help to the respondent because in the present case, as observed earlier, the Tribunal has expressly found that the respondent was carrying on the business during the relevant years. 9. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Hajarnavis upon the decision of House of Lords in the case of the Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. Ltd. , (1922) 12 Tax Cas 427 (supra). The assessee in that case was carrying on business for the manufacturing of fireclay goods and had taken in connection with that business a fireclay field on lease, over part of which ran the lines of the Caledonian Railway. The Railway administration prohibited the assessee from excavating the field within a certain distance of the rails and paid compensation therefor in accordance with the provisions of a statute. It was held by the House of Lords that this was a capital receipt as the compensation was really the price paid "for sterlizing the assets from which otherwise profits might have been obtained". It would follow from the above that the fireclay field was accepted to be a capital asset which was to be utilized for the carrying on of the business of manufacturing fireclay goods. When the assessee was prohibited from exploiting the field, it was considered to be an injury inflicted on his capital asset. The case of Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. Ltd., (1922) 12 Tax Cas 427 (supra) was cited before this Court in Commr. of Income Tax, Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji, 35 ITR 148 = (AIR 1959 SC 291 ) and in Senairam Doongarmall, 42 ITR 392 = (AIR 1961 SC 1579 ) (supra) and was distinguished on the ground that it related to the sterlization and distruction of a capital asset. In the present case there has been no sterilization and destruction of the capital asset of the respondent firm. As such, the case of The Glenboig Union Fireclay Co. Ltd. cannot afford much assistance in the present case. 10. Reference has also been made by Mr. Hajarnavis to the cases of S. R. Y. Sivaram Prasad Bahadur v. Commr. of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh, 82 ITR 527 = (AIR 1972 SC 260 ) and Commr. of Income Tax, Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh v. Prabhu Dayal, 82 ITR 804 = (AIR 1972 SC 386 ). Sivaram Prasad Bahadurs case related to interim payments made under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948; of a former holder of an estate which had been abolished during the period between the taking over of the estate and the final determination and deposit of compensation under that Act. It was held to be a capital receipt and not liable to tax. Prabhu Dayals case related to an assessee who had discovered by chance the existence of Kankar in the Jind State. The assessee brought about an agreement between the State and one Shanti Prasad Jain for the acquisition of sole and exclusive monopoly rights for manufacturing cement. Shanti Prasad Jain transferred his rights under the agreement to a company of which the assessee was one of the promoters. For the services rendered by him, the company agreed to pay the assessee a commission of 1 per cent. on the yearly net profits earned by the company. The agreement was acted upon till 1950 whereafter the company did not pay the commission to the assessee. The assessee filed a suit which ended in a compromise. In terms of the compromise, the assessee was paid certain amounts as commission for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953 further sum of Rupees 70,000 by way of compensation for the determination of the agreement between him and the company as from January 1, 1954. Question which arose for determination was whether the sum of Rupees 70,000 was capital receipt in the hand of the assessee. The assessee, it was found, had not engaged either in the business of discovering kankar or any minerals or in the business of bringing about agreement between the parties. There was indeed, no evidence that he was a business man. It was held that none of the activities of the assessee could be considered to be business activity. The compromise, in the opinion of this Court, destroyed an income yielding asset of the assessee and in its place he was given Rupees 70,000 as compensation. The sum of Rupees 70,000 was accordingly held to be capital receipt. It is manifest from the narration of the facts of Sivaram Prasad Bahadur and Prabhu Dayals case that there is no similarity between those cases and the present case. As such, these two decisions cannot be of any avail to the respondent. 11.It may also be mentioned that Mr. Hajarnavis has assailed the findings of fact of the Tribunal. In this respect we are of the view that the Tribunal is the final fact finding authority. It is for the Tribunal to find facts and it is for the High Court and this Court to lay down the law applicable to the facts found. Neither the High Court nor this Court has jurisdiction to go behind or to question the statement of facts made by the Tribunal. The statement of case is binding on the parties and they are not entitled to go behind the facts of the Tribunal in the statement. When the question referred to the Hitgh Court speaks of "on the facts and circumstances of the case", it means on the facts and circumstances found by the Tribunal and not on the facts and circumstances as may be found by the High Court (see Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 82 ITR 547 = (AIR 1972 SC 2315 ).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]10. Reference has also been made by Mr. Hajarnavis to the cases of S. R. Y. Sivaram Prasad Bahadur v. Commr. of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh, 82 ITR 527   = (AIR 1972 SC 260  ) and Commr. of Income Tax, Punjab, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh v. Prabhu Dayal, 82 ITR 804   = (AIR 1972 SC 386  ). Sivaram Prasad Bahadurs case related to interim payments made under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948; of a former holder of an estate which had been abolished during the period between the taking over of the estate and the final determination and deposit of compensation under that Act. It was held to be a capital receipt and not liable to tax. Prabhu Dayals case related to an assessee who had discovered by chance the existence of Kankar in the Jind State. The assessee brought about an agreement between the State and one Shanti Prasad Jain for the acquisition of sole and exclusive monopoly rights for manufacturing cement. Shanti Prasad Jain transferred his rights under the agreement to a company of which the assessee was one of the promoters. For the services rendered by him, the company agreed to pay the assessee a commission of 1 per cent. on the yearly net profits earned by the company. The agreement was acted upon till 1950 whereafter the company did not pay the commission to the assessee. The assessee filed a suit which ended in a compromise. In terms of the compromise, the assessee was paid certain amounts as commission for the years 1951, 1952 and 1953   further sum of Rupees 70,000 by way of compensation for the determination of the agreement between him and the company as from January 1, 1954. Question which arose for determination was whether the sum of Rupees 70,000 was capital receipt in the hand of the assessee. The assessee, it was found, had not engaged either in the business of discovering kankar or any minerals or in the business of bringing about agreement between the parties. There was indeed, no evidence that he was a business man. It was held that none of the activities of the assessee could be considered to be business activity. The compromise, in the opinion of this Court, destroyed an income yielding asset of the assessee and in its place he was given Rupees 70,000 as compensation. The sum of Rupees 70,000 was accordingly held to be capital receipt. It is manifest from the narration of the facts of Sivaram Prasad Bahadur and Prabhu Dayals case that there is no similarity between those cases and the present case. As such, these two decisions cannot be of any avail to the respondent11.It may also be mentioned that Mr. Hajarnavis has assailed the findings of fact of the Tribunal. In this respect we are of the view that the Tribunal is the final fact finding authority. It is for the Tribunal to find facts and it is for the High Court and this Court to lay down the law applicable to the facts found. Neither the High Court nor this Court has jurisdiction to go behind or to question the statement of facts made by the Tribunal. The statement of case is binding on the parties and they are not entitled to go behind the facts of the Tribunal in the statement. When the question referred to the Hitgh Court speaks of "on the facts and circumstances of the case", it means on the facts and circumstances found by the Tribunal and not on the facts and circumstances as may be found by the High Court (see Karnani Properties Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 82 ITR 547   = (AIR 1972 SC 2315  ).