Case: Cumbum Roadways (P) Ltd Vs. Somu Transport (P) Ltd. And Others

then contends that even so the Appellate Tribunal should have been asked to consider the cases of the appellant and the respondent only on remand and the Appeal Court was not right in ordering the Appellate Tribunal to consider all the appeals afresh. It is true that generally the Appellate Tribunal deals with all appeals relating to one route by one order. It is also true that before the decision of this Court the Appellate Tribunals were generally influenced by the Government Order in question. There is therefore some force in the observation of the Appeal Court that where the disposal of appeals has been found to have departed from known principles of judicial procedure all the appeals disposed of by one order should be revived. But there is one serious difficulty in accepting this view of the Appeal Court. Even though all the appeals with respect to one route may have been disposed of by a single appellate order in form, in reality the appellate order consists of as many orders as there are appeals disposed of thereby. 6. In this very case there were seven appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and the order says that the appeal of the appellant alone was allowed while the other appeals were dismissed. Now if none of the parties concerned in the seven appeals had come to the High Court in writ proceedings within a reasonable time, the order of the Appellate Tribunal would have become final, even though it might have been influenced by the Government Order in question. Therefore there seems to be no reason why when only one party brought the matter before the High Court by way of writ proceedings against another party, and the appellants in the other six appeals were content with the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court should interfere in favour of those persons also who had not thought fit to challenge the order of the Appellate Tribunal. On principle therefore it does not appear right that the High Court should set aside orders in appeal passed by the Appellate Tribunal when the parties to those appeals do not bring up the matter before the High Court, simply because as a matter of convenience the Appellate Tribunal deals with all the appeals relating to one route by a consolidated order. Therefore, we are of opinion that the remand should only be confined to those parties which came to the High Court and not extend to others, as the High Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal either in favour of or against the parties which have not come to it. In the circumstances the order of the Appeal Court will have to be modified and the remand confined to a reconsideration of the appeal of the present appellant alone as against the claims of the respondent, and the Appellate Tribunal should decide between these two only who should be granted the permit for the route in question. 7. Turning now to appeal No. 907, we find that the permit was granted by the Transport Authority to respondent No. 1 out of 32 applicants. Ten of the applicants appealed before the Appellate Tribunal. Of these, the appeal of the present appellant was allowed and the order of the Transport Authority granting the permit to the respondent was set aside and the permit was granted to the appellant instead. The respondent filed a writ petition before the High Court against the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The learned Single Judge quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal and remanded the matter for disposal of the appeal in question afresh. This order of the learned Single Judge was taken in appeal by the present appellant and the appeal was heard by a Full Bench. It appears that a new ground was urged before the Appellate Tribunal with respect to the respondent being a benamidar of Aruppukottai Sri Jaya Vilas (P) Limited, and that was taken into consideration by the Appellate Tribunal. The Appeal Court set aside the view of the learned Single Judge with respect to this. But it remitted the matter to the Appellate Tribunal for fresh disposal in view of the decision of this Court in Rajagopala Naidus case. It is not clear whether the Appeal Court intended by its order that all the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal should be revived and re-heard; but this is how apparently the order has been interpreted. In view of our decision in C. A. 363 we order that when the matter is re-heard by the Appellate Tribunal, it shall confine itself to the case of the appellant and respondent No. 1 before us and not consider the cases of other appellants before it who had not gone to the High Court against the Appellate Tribunals order. We however express no opinion on the new ground which was raised before the Appellate Tribunal as to the question of benami and that matter may have to be considered after the fresh decision of the Appellate Tribunal. 8. We now come to appeal No. 150. It appears that there were two writ petitions before the High Court. They grave rise to two appeals. The appeal before us is only from one of the appeals, in which the present appellant was the appellant and the present respondent No. 1 was respondent No. 1. The appeals failed before the Appeal Court in view of the decision of this Court in Rajagopala Naidus case, 1964-7 SCR 1 : (AIR 1964 SC 1573 ).The only point raised before us is whether the order of the High Court reviving other appeals before the Appellate Tribunal besides the two between the parties which went to the High Court is correct. In view of our decision in appeal No. 363 the reconsideration before the Appellate Tribunal will only be confined to the parties which went to the High Court in writ proceedings and the respondents therein. 9.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]was plainly influenced by the Government Order when it dealt with the appeals before it and this cannot be said to be a case where the decision of the Appellate Tribunal was not influenced by the Government Order in question. A perusal of the order of the Appellate Tribunal shows that it considered the various aspects which were mentioned in the Government Order in question. It had even referred in some of the appeals to the marks obtained by various operators. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the Appellate Tribunal was not influenced by the Government Order in question. We also see no force in the contention that as the respondent had relied on the Government Order it was not open to it to urge in the High Court that the Government Order was bad. Before the decision of this Court, referred to above, the Government Order had always been relied upon by applicants for permits. That is no reason for holding that the respondent was barred from raising the question that the Government Order was bade after the decision of this CourtIt is true that in Rajagopala Naidus case, 1964-7 SCR 1 : (AIR 1964 SC 1573 ), this Court had ordered that the matter be remanded to the Transport Authority and not to the Appellate Tribunal. That however does not mean that in every case where there has to be a remand it must be to the original authority which has the power to grant the permit. As the Appeal Court has pointed out there may be serious public inconvenience specially in the matter of new routes if the order of the Transport Authority is also set aside with the result that such new routes would be without any transport facility. It is therefore always a question to be decided in each case whether the remand should be to the Appellate Tribunal or the Transport Authority. We agree with the Appeal Court that in most cases it would be proper if the remand is made to the Appellate Tribunal to consider the appeals before it without being influenced by the Government Order in questionThere is therefore some force in the observation of the Appeal Court that where the disposal of appeals has been found to have departed from known principles of judicial procedure all the appeals disposed of by one order should be revived. But there is one serious difficulty in accepting this view of the Appeal Court. Even though all the appeals with respect to one route may have been disposed of by a single appellate order in form, in reality the appellate order consists of as many orders as there are appeals disposed of thereby.In this very case there were seven appeals before the Appellate Tribunal and the order says that the appeal of the appellant alone was allowed while the other appeals were dismissed. Now if none of the parties concerned in the seven appeals had come to the High Court in writ proceedings within a reasonable time, the order of the Appellate Tribunal would have become final, even though it might have been influenced by the Government Order in question. Therefore there seems to be no reason why when only one party brought the matter before the High Court by way of writ proceedings against another party, and the appellants in the other six appeals were content with the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal, the High Court should interfere in favour of those persons also who had not thought fit to challenge the order of the Appellate Tribunal. On principle therefore it does not appear right that the High Court should set aside orders in appeal passed by the Appellate Tribunal when the parties to those appeals do not bring up the matter before the High Court, simply because as a matter of convenience the Appellate Tribunal deals with all the appeals relating to one route by a consolidated order. Therefore, we are of opinion that the remand should only be confined to those parties which came to the High Court and not extend to others, as the High Court would have no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Appellate Tribunal either in favour of or against the parties which have not come to it. In the circumstances the order of the Appeal Court will have to be modified and the remand confined to a reconsideration of the appeal of the present appellant alone as against the claims of the respondent, and the Appellate Tribunal should decide between these two only who should be granted the permit for the route in questionIt is not clear whether the Appeal Court intended by its order that all the appeals before the Appellate Tribunal should be revived and re-heard; but this is how apparently the order has been interpreted. In view of our decision in C. A. 363 we order that when the matter is re-heard by the Appellate Tribunal, it shall confine itself to the case of the appellant and respondent No. 1 before us and not consider the cases of other appellants before it who had not gone to the High Court against the Appellate Tribunals order. We however express no opinion on the new ground which was raised before the Appellate Tribunal as to the question of benami and that matter may have to be considered after the fresh decision of the Appellate TribunalWe now come to appeal No. 150. It appears that there were two writ petitions before the High Court. They grave rise to two appeals. The appeal before us is only from one of the appeals, in which the present appellant was the appellant and the present respondent No. 1 was respondent No. 1. The appeals failed before the Appeal Court in view of the decision of this Court in Rajagopala Naidus case, 1964-7 SCR 1 : (AIR 1964 SC 1573 ).The only point raised before us iswhether the order of the High Court reviving other appeals before the Appellate Tribunal besides the two between the parties which went to the High Court is correct.In view of our decision in appeal No. 363 the reconsideration before the Appellate Tribunal will only be confined to the parties which went to the High Court in writ proceedings and the respondents therein.