Case: Aluru Kondayya And Ors Vs. Singaraju Rama Rao And Ors

proceeding it becomes necessary to determine whether an inam village or a separated part of an inam village was or was not an estate within the meaning of this Act as it stood before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is shown, that such village or part was an estate. The presumption under S. 23 in terms applies only to cases in which the question (arises?) whether an inam village was an estate before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936. Under the Act, before it was amended in 1936, a grant of a village could be deemed a grant of an estate where only melvaram was granted to the inamdar and not where both the melvaram and the kudivaram were granted. By enacting S. 23 the Legislature intended to declare that in determining whether under a grant of an inam village both varams were granted or only the melvaram was granted, it shall be presumed, until the contrary was shown, that such village or part thereof was an estate that is, only the melvaram was granted. 34. Under the Act before its amendment, one of the conditions of the applicability of S. 3 (2) (d) was that the grant in favour of the inamdar was only of the melvaram, and that it did not include the kudivaram, and the Legislature by S. 23 as amended provided that in a dispute arising between the landlord and tenant whether an inam village was or was not an estate, it was to be presumed that it was only of the melvaram. Enactment of this section was apparently found desirable because of certain decisions of the Judicial Committee. In Suryanarayana v. Patanna, (1918) 45 Ind App 209: (AIR 1918 PC 169), and Upadrashta Venkata Sastrulu v. Divi Seetharamudu, (1919) 46 Ind App 123: (AIR 1919 PC 111), the Judicial Committee expressed the view that where there was no evidence of the terms of an ancient grant, there was no presumption that it was of melvaram alone. The Madras High Court in Muthu Goudan v. Perumal Iyen, (1921) ILR 44 Mad 588: (AIR 1921 Mad 145 (FB), held that the ground on which the decisions of the Judicial Committee proceeded, though it was not necessary for the purpose of those cases to so decide, a presumption that the grant was of both the varams was deducible. The Judicial Committee overruled this decision in Chidambara Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhigal v. Veerma Reddi, (1922) 49 Ind App 286: (AIR 1922 PC 292), and held that in each case the question was one of fact to be determined on the evidence. The legislature then intervened and enacted the presumption applicable only to cases arising under the unamended Act. Undoubtedly in cases arising under amended Act, the conditions on which the presumption will arise are prescribed in the explanation (1). The language used by the Legislature in the amended S. 23 clearly shows that the section was not intended to deal with cases arising under the Madras Estates Land Act as amended by Act 18 of 1936. Any reference in S. 23 to a presumption in respect of cases arising after Cl. (d) was recast by Act 18 of 1936 would have been wholly out of place. There were two presumptions which applied to different situation. In cases which arose before the Amending Act of 1936 the presumption under S. 23 applied: in cases which arose since the amendment of 1936 the presumption prescribed by the Explanation (1) applied. This is so, because the Explanation though enacted by Act 2 of 1945 has been brought into force since the date on which the amending Act of 1936 became operative. 35. In our view the following passage from the decision of the Madras High Court in Mantravadi Bhavanaryana v. Merugu Venkatadu, ILR (19540 Mad 116. (AIR 1954 Mad 415 (FB)), correctly interprets S. 3 (2) (d): It is now settled law that by reason of the amendment made in 1945, which added an explanation to Section 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act and numbered it as explanation1, a grant constitutes an estate if it is expressed to be a named village irrespective of the fact that some of the lands in the village had already been granted on inam or service grants, or were reserved for communal purposes. 36. We do not deem it necessary to decide whether the suit for a mere declaration that the tenants were not occupancy tenants at the instance of the shrotriemdars, after determining the tenancy of some of the tenants was maintainable. The High Court has dismissed the suit against defendants 1 to 10 who were served with notices to quit, but against whom the shortriemdars did not claim a decree for possession. There is no appeal by the shortriemdars before us against defendants 1 to 10, and in any event on the view taken by us, the suit of the shrotriemdars must fail in its entirety. 37. In Appeal No. 342 of 1961 the decision recorded by us on the principal question does not put an end to the litigation. The dispute arose between two rival claimants to the rights of occupancy in a piece of land. The respondent in this appeal claims that he is a transferee of the original tenant, and the appellant claims to have acquired the rights of occupancy from the shrotriemdar. In suit No. 93 of 1947, four substantive issues were raised, and the issues are discussed in paragraphs 106 to 120 of the judgment of the Trial Judge. The High Court did not separately deal with those issues, but decided Appeal No.789 of 1950 on the review of the law which it declared in the principal appeal. We have disagreed with the High Court for reasons already set out and the other issues which have not been tried by the High Court have now to be tried. 38.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]18. But long possession fixity of rent, assertion of title in formal deeds may not necessarily justify an inference of permanent occupancy rights. Again the mere fact that the village was treated as one unit for the purpose of revenue administration does not justify any positive inference and the fact that five separate sanads were issued in respect of the minor inams without any evidence to prove the date and the terms of the grant leaves the matter on doubt. Some of these circumstances may prima facie support the inamdars and the other the tenants but on a careful review of all those circumstances, we are unable to disagree with the opinion of the High Court that the grant was not proved to be of a whole villageA large majority of the inams are ancient and the records bearing on the commencement, extent and nature of the grant would invariably be in the possession of the inamdars. To expect that tenants who are generally illiterate, and who came to occupy the lands not infrequently many years after the original grant, would be able to lead evidence on matters principally within the knowledge of the inamdars, and information whereof the inamdars would be interested in withholding, would be to attribute to the legislature gross ignorance of local conditions. In terms the presumption arises on proof that the grant is an inam expressed to be of a named village, and it arises even if it appears that there have been other minor inams granted for service or other tenure or have been reserved for communal purposes. The non-obstante clause in the Explanation, in our judgment, does not prescribe a condition for the raising of the presumption. The presumption arises only when it is proved that the grant is expressed to be of a named village, and the burden of proving that the grant is so expressed must lie upon the party who claims to bring the grant within the exception, but once it is proved that the grant is expressed to be of a named village, raising of the presumption will not depend upon proof that certain lands in the village were granted on service or other tenure, or were reserved for communal purposes before the grant of the villageWe do not deem it necessary to decide whether the suit for a mere declaration that the tenants were not occupancy tenants at the instance of the shrotriemdars, after determining the tenancy of some of the tenants was maintainable. The High Court has dismissed the suit against defendants 1 to 10 who were served with notices to quit, but against whom the shortriemdars did not claim a decree for possession. There is no appeal by the shortriemdars before us against defendants 1 to 10, and in any event on the view taken by us, the suit of the shrotriemdars must fail in its entiretyIn Appeal No. 342 of 1961 the decision recorded by us on the principal question does not put an end to the litigation. The dispute arose between two rival claimants to the rights of occupancy in a piece of land. The respondent in this appeal claims that he is a transferee of the original tenant, and the appellant claims to have acquired the rights of occupancy from the shrotriemdar. In suit No. 93 of 1947, four substantive issues were raised, and the issues are discussed in paragraphs 106 to 120 of the judgment of the Trial Judge. The High Court did not separately deal with those issues, but decided Appeal No.789 of 1950 on the review of the law which it declared in the principal appeal. We have disagreed with the High Court for reasons already set out and the other issues which have not been tried by the High Court have now to be tried.