Case: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. TRILOK RAM

its replacement by the new provision. As regards repeal of a statute the law is thus stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction:?The effect of the repeal of a statute where neither a saving clause nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed.? (Vol. I, para 2042, pp. 522-523)10. Similarly in Crawfords Interpretation of Laws it has been said:?Effect of Repeal, Generally.— In the first place, an outright repeal will destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and operate to destroy inchoate rights dependent on it, as a general rule. In many cases, however, where statutes are repealed, they continue to be the law of the period during which they were in force with reference to numerous matters.? (pp. 640-641) 11. The observations of Lord Tenterden and Tindal, C.J. referred in the above- mentioned passages in Craies on Statute Law also indicate that the principle that on repeal a statute is obliterated is subject to the exception that it exists in respect of transactions past and closed. To the same effect is the law laid down by this Court. (See: Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board [(1974) 1 SCC 202 : (1974) 2 SCR 530 ] , SCR at p. 539) 12. This means that as a result of repeal of a statute the statute as repealed ceases to exist with effect from the date of such repeal but the repeal does not affect the previous operation of the law which has been repealed during the period it was operative prior to the date of such repeal . (emphasis supplied)18. Therefore, when a substitution was carried out initially on 28.6.2006, all the provisions of clause (3) of Rule 266, as it stood, suffered a repeal and in its place a new avtaar was born. It must be at once remembered that the proviso was inserted on 1.7.2004 in clause (3) of Rule 266. Therefore, when the rule making authority substituted clause (3) of Rule 266 by the amendment dated 28.6.2006, the inevitable result would be the repeal of entire clause (3) of Rule 266 including the proviso. It is crucial to bear in mind that the amendment to Rule 266 (3) by substitution did not expressly save the proviso. It is equally important to be not oblivious to the fact that the proviso was an integral part of clause(3) of Rule 266. Since Rule 266(3) came to be substituted, having regard to the legal consequences of the same, the proviso could not survive. 19. The fact that the proviso had ceased to exist as a result of the substitution dated 28.6.2006 is unambiguously demonstrated, by the fact the rule making authority chose to step in by issuing notification dated 29.11.2006 by inserting again the proviso to Rule 266(3). It read as follows:?Provided that the person who has appeared or is appearing in the B.Ed./ B.S.T.C./DSE/B.Ed.(Special Education) Examination shall be eligible to apply for the post of primary and upper primary school teachers (General Education/ Special Education) but he shall have to submit proof of having acquired the said educational qualification to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission before the declaration of result of the competitive examination.?It is by a subsequent amendment that the words ‘District Establishment Committee? was inserted in place of Rajasthan Public Service Commission. 20. Rule 266 (3) as was brought into life by the amending Act dated 28.6.2006 continued to hold the field till it suffered substitution by notification dated 11.5.2011. Apparently, consequent upon the need to change the qualifications, Rule 266(3) came to be substituted. However, it is not in dispute that after the substitution dated 11.5.2011, the proviso relied upon by the respondent has not been brought back into existence as was done in the year 2006. 21. We would think whatever ambiguity there may have been as to the actual effect of the substitution, it stands removed by the legislative history of clause (3) of Rule 266 including the proviso therein. The legislative intention is clear that when rule maker substituted the provisions of clause (3), it intended that the entirety of clause (3) would stand obliterated as indeed is the effect of a repeal and a new set of provisions taking its place. It is on this understanding that the rule making authority, when it intended that the proviso must govern, it expressly did so, and it issued the notification dated 29.11.2006. Admittedly after 11.5.2011, the proviso has not been brought back to life. Apparently, the notification dated 29.11.2006 bringing the proviso back to life after the substitution of clause (3) to Rule 266 in 2006 was not brought to the notice of the High Court. 22. As far as the Circular dated 29.2.2012 relied upon by the respondent is concerned, it related to the advertisement issued in 2012 though legally the proviso to Rule 266(3) was non-existent. For whatever reasons it may have been, the order came to be issued extending the benefit of the proviso but after changing the condition in the advertisement. It cannot advance the case of the respondent who applied pursuant to a later advertisement dated 11.8.2013 wherein the requirement as to possession of qualifications as on the last date is clearly indicated. As far as the advertisement with which we are concerned which is of the year 2013, the Circular dated 29.2.2012 cannot be pressed into service by the respondent both in law and on facts. 23. The candidates must possess the qualifications on the last date when applying under the advertisement when it is so provided. In view of our finding that the proviso had ceased to exist after substitution of Rule 266(3) by notification dated 11.5.2011, there can be no question of the advertisement being opposed to the statutory rule.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]4. In short, if the proviso held the field, the respondent would become eligible and qualified for selection and appointment based on merit. If the proviso on the other hand was not available, the respondent would not be eligible for the reason that as contended by the appellants, as on the last date for filing application the respondent had admittedly not passed the B.S.T.C. examination. The respondent had actually appeared for the examination and taking shelter under the proviso, the respondent claimed to be qualified on the terms thereof. The High Court after referring to the amendment dated 11.5.2011 to clause (3) of Rule 266, dwelt upon the purpose of a proviso. The Court adverted to case law on the point. It was found that there is no rule that the proviso must always be restricted to the ambit of the main provision. Occasionally in a statute, it was reasoned a proviso may be unrelated to the subjecthe preceding section or contains matter extraneous to that section. Under such circumstances, it was reasoned by the High Court that it would have to be interpreted as a substantive provision dealing independently with the matter comprised therein and not as qualifying the main and preceding section. The academic qualifications in clause (3) of Rule 266, it was found, were neither expanded nor qualified by the proviso. The proviso dealt with a clearly different area, namely, the time in which the eligibility prescribed under the Rules had to be attained. The amendment to sub-Rule (3) regarding academic qualifications was necessitated on account of subsequent legislation. Even after sub- rule (3) was substituted by amendment dated 11.5.2011, the proviso continued to hold the field. It is found that in such circumstances the condition in the advertisement being contrary to the proviso it would be illegal for the reason that an executive instruction cannot supplant the rule. The writ appeals were allowed. Petitioners were found entitled to benefits of employment in the light of their merit position except for back wages.The High Court has taken the view that when the substitution was effected on 11.5.2011, all that happened was one set of qualifications were replaced by another set of qualifications. The domain of clause (3) of Rule 266 was the declaration as to the qualifications to be possessed by the candidates for appointment as teachers at different levels. The proviso which was inserted on 1.7.2004 did not add to or take away from the qualifications which were declared in the main provision. All that the proviso purported to achieve was to give an opportunity to those candidates who had not acquired the qualifications as on the last date for making application but who had appeared for the concerned examination, to apply for the post. Thus, the proviso was indeed a beneficial provision as it provided a window of opportunity to those while not being qualified as such, were in the process of acquiring qualification by having appeared in the examination. This is no doubt subject to the conditions in the proviso.We do agree with the High Court and with the learned counsel for the respondent that the proviso was intended to have a different area of operation from the main provision whose function was only to enunciate the requisite qualifications.The argument also is that in the year 2006 also when the new set of qualifications was ushered in, it was facilitated by the substitution of clause (3) of Rule 266 of the Rules. Therefore, the contention is, when qualifications changed as a result of NCTE stipulating new qualifications, by substituting the existing qualifications contained in Rule 266(3), the rule making authority complied with the requirement of law. This has nothing to do with the continued availability of the beneficial provisions of the proviso.We are in this case concerned with the effect of amending Act which brought about the substitution of a provision. An amendment which brings about substitution of a provision essentially does two things. In the first place, the provision which is substituted undergoes a repeal. At the same time, there is a re-enactment through the newly inserted provisions.Therefore, when a substitution was carried out initially on 28.6.2006, all the provisions of clause (3) of Rule 266, as it stood, suffered a repeal and in its place a new avtaar was born. It must be at once remembered that the proviso was insertedin clause (3) of Rule 266. Therefore, when the rule making authority substituted clause (3) of Rule 266 by the amendment dated 28.6.2006, the inevitable result would be the repeal of entire clause (3) of Rule 266 including the proviso. It is crucial to bear in mind that the amendment to Rule 266 (3) by substitution did not expressly save the proviso. It is equally important to be not oblivious to the fact that the proviso was an integral part of clause(3) of Rule 266. Since Rule 266(3) came to be substituted, having regard to the legal consequences of the same, the proviso could not survive.The fact that the proviso had ceased to exist as a result of the substitution dated 28.6.2006 is unambiguously demonstrated, by the fact the rule making authority chose to step in by issuing notification dated 29.11.2006 by inserting again the proviso to Ruleded that the person who has appeared or is appearing in the B.Ed./ B.S.T.C./DSE/B.Ed.(Special Education) Examination shall be eligible to apply for the post of primary and upper primary school teachers (General Education/ Special Education) but he shall have to submit proof of having acquired the said educational qualification to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission before the declaration of result of the competitiveis by a subsequent amendment that the words ‘District Establishment Committee? was inserted in place of Rajasthan Public Service Commission.Rule 266 (3) as was brought into life by the amending Act dated 28.6.2006 continued to hold the field till it suffered substitution by notification dated 11.5.2011. Apparently, consequent upon the need to change the qualifications, Rule 266(3) came to be substituted. However, it is not in dispute that after the substitution dated 11.5.2011, the proviso relied upon by the respondent has not been brought back into existence as was done in the year 2006.We would think whatever ambiguity there may have been as to the actual effect of the substitution, it stands removed by the legislative history of clause (3) of Rule 266 including the proviso therein. The legislative intention is clear that when rule maker substituted the provisions of clause (3), it intended that the entirety of clause (3) would stand obliterated as indeed is the effect of a repeal and a new set of provisions taking its place. It is on this understanding that the rule making authority, when it intended that the proviso must govern, it expressly did so, and it issued the notification dated 29.11.2006. Admittedly after 11.5.2011, the proviso has not been brought back to life. Apparently, the notification dated 29.11.2006 bringing the proviso back to life after the substitution of clause (3) to Rule 266 in 2006 was not brought to the notice of the High Court.As far as the Circular dated 29.2.2012 relied upon by the respondent is concerned, it related to the advertisement issued in 2012 though legally the proviso to Rule 266(3) was non-existent. For whatever reasons it may have been, the order came to be issued extending the benefit of the proviso but after changing the condition in the advertisement. It cannot advance the case of the respondent who applied pursuant to a later advertisement dated 11.8.2013 wherein the requirement as to possession of qualifications as on the last date is clearly indicated. As far as the advertisement with which we are concerned which is of the year 2013, the Circular dated 29.2.2012 cannot be pressed into service by the respondent both in law and on facts.The candidates must possess the qualifications on the last date when applying under the advertisement when it is so provided. In view of our finding that the proviso had ceased to exist after substitution of Rule 266(3) by notification dated 11.5.2011, there can be no question of the advertisement being opposed to the statutory rule.