Case: Moti Das Vs. S.P. Sahi, The Special Officer In Charge of Hindu Religious Trusts and Ors

time to time, with the previous sanction of the State Government, determine."The argument is that S. 70 imposes an unauthorised tax.The point is, we think, concluded by our decision in 1954 SCR 1046 : (AIR 1954 SC 400 ), where the distinction between a tax and a fee for legislative purposes under our Constitution was pointed out and with regard to an identical imposition under S. 49 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1939, it was held that the contribution levied was a fee and not a tax.It was observed there at p. 1054 (of SCR) : (at p. 403 of AIR) :"The collections made are not merged in the general public revenue and are not appropriated in the manner laid down for appropriation of expenses for other public purposes. They go to constitute the fund which is contemplated by S. 50 of the Act . . . . . . . . We are further of opinion that an imposition like this cannot be said to be hit by article 27 of the Constitution. What is forbidden by Art. 27 is the specific appropriation of the proceeds of any tax in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. The object of the contribution under S. 49 is not the fostering or preservation of the Hindu religion or of any denomination within it; the purpose is to see that religious trusts and institutions wherever they exist are properly administered. It is the secular administration of the religious institutions that the legislature seeks to control and the object, as enunciated in the Act, is to ensure that the endowments attached to the religious institutions are properly administered and their income is duly appropriated for purposes for which they were founded or exist. As there is no question of favouring any particular religion or religious denomination, Art. 27 could not possibly apply."These observations apply, with equal force to the present case.16. It has also been argued that S. 55 (2) of the Act contravenes Art. 138 of the Constitution and is accordingly invalid. Section 55 is in these terms :55 (1). "Unless otherwise provided in this Act, an appeal shall lie to the High Court against every order passed by the District Judge under this Act.(2) No appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under this section."We do not think that S. 55 (2) of the Act overrides or is intended to override Art. 133 or any other Article of the Constitution relating to appeals to the Supreme Court. Such appeals must undoubtedly lie to the Supreme Court, provided the necessary requirements for such appeals are fulfilled. It is, we think, obvious that the Act cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.17. We now come to that part of the case of the appellants in which they claim the properties to be their private properties or, in the alternative, the trusts to be private trusts. The High Court has pointed out that in M. J. C. 418 of 1952 out of which has arisen Civil Appeal No. 225 of 1955, though there was an assertion that the properties were not trust properties, there was a counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of Bihar that the asthal in question was a public asthal and the properties appertaining thereto trust properties within the meaning of the Act. In M. J. C. 124 of 1953 out of which has arisen Civil Appeal No. 226 of 1955 there was a similar claim that the mahant of the asthal was the absolute owner of the properties belonging to the math. In suit No. No. 34 of 1952 /106 of 1953 out of out of which has arisen Civil Appeal No. 228 of 1955 there was a prayer for adjournment in order to enable the plaintiffs (now appellants before us) to file a petition to amend the plaint, and the purpose of the amendment sought to be made was to claim that the institutions in question were of a private character and the Act had no application to them. This prayer was dissolved by the High Court on the ground that the amendment sought to be made would alter the whole character of the suit. In M.J.C.188 of 1953 out of which has arisen Civil Appeal No. 229 of loss the claim was that there was no trust, express or implied. In M. I. C. 235 of 1953 out of which as arisen Civil Appeal No. 248 of 1955 there was a counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of Bihar that the temple in question was a public temple and the Act applied to it.In all these cases the High Court has taken the view, rightly in our opinion, that the questions whether the trusts are public or private trusts or the properties are private or trust properties are questions which involve investigation of complicated facts and recording of evidence and such investigation could not be done on writ proceedings. In the one suit which was tried in the High Court the question did not arise as no amendment was allowed.Therefore, in these cases there are no materials on which the question as to the nature of the trust can be determined, though in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 : (AIR 1959 SC 951 ), in which also judgment is being delivered today, we have held that having regard to the preamble to the Act, the provisions in S. 3 and the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 4 the definition cause of religious trust in the Act must mean public trusts express or constructive, recognised by Hindu law to be religious, pious or charitable. That finding, however, is of no assistance to the appellants in the present cases. The fate of these cases must depend on the sole question whether the Act is constitutionally valid or not. We have held that the Act is constitutionally valid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is enough to say that it is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that while Art. 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation, and in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases such as, geographical, or according to objects or occupations and the like. The decisions of this Court further establish that there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional guarantee; that it must be, presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; and further that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. It is not disputed before us, and this has been pointed out by the High Court, that there are some differences between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains in some of the essential details of the faith which they profess and the religious practices they observe; the Sikhs have no caste or priests, though they have grantis who officiate at marriages and other ceremonies; they do not believe in the Vedas, Puranas or Shastras, at least not in the same way as the Hindus believe in them.The Jains also do not recognise the divine authority of the Vedas and do not practise sradhs or ceremonies of the dead, nor do they recognise the spiritual authority of the Brahmins (Maines Hindu Law., 11th Edition, p. 82). It has been further pointed out that there are also organisational differences in the matter of religious trusts between Hindus, Sikhs and Jains. There are not many Sikh religious trusts in Bihar, and their organisation is essentially different. Jains consist of two main branches - Swetambar Jains and Digambar Jains - and each branch has a separate central organisation. Section 8 of the Act recognises these differences; for example, there is an assembly of Swetambar Jains known as Shree Sangh and under S. 8 (2) (c) of the Act the Shree Sangh is entitled to elect five persons to the Board of Swetambar lain Religious Trust. Similarly, Digambar Jains also have an assembly known as the Digambar Samaj and under S. 8 (3) (c) of the Act this assembly is entitled to elect five persons to the Board for Digambar Jain Religious Trust.In view of these differences it cannot be said that in the matter of religious trusts in the State of Bihar, Sikhs, Hindus and Jains are situated alike or that the needs of the Jains and Hindus are the same in the matter of the administration of their respective religious Trusts; therefore, according to the well established principles laid down by this Court with regard to legislative classification, it was open to the Bihar Legislature to exclude Sikhs who might have been in no need of protection and to distinguish between Hindus and Jains. Therefore, the contention urged on behalf of the appellants that the several provisions of the Act contravene Art. 14 is devoid of anyare other sections in the chapter which give the Board power to enter into contracts and to borrow money etc., for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act or to give effect to the provisions thereof. Under S. 58 every trustee must carry out all directions which may from time to time be issued to him by the Board under any of the provisions of the Act. The powers given under S. 28 include the power to prepare and settle the budget, to cause inspection to be made of the property and the office of any religious trust, to call for information, reports, returns etc., to give directions for the proper administration of a religious trust in accordance with the law governing such trusts and the wishes of the founder, to remove a trustee from his office in certain circumstances, and to control and administer the trust fund etc. The argument before us is that the position of a mahant or shebait of a Hindu religious trust is a combination of office and proprietary right and under the provisions of the Act the mahant or shebait practically loses his right of management and is reduced to the position of a mere servant of the Board; this, it is contended, is violative of the appellants fundamental right under Art. 19 (1) (f)are of the view, in agreement with that of the High Court, that the restrictions imposed by the Act on the power of the trustees are really intended, as the preamble of the Act states, for the better administration of Hindu religious trusts in the State of Bihar and for the protection and preservation of properties appertaining to such trusts. It is indeed true that the Act provides a better and more speedy remedy for the enforcement of the obligations and duties imposed on the trustees than the lengthy and cumbrous procedure of a suit under S. 92 of the Civil Procedureanswer to this submission is twofold : we have pointed out earlier that the power to alter the budget is subject to Cl. (6) of S. 60 of the Act and the Board is not authorised to alter or modify the budget in a manner or to an extent inconsistent with the wishes of the founder or with the provisions of the Act. The power to give directions to the trustee is also subject to a similar restrictions, namely, the directions must be for the proper administration of the religious trust in accordance with the law governing such trust and the wishes of the founder in so far as such wishes can be ascertained and are not repugnant to such law. The keynote of all the relevant provisions of the Act is the due observance of the objects of the religious trust and not its breach or violation. Secondly, as was observed in 1954 SCR 1005     at p. 1030 : (AIR 1954 SC 282   at p. 292),"an apprehension that the powers conferred . . .. .... may be abused in individual cases does not make the provision itself bad or invalid inthat matters of religion include practices which a religious denomination regards as part of its religion, none of the provisions of the Act interfere with such practices; nor do the provisions of the Act seek to divert the trust property or funds for purposes other than those indicated by the founder of the trust or those established by usage obtaining in a particular institution. On the contrary; the provisions of the Act seek to implement the purposes for which the trust was created and prevent mismanagement and waste by the trustee. In other words, the Act by its several provisions seeks to fulfil rather than defeat the trust.In our opinion, there is no substance in the argument that the provisions of the Act contravene Arts. 25 and 26 of thedo not think that S. 55 (2) of the Act overrides or is intended to override Art. 133 or any other Article of the Constitution relating to appeals to the Supreme Court. Such appeals must undoubtedly lie to the Supreme Court, provided the necessary requirements for such appeals are fulfilled. It is, we think, obvious that the Act cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Supremein these cases there are no materials on which the question as to the nature of the trust can be determined, though in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Sahi, Civil Appeal No. 343 of 1955 : (AIR 1959 SC 951  ), in which also judgment is being delivered today, we have held that having regard to the preamble to the Act, the provisions in S. 3 and the provisions of(5) of S. 4 the definition cause of religious trust in the Act must mean public trusts express or constructive, recognised by Hindu law to be religious, pious or charitable. That finding, however, is of no assistance to the appellants in the present cases. The fate of these cases must depend on the sole question whether the Act is constitutionally valid or not. We have held that the Act is constitutionally valid.