Case: Surja Vs. Hardeva And Ors

Under S. 18 (2) the Assistant Collector is only authorised to determine the value of the land after making such enquiries as he thinks fit. He is not authorized expressly to go into the question whether the land sought to be purchased is included in the reserved or selected area of the land-owner or not. But, obviously it must be the intention that he should go into these questions before embarking on determining the price.But by wrongly deciding that question he cannot finally confer on himself jurisdiction to deal with the matter. In exercise of the powers under Sec. 24 of the Act, read with Section 84 of the Tenancy Act, the Financial Commissioner had jurisdiction to go into the question whether the Assistant Collector or the Collector had rightly assumed jurisdiction . 8. It was urged before us that the orders of the Assistant Collector and the Collector were final and could not be assailed on the ground that they had wrongly jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on authorities like Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw, 1951 SCR 145 = (AIR 1951 SC 115 ) where this Court referred to Queen v. Commrs. for Spl. Purposes of Income-tax, (1888) 21 QBD 313 and Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willan, (1874) 5 PC 417. That was a case of a suit whereby the order of the Commissioner under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (S. 11) was sought to be declared illegal, ultra vires and without jurisdiction, but we are concerned with the revisional power of the Financial Commissioner which is the same as that of the High Court. As observed by Kapur, J., speaking for the Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Chaturvedi, 1959 Supp 1 SCR 733 at p. 746 = (AIR 1959) SC 492 at p. 498) these cases have no application to the exercise or revisional power. He observed:"The appellant also relied on 1951 SCR 145 = (AIR 1951 SC 115 ) where this Court quoted with approval the observations of Lord Esher in (1888) 21 QBD 313 and (1875) 5 PC 417, where Sir James Colville said: "Accordingly the authorities....establish that an adjudication by a Judge having jurisdiction over the subject matter is, if no defect appears on the face of it, to be taken as conclusive of the facts stated therein and that the Court of Queens Bench will not on certiorari quash such an adjudication on the ground that any such fact, however, essential, has been erroneously found." But these observations can have no application to the judgment of the Additional Civil Judge whose jurisdiction in the present case is to be determined by the provisions of Section 5 (4) of the Act. And the power of the High Court to correct questions of jurisdiction is to be found within the four corners of S. 115. If there is an error which falls within this section the High Court will have the power to interfere, not otherwise. The only question to be decided in the instant case is as to whether the High Court had correctly interfered under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure with the order of the Civil judge. As we have held above, at the instance of the landlord the suit was only maintainable if it was based on the inadequacy of the reasonable annual rent and for that purpose the necessary jurisdictional fact to be found was the date of the construction of the accommodation and if the court wrongly decided that the fact and thereby conferred jurisdiction upon itself which it did not possess, it exercised jurisdiction not vested in it and the matter fell with the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Joy Chand Lal Babu v. Kamalaksha Chaudhary, 76 Ind App 131 = (AIR 1949 PC 239 ). The High Court had the power to interfere and once it had the power it could determine whether the question of the date of construction was rightly or wrongly decided. The High Court held that the Civil Judge had wrongly decided that the construction was of a date after June 30, 1946, and therefore fell within Section 3-A." Similarly, in Jagannath Ramchandra Datar v. Dattaraya Balwant Hingmire, Civil Appeal No. 585 of 1964, D/- 9-9-1966 (SC) this Court observed:"Therefore if it can be shown that the subordinate court without any evidence whatsoever held that the transaction in question was not a sale but a mortage and that the relationship between the parties was that of a debtor and a creditor and on that footing proceeded to exercise its power under Sections 3 and 10A of the Dekhan Agriculturists Relief Act the High Court would be entitled to interfare with such a decision under both the parts of Section 115. It would then be possible to say that the subordinate court had clutched at jurisdiction which it had not under the said section and it would also be possible to say that that court had exercised its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity." 9. It seems to us that the Financial Commissioner did not appreciate the content of his powers of revision under Section 24, read with Section 84 of the Tenancy Act. It was obvious from the report of the Commissioner that if the finding arrived at by the Commissioner was accepted the Assistant Collector and the Collector had no jurisdiction in the matter. 10. In our opinion the Financial Commissioner should have gone into the question whether the Commissioners report was acceptable or not on merits. 11. It is urged by the learned counsel for the Surja that the High Court did not decide the question whether the selection had been properly made within time, but it merely accepted the report of the Commissioner. He, therefore, still disputes the fact that the selection was made within time. He also says that it is not a genuine and valid selection. These points should be gone into by the Financial Commissioner.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. It seems to us that the Financial Commissioner did not appreciate the content of his powers of revision under Section 24, read with Section 84 of the Tenancy Act. It was obvious from the report of the Commissioner that if the finding arrived at by the Commissioner was accepted the Assistant Collector and the Collector had no jurisdiction in the matter10. In our opinion the Financial Commissioner should have gone into the question whether the Commissioners report was acceptable or not on merits11. It is urged by the learned counsel for the Surja that the High Court did not decide the question whether the selection had been properly made within time, but it merely accepted the report of the Commissioner. He, therefore, still disputes the fact that the selection was made within time. He also says that it is not a genuine and valid selection. These points should be gone into by the Financial Commissioner.