Case: Ceo, Krishna District Coop. Central Bank Ltd  Vs. K Hanumantha Rao

An imprimatur to the aforesaid principle was accorded by this Court as well in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113]. Speaking for the Court, Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) emphasising that ?all powers have legal limits? invoked the aforesaid doctrine in the following words: (SCC p. 620, para 25)?25...The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.?No such finding is arrived at by the High Court to the effect that the punishment awarded to respondent No.1 was shockingly disproportionate.Even otherwise, we do not find it to be so having regard to the fact that respondent No.1 did not perform his duties with due diligence and his negligence in performing the duties as a Supervisor has led to serious frauds in number of accounts by the subordinate staff. It was, therefore, for the disciplinary authority to consider as to whether respondent No.1 was fit to continue in the post of Supervisor.(iii) The impugned order is also faulted for the reason that it is not the function of the High Court to impose a particular punishment even in those cases where it was found that penalty awarded by the employer is shockingly disproportionate. In such a case, the matter could, at the best, be remanded to the disciplinary authority for imposition of lesser punishment leaving it to such authority to consider as to which lesser penalty needs to be inflicted upon the delinquent employee. No doubt, the administrative authority has to exercise its powers reasonably. However, the doctrine that powers must be exercised reasonably has to be reconciled with the doctrine that the Court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority. The Court must strive to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Anr. v. Rajendra Singh (2013) 12 SCC 372 ), this principle is formulated in the following manner:?13. Indubitably, the well-ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts cannot assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority. In Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra [(1999) 1 SCC 759 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 405] this principle was explained in the following manner: (SCC p. 773, para 22)?22...The High Court in our opinion fell in error in interfering with the punishment, which could be lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on the respondent for his proven misconduct. ? The High Court should not have substituted its own discretion for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority and did not warrant any interference by the High Court. The entire approach of the High Court has been faulty. The impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone.?14. Yet again, in State of Meghalaya v. Mecken Singh N. Marak [(2008) 7 SCC 580 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 431], this Court reiterated the law by stating: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 14 and 17)?14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope of interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice.xx xx xx17. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The High Court in this case, has not only interfered with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority in a routine manner but overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the appellate authority to impose any other punishment short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment for serious misconducts committed by the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226. Judged in this background, the conclusion of the Division Bench of the High Court cannot be regarded as proper at all. The High Court has interfered with the punishment imposed by the competent authority in a casual manner and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.?

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court is unsustainable. There are more than one reason for coming to this conclusion, which are stated hereunder:(i) The observation of the High Court that accusation of lack of proper supervision holds good against the top administration as well is without any basis. The High Court did not appreciate that respondent No.1 was the Supervisor and it was his specific duty, in that capacity, to check the accounts etc. and supervise the work of subordinates. Respondent No.1, in fact, admitted this fact. Also, there is an admission to the effect that his proper supervision would have prevented the persons named from defrauding the Bank. The High Court failed to appreciate that the duties of the Supervisor are not identical and similar to that of the top management of the Bank. No such duty by top management of the Bank is spelled out to show that it was similar to the duty of respondent No.1.(ii) Even otherwise, the aforesaid reason could not be a valid reason for interfering with the punishment imposed. It is trite that Courts, while exercising their power of judicial review over such matters, do not sit as the appellate authority. Decision qua the nature and quantum is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority. It is not the function of the High Court to decide the same. It is only in exceptional circumstances, where it is found that the punishment/penalty awarded by the disciplinary authority/employer is wholly disproportionate, that too to an extent that it shakes the conscience of the Court, that the Court steps in and interferes.No doubt, the award of punishment, which is grossly in excess to the allegations, cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope for judicial review. This limited power of judicial review to interfere with the penalty is based on the doctrine of proportionality which is a well recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The punishment should appear to be so disproportionate that it shocks the judicial conscience. (See State of JharkhandOrs. v. Kamal PrasadOrs. (2014) 7 SCC 223  )).