Case: United Provinces Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Allahabad Vs. T. N. Chatterjee

been validly retired having reached the age of superannuation on that date under that clause.14. In view of the previous decisions of this court and in particular that of Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. (1960) 1 SCR 348 = (AIR 1959 SC 1279 ) it has not been disputed that in the industrial dispute which was referred it was open to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to determine the age of retirement of superannuation notwithstanding that clause 32 of the Standing Orders as certified in 1961 had been legally and validly certified. Indeed in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. it was not disputed that even this court could give an appropriate direction which might be considered reasonable with regard to fixing the age of superannuation. As stated before, according to clause 32 of the Standing Orders, as certified in April 1961, the age of superannuation was fixed at 58. The appellant filed an appeal and the appellate authority refixed the age at 55 years. It appears that in the case of Agra Electric Supply Co. (1970) 1 SCR 808 = (AIR 1970 SC 512 ) also a similar Standing Order had been certified and on appeal the age of retirement was reduced from 58 to 55 years by the appellate authority. This Court in that case held the Standing Order fixing the age at 55 years applicable not only to those employees who were employed subsequently but also to all workmen who were in employment at the time when the Standing Orders became legally applicable. It does not appear in that case that any such argument was raised that the matter should be remitted either to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court to fix the age of superannuation or that this court itself might do so as was the course followed in the case of Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. in which the age was fixed at 60 years with regard to those employees who had raised the dispute on the ground that the Standing Orders could not govern them as they had been employed before the Standing Orders became applicable. After considering the entire material and keeping in mind the fact that according to the appellate authority even the age of retirement at 55 was fair and reasonable we are of the view that the age of superannuation of the respondents in the present case, should be 58 years. In other words, it will be the same as was fixed by the Certifying Officer by modifying clause 32 on April 22, 1961.15. Lastly we must deal with the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the order of the Allahabad High Court made on July 12, 1966 quashing the award after following the decision of this court in Guest Keen Williams Pvt. Ltd. should be deemed to be final and should debar any fresh consideration or decision of that point by virtue of the rule or principle of res judicata. It is noteworthy that the order of the Allahabad High Court was not final against which the matter could have been taken in appeal either to a Division Bench of the High Court or to this court. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this court in Management of Northern Railway Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Rajasthan, Jaipur, (1967) 2 SCR 476 = (AIR 1967 SC 1182 ) where reference had been made by the State Government to the Industrial Tribunal on the Railway Workers Union having raised an industrial dispute against the Management of the Northern Railway Co-operative Society Ltd. The society filed a writ petition on the ground that the dispute having been raised by the Railway Workers Union and not by the Societys own employees the reference to the Tribunal was not competent. The High Court dismissed the petition. Thereafter the Tribunal heard the matter and gave its decision in favour of the workman concerned. The society appealed to this court by special leave. It was held that the order of the High Court was not interlocutory but was a final order in regard to the proceedings under Art. 226. The appropriate remedy for the appellant in that case was to appeal against the High Courts order and that not having been done the appellants plea relating to the competency of the reference was barred by res judicata as the same had been raised before the High Court and had been rejected. The present case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the order made by the High Court was not final and a remand had been directed presumably under Art. 227 of the Constitution. That order in fact did not finally terminate any proceedings at all. The proceedings were terminated only by the award against which the present appeal has been brought by special leave. We are unable to see how the decision in the aforesaid case can afford any assistance to the respondents before us. Indeed the case which is more apposite is Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590 = (AIR 1960 SC 941 ). There an order of remand had been made by the High Court while exercising powers under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was observed after referring to the various decisions of the Privy Council, that the order of remand was interlocutory and did not purport to dispose of the case. A party is not bound to appeal against every interlocutory order which is a step in the procedure that leads up to a final decision or award. The following observations from this case may be reproduced with advantage:"Interlocutory judgments which have the force of a decree must be distinguished from other interlocutory judgments which are a step towards the decision of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a final order".We are unable, therefore, to accede to the contention that the rule of res judicata could be invoked by the respondent in the present case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In our opinion the principle applied in the latter case is fully supported by the scheme of the Act and was rightly extended and applied in Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (1970) 1 SCR 808   = (AIR 1970 SC 512  ).We concur with the view expressed therein that it was not intended by the legislature that different sets of conditions should apply to employees depending on whether a workman was employed before the Standing Orders were certified or after, which would defeat the very object of the legislation. In the preamble it is stated in categorical terms "whereas it is expedient to require employers in industrial establishments to define with sufficient precision the conditions of employment under them and to make the said conditions known to workmen employed by them". Not only the object but the scheme of the Act is such that the employers must define precisely the conditions of employment of all the employers must define precisely the conditions of employment of all the employees and have the same certified by the Certifying Officer against whose orders an appeal lies to the appellate authority. The right given to workmen to express their view and to raise objections is of great significance. They can even ask for modification of the Standing Orders in accordance with Section 10 of the Act. Every possible safeguard has been provided for keeping the workmen informed about their conditions of service so that they can take whatever steps they desire or are advised to take in their interest before the Certifying Officer or the appellate authority. It is also very difficult to conceive taking each individual item in the schedule how there can be different conditions for different employees depending upon the point of time when they came to be employed; for instance Item 3 relates to shift working. Is it possible to suggest that for the same kind of work employees who were in employment before the Standing Orders were certified would have different hours of shift from the other employees who were employed subsequently? In the very nature of things a great deal of irritation and annoyance between employees inter se would result if any such discrimination is made in any of the items in the Schedule. It has been rightly pointed out in Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. that this would only lead to industrial unrest and not industrial peace, the latter being the principal object of legislation.In our judgment much assistance or help cannot be derived from Para 16 of the Model Standing Orders as contained in Schedule 1 to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules 1946. Retirement which is mentioned there may be under the terms of contract of employment entered into between the employer and the employees. Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, throws a certain amount of light on thepresent case is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the order made by the High Court was not final and a remand had been directed presumably under Art. 227 of the Constitution. That order in fact did not finally terminate any proceedings at all. The proceedings were terminated only by the award against which the present appeal has been brought by special leave. We are unable to see how the decision in the aforesaid case can afford any assistance to the respondents before us. Indeed the case which is more apposite is Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590   = (AIR 1960 SC 941  ). There an order of remand had been made by the High Court while exercising powers under S. 115 of theCode of Civil Procedure. It was observed after referring to the various decisions of the Privy Council, that the order of remand was interlocutory and did not purport to dispose of the case. A party is not bound to appeal against every interlocutory order which is a step in the procedure that leads up to a final decision or award. The following observations from this case may be reproduced withjudgments which have the force of a decree must be distinguished from other interlocutory judgments which are a step towards the decision of the dispute between parties by way of a decree or a finalare unable, therefore, to accede to the contention that the rule of res judicata could be invoked by the respondent in the present case.