Case: Board Of Trustees Of The Port Of Mumbai Vs. M/S Byramjee Jeejeebhoy P.Ltd

an Officer of the Port Trust.Dated 1/2/1963Sd/-Estate Manager" 22. There are receipts of the years 1963 and 1965 issued by the Mumbai Port Trust acknowledging the payment of rent from defendant no.2. More importantly the sub-lease deed that forms the sheet-anchor of the plaintiffs case, though executed on June 1, 1978, was made effective retrospectively from June 15, 1964. It came to an end on February 26, 1985. 23. On the basis of the materials on record, we must accept and proceed on the basis that defendant no.2 was in occupation of the suit land long before February 1, 1973 and had continued to be in its possession on that date. The sub-letting by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2, thus, clearly fell within the protective ambit of section 15(2) of Bombay Rent Act. 24. Faced with this situation, Mr. Sundaram, learned senior advocate, appearing for the plaintiff-respondent no.1 contended that in order to claim protection under section 15(2) of the Act, it was incumbent upon the claimant to show that there was a sub-lease, assignment or transfer in his favour prior to 1973 and it was in pursuance of such sub-lease, assignment or transfer that it came in possession and continued to be in possession of the demised property and was actually in possession of the demised property on February 1, 1973. In this case, according to Mr. Sundaram, apart from the sub-lease dated June 17, 1978, there was no other sub-lease or any other instrument of transfer to show that defendant no.2 came in possession of the suit land in pursuance of any sub-lease, assignment or transfer, etc. 25. We find no force in this submission. Section 15(2), apart from others uses the expression `transfer of interest in any other manner. It is sufficiently wide to include even an oral arrangement pursuant to which the sub-lessee might enter upon the land and continue in its possession. We have no manner of doubt that the initial induction of defendant no.2 on the suit land was covered by section 15(2) of the Act. 26. Mr. Sundaram next contended that the possession of the suit land by defendant no.2 on February 1, 1973 might have had the protection of section 15(2) of the Act. But a basic change was brought about by the execution of the lease deed on June 17, 1978 which gave rise to a new relationship between the two defendants, the lessee and the sub-lessee. Mr. Sundaram submitted that the execution of the sub-lease by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.2 on June 17, 1978 and the continued possession of the suit land by defendant no.2 on the basis of that sub-lease would certainly not come under the protection of section 15(2) of the Act. 27. In order to appreciate Mr. Sundarams submission it would be apposite to refer to section 22 of the Bombay Rent Act, which is as follows: "22. Particulars to be furnished by tenant of tenancy sub-let or transferred before the 1st day of February 1973.(1) Every tenant who before the 1st day of February 1973, has without the consent of the landlord given in writing sub-let the whole or any part of the premises let to him or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein, and every sub-tenant to whom the premises are so sub-let or the assignment or transfer is so made, shall furnish to the landlord, within a month of the receipt of a notice served upon him by the landlord by post or in any other manner, a statement in writing signed by him giving full particulars of such sub-letting assignment or transfer including the rent charged or paid by him.(2) Any tenant or sub-tenant who fails to furnish such statement or intentionally furnishes a statement which is false in any material particular shall, on conviction, be punished with the fine which may extend to one thousand rupees." 28. Section 22 provided for the landlord to have full information concerning the sub-lessee/licensee who might be in occupation of the demised premises on February 1, 1973, including the rent charged from him by the tenant. The provisions of section 22 clearly suggest that after the cut off date, i.e., February 1, 1973 there should be no material change, to the detriment of the landlord in the terms and conditions on which the sub-tenant was in possession of the demised premises on that date and in case after that date, any material change is brought about in the status of the sub-tenant, to the prejudice of the landlord that might not have the protection of section 15(2) but may come within the mischief of section 13(1)(e). And hence, the point raised by Mr. Sundaram appears to be theoretically correct. But in the facts of the case the point does not seem to arise. Mr. Parag Tripathi, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Mumbai Port Trust, rightly submitted that in pith and substance the sub-lease deed of 1978, was simply a formalization and continuation of the arrangement as existing between the defendants prior to February 1, 1973. There was no material change in the status of defendant no.2 or in the terms and conditions on which it was in possession of the suit land on February 1, 1973 or in the inter se relationship between the two defendants. The execution of the sub- lease on June 17, 1978 by defendant no.1 in favour defendant no.2 would not, therefore, militate against the protection offered by section 15(2) of the Act. The execution of the lease would not constitute a ground for eviction against defendant no.1 in terms of section 13(1)(e) of the Act.29. In light of the discussion made above, we find that the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the two courts below are quite unsustainable. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the court of Small Causes and dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent no.1.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]25. We find no force in this submission. Section 15(2), apart from others uses the expression `transfer of interest in any other manner. It is sufficiently wide to include even an oral arrangement pursuant to which the sub-lessee might enter upon the land and continue in its possession. We have no manner of doubt that the initial induction of defendant no.2 on the suit land was covered by section 15(2) of the Act.Section 22 provided for the landlord to have full information concerning the sub-lessee/licensee who might be in occupation of the demised premises on February 1, 1973, including the rent charged from him by the tenant. The provisions of section 22 clearly suggest that after the cut off date, i.e., February 1, 1973 there should be no material change, to the detriment of the landlord in the terms and conditions on which the sub-tenant was in possession of the demised premises on that date and in case after that date, any material change is brought about in the status of the sub-tenant, to the prejudice of the landlord that might not have the protection of section 15(2) but may come within the mischief of section 13(1)(e). And hence, the point raised by Mr. Sundaram appears to be theoretically correct. But in the facts of the case the point does not seem to arise. Mr. Parag Tripathi, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the Mumbai Port Trust, rightly submitted that in pith and substance the sub-lease deed of 1978, was simply a formalization and continuation of the arrangement as existing between the defendants prior to February 1, 1973. There was no material change in the status of defendant no.2 or in the terms and conditions on which it was in possession of the suit land on February 1, 1973 or in the inter se relationship between the two defendants. The execution of the sub- lease on June 17, 1978 by defendant no.1 in favour defendant no.2 would not, therefore, militate against the protection offered by section 15(2) of the Act. The execution of the lease would not constitute a ground for eviction against defendant no.1 in terms of section 13(1)(e) of the Act.29. In light of the discussion made above, we find that the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the two courts below are quite unsustainable. We, accordingly, set aside the judgments and orders passed by the High Court and the court of Small Causes and dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondent no.1.