Case: Munshi Singh &amp; Others Etc. Etc Vs. Union Of India Etc. Etc

sought to be produced were either relevant or were required to enable this Court to pronounce judgment. 9. Learned counsel for the State next contended that the proposed acquisition was in pursuance of the activity under the Regulation Act. Moreover planned development is one of the public purposes as defined in S. 3 (f) as amended by the U. P. Amending Act 1954. Mere mention of such a public purpose was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of law. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Arnold Rodricks v. State of Maharashtra, (1966) 3 SCR 885 = (AIR 1966 SC 1788 ) in which in the notification under S. 4 it was stated that the land was needed "for a public purpose, viz. for development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area". It was said that the purpose specified was a public purpose within the Acquisition Act. The points which arose for determination in that case were entirely different. At any rate, the public purpose was stated with sufficient particularity, namely, for development and utilisation of the land as an industrial and residential area. Once it was stated that the land will be utilised for the aforesaid purpose the persons interested could certainly object effectively. But the mere words, as are to be found in the notifications here "planned development of the area" were wholly insufficient and conveyed no idea as to the specific purpose for which the lands were to be utilised. It must be remembered that the Acquisition Act is silent as to the nature of objections that could be raised. In some of the States executive instructions have been issued or rules have been framed which indicate the classes of objections which are contemplated. In Madras the classes of objections that the Collectors inquiry should specifically deal with are the following : (a) that the purpose for which the land is acquired is not a public purpose; (b) that the land notified is not the best adapted to the purpose intended or that its area is greater than is actually required for the purpose, and c) that the acquisition of the land or any land in the locality is not desirable or expedient. In Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 128 = (AIR 1960 SC 1203 ) it was stated in the notification under S. 4 (1) that the land was likely to be needed for purposes of a company which was named. A challenge was made against the validity of that notification on the ground that it was not stated that the land was required for a public purpose. It was laid down that where the land was required for a company the requirement of the law would be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government was satisfied on a report under Section 5A (2) or by an inquiry under Section 40 that the purpose of the acquisition was the same as contemplated by Section 40 of the Act. This Court said that the purpose of the notification under Section 4 was to carry out a preliminary investigation with a view to find out after the necessary survey and taking of levels and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purposes for which it was sought to be acquired. It was only under Section 6 that a firm declaration had to be made by the Government that land with proper description and area was needed for a public purpose or a company. Hence it was not correct to say that any defect in the notification under Section 4 was fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when the acquisition was for a company. We are unable to accede to the suggestion on behalf of the State that the observations made in this decision can be of any avail to it in the present cases. The question which we are called upon to decide is of an entirely different nature. It relates to the notification under Section 4 in the light of S. 5A with a view to giving full effect to that section and not simply wiping it out. We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which came into force on January 1, 1924 that S. 5A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly irrelevant but after the insertion of Section 5A the position has completely changed and it cannot be said that the owners wishes are not relevant and that he does not need an opportunity to file his objections. To take such a view would render S. 5A otios. If it has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the person interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to submit his objections and that he can only if the notification under S. 4 (1) while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such specific or particular purpose being stated the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under S. 5A which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under S. 4 (1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under S. 5A of the Acquisition Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In Babu Barkya Thakur v. The State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 128  = (AIR 1960 SC 1203 ) it was stated in the notification under S. 4 (1) that the land was likely to be needed for purposes of a company which was named. A challenge was made against the validity of that notification on the ground that it was not stated that the land was required for a public purpose. It was laid down that where the land was required for a company the requirement of the law would be sufficiently met if the appropriate Government was satisfied on a report under Section 5A (2) or by an inquiry under Section 40 that the purpose of the acquisition was the same as contemplated by Section 40 of the Act. This Court said that the purpose of the notification under Section 4 was to carry out a preliminary investigation with a view to find out after the necessary survey and taking of levels and, if necessary, digging or boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for the purposes for which it was sought to be acquired. It was only under Section 6 that a firm declaration had to be made by the Government that land with proper description and area was needed for a public purpose or a company. Hence it was not correct to say that any defect in the notification under Section 4 was fatal to the validity of the proceedings particularly when the acquisition was for a company. We are unable to accede to the suggestion on behalf of the State that the observations made in this decision can be of any avail to it in the present cases. The question which we are called upon to decide is of an entirely different nature. It relates to the notification under Section 4 in the light of S. 5A with a view to giving full effect to that section and not simply wiping it out. We need only point out that the Acquisition Act did not originally provide for filing or hearing of objections to the proposed acquisition. It was only by the Amending Act 38 of 1923 which came into force on January 1, 1924 that S. 5A was inserted in the Acquisition Act. Up to that time the view was that the wishes of the owners of the land were wholly irrelevant but after the insertion of Section 5A the position has completely changed and it cannot be said that the owners wishes are not relevant and that he does not need an opportunity to file his objections. To take such a view would render S. 5A otios. If it has any purpose and if it has to be given its full effect the person interested in the land proposed to be acquired must have an opportunity to submit his objections and that he can only if the notification under S. 4 (1) while mentioning the public purpose gives some definite indication or particulars of the said purpose which would enable the persons concerned to object effectively if so desired. In the absence of such specific or particular purpose being stated the objector cannot file any proper or cogent objections under S. 5A which he has a right to do under that provision. We would accordingly hold that owing to the vagueness and indefiniteness of the public purpose stated in the notifications under S. 4 (1) and in the absence of any proof that the appellants were either aware of or were shown the scheme or the Master Plan in respect of the planned development of the area in question the appellants were wholly unable to object effectively and exercise their right under S. 5A of the Acquisition Act.