Case: Union Of India Vs. Tarachand Gupta &amp; Bros

misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so that it failed to deal with the question remitted to it and decided some question which was not remitted to it. It may have refused to take into account something which it was required to take into account. Or it may have based its decision on some matter which, under the provisions setting it up, it had no right to take into account. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive. But if it decides a question remitted to it for decision without committing any of these errors it is as much entitled to decide that question wrongly as it is to decide it rightly".To the same effect are also the observations of Lord Pearce at page 233. R. v. Fulham Hammersmith and Kensingon Rent Tribunal, (1953) 2 All ER 4 is yet another decision of a tribunal properly embarking on or enquiry, that is, within its jurisdiction but at the end of its making an order in excess of its jurisdiction which was held to be a nullity though it was an order of the kind which it was entitled to make in a proper case.22. The principle thus is that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion, however, is inferred where the of statute gives finality to the order of the tribunal on which it confers jurisdiction and provides for adequate remedy to do what the Courts would normally do in such a proceeding before it. Even where a statute gives finality, such a provision does not exclude cases where the provisions of the particular statute have not been complied with or the tribunal has not acted in conform with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The word "jurisdiction" has both a narrow and a wider meaning. In the sense of the former, it means the authority to embark upon an enquiry; in the sense of the latter it is used in several , one of such aspects being that the decision of the tribunal is in non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act, and therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction.23. The respondents licence admittedly authorised them to import goods covered by entry 295. They could, therefore, legitimately import, on the strength of that licence, all and several kinds of parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters. The only question, therefore, before the Collector was whether the respondents licence covered the goods imported by them. i e. whether the goods were parts and accessories. If they were, the imports were legitimate and no question of their being not covered by the licence or the respondent having committed breach of Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act or Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act could possibly arise. What the Collector, however did was that he put the two consignments together and held that they made up 51 Rixe Mopeds in C. K. D. condition and were for that reason not the articles covered by entry 295 but articles prohibited under remark (ii) of entry 294. But entry 294 deals with motor cycles and scooters complete and assembled. Remark (ii) against that entry prohibits an importer who held a licence to import motor cycles and scooters from importing motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Remark (ii) containing that prohibition had nothing to do with entry 295 which did not condition any limitations or restrictions whatsoever against imports of parts and accessories.24. That being so if an importer has imported parts and accessories, his import would be of the articles covered by entry 295 The Collector could not say, if they were so covered by entry 295, that when jumped together, they would constitute other articles namely, motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Such a process, if adopted by the Collector, would mean that he was inserting in entry 295 a restriction which was not them. That obviously he had no power to do. Such a restriction would mean that though under a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 an importer could import parts and accessories of all kinds and types, he shall not import all of them but only some, so that when put together they would not make them motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. In the Present case even that was not so because he would have to buy tyres, tubes and saddles to convert them into motor cycles and scooters into C. K. D. condition. That would be tantamount to the Collector making a new entry in place of entry 295 which must mean non-compliance of that entry and acting in excess of jurisdiction during the course at his enquiry even though he had embarked upon the enquiry with judsdiction. In our view that was precisely what the collector did. This is therefore, not one of those cases where between two competing entries the statutory authority applied one or the other though in error, and where a civil court cannot interfere.25. In this view the order was in non-compliance of the provisions of the statute and, therefore, was covered by the exceptions laid down in Mask and Co.s case, 67 Ind App 222 = (AIR 1940 PC 105 ). It was not an order in respect of which the Collector was invested with jurisdiction. That being so the provision excluding the jurisdiction of civil Courts was not applicable. Indeed the order was a nullity and Article 14 of the Limitation Act of 1908 could not be applied to hold the suit time barred. Even if Article 14 applied, it would not be time-barred, it as the High Court pointed out, the date of the appellate order was taken into consideration.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In the absence of any restriction in entry 295, namely, that a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 would not be valid for import of parts and accessories which when taken together, would make them motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition, the respondents could import under their licence all kinds and types of parts and accessories Therefore, the mere fact, that the goods imported by them were so complete that when put together would make them motor cycles and scooters in C.K. D. condition, would not entry 295. Were that to be so, the position would be anomalous as aptly described by the High Court Suppose that an importer were to import equal number of various parts from different countries under different indents and at different times, and the goods were to reach here in different consignments and on different dates instead of two consignments from the same country as in the present case. If the contention urged before us were to be correct, the Collector can treat them together and say that they would constitute motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Such an approach would mean that there is in entry 295 a limitation against importation of all parts and accessories of mater. cycles and scooters. Under that contention, even if the importer had sold away the first consignment or part of it, it would still be possible for the Collector to say that had the importer desired it was possible for him to assemble all the parts and make mater cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Surely, such as meaning has not to be given to entry 295 unless there is in it or in the licence a condition that a licensee is not to import parts in such a fashion that his consignments, different though they may be, when put together would make motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Such a condition was advisedly not placed in entry 295 but was put in the entry 294 only. The reason was that import of both motor cycles and scooters as also parts and accessories thereof was permitted, of the first under entry 294 and of the other under entry 295. A trader having a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 294 could import assembled motor cycles and scooters, but not those vehicles in C. K. D. condition unless he was a manufacturer and had obtained a separate licence therefor from the Controller of Imports who, as aforesaid, was authorised to issue such a licence on an ad hoc basis. Thus the restriction not to import motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition was against an importer holding a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 294 under which he could import complete motor cycles and scooters and not against an importer who had a licence to import parts md accessories under entry 295.14. If Dr. Syed Mohameds contention were to be right we would have to import remark (ii) against entry 294 into entry 295, a thing which obviously is not permissible while construing these entries. Further, such a condition if one were to be implied in entry 295, would not fit in as it is a restriction against import of motor cycles and scooters m C. K. D. condition and not their parts and accessories. There is therefore, no question of a licensee under entry 295 doing indirectly what he was not allowed to do directly. What he was not allowed to do directly was importing motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition under a licence under which he could import complete motor cycles and scooters only. That restriction, as already observed, applied to a licensee in respect of goods described in entry 294 and not a licensee in respect of goods covered by entry 295.15. The result is that when Collector examines goods imported under a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 what he has, to ascertain is whether the goods are parts and accessories, and not whether the goods, though parts and accessories, are so comprehensive that if put together would constitute motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Were he to adopt such an approach, he would be acting contrary to and beyond entry 295 under which he had to find out whether the goods imported were of the description in that entry. Such an approach would in other words, be in non-compliance of entry 295.What needs to be observed in that decision is that the Collectors decision was under which of the two competing entries the imported items fell, that is, whether the goods were bolts and nuts or were components of the prohibited article. And the Court there laid down the well established principle that the High Court under Article 226, could not interfere with the decision of the authority upon whom jurisdiction to decide the question, whether the goods fell under one or the other entry, was conferred on the ground that it was erroneous. Further, the nuts and bolts imported by the appellant could only be used as components of the prohibited article. In other words, the import was of parts of the prohibited article and therefore, of the prohibited article. It was, therefore, that the Court held (1) that the Customs decision was not incorrect and (2) that the importer could not be allowed to do indirectly what he could not do directly.18. It will be noticed that the Bombay decision in D. P. Anands case. Civil Appl. No. 4 of 1959, D/17-8-1960(Bom) was not dissented from but only distinguished, and therefore, the High Court in the present case was justified in following it. It is true, however, that counsel for the appellant there relied on that decision in support of his proposition that a ban on a completed article cannot be read as a ban on the importation of its constituents, which when assembled, would result in the prohibited article, and this Court pointed out in answer that in D. P. Anands case, Civil Appl. No. 4 of 1959, D/-17-8 l960 (Bom) the imported components could not have, when assembled made up the completed article because of the lack of certain essential parts which admittedly were not available in India and could not be imported. The real distinction, however, between the two cases was that the decision of the Collector in D. P. Anands case. Civil Appl. No. 4 of 1959. D/- 17-8-1960 (Bom) was not, as was the decision in Girdharilals case,= (1964) 7 SCR 62   = (AIR 1964 SC 1591) under which of the two competing entries the imported goods fell but that the imported goods in question, if assembled together, would not be the goods covered by the entry, and therefore, not the goods in respect of which the licence was granted.The words "a decision or order passed by an officer of Customs under this Act" used in Section 188 of the Sea Customs Act must mean a real and not a purported determination. A determination, which takes into consideration factors which the officer has no right to take into account, is no determination. This is also the view taken by Courts in England. In such cases the provision excluding jurisdiction of civil Courts cannot overate so as to exclude an inquiry byThe principle thus is that exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily inferred. Such exclusion, however, is inferred where the of statute gives finality to the order of the tribunal on which it confers jurisdiction and provides for adequate remedy to do what the Courts would normally do in such a proceeding before it. Even where a statute gives finality, such a provision does not exclude cases where the provisions of the particular statute have not been complied with or the tribunal has not acted in conform with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The word "jurisdiction" has both a narrow and a wider meaning. In the sense of the former, it means the authority to embark upon an enquiry; in the sense of the latter it is used in several , one of such aspects being that the decision of the tribunal is in non-compliance with the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, a determination by a tribunal of a question other than the one which the statute directs it to decide would be a decision not under the provisions of the Act, and therefore, in excess of its jurisdiction.23. The respondents licence admittedly authorised them to import goods covered by entry 295. They could, therefore, legitimately import, on the strength of that licence, all and several kinds of parts and accessories of motor cycles and scooters. The only question, therefore, before the Collector was whether the respondents licence covered the goods imported by them. i e. whether the goods were parts and accessories. If they were, the imports were legitimate and no question of their being not covered by the licence or the respondent having committed breach of Section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act or Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act could possibly arise. What the Collector, however did was that he put the two consignments together and held that they made up 51 Rixe Mopeds in C. K. D. condition and were for that reason not the articles covered by entry 295 but articles prohibited under remark (ii) of entry 294. But entry 294 deals with motor cycles and scooters complete and assembled. Remark (ii) against that entry prohibits an importer who held a licence to import motor cycles and scooters from importing motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Remark (ii) containing that prohibition had nothing to do with entry 295 which did not condition any limitations or restrictions whatsoever against imports of parts and accessories.24. That being so if an importer has imported parts and accessories, his import would be of the articles covered by entry 295 The Collector could not say, if they were so covered by entry 295, that when jumped together, they would constitute other articles namely, motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. Such a process, if adopted by the Collector, would mean that he was inserting in entry 295 a restriction which was not them. That obviously he had no power to do. Such a restriction would mean that though under a licence in respect of goods covered by entry 295 an importer could import parts and accessories of all kinds and types, he shall not import all of them but only some, so that when put together they would not make them motor cycles and scooters in C. K. D. condition. In the Present case even that was not so because he would have to buy tyres, tubes and saddles to convert them into motor cycles and scooters into C. K. D. condition. That would be tantamount to the Collector making a new entry in place of entry 295 which must mean non-compliance of that entry and acting in excess of jurisdiction during the course at his enquiry even though he had embarked upon the enquiry with judsdiction. In our view that was precisely what the collector did. This is therefore, not one of those cases where between two competing entries the statutory authority applied one or the other though in error, and where a civil court cannot interfere.25. In this view the order was in non-compliance of the provisions of the statute and, therefore, was covered by the exceptions laid down in Mask and Co.s case, 67 Ind App 222 = (AIR 1940 PC 105  ). It was not an order in respect of which the Collector was invested with jurisdiction. That being so the provision excluding the jurisdiction of civil Courts was not applicable. Indeed the order was a nullity and Article 14 of the Limitation Act of 1908 could not be applied to hold the suit time barred. Even if Article 14 applied, it would not be time-barred, it as the High Court pointed out, the date of the appellate order was taken into consideration.