Case: Ishwari Prasad Mishra Vs. Mohammad Isa

with the pull and weight that would be harnessed from behind would be sufficient to carry him through." Similarly, in criticising the trial Court for accepting the evidence of Jamuna Singh, the High Court has observed that the presumption made by the trial Court that teacher, as a rule, is a respectable person, "is not any legal appreciation of the evidence but a way found to suit the convenience of the court for holding in favour of the plaintiff." It would thus be seen that in reversing the decision of the trial Court, the High Court has suggested that the trial Court, was persuaded by extraneous considerations and that some pull and weight had been, used in favour of the appellant from behind. We are constrained to observe that the High Court was not justified in passing these strictures against the trial Judge in dealing with the present case. Judicial experience shows that in adjudicating upon the rival claims brought before the courts it is not always easy to decide where truth lies. vidence is adduced by the respective parties in support of their conflicting contentions and circumstances are similarly pressed into service. In such a case, it is no doubt, the duty of the Judge to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately, examine it in the light probabilities and decide which way the truth lies. The impression formed by the Judge about the character of the evidence will ultimately determine the conclusion which he reached. But it would be unsafe to overlook the fact that all judicial minds may not react in the same way to the said evidence and it is not unusual that evidence which appears to be respectable and trustworthy to one Judge may not appear to be respectable and trustworthy to another Judge. That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse conclusions of facts recorded by the trial Court on its appreciation of oral evidence. The knowledge that another view is possible on the evidence adduced in a case, acts as a sobering factor and leads to the use of temperate language in recording judicial conclusions. Judicial approach in such cases should always be based on the consciousness that one may make a mistake; that is why the use of unduly strong words in expressing conclusions or the adoption of unduly strong intemperate, or extravagant criticism, against the contrary view, which are often founded on a sense of infallibility should always be avoided. In the present case, the High Court has used intemperate language and has even gone to the length of suggesting a corrupt motive against the Judge who decided the suit in favour of the appellant.In our opinion, the use of such intemperate language may, in some cases, tend to show either a lack of experience in judicial matters or an absence of Judicial poise and balance. We have carefully considered all the evidence to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel on both the sides and we are satisfied that the imputations made by the High Court against the impartiality and the objectivity of the approach adopted by the trial Judge are wholly unjustified. It is very much to be regretted that the High Court should have persuaded itself to use such extravagant language in criticising the trial Court, particularly when our conclusion in the present appeal shows that the trial Court was right and the High Court was wrong.But even if we had not upheld the findings of the trial Court, we would not have approved of the unbalanced criticism made by the High Court against the trial Court. No doubt, if it is shown that the decision of the trial Court in a given case is a result of corrupt motive, the High Court must condemn it and must take due further steps in the matter.But the use of strong language and imputation of corrupt motives should not be made light heatedly because the Judge against whom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicate, his position.28. What we have said about the extravagant criticism made by the High Court against the trial Judge needs to be repeated in respect of similar criticism made by the High Court against some of the witnesses examined in the case. There is no doubt that judicial administration should be fearless; judges must have full freedom to express their conclusions in respect of the evidence given by the witnesses before them without any favour or fear; and so, judicial power to express its appreciation about oral evidence is very wide. But the very width of the said power must inevitably impose some healthy restraints upon its exercise. Take, for instance, the criticism made by the High Court against the young lawyer Mr. Choudhary. In our opinion, that criticism is wholly unjustified. It is conceivable that in a given case, a court of facts may come to the conclusion that all the witnesses who have supported one party have conspired to give false evidence, and in such a case the court must unhesitatingly record its conclusion to that effect. But, before such a conclusion is reached, all the pros and cons must be carefully and scrupulously examined and a conscientious effort must always be made not to regard evidence which appears to be unreasonable or improbable as being false and perjured. We have noticed that the judgment of the High Court shows a tendency to regard every witness whose evidence the High Court did not feel inclined to accept as a perjuror and a conspirator. This approach again may tend to show with respect, either lack of experience or absence of judicial poise and balance. It is because the judgment of the High Court showed these glaring infirmities that Mr. Sastri told us at the very outset that in the present appeal, all that he proposed to do was to defend the respondent but not the judgment of the High Court which has been pronounced in his favour.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]No doubt, the High Court has come to the conclusion that there has been a conspiracy between all the witnesses, and if that conclusion is right, then the draft would, of course, have to be treated as a false document. But, for the moment, dealing with the argument about the failure of the appellant to mention the draft in the plaint by itself, we do not think there is any substance inis true that if the last recital "that the deed of contract shall be deemed to the deed of sale" is literally construed, it would be unusual. But, in the context, all that it seems to mean is that sale-deed would be executed in the same terms as the agreement of sale. It seems to us unreasonable to suggest that because this particular part of the clause is somewhat unusually worded, the court should draw the inference that the senior Mr. Choudhary could not have dictated it and the whole story about the draft isagain is an unusual provision. But it cannot sustain the argument that the story about the draft having been dictated by Mr. Choudhary is untrue. That fact will have to be decided in the light of the oral evidence adduced by the appellant to show that the draft was in fact dictated by the senior Mr. Choudhary. Therefore we do not think that the two clauses on which Mr. Sastri relies can justify the conclusion that the story about the draft is athe day when the agreement was entered into, the appellants father had gone to Lucknow and if the appellant is taking the oath in support of his case and he knows all the relevant facts which have to be proved in this case, there is no reason why his father should have stepped into the box or hiswould thus be seen that the statements made by this witness do not appear to be credible and the claim made by him that the construction work of the house spread over several years and that he spent Rs. 30,000/- for the improvements, cannot, therefore, be accepted as true. In our opinion, on the material as it stands, there was no justification for the High Court to have reversed the finding of the trial Court about the value of the property. Therefore, the argument that the value of the property was Rs. 30,000/- and that negatives the version about the agreement of sale, must beconsidering the broad features of the case on which the learned Counsel for the respective parties relied before us, it appears that these features are not inconsistent with the appellants case but are inconsistent with the version set out by thehave carefully considered the evidence of this young lawyer and we agree with the trial Court that the story deposed to by him is true and straightforward. Thus, the position is that the evidence led by the appellant satisfactorily proves the purchase of the stamps which bore the thumb marks of the respondent, the preparation of the draft and the engrossment of the draft on a stamp paper by the scribe Khakhan Singh, and its attestation by the three attesting witnesses. That is why we feel no difficulty in holding that the trial Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the suit agreement was genuine and valid and is supported by consideration. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in interfering with this conclusion ingiven by experts of handwriting can never be conclusive, because it is, after all, opinion evidence. Since we have come to the conclusion that the evidence given by the attesting witnesses and the scribe and the appellant is wholly satisfactory, that evidence proved the execution of the document by the respondent and the said evidence does not really need to be corroborated by the opinion of experts. Even so, Mr. Bennett does support the appellants cases and though Mr. Nasrat Hussain supports the respondents case, it is significant that he has categorically admitted that what purports to be the writing of the respondent is simulated forgery. The writing in question purports to acknowledge the receipt of Rs. 10,000/; the appellant says that it is the writing of the respondent, whereas the respondent contends that it is forgery. The respondents expert calls it simulated forgery. After the respondents expert described the writing as simulated forgery he was asked a specific question as to whether it would be possible to have simulated forgery where there was no model before the forger of the respondents writing and the expert definitely stated that it would not be possible to bring out simulated forgery without the model of the respondents writing. This answer clearly means that the appellant or any of his alleged accomplices should have been in possession of a model writing of the respondent, and on this point, not even a suggestion has been made to the appellant that he was in possession of any writing of the respondent. That only shows that the expert evidence given by Mr. Nasrat Hussain does not really help the respondents case.27. Before we part with this appeal, it is necessary that we should make some observations about the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the judgment of the that court which was in appeal before it. In several places the High Court has passed severe strictures against the trial Court and has, in substance, suggested that the decision of the trial Court was not only perverse but was based on extraneous considerations. It has observed that the mind of the learned Subordinate Judge was already loaded with bias in favour of the plaintiff an that the plaintiff had calculated that such of the evidence as he would produce "long with the pull and weight that would be harnessed from behind would be sufficient to carry him through." Similarly, in criticising the trial Court for accepting the evidence of Jamuna Singh, the High Court has observed that the presumption made by the trial Court that teacher, as a rule, is a respectable person, "is not any legal appreciation of the evidence but a way found to suit the convenience of the court for holding in favour of the plaintiff." It would thus be seen that in reversing the decision of the trial Court, the High Court has suggested that the trial Court, was persuaded by extraneous considerations and that some pull and weight had been, used in favour of the appellant from behind. We are constrained to observe that the High Court was not justified in passing these strictures against the trial Judge in dealing with the present case. Judicial experience shows that in adjudicating upon the rival claims brought before the courts it is not always easy to decide where truth lies. vidence is adduced by the respective parties in support of their conflicting contentions and circumstances are similarly pressed into service. In such a case, it is no doubt, the duty of the Judge to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately, examine it in the light probabilities and decide which way the truth lies. The impression formed by the Judge about the character of the evidence will ultimately determine the conclusion which he reached. But it would be unsafe to overlook the fact that all judicial minds may not react in the same way to the said evidence and it is not unusual that evidence which appears to be respectable and trustworthy to one Judge may not appear to be respectable and trustworthy to another Judge. That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse conclusions of facts recorded by the trial Court on its appreciation of oral evidence. The knowledge that another view is possible on the evidence adduced in a case, acts as a sobering factor and leads to the use of temperate language in recording judicial conclusions. Judicial approach in such cases should always be based on the consciousness that one may make a mistake; that is why the use of unduly strong words in expressing conclusions or the adoption of unduly strong intemperate, or extravagant criticism, against the contrary view, which are often founded on a sense of infallibility should always be avoided. In the present case, the High Court has used intemperate language and has even gone to the length of suggesting a corrupt motive against the Judge who decided the suit in favour of the appellant.In our opinion, the use of such intemperate language may, in some cases, tend to show either a lack of experience in judicial matters or an absence of Judicial poise and balance. We have carefully considered all the evidence to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel on both the sides and we are satisfied that the imputations made by the High Court against the impartiality and the objectivity of the approach adopted by the trial Judge are wholly unjustified. It is very much to be regretted that the High Court should have persuaded itself to use such extravagant language in criticising the trial Court, particularly when our conclusion in the present appeal shows that the trial Court was right and the High Court was wrong.But even if we had not upheld the findings of the trial Court, we would not have approved of the unbalanced criticism made by the High Court against the trial Court. No doubt, if it is shown that the decision of the trial Court in a given case is a result of corrupt motive, the High Court must condemn it and must take due further steps in the matter.But the use of strong language and imputation of corrupt motives should not be made light heatedly because the Judge against whom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicate, his position.28. What we have said about the extravagant criticism made by the High Court against the trial Judge needs to be repeated in respect of similar criticism made by the High Court against some of the witnesses examined in the case. There is no doubt that judicial administration should be fearless; judges must have full freedom to express their conclusions in respect of the evidence given by the witnesses before them without any favour or fear; and so, judicial power to express its appreciation about oral evidence is very wide. But the very width of the said power must inevitably impose some healthy restraints upon its exercise. Take, for instance, the criticism made by the High Court against the young lawyer Mr. Choudhary. In our opinion, that criticism is wholly unjustified. It is conceivable that in a given case, a court of facts may come to the conclusion that all the witnesses who have supported one party have conspired to give false evidence, and in such a case the court must unhesitatingly record its conclusion to that effect. But, before such a conclusion is reached, all the pros and cons must be carefully and scrupulously examined and a conscientious effort must always be made not to regard evidence which appears to be unreasonable or improbable as being false and perjured. We have noticed that the judgment of the High Court shows a tendency to regard every witness whose evidence the High Court did not feel inclined to accept as a perjuror and a conspirator. This approach again may tend to show with respect, either lack of experience or absence of judicial poise and balance. It is because the judgment of the High Court showed these glaring infirmities that Mr. Sastri told us at the very outset that in the present appeal, all that he proposed to do was to defend the respondent but not the judgment of the High Court which has been pronounced in his favour.