Case: 5 M &amp; T Consultants, Secunderabad Vs. S.Y. Nawab &amp; Another

risk and executed the works to the satisfaction of the authorities and appreciation of public as well. The risk involved is not only in recouping the investments to be made for installations and constructions but to maintain them in good, proper and working conditions without also sacrificing the beauty of the installations throughout the duration of 15 years. Conditions imposed on the appellants involve great responsibilities and obligations and necessarily certain concessions had to be shown to keep the project working and maintain them in good shape. Not only the Municipal Corporation had no financial commitments in getting such works by any expenditure therefor, which were to be executed by the appellant only on self-financing basis generating the required funds for installation and continued maintenance and their upkeep from sponsors by collecting premiums for giving them the privilege to avail of the space permitted by the Corporation for advertisements but ultimately the whole works have to be left with the Corporation and it is not to be removed by the appellants. As rightly observed by the learned Single Judge the venture cannot be considered to be the grant of a largesse or lease or contract in the conventional sense. The provisions in the Municipal Corporation Act cannot be said to envisage situations of the nature, when enacted. This appears to be a project more akin to the one considered by this Court in G.B. Mahajans case (supra). The fact that no other private advertising agencies, including the writ petitioner could offer to undertake such a venture in the other available areas when their participation was sought for belies the tall claims of the writ petitioner now made, after finding the project to have become successful and apparently fruitful - more perhaps than it could have been thought of, initially by everyone. Perhaps irked by this only the interests of the writ petitioner seem to have gained momentum, to try in desperateness for the Shylocks pound of flesh, to ruin the very project, unmindful of any concern for the Corporation, public good and the appellant.17. A careful and dispassionate assessment and consideration of the materials placed on record does not leave any reasonable impression, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, that anything obnoxious which require either public criticism or condemnation by courts of law had taken place. It is by now well settled that non-floating of tenders or absence of public auction or invitation alone is no sufficient reason to castigate the move or an action of a public authority as either arbitrary or unreasonable or amounted to malafide or improper exercise or improper abuse of power by the authority concerned. Courts have always learned in favour of sufficient latitude being left with the authorities to adopt its own techniques of management of projects with concomitant economic expediencies depending upon the exigencies of a situation guided by appropriate financial policy in the best interests of the authority motivated by public interest, as well in undertaking such ventures. Though now, an attempt is sought to be made by the writ petitioner and surprisingly even by the Corporation too, attempting a somersault and claiming non-compliance with certain statutory formalities, we find that such a move is not only a pure after thought, but really unwarranted and not based upon a firm or sufficient ground or basis. The very applicability of the regulations contained in Sections 126, 129A, 148, 420 or 421 of the Act to the case on hand would itself be seriously doubtful. On the face of it they involve transactions envisaged therein, when granted in favour of third parties, to be executed with the Corporation funds and involving financial commitments or parting with the property or rights and privileges of the Corporation for value/consideration, and not to a self-financing scheme to be implemented and maintained without any financial commitments or expenditure to the Corporation. Section 124 seems to enable the Commissioner to undertake such ventures even without going before the Committee, as is now sought to be claimed. The provisions relating to Section 420/421 would also have relevance only when any such installations are to be made for the benefit/utility of private person/licensee, who executes it and not to a peculiar case like the one wherein the installations are such which are to be normally made and maintained by the Corporation for public good, but instead being permitted to be made o nits behalf and at its behest by a private property for the use and benefit of public at large, which ultimately have to be left as the property of the Corporation only, and that too when executed on a self-financing basis. The Commissioner or other authorities of the Corporation, who seem to have undertaken this at a point of time when there is no concrete scheme/project or sufficient funds with the Corporation, appear to have embarked upon this venture in good faith, keeping in view not only the public good but also in an earnest endeavour to secure such a novel project executed without any financial commitments or expenditure whatsoever either for the installations or subsequent upkeep and maintenance for at least 15 years. Merely because as an ultimate outcome in the long range, the appellant is able to make some more profit than what was envisaged itself could not render the exercise undertaken or scheme executed vulnerable for being challenged to be either as one in improper abuse of powers or by means of any reprehensible/ condemnable conduct, calling for interference in the hands of Court of Law.18. The Division Bench, except cataloguing the catena of decisions, has not chosen to objectively consider the extent of their applicability, relevance or otherwise of the principle befitting the merits of the peculiar facts of the case. The case on hand does not constitute or at any rate can by no means said to be the outcome of any unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of power so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It should be noticed at this stage, exceptstatements like them which were seriously disputed by the Corporation, there is nothing on record/writing to prove any such fancy claims. In the last week prior to the filing of the Writ Petition in December 1994, it is claimed that he came to the know that the Corporation as granted permission to the appellant to erect the arches and display thereon at M.G. Road, Secunderabad, near Telegraph Office asserting at the same time vaguely that the grant was opposed to public duties cast on the Corporation, besides being opposed to the principles of law and Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the same being, according to the Writ Petitioner, arbitrary, unjust and opposed to the principles of natural justice, fair play and equal opportunity to all.The facts averred in the writ Petition and the stand pursued before this Court also would bring out the real object, i.e. vindication of his own personal interests and there is nothing in the matter involving any great public interest, which can justify and public outcry through a public interest litigation. The desperateness of the writ petitioner is betrayed by the liberally invented incorrect averments about his alleged approach to the authorities prior to the filing of writ petition, when the fact remains that notwithstanding public notice for selection of agents for similar work in other areas, he did not respond like others and merely approached the court feigning ignorance of all that happened. The manner in which the writ petitioner was attempting to make bald claims after certain orders were passed by the Division Bench pending final disposal of the appeal to explore possibilities of grant of work in his favour without disclosing for that purpose concrete plans or models to convince the authorities of the genuineness of his moves also demonstrate, mere by his attempts to ventilate personal vendetta ad exhibit revengeful attitude rather than any of his sincere endeavours to really seek relief even for him. The writ petition itself deserved summary dismissal and the Division bench committed a grave error in interfering in the matter. Theorder of the learned Single Judge ought not to have disturbed by the division Bench of the High Court.16. The materials on record substantiated the absolute need and necessity to undertake works of the nature executed by the appellant, in furtherance of great public interest and for larger public and common good. The admitted dire financial position of the Corporation and their inability to undertake such a project at the cost of the Corporation and the cost that the venture was long over due apparently made the Corporation authorities to avail of the project as unfolded and volunteered by the appellant, subject, of course, to further revisions, modifications and suggestions in the best interest of the Corporation. When it was undertaken as a pilot project on a trial basis there might not have been much certainty about the profitability of the scheme as a business venture for the private party concerned and the appellants were prepared to undertake the said risk and executed the works to the satisfaction of the authorities and appreciation of public as well. The risk involved is not only in recouping the investments to be made for installations and constructions but to maintain them in good, proper and working conditions without also sacrificing the beauty of the installations throughout the duration of 15 years. Conditions imposed on the appellants involve great responsibilities and obligations and necessarily certain concessions had to be shown to keep the project working and maintain them in good shape. Not only the Municipal Corporation had no financial commitments in getting such works by any expenditure therefor, which were to be executed by the appellant only onbasis generating the required funds for installation and continued maintenance and their upkeep from sponsors by collecting premiums for giving them the privilege to avail of the space permitted by the Corporation for advertisements but ultimately the whole works have to be left with the Corporation and it is not to be removed by the appellants. As rightly observed by the learned Single Judge the venture cannot be considered to be the grant of a largesse or lease or contract in the conventional sense. The provisions in the Municipal Corporation Act cannot be said to envisage situations of the nature, when enacted. This appears to be a project more akin to the one considered by this Court in G.B. Mahajans case (supra). The fact that no other private advertising agencies, including the writ petitioner could offer to undertake such a venture in the other available areas when their participation was sought for belies the tall claims of the writ petitioner now made, after finding the project to have become successful and apparently fruitfulmore perhaps than it could have been thought of, initially by everyone. Perhaps irked by this only the interests of the writ petitioner seem to have gained momentum, to try in desperateness for the Shylocks pound of flesh, to ruin the very project, unmindful of any concern for the Corporation, public good and the appellant.17. A careful and dispassionate assessment and consideration of the materials placed on record does not leave any reasonable impression, on the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, that anything obnoxious which require either public criticism or condemnation by courts of law had taken place. It is by now well settled thatof tenders or absence of public auction or invitation alone is no sufficient reason to castigate the move or an action of a public authority as either arbitrary or unreasonable or amounted to malafide or improper exercise or improper abuse of power by the authority concerned. Courts have always learned in favour of sufficient latitude being left with the authorities to adopt its own techniques of management of projects with concomitant economic expediencies depending upon the exigencies of a situation guided by appropriate financial policy in the best interests of the authority motivated by public interest, as well in undertaking such ventures. Though now, an attempt is sought to be made by the writ petitioner and surprisingly even by the Corporation too, attempting a somersault and claimingwith certain statutory formalities, we find that such a move is not only a pure after thought, but really unwarranted and not based upon a firm or sufficient ground or basis. The very applicability of the regulations contained in Sections 126, 129A, 148, 420 or 421 of the Act to the case on hand would itself be seriously doubtful. On the face of it they involve transactions envisaged therein, when granted in favour of third parties, to be executed with the Corporation funds and involving financial commitments or parting with the property or rights and privileges of the Corporation for value/consideration, and not to ascheme to be implemented and maintained without any financial commitments or expenditure to the Corporation. Section 124 seems to enable the Commissioner to undertake such ventures even without going before the Committee, as is now sought to be claimed. The provisions relating to Section 420/421 would also have relevance only when any such installations are to be made for the benefit/utility of private person/licensee, who executes it and not to a peculiar case like the one wherein the installations are such which are to be normally made and maintained by the Corporation for public good, but instead being permitted to be made o nits behalf and at its behest by a private property for the use and benefit of public at large, which ultimately have to be left as the property of the Corporation only, and that too when executed on abasis. The Commissioner or other authorities of the Corporation, who seem to have undertaken this at a point of time when there is no concrete scheme/project or sufficient funds with the Corporation, appear to have embarked upon this venture in good faith, keeping in view not only the public good but also in an earnest endeavour to secure such a novel project executed without any financial commitments or expenditure whatsoever either for the installations or subsequent upkeep and maintenance for at least 15 years. Merely because as an ultimate outcome in the long range, the appellant is able to make some more profit than what was envisaged itself could not render the exercise undertaken or scheme executed vulnerable for being challenged to be either as one in improper abuse of powers or by means of any reprehensible/ condemnable conduct, calling for interference in the hands of Court of Law.18. The Division Bench, except cataloguing the catena of decisions, has not chosen to objectively consider the extent of their applicability, relevance or otherwise of the principle befitting the merits of the peculiar facts of the case. The case on hand does not constitute or at any rate can by no means said to be the outcome of any unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of power so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.