Case: Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhakcommittee Vs. Lt. Sardar Raghbir Singh And Others

to the provisions of Section 88. there shall be one committee for the Gurdwaras known as the Darbar Sahib, Amritsar, and the Baba Atal Sahib, and all other Notified Sikh Gurdwaras situated within the municipal boundaries of Amritsar other than the Sri Akal Takht Sahib."16. Section 86 is as follows (in so far as it is relevant):"For every Notified Sikh Gurdwara other than a Gurdwara specified in section 85 a committee shall be constituted after it has been declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act".17. Section 88 is as follows (in so far as it is relevant):"(1) The committees described in sections 85 and 86 shall be constituted as soon as may be after the constitution of the Board, provided that no committee shall be constituted for any gurdwara under the provisions of this Act unless and until it has been declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of this Act.(2) When all the members of my committee described in section 85 have been elected or co-opted, as the case may be, according to the provisions of that section, the Provincial Government shall notify the fact, that the committee has been duly constituted, and the date, of the publication of the Notification shall be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the committee".18. Now, it is not disputed that the present plaintiff is the Committee of Management for all the Gurdwaras situated within the Municipal limits of Amritsar, except the Gurdwara Sri Akal Takht Sahib was constituted prior to the year 1930 and was in fact functioning at the date of the compromises in the section 5 proceedings dated the 6th February, 1930. It is also not disputed that by virtue of Section 85(2), this committee also became the committee concerned with the suit Gurdwara, which is admittedly located within the Municipal limits of Amritsar. But it is contended for the appellants that this Committee becomes concerned with the suit Gurdwara only from the date when the notification under, section 17 is issued, i.e. from the 3rd March, 1937, and that therefore, the plaintiff had one year from that date for the filing of the suit and that in the situation, section 25-A in providing the alternative period of limitation as being "one year from the date of the constitution of the committee", must be construed reasonably as being one year from the date of the notification in such a case and that for the purposes of this, section, the pre-existing committee must be deemed to have been constituted for the suit Gurdwara only on the date of the notification.19. In support of this contention it has been pointed out that the specific policy of the Act as disclosed in sections 86 and 88 is that no Committee is to be formed for a Gurdwara until after it has been declared a Sikh Gurdwara under the provisions of the Act.It is accordingly urged that the phrase "constitution of the committee" in section 25-A should be construed so as to indicate a point of time not earlier than the notification of the concerned Gurdwara and that in the circumstances and in such cases the date of the notification of the Gurdwara must be the date of the constitution of the concerned committee. It appears to us, however, that this contention is untenable.20. Section 86 in terms relates to a Notified Sikh Gurdwara other than Gurdwaras specified in Section 821. . Hence so far as our present purpose is concerned, the policy underlying Section 86 does not necessarily apply to the Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar for which a Committee already exists.Moreover, sub-section (2) of S. 88 provides with reference to Committees under Section 85, that, as soon as all the members described therein have been elected or co-opted, the fact should be duly, notified, and also declares in clear and categorical terms that the date of the publication of the notification shall be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committee.22. In the face of this deeming provision relating to these committees, it is not permissible to impute to such a Committee any other date as the date of its constitution for any of the purpose of the Act and to imply an exception and an addendum to the specific deeming provision. This would be legislating. We cannot therefore, accept the contention of the appellant that the date of the notification under Section 17 in the present case should be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committee concerned for the purposes of Section 25-A.It has been urged that this view deprives the Committee of the benefit of the longer alternative period of limitation and that in a case where no notification under Section 17 has been issued until after the expiry of an year from the date of the final decision that the Gurdwara claimed is a Sikh Gurdwara, the remedy under Section 25-A would become inapplicable. It may be that an exceptional case of undue delay in the publication of the notification may be a casus omissus but such a delay need not be assumed to be a matter of course. That, at any rate is not the present case where the notification was in fact issued within nine months of the decision of the High Court. The Committee which should have been alert with reference to these matters, had, not only the whole of these nine months to take steps to get the notification published earlier, but, it had three months thereafter to come forward with the present suit. However this may be, we do not consider that there is any question of hardship, because obviously Section 25-A is only an enabling section providing a cheap remedy by way of a suit before the Tribunal itself. We are clearly of the opinion that the present suit under Section 25-A is barred by limitation and on this ground the appeal must fail.23.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]On the merits, the case for the plaintiff is quite simple. The plaintiff says that whatever may be the position with reference to the earlier compromises arrived at between the parties in the proceedings under Section 5 of the Act, the later proceedings with reference to those very properties under Section 10 of the Act resulted in the judgment of the High Court dated the 16th June 1936, which is conclusive and binding. By virtue of the said judgment and the notification dated the 3rd March, 1937, following thereupon, the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the properties by virtue of S. 25A of the Act.Though we have heard elaborate arguments from both sides on these various contentions, it appeared to us ultimately that the plea of limitation is decisive against the appellants and that it is unnecessary to express any opinion on any of the other contentions raised.Hence so far as our present purpose is concerned, the policy underlying Section 86 does not necessarily apply to the Gurdwaras within the Municipal limits of Amritsar for which a Committee already exists.Moreover, sub-section (2) of S. 88 provides with reference to Committees under Section 85, that, as soon as all the members described therein have been elected or co-opted, the fact should be duly, notified, and also declares in clear and categorical terms that the date of the publication of the notification shall be deemed to be the date of the constitution of thethe face of this deeming provision relating to these committees, it is not permissible to impute to such a Committee any other date as the date of its constitution for any of the purpose of the Act and to imply an exception and an addendum to the specific deeming provision. This would be legislating. We cannot therefore, accept the contention of the appellant that the date of the notification under Section 17 in the present case should be deemed to be the date of the constitution of the Committee concerned for the purposes of Section 25-A.It has been urged that this view deprives the Committee of the benefit of the longer alternative period of limitation and that in a case where no notification under Section 17 has been issued until after the expiry of an year from the date of the final decision that the Gurdwara claimed is a Sikh Gurdwara, the remedy under Section 25-A would become inapplicable. It may be that an exceptional case of undue delay in the publication of the notification may be a casus omissus but such a delay need not be assumed to be a matter of course. That, at any rate is not the present case where the notification was in fact issued within nine months of the decision of the High Court. The Committee which should have been alert with reference to these matters, had, not only the whole of these nine months to take steps to get the notification published earlier, but, it had three months thereafter to come forward with the present suit. However this may be, we do not consider that there is any question of hardship, because obviously Section 25-A is only an enabling section providing a cheap remedy by way of a suit before the Tribunal itself. We are clearly of the opinion that the present suit under Section 25-A is barred by limitation and on this ground the appeal must fail.