Case: Raja Ram Chandra Reddy &amp; Another Vs. Rani Shankaramma &amp; Others

sufficiently dealt with there, presumably in view of a concession made by the Government Advocate before them as shown by the following passage in their judgment."Shri Anand Swarup Choudhury, Advocate, on behalf of the Government very candidly conceded before us that if it is held that the Revenue Minister had no jurisdiction, then in that case the sanction of the Chief Minister would not be valid."Such a concession would obviously not bind the appellants in this case. It is necessary for us, therefore, to deal with it. Now, it is true that where the responsibility for the passing of a particular kind of order is by statute vested in a specified authority but such an order was passed by a different authority, the fact, that the proper appellate authority affirmed the original invalid order does not cure the invalidity thereof. See - Suraj Narain v. N.W.F. Province, 1942 FC 3(AIR v. 29) at p. 6. (FC) (A).It is also true that the fact that the decision of a tribunal requires the sanction of a higher authority would not necessarily make it any the less an effective order amenable to the writ jurisdiction of courts in appropriate cases. See - The King v. Electricity Commrs., 1924-I KB 171(B) and - Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of Bharat Bank Ltd, 1950 SC 188 (AIR v. 37) at pp. 190, 191 and 198 (PC) (C). But there are cases where the intended effective order according to the scheme of the statutory provisions relating thereto was the original order itself and not the appellate or confirming order. In the present case the position is different. The case was taken up by the Revenue Minister by virtue of S. 20(2) of the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs), Regulation as being in a pending case. It was to be decided with references to "the existing law" as defined in that Regulation. Under that law in a case of this kind the only effective order would be that of the Nizam himself and not of any subordinate authority. As already pointed out the whole intendment of section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act was to invest the Chief Ministers order in such cases with the a tributes of the Nizams Firman. This was indeed realised by the Revenue Minister himself who in his order specifically stated as follows :"So far as Atiyat properties are concerned it is completely within my jurisdiction subject to confirmation by the Honble the Chief Minister, who now exercises the powers of His Exalted Highness so far as final orders in Atiyat cases are concerned."This clearly shows that though he considered the matter to be within his jurisdiction or competence for the purposes of the enquiry, he was alive to the situation that the effective order in the case could only be that of the Nizam himself before the police action, or of the Chief Minister at the date of the order in question by virtue of what was then assumed to be his validly delegated authority in this behalf. The submission of his order to the Chief Minister was in terms only "for orders" and not for bare confirmation.Now, there can be no doubt that the Nizam himself in the period prior to the police action was competent to exercise the power not merely of accepting or vetoing, but of coming to his own independent conclusion, and of making any kind of disposition of the Jagir property (or its money substitute) such as the one contemplated by the order of the Revenue Minister in this case and overriding any supposed rights therein under his prior Firman. If so the Chief Minister could also do the same in purported exercise of the delegated authority (subject only to the objection as to the validity of such delegation). It is to be noticed the in the interval between the order of the Revenue Minister and that of the Chief Minister, both the parties sent representations to the Chief Minister for a hearing by counsel before passing any orders.The Chief Minister if he chose to accede to the request could well have come to an independent conclusion on a fresh consideration of the entire material.When, therefore, in spite of such a request by both the parties in spite of such a request by both the parties for being heard, the Chief Minister confirmed the Revenue Ministers order and specifically said that he saw no reason to interfere, it must be taken that he adopted the Revenue Ministers order as his own.That the Revenue Ministers order was elaborate and that of the Chief Minister is summary does not affect this position. We are therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Chief Ministers order must be taken to be a competent, valid and final order in so far as it relates to the Atiyat and Jagir property and that, in the events that have happened and by virtue of S. 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act., there has emerged a valid and final determination of the respective rights therein of the three contending parties, viz., Ramachandra Reddy, Rani Lakshmayamma and Rani Shankaramma.The measure of their respective rights is as specified and directed in the Revenue Ministers order. What becomes final and conclusive under S. 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act is the determination of the rights and not the reasoning or the steps leading thereto. It is needless to add that this does not affect any rights in or questions relating to non-Atiyat property.14. In the view we have taken of the Chief Ministers order of confirmation, it appears to us that the further argument advanced by Mr. Engineer as to whether the Revenue Ministers order had errors apparent on the face of the record justifying the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing it does not call for consideration. That question would have arisen only if the Revenue Ministers order was itself intended to be the final and effective order in the case and was within his competence.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The conflict of title arises from the fact that on the death of Raja Durga Reddy, Virasat for the Jagir had been sanctioned in the name of Rani Shankaramma by Firman of 1903 and that by the Nizams Firman dated 26-8-1934 the adoption of Ramachandra Reddy by Rani Lakshmayamma was sanctioned by the Nizam as regards Crown Grant Maash. What exactly the phrase "as regards Crown Grant Maash" was intended to convey has not been specifically stated in this Firman.In view of the fact that the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation abolishing the Jagirs themselves had already come into force by that time,his jurisdiction to deal with the matter has been questioned by the 1st respondent. But it has been maintained on the side of the appellants on two cumulative grounds. (1) That the questions raised before the Revenue Minister were matters which arose from a pending enquiry falling within the proviso to S. 21 (2), Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, and (2) that the questions at issue related to the Intazami side of the Atiyator not this contention is tenable, there can be no doubt that the judgment of the Nazim Atiyat dated 1-2-1950, was given on the footing that it was the petition of the 22nd June, 1949, which was by then treated as pending. An appeal as against the judgment, therefore, to the Revenue Minister would be an appeal in a pending proceeding if the appeal was competent. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court that there was no pending proceeding falling within the proviso to S. 21 (2) by the time when the Revenue Minister took up the matter in August, 1950, for hisare, however, unable to agree that either the wording of the petition filed by Ramachandra Reddy on 22-6-1949 or substance of the claim raised therein and the proceedings following thereon, can by any logic be said to be for a mere amendment of the Takhta Virasat or of the "Muntakhab" falling within item 7 of Schedule A of Gashti 19 of 1332 F. above quoted. The actual import of the various entries in Schedule A is somewhat obscure and could not be satisfactorily elucidated before us by learned counsel on either side. But it appears to us reasonably clear that the intention of the circular was that what may be called judicial matters which raise serious issues between parties involving their legal rights were to be taken out of the hands of the mere administrative machinery and had to be dealt with by the Directorate of Atiyat under judicial procedure and that it is only what may really be called administrative matters relating to Atiyat grants that could be dealt with as Atiyat Intezami by the ordinary Revenue departmental Machinery. This appears also to be confirmed by another copy of Circular No. 19 of 1332 F. supplied to us wherein as against entry No. 7 relating to amendment of Muntakhab of schedule A it is specifically stated "in case of any dispute the Revenue Minister will send the same to the Commissioner". Whether this copy is correct or not, there can be no doubt that in this case so far as Jagir property was concerned the question raised was a serious question of title between the parties. What in substance was asked for was the reopening of the Virasat proceedings which were originally taken on the death of Raja Durga Reddy and the reconsideration of the same with reference to the subsequent adoption which, it was claimed, dated back to Raja Durga Reddys death and divested the title of Rani Shankaramma.A careful perusal of the Revenue Ministers order relating to this part of the case clearly shows that this was in fact the contention which was accepted. Notwithstanding strenuous arguments to the contrary by the learned Attorney-General, we feel unable to accept the contention that the question raised before the Revenue Minister was one merely on the administrative side of the Atiyat department so as to vest the jurisdiction in him to deal with it. We are, therefore of the opinion that so far as the dispute as to Atiyat property was concerned and determination of the question involved in the case was outside the authority and competence of the Revenue Minister however bona fide his assumption of jurisdiction in this behalf maysuggestion - as we understand it - is that the Chief Minister by his order of confirmation must be taken to have adopted the Revenue Minister as his own and that, therefore, it was the Chief Ministers order, in terms of that of the Revenue Minister, which was the final and effective order in the case.In view of the language of S. 13(2), we are unable to accept these contentions.12. Doubtless, what falls within the ambit of the deeming provision is the Chief Ministers order and not somebody elses order. But what is cured thereby is not merely the incompetence any invalidity, if any, inhering in the Chief Minister to pass such an order. The language used is wide enough and strong enough to cure the incompetence and invalidity arising from similar lacuna in the precedent proceedings of which the Chief Ministers order is the culmination. It does not appear to us that in any other view full effect can be given to the language used. Even, on the view suggested by Mr. Engineer, the Chief Ministers order in such cases was to be taken as a substitute for the Nizams Firman and the purpose of S. 13(2) was to obviate the possible objection that the Nizams Firman in Atiyat case was an exercise of his prerogative and could not be delegated. If, as contended, that true purpose of S. 13(2) was to supply the lack of the imprimatur of the Nizams Firman, it is difficult to see why the operation of this provision should be confined to such of the Chief Ministers orders as are preceded by recommendations of competent authorities. No such limitation could have been imported into the effect of the Nizams Firman, at the time when the Nizam was in a position to issue the Firmans. We have no doubt, therefore, that if the intended effective order in a particular case was the Chief Ministers order, such an order would be validated by S. 13(2) irrespective of the competence of the preceding authorities who dealt with themay be mentioned at this stage that this aspect of the case does not appear to have received adequate attention in the Highthe present case the position is different. The case was taken up by the Revenue Minister by virtue of S. 20(2) of the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs), Regulation as being in a pending case. It was to be decided with references to "the existing law" as defined in that Regulation. Under that law in a case of this kind the only effective order would be that of the Nizam himself and not of any subordinate authority. As already pointed out the whole intendment of section 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act was to invest the Chief Ministers order in such cases with the a tributes of the Nizams Firman. This was indeed realised by the Revenue Ministerclearly shows that though he considered the matter to be within his jurisdiction or competence for the purposes of the enquiry, he was alive to the situation that the effective order in the case could only be that of the Nizam himself before the police action, or of the Chief Minister at the date of the order in question by virtue of what was then assumed to be his validly delegated authority in thissubmission of his order to the Chief Minister was in terms only "for orders" and not for bare confirmation.Now, there can be no doubt that the Nizam himself in the period prior to the police action was competent to exercise the power not merely of accepting or vetoing, but of coming to his own independent conclusion, and of making any kind of disposition of the Jagir property (or its money substitute) such as the one contemplated by the order of the Revenue Minister in this case and overriding any supposed rights therein under his prior Firman. If so the Chief Minister could also do the same in purported exercise of the delegated authority (subject only to the objection as to the validity of suchChief Minister if he chose to accede to the request could well have come to an independent conclusion on a fresh consideration of the entire material.When, therefore, in spite of such a request by both the parties in spite of such a request by both the parties for being heard, the Chief Minister confirmed the Revenue Ministers order and specifically said that he saw no reason to interfere, it must be taken that he adopted the Revenue Ministers order as his own.That the Revenue Ministers order was elaborate and that of the Chief Minister is summary does not affect this position. We are therefore, clearly of the opinion that the Chief Ministers order must be taken to be a competent, valid and final order in so far as it relates to the Atiyat and Jagir property and that, in the events that have happened and by virtue of S. 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act., there has emerged a valid and final determination of the respective rights therein of the three contending parties, viz., Ramachandra Reddy, Rani Lakshmayamma and Rani Shankaramma.The measure of their respective rights is as specified and directed in the Revenue Ministers order. What becomes final and conclusive under S. 13(2) of the Atiyat Enquiries Act is the determination of the rights and not the reasoning or the steps leading thereto. It is needless to add that this does not affect any rights in or questions relating to non-Atiyatfirst observation that requires to be made as against the validity of this order is that there is no clear proof before us that Rani Shankaramma had title, if any, to the entire estate - a matter about which we express no opinion. Her title prima facie was only to the Jagir at the start and it may be a matter of contest between the parties as to whether there were any other properties of Raja Durga Reddy which he died possessed of and whether the subsequent accretions are accretions to the Jagir estate or to the non-Jagir property, it any, of Raja Durga Reddy or whether they are her absolute property. Even if the continuing title of Rani Shankaramma to the Jagir property were assumed it may not follow that the entire estate under the control of the Court of Wards is being held on behalf of Rani Shankaramma. This is a matter which may require further investigation. The High Court had no material before it to assume that the entire estate belonged to Rani Shankaramma and to direct the handing over of it to her.Apart however from his preliminary observation, the right of Rani Shankaramma to obtain possession of the estate is not as clear as the learned Judges have assumed it to be. Mr. Engineer for Rani Shankaramma has drawn our attention to voluminous material in this case bearing on her alleged right to obtain release in her favour, which according to him, has been accepted by a number of officers on prior occasions. But the fact remains that in spite of such expressions of opinion the estate was not fact handed over and some of the Firmans of the Nizam himself (in particular the Firmans dated 22-1-1920, 9-11-1922 and 24-11-1934, set out in an earlier part of this judgment) show a definite expression of intention to the contrary. We cannot treat the right of Rani Shankaramma to obtain possession and the obligation of the Court of Wards to hand over possession as beyondstated at the outset of this judgment the property was taken possession of immediately after the death of Raja Durga Reddy and the supervision of the Court of Wards was established, by notifications of the Government published on 21-5-1900 and 4-6-1900. It was thereafter that the Virasat in respect of Jagir Samasthan Papannepet was sanctioned in the name of Rani Shankaramma by a Firman of the Nizam dated 29-5-1903. That Firman specifically committed the care of the property and the person of Rani Shankaramma to the Court o f Wards. Subsequent proceedings have treated the supervision of the Court of Wards over the property as having been established by the Firmans of the Nizam. If therefore, S. 53 of the Court of Wards Act is to be applied to this case it would require another Firman of the Nazim for the supervision of the Court of Wards to be released and the fact that Rani Shankaramma attained majority would not by itself be enough. This indeed was the assumption to be found in some of the latter Firmans of the Nizam relating to this matter.It is true that clause (c) of S. 53 is inapplicable in the altered circumstances at any rate after 1950, since admittedly a Firman of Nizam can have now no constitutional validity. But we have not been shown whether this clause has been adapted or modified by the President under Art. 372 of the Constitution nor has it been urged before us that in the altered circumstances we can treat it as either abrogated or as suitably adapted. It is, therefore, enough to say that we have not been shown that the Court of Wards was under a statutory obligation is this case to hand over to Rani Shankaramma possession of the properties which are in their control. We are accordingly unable to maintain also the portion of the order of the High Court directing the estate to be handed over to her.17. This undoubtedly leads to a very anomalous situation and may have the effect of indefinitely continuing the administration of the Court of Wards over the property until such time as one party or the other goes to the Court and obtains release or until the Court of Wards releases the same on its own responsibility or by filing an interpleader suit. These are matters however which do not concern the Court in an application for issue of a writ.