Case: STATE OF KERALA &amp; ANR Vs. M/S POPULAR ESTATES (NOW DISSOLVED) &amp; ANR

comprised of roads and buildings. These arguments found favour with the High Court. In our considered opinion, there is no glaring error in the impugned judgment, having regard to these circumstances. 39. The tribunal entirely rejected the evidence of PW-1, the Forest Range Officer, who gave the memorandum to the Commissioner on 01.09.1977. The tribunal wholly discredited and brushed aside the evidence of this officer and viewed it with suspicion. This is clear from the repeated use of the phrase magic money suggesting that PW-1 was devious and had been bribed. A reading of his deposition shows no such suggestion to him; no material was placed on record that he was prosecuted for an offence, nor were departmental proceedings initiated, for misconduct. 40. The other materials on record (the auditors balance sheets, Ex. A-57 to A- 64) the evidence of the auditor (PW-4), the deposition of the manager of the respondent/ Popular Estates, PW-5, who had worked since 1969 onwards reinforce the respondents contentions that the largest part of the area was cultivation for plantation crops. The tribunal, in this courts opinion unreasonably discarded these materials. 41. The other documents, i.e. Ex. A-66, Settlement arrived at between Popular Estates and its workers after closure on 25.6.1982 reveal that it had 80 permanent workers and 29 temporary workers on its rolls. Likewise, copies of income tax returns for various dates showed that income from these estates was consistently reported, along with expenditure. For the year ending on 31.3.1968 income was reported as ? 81,319; for the year ending 31.3.1969 it was ?95,707/-; the year ending 31.3.1970 it was ? 1,12,524; and for the year ending 31.3.1971 it was ? 1,38,918. The respondent Popular Estates was apparently depositing agricultural income tax and employees provident fund (Ex. A-67, A-69 and A-70). It had produced correspondence with these statutory authorities, as well as sales tax returns (Ex. A-71). 42. The title deeds of the predecessor-in-interest of the partners of the Popular Estates who had acquired the lands in 1963, show that large areas were shown as cardamon plantation. Popular Estates had filed agricultural income returns and even in 1970, it was producing coffee, rubber and cardamom. The fact that it had some labour trouble also supported its contention that Popular Estates plantation activities were on in full scale. All these materials, in the opinion of the court, support the conclusions of the High Court, which are based on plausible (and not an unreasonable) inference of the overall analysis of the evidence on the record. 43. There is some authority for the proposition that where two plausible views on the conclusions that can be drawn from facts on the record exist, this court, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of the High Court. It has been observed in Pritam Singh v. The State 1950 SCR 453, this Court observed that: On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article. Similar observations were made in Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1. In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214 , this Court observed that- The discretionary power of the Supreme Court is plenary in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself qualifying that power. The very conferment of the discretionary power defies any attempt at exhaustive definition of such power. The power is permitted to be invoked not in a routine fashion but in very exceptional circumstances as when a question of law of general public importance arises or a decision sought to be impugned before the Supreme Court shocks the conscience. This overriding and exceptional power has been vested in the Supreme Court to be exercised sparingly and only in furtherance of the cause of justice in the Supreme Court in exceptional cases only when special circumstances are shown to exist. 44. Likewise, in Union of India v. Gangadhar Narsingdas Agarwal & Anr (1997) 10 SCC 305 this court, declining to interfere with the order of the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution, said that even if two views are possible, the view taken by the High Court being a plausible one, it would not call for intervention by this court. A similar view was expressed in Jai Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak (Smt) & Ors (2000) 5 SCC 141 , wherein this court held that when there was nothing illegal and wrong in the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the High Court and it appeared to be merited and in accordance with the interpretation of statutory provisions, this court would not interfere with the order of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In Taherakhatoon (D) By Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1992) 2 SCC 635 , this Court at observed as follows: In view of the above decisions, even though we are now dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, we are not bound to go into merits and even if we do so and declare the law or point out the error- still we may not interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not require interference or if we feel that the relief could be moulded in a different fashion. 45. This court has carefully considered the findings of the High Court while setting aside the order of the tribunal. The reasons which led the High Court to conclude that the tribunals findings called for interference are merited and in accord with the material evidence on record.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]31. The definition of private forest given in Section 2(f) of the Vesting Act and Section 2(47) of the KLR Act were considered by this court in Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Ltd v. The Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat & Anr 1990 (Supp) SCC 785. The lands involved in that case were forests as defined in the Madras Act and continued to be so when the Vesting Act came into force in 1971. It was observed that the definition of private forests applicable to the Malabar district was not general in terms but limited to the area and lands to which the Madras Act applied, and exempted therefrom land described under sub-clause (A) to (D). It was held that the previous decision of this court in Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [1973] 1 SCR 399    and the earlier decision in State of Kerala v. Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Ltd [1974] 1 SCR 67 1 (supra) was aa judicial recognition of the distinction between private forest in Travancore- Cochin area in Kerala State and the private forest in Malabar district. This distinction by itself is sufficient to dispel the anomalies suggested by counsel for the appellant. Look at the definition. Sub-clause (A) refers to gardens or nilams as defined in the KLR Act. Garden means lands used principally for growing coconut trees, arecanut trees or pepper vines or any two or more of the same. Nilam means lands adapted for the cultivation of paddy. Sub-clause (B) deals with what may be called plantation crops, cultivation of which in the general sense would be cultivation of agricultural crops. Such agricultural crops are by name specified. Lands used for any purpose ancillary to such cultivation or for preparation of the same for the market are also included thereunder. Next follows sub-clause (C). It first refers to lands which are principally cultivated with cashew or other fruit-bearing trees. It thus refers to only the fruit beating trees. It next refers to lands which are principally cultivated with any other agricultural crop. If the legislature had intended to use the term agricultural crop in a wide sense so as to take within its fold all species of trees fruit-beating or otherwise, it would be unnecessary to have the first limb denoting only the cashew or other fruit-beating trees. It may be significant to note that the Legislature in each sub-clause (A) to (C) has used the words to identify the different categories of crops or trees. The words used in every sub-clause too have associations, echoes and overtones.33. The correct manner of interpreting the interplay between the Madras Act and the Vesting Act, was explained lucidly in the judgment of this court in State of Kerala v. Pullangode Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd (1999) 6 SCC 92.  This court observed that:8. It is necessary first, we think, to construe the definition of private forest in the said Act. It means, as aforestated, in relation to the erstwhile Malabar District of the State of Madras, land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act applied immediately before 10-5-1971, being the appointed day under the said Act, but excluding, inter alia,lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market. Such lands so used are, therefore, not private forests within the meaning of the said Act. Now what this means is that the lands in Malabar District aforementioned which are used (a) principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon, (b) for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops, and (c) for the preparation of such crops for the market are not private forests under the said Act. The use of the words are used in this context necessarily refers to such use as on the appointed date under the said Act, namely, 10-5-1971. It is not possible to give any other meaning to the words are used. They must relate to use on that particular day for it is on that day that land is or is not a private forest within the meaning of the said Act.34. The states contention that as Popular Estates had mentioned in its petition that a certain area was forest (since it was so, by virtue of provisions of the Madras Act) therefore, does not preclude the latters contention that no vesting could take place; whether the lands were forest or cultivated plantations or estates, for the purposes of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Vesting Act, especially whether they stood excluded from operation of that Act, had to be considered independently.35. The judgment in Kunjanam Antony (supra) enunciated the rule that where the Land Board arrives at a determination about the character of lands, under the KLR Act, that becomes a piece of evidence for the purposes of the Vesting Act. It was observed that:There can be no doubt that the order of the Thaluka Land Board, a statutory authority, is binding on the authorities under the Land Reforms Act. So far as the proceedings under the Forest Act are concerned, the order of the Thaluka Land Board would be a piece of evidence but it cannot be treated as a binding on the authorities under the Forest Act. Unless a contrary state of affairs is shown to exist, the order of the Thaluka Land Board would have to be given due weight. From the material placed before the High Court and also before us, it appears that there is no evidence in regard to the destruction of the rubber plantation due to fire. There is, however, material to show that the appellant has been cultivating tapioca. Further, the High Court recorded a finding that there was no evidence indicating that the appellant had intention to cultivate the land which only meant cultivation of rubber plantation. There is also nothing on record to show that absence of rubber plantation was for short period and that the land was in the process of rubber plantation.36. Apart from this courts judgment in Popular II, another recent judgment, in State of Kerala v. Mohammed Basheer (2019) 2 SCC 260    has also followed the rule in Kunjanam Antony. Therefore, it is no longer open for the state to argue that the Boards determination or order, had little or no evidentiary value. In view of the judgments of this court, including Popular II, the enunciation of the principle that unless a contrary state of affairs were shown to exist, the Boards order would have to be given due weight had to apply, and was correctly invoked by the High Court.37. Coming to the facts of this case, what can be seen is that the two reports: preliminary and final, filed by the Commissioner, in the first proceeding (instituted by Popular Estates in 1974 by two applications) were the nearest in point of time, to the appointed date. The preliminary report, Ex. A-6 (filed on 15.01.1976) discloses widespread cultivation of coffee, cardamom, rubber, areca nut, etc. The two reports are part of the record. Ex. A-7 by the Commissioner, i.e. the final report dated 12.09.1977 recorded that the Forest Range Officer, after inspection stated that only disputed portions in Bit Nos. 1 to 7 had been demarcated and that the other areas were cultivated. The respondents contention was that this reflected the true factual position, coupled with the Range Officers memorandum (Ex. A-4) filed before the Commissioner on 01.09.1977.38. A combined reading of these materials, leads one to infer that a detailed inspection of the area took place. Only those areas that vested with the government were demarcated by the survey party, attached with the Superintendent, Land Records. It was in these circumstances that the respondent successfully urged before the High Court that what was demarcated was only 100 hectares and the others were not demarcated since they were cultivated. This was borne out by Ex. A-7, the final report. The possession with respect to 100 hectares of uncultivated forest lands was also covered by draft statement of land (Ex. A- 50, dated 24.01.1979) furnished to the Board in proceedings under the KLR Act. Ex. A-50 was the foundation for the Boards order dated 04.11.1980 (Ex. A-51). Both these documents confirmed that 100 hectares was vested forest. Popular Estates had submitted that 533 acres was under cardamom cultivation; 120 acres under rubber plantation; 257 acres under coffee plantation and that 155.9 acres was forest land; and 17.5 acres of were comprised of roads and buildings. These arguments found favour with the High Court. In our considered opinion, there is no glaring error in the impugned judgment, having regard to these circumstances.39. The tribunal entirely rejected the evidence of PW-1, the Forest Range Officer, who gave the memorandum to the Commissioner on 01.09.1977. The tribunal wholly discredited and brushed aside the evidence of this officer and viewed it with suspicion. This is clear from the repeated use of the phrase magic money suggesting that PW-1 was devious and had been bribed. A reading of his deposition shows no such suggestion to him; no material was placed on record that he was prosecuted for an offence, nor were departmental proceedings initiated, for misconduct.40. The other materials on record (the auditors balance sheets, Ex. A-57 to A- 64) the evidence of the auditor (PW-4), the deposition of the manager of the respondent/ Popular Estates, PW-5, who had worked since 1969 onwards reinforce the respondents contentions that the largest part of the area was cultivation for plantation crops. The tribunal, in this courts opinion unreasonably discarded these materials.41. The other documents, i.e. Ex. A-66, Settlement arrived at between Popular Estates and its workers after closure on 25.6.1982 reveal that it had 80 permanent workers and 29 temporary workers on its rolls. Likewise, copies of income tax returns for various dates showed that income from these estates was consistently reported, along with expenditure. For the year ending on 31.3.1968 income was reported as ? 81,319; for the year ending 31.3.1969 it was ?95,707/-; the year ending 31.3.1970 it was ? 1,12,524; and for the year ending 31.3.1971 it was ? 1,38,918. The respondent Popular Estates was apparently depositing agricultural income tax and employees provident fund (Ex. A-67, A-69 and A-70). It had produced correspondence with these statutory authorities, as well as sales tax returns (Ex. A-71).42. The title deeds of the predecessor-in-interest of the partners of the Popular Estates who had acquired the lands in 1963, show that large areas were shown as cardamon plantation. Popular Estates had filed agricultural income returns and even in 1970, it was producing coffee, rubber and cardamom. The fact that it had some labour trouble also supported its contention that Popular Estates plantation activities were on in full scale. All these materials, in the opinion of the court, support the conclusions of the High Court, which are based on plausible (and not an unreasonable) inference of the overall analysis of the evidence on the record.43. There is some authority for the proposition that where two plausible views on the conclusions that can be drawn from facts on the record exist, this court, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of the High Court. It has been observed in Pritam Singh v. The State 1950 SCR 453, this Court observed that:On a careful examination of Article 136 along with the preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary power with which this Court is invested under is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under this article.44. Likewise, in Union of India v. Gangadhar Narsingdas Agarwal & Anr (1997) 10 SCC 305    this court, declining to interfere with the order of the High Court in exercise of its power under Article 136 of the Constitution, said that even if two views are possible, the view taken by the High Court being a plausible one, it would not call for intervention by this court. A similar view was expressed in Jai Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak (Smt) & Ors (2000) 5 SCC 141 , wherein this court held that when there was nothing illegal and wrong in the reasoning and conclusions arrived at by the High Court and it appeared to be merited and in accordance with the interpretation of statutory provisions, this court would not interfere with the order of the High Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In Taherakhatoon (D) By Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1992) 2 SCC 635 , this Court at observed as follows:In view of the above decisions, even though we are now dealing with the appeal after grant of special leave, we are not bound to go into merits and even if we do so and declare the law or point out the error- still we may not interfere if the justice of the case on facts does not require interference or if we feel that the relief could be moulded in a different fashion.45. This court has carefully considered the findings of the High Court while setting aside the order of the tribunal. The reasons which led the High Court to conclude that the tribunals findings called for interference are merited and in accord with the material evidence on record.