Case: Purushothaman Nambudiri Vs. The State Of Kerala

or(b) of Art. 31A(2). As already pointed out, any extrinsic aid to construction can be sought only when the words of the statute reasonably and properly interpreted are of ambiguous import, and the construction of the clauses now under consideration leads to no ambiguity. In the circumstances, to accept the construction contended for by the respondent would be not to interpret the enacted words, but to rewrite the clauses altogether. Beside, Art. 31A makes provision for special cases where on account of over-whelming social needs, the protection normally afforded to the citizen by the guarantee of fundamental rights is withdrawn. It would, I consider, be a proper rule of construction to interpret the terms of such a provision with strictness which would serve to preserve the area of the guaranteed freedoms from encroachment except as specially provided. In other words, if the construction of Art. 31A were ambiguous, the ambiguity should be resolved in favour of the citizen so as to reserve to him the guarantee of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31 except where the same has been denied to him by the clear words of the Constitution. 67. Secondly, reliance was placed on three decisions of this Court 1959 Supp (1) SCR 489 : (AIR 1959 SC 459 ), 1959 Supp (1) SCR 748 : (AIR 1959 SC 519 ) and W. P. Nos. 93 and 125 of 1959 D/-4-4-1961: (AIR 1961 SC 1517 ). In the two reported decisions, no doubt this Court held that interests of persons similar to those of raiyatwari proprietors were comprehended within the definition of an estate within sub-cl. (a) but the reasoning upon which this was rested is wholly inapplicable for resolving the controversy now before us. In the first case 1959 Supp (1) SCR 489 : (AIR 1959 SC 459 ), the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 contained a definition of an estate which included not merely the estates of intermediaries such as zamindars, taluqdars and other proprietors but also an occupant, i. e., a person who held directly under the government and whose property was assessed to land revenue in full. The question however was whether the provision in Art. 31A(2)(a) that the expression estates shall have the same meaning as that expression has in the existing law relating to land-tenures in force in the area could be read as permitting the exclusion from the definition of interests which were defined in such a law as estate on the ground that such interests were not those of an intermediary. This Court held that full effect had to be given to these words and that the definition of an estate in a pre-Constitution law relating to land tenures must determine the content of that expression. It would be seen that the result would have been the same whether the case arose before or after the Fourth Amendment. The decision in 1959 Supp (1) SCR 748 : (AIR 1959 SC 519 ) proceeds on an identical basis and turned on the definition of an estate in the Punjab Revenue Act 17 of 1887, In this, as in the earlier case in relation to the Bombay Land Revenue Code, there could be no dispute that the enactment was a law in relation to land-tenure. The only question therefore was whether full effect could or ought to be given to the words of the definition, and this was answered in the affirmative. In my opinion, the learned Attorney-General cannot derive any assistance from either of these decisions. In the unreported decision in WP Nos. 93 and 125 of 1959 D/- 4-4-1961 : (AIR 1961 SC 1517 ) the challenge was to the validity of a Bombay enactment of 1958 which extended the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1956 to the Vidarbha region, an enactment whose constitutional validity had been upheld by this Court in Medhis case. The argument before the Court was that the lands of the petitioners were not an estate and this, for the most part, was sought to be supported by the absence of any definition of the word estate in the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code of 1954 which, was taken to be the existing law relating to land-tenures in the Vidarbha region. This Court accepted the submission of Counsel for the respondent that Art. 31A applied to and saved the legislation from being impugned under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 for the reason that the interest of the petitioners in that case (who were bhoomiswamis) was the local equivalent of an estate. The decision, therefore, is no authority for the point now under consideration as to the proper meaning to be attached to the word raiyat and under-raiyat in sub-cl. (2)(b) of Art. 31A or as regards the effect of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in regard to the point now under controversy. 68. From the foregoing it would be seen that the interests of the petitioner in the lands held by him on Puravaka tenure are within Art. 31A because they are lands belonging to a Jenmi and so covered by the definition of an estate as amended by virtue of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. With regard, however, to the Pandara, vaka Verumpattom lands I am clearly of the opinion that they are not an estate and that the interests of the petitioner in them do not amount to an interest in an estate within sub-cl. (b) of Art. 31A(2). 69. It would follow that the validity of the impugned Act in relation to Pandaravaka lands would have to be considered with reference to Arts. 14, 19 and 31. For the reasons stated in the judgment of this Court in Writ Petitions 114 and 115 which need not be repeated, I hold that the impugned Act is constitutionally invalid and cannot be applied to the Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands of the petitioner but that the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief as regards his other properties. 70. Order:

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]. It would thus be seen that under the Constitution, where the State Legislature is bicameral the Legislative Council is not subject to dissolution and this is a feature which distinguishes the State Legislatures from the English Houses of Parliament. When the Parliament is dissolved both the Houses stand dissolved, whereas the position is different in India. In the States with bicameral Legislature only the Legislative Assembly can be dissolved but not the Legislative Council. The same is the position under Art. 83 in regard to the House of the People and the Council of States. This material distinction has to be borne in mind in construing the provisions of Art. 196 and appreciating their effectIt is true that the question raised before us by the present petition under Art. 196 is not free from difficulty; but, on the whole, we are inclined to take the view that the effect of cl. (5) is that all cases not falling within its scope are not subject to the doctrine of lapse of pending business on the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. In that sense we read cl. (5) as dealing exhaustively with Bills which would lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. If that be the true position then the argument that the Bill which was pending assent of the President lapsed on the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly cannot be upheld19. It is well known that the Constitution First Amendment of 1951 was made in order to validate the acquisition of zamindar estates and the abolition of permanent settlement. In other words, the effect of the First Amendment was to provide that any law which affected the rights of any proprietor or intermediate holder any estate shall not be void on the ground that its provisions were inconsistent with any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The acquisition of zamindari rights and the abolition of permanent settlement, however, was only the first step in the matter of agrarian reform which the Constitution-makers had in mind. When the first zamindari abolition laws were passed in pursuance of the programme of social welfare legislation their validity was impugned on the ground that they contravened the provisions of Arts.14, 19 and 31. In order to save the impugned legislation from any such challenge Arts. 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule were enacted by the Constitution First Amendment Act; and it is in that context that Art. 31A (2)(a) and (b) were also enacted. After the zamindari abolition legislation was thus saved the Constitution-makers thought of enabling the state Legislatures to take the next step in the matter of agrarian reform. As subsequent legislation passed by several States shows the next step which was intended to be taken in the matter of agrarian reform was to put a ceiling on the extent of individual holding of agricultural land. The inevitable consequence of putting a ceiling on individual occupation or ownership of such agricultural and was to provide for the acquisition of the land held in excess of the prescribed maximum for distribution amongst the tillers of the soil.It is in the light of this background that we have to determine the question as to whether the property with which the petitioner is concerned constitutes an estate or rights in relation to an estate under cl. (2)(a) or (b)24. It is necessary therefore to have some basic idea of the meaning of the word estate is used in Art. 31A(2)(a), As we have said already, where the word estate as such is used in the existing law relating to land-tenures in force in a particular area, there is no difficulty and the word estate as defined in the existing law would have that meaning for that area and there would be no necessity for looking for a local equivalent. But where the word estate as such is not defined in an existing law it will be necessary to see if some other term is defined or used in the existing law in a particular area which in that area is the local equivalent of the word estate. In that case the word estate would have the meaning assigned to that term in the existing law in that area. To determine therefore whether a particular term defined or used in a particular area is the local equivalent of the word estate as used in Art. 31A(2) (a) it is necessary to have some basic concept of the meaning of the word estate as used in the relevant Article of the Constitution. It seems to us that the basic concept of the word estate is that the person holding the estate should be proprietor of the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in whole or in part, if therefore a term is used or defined in any existing law in a local area which corresponds to this basic concept of estate that would be the local equivalent of the word estate in that area. It is not necessary that there must be an intermediary in an estate before it can be called an estate within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a); it is true that in many cases of estates such intermediaries exist, but there are many holders of small estates who cultivate their lands without any intermediary whatever. It is not the presence of the intermediary that determines whether a particular landed property is an estate or not; what determines the character of such property to be an estate is whether it comes within the definition of the word estate in the existing law in a particular area or is for the purpose of that area the local equivalent of the word estate, irrespective of whether there are intermediaries in existence or not. This, in our opinion, is also borne out by consideration of the relevant decisions of this Cour34. It would thus be seen that under Cl. 13 the person holding lands on the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure is not a tenant. He is given the proprietary right in the soil itself, subject of course to the lights as to metals and minerals reserved in favour of the State. Indeed, the whole scheme of the new proclamation appears to be to change the character of the possession of the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant into that of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he is made liable to pay half of the net produce and that may appear to be a little too high, but the measure of the levy will not convert what is intended to be a recovery of assessment into a recovery of rent. The proprietor of the land held on Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure is nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds the land subject to his liability to pay the assessment to the State. It is not difficult to imagine that in a fairly large number of lands held by Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure-holders the holders in turn would let out the lands to the cultivators and thus would come into existence a local equivalent of the class of intermediaries.Land revenue record is required to be prepared by the proclamation and relevant entries showing the extent of the properties belonging to the respective holders and the details about their lability to pay the assessment are intended to be shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would not be reasonable to hold that the lands held by the petitioner under the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure do not confer on him the proprietary right at all but make him a tenant of the State.In the proclamation there does not appear to be a provision for forfeiture or surrender and the scheme adopted by the proclamation suggests that the amount due from the tenure-holder by way of assessment would presumably be recovered as arrears of land revenue and not as rent. Therefore, we are inclined to hold that the Pandaravaka verumpattom can be regarded as a local equivalent of an estate under cl. (2)(a) of Art. 31ASince it was thought that the said method of apportionment was fair and equitable the clause adopted the same in the State of Cochin. It would thus be clear that the lands held by the petitioner under the Puravaka tenure satisfy the test of even the narrow construction placed by the petitioner on the term estate in cl. (2)(a). Therefore, there can be no doubt that about 350 acres of land held by the petitioner on the puravaka tenure constitute an estate under cl. (2)(a).