Case: I.N.Saksena Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

had attained the age of 55 years on three months notice; otherwise we do not see why this was not included in the amendment when it was published on December 6, 1963.We may note in contrast that the contents of Para 3 of the memorandum were incorporated in the rule. We, therefore, hold that the memorandum of February 28, 1963 does not amount to rules under Art. 309; it contains merely executive instructions, and the only rule which the Government has made on the question of superannuation is by the notification of December 6, 1963. That rule would apply to the appellant and it does not empower the Government to retire Government servants over the age of 55 years on three months notice without assigning any reason. As this rule would apply to the appellant from the date it came into force, the notice which had been served retiring him from December 31, 1963 must fall in the face of the rule published on December 6, 1963.11. Then it is urged that if the memorandum of February 28, 1963 does not amount to rules under Art. 309, the appellant would have to retire in August 1963 and. therefore, could not take advantage of the rule published on December 6, 1963 fixing the age of retirement at 58. We are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. Fundamental Rule 56, as it existed before March 1, 1963, provided 55 years as the age of retirement. It further provided that a Government servant might be retained in service after that date with the sanction of the local Government on public grounds which must be recorded in writing but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. It is clear, therefore, that it was open to Government to extend the date of retirement of a Government servant under F. R. 56 (a) or 56 (aa), if it so desired. It is true that the extension contemplated by this rule was generally for individuals and an individual order is passed in such a case. But we see nothing illegal if the Government came to the conclusion generally that services of all Government servants should be retained till the age of 58 in public interest. In such a case a general order would be enough and no individual orders need be passed. We are of opinion that the memorandum of February 28, 1963 is merely in the nature of such a general order of extension of service by Government under F. R. 56 as it existed on that date. It seems that the Government thought it proper in the public interest to retain all Government servants upto the age of 58 under F. R. 56 and these executive instructions he taken to provide such retention till a proper rule, as envisaged in the memorandum came to be made. As we have indicated already, we see nothing in F. R. 56 as it was which would in any way bar the Government from passing such a general order retaining the services of all Government servants upto the age of 58, though ordinarily one would expect an individual order in each individual case under that rule. Even so, if the Government comes to the conclusion generally that services of all Government servants should be retained upto the age of 58 years, we cannot see why the Government cannot pass a general order in anticipation of the relevant rule being amended raising the age of retirement in the public interest. We, therefore, read the executive instructions contained in the memorandum as amounting to an order of Government retaining the services of all Government servants upto the age of 58 years subject to the conditions prescribed in the memorandum, till an appropriate rule as to age of superannuation is framed. Therefore, the appellant would continue in service after he attained the age of .55 years in August 1963. But when actually the rule came to be framed on November 29, 1963 it dropped the conditions mentioned in the memorandum; thereafter it, is that which would apply to him after it was published on December 6, 1963, and as that rule contained no reservation of any power in Government to retire a Government servant on three months notice without assigning any reason after the age of 55 years, the notice issued to the appellant must fall.12. Lastly it is urged that the appellant could be retired under the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1958. It is urged that those rules apply to District Judges in view of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1955. Rule 7 (2) thereof provides that"the Rules and other provisions relating to pension and gratuity which apply to officers holding superior posts in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service shall apply mutatis mutandis to District Judges also".We are of opinion that this provision can, only take in the rules which applied to officers holding superior posts in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service on the date it came into force in 1956. The rule does not say that all future amendments to the Rules relating to officers holding superior posts in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service shall also apply to District Judges appointed under the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Classification Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules I955. In these circumstances the respondent cannot take advantage of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, l958, particularly of a rule which came into force in 1963.13. Our attention has also been drawn to the Madhya Pradesh New Pension Rules, 1951. But those rules do not apply to District Judges. Further in any case the provision with respect to retiring at the age of 55 years on three months notice was introduced in those rules in August/September 1964, and the Government could not, therefore, take advantage of that rule at the time when the appellant was retired.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]7. We are not prepared to extend the decisions of this Court on this aspect if the matter in the manner contended for by the appellant. Where an order requiring a Government servant to retire compulsory contains express words from which a stigma can be inferred, that order will amount to removal within the meaning of Art. 311. But where there are no express words in the order itself which throw any stigma on the Government servants we cannot delve into Secretariat files to discover whether some kind of stigma can be inferred on suchis no stigma here. The second part to which the appellant refers is nothing more than a direction from Government to the appointing authority that it will not use the above power except to weed out unsuitable employees after they have attained the age of 55 years. When, therefore, the order in question refers to the memorandum it really refers to the first part of Para. 5 wherein power is given to the appointing authority to retire a Government servant after he attains the age of 55 years on three months notice without assigning any reason. It may be mentioned that the order assigns no reason. In the circumstances we hold that as the order does not expressly contain any words from which any stigma can be inferred it cannot amount to an order of removal. What the appellant wants us to hold is that the mere fact that a Government servant is compulsorily retired before he reaches the age of superannuation is in itself a stigma. But this its against the consistent view of the Court that if the order of compulsory retirement before the age of superannuation contains no words of stigma it cannot be held to be a removal requiring action under Articleis, however clear that facts in that case with respect to the Resolution of November 15, 1919 were very different. In the first place the Resolution was published in the gazette of India while in the present case the memorandum, which has been treated by the High Court as amounting to rules made under Art. 309, has never been published in the gazette. As already indicated, it is only in the form of a letter to the Collectors with copies to the High Court, the Finance Department and the Accountant-General. Secondly, the Resolution of November 15, 1919 in terms said that it was announcing certain new rules relating to retiring pensions of certain officers in the services specified therein. The present memorandum is not in the form of rules. Further it is said definitely in Para. 7 of the memorandum that necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulation would be issued in due course. It is one thing to issue rules and thereafter incorporate them in the Civil Service Regulations: it is quite another thing to issue a memorandum of this nature which is merely a letter from Government to all the Collectors with the specific direction that necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations will be issued in due course. It is true that the letter says that the order will have effect from March 1, 1963, but that does not make the memorandum of the State Government a rule issued under Art. 309, when it is said in the memorandum itself that necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations will be issued in due course. We have already set out the relevant parts of the memorandum and the very first sentence shown that the memorandum is merely an executive direction and not a rule ,for we cannot understand how a rule could be in the following words,State Government have decided that the age of compulsory retirement of State Governments servants should be raised to 58 years."The very form of these words shows that it is conveying an executive decision of the State Government to Collectors to be followed by them and is not a rule issued under Art. 309 of the Constitution. The form in which a rule is issued under Art. 309 is clear from what happened on November 29, 1963 when the amendment was actually made. We have set out that already, and the contrast in the language would show that the latter was a rule while the former was merely an executive instruction by Government to its Collectors with a copy to the High Court, the Finance Department and theis true that the rule said so. It is not necessary for us to decide whether a rule of this kind which was notified on December 6, 1963 could be made retrospectively. If it could be made retrospectively. the notification of December 6, 1963 itself would make it retrospective and one need not go to the memorandum for that purpose. If it could not be made retrospectively, the fact that the notification of December 6, 1963 said that the rule had come into force from March 1, l963 would still not make the memorandum a rule. As we shall show later the memorandum could be legitimately justified as an executive order of Government in view of F. R .56 as it was upto February 28, 1963. We, therefore, see no reason to hold that this memorandum of February 28, 1963 which was never published in the gazette, which was in the form of a letter addressed to Collectors with a copy to the High Court, the Finance Department and the Accountant-General, and which itself said that necessary amendments to the State Civil Service Regulations will be issued in due course, was anything more than a mere executive instruction of Government. If there was any doubt about the matter, it is in our opinion removed by what happened when the amendment to F. R. 56 was made and published on December 6, 1963. That amendment has been set out by us above. It says nothing about what is contained in Para. 5 of the memorandum. If it was the intention of Government that the first part of Para. 5 of the memorandum should also form a part of the rule we fail to see why that was not inserted as a note, proviso or explanation to F. R. 56 when it was in terms amended on November 29, 1963 and the amendment was published in the gazette of December 6, 1963. The omission of the first part of Para. 5 from the notification is itself an indication that the memorandum of February 28, 1963 contained mere executive instructions. It may be that later Government decided not to include the first part of Para. 5 in the rule and, therefore it did not find place in the amendment of November 29. The analogy that the High Court has drawn between the Resolution of November15, 1919 which was discussed in Shyamlals case, 1955-1 SCR 26 : (AIR 1954 SC 369  ), does not, therefore ,apply and we are of opinion that the memorandum of February 28, 1963 contained merely executive instructions.10. The rule framed on the basis of these executive instructions does not contain the first part of para. 5. Apparently the Government dropped the idea of retiring compulsorily Government servants after they had attained the age of 55 years on three months notice; otherwise we do not see why this was not included in the amendment when it was published on December 6, 1963.We may note in contrast that the contents of Para 3 of the memorandum were incorporated in the rule. We, therefore, hold that the memorandum of February 28, 1963 does not amount to rules under Art. 309; it contains merely executive instructions, and the only rule which the Government has made on the question of superannuation is by the notification of December 6, 1963. That rule would apply to the appellant and it does not empower the Government to retire Government servants over the age of 55 years on three months notice without assigning any reason. As this rule would apply to the appellant from the date it came into force, the notice which had been served retiring him from December 31, 1963 must fall in the face of the rule published on December 6,are of opinion that there is no force in this contention. Fundamental Rule 56, as it existed before March 1, 1963, provided 55 years as the age of retirement. It further provided that a Government servant might be retained in service after that date with the sanction of the local Government on public grounds which must be recorded in writing but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. It is clear, therefore, that it was open to Government to extend the date of retirement of a Government servant under F. R. 56 (a) or 56 (aa), if it so desired. It is true that the extension contemplated by this rule was generally for individuals and an individual order is passed in such a case. But we see nothing illegal if the Government came to the conclusion generally that services of all Government servants should be retained till the age of 58 in public interest. In such a case a general order would be enough and no individual orders need be passed. We are of opinion that the memorandum of February 28, 1963 is merely in the nature of such a general order of extension of service by Government under F. R. 56 as it existed on that date. It seems that the Government thought it proper in the public interest to retain all Government servants upto the age of 58 under F. R. 56 and these executive instructions he taken to provide such retention till a proper rule, as envisaged in the memorandum came to be made. As we have indicated already, we see nothing in F. R. 56 as it was which would in any way bar the Government from passing such a general order retaining the services of all Government servants upto the age of 58, though ordinarily one would expect an individual order in each individual case under that rule. Even so, if the Government comes to the conclusion generally that services of all Government servants should be retained upto the age of 58 years, we cannot see why the Government cannot pass a general order in anticipation of the relevant rule being amended raising the age of retirement in the public interest. We, therefore, read the executive instructions contained in the memorandum as amounting to an order of Government retaining the services of all Government servants upto the age of 58 years subject to the conditions prescribed in the memorandum, till an appropriate rule as to age of superannuation is framed. Therefore, the appellant would continue in service after he attained the age of .55 years in August 1963. But when actually the rule came to be framed on November 29, 1963 it dropped the conditions mentioned in the memorandum; thereafter it, is that which would apply to him after it was published on December 6, 1963, and as that rule contained no reservation of any power in Government to retire a Government servant on three months notice without assigning any reason after the age of 55 years, the notice issued to the appellant must7 (2) thereof provides that"the Rules and other provisions relating to pension and gratuity which apply to officers holding superior posts in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service shall apply mutatis mutandis to District Judges also".We are of opinion that this provision can, only take in the rules which applied to officers holding superior posts in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service on the date it came into force in 1956. The rule does not say that all future amendments to the Rules relating to officers holding superior posts in the cadre of the Indian Administrative Service shall also apply to District Judges appointed under the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service (Classification Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules I955. In these circumstances the respondent cannot take advantage of the All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, l958, particularly of a rule which came into force in 1963.13. Our attention has also been drawn to the Madhya Pradesh New Pension Rules, 1951. But those rules do not apply to District Judges. Further in any case the provision with respect to retiring at the age of 55 years on three months notice was introduced in those rules in August/September 1964, and the Government could not, therefore, take advantage of that rule at the time when the appellant was retired.