Case: Babu Barkya Thakur Vs. The State Of Bombay And Others

by this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, 1955-1 SCR 777 : ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ), that providing housing accommodation to the homeless is a public purpose. In an industrial concern employing a large number of workmen away from their homes it is a social necessity that there should be proper housing accommodation available for such workmen. Where a large section of the community is concerned, its welfare is a matter of public concern. Similarly, if a Company is generous enough to errect a hospital or a public reading room and library or an educational institution open to the public, it cannot be doubted that the work is one of public utility and comes within the provisions of the Act. We are not in possession of all the relevant facts in the present case as to the exact purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. That investigation was in progress when the petitioner moved this Court. Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the application is premature is not wholly devoid of merit. 11. But the main attack on the constitutionality of the proceedings in question was based upon the notification under S. 4, which is in these terms :-"Ex. "A". NOTIFICATION REVENUE DEPARTMENT. Sachivalaya, Bombay 3rd April, 1959. LAND ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 (I of 1894) District Thana, No. LTH, 15-59/42051-H-Whereas, it appears to the Government of Bombay that the lands specified in the schedule hereto are likely to be needed for the purposes of the company, viz., for factory buildings, etc., of M/s. Mukund Iron and Steel Works Limited, Bombay; It is hereby notified under the provisions of section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), that the said lands are likely to be needed for the purpose specified above. All persons interested in the said lands are hereby warned not to obstruct or interfere with any surveyors or other persons employed upon the said lands for the purpose of the said acquisition. Any contracts for the disposal of the said lands by sale, lease, mortgage, assignment, exchange or otherwise, or any outlay or improvements made therein, without the sanction of the Collector after the date of this notification will, under section 24 (seventhly) of the said Act, be disregarded by the officer assessing compensation for such parts of the said lands as may be finally acquired. If the Government of Bombay is satisfied that the said lands are needed for the aforesaid purpose, a final notification to that effect under S. 6 of the said Act will be published in the Bombay Government Gazette in due course. If the acquisition is abandoned wholly or in part, the fact will be duly notified in the Bombay Government Gazette. Under clause (c) of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Government of Bombay is pleased to appoint the Special Land Acquisition Officer. Thana, to perform the function of a Collector under section 5-A of the said Act in respect of the said lands". It is argued that in terms the notification does not state that the land sought to be acquired was needed for a public purpose. In our opinion, it is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings that statement should find a place in the notification actually issued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if, in substance, it is found on investigation, and the appropriate Government is satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land was needed for the purposes of the Company, which would amount to a public purpose under Part VII, as already indicated.See in this connection 1955-1 SCR 777 ; ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ). In that case the question was whether the Bombay Land Requisition Act (Bombay Act XXXIII of 1948) was invalid inasmuch as the purpose for the requisition was not in express terms stated to be a public purpose. This Court laid it down that the Statute was not invalid for that reason provided that from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the property was acquired either for the purpose of the State or for any public purpose. 12. It is further argued that S. 4(1) of the Act had deliberately omitted the words "for a Company" and insisted upon a public purpose. The absence from the notification under S. 4 aforesaid of those words, namely, for a public purpose, are fatal to the proceedings.The purpose of the notification under S. 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary digging or boring into the subsoil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under S. 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. What was a mere proposal under S. 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, it is not correct to say that any defect in the notification under S. 4 is fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a Company and the purpose has to be investigated under S. 5A or S. 40 necessarily after the notification under S. 4 of the Act. 13. The other attack under Act 19(1) (f) of the Constitution is equally futile in view of the decision of this Court in 1955-1 SCR 777 : ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ) and 1957 SCR 721 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 521 ). Nothing was said with reference to the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, though that Article has been referred to in the grounds in support of the writ petition.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Therefore even if the Act contemplated acquisition for a company which may or may not be for a public purpose, it would be saved by Art. 31(5) (a) as an existing lawFurther, though it may appear on the words of the Act contained in Part II, which contains the operative portions of the proceedings leading up to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for a Company may or may not be for a public purpose, the provisions of Part VII make it clear that the appropriate Government cannot permit the bringing into operation in effective machinery of the Act unless it is satisfied as aforesaid, namely that the purpose of acquisition is to enable the Company to erect dwelling houses for workmen employed by it or for the provision of amenities directly connected with the Company or that the land is needed for construction of some work of public utility.These requirements indicate that the acquisition for a Company also is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch as it cannot be seriously contended that constructing dwelling houses, and providing amenities for the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of some work of public utility do not serve a public purpose.It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to go into the question whether acquisition for a Company, even apart from the provisions of S. 40 will be for a public purpose, or justifiable under the provisions of the Act, even on the assumption that it will not serve a public purpose. The facts of the present case have not been investigated, as this Court was moved when only a notification under S. 4 of the Act had been issued; and the purpose of the acquisition in question was still at the enquiry stage. By S. 38A, which was inserted by the amending Act of 1933, it has been made clear that an industrial concern not being a Company, ordinarily employing not less than 100 workmen, may also take the advantage of land acquisition proceedings if the purpose of the acquisition is the same as is contemplated by S. 40 in respect of CompaniesIn an industrial concern employing a large number of workmen away from their homes it is a social necessity that there should be proper housing accommodation available for such workmen. Where a large section of the community is concerned, its welfare is a matter of public concern. Similarly, if a Company is generous enough to errect a hospital or a public reading room and library or an educational institution open to the public, it cannot be doubted that the work is one of public utility and comes within the provisions of the Act. We are not in possession of all the relevant facts in the present case as to the exact purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. That investigation was in progress when the petitioner moved this Court. Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the application is premature is not wholly devoid of meritThe provisions of Art. 31(2) make it clear beyond all controversy that in order that property may be compulsorily acquired, the acquisition must be for a public purpose and by authority of law. But Art. 31(5) (a) lays down that nothing in cl. (2) shall affect the provisions of any existing law other than a law to which the provisions of cl. (6) applies (and the Act is obviously a law to which the provisions of cl. (6) do not apply).Therefore even if the Act contemplated acquisition for a company which may or may not be for a public purpose, it would be saved by Art. 31(5) (a) as an existinglaw.(See Lilavati Bai v. State of Bombay, 1957 SCR 721 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 521 )).Further, though it may appear on the words of the Act contained in Part II, which contains the operative portions of the proceedings leading up to acquisition by the Collector that acquisition for a Company may or may not be for a public purpose, the provisions of Part VII make it clear that the appropriate Government cannot permit the bringing into operation in effective machinery of the Act unless it is satisfied as aforesaid, namely that the purpose of acquisition is to enable the Company to erect dwelling houses for workmen employed by it or for the provision of amenities directly connected with the Company or that the land is needed for construction of some work of public utility.These requirements indicate that the acquisition for a Company also is in substance for a public purpose inasmuch as it cannot be seriously contended that constructing dwelling houses, and providing amenities for the benefit of the workmen employed by it and construction of some work of public utility do not serve a public purpose.It is not necessary for the purposes of this case to go into the question whether acquisition for a Company, even apart from the provisions of S. 40 will be for a public purpose, or justifiable under the provisions of the Act, even on the assumption that it will not serve a public purpose. The facts of the present case have not been investigated, as this Court was moved when only a notification under S. 4 of the Act had been issued; and the purpose of the acquisition in question was still at the enquiry stage. By S. 38A, which was inserted by the amending Act of 1933, it has been made clear that an industrial concern not being a Company, ordinarily employing not less than 100 workmen, may also take the advantage of land acquisition proceedings if the purpose of the acquisition is the same as is contemplated by S. 40 in respect of. It has been recognised by this Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, 1955-1 SCR 777  : ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ), that providing housing accommodation to the homeless is a public purpose.In an industrial concern employing a large number of workmen away from their homes it is a social necessity that there should be proper housing accommodation available for such workmen. Where a large section of the community is concerned, its welfare is a matter of public concern. Similarly, if a Company is generous enough to errect a hospital or a public reading room and library or an educational institution open to the public, it cannot be doubted that the work is one of public utility and comes within the provisions of the Act. We are not in possession of all the relevant facts in the present case as to the exact purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired. That investigation was in progress when the petitioner moved this Court. Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the application is premature is not wholly devoid of meritIn our opinion, it is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land acquisition proceedings that statement should find a place in the notification actually issued. The requirements of the law will be satisfied if, in substance, it is found on investigation, and the appropriate Government is satisfied as a result of the investigation that the land was needed for the purposes of the Company, which would amount to a public purpose under Part VII, as already indicatedThe absence from the notification under S. 4 aforesaid of those words, namely, for a public purpose, are fatal to the proceedings.The purpose of the notification under S. 4 is to carry on a preliminary investigation with a view to finding out after necessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary digging or boring into the subsoil whether the land was adapted for the purpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only under S. 6 that a firm declaration has to be made by Government that land with proper description and so as to be identifiable is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. What was a mere proposal under S. 4 becomes the subject matter of a definite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, it is not correct to say that any defect in the notification under S. 4 is fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a Company and the purpose has to be investigated under S. 5A or S. 40 necessarily after the notification under S. 4 of the Act13. The other attack under Act 19(1) (f) of the Constitution is equally futile in view of the decision of this Court in 1955-1 SCR 777  : ( (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 ) and 1957 SCR 721  : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 521 ). Nothing was said with reference to the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, though that Article has been referred to in the grounds in support of the writ petition.