Case: Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati &amp; Anr, Vs. Ramji Tripathi &amp; Anr

reason why the same principle should not apply, if what the plaintiffs seek to vindicate here is the individual or personal right of Kirshnabodhashram to be installed as Shankaracharay of the Math. Where two or more persons interested in a trust a suit purporting to be under Section 92, the question whether the suit is to vindicate the personal or individual right of a third person or to assert the right of the public must be decided after taking into account the dominant purpose of the suit in the light of the allegations in the plaint. If, on the allegations in the plaint, it is clear that the purpose of the suit was to vindicate the individual right of Krishnabodhashram to be the Shankaracharya, there is no reason to hold that suit was brought to uphold the right of the beneficiaries of the trust, merely because the suit was filed by two more members of the public after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate General and claiming one or more of the reliefs specified in the section. There is no reason to think that whenever a suit is brought by two or more persons under Section 92, the suit is to vindicate the right of the public. As we said, it is the object or the purpose of the suit and not the reliefs that should decide whether it is one for vindicating the right of the public or the individual right of the plaintiffs or third persons.12. The Trial Court, after reading the allegations in the plaint and after looking into the entire evidence in the case, came to the conclusion that the suit was primarily one for declaration that Krishanbodhashram was duly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25,1953 and that respondent No. 1 had no right to be nominated as the Head of the Math by Brahmanand as he did not possess the requisite qualification and that his possession of the trust property was only in the capacity of a trustee de son tort, and so he must be removed from the headship of the Math. The high court saw no reason to differ from the finding. We would be slow to disturb a finding of this nature especially when we see that the allegation in the plaint are reasonably susceptible of being so read. We think that the purpose of the suit was to settle the controversy as to whether Krishnabodhashram or respondent No.1 had the better claim to the headship of the Math and to the possession and management of its properties by obtaining a declaration of the court. If the real purpose in bringing the suit was to vindicate the general right of the public to have the rightful claimant appointed to the office, there was no reason why the plaintiffs omitted to implead or at least refer in the plaint to the three persons nominated by Brahmanand in his will to succeed him in the order indicated therein especially when it is seen that the plaintiffs accepted the customs of the Math to have the successor nominated by the incumbent for the time being of the office of Shankracharya.13. The Trial Court as well as the High Court found that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations regarding the breach of trust said to have been committed by respondent No. 1. In paragraph 20 of the plaint, there was an allegation that the direction of the Court was necessary for the administration of the trust. But no reasons were given in the plaint why the plaintiffs were seeking the direction of the Court. There were no clear allegations of maladministration viz. that respondent No. 1 was diverting the trust properties for his personal benefit or that he was committing any devastative. The High Court was of the view that since the plaintiffs did not plead facts and particulars as regards the defect in the machinery for administration which had crept in under custom or rules which required rectification, the prayer for direction was a mere pretence to bring the suit under Section 92. A direction cannot be given by the court unless it is shown that it is necessary for the proper administration of the trust. We do not think it necessary to decide for the purpose of this case whether the words " where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust" must be interpreted as meaning that where the Court has to give directions in the nature of framing a scheme or otherwise for the administration of trust or whether those words can refer only to directions given to existing trustee when there is one or two new trustees when one is to be appointed or to directions when there are allegations of maladministration amounting to breach of trust. It is sufficient for the purpose of this case to say that the prayer for direction was a prayer in vacuum without any basis in reason or facts.14. It is, no doubt, true that it is only the allegations in the plaint that should be looked into in the first instance to see whether the suit falls within the ambit of Section 92 (See Association of R.D.B. Bagga Singh v. Gurnam Singh, AIR 1972 Raj 263 ; Sohan Singh v. Achhar Singh, AIR 1968 Punj and Har 463 and Radha Krishna v. Lachhmi Narain, AIR 1948 Oudh 203). But, if after evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the prayer for direction of the court is vague and is not based on any solid foundation in facts or reason but is made only with a view to bring the suit under the section, than a suit purporting to be brought under Section 92 must be dismissed. This was one of the grounds relied on by the High Court for holding that the suit was not maintainable under Sec. 92.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. It is clear from the allegations in the plaint that the plaintiffs primarily wanted a declaration from Court that Krishnabodhashram was duly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25, 1953, that he came into possession of the properties of the Math and, therefore, the Court should appoint him as the Shankaracharya of the Math. In order to enable the Court to give that declaration, the plaintiffs wanted a declaration that the will nominating respondent No.1 as successor of Brahmanand was not executed by Brahmanand when he was in a sound disposing state of mind and that even if the will was validly executed, respondent No.1 did not have the requisite learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas and so, he was not qualified to be nominated as the Head of the Math and therefore, his installation as the Shankaracharaya of the Math of June 12, 1953, was invalid. There was no allegation in the plaint questioning or even casting any doubt on the validity of the installation of Krishnabodhashram as the Shankaracharya of the Math and there was also no allegation against him as respects his management of the trust properties. Then, how was it that the plaintiffs prayed in the alternative for appointment of some other person as Shankaracharya? The relief for the appointment of Krishnabodharshram as the Shankaracharya of the Math by the Court and the alternative relief to appoint some other person as the Shankaracharya, without any allegation as to the circumstance which would invalidate the installation of Krishnabodhashram and without impleading him as a party to the suit would show the strain of the draftsman to dress up the plaint with prayers to make it appear that the plaintiffs were the disinterested champions of the right of the public and not the mere partisan advocates of the personal cause of Krishnabodashram.We see no reason why the same principle should not apply, if what the plaintiffs seek to vindicate here is the individual or personal right of Kirshnabodhashram to be installed as Shankaracharay of the Math. Where two or more persons interested in a trust a suit purporting to be under Section 92, the question whether the suit is to vindicate the personal or individual right of a third person or to assert the right of the public must be decided after taking into account the dominant purpose of the suit in the light of the allegations in the plaint. If, on the allegations in the plaint, it is clear that the purpose of the suit was to vindicate the individual right of Krishnabodhashram to be the Shankaracharya, there is no reason to hold that suit was brought to uphold the right of the beneficiaries of the trust, merely because the suit was filed by two more members of the public after obtaining the sanction of the Advocate General and claiming one or more of the reliefs specified in the section. There is no reason to think that whenever a suit is brought by two or more persons under Section 92, the suit is to vindicate the right of the public. As we said, it is the object or the purpose of the suit and not the reliefs that should decide whether it is one for vindicating the right of the public or the individual right of the plaintiffs or third persons.The Trial Court as well as the High Court found that there was no evidence to substantiate the allegations regarding the breach of trust said to have been committed by respondent No. 1. In paragraph 20 of the plaint, there was an allegation that the direction of the Court was necessary for the administration of the trust. But no reasons were given in the plaint why the plaintiffs were seeking the direction of the Court. There were no clear allegations of maladministration viz. that respondent No. 1 was diverting the trust properties for his personal benefit or that he was committing any devastative. The High Court was of the view that since the plaintiffs did not plead facts and particulars as regards the defect in the machinery for administration which had crept in under custom or rules which required rectification, the prayer for direction was a mere pretence to bring the suit under Section 92. A direction cannot be given by the court unless it is shown that it is necessary for the proper administration of the trust. We do not think it necessary to decide for the purpose of this case whether the words " where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust" must be interpreted as meaning that where the Court has to give directions in the nature of framing a scheme or otherwise for the administration of trust or whether those words can refer only to directions given to existing trustee when there is one or two new trustees when one is to be appointed or to directions when there are allegations of maladministration amounting to breach of trust. It is sufficient for the purpose of this case to say that the prayer for direction was a prayer in vacuum without any basis in reason or facts.14. It is, no doubt, true that it is only the allegations in the plaint that should be looked into in the first instance to see whether the suit falls within the ambit of SectionBut, if after evidence is taken, it is found that the breach of trust alleged has not been made out and that the prayer for direction of the court is vague and is not based on any solid foundation in facts or reason but is made only with a view to bring the suit under the section, than a suit purporting to be brought under Section 92 must be dismissed. This was one of the grounds relied on by the High Court for holding that the suit was not maintainable under Sec. 92.