Case: Gajanand &amp; Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

various terms of imprisonment. He also convicted them under Section 302/149, I.P.C. and sentenced each of them to transportation for life but as in the opinion of the Sessions Judge Lalji had caused the fatal injury to Sukkhu with a gandasa, he passed a capital sentence against him. In the cross case all the accused were acquitted on the finding that the prosecution story was inherently improbable and unworthy of acceptance.The five persons convicted on the side of Anjaninandan appealed to the High Court, while the Government filed an appeal against the order of acquittal. The High Court acquitted Lalji and another by giving them the benefit of doubt but maintained the conviction and sentence of the other accused under the various charges. In the appeal filed by the State four persons Gajanand, Dasu, Bathe, and Chammar were convicted. They were sentenced under section147, I.P.C. to two years R.I. and under section 324/149 and 323/149, I.P.C. to three years R.I. each, the sentences to run concurrently. Both parties obtained special leave.4. We take up the appeal of Gajanand and others first. The High Court after consideration of the evidence and the circumstances of the case recorded the finding that the incident occurred at the time when the Nepali pilgrim was being entertained by Gajanand and that the immediate cause of the riot was the dispute raised by Anjaninandan that he was entitled to a share of the offerings made by him. The High Court further found that the version of Anjaninandans party that Gajanands party attacked him and his party at Chunawali-Marhi where the Daswan Ceremony was being performed was incredible. On the contrary it was established to their satisfaction that the fight took place in the narrow path or lane as stated by Gajanands group.In coming to his conclusion the learned Judges were influenced, not unnaturally, by the existence of blood marks in the narrow path and their complete absence at Chunawali-Marhi. After having recorded these findings the High Court went on to observe"It seems the dispute arose between Raghunath Dube and Gajanands men who were on the takhat, while Gajanand was at the Ghat below; and in view of the longstanding enmity between the two groups, it provided them with an opportunity to fight, upon which they were predetermined. Gajanands men moved from their place, that is from near Gajanands takhat and the complainants party moved from the place where the Daswan ceremony was being performed. Both the parties had armed themselves with deadly weapons and fought. None could be said to have acted in self defence."5. Mr. Sethi on behalf of the appellants contends that this observation is inconsistent with the previous finding and the High Court made out a new case in appeal which was neither set up by the other side nor found by the Sessions Judge. If the story that Gajanand accompanied by 14 persons, went from his Takhat to launch an attack on Anjaninandans group at Chuna-wali-Marhi is found to be untrue and rejected, and the contrary version that the fight took place at the narrow path is accepted, it follows as a necessary consequence that Anjaninandans party were the aggressors and Gajanands party acted in self-defence.The observations of the High Court that Gajanands men moved from their place, that is from near Gajanands takhat and that the other side having similarly moved from the place where the Dasawan ceremony was being performed in order to have a free fight, is based upon mere conjecture and has no. admissible evidence to support it. A free fight according to Harrison J. in --- Ahmad Sher v. Emperor, AIR 1931 Lah 513 (A), is"When both sides mean to fight from the start, go out to fight and there is a pitched battle. The question of who attacks and who defends in such a fight is wholly immaterial and depends on the tactics adopted by the rival commanders".There can be no. question of a free fight in the present case, as there is a clear finding of the High Court that Anjaninandans party were the aggressors.Having regard to the finding reached by the High Court that the riot took place at the narrow path as a result of the dispute about the Nepali pilgrim and the further fact that Gajanands party received more numerous injuries one of which was fatal, it is obvious that Gajanands party cannot be said to have constituted an unlawful assembly. Gajanands party was engaged in the peaceful pursuit of worship at their own takhat and was busy attending to the Puja for the Nepali pilgrim. It is not suggested that at that point of time they were members of an unlawful assembly. There is no. material to justify the conclusion that they became members of the unlawful assembly at any time thereafter.It was the party of Anjaninandan who left their place and came to Gajanands takhat, presumably raising a dispute over the offerings made by the Nepali pilgrim. They came armed with deadly weapons and one of them inflicted a sever blow on Sukku which resulted in his death and other received as many as 27 serious injuries. In these circumstances it is not possible to suggest that both parties were pre-determined for a trial of strength and had a free fight. Gajanands party were the worst suffered and though they also inflicted injuries on the other side, they did so in the exercise of their right of self-defence. Learned counsel for the State was unable to point to any material on the record to show that Gajanands party which was lawful in its inception became unlawful afterwards and we hold, therefore, that the conviction and sentence of Gajanand and his associates cannot be sustained under Section 147 and Sections 324/149 and 323/149, I.P.C.These appellants had been acquitted by the Session Judge but were convicted by the High Court on appeal by the State. We are of opinion that this was hardly a case for interference with the order of acquittal.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Having regard to the finding reached by the High Court that the riot took place at the narrow path as a result of the dispute about the Nepali pilgrim and the further fact that Gajanands party received more numerous injuries one of which was fatal, it is obvious that Gajanands party cannot be said to have constituted an unlawful assembly. Gajanands party was engaged in the peaceful pursuit of worship at their own takhat and was busy attending to the Puja for the Nepali pilgrim. It is not suggested that at that point of time they were members of an unlawful assembly. There is no. material to justify the conclusion that they became members of the unlawful assembly at any time thereafter.It was the party of Anjaninandan who left their place and came to Gajanands takhat, presumably raising a dispute over the offerings made by the Nepali pilgrim. They came armed with deadly weapons and one of them inflicted a sever blow on Sukku which resulted in his death and other received as many as 27 serious injuries. In these circumstances it is not possible to suggest that both parties werefor a trial of strength and had a free fight. Gajanands party were the worst suffered and though they also inflicted injuries on the other side, they did so in the exercise of their right ofLearned counsel for the State was unable to point to any material on the record to show that Gajanands party which was lawful in its inception became unlawful afterwards and we hold, therefore, that the conviction and sentence of Gajanand and his associates cannot be sustained under Section 147 and Sections 324/149 and 323/149, I.P.C.These appellants had been acquitted by the Session Judge but were convicted by the High Court on appeal by the State. We are of opinion that this was hardly a case for interference with the order of acquittal.It was heldCharan Rai v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 242   (B),Section 149 the liability of the other members for the offence committed during the continuance of the occurrence rests upon the fact whether the other members knew beforehand that the offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Such knowledge may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms or behaviour, at or before the scene of action. If such knowledge may not reasonably be attributed to the other members of the assembly then their liability for the offence committed during the occurrence does notagree with this statement of the law.Thequestion is whether such knowledge can be attributed to the appellants who were themselves not armed with sharp edged weapons.The evidence on this point is completely lacking. The appellants had only lathis which may possibly account for injuries Nos. 2 & 3 on Sukkus left arm and left hand but they cannot be held liable for murder by invoking the aid of Section 149, I.P.C. According to the evidence only two persons were armed with deadly weapons. # Both of them were acquitted and Sosa, who is alleged to have had a spear, is absconding. We are not prepared therefore to ascribe any knowledge of the existence of deadly weapons to the appellants, must less that they would be used in order to cause death.Accordingly we hold that the appellants are not guilty of the offence under Section 302/149, I.P.C., and set aside their conviction and sentence of transportation for life. That, however, does not conclude the matter. The appellants were convicted under Sections 147, I.P.C., 323/149, I.P.C., 324/249, I.P.C., 325/149, I.P.C. and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years, one year, 3 years 5 years R.I. respectively, the sentences to run concurrently. The appellants have been found to be the aggressors and this finding supported as it is by the material on the record must be accepted as binding. We accordingly see no. reason to interfere with their convictions and sentences passed under the various sections referred to above.10.It was argued on behalf of the appellants that the trial of the appellants was vitiated because the prosecution had not been fairlyReference was made to the strong comments passed by the High Court on the conduct of the investigation and in particular to the fact that the Police did not produce the Police diary before the High Court despite several reminders. We are unable to enter into the question of the fairness or unfairness of the trial due to certain irregularities in the investigation, for we do not think it affects the merits of the matter. The High Court was fully conscious of these defects and although it severely commented upon the conduct of the prosecution, yet it arrived at the finding adverse to the appellants so far as their participation in the offence is concerned.