Case: Shri Kishan Singh And Others Vs. The State Of Rajasthan And Others

operation from a date earlier than the succeeding year and even retrospectively from a date prior to the settlement, and that such a power was repugnant to both Art. 19 (1) (1) and Art. 31(2). The argument with reference to Art. 19(1)(f) is that S. 86 is an encroachment on the rights of a person to hold property, and can be valid only if it falls within Art. 19(5), that it is only a law of a regulatory character that is protected by Art. 19(5), that there could be regulation only with reference to rights to be exercised in future, and that a law giving retrospective operation is consequently outside Art. 19(5).This contention rests on an assumption for which there is no basis. The question whether a law is valid under Art. 19(5) can arise only when there is a violation of the fundamental right declared in Art. 19(1)(f), and if the right to hold property imports, as we have held it does, only a right to recover reasonable rent from cultivating tenants, that right cannot be held to have been invaded by a law fixing reasonable rent, even when it is retrospective in operation.If the rent fixed is reasonable with reference to a period subsequent to the settlement, it must be reasonable for the period prior to it as well, and if the settlement is not an encroachment on the rights of the holder as regards the future - and that is conceded - it cannot be an encroachment as regards the past.A consideration, therefore, of the question whether a law under Art. 19 (5) should be regulatory, and whether a law with retrospective operation could be said to be regulatory would be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present controvercy.8. The argument in support of the contention that S. 86 is repugant to Art. 31(2) is that to the extent that it gives retrospective operation, it deprives the landlord of the right to rent which had accrued prior to the settlement, and that is taking property without payment of compensation.But it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within Art. 31(2), even though it had the effect of reducing his rights.In - Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, AIR 1943 FC 29 (D), the question arose for decision whether the provisions of Act 17 of 1939, United Provinces, under which the rent payable to a landlord became diminished were obnoxious to S. 299 (2), Government of India Act, 1935, it was held by the Federal Court that they were not, and in affirming this decision on appeal, the Privy Council in - Jagannath Baksh Singh v. United Provinces, AIR 1946 PC 127 (E) observed:"The appellant relies on certain express provisions of the Government of India, Act. Thus he relies on S. 299 of the Act, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law, and that neither the Federal nor a Provincial Legislature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes save on the basis of providing for the payment of compensation.But in the present case there is no question of confiscatory legislation. To regulate the relations of landlord and tenant and thereby diminish rights, hitherto exercised by the land lord in connection with his land, is different from compulsory acquisition of the land."9. It was finally urged that S. 86 in so far as it conferred authority on the Settlement Officer to give retrospective operation to the rent rates was bad, because the exercise of that authority was left to his arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion, that the Act laid down no rules and prescribed no conditions under which the discretion had to be exercised, and that the power conferred in those terms must be held to be unconstitutional. The decision in - Raghubir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, AIR 1953 SC 373 (F) was relied on, in support of this contention. There, the question was as to the validity of a power conferred on the Court of Wards to take over the management of an estate "if a landlord habitually infringes the right of a tenant."Under the Act, the decision whether the condition aforesaid was satisfied depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner, and that was final and not liable to be questioned in civil courts. It was held that a power which could be exercised at the absolute discretion of the authority was an encroachment on the rights of a citizen to hold property under Art. 19(1)(f). and that it was not saved by Art. 19(5),But, in the present case, S. 86 of the Act expressly lays down that if a Settlement Officer decides to bring rates into operation from a date earlier than the following 1st of July, it must be for reasons.There is no force in the contention that S. 86 does not lay down under what circumstances such an order could be passed, because the very nature of the thing requires that a large discretion should be left to the authority. Discretion which is wide is not necessarily arbitrary.It was said that under S. 233 of the Act the civil courts are debarred from enquiring into the reasonableness of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under S. 62 of the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional jurisdiction over all orders passed in connection with settlement. We think that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier date for giving operation to the rent rate is reasonable and valid, and that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.10. For the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in Ss. 81 to 86 of the Act does not transgress any of the Constitutional limitations, and is valid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]3. The contention that Ss. 81 to 86 of the Act are void as being repugnant to Art. 14 is sought to be made out on two grounds. It is stated firstly that the Act applies only to what was prior to its merger the State of Marwar, that the present State of Rajasthan comprises Marwar and 17 other States which have merged in it, and that as the Act; as it stands is directed against the jagirdars in one area of the state and not the whole of it, it has become discriminatory any void.This contention is clearly untenable.What Art. 14 prohibits is the unequal treatment of persons similarly situated, and therefore before the petitioners can claim the protection of that Article, it is incumbent on them to establish that the conditions which prevail in other areas in the State of Rajasthan are similar to those which obtain in Marwar. But of this, there has been neither allegation norare no materials on which we could hold that the impugned Act is discriminatory in character, and we cannot strike it down merely on the ground that it does not apply to the whole of the State ofCourt has also repeatedly held that classification, might properly be made on territorial basis if that was germane to the purposes of the enactment. Having regard to the fact that the conditions of tenants vary from locality to locality, we have no hesitation in holding that a tenancy legislation restricted to a portion of a State cannot be held on this ground alone to contravene Art.are unable to agree with this contention. Settlement operations can be conducted only by a specialised staff having technical knowledge and administrative experience, and it might be beyond the capacity of the State to undertake them for the whole area at one and the same time.To accede to the contention of the petitioners would, in effect, be to prevent the States from carrying on settlement operations.It was held by this Court inBiswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 139   at pp.(B) and inAmar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, (S) AIR 1955 SC 504   at pp.(C) that a provision authorising the taking over of estates on different dates was not repugnant to Art. 14, and the principle of those decisions would apply to the present case as well. The contention that the impugned provisions are in contravention of Art. 14 must, therefore, beare unable to agree with this contention. The fundamental right which a citizen has to hold and enjoy property imports only a right to recover reasonable rent when the lands are cultivated by a tenant, and therefore a legislation whose object is to fix fair and equitable rent cannot be said to invade that right. The contention that the provision in S. 82(1) (a) that abnormal years as notified in the Gazette should be excluded in determining average collections is calculated to reduce the rent and is therefore unreasonable is unfounded, because a declaration that a year is abnormal is made not only when there are bumper crops but also when the yield is very low, and the provision is intended equally for the benefit of the tenant and of the landlord. A provision of this kind is usual in all tenancy legislation, and there is nothing unreasonable or unfair aboutcontention rests on an assumption for which there is no basis. The question whether a law is valid under Art. 19(5) can arise only when there is a violation of the fundamental right declared in Art. 19(1)(f), and if the right to hold property imports, as we have held it does, only a right to recover reasonable rent from cultivating tenants, that right cannot be held to have been invaded by a law fixing reasonable rent, even when it is retrospective in operation.If the rent fixed is reasonable with reference to a period subsequent to the settlement, it must be reasonable for the period prior to it as well, and if the settlement is not an encroachment on the rights of the holder as regards the futureand that is concededit cannot be an encroachment as regards the past.A consideration, therefore, of the question whether a law under Art. 19 (5) should be regulatory, and whether a law with retrospective operation could be said to be regulatory would be wholly irrelevant for the purpose of the present controvercy.8. The argument in support of the contention that S. 86 is repugant to Art. 31(2) is that to the extent that it gives retrospective operation, it deprives the landlord of the right to rent which had accrued prior to the settlement, and that is taking property without payment of compensation.But it is well settled that a law which regulates the relation of landlord with his tenant is not one which takes property within Art. 31(2), even though it had the effect of reducing hisbir Singh v. Court of Wards, Ajmer, AIR 1953 SC 373   (F) was relied on, in support of this contention.There, the question was as to the validity of a power conferred on the Court of Wards to take over the management of an estate "if a landlord habitually infringes the right of a tenant."Under the Act, the decision whether the condition aforesaid was satisfied depended on the subjective satisfaction of the Chief Commissioner, and that was final and not liable to be questioned in civil courts. It was held that a power which could be exercised at the absolute discretion of the authority was an encroachment on the rights of a citizen to hold property under Art. 19(1)(f). and that it was not saved by Art. 19(5),But, in the present case, S. 86 of the Act expressly lays down that if a Settlement Officer decides to bring rates into operation from a date earlier than the following 1st of July, it must be for reasons.There is no force in the contention that S. 86 does not lay down under what circumstances such an order could be passed, because the very nature of the thing requires that a large discretion should be left to the authority. Discretion which is wide is not necessarily arbitrary.It was said that under S. 233 of the Act the civil courts are debarred from enquiring into the reasonableness of the order; but that is because matters concerning revenue and settlement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts, and under S. 62 of the Act, the Board of Revenue has revisional jurisdiction over all orders passed in connection with settlement. We think that the power conferred on the Settlement Officer to fix an earlier date for giving operation to the rent rate is reasonable and valid, and that it invades no fundamental rights of the landlord.10. For the reasons given above, we must hold that the scheme embodied in Ss. 81 to 86 of the Act does not transgress any of the Constitutional limitations, and is valid.