Case: Maturi Pullaiah &amp; Another Vs. Maturi Narasimham &amp; Others

for the proper management of the large family properties and the business and also because a large extent of the properties stood in the name of Narasimha, with the advice of Mr. Chakradhara Rao, a leading lawyer of Eluru, entered into an arrangement with the 1st defendant which was embodied in Ex. B-1, which we have already extracted at the beginning. Ex. B-1 records the directions given by the father, the request made by Venkatramaiah to Narasimha asking him to continue the management, the intention of Narasimha to separate himself from the joint family in 1931, the request made by Venkatramaiah to Narasimha to continue to manage the family properties for at least 6 more years and his promise to Narasimha to give him at the end of 6 years three-fifths share in the properties. It then proceeded to state that out of the family properties which belonged to them at that time and which might be acquired thereafter Venkatramaiah should take 2 shares and Narasimha should take 3 shares. Mr. Chakradhara Rao speaks to this document and the representations made to him by the two brothers on the basis of which the recitals were made in the document. 19. It is, therefore, clear that Narasimha contributed to the prosperity of the family. Their father, who acquired the properties before his death, gave a direction that Narasimha should be given a larger share in the property. Narasimha, though a junior member of the family, on the promise given by the elder brother managed the properties sincerely and improved them. He was demanding partition and was asking his brother to give him a larger extent of property as directed by their father. There was also a possibility of Narasimha claiming the properties standing in his name as his own. The elder brother, Venkatramaiah, in the interests of harmony among the members of the family and for its benefit accepted the directions given by their father and on the advice of the mother agreed to give Narasimha three shares in the properties and to take 2 shares for himself therein. All the ingredients of a family arrangement as found in decided cases are satisfied in the present case. We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the lower Courts, that this was a family arrangement binding on the members of the family. 20. The next question turns upon the validity of Ex. B-1. Both the Courts held that Ex. B-1 did not require registration. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that though in law Narasimha was entitled only to 1/2 share, the document enlarged his shares to 2/5 and, therefore, it clearly affected immovable property and hence it created a larger interest in the immovable property in favour of Narasimha within the meaning of S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. 21. The operative part of Ex. B-1 reads thus:"Therefore out of our family property, i.e., property which belongs to us at present and the property which we may acquire in future, the 1st party of us and his representatives shall take two shares while the 2nd party of us and his representatives shall take three shares. We both parties, having agreed that whenever any one of us or any one of our representatives desires at any time that the family properties should be partitioned according to the above mentioned shares and that till such time our family shall continue to be joint subject to the terms stipulated herein entered into this agreement." It is common case that this document did not bring about a division by metes and bounds between the parties. It did not also affect the interests of the parties in immovable properties in praesenti. What in effect it said was that the parties would continue to be members of the joint Hindu family and that Narasimha would manage the family properties as before, and that when they effected a partition in future Venkatramaiah would get 2 shares and Narasimha would get 3 shares in the properties then in existence or acquired thereafter. There was neither a division in status nor a division by metes and bounds in 1939.Its terms relating to shares would come into effect only in the future if and when division took place. If so understood, the document did not create any interest in immovable properties in praesenti in favour of the parties mentioned therein. If so, it follows that the document was not hit by S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act. 22. The principle underlying S. 17 of the Registration Act is well settled. The decisions cited at the Bar are only application of the said principle to the facts of each case. The decision of the Judicial Committee in (1911) 38 Ind App 104 (PC), relates to an instrument of 1884 which was intended to effect partition immediately and, therefore, it was held that it was void as regards immovable property. The decision in Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar, 50 Ind App 134; (AIR 1922 PC 266), turned upon the terms of Ex. AY whereunder two brothers severed themselves in status and agreed to have a document executed for effectuating the partition. Dealing with the document, the Judicial Committee held that the document did not by itself create, assign, limit or extinguish any right or interest in immovable property but only created a right to obtain another document. The decision in Hari Sankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha, 66 Ind App 184: (AIR 1939 PC 167 ), was relied upon by analogy. There an agreement in writing which contained all the essentials of the transaction of a mortgage was held to be a document hit by S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. It was held to be a document containing the bargain made between the parties and constituting a transfer of the property by way of mortgage and, therefore, it required registration. Further citation is unnecessary. 23. For the forgoing reasons, we hold that the document, Ex. B-1, does not require registration.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]These observations do not appear to contain the full statement of the law on the subject15. Relying upon this judgment it is contended that a competing title is a necessary condition for the validity of a familyarrangement.But it will be noticed that the widows, who had only a womans interest in the property, divided the property between themselves: they could not enlarge their interest in the estate. A widow could enter into a bona fide arrangement in regard to the estate only to preserve it against a conflicting claim against the estateThese observations show how strongly Courts lean in favour of a family arrangement that brings about harmony in the family. The decisions cited at the Bar are only illustrations of the passage quoted from Halsburys Laws of England in its application to the peculiar circumstances of our country17. Briefly stated, though conflict of legal claims in praesenti or in future is generally a condition for the validity of a family arrangement, it is not necessarily so.Even bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims will suffice. Members of a joint Hindu family may, to maintain peace or to bring about harmony in the family, enter into such a familyarrangement.If such an arrangement is entered into bona fide and the terms thereof are fair in the circumstances of a particular case, Courts will more readily give assent to such an arrangement than to avoid it19. It is, therefore, clear that Narasimha contributed to the prosperity of the family. Their father, who acquired the properties before his death, gave a direction that Narasimha should be given a larger share in the property. Narasimha, though a junior member of the family, on the promise given by the elder brother managed the properties sincerely and improved them. He was demanding partition and was asking his brother to give him a larger extent of property as directed by their father. There was also a possibility of Narasimha claiming the properties standing in his name as his own. The elder brother, Venkatramaiah, in the interests of harmony among the members of the family and for its benefit accepted the directions given by their father and on the advice of the mother agreed to give Narasimha three shares in the properties and to take 2 shares for himself therein. All the ingredients of a family arrangement as found in decided cases are satisfied in the present case. We, therefore, hold, agreeing with the lower Courts, that this was a family arrangement binding on the members of the familyIt is common case that this document did not bring about a division by metes and bounds between the parties. It did not also affect the interests of the parties in immovable properties in praesenti. What in effect it said was that the parties would continue to be members of the joint Hindu family and that Narasimha would manage the family properties as before, and that when they effected a partition in future Venkatramaiah would get 2 shares and Narasimha would get 3 shares in the properties then in existence or acquired thereafter. There was neither a division in status nor a division by metes and bounds in 1939.Its terms relating to shares would come into effect only in the future if and when division took place. If so understood, the document did not create any interest in immovable properties in praesenti in favour of the parties mentioned therein. If so, it follows that the document was not hit by S. 17 of the Indian Registration Act22. The principle underlying S. 17 of the Registration Act is well settled. The decisions cited at the Bar are only application of the said principle to the facts of each case. The decision of the Judicial Committee in (1911) 38 Ind App 104 (PC), relates to an instrument of 1884 which was intended to effect partition immediately and, therefore, it was held that it was void as regards immovable property. The decision in Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar, 50 Ind App 134; (AIR 1922 PC 266), turned upon the terms of Ex. AY whereunder two brothers severed themselves in status and agreed to have a document executed for effectuating the partition. Dealing with the document, the Judicial Committee held that the document did not by itself create, assign, limit or extinguish any right or interest in immovable property but only created a right to obtain another document. The decision in Hari Sankar Paul v. Kedar Nath Saha, 66 Ind App 184: (AIR 1939 PC 167  ), was relied upon by analogy. There an agreement in writing which contained all the essentials of the transaction of a mortgage was held to be a document hit by S. 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act. It was held to be a document containing the bargain made between the parties and constituting a transfer of the property by way of mortgage and, therefore, it required registration. Further citation is unnecessary23. For the forgoing reasons, we hold that the document, Ex., does not require registration.