Case: State Of Mysore Vs. S. R. Jayaram

candidate should be appointed. But the more fundamental question is whether that portion of Rule 9 (2) which vests in the Government this power of selection is valid. The contention of the respondent is that this portion of the Rule is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 4. The Rules make provisions for the direct recruitment to several cadres in the State Services on the basis of the result of a competitive examination. The examination is held annually. It is open to all eligible candidates. The result of the examination is announced and the list of successful candidates in the order of merit is published. Subject to the reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, the successful candidates are entitled to be appointed as probationers to Class I posts in the order of merit and thereafter to Class II posts in the order of merit. If there are vacancies in a number of Class I or Class II cadres Rule 9 (2) comes into play. The candidates are required to indicate in their applications their preferences for the cadres they wish to join. Had there been nothing more in Rule 9 (2), the successful candidates would have the preferential claim in the order of merit to appointment in the cadres for which they indicated their preferences. Thus if there are 20 vacancies in cadre A and 7 vacancies in cadre B, a successful candidate ranking fourth in order of merit would be appointed as a matter of course to cadre A For which he indicated his preference. 5. But the last part of Rule 9 (2) reserves to the Government the right of appointing to any particular cadre any candidate whom it considers more suitable for such cadre. The Rules are silent on the question as to how the Government is to find out the suitability of a candidate for a particular cadre. A single competitive examination is held to test the suitability of candidates for several cadres. Those who succeed in the examination are found suitable for all the cadres and their list in order of merit is published under Rule 8. No separate examination is held to test the suitability of the candidate for any particular cadre. The list of successful candidates published under Rule 8 does not indicate that any candidate is more suitable for cadre A rather than for cadre B. The Rules do not give the Public Service Commission the power to test the suitability of a candidate for a particular cadre or to recommend that he is more suitable for it. Nor is there any provision in the Rules under which the Government can test the suitability of a candidate for any cadre after the result of the examination is published. The result is that the recommendation of the Public Service Commission is not a relevant material nor is there any other material on the basis of which the Government can find that a candidate is more suitable for a particular cadre. It follows that under the last part of Rule 9 (2) it is open to the Government to say at its sweet will that a candidate is more suitable for a particular cadre and to deprive him of his opportunity to join the cadre for which he indicated his preference.Take the present case. An open competitive examination was held for recruitment to the posts of Assistant Commissioners in the Mysore Administrative Service and Assistant Controllers in the Mysore State Accounts Service. Though both are Class I posts the post of Assistant Commissioner has better prospects. But for the last part of R. 9 (2) the successful candidates would have the preferential claim for appointment as probationers to the posts of Assistant Commissioners in order of merit and thereafter to the posts of Assistant Controllers in the order of merit. As a matter of fact, there were 20 vacancies in the posts of Assistant Commissioners. The respondent ranked fourth in the order of merit. He indicated his preference for the post of Assistant Commissioner and had a preferential claim for appointment to that post. The candidates ranking 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th were appointed as Assistant Commissioners. The respondent though ranking fourth in order of merit was singled out and was debarred from the post of Assistant Commissioner. It is because of the arbitrary power under the last part of Rule 9 (2) that the Government could make this unjust discrimination. 6. The principle of recruitment by open competition aims at ensuring equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and obtaining the services of the most meritorious candidates. Rules 1 to 8, 9 (1) and the first part of Rule 9 (2) seek to achieve this aim. The last part of Rule 9 (2) subverts and destroys the basic objectives of the preceding rules. It vests in the Government an arbitrary power of patronage. Though R. 9(1) requires the appointment of successful candidates to Class I posts in the order of merit and thereafter to Class II posts in the order of merit, Rule 9 (1) is subject to Rule 9 (2), and under the cover of Rule 9 (2) the Government can even arrogate to itself the power of assigning a Class I post to a less meritorious and a Class II post to a more meritorious candidate. We hold that the last part of Rule 9 (2) gives the Government an arbitrary power of ignoring the just claims of successful candidates for recruitment to offices under the State. It is violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution and must be struck down. 7. Having regard to his rank in order of merits, the respondent had the right to be appointed to the post of Assistant Commissioner. As the offending part of R. 9(2) is invalid, the State Government had no power to withhold the post from him. The High Court should, therefore, have directed the Government to appoint him to that post.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds].Take the present case. An open competitive examination was held for recruitment to the posts of Assistant Commissioners in the Mysore Administrative Service and Assistant Controllers in the Mysore State Accounts Service. Though both are Class I posts the post of Assistant Commissioner has better prospects. But for the last part of R. 9 (2) the successful candidates would have the preferential claim for appointment as probationers to the posts of Assistant Commissioners in order of merit and thereafter to the posts of Assistant Controllers in the order of merit. As a matter of fact, there were 20 vacancies in the posts of Assistant Commissioners. The respondent ranked fourth in the order of merit. He indicated his preference for the post of Assistant Commissioner and had a preferential claim for appointment to that post. The candidates ranking 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 5th were appointed as Assistant Commissioners. The respondent though ranking fourth in order of merit was singled out and was debarred from the post of Assistant Commissioner. It is because of the arbitrary power under the last part of Rule 9 (2) that the Government could make this unjust discrimination6. The principle of recruitment by open competition aims at ensuring equality of opportunity in the matter of employment and obtaining the services of the most meritorious candidates. Rules 1 to 8, 9 (1) and the first part of Rule 9 (2) seek to achieve this aim. The last part of Rule 9 (2) subverts and destroys the basic objectives of the preceding rules. It vests in the Government an arbitrary power of patronage. Though R. 9(1) requires the appointment of successful candidates to Class I posts in the order of merit and thereafter to Class II posts in the order of merit, Rule 9 (1) is subject to Rule 9 (2), and under the cover of Rule 9 (2) the Government can even arrogate to itself the power of assigning a Class I post to a less meritorious and a Class II post to a more meritorious candidate. We hold that the last part of Rule 9 (2) gives the Government an arbitrary power of ignoring the just claims of successful candidates for recruitment to offices under the State. It is violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution and must be struck down7. Having regard to his rank in order of merits, the respondent had the right to be appointed to the post of Assistant Commissioner. As the offending part of R. 9(2) is invalid, the State Government had no power to withhold the post from him. The High Court should, therefore, have directed the Government to appoint him to that post.