Case: Mohsin Ali &amp; Ors Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

by considerations of gratitude for the valuable services rendered by the grantee. The object of conferring these three-fold benefits was the same, namely, to secure to the retiring servant a handsome maintenance and comfortable residence for the rest of his life.In other words, all the three benefits granted under this Fireman were cognate benefits, arising out of the same occasion, and made with the same object in view viz., to enable the grantee to live comfortably in retirement. These related benefits could be compendiously described as "retirement benefits". The first two benefits were indisputably pensioner benefits ensuring only for the lifetime of the grantee. All the three kindred benefits, including the one in question, were expressly meant for the person of the grantee. This is clear from the word apko which means "to you" in the phrase "apko inayat atta kiya jata hai" The conjunction "aur" (and) at the commencement of the last sentence of the Fireman inextricably links the grant of interest in the residential house, with the pensionary benefits conferred in the foregoing parts of the Fireman. In short, all the threefold benefits granted under this Fireman are off-spring of the same genus. The language of the Fireman relating directly to the grant in question therefore takes its colour from the preceding parts of the Fireman relating to the pensionary benefits conferred on the grantee for life. Thus if the crucial words quoted above are construed in the context of the akin grants, and - according to the general tenor of the Fireman as a whole, it becomes clear that the intention of the Ruler was to grant only a right of residence limited to the lifetime of the grantee - and not an absolute estate in the house.28-A. The surrounding circumstances also confirm the interpretation adopted by us. The first such circumstance was that at the time of the grant, the grantee had no issue, nor any near relation. Indeed, he died widowless and issueless. In this context, coupled with the omission of any words such as to "grantee and his heirs or "nasalan-darnasalan" indicating the grant to be heritable, it would be reasonable to hold that the grant was intended to be for life only.29. There is yet another circumstances which points towards the same conclusion. It is that at the time of the grant the grantee was already residing in the suit house. In this context, the word "sakoonti (residential) in the last part of the Firman used in association with makan(house) assumes significance. It suggests that the intention of the grantor was to convey to the grantee no more than a right of residence in the house which the latter was already enjoying.30. The letter Ex. P-3 written by the Chief Engineer on 29-6-1938, is of hardly any assistance in construing the grant made three or four years earlier. It could not be treated as contemporaneous conduct of the grantor or his agent, which could legitimately be taken into consideration in construing the grant.31. On parity of reasoning, it is doubtful whether the fact of eviction of Syed Mohammed Ali from the suit house, about two months after the death of the grantee and about 15 years after the grant, could justifiably be called in aid as a "surrounding circumstances" to interpret the Fireman dated 24-10-1934. The High Court has taken this circumstance also into account.We need only say that even after excluding this circumstance, there remains sufficient and sound foundation in the language of the Firman and contemporaneous surrounding circumstances, including the common genus, the same occasion and purpose of the three seeded grant, to hold that the Ruler had conferred only a limited estate in the suit property for the lifetime of the grantee.32. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants: that the grant in question was a hiba made in accordance with Mohammedan Law by one Muslim to another, has been stated only to be rejected. To all intents and purposes, it was a grant made by an absolute Ruler to his subject who had rendered long meritorious services, on the eve of his retirement. Reference to Muslim law is therefore misconceived. We may, however, say in passing that even according to the observations of the Privy Council relied upon by the Counsel, creation of an interest limited in point of time, in the usufruct of the property is not necessarily repugnant to Muslim Law.33. Mr. Panjwani has advanced an alternative argument, also, to support the decision of the High Court. The contention is that even if it is assumed that the house had been given to Sir Liaqat Ali absolutely, then also the grant had come to an end on resumption of the possession of the house by the Government of Bhopal in 1947, and thereafter the grant continued to be non est because after the merger of the State of Bhopal on 1-6-1949, it was not recognised by the Government of India or by the new Government of Madhya Pradesh after Bhopal became a part of that State on 1-11-l95l. Rather, as per Ex. P-6, the new Government after the disappearance of Bhopal State from the scene, repudiated the grant. In these circumstances, submits the Counsel, the appellants did not carry with them the right, if any, they had under the grant as subjects of the Ex-Sovereign Ruler of Bhopal and after the extinction of Bhopal State and its Ruler, they had only such rights as were granted or recognised by the new Sovereign i. e. the Central Government. According to the Counsel, the plaintiffs claim was not enforceable in the municipal courts. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Vora Fiddali Badruddin Mithibarwale, (1964) 6 SCR 461 at p. 551 = (AIR 1964 SC 1043 at p. 1078).34. There is no foundation for the plea either in the pleadings or in the issues. We therefore do not allow it to be raised for the first time in this Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]17. This general rule is, however, capable of important relaxations in favour of the subject. If the intention of the Sovereign is obvious from the document which in precise, unequivocal terms defines the extent and nature of the benefit conferred, it must take, effect. No question of seeking extrinsic aid to its construction arises. If the grant is for valuable consideration it must be construed strictly in favour of the grantee, for the honor of the Sovereign and where two constructions are possible, one valid and the other void, that which is valid ought to be preferred, for the honour of the Sovereign, ought to be more regarded than the Sovereigns profit. Where, however, two interpretations may be given to the grant, both of which are good, that which is most favourable to the Crown is in many casesWe are not persuaded to accept the appellants contention that the Fireman conveys, in precise and unequivocal terms, full and absolute ownership of the suit house to the grantee. In our opinion, the language of the last sentence of the Fireman, which is the sheet-anchor of this contention, even by itself, does not indubitably and unequivocally indicate that the intention of the Ruler was to grant an absolute estate. The Firman is conspicuous by the non-employment of any words declaring that thenceforth the grantee would have a heritable estate in the house or that the grantor had transferred all his rights in the property, absolutely in favour of the grantee. There is no use of such words the grant would take effect as "nasalandar-nasalan", "from generation to generation" "warsan, kaiam u qaman" "to grantee and his heirs" etc. pointing towards the creation of a heritable estate. Even the use of such terms by itself has been held to be an inconclusive indication of the grantors intention to confer absolute, heritable rights.It is not necessary to multiply authorities with regard to the construction of such customary terms which could possibly be indicative of the grantors intention to make a heritable grant, because the Firman Ex. P-1, is bereft of all such terms. It will be sufficient to say that the language of the Fireman does not in clear and unambiguous terms express an intention to create an absolute estate in favour of the grantee and his heirs. The Firman has therefore to be construed in accordance with the well-established rule of construction applicable to Sovereign grants.26. Another cardinal canon of interpretation to be borne in mind is that in order to ascertain the real intention of the grantor, the Firman has to be read as a whole. It will not be correct - as the appellants want us to do - to dissect the Fireman into three watertight compartments or to read the last sentence of the Fireman out of the context. It is also permissible to consider the surrounding circumstances and the occasion on which this grant was made as legitimate aids to construction of theIn short, all the threefold benefits granted under this Fireman are off-spring of the same genus. The language of the Fireman relating directly to the grant in question therefore takes its colour from the preceding parts of the Fireman relating to the pensionary benefits conferred on the grantee for life. Thus if the crucial words quoted above are construed in the context of the akin grants, and - according to the general tenor of the Fireman as a whole, it becomes clear that the intention of the Ruler was to grant only a right of residence limited to the lifetime of the grantee - and not an absolute estate in the house.There is yet another circumstances which points towards the same conclusion. It is that at the time of the grant the grantee was already residing in the suit house. In this context, the word "sakoonti (residential) in the last part of the Firman used in association with makan(house) assumes significance. It suggests that the intention of the grantor was to convey to the grantee no more than a right of residence in the house which the latter was already enjoying.30. The letter Ex. P-3 written by the Chief Engineer on 29-6-1938, is of hardly any assistance in construing the grant made three or four years earlier. It could not be treated as contemporaneous conduct of the grantor or his agent, which could legitimately be taken into consideration in construing theneed only say that even after excluding this circumstance, there remains sufficient and sound foundation in the language of the Firman and contemporaneous surrounding circumstances, including the common genus, the same occasion and purpose of the three seeded grant, to hold that the Ruler had conferred only a limited estate in the suit property for the lifetime of the grantee.On parity of reasoning, it is doubtful whetherthe fact of eviction of Syed Mohammed Ali from the suit house, about two months after the death of the grantee and about 15 years after the grant, could justifiably be called in aid as a "surrounding circumstances" to interpret the Fireman datedmay, however, say in passing that even according to the observations of the Privy Council relied upon by the Counsel, creation of an interest limited in point of time, in the usufruct of the property is not necessarily repugnant to Muslim Law.There is no foundation for the plea either in the pleadings or in the issues. We therefore do not allow it to be raised for the first time in this Court.The argument advanced on behalf of the appellants: that the grant in question was a hiba made in accordance with Mohammedan Law by one Muslim to another, has been stated only to be rejected. To all intents and purposes, it was a grant made by an absolute Ruler to his subject who had rendered long meritorious services, on the eve of his retirement. Reference to Muslim law is therefore misconceived. Wemay, however, say in passing that even according to the observations of the Privy Council relied upon by the Counsel, creation of an interest limited in point of time, in the usufruct of the property is not necessarily repugnant to Muslim Law.The surrounding circumstances also confirm the interpretation adopted by us. The first such circumstance was that at the time of the grant, the grantee had no issue, nor any near relation. Indeed, he died widowless and issueless. In this context, coupled with the omission of any words such as to "grantee and his heirs orindicating the grant to be heritable, it would be reasonable to hold that the grant was intended to be for life only.