Case: State of Odisha &amp; Ors Vs. Bichitrananda Das

6 August 2008 and that the purported communication dated 19 April 2006 appears to be an ante-dated document. Be that as it may, it was urged that as a matter of principle it was not open to the respondent to claim that the conversion charges be computed on the basis of the rate prevalent on the date of the application. The application for conversion could be considered only in terms of the policy frame by the government and one of its conditions was that the applicant should not be in unauthorized occupation of government land.16. On the other hand, it has been urged by Mr Santosh Raut, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent that, as a matter of fact, the case of the respondent was that there was no encroachment whatsoever on the land, which was clarified in the letters dated 19 April 2006 and 6 August 2008. Learned counsel submitted that, at the highest, only a plantation had been made outside the leasehold plot and this could not have been treated as an encroachment. Hence, it was urged on behalf of the respondent that where the State had taken an inordinately long time to consider the application, there was no justification or reason to saddle the respondent with the increased rates which were payable as on the date on which the decision was ultimately taken. Hence, it was further urged that the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion that the rate as on the date of the application must be the governing rate for computing the conversion charges.17. In the recent decision of this Court in Chennai Metropolitan Developoment Authority (supra), this Court relied upon a line of precedents emanating from the Court, including the decisions in State of Tamil Nadu v Hind Stone (1981) 2 SCC 205 and Howrah Municipal Corporation v Ganges Rope Co Ltd (2004) 1 SCC 663. The submission of an application does not confer a vested right for permission. The applicant must comply with the terms of the policy. One of the terms in the policy in question is that the applicant should not have encroached on government land. An applicant who seeks the benefit of the policy must comply with its terms. In the present case, the policy which was formulated by the State government specifically contained a stipulation to the effect that a lessee, who had encroached upon or unauthorisedly occupied government land anywhere within Bhubaneswar Municipal Corporation limits would not be eligible to be covered by the scheme unless the unauthorised occupation is vacated.18. The record shows that on 13 May 2004, the Land Officer informed the respondent that he was unauthorisedly in occupation of land admeasuring 60? x 63? which had been covered by barbed wire fencing, which was being used for the purpose of a garden. The respondent addressed a communication on 6 August 2008, stating that he had already replied to the letter dated 13 May 2004 on 19 April 2006. The letter dated 19 April 2006 is carefully worded and states that ?no barbed wire fencing and ?no encroachment now exists?. Interestingly, a copy of the earlier letter dated 19 April 2006 was annexed to the communication dated 6 August 2008. However, the purported letter dated 19 April 2006 contains a statement that the respondent had been told that in a communication, which had not been received by him, he had been asked to vacate a portion of the government land, which had been occupied unauthorisedly with a barbed wire fencing. The contents of the letter dated 6 August 2008 do not square up with the purported communication dated 19 April 2006. Be that as it may, it is evident from the communications that it was his case that no encroachment existed ?at present?. Eventually, a notice to show cause had to be issued to the respondent under the Act on 28 December 2009. The State has placed on record a copy of the inspection report of 30 June 2010 which indicates that the encroachment had not been vacated. It was in this view of the matter that the State called upon the respondent to furnish a declaration that the encroachment had been removed and that he would not claim possession of the adjacent land even after conversion was allowed. Eventually, on 22 March 2014, it was stated that while an open plantation existed over the land, the plantation may not be treated as an encroachment.19. In this background, we are of the view that there was no justification for the High Court to direct that the rate for the computation of conversion charges should be that which was applicable on the submission of an application on 15 September 2003. The application for conversion from leasehold to freehold must necessarily be consistent with and compliant to the governing provisions of the policy which has been framed by the State government. Unless compliance is effected, there is no right to claim conversion of the land to freehold. Consequently, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges as on 15 September 2003. The respondent would necessarily have to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final decision was taken after due verification that there was no encroachment and after scrutinizing the declaration which was filed by the respondent.20. A period of nearly twelve years has elapsed in the meantime. It is significant that the respondent moved the writ proceedings before the High court only in 2015. If the grievance of the respondent was that the State had not taken any action on his representations, he ought to have moved the writ proceedings at an earlier point of time seeking a decision on his application. Having himself waited until 2015 to seek a declaration from the High Court, the respondent cannot claim that the conversion charges should be fixed as on the date of the application, namely, 15 September 2003.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]18. The record shows that on 13 May 2004, the Land Officer informed the respondent that he was unauthorisedly in occupation of land admeasuring 60? x 63? which had been covered by barbed wire fencing, which was being used for the purpose of a garden. The respondent addressed a communication on 6 August 2008, stating that he had already replied to the letter dated 13 May 2004 on 19 April 2006. The letter dated 19 April 2006 is carefully worded and states that ?no barbed wire fencing and ?no encroachment now exists?. Interestingly, a copy of the earlier letter dated 19 April 2006 was annexed to the communication dated 6 August 2008. However, the purported letter dated 19 April 2006 contains a statement that the respondent had been told that in a communication, which had not been received by him, he had been asked to vacate a portion of the government land, which had been occupied unauthorisedly with a barbed wire fencing. The contents of the letter dated 6 August 2008 do not square up with the purported communication dated 19 April 2006. Be that as it may, it is evident from the communications that it was his case that no encroachment existed ?at present?. Eventually, a notice to show cause had to be issued to the respondent under the Act on 28 December 2009. The State has placed on record a copy of the inspection report of 30 June 2010 which indicates that the encroachment had not been vacated. It was in this view of the matter that the State called upon the respondent to furnish a declaration that the encroachment had been removed and that he would not claim possession of the adjacent land even after conversion was allowed. Eventually, on 22 March 2014, it was stated that while an open plantation existed over the land, the plantation may not be treated as an encroachment19. In this background, we are of the view that there was no justification for the High Court to direct that the rate for the computation of conversion charges should be that which was applicable on the submission of an application on 15 September 2003. The application for conversion from leasehold to freehold must necessarily be consistent with and compliant to the governing provisions of the policy which has been framed by the State government. Unless compliance is effected, there is no right to claim conversion of the land to freehold. Consequently, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in directing the State to recompute the conversion charges as on 15 September 2003. The respondent would necessarily have to pay the conversion charges on the date when a final decision was taken after due verification that there was no encroachment and after scrutinizing the declaration which was filed by the respondent20. A period of nearly twelve years has elapsed in the meantime. It is significant that the respondent moved the writ proceedings before the High court only in 2015. If the grievance of the respondent was that the State had not taken any action on his representations, he ought to have moved the writ proceedings at an earlier point of time seeking a decision on his application. Having himself waited until 2015 to seek a declaration from the High Court, the respondent cannot claim that the conversion charges should be fixed as on the date of the application, namely, 15 September 2003.