Case: K.V.S.Ram Vs. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corp

court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised. (Emphasis supplied) 13. In the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar vs. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 434, it was held as under:- 15. We find the judgment and award of the labour court well reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour court in its award as it is well settled law that the [pic]High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the award of the Labour Court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice. 16. It is relevant to mention that in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was held in para 49 that: (SCC p. 348) 49. (m) ... The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, para 49) 49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. 14. Emphasizing that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts are to keep in view the goals set out in the Preamble and in Part IV of the Constitution while construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, (2010) 3 SCC 192 , this Court has held as under: 21. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the Preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to subserve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J. opined that: 10. ...The concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State. (State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 at page 928 para 10) 15. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. The appellant joined the services of the corporation in the year 1985. In the year 1990, charges were framed against the appellant alleging that he had secured appointment by producing a false certificate and enquiry was initiated in the year 1992 and the Enquiry Officer submitted his report only in the year 2002, nearly twelve years after framing of charges. Even though the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 13.3.2002, order of dismissal from service was passed only on 1.10.2004Enquiry report was thus submitted after a lapse of twelve years and there was a delay of twelve years in conducting and completing the enquiry. As pointed out by the Labour Court, there was no plausible explanation for such inordinate delay in completing the enquiry. The appellant continued in service from 1990 to 2004. Having allowed the appellant-workman to work for fourteen years, by the time punishment of dismissal from service was imposed on the appellant, the appellant had reached the age of forty five years. As observed by the Labour Court, the appellant having crossed forty five years, he could not have sought for alternative employment. Further, as seen from Exs. W.5 to W.11, similarly placed workmen were ordered to be reinstated with lesser punishment of stoppage of few increments. While so, there is no reason as to why for the similar misconduct the appellant should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from service10. It is settled proposition of law that while considering the managements decision to dismiss or terminate the services of a workman, the Labour Court can interfere with the decision of the management only when it is satisfied that the punishment imposed by the management is highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of the workman concerned. Considering the delay in completing the enquiry and the age of the appellant and the fact that similarly situated workmen were reinstated with lesser punishment, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement, in exercise of its discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act15. Once the Labour Court has exercised the discretion judicially, the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it is satisfied that the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws. We do not find that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from any such flaws. While interfering with the award of the Labour Court, the High Court did not keep in view the parameters laid down by this Court for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.