Case: Chairman And M.D., B.P.L. Ltd Vs. S.P. Gururaja

meaning of Article 12 but that would not mean that in a given case the court shall assume the role of the Executive Government of the State. Statutory functions are assigned to the State by the Legislature and not by the Court. The Courts while exercising its jurisdiction ordinarily must remind itself about the doctrine of separation of powers which, however, although does not mean that the Court shall not step-in in any circumstance whatsoever but the Court while exercising its power must also remind itself about the rule of self-restraint. The courts, as indicated hereinbefore, ordinarily is reluctant to assume the functions of the statutory functionaries. It allows them to perform their duties at the first instance. The court steps in by Mandamus when the State fails to perform its duty. It shall also step in when the discretion is exercised but the same has not been done legally and validly. It steps in by way of a judicial review over the orders passed. Existence of alternative remedy albeit is no bar to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but ordinarily it will not do so unless it is found that an order has been passed wholly without jurisdiction or contradictory to the constitutional or statutory provisions or where an order has been passed without complying with the principles of natural justice. (See Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others (1998) 8 SCC 1 ). Exercise of self-restraint, thus, should be adhered to, subject of course to, just exceptions." 32. Dawn Oliver in Constitutional Reform in the UK under the heading the Courts and Theories of Democracy, Citizenship, and Good Governance at page 105 states: "However, this concept of democracy as rights-based with limited governmental power, and in particular of the role of the Courts in a democracy, carries high risk for the judges- and for the public. Courts may interfere inadvisedly in public administration. The case of Bromley London Borough Council vs. Greater London Council (1983) 1 AC 768, HL) is a classic example. The House of Lords quashed the GLC cheap fares policy as being based on a misreading of the statutory provisions, but were accused of themselves misunderstanding transport policy in so doing. The courts are not experts in policy and public administration - hence Jowells point that the courts should not step beyond their institutional capacity (Jowell, 2000). Acceptance of this approach is reflected in the judgments of Laws LJ in International Transport Roth GmbH vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2002) EWCA Civ 158, (2002) 3 WLR 344), and of Lord Nimmo Smith in Adams vs. Lord Advocate (Court of Session. Times, 8 August 2002) in which a distinction was drawn between areas where the subject matter lies within the expertise of the courts (for instance, criminal justice, including sentencing and detention of individuals) and those which were more appropriate for decision by democratically elected and accountable bodies. If the courts step outside the area of their institutional competence, government may react by getting Parliament to legislate to oust the jurisdiction of the courts altogether. Such a step would undermine the rule of law. Government and public opinion may come to question the legitimacy of the judges exercising judicial review against Ministers and thus undermine the authority of the courts and the rule of law." Conclusions: 33. Salient principles of law as noticed hereinbefore, were not considered by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment.34. In the facts and circumstances, we do not find that the Board and the State had committed any illegality which could have been a subject matter of judicial review. The High Court in our opinion committed a manifest error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the delay in this case had defeated equity. The allotment was made in the year 1995. The writ application was filed after one year. By that time the Company had not only took possession of the land but also made sufficient investment. Delay of this nature shall have been considered by the High Court to be of vital importance.35. Furthermore, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the factum of resistance in the matter from those persons whose lands have been acquired. Only because the lands are vested in the State upon acquisition thereof, the same by itself would not mean that the persons whose lands were acquired were not interested in getting the allotment. The locus standi of the respondent ought to have been taken into consideration having regard to the specific pleas raised in this behalf by the appellants herein.36. Undue haste also is a matter which by itself would not have been a ground for exercise of power of judicial review unless it is held to be malafide. What is necessary in such matters is not the time taken for allotment but the manner in which the action had been taken. The court, it is trite, is not concerned with the merit of the decision but the decision making process. In absence of any finding that any legal malice was committed, the impugned allotment of land could not have been interfered with. What was only necessary to be seen was as to whether there had been a fair play in action. 37. The question as to whether any undue haste has been shown in taking an administrative decision is essentially a question of fact. The state had devolved a policy of Single Window System with a view to get rid of red-tapism generally prevailing in the bureaucracy. A decision which has been taken after due deliberations and upon due application of mind cannot be held to be suffering from malice in law on the ground that there had been undue haste on the part of the State and the Board. (See Bangalore Medical Trust vs. B.S. Muddappa and others (1991) 4 SCC 54 and Pfizer Ltd. vs. Mazdoor Congress and others (1996) 5 SCC 609 ).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]20. It is a well-settled principle of law that different considerations arises for the purpose of fixation of price in respect of price of land i.e. for a small area vis-a-vis a large area. The allotment price was Rs. 3,73,324/- per acre which, having regard to the policy decision of the State as also the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be said to be wholly arbitrary warranting interference by the Court. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that normally allotment of such industrial plots should be done in terms of Regulation 7 aforementioned. But the same by itself did not preclude the authorities of the Board and the State having regard to the fact situation obtaining herein to take recourse to Regulation 13. Once the Court finds that the power exercised by the statutory authorities can be traced to a provision of statute, unless and until violation of mandatory provisions thereof are found out and/ or it is held that a decision is taken for unauthorised or illegal purpose, the court will not ordinarily interfere either with the policy decision or any decision taken by the executive authorities pursuant to or in furtherance thereof.Salient principles of law as noticed hereinbefore, were not considered by the High Court in passing the impugned judgment.34. In the facts and circumstances, we do not find that the Board and the State had committed any illegality which could have been a subject matter of judicial review. The High Court in our opinion committed a manifest error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the delay in this case had defeated equity. The allotment was made in the year 1995. The writ application was filed after one year. By that time the Company had not only took possession of the land but also made sufficient investment. Delay of this nature shall have been considered by the High Court to be of vital importance.35. Furthermore, the High Court ought to have taken into consideration the factum of resistance in the matter from those persons whose lands have been acquired. Only because the lands are vested in the State upon acquisition thereof, the same by itself would not mean that the persons whose lands were acquired were not interested in getting the allotment. The locus standi of the respondent ought to have been taken into consideration having regard to the specific pleas raised in this behalf by the appellants herein.36. Undue haste also is a matter which by itself would not have been a ground for exercise of power of judicial review unless it is held to be malafide. What is necessary in such matters is not the time taken for allotment but the manner in which the action had been taken. The court, it is trite, is not concerned with the merit of the decision but the decision making process. In absence of any finding that any legal malice was committed, the impugned allotment of land could not have been interfered with. What was only necessary to be seen was as to whether there had been a fair play instate had devolved a policy of Single Window System with a view to get rid of red-tapism generally prevailing in the bureaucracy. A decision which has been taken after due deliberations and upon due application of mind cannot be held to be suffering from malice in law on the ground that there had been undue haste on the part of the State and the