Case: Sri Sudhansu Shekhar Singh Deo Vs. The State Of Orissa And Another

due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under any such covenant or agreement as is referred to in Art. 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State.8. Article 291 of the Constitution deals with the privy purse of the Rulers under any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of the Constitution payment whereof is free from tax as has been granted or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India. Article 362 recommends to the Parliament and the State Legislatures in making laws after the Constitution "to have due regard to the guarantee or assurance given under any convenient or agreement. Even though Art. 362 is not restricted in its recommendation to agreements relating to the privy purse and covers all agreements and covenants entered into by the Rulers of Indian States before the commencement of the Constitution whereby the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State were guaranteed, it does not import any legal obligation enforceable at the instance of the erstwhile enforceable at the instance of the erstwhile Ruler of a former Indian State. If, despite the recommendation that due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under the covenant or agreement, the Parliament or the Legislature of a State makes laws inconsistent with the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State, the exercise of the legislative authority cannot relying upon the agreement or covenant, be questioned in any court, and that is so expressly provided by Art. 363 of the Constitution.9. The plea of the appellant that he was not seeking to enforce the terms of the merger agreement and that he was merely resisting the claim made by the authority appointed by the State of Orissa to levy a tax inconsistently with the terms of the merger agreement, has no substance. In truth, the appellant sought by his petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution to enforce the terms of Art. 4 of the merger agreement. By his petitions, the appellant contended that in enacting the Agricultural Income-tax Act and in seeking to enforce it against him, the State of Orissa acted contrary to the terms of the merger agreement and he asked the High Court to enforce the terms of the merger agreement. On the grounds therefore that liability to pay agricultural income-tax in respect of his private property is imposed upon the appellant by S. 3 of the Act, and the immunity claimed by the appellant is not one of the personal rights or privileges within the meaning of the merger agreement and that the claim made by the appellant is not justiciable, the objection raised by the appellant to liability to pay agricultural income-tax assessed under the Act cannot be sustained.10. Two subsidiary contentions which were sought to be raised before us may be briefly referred to. It was urged that of the forty-two villages of which the appellant is held by the assessing authority to be the holder, two were in the year 1945 transferred by him to the Yuvrani (the appellants sons wife) and on that account, the income of those villages was not liable to be taxed in his hands. It appears from the assessment order that this contention was raised before the Agricultural Income-tax Officer and that officer rejected the contention relying upon S. 14, cl. (1) of the Act. It is unnecessary for the purpose of these appeals to decide whether the assessing officer was right in the view which he took. In the petitions filed by the appellant in the High Court, this plea was not raised and no relief was claimed by him in respect of the income of the two villages. The question was never mooted before the High Court and the State of Orissa had no opportunity of meeting the claim now sought to be made by the appellant. On the ground that the question was never raised in the High Court, we reject this contention.11. It was also urged that whereas the assessing officer has found that the appellant had lands in forty-two villages, in the inventory of properties submitted by the appellant to the Government, only eighteen villages were set out and this inventory was accepted by the Government of India. Relying upon this premise, the appellant contends that he is liable to pay tax in respect of his income from these eighteen villages and no more. But even this plea was never raised in the High Court and we cannot, in dealing with these appeals, enter upon an enquiry into a question which was never raised on which no evidence was led, and on which no finding was given by the High Court.12. On the view taken by us, Appeals Nos. 307, 308 and 309 of 1958 fail and are dismissed with costs. There will, be one hearing fee.13. Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1958. The appellant in this appeal is the Ruler of the former State of Talcher-one of the Orissa States. Relying on the same grounds on which the Ruler of the former State of Sonepur claimed immunity from payment of agricultural income-tax, the appellant claimed immunity for the years of assessment, 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52 and 1952-53. The High Court upheld his plea for the year 1949-50 on the ground that the income of the previous year was not derived from the taxable territory, and cancelled the assessment for that year, but rejected his claim for the remaining years. With certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution granted by the High Court, the appellant has appealed to this Court.14. For reasons set out in the judgment in Appeals Nos. 307, 308 and 309 of 1958, the contentions raised by the appellant which are identical with the principal contentions raised by the Ruler of the former State of Sonepur, this appeal must also fail.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. The Act imposes on the agricultural income of "every person liability to pay agriculturalBy the proviso to S. 3, agricultural income of the Central Government, State Government and of local authorities is exempt from tax, but this exemption is not extended to any other body or person. It is true that in the definition of the expression "person as originally enacted in S. 2, cl. (i) a Ruler of an Indian State was expressly included and by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, reference to Rulers of Indian Sates was deleted as from January 26, 1950. But by that amendment, an intention to exclude the Rulers of Indian States from liability to pay agriculturalwas, in our judgment, not evinced. Between the dates on which the Act was enacted and the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, several political events of far reaching effect had taken place, in consequence of which the appellant had ceased to be a Ruler of an Indian State. On January 26, 1950, the date on which the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 became operative, there were in existence no Indian States. The sovereign rights of the erstwhile Rulers of the Indian States were extinguished, and their territories were merged in the Indian Union.Article 291 of the Constitution deals with the privy purse of the Rulers under any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of the Constitution payment whereof is free from tax as has been granted or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India. Article 362 recommends to the Parliament and the State Legislatures in making laws after the Constitution "to have due regard to the guarantee or assurance given under any convenient or agreement. Even though Art. 362 is not restricted in its recommendation to agreements relating to the privy purse and covers all agreements and covenants entered into by the Rulers of Indian States before the commencement of the Constitution whereby the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State were guaranteed, it does not import any legal obligation enforceable at the instance of the erstwhile enforceable at the instance of the erstwhile Ruler of a former Indian State. If, despite the recommendation that due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given under the covenant or agreement, the Parliament or the Legislature of a State makes laws inconsistent with the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State, the exercise of the legislative authority cannot relying upon the agreement or covenant, be questioned in any court, and that is so expressly provided by Art. 363 of the Constitution.9. The plea of the appellant that he was not seeking to enforce the terms of the merger agreement and that he was merely resisting the claim made by the authority appointed by the State of Orissa to levy a tax inconsistently with the terms of the merger agreement, has no substance. In truth, the appellant sought by his petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution to enforce the terms of Art. 4 of the mergerthe grounds therefore that liability to pay agriculturalin respect of his private property is imposed upon the appellant by S. 3 of the Act, and the immunity claimed by the appellant is not one of the personal rights or privileges within the meaning of the merger agreement and that the claim made by the appellant is not justiciable, the objection raised by the appellant to liability to pay agriculturalassessed under the Act cannot beappears from the assessment order that this contention was raised before the AgriculturalOfficer and that officer rejected the contention relying upon S. 14, cl. (1) of the Act. It is unnecessary for the purpose of these appeals to decide whether the assessing officer was right in the view which he took. In the petitions filed by the appellant in the High Court, this plea was not raised and no relief was claimed by him in respect of the income of the two villages. The question was never mooted before the High Court and the State of Orissa had no opportunity of meeting the claim now sought to be made by the appellant. On the ground that the question was never raised in the High Court, we reject thisupon this premise, the appellant contends that he is liable to pay tax in respect of his income from these eighteen villages and no more. But even this plea was never raised in the High Court and we cannot, in dealing with these appeals, enter upon an enquiry into a question which was never raised on which no evidence was led, and on which no finding was given by the High Court.12. On the view taken by us, Appeals Nos. 307, 308 and 309 of 1958 fail and are dismissed with costs. There will, be one hearing fee.13. Civil Appeal No. 310 of 1958. The appellant in this appeal is the Ruler of the former State ofof the Orissa States. Relying on the same grounds on which the Ruler of the former State of Sonepur claimed immunity from payment of agriculturalthe appellant claimed immunity for the years of assessment,52 andThe High Court upheld his plea for the yearon the ground that the income of the previous year was not derived from the taxable territory, and cancelled the assessment for that year, but rejected his claim for the remaining years. With certificate under Art. 132 of the Constitution granted by the High Court, the appellant has appealed to this Court.14. For reasons set out in the judgment in Appeals Nos. 307, 308 and 309 of 1958, the contentions raised by the appellant which are identical with the principal contentions raised by the Ruler of the former State of Sonepur, this appeal must also fail.