Case: Municipal Council, Ahmednagar &amp; Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig &amp; Others

a power of attorney in favour of Mohd. Ali Beig to act on his behalf in the proceedings before the authorities and to receive the amount of compensation. The power of attorney stands recorded in England in February 1973. While it is true that the evidence tendered by the respondents during the course of hearing was without prejudice qua the reservation of rights to challenge the same but the factual backdrop in its entirety however in our view does not indicate any challenge to the notice of acquisition. 17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. ( 1996 SC 1954)) this Court observed as below : (SCC p. 628, para 4): "4. The admitted position is that pursuant to the notification published under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the Act) in GOR No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962, total extent of 6 acres 41 cents of land in Madhavaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpattu District in Tamil Nadu was acquired under Chapter VII of the Act for the manufacture of Synthetic Rasina by Tvl. Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Madras. The acquisition proceedings had become final and possession of the land was taken on 30-4-1964. Pursuant to the agreement executed by the company, it was handed over to Tvl. Simpson and General Finance Co. which is a subsidiary of Reichold Chemicals India Ltd. It would appear that at a request made by the said company, 66 cents of land out of one acre 37 cents in respect of which the appellants originally had ownership, was transferred in GOMs. No. 816 Industries dated 24-3-1971 in favour of another subsidiary company. Shri Rama Vilas Service Ltd., the 5th respondent which is also another subsidiary of the Company had requested for two acres 75 cents of land; the same came to be assigned on leasehold basis by the Government after resumption in terms of the agreement in GOMs. No. 439 Industries dated 10-5-1985. In GOMs. No. 546 Industries dated 30-3-1986, the same came to be approved of. Then the appellants challenged the original GOMs No. 1392 Industries dated 17-10-1962 contending that since the original purpose for which the land was acquired had ceased to be in operation, the appellants are entitled to restitution of the possession taken from them. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have held that the acquired land having already vested in the State, after receipt of the compensation by the predecessor-in-title of the appellants, they have no right to challenge the notification. Thus the writ petition and the writ appeal came to be dismissed." *. 18. Similar is the view in an earlier decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment. Co. (P) Ltd. ( 1996 SC 2162) Incidentally, the decision last noted was also on land acquisition and requisition under the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and in para 29 of the Report this Court observed : (SCC p. 520): "29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches." * 19. Mr. Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for one of the respondents placed strong reliance upon a recent decision of this Court in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dolly Das ( 1999 SC 1073) . This Court in para 8 of the Report observed as below : (SCC p. 455): "8. So far as the contention regarding laches of the respondent in filing the writ petition is concerned, delay, by itself, may not defeat the claim for relief unless the position of the appellant had been so altered which cannot be retracted on account of lapse of time or inaction of the other party. This aspect being dependent upon the examination of the facts of the case and such a contention not having been raised before the High Court, it would not be appropriate to allow the appellants to raise such a contention for the first time before us. Besides, we may notice that the period for which the option of renewal has been exercised has not come to an end. During the subsistence of such a period certainly the respondent could make a complaint that such exercise of option was not available to the appellants and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court could he invoked even at a later stage. Further, the appellants are not put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of this delay in approaching the High Court for a relief." * 20. The observations however pertain to the Transfer of Property Act and in particular reference to Section 105 and the facts therein are clearly distinguishable and the sentence emphasised as above depicts the disgust feature. Hindustan Petroleum case ( 1999 SC 1073) is not a case for acquisition at all and reliance thereon thus is totally misplaced.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]12. The factual analysis in short therefore, depicts that the notification for acquisition in terms of the Act was issued in 1971, the award was published in regard thereto in 1976 and the writ petition was filed in 1992. During the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent writ petitioners moved an execution application so far as the award is concerned and thereafter moved a further civil revision application before the High Court in 1995these factual details in our view go to negate the observations of the High Court13. It is significant to note that since the year 1952, this particular property which is under acquisition was reserved for a school and playground. In the year 1963 the reservation was further continued and as such, there had not been any development of the plot by any concern since 1952 onwards. Another redeeming feature ought also to be noticed at this juncture, namely, the original writ petitioner being the father of the present respondents sent a notice in 1964 to the Municipal Council to purchase the reserved property or to release the same in favour of the writ petitioner. But there was no assertion of right thereafter and till the issuance of the notification in 1971 and possession being delivered in terms of the award in 197614. The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now ad principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given ay to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise. The High Court as a matter of fact lost sight of the fact that since the year 1952, the land was specifically reserved for public purposes of a school playground and roads in the development plan and by reason therefor, the notification to acquire the land has, therefore, been issued under the provisions of the Act as stated above16. The other owner Shah Hyder Beig, however, did not put forth any claim for any specific amount but claimed only the market value of the land together with 15 per cent solatium and the cost of the building now standing on the land. Incidentally, the other owner is a resident of England and executed a power of attorney in favour of Mohd. Ali Beig to act on his behalf in the proceedings before the authorities and to receive the amount of compensation. The power of attorney stands recorded in England in February 1973. While it is true that the evidence tendered by the respondents during the course of hearing was without prejudice qua the reservation of rights to challenge the same but the factual backdrop in its entirety however in our view does not indicate any challenge to the notice of acquisition