Case: The Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. And Another Vs. The Janapada Sabha, Chhindwara (And Connected Appeals)

80A(3) could not be urged. From the recitals at the beginning of the Act it was found that the previous sanction of the Governor-General had been obtained to the introduction of the measure in the Local Legislature under S. 79(2) of the Government of India Act, 1915 - i.e., before S. 80A(3) introduced into the Government of India Act, 1919, was brought into force.10. The learned Attorney-General, therefore, modified his argument and presented it in this form : No doubt when S. 51 of the Act was enacted, it was within the competence of the Local Legislature. But the power conferred by that section to levy the tax was exercised only in 1935 and by that date S. 80A had been introduced into the Government of India Act and thereafter there could be no legal imposition of a tax, not included in the Scheduled Taxes Rules without the previous sanction of the Governor-General being obtained. We consider this argument wholly without force. The validity of S. 51 of the Act, when enacted, not being open to any objection under the Government of India Act, 1915, the amendments effected to the Government of India Act, 1915, by the Act of 1919 did not in any manner, or to any extent, expressly or even by implication affect, or trench upon the continued validity and operation of that section. Obviously S. 80A (3) was only concerned to lay down the preliminaries for enacting a law after that provision came into force and after a law has once been enacted and is in operation, there is no question of the procedure laid down for bills being attracted. This apart, all controversy is set at rest and any argument of the type now urged is precluded by R. 5 of the Scheduled Taxes Rules which runs :"Nothing in these rules shall affect the right of a local authority to impose a tax without previous sanction or with the previous sanction of the local Government when such right is conferred upon it by any law for the time in force."The submission therefore that before the power conferred by S. 51 of the Act, the previous sanction of the Governor-General had to be obtained or that there must be fresh legislation, must be rejected.11. (b) The second matter urged under this head was based on the meaning to be given to the opening words of S. 51 of the Act : "Subject to the provision of any law or enactment for the time being in force". It was suggested that the provision contained in S. 80A(3) of the Government of India Act read with the Scheduled Taxes Rules framed under that section constituted "a law for the time being in force" to which the power to levy the tax was subject. In the first place it is clear that a law like that which is found in S. 80A(3) prescribing a procedure for enacting future Acts of the Local Legislature could not be comprehended within those words. But even if it did, in the face of R. 5 of the Scheduled Taxes Rules, the construction suggested could have no basis.12. (c) The last reason assigned for disputing the validity of the original imposition of the tax, was that S. 51 of the Act on its language and in the context of the other provisions referred to in that section, did not authorise the levy of a tax or cess of the nature of the "coal tax". We are wholly unable to accept this argument. The relevant words of S. 51 are :"impose any tax, toll or rate other than those specified in Ss. 24, 48, 49 and 50".13. It is not suggested that "the coal tax" is one specified in any of the sections set out, and hence, there was power to levy any other tax including that which is now impugned. The learned Attorney-General however suggested that the tax authorised by S. 51 should still be somewhat like the taxes referred to in the other sections, thought not identical with them. Obviously, in the face of the words "other than those .........." the rule of ejusdem generis is contra-indicated and if so on no rule of construction could "the coal tax" be excluded from the purview of the local authority.14. We, therefore, hold that the original imposition of the tax in 1935 was valid.15. (2)The next question is : has the tax ceased to be legally leviable by reason of the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935 and of the Constitution? Both these constitutional enactments contain express provisions whereby taxes, cesses, etc., which were previously lawfully levied by local authorities for the purposes of their local areas, might continue to be collected and applied for the same purposes notwithstanding that those taxes could thereafter be imposed only by the Central or the Union Government, as the case may be (Vide S. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. 277 of the Constitution). The objection therefore that "coal tax" or some of the components of it, could have been imposed only by the Central Government or the Union Government is no ground for impugning the continued validity and exigibility of the tax. It is needless to add that if the tax fell within the Provincial or the State List, the levy would be valid under S. 292 of the Government of India Act and Art. 372 of the Constitution even without the aid of the special provisions in S. 143 or Art. 277.In view of these considerations the learned Attorney-General did not address us seriously on this point.16. (3) The last point urged was as regards the validity of the increase in the rate of tax to 9 pies per ton effected in 1949, i.e., after the commencement of Government of India Act, 1935. This objection was not even hinted in the petition now before us, and we did not consider it proper to permit petitioners to raise the point.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. The petition as filed setting out this contention proceeds on the basis that the Act was passed after the Government of India Act, 1919, by which S. 80A was introduced into the Act of 1915 came into force. If that had been the correct position, the proviso to S. 80A(3) reading :"Provided that an Act or a provision of an Act made by a local legislature, and subsequently assented to by the Governor-General in pursuance of this Act, shall not be deemed invalid by reason only of its requiring the previous sanction of the Governor-General under this Act"would be a complete answer to the above objection, since under the Government of India Act, 1915, before and after its amendment in 1919, every bill passed by a local legislative council had, after receiving the assent of the Governor, to be transmitted to the Governor-General and could become law only after the latter had signified his assent (Vide S. 81(1) and (3) of the Act). That the Governor-General had assented to the Act under this provision was never in dispute. The saving contained in the proviso is, it should be noticed, in addition to the general saving contained S. 84(2) of the Government of India Act (to read only the material words): "........... the validity of any Act of ............. any local legislative shall not be open to question in any legal proceedings on the ground that the Act affects ....................... a central subject" which is of wider import and designed to remove all questions of legislative competence of the type now put forward from the purview of Courts.9. At the stage of the arguments, however, it was found that the Act had become law even prior to the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1919, with the result that the contention raised in the petition based on S. 80A(3) could not be urged. From the recitals at the beginning of the Act it was found that the previous sanction of the Governor-General had been obtained to the introduction of the measure in the Local Legislature under S. 79(2) of the Government of India Act, 1915 - i.e., before S. 80A(3) introduced into the Government of India Act, 1919, was brought intoconsider this argument wholly without force. The validity of S. 51 of the Act, when enacted, not being open to any objection under the Government of India Act, 1915, the amendments effected to the Government of India Act, 1915, by the Act of 1919 did not in any manner, or to any extent, expressly or even by implication affect, or trench upon the continued validity and operation of that section. Obviously S. 80A (3) was only concerned to lay down the preliminaries for enacting a law after that provision came into force and after a law has once been enacted and is in operation, there is no question of the procedure laid down for bills being attracted. This apart, all controversy is set at rest and any argument of the type now urged is precluded by R. 5 of the Scheduled Taxessubmission therefore that before the power conferred by S. 51 of the Act, the previous sanction of the Governor-General had to be obtained or that there must be fresh legislation, must bethe first place it is clear that a law like that which is found in S. 80A(3) prescribing a procedure for enacting future Acts of the Local Legislature could not be comprehended within those words. But even if it did, in the face of R. 5 of the Scheduled Taxes Rules, the construction suggested could have noare wholly unable to accept this argument. The relevant words of S. 51 are :"impose any tax, toll or rate other than those specified in Ss. 24, 48, 49 and 50".13. It is not suggested that "the coal tax" is one specified in any of the sections set out, and hence, there was power to levy any other tax including that which is now impugned. The learned Attorney-General however suggested that the tax authorised by S. 51 should still be somewhat like the taxes referred to in the other sections, thought not identical with them. Obviously, in the face of the words "other than those .........." the rule of ejusdem generis is contra-indicated and if so on no rule of construction could "the coal tax" be excluded from the purview of the local authority.14. We, therefore, hold that the original imposition of the tax in 1935 wasthese constitutional enactments contain express provisions whereby taxes, cesses, etc., which were previously lawfully levied by local authorities for the purposes of their local areas, might continue to be collected and applied for the same purposes notwithstanding that those taxes could thereafter be imposed only by the Central or the Union Government, as the case may be (Vide S. 143 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Art. 277 of the Constitution). The objection therefore that "coal tax" or some of the components of it, could have been imposed only by the Central Government or the Union Government is no ground for impugning the continued validity and exigibility of the tax. It is needless to add that if the tax fell within the Provincial or the State List, the levy would be valid under S. 292 of the Government of India Act and Art. 372 of the Constitution even without the aid of the special provisions in S. 143 or Art. 277.In view of these considerations the learned Attorney-General did not address us seriously on this point.16. (3) The last point urged was as regards the validity of the increase in the rate of tax to 9 pies per ton effected in 1949, i.e., after the commencement of Government of India Act, 1935. This objection was not even hinted in the petition now before us, and we did not consider it proper to permit petitioners to raise the point.