Case: G. Sarana Vs. University of Lucknow and Others

A. K. Karipaks case (supra), reiterated in S. Parthasarthi v. State of Andhra Pradesh([1974] S.L.R. 427.) and followed by the High Court of Jarainu &Kashmir in Farooq Ahmed Pandey and Ors. v. Principal Regional Engineering College &Anr.([1975] J &K.L.R. 427.) the real question is not whether a member of an administrative Board while exercising quasi-judicial powers or discharging quasi-judicial functions was biased, for it is difficult to prove the mind of a person. What has to be seen is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In deciding the question of bias, human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct have to be taken into consideration. In a group de liberation and decision like that of a Selection Board, the members do not function as computers. Each member of the group or board is bound to influence the others, more so if the member concerned is a person with special knowledge. His bias is likely to operate in a subtle manner.At page 156 of "Principles of Administrative Law" by J.A.G. Griffith and H. Street (Fourth Edition), the position with regard to bias is aptly and succinctly stated as follows:-"The prohibition of bias strikes against factors which may improperly influence a judge in deciding in favour of one party. The first of the three disabling types of bias is bias on the subject-matter. Only rarely will this bias invalidate proceedings. "A mere general interest in the general object to be pursued would not disqualify, " said Field J., holding that a magistrate who subscribed to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was not thereby disabed from trying a charge brought by that body of cruelty to a horse. There must be so me direct connection with the litigation. If there is such prejudice, on the subject-matter that , the court has reached fixed and unalterable conclusions not founded on reason or understanding, so that there is not a fair hearing, that is bias of which the courts wilt take account, as where a justice announced his intention of convicting anyone coming before him on a charge of supplying liquor after the permitted hours ...........Secondly, a pecuniary interest, however, slight will disqualify, even though it is not proved that the decision is in any way affected.The third type of bias is personal bias. A Judge may be a relative, friend or business associate of a party, or he may be personally hostile as a result of events happening either before or during the course of a trial. The courts have not been consistent in laying down when bias of this type will. invalidate a hearing. The House of Lords in Frome United Brewering v. Bath Justices ([1926] A.C. 586.) approved an earlier test of whether "there is a real likelihood of bias." the House of Lords has since approved a dictum of Lord Hewart that "justice should not only be done, , but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" although it did not mention another test suggested by him in the same judgment: Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice."At page 225 of hi s Treatise on "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" (Third Edition), Prof. S.A. De Smith, has stated as follows with regard to Reports and Preliminary decisions:--"The case-law on the point is thin, but on principle it would seem that where a report or determination lacking final effect may nevertheless have a seriously judicial effect on the legally protected interests of individuals (e.g. when it is a necessary prerequisite of a final order) the person making the report or preliminary decision must not be affected by interest or likelihood of bias."6. From the above discussion, it clearly follows that what has to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias, in respect of a member of an administrative Board or body is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In other words whether there is substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party.We do not, however, consider it necessary in the present case to go into the question of the reasonableness of bias or real likelihood or bias as despite the fact that, the appellant knew all the relevant facts, he did not before appearing for the interview or at the time of the interview raise even his little finger against the constitution. of the Selection Committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the Committee and taken a chance of having a favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and question the constitution of the Committee. This view gains strength from a decision of this Court in Manak Lals case (Supra) where in more or less similar circumstances, it was held that the failure of the appellant to take the identical plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings created an effective bar of waiver against him. The following observations made therein are worth quoting:---"It seems dear that the appellant wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable report from the tribunal which was constituted and when he found that he was confronted with an unfavourable report, he adopted the device of raising the present technical point."7. It is also difficult to understand how the writ petition or for that matter the present appeal before us is maintainable when the recommenlation of the Selection Committee has still to be scrutinzed by the Executive Council of the University and either accepted or rejected by and other remedies by way of representation to. the Executive Council and an application for reference of the matter under section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Universities (Reenactment and Amendment) Act, 1974, the Chancellor are still open to the appellant and have not been exmusted.8.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]From the above discussion, it clearly follows that what has to be seen in a case where there is an allegation of bias, in respect of a member of an administrative Board or body is whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. In other words whether there is substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member against the aggrieved party.We do not, however, consider it necessary in the present case to go into the question of the reasonableness of bias or real likelihood or bias as despite the fact that, the appellant knew all the relevant facts, he did not before appearing for the interview or at the time of the interview raise even his little finger against the constitution. of the Selection Committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the Committee and taken a chance of having a favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and question the constitution of the Committee. This view gains strength from a decision of this Court in Manak Lals case (Supra) where in more or less similar circumstances, it was held that the failure of the appellant to take the identical plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings created an effective bar of waiver againstis also difficult to understand how the writ petition or for that matter the present appeal before us is maintainable when the recommenlation of the Selection Committee has still to be scrutinzed by the Executive Council of the University and either accepted or rejected by and other remedies by way of representation to. the Executive Council and an application for reference of the matter under section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh Universities (Reenactment and Amendment) Act, 1974, the Chancellor are still open to the appellant and have not been exmusted.