Case: M/s. Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd Vs. Union of India &amp; Others

taken into account in determining the amount of compensation, the concluding words of Art. 31 (2) preclude the petitioners from challenging the law. Mr. Das pointed out that the only ground on which the Central Government in their affidavit have tried to sustain the validity of the provisions relating to the acquisition of land under the Act is that a challenge to the validity of the law is barred by the provisions of Art. 31A (1) (e) and that it is not now open to the Central Government to say that the law can be sustained on another ground. We cannot accept this contention.Where the validity of a law made by a competent legislature is challenged in a Court of law that Court is bound to presume in favour of its validity. Further, while considering the validity of the law the court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State and would be free to satisfy itself whether under any provision of the Constitution the law can be sustained. There is no doubt that the entire Act cannot be sustained by resorting only to Art. 31A (1) (e) or to Art. 31 (2A) of the Constitution because these provisions do not deal with the question of acquisition and the Attorney-General fairly admitted that it could not be so sustained.The opening words of sub-sec. (2) of S. 13 read thus :"Where the rights under a mining lease are acquired under this Act, there shall be paid to the person interested compensation, the amount of which shall be a sum made up of the following items, namely,........".Then follow the items which have to be added up. Undoubtedly they are items of expenditure and interest on such expenditure. Sub-section (3) deals with the procedure to be adopted where the rights acquired under S. 9 relate only a part of the land covered by the mining lease. Sub-section (4) deals with the compensation to be paid where the mining lease ceases to have effect for any period under cl. (b) of S. 5. Sub-section (5) provides for payment of compensation for any land acquired under S. 9 and lays down the principles to be followed in computing the compensation. Sub-section (6) provides for payment of compensation for damage done to the surface of any land or any works thereon and in respect whereof no provision for compensation is made elsewhere in the Act. Sub-section (7) deals with the question of compensation for maps, charts and other documents. Section 14 of the Act deals with the method of determining the compensation.It will be clear from these provisions that the Act specifies the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation should be determined and given. This is all that is required of a law relating to the acquisition of property by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution. Where provisions of this kind exist in a law that Article lays down that such law cannot be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate. Here compensation is specifically provided for the land which is to be acquired under the Act. The land includes all that lies beneath the surface or, as Mr. Das put it, all that is "locked up" in the land. Parliament has laid down in sub-sec. (5) of S. 13 how the value of this land is to be calculated. The contention that the provisions made by Parliament for computing the amount of compensation for the land do not take into account the value of the minerals is in effect a challenge to the adequacy of the compensation payable under the Act. The concluding words of Art. 31(2) preclude such a challenge being made.26. But Mr. Das contended that the minerals are a separate tenement and have to be separately compensated for. We have already dealt with the contention of Mr. Das that the minerals underlying the surface are a separate tenement and we need not repeat here all that we have said before.In our opinion the minerals cannot be regarded as a separate tenement except perhaps in a case of a trespass and, therefore, there is no question of the law providing for a separate compensation for them. Apart from that if minerals have become a separate tenement then the present Act may not apply to such a tenement at all. As we have pointed out the coal contained in the two collieries in question is not held by the respective petitioners as a tenement separate from the surface.In the circumstances the challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground that it offends Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution fails, and we dismiss the petition with costs.27. We must say a few words about W. P. 242 of 1960. Out of 737 bighas of land held by the petitioner in that writ petition, we are informed that 321 bighas have been worked. The working of this mine was closed in the year 1928 on the ground that the mine was flooded. An application was made by the petitioner for reopening the mine on June 5, 1957. Repeated reminders were sent subsequently but there was no reply to any of them either. In its application the petitioner, it may be stated, did not apply for opening new mines. Since the necessary permission was not received, it did not commence any operations. We are informed that over a million tons of coal was extracted by the petitioner from its colliery in the past. Even so, we do not think that any different considerations could apply to the petitioners case from those which apply to the case of the Burrakur Coal Co. The petitioners colliery was also dormant for too long a period and was thus an "unworked mine". The impugned Act and the notification made thereunder both apply to it in the same way as they apply to the Sudamdih colliery belonging to Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]While holding that it is permissible to look at the preamble for understanding the import of the various clauses contained in the Bill this Court has not said that full effect should not be given to the express provisions of the Bill even though they appear to go beyond the terms of the preamble. It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it.Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which it is clear must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply*(a).We cannot therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we would be justified in resorting to it, nay, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limitedvery fact that power has been given to the Central Government to enter upon and survey land for the purpose of ascertaining whether there is any coal in that land shows that the legislature had in mind only that land which has not been mentioned as coal bearing in any of the reports of the Geological Survey India.Here again we may point out that the object of survey of land is to enable the Government to satisfy itself not merely about the fact that any coal exists in that land but also about the quality and quantity of coal therein and whether it would be an economical proposition to work the mines already existing on thatcannot, however, accede to the contention that the resumption of mining operations on a land is outside the bar created by this provision. The words used in the section are "to undertake any operations in the land" which , according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary mean "to enter upon (work, enterprise, responsibility)". The meaning of the provision, therefore, is that what the lessee is prohibited from doing is something which he was not doing at the date of the notification though he was authorised to do it under his lease. Thus if a colliery was not functioning at the date of the notification then by virtue of the provisions of S. 5(b) he would not be permitted to work it. Undoubtedly the provision has to be interpreted reasonably and it does not mean that if the notification came into force on a Monday and the mine was not worked on Sunday because of a holiday, the lessee was prohibited by the notification from workingdoubt the petitioner had given notice as required by these provisions. No doubt also that it was necessary for the authorities concerned to take appropriate action on the notice. But it is difficult to say that the inaction of the authorises can be availed of by the petitioner. We must given effect to the plain language of sub-s. (4) of S. 4. That provision in clear terms makes an exclusion or exemption only with regard to that portion of the land in which coal mining operations are actually being carried on in conformity with the provisions of any enactment rule or order. Therefore, it is clear that Parliament was exempting only such collieries as were being worked in consonance with the provisions of law. Mr. Dass argument, however, is that the Act prescribes penalties for the breach of its provisions and of those of the regulations and so the petitioner could well be visited with an appropriate penalty but that its right to run the mine could not be affected. We are not here concerned with the question whether the failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirements of the Coal Mines Act or of the Regulations of 1957 precludes the petitioner under that Act or under those regulations from carrying on miningto S. 6(1) of the Act which deals with compensation for any necessary damage done under S. 4 of the Act, learned counsel contended that Parliament plainly intended the Act to apply to virgin land. If the section was intended to apply to worked mines there would have been provision, according to learned counsel, for payment of compensation to the owner or lessee of the mine, for being deprived of his right to work the mine consequent upon the issue of the notification. It is sufficient to point out that S. 4 does not contemplate entering upon any land which is actually being worked and there will thus be no deprivation in fact of the owners or lessees right of working the mine. The Act applies only to "unworked lands". This expression would include not only virgin lands but also lands on which mines may have been opened and worked sometime in the past but working on those mines was either discontinued or abandoned. Of course, it is possible to say that the action of the Government would interfere with the potential rights of the owner or the lessee to work the mines and this would interfere with his right to hold property and carry on his business. When we deal with the other part of Mr. Dass argument we shall deal with thisis difficult to appreciate the contention that merely because the owner or the lessee of a land had opened mines on that land a severance is effected between the surface and the underground minerals. It may be that a trespasser by adverse possession for the statutory period can acquire rights to underground minerals. It may also be that if that happens the surface right would become severed from the mineral rights as a result of which the minerals underground would form a separate tenement. It is, however difficult to see how the owner or the lessee of land who has right to minerals can effect such a severance between the mineral rights and surface rights by opening and operating the mines of that land. For, even while he is carrying on mining operations he continues to enjoy the surface rights also. We cannot, therefore, accept the contention that there was any severance of the mineral rights and surface rights in either of these twono point can be made from the absence of a provision for compensation for minerals that the Act was applicable only to virgin lands. For all these reasons it is clear that the notification is not ultra vires the Act because, in our view the Act applies not only to virgin lands but also to dormant collieries or unworked lands.20.To sum up, in our view, the preamble of this Act need not be resorted to for construing its provisions and in particular for understanding the meaning of the word "land" used in the Act; that even if the preamble is taken into consideration the expression "unworked land" occurring in the preamble should be given its ordinary meaning, that is to say, land which was not being worked at the time of the notification issued under the Act, which would include dormant mines; that the provisions of the Act and in particular those of sub-sec. (4) of S. 4 and S. 5(b) clearly militate against the contention that the Act was intended to apply only to virgin lands, to the exclusion of land on which there are dormant mines, and that the absence of a provision in S. 13 of the Act providing for compensation for mineral rights cannot be itself justify the conclusion that the Act was intended to apply to virgin landhave already indicated that prospecting operations, in their very nature, must take a long time to complete and presumably Parliament had fixed this period after bearing in mind this factor and also on the basis of expert advice.Of course, there are no pleadings to that effect in the affidavit of the State. But in our opinion the petitioner cannot be permitted to complain of the absence of pleading because it has not itself stated in the petition what would be reasonable time for conducting prospecting operations. We are, therefore, unable to accede to thesee no ground whatsoever for holding that for a thing to be a modification it must be of a permanent duration. A right may well be modified for all time or for a limited duration and in either case the right must be regarded as having been modified.For these reasons we hold that the provisions of Art. 31A, Cl. (1)(e), debar the petitioners from challenging the validity of Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act on the ground that they infringe the provisions of Art. 31 (2) of thecannot accept this contention.Where the validity of a law made by a competent legislature is challenged in a Court of law that Court is bound to presume in favour of its validity. Further, while considering the validity of the law the court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of the State and would be free to satisfy itself whether under any provision of the Constitution the law can be sustained. There is no doubt that the entire Act cannot be sustained by resorting only to Art. 31A (1) (e) or to Art. 31 (2A) of the Constitution because these provisions do not deal with the question of acquisition and the Attorney-General fairly admitted that it could not be soour opinion the minerals cannot be regarded as a separate tenement except perhaps in a case of a trespass and, therefore, there is no question of the law providing for a separate compensation for them. Apart from that if minerals have become a separate tenement then the present Act may not apply to such a tenement at all. As we have pointed out the coal contained in the two collieries in question is not held by the respective petitioners as a tenement separate from the surface.In the circumstances the challenge to the validity of the Act on the ground that it offends Art. 31 (2) of the Constitution fails, and we dismiss the petition withapplication was made by the petitioner for reopening the mine on June 5, 1957. Repeated reminders were sent subsequently but there was no reply to any of them either. In its application the petitioner, it may be stated, did not apply for opening new mines. Since the necessary permission was not received, it did not commence any operations. We are informed that over a million tons of coal was extracted by the petitioner from its colliery in the past. Even so, we do not think that any different considerations could apply to the petitioners case from those which apply to the case of the Burrakur Coal Co. The petitioners colliery was also dormant for too long a period and was thus an "unworked mine". The impugned Act and the notification made thereunder both apply to it in the same way as they apply to the Sudamdih colliery belonging to Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd.