Case: The Bombay Gas Company Limited, A Company At Bombay Vs. R.N. Kulkarni, Presiding Officer, First Labour Court, Bombay &amp; Another

loss of wages and (2) loss of leave or absence from work or rest. What the applicant has claimed in this case is wages for the leave period or days of privilege leave to which the applicant was entitled to and which the opponent refused to give. Now it seems to its that in this passage, the Labour Court has made an assumption which is not warranted upon the facts, viz. that the workers in these two petitions asked for privilege leave and were refused privilege leave by the employer. That is completely contrary to the facts. In tact, in paragraph 6 of the petition, it was the complaint of the employed that, at no time prior to the filing of the said application, did the second respondents complain that they had not been given privilege leave to which they were entitled. Thus, it was the employer who was making a grievance of the fact that the workers had never asked for privilege leave before and that their application under S. 330(2) was not maintainable. Therefore, it is clear that there could have been no possible refusal to grant privilege leave. Indeed, the statement, to which we have referred above, made in the petition, was never controverted on behalf of the workers in this Court. They have mil filed any return whatsoever, and, therefore, the statement in paragraph 6 must he accepted as correct. If so, the one principal assumption which the Labour Court made that privilege leave was asked for and refused by the employer is contrary to the facts. 12. But then, even assuming that a refusal of privilege leave has taken place, we are unable to understand the further reasoning of the Labour Court. It seems to have taken the view that when privilege leave is refused by the employer, he is automatically entitled to compensation or the money equivalent, that is to say, to have the benefit computed. The other remark which the Labour Court made that it involved the employee in two losses, viz., the loss of wages and loss of leave or absence from work or rest is also not correct, because for the period of the leave the employee does work and is actually paid for it, Therefore, there is no loss of wages involved. All that is involved is the loss of the privilege itself. If no privilege leave is granted, the employee continues to work and receives his pay. The Labour Court, moreover, did not at all advert to the grounds upon which and the purpose for which his benefit was given by the award itself.We are unable to sustain the decision of the Labour Court that the privilege leave was a benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money. In our opinion, the privilege leave by its very nature cannot be computed in terms of money. 13. Then we turn to the other point which was argued before us which, upon the view we have taken, is really not necessary to decide, but since it has been argued in full, we merely state the point here. Paragraph 26 of the award granted privilege leave to the workmen at the rate of 21 days in a year. Now, it must have struck the Labour Court that when the award says a year, it could not possibly mean a calendar year or 365 clays, because the employee, having regard to the other benefits which he receives of non-working days, such as Sundays, paid holidays, unpaid holidays, etc., could not possibly work for the whole of the calendar year. Then arose the question as to what was involved in the direction of the award that the privilege leave shall be at the rate of 21 days in a year. The Labour Court has, it seems, after a considerable amount of hesitation come to its own conclusion that the year must be 291 days, and the manner in which it arrived at 291 days is by calculating various benefits which the workers had of non-working days including seven days of casual leave, 15 days of sick leave, 10 paid holidays and 10 unpaid festival days and other benefits. The employer has in his petition computed the year as being of 800 days, a calculation which the Labour Court did not accept. Before us several other interpretations have been advanced. The extreme one is that so long as a worker works for a single day in a year, he would be entitled to the whole of the privilege leave so long as his name continues on the muster roll of the Company. Then it was variously argued that sick leave and casual leave cannot be computed for the purpose of arriving at the year for calculation of privilege leave. As we have said if is unnecessary for us to go into these rival contentions, because we have shown that, in the first place, the privilege leave was not a benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money. But we may say it here that the very fact that the expression used in the award of Mr. Naik is capable of such varied interpretations shows that initially the use of the word year in the award not having been defined, we would be, undoubtedly, adding to the award, were we today to hold that though a year is mentioned, it is something less than a year. That again, as has been clearly held upon the authorities would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to do. In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to decide whether Sundays and paid holidays should be included or excluded in the computation of a year. In our opinion, the question which was before the Labour Court clearly did not fall within the ambit of Section 330(2). The Labour Court thus had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question, nor to award monetary compensation in lieu of the privilege leave.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We shall presently advert to those cases, but it seems to us that so far as the expression benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money is concerned, in the absence of any definition of the word benefit or of the words capable of being computed, we can only give those words the normal connotation that they carry in the English language. By the word capable, according to the Oxford Dictionary is meant susceptible and by the word compute is meant to estimate or determine by arithmetical or mathematical reckoning. The question then is, whether the benefit with which we are concerned, viz., privilege leave, is susceptible of being estimated or determined in terms of money by any arithmetical or mathematical reckoning that, is a question which in our opinion would fall to be determined upon a consideration of the nature of the benefit and the purpose for which it was granted to the workmen11. The paragraphs of the award by which this benefit was conferred upon the workers do not at all refer to any money equivalent or computation of any money equivalent in the event that privilege leave is not granted to any worker. Now, no doubt, in the discharge of its function as executing Court, the Labour Court can interpret the award, but howsoever it may interpret the award, it cannot read into that award any terms that a monetary compensation equivalent to the benefit of privilege leave was to be granted.Such a question was not even considered by Mr. Naik when making the award. Therefore, it seems to us that when, for the first time, about five years after the award was made, the workers are asking for computation of the money equivalent of that benefit, there is no question here involved of interpreting any term of the award. What in effect is being asked for is that the workers be given an additional benefit, which was not the subject matter of the award and was not within the consideration of the Tribunal which made the award. To that extent it seems to us that the Labour Court went beyond its jurisdictionthe Labour Court put the argument thusBy refusing to give the privilege leave the employer deprives an employee of the benefit to slay away from work by getting the wages. By refusing the privilege leave the employer puts the employee to two losses viz. (1) loss of wages and (2) loss of leave or absence from work or rest. What the applicant has claimed in this case is wages for the leave period or days of privilege leave to which the applicant was entitled to and which the opponent refused to giveNow it seems to its that in this passage, the Labour Court has made an assumption which is not warranted upon the facts, viz. that the workers in these two petitions asked for privilege leave and were refused privilege leave by the employer. That is completely contrary to the facts. In tact, in paragraph 6 of the petition, it was the complaint of the employed that, at no time prior to the filing of the said application, did the second respondents complain that they had not been given privilege leave to which they were entitled. Thus, it was the employer who was making a grievance of the fact that the workers had never asked for privilege leave before and that their application under S. 330(2) was not maintainable. Therefore, it is clear that there could have been no possible refusal to grant privilege leave. Indeed, the statement, to which we have referred above, made in the petition, was never controverted on behalf of the workers in this Court. They have mil filed any return whatsoever, and, therefore, the statement in paragraph 6 must he accepted as correct. If so, the one principal assumption which the Labour Court made that privilege leave was asked for and refused by the employer is contrary to the facts12. But then, even assuming that a refusal of privilege leave has taken place, we are unable to understand the further reasoning of the Labour Court. It seems to have taken the view that when privilege leave is refused by the employer, he is automatically entitled to compensation or the money equivalent, that is to say, to have the benefit computed. The other remark which the Labour Court made that it involved the employee in two losses, viz., the loss of wages and loss of leave or absence from work or rest is also not correct, because for the period of the leave the employee does work and is actually paid for it, Therefore, there is no loss of wages involved. All that is involved is the loss of the privilege itself. If no privilege leave is granted, the employee continues to work and receives his pay. The Labour Court, moreover, did not at all advert to the grounds upon which and the purpose for which his benefit was given by the award itself.We are unable to sustain the decision of the Labour Court that the privilege leave was a benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money. In our opinion, the privilege leave by its very nature cannot be computed in terms of money13. Then we turn to the other point which was argued before us which, upon the view we have taken, is really not necessary to decide, but since it has been argued in full, we merely state the point here. Paragraph 26 of the award granted privilege leave to the workmen at the rate of 21 days in a year. Now, it must have struck the Labour Court that when the award says a year, it could not possibly mean a calendar year or 365 clays, because the employee, having regard to the other benefits which he receives ofg days, such as Sundays, paid holidays, unpaid holidays, etc., could not possibly work for the whole of the calendar year. Then arose the question as to what was involved in the direction of the award that the privilege leave shall be at the rate of 21 days in a year. The Labour Court has, it seems, after a considerable amount of hesitation come to its own conclusion that the year must be 291 days, and the manner in which it arrived at 291 days is by calculating various benefits which the workers had ofg days including seven days of casual leave, 15 days of sick leave, 10 paid holidays and 10 unpaid festival days and other benefits. The employer has in his petition computed the year as being of 800 days, a calculation which the Labour Court did not accept. Before us several other interpretations have been advanced. The extreme one is that so long as a worker works for a single day in a year, he would be entitled to the whole of the privilege leave so long as his name continues on the muster roll of the Company. Then it was variously argued that sick leave and casual leave cannot be computed for the purpose of arriving at the year for calculation of privilege leave. As we have said if is unnecessary for us to go into these rival contentions, because we have shown that, in the first place, the privilege leave was not a benefit which was capable of being computed in terms of money. But we may say it here that the very fact that the expression used in the award of Mr. Naik is capable of such varied interpretations shows that initially the use of the word year in the award not having been defined, we would be, undoubtedly, adding to the award, were we today to hold that though a year is mentioned, it is something less than a year. That again, as has been clearly held upon the authorities would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to do. In the view we have taken it is also not necessary to decide whether Sundays and paid holidays should be included or excluded in the computation of a year. In our opinion, the question which was before the Labour Court clearly did not fall within the ambit of Section 330(2). The Labour Court thus had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question, nor to award monetary compensation in lieu of the privilege leave.