Case: Union of India and Others Vs. P. S. Bhatt

employment of Shri Bhatt as Producer in which post he was still on probation was likely to affect the discipline in the administration and as such he was not a person suitable to be employed in that post and his employment in that post in which he was still a probationer should be terminated and he should be reverted to his original post of Announcer. The learned Solicitor-General contends that the conduct of Shri Bhatt might have motivated the authorities in taking the action against him and in passing the order; but it cannot be said that the termination of the period of probation in such circumstances would amount to any punishment. He has referred to the decision of this Court in the cases State of U.P. v. Bhoop Singh Verma, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 684 and also to the decision in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission and others v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali, [1980-II L.L.J. 155]. The learned Solicitor-General, therefore, contends that as the order in question is an order of simple termination of employment on probation of the petitioner, there can be no question of Article 311 of the Constitution being attracted.7. On behalf of Shri Bhatt, the petitioner in the writ petition and respondent in the appeal, it has been argued that the termination of the period of probation in the instant case and reversion of Shri Bhatt from his post of Producer to his old post of Announcer is in the facts and circumstances of this case by way of punishment. It has been argued that the facts and circumstances of the case go to indicate that the Station Director wanted to punish him because of loose talks which had been taped and placed before him and with the object of punishing him, the Station Director had made a report on the basis of which the authorities reverted Shri Bhatt to his old post of Announcer after terminating his employment as Producer in which post he was on probation. It has been argued that if the order termination of the employment of Shri Bhatt as producer on probation and his reversion is by way of punishment the said order must be held to be illegal, as Article 311 of the Constitution will be clearly attracted. In support of this case, reference has been made to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Purushottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958-II L.L.J. 544], S. Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, [1963-I L.L.J. 671], K. H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra and Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, [1974-II L.L.J. 465].8. The law in relation to termination of service of an employee on probation is well settled. If any order terminating the service of a probationer be an order of termination simpliciter without attaching any stigma to the employee and if the said order is not an order by way of punishment, there will be no question of the provisions of Article 311 being attracted. As the law on the question appears to be well settled it does not become necessary to consider the various decisions which have been cited.9. The only question which falls for determination in the present appeal is whether the impugned order was passed by way of punishment or not. It has not been argued that the impugned order attaches any kind of stigma to Shri Bhatt. We have earlier noticed the order and it is clear from the order that the order is an order of termination of the employment on probation simpliciter and reversion to the old post without attaching any kind of stigma. The High Court had proceeded on the basis that the impugned order was by way of punishment.10. It may be true that in deciding whether an order is by way of punishment or not, the relevant facts and circumstances may have to be considered. In the instant case, the broad facts, as established, appear to be as follows :(1) Shri Bhatt and Shri Prasad had indulged in loose talk and used filthy language against the Station Director and other officers of All India Radio, Vijayawada, while in officer;(2) This Finding has been recorded by the learned single Judge;(3) The tape-recording of the conversation of Shri Bhatt and Prasad had been forwarded to the Station Director;(4) The Station Director by his memo dated December 1, 1976 which we have earlier noted, had warned Mr. Bhatt;(5) The Station Director had further reported the matter to the Director General, All India Radio for appropriate action;(6) The impugned order terminating the period of probation of Shri Bhatt as producer and reverting him to his post of Announcer had thereafter been passed.11. On a proper consideration of these facts, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment; and, in our view, the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was by way of punishment, as the report of the Station Director had influenced the Director General to pass the said order. Loose talks and filthy and abusive language which had been used against the Station director and the other officers may legitimately in the facts and circumstances of the case lead to the formation of a reasonable belief in the minds of the authorities that the person be having in such fashion is not a suitable person to be employed as a producer. This undesirable conduct on the part of Shri Bhatt might have been the motive for terminating the employment on probation and for reverting him to his old post of Announcer. Even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the authority to terminate the service of the employee on probation, such termination cannot be termed as penalty or punishment. This principle has been clearly enunciated and reiterated in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission an others v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali (supra).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]10. It may be true that in deciding whether an order is by way of punishment or not, the relevant facts and circumstances may have to be considered. In the instant case, the broad facts, as established, appear to be as follows :(1) Shri Bhatt and Shri Prasad had indulged in loose talk and used filthy language against the Station Director and other officers of All India Radio, Vijayawada, while in officer;(2) This Finding has been recorded by the learned single Judge;(3) Theof the conversation of Shri Bhatt and Prasad had been forwarded to the Station Director;(4) The Station Director by his memo dated December 1, 1976 which we have earlier noted, had warned Mr. Bhatt;(5) The Station Director had further reported the matter to the Director General, All India Radio for appropriate action;(6) The impugned order terminating the period of probation of Shri Bhatt as producer and reverting him to his post of Announcer had thereafter been passed.11. On a proper consideration of these facts, in our opinion, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed by way of punishment; and, in our view, the High Court was in error in arriving at the finding that the impugned order was by way of punishment, as the report of the Station Director had influenced the Director General to pass the said order. Loose talks and filthy and abusive language which had been used against the Station director and the other officers may legitimately in the facts and circumstances of the case lead to the formation of a reasonable belief in the minds of the authorities that the person be having in such fashion is not a suitable person to be employed as a producer. This undesirable conduct on the part of Shri Bhatt might have been the motive for terminating the employment on probation and for reverting him to his old post of Announcer. Even if misconduct, negligence, inefficiency may be the motive or the inducing factor which influences the authority to terminate the service of the employee on probation, such termination cannot be termed as penalty or punishment. This principle has been clearly enunciated and reiterated in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission an others v. Dr. Md. S. Iskander Ali (supra).