Case: Madan Lal Puri Vs. Sain Das Berry

the application for eviction on November 26, 1964, the landlord has made any demand from the tenant for payment of higher rent. Finally, the High Court having due regard to the above circumstances and the size of the family of the landlord and the findings recorded by the Tribunal on May 4, 1970 held that the decision of the two subordinate authorities dismissing the landlords application was erroneous. On the other hand, the learned Judge held that the landlord has made out his claim under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act. On this reasoning the learned Judge reversed the decision of the Rent Controller and the Tribunal and allowed the application of the landlord for eviction of the appellant. The appellant was given six months time for vacating the premises. 8. Mr. Hardev Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, has very streneously urged that in view of the concurrent findings tribunals, there was no question of law, much less a substantial question of law arising for consideration before the High Court in the appeal filed by the landlord. Hence he urged that the interference by the High Court with the concurrent findings so recorded was not justified. Learned counsel further pointed out that the landlord has not made out his claim under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act. Mr. Hardev Singh referred us to certain decisions of this Court dealing with the question, under what circumstances it can be considered that a substantial question of law arises. We do not think it necessary, in the circumstances of this case, to refer to those decisions, as in our opinion they have no bearing on the short question that arises for consideration before us, namely, the power of the High Court under Section 39, to consider the correctness of a finding regarding bona fide requirement under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act. 9. As we have already pointed out, the sole question that has to be decided by us is whether the High Court in reversing the decisions of the Rent Controller and the Tribunal, in the circumstances of this case, can be considered to have exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 39 (2). We are satisfied that the High Court has not exceeded its jurisdiction in any manner. 10. The argument of Mr. Hardev Singh that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 39 (2) of the Act when it reversed the finding of the two subordinate authorities on the question of bona fide requirement has, in our opinion, no substance. In Smt. Kamla Soni v. Rup Lal Mehra, Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966, D/- 26-9-1969 (SC), this Court observed as follows :". . . . .whether on the facts proved the requirement of the landlord is bona fide, within the meaning of Section 14 (1) (e) is a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. . . ." From the above observations it is clear that an inference drawn by the subordinate authorities that the requirement of the respondent was not bona fide, could not be regarded as conclusive. The High Court, in proper cases, has ample jurisdiction to interfere with that finding and record its own conclusions on the basis of the materials on record. 11. We may also point out that in the case before us the position is made worse for the appellant in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal in favour of the landlord on May 4, 1970. We have already pointed out the circumstances under which a finding was called for by the High Court. The High Court has accepted those findings and held in favour of the landlord that he has made out a case under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act. 12. Mr. Hardev Singh referred us to the decision of this Court reported in Bhagwan Dass v. S. Rajdev Singh, AIR 1970 SC 986 , wherein it has been observed :". . . .A second appeal lies to the High Court against the decision of the Rent Control Tribunal under Section 39 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, only if the appeal involves some substantial question of law. The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal, on a consideration of the relevant terms of the agreement and oral evidence and the circumstances found that a clear case of sub-letting was established. On that finding no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, arose." 13. The first part of the above extract lays down the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Section 39 (2) of the Act. In that decision, on facts, it was found both by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal, on a relevant consideration of the materials on record, that a case of sub-letting was established. On such a finding concurrently arrived at by both the authorities, it was held by this Court that no question of law, much less a substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court. 14. But the facts in the case before us are entirely different. We have already pointed out that the question that fell to be considered by the High Court was whether the claim made by the landlord under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act was bona fide. As already pointed out, this Court, in Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966, D/- 26-9-1969 (SC), has held that a finding on such an issue is not one of fact alone but is a finding on mixed question of law and fact, and that it was open to the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Section 39 (2) of the Act, to consider the correctness or otherwise of such a finding. The findings recorded on such an issue by the subordinate tribunals are not conclusive.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]13. The first part of the above extract lays down the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court under Section 39 (2) of the Act. In that decision, on facts, it was found both by the Rent Controller and the Tribunal, on a relevant consideration of the materials on record, that a case of sub-letting was established. On such a finding concurrently arrived at by both the authorities, it was held by this Court that no question of law, much less a substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court14. But the facts in the case before us are entirely different. We have already pointed out that the question that fell to be considered by the High Court was whether the claim made by the landlord under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the Act was bona fide. As already pointed out, this Court, in Civil Appeal No. 2150 of 1966, D/- 26-9-1969 (SC), has held that a finding on such an issue is not one of fact alone but is a finding on mixed question of law and fact, and that it was open to the High Court when exercising its jurisdiction under Section 39 (2) of the Act, to consider the correctness or otherwise of such a finding. The findings recorded on such an issue by the subordinate tribunals are not conclusiveWe do not think it necessary, in the circumstances of this case, to refer to those decisions, as in our opinion they have no bearing on the short question that arises for consideration before us, namely, the power of the High Court under Section 39, to consider the correctness of a finding regarding bona fide requirement under clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1) of the ActWe are satisfied that the High Court has not exceeded its jurisdiction in any manner10. The argument of Mr. Hardev Singh that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 39 (2) of the Act when it reversed the finding of the two subordinate authorities on the question of bona fide requirement has, in our opinion, no substanceFrom the above observations it is clear that an inference drawn by the subordinate authorities that the requirement of the respondent was not bona fide, could not be regarded as conclusive. The High Court, in proper cases, has ample jurisdiction to interfere with that finding and record its own conclusions on the basis of the materials on record.