Case: THE DIRECTOR GENERAL (ROAD DEVELOPMENT) NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA Vs. AAM AADMI LOKMANCH &amp; ORS

Harrison [1947 WN 191 : 63 TLR 484], Quinn v. Scott [(1965) 1 WLR 1004 : (1965) 2 All ER 588] and Mackie v. Dumbartonshire County Council [1927 WN 247] ). The duty of the owner/occupier of the premises by the side of the road whereon persons lawfully pass by, extends to guarding against what may happen just by the side of the premises on account of anything dangerous on the premises. The premises must be maintained in a safe state of repair. The owner/occupier cannot escape the liability for injury caused by any dangerous thing existing on the premises by pleading that he had employed a competent person to keep the premises in safe repairs. In Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Subhagwanti [AIR 1966 SC 1750 ] a clock tower which was 80 years old collapsed in Chandni Chowk, Delhi causing the death of a number of persons. Their Lordships held that the owner could not be permitted to take a defence that he neither knew nor ought to have known the danger. [T]he owner is legally responsible irrespective of whether the damage is caused by a patent or a latent defect, — said their Lordships. In our opinion the same principle is applicable to the owner of a tree standing by the side of a road. If the tree is dangerous in the sense that on account of any disease or being dead the tree or its branch is likely to fall and thereby injure any passer-by then such a tree or branch must be removed so as to avert the danger to life. It is pertinent to note that it is not the defence of the Municipal Corporation that vis major or an act of God such as a storm, tempest, lightning or extraordinary heavy rain had occurred causing the fall of the branch of the tree and hence the Corporation was not liable. This approach that a statutory corporation or local authority can be held liable in tort for injury occasioned on account of omission to oversee, or defective supervision of its activities contracted out to another agency, was also followed in Vadodara Municipal Corporation v Purshottam V . Muranji 2014 (16) SCC 14 . 64. The terms of the agreement which the NHAI entered into with the concessionaire clearly contemplated the safety of highway users (Clause 18.1.1) and an elaborate highway monitoring mechanism (Clause 19.1). The agreement also required any unusual occurrences to be reported; an independent engineer was required to, and did inspect the highway. The reports of the inspecting engineer reveal that the deficiencies by way of narrowing of water channels, and the unusual collection of debris, were noted. Even before the incident, the NHAI was alive to this; it had separately written to Rathod, and later to the local administration about it through its letter dated 15.04.2011. That letter is revealing; it inter alia, states that: During pre-monsoon rains all the excavated muck has been carried to NH4 alongwith rain water and block Satara bound traffic lane for quite some time. The problem will be severe during heavy rains of July and August. As such safety of highway and tunnel is completely at stake due to indiscriminate cutting of hills on upper side of tunnel and both the end. 65. Having regard to the duty imposed on the NHAI by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of the Highways Act, read with Section 16 of the NHAI Act, there can be no manner of doubt that the NHAI was responsible for the maintenance of the highway, including the stretch upon which the accident occurred. The report of the sub-divisional officer clearly shows that inspection reports were furnished to the NHAI shortly before the incident, highlighting the deficiencies; also, the NHAIs correspondence with Rathod, and the local administration, reveal that it was aware of the danger and likelihood of risk to human life, and the foreseeability of the event that actually occurred later. Further, letters addressed by the local administration and the NHAI to Rathod similarly show that it was incumbent upon him to take remedial action. The failure of the NHAI to ensure remedial action, and likewise the failure by Rathod to take measures to prevent the accident, prima facie, disclose their liability. 66. The absence of legal representatives or heirs of the deceased in the proceedings, or the fact that they had initiated independent civil action, in the opinion of this court, was not an impediment, nor could it have precluded the NGT from exercising its jurisdiction, given the gravity of the matter and the danger posed to the members of the public. The initiation of civil action did not mean that the NGT had to either reject the application (as far as it claimed relief for the accident), or await the outcome of the civil suit. This position is clear from the proviso to Section 18(1) which reads as follows: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation or relief or settlement of dispute, the application shall be made on behalf of, or, for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. 67. The above provision clearly implies that an application without impleading the legal heirs cannot be rejected. At the most, the tribunal has to implead all legal heirs. In the present case, that procedure was not followed. However, the legal heirs have instituted a suit. The ends of justice would be served if that suit (Special Civil Suit No. 890 of 2014 before the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune) is directed to revive and continue it; a direction is issued to the concerned court (Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune). The directions in this regard by the NGT, towards payment of compensation are to be regarded as indicative of a prima facie determination.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]33. A plain reading of the above provisions of the NGT Act would reveal that the tribunal possesses two kinds of power and jurisdiction: one, primary jurisdiction under Sections 14-15, and appellate jurisdiction under Section 16. Under Section 14, the NGT has the power to adjudicate upon disputes relating to civil cases where a substantial question relating to environment (including enforcement of any legal right relating to environment), is involved relating to the implementation of the enactments specified in Schedule I [Section 14 (1)]. The other provisions [Sections 14(2) and (3)] are incidental to the primary jurisdiction under Section 14(1). Section 15, on the other hand, is couched in wide terms. Section 15(1) provides that compensation or damages can be given by the NGT to victims of pollution and other environmental damage arising under the enactments specified in the Schedule I [Section 15 (1)(a)]; for restitution of property damaged [Section 15(1)(b)] and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas [Section 15(1)(c)]. Section 15(2) is procedural; Section 15(3) prescribes the period of limitation for applications. Section 15(4) enables the NGT to, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment, divide the compensation or relief payable under separate heads specified in Schedule II so as to provide compensation or relief to the claimants and for restitution of the damaged property or environment, as it may think fit.36. A conjoint reading of Sections 14, 15 and the Schedules would lead one to infer that the NGT has circumscribed jurisdiction to deal with, adjudicate, and wherever needed, direct measures such as payment of compensation, or make restitutionary directions in cases where the violation (i.e. harm caused due to pollution or exposure to hazards, etc.) are the result of infraction of any enactment listed in the first schedule. Yet, that, interpretation, in the opinion of this court, is not warranted.37. The reference to Schedule II, in Section 15(4) is not merely by way of events which are actionable in relation to harm caused due to the acts resulting in violation of any enactment under Schedule I. The wide language of that provision enables the tribunal (NGT) to direct, inter alia, payment of compensation, having regard to the damage to public health, property and environment . This interpretation is borne out by a reading of Section 17(2) regarding the apportionment of liability for payment of compensation.38. In the decision of this court reported as Hinch Lal Tiwari v. Kamala Devi 2001 (6) SCC 496 ,  this court held that ponds constituted public utility and were meant for common use. The court held that ponds could not be allotted or commercialised, and that filling up of ponds was illegal. Recently, in Jitendra Singh v. Ministry of Environment & Ors 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1510, the Court quoted and applied the observations in Hinch Lal (supra), in the context of an appeal directed against an order of the NGT which had summarily dismissed an application under Sections 14 and 15 of the NGT Act seeking directions to cease the filling up of ponds in the Greater Noida Industrial Development Area.43. It is noteworthy that this court clearly held that under Section 15(1)(b) and 15(1)(c), the NGT has the power to make directions and provide for restitution of property damaged and for restitution of the environment for such area or areas as the Tribunal may think fit. It is noteworthy that Section 15(1)(b) & (c) have not been made relatable to Schedule I enactments of the Act. Though a direction for compensation under Section 15(1)(a) is relatable to violation of enactments specified under the first schedule, the power under Section 17 appears to be cast in wider terms.44. As noticed earlier, Section 17 (1) refers to first schedule enactments; it talks of death of, or injury to, any person or damage to any property or environment which has resulted from an accident or the adverse impact of an activity or operation or process, under any enactment in Schedule I. One of the enactments is the Environment Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter EPA).47. Acting under the provisions of the EPA, the Central Government had issued a notification on 14.09.2006, mandating Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in exercise of its power under Section 3(2) of the EPA read with Rule 5 of the rules framed thereunder. In terms of this notification, environment impact assessment and clearance was necessary for different processes and industries. Mining too, was included as part of the notification; the only exception was that minor mineral leases for an area below five hectares were exempted. Clearly, therefore, the Central Government included within the purview of the EPA, major and minor mineral extraction.48. Several irregularities were noticed over a period of time, with regard to minor mineral extraction, including sand, and there was need for introducing stringent regulations for those activities. A report of the then Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF, now MoEF&CC) submitted in 2010 was critical of the prevailing norms. As a result, this court and the NGT issued orders and directives making ECs compulsory for projects less than five hectares. The Central Government too initiated measures.50. By virtue of a notification, environmental clearance is necessary even for minor mineral extraction where the area of operation is less than 5 hectares; the procedure has been outlined under Appendix XI of that notification. Clearly, therefore, mining of even minor minerals, when resorted to on a large scale (i.e. where more than a few leases or permits are granted), has a potential impact on the environment. In the facts of this case, the state had granted no less than 62 minor mineral permits in the vicinity; unauthorized activity (in the form inter alia, of over-mining and piling of debris) had resulted in the imposition of the penalty. Clearly, there was violation of the EPA in the present case, because Rathods mining lease covered an area in excess of 5 hectares; it fell within the regulatory notification of 2006. There is nothing on record to show that the relevant clearance was obtained by Rathod. Plainly, therefore, the facts of the present case disclosed violation of the EPA- an enactment listed in Schedule I of the NGT Act. This meant that the NGTs jurisdiction under Section 15(1)(a) and Section 17 could not have been disputed.51. This court is of the considered opinion that the expression environment and environmental pollution have to be given a broader meaning, having regard to Parliamentary intent to ensure the objective of the EPA. It effectuates the principles underlying Article 48A of the Constitution of India. The EPA is in essence, an umbrella legislation enacting a broad framework for the central government to coordinate the activities of various central and state authorities established under other laws, such as the Water Act and Air Act. The EPA also effectively enunciates the critical legislative policy for environment protection. It changes the narrative and emphasis from a narrow concept of pollution control to a wider facet of environment protection. The expansive definition of environment that includes water, air and land and the interrelation which exist among and between water, air and land, other human creatures, plants, micro-organisms and property give an indication of the wide powers conferred on the Central Government. A wide net is cast over the environment related laws. The EPA also empowers the central government to comprehensively control environmental pollution by industrial and related activities. For these reasons, and in view of the above discussion, it is held that the NGT correctly assumed jurisdiction, having regard to the nature of the accident in the facts of this case.52. In the present case, the deceased were concededly travelling on the highway. The incident of flooding occurred, and was caused due to clogging of the water channels. The report of the sub divisional magistrate indicated that the Inspecting Engineer (Arvi Associates, a firm) had given a report after inspection. On behalf of the independent engineering firm appointed by the NHAI, an oral deposition was given before the sub-divisional officer. It was stated that the roadside channel and culvert from where water is disposed of, had been rendered screen blinded and a pipeline of 1.2 m diameter existed there for disposal of water. The necessity of remedial action was communicated to the concessionaire, before the occurrence of the accident. It was also stated that in terms of the instructions of the NHAI, the concessionaire was informed about the deficiency on 15.05.2013 and by a further letter dated 04.06.2013. An action plan for completing pre-monsoon work was sought from the concessionaire. However, the concessionaire did not submit an action plan despite lapse of one month.53. The SDOs report noted that the culvert had been constructed from the new tunnel and was existing from 2004. Apparently a 1m diameter pipe was positioned in the culvert and had made a causeway. One hotel also had constructed an approach road and placed a 950 MM pipe. The existing drainage capacity of the octroi post and the hotel was insufficient due to heavy rains as a result of which rainwater was not totally drained. This water started accumulating on the road. Certain ramps were also constructed by Tata Motors for its convenience; they were removed by the concessionaire; nevertheless, the ramps were prepared again. The existing cross drainage provision was of a sub-culvert -type structure and the size at the time of the old highway was 1m x 1 m. The report further observed that the natural drainage and sides of hills of the highway was adversely affected and had been tampered with. The disposal of water on the right side overhead of the tunnel through the cross train on the old highway via the catch drain and subsequently the channels for the water flow were choked due to development work and adversely affected the clearance of rain water. The report indicates that after the accident on 06.06.2013, the local administration cleared the debris which had created obstacles, to facilitate the free flow of water into the catch drain culvert and further flow of water.56. Acting in furtherance of its powers, the NHAI entered into an agreement with the concessionaire for the construction, operation and maintenance of the highway in question (i.e. the stretch of 140 kms on which the accident occurred).64. The terms of the agreement which the NHAI entered into with the concessionaire clearly contemplated the safety of highway users (Clause 18.1.1) and an elaborate highway monitoring mechanism (Clause 19.1). The agreement also required any unusual occurrences to be reported; an independent engineer was required to, and did inspect the highway. The reports of the inspecting engineer reveal that the deficiencies by way of narrowing of water channels, and the unusual collection of debris, were noted. Even before the incident, the NHAI was alive to this; it had separately written to Rathod, and later to the local administration about it through its letter dated 15.04.2011. That letter is revealing; it inter alia, states that:During pre-monsoon rains all the excavated muck has been carried to NH4 alongwith rain water and block Satara bound traffic lane for quite some time. The problem will be severe during heavy rains of July and August.As such safety of highway and tunnel is completely at stake due to indiscriminate cutting of hills on upper side of tunnel and both the end.65. Having regard to the duty imposed on the NHAI by virtue of Sections 4 and 5 of the Highways Act, read with Section 16 of the NHAI Act, there can be no manner of doubt that the NHAI was responsible for the maintenance of the highway, including the stretch upon which the accident occurred. The report of the sub-divisional officer clearly shows that inspection reports were furnished to the NHAI shortly before the incident, highlighting the deficiencies; also, the NHAIs correspondence with Rathod, and the local administration, reveal that it was aware of the danger and likelihood of risk to human life, and the foreseeability of the event that actually occurred later. Further, letters addressed by the local administration and the NHAI to Rathod similarly show that it was incumbent upon him to take remedial action. The failure of the NHAI to ensure remedial action, and likewise the failure by Rathod to take measures to prevent the accident, prima facie, disclose their liability.66. The absence of legal representatives or heirs of the deceased in the proceedings, or the fact that they had initiated independent civil action, in the opinion of this court, was not an impediment, nor could it have precluded the NGT from exercising its jurisdiction, given the gravity of the matter and the danger posed to the members of the public. The initiation of civil action did not mean that the NGT had to either reject the application (as far as it claimed relief for the accident), or await the outcome of the civil suit. This position is clear from the proviso to Section 18(1) which reads as follows:Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation or relief or settlement of dispute, the application shall be made on behalf of, or, for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.67. The above provision clearly implies that an application without impleading the legal heirs cannot be rejected. At the most, the tribunal has to implead all legal heirs. In the present case, that procedure was not followed. However, the legal heirs have instituted a suit. The ends of justice would be served if that suit (Special Civil Suit No. 890 of 2014 before the Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune) is directed to revive and continue it; a direction is issued to the concerned court (Court of the Civil Judge Senior Division, Pune). The directions in this regard by the NGT, towards payment of compensation are to be regarded as indicative of a prima facie determination.71. The power and jurisdiction of the NGT under Sections 15(1)(b) and (c) are not restitutionary, in the sense of restoring the environment to the position it was before the practise impugned, or before the incident occurred. The NGTs jurisdiction in one sense is a remedial one, based on a reflexive exercise of its powers. In another sense, based on the nature of the abusive practice, its powers can also be preventive.72. As a quasi-judicial body exercising both appellate jurisdiction over regulatory bodies orders and directions (under Section 16) and its original jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the NGT Act, the tribunal, based on the cases and applications made before it, is an expert regulatory body. Its personnel include technically qualified and experienced members. The powers it exercises and directions it can potentially issue, impact not merely those before it, but also state agencies and state departments whose views are heard, after which general directions to prevent the future occurrence of incidents that impact the environment, are issued.75. The NGTs directions, though placed in the context of its adjudicatory role, have a wider ramification in the sense that its rulings constitute the appropriate norm which are to be followed by all those engaging in similar activities. Therefore, its orders, contextually in the course of adjudication, also establish and direct behaviour appropriate for future guidance. In these circumstances, given the panoply of the NGTs powers under the NGT Act, which include considering regulatory directions issued by expert regulatory bodies under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Biodiversity Act, 2002 it has to be held that general directions for future guidance, to avoid or prevent injury to the environment for appropriate assimilation in relevant rules, can be given by the NGT.76. Turning next to the question of the correctness of the general directions contained in Para 17(e) of the NGTs order, this court has no manner of doubt that such directions were improper and not justified in the facts of this case. What the NGT had before it, was the report of the SDM and a report commissioned about the nature of the incident. Based on these limited inputs, the tribunal concluded- without any rationale and based on no scientific or technical evidence, or experts opinion, that development and construction should not be carried out within 100 feet of a lowest slope i.e. incline of any hill within its territorial limits, as well as hill-tops. The decisions of this court, including the All Dimasa Students Union case (f.n. 9); Mantri Technoze Pvt. Ltd case (f.n.3); the Hanuman Laxman Aroskar case (f.n. 4) and the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board case (f.n. 2) all show that the NGT resorted to the appointment of technical and scientific experts in the relevant field, who studied the issue, made site inspections and furnished reports. Such reports were subjected to discussion by the parties before the NGT, who were also given the opportunity of objecting to or making representations against such reports. Based on a final consideration of all these materials, and the submissions of parties before it, the NGT proceeded to issue directions. This procedure was wholly overlooked by the NGT in the present case.80. So far as plans and developments that were approved before the impugned notification was issued, this court is of the opinion that they cannot be disturbed and the right of the applicants, be they developers, builders or owners of land or plots, cannot be prejudiced or adversely affected. This is evident from a ruling of this court in T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502 . This court stated that town planning legislations (like the MRTP Act) are regulatory; and that when a development plan is in force during the proposal for its amendment, courts should not interfere with them on the assumption that the approved plan for building or development, would not be eventually permitted. It was held that:Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the State or not is uncertain. It is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan must conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecological balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts while interpreting a statute should bestow serious consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, are ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in the legislation itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not been taken into consideration keeping in view the future need, the State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the Authority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendment in the legislation is not brought into force.84. Now, under the provisions of the MRTP Act Section 14 and 22, regional plans and development plans have to take into account features such as soil conservation, preservation of natural features, prevention of flooding etc, while factoring planning for each city or area concerned. In turn, such regional and development plans would constitute the blueprint for local town planning authorities to grant or refuse permission to individual applicants. In these circumstances, the use of Section 154 of the MRTP Act, in the present case, in fact amounted to a modification of all plans - regional, development, etc. Such modification (by way of absolute prohibition in construction) was not preceded by any manner of public consultation, much less previous invitation of objections or consideration of the views of affected parties. It is in this background that one has to consider the argument of the state, which found favour with the High Court, that such notification was issued in public interest.87. Directions can be issued notwithstanding any other provisions of the Act, for implementing or bringing into effect the Central or the State Government programmes, policies or projects or for the efficient administration of this Act or in the larger public interest, issue, from time to time. No doubt, the non-obstante clause has an overriding effect on other provisions of the Act. However, if one keeps in mind that the preparations of regional and development plans are in terms of specific provisions which outline detailed procedures that have to be necessarily followed, in the absence of which, time and again courts have intervened and held that such modifications (without following prescribed procedure or without prescribed consultations) are illegal, the power has to be resorted to for good and adequate reasons. The direction, impugned in the present case, on the face of it, is not premised on any central or state government programmes, policies or projects.88. There are several authorities for the proposition that though an administrative order need not necessarily comply with principles of natural justice such as granting hearing, yet, administrative decisions or orders have to be based on some reasons. In Shri. Sitaram Sugar Mills Company v. Union of India, (1990) 3 SCC 223 ( which concerned the zoning regulations for the purpose of levy sugar under the relevant statutory order, in terms of the Essential Commodities Act), the Supreme Court held as follows:Power delegated by statute is limited by its terms and subordinate to its objects. The delegate must act in good faith, reasonably, intra vires the power granted, and on relevant consideration of material facts. All his decisions, whether characterised as legislative or administrative or quasi-judicial, must be in harmony with the Constitution and other laws of the land. They must be reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation. If they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised end or do not tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the objects of delegation, court might well say, Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable ultra vires.A repository of power acts ultra vires either when he acts in excess of his power in the narrow sense or when he abuses his power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness.89. In Cellular Operators Association v. Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, (2016) 7 SCC 703 this court held that subordinate regulatory legislation, can be set aside in judicial review, if they show no rationale or are arbitrary:62. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that the Quality of Service Regulations and the Consumer Regulations must be read together as part of a single scheme in order to test the reasonableness thereof. The countervailing advantage to service providers by way of the allowance of 2% average call drops per month, which has been granted under the 2009 Quality of Service Regulations, could not have been ignored by the impugned Regulation so as to affect the fundamental rights of the appellants, and having been so ignored, would render the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.63. Secondly, no facts have been shown to us which would indicate that a particular area would be filled with call drops thanks to the fault on the part of the service providers in which consumers would be severely inconvenienced. The mere ipse dixit of the learned Attorney General, without any facts being pleaded to this effect, cannot possibly make an unconstitutional regulation constitutional. We, therefore, hold that a strict penal liability laid down on the erroneous basis that the fault is entirely with the service provider is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. Also, the payment of such penalty to a consumer who may himself be at fault, and which gives an unjustifiable windfall to such consumer, is also manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to go into the appellants submissions that call drops take place because of four reasons, three of which are not attributable to the fault of the service provider, which includes sealing and shutting down towers by municipal authorities over which they have no control, or whether they are attributable to only two causes, as suggested by the Attorney General, being network-related causes or user-related causes. Equally, it is not necessary to determine finally as to whether the reason for a call drop can technologically be found out and whether it is a network-related reason or a user-related reason.XXXXXX XXXXXX XXXXXX66. The reason given in the Explanatory Memorandum for compensating the consumer is that the compensation given is only notional. The very notion that only notional compensation is awarded, is also entirely without basis. A consumer may well suffer a call drop after 3 or 4 seconds in a voice call. Whereas the consumer is charged only 4 or 5 paise for such dropped call, the service provider has to pay a sum of rupee one to the said consumer.This cannot be called notional at all. It is also not clear as to why the Authority decided to limit compensation to three call drops per day or how it arrived at the figure of Re 1 to compensate inconvenience caused to the consumer. It is equally unclear as to why the calling party alone is provided compensation because, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, inconvenience is suffered due to the interruption of a call, and such inconvenience is suffered both by the calling party and the person who receives the call. The receiving party can legitimately claim that his inconvenience when a call drops, is as great as that of the calling party. And the receiving party may need to make the second call, in which case he receives nothing, and the calling party receives Re 1 for the additional expense made by the receiving party. All this betrays a complete lack of intelligent care and deliberation in framing such a regulation by the Authority, rendering the impugned Regulation manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable.90. In the present case, the State of Maharashtra has not shown any material or file containing the reasons behind the directive of 14.11.2017. It is not in dispute that the direction was consequential to, and solely based on the directions of the NGT in Para 17(e). As noticed earlier, those directions were not based on any scientific evidence or report of any technical expert. Furthermore, even the impugned notification does not specify what constitutes hills, and how they can be applied in towns and communities set in undulating areas and hilly terrain. This is not only vague, but makes the directions arbitrary as they can be applied at will by the concerned authorities. More importantly, they amount to a blanket change of all regional and development plans. While such directions can be issued, if situations so warrant, such as in extraordinary or emergent circumstances, the complete absence of any reasons why the state issued them, coupled with the lack of any supporting expert report or input, renders it an arbitrary exercise. That they are based only on the NGTs orders, only underlines the lack of any application of mind on the part of the State, while issuing them.