Case: Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore Vs. Shah Jethaji Phulchand

shall be terminated at the will of any of the partners(5) That the partners shall have a right to borrow any money required for partnership business at prevailing rate of interest(9) That the profits and loss of the company shall be shared by the partners in the following proportions irrespective of the contribution of the capitalIst party shall be entitled to Rs. 0-3-6IInd party shall be entitled to Rs. 0-3-0IIIrd party shall be entitled to Rs. 0-3-3IVth party shall be entitled to Rs. 0-3-0Vth party shall be entitled to Rs. 0-3-3Half an anna of the profits shall be credited to the Charity Fund. The portion of loss to be contributed by the 3rd party is to be borne by the first party and adjusted in the accounts(16) That (1) Nathmal Jethaji, (2) Phulchand Nathmal, (3) Sakalchand Thikmaji shall be working partners. They shall have the right of doing business, borrowing moneys from banks and other persons, drawing cheques on the account of the firm in the banks and generally they shall have all the rights connected with the business."The Income-tax Officer rejected the applications for registration for 1953-54 and 1954-55 on the ground that there were no valid applications for renewal of registration. Apparently the firm had been registered in the earlier assessment years5. For the assessment year 1953-54, the Appallate Assistant Commissioner, inter alia, held that the partnership deed on which the application was based was defective. He observed : " The minor is made a party of the partnership through Nathmal Jethaji, the natural father, who is incidentally not the real guardian as discussed already. No minor can enter into a contract for partnership either by himself or through a guardian. " For the assessment year 1954-55, he held that although the minor was not liable for loss but he was described as a partner and was vested with all the rights relating to the conduct of business along with the other partners and was thus treated as a full-fledged partner. He held that the contract of partnership was void in law, and, therefore, the firm could not be registered6. The Appellate Tribunal, by one order, disposed of the two appeals relating to both the assessment years. Relying on Jakka Devayya and Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, it held that the minor could be regarded as only having been admitted to the benefits of partnership. The High Court, on reference, as already stated, answered the question in favour of the assessee7. We have just delivered judgment in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Shah Mohandas Sadhuram. In that case we have held that a partnership deed must be construed reasonably and that a guardian is entitled to do all things necessary for effectuating the conferment of the benefits of partnership8. The question then arises whether the deed makes the minor a full partner or he has been admitted only to the benefits of partnership. There is no doubt that on a true interpretation of sub-clause (9), the minor is not to bear any losses ; the losses are to be borne by Nathmal Jethaji. Sub-clause (16) does not make the minor a working partner. The only persons who were entitled to be the working partners are Nathmal Jethaji, Phulchand Nathmal and Sakalchand Thikmaji. It is in the light of these clauses that the other clauses should be construedMr. Karkhanis drew our attention to sub-clause (2) requiring the third party to contribute Rs. 70, 000. There is no provision that the minor will not be entitled to share in profits unless the capital is contributed, for under sub-clause (9) partners are entitled to share in profits irrespective of the contribution of capital. At any rate, as held in Shah Mohan Dass case, a guardian can agree to contribute capital. Sub-clause (3) of clause 4 of the partnership deed, which enables the partners to individually carry on the other business, cannot affect the validity of the deed. Mr. Karkhanis relies specially on sub-clause (4) which states that the partnership shall be terminated at the will of any of the partners. But this clause is a general clause usually found in partnership deeds and it cannot be said that this clause enables the minor partner to terminate the partnership itself, and in the context it only means, as far as the minor is concerned, that the guardian would be entitled to exercise his right of severance given to him by section 30 of the Partnership Act. Sub-clause (5) which enables partners to borrow money obviously has to be read along with sub-clause (16) by which only the three major partners have been designated as working partners. It seems to us that the minor has not been made a full partner but has only been given the benefits of partnership9. But the final objection of Mr. Karkhanis requires serious consideration. He says that the guardian has by clause 3 and sub-clause 4(1) purported, to agree to the starting of business and the constitution of a firm. This, according to him, he was not entitled to do and clauses 3 and 4(1) are void. The learned counsel for the respondent tried to sustain these clauses on the ground that the guardian must be deemed to have acted on his own behalf. But we are unable to sustain these clauses on this ground. Then the question arises : Can a guardian agree to the starting of a business and the constitution of a firm on the condition that the minor shall not be a full partner but only entitled to the benefits of partnership? In our opinion, there is no bar in law to the guardian entering into such a contract, for he is only securing the conferment of benefits of partnership on a minorTherefore, in our opinion, no fatal defect has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Accordingly we hold that the assessee-firm is entitled to be registered, and agreeing with the High Court, we answer the question in the affirmative

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. We have just delivered judgment in Commissioner ofv. Shah Mohandas Sadhuram. In that case we have held that a partnership deed must be construed reasonably and that a guardian is entitled to do all things necessary for effectuating the conferment of the benefits of partnershipThere is no doubt that on a true interpretation of(9), the minor is not to bear any losses ; the losses are to be borne by Nathmal Jethaji.(16) does not make the minor a working partner. The only persons who were entitled to be the working partners are Nathmal Jethaji, Phulchand Nathmal and Sakalchand Thikmaji. It is in the light of these clauses that the other clauses should beThere is no provision that the minor will not be entitled to share in profits unless the capital is contributed, for under(9) partners are entitled to share in profits irrespective of the contribution of capital. At any rate, as held in Shah Mohan Dass case, a guardian can agree to contribute capital.(3) of clause 4 of the partnership deed, which enables the partners to individually carry on the other business, cannot affect the validity of the deed. Mr. Karkhanis relies specially on(4) which states that the partnership shall be terminated at the will of any of the partners. But this clause is a general clause usually found in partnership deeds and it cannot be said that this clause enables the minor partner to terminate the partnership itself, and in the context it only means, as far as the minor is concerned, that the guardian would be entitled to exercise his right of severance given to him by section 30 of the Partnership Act.(5) which enables partners to borrow money obviously has to be read along with(16) by which only the three major partners have been designated as working partners. It seems to us that the minor has not been made a full partner but has only been given the benefits of partnershipBut we are unable to sustain these clauses on this ground. Then the question arises : Can a guardian agree to the starting of a business and the constitution of a firm on the condition that the minor shall not be a full partner but only entitled to the benefits of partnership? In our opinion, there is no bar in law to the guardian entering into such a contract, for he is only securing the conferment of benefits of partnership on a minorTherefore, in our opinion, no fatal defect has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Accordingly we hold that theis entitled to be registered, and agreeing with the High Court, we answer the question in the affirmative