Case: Century Spinning &amp; Manufacturing Companyltd. And Anr Vs. The Ulhasnagar- Municipal Council And Anr

determination, and the claim could not be characterised as frivolous, vexatious or unjust. The High Court has given no reasons for dismissing the petition in limine, and on a consideration of the averments in the petition and the materials placed before the Court we are satisfied that the Company was entitled to have its grievance against the action of the Municipality, which was prima facie unjust, tried.9. The Company pleaded that the Ulhasnagar Municipality had "entered into a solemn arrangement" not to levy octroi duty for a period of seven years from the date of its imposition. The evidence relating to the undertaking was contained in public records. The Government of Maharashtra advised the Municipality that it was acting in violation of the terms of that undertaking. By its resolution the Municipality declined to abide by the undertaking of its predecessor.10. There is undoubtedly a clear distinction between a representation of an existing fact and a representation that something will be done in future. The former may, if it amounts to a representation as to some fact alleged at the time to be actually in existence, raise an estoppel, if another person alters his position relying upon that representation. A representation that something will be done in the future may result in a contract, if another person to whom it is addressed acts upon it. A representation that something will be done in future is not a representation that it is true when made. But between a representation of a fact which is untrue and a representation express or implied - to do something in future, there is no clear antithesis. A representation that something will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is acted upon by another person it may, unless the statute governing the person making the representation provides otherwise, result in an agreement enforceable at law; if the statute requires that the agreement shall be in a certain form, no contract may result from the representation and acting therefor but the law is not powerless to raise in appropriate cases an equity against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation.11. Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have altered their position to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex contract by a person who acts upon the promise: when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation if the contract be not in that form may be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity. In Union of India v. M/s. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd., (1968) 2 SCR 366 = (AIR 1968 SC 718 ) this Court held that the Government is not exempt from the equity arising out of the acts done by citizens to their prejudice, relying upon the representations as to its future conduct made by the Government. This Court held that the following observations made by Denning, J., in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions, (1949) 1 KB 227 applied in India."The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppels do not bind the Crown for that doctrine has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrine of executive necessity, that is, the doctrine that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to better its future executive action".We are in this case not concerned to deal with the question whether Denning, L. J., was right in extending the rule to a different class of cases as in Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd., v. Howell, (1950) 1 All ER 538, where he observed at page 542:"Whenever Government officers in their dealings with a subject take on themselves to assume authority in a matter with which the subject is concerned, he is entitled to rely on their having the authority which they assume. He does not know, and cannot be expected to know, the limits of their authority, and he ought not to suffer, if they exceed it".It may be sufficient to observe that in appeal from that judgment Howell v.Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd, (1950) 1 All ER 538 Lord Simonds observed after referring to the observations of Denning, L J.:"The illegality of an act is the same whether the action has been misled by an assumption of authority on the part of a government officer however high or low in the hierarchy."* * * The question is whether the character of an act done in force of a statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it had been induced by a misleading assumption of authority. In my opinion the answer is clearly: No".12. If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice.13. Mr. Gokhale appearing on behalf of the Municipality urged that the petition filed by the Company apparently raised questions of fact which in the view of the High Court could not appropriately be tried in the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. But the High Court has not said so, and on a review of the averments made in the petition this argument cannot be sustained. Merely because a question of fact is raised, the High Court will not be justified in requiring the party to seek relief by the somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive process by a civil suit against a public body. The questions of fact raised by the petition in this case are elementary.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]12. If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to histhe High Court has not said so, and on a review of the averments made in the petition this argument cannot be sustained. Merely because a question of fact is raised, the High Court will not be justified in requiring the party to seek relief by the somewhat lengthy, dilatory and expensive process by a civil suit against a public body. The questions of fact raised by the petition in this case are elementary.