Case: Lal Chand (Dead) By L.Rs. &amp; Ors Vs. Radha Kishan

against whom a decree for eviction is passed is a tenant for the purposes of the Delhi Rent Control Act but whether he is a tenant for the purposes of s. 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. Lakhmi Chands (supra) case does not deal with this problem at all.Since the respondent had not obtained permission of the competent authority for instituting the present suit for obtaining a decree for eviction of Lal Chand from a building situated in the slum area and since Lal Chand must be held to be a tenant for the purposes of s. 19(1) (a) it must follow that the suit is incompetent and cannot be entertained.The suit is also barred under s. 37A of the Slum Clearance Act which reads thus:"37A. Bar of jurisdiction.---Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the competent authority or any other person is empowered by or under this Act, to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under tiffs Act."12. The competent authority is empowered under s. 19( 3 ) to determine the question whether permission should be granted or refused for instituting a suit for obtaining a decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from any building in a slum area. Consequently, no civil court can have jurisdic tion in respect of that matter, namely, in respect of the question whether a tenant of a building in a slum area should or should not be permitted to be evicted therefrom. As a result of the combined operation of s. 19(3) and s. 37A of the Slum Clearance Act, that jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the competent authority and the jurisdiction in that behalf of civil courts is expressly taken away.13. Only one more aspect of the matter needs is to be ad-verted to. The respondent after obtaining a decree for eviction against Lal Chand and his alleged sub tenants applied for permission of the competent authority to execute that degree. Permission was granted to him to execute the decree in respect only of the two rooms on the second floor and in pursuance of that permission he obtained pos session of those two rooms. We are unable to , understand how after working out his remedy under the Delhi Rent Control Act as modified by the Slum Clearance Act, it is competent to the respondent to bring a fresh suit for evict ing the appellants from the premises on the ground floor. The authorities under the Slum Clearance Act who are exclu sively invested with the power to determine whether a decree for eviction should be permitted to be executed and, if so, to what extent, had finally decided that question, refusing to allow the respondent to execute the decree in respect of the ground floor premises. By the present suit, the respondent is once again asking for the relief which was included in the larger relief sought by him in the application filed under the Slum Clearance Act and which was expressly denied to him. In the circumstances, the present suit is also barred by the principle of res judicata. The fact that s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply on its terms, the earlier proceeding before the competent authority not being a suit, is no answer to the extension Of the principle underlying-that section to the instant case. Section 11, it is long since settled, is not exhaustive and the principle which motivates that sect ion can be extended to cases which do not fall strictly within the letter of the law. The issues involved in the two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as between the same parties and thirdly, the issue now sough t to be raised was decided finally by a competent quasi judicial tribunal. The principle of res judicata is con ceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good con science which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. Were it permissible to bring suits of the present nature, the beneficial jurisdiction conferred on the competent authority by the Slum Clearance Act would become illusory and meaningless for, whether the competent authori ty grants or refuses permission to execute a decree for eviction, it would always be open to the landlord to enforce the ejectment decree by filing a substantiative suit for possession. Verily, the respondent is executing the evic tion decree by installments, now under the garb of a suit. Apart from the fact that the suit is barred on account of principles analogous to res judicata, it is plainly in violation of the injunction contained in s. 19 (1)(b) of the Slum Clearance Act, if regard is to be had to the substance and not for the form of the proceedings. Lal Chands widow died after the decision of the second appeal by the High Court and before the filing of this appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent wants to utilise that event to highlight his argument that the cause of action cannot survive at least after her death, in view by the amendment made to s. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act by Amending Act 18 of 1976. We cannot accept this argument either. The suit filed by the respondent being incompetent and the Civil Court not having jurisdiction to entertain it, the decree passed by it is non-est. The nullity of that decree can be set up at least by Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram who are entitled to defend and protect their possession by invoking the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act.14.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The High Court seems to have been impressed by the contention that the suit was not maintainable by reason of the provisions of s. 37A of the Slum Clearance Act, but it thought that Lal Chand having died there was no one before the Court who could legitimately contend that the suit was not maintainable. As stated before this was an erroneous approach to the problem, which makes it necessary for us to examine the merits of the contention as regards the maintainability of theare unable to appreciate how the judgment in that ease supports the contention of the respondent. All that was decided therein was that a person against whom an order for eviction is passed cannot be a tenant within the meaning of the Delhi Rent Control Act and that the definition of the word tenant as contained in that Act would not be affected by anything contained in s. 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. The question which arose in that case was whether s. 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit in relation to any premises to which that Act applied, for eviction of a tenant therefrom. Not only that no question arose in that case as to whether the definition of tenant as contained in the Delhi Rent Control Act should be extended to the Slum Clearance Act, but the Court observed expressly that: "No question as to what the rights of a tenant against whom a decree in ejectment has been passed in view of Section 19 of the Slum Areas Act are, arises in this appeal", and that the Court was not concerned in the appeal before it "with any question as to the protection given by the Slum Areas Act. to tenants" .... The question before us is not whether a person against whom a decree for eviction is passed is a tenant for the purposes of the Delhi Rent Control Act but whether he is a tenant for the purposes of s. 19 of the Slum Clearance Act. Lakhmi Chands (supra) case does not deal with this problem at all.Since the respondent had not obtained permission of the competent authority for instituting the present suit for obtaining a decree for eviction of Lal Chand from a building situated in the slum area and since Lal Chand must be held to be a tenant for the purposes of s. 19(1) (a) it must follow that the suit is incompetent and cannot beone more aspect of the matter needs is to be ad-verted to. The respondent after obtaining a decree for eviction against Lal Chand and his alleged sub tenants applied for permission of the competent authority to execute that degree. Permission was granted to him to execute the decree in respect only of the two rooms on the second floor and in pursuance of that permission he obtained pos session of those two rooms. We are unable to , understand how after working out his remedy under the Delhi Rent Control Act as modified by the Slum Clearance Act, it is competent to the respondent to bring a fresh suit for evict ing the appellants from the premises on the ground floor. The authorities under the Slum Clearance Act who are exclu sively invested with the power to determine whether a decree for eviction should be permitted to be executed and, if so, to what extent, had finally decided that question, refusing to allow the respondent to execute the decree in respect of the ground floor premises. By the present suit, the respondent is once again asking for the relief which was included in the larger relief sought by him in the application filed under the Slum Clearance Act and which was expressly denied to him. In the circumstances, the present suit is also barred by the principle of res judicata. The fact that s. 11 of theCode of Civil Procedure cannot apply on its terms, the earlier proceeding before the competent authority not being a suit, is no answer to the extension Of the principle underlying-that section to the instant case. Section 11, it is long since settled, is not exhaustive and the principle which motivates that sect ion can be extended to cases which do not fall strictly within the letter of the law. The issues involved in the two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as between the same parties and thirdly, the issue now sough t to be raised was decided finally by a competent quasi judicial tribunal. The principle of res judicata is con ceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good con science which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. Were it permissible to bring suits of the present nature, the beneficial jurisdiction conferred on the competent authority by the Slum Clearance Act would become illusory and meaningless for, whether the competent authori ty grants or refuses permission to execute a decree for eviction, it would always be open to the landlord to enforce the ejectment decree by filing a substantiative suit for possession. Verily, the respondent is executing the evic tion decree by installments, now under the garb of a suit. Apart from the fact that the suit is barred on account of principles analogous to res judicata, it is plainly in violation of the injunction contained in s. 19 (1)(b) of the Slum Clearance Act, if regard is to be had to the substance and not for the form of the proceedings. Lal Chands widow died after the decision of the second appeal by the High Court and before the filing of this appeal. Learned counsel for the respondent wants to utilise that event to highlight his argument that the cause of action cannot survive at least after her death, in view by the amendment made to s. 2(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act by Amending Act 18 of 1976. We cannot accept this argument either. The suit filed by the respondent being incompetent and the Civil Court not having jurisdiction to entertain it, the decree passed by it is non-est. The nullity of that decree can be set up at least by Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram who are entitled to defend and protect their possession by invoking the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act.