Case: Jagdish Pandey Vs. The Chancellor University Of Bihar &amp; Anr

be the actual qualification of the teacher appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 that qualification will be considered to be equal to the minimum qualification for the post he holds. The words "for the post he holds" are only descriptive and mean that if a person holds the post of a lecturer, his actual qualification will be considered to be equal to the minimum qualification of the lecturer; if he happens to hold the post of a Principal, his actual qualification will be considered to be equal to the minimum qualification required for the post of the Principal, even though in either of these cases the actual qualification is less than the minimum qualification. The obvious intention behind sub-r. (6) was to safeguard the interest of teachers already appointed and confirmed before July l, 1952, and that is why we find language which lays down that even though the actual qualification may be less than the minimum, that will be considered equivalent to the minimum. Once that equivalence is established by sub-r. (6), and it is held that even though the actual qualification was less, it was equal to the minimum qualification as provided by sub-r. (1), we fail to see how that deemed qualification can be given a go -by in the case of further promotion or appointment. 17. The appellant was a lecturer in Ramakrishna College, and though he had only a third class Masters degree, sub-r. (6) provided that that third class Masters degree must be treated as equivalent to the minimum qualification necessary for the lecturers post i. e. a second class Masters degree. Therefore, it must be held that from the date the sub-rule came into force, the appellant, though he actually had a third class Masters degree, must be deemed to have a second class Masters degree, which was the minimum qualification for the lecturers grade. Nothing has been pointed out to us in the Statutes which would take away this deemed qualification thereafter.We cannot therefore agree with the High Court that when sub-r. (6) says that a teacher appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 would be deemed to have the minimum qualification-though in fact he does not have it-it only provides for this deeming so long as he held the particular post he was holding on the date the Statutes came into force. That in our opinion is not the effect of the words "the post he holds", for these words are only descriptive and have to be there because the provision in R (1) (1) referred to three categories, namely, lecturers, professors and principals. We may in this connection refer to sub-r. (5) which shows that even if in future candidates with minimum qualification are not available, the Syndicate can relax the minimum qualification, thus indicating that the minimum qualifications are not absolutely rigid. But apart from this it appears to us that sub-r. (6) was made for the protection of teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July l, 1952, and by this deeming provision gave them the minimum qualifications and if that was so that must be for all purposes in future. If this were not the interpretation of sub-r. (6), another curious result would follow inasmuch as a lecturer could be appointed a college professor for which a second class Masters degree was not made the minimum qualification under sub-r. (1) but he could not be appointed a Principal on the interpretation pressed before us on behalf of the respondents. We should have thought that a good degree would be more necessary in the case of a professor whose main work is teaching than in the case of a principal whose main work is administrative. However that may be, we are of opinion that sub-r. (6) is meant for the protection of teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952, and it confers on them a qualification by its deeming provision and that must enure to their benefit for all time in future for the purpose of promotion or appointment to a higher grade in another college. 18. Another curious result would follow if the interpretation accepted by the High Court is correct. The High Court as we have pointed out above has held that sub-r. (6) gives equivalence only for the particular post held by a teacher appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952. Suppose that a lecturer in one college who holds a third class Masters degree and is entitled to remain as lecturer in that college, for some reason is appointed to another college after the Statutes came into force.This would be a new appointment and such a lecturer could not be appointed in a new college because he would not have a second class Masters degree for the new appointment. It seems to us therefore that the intention of sub-r. (6) was not that for the purpose of the particular post actually held the equivalence would prevail but no more. We are of opinion that sub-r. (6) must be read as a protection to the teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 and by fiction it gave the minimum qualification even though they may not actually have it. That minimum qualification must therefore remain with them always for the future, for nothing has been brought to our notice which takes away that minimum qualification deemed to be conferred on the teachers by sub-rule (6).We are therefore of opinion that the order dated February 18, 1963 passed by the Chancellor requiring the governing body of the Pandaul College to give the appellant a year or two to appear at an examination to enable him to obtain a second class Masters degree, otherwise his services might be terminated, is not valid, for the appellant must be deemed to have the minimum qualification of a second class Masters degree by virtue of sub-rule (6) of the Statutes and as such he was qualified for appointment as Principal of Pandual College. 19.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We are entitled to look into those reasons to see what was the state of affairs when S. 4 came to be passed and whether that state of affairs would justify making a special provision for teacher appointed, dismissed etc. between the two dates specified therein. The reason for these two dates appears to be that a bill for the establishment of the Commission which would have the effect of curtailing the powers of the governing bodies of affiliated colleges was on the anvil of the legislature. The report of the Joint Select Committee in that connection was made on November 27, 1961. Act II of l962 was passed after the report of the Joint Select Committee on January 19, 1962 and S. 48-A with respect to the Commission was actually put into force from March 1, 1962. The statement of objects and reasons also shows that irregularities had been brought to the notice of the Government as to appointments, dismissals etc. during this period and that led to the enactment of S. 4 of the Act by the legislature. In these circumstances it cannot be said that these dates in S. 4 are arbitrary. Taking the circumstances as they were when S. 4 came to be enacted and enforced, it cannot be said that teachers appointed etc. between these two dates did not form a class that would have nexus with the object to be achieved. In these circumstances we must hold that S. 4 cannot be struck down on the ground that it has fixed two arbitrary dates and has visited teachers appointed dismissed etc. between these two dates with a differential treatment as compared to teachers appointed before November 27, 1961We are of opinion that S. 4 must be read down and if we read it down there is no reason to hold that the legislature was conferring a naked arbitrary power on the Chancellor. It seems to us that the intention of the legislature was that all appointments, dismissals, etc. made between the two dates should be scrutinised and the scrutiny must be for the purpose of seeing that the appointments, dismissals etc. were in accordance with the University Act and the Statutes. Ordinances, Regulations and Rules framed thereunder, both in the matter of qualifications, and in the matter of procedure prescribed for these purposes. We do not think that the legislature intended more than that when it gave power to the Chancellor to scrutinise the appointments, dismissals, etc., made between these two dates. We have therefore no hesitation in reading down the Section and hold that it only authorises the Chancellor to scrutinise appointments, dismissals etc. made between these two dates for the purpose of satisfying himself that these appointments, dismissals etc., were in accordance with the University Act and the Statutes, Ordinances, Regulations or Rules made thereunder, both as to the substantive and procedural aspect thereof. If the appointments etc. were in accordance with the University Act etc., the Chancellor would uphold them, and if the were not, the Chancellor would pass such orders as he deemed fit. Read down this way, S. 4 does not confer uncanalised power on the Chancellor, as such it is not liable to be struck down as discriminatory under Art. 14It seems to us reasonable to hold that the Commission before making the recommendation would hear the teacher concerned, according to the rules of natural justice. This to our mind is implicit in the Section when it provides that the Commission has to make a recommendation, to the Chancellor on which the Chancellor will pass necessary orders. If an order is passed under S. 4 even though on the recommendation of the Commission but without complying with the principles of natural justice, that order would be bad and liable to be struck down as was done by the Patna High Court in AIR 1964 Pat 41  .But we have no difficulty in reading S. 4 as requiring that the Commission before it makes its recommendation must hear the teacher concerned according to principles of natural justice. Reading the Section therefore in this way - and that is the only way in which it can be read - we are of opinion that it cannot be struck down under Art. 14 of the Constitution as discriminatoryWe are of opinion that S. 4 was enacted to meet a particular situation as we have already indicated above, and in that situation the approval by the University of the Chancellors order would be quite out of place. Section 4 cannot be struck down as discriminatory on this groundWe therefore read S. 4 in the manner indicated above both as to the limit of the Chancellors power while passing an order thereunder and as to the necessity of the Commission giving a hearing to the teacher concerned before making the recommendation, and so read we are of opinion that S. 4 cannot be held to be discriminatory and as such liable to be struck down under Art. 14 of the Constitution. It is true that the subsequent proceedings were in form as if they were for the review or modification of the order of August 18, 1962-and it is doubtful whether S. 4 provides for review of an order once passed.It seems to us that in substance what happened was that the order of August 18, 1962 was not given effect to when it was realised that it might be illegal and thereafter action was taken to give notice to the appellant and a hearing before passing an order under S. 4. Here again the order of February 18, 1963 is in form an order modifying the order of August 18, 1962, but in substance it should be taken as a fresh order under S. 4 after giving opportunity to the appellant to represent his case before the Commission. The order made on February 18, 1963 therefore cannot be said to suffer from the defect that it was passed without observing the principles of natural justice. As for the order of August 18, 1962, it must be taken to have fallen when action was taken to give notice to the appellant on November 8, l962 and pass a fresh order on February 18, 1963 after giving a proper hearing. In the circumstances it is not necessary to quash the order of August 18, 1962, for it fell when further proceedings were taken after notice to the appellant. Further as to the order of February 18, 1963 it must be treated to be a fresh order and as it is not defective on the ground that the principles of natural justice had been violated, it cannot be struck down on that groundTherefore, it must be held that from the date the sub-rule came into force, the appellant, though he actually had a third class Masters degree, must be deemed to have a second class Masters degree, which was the minimum qualification for the lecturers grade. Nothing has been pointed out to us in the Statutes which would take away this deemed qualification thereafter.We cannot therefore agree with the High Court that when sub-r. (6) says that a teacher appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 would be deemed to have the minimum qualification-though in fact he does not have it-it only provides for this deeming so long as he held the particular post he was holding on the date the Statutes came into force. That in our opinion is not the effect of the words "the post he holds", for these words are only descriptive and have to be there because the provision in R (1) (1) referred to three categories, namely, lecturers, professors and principals. We may in this connection refer to sub-r. (5) which shows that even if in future candidates with minimum qualification are not available, the Syndicate can relax the minimum qualification, thus indicating that the minimum qualifications are not absolutely rigid. But apart from this it appears to us that sub-r. (6) was made for the protection of teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July l, 1952, and by this deeming provision gave them the minimum qualifications and if that was so that must be for all purposes in future. If this were not the interpretation of sub-r. (6), another curious result would follow inasmuch as a lecturer could be appointed a college professor for which a second class Masters degree was not made the minimum qualification under sub-r. (1) but he could not be appointed a Principal on the interpretation pressed before us on behalf of the respondents. We should have thought that a good degree would be more necessary in the case of a professor whose main work is teaching than in the case of a principal whose main work is administrative. However that may be, we are of opinion that sub-r. (6) is meant for the protection of teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952, and it confers on them a qualification by its deeming provision and that must enure to their benefit for all time in future for the purpose of promotion or appointment to a higher grade in another collegeAnother curious result would follow if the interpretation accepted by the High Court is correct. The High Court as we have pointed out above has held that sub-r. (6) gives equivalence only for the particular post held by a teacher appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952. Suppose that a lecturer in one college who holds a third class Masters degree and is entitled to remain as lecturer in that college, for some reason is appointed to another college after the Statutes came into force.This would be a new appointment and such a lecturer could not be appointed in a new college because he would not have a second class Masters degree for the new appointment. It seems to us therefore that the intention of sub-r. (6) was not that for the purpose of the particular post actually held the equivalence would prevail but no more. We are of opinion that sub-r. (6) must be read as a protection to the teachers who were appointed and confirmed before July 1, 1952 and by fiction it gave the minimum qualification even though they may not actually have it. That minimum qualification must therefore remain with them always for the future, for nothing has been brought to our notice which takes away that minimum qualification deemed to be conferred on the teachers by sub-rule (6).We are therefore of opinion that the order dated February 18, 1963 passed by the Chancellor requiring the governing body of the Pandaul College to give the appellant a year or two to appear at an examination to enable him to obtain a second class Masters degree, otherwise his services might be terminated, is not valid, for the appellant must be deemed to have the minimum qualification of a second class Masters degree by virtue of sub-rule (6) of the Statutes and as such he was qualified for appointment as Principal of Pandual College.