Case: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL &amp; ORS Vs. GITASHREE DUTTA (DEY)

a selected candidate does not vest such candidate with the right to direct the Authorities to give him appointment. Having regard to the above, it cannot be said that the State has acted with material irregularity in issuing the impugned notification dated 17.08.2015. 23. This Court in Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P. (1981) 4 SCC 471 has held that no person can claim a right to run a fair price shop as an agent of the government and he could only have a right to be considered for appointment. In this context, this Court observed as follows: 11. ……………… No one could claim a right to run a fair price shop as an agent of the Government. All that he could claim was a right to be considered to be appointment to run a fair price shop. If the Government took a policy decision to prefer cooperative societies for appointment as their agents to run fair price shops, in the light of the frustrating and unfortunate experience gathered in the last two decades, we do not see how we can possibly hold that there was any discrimination. 24. The appellant has contended that the State Government was reposed with a responsibility for implementing the 2013 Act which, inter alia, entrusted a responsibility to reform the existing Targeted Distribution System. The respondent in an unfinalized selection process has no vested right in his favour to seek continuation of the notified vacancies. Hence, by recalling the vacancy notification, the State endeavored to enforce the statute and that there can be no estoppel against a statute. 25. It is trite law that there can be no estoppel against a statute. This Court has settled this principle in a catena of judgments, starting as early as 1955. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955) 2 SCR 303 held as follows: ….We are unable on these facts to see any basis for a plea of estoppel. The letter dated 28.11.1953 was not addressed to the petitioner; nor does it amount to any assurance or undertaking not to resume the jagir. And even if such assurance had been given, it would certainly not have been binding on the Government, because its powers of resumption are regulated by the statute, and must be exercised in accordance with its provisions. The Act confers no authority on the Government to grant exemption from resumption, and an undertaking not to resume will be invalid, and there can be no estoppel against a statue. 26. A Constitution of Bench of this Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy. Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458 also upheld this principle and held as follows: 21. There are two short answers to this contention. In the first place, there can be no estoppel against a statute……. 27. This Court in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation v. B Narasimha Reddy (2011) 9 SCC 286, has held that when the actions of the government are not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. This Court observed: 40.….The State, being a continuing body can be stopped from changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry it came to the conclusion that action was not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. 28. It is clear that this Court in several judgments has also upheld that the plea of promissory estoppel would stand negated when the mandate of a statute is followed. This Court in A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu & ors. (2001) 2 SCC 62, held as under: 69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central Government, a case for applying principle of promissory estoppel applied to the facts of this case. There could be no estoppel against the statute…. 29. In the instant case, we have already noticed that the appellants were reposed with a responsibility of implementing the mandate of the 2013 Act, and more importantly, to bring about reforms in the existing Public Distribution System as stipulated under Section 12 of the said Act. The respondent herein being a mere applicant in an un-finalised selection process, has no vested right in his favour to seek continuation of the notified vacancies, when by recalling the vacancy notification, the appellants endeavored to enforce the statute. Moreover, as discussed above, there can be no estoppel against a statute. Even going by the observations of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment, that the State was aware of the 2013 Act while issuing the 30.01.2014 vacancy notification, the said notification cannot be sustained, being contrary to the mandate of the National Food Security Act, 2013, more importantly of Section 12 thereof as held in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation (supra). 30. There is also no merit in the contention of the respondent that the Authorities have taken into consideration the parameters laid down in 2013 Act while declaring the vacancies on 30.01.2014. There is nothing on record to suggest that when the vacancies were declared on 30.01.2014, the Authorities kept in mind the provision of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act came into effect on 10.09.2013. The vacancy notice is dated 30.01.2014. The vacancy notice does not refer to the provisions of 2013 Act. In our view, it would be improper to infer that the provisions of 2013 Act were kept in mind while issuing vacancy notice dated 30.01.2014. The respondent has not made out a case of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or mala fide. In our view, the Division Bench ought to have held that the notification dated 17.08.2015 was issued to keep the public distribution system in tune with the mandate of 2013 Act, more specifically Section 12 which provides for reform in the public distribution system.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. However, the doctrine of legitimate expectation ordinarily would not have any application when the legislature has enacted the statute. Further, the legitimate expectation cannot prevail over a policy introduced by the Government, which does not suffer from any perversity, unfairness or unreasonableness or which does not violate any fundamental or other enforceable rights vested in the respondent. When the decision of public body is in conformity with law or is in public interest, the plea of legitimate expectation cannot be sustained. In Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. 1999 (4) SCC 727  this Court held that policy decision creating the legitimate expectation which is normally binding on the decision maker, can be changed by the decision maker in overriding public interest. It was held as under:37. The above survey of cases shows that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in the substantive sense has been accepted as part of our law and that the decision-maker can normally be compelled to give effect to his representation in regard to the expectation based on previous practice or past conduct unless some overriding public interest comes in the way…….12. In Sethi Auto Service Station and Another v. Delhi Development Authority and Others (2009) 1 SCC 180,  this Court after referring to various precedents observed as under:32. An examination of the aforenoted few decisions shows that the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.33. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an abuse of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. [Vide: Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation – (1993) 3 SCC 499] .14. There is a necessary inter-play between the plea of legitimate expectation and Article 14. For a decision to be non-arbitrary, the reasonable/legitimate expectations of the claimant have to be considered. However, to decide whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context, is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimants perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. In Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (1993) 1 SCC 71 ,  this Court has pointed out as under:8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimants perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.19. It is clear from the different provisions of the 2013 Act that there is a paradigm shift in addressing the problem of food security from the current welfare approach to a right based approach. The Act confers legal right on the eligible beneficiaries to get the essential commodities through fair price shops at a highly subsidized price. The Act also envisages reforms necessary for distribution of essential commodities to the ration card holders.20. This Court in Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 12 SCC 170  has held that the 2013 Act is a social welfare legislation and its provisions are mandatory. It is held thus:42. The provisions in the NFS Act mentioned above are mandatory and yet almost four years down the line they have not been fully implemented by some States.44. These questions have been troubling us since this matter was listed on 24-10-2016 subsequent to our order dated 13-5-2016 in Swaraj Abhiyan (II) [Swaraj Abhiyan (2) v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 498  : (2016) 7 SCC 534 : AIR 2016 SC 2953 ] . We had expected the State Governments concerned to implement the provisions of the NFS Act with all due seriousness since it is a social welfare legislation enacted by Parliament.21. In the present case, upon scrutiny, it was found that declaration of vacancies vide notification dated 30.01.2014 was not in conformity with the 2013 Act and thus, cancellation of the said notification was necessary for the implementation of the provisions of the said Act. In view of above, the plea of legitimate expectation of the respondent is without having any basis.22. We are also of the view that, in the instant case, no promise of any kind was made to continue the existing policy on the part of the State. Furthermore, Clause 4 of the Conditions of the Notification dated 30.01.2014, calling for vacancies, provided that the State could reject applications without ascertaining any reasons. The agency which initiated the selection process is entitled to recall it upon reasonable grounds. Participation in the selection process or being a selected candidate does not vest such candidate with the right to direct the Authorities to give him appointment. Having regard to the above, it cannot be said that the State has acted with material irregularity in issuing the impugned notification dated 17.08.2015.23. This Court in Sarkari Sasta Anaj Vikreta Sangh v. State of M.P. (1981) 4 SCC 471  has held that no person can claim a right to run a fair price shop as an agent of the government and he could only have a right to be considered for appointment. In this context, this Court observed as follows:11. ……………… No one could claim a right to run a fair price shop as an agent of the Government. All that he could claim was a right to be considered to be appointment to run a fair price shop. If the Government took a policy decision to prefer cooperative societies for appointment as their agents to run fair price shops, in the light of the frustrating and unfortunate experience gathered in the last two decades, we do not see how we can possibly hold that there was any discrimination.25. It is trite law that there can be no estoppel against a statute. This Court has settled this principle in a catena of judgments, starting as early as 1955. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan (1955) 2 SCR 303   held as follows:….We are unable on these facts to see any basis for a plea of estoppel. The letter dated 28.11.1953 was not addressed to the petitioner; nor does it amount to any assurance or undertaking not to resume the jagir. And even if such assurance had been given, it would certainly not have been binding on the Government, because its powers of resumption are regulated by the statute, and must be exercised in accordance with its provisions. The Act confers no authority on the Government to grant exemption from resumption, and an undertaking not to resume will be invalid, and there can be no estoppel against a statue.26. A Constitution of Bench of this Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy. Revenue Deptt., Govt. of A.P. (1999) 4 SCC 458  also upheld this principle and held as follows:21. There are two short answers to this contention. In the first place, there can be no estoppel against a statute…….27. This Court in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation v. B Narasimha Reddy (2011) 9 SCC 286,  has held that when the actions of the government are not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply. This Court observed:40.….The State, being a continuing body can be stopped from changing its stand in a given case, but where after holding enquiry it came to the conclusion that action was not in conformity with law, the doctrine of estoppel would not apply.28. It is clear that this Court in several judgments has also upheld that the plea of promissory estoppel would stand negated when the mandate of a statute is followed. This Court in A.P. Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. M.V. Nayudu & ors. (2001) 2 SCC 62,  held as under:69. The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central Government, a case for applying principle of promissory estoppel applied to the facts of this case. There could be no estoppel against the statute….29. In the instant case, we have already noticed that the appellants were reposed with a responsibility of implementing the mandate of the 2013 Act, and more importantly, to bring about reforms in the existing Public Distribution System as stipulated under Section 12 of the said Act. The respondent herein being a mere applicant in an un-finalised selection process, has no vested right in his favour to seek continuation of the notified vacancies, when by recalling the vacancy notification, the appellants endeavored to enforce the statute. Moreover, as discussed above, there can be no estoppel against a statute. Even going by the observations of the Division Bench in the impugned judgment, that the State was aware of the 2013 Act while issuing the 30.01.2014 vacancy notification, the said notification cannot be sustained, being contrary to the mandate of the National Food Security Act, 2013, more importantly of Section 12 thereof as held in A.P. Dairy Development Corpn. Federation (supra).30. There is also no merit in the contention of the respondent that the Authorities have taken into consideration the parameters laid down in 2013 Act while declaring the vacancies on 30.01.2014. There is nothing on record to suggest that when the vacancies were declared on 30.01.2014, the Authorities kept in mind the provision of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act came into effect on 10.09.2013. The vacancy notice is dated 30.01.2014. The vacancy notice does not refer to the provisions of 2013 Act. In our view, it would be improper to infer that the provisions of 2013 Act were kept in mind while issuing vacancy notice dated 30.01.2014. The respondent has not made out a case of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or mala fide. In our view, the Division Bench ought to have held that the notification dated 17.08.2015 was issued to keep the public distribution system in tune with the mandate of 2013 Act, more specifically Section 12 which provides for reform in the public distribution system.