Case: Kantendra Jaymukhlal Majumdar Vs. Collector of Baroda &amp; Another

land is to be released from requisition, the State Government may, after making such enquiry as it deems fit specify by order in writing the person to whom possession of the land shall be given and sub-s. (4) states that the delivery of possession of the land to such person shall be a full discharge of the State Government from all liability in respect of such delivery but shall not prejudice any rights in respect of the land which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom possession of the land is so delivered. Sub-section (6) provides that in certain circumstances possession would be deemed to have been delivered on a certain date to the person entitled to possession thereof and that the State Government shall not be liable for any compensation or other claim in respect of the land for any period after the said date, and sub-s. (7) provides that for the purpose of releasing any land from requisition, the State Government may by order direct the person to whom the State Government had given possession of such land and other person, if any, in occupation of such land, to deliver possession thereof to the officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government. Section 11 provides that any officer authorised in that behalf by the State Government by a general or special order may take possession of any land in respect of which an order has been made under S. 5 or S. 6 or sub-s. 7. of S. 9. 9. Now, the Government of Bombay directed, in the exercise of powers conferred under S. 15 of the Act, by notification, dated August 5, 1950, that the powers conferred and duties imposed upon the State Government by the sections specified therein including Ss. 5, 6 and sub-s. (1), (3), (5) and 7. of S. 9 and 11, shall also be exercised or discharged by the Collectors mentioned in the notification within the limits of their respective jurisdictions. The Collector of Baroda first issued a notification on March 29, 1951 in the exercise of powers conferred by sub-s. (1) of S. 6 of the Act specifying the area within the limits of the Baroda Municipal Borough as the area for the purpose of the said sub-s. (1). The Collector of Baroda requisitioned the premises in December 1953 and allotted it to the appellant. 10. The Collector, by another notification, dated April 13, 1954, withdrew the areas specified in the schedule to that order from the operation of S. 6 of the Act. The area mentioned in the schedule does not cover the area in which the premises in suit are situate. It follows that the original notification of March 29, 1951, continued to apply to the area where the premises in dispute were situate. 11. The Collector issued another notification on December 26, 1959, specifying the area within the limits of the Baroda Municipal Borough to be the area for the purposes of the said sub-s. (1). This notification, in a way was a duplication so far as the areas which had not been excluded by the Notification of April 13, 1954. The Government rescinded the Collectors order, dated December 26, 1959 by its order, dated December 5, 1961. In the context of the various notifications, the rescinding of the Collectors order, dated December 26, 1959, does not affect the application of sub-s. (1) of S. 6 to the area in which the premises in suit are situate and even if it be held otherwise, that would simply debar the Collector from taking any further action under S. 6 of the Act, but will not have the result of releasing from requisition premises which had been lawfully requisitioned prior to this order of Government. 12. In view of S. 9 of the Act, it was the duty of the Collector, on derequisitioning the premises, to restore them to the landlord in the condition in which he had taken in possession. He took vacant possession from the landlord and therefore had to deliver vacant possession to him. Sub-section (3) and 7. of S. 9 specially provide for specifying in the order of de-requisitioning, the person to whom possession of the land be given and such person can be the person from whom possession had been obtained by Government or some officer of Government specified therefor. It was, therefore, essential for the Collector to order by his order of de-requisitioning the premises the vacation of the premises by the appellant and the delivery of possession to respondent No. 2 to whom the Government had to restore possession in order to relieve itself of any further claims to compensation. The contention that the Collector was incompetent to make such an order is not sound. 13. It was not for the collector to consider whether there was any private arrangement between the appellant and the landlord with respect to the tenancy of the premises after the de-requisitioning, and it is rightly conceded that the Collector would not be bound by any such arrangement. Nor can the question of any such arrangement between the two be a matter for decision by the High Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is a different forum for the determination of the rights of the two parties, if any. 14. It was sought to be urged for the appellant that the expression to requisition in S. 4 applies to the taking of possession of land and does not apply to the taking of possession of premises, which, according to the appellant, are not included in the term land as defined in sub-s. (1). It is argued on this basis that the requisition of the premises in suit was not under the Act. No. such question was raised before the High Court and we did not allow learned counsel for the appellant to raise this question in this Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]12. In view of S. 9 of the Act, it was the duty of the Collector, onderequisitioningthe premises, to restore them to the landlord in the condition in which he had taken in possession. He took vacant possession from the landlord and therefore had to deliver vacant possession to him.n (3) and 7. of S. 9 specially provide for specifying in the order of, the person to whom possession of the land be given and such person can be the person from whom possession had been obtained by Government or some officer of Government specified therefor. It was, therefore, essential for the Collector to order by his order ofderequisitioningthe premises the vacation of the premises by the appellant and the delivery of possession to respondent No. 2 to whom the Government had to restore possession in order to relieve itself of any further claims to compensation. The contention that the Collector was incompetent to make such an order is not sound13. It was not for the collector to consider whether there was any private arrangement between the appellant and the landlord with respect to the tenancy of the premises after the, and it is rightly conceded that the Collector would not be bound by any such arrangement. Nor can the question of any such arrangement between the two be a matter for decision by the High Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. There is a different forum for the determination of the rights of the two parties, if any14. It was sought to be urged for the appellant that the expression to requisition in S. 4 applies to the taking of possession of land and does not apply to the taking of possession of premises, which, according to the appellant, are not included in the term land as defined in. (1). It is argued on this basis that the requisition of the premises in suit was not under the Act. No. such question was raised before the High Court and we did not allow learned counsel for the appellant to raise this question in this Court.