Case: Pioneer Embroideries Limited Vs. Prithvi Singh &amp; Others

admitted to be, entitled to receive such benefit. The appellants construction would necessarily introduce the addition of the words admittedly, or admitted to be in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellants construction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s. (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workmans application. The claim under Section 33C(2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-sec. (2). As Maxwell has observed where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. We must accordingly hold that S. 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. Incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under sub-s.(3), the Labour Court should have been authorized to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-s. (2). On the other hand, sub-s. (3) becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub-s.(2). 17. It is, however, urged that in dealing with the question about the existence of a right set up by the workman, the Labour Court would necessarily have to interpret the award or settlement on which the right is based, and that cannot be within its jurisdiction under S. 33C(2), because interpretation of awards or settlements has been specifically and expressly provided for by S.36A. We have already noticed that Section 36A has also been added by the Amending Act No.36 of 1956 along with S. 33C, and the appellants argument is that the legislature introduced the two sections together and thereby indicated that questions of interpretation fall within S. 36A and, therefore, outside S. 33C(2). There is no force in this contention. Section 36A merely provides for the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement, and the appropriate Government is satisfied that a defect or doubt has arisen in regard to any provision in the award or settlement. Sometimes, cases may arise where the awards or settlements are obscure, ambiguous or otherwise present difficulty in construction. It is in such cases that S. 36A can be invoked by the parties by moving the appropriate Government to make the necessary reference under it. Experience showed that where awards or settlements were defective in the manner just indicated, there was no remedy available to the parties to have their doubts or difficulties resolved and that remedy is now provided by S. 36A. But the scope of S. 36A is different from the scope of S. 33C(2), because S. 36A is not concerned with the implementation or execution of the award at all, whereas that is the sole purpose of S. 33C(2). Whereas S.33C(2) deals with cases of implementation of individual rights of workmen falling under its provisions, S. 36A deals merely with a question of interpretation of the award where a dispute arises in that behalf between the workmen and the employer and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the dispute deserves to be resolved by reference under S.36A. 7. As is evident from the above stated principles that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not so limited or narrow so as to dismiss the application filed by the workmen at the threshold itself. Besides, if some ancillary questions are to be dealt with and/or decided by the Labour Court, determination or adjudication of a right itself may not squarely fall within the scope of these provisions. But, certainly, like in the present case, where the workmen, while relying upon the provisions of the Factories Act and even partial admission of the Company that the workmen were working 8 hours as per law and the Labour Court leaving the questions open till the parties have been given opportunity to lead evidence and prove their case and deferring the findings can hardly be faulted with. We must notice that it is not in dispute that the workmen would be entitled to receive overtime wages provided they show that they have worked in excess of 8 hours. So in other words, the right to claim overtime can hardly be a subject matter of dispute in the facts and circumstances of the present case provided the workmen establish their claim. This is not a case where the Court should accept preliminary objection to the extent of declining to exercise its jurisdiction and reject the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act at the very threshold thus shutting the doors of justice for the workmen. We are in agreement with the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that the learned Single Judge could not have recorded finding as regards to the maintainability of the application particularly when the Labour Court has kept the questions open and required them to lead evidence. We are of the view that the order of the Labour Court does not suffer from error of law and is in consonance with the settled principles of Industrial Jurisprudence.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. As is evident from the above stated principles that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not so limited or narrow so as to dismiss the application filed by the workmen at the threshold itself. Besides, if some ancillary questions are to be dealt with and/or decided by the Labour Court, determination or adjudication of a right itself may not squarely fall within the scope of these provisions. But, certainly, like in the present case, where the workmen, while relying upon the provisions of the Factories Act and even partial admission of the Company that the workmen were working 8 hours as per law and the Labour Court leaving the questions open till the parties have been given opportunity to lead evidence and prove their case and deferring the findings can hardly be faulted with. We must notice that it is not in dispute that the workmen would be entitled to receive overtime wages provided they show that they have worked in excess of 8 hours. So in other words, the right to claim overtime can hardly be a subject matter of dispute in the facts and circumstances of the present case provided the workmen establish their claim. This is not a case where the Court should accept preliminary objection to the extent of declining to exercise its jurisdiction and reject the application under Sectionof the Act at the very threshold thus shutting the doors of justice for the workmen. We are in agreement with the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant that the learned Single Judge could not have recorded finding as regards to the maintainability of the application particularly when the Labour Court has kept the questions open and required them to lead evidence. We are of the view that the order of the Labour Court does not suffer from error of law and is in consonance with the settled principles of Industrial Jurisprudence.