Case: Sri Vedaraneeswararswamy Devasthanam Vs. The Dominion Of India And Another

the manager of the temple at the relevant time. Mr. Sastri has relied on the fact that the manager of a temple could not have entered into a transaction of permanent lease unless there was a compelling necessity so to do. A permanent lease amounts to an alienation of the property and would have to be justified as such. An annual lease, on the order hand, can be executed by the manager in his capacity as the manager and the same is treated as an act of prudent management. That, however, is not true about a permanent lease, and so in construing the document we should attribute to the manager the desire and intention to act within his powers and not without them. In support of this argument Mr. Sastri has referred us to the decisions of the Privy Council in Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo (1), Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (2), and Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara (3). The argument is that a fair and reasonable rule of construction would be to treat the document as executed in pursuance of the legitimate authority available to the manager of the temple and not as one which is executed in breach of the said authority. This position cannot be and is not disputed.( 15. ) In the application of this rule to the present case, however, two relevant facts cannot be ignored. The first important fact is that after the execution of the document more than a century has elapsed; and so, as observed by the Privy Council in Bawa Magniram Sitaram v. Kasturbai Manibhai (4), "where the validity of a permanent lease granted by a shebait comes in question a long time (in the present case nearly 100 years) after the grant, so that it is not possible to ascertain what were the circumstances in which it was made, the Court should, assume that the grant was made for necessity so as to be valid beyond the life of the grantor". In the present case more than a century has elapsed after the grant was made, and so the principle laid down by the Privy Council in that case can well be invoked by respondent 1.( 16. ) Besides, it is common ground that under the relevant provisions of Regulation 1 of 1805 the manufacture and sale of salt was made subject to the immediate direction and control of the general agent appointed by the Government, and the said manufacture and sale as well as transit, export and import of salt, whether by sea or by land in the territory subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George was prohibited except on account of Government or with their express sanction. It was also provided that all salt manufactured, sold, conveyed, exported or imported, directly on indirectly, otherwise than is provided for in the said Regulation, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation. In other words, part of this property belonging to the temple on which salt was being manufactured became absolutely useless for that purpose as the temple could no longer manufacture, or permit the manufacture of, salt. Faced with this situation it is not at all unlikely that the manager of the temple was compelled to enter into an arrangement with the Company and secure for the benefit of the temple a substantial permanent income accruing from year to year.( 17. ) It is common ground that the whole of the property was marshy and the only use to which it could be profitably put was for the manufacture of salt, and that could no longer be done after Regulation 1 of 1805 was passed. That is why we think that even the test of the rule of construction on which Mr. Sastri relies can be said to be satisfied in the present case. Circumstances as he was the then manager or trustee had no option but to enter into an agreement like the one which was evidenced by Ex. A. .1; thereby the manager provided for a recurring income to the temple and thus arranged for the upkeep of the temple, the worship of the idol and discharge his duties as trustee.( 18. ) We have already seen how the previous correspondence which preceded the execution of the document unambiguously shows that the intention of the Company was to take possession of the property on a permanent footing, and realising the limitations imposed by the Regulation the manager of the temple would also have wanted to give the property to the Company permanently and thereby create a permanent source of income for the temple. The subsequent conduct of the temple for over a century is consistent with the view that the temple knew that the property has been permanently given to the Company and is inconsistent with the present case that the lease is an annual lease. The payment and acceptance of the same uniform rent for over a century when so many political and other changes took place also support the same conclusion. The pleas set up by the appellant from, stage to stage in respect of its relationship with respondent 1 in regard to the possession of this land have changed from time to time and that shows that the appellant was at pains to put forward a basis on which it could claim either possession or enhanced rent. The fact that respondent 1 is making large profits out of this property may explain, the appellants desire to get some more share in the said income but that cannot assist the appellant if it has parted with the property permanently as early as 1805 on the terms and conditions specified in Ex. A. 1. In our opinion, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the transaction evidenced by Ex. A. 1 is a permanent lease and that respondent 1 is entitled to retain possession of the whole of the property on the terms and conditions specified in the said document.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In computing the compensation- which may be paid to the temple the accounts of the pagoda were examined. It was found that the pagoda enjoyed revenue from the duties levied at ports at Thopputhurai and Kodikarai. Ten years account showed that the average annual income in that behalf was 283 Pagodas. To this amount was added the amount of magmata or charitable and litigious fees and the total worked out at an average of 532 Pagodas. From. this was deducted 46 Pagodas which was the average of charges and expenses incurred in collecting the port duties. Thus the net annual average revenue was 486 Pagodas. Then an account was made of the income received by the temple from salt manufacture in the salt pans and it was ascertained that an average income in that behalf would be Star Pagodas 1362. That is how the whole annual income was found .to be 1848 Pagodas. It would thus be seen that elaborate calculations were made to determine the amount of compensation which should be legitimately paid to the temple for depriving the temple of the possession of its properties in question. It was then considered whether the commutation for the amount should be in land or in money, and, as we have already pointed out, a recommendation was made that payment of commutation in the form of land would be more certain and permanent. Thus the perusal of this document leaves no doubt that the property was intended to be acquired permanently for the purpose of manufacturing salt. It is on that basis that calculations were made and the amount of compensation( 10. ) It appears that this proposal made by the Collector was not approved by the Government at Fort St. George. In the letter written by the Secretary to the Government on October 28, 1806, it was recommended that a payment should be made from the public treasury of a compensation for the loss which the pagoda had sustained by the introduction of salt monopoly in the Province of Tanjore not exceeding Star Pagodas 1848 per annum. The proposal thus made by the Government was accepted by the Board and its decision was communicated by the letter of November 17, 1806. It is in the background of this correspondence that we have to decide the effect of the terms contained in Ex. A. 1. Thus considered there can be little doubt that though the property was not purchased outright it was taken charge of on a permanent basis for the purpose of manufacturing salt and compensation was determined on the same basis. but made payable annually at the rate of 1848is true that in determining the additional assessment on excess area payable by the temple the whole of the property is assumed to belong to the temple; but that is not inconsistent with the temple continuing to be the lessor of the suit property at all. There is no doubt that if the Company had become the; lessee of the said suit property by a document duly executed in that behalf entries made in the inam register cannot change or affect the character of the said right. Therefore, in our opinion, there is nothing in Ex. A. 18 which militates against the case set up by respondent 1.(13. ) It appears that from 1806 when the Company took possession of the property until 1941 the appellant has allowed the Company and its successors to be in quiet enjoyment of the property on receipt of an annual compensation paid from year to year. In 1941 the factory .officer wrote to the trustee of the appellant to let him know the name or the names of the revenue villages to which the area covered by the salt factory was originally attached prior to the acquisition, and he enquired whether any compensation amount had been paid to the temple for the said acquisition. It is this letter which presumably started the appellants present claim. Soon after receiving this letter the appellant wrote to the factory officer on April 8, 1941 alleging that the property had been leased out to Government; for the manufacture of salt for a monthly lease of Rs. 350 or annually Rs. 4,200. The appellant thus set up a relationship of lessor and lessee between itself and respondent 1. Then the appellant moved the relevant authorities for appropriate relief on one ground or another. All its efforts" to obtain possession of the property or even to have the amount of compensation enhanced failed and that led to the present dispute.(16. ) Besides, it is common ground that under the relevant provisions of Regulation 1 of 1805 the manufacture and sale of salt was made subject to the immediate direction and control of the general agent appointed by the Government, and the said manufacture and sale as well as transit, export and import of salt, whether by sea or by land in the territory subject to the Presidency of Fort St. George was prohibited except on account of Government or with their express sanction. It was also provided that all salt manufactured, sold, conveyed, exported or imported, directly on indirectly, otherwise than is provided for in the said Regulation, shall be liable to seizure and confiscation. In other words, part of this property belonging to the temple on which salt was being manufactured became absolutely useless for that purpose as the temple could no longer manufacture, or permit the manufacture of, salt. Faced with this situation it is not at all unlikely that the manager of the temple was compelled to enter into an arrangement with the Company and secure for the benefit of the temple a substantial permanent income accruing from year to year.( 17. ) It is common ground that the whole of the property was marshy and the only use to which it could be profitably put was for the manufacture of salt, and that could no longer be done after Regulation 1 of 1805 was passed. That is why we think that even the test of the rule of construction on which Mr. Sastri relies can be said to be satisfied in the present case. Circumstances as he was the then manager or trustee had no option but to enter into an agreement like the one which was evidenced by Ex. A. .1; thereby the manager provided for a recurring income to the temple and thus arranged for the upkeep of the temple, the worship of the idol and discharge his duties as trustee.( 18. ) We have already seen how the previous correspondence which preceded the execution of the document unambiguously shows that the intention of the Company was to take possession of the property on a permanent footing, and realising the limitations imposed by the Regulation the manager of the temple would also have wanted to give the property to the Company permanently and thereby create a permanent source of income for the temple. The subsequent conduct of the temple for over a century is consistent with the view that the temple knew that the property has been permanently given to the Company and is inconsistent with the present case that the lease is an annual lease. The payment and acceptance of the same uniform rent for over a century when so many political and other changes took place also support the same conclusion. The pleas set up by the appellant from, stage to stage in respect of its relationship with respondent 1 in regard to the possession of this land have changed from time to time and that shows that the appellant was at pains to put forward a basis on which it could claim either possession or enhanced rent. The fact that respondent 1 is making large profits out of this property may explain, the appellants desire to get some more share in the said income but that cannot assist the appellant if it has parted with the property permanently as early as 1805 on the terms and conditions specified in Ex. A. 1. In our opinion, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the transaction evidenced by Ex. A. 1 is a permanent lease and that respondent 1 is entitled to retain possession of the whole of the property on the terms and conditions specified in the said document.