Case: S.H.Rangappa Vs. State Of Karnataka

was any time prescribed for publication of the declaration this Court held as follows : 25. It is clear from the provisions set out above that the object of the notification under section 6 is to ensure that the Government is duly satisfied, after an enquiry at which parties concerned are heard, that the land under consideration is really needed for a public purpose and that the declaration is to operate as conclusive evidence to show that this is so. The conclusiveness of this declaration cannot be questioned anywhere if the procedure dealing with its making has been observed. The notification which takes place under Section 6(2), set out above, follows and serves only as evidence of the declaration. That the declaration is shown by the fact that it has to be signed by a Secretary or other officer duly authorised. The declaration is in the form of an order. The notification is its publication and proof of its existence. It has been shown, in the case before us, that the deemed notification under Section 6 took place about three and a half months after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the ordinance of 1967. But, it is not argued on behalf of the appellant that the declaration under Section 6 was similarly delayed. Presumably, it was within time. 26. A look at the amendment introduced by the Section 4(2) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, shows that it is declaration which has to take place within two years of the expiry of the commencement of the ordinance which came into force on January 20, 1967. In fact, Section 4(2) of the Amendment Act of 1967, set out above, itself makes a distinction between a declaration under Section 6 and its notification under Section 4 of the principal Act. It does not say that no notification under Section 6 of the principal Act can take place beyond the time fixed. The prohibition is confined to declarations made beyond the specified period. If the case of the appellant could be that no declaration was made within the prescribed time, it was his duty to prove it. He has not discharged that onus. 27. As indicated by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, the amendment of 1967, was the result of a decision of this Court in the State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma holding successive notifications, under section 6, with excessive intervening delay between a notification under Section 4(2) and a declaration under Section 6, keeping the owner or other person entitled to compensation in suspense between a declaration and its notification is shown to exist, it may raise a suspicion about the existence of the declaration itself or about the bona fides of acquisition proceedings. This, however, is not the position in the case before us. Neither the existence nor the bona fides of the declaration have been questioned. It has not been either asserted or shown, as already mentioned, that no declaration was made within the period of time fixed for it. We, therefore, reject the last objection also. 10. While referring to the decisions of this Court in Bachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1962 Suppl. (3) SCR 713 as well as Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr. v. Makrand Singh and Ors., 1995(2) RCR(Civil) 146(SC) : 1995(2) SCC 497 and Eugenia Misquita and Ors. v. State of Goa and Ors., 1997(8) SCC 47, Mr. Sanghi, Learned senior counsel contended that the observations of this Court in Khadim Hussains case require reconsideration. With respect, we are unable to agree with this for more than one reason. Firstly, the decision in Khadim Hussains case was rendered by four Judges and the said decision is binding on us, apart form the fact that on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 6 we are in agreement with the views expressed by the Bench in that case. Secondly, as far as Bachhittar Singhs case is concerned that related to nothings on the file made by a Minister and the question which arose was whether that was on order which could have been regarded to have been passed. By referring to the provisions of Article 166 of the Constitution of India, this Court held that the said decision would not be regarded as an order of the Government. In Krishi Utpadans case and Eugenias case there was no reference made to the binding decision of this Court in Khadim Hussains case. Even otherwise, in both these cases, declaration under Section 6 had been published within one year of the notification under Section 4 and the question in the form in which it has arisen for consideration in the instant case did not arise there. 11. Mr. Sanghi also drew our attention to the observations of this Court in Senjeeva Nagar Medical and Health Employees Co-operative Housing Society v. Mohd. Abdul Bawahab, 1996(2) RCR(Civil) 76 (SC) : 1996(3) SCC 600. While referring to the various provisions of the Act at page 606, it was observed that the declaration should be within one year. Mr. Sanghi contends that this is a decision of three Judges which we should follow. We are unable to accept this for the reason that what arose for consideration before the Court in Senjeeva Nagars case was the provision of Section 4 as amended by the State of A.P. which fixed time limit of 40 days for giving public notice on the substance of a notification under Section 4(1). The Court was called upon in that case to consider whether a declaration under Section 6(1) was required to be published in a Gazette within one year of the publication of Section 4 Notification. Therefore, the aforesaid observation is only an orbiter and contrary to the decision of this Court of a larger Bench in Khadim Hussains case which decision has neither been referred to in the Senjeeva Nagars case or in the Krishi Utpadan Mandis case and in Eugenias case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Pursuant to the issuance of the same, objections can be filed and after hearing the same, Section 6(1) enables the appropriate authority if it is satisfied, after considering the report made under Section 5A of the Act, that if any particular land is needed for a public purpose, then a declaration is to be made under the signature of an appropriate officer. Where notification under Section 4 is published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984, as in the present case, proviso (ii) requires that such a declaration shall not be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of Section 4 notificationThe main purpose for the issuance of a declaration under Section 6 is provided byn (3), namely, that the declaration is conclusive evidence that the land is needed inter alia for a public purpose and after the making of the declaration the appropriate Government may acquire the land in the manner provided by the Act.n (2) requires the declaration to be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate and in addition thereto the Collector is also required to cause public notice of the substance of the declaration to be given in the convenient places in the said localityIt is well known that after an order or declaration is made there can be a time gap between the making of the order or a declaration and its publication in the Official Gazette. Whereas the time limit for the making of an order is provided under Section 6(1), the legislature advisedly did not provide for any time limit in respect of the steps required to be taken undern (2) of Section 69. This view which we have expressed hereinabove finds support from a decision of a Bench of four Judges of this Court in the case of Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P. and Ors., 1976(1) SCC 843. The question which arose in that case related to the time within which the declaration made under Section 6(1) had to be published in the Gazette.