Case: The State Of Uttar Pradesh Vs. M/S. Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co., Ltd.,And Another(And Conn

to awards that have become final, the Tribunal overlooked the fact that this sub-section referred to awards which may be made even after the commencement of the Ordinance and it is not easy to appreciate how finality could be said to attach to these awards on the date when the Ordinance was promulgated. The Tribunal also felt impressed by the argument that if S. 6-A applies to appeals or proceedings against awards pending at the date of the commencement of the Ordinance, there was no reason why the same provision should not apply to appeals or proceedings which may be taken against the awards after the commencement of the Ordinance. In giving expression to this view, however, the Tribunal clearly overlooked the fact that S. 3 (3) is deliberately confined to proceedings against an award pending at the commencement of the Ordinance and no others.12.There can be little doubt, in our opinion, that the main purpose of the Ordinance was to validate orders of extension of time within which an award had to be submitted as well as to prevent its validity being questioned merely on the ground that it had been submitted beyond the specified time or any enlargement thereof. Apart from an order of extension of time the Ordinance purported to deal with at least three situations so far as the submission of an award was concerned. One was where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance and against which no proceeding was pending before any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance; another was where an award was submitted after the Ordinance came into force. These cases were dealt with by Cl. (2) of S. 3 of the Ordinance. The third was the case where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance against which a proceeding was pending before a Court or a Tribunal before the Ordinance came into force. S. 3 (3) of the Ordinance was so drafted that it should not interfere with judicial proceedings already pending against an award. It merely directed that such a proceeding must be decided as if S. 6-A had been a part of the Act from the date of its enactment. Where, however, no judicial proceedings against an award were pending it was the intention of the Ordinance that the award shall not be questioned merely on the ground that it was submitted after the specified period for its submission or any enlargement thereof. Although S. 3 (2) of the Ordinance is not happily worded and appears to have been the result of hasty legislation, we think, that upon a reasonable construction of its provisions its meaning is clear and there is no real conflict between its provisions and the provisions of Clause (3) of the section. The words "as if Section 6-A had been in force at all material dates" have to be given some meaning and they cannot be regarded as redundant as suggested on behalf of the appellants. Grammatically they should be regarded as referring to any action or proceeding taken, direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon an award. S. 6-A of the Act, however, has nothing to do with this and these words cannot apply to that part of the clause. These words also cannot refer to a case where the award has been made beyond the specified period and in which there has been no order of enlargement of time as S. 6-A of the Act does not apply to such a case. The words in question, therefore, can only apply to that part of the clause which refers to an enlargement of time for the submission of the award, which is the purpose of Section 6-A of the Act. In our opinion, if Section 3 (2) of the Ordinance is read in this way an intelligible meaning is given to it which is consistent with Section 6-A of the Act and not in conflict with Section 3 (3) of the Ordinance. The awards referred to in Section 3 (2) are awards against which no judicial proceeding was pending at the commencement of the Ordinance. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 3 (2) and (3) are not in conflict with each other. We cannot accept the view of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that Section 3(2) refers only to awards that had become final.13. Having construed the provisions of S. 3 of the Ordinance, it is now necessary to deal specifically with the appeals before us. Appeal No. III-198/53 of the Labor Appellate Tribunal, out of which Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955 arises,was filed before the commencement of the Ordinance and by virtue of S.3 (3) of the Ordinance the appeal had to be decided as if the provisions of S. 6-A had been in force at all material dates. To such an appeal the provisions of Cl. (2) of S. 3 of the Ordinance would not apply. This appeal would, therefore, be governed by Cl (3). As in this case, the award had been submitted on 13-5-1953, and, the last date of enlargement gave time for the submission of the award upto 10-3-1953, the award was submitted beyond time and, therefore, was invalid as having been made without jurisdiction.In Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, arising out of Appeal No. III-321 of 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the appeal was filed before that Tribunal after the commencement of the Ordinance. The award was submitted long after the period, namely, 40 days, within which it had to be submitted and there were no orders of enlargement of time. S. 3 (2) of the Ordinance and no S. 3 (3) would, therefore, apply to this appeal. The award in this case consequently has been validated by virtue of the provisions of S. 3 (2) of the Ordinance and its validity cannot be questioned merely on the ground that it was submitted after the period within which it should have been submitted.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]12.There can be little doubt, in our opinion, that the main purpose of the Ordinance was to validate orders of extension of time within which an award had to be submitted as well as to prevent its validity being questioned merely on the ground that it had been submitted beyond the specified time or any enlargement thereof. Apart from an order of extension of time the Ordinance purported to deal with at least three situations so far as the submission of an award was concerned. One was where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance and against which no proceeding was pending before any Court or Tribunal at the commencement of the Ordinance; another was where an award was submitted after the Ordinance came into force. These cases were dealt with by(2) of S. 3 of the Ordinance. The third was the case where an award was submitted before the commencement of the Ordinance against which a proceeding was pending before a Court or a Tribunal before the Ordinance came into force. S. 3 (3) of the Ordinance was so drafted that it should not interfere with judicial proceedings already pending against an award. It merely directed that such a proceeding must be decided as if S. 6-A had been a part of the Act from the date of its enactment. Where, however, no judicial proceedings against an award were pending it was the intention of the Ordinance that the award shall not be questioned merely on the ground that it was submitted after the specified period for its submission or any enlargement thereof. Although S. 3 (2) of the Ordinance is not happily worded and appears to have been the result of hasty legislation, we think, that upon a reasonable construction of its provisions its meaning is clear and there is no real conflict between its provisions and the provisions of Clause (3) of the section. The words "as if Section 6-A had been in force at all material dates" have to be given some meaning and they cannot be regarded as redundant as suggested on behalf of the appellants. Grammatically they should be regarded as referring to any action or proceeding taken, direction issued or jurisdiction exercised in pursuance of or upon an award. S. 6-A of the Act, however, has nothing to do with this and these words cannot apply to that part of the clause. These words also cannot refer to a case where the award has been made beyond the specified period and in which there has been no order of enlargement of time as S. 6-A of the Act does not apply to such a case. The words in question, therefore, can only apply to that part of the clause which refers to an enlargement of time for the submission of the award, which is the purpose of Section 6-A of the Act. In our opinion, if Section 3 (2) of the Ordinance is read in this way an intelligible meaning is given to it which is consistent with Section 6-A of the Act and not in conflict with Section 3 (3) of the Ordinance. The awards referred to in Section 3 (2) are awards against which no judicial proceeding was pending at the commencement of the Ordinance. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 3 (2) and (3) are not in conflict with each other. We cannot accept the view of the Labour Appellate Tribunal that Section 3(2) refers only to awards that had become final.13. Having construed the provisions of S. 3 of the Ordinance, it is now necessary to deal specifically with the appeals before us. Appeal No. III-198/53 of the Labor Appellate Tribunal, out of which Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1955 arises,was filed before the commencement of the Ordinance and by virtue of S.3 (3) of the Ordinance the appeal had to be decided as if the provisions of S. 6-A had been in force at all material dates. To such an appeal the provisions of(2) of S. 3 of the Ordinance would not apply. This appeal would, therefore, be governed by Cl (3). As in this case, the award had been submitted on 13-5-1953, and, the last date of enlargement gave time for the submission of the award upto 10-3-1953, the award was submitted beyond time and, therefore, was invalid as having been made without jurisdiction.n Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1955, arising out of Appeal No. III-321 of 1953 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the appeal was filed before that Tribunal after the commencement of the Ordinance. The award was submitted long after the period, namely, 40 days, within which it had to be submitted and there were no orders of enlargement of time. S. 3 (2) of the Ordinance and no S. 3 (3) would, therefore, apply to this appeal. The award in this case consequently has been validated by virtue of the provisions of S. 3 (2) of the Ordinance and its validity cannot be questioned merely on the ground that it was submitted after the period within which it should have been submitted.