Case: Chaliagulla Ramachandrayya Vs. Boppana Satyanarayana &amp; Others

25. The facts there were that the defendants father who was selected by Musalireddi, in pursuance of a special custom, as a son-in-law who should take his property as if he was a son entered into possession of the property on Musalireddis death. He then associated with himself the plaintiff in the management of his property on promise of a share. The plaintiff continued thus for many years aiding in the management and improvement of the property, until short time before the suit was brought, the first defendant turned the plaintiff out of doors and refused to give him the promised share. The High Court of Madras held that the agreement by the first defendants father was to the effect that the plaintiff was being admitted to the rights of a co-sharer and further, as there was complete adoption or ratification of the fathers contract by the first defendant he ought to be held to it and the plaintiff was therefore a co-sharer in the property.8. It has to be mentioned that this case was decided long before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was enacted and the question whether a written document was necessary for transfer did not come up for consideration.9. In Bhala Nahana v. Prabhu Hari ILR 2 Bom 67 which was the next case cited, what happened was that one Gosai Ramji induced the parents of the defendant Prabhu Hari to give him in adoption by an express promise to settle his property upon the boy but died before such settlement could be executed. Nearly 30 years after his death Ramjis widow Bhani gave effect to her husbands undertaking by executing a deed of gift of his property in her hands in favour of Prabhu Hari. The reversioner to Gosai Ramjis estate contested in a suit brought by him, the validity of this alienation. In holding that the alienation was valid, the High Court of Bombay pointed out that the performance of a husbands contracts was among the proper and necessary purposes specified by Hindu jurists under which a widow could alienate property and said further that the equity to compel the heir and legal representative of the adoptive father specifically to perform his contracts survived and the property in the hands of his widow was bound by that contract. Whether Prabhu Hari would have been entitled to the property even in the absence of the deed of gift did not fall for consideration in that case.10. It also deserves to be mentioned that this case was also decided several years before the Transfer of Property Act came into force.11. In Asita Mohan v. Nerode Mohan, 20 Cal WN 901 : (AIR 1917.Cal 292) one of the questions in dispute was whether the adopted son could take an equal share with the son Answering the question in the affirmative the High Court of Calcutta after deciding that under the Hindu Law the adopted son was entitled to an equal share, also referred to an Ikrarnama which had been executed by the adoptive father, and holding that the Ikrarnama was valid and operative, said that even apart from the law, the adopted son would be so entitled. It is difficult to see how this can be of any assistance in solving our present problem.12. Lastly, the learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Rao v. Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao, 43 Ind App 138 : (AIR 1916 PC 9). The main question in controversy in that case was whether there was a completed contract by which the Rani, the former owner of the property had agreed that the possession of the property would be given to her niece Venkayyamma Rao immediately upon the expiry of her life interest. The Privy Council held that there was such completed contract and directed the Receiver to deliver possession "upon the terms of the contract now affirmed.13. It may be mentioned that this decision in Venkayyamma Raos case, 43 Ind App 138: (AIR 1916 PC 9) was among the authorities on which the Calcutta High Court relied in Ariff v. Jadunath, ILR 55 Cal 1090 : (AIR 1929 Cal 101 ). The High Court held that the result of equitable principles which had been applied in many cases in England and were also applied by the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Raos Case 43 Ind App 138: (AIR 1916 PC 9) was that the defendant had acquired the rights of a permanent tenant. When this very case went up to the Privy Council in appeal Ariff v. Jadunath, 58 Ind 91: (AIR 1931 PC 79 ) the High Courts decision was reversed. The Privy Council pointed out that the dicta in Venkayyamma Raos Case. 43 Ind App 138: (AIR 1916 PC 9) did not mean "that equity can override the provisions of a statute and (where no registered document exists and no registrable document can be procured), confer upon a person a right which the statute enacts, shall be conferred only by a registered instrument.14. This decision of the Privy Council in 58 Ind App 91 : (AIR 1931 PC 79 ) was given in January 1931. Nearly two years before that. Section 53A had been enacted in the Transfer of Property Act introducing in a limited form the doctrine of equity of part performance. There can in our opinion be no doubt that after S. 53A was enacted the only case in which the English doctrine of equity of part performance could be applied n India is where the requirements of S. 53A are satisfied. Quite clearly, S. 53A does not apply to the facts of the present case. It must therefore be held that the considerations of equity cannot confer on Nagayya or his heirs any title in the lands which under the statue could be conferred only by a registered instrument.15. Our conclusion therefore is that the High Court was right in holding that Nagayya or his heirs had acquired no right in the property.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]13. It may be mentioned that this decision in Venkayyamma Raos case, 43 Ind App 138: (AIR 1916 PC 9) was among the authorities on which the Calcutta High Court relied in Ariff v. Jadunath, ILR 55 Cal 1090   : (AIR 1929 Cal 101  ). The High Court held that the result of equitable principles which had been applied in many cases in England and were also applied by the Privy Council in Venkayyamma Raos Case 43 Ind App 138: (AIR 1916 PC 9) was that the defendant had acquired the rights of a permanent tenant. When this very case went up to the Privy Council in appeal Ariff v. Jadunath, 58 Ind 91: (AIR 1931 PC 79  ) the High Courts decision was reversed. The Privy Council pointed out that the dicta in Venkayyamma Raos Case. 43 Ind App 138: (AIR 1916 PC 9) did not mean "that equity can override the provisions of a statute and (where no registered document exists and no registrable document can be procured), confer upon a person a right which the statute enacts, shall be conferred only by a registered instrument.14. This decision of the Privy Council in 58 Ind App 91 : (AIR 1931 PC 79  ) was given in January 1931. Nearly two years before that. Section 53A had been enacted in the Transfer of Property Act introducing in a limited form the doctrine of equity of part performance. There can in our opinion be no doubt that after S. 53A was enacted the only case in which the English doctrine of equity of part performance could be applied n India is where the requirements of S. 53A are satisfied. Quite clearly, S. 53A does not apply to the facts of the present case. It must therefore be held that the considerations of equity cannot confer on Nagayya or his heirs any title in the lands which under the statue could be conferred only by a registered instrument.15. Our conclusion therefore is that the High Court was right in holding that Nagayya or his heirs had acquired no right in the property.