Case: K.M. Singh Vs. Secretary Association of India Universities and others

the sense that the parties desired to know something which none of them had any knowledge of- Where there is a dispute as regards a certain question and the Court is in need of information regarding the truth on that point, any statement which the referee may make is nevertheless information within the purview of Section 20 and is admissible. The reason behind admissibility of the statement is that when a party refers to another person for a statement of his views, the party approves of his utterance in anticipation and adopts that as his own. The principle is the same as that of reference to arbitration.The reference under Section 20 may be by express words or by conduct, but in any case there must be a clear admission to refer and such admissions are generally conclusive. Admissions may operate as estoppel and they do so where parties had agreed to” abide by them.” 13. A Similar question arose in J.A.Munnuswami Naidu, AIR 1977 Madras 273 (supra) before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. There a suit had been filed on 16th June, 1971 for recovery of money against the appellant on the foot of a security bond. The second respondent in the suit was a puisne mortgagee. The appellant filed the written statement that the respondent, the first mortgagee had fraudulently suppressed the payment of interest in the security bond and if the proper account was taken the money will be due to the first respondent. When the suit was taken up for trial, the plaintiff agreed to take a special oath on his family deity that for the suit security bond no money except those shown by way of endorsement was received by him. It was “also agreed that the plaintiff mortgagee taking such an oath, the suit may be decreed. The plaintiff took a special oath and the suit was decreed. The Judgment Debtor filed an un-numbered execution applica­tion praying that the decree be declared as a nullity having been passed by the Civil Court having no jurisdiction. The executing court dismissed the objections to the execution and the matter came up in appeal before the High Court. The learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal. Whereupon the matter was taken up before the Division Bench. Kailasam, C.J. (as His Lordship then was) and Balasubrahmanyam, J. dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal. It was submitted before the Division Bench that because the Oaths Act, 1873 has been repealled, what the plaintiff had stated on special oath is not an evidence. The learned Single Judge who had heard the appeal was confronted with the arguments that the date on which the special oath was taken the Oaths Act, 1873, which provided that when a special oath was taken under Section 10, it would be conclusive against the person who offered, was no longer in force as the said Act had been repealed in 1969 and the new Act of 1969 dispensed with the procedure as to the taking of the special oath and its consequences. It was common ground that the special oath was taken in ignorance of the fact that the Oaths Act, 1873, under which the procedure as to the taking of special oath was admitted, had been repealed and that the new Oaths Act had no provision for such a procedure. The Division Bench observed that they could not accept the contention that because Oaths Act, 1873 had been repealed, what the plaintiff has stated on special oath is not an evidence Earlier the Single Judge had taken the same view. 14. The question directly in issue came up before a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Thakur Singh and Others v. Inder Singh, AIR 1976 P&H 287 . The Division Bench took the view that: “The only effect of exclusion of Sections 9 to 12 of the OathsAct, 1873 by Oaths Act 1969 is that if any party to any judicial proceeding offers to be bound by any special oath and the Court thinks it fit to administer such an oath to the other party consenting thereto and such oath is taken by the other party, the evidence given on such oath as against persons who offered to be bound as aforesaid would no more be conclusive proof of the matter stated in such deposition. Where an agreement was arrived at between the Counsel for parties that if the defendant were to take oath in a particular Gurdwara stating that the suit land was not of plaintiff and that defendant had not executed any agreement in favour of plaintiff, the suit of plaintiff be dismissed and in pursuance of the order of the Court on the basis of agreement, the defendant did take oath, there being no special oath either prescribed or taken and the suit having been dismissed on the basis of such oath.Held that the compromise arrived at between the Counsel for the plaintiff on behalf of his client and the defendant-appellant would be covered by Section 20 of the Evidence Act and the plaintiff would be bound by the statement made by the defendant if the same is found to have been made strictly in accordance with the terms offerred by him.” 15. It will be noticed that in the present case the oath was adminis­tered as per plaintiffs/petitioners statement and, therefore, there is thus no manner of doubt that the oath taken by two persons in pursuance of the offer of the petitioner amounted to admission of respondents claim on his part within the meaning of Section 20 of the Evidence Act. The two persons were the nominees of the plaintiff and the statements of the nominees by virtue of Section 20 of the Evidence Act would be treated as an admission of the parties. Thus the orders of the trial Court dated 14th October, 1988 and 30th January, 1989 were unassailable and the High Court has rightly dismissed the revision petition.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. It may be noticed that both the learned Single Judge of the Karanataka High Court as well as the learned Division Bench of the Orissa High Court were correct in noticing the effect of repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1969. But it appears the provisions of Section 20 of the Evidence Act were not brought to their notice. The learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court and Orissa High Court were right in observing in what cases the provisions of the Oaths Act, 1873 was to continue to govern and in which cases they would cease to apply.It will be noticed that in the present case the oath wasas per plaintiffs/petitioners statement and, therefore, there is thus no manner of doubt that the oath taken by two persons in pursuance of the offer of the petitioner amounted to admission of respondents claim on his part within the meaning of Section 20 of the Evidence Act. The two persons were the nominees of the plaintiff and the statements of the nominees by virtue of Section 20 of the Evidence Act would be treated as an admission of the parties. Thus the orders of the trial Court dated 14th October, 1988 and 30th January, 1989 were unassailable and the High Court has rightly dismissed the revision petition.