Case: CANTONMENT BOARD AND ANOTHER Vs. M.P.S.R.T.C

The Entry in question was to the effect :- taxes on luxury or entertainment or amusement 13. It was contended before the Court that the tax in question was really a tax imposed for the privilege of carrying on any trade or calling under Entry 46 and, therefore, the same cannot exceed Rs. 100 per annum as provided u/s 142-A of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Rs. 250 per annum under Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The Court repelling the argument held :- The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and amusements as objects on which the tax is to be imposed. If the words are to be so regarded, as we think they must, there can be no reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver of the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements and both may, with equal propriety, be made amenable to the tax. It is true that economists regard an entertainment, it does become a tax on expenditure, but there is no warrant for holding that entry 50 contemplates only a tax on moneys spent on luxuries, entertainments or amusements. The entry, as we have said, contemplates a law with respect to these matters regarded as objects and a law which imposes tax on the act of entertaining is within the entry whether it falls on the giver or the receiver of that entertainment. Nor is the impugned tax a tax imposed for the privilege of carrying on any trade or calling. 14. Thus considered, the tax leviable on Motor Vehicles when used or kept for use u/s 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act is different from the tax leviable on Motor Vehicles. Entering the limits of the Municipality u/s 127(1)(iii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and there is no repugnancy between the two and both the provisions can therefore operate in its own fields. Since u/s 127(1)(iii) of the Municipalities Act, Municipality could levy a tax on Motor Vehicles entering the limits of the Municipality, the same could be levied by the Cantonment Board in exercise of its power u/s 60 of the Cantonments Act with the previous sanction of the Central Government. Consequently, notifications issued by the Cantonment Boards of Mhow, Jabalpur and Saugar were valid notifications issued u/s 60 of the Cantonments Act and imposition of tax on Motor Vehicles entering into the limits of the Cantonment Boards cannot be said to be invalid or inoperative. The High Court in our opinion committed error in striking down those notifications on the ground of repugnancy with this special legislation, namely, the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. 15. So far as the contention of Mr. Lekhi, the learned senior counsel with regard to the proviso to Section 7 of the Taxation Act is concerned, we however, do not find any force in the same inasmuch as Section 7 deals with the grant to the local authorities and it provides that if a grant was being paid by the State Government to any such Board or Committee immediately before the commencement of the Taxation Act then the said grant shall be continued to be paid. But the Cantonment Board by virtue of the proviso will not be entitled to receive the said grant unless if agrees not to recover any tax, toll or licence in respect of the Motor Vehicles. In other words, Section 7 and proviso thereto deals with the right of the Cantonment Board and the Municipality to receive a grant which was being paid by the State Government prior to the commencement of the Taxation Act and the said provision has no connection with the imposition of tax on Motor Vehicle which is governed by Section 3(2) and the bar on such imposition which is contained in Section 6 of the Taxation Act. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Lekhi, the learned senior counsel that conjoint reading of Sections 6 and 7 and its proviso would lead to the conclusion that even under the Taxation Act a Cantonment Board was entitled to impose tax on Motor Vehicle used or kept for use notwithstanding the bar u/s 6. 16. Coming to the conclusion of the applicability of doctrine of desuetude Mr. Lekhi, the learned senior counsel strongly relied upon the decision of this Court in Municipal Corporation for City of Pune v. Bharat Forge Company Ltd (1995) 3 SCC 434 : AIR1996 SCW 449 and submitted that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act must be held to be of disuse as no grant as provided in Section 7 of the Taxation Act has ever been made at any point of time after the enactment of the said Act in 1947. This contention is wholly unsustainable in law in as much as we are not concerned with the question of grant to local authorities and Cantonment Boards as provided u/s 7 of the Taxation Act but we are concerned with the livability of tax on Motor Vehicles u/s 3(2) of the Taxation Act. It is nobodys case that no tax was being levied on Motor Vehicles which is used or kept for use u/s 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1947. That apart to apply the principle of desuetude it is necessary to establish that the statute in question has been in disuse for long and the contrary practice of some duration has evolved. In other words to make the aforesaid principle applicable in the case in hand it is required to be established that the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act has been in disuse for a long period and that the imposition of tax on entry of Motor Vehicles into the Contonment limit has been in operation for a fairly long period. Neither these two ingredients has been satisfied in the case in hand and therefore the aforesaid principle of desuetude is of no application to the case in hand.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]8. The admitted position that emerges from the facts already narrated are that the Cantoment Act, 1924 is the earliest in point of time which empowered the Cantonment Baord to impose tax with the previous sanction of the Central Government which tax could be imposed in any Municipality in the State where such Cantonment is situated. The Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1947 is a special provision dealing with levy of tax on Motor Vehicle which is used or kept for use. There is no provision in the aforesaid Taxation Act for levy of any tax on entry of Motor Vehicles alone. The Municipalities Act of 1961, however authorises imposition of tax on vehicles, boats and animals entering the limits of the Municipality as provided in Section 127(1)(iii) of the said Act.As has been stated earlier under the Taxation Act, tax could be imposed on the Motor Vehicles which is used or kept for use as provided in Section 3(2) of the said Act and there is no provision for imposition of tax on vehicles which is neither used nor kept for use but for mere entry into any municipal limits. When the legislature imposed a ban on levy of tax by any local authority u/s 6 of the Taxation Act what is prohibited is levy of tax which is leviable u/s 3(2) of the Taxation Act. When the same legislature enacted the Municipalities Act in 1961 and authorised the Municipalities to impose tax on vehicles entering the limits of the Municipality u/s 127(1)(iii) they must be presumed to be aware of the provisions of the Taxation Act and leviability of the tax thereunder in respect of Motor Vehicles used or kept for use. The expression vehicle having been defined in Section 2(38) to include a bicycle, a tricycle, motor car and every wheel conveyance which is used or capable of being used on a public street, it is not possible for us to accept the contention of Mr. Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents to interpret the same expression to mean vehicles other than the motor vehicles. Since the Taxation Act does not provide for any imposition of tax on entry of the Motor Vehicles within Municipal limits whereas the Municipal Act authorises for such levy u/s 127(1)(iii) we do not find any inconsistency or repugnancy between the two provisions. In other words while under the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act a tax could be imposed on Motor Vehicles used or kept for use by the registering authority, no such imposition can again be made by any local authority including the Municipalities u/s 127(1)(ii) of the Municipalities Act. But so far as the imposition of tax on Motor Vehciels entering into the Municipal limits is concerned, which is provided u/s 127(1)(iii), of the Municipalities Act the said provision can not be said to be repugnant to the special statute in respect of Motor Vehicles, namely, the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. It has been stated by this Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another Vs. Punjab National Bank and others, that the principle of statutory interpretation, namely, later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws is subject to exception that a general provision does not derogate from a special one. This would mean that where a literal meaning of the general enactment covers a situation for which specific provision is made by another enactment contained in the earlier Act, it is presumed that the situation was intended to be continued to be dealt with by the specific provision rather than the later general one. In other words if the Taxation Act would have contained a provision authorising imposition of Entry Tax on Motor Vehicle then certainly the later general Act, namely, the Municipalities Act even if by making a provision for imposition of entry tax on vehicles entering into the Municipal limits would not have operated. But since the special law, namely, the Taxation Act does not have any provision authorising imposition of tax on entry of Motor Vehicles and the later general provision, namely, the Municipalities Act, provides for imposition of the entry tax on Motor Vehicles. The said provision would remain valid and would be applicable and there would be no bar for the Municipality to impose entry tax on all vehicles including Motor Vehicles for entering into the limits of the Municipalities. This construction being the only harmonious construction by which both the provisions remain operative, it is the duty of the Court to adopt such construction. There is no dispute with the proposition advanced by Mr. Lekhi, learned senior counsel with regard to theory implied repeal. This theory the learned senior counsel advanced since the Municipalities Act did not repeal the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. It was held by this Court of Yogender Pal Singh and others Vs. Union of India others,It is well settled that when a Competent Authority makes a new law which is totally inconsistent with the earlier law and the two cannot stand together any longer it must be construed that the earlier law has been repealed by necessary implication by the later law.9. In considering the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act 1897 in the case of State of Orissa Vs. M.A. Tulloch and Co., this Court had observed :-The entire theory underlying implied repeals is that there is no need for the later enactment to state in express terms that an earlier enactment has been repealed by using any particular set of words or form of drafting but that if the legislative intent to supresede the earlier law is manifested by the enactment of provisions as to effect such supersession, then there is in law a repeal notwithstanding the absence of the words repeal in the later statute.10. The aforesaid observation no doubt has been made while analysing the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and the continuance of rights accrued and liabilities incurred under the superseded enactment and thus has no direct application to the case in hand.12. But in view of our conclusion that there is no repugnancy between Section 3 read with Section 6 of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act and the provisions of Section 127(1)(iii) of the Municipalities Act and both the provisions operate in two different fields the principle of implied repeal will have no application. In this connection it would be appropriate for us to notice one decision of this Court in the case of The Western India Theatres Ltd. Vs. The Cantonment Board, Poona, Cantonment, where the validity of levy of entertainment tax under Entry 50 in Schedule VII of Government of India Act, 1935 was under consideration.13. It was contended before the Court that the tax in question was really a tax imposed for the privilege of carrying on any trade or calling under Entry 46 and, therefore, the same cannot exceed Rs. 100 per annum as provided u/s 142-A of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Rs. 250 per annum under Article 276(2) of the Constitution. The Court repelling the argument held :-The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and amusements as objects on which the tax is to be imposed. If the words are to be so regarded, as we think they must, there can be no reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver of the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements and both may, with equal propriety, be made amenable to the tax. It is true that economists regard an entertainment, it does become a tax on expenditure, but there is no warrant for holding that entry 50 contemplates only a tax on moneys spent on luxuries, entertainments or amusements. The entry, as we have said, contemplates a law with respect to these matters regarded as objects and a law which imposes tax on the act of entertaining is within the entry whether it falls on the giver or the receiver of that entertainment. Nor is the impugned tax a tax imposed for the privilege of carrying on any trade or calling.14. Thus considered, the tax leviable on Motor Vehicles when used or kept for use u/s 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act is different from the tax leviable on Motor Vehicles. Entering the limits of the Municipality u/s 127(1)(iii) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and there is no repugnancy between the two and both the provisions can therefore operate in its own fields. Since u/s 127(1)(iii) of the Municipalities Act, Municipality could levy a tax on Motor Vehicles entering the limits of the Municipality, the same could be levied by the Cantonment Board in exercise of its power u/s 60 of the Cantonments Act with the previous sanction of the Central Government. Consequently, notifications issued by the Cantonment Boards of Mhow, Jabalpur and Saugar were valid notifications issued u/s 60 of the Cantonments Act and imposition of tax on Motor Vehicles entering into the limits of the Cantonment Boards cannot be said to be invalid or inoperative. The High Court in our opinion committed error in striking down those notifications on the ground of repugnancy with this special legislation, namely, the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act.15. So far as the contention of Mr. Lekhi, the learned senior counsel with regard to the proviso to Section 7 of the Taxation Act is concerned, we however, do not find any force in the same inasmuch as Section 7 deals with the grant to the local authorities and it provides that if a grant was being paid by the State Government to any such Board or Committee immediately before the commencement of the Taxation Act then the said grant shall be continued to be paid. But the Cantonment Board by virtue of the proviso will not be entitled to receive the said grant unless if agrees not to recover any tax, toll or licence in respect of the Motor Vehicles. In other words, Section 7 and proviso thereto deals with the right of the Cantonment Board and the Municipality to receive a grant which was being paid by the State Government prior to the commencement of the Taxation Act and the said provision has no connection with the imposition of tax on Motor Vehicle which is governed by Section 3(2) and the bar on such imposition which is contained in Section 6 of the Taxation Act. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Lekhi, the learned senior counsel that conjoint reading of Sections 6 and 7 and its proviso would lead to the conclusion that even under the Taxation Act a Cantonment Board was entitled to impose tax on Motor Vehicle used or kept for use notwithstanding the bar u/s 6.This contention is wholly unsustainable in law in as much as we are not concerned with the question of grant to local authorities and Cantonment Boards as provided u/s 7 of the Taxation Act but we are concerned with the livability of tax on Motor Vehicles u/s 3(2) of the Taxation Act. It is nobodys case that no tax was being levied on Motor Vehicles which is used or kept for use u/s 3(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1947. That apart to apply the principle of desuetude it is necessary to establish that the statute in question has been in disuse for long and the contrary practice of some duration has evolved. In other words to make the aforesaid principle applicable in the case in hand it is required to be established that the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act has been in disuse for a long period and that the imposition of tax on entry of Motor Vehicles into the Contonment limit has been in operation for a fairly long period. Neither these two ingredients has been satisfied in the case in hand and therefore the aforesaid principle of desuetude is of no application to the case in hand.