Case: State Of Punjab  Vs. Surjit Singh

the nature of the duties of either categories and it is not possible to hold that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" is an abstract one. 12. "Equal pay for equal work" is a concept which requires for its applicability complete and wholesale identity between a group of employees claiming identical pay scales and the other group of employees who have already earned such pay scales. The problem about equal pay cannot always be translated into a mathematical formula." Reliance placed by the High Court is Civil Appeal Nos. 1979-83 of 2003 - State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Rakesh Kumar & Ors. - is also misplaced. Therein the leave was granted purported to be on the basis of the benefit of regular pay-scale granted by other department in terms of the decision of the High court in Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Punjab [C.W.P. No. 9623 of 1993 decided on 12.4.1994]. The main plank of the case of the workmen therein was that they had been not only working for a long time it was urged that their regular counter-parts were holding similar posts and their postings are being inter-changed with them. The High Court noticing the allegation of the writ petitioners that they had been discharging absolutely similar functions with the same element of responsibility and having similar qualifications as are being discharged by the regularly appointed persons which having not been specifically controverted opined as under: "However, no material has been placed before this Court to show as to what is the real difference between the duties being performed by the petitioners (daily wagers) and regular employees. The statement containing the date of joining of the petitioners shows that all of them have rendered service between one to eleven years as on the date of the filing of the petition. The fact that they are continuously in service has not been controverted by the respondents. Therefore, merely because 64 petitioners have remained absent for different durations cannot be a ground for taking the view that all the 973 petitioners are discharging duties without proper responsibility. Absence from duty may constitute a misconduct but that by itself cannot lead to an inference that whole body of employees does not discharge its duties with responsibility. In fact on a query made by the court, learned Deputy Advocate General stated at the bar that the Government is not in a position to dispense with the services of the petitioners because the same are necessary for maintaining the distribution and supply of the drinking water to the people in rural as well as urban areas. From this, it can safely be inferred that the nature of the work being performed by the petitioners is not of a casual nature or of a fixed duration. They might have been posted to work against particular projects, but, these projects are perennial in character and there is no indication that the projects are going to be wound up by the Government. Continuous engagement of a large number of employees for years together is also indicative of the requirement of the man-power. Therefore, merely because the Government has not thought it proper to sanction regular posts, it cannot be held that there is a marked distinction between the functions of the petitioners and the regular employees." The High Court noticed that this Court in several decisions had arrived at an opinion that the principle of `equal pay for equal work cannot be applied blindly but chose to rely upon the decision of this Court in Dhirendra Chamoli & Anr. v. State of U.P. [(1986) 1 SCC 637].With utmost respect, the principle, as indicated hereinbefore, has undergone a sea change. We are bound by the decisions of large benches. This Court had been insisting on strict pleadings and proof of various factors as indicated hereto before.Furthermore, the burden of proof even in that case had wrongly been placed on the State which in fact lay on the writ petitioners claiming similar benefits. The factual matrix obtaining in the said case particularly similar qualification, interchangeability of the positions within the regular employees and the casual employees and other relevant factors which have been noticed by us also had some role to play.This Court in Gurcharan Singh Kahlon (supra) although noticed the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors.v. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 1] declined to interfere with the order of the High Court having regard to the fact that no order of stay having been passed, the State of Punjab had implemented the order of the High Court. Furthermore, a scheme of regularization had already been drawn up. It is of some significance to notice that similar orders passed by some Benches of this Court relying on or on the basis of Paragraph 53 in Uma Devi (supra) vis-à-vis Para 43 and other paragraphs thereof, has been severally criticized by this Court in Official Liquidator (supra). We are bound by the law laid down therein.We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the State is directed to examine the cases of the respondents herein by appointing an Expert Committee as to whether the principles of law laid down herein, viz., as to whether the respondents satisfy the factors for invocation of the decision in Charanjit Singh (supra) in its entirety including the question of appointment in terms of the recruitment rules have been followed. It has a positive concept.We would, however, before parting make an observation that the submission of the learned counsel that only because some juniors have got the benefit, the same by itself cannot be a ground for extending the same benefit to the respondents herein. It is now well known that the equality clause contained in Article 14 should be invoked only where the parties are similarly situated and where orders passed in their favour is legal and not illegal. It has a positive concept.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]While laying down the law that regularization under the Constitutional scheme is wholly impermissible, the Court had issued certain directions relating to the employees in the services of Commercial Taxes Department as noticed hereinbefore. The employees of the Commercial Taxes Department were in service for more than 10 years. They were appointed inThey were sought to be regularized in terms of a scheme. Recommendations were made by the Director, Commercial Taxes for their absorption. It was only when such recommendations were not acceded to, the Administrative Tribunal was approached. It rejected theiris in the aforementioned factual backdrop, this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed:"Hence, that part of the direction of the Division Bench is modified and it is directed that theseearners be paid wages equal to the salary at the lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in government service, from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are onlyearners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion, that the courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for regularisation. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was regularisation or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation, the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the respondents in CAs Nos.and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated, will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do justice to them."We, therefore, do not see that any law has been laid down in paragraph 55 of the judgment. Directions were issued in view of the limited controversy. As indicated, the States grievances were limited.Reliance placed by Mr. Gupta on Haryana State Minor Irrigation Tubewells Corpn. v. G.S. Uppal [(2008) 7 SCC 375 at 384] is equally meritless. In that case, the question involved was application of the recommendations of the Pay Revision Committee. As a discriminatory treatment was meted out to the appellants therein, this Court interfered opining that the decision of the Government is unreasonable, unjust and prejudicial.Further contention of Mr. Gupta is that his clients had been appointed upon undertaking the due process of recruitment. It was not so, as while making appointments, the recruitment rules had not been followed. There had been no advertisement. How and in what manner the names were called from the employment exchange has not been disclosed. Ordinarily a large number of people would not be interested in applying for appointment against a Class III or Class IV post so long the appointment is contractual. Interviews were also taken by a Committee which was not competent therefor as appointment in the post of Clerk and above were required to be made by the Public Serviceplaced by the High Court is Civil Appeal Nos.ate of Punjab & Ors. vs. Rakesh Kumar & Ors.is also misplaced. Therein the leave was granted purported to be on the basis of the benefit of regulargranted by other department in terms of the decision of the High court in Gurmukh Singh vs. State of Punjab [C.W.P. No. 9623 of 1993 decided on 12.4.1994]. The main plank of the case of the workmen therein was that they had been not only working for a long time it was urged that their regularwere holding similar posts and their postings are beinghe High Court noticed that this Court in several decisions had arrived at an opinion that the principle of `equal pay for equal work cannot be applied blindly but chose to rely upon the decision of this Court in Dhirendra Chamoli & Anr. v. State of U.P. [(1986) 1 SCC 637].With utmost respect, the principle, as indicated hereinbefore, has undergone a sea change. We are bound by the decisions of large benches. This Court had been insisting on strict pleadings and proof of various factors as indicated hereto before.Furthermore, the burden of proof even in that case had wrongly been placed on the State which in fact lay on the writ petitioners claiming similar benefits. The factual matrix obtaining in the said case particularly similar qualification, interchangeability of the positions within the regular employees and the casual employees and other relevant factors which have been noticed by us also had some role to play.This Court in Gurcharan Singh Kahlon (supra) although noticed the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors.v. Umadevi (3) & Ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 1] declined to interfere with the order of the High Court having regard to the fact that no order of stay having been passed, the State of Punjab had implemented the order of the High Court. Furthermore, a scheme of regularization had already been drawn up. It is of some significance to notice that similar orders passed by some Benches of this Court relying on or on the basis of Paragraph 53 in Uma Devi (supra)Para 43 and other paragraphs thereof, has been severally criticized by this Court in Official Liquidator (supra). We are bound by the law laid down therein.We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if the State is directed to examine the cases of the respondents herein by appointing an Expert Committee as to whether the principles of law laid down herein, viz., as to whether the respondents satisfy the factors for invocation of the decision in Charanjit Singh (supra) in its entirety including the question of appointment in terms of the recruitment rules have been followed. It has a positive concept.We would, however, before parting make an observation that the submission of the learned counsel that only because some juniors have got the benefit, the same by itself cannot be a ground for extending the same benefit to the respondents herein. It is now well known that the equality clause contained in Article 14 should be invoked only where the parties are similarly situated and where orders passed in their favour is legal and not illegal. It has a positive concept.