Case: Madhavrao Narayanrao Patwardhan Vs. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu &amp; Others

Both the courts below have viewed the controversy under S. 14 of the Limitation Act, as if it was for the defendant to showmala fideson the part of the plaintiff when he instituted the previous suit and was carrying on the proceedings in that court. In our opinion, both the courts below have misdirected themselves on this question. Though they do not say so in terms, they appear to have applied the definition of good faith as contained in the General Clauses Act, to the effect that A thing shall be deemed to be done in good faith where it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. But the Indian Limitation Act contains its own definition of good faith to the effect that nothing shall be deemed to be done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention -(S. 2 (7)). We have, therefore, to see if the institution and prosecution of the suit in the Munsiffs court at Miraj, was done with due care and attention. We know that the plaint in the Tikoni suit filed by the same plaintiff in the same court, did contain a statement as to the value of the subject-matter, but it was conspicuous by its absence in the plaint in the suit as originally filed in the Munsiffs court at Miraj. All the facts alleged in the plaintiffs petition for the return of the plaint, were known to the plaintiff ever since the institution of the suit.Nothing fresh was discovered in 1940. On the other hand, we know definitely that the Tikoni suit had been dismissed by the trail court on merits. The suits were of an analogous character in the sense that the controversy was similar in both of them. The appellants contention that on the dismissal of the plaintiffs Tikoni suit in November, 1939, he, naturally, became apprehensive about the result of the other suit, and then moved the court for the return of the plaint on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction, appears to be well-founded. The plaintiff knew all the time that the value of the properties involved in the suit, was much more than Rs. 5,000 which was the limit of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judges court.Can an omission in the plaint to mention the value of the properties involved in the suit, be brought within the condition of due care and attention according to the meaning of and attention according to the meaning of good faith as understood in the Limitation Act? It has to be remembered that it is not one of those cases which usually arise upon a revision of the valuation as given in the plaint, on an objection raised by the defendant contesting the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Curiously enough, the defendant had not raised any objection in his written statement to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Apparently, the plaintiff was hard put to it to discover reasons for having the case transferred to another court. The question is not whether the plaintiff did it dishonestly or that his acts or omission in this connection, weremala fide.On the other hand, the question is whether, given due care and attention, the plaintiff could have discovered the omission without having to wait for about 10 years or more.The trial court examined the plaintiffs allegation that the omission was due to his pleaders mistake. As that court observed he makes this contention with a view to shield himself behind a wrong legal advice. That court has answered the plaintiffs contention against him by observing that the plaintiff was not guided by any legal advice in this suit ; that the plaint was entirely written by him in both the suits, and that he himself conducted those suits in the trial court in a manner worthy of a senior counsel. The court, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff himself was responsible for drafting the plaint and for presenting it in court, and that no pleader had any responsibility in the matter. No reason was adduced why, in these circumstances, the value of the subject-matter of the suit, was mentioned in the plaint in the Tikoni suit but not in the plaint in respect of the present suit. 8. There is another serious difficulty in the way of the plaintiff. He has not brought on the record of this case any evidence to show that he was prosecuting the previously instituted suit with due diligence as required by S. 14. He has not adduced in evidence the order-sheet or some equivalent evidence of the proceedings in the Sub-Judges court at Miraj, to show that in spite of his due diligence, the suit remained pending for over ten years in that court, before he thought of having the suit tried by a court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, all the conditions necessary to bring the case within S. 14 have not been satisfied by the plaintiff.There could be no doubt about the legal position that the burden lay on the plaintiff to satisfy those conditions in order that he may entitle himself to the deduction of all that period between 31st January 1929, and 4th July 1940. It is also clear that the courts below were in error in expecting the contesting defendant to adduce evidence to the contrary. When the plaintiff has not satisfied the initial burden which lay upon him to bring his case within S. 14, the burden would not shift, if it ever shifted, to the defendant to show the contrary.In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the other contention raised on behalf of the appellants that, even after giving the benefit of S. 14, the suit is still barred under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. This is a serious question which may have to be determined if and when it becomes necessary.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]6. In our opinion, the appellants, contentions based on the provisions of S. 14 of the Limitation Act, are, and the decision of the courts below, granting thet the benefit of that section, must be reversed for the following reasons: Before the promulgation, on 1st January 1926, of the Proclamation by StateKarabhari,Miraj State, the law of limitation in that State, it is common ground, was that the plaintiff had the benefit of the period of 20 years as the period during which a suit for possession after dispossession, could be instituted. By that Proclamation, the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) was made applicable to that State with effect from 1st February 1926, subject to this modification that all suits which would have been in time according to the old law of the State, but would have become barred by limitation as a result of the introduction of the Indian Limitation Act, could be filed upto 31st January 1929, by virtue of certain notification extending the last date for the institution of such suits. Hence the suit filed on that date in the Munsiffs court at Miraj, was admittedly within time, and was subject to the law of limitation under the Indian Limitation Act. When the plaint was returned by the Munsiffs court at Miraj, at the instance of the plaintiff himself on the ground of want of pecuniary jurisdiction, andto the court of the District Judge at Miraj on 4th July 1940, it was, on the face of it, barred by limitation, whether the period of limitation started to run in 1910 or 1915, unless the case is brought within S. 14 of the Limitation ActIt has to be remembered that it is not one of those cases which usually arise upon a revision of the valuation as given in the plaint, on an objection raised by the defendant contesting the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Curiously enough, the defendant had not raised any objection in his written statement to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. Apparently, the plaintiff was hard put to it to discover reasons for having the case transferred to another courtThe court, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff himself was responsible for drafting the plaint and for presenting it in court, and that no pleader had any responsibility in the matter. No reason was adduced why, in these circumstances, the value of ther of the suit, was mentioned in the plaint in the Tikoni suit but not in the plaint in respect of the present suit8. There is another serious difficulty in the way of the plaintiff. He has not brought on the record of this case any evidence to show that he was prosecuting the previously instituted suit with due diligence as required by S. 14. He has not adduced in evidence thet or some equivalent evidence of the proceedings in thes court at Miraj, to show that in spite of his due diligence, the suit remained pending for over ten years in that court, before he thought of having the suit tried by a court of higher pecuniary jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, all the conditions necessary to bring the case within S. 14 have not been satisfied by the plaintiff.There could be no doubt about the legal position that the burden lay on the plaintiff to satisfy those conditions in order that he may entitle himself to the deduction of all that period between 31st January 1929, and 4th July 1940. It is also clear that the courts below were in error in expecting the contesting defendant to adduce evidence to the contrary. When the plaintiff has not satisfied the initial burden which lay upon him to bring his case within S. 14, the burden would not shift, if it ever shifted, to the defendant to show the contrary.In view of this conclusion, it is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the other contention raised on behalf of the appellants that, even after giving the benefit of S. 14, the suit is still barred under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act. This is a serious question which may have to be determined if and when it becomes necessary.