Case: Idbi Trusteeship Services Ltd Vs. Hubtown Ltd

on the one hand, and arbitrariness on the other, are sworn enemies. The discretion that a Judge exercises under Order XXXVII to refuse leave to defend or to grant conditional or unconditional leave to defend is a discretion akin to Josephs multi-coloured coat - a large number of baffling alternatives present themselves. The life of the law not being logic but the experience of the trial Judge, is what comes to the rescue in these cases; but at the same time informed by guidelines or principles that we propose to lay down to obviate exercise of judicial discretion in an arbitrary manner. At one end of the spectrum is unconditional leave to defend, granted in all cases which present a substantial defence. At the other end of the spectrum are frivolous or vexatious defences, leading to refusal of leave to defend. In between these two extremes are various kinds of defences raised which yield conditional leave to defend in most cases. It is these defences that have to be guided by broad principles which are ultimately applied by the trial Judge so that justice is done on the facts of each given case.18. Accordingly, the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelecs case will now stand superseded, given the amendment of O.XXXVII R.3, and the binding decision of four judges in Milkhirams case, as follows: a. If the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit;b. if the defendant raises triable issues indicating that he has a fair or reasonable defence, although not a positively good defence, the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment, and the defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend;c. even if the defendant raises triable issues, if a doubt is left with the trial judge about the defendants good faith, or the genuineness of the triable issues, the trial judge may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court or furnishing security. Care must be taken to see that the object of the provisions to assist expeditious disposal of commercial causes is not defeated. Care must also be taken to see that such triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit or security;d. if the Defendant raises a defence which is plausible but improbable, the trial Judge may impose conditions as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court, or furnishing security. As such a defence does not raise triable issues, conditions as to deposit or security or both can extend to the entire principal sum together with such interest as the court feels the justice of the case requires.e. if the Defendant has no substantial defence and/or raises no genuine triable issues, and the court finds such defence to be frivolous or vexatious, then leave to defend the suit shall be refused, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith;f. if any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit, (even if triable issues or a substantial defence is raised), shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant in court. 19. Coming to the facts of the present case: a. It is clear that a sum of L 418 crores has been paid by FMO, the Dutch company, to Vinca for purchase of shares as well as compulsorily convertible debentures. This transaction by itself is not alleged to be violative of the FEMA regulations.b. The suit is filed only on invocation of the Corporate Guarantee which on its terms is unconditional. It may be added that it is not the defendants case that the said Corporate Guarantee is wrongly invoked.c. Payment under the said Guarantee is to the debenture trustee, an Indian company, for and on behalf of Vinca, another Indian company, so that prima facie again there is no infraction of the FEMA Regulations.d. Since FMO becomes a 99% holder of Vinca after the requisite time period has elapsed, FMO may at that stage utilise the funds received pursuant to the overall structure agreements in India. If this is so, again prima facie there is no breach of FEMA Regulations.e. At the stage that FMO wishes to repatriate such funds, RBI permission would be necessary. If RBI permission is not granted, then again there would be no infraction of FEMA Regulations.f. The judgment in Immami Appa Raos case would be attracted only if the illegal purpose is fully carried out, and not otherwise. 20. Based on the aforesaid, it cannot be said that the defendant has raised a substantial defence to the claim made in the suit. Arguably at the highest, as held by the learned Single Judge, even if a triable issue may be said to arise on the application of the FEMA Regulations, nevertheless, we are left with a real doubt about the Defendants good faith and the genuineness of such a triable issue. L 418 crores has been stated to be utilized and submerged in a building construction project, with payments under the structured arrangement mentioned above admittedly being made by the concerned parties until 2011, after which payments stopped being made by them. The defence thus raised appears to us to be in the realm of being `plausible but improbable. This being the case, the plaintiff needs to be protected. In our opinion, the defendant will be granted leave to defend the suit only if it deposits in the Bombay High Court the principal sum of L 418 crores invested by FMO, or gives security for the said amount of L 418 crores, to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master, Bombay High Court within a period of three months from today.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]12. We find that Milkhirams case is in fact an important judgment on the scope of O.XXXVII of the CPC, and is not a judgment on principles to be applied under Section 115. This judgment, being a judgment of four learned judges of this court, set out, in paragraph 1, O.XXXVII, Rule 3 sub-rules (2) and (3) as amended by the Bombay High Court at the relevant time, asIf the defendant enters an appearance, the plaintiff shall thereafter serve on the defendant a summons for judgment returnable not less than ten clear days from the date of service supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit.(3) The defendant may at any time within ten days from the service of such summons for judgment by affidavit or otherwise disclosing such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend, apply on such summons for leave to defend the suit. Leave to defend may be granted to him unconditionally or upon such terms as to the Judge appear just.It is thus clear that O.XXXVII has suffered a change in 1976, and that change has made a difference in the law laid down. First and foremost, it is important to remember that Milkhirams case is a direct authority on the amended O.XXXVII provision, as the amended provision in O.XXXVII Rule 3 is the same as the Bombay amendment which this Court was considering in the aforesaid judgment. We must hasten to add that the two provisos to sub-rule (3) were not, however, there in the Bombay amendment. These are new, and the effect to be given to them is something that we will have to decide. The position in law now is that the trial Judge is vested with a discretion which has to result in justice being done on the facts of each case. But Justice, like Equality, another cardinal constitutional value, on the one hand, and arbitrariness on the other, are sworn enemies. The discretion that a Judge exercises under Order XXXVII to refuse leave to defend or to grant conditional or unconditional leave to defend is a discretion akin to Josephs multi-coloured coat - a large number of baffling alternatives present themselves. The life of the law not being logic but the experience of the trial Judge, is what comes to the rescue in these cases; but at the same time informed by guidelines or principles that we propose to lay down to obviate exercise of judicial discretion in an arbitrary manner. At one end of the spectrum is unconditional leave to defend, granted in all cases which present a substantial defence. At the other end of the spectrum are frivolous or vexatious defences, leading to refusal of leave to defend. In between these two extremes are various kinds of defences raised which yield conditional leave to defend in most cases. It is these defences that have to be guided by broad principles which are ultimately applied by the trial Judge so that justice is done on the facts of each given case.18. Accordingly, the principles stated in paragraph 8 of Mechelecs case will now stand superseded, given the amendment of O.XXXVII R.3, and the binding decision of four judges in Milkhirams case, asIf the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign judgment, and the defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend the suit;b. if the defendant raises triable issues indicating that he has a fair or reasonable defence, although not a positively good defence, the plaintiff is not entitled to sign judgment, and the defendant is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend;c. even if the defendant raises triable issues, if a doubt is left with the trial judge about the defendants good faith, or the genuineness of the triable issues, the trial judge may impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court or furnishing security. Care must be taken to see that the object of the provisions to assist expeditious disposal of commercial causes is not defeated. Care must also be taken to see that such triable issues are not shut out by unduly severe orders as to deposit or security;d. if the Defendant raises a defence which is plausible but improbable, the trial Judge may impose conditions as to time or mode of trial, as well as payment into court, or furnishing security. As such a defence does not raise triable issues, conditions as to deposit or security or both can extend to the entire principal sum together with such interest as the court feels the justice of the case requires.e. if the Defendant has no substantial defence and/or raises no genuine triable issues, and the court finds such defence to be frivolous or vexatious, then leave to defend the suit shall be refused, and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith;f. if any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave to defend the suit, (even if triable issues or a substantial defence is raised), shall not be granted unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by the defendant incannot be said that the defendant has raised a substantial defence to the claim made in the suit. Arguably at the highest, as held by the learned Single Judge, even if a triable issue may be said to arise on the application of the FEMA Regulations, nevertheless, we are left with a real doubt about the Defendants good faith and the genuineness of such a triable issue. L 418 crores has been stated to be utilized and submerged in a building construction project, with payments under the structured arrangement mentioned above admittedly being made by the concerned parties until 2011, after which payments stopped being made by them. The defence thus raised appears to us to be in the realm of being `plausible but improbable. This being the case, the plaintiff needs to be protected. In our opinion, the defendant will be granted leave to defend the suit only if it deposits in the Bombay High Court the principal sum of L 418 crores invested by FMO, or gives security for the said amount of L 418 crores, to the satisfaction of the Prothonotary and Senior Master, Bombay High Court within a period of three months from today.