Case: Babulal Parate Vs. The State Of Bombay And Another

thereof are specified in a Schedule.There is, therefore, no difficulty in understanding what is meant by the expression State in Art. 3. It obviously refers to the States in the First Schedule and the Legislature of the State refers to the Legislature which each State has under the Constitution. That being the position, we see no reasons for importing into the construction of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for giving an extended meaning to the expression State occurring therein.None of the constituent units of the Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were before they formed their federal unions. The Constituent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the sovereign people, was unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole. Unlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has been vested with the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or diminishing the area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the proposals. It is significant that for making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary even to invoke the provisions governing constitutional amendments.9. The second line of argument presentend on behalf of the appellant is that the word Bill in the proviso must be interpreted to include an amendment of any of the clause of the Bill, at least any substantial amendment thereof, and any proposal contained in such amendment must be referred to the State Legislature for expression of its views.We do not think that this interpretation is correct. Wherever the introduction of an amendment is subject to a condition precedent, as in the case of financial bills, the Constitution has used the expression A bill or amendment, e. g. in Art. 117. No such expression occurs in Art. 3. Secondly, under Art. 118 Parliament has power to make rules of its own procedure and conduct of business, including the moving of amendments etc. Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the House of the People (Lok Sabha) lays down the conditions which govern the admissibility of amendments to clauses or schedules of a Bail, and one of the conditions is that an amendment shall be within the scope of the Bill and relevant to the subject-matter of the clause of which it relates. Article 122 (1) of the Constitution says that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. In view of these provisions, we cannot accept an interpretation of Art, 3 which may nullify the effect of Art. 122, an interpretation moreover which is based not on the words used therein but on certain abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of what learned counsel for the appellant has characterised as the democratic process.10.We recognise that the formation of a new composite State of Bombay as in S. 8 of the Act was a substantial modification of the original proposal of three units contained in the Bill. That, however, does not mean that it was not a proper amendment of the original proposal or that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views on all aspects of the subject-matter of the proposal.The High Court rightly pointed out that in the debates in the State Legislature several members spoke in favour of a composite State of Bombay. The point to note is that many different views were expressed in respect of the subject-matter of the original proposal of three units, and as a matter of fact it cannot be said that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views in favour of one composite unit instead of three units if it so desired. It cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to the subject-matter of the original proposal.In T. H. Vakil v. Bombay Presidency Radio Club Ltd., 47 Bom LR 428: (AIR 1945 Bom 475 ), a decision on which learned counsel for the appellant has relied, the question arose of the power of the chairman of a club to rule an amendment out of order. It was said therein that (1) an amendment must be germane to the subject-matter of the original proposition and (2) it must not be a direct negative thereof.Judged by these two conditions, it cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not germane to the subject-matter of the original proposal or was a direct negative thereof. We are unable, therefore, to accept the third contention of learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the formation of a new Bombay State as envisaged in S. 8 of the Act was so completely divorced from the proposal contained in the Bill that it was in reality a new bill and, therefore, a fresh reference was necessary.11. It is advisable, perhaps, to add a few more words about Art. 122 (1) of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellant has posed before us the question as to what would be the effect of that Article if in any Bill completely unrelated to any of the matters referred to in cls. (a) to (e) of Art.3, an amendment was to be proposed and accepted changing (for example) the name of a State. We do not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the present case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Thus, the proviso lays down two conditions: one is that no Bill shall be introduced except on the recommendation of the President, and the second condition is that where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has to be referred by the President to the Legislature of the State for expressing its views thereon. The period within which the State Legislature must express its views has to be specified by the President; but the President may extend the period so specified. If, however, the period specified or extended expires and no views of the State Legislature are received, the second condition laid down in the proviso is fulfilled in spite of the fact that the views of the State Legislature have not been expressed.The intention seems to be to given an opportunity to the State Legislature to express its views within the time allowed; if the State Legislature fails to avail itself of that opportunity, such failure does not invalidate the introduction of the Bill. Nor is there any thing in the proviso to indicate that Parliament must accept or act upon the views of the State Legislature. Indeed, two State Legislatures may express totally divergent views. All that is contemplated is that Parliament should have before it the views of the State Legislatures as to the proposals contained in the Bill and then be free to deal with the Bill in any manner it thinks fit, following the usual practice and procedure prescribed by an under the rules of business. Thus the essential content of the second condition is a reference by the President of the proposal contained in the Bill to the State Legislature to express its views thereon within the time allowed. It is worthy of note, and this has been properly emphasised in the judgment of the High Court, that what has to be referred to the State Legislature by the President is the proposal contained in the Bill. The proviso does not say that if and when a proposal contained in the Bill is modified subsequently by an amendment properly moved and accepted in Parliament, there must be a fresh reference to the State Legislature and a fresh bill must be introduced. It was pointed out in the course of arguments that if the second condition required a fresh reference and a fresh bill for every amendment, it might result in an interminable process; because any and every amendment of the original proposal contained in the Bill would then necessitate a fresh Bill and a fresh reference to the State Legislature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a construction were put on the proviso, for example, in a case where two or three States were involved, different views might be expressed by the Legislatures of different States . If Parliament were to accept the views of one of the Legislatures and not of the other, a fresh reference would still be necessary by reason of any amendment in the original proposal contained in theare of the view that the words of the proviso are clear enough and bar their ordinary plain meaning. According to the accepted connotation of the words used in the proviso, the second condition means what it states and what has to be referred to the State Legislature is the proposal contained in the Bill; it has not such drastic effect as to require a fresh reference every time an amendment of the proposal contained in the Bill is moved and accepted in accordance with the rules of procedure ofsee no reasons for importing into the construction of Art. 3 any doctrinaire consideration of the sanctity of the rights of States or even for giving an extended meaning to the expression State occurring therein.None of the constituent units of the Indian Union was sovereign and independent in the sense the American colonies or the Swiss Cantons were before they formed their federal unions. The Constituent Assembly of India, deriving its power from the sovereign people, was unfettered by any previous commitment in evolving a constitutional pattern suitable to the genius and requirements of the Indian people as a whole. Unlike some other federal legislatures, Parliament, representing the people of India as a whole, has been vested with the exclusive power of admitting or establishing new States, increasing or diminishing the area of an existing State or altering its boundaries, the Legislature or Legislatures of the States concerned having only the right to an expression of views on the proposals. It is significant that for making such territorial adjustments it is not necessary even to invoke the provisions governing constitutionalview of these provisions, we cannot accept an interpretation of Art, 3 which may nullify the effect of Art. 122, an interpretation moreover which is based not on the words used therein but on certain abstract and somewhat illusory ideas of what learned counsel for the appellant has characterised as the democratic process.10.We recognise that the formation of a new composite State of Bombay as in S. 8 of the Act was a substantial modification of the original proposal of three units contained in the Bill. That, however, does not mean that it was not a proper amendment of the original proposal or that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views on all aspects of the subject-matter of the proposal.The High Court rightly pointed out that in the debates in the State Legislature several members spoke in favour of a composite State of Bombay. The point to note is that many different views were expressed in respect of the subject-matter of the original proposal of three units, and as a matter of fact it cannot be said that the State Legislature had no opportunity of expressing its views in favour of one composite unit instead of three units if it so desired. It cannot be said that the proposal of one unit instead of three was not relevant or pertinent to the subject-matter of the originaldo not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the presentdo not think that we need answer such a hypothetical question except merely to say that if an amendment is of such a character that it is not really an amendment and is clearly violative of Art. 3, the question then will be not the validity of proceedings in Parliament but the violation of a constitutional provision. That, however, is not the position in the present