Case: Dr.Suhas H. Pophale of Bombay Indian Inhabitant Vs. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited &amp; Others

been understood even by the Act of 1971, as deemed to include all assets-properties and rights, powers, privileges thereto. The Petitioner on the other hand, was claiming to have acquired right on the basis of leave and licence agreement executed i.e. on 20th December, 1972, executed after the said premises acquired the status of public premises. As a necessary corollary, the provisions of Rent Act would have no application to the said premises on the date of execution of the leave and licence agreement. Thus, the Entry of the Petitioner in the said premises, was not lawful for the purposes of the P.P. Act as no prior consent or approval of the authorised officer under the PP Act was obtained. Moreover, the said Leave and Licence agreement dated 20th December, 1972 could not have been executed without the prior approval of the person specified by the Central Government in respect of the erstwhile company as required by section 3 of the Act of 1971; and in any case the status of the Petitioner as tenant could not have been accepted by the General Manager of the erstwhile company without the prior approval of the specified person, as per the said provision.19. For the view that we have taken, the other grounds of challenge pressed into service by the Petitioner will be of no avail. Further, it is not necessary for us to examine the grievance about the correctness of the finding of the Appellate Court that the Leave and Licence agreement is invalid. Assuming that the said leave and licence agreement is legal and genuine, that would not take the matter any further for the Petitioner. Similarly, even if we were to consider other documents pressed into service on behalf of the Petitioner, for the reasons already recorded, the same will be of no avail. Inasmuch as, in law, the entry of the Petitioner in the said premises itself was unlawful, in the context of the provisions of P.P. Act. Since the provisions of P.P. Act became applicable to the said premises on and from 13th May, 1971, it is not open to the Petitioner to invoke rights arising on account of the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In that, the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act ceased to apply to the said premises from 13th May, 1971.20. Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the exposition of the Apex Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. V/s. Nusli Neville Wadia & Anr. reported in (2008) 3 SCC 279 , to contend that the Respondent No.1 has not adhered to the guidelines issued by the Central Government. According to the Petitioner, the action on the part of the Respondent No.1 is not fair and reasonable. In the first place, the question considered in the said decision was who should begin to lead evidence in a proceedings under the P.P. Act. Further, the principal ground for initiating proceedings in that case was of requirement of the public premises for own use and occupation and incidentally because the tenancy was already terminated. In the present case, the competent authority in the first place issued notice of termination on 12th July, 1980 against the original allottee/tenant(Mr.Erix Voller) on the ground that he had allowed user of the said premises by unauthorised persons and was not using it himself for the purpose let out to him. The original allottee/tenant allowed the said notice of termination to become final. It is only thereafter, show cause notice was issued not only to the said original allottee/tenant but also to the petitioner who was found to be in unauthorised occupation of the suit premises. The said proceedings were contested only by the Petitioner. In the present case, the Petitioner is not claiming to be allottee/tenant of the Respondent No.1. The Estate Officer after giving fair opportunity to the Petitioner has recorded finding of fact that the Petitioner was in occupation of the said premises without authority therefor. That finding of fact has been upheld by the Appellate forum, i.e., the City Civil Court. The procedure followed by the Respondent No.1 is in conformity with the requirement of the P.P. Act. It is not possible to countenance the grievance of the Petitioner either about inappropriateness in the conduct of the proceedings or of action of the Respondent No.1 in resorting to eviction of the petitioner from the said premises being arbitrary, malafide, unfair or unreasonable as such. If any other view is taken that will defeat the intent of the P.P. Act, which was to provide for a speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorized occupants of the public premises. Suffice it to observe that the decision pressed into service by the Petitioner is of no avail to the fact situation of the present case.21. To sum up, we hold that the provisions of PP Act became applicable to the said premises on and from 13th May, 1971. Further, the entry of the Petitioner and continued occupation of the suit premises is without authority therefor in the context of the provisions of the PP Act; and also not in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1971. The leave and licence agreement dated 20th December, 1972 cannot confer higher right in the Petitioner than that of the original allottee/tenant who has suffered the notice of termination issued as back as on 12th July, 1980. Atleast on and from that date, the occupation of the original allottee/tenant and as a consequence of that the Petitioner, who was claiming through him, became unauthorised occupant and amenable to action of eviction as well as payment of damages. As mentioned earlier the question regarding damages will be reconsidered by the Estate Officer in view of the limited remand of the proceedings in terms of the impugned decision of the City Civil Court. The order of eviction as passed against the opposite parties does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever. The same will have to be therefore upheld.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. The argument of the Petitioner that the said premises did not acquire the status of public premises, within the meaning of P.P.Act, after coming into force the Act of 1971, will have to be examined keeping in mind the sweep of provisions of Act of 1971 and more importantly the definition of public premises in the P.P.Act. Section 2(e) of the P.P.Act reads thus:2. Definitions.In this Act, unless the context otherwise.......(c) .........(d) .........(e) public premises meansany premises belonging to , or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of, the Central Government, and includes any such premises which have been placed by that Government, whether before or after the commencement of the Public Premises (Eviction) of Unauthorised Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980(61 of 1980), under the control of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament for providing residential accommodation to any member to any member of the staff of that Secretariat;(2) any premises belonging to , or taken on lease by, or on behalfany company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956), in which not less thanper cent. Of theshare capital is held by the Central Government or any company which is a subsidiary(within the meaning of that Act) of thecompany,(ii) any corporation(not being a company as defined in section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956(1 of 1956), or a local authority) established by or under a Central Act and owned or controlled by the Central Government,(iii) any University established or incorporated by any Central Act,(iv) any Institute incorporated by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961(59 of 1961)(v) any Board of Trustees constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 (39 of 1963),(vi) the Bhakra Management Board constituted under section 79 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that Board as and when renamed as theManagement Board under subsection (6) of section 80 of that Act,(vii) any State Government or the Government of any Union territory situated in the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in any other Union territory,(viii) any Cantonment Board constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924(2 of 1924); and](3) in relation to the [National Capital Territory of Delhi](i) any premises belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, or any Municipal Committee or notified area committee,(ii) any premises belonging to the Delhi Development Authority, whether such premises are in the possession of , or leased out by, the said Authority,](iii) any premises belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf of any State Government or the Government or the Government of any Union Territory;The expression belonging to has been amplified by the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of M. Mohd. Vs. Union of India and ors. Reported in AIR 1982 Bombay 443. Paragraph 22 reads thus:Assuming we are wrong in our aforesaid conclusions, we are of the view that there is no reason why the present premises should not fall within the expression belonging to the Central Government in the definition of public premises in S. 2(e) of the said Act. There is no doubt that the expression belonging to does not mean the same thing as owned by. The two expressions have two different connotations. The expression belonging to will take within its sweep not only ownership but also rights lesser than that of ownership. It must be remembered in this connection that the expressions used in the statute are to be interpreted and given meaning in the context in which they are used. The present Act has been placed on the statute book to give a summary remedy to the Government to evict persons in occupation of public premises to obviate the long ordeal of trial in a Civil Court and of further proceedings thereafter. Hence a wider meaning will have to be given to the expressions used in the Act for defining the concept of public premises. So viewed there is no reason why the premises of which possession for the time being vests in the Government and which are allotted by the Government to others while so in possession should not be held to be public premises.In AIR 1965 SC 1923  , (Mahomed Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of Sitapur), the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the expression belonging to me used by the tenant in an application to the Compensation Officer under Act 26 of 1948 for the Rehabilitation of Refugees. While commenting upon this in para 14 of the judgment the Court observed asto revert to paragraphs 2, 5 and 8 which the learned Judges considered amounted to a clear and unequivocal denial of the Governments title, they referred in para 2 to the wordsto me as constituting a disclaimer of the tenancy and a repudiation of the landlords title. We do not agree that this is the only or proper construction which the words are capable of bearing. Though the word belonging no doubt is capable of denoting as absolute title, is nevertheless not confined to connoting that sense. Even possession of an interest less than that of full ownership could be signified by that word. In Websterto is explained as meaning inter aliabe owned by, be possession of. The precise sense which the word was meant to convey can therefore be gathered only by reading the document as a whole and adverting to the context in which it occurs. ......In Strouds Judicial Dictionary at page 269 the word belonging has been defined as to a person has two general meanings, (1) ownership, (2) the absolute right of user:A road may be said, with perfect propriety to belong to a man who has the right to use it as of right, although the soil does not belong to him.Therefore, where a person has an absolute right to user i.e. right of user even against the owner, it can be said that the property belongs to him. It must be remembered that the absolute right of user is distinct from the possessory title which a person has against the whole world except the true owner. In the present case, in the first instance there is no dispute between the landlord and the Government that the Government is the monthly tenant of the premises in question. Secondly, even under the Bombay Rent Act, by virtue of Section 4(1) thereof, the Governments tenancy is protected. Therefore, it can legitimately be held that the Government has absolute right of user of the premises in question. If this is so, then the premises can properly be said to belong to the Government. Since we have already observed that the expression belonging to does not merely include the right of ownership but also something less than and since further the premises of which the absolute right of user vests in a person can be said to belong to him, the present premises will squarely be embraced by the definition of public premises within the meaning of the said Act.We may usefully refer, in this connection, to two authorities. In (1950) 52 Bom LR 688: (AIR 1951 Bom 205  ), (Laxmipat Singhania v. LarsenTourbo Ltd.), the facts were that the plaintiff had filed a suit for eviction against the defendants who were a Company to whom a portion of the building was let out. The plaintiffs predecessor had taken on lease the land from the Port Trust for constructing the building. After constructing the building, he had let out a portion of the same to the defendants. The question was whether the building belonged to the Port Trust or to the plaintiff. If it belonged to the Port Trust the Rent Court had no jurisdiction in view of S. 4(1) of the Bombay Rent Act. While holding that the building belonged to the Plaintiff the Court observed as follows (at p. 209 ofdecisions in my opinion establish that there may be in relation to property a dual ownership for a limited period of time; and it would be possible to say in such cases that even a person who was not the absolute owner but had a right of ownership limited to that period was a person to whom the property belonged. No doubt these cases related to movable property; but I do not conceive that the principle is any different when we are dealing with immovable property. The tests as to whether for a limited period of time a temporary ownership has been created is according to the cases (1) whether there is a demise of the property, (2) whether there is full dominion and control over the property in the demisee and (3) whether the risk of the property falls on the demisee, or the absolute owner.Applying these principles to the case of a lease of land together with the building for a limited period of timeparticularly a period as long as 99 yearsit appears to me that if the lease demises the land with the building and confers on the transferee full dominion and control over the property, the transferee taking the risk of the property, then, for that limited period, the lessee is the owner of the property and the property can be said to belong to him. Ownership is nothing more than a bundle of rights in relation to property. The aggregate of rights constitutes absolute ownership. It may be that during a stated period some of these rights are vested in one person and some in others. In the case of a lessor and a lessee such as we are considering, the lessee has the right of reversion which of course is not tangible immovable property, but an intangible thing. He has also a right of reentry under the terms of the lease and he has further a right by covenant to claim the building upon termination of the lease or upon its determination in any other manner provided by lease. With regard to all other rights in the property, these vest completely in the lessee for the limited period of time. It seems to be that it is the lessee who is under the circumstances the owner qua at any rate those to whom he has let or sublet such premises. It is consistent with dual ownership that qua the lessee it may be that the lessor is the owner of the property; and in any proceedings between the lessor and the lessee it would be possible to say that the premises belonged to the lessor and not to the lessee. That is not the case before me. The case here arises between the lessee and those to whom he has let the premises. I have no doubt in my mind that qua the defendants in these two suits the premises in suit belong to the plaintiff and to nobody else so long as the lease is subsisting. That being so, those premises are not excluded from the operation of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, and this Court has therefore no jurisdiction to entertain or try either of these suits.In AIR 1977 Bom 220   (S.R.B. Kaikwad v. Union of India), what fell for consideration was the status of the Central Government as the lessee when the lease is determined and the Government becomes a statutory tenant under the Bombay Rent Act. While construing the meaning of public premises in this context, the Court observed aswhere the lease in favour of the Central Government is determined and the Central Govt. becomes a statutory tenant under the Bombay Rent Act, 1947 the premises do not cease to be public premises within the meaning of Section 2(e). The Act is not so much concerned with the title as with the possessory rights vested in the Central Government and Section 2(e) only indicates the sources by which such right to possession can be acquired, one such being, the taking of the premises on lease from its owner. The definition thus is descriptive of the source or origin of the possessory rights acquired by the Central Government. It is the continuance of the vesting of this possessory right in Government and not so much the origin thereof, that makes any premises, a public premises under the Act. The contract of lease, no doubt gives rise to the estate and interest of the lessee in the property, bare right to possession being only a part of such estate and interest. The determination of the lease, no doubt puts an end to the contract and such interest and the estate. However, provisions of the Bombay Rent Act afford some protection to the tenants against eviction and prevents such determination of lease from having its full effect. In spite of the determination of the lease and incapacity of the tenant and the landlord to enforce the terms of the contract, extenant actually happens to enjoy still, what once was the fruit and the product of the same contractual lease. In other words, the entire interest covered by the possessory right created by the contract does not come to an end with the determination of the lease but part of it, at any rate, i.e. the bare right to remain in possession still survives and is protected by the Rent Act. The right to possession acquired by the Central Government under the lease on taking the same on lease, thus continues to exist and is protected, though the lease interest and the estate comes to an end. The premises do not cease to have been taken on lease as the phraseology is merely descriptive of how the possessory right originated. The loss of contractual security, and the substitution thereof by the cover of the protection under the Rent Act does not affect, any rate, the kernel, i.e. the possessory right which also was the creature of the contractual lease. It is difficult to see how the premises cease to be public premises when in spite of the determination of the lease, possessory right created thereunder continues to be vested in the Government.The aforesaid observations reinforce the conclusion that where a person has an absolute right to user i.e. the right of user even against the owner, it can truly be said that the premises belong to such person though he is not the owner of the same. In the present case therefore, on the facts discussed earlier it can validly be held that the premises belong to the Central Government. Even assuming therefore that we are wrong in our conclusion that the premises are leased to the Central Government, the premises will be public premises within the meaning of the said Act and therefore the orders passed evicting the appellants are valid in law.11. Considering the provisions in the Act of 1971, we have no hesitation in taking the view that the same are wide enough to encompass the power of vesting of complete control of the assets and properties of the insurer(erstwhile company) in the Central Government from the appointed day(i.e. 13th May, 1971). It is true that this Act of 1971 does not transfer or vest the title in the assets of the insurer (erstwhile company), in favour of the Central Government; but nevertheless, it purports to vesting of complete control of the assets and properties of the insurer in the Central Government and to be regulated by the Custodian or with the approval of the person specified by the Central Government in that behalf in respect of the insurer, as the case may be. The primary intention of which is to protect the interests of the policy holders until the nationalisation of insurance business was to be accomplished. Indubitably, the enactment of 1971 invests some rights in the Central Government to be enforced through the specified person(s) for management of the insurer in anticipation of nationalisation of such business and incidental matters including to deal with the assets and properties of the insurer. It matters not that the said right of the Central Government in the respect of the assets and properties of the insurer were to be lesser than that of the ownership rights. As a result, by virtue of the expansive definition of public premises in section 2(e) of the P.P.Act, the said premises acquired the status of public premises within the meaning of the P.P.Act after the appointed day(i.e. 13th May, 1971) specified by the Act of 1971.12. Once the provisions of the P.P. Act became applicable to the said premises, the question of dealing with such premises in manner other than the provisions of PP Act or for that matter, the Act of 1971 would not arise. If so, the fact that a Leave and Licence Agreement was executed in favour of the Petitioner by the original tenant on 20th December, 1972 does not take the matter any further. For, the entering into such agreement was impermissible in relation to the public premises without prior approval of the Competent Authority. Moreso, no such agreement could have been executed without the prior approval of the person specified by the Central Government. No such general or special approval, as the case may be, was relied or produced before us. In absence of such approval, transaction by way of Leave and Licence agreement entered into by the Original tenant in favour of the Petitioner herein was not legal and valid and in any case was not binding on the Respondent No.1 or the erstwhile company. The letter purportedly issued under the signature of the General Manager of the erstwhile company dated 16th January, 1973 cannot legitimise the transaction. Significantly the General Manager has not referred to any approval given by the person specified by the Central Government authorising issuance of such communication.13. In the present case, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two authorities below, is that, the communication dated 16th January, 1973 relied by the Petitioner is not legal and genuine. That being concurrent finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence on record, cannot be overturned by this Court. In any case, in view of the legal position flowing from the provisions of the Act of 1971, the inevitable conclusion is that the said premises acquired the status of public premises on or from 13th May, 1971. The original tenant therefore, could not have parted with possession thereof to third person without the express prior written approval of the Competent Authority under the P.P.Act. As no such approval has been obtained, the Leave and Licence Agreement pressed into service will be of no effect and cannot extricate the Petitioner from the action under P.P.Act. The said agreement would be of no avail also because, after application of the provisions of the P.P. Act to the said premises, the provisions of Bombay Rent Act have no application thereto. For the same reason, rights under the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act in respect of the public premises, would become unavailable. For, the provisions of P.P. Act overrides the application of the Bombay Rent Act qua the public premises. This position has been restated in catena of decisions. We may usefully refer to the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd.Anr. v/s. Punjab National BankOrs. (1990) 4 SCC 406.   In paragraph70 of the said decision, the Constitution Bench authoritatively rejected the contention that the provisions contained in the P.P. Act cannot be applied to the premises which fall within the ambit of Rent Control Act. It has taken the view that the provisions of the P.P.Act, to the extent they covered premises falling within the ambit of Rent Control Act, override the provision of the Rent Act; and a person in unauthorised occupation of public premises under section 2(e) of the Act cannot invoke the protection of the Rent Control Act.The above arguments canvassed on behalf of the petitioners will have to be stated to be rejected. For, by now it is authoritatively held by the Apex Court that after coming into force of the P.P.Act, the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act qua the properties of the Government and Government Companies would be inoperative. Indeed, the objective and purpose of the P.P. Act, is in relation to the public premises. Whereas, the provisions of Bombay Rent Act inter alia deal with relationship between landlord and tenant or tenant and subtenant. However, the said relationship is ascribable to a premises which is necessarily governed by the Rent Control Legislation and not otherwise. Once the provisions of the P.P. Act are applicable to any premises, all rights and obligations of the occupants therein by whatever name called, would be and ought to be controlled by the mechanism provided for therein for eviction of occupants from such premises. The P.P. Act recognizes only authorized occupants and all others in occupation will have to be treated as unauthorised occupants or in unauthorised occupation of the public premises. These are the only two classes of occupants which are recognised by the provisions of the P.P. Act in relation to any public premises. Therefore, a person who claims to be a licensee or subtenant of the lawful occupant, cannot acquire the status of a lawful or authorisedthe statutory authority were to recognise his possession of the public premises in that capacity. Indeed, the moment the statutory authority were to recognise the possession of such occupant as legitimate one, than that person will have to be recognised as an authorised occupant of the public premises within the meaning of the P.P. Act and not otherwise. The concept of subtenant or lawful subtenant or protected licensee is the creature of the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act and is alien to the Scheme of P. P. Act. (emphasis supplied)It would be useful to reproduceto 16, which reads thus:14. The argument that the Rent Legislation merely exempts only the premises belonging to Government or a Local Authority clearly overlooks the settled legal position that after coming into force of the P.P. Act, the premises belonging to the Government as also the Corporations or the Companies (covered by the definition of Public Premises Act) are controlled by the regime of the said Act alone. The provisions of P.P. Act overrides the application of the Bombay Rent Act qua the public premises. In other words, the provisions of the Rent Act will have no application to such premises. The fact that section 4 of the Rent Act does not make specific reference to Corporations or companies referred to in section 2(e)2(ii) of the P.P. Act, does not take the matter any further. The field regarding the public premises belonging to the specified Corporation is fully occupied by the Central enactment. The State Legislation would be void to the extent it is repugnant with the Central enactment. In other words, irrespective of the State Legislation (Rent Act) being silent about the exemption of application qua the premises belonging to Banks or Corporations, that is of no avail. For, the law expounded by the Apex Court in the abovesaid two decisions is that the provisions of Bombay Rent Act will have no application to premises belonging to specified Companies or the Corporation such as the Punjab National Bank.15. True it is that the Bombay Rent Act deals with the aspects of relationship of landlord and tenant or tenant andand/or protected licensees. However, that relationship cannot be examined in abstract but is ascribable to a premises. Significantly, even the claim regarding rights and liabilities under the Rent Legislation is in relation to premises to which Rent Legislation is made applicable. If the premises are exempted from the operation of the Rent Legislation, the question of occupant of such premises claiming any rights in the context of provisions of the Rent Act does not arise. If any other view is taken, it would end up in a situation that even if Rent Legislation has no application to the premises, the person occupying the same may assert that he has the protection of the Rent Legislation. That cannot be countenanced. Applying the same logic, once the premises are governed by the definition of Public Premises in the P.P. Act, it is not open to the occupant of such premises or person claiming through the authorised occupant to seek protection of the provisions of the Rent Act therein. For, the provisions of Rent Act have no application to such premises and the only enquiry that is permissible in relation to such premises (public premises) is whether the occupant of the premises is authoritsed or unauthorised in the context of the provisions of P.P. Act and not with reference to any matter referred to in the Bombay Rent Act. I have no hesitation in taking the view that in such a case neither the provisions of section 4 nor section 5(8) read with section 6 of the Bombay Rent Act would be of any avail. Taking any other view would lead to a preposterous situation. In that, if a person claiming to be in occupation in the capacity as licensee orhis claim was to be accepted with reference to the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, obviously such person would acquire rights and protection in terms of provisions contained in the Bombay Rent Act. In that case he can be dispossessed only by following due process under the said enactment. In a given case, if the Estate Officer was to initiate action of eviction against the original allottee of the public premises on legitimate grounds and order of eviction was to be passed, in that case the so calledsubtenant or licensee inoccupation of portion of the premises would assert that his possession is protected and has become the direct tenant of the statutory authority, having regard to the Scheme of section 14 and 15 of the Bombay Rent Act. In that case, he may further contend that he cannot be evicted merely on the basis of order passed against the main tenant. Obviously, when enacting the P.P. Act, the Parliament consciously evolved a mechanism for eviction of occupants or persons in unauthorised occupation by following summary procedure stipulated therein, so as to ensure remedy of speedy eviction in relation to public premises and also for its effective management and preservation in public interest.16. To get over this position it was argued that only matters referred to in section 15 of the P.P. Act have been barred by the Legislature. It was contended that matters which are not covered by section 15 could be tried by the regular Courts or Special Courts. According to petitioners, none of the matters referred to in section 15 of the P.P. Act would cover the relief claimed by the petitioners in the suit as presented. In the first place, this argument clearly overlooks that once it is held that after coming into force of the P.P. Act, the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act have no application to public premises, the question of resorting to proceedings by invoking the provisions of Rent Act or to assert right in the public premises in the context of provisions of the Rent Legislation does not arise. Viewed thus, there was no necessity to bar the jurisdiction of the Rent Court from entertaining any proceedings between the so called tenant andsubtenant or licenseeon thereof, either in section 15 of the P.P. Act or in section 4 of the Bombay Rent Act, can be no basis to assume that the dispute between the original allottee of the public premises and his subtenant will still be governed by the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. (emphasis supplied).In another case between LICAnr. v/s. BanatwalaCo., in Writ Petition No.5023 of 2009 decided by learned Single Judge of this Court on 8th September, 2009 to consider the question as to whether the provisions of P.P. Act had overriding effect over the provisions of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 and whether any application for fixation of standard rent under the provisions of the said Act of 1999 is amenable in relation to the premises governed by the provisions of the P.P. Act, has restated the legal position that the provisions of Rent Control Legislation will cease to apply in respect of the premises governed by the provisions of the P.P.Act and further, occupant of such premises cannot claim protection under the provision of the Rent Control Legislation.16. Considering the above, the fact that there exists a leave and licence agreement in favour of the Petitioner in respect of the said premises, does not take the matter any further. Inspite of the said leave and licence agreement, it will have to be concluded that the entry of the Petitioner in to the said premises itself was without authority therefor. With the result, even the original allottee became liable for action under the provisions of P.P. Act on that count. The status of the Petitioner, at best, would be that of a person claiming through the original allottee/tenant. Insofar as the original allottee/tenant is concerned, his rights in relation to the said premises have been determined by notice of termination dated 12th July, 1980, for the reasons mentioned therein. The said notice has attained finality. It was thus open and permissible for the Estate Officer to take recourse to action under the provisions of P.P. Act. Accordingly, the Estate Officer has initiated the present proceedings not only against the original allottee/tenant but also against the person in occupation of the said premises who is allegedly inducted by the said original allottee/tenant. For taking action against the original allottee/tenant on the ground that the other persons are in unauthorized occupation of the said premises was legitimate and permissible as per the provisions of the PP Act.17. Reverting to the Act of 1972, it was intended to provide for acquisition and transfer of shares of Indian Insurance companies and undertakings of other existing insurers in order to serve better the need of the economy by securing development of general insurance business in the best interests of the community and to ensure that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth to the common detriment, for the regulation and control of such business and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The appointed day, as per the Act of 1972 in terms of Section 3(b) means such day not being a day later than the 2nd day of January, 1973, as the Central Government may, by notification appoint. The Central Government by notification has appointed the said day as 1st January, 1973. There is no dispute in this behalf. It is also not in dispute that the erstwhile company was covered by the definition of existing insurer within the meaning of section 3(e) of the said Act of 1972. By virtue of section 4 of this Act, on the appointed day (i.e. 1st January, 1973), all the shares in the capital of every Indian Insurance Company stood transferred to and vested in Central Government free of all trusts, liabilities and encumbrances affecting them. Further, the erstwhile company was to now function as a Government company. Suffice it to note that this enactment was intended to acquire the shares of the Indian Insurance Company, providing for scheme for reorganisation of general insurance business (Chapter V of the Act). Section 16 provides for scheme for mergers of companies. In the present case, the scheme in respect of erstwhile company, under section 16 of the Act of 1972, was notified by the Central Government, vide notification dated 31st December, 1973. As per the said notification, scheme was to come into force on the 1st day of January, 1974, being the specified day. The effect of the said scheme was to transfer all undertakings of every merged company to and vested in the transferee company (Respondent No.1 herein). Clause 4(2) of the Scheme provides that the undertaking shall be deemed to include all assets, rights, powers, authorities and privileges and all properties, movable and immovable, cash balance, capital and reserve fund, investments and all other rights and interests in or arising out of such property, as were immediately before the specified day in the ownership, possession, power or control of such merged company, whether within or without India and all books of accounts, registers, records and all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto; and shall be deemed to include all borrowings, liabilities and obligations of whatever kind then subsisting of the merged company. The effect of transfer is provided inof the said scheme.stipulates that on the specified day, the merged company shall stand dissolved without winding up.18. Relying on the provisions of the Act of 1972 and the scheme referred to above, it was contended that as per the Act of 1972, all the shares in the capital of the erstwhile company stood transferred to and vested in the Central Government. That does not mean that the properties of the insurer company (erstwhile company) vested in the Central Government before the scheme was notified which came into force from 1st day of January, 1974. For the reasons already noted while dealing with the earlier submission, it is not necessary to elaborate on this matter. Inasmuch as, the provisions of the P.P. Act does not require that the Central Government should be the owner of the property. As aforesaid, even if it is shown that the Central Government has had lesser right than the ownership right in respect of the given premises, the same would acquire the status of public premises. In which case, the premises would become amenable to the rigours of P.P. Act. We have held that by virtue of taking over the management of the undertakings of all insurers pending nationalisation, as per the scheme of the said Act of 1971, the Central Government was in complete control even in respect of the assets and properties of the insurer. This logic is reinforced even by the express provision in clause 4(2) of the Scheme of 1973 framed in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the Act of 1972. For, the expression undertaking as has always been understood even by the Act of 1971, as deemed to include alland rights, powers, privileges thereto. The Petitioner on the other hand, was claiming to have acquired right on the basis of leave and licence agreement executed i.e. on 20th December, 1972, executed after the said premises acquired the status of public premises. As a necessary corollary, the provisions of Rent Act would have no application to the said premises on the date of execution of the leave and licence agreement. Thus, the Entry of the Petitioner in the said premises, was not lawful for the purposes of the P.P. Act as no prior consent or approval of the authorised officer under the PP Act was obtained. Moreover, the said Leave and Licence agreement dated 20th December, 1972 could not have been executed without the prior approval of the person specified by the Central Government in respect of the erstwhile company as required by section 3 of the Act of 1971; and in any case the status of the Petitioner as tenant could not have been accepted by the General Manager of the erstwhile company without the prior approval of the specified person, as per the said provision.19. For the view that we have taken, the other grounds of challenge pressed into service by the Petitioner will be of no avail. Further, it is not necessary for us to examine the grievance about the correctness of the finding of the Appellate Court that the Leave and Licence agreement is invalid. Assuming that the said leave and licence agreement is legal and genuine, that would not take the matter any further for the Petitioner. Similarly, even if we were to consider other documents pressed into service on behalf of the Petitioner, for the reasons already recorded, the same will be of no avail. Inasmuch as, in law, the entry of the Petitioner in the said premises itself was unlawful, in the context of the provisions of P.P. Act. Since the provisions of P.P. Act became applicable to the said premises on and from 13th May, 1971, it is not open to the Petitioner to invoke rights arising on account of the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. In that, the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act ceased to apply to the said premises from 13th May, 1971.20. Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance on the exposition of the Apex Court in the case of New India Assurance Company Ltd. V/s. Nusli Neville WadiaAnr. reported in (2008) 3 SCC 279  , to contend that the Respondent No.1 has not adhered to the guidelines issued by the Central Government. According to the Petitioner, the action on the part of the Respondent No.1 is not fair and reasonable. In the first place, the question considered in the said decision was who should begin to lead evidence in a proceedings under the P.P. Act. Further, the principal ground for initiating proceedings in that case was of requirement of the public premises for own use and occupation and incidentally because the tenancy was already terminated. In the present case, the competent authority in the first place issued notice of termination on 12th July, 1980 against the original allottee/tenant(Mr.Erix Voller) on the ground that he had allowed user of the said premises by unauthorised personsand was not using it himself for the purpose let out to him. The original allottee/tenant allowed the said notice of termination to become final. It is only thereafter, show cause notice was issued not only to the said original allottee/tenant but also to the petitioner who was found to be in unauthorised occupation of the suit premises. The said proceedings were contested only by the Petitioner. In the present case, the Petitioner is not claiming to be allottee/tenant of the Respondent No.1. The Estate Officer after giving fair opportunity to the Petitioner has recorded finding of fact that the Petitioner was in occupation of the said premises without authority therefor. That finding of fact has been upheld by the Appellate forum, i.e., the City Civil Court. The procedure followed by the Respondent No.1 is in conformity with the requirement of the P.P. Act. It is not possible to countenance the grievance of the Petitioner either about inappropriateness in the conduct of the proceedings or of action of the Respondent No.1 in resorting to eviction of the petitioner from the said premises being arbitrary, malafide, unfair or unreasonable as such. If any other view is taken that will defeat the intent of the P.P. Act, which was to provide for a speedy machinery for eviction of unauthorized occupants of the public premises. Suffice it to observe that the decision pressed into service by the Petitioner is of no avail to the fact situation of the present case.21. To sum up, we hold that the provisions of PP Act became applicable to the said premises on and from 13th May, 1971. Further, the entry of the Petitioner and continued occupation of the suit premises is without authority therefor in the context of the provisions of the PP Act; and also not in conformity with the provisions of the Act of 1971. The leave and licence agreement dated 20th December, 1972 cannot confer higher right in the Petitioner than that of the original allottee/tenant who has suffered the notice of termination issued as back as on 12th July, 1980. Atleast on and from that date, the occupation of the original allottee/tenant and as a consequence of that the Petitioner, who was claiming through him, became unauthorised occupant and amenable to action of eviction as well as payment of damages. As mentioned earlier the question regarding damages will be reconsidered by the Estate Officer in view of the limited remand of the proceedings in terms of the impugned decision of the City Civil Court. The order of eviction as passed against the opposite parties does not suffer from any infirmity whatsoever. The same will have to be therefore upheld.