Case: Raja Kulkarni And Others Vs. The State Of Bombay

it. Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra. We consider that the word appeal must be constructed in its plain and natural sense without the insertion of any qualifying words such as are intended to be introduced by the contention raised before us. There is yet another reason for not constructing the word appeal in the manner suggested by the appellants and that is that the legislature in introducing this provision contemplated that industrial peace should not be disturbed so long as the matter was pending in the court of appeal, irrespective of the fact whether such an appeal was competent in law, if this were not the case, the parties could easily defeat the object of the legislature by errogating to themselves the right to decide about the competency of the appeal without reference to the court, commit a breach of the peace and escape the penalty imposed by S. 27. There was no justification for the appellants to instigate the workers in the so-called bona fide belief that section 27 did not apply to an appeal which they thought was incompetent. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the conferment of a right of appeal during the pendency of a proceeding can affect the rights of the parties to those proceedings and make the order the pending proceeding appealable. (8) The second contention relates to the alleged infringement of the rights of the appellants under Article 19 (1) (a) and (c), read with Article 14 of the Constitution. In order to understand this contention, a reference to the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, will be necessary. (9) Section 3, sub-section (32) defines Representative of Employees as one entitled to act as such under section 30 and representative Union is defined as a Union for the time being registered as a representative Union under the Act (Sub-section 33). (10) Section 12 enjoins upon the Registrar of Union appointed under the Act to maintain: (a) a register of Unions registered by him under the provisions of the Act and (b) a list of approved Unions. (11) Section 13 deals with the registration of Union by the Registrar. By the first sub-section a Union can be registered as a representative Union for an industry in a local area if it has for the whole of the period of three months next preceding the date of its application, a membership of not less than 15 per cent of the total number of employees employed in any industry in any local area. If a Union does not satisfy that condition and has a membership of not less than five per cent, it can be registered as a qualified Union, If neither of these Unions has been registered in respect of an industry, then a Union having a membership of not less than 15 per cent of the total number of employees employed in any undertaking in such industry can by an application to the Registrar by registered as a primary Union. It is common ground that the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh comes under the first category and the Union of which the appellants are office-bearers comes under the second namely that it is a qualified Union. This registration can be cancelled under section 15 if it has been procured by mistake, misrepresentation or fraud or if the membership has fallen below the minimum required under section 13 for its registration. (12) It is argued that the right of the appellants to freedom of speech and expression and to form associations or Unions under Article 19 (1) and (c), read with Article 14, conferring the right or equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws is infringed by the Act, inasmuch as it gives preference to a trade Union upon the artificial test of having the greater percentage of membership, namely not less than 15 per cent. We see little merit in this contention. It is obvious that the Act imposes no restriction either upon the freedom of speech and expression of the Textile workers or their right to form associations or Unions; indeed it is not denied that the workers have already formed as many as three Unions, though they do not exhaust the number of workers in Bombay, for it leaves as many as 65 per cent of workers unorganized who do not belong to any trade Union. The statute lays down the minimum qualification of 15 per cent, of membership to enable the Union to be called a representativee Union so as to represent the interests of the entire body of workers in their relations with the employers. After laying down the test of not less than 15 per cent it was perfectly reasonable not to allow any other Union such as the appellants to interpose in a dispute on behalf of the Textile workers when they did not command the minimum percentage or when their membership fell below the prescribed percentage. It is perfectly open to the appellants to enlist that percentage over the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh so as to be able to represent the interests of all the workers. The right to freedom of speech and expression is not denied to the appellants, nor are they prohibited from forming associations or Unions. (13) The Act makes no discrimination between Textile workers as a class but lays down a reasonable classification to the effect that a certain percentage of membership possessed by a Union will be allowed to represent the workers as a class to the exclusion of others but there is nothing to prevent the other Unions or other workers from forming a fresh Union and enrolling a higher percentage so as to acquire the sole right of representation. The appellants challenge the validity of the Act as infringing their fundamental rights and yet they base their case of discrimination on the provisions of the same Act. This position is not in accord with reason or principle. (14)

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]From the mere fact that such an appeal is held to be unmaintainable on any ground whatsoever, it does not follow that there was no appeal pending before the Court. Article 182 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act prescribed three years period of limitation for the execution of a decree or order to run from the date of the final decree or order of the Appellate Court when there has been an appeal.The Privy Council constructed the latter phrase to mean that any application by a party to the Appellate Court to set aside or revise a decree or order of a Court subordinate thereto is an appeal within the meaning of the above provision, even though it is irregular or incompetent, or the persons affected by the application to execute were not parties., or it did not imperil the whole decree or order. They refused to read into the words any qualification either as to the character of the appeal, or as to the parties to it. Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra. We consider that the word appeal must be constructed in its plain and natural sense without the insertion of any qualifying words such as are intended to be introduced by the contention raised before us. There is yet another reason for not constructing the word appeal in the manner suggested by the appellants and that is that the legislature in introducing this provision contemplated that industrial peace should not be disturbed so long as the matter was pending in the court of appeal, irrespective of the fact whether such an appeal was competent in law, if this were not the case, the parties could easily defeat the object of the legislature by errogating to themselves the right to decide about the competency of the appeal without reference to the court, commit a breach of the peace and escape the penalty imposed by S. 27. There was no justification for the appellants to instigate the workers in the so-called bona fide belief that section 27 did not apply to an appeal which they thought was incompetent. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider whether the conferment of a right of appeal during the pendency of a proceeding can affect the rights of the parties to those proceedings and make the order the pending proceeding appealableIt is obvious that the Act imposes no restriction either upon the freedom of speech and expression of the Textile workers or their right to form associations or Unions; indeed it is not denied that the workers have already formed as many as three Unions, though they do not exhaust the number of workers in Bombay, for it leaves as many as 65 per cent of workers unorganized who do not belong to any trade Union. The statute lays down the minimum qualification of 15 per cent, of membership to enable the Union to be called a representativee Union so as to represent the interests of the entire body of workers in their relations with the employers. After laying down the test of not less than 15 per cent it was perfectly reasonable not to allow any other Union such as the appellants to interpose in a dispute on behalf of the Textile workers when they did not command the minimum percentage or when their membership fell below the prescribed percentage. It is perfectly open to the appellants to enlist that percentage over the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh so as to be able to represent the interests of all the workers. The right to freedom of speech and expression is not denied to the appellants, nor are they prohibited from forming associations or Unions.The Act makes no discrimination between Textile workers as a class but lays down a reasonable classification to the effect that a certain percentage of membership possessed by a Union will be allowed to represent the workers as a class to the exclusion of others but there is nothing to prevent the other Unions or other workers from forming a fresh Union and enrolling a higher percentage so as to acquire the sole right of representation. The appellants challenge the validity of the Act as infringing their fundamental rights and yet they base their case of discrimination on the provisions of the same Act. This position is not in accord with reason or principle.