Case: T. Govindaraja Mudaliar Etc. Etc Vs. The State Of Tamil Nadu &amp; Others

the Act was acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal. Since he was a member of the committee which had made the report in accordance with which the scheme had been published under Section 68-C it is claimed that the Secretary, Home, acted as a Judge in his own cause. In other words, he participated in the policy decision of the Government and then he exercised the powers under Section 68-D of hearing objections and considering the merits of the schemes. This, it is suggested, is wholly contrary to the rules of natural justice the hearing by the Secretary, Home, being vitiated by bias. The learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in East India Electric Supply and Traction Co., Ltd. v. S. C. Dutta, (1955) 59 Cal WN 162 held that where a member of a Rating Committee had already pre-judged at least one of the issues that had been raised before it, his inclusion as a member made by Rating Committee and its functioning, contrary to law. In D. Satyanarayanamurthy v. A. P. State Road Transport Corporation, (1961) 1 SCR 642 = (AIR 1961 SC 82 ) the Minister in charge of the port-folio of Transport had presided over the sub-committee constituted to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus services. It was contended there that the same Minister could not be a Judge in his own case as he was biased against the private operators. That contention was negatived by this Court.It was pointed out that any decision arrived at by the sub-committee was not final or irrevocable and it was only a policy decision. The sub-committee was only meant to advise the State Government how to implement the policy of nationalisation. That could not either expressly or by necessary implication involve a predetermination of the issue. The Minister, therefore, could not be said to have any such bias as disqualified him from hearing objections under Chapter IV-A of the Act in which Section 68-D occurs. This case is quite apposite for disposing of the submission based on bias.15. The second reason advanced in support of the challenge to the schemes is based on what is described as complete absence of coordination so far as the various schemes are concerned. The objectionable feature of the schemes is stated to be that there was no proper coordination of the services on the various routes which are to be nationalised and which should have been done by an integrated scheme. We are unable to see that if the schemes conformed to the requirements of Section 68-C why they should be struck down on the only ground that routes were to be nationalised as and when permits of private operators on those routes expired. Section 68-C permits the State Transport Undertaking to operate a service in relation to any area or route or even a portion thereof and to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons. The decision in Shrinivasa Reddy v. State of Mysore, (1960) 2 SCR 130 = (AIR 1960 SC 350 ) can be of no avail to the appellants because no question arose of coordination of services on the various routes which were to be nationalised and in respect of which the nationalisation was to become effective from different dates. In that case it was pointed out that peicemeal nationalisation of a particular route is not permissible. It is quite clear that each route can be nationalised and it is difficult to comprehend that when the law empowers that to be done any further conditions should be superimposed of coordinating the services on all the routes which are proposed to be nationalised.The following observations with regard to the above decision in D. Satyanarayanamurthys case, (1961) 1 SCR 642 = (AIR 1961 SC 82 ) explain the law on the point :"This Court did not lay down that there cannot be any phased programme in the nationalisation of transport services in a State or in a district nor did it hold that there cannot be more than one scheme for a district or a part of a district. The observations of this Court in regard to the implementation of a scheme piecemeal were aimed at to prevent an abuse of power by discriminating against some operators and in favour of others in respect of a single scheme."16. Learned Counsel for the appellants laid a great deal of emphasis on the manner in which the policy decisions were taken by the Government and the mandatory language contained in the Government Orders already referred to which hardly left any discretion or choice to the authority considering the objections under Section 68-D of the Act. We are unable to see how any authority who exercises individual power under Section 68-D is bound by what has been stated as a policy decision of the Government. In fact his main function is to hear such objections as may be preferred to the schemes published under Section 68-C and approve or modify the schemes so published after giving an opportunity to the objector. His function being of a quasi-judicial nature he is to bring a judicial approach to the matter and even if he happens to be a servant of the Government he is not bound in any way to carry out or endorse the policy of the Government without discharging his duties as contemplated by Section 68-D.We are unable to hold nor has anything been shown to us except the suggestion that the schemes as published under Section 68-C were approved in toto that the authority acting under Section 68-D had not discharged his duties in a proper and judicial manner. The mere fact that the schemes were approved without any modification cannot establish that the Secretary. Home, who exercised the functions of the State Government under Section 68-D had failed to carry out his functions as laid down in Section 68-D or that he had approved the schemes without any modification merely because the Government orders contained language of mandatory nature.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Bhanji Munji (1955) 1 SCR 777   = (AIR 1955 SC 41  ) and other decisions which followed it were based mainly on an examination of the inter-relationship between Article 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2). There is no question of any acquisition or requisition in Chapter IV-A of the Act. The relevant decision for the purpose of these cases was only the one given in Kochunis case, (1960) 3 SCR 887   = (AIR 1960 SC 1080  ) after which no doubt was left that the authority of law seeking to deprive a person of his property otherwise than by way of acquisition or requisition was open to challenge on the ground that it constituted on the ground that it constituted infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f).It was, therefore, open to those affected by the provisions of Chapter IV-A to have agitated before this Court the question which is being raised now based on the guarantee embodied in Art. 19 (1) (f) which was never done. It is apparently too late in the day now to pursue this line ofis possible and likely that the value of the buses owned by the operators may be prejudicially affected or that they may not be able to carry on trade or business on the nationalised routes. According to the clear instance given in Akadshi Padhans case, (1963) Supp 2 SCR 691 = (AIR 1963 SC 1047  ) to which reference has already been made a law relating to such a monopoly would not normally infringe the citizens fundamental right under Article 19 (1)examining the above contentions it may be stated that there is no dispute on certain matters. The first is that according to the scheme of nationalisation which has been impugned all existing permits must come to an end before each scheme will become enforceable on a particular route. In other words by virtue of the scheme the existing permits of any operator will not be cancelled. None of the properties or assets of the appellants is going to be acquired. So far as the renewal of a permit is concerned this Court has already held that no operator can claim renewal as a matter of right. Section 68-G of the Act contains the principle and method of determination of compensation if any existing permit is cancelled or its terms are modified. In the present cases, however, no such question arises because no occasion for cancellation of existing permits can arise in view of the terms of the impugned scheme. The effect of nationalisation on the properties or business of the operators is not such as cannot be regarded to be a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public within Article 19 (5) in the same way as a State monopoly must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of the general public so far as Article 19 (1) (g) and Article 19 (6) are concerned. This is in view of the fact that the tests prescribed by Clauses 5 and 6 of Article 19 are the same : (vide Akadshi Padhans case, (1963) Supp 2 SCR 691 = (AIR 1963 SC 1047  ). We are accordingly unable to sustain the challenge under Article 19 (1) (f) even if such a challenge is open to the appellants in the light of what has been observedit is suggested, is wholly contrary to the rules of natural justice the hearing by the Secretary, Home, being vitiated by bias. The learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in East India Electric Supply and Traction Co., Ltd. v. S. C. Dutta, (1955) 59 Cal WN 162   held that where a member of a Rating Committee had already pre-judged at least one of the issues that had been raised before it, his inclusion as a member made by Rating Committee and its functioning, contrary to law. In D. Satyanarayanamurthy v. A. P. State Road Transport Corporation, (1961) 1 SCR 642   = (AIR 1961 SC 82  ) the Minister in charge of the port-folio of Transport had presided over the sub-committee constituted to implement the scheme of nationalisation of bus services. It was contended there that the same Minister could not be a Judge in his own case as he was biased against the private operators. That contention was negatived by this Court.It was pointed out that any decision arrived at by the sub-committee was not final or irrevocable and it was only a policy decision. The sub-committee was only meant to advise the State Government how to implement the policy of nationalisation. That could not either expressly or by necessary implication involve a predetermination of the issue. The Minister, therefore, could not be said to have any such bias as disqualified him from hearing objections under Chapter IV-A of the Act in which Section 68-D occurs. This case is quite apposite for disposing of the submission based onare unable to see that if the schemes conformed to the requirements of Section 68-C why they should be struck down on the only ground that routes were to be nationalised as and when permits of private operators on those routes expired. Section 68-C permits the State Transport Undertaking to operate a service in relation to any area or route or even a portion thereof and to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons. The decision in Shrinivasa Reddy v. State of Mysore, (1960) 2 SCR 130   = (AIR 1960 SC 350  ) can be of no avail to the appellants because no question arose of coordination of services on the various routes which were to be nationalised and in respect of which the nationalisation was to become effective from different dates. In that case it was pointed out that peicemeal nationalisation of a particular route is not permissible. It is quite clear that each route can be nationalised and it is difficult to comprehend that when the law empowers that to be done any further conditions should be superimposed of coordinating the services on all the routes which are proposed to beare unable to see how any authority who exercises individual power under Section 68-D is bound by what has been stated as a policy decision of the Government. In fact his main function is to hear such objections as may be preferred to the schemes published under Section 68-C and approve or modify the schemes so published after giving an opportunity to the objector. His function being of a quasi-judicial nature he is to bring a judicial approach to the matter and even if he happens to be a servant of the Government he is not bound in any way to carry out or endorse the policy of the Government without discharging his duties as contemplated by Section 68-D.We are unable to hold nor has anything been shown to us except the suggestion that the schemes as published under Section 68-C were approved in toto that the authority acting under Section 68-D had not discharged his duties in a proper and judicial manner. The mere fact that the schemes were approved without any modification cannot establish that the Secretary. Home, who exercised the functions of the State Government under Section 68-D had failed to carry out his functions as laid down in Section 68-D or that he had approved the schemes without any modification merely because the Government orders contained language of mandatoryare unable to hold that there is much substance in this argument.Bhanji Munji (1955) 1 SCR 777   = (AIR 1955 SC 41  ) and other decisions which followed it were based mainly on an examination of thebetween Article 19 (1) (f) and Art. 31 (2). There is no question of any acquisition or requisition in Chapterof the Act.