Case: Indian Statistical Institute Vs. M/S Associated Builders And Ors

on the record is revoked no one can act for the appellant. It was represented on behalf of the appellant at the earliest opportunity that it had decided to change the Counsel and prayed for extension of time. The learned Judge ignored the plea of the appellant that from October 25, 1976 to January 21, 1977 the appellant could not obtain the original objections filed by Shri B. Singh and overlooked the fact that when the papers were obtained from Shri B. Singh on January 20, 1977 the objections were promptly refiled on January 21, 1977. 7. On the facts we are constrained to say that we are most unhappy at the unsympathetic attitude taken by the High Court. The appellant was totally helpless and could not have refiled the memorandum of objections before January 21, 1977 in the circumstances in which it found itself. Further, the learned Judge did not even take notice of the fact that the petition for condonation of delay was pending and before that was disposed of the memorandum of objections cannot be properly refiled. 8. Regarding the conduct of Shri B. Singh the Counsel who was engaged by the appellant we feel the less said the better. The facts disclose that he was paid Rs. 3, 000. He filed the objections without affixing any stamp, which does not appear to be due to oversight, and when they were returned for rectifying defects, he made a demand for Rs. 15, 000 which is unconscionable. The subsequent conduct in not making the papers available cannot be innocently explained. We feel that Shri B. Singh has acted in a most unbecoming manner in the discharge of his duties as a member of the noble profession to which he belongs. We refrain from issuing any notice or calling upon him to explain as he is not under our disciplinary control. We direct that a copy of the judgment be sent to the All India Bar Council for taking such action as they may deem fit.9. On the facts disclosed we feel sufficient grounds are made out for condoning the delay in filing the objections. The two defects that were pointed out were : (i) the objections were not properly stamped and (ii) the verification was not dated. So far as the deficiency in stamps is concerned, under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code, the Court has ample jurisdiction to allow the person by whom such fee is payable to pay such Court fees at any stage. The defect in not affixing the date of the verification is not a material one to be taken serious note of. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that objections were not filed within time or that because they were not properly stamped the objections could not be taken as having been filed at all. Therefore, in our view, there had not been any delay in preferring the objections. The delay, if any, was in complying with the directions of the Registrar to rectify the defects and refiling the objections. The delay, as we have pointed out earlier, is not due to any want of care on the part of the appellant but due to circumstances beyond its control. 10. The High Court was in error in holding that there was any delay in filing the objections for setting aside the award. The time prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing of the objections is one month from the date of the service of the notice. It is common ground that the objections were filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act though defectively. The delay, if any, was in re-presentation of the objection petition after rectifying the defects. Section 5 of the limitation Act provides for extension of the prescribed period of limitation if the petitioner satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the objections within that period. When there is no delay in presenting the objection petition Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application and the delay in representation is not subject to the rigorous tests which are usually applied in excusing the delay in a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application filed before the lower Court for condonation of the delay in preferring the objections and the order of the Court declining to condone the delay are all due to misunderstanding of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. As we have already pointed out in the return the Registrar did not even specify the time within which the petition will have to be re- presented. 11. In a recent judgment of this Court delivered on August 3, 1977 in Mahant Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioner (1977 4 SCC 69 ), it is pointed out that the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking to condone the delay in preferring an appeal is different from a petition for excusing the delay in re-presentation. 12. Even in cases where there has been delay in filing of an appeal or objection petition within the time prescribed when the delay is not due to want of bona fides by the petitioner and is due to the party having acted in a particular manner on the wrong advice given by his legal adviser, he cannot be held guilty of negligence so as to disentitle him to plead sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972 2 SCR 874 : 1972 1 SCC 366 )). 13. Equally when the petition is not properly stamped the Court has ample powers to extend the time for affixing proper Court-fee. Section 149 of the Code of Civil procedure confers ample power on the High Court to exercise its powers in order to do justice to a litigant where the failure is not due to any fault of the litigant. (Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das (1961 3 SCR 763 : AIR 1961 SC 882 )).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. The reasons given by the High Court are unsound and totally unconvincing. We feel that the petition discloses sufficient cause for condonation of the delay. The High Court found Shri B. Singh "may have acted without care or attention of the interest of his client or may have behaved recklessly, but nevertheless he was negligent". We are unable to perceive how the appellant was negligent. Even before the notice was received from the Registry on August 21, 1976 the appellant requested Shri B. Singh to file the objections within the time allowed. On the basis of the threat demanding fees the appellant promised to pay Shri Singh Rs. 3, 000 which was admittedly paid. By another letter the appellant undertook to pay Shri Singh according to schedule of fees by first week of October, 1976. The objections were filed on September 29, 1976 i.e. within time but no stamps were fixed to the objections and the date of verification was not entered. This intimation was given by Shri Singh on October 13, 1976 a day after the objections were returned by the office. Shri B. Singh wrote to the appellant informing him of the return, the necessity for removing the objections and refiling the objections and threatening that if the fees were not paid the matter would be held up. By the letter dated October 21, 1976 Shri Singh demanded Rs. 15, 000. At the earliest opportunity, that is when the matter came up before the Deputy Registrar the appellant prayed for time for filing objections stating that it had decided to change its advocate. On October 29, 1976 Shri B. Singh again wrote stating that though it had been repeatedly made clear that objections would be filed only after receiving full payments, he had filed objections in time on September 29, 1976. The learned Judge found that though the material for drafting objections for setting aside the award was available either in the records of the Court or in the record of the appellant, there is no explanation for not filing objections till January 21, 1977. The lower Court ignored the fact that before the vakalatnama of the Counsel on the record is revoked no one can act for the appellant. It was represented on behalf of the appellant at the earliest opportunity that it had decided to change the Counsel and prayed for extension of time. The learned Judge ignored the plea of the appellant that from October 25, 1976 to January 21, 1977 the appellant could not obtain the original objections filed by Shri B. Singh and overlooked the fact that when the papers were obtained from Shri B. Singh on January 20, 1977 the objections were promptly refiled on January 21,On the facts we are constrained to say that we are most unhappy at the unsympathetic attitude taken by the High Court. The appellant was totally helpless and could not have refiled the memorandum of objections before January 21, 1977 in the circumstances in which it found itself. Further, the learned Judge did not even take notice of the fact that the petition for condonation of delay was pending and before that was disposed of the memorandum of objections cannot be properlyRegarding the conduct of Shri B. Singh the Counsel who was engaged by the appellant we feel the less said the better. The facts disclose that he was paid Rs. 3, 000. He filed the objections without affixing any stamp, which does not appear to be due to oversight, and when they were returned for rectifying defects, he made a demand for Rs. 15, 000 which is unconscionable. The subsequent conduct in not making the papers available cannot be innocently explained. We feel that Shri B. Singh has acted in a most unbecoming manner in the discharge of his duties as a member of the noble profession to which he belongs. We refrain from issuing any notice or calling upon him to explain as he is not under our disciplinary control. We direct that a copy of the judgment be sent to the All India Bar Council for taking such action as they may deemOn the facts disclosed we feel sufficient grounds are made out for condoning the delay in filing the objections. The two defects that were pointed out were : (i) the objections were not properly stamped and (ii) the verification was not dated. So far as the deficiency in stamps is concerned, under Section 149, Civil Procedure Code, the Court has ample jurisdiction to allow the person by whom such fee is payable to pay such Court fees at any stage. The defect in not affixing the date of the verification is not a material one to be taken serious note of. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that objections were not filed within time or that because they were not properly stamped the objections could not be taken as having been filed at all. Therefore, in our view, there had not been any delay in preferring the objections. The delay, if any, was in complying with the directions of the Registrar to rectify the defects and refiling the objections. The delay, as we have pointed out earlier, is not due to any want of care on the part of the appellant but due to circumstances beyond itsThe High Court was in error in holding that there was any delay in filing the objections for setting aside the award. The time prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing of the objections is one month from the date of the service of the notice. It is common ground that the objections were filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act though defectively. The delay, if any, was in re-presentation of the objection petition after rectifying the defects. Section 5 of the limitation Act provides for extension of the prescribed period of limitation if the petitioner satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the objections within that period. When there is no delay in presenting the objection petition Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application and the delay in representation is not subject to the rigorous tests which are usually applied in excusing the delay in a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application filed before the lower Court for condonation of the delay in preferring the objections and the order of the Court declining to condone the delay are all due to misunderstanding of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. As we have already pointed out in the return the Registrar did not even specify the time within which the petition will have to be re-The High Court was in error in holding that there was any delay in filing the objections for setting aside the award. The time prescribed by the Limitation Act for filing of the objections is one month from the date of the service of the notice. It is common ground that the objections were filed within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act though defectively. The delay, if any, was inof the objection petition after rectifying the defects. Section 5 of the limitation Act provides for extension of the prescribed period of limitation if the petitioner satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the objections within that period. When there is no delay in presenting the objection petition Section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application and the delay in representation is not subject to the rigorous tests which are usually applied in excusing the delay in a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The application filed before the lower Court for condonation of the delay in preferring the objections and the order of the Court declining to condone the delay are all due to misunderstanding of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. As we have already pointed out in the return the Registrar did not even specify the time within which the petition will have to be re