Case: BIRLA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Vs. THE STATE OF JHARKHAND

to the meaning of words associated with it . [See Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 8th Edn., Syn. 8, at p. 379.] 23. The wordunskilled is opposite of the wordskilled and the wordsemi- skilled seems to describe a person who falls between the two categories i.e. he is not fully skilled and also is not completely unskilled but has some amount of skill for the work for which he is employed. The wordunskilled cannot, therefore, be understood dissociated from the wordskilled and semi-skilled to read and construe it to include in it all categories of employees irrespective of the nature of employment. If the legislature intended to cover all categories of employees for extending benefit of gratuity under the Act, specific mention of categories of employment in the definition clause was not necessary at all. Any construction of definition clause which renders it superfluous or otiose has to be avoided. 24. The contention advanced that teachers should be treated as included in the expression unskilled or skilled cannot, therefore, be accepted. The teachers might have been imparted training for teaching or there may be cases where teachers who are employed in primary schools are untrained. A trained teacher is not described in the industrial field or service jurisprudence as a skilled employee. Such adjective generally is used for an employee doing manual or technical work. Similarly, the words semi-skilled andunskilled are not understood in educational establishments as describing nature of jobof untrained teachers. We donot attach much importance to the arguments advanced on the question as to whetherskilled,semi-skilled and unskilled qualify the wordsmanual, supervisory,technical orclerical or the above words qualify the word work. Even if all the words are read disjunctively or in any other manner, trained or untrained teachers do not plainly answer any of the descriptions of the nature of various employments given in the definition clause. Trained or untrained teachers are notskilled, semi-skilled, unskilled, manual, supervisory,technical orclerical employees. They are also not employed in managerial or administrative capacity. Occasionally, even if they do some administrative work as part of their duty with teaching, since their main job is imparting education, they cannot be held employed in managerial or administrative capacity.The teachers are clearly not intended to be covered by the definition ofemployee. 25. The legislature was alive to various kinds of definitions of the word employee contained in various previouslabour enactmentswhen the Act was passed in 1972. If it intended to cover in the definition ofemployee all kinds of employees, it could have as well used such wide language as is contained in Section 2(f) of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 which definesemployee to meanany person who is employed for wages in any kind of work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment …. Non-use of such wide language in the definition of employee in Section 2(e) of the Act of 1972 reinforces our conclusion that teachers are clearly not covered in the definition. 26. Our conclusion should not be misunderstoodthatteachersalthough engaged in a very noble profession of educating our young generation should not be given any gratuity benefit. There are already in several States separate statutes, rules and regulations granting gratuity benefits to teachers in educational institutions which are more or less beneficial than the gratuity benefits provided under the Act. It is for the legislature to take cognizance of situation of such teachers in various establishments where gratuity benefits are not available and think of a separate legislation for them in this regard. That is the subject-matter solely of the legislature to consider and decide. (emphasis supplied) 16. Reading the aforementioned principle of law laid down by this Court, we have no hesitation in holding that respondent No.4, who was also a teacher and worked with the appellant as such, was not eligible to claim gratuity amount from the appellant (BIT) under the Act. 17. In our opinion, the High Court though took note of the decision rendered in the case ofAhmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra) but erred in distinguishing it on the ground that it is applicable only to the primary teachers working in primary schools and since the case at hand is not a case of a primary teacher, it has no application to this case. 18. In our view, the High Court failed to read last line of Para 24 quoted above wherein this Court has held in clear terms thatteachers are clearly not intended to be covered by the definition ofemployee.The High Court was, therefore, not justified in making a distinction between the teachers working in the primary schools and theteachers working in other educational institutions. 19. In other words, the High Court failed to see that this Court had examined the expressionteacher qua the expressionemployee defined in Section 2(e) of the Act and then held thatteacher is not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act. While laying down the law, this Court did not make any distinction between the teachers inter se and nor made any distinction as to in which type of educational institute the teacher is working for determining his entitlement to claim the gratuity under the Act. 20. We cannot, therefore, concur with the view taken by the High Court, which in our view, is not in conformity with the law laid down by this Court in the case ofAhmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra). It is based on incorrect reading of this Courts decision and, therefore, it deserves to be set aside. 21. We, however, make it clear that we have examined the case at hand only in the light of the provisions of the Act, which were akin to the facts of the case inAhmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra). 22.In case there is any other State Act or Scheme in force, which extends any benefit to the employees of the Institute only then respondent No.4 would be at liberty to take benefit of such Act/Scheme in accordance with law.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]16. Reading the aforementioned principle of law laid down by this Court, we have no hesitation in holding that respondent No.4, who was also a teacher and worked with the appellant as such, was not eligible to claim gratuity amount from the appellant (BIT) under the Act.17. In our opinion, the High Court though took note of the decision rendered in the case ofAhmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra) but erred in distinguishing it on the ground that it is applicable only to the primary teachers working in primary schools and since the case at hand is not a case of a primary teacher, it has no application to this case.18. In our view, the High Court failed to read last line of Para 24 quoted above wherein this Court has held in clear terms thatteachers are clearly not intended to be covered by the definition ofThe High Court was, therefore, not justified in making a distinction between the teachers working in the primary schools and theteachers working in other educational institutions.19. In other words, the High Court failed to see that this Court had examined the expressionteacher qua the expressionemployee defined in Section 2(e) of the Act and then held thatteacher is not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the Act. While laying down the law, this Court did not make any distinction between the teachers inter se and nor made any distinction as to in which type of educational institute the teacher is working for determining his entitlement to claim the gratuity under the Act.20. We cannot, therefore, concur with the view taken by the High Court, which in our view, is not in conformity with the law laid down by this Court in the case ofAhmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra). It is based on incorrect reading of this Courts decision and, therefore, it deserves to be set aside.21. We, however, make it clear that we have examined the case at hand only in the light of the provisions of the Act, which were akin to the facts of the case inAhmadabad Pvt. Primary Teachers Association (supra).case there is any other State Act or Scheme in force, which extends any benefit to the employees of the Institute only then respondent No.4 would be at liberty to take benefit of such Act/Scheme in accordance with law.