Case: Municipal Corporation Of The City Of Jabalpur Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh

71 of the Jabalpur Corporation Act, were never in dispute and indeed formed the very basis of the appellants petition to the High Court. If any particular property had vested in the Municipal Committee subject to its being divested in particular contingencies, that the property in the hands of the Corporation would be held subject to the same obligations or disabilities could also not be in controversy. Nor could it be contested that the making of a public road is "a public purpose" for which land may be resumed by the State under S. 81. What we desire to point out is that it the State of Madhya Pradesh was or must be deemed to have been the transferor of the property under the communication dated April 5, 1930, the validity of the notification under S. 81 could not be challenged.8. As we have pointed out earlier, the learned Judges proceeded, however, on the assumption that it was not the Government of C. P. and Berar but the Central Government that was the transferor of the land in question. There was, however, no basis upon which the learned Judges could have rested this assumption. In the first place, in the Writ Petition by which the appellant-Corporation challenged the validity of the notification it did not deny the fact that it was the Government of C. P. and Berar that had effected the transfer, and, in fact, the allegations in the petition proceeded on the basis that it was the State Government that had done so but the contention raised was that on a proper construction of S. 81 it applied only to transfers made after the Jubbulpore Corporation Act, 1948 came into force-an untenable contention which has not been persisted in.9. The question as to who a transferor is obviously a question of fact or at best a mixed question of law and fact and when a party in a Writ Petition does not allege any such fact, it stands to reason that he ought not to be permitted to travel beyond the facts stated, at the stage of the arguments. To confine a party to his pleadings, particularly to his allegations as regards facts is dictated not merely by the need for orderliness in these proceedings but for avoiding surprise to the other party and consequent injustice resulting therefrom. Save in exceptional cases, parties should be held strictly to their pleadings and if owing to discovery of new matter of grounds, there is need to add to or to modify the allegations either in the petition or in the counter-affidavit, the Court should insist on formal amendments being effected, for this would enable each party to state its case with precision and definiteness and the other side would have a proper opportunity to know this case and meet it with appropriate defences. This salutary rule was not adhered to in this case, and the departure from the pleadings which the appellant was permitted to adopt during the course of its arguments before the High Court has led to injustice because thereby the Counsel for the State who was apparently not prepared to meet an argument not raised in the petition, made submissions at the spur of the moment which were not justified by the true state of affairs. In our opinion, on the allegations made in the petition by the appellant-Corporation it ought not to have been permitted to put forward a case that the State Government was not the transferor of the property and the learned Judges of the High Court should have proceeded on the basis of the pleadings in the case.10. Apart from this question of pleadings, we consider that there is no merit in the contention even otherwise. We have already set out the terms by which the transfer of the land was communicated to the Municipal Committee. The preamble recites that what is being communicated is the order of the Government of the Central Provinces. The words of conveyance are in the second paragraph and they read:"Under S. 38 (1) (f) of the Central Provinces Municipalities Act, 1922 Government is pleased to transfer to the Municipal Committee......" (italics (here into ) ours).The expression " Government" here obviously, in the context, means the Government of the Central Provinces. Paragraph 2 which specifies what should happened if the condition on which the land has been granted should be broken, states:"The land shall be liable to be divested under S. 38 (2) and resumed by Government.""Government" here again obviously is the Government of the Central Provinces-a construction reinforced if one looked at the sub-section referred to. Further, in Condition 3 which speaks of what was to happen if the land was resumed by Government for any Government purpose the reference to "Government" again is to the "State Government".On the terms of the document therefore it was the Government of the Central Provinces that made the grant-the predecessor of the State Government. We find therefore, that there is no factual foundation for the submission which was apparently made before the High Court that the transfer in the present case was by the Central Government. No doubt, the communication refers to the fact that previous to making the grant the Government of C. P. and Berar had obtained the approval of the Central Government, but that was merely a matter of administrative arrangement between the Central and Local Governments which is totally irrelevant for determining the identity of the Government which made the grant. Besides, the Corporation having accepted the grant from the State Government was obviously estopped from contending that the land of which it continued in possession under that grant was not one by the State Government or that the State Government had not the authority to make the grant. If such contention is both not open to the Corporation and not tenable on the merits, it would follow that the impugned notification was fully justified by the provisions under S. 81 of the Jabalpur Corporation Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. There could not be any dispute that if the authority that had transferred the property covered by the impugned notification, to the Municipal Committee of Jabalpur was the Government of Central Provinces and Berar, the right of the successor Government, viz., the State Government of Madhya Pradesh to take over the land from the Corporation for the purpose of forming a public road would manifestly be within their power under S. 81. That the Corporation of Jabalpur was the successor-in-title to the Municipal Committee of Jabalpur and that the property which was vested in the Municipal Committee of Jabalpur was transferred to and became vested in the appellant-Corporation under S. 71 of the Jabalpur Corporation Act, were never in dispute and indeed formed the very basis of the appellants petition to the High Court. If any particular property had vested in the Municipal Committee subject to its being divested in particular contingencies, that the property in the hands of the Corporation would be held subject to the same obligations or disabilities could also not be in controversy. Nor could it be contested that the making of a public road is "a public purpose" for which land may be resumed by the State under S. 81. What we desire to point out is that it the State of Madhya Pradesh was or must be deemed to have been the transferor of the property under the communication dated April 5, 1930, the validity of the notification under S. 81 could not be challenged.8. As we have pointed out earlier, the learned Judges proceeded, however, on the assumption that it was not the Government of C. P. and Berar but the Central Government that was the transferor of the land in question. There was, however, no basis upon which the learned Judges could have rested this assumption. In the first place, in the Writ Petition by which the appellant-Corporation challenged the validity of the notification it did not deny the fact that it was the Government of C. P. and Berar that had effected the transfer, and, in fact, the allegations in the petition proceeded on the basis that it was the State Government that had done so but the contention raised was that on a proper construction of S. 81 it applied only to transfers made after the Jubbulpore Corporation Act, 1948 came into force-an untenable contention which has not been persisted in.The question as to who a transferor is obviously a question of fact or at best a mixed question of law and fact and when a party in a Writ Petition does not allege any such fact, it stands to reason that he ought not to be permitted to travel beyond the facts stated, at the stage of the arguments. To confine a party to his pleadings, particularly to his allegations as regards facts is dictated not merely by the need for orderliness in these proceedings but for avoiding surprise to the other party and consequent injustice resulting therefrom. Save in exceptional cases, parties should be held strictly to their pleadings and if owing to discovery of new matter of grounds, there is need to add to or to modify the allegations either in the petition or in the counter-affidavit, the Court should insist on formal amendments being effected, for this would enable each party to state its case with precision and definiteness and the other side would have a proper opportunity to know this case and meet it with appropriate defences. This salutary rule was not adhered to in this case, and the departure from the pleadings which the appellant was permitted to adopt during the course of its arguments before the High Court has led to injustice because thereby the Counsel for the State who was apparently not prepared to meet an argument not raised in the petition, made submissions at the spur of the moment which were not justified by the true state of affairs. In our opinion, on the allegations made in the petition by the appellant-Corporation it ought not to have been permitted to put forward a case that the State Government was not the transferor of the property and the learned Judges of the High Court should have proceeded on the basis of the pleadings in the case.Apart from this question of pleadings, we consider that there is no merit in the contention even otherwise. We have already set out the terms by which the transfer of the land was communicated to the Municipal Committee. The preamble recites that what is being communicated is the order of the Government of the Centralthe terms of the document therefore it was the Government of the Central Provinces that made the grant-the predecessor of the State Government. We find therefore, that there is no factual foundation for the submission which was apparently made before the High Court that the transfer in the present case was by the Central Government. No doubt, the communication refers to the fact that previous to making the grant the Government of C. P. and Berar had obtained the approval of the Central Government, but that was merely a matter of administrative arrangement between the Central and Local Governments which is totally irrelevant for determining the identity of the Government which made the grant. Besides, the Corporation having accepted the grant from the State Government was obviously estopped from contending that the land of which it continued in possession under that grant was not one by the State Government or that the State Government had not the authority to make the grant. If such contention is both not open to the Corporation and not tenable on the merits, it would follow that the impugned notification was fully justified by the provisions under S. 81 of the Jabalpur Corporation Act.