Case: Colonel His Highness Sawai Tej Singhji, Maharaja of Alwar Vs. Union of India and Another

given after that date under clause 3 of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant and that the only surviving provision und er which disputes regarding property owned by the plaintiff could be determined after the 15th of May 1949, was Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant. It is true that the expression "new Covenanting State" as defined in clause (c) of Article I of tha t Covenant meant only any of the four States of Bikaner, Jaipur, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur, that the definition was not amended by any provision of the Amending Agreement, so that the State of Alwar could not be regarded as a "new Covenanting Sta t. " for the purpose of clause (3) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and that the clause of that Article in accordance with which disputes relating to property claimed by tho Ruler of Alwar as his private property were to be determi ned was clause (2) which provided for their decision by a person nominated by the Government of India in that behalf. The fact remains, however, that no such person was ever nominated and that the letter dated the 14th September, 1949, cannot be con strued (for reasons already stated by us) as laying down a decision of any such person. What appears to have happened is that instead of following the course indicated in clause (2) last mentioned and having the disputes referred for decision to a person nominated by the Government of India, the parties (the Government of India and the appellant) decided to adopt the method of mutual agreement to settle those disputes-a method which always remained open to them, notwithstanding the Matsya Covenant and the Rajasthan Covenant. Such mutual agreement could, by no stretch of imagination be regarded as a decision by a person nominated by the Government of India either under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant or clause (2) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant and must be deemed to be nothing more or less than an agreement simpliciter even though it was labelled as a "decision of the States Ministry" in the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September, 1949.11. Another contention raised by Mr. Sharma was that even if the letter dated the 14th September, 1949 was held to evidence an agreement, it was not hit by the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution inasmuch as it was an agreement resulting from the Rajasthan Covenant which alone according to him, was the agreement covered by the article. This contention is also without substance. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any agreement which was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to which the Government of India was a party. The operation of the article is not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement whether it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a preceding agreement would fall within the ambit of the article. Thus the fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated the 14th September 1949 had resulted from action taken under the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that article 363 of the Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the two suits, although we may add, that agreement did not flow directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and departing from the provisions of clause (2) of Article XII thereof.12. The only other contention put f orward by Mr. Sharma was based on the contents of column 3 of Item 1 of the inventory appended to the letter dated the 14th September 1949. He drew our attention to the mention in that column of the portions of the adjoining building being occupie d by the State for administrative purposes or for Museum and Imperial Bank and also comprising the Zenana and Mardana Mahals. According to him, this meant that the entire building adjoining the City Palace was held to be the private pro perty of the plaintiff, which finally vested in the plaintiff as from the date of the letter and of which the plaintiff could not be divested by any subsequent decision of the Ministry of States. In this connection, Mr. Sharma urged that the Ministry of States had no power of reviewing a settlement once arrived at and argued that if it was claimed that such a power existed, the determination by a court of the limited question of the power of review would be barred b y the provisions of article 363 of the Constitution. This contention also is of no avail to him. As held above, the agreement dated the 14th September 1949 was not to stand by itself but was to be a part and parcel of an overall agreement embracing all outstanding matters of dispute. It follows that the terms of the agreement contained in the letter were liable to change till a final agreement was reached, and in this view of the matter no finality could be said to attach t o those terms until all the disputes became the subject-matter of an agreed settlement. The terms of the inventory attached to the letter were thus merely tentative, the process of settlement being a continuous one till all the disputes were finally resolved. And the ultimate decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed in its letter of the 24th of December 1959, not to treat the Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining the City Palace to be t he private property of the plaintiff, was based upon a mutual agreement between the parties which was reached after discussion in March 1952, as part of an over-all agreement as is evident from the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated the 6th/8th of December 1960.13.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff had furnished the inventory of the properties held by him in accordance with Article XI of the Matsya Covenant as is stated in the opening paragraph of the letter dated the 14th of September 1949. It further cannot bethat the third column of the inventory to that letter was headed "decision of the State Ministry". These two factors, without more, might have gone a long way to support the case propounded on behalf of the plaintiff, but they are sought to be used out of context as is clear from a perusal of the entire letter from which it can be safely spelt out that the"decision" was nothing but an agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the plaintiff. It is pertinent that the letter mentions that the inventory furnished by the plaintiff was discussed with him at New Delhi on the 9th and 10th of April 1949 and then states that a copy of the final inventory of the plaintiffs private properties, which had the approval of the Government of India in the Ministry of States, was forwarded to him. Now, under clause (3) of Article XI of the Matsya Covenant as also clause (2) of Article XII of the Rajasthan Covenant no approval of the Ministry of State s was called for. In fact, what each of those clauses provided was that if any dispute arose as to whether any item of property was the private property of the Ruler concerned or of his erstwhile State, it was to be referred to such person as the Government of India might nominate, and the decision of that person was to be final and binding on all parties concerned. Now, it is not the case of the plaintiff that the Government of India nominated a person to whom the dispute was to be referred; nor is it claimed by him that such a person gave any decision. The contents of the letter, therefore, are not at all relateable to those of either of the two clauses justOn the other hand, they clearly indicate that the"decisions" of the Sates Ministry contained in the inventory appended to the letter formed really the record of the agreement arrived at between the Ministry of States and the plaintiff as a result of negotiations held on the 9th and 10th of Aprilcontention is also without substance. Article 363 of the Constitution bars the jurisdiction of all courts in any dispute arising out of any agreement which was entered into or executed before the commencement of the Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State to which the Government of India was a party. The operation of the article is not limited to any "parent" Covenant and every agreement whether it is primary or one entered into in pursuance of the provisions of a preceding agreement would fall within the ambit of the article. Thus the fact that the agreement contained in the letter dated the 14th September 1949 had resulted from action taken under the provisions of the Rajasthan Covenant, is no answer to the plea raised on behalf of the respondents that article 363 of the Constitution is a bar to the maintainability of the two suits, although we may add, that agreement did not flow directly from the Rajasthan Covenant but was entered into by ignoring and departing from the provisions of clause (2) of Article XIIcontention also is of no avail to him. As held above, the agreement dated the 14th September 1949 was not to stand by itself but was to be a part and parcel of an overall agreement embracing all outstanding matters of dispute. It follows that the terms of the agreement contained in the letter were liable to change till a final agreement was reached, and in this view of the matter no finality could be said to attach t o those terms until all the disputes became theof an agreed settlement. The terms of the inventory attached to the letter were thus merely tentative, the process of settlement being a continuous one till all the disputes were finally resolved. And the ultimate decision of the Ministry of Home Affairs conveyed in its letter of the 24th of December 1959, not to treat the Secretariat building, Daulat Khana building and Indra Viman Station adjoining the City Palace to be t he private property of the plaintiff, was based upon a mutual agreement between the parties which was reached after discussion in March 1952, as part of anagreement as is evident from the letter of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated the 6th/8th of December 1960.13. In view of the conclusions arrived at above, we hold that the "decision" sought to be enforced by the plaintiff is an agreement hit by article 363 of the Constitution and that the High Court was right in dismissing suit No. 5 of 1963 as being not maintainable.