Case: B.D. Shetty and ors Vs. M/s Ceat Ltd. and anr

Sometimes Court was vacant, sometimes the proceedings were adjourned by the consent of the parties and sometimes for other reasons. The learned counsel for the appellants complained that there was delay on the part of the respondent also after issuing suspension orders to the appellants on May 8, 1996; the appellants replied to the suspension orders on August 6, 1996; no action was taken upto October 7, 1996 on which date charge-sheets were received by the appellants; the appellants filed reply to the charge-sheets on October 15, 1996 and the domestic inquiry commenced only on January 25, 1997.14. We are not impressed by the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that once there is delay on account of the conduct of the workman whatever may be the reason for delay, it is good enough to attract Section 10-A(1)(b) to deny the workman subsistence allowance at 75% after 90 days of suspension. According to him, no distinction can be made to exclude delay caused on account of stay order granted by a Court at the instance of workman. He contended that no words can be added or excluded to the said provision to avoid the mischief of it. In our view, a plain reading and clear understanding of Section 10-A(1)(b) as already discussed above, excludes the delay in completion of disciplinary proceedings caused on account of order granted by a competent Court from the mischief of the said provision. It is only the delay that is directly attributable to the workman is covered by the said provision. For what is stated above, the question raised in the beginning is answered in the negative.15. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that looking to the Model Standing Orders appearing in Schedule I appended to the Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959, which are more beneficial, the appellants are entitled for 100% subsistence allowance equivalent to their wages, dearness allowance and other compensatory allowance in case inquiry is not completed within the period of 180 days is based on Section 10-A(3) is untenable. The learned senior counsel for the respondent pointed out that Model Standing Orders contained in Schedule I, are the part of Bombay Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules, 1959 and these rules are framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 15 of the Act. Hence, it cannot be said that the said Model Standing Orders comes within the meaning of such other law covered by Section 10-A(3). He drew our attention to a Division Bench judgment of Bombay High Court in May & Baker Ltd. v. Kishore Jaikishandas Icchaporia 1994-III-LLJ (Suppl)-237 (Bom), in which it is clearly held that Model Standing Orders were not "other laws". Para 9 of the said judgment reads as under at p. 241 of LLJ : "There is no dispute that the payment that was made by the appellant to the 1st respondent was in accord not only with the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to their industrial establishment but also with those of Section 10-A. It was urged by Ms. Dsouza, learned counsel for the 1st respondent that the 1st respondent was entitled to subsistence allowance as provided by the Model Standing Orders by reason of sub-section (3) of Section 10-A because the Model Standing Orders were "other laws" within the meaning of sub-section (3). We find this argument difficult to accept. The Model Standing Orders, as also Certified Standing Orders, are laws no doubt, but they are laws made under the provisions of the Act. They are not provisions "under any other law". In our view, therefore, the provisions of Section 10-A supervene in relation to the payment of subsistence allowance over the provisions of the Model Standing Orders." * 16. We have every good reason to accept the said view. It is plain from the very language of Section 10-A(3) that the words provisions of such other law necessarily refer to the law other than one covered by the very Act and Rules made thereunder. In this view, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Similarly, his argument that there is a practice with the respondent to make 100% subsistence allowance if inquiry is not completed within 180 days, and as such the appellants are also entitled accordingly cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision contained in Section 10-A of the Act. In view of submissions made by both learned counsels that the revisional authority may be directed to dispose of the revision petitions pending before the Industrial Tribunal within the given time-frame and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we also think it just and appropriate to direct the Industrial Tribunal, Thane, to dispose of the revisions pending before it within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is open to both the parties to urge all the contentions available to them including that there is no need to continue the stay order at this length of time and that no prejudice will be caused to appellants when they have already disclosed their defence in the domestic inquiry.17. The learned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that in the event we hold against the respondent and reverse the impugned order, the payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% may be ordered prospectively. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the view we have taken, it is not possible to accept the request made on behalf of the respondent that payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% may be ordered prospectively. In view of the interpretation we have placed on Section 10-A(1)(b) in regard to delay and answered the question in the negative, the impugned order does call for interference. For what is stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained. We set aside the same and hold that the appellants are entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate of 75%.18.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In our view, therefore, the provisions of Section 10-A supervene in relation to the payment of subsistence allowance over the provisions of the Model Standing Orders." *We have every good reason to accept the said view. It is plain from the very language of Section 10-A(3) that the words provisions of such other law necessarily refer to the law other than one covered by the very Act and Rules made thereunder. In this view, we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Similarly, his argument that there is a practice with the respondent to make 100% subsistence allowance if inquiry is not completed within 180 days, and as such the appellants are also entitled accordingly cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision contained in Section 10-A of the Act. In view of submissions made by both learned counsels that the revisional authority may be directed to dispose of the revision petitions pending before the Industrial Tribunal within the given time-frame and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we also think it just and appropriate to direct the Industrial Tribunal, Thane, to dispose of the revisions pending before it within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is open to both the parties to urge all the contentions available to them including that there is no need to continue the stay order at this length of time and that no prejudice will be caused to appellants when they have already disclosed their defence in the domesticlearned senior counsel for the respondent submitted that in the event we hold against the respondent and reverse the impugned order, the payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% may be ordered prospectively. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the view we have taken, it is not possible to accept the request made on behalf of the respondent that payment of subsistence allowance at the rate of 75% may be ordered prospectively. In view of the interpretation we have placed on Section 10-A(1)(b) in regard to delay and answered the question in the negative, the impugned order does call for interference. For what is stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained. We set aside the same and hold that the appellants are entitled to subsistence allowance at the rate of 75%.