Case: Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd Vs. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan

No.14 of 1947, and it was held by Bhargava J., that an industrial dispute could come into existence even if the parties thereto were only the employer and a single employee and that the reference and the award were, inconsequence, valid. A similar decision was given by a. Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal inSwadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen,1953-1 Lab LJ 757 (F). (III) A dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. That was held by Bose J., inBilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie and Co Ltd.,A I R 1953 Cal 613 (G), by Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad J J. inNew India Assurance Co. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal.A I R 1953 Pat 321 : 32 Pat 181 (H), and by Balakrishna Ayyar J. inLakshmi Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami,1955-2 Lab L J 477 (1), and by the Industrial Tribunal inGordon Woodroffe and Co. (Madras) Ltd. v. Appa Rao1955-2 Lab L J 541 (J) andLynns and Co. v. Hemanta Kumar Samanta,1956-2 Lab L J 89 (K). 9. The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it. Notwithstanding that the language of S. 2 (k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme, of the Industrial Disputes Act does appeal to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. If that were the correct position, the respondent was not entitled to apply under S. 16 (2) of the Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted his dispute p73 as their own and chosen to treat it as theircasus belliwith the company. But then, we are directly concerned in this appeal not with the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 but with the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No.23 of 1947, and in the view which we take of the rights of the respondent under that statute, there is no need to express a final opinion on the question whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman would be an industrial dispute within S. 2 (k) of Act No. 14 of 1947. 10. Now, the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No. 23 of 1947 with which we are concerned, is not inpari materiawith Act No. 14 of 1947. It no doubt covers the ground occupied by that Act, and contains provisions relating to arbitration, adjudication awards, strikes and lockouts. But it contains more. It enacts in Ch.1V provisions, which are intended to regulate the contract of employment between employer and workmen, a subject which is covered by a distinct piece of central legislation, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act No. 20 of 1946. The object of that Act was, as appears from the preamble thereto, "to require employers in industrial establishments formally to define conditions of employment under them", where as the object of the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 is as set out in its preamble, "to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes". Thus, even though the two enactments are pieces of what is termed labour legislation, their objects and their vision are different. While Act No. 14 of 1947, may be said to be primarily concerned with disputes of labour as a class, Act No.20 of 1946 is directed to getting the rights of an employee under a contract defined.Now, as the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No.23 of 1947 covers the ground occupied by both Act No.20 of 1946 and Act No.14 of 1947, it would be proper to interpret the expression "industrial dispute" therein in a sense wider than what it bears in Act no. 14 of 1947 so as to cover not only disputes of workmen as a class but also their individual disputes.And this view receives considerable support from other provisions of the Act. Section 41 enacts that an application under that section can be made either by an employee or employees concerned or by a representative of the employees concerned. Section 2 (24) defines "representative of employees" as meaning a union or where there is no union, persons elected by the employees not exceeding five. Thus, there is a clear recognition of the rights of an individual employee as distinguished from a class of employees, to move for redress. It is argued by Mr. Umrigar that this recognition is only for the purpose of S. 41 and that no inference can be drawn therefrom that the employee has a similar right to apply under S. 16 (2). But the importance of S. 41 consists in this that it indicates that the Act has in contemplation the enforcement of individual rights of workmen also. Then we have S. 53, which runs as follows:"Save with the permission of the authority holding any proceeding under this act, no employee shall be allowed to appear in such proceeding except through the representative of employees: Provided that where only a single employee is concerned he may appear personally". This section again recognises the rights of employees to agitate their individual rights under the provisions of the Act.Section l6 is intended, in our opinion, to enable an employee to enforce his individual rights when there is an order of dismissal, discharge p73 or removal or suspension, and in the context, "industrial dispute" must be interpreted as including the claim of an employee who has been dismissed, for reinstatement and compensation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is not disputed that a question of reinstatement is an industrial matter as defined in S. 2 (13) of the ActWe do not see any force in either of these contentions. Section 2 (12) and S. 2 (13) of the Act are substantially inpari materiawith S. 2 (k) of Act No. 14 of 1947, and the ratio of the decision in 1949 F C R 321: A I R 1949 F C 111 (A), will be as much applicable to the one enactment as to the other. Nor does it make any difference that there were comprised in the reference other items which fell within the definition under S. 2 (k), because if the Government had no jurisdiction under the Act to refer the question of reinstatement of dismissed employee for adjudication, then the reference must, to that extent, be treated as a nullity, and it would be immaterial that, it wasintra viresas regards the other items of dispute6. We are also unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the inclusive clause in S. 2 (10) of the Act is an indication that the legislature did not intend to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service. In our opinion that clause was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall within S. 2 (10), and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that definition. On the other hand S. 16 of the Act expressly provides for relief being granted to dismissed employees by way of reinstatement and compensation, and that provision must become useless and inoperative, if we are to adopt the construction which the appellant seeks to put on the definition of employee in S. 2 (10).We must accordingly hold agreeing with the decision in 1949 F C R 321: A I R 1949 F C 111(A), that the definition of "employee" in the act would include one who has been dismissed and the respondent cannot be denied relief only by reason of the fact that he was not in employment on the date of the application9. The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it. Notwithstanding that the language of S. 2 (k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme, of the Industrial Disputes Act does appeal to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. If that were the correct position, the respondent was not entitled to apply under S. 16 (2) of the Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted his dispute p73 as their own and chosen to treat it as theircasus belliwith the company. But then, we are directly concerned in this appeal not with the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 but with the C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act No.23 of 1947, and in the view which we take of the rights of the respondent under that statute, there is no need to express a final opinion on the question whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman would be an industrial dispute within S. 2 (k) of Act No. 14 of 1947Thus, there is a clear recognition of the rights of an individual employee as distinguished from a class of employees, to move for redressSection l6 is intended, in our opinion, to enable an employee to enforce his individual rights when there is an order of dismissal, discharge p73 or removal or suspension, and in the context, "industrial dispute" must be interpreted as including the claim of an employee who has been dismissed, for reinstatement and compensation.