Case: INDERJIT SINGH SODHI AND OTHERS Vs. THE CHAIRMAN, PUNJAB STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ANOTHER

deemed to have been appointed by direct recruitment. This legal fiction is limited. It is applicable only to those employees who have been promoted in conformity with the provisions contained in Clause 4. Thus, the employees who had passed both Parts (A) and (B) of the AMIE examination and were promoted against 9% posts reserved for that class were fictionally treated as direct recruits. Thus, it clearly stipulates that only those Assistant Engineers who were either directly recruited or had acquired the requisite qualifications prescribed for direct recruitment were chosen to be granted higher scale if they had been promoted against the post falling within the quota of 9% of the cadre strength of the said post. 23. The 1990 Order contemplates that it is to be followed as per regulation which provides that only such persons as have been promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10(4) shall be treated as direct recruits. In other words, it does not apply to the promotees irrespective of their academic qualifications nor can they be treated on a par with the direct recruits. There was a purpose for treating them so, otherwise, it would have the effect of violating the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, on the premise that unequals have been treated as equals. It is with that intention, to avoid criticism and future litigation that such persons who possessed qualifications for direct recruitment and could be promoted against the posts falling vacant, would become entitled to claim the benefit. Since Respondent 1 did not fall in this category, obviously, he was not entitled to the higher scale. 24. Thus, there appears to be no illegality committed by the Board in rejecting Respondent 1s representation. So, in our considered opinion, the High Court has clearly erred in setting aside and quashing the same. 25. The critical examination of the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court completely defeats primary purpose of the 1990 Order and provisions applicable to the employees of the Board. No doubt, it is true that the 1990 Order was issued only with an intention to remove the stagnation but this would not give blanket or absolute right to any employee to be entitled to higher pay scale even if he does not fulfil prerequisite qualifications for holding the higher post. In other words, if he possesses the required qualifications but is unable to get the higher post on account of non-availability of such post, then only he can be categorised as suffering from stagnation as per Order of 23-4-1990. 19. The First and Second Circulars of the Punjab State Electricity Board were examined by this Court, wherein, it was observed that the Second Circular is applicable only in respect of employees appointed by way of direct recruitment. The benefit would not be extended to the promoted employees. This Court found that the legal fiction is limited in respect of the employees promoted under Regulation 7(a)(i) read with Regulation 10(4). It is applicable to only those employees who have been promoted in conformity with the provisions contained in Clause 4 of the Regulation 10 of the Regulations which deal with promotion of the employees who have passed both parts (A) and (B) of A.M.I.E. Examination and were promoted against 9% posts reserved for that Class of direct recruitment. 20. Shri Krishan Kumar Vij, in the reported judgment, was not possessing A.M.I.E. qualification and thus was never appointed in terms of Regulation 7(a)(i) read with Regulation 10.4 of the Regulations. In the present appeals, there is no assertion that any of the appellants have qualified both parts of A.M.I.E. Examination which is treated to be equivalent to the Engineering Degree. The appellants being only Diploma holders were promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10.4 of the Regulations. They had the opportunity to compete for direct recruitment after 12 years of service, which they never availed or remained unsuccessful. The appellants would have been entitled to claim parity with Kripal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg only if they were qualified and promoted against the posts reserved for those employees by direct recruitment. Consequently, the appellants cannot claim time bound promotion after completion of 9/16 years at par with Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg. 21. The claim of the appellants of discrimination and arbitrariness on the basis of time bound promotional scale granted to Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg is not found to be sustainable. It has been categorically admitted by the appellants that the said persons were appointed by way of direct recruitment under Regulation 7(a)(i) as provided under Regulation 9 of the Regulations. The appellants, on the contrary, have been promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in their term as per their seniority in the cadre of Junior Engineer. Thus, Second Circular which would be applicable to Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg would not apply to the appellants as they are instead covered by the First Circular. 22. In terms of the First and Second Circulars, the employees of the Board who have not earned promotion within 9 years from their initial recruitment are entitled to time bound promotional scale. If they have been promoted within the initial 9 years, the next promotion cannot be granted to them after completion of 3 years. 23. Therefore, the High Court in the impugned judgment was correct in law holding that in view of the judgment in Krishan Kumar Vij, the appellants are not entitled to time bound promotional scale on the basis of parity in the other cases. 24. The argument that the appellants are entitled to promotion scale after 23 years was not the case setup either in the writ petition or even in the present appeals. Such an argument has in fact been raised for the first time in the written submissions. We find that such a factual argument cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]16. We do not find any merit in the argument raised by Mr. Patwalia. The claim of the appellants was based upon the First Circular for 9/16 years time bound promotion scale though the appellants have referred to the Second Circular in para 18 of the writ petition. The Second Circular was not even annexed with the writ petition, however the same has been annexed by two other appellants Surinder Kumar Pathak and R.K. Arora. There is no challenge to the legality and validity of the Second Circular. Still further, the appellants have never claimed that there should be equal pay being members of the same cadre. The claim of the appellants was for time bound promotional scale after completion of 9-16 years service only at par with Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg.17. We find that the appellants were promoted within 9 or 16 years from their initial appointment, therefore, they are not entitled to time bound promotional scale. Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg were appointed by direct recruitment as Assistant Engineer (Civil), whereas the appellants have been promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil). Hence, the Second Circular would not be applicable to them. The promotee employees are entitled to time bound promotion scale in terms of the First Circular only. Hence, the appellants are not entitled to claim any parity with Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg.18. We find that some other employees have been granted benefit by virtue of the orders passed by the High Court. However, the principle laid down in the aforesaid judgments run counter to the subsequent judgment of this Court in Krishan Kumar Vij. The Special Leave Petition in many of these cases were dismissed but the such dismissals would not be a binding precedent for this Court. This argument was also raised and examined in Krishan Kumar Vij wherein this Court relied upon the judgment of this Court reported as Kunhayammed & Ors v. State Of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 .   Therefore, the dismissal of special leave petitions is of no consequence on the question of law. The following was held in Krishan Kumar Vij:22. We have already mentioned hereinabove with regard to Clause 2 of the 1990 Order read with Regulation 9 which restricts the benefit only to directly recruited Assistant Engineers/Assistant Executive Engineers, meaning thereby that one must possess the requisite qualification as prescribed under the Regulations, then only the benefit would accrue to the employee, not otherwise. The Note appended thereto clearly stipulates that even those employees who were promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10(4) shall be deemed to have been appointed by direct recruitment. This legal fiction is limited. It is applicable only to those employees who have been promoted in conformity with the provisions contained in Clause 4. Thus, the employees who had passed both Parts (A) and (B) of the AMIE examination and were promoted against 9% posts reserved for that class were fictionally treated as direct recruits. Thus, it clearly stipulates that only those Assistant Engineers who were either directly recruited or had acquired the requisite qualifications prescribed for direct recruitment were chosen to be granted higher scale if they had been promoted against the post falling within the quota of 9% of the cadre strength of the said post.23. The 1990 Order contemplates that it is to be followed as per regulation which provides that only such persons as have been promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10(4) shall be treated as direct recruits. In other words, it does not apply to the promotees irrespective of their academic qualifications nor can they be treated on a par with the direct recruits. There was a purpose for treating them so, otherwise, it would have the effect of violating the constitutional mandate contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, on the premise that unequals have been treated as equals. It is with that intention, to avoid criticism and future litigation that such persons who possessed qualifications for direct recruitment and could be promoted against the posts falling vacant, would become entitled to claim the benefit. Since Respondent 1 did not fall in this category, obviously, he was not entitled to the higher scale.24. Thus, there appears to be no illegality committed by the Board in rejecting Respondent 1s representation. So, in our considered opinion, the High Court has clearly erred in setting aside and quashing the same.25. The critical examination of the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court completely defeats primary purpose of the 1990 Order and provisions applicable to the employees of the Board. No doubt, it is true that the 1990 Order was issued only with an intention to remove the stagnation but this would not give blanket or absolute right to any employee to be entitled to higher pay scale even if he does not fulfil prerequisite qualifications for holding the higher post. In other words, if he possesses the required qualifications but is unable to get the higher post on account of non-availability of such post, then only he can be categorised as suffering from stagnation as per Order of 23-4-1990.19. The First and Second Circulars of the Punjab State Electricity Board were examined by this Court, wherein, it was observed that the Second Circular is applicable only in respect of employees appointed by way of direct recruitment. The benefit would not be extended to the promoted employees. This Court found that the legal fiction is limited in respect of the employees promoted under Regulation 7(a)(i) read with Regulation 10(4). It is applicable to only those employees who have been promoted in conformity with the provisions contained in Clause 4 of the Regulation 10 of the Regulations which deal with promotion of the employees who have passed both parts (A) and (B) of A.M.I.E. Examination and were promoted against 9% posts reserved for that Class of direct recruitment.20. Shri Krishan Kumar Vij, in the reported judgment, was not possessing A.M.I.E. qualification and thus was never appointed in terms of Regulation 7(a)(i) read with Regulation 10.4 of the Regulations. In the present appeals, there is no assertion that any of the appellants have qualified both parts of A.M.I.E. Examination which is treated to be equivalent to the Engineering Degree. The appellants being only Diploma holders were promoted under Regulation 7(a)(ii) read with Regulation 10.4 of the Regulations. They had the opportunity to compete for direct recruitment after 12 years of service, which they never availed or remained unsuccessful. The appellants would have been entitled to claim parity with Kripal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg only if they were qualified and promoted against the posts reserved for those employees by direct recruitment. Consequently, the appellants cannot claim time bound promotion after completion of 9/16 years at par with Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg.21. The claim of the appellants of discrimination and arbitrariness on the basis of time bound promotional scale granted to Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg is not found to be sustainable. It has been categorically admitted by the appellants that the said persons were appointed by way of direct recruitment under Regulation 7(a)(i) as provided under Regulation 9 of the Regulations. The appellants, on the contrary, have been promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer in their term as per their seniority in the cadre of Junior Engineer. Thus, Second Circular which would be applicable to Kirpal Singh Mangat and Raj Kumar Garg would not apply to the appellants as they are instead covered by the First Circular.22. In terms of the First and Second Circulars, the employees of the Board who have not earned promotion within 9 years from their initial recruitment are entitled to time bound promotional scale. If they have been promoted within the initial 9 years, the next promotion cannot be granted to them after completion of 3 years.23. Therefore, the High Court in the impugned judgment was correct in law holding that in view of the judgment in Krishan Kumar Vij, the appellants are not entitled to time bound promotional scale on the basis of parity in the other cases.24. The argument that the appellants are entitled to promotion scale after 23 years was not the case setup either in the writ petition or even in the present appeals. Such an argument has in fact been raised for the first time in the written submissions. We find that such a factual argument cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage.