Case: State Of H.P Vs. Ashwani Kumar

as he may deem fit and select the land for him in the manner specified in sub-section (1) of section 8.(3) If such person fails to furnish the declaration, the provisions of (Section 9) shall apply.(4) The excess land of such person shall be at the disposal of the State Government for utilization as surplus area under section 15 or for such other purpose as the State Government may by notification direct.Explanation:- In the case of family, the return may be furnished by any adult member of the family and in the case of the sole minor by his guardian:Provided that the Collector shall, before determining the surplus area, give to all the members of the family an opportunity of being heard.” 17. The aforesaid provision makes it clear that when any person/landowner acquires or succeeds land which is in excess of permissible area after the commencement of the Act, such land holder has to file separate return to the Collector as per Rule 16 of the Himachal Pradesh Ceiling on Land Holdings Rules, 1972. 18. The High Court passed the impugned order based on the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court in Rajkumar Rajindra Singh vs. Union of India, ILR 1976 HP 453. The Division Bench of the High Court quoted some of the paragraphs of Full Bench decision. In order to appreciate the impugned order, we shall quote paragraphs nos. 17, 18 and 19 of the impugned judgment as under:- “17. In Rajkumar Rajinder Singh’s case (supra), Full Bench of this Court in Paragraph-8 has held as under:-“………….It is the permissible area in the case of a person or a family. And it is the permissible area in respect of the landholding of such person or family. It is the landholding of such person or family alone which forms the subject-matter of Section 4, and the several sub-sections lay down the principles for the mathematical computation of the permissible area in respect of such landholding.Section 4 is not concerned with the landholding of any other person or family nor with the transfer of the rights of one landholder in favour of another.18. In Paragraph 24, the Full Bench has held that no doubt that sub-section (6) of Section 4 contemplates where a person is a member of family, the land held by such family together with the land held by all the members of the family shall be taken into account for the purposes of calculating the permissible area, that question can arise only in relation to a family, the provision is concerned only with the mathematical computation of the permissible area.19. In paragraph- 19, the Full Bench has held:-The petitioners say that while a husband and the children have the right to hold land a wife has been deprived of such right. There is nothing in the Act which can lead to that conclusion. A family, consisting of husband, wife and children has been recognised as a unit for the determination of the permissible area, and the land holding of the family as such is treated for that purpose. If a wife holds land separately in her own right, she is entitled to be treated as an individual person for the purposes of determining the permissible area available to her.” 19. From perusal of the aforementioned paragraphs of the Full Bench judgment, it appears that the High Court has completely departed from the plain language used in Section 4 of the said Act. The High Court has committed serious error of law in holding that if a wife holds land separately in her own right, she is entitled to be treated as an individual person for the purpose of determining the permissible area available to her. We are of the definite opinion that the Full Bench has not rightly interpreted the provisions of the Act. 20. The submission made by learned counsel appearing for the respondents that the impugned judgment needs no interference on the principle of stare decisis cannot be accepted. The decision relied upon by the respondents in the case of Gajnan (supra), this Court held that to maintain certainty in the judicial decision the court should refrain from interfering with such decision which stood for a long period. However, this Court has clearly laid down that this principle will be applicable “where the meaning of a statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretations than one”. 21. This Court in Indra Sawhney and others vs. Union of India and others, etc. AIR (1993) SC 477 , in paragraph 26-A of the Judgment, considered the principle of stare decisis and observed that in the law certainty, consistency and continuity are highly desirable features. Where a decision has stood the test of time and has never been doubted, we have respected it unless, of course, there are compelling and strong reasons to depart from it. 22. We make it clear that to maintain certainty in the judicial decision, we have to restrain from interfering with the decision of the High Court which has stood for a long period on the principle of stare decisis. However, the said principle will be applicable where the meaning of the Statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretation than one. In the instant case, the provision of the Act/Statute is very clear and, therefore, principle of stare decisis is of no help to the respondents.23. Apart from that it appears that the instant case arose out of certain proceedings initiated as far back as in 1974, and travelled up to this Court. The Full Bench judgment came only in the year 1976 and, therefore, in our considered opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis should not apply in the facts of the present case.24. Considering the entire facts of the case and the relevant provisions of the Act, we are of the definite opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is contrary to law, facts on record, and the findings recorded therein cannot be sustained.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]22. We make it clear that to maintain certainty in the judicial decision, we have to restrain from interfering with the decision of the High Court which has stood for a long period on the principle of stare decisis. However, the said principle will be applicable where the meaning of the Statute is ambiguous and capable of more interpretation than one. In the instant case, the provision of the Act/Statute is very clear and, therefore, principle of stare decisis is of no help to the respondents.23. Apart from that it appears that the instant case arose out of certain proceedings initiated as far back as in 1974, and travelled up to this Court. The Full Bench judgment came only in the year 1976 and, therefore, in our considered opinion, the doctrine of stare decisis should not apply in the facts of the present case.24. Considering the entire facts of the case and the relevant provisions of the Act, we are of the definite opinion that the impugned judgment passed by the High Court is contrary to law, facts on record, and the findings recorded therein cannot be sustained.