Case: Sahu Minerals &amp; Properties Ltd Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court &amp; Ors

to be" in that clause, and that clearly is not permissible. Besides, it seems to us that if the appellants construction is accepted it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the workman to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-section (2), because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workmans application. The claim under Section 33-C (2) clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may in some cases have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2). As Maxwell has observed "where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution(1)". We must accordingly hold that Section 33-C (2) takes within its purview cases of work men who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by their employers. Incidentally, it may be relevant to add that it would be somewhat odd that under sub-section (3), the Labour Court should have been authorised to delegate the work of computing the money value of the benefit to the Commissioner if the determination of the said question was the only task assigned to the Labour Court under sub-section (2). On the other hand sub-section (3) becomes intelligible if it is held that what can be assigned to the Commissioner includes only a part of the assignment of the Labour Court under sub-section (2)."(1) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 350.Furtheron this Court observed:"It is thus clear that claim made under Section 33-C (1), by itself can be only claim referable to the settlement, award, or the relevant provisions of Chapter V-A. These words of limitations are not to be found in Section 33-C (2) and to that extent, the scope of S. 33-C (2) is undoubtedly wider than that of Section 33-C (1) ........... It is unnecessary in the present appeals either to state exhaustively or even to indicate broadly what other categories of claims can fall under Section 33-C (2). There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Section 33 C (1) fall under Section 33 C (2) and in that sense. Section 33-C (2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceeding, but it is possible that claims not based on settlements, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter V-A, may also be competent under Section 33-C (2) and that may illustrate its wider scope."This Court then went on to discuss some of the claims which would not fall under Section 33-C (2) which is not very relevant for the purposes of this case. The present case stands on an even stronger footing. Even the employer does not dispute that the workmen are entitled to compensation. It only says that the compensation should be calculated on a particular basis different from the basis on which the workmen claim. The claim also falls under Chapter V-A.5. In the decision in South Arcot Elect. Co. v. N. K. Khan, (1969) 2 SCR 902 where a right had been claimed by the various workmen in their applications under Section 33-C (2), it was held that it was a right which accrued to them under Section 25-FF at the Act and was an existing right at the time when these applications were made, that the Labour Court clearly had jurisdiction to decide whether such a right did or did not exist when dealing with the application under that provision, and that the mere denial of that right by the company could not take away its jurisdiction.6. We hold that in this case it was competent to the Labour Court to decide whether the case before it was a case of retrenchment compensation or the proviso to sub-section (1) it of Section 25-FFF was attracted on closure of the establishment. The question even according to the employer falls under Section 25-FFF and therefore in deciding that question the Labour Court has necessarily to decide whether the proviso has been satisfied.7. We do not consider that the reference to Item No. 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act can decide the matter one way or the other. The item reads as follows:"10. Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment."It does not say that all questions arising out of retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishments have to be decided by Industrial Tribunal. Logically if the contention is to be accepted, even if the question of retrenchment is not disputed the Labour Court will not be competent to decide the question of compensation payable in a case of retrenchment because it raises a question of jurisdiction.This entry should therefore be held to refer to cases where the right to retrench workers or to close an establishment is disputed and that question is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. In that case the Tribunal will be competent to decide whether the closure or retrenchment was justified and whether the retrenched workmen should be reinstated or the workers in the establishment purported to have been closed should be continued to be paid on the basis that the so called closure was no closure at all. In the present case the workmen do not ask for reinstatement. They accept the termination of their services and ask for compensation. The only dispute is about the compensation whether it is to be paid under Sections 25-F or 25-FFF. Item 10 of Third Schedule will not cover such a case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We, therefore, do not see how the decision in the U. P. Electric Companys case (supra) can come to the aid of the appellant in this case. The said case is clearly distinguishable on the peculiar facts as noticed above.We hold that in this case it was competent to the Labour Court to decide whether the case before it was a case of retrenchment compensation or the proviso to sub-section (1) it of Section 25-FFF was attracted on closure of the establishment. The question even according to the employer falls under Section 25-FFF and therefore in deciding that question the Labour Court has necessarily to decide whether the proviso has been satisfied.7. We do not consider that the reference to Item No. 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act can decide the matter one way or thedoes not say that all questions arising out of retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishments have to be decided by Industrial Tribunal. Logically if the contention is to be accepted, even if the question of retrenchment is not disputed the Labour Court will not be competent to decide the question of compensation payable in a case of retrenchment because it raises a question of jurisdiction.This entry should therefore be held to refer to cases where the right to retrench workers or to close an establishment is disputed and that question is referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. In that case the Tribunal will be competent to decide whether the closure or retrenchment was justified and whether the retrenched workmen should be reinstated or the workers in the establishment purported to have been closed should be continued to be paid on the basis that the so called closure was no closure at all. In the present case the workmen do not ask for reinstatement. They accept the termination of their services and ask for compensation. The only dispute is about the compensation whether it is to be paid under Sections 25-F or 25-FFF. Item 10 of Third Schedule will not cover such a case.