Case: State of Bombay Vs. Bhanji Munji &amp; Another

informers by giving them the vacancies they were instrumental in discovering. This, it was hoped, would show landlords and tenants that suppression did not pay and so they might as well obey the law, and that in turn, would enable Government to benefit the only privileged class of persons it had any real intention of benefiting, namely its own officers and servants. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that when the decision about suppressed vacancies and first informers was made in 1947, and again when the Bombay Land Requisition Act was passed in 1948, there was no. need for a public purpose. So runs the argument16. Another argument was that in the affidavit in reply the State of Bombay says that the purpose of the legislation was to effect an equitable distribution."The policy of the Government was that having regard to the fact that but for such intimation a vacancy would not have come to light at all, it was fair and just and conducive to an equitable distribution of accommodation that the premises should be allotted to the first informant provided he genuinely needs accommodation."It was contended, and the contention prevailed in the High Court, that a decision to set apart a section of the much needed vacancies for the use of spies and informers as a reward for their services, whether their need was as great as that of other houseless persons or not, was not equitable, and as the purpose of the legislation was said to be the equitable distribution of vacant accommodation this fell outside its scope.17. In our opinion, this is not a proper approach to the problem. The Constitution authorises requisitions for a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless. If therefore a vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact houseless, the purpose is fulfilled. It might be possible to attack a given allotment on other grounds, such as fraud, invidious discrimination, nepotism, bribery or corruption, but none of that is alleged here. All that is said is that there was no. public purpose.18. A wide discretion must be left to Government to carry out the policy of the Act. If the number of vacancies is small and the number of the homeless large, it is evident that there must be some picking and choosing. So long as this is done on broad lines of principle and reasonably, the Courts cannot interfere simply because other methods are also possible, even if the Courts think they are better, for in the end Government must be left to determine which of many possible schemes is the best. Government had to weigh many conflicting factors : the urgency of the situation, the need of reasonable dispatch, the expenditure of public funds which would be inevitable on long and protracted enquiries about the private affairs of thousands of applicants for accommodation, the maintenance of public morale by ensuring that the honest landlord who did his duty did not suffer as against the dishonest person who suppressed his vacancies and m ade large and illicit profits under his "puggree"; and in addition the equitable maxim that "equity helps the vigilant". We hold that neithar the order of requisition nor the order of allotment in Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and 146 of 1952 is ultra vires.19. In Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1951 a further question arises. Under the Act only premises (to which a special meanings is given, within the meaning of Section 4 (3) can be requisitioned. It was urged that the premises in this case were not premises within the meaning of that definition, so it was said they could not be requisitioned. The question turns on whether the premises were "let" or "intended to be let". The learned trial Judge threw the burden of proof on the State Government and told its learned counsel that he should proceed to prove this fact if he so desired. He replied that he did not intend to lead any evidence.It was explained to us that Government took up this attitude as it wanted a decision about where the burden lay as the question arises continually and cannot be decided when both parties adduce evidence. The learned Attorney General gave an assurance that the possession of the petitioners in this case would not be disturbed; all he wanted was a decision on the point. In the absence of any counter evidence the learned trial Judge accepted the facts proved by the petitioners affidavit and decided the matter in their favour.20. On appeal the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court and Bhagwati, J. upheld the view of the learned trial Judge Tendolkar, J. In our opinion, the burdan was wrongly placed. The petitioners came to Court with the allegation that Government had passed an illegal order against them. On the face of it, the order is not illegal. Government has authority under the law to make such orders, and prima facie the order complies with the provisions of the statute. It was therefore the duty of the petitioners to show that the order was illegal. This is particularly so here as the question whether the petitioners has let or had intended to let the building or a part of it was a matter on which they had special means of knowledge. However, in view of the learned Attorney-Generals assurance there is no. need to go into this matter any further. This appeal will accordingly be dismissed because of the assurance given and here will be no. order about costs thought.21. In Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1952, the order of requisition was under Section 5(1) but the same questions arise. As in the other two cases, no. public purpose is mentioned and, as before, a second order setting out the purpose, housing a person without accommodation, was made in August 1951. For the reasons already given, we hold that there was a public purpose and that the orders here were valid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]6. In our opinion, Article 19(1) (f) does not apply to them.of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92  (A) andDwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC l19 (B), the majority of the Judges were agreed that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 deal with different subjects and cover different fields. There was some disagreement about the nature and scope of the difference but all were agreed that there was no. overlapping. We need not examine those differences here because it is enough to say that Article 19(1)(f) read with Clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and over which rights can be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Clause (5) could not be brought into play. If there is no. property which can be acquired held or disposed of, no. restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of it, and as Clause (5) contemplates the placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights it must follow that the Article postulates the existence of property over which these rights can be exercised.Inthe present case, the right to occupy the premises has gone as also the right to transfer, assign, let orWhat is left is but the mere husk of title in the leasehold interest : a forlorn hope that the force of this law will somehow expend itself before the lease runspresent Chief Justice (mahajan, J. as he then was) pointed out inState of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252  at p. 274 (D), that"It is unnecessary to state in express terms in the statute itself the precise purpose for, which property is being taken, provided from the whole tenor and intendment of the Act it could be gathered that the property was being acquired either for purposes of the State or for purposes of the public and that the intention was to benefit the community at large".Following that decision we hold that the Act is not invalid for this reason.In our opinion, it is not necessary to set out the purpose of the requisition in the order. The desirability of such a course is obvious because when it is not done proof of the purpose must be given in other ways and that exposes the authorities to the kind of charges we find here and to the danger that the Courts will consider them well founded. But in itself an omission to set out the purpose in the order is not fatal so long as the facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court in some other way. The underlying principle of our decision inBiswabhusan Naik v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 359  (E), applieswas contended, and the contention prevailed in the High Court, that a decision to set apart a section of the much needed vacancies for the use of spies and informers as a reward for their services, whether their need was as great as that of other houseless persons or not, was not equitable, and as the purpose of the legislation was said to be the equitable distribution of vacant accommodation this fell outside its scope.17. In our opinion, this is not a proper approach to the problem. The Constitution authorises requisitions for a public purpose. The purpose here is finding accommodation for the homeless. If therefore a vacancy is allotted to a person who is in fact houseless, the purpose is fulfilled. It might be possible to attack a given allotment on other grounds, such as fraud, invidious discrimination, nepotism, bribery or corruption, but none of that is alleged here. All that is said is that there was no. public purpose.18. A wide discretion must be left to Government to carry out the policy of the Act. If the number of vacancies is small and the number of the homeless large, it is evident that there must be some picking and choosing. So long as this is done on broad lines of principle and reasonably, the Courts cannot interfere simply because other methods are also possible, even if the Courts think they are better, for in the end Government must be left to determine which of many possible schemes is the best. Government had to weigh many conflicting factors : the urgency of the situation, the need of reasonable dispatch, the expenditure of public funds which would be inevitable on long and protracted enquiries about the private affairs of thousands of applicants for accommodation, the maintenance of public morale by ensuring that the honest landlord who did his duty did not suffer as against the dishonest person who suppressed his vacancies and m ade large and illicit profits under his "puggree"; and in addition the equitable maxim that "equity helps the vigilant". We hold that neithar the order of requisition nor the order of allotment in Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and 146 of 1952 is ultra vires.On appeal the learned Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court and Bhagwati, J. upheld the view of the learned trial Judge Tendolkar, J. In our opinion, the burdan was wrongly placed. The petitioners came to Court with the allegation that Government had passed an illegal order against them. On the face of it, the order is not illegal. Government has authority under the law to make such orders, and prima facie the order complies with the provisions of the statute. It was therefore the duty of the petitioners to show that the order was illegal. This is particularly so here as the question whether the petitioners has let or had intended to let the building or a part of it was a matter on which they had special means of knowledge. However, in view of the learnedassurance there is no. need to go into this matter any further. This appeal will accordingly be dismissed because of the assurance given and here will be no. order about costs thought.21. In Civil Appeal No. 147 of 1952, the order of requisition was under Section 5(1) but the same questions arise. As in the other two cases, no. public purpose is mentioned and, as before, a second order setting out the purpose, housing a person without accommodation, was made in August 1951. For the reasons already given, we hold that there was a public purpose and that the orders here were valid.