Case: Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha &amp; Others Vs. Manhabala Jeram Damodar &amp; Another

the PSCC Act. The purpose is evidently to make it more wide so as to cover gratuitous licensee as well with an object to avoid multiplicity of proceedings in different courts causing unnecessary delay, waste of money and time etc. The object is to see that all suits and proceedings between a landlord and a tenant or a licensor and a licensee for recovery of possession of premises or for recovery of rent or licence fee irrespective of the value of the subject matter should go to and be disposed of by Small Cause Court. The object behind bringing the licensor and the licencee within the purview of Section 41(1) by the 1976 Amendment was to curb any mischief of unscrupulous elements using dilatory tactics in prolonging the cases for recovery of possession instituted by the landlord/licensor and to defeat their right of approaching the Court for quick relief and to avoid multiplicity of litigation with an issue of jurisdiction thereby lingering the disputes for years and years. 48. We may in this connection also refer to the judgment of this Court in Km. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 585 , wherein this Court was concerned with the ambit of expression “transfer” and “consideration” occurring in U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. Both the expressions were not defined in the Act. In such circumstances, this Court observed that the word “transfer” has been used by the legislature in general sense of the term as defined in the Transfer of Property Act. This Court also observed that the word “transfer” being a term of well known legal significance having well ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it necessary to define the term “transfer” separately. The ratio laid down by the apex court in the above-mentioned judgment in our view is also applicable when we interpret the provisions of the PSCC Act because the object of the Act is to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. 49. The interpretation of the expressions licensor and licensee which we find in Section 41(1), in our view, is in tune with the objects and reasons reflected in the amendment of the PSCC Act by the Maharashtra Act (XIX) of 1976 which we have already extracted in the earlier part of the judgment. The objects and reasons as such may not be admissible as an aid of construction to the statute but it can be referred to for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time of introduction of the bill and the extent and urgency of the evil which was sought to be remedied. The legal position has been well settled by the judgment of this Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Anr. v. Government of Madras and Ors. AIR 1955 SC 604 . It is trite law that the statement of objects and reasons is a key to unlock the mind of legislature in relation to substantive provisions of statutes and it is also well settled that a statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. This Court in Bhaiji v. Sub Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 692 stated that the weight of the judicial authority leans in favour of the view that the statement of objects and reasons cannot be utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling statute and excluding from its operation such transactions which it plainly covers. Applying the above-mentioned principle, we cannot restrict the meaning and expression licensee occurring in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act to mean the licensee with monetary consideration as defined under Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act. ONE UMBERALLA POLICY 50. We are of the considered view that the High Court has correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expression “licensor and licensee” with “landlord and tenant” in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between the “landlord and tenant” and the “licensor and licensee” under one umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship. The act of the legislature was to bring all suits between “landlord and tenant” and “licensor and licensee” whether under the Rent Act or under the PSCC Act under one roof. We find it difficult to accept the proposition that the legislature after having conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one Court in all the suits between licensee and licensor should have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its jurisdiction. The various amendments made to Rent Act as well the Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 would clearly indicate that the intention of the legislature was to avoid unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suitor or else they have to move from the one court to the other not only on the question of jurisdiction but also getting reliefs.51. We are of the view that in such a situation the court also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act. 52. We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expression ‘licensee’ used in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expression ‘licensee’ as used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well. 53.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We find the expressionin Section 41 of the PSCC Act has been used to fully achieve the object and purpose especially of 1976 Amendment Act and legislature has used clear and plain language and the principle noscitur a sociis is inapplicable when intention is clear and unequivocal. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of a narrow significance is doubtful or otherwise not clear, the rule of Noscitur a Sociis can be applied. When the intention of the legislature in using the expressionin Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act is clear and unambiguous, the principle of Noscitur a Sociis is not to benotice in the instant case that the concept of licence and lease were dealt with by contemporary statutes - Indian Easement Act, Transfer of Property Act and Section 41 of the PSCC Act and, as already indicated, all those statutes were enacted in the year 1882. Therefore, Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act could not have been contemplated any other meaning of the termbut only the permission as contemplated by Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. The PSCC Act is a procedural law and as already indicated, the expressionused in Section 41 of the PSCC Act (as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976) relate to immovable property and Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act which defines a licence has an inseparable connection to immovable property and property law. Legislature was well aware of those contemporaneous statutes, that was the reason, why the expression licence as such has not been defined in the PSCC Act with the idea that the expression used in a contemporaneous statutes would be employed so as to interpret Section 41 of the PSCC Act. Above-mentioned principle, in our view, would apply to the instantare of the considered view that the High Court has correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expressionrd andin Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is only with a view to bring all suits between theand theunder one umberalla to avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship. The act of the legislature was to bring all suits betweenor andwhether under the Rent Act or under the PSCC Act under one roof. We find it difficult to accept the proposition that the legislature after having conferred exclusive jurisdiction in one Court in all the suits between licensee and licensor should have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous licensee alone outside its jurisdiction. The various amendments made to Rent Act as well the Objects and Reasons of the Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976 would clearly indicate that the intention of the legislature was to avoid unnecessary delay, expense and hardship to the suitor or else they have to move from the one court to the other not only on the question of jurisdiction but also getting reliefs.51. We are of the view that in such a situation the court also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easementhave elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expressionin Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expressionused in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expressionas used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expressionused in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well.