Case: D.B.BASNETT (D) THROUGH LRS Vs. THE COLLECTOR EAST DISTRICT, GANGTOK, SIKKIM &amp; ANR

be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chennai (2005) 7 SCC 627 ,wherein this Court held that: 6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. (emphasis originally supplied) In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy (2008) 15 SCC 517 , this Courtheld that: 21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300 A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed. (emphasis originally supplied)In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of U.P .& Ors. (2011) 9 SCC 354 , this Court recognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: 30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists. (emphasis originally supplied)In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596 this Court held as follows: 48. …In other words, Article 300A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300 A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation. (emphasis originally supplied)10.3. In this case, the Appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 10.4. The contention of the State that the Appellant or her predecessors had orally consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the Appellant of her property by the State. 10.5. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353 wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension. 17. There is also a discussion in the judgment on the aspect of delay and laches, which is as under: 10.7. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the Appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional Court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it (P .S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. (1975) 1 SCC 152 ). In Tukaram Kana Joshi &Ors. v. M.I.D.C. &Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 353 , this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the Appellants without any sanction of law. The Appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. (emphasis originally supplied) 18. The aforesaid legal principles do not leave the respondents with any defence in the given facts of the case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. Be that as it may, the fact remains, as noticed by the High Court, that it is not the case of the respondents that they had adverse possession, but that they had acquired the land through due process and had paid compensation for the same. We agree with the High Court that there is no plea even of adverse possession by the respondent. We are not to be detained by the same in this appeal12. We are in complete agreement with this view and for this reason also the plea of adverse possession really does not surviveNo notification has been shown to us of the intent to acquire land under Section 4, or any other declaration thereafter. In fact what is claimed before us, as also before the courts below, is that no records are available in respect of the acquisition process. This obviously puts the respondent State in a difficult situation, which was sought to be got over by only relying on a consent having been obtained for acquisition and the compensation having been paid, as determined. On the aspect of the compensation, only a covering letter is available, and not the actual receipt. We have also observed aforesaid that an unusual process of making payment in cash is claimed to have been adopted, and the amount is not an insignificant amount, if we look at the year of acquisition. We even gave a further opportunity to the authorities to show, as to from which account this compensation was withdrawn by the Collector, but it appears that there is no proof even of the withdrawal of the amount, much less payment of the compensation. The letter dated 20.3.1980 of late Man Bahadur Basnett is no doubt a no- objection to the acquisition of land, but provided compensation was paid subsequently. This letter does not obviate the need to furnish proof of the process for acquisition of land or for the determination of compensation, under the said Act. There cannot be a presumption of acquisition without following the due process as envisaged under Sections 3(1), 4(2), 5(1) and 7(2) of the said Act. The burden was on the State to prove that the process as envisaged under the said Act was followed and the compensation paid. Not an iota of evidence has been laid in support of any of these aspects, except the willingness of late Man Bahadur Basnett to permit the land to be acquired on payment of compensation, the forwarding of the amount by the Land Revenue Department to the District Collector through a cheque, and thereafter a letter from the Collector/respondent No.1 stating that some receipt was being enclosed, acknowledging the payment in cash (without a receipt being found). There is, thus, absence of both primary and secondary evidence14. We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and the provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person from the rights in property have to be strictly followed N. Padmamma & Ors. v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy &Ors. (2008) 15 SCC 517  15. It is also settled law that following the procedure of Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (akin to Section 5(1) of the said Act) is mandatory, and unless that notice is given in accordance with the provisions contained therein, the entire acquisition proceeding would be vitiated. An entry into the premises based on such non-compliance would result in the entry being unlawful Narinderjit Singh & Ranjit Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P . &Ors., Etc. (1973) 1 SCC 157  .  The law being ex-propriatory in character, the same is required to be strictly followed. The purpose of the notice is to intimate the interested persons about the intent to acquire the land. These provisions, as they read, of the said Act, thus, are also required to be so followed18. The aforesaid legal principles do not leave the respondents with any defence in the given facts of the case