Case: State Of Maharashtra  Vs. Kanchanmala Vijaysing Shirke

out insurance policy providing insurance against any liability to third parties incurred by the person using the vehicle. In this background, according to us, the courts while judging the liability of the Central or State Government or local authorities or transport undertakings, which have been exempted from the provision of sub-section (1) of Section 94, have to be more cautious, while recording a finding as to whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case the Central or the State Government or the local authority or the transport undertaking in question can be held vicariously liable for any act of its employee in the course of employment. As a result of commercial and industrial growth, even motor accidents are on steep rise. For no fault or any contributory negligence of the victims of such accidents, the families are deprived of their breadwinners. The jurisprudence of compensation for motor accidents must develop towards liberal approach, because of mounting highway accidents 17. Incidentally, it may be pointed out that in Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Chapter VII-A "liability without fault in certain cases" has been introduced (Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988). Sub-section (1) of Section 92-A provides that where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said section. Sub-section (2) specifies a fixed amount for such liability without fault. In view of sub-section (3), the claimant is not required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle. Sub-section (4) of that section says in clear and unambiguous words that a claim for compensation under sub-section (1) of that section shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made. Section 92-B clarifies that the right to claim compensation under Section 92-A in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right i.e. the right to claim compensation on principle of fault. The introduction of provisions creating liability without fault gives out that Parliament has provided for payment of compensation within certain limits, ignoring the principle of fault. When even under the law of tort, courts have held that the employer is vicariously liable for an authorised act done in an unauthorised manner taking into consideration the interest of the victims of the accident, according to us, this approach is all the more necessary while judging the liability of the owner of the vehicle under the statutory provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 18. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion, on basis of the pleadings and evidence on record, that it was the year ending day i.e. 31-3-1980 and the clerks and officers were required to work during night time. This direction had been given by Appellant 2 who was in charge of the office. It further appears that after normal working hours of the office, the employees had gone to their homes and were required to come back after taking dinner. The jeep was used for bringing such employees to the office. In this background, there is no escape from the conclusion that the jeep was being used in connection with the affairs of the State and for official purpose. The High Court has also found that the respondent who was the clerk in the office of Appellant 2 was driving the vehicle under the authority of the driver who was in charge of the said vehicle and as the driver had consumed more liquor on that day he permitted the respondent to drive the vehicle that night. The facts of the present case disclose and demonstrate that an authorised act was being done in an unauthorised manner. The accident took place when the act authorised was being performed in a mode which may not be proper but nonetheless it was directly connected with "in the course of employment" - it was not an independent act for a purpose or business which had no nexus or connection with the business of the State Government so as to absolve the appellant-State from the liability 19. The crucial test is whether the initial act of the employee was expressly authorised and lawful. The employer, as in the present case the State Government, shall nevertheless be responsible for the manner in which the employee, that is, the driver and the respondent executed the authority. This is necessary to ensure so that the injured third parties who are not directly involved or consumed with the nature of authority vested by the master to his servant are not deprived from getting compensation. If the dispute revolves around the mode or manner of execution of the authority of the master by the servant, the master cannot escape the liability so far third parties are concerned on the ground that he had not actually authorised the particular manner in which the act was done. In the present case, it has been established beyond doubt that the driver of the vehicle had been fully authorised to drive the jeep for a purpose connected with the affairs of the State and the dispute is only in respect of the manner and the mode in which the said driver performed his duties by allowing another employee of the State Government, who was also going on an official duty, to drive the jeep, when the accident took place. Once it is established that negligent act of the driver and respondent was "in the course of employment", the appellant-State shall be liable for the same

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]18. So far the facts of the present case are concerned, the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion, on basis of the pleadings and evidence on record, that it was the year ending day i.e. 31-3-1980 and the clerks and officers were required to work during night time. This direction had been given by Appellant 2 who was in charge of the office. It further appears that after normal working hours of the office, the employees had gone to their homes and were required to come back after taking dinner. The jeep was used for bringing such employees to the office. In this background, there is no escape from the conclusion that the jeep was being used in connection with the affairs of the State and for official purpose. The High Court has also found that the respondent who was the clerk in the office of Appellant 2 was driving the vehicle under the authority of the driver who was in charge of the said vehicle and as the driver had consumed more liquor on that day he permitted the respondent to drive the vehicle that night. The facts of the present case disclose and demonstrate that an authorised act was being done in an unauthorised manner. The accident took place when the act authorised was being performed in a mode which may not be proper but nonetheless it was directly connected with "in the course of employment" - it was not an independent act for a purpose or business which had no nexus or connection with the business of the State Government so as to absolve the appellant-State from the liability19. The crucial test is whether the initial act of the employee was expressly authorised and lawful. The employer, as in the present case the State Government, shall nevertheless be responsible for the manner in which the employee, that is, the driver and the respondent executed the authority. This is necessary to ensure so that the injured third parties who are not directly involved or consumed with the nature of authority vested by the master to his servant are not deprived from getting compensation. If the dispute revolves around the mode or manner of execution of the authority of the master by the servant, the master cannot escape the liability so far third parties are concerned on the ground that he had not actually authorised the particular manner in which the act was done. In the present case, it has been established beyond doubt that the driver of the vehicle had been fully authorised to drive the jeep for a purpose connected with the affairs of the State and the dispute is only in respect of the manner and the mode in which the said driver performed his duties by allowing another employee of the State Government, who was also going on an official duty, to drive the jeep, when the accident took place. Once it is established that negligent act of the driver and respondent was "in the course of employment", the appellant-State shall be liable for the