Case: Sri Dwarka Nath Tewari &amp; Ors Vs. State Of Bihar &amp; Ors

finances of the school properly. The following clause may be added after rule (f) : For reasons specified in clause (e) the Board instead of withdrawing or withholding recognition may withdraw its approval of the constitution of the managing committee and make such arrangement for the management of the school as it considers suitable peading reconstitution of the Managing Committee." * 8. It is not necessary for us to pronounce upon the controversy raised on behalf of the petitioners, founded on the Note under the original Art. 182, that the rules contained in that article did not apply to High English Schools, like the one in question. We shall proceed on the assumption that Art. 182 of the Code, as a amended, applied to the school in question. Nor have we thought it necessary to refer, in detail, to the decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Bhim Chandra Mahto v. Deputy Director of Education (Secondary), Bihar, (S) 1956 AIR(PAT) 81, because we are basing our judgment on the admissions made either in the pleadings or at the bar. 9. As already indicated, proceeding on the assumption that the land and the building of the school, are vested in the petitioners as the Managing Committee of the school, have the petitioners been divested of their rights by authority of law, under Art. 31 (1) of the Constitution ? If the amended Art. 182 of the Code, extracted above, is law within, the meaning of the article aforesaid of the Constitution, the petitioners cannot have any just complaint if they have been or are being deprived of those properties, because it is clear that the petitioners are holding the properties not in their individual absolute rights but only as trustees, for the purposes of the school. They have the properties vested in them because they are the Managing Committee. If they have been divested of those rights by the authority of law, this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution must stand dismissed. If, on the other hand, the amended Art. 182 of the Education Code, is not law within the meaning of Art. 13 of the Constitution, then the petitioners cannot be deprived of their right to hold the properties as trustees, by a mere fiat of the officials of the Government of Bihar. Though, in the affidavits sworn on behalf of the respondents, it was claimed that the provisions of the Bihar Education Code, had the force of law, it has been conceded by the learned Solicitor-General, appearing on behalf of the respondents, that he could not justify that contention. The preface to the latest edition (7th Edition) printed in 1957, of the Bihar Education Code (1944), contains the following statement by the then Director of Public Instruction, Bihar : " The Bihar Education Code is compiled in the office of the Director of Public Instruction, Bihar, and is issued under his authority. Those articles, below which no. reference to higher authority is cited, have the same authority as circular and other orders of the Director." * It is clear, therefore, from the portion of the preface extracted above, that Art. 182 of the Code has no. greater sanction than an administrative order or rule, and is not based on any statutory authority or other authority which could give it the force of law. Naturally, therefore, the learned Solicitor General, with his usual fairness, conceded that the article relied upon by the respondents as having the force of law, has no. such force, and could not, therefore, deprive the petitioners of their rights in the properties aforesaid. 10. The only other question which remains to be determined, is whether the petitioners have made out any grounds for interference by this Court with the orders passed by the respondents and impugned in this case. In para. 34 of the petition, it is stated that "The petitioners further apprehend that if charge is not given over as requested in the said letter, possession will be taken by force with the aid of the police and local executive authorities." * That this apprehension on the part of the petitioners is not a mere figment of imagination, is brought out by the following endorsement dated December 25, 1957, on the letter of that date, from the Inspector of Schools, Tirahut Division, to the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Bihar, which may better be reproduced in extenso : "From The Inspector of Schools, Tirahut Division. To The Secretary, Board of Secondary Education Bihar, Patna. Muzaffarpur, the 25th December, 1957. Sub : Appeal case of Shri Sheo Kumar Mishra Sharma. Sir, I am to refer you to letter No. 1245 dated the 22nd December 1957 from the District Inspector of Schools, Saran, regarding flouting of the Government orders by the authorities of the Parsa High School. Consequent upon this action of the Committee, it is dissolved and an ad hoc committee consisting of the following persons formed to look after the management of the school : 1. Circle Officer, Parsa President 2. Dy. Inspector of Schools, Sadar ChapraSecretary 3. Distt. Superintendent of Education, SaranMember It may be approved. Yours faithfully, Sd./. H. N. Chaudhary. Inspector of Schools, Tirahut Division. Memo. No. 4965 Muzaffarpur, the 25th December, 1957. Copy forwarded to the District Inspector of Schools, Saran, Distt. Superintendent of Education, Saran, Dy Inspector of Schools, Sadar, Chapra and Circle Officer, Parsa, for information and guidance. They are requested to see that the Govt. order is implemented. The District Inspector of Schools, Saran will please take the help of local Executive, in case of necessity. Sd./- Illegible. 2 5. 12 Inspector of Schools, Tirhut Divn." 11. The endorsement aforesaid to the District Inspector of Schools and other officers mentioned therein, shows that they were authorized by the Inspector of Schools to seek the aid of the local executive authorities in the event of the Managing Committee not making over complete charge of the School which, in the context, includes the buildings also.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The counsel for the respondents was not able to point out any allegations in their affidavits denying those allegations. It must, therefore, be taken, for the purposes of this case, that the fact is admitted on behalf of the respondents that the Managing Committee purchased the land, and constructed the building for the school on that land, and that the Committee is the proprietor of the building and the land on which the building stands. But it is a little difficult to appreciate in what way the Committee can claim to be the "owner of the School, " apart from the land and the building. We must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the petitioners are the proprietors of the land and the building of the school as trustees but certainly not as beneficial owners in the sense in which property ordinarily is owned and possessed-that was not even claimed on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled, on that assumption, to hold the land and the building of the school as trustees for the purposes of the school. It is also clear, on the affidavits, that the Education Department of the Bihar Government, purported to divert the petitioners of their character as trustees in respect of the land and the building of the schoolIf the amended Art. 182 of the Code, extracted above, is law within, the meaning of the article aforesaid of the Constitution, the petitioners cannot have any just complaint if they have been or are being deprived of those properties, because it is clear that the petitioners are holding the properties not in their individual absolute rights but only as trustees, for the purposes of the school. They have the properties vested in them because they are the Managing Committee. If they have been divested of those rights by the authority of law, this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution must stand dismissed. If, on the other hand, the amended Art. 182 of the Education Code, is not law within the meaning of Art. 13 of the Constitution, then the petitioners cannot be deprived of their right to hold the properties as trustees, by a mere fiat of the officials of the Government of BiharIt is clear, therefore, from the portion of the preface extracted above, that Art. 182 of the Code has no. greater sanction than an administrative order or rule, and is not based on any statutory authority or other authority which could give it the force of law. Naturally, therefore, the learned Solicitor General, with his usual fairness, conceded that the article relied upon by the respondents as having the force of law, has no. such force, and could not, therefore, deprive the petitioners of their rights in the properties aforesaid11. The endorsement aforesaid to the District Inspector of Schools and other officers mentioned therein, shows that they were authorized by the Inspector of Schools to seek the aid of the local executive authorities in the event of the Managing Committee not making over complete charge of the School which, in the context, includes the buildings also.