Case: M/s. Mahesh Transport Company Vs. The Transport &amp; Dock Workers Union

employers." 10. It is contended by Mr. Hardy that on the very finding of the Tribunal that the workers are the employees of two masters the reference was incompetent, because, in his submission, the concept of common employment of more than one employer is foreign to the Industrial Law, and in particular, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. As a corollary to that proposition he further contended that the reference it self under Section 10(1)(d) was incompetent. 11. We do not think that there is any substance in either of these submissions. It must be noted that the principal case put forward by the two firms before the Tribunal was that these Dock workers were not their employees at all. Their case was that they were employees of a labour contractor with whom the firms had their contract and, therefore, the workers were not the direct employees of the firms. This contention was rejected by the Tribunal as false because the evidence clearly disclosed that the workers had come under the employ of both the firms and both the firms had paid these workers bonus for the year 1966 and 1967. A common employee of the firms namely Ram Niwas Pannalal used to make the payment to the workers on behalf of both the firms in respect of the work done for both the firms. In these circumstances, it is very difficult to see how the reference between the workers, on the one hand, and the two firms, on the other, is incompetent, The workers were not interested as to whether the one firm or the other bore the total responsibility for paying for the work which they were doing. In fact, they had thought that they were the employees of only M/s. Krishna Commercial Co. But the latter shared its liability to pay the workers with a new firm of the appellants after 1-8-1965; and if the two firms agree that they have so shared the liability both would be regarded as the employers of the workmen. The workers continued to do the same work and receive the same payment without any change in their employment. The change was merely in the Constitution of the employers, In fact the workers had not even agreed by a separate contract to work for the appellants. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that on the finding of the Tribunal it should be held that this was a case of common employment. If what the two firms had done created a situation of common employment that was not of the seeking of the workers. The doctrine of common employment may, perhaps apply where the workers contract separately to serve two employers, without the latters mutual agreement. That is not the case here. As to whether the doctrine of common employment is unknown to Industrial law it is not necessary for us to decide in this case. 12. Mr. Hardy invited our attention to the judgment of a single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Rangamannar Chetty v. The Industrial Tribunal where the learned Judge seems to have been of the view that a part-time employee is not covered by the Industrial Disputes Act. For that proposition he referred to the fact that several decisions of Industrial Tribunals had taken that view. The decisions of the Industrial Tribunals, however, have not been specifically referred to or discussed in the judgment, nor has the learned Judge discussed the matter independently. We do not wish to say in the absence of a detailed argument on the point, as to whether the workers appointed part-time by an employer may never get the benefits of the Industrial Disputes Act. So far as we are concerned in the present case, there is no question of part-time employment. All these workers are working in two shifts. There are definite hours when the two shifts are working. Ships may come with only Cement or Clinker or both. The workers in the relevant shift will have to unload the same on the wharf and then load the same in the trucks. If it is Cement it will be loaded in the trucks brought by M/s. Krishna Commercial Co. If it is Clinker it will be loaded in the trucks brought by the appellants. The tally clerk who is in the common employment of the firms will make the necessary note as to how much cement or Clinker was loaded and unloaded. The workers will then be paid accordingly, M/s. Krishna Commercial Co. taking the responsibility to pay for the Cement and the appellants for the Clinker. The two firms, as already stated, have merely split between themselves the responsibility for paying for loading and unloading Cement and Clinker in which business the respondent workers are employed. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in saying that the reference was quite competent and so was the award. 13. Mr. Hardy then invited our attention to the actual order of interim relief passed by the Tribunal and sought to submit that it might be very difficult for the two firms to apportion among themselves the liability imposed by the award. We do not think there is any difficulty whatsoever. The two firms have employed common clerks to supervise the actual work done by the gang, how much for one firm, how much for the other. The interim relief is not only given on a monthly basis but also, alternatively, on shift basis. As the workers are working in shifts and the work done in each shift for each of the employers is duly noted, there is no difficulty at all as to how this additional relief given by the award should be shared between the two firms. Again, if the employers do not want to share the liability on shift basis they know how much interim relief they have to pay to each worker every month, having regard to the total work done by each worker individually for them. 14.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We do not think that there is any substance in either of these submissions. It must be noted that the principal case put forward by the two firms before the Tribunal was that these Dock workers were not their employees at all. Their case was that they were employees of a labour contractor with whom the firms had their contract and, therefore, the workers were not the direct employees of the firms. This contention was rejected by the Tribunal as false because the evidence clearly disclosed that the workers had come under theof both the firms and both the firms had paid these workers bonus for the year 1966 and 1967. A common employee of the firms namely Ram Niwas Pannalaused to make the payment to the workers on behalf of both the firms in respect of the work done for both the firms. In these circumstances, it is very difficult to see how the reference between the workers, on the one hand, and the two firms, on the other, isThe workers were not interested as to whether the one firm or the other bore the total responsibility for paying for the work which they were doing. In fact, they had thought that they were the employees of only M/s. Krishna CommercialBut the latter shared its liability to pay the workers with a new firm of the appellants afterand if the two firms agree that they have so shared the liability both would be regarded as the employers of the workmen. The workers continued to do the same work and receive the same payment without any change in their employment. The change was merely in the. In factthe workers had not even agreed by a separate contract to work for the appellants. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention that on the finding of the Tribunal it should be held that this was a case of common employment. If what the two firms had done created a situation of common employment that was not of the seeking of the workers. The doctrine of common employment may,apply where the workers contract separately to serve two employers, without themutual agreement. That is not the case here. As to whether the doctrine of common employment is unknown to Industrial law it is not necessary for us to decide in thisthat proposition he referred to the fact that several decisions of Industrial Tribunals had taken that view. The decisions of the Industrial Tribunals, however, have not been specifically referred to or discussed in the judgment, nor has the learned Judge discussed theindependently. We do not wish toin the absence of a detailed argument on the point, as to whether the workers appointedby an employer may never get the benefits of the Industrial Disputes Act. So far as we are concerned in the present case, there is no question ofemployment. All these workers are working in two shifts. There are definite hours when the two shifts are working. Ships may come with only Cement or Clinker or both. The workers in the relevant shift will have to unload the same on the wharf and then load the same in the trucks. If it is Cement it will be loaded in the trucks brought byKrishna Commercial Co.If it is Clinker it will be loaded in the trucks brought by the appellants. The tally clerk who is in the common employment of thefirms will make the necessary note as to how muchCement or Clinkerwas loaded and unloaded. The workers will then be paid accordingly,a Commercial Co.taking the responsibility to pay for the Cement and the appellants for the Clinker. The two firms, as already stated, have merely split between themselves the responsibility for paying for loading and unloading Cement andin which business the respondent workers are employed. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in saying that the reference was quite competent and so was thetwo firms have employed common clerks to supervise the actual work done by the gang, how much for one firm, how much for the other. The interim relief is not only given on a monthly basis but also, alternativelyon shift basis. As the workers are working in shifts and the work done in each shift for each of the employers is duly noted, there is no difficulty at all as to how this additional relief given by the award should be shared between the two firms. Again, if the employers do not want to share the liability on shift basis they know how much interim relief they have to pay to each worker every month, having regard to the total work done by each worker individually for them.