Case: M.R.Prabhakar  Vs. Canara Bank

“resignation” and “retirement” carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions “resignation” and “retirement” have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The pension scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master and servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits. …………” (emphasis added) In the above mentioned judgment, this Court has also held that there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting the resignation, vis-à-vis voluntary retirement and exceptions thereof. In that context, the scope of Regulation 22 of Regulations 1995 was also considered and the Court held as follows: 9. …………….In our view, Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class of employees. The view we have taken is supported by the judgment of this Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon (2004) 9 SCC 461 . Before concluding we may state that Clause 22 is not in the nature of penalty as alleged. It only disentitles an employee who has resigned from service from becoming a member of the Fund. Such employees have received their retiral benefits earlier. The pension scheme, as stated above, only provides for a second retiral benefit. Hence there is no question of penalty being imposed on such employees as alleged. The pension scheme only provides for an avenue for investment to retirees. They are provided avenue to put in their savings and as a term or condition which is more in the nature of an eligibility criteria the scheme disentitles such category of employees out of it.” 16. We may indicate that in Sanwar Mal (supra), the employee, who was working on Class III post, resigned from the service of UCO Bank on 25.2.1988 after giving one month’s notice and also accepted his provident fund without protest. On coming into force of the Regulations 1995, Sanwar Mal opted for pension scheme. Since Sanwar Mal had resigned in the year 1988, UCO Bank declined its option for admitting him as a member of the fund. 17. This Court, as already indicated, after referring to the various provisions of the Regulations 1995 and after examining the meaning of the expressions ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’, held that since Regulation 22 provided for disqualification of employees who had resigned, such employees could not claim membership of the fund. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants have placed heavy reliance on Sheelkumar Jain (supra) and submitted that in the light of that judgment, the decision rendered in Sanwar Mal (supra) requires reconsideration. We find it difficult to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants. 19. We may point out in Sheelkumar Jain (supra) that this Court was dealing with an insurance scheme and not the pension scheme, which is applicable in the banking sector. The provisions of both the scheme and the Regulation are not pari materia. In Sheelkumar Jain case (supra), while referring to Para 5, this Court came to the conclusion that the same does not make distinction between ‘resignation’ and ‘voluntary retirement’ and it only provides that an employee who wants to leave or discontinue his service amounts to ‘resignation’ or ‘voluntary retirement’. Whereas, Regulation 20(2) of the Canara Bank (Officers) Service Regulations 1979 applicable to banks, had specifically referred to the words ‘resignation’, unlike Para 5 of the Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted that, in that judgment, this Court in Para 30 held that the Court will have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement.20. The appellants, when tendered their letters of resignation, were governed by the Regulations 1979. Regulation 20(2) of Regulations 1979 dealt with resignation from service and they tendered their resignation in the light of that provision. We are of the view that the appellants have failed to show any pre-existing rights in their favour either in the Statutory Settlement/Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 or under the Regulations 1995. Appellants had resigned from service prior to 1.11.1993 and, therefore, were not covered by the statutory settlement, Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 and the Regulations 1995. They could not establish any pre- existing legal, statutory or fundamental rights in their favour to claim the benefit of Regulations 1995. Consequently, the reliance placed by the appellants either on Regulation 29 or Regulation 22 in support of their contentions, cannot be accepted, since they are not covered by the scheme of pension introduced by the banks with effect from 1.11.1993.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. The appellants, in our view, did not retire from the service, but resigned from the service. Appellants tried to build up a case that in the absence of a legal definition of ‘voluntaryor in the absence of legally prescribed consequences ofit must be understood in the sense of voluntary relinquishment of service. It was pointed out that there can be no distinction between ‘voluntaryand those expressions are to be understood in their ordinary literal sense.15. We find it difficult to accept the contentions raised by the appellants. There is no ambiguity in the definition clause under Regulation 2(y) which has statutorily brought in the ‘voluntarilyThough the concept ofis well known in Service Jurisprudence, the same has not been brought within the definition ofunder Regulation 2(y). Further, the wordshave some resemblance in their meanings, but notRegulation 3(1)(a) specifically used the expressionand the expressionhas not been incorporated either in the definition clause or in Regulation 3(1)(a). We need not labour much on this issue, since the difference between these two conceptsin the context of the same Banking Regulations 1995, came up for consideration before this Court in Sanwar Mal (supra), wherein this Court has distinguished the wordsand held as……… The wordscarry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressionshave been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The pension scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is ascheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master and servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits.We may point out in Sheelkumar Jain (supra) that this Court was dealing with an insurance scheme and not the pension scheme, which is applicable in the banking sector. The provisions of both the scheme and the Regulation are not pari materia. In Sheelkumar Jain case (supra), while referring to Para 5, this Court came to the conclusion that the same does not make distinction betweenand it only provides that an employee who wants to leave or discontinue his service amounts toWhereas, Regulation 20(2) of the Canara Bank (Officers) Service Regulations 1979 applicable to banks, had specifically referred to the wordsunlike Para 5 of the Insurance Rules. Further, it is also to be noted that, in that judgment, this Court in Para 30 held that the Court will have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out whether the termination of service of an employee was a termination by way of resignation or a termination by way of voluntary retirement.20. The appellants, when tendered their letters of resignation, were governed by the Regulations 1979. Regulation 20(2) of Regulations 1979 dealt with resignation from service and they tendered their resignation in the light of that provision. We are of the view that the appellants have failed to show any pre-existing rights in their favour either in the Statutory Settlement/Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 or under the Regulations 1995. Appellants had resigned from service prior to 1.11.1993 and, therefore, were not covered by the statutory settlement, Joint Note dated 29.10.1993 and the Regulations 1995. They could not establish any pre- existing legal, statutory or fundamental rights in their favour to claim the benefit of Regulations 1995. Consequently, the reliance placed by the appellants either on Regulation 29 or Regulation 22 in support of their contentions, cannot be accepted, since they are not covered by the scheme of pension introduced by the banks with effect from 1.11.1993.