Case: C.A. Rajendran Vs. Union of India &amp; Others

satisfied that reservation quotas of promotion were harmful from the point of view of efficiency of Railway Service and therefore the Government issued the memorandum dated November 8, 1963 with drawing the reservation quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Officers made in the previous Government orders. On behalf of the petitioner Mr. N. C. Chatterjee submitted the argument that the provision contained in Article 16 (4) of the Constitution was in itself a fundamental right of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and it was not open to the Government to withdraw the benefits conferred on Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes by the Government orders dated May 7, 1955 and January 4, 1957. The learned Counsel based his argument on the following observations of Subba Rao, J., as he then was, in the minority judgment of this Court in T. Devadasan v. Union of India, 1964-4 SCR 680 at p. 700 = (AIR 1964 SC 170 at p. 190)."The expression nothing in this article is a legislative device to express its intention most emphatic way that the power conferred thereunder is not limited in any way by the main provision but falls outside it. It has not really carved out an exception, but has preserved a power untrammelled by the other provisions of the Article." But the majority judgment of this Court in that case took the view that Article 16 (4) was an exception and it could not be so construed as to reader nugatory or illusory the guarantee conferred by Article 16 (1). It was pointed out that though under Art. 16 (4) of the Constitution a reservation of a reasonable percentage of posts for members of the Scheduled Castes and Tribes was within the competence of the State, the method evolved by the Government must be such as to strike a reasonable balance between the claims of the backward classes and claims of other employees, in order to effectuate the guarantee contained in Article 16 (1), and for this purpose each year of recruitment would have to be considered by itself. Accordingly, the Court struck down the Carry forward rule" on the ground that it contravened Articles 14, 16 and 335 of the Constitution. In any case, even the minority judgment of Subba Rao, J. does not support the contention of Mr. N. G. Chatterjee that Article 16 (4) confers a right on the backward classes and net merely a power to be exercised at the discretion of the Government for making a provision for reservation of appointments for backward classes which, in its opinion, are not adequately represented in the Services of the State.Our conclusion therefore is that Article 16 (4) does not confer any right on the petitioner and there is no constitutional duty imposed on the Government to make a reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion. In other words Article 16 (4) is an enabling provision and confers a discretionary power on the State to make a reservation of appointments in favour of backward class of citizens which in its opinion, is not adequately represented in the Services of the State. We are accordingly of the opinion that the petitioner is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the case. 10. We shall next deal with the contention of the petitioner that there is discrimination between the employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Railway Services and similar employees in the Central Secretariat Service. It was said that the competitive departmental examination for promotion to the grade of Section Officers was not held by the Railway Board for the years 1955-1963. On the contrary, such examinations were held for the Central Secretariat Service and 74 employees belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes secured the benefit of the provisions of reservation. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. The petitioner being an employee of the Railway Board is governed by the rules applicable to the officers in the Service to which he belongs.The employees of the Central Secretariat Service belong to a different class and it is not possible to adopt the argument that there is any discrimination against the petitioner and violation of the guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. It was also contended by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the impugned order Annexure C, arbitrarily discriminates among Class III employees themselves and Class IV employees themselves. Under the impugned order reservation is kept for appointments for which there is direct recruitment and for a promotions made by (1) selection or (2) on the result of a competitive examination limited to departmental candidates. There is no reservation for appointments made by promotion on the basis of seniority cum-fitness.In our opinion, there is no justification for this argument as it is well established that there can be a reasonable classification of employees for the purpose of appointment by promotion and the classification as between direct recruits and promotees is reasonable [See the decision of this court in Mervyn Countindo v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (1966) 3 SCR 600 = (AIR 1967 SC 52 ) and in S. G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 ]. 12. A grievance was also made by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that there is discrimination as between Classes I and II where there is no reservation and Classes III and IV where reservation has been made for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The respondent stated in the counter-affidavit that in Classes I and II posts a higher degree of efficiency and responsibility was required and therefore reservation was considered harmful so far as Classes I and II were concerned.In view of the requirement of efficiency in the higher echelons of Service it obvious that the classification made in the impugned order is reasonable and the argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee on this point must also be rejected as untenable. 13

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The relevant law on the subject is well settled. Under Article 16 of the Constitution, there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State or to promotion from one office to a higher office thereunder. Articles 14, 15 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Art. 16 of the Constitution is only an incident of the application of the concept of equality enshrined in Article 14 thereof. It gives effect to the doctrine of equality in the matter of appointment and promotion.. It follows therefore that there can be a reasonable classification of the employees for the purpose of appointment and promotion. To put it differently, the equality of opportunity guaranteed by Article 16 (1) means equality as between member of the same class of employees, and not equality between members of separate, independent classesIn any case, even the minority judgment of Subba Rao, J. does not support the contention of Mr. N. G. Chatterjee that Article 16 (4) confers a right on the backward classes and net merely a power to be exercised at the discretion of the Government for making a provision for reservation of appointments for backward classes which, in its opinion, are not adequately represented in the Services of the State.Our conclusion therefore is that Article 16 (4) does not confer any right on the petitioner and there is no constitutional duty imposed on the Government to make a reservation for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, either at the initial stage of recruitment or at the stage of promotion. In other words Article 16 (4) is an enabling provision and confers a discretionary power on the State to make a reservation of appointments in favour of backward class of citizens which in its opinion, is not adequately represented in the Services of the State. We are accordingly of the opinion that the petitioner is unable to make good his submission on this aspect of the caseIn our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. The petitioner being an employee of the Railway Board is governed by the rules applicable to the officers in the Service to which he belongs.The employees of the Central Secretariat Service belong to a different class and it is not possible to adopt the argument that there is any discrimination against the petitioner and violation of the guarantee under Article 14 of the ConstitutionIn our opinion, there is no justification for this argument as it is well established that there can be a reasonable classification of employees for the purpose of appointment by promotion and the classification as between direct recruits and promotees is reasonableIn view of the requirement of efficiency in the higher echelons of Service it obvious that the classification made in the impugned order is reasonable and the argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee on this point must also be rejected as untenable.