Case: Meeta Sahai Vs. State of Bihar and Ors

the system and cause interpretative chaos which would undermine the fair and just right to compete for public employment. 27. Further, if faced between a choice in which only a few people would be eligible versus a fairly large group, we feel that the latter ought to be adopted to have a diverse pool of applicants. This would promote merit, bring better doctors and further the Constitutional scheme of providing equal opportunity in public employment to the masses. We are thus of the view that the provisions of the Rules in the case¬at¬hand cannot be construed or explained by applying the principle of literal interpretation. Purposive Interpretation 28. In pursuance to the above analysis, we are of the view that it is necessary to resort to purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Rules, in light of its objectives. Otherwise also as per the prefatory part of Article 309, the Rules framed thereunder must be in conformity with all other Constitutional provisions, which necessarily includes Part III. Dealing with recruitment in Government hospitals, it is clear that the object and purpose of the Rules too must satisfy the test of Article 16. 29. Further, given the absence of express definition of Government hospitals under the Rules which is the central stage of this debate, we deem it fit to make use of Constitutional values as a tool of statutory interpretation. It is well known the Constitution must not only be seen as a benchmark for testing the validity of legislations, but also as an inspirational document to guide State action. When there are two plausible interpretations, the one which promotes Constitutional values must be preferred. 30. Under our constitutional scheme, obligations and duties of the State have eloquently been divided using a three¬tier system of governance. The Union of India at the national level, individual State Governments at the State Level and various Municipalities/Panchayats at the local level, parallelly discharge their respective Constitutional duties for the welfare of the general public. 31. In deference to their duties to raise the standard of living, ensure adequate nutrition and public health of its people under Article 47 of the Constitution, both the Central as well as the State Governments formulate various welfare schemes and establish institutions including hospitals/primary health centres. Still further, under Article 243G read with Entry 23 of Schedule XI of the Constitution, the legislature of the State can entrust the functions of Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries to the Panchayati Raj Institutions. Similarly, the State legislature may entrust under Article 243W read with Entry 6 of Schedule XII, the functions of Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management to Municipalities. Hospitals of these local governments are often run on the back of funds derived from the Consolidated Fund of the States. It may thus be seen that the Constitution envisages the setting up of hospitals by many different public authorities, including the Central Government, State Government, Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions. 32. In addition, it is a well¬known fact that several hospitals throughout the country have been set up by instrumentalities of the Central or State Governments, more notably the Employees State Insurance Corporation Hospitals, to cater to the need of poor and needy persons. These hospitals, therefore, are at par with other government hospitals for all intents and purposes, and the experience gained by a doctor in such hospitals subsume the characteristics acquired in a hospital set up by the Bihar Government. 33. Other hospitals are also established by instrumentalities of the States and the Centre in pursuance of Constitutional obligations under Part IV. These although not strictly covered within the ambit of the Rules as propounded by the respondents, nevertheless serve the same purpose of providing best medical facilities to public at large. An apt example is of Army hospitals, and there is little reason to ignore and overlook the experience gained in such hospitals. 34. It is hence irrational to urge that the work experience in any such hospital is different from that in a Government of Bihar hospital. Hence, it would be Constitutionally unjust to allow differentiation between the experience gained by doctors at these hospitals established by Panchayats or Municipalities or by the Central Government and its instrumentalities in the territory of Bihar vis¬à¬vis those run by the Bihar Government. Any attempt to discriminate between hospitals run by the State Government and the Central Government or Municipalities/Panchayati Raj Institutions is bound to hit the very ethos of our Constitutional governance setup. 35. Having said so, we are not oblivious to the fact that equality does not imply that there can be no classification. Instead, sometimes it may be necessary to treat unequals unequally, for equal treatment of persons with unequal circumstances creates an unjust situation.Indira Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 ¶ 415.Such classification, however, must not be arbitrary but rationally founded on some quality or characteristics which are identifiable within the class of people so created and absent in those excluded from such classification 36. We are of the view that the purpose behind formulation of the Rules was to recognize the unique challenges of hospitals in Bihar and incentivise doctors to work in non-private hospitals. There is some substance in the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that Bihar is predominantly poor and thus requires doctors having exposure to such challenging environment as compared to their counterparts in private hospitals. Experience in a non¬private hospital instills sensitivity in its doctors, making them more adept to understand the ail and agony of poor patients. Such experience will undoubtedly be useful in furthering the object of Government hospitals and must be given due weightage while selecting suitable candidates. Interpreting Government hospitals to include only a small class of persons who have worked under the Government of Bihar, is thus clearly erroneous and anti¬merit. Such an objective would not be defeated by the understanding of the Rules as has been construed by us. CONCLUSION

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The underlying objective of this principle is to prevent candidates from trying another shot at consideration, and to avoid an impasse wherein every disgruntled candidate, having failed the selection, challenges it in the hope of getting a second chance18. However, we must differentiate from this principle insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the selection process19. The question of permissibility of giving weightage for work experience in government hospitals is also not the bone of contention in this case. Medicine being an applied science cannot be mastered by mere academic knowledge. Longer experience of a candidate adds to his knowledge and expertise. Similarly, government hospitals differ from private hospitals vastly for the former have unique infrastructural constraints and deal with poor masses. Doctors in such non¬private hospitals serve a public purpose by giving medical treatment to swarms of patients, in return for a meagre salary. Hence, when placing emphasis on the requirement of work experience, there is no dispute on such recognition of government hospitals and private hospitals as distinct classes. Instead such recognition ensures that the doctors recruited in notso-rich states like Bihar have the requisite exposure to challenges faced in those regions20. The appellant has thus rightly not challenged the selection procedure but has narrowed her claim to only against the respondents interpretation of work experience as part of merit determination. Since interpretation of a statute or rule is the exclusive domain of Courts, and given the scope of judicial review in delineating such criteria, the appellants challenge cannot be turned down at the threshold. However, we are not commenting specifically on the merit of appellants case, and our determination is alien to the outcome of the selection process. It is possible post what is held hereinafter that she be selected, or not21. It is a settled cannon of statutory interpretation that as a first step, the Courts ought to interpret the text of the provision and construct it literally. Provisions in a statute must be read in their original grammatical meaning to give its words a common textual meaning. However, this tool of interpretation can only be applied in cases where the text of the enactment is susceptible to only one meaningDevi Gupta,(2005) 2 SCC 271 &  para;13. Nevertheless, in a situation where there is ambiguity in the meaning of the text, the Courts must also give due regard to the consequences of the interpretation taken24. At the outset, the respondents contention that meaning of the term Government hospital would be bound by the restrictive definition of Government under Rule 2(a) of the Rules, does not sound well. It is settled that grammatical rules must be given due weightage during statutory interpretation. ( Navinchandra Mafatlal v. CIT, (1955) 1 SCR 829 &  para;6.) Rule 2 is a definitional provision and defines Government as a noun. However, it would not necessarily govern instances where the word has been used in another form. (See FCC v. AT&T Inc. 562 U.S. 397 (2011); where the Supreme Court of the United States held that definition of person as a noun would not be applicable to its use as an adjective.)Under Rule 5, the operative phrase is any Government hospital. Here, Government is restrictively defining the noun hospital to exclude those run by certain entities. Thus, Government as part of Government hospital is a noun adjunct and has been used as an adjective. Such usage of a noun in its adjectival form changes its character altogether and it would be unwise to import the meaning of its noun form. This is especially true considering how the prefatory portion of Rule 2 explicitly provides that the definitions as prescribed thereunder shall be referred to unless otherwise required in context. The phrase Government hospital therefore cannot be construed to exclude other non-private hospitals which are otherwise run exclusively with the aid and assistance of the Governments. Additionally given the difference in common usage wherein government hospital refers to all non-private hospitals and not hospitals established by a particular government, Rule 5 & 6(iii) would not be bound by Rule 2(a)26. In addition to this, adopting the respondents interpretation would increase uncertainty and create practical difficulties. When Rule 2(a) is applied to Government hospital there is substantial ambiguity created as to whether or not hospitals run by instrumentalities of the Government, which are not strictly owned by the Government of Bihar would be included within Rule 5. When a pointed question was put forth to learned counsel for the respondents as to whether a hospital established by the municipality or one run by an institute substantially funded by State money would be included in their definition, no clear answer was forthcoming. Such issues are bound to arise repeatedly in any selection process. Given how there is no simple answer to such questions, the rigid interpretation adopted by the Government would only lead to friction in the system and cause interpretative chaos which would undermine the fair and just right to compete for public employment27. Further, if faced between a choice in which only a few people would be eligible versus a fairly large group, we feel that the latter ought to be adopted to have a diverse pool of applicants. This would promote merit, bring better doctors and further the Constitutional scheme of providing equal opportunity in public employment to the masses. We are thus of the view that the provisions of the Rules in the case¬at¬hand cannot be construed or explained by applying the principle of literal interpretation28. In pursuance to the above analysis, we are of the view that it is necessary to resort to purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Rules, in light of its objectives. Otherwise also as per the prefatory part of Article 309, the Rules framed thereunder must be in conformity with all other Constitutional provisions, which necessarily includes Part III. Dealing with recruitment in Government hospitals, it is clear that the object and purpose of the Rules too must satisfy the test of Article 1634. It is hence irrational to urge that the work experience in any such hospital is different from that in a Government of Bihar hospital. Hence, it would be Constitutionally unjust to allow differentiation between the experience gained by doctors at these hospitals established by Panchayats or Municipalities or by the Central Government and its instrumentalities in the territory of Bihar vis¬à¬vis those run by the Bihar Government. Any attempt to discriminate between hospitals run by the State Government and the Central Government or Municipalities/Panchayati Raj Institutions is bound to hit the very ethos of our Constitutional governance setup35. Having said so, we are not oblivious to the fact that equality does not imply that there can be no classification. Instead, sometimes it may be necessary to treat unequals unequally, for equal treatment of persons with unequal circumstances creates an unjust situation.Indira Sawhney v. Union of India 1992 Supp. (3) SCC 217 ¶ 415.Such classification, however, must not be arbitrary but rationally founded on some quality or characteristics which are identifiable within the class of people so created and absent in those excluded from such classification36. We are of the view that the purpose behind formulation of the Rules was to recognize the unique challenges of hospitals in Bihar and incentivise doctors to work in non-private hospitals. There is some substance in the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that Bihar is predominantly poor and thus requires doctors having exposure to such challenging environment as compared to their counterparts in private hospitals. Experience in a non¬private hospital instills sensitivity in its doctors, making them more adept to understand the ail and agony of poor patients. Such experience will undoubtedly be useful in furthering the object of Government hospitals and must be given due weightage while selecting suitable candidates. Interpreting Government hospitals to include only a small class of persons who have worked under the Government of Bihar, is thus clearly erroneous and anti¬merit. Such an objective would not be defeated by the understanding of the Rules as has been construed by usIt may thus be seen that the Constitution envisages the setting up of hospitals by many different public authorities, including the Central Government, State Government, Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions32. In addition, it is a well¬known fact that several hospitals throughout the country have been set up by instrumentalities of the Central or State Governments, more notably the Employees State Insurance Corporation Hospitals, to cater to the need of poor and needy persons. These hospitals, therefore, are at par with other government hospitals for all intents and purposes, and the experience gained by a doctor in such hospitals subsume the characteristics acquired in a hospital set up by the Bihar Government33. Other hospitals are also established by instrumentalities of the States and the Centre in pursuance of Constitutional obligations under Part IV. These although not strictly covered within the ambit of the Rules as propounded by the respondents, nevertheless serve the same purpose of providing best medical facilities to public at large. An apt example is of Army hospitals, and there is little reason to ignore and overlook the experience gained in such hospitals.