Case: Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy  Vs. State Of A.P

?language? is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the Legislature cannot be approached as the Legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the Legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making. 15. Statute being an edict of the Legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in clear and unambiguous language. In spite of Courts saying so, the draftsmen have paid little attention and they still boast of the old British jingle ?I am the parliamentary draftsman. I compose the country?s laws. And of half of the litigation, I am undoubtedly the cause?, which was referred to by this Court in Palace Admn. Board v. Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran, AIR 1980 SC 1187 at P.1195. In Kirby v. Leather, 1965 (2) All ER 441, the draftsmen were severely criticized in regard to Section 22(2)(b) of the (UK) Limitation Act, 1939, as it was said that the Section was so obscure that the draftsmen must have been of unsound mind. 16. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased. This can be vouchsafed by ?an alert recognition of the necessity not to cross it and instinctive, as well as trained reluctance to do so?. (See: Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes in ?Essays on Jurisprudence?, Columbia Law Review, P. 51.) 17. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. [See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR 1998 SC 74 ]. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner, (1846 (6) Moore PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures? defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. [See The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr., III (1998) SLT 400=I (1998) CCR 380 (SC)=JT 1998 (2) SC 253 ]. It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones (Tiptan) Ltd., 1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors., AIR 1962 SC 847 ). 18. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. ?Statutes should be construed not as theorems of Euclid?. Judge Learned Hand said, ?but words must be construed with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them?. (See Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem Vasco De Gama, AIR 1990 SC 981 . 19. In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. Etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. Etc. AIR 1977 SC 842 , it was observed that Courts must avoid the danger of a prior, determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under the disguise of interpretation. 20. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain, I (2000) SLT 611=(2000 (5) SCC 511. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. (See Maulavi Hussein Haji Abraham Umarji v. State of Gujarat and Anr., IV (2004) SLT 886=2004(6) SCC 672 and State of Jharkhand and Anr. v. Govind Singh, VII (2004) SLT 393=2005 (10) SCC 437. 21. The residual question is the number of years for which the Seignorage rates are to be computed. 22. We do not find any substance in the plea of learned Counsel for the appellants that the entitlement of the appellants is for 30 years. Admittedly the trees were 12 years old at the time the land were surrendered and, therefore, for the balance 18 years only the appellants will be entitled to at the relevant seignorage rates.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. A bare reading thereof makes the position clear that the amounts are to be calculated from 5th to 30th years10. That being so, the stand of the State Government as accepted by the High Court that the seignorage rate is for one year and accordingly fixing it for the 12 years is clearly unsustainable. It is to be noted that the trees were 12 years old and stood on the surrendered land. It is further clear that up to 5 years cashew trees are held to be not fruit bearing trees11. The emphasis for the State was that the object of the concerned statue was not to confer any benefit beyond the statutory entitlements and for that purpose according to learned Counsel for the State the object of the statute was vital. According to him for the purpose of construction of the notifications of the District Collector, the same has to be read in a manner which would give true effect to the intention of the statute13. It is said that a statute is an edict of the Legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting or construing a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the Legislature. It is well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous14. Interpretation postulates the search for the true meaning of the words used in the statute as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. The task is not easy as the ?language? is often misunderstood even in ordinary conversation or correspondence. The tragedy is that although in the matter of correspondence or conversation the person who has spoken the words or used the language can be approached for clarification, the Legislature cannot be approached as the Legislature, after enacting a law or Act, becomes functus officio so far as that particular Act is concerned and it cannot itself interpret it. No doubt, the Legislature retains the power to amend or repeal the law so made and can also declare its meaning, but that can be done only by making another law or statute after undertaking the whole process of law-making16. Where, however, the words were clear, there is no obscurity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate or take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. In that situation the Judges should not proclaim that they are playing the role of a law-maker merely for an exhibition of judicial valour. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed or erased17. Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. The object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature enacting it. [See Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. M/s. Price Waterhouse and Anr., AIR 1998 SC 74 ]. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the language used, which means that attention should be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be avoided22. We do not find any substance in the plea of learned Counsel for the appellants that the entitlement of the appellants is for 30 years. Admittedly the trees were 12 years old at the time the land were surrendered and, therefore, for the balance 18 years only the appellants will be entitled to at the relevant seignorage rates.