Case: B.R. Mehta Vs. Smt. Atma Devi &amp; Ors

which highlights that such oral admission must be definite and unambiguous and must be satisfactorily established. In our opinion, from the fact that the wife of the tenant was allotted a temporary Government accommodation, it cannot be said that there was admission by virtue of which the tenant could lose his tenancy that the wife has acquired a house which is available to the husband over which the husband has a domain which could be a substitute to the tenanted premises. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that there was no admission at all. 6. Our attention was drawn to certain observations of Bhagwati, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Phiroze Bamanji Desai vs. Chandrakant M. Patel and Others, (1974) 3 S.C.R. 267), were dealing with certain facts whether premises given on a licence could be considered in considering the bona fide requirement of the landlord to the allotment or acquisition. In our opinion, this principle is wholly irrelevant for the point in controversy before this Court. We are not concerned whether there was ground for bona fide requirement of the landlord for which a suit had been filed and which is pending appeal. This fact of acquisition or allotment of flat in the name of wife (which incidentally she has lost having given up her job) can be in certain circumstances a factor in Judging the bona fide needs of the landlord; but the same indisputably cannot be any ground to evict the tenant on the ground that he has acquired vacant possession or allotted residence in terms of Clause (h) of Section 14(1). Mr. Rohtagi drew our attention to certain observations of this Court in Gajanan Dattatraya vs. Sherbanu Hosang Patel and Others, (1976 1 S.C.R. 535), where this Court held that the tenant?s liability to eviction arises when the fact of unlawful subletting is proved. The fact that subsequently the other tenant had left the premises does not cure the mischief done. Mr. Rohtagi placing this decision tried to urge before us that the allotment itself of a residence or acquisition of a residence by the tenant or the wife of the tenant was sufficient to attract Clause (h) of Section 14(1) of the Act. The fact that subsequently the tenant had left the premises was irrelevant and did not affect the position. It was further submitted that the tenant had acquired a premises or allotted a residence which could be considered to be so in terms of Clause (h) of Section 14(1) and but the flat in question allotted to the wife of the tenant was not by any stretch of imagination be considered to be a matrimonial home. In England the rights of the spouses be husband and wife to the matrimonial home are now governed by the pro-visions of Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967 Halsbury?s Laws of England, Fourth Edition Vol. 22 page 650 deals with the rights of occupation of matrimonial home and paragraph 1047 deals and provides that where one spouse is entitled to occupy a dwelling house by virtue of any estate or interest or contract or by virtue of any enactment giving him or her the right to remain in occupa-tion, and the other spouse is not so entitled, then the spouse not so entitled has the certain rights (known as ?rights of occupation?) that is to say if in occupation, a right not be evicted or excluded from the dwelling house or any part of it by the other spouse except with the leave of the Court given by an order if not in occupation, a right with the leave of the Court so given to enter into and occupy the dwelling house. But such rights are not granted in India though it may be in that with change of situation and complex problems arising it is high time to give the wife or the spouse a right of occupation in a truly matrimonial home, in case of marriage breaking up or in case of strain-ed relationship between the husband and the wife. We, however, cannot for the purpose of this case get much assistance from the principle adumbrated in paragraph 1047 of Halsbury?s Laws of England. In England cases before 1968 established that occupation of the matrimonial home by a tenant?s wife after the tenant had left counts as occupation by the tenant so as to preserve the statutory tenancy for as long as the marriage itself subsists. In those circumstances in England the landlord could not properly be granted an order for possession against the husband unless there were available grounds for possession against both husband and wife. The tenant cannot abandon his rights while his wife remains; nor can the landlord evict the wife even if the tenant consents or purports to surrender his statutory tenancy. This is the result of the case law in England and much social awareness and the case laws have been given statutory expression in the Matrimonial Homes Act, 1967. We have no such law. The premises in question which the wife occupied was indisputably not the matrimonial home. It is nobody?s case. The husband would not, therefore, have any statutory or legal right against the Government to use and enjoy the allotted premises to the wife of the tenant because of her job. Looked at any point of view, the tenant cannot be made to lose his tenancy because of wife acquiring possession of a flat or allotment of a flat because of her official duties over which the husband has no right or domain or occupation. 7. In the premises we are unable to sustain the judgment under appeal. To complete the story the wife of the tenant has resigned and has joined the husband at 2/14, Kalkaji Extension, New Delhi. We hope there will be no more strained relationship in the family. Hereafter they will live happily provided landlord the permits so. We shall try to ensure that they so permit.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We are unable to accept the view of the Delhi High Court, We have noted the provisions. The purpose of the Act is to control rents and eviction, in other words, to control unreasonable evictions and to ensure that in an atmosphere of acute shortage of accommodation, there is proper enjoyment of available spaces by those who want and deserve. In other words, to ensure that there is no unreasonable and unnecessary spaces in the hands of one tenant and other tenants and landlords? need of occupation of spaces remains unsatisfied, Clause (h) of Section 14(1) is an attempt in a way to ration out accommoda-tion between tenants and landlords. Looked at from that point of view unless acquisition of a premises or a flat or allotment of a premises or part of a premises by the tenant in which he has domain which he can reasonably and alternatively use as a substitute for the place he is using in the tenancy it cannot lead to a forfeiture of his right to occupy his tenanted premises. The case would be otherwise, however, if a tenant comes into possession of a pre-mises or is allotted a piece of residence or acquires vacant possession of the premises then such a tenant cannot prevent, if other conditions are fulfilled under Section 14(1)(h) of the Act being liable to forfeiture of his tenancyHaving considered the averments of the parties on the point at issue it was held in that case that the respondent had through his wife acquired vacant possession of a residence in Delhi and in that view of the matter was held not entitled to retain old tenant-ed premises. Mr. Avadh Bihari Rohtagi, learned Counsel strenuously contended before us that this proposition that acquisition of a flat by the wife was acquisition by the tenant and such acquisition in all circumstances would be within the mischief of Section 14(1)(h) of the Act and would disentitle the tenant to retain his flat in question. We are unable to accept this reading of said Act. The said decision rested on the facts of that case. There in that case, this Court has found in a case that the respondent?s wife had purchased a flat in Saket and that further found that the flat was available to the respon-dent. In those circumstances it was held that there was acquisition of vacant possession of a residence and as such Section 14(1)(h) of the Act would be attracted. It cannot however be laid down as a general proposition of law that acquisition of flat by the wife in all circumstances would amount to acquisition of flat by the tenantTenancy is a right vested in the tenant. The main purpose of the Act is the protection of tenants from eviction. The various provisos to Sub-section (1) of Section 14 laid down the exception to this rule. The learned Judge observed that when proviso (h) made tenant liable to eviction, its effect was to divest the tenant of his right of tenancy. The intention of the legislature in divesting the tenant of his right was based upon the fact that the tenant had legally acquired another residence as of right. There is no law according to which husband and wife could be deemed to be one person. Therefore, the correct position must be that if a wife or a husband vice-versa acquires a property then the other spouse if he/she is the tenant and by such acquisition by the other spouse of a tenant as a legal right to go there and have right of stay and then only can such acquisition or allotment of premises would disentitle or attract the provisions of Clause (h) of Section 14(1), otherwise the whole purpose would be defeated. In other words if for all practi-cal and real sense the tenant, acquired, built or allotted another residence then his need for the old tenanted residence goes and the tenant loses his right to retain his tenanted premises. That is the rationale behind the schemeIn our opinion, this principle is wholly irrelevant for the point in controversy before this Court. We are not concerned whether there was ground for bona fide requirement of the landlord for which a suit had been filed and which is pending appeal. This fact of acquisition or allotment of flat in the name of wife (which incidentally she has lost having given up her job) can be in certain circumstances a factor in Judging the bona fide needs of the landlord; but the same indisputably cannot be any ground to evict the tenant on the ground that he has acquired vacant possession or allotted residence in terms of Clause (h) of Section 14(1)7. In the premises we are unable to sustain the judgment under appeal. To complete the story the wife of the tenant has resigned and has joined the husband at 2/14, Kalkaji Extension, New Delhi. We hope there will be no more strained relationship in the family. Hereafter they will live happily provided landlord the permits so. We shall try to ensure that they so permit.