Case: Pandit Ram Narain Vs. The State Of Uttar Pradesh Andothers

that if an inhabitant of the Town Area alone was entitled to file an objection to preliminary proposals for taxation, then in all the clauses of sub.s.(1) of S. 14 residence within the Town Area must be read as a necessary condition for the imposition of the taxes under S.14. This condition appears to us to be unsound. Firstly, the objection as to preliminary proposals for taxation is not the same thing as objection to an assessment, and it may well be that the legislature in their wisdom thought fit to confine the filing of objections to preliminary proposals for taxation to the inhabitants of the Town Area. Secondly, there are several other sections of the Act such as S. 20 and S. 21, which show that the imposition of a tax on persons not resident within the Town Area but having some other nexus within the Area, was permissible. Thirdly, the question of the validity of sub.s.(4) of S. 15-A does not arise in this case. The appellant was assessed to a tax and had a right to file an appeal which right he exercised. No grievance was made of the failure to exercise the right under sub.s.(4) of S.15-A. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to make any pronouncement on the validity or otherwise of sub.s.(4) of 15-A.All that is necessary for us to state is that by reason of sub.s (4) of S.15-A, it cannot be held that residence within the Town Area is a necessary condition for the imposition of a tax in all the clauses of sub.s.(1) of S.14 of the Act.9. Learned counsel for the appellant referred us to two decisions of the Allahabad High Court:District Board Farrukhabad v. Prag DuttA I R 1948 All 382 (FB) (A) andDistrict Board Dehra Dun v. Damodar Dutt,I L R (1944) ALL 611: (AIR 1944 All 223 (2)) (B). The second decision, which was earlier in point of time, arose out of a suit for recovery of circumstances and property tax under the U. P. District Boards Act (Local Act 10 of 1922). The question there was whether District Board of Dehradun could impose a tax on the defendants who were not residents within the area of the District Board. It is worthy of note that under S.114, U.P. District Boards Act, the power of a Board to impose a tax on circumstances and property is subject to the condition that the tax may be imposed on any person residing or carrying on business in the rural area within the District Board. The only question in that Allahabad case was whether the defendants resided within the rural area of the District Board so as to make them liable for the tax. The finding was that they did not reside within the rural area and therefore the imposition of the tax was illegal, and S.131, U.P. District Boards Act did not bar the suit. This decision does not help the appellant. If it shows anything, it shows that it was open to the District Board to impose a circumstances and property tax on any person residing or carrying on business in the rural area.10. In the 1948 Allahabad decision, the main question was whether the provisions of S. 2, Professions Tax Limitation Act (20 of 1941) affected the powers conferred upon the District Board by S.108, U.P. District Boards Act, to levy a tax on Circumstances and property. A subsidiary question was also raised, whether S.131, U.P. District Boards Act, barred the suit. With regards to the main question, it was pointed out that the name given to a tax did not matter; what had to he considered was the pith and substance of it. It was held that in pith and substance the tax was one which attracted the provisions of S.2, Professions Tax Limitation Act (20 of 1941). A tax on circumstances and property is a composite tax and the word circumstances means a mans financial position, his status as a whole, depending among other things, on his income from trade or business.Far from militating against the principle that in considering the circumstances of a person his income from trade or business within the Town Area may be taken into consideration, the decision approves of the principle. In the course of his judgement, Bind Basni Prasad J. referred to S.128, U.P. Municipalities, Act, 1916, where taxes on circumstances and property appear as a head distinct from the taxes on trades, callings and vocations and employments and the argument was that the taxes being under different heads should be treated as being entirely different, one from the other. It was rightly pointed out that it is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. It is true that in the Act under our consideration the taxes which the Town Area Committee may impose appear under different heads in sub.s. (1) of S.14.We have already stated that though the clauses are different, the words used in the section show that there may be overlapping between the different clauses, and to prevent the same person being subjected to multiple taxation, a proviso was incorporated in cl.(f). In view of the words and expressions used in S.14 of the Act, we cannot accept the argument that cl.(f) should be read as entirely independent of and unconnected with the other clauses and a different condition, namely residence within the Town Area, must be read as a necessary part of cl.(f). To do so will be to read in cl.(f) words which do not occur there. The limitations for the imposition of a tax under cl.(f) are given in R. 3 and residence is only one of the alternative conditions for the imposition of the tax - not asine qua nonas is contended by learned counsel for the appellant.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We think that learned counsel has rightly submitted that, so far as the present appellant is concerned,the list prepared under S.15 must have shown him as assessed to a certain amount of tax under cl.(f) of sub.s.(1) of S.14 and the assessment must have been confirmed on that basis by the District Magistrate. Therefore, the legality of the tax imposed on the appellant must be considered with reference to the clause under which the assessment was actually made, and a different clause under which the assessment might have fallen cannot be called in aid of thecondition appears to us to be unsound. Firstly, the objection as to preliminary proposals for taxation is not the same thing as objection to an assessment, and it may well be that the legislature in their wisdom thought fit to confine the filing of objections to preliminary proposals for taxation to the inhabitants of the Town Area. Secondly, there are several other sections of the Act such as S. 20 and S. 21, which show that the imposition of a tax on persons not resident within the Town Area but having some other nexus within the Area, was permissible. Thirdly, the question of the validity of sub.s.(4) of S. 15-A does not arise in this case. The appellant was assessed to a tax and had a right to file an appeal which right hegrievance was made of the failure to exercise the right under sub.s.(4) of S.15-A. It is, therefore, unnecessary for us to make any pronouncement on the validity or otherwise of sub.s.(4) of 15-A.All that is necessary for us to state is that by reason of sub.s (4) of S.15-A, it cannot be held that residence within the Town Area is a necessary condition for the imposition of a tax in all the clauses of sub.s.(1) of S.14 of thewas rightly pointed out that it is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. It is true that in the Act under our consideration the taxes which the Town Area Committee may impose appear under different heads in sub.s. (1) of S.14.We have already stated that though the clauses are different, the words used in the section show that there may be overlapping between the different clauses, and to prevent the same person being subjected to multiple taxation, a proviso was incorporated inview of the words and expressions used in S.14 of the Act, we cannot accept the argument that cl.(f) should be read as entirely independent of and unconnected with the other clauses and a different condition, namely residence within the Town Area, must be read as a necessary part of cl.(f). To do so will be to read in cl.(f) words which do not occur there. The limitations for the imposition of a tax under cl.(f) are given in R. 3 and residence is only one of the alternative conditions for the imposition of the tax - not asine qua nonas is contended by learned counsel for the appellant.