Case: T. V. R. Subbu Chetty'S Family Charities Vs. M. Raghava Mudaliar And Others

the respondent had supported the plaintiff in the said suit it was necessary that he should have got himself transposed as a plaintiff, when he found that the original plaintiff was allowing the suit to be dismissed for non-prosecution. In our opinion, this argument is far-fetched and cannot possibly sustain the plea of ratification against the respondent. If the respondent took possession of the property under the arrangement with the distinct understanding that the arrangement was to last only during the lifetime of the widow, we see no justification for the assumption that he should have carried on Civil Suit No. 1117 of 1921 or should in fact have challenged the said arrangement at all. 18. The last argument urged in support of the plea of ratification is based on the oral evidence given by the respondent in the present case. The respondent was asked about the quarrels between the mother and the widow of the deceased Mudaliar, and he said that they were living together and that there were quarrels between them. Then he was asked as to whether he got the property under the impugned arrangement, and he said that his grandmother gave him the house with the Collectors certificate and told him that she was going to die soon and so he may take the house. The respondent also admitted that since the house was thus delivered to him and to his sister they were in possession of it and in enjoyment of its income. The respondent then stated that he was not aware of the document of 1895 until 1916, and that he came to know about the division between the two widows only in 1910. It is urged that this statement should not be believed, and that the reluctance of the respondent to disclose the truth should lead to the inference that he knew all about the impugned transaction and its effect, and that when he took possession of the property allotted to him under the said transaction he knew fully well about his rights and he accepted the benefits with the object of ratifying the whole transaction. In our opinion there is no substance in this argument. 19. In this connection it is relevant to remember that until Act II of 1929 was passed a sister son, like the respondent, would have had very few chances of becoming an actual reversioner; he would have come in the list of bandhus; and so it would be difficult to assume that at the time when the respondent accepted the gift of the house he knew about his rights as a possible reversioner. Besides, the benefit which he obtained under the impugned transaction could also in substance have been claimed by him under an earlier arrangement entered into between Govinda, Mudaliar and Madhva Ramanuja Mudaliar on February 7, 1887, (Ex. D-1). Having regard to the arrangement disclosed by the said document the benefit given to the respondent and the other children of the sisters of the deceased Mudaliar may as well have been based on the said arrangement, and all that the transactions of 1893 and 1895 did was to give effect to it (Exs. D-2 and D-5). Besides, as we have already pointed out, in 1893 the respondent was a minor, and when subsequent to 1895 he took possession of the property it does not appear on evidence that he knew that the intention of the widows was to treat the property as absolute owners and to convey absolute titles to the respective donees and transferees under the said transaction. He also could not have known about his rights as a possible reversioner. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the appellant had failed to establish his plea of ratification against the respondent. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be in the words of the Privy Council a quite unwarrantable proposition: 46 Ind App 72 at p. 87: (AIR 1918 PC 196 at p. 202). 20. That leaves the question of legal necessity to be considered. The High Court has held that the impugned transfer cannot be said to have been justified by legal necessity; and, in our opinion, the finding of the High Court on this point is obviously right. In dealing with this question it may be relevant to recall that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar had obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased on April 26, 1893, and, as usual, in issuing the letters limitation had been imposed upon the widow that she could not deal with or transfer the property in question without the requisite sanction. There is some force in the argument urged before us by Mr. Sastri on behalf of the respondent that it was with a view to avoid the necessity to obtain the requisite sanction that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar was persuaded by her mother-in-law to enter into the impugned transaction under the guise of a family arrangement. The document itself (Ex. D-5) does not purport to be justified by legal necessity. In terms it purports to give effect to the original arrangement of 1893 (Ex. D-2); and if the said arrangement is not valid as a family arrangement the subsequent transfer would also be invalid. Besides, out of a total consideration of about Rs. 10,000 the amount of Rs. 776 can be taken to represent the debts due by the deceased Mudaliar; the rest of the items of consideration cannot be treated as constituting a legal necessity at all. The amount of Rs. 558 was the expense incurred for executing the document; similarly the amount of Rs. 409 representing the funeral expense of the deceased Mudaliar, had apparently been spent by the widow who wanted to reimburse herself and that cannot be a legal necessity. The other items of consideration do not even purport to be for legal necessity. Therefore, in our opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that the impugned transfer is not justified by legal necessity.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]There is of course no doubt about the correctness of the principle thus enunciated, but the difficulty in the way of the appellant arises when the applicability of the said principle is tested in the light of the relevant material findings in that caseThese two decisions also emphasies the fact that if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of his opponents at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually falls open14. There can be no doubt that the transaction which took place on May 27, 1893, as a result of the dispute between the two widows and with the intervention of the well-wishers of the family is not a family arrangement as understood under Hindu Law. This position was conceded before the High Court and is not disputed before usThus in dealing with the question as to whetherthe respondent is precluded from challenging the validity of the impugned transactionit is necessary to bear in mind that the original transaction is not a transaction in the nature of a family arrangement. Besides, he was then a minor and admittedly he was not a party to any of the said transactionsThe explanation given by the respondent for not producing the patta is attacked as unsatisfactory, and it is urged that the said explanation cannot possibly conceal his intention to keep back the document from the Court. In his cross-examination the respondent stated that the Collectors certificate which had been given to him by his grand-mother had been filed by him in Suit No. 495 of 1916 in the City Civil Court, and he added that his advocate in the said suit had not returned the document to him. We may assume that the respondent has not produced the document though it was in his possession; but we have on the record two documents which were issued to the other donees, and all that the appellant is entitled to assume is that a similar document had been issued in favour of the respondent. In our opinion, the two documents on the record do not assist the appellants argument that any representation had been made by the respondent to the Collector before he obtained a patta in his favour. In fact the issue of the patta is a routine matter which would necessarily follow on the execution of the registered sale deed (Ex. D-5). On the registration of the said document persons who got certain immovable properties under it were given the certificates by the Collector in ordinary course, and so no argument can be built up against the respondent that the acceptance of the patta amounts to the ratification of the original transaction of saleIt appears that the plaintiff in that suit had based her claim on the said impugned transaction, and in respect of the said claim the respondent had alleged in paragraph 2 of his written statement that he admitted that in consequence of certain disputes which arose between the mother and the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar a compromise settlement was arrived at in pursuance of which some transfers were effected. This, it is said, amounts to an admission of the validity of the said transaction (Ex. D-15). This argument, however, fails to take notice of the fact that while referring to the said compromise settlement the respondent had expressly added that the said compromise settlement was obviously to take effect only during the life tenancy of the widow of the deceased Govinda Mudaliar (Ex. P-3). In other words, taking the statement as a whole, as we must, the respondent looked upon the said compromise settlement as an alienation made by the widow and as intended to take effect during her lifetime and no more. In other words, far from supporting a plea of ratification against the respondent this statement strengthens his case that he took the benefit with the knowledge and under the belief that the arrangement under which the said benefit flowed was intended to be operative during the lifetime of the widow, and as such he had no occasion to challenge its validity whilst the widow was aliveIt is unnecessary to refer to the pleadings in the said suit or to specify in detail the reliefs claimed. The only point which is relevant to consider is that the reversioner had challenged the arrangement in question. The respondent by his written statement had purported to support the plea made by the plaintiff, and had added that he was no personally aware of any attempt on the part of defendants 2 to 4 to alienate the properties in respect of their possession and enjoyment. This suit, however, did not proceed to a trial as it was dismissed for want of prosecution, and the argument is that since the respondent had supported the plaintiff in the said suit it was necessary that he should have got himself transposed as a plaintiff, when he found that the original plaintiff was allowing the suit to be dismissed for non-prosecution. In our opinion, this argument is far-fetched and cannot possibly sustain the plea of ratification against the respondent. If the respondent took possession of the property under the arrangement with the distinct understanding that the arrangement was to last only during the lifetime of the widow, we see no justification for the assumption that he should have carried on Civil Suit No. 1117 of 1921 or should in fact have challenged the said arrangement at allIn our opinion there is no substance in this argumentHaving regard to the arrangement disclosed by the said document the benefit given to the respondent and the other children of the sisters of the deceased Mudaliar may as well have been based on the said arrangement, and all that the transactions of 1893 and 1895 did was to give effect to it (Exs. D-2 and D-5). Besides, as we have already pointed out, in 1893 the respondent was a minor, and when subsequent to 1895 he took possession of the property it does not appear on evidence that he knew that the intention of the widows was to treat the property as absolute owners and to convey absolute titles to the respective donees and transferees under the said transaction. He also could not have known about his rights as a possible reversioner. Therefore, in our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the appellant had failed to establish his plea of ratification against the respondentIn dealing with this question it may be relevant to recall that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar had obtained letters of administration to the estate of the deceased on April 26, 1893, and, as usual, in issuing the letters limitation had been imposed upon the widow that she could not deal with or transfer the property in question without the requisite sanction. There is some force in the argument urged before us by Mr. Sastri on behalf of the respondent that it was with a view to avoid the necessity to obtain the requisite sanction that the widow of the deceased Mudaliar was persuaded by her mother-in-law to enter into the impugned transaction under the guise of a family arrangement. The document itself (Ex. D-5) does not purport to be justified by legal necessity. In terms it purports to give effect to the original arrangement of 1893 (Ex. D-2); and if the said arrangement is not valid as a family arrangement the subsequent transfer would also be invalid. Besides, out of a total consideration of about Rs. 10,000 the amount of Rs. 776 can be taken to represent the debts due by the deceased Mudaliar; the rest of the items of consideration cannot be treated as constituting a legal necessity at all. The amount of Rs. 558 was the expense incurred for executing the document; similarly the amount of Rs. 409 representing the funeral expense of the deceased Mudaliar, had apparently been spent by the widow who wanted to reimburse herself and that cannot be a legal necessity. The other items of consideration do not even purport to be for legal necessity. Therefore, in our opinion, the conclusion is inescapable that the impugned transfer is not justified by legal necessity.