Case: Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Limited Vs. M/s. Dalichand Jugraj Jain &amp; Others

landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply an to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions, and subject to the pro- visions of sub-section (2), no other Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question...."This section expressly bars the jurisdiction of other Courts to entertain any suit, proceeding or application between a land. lord and tenant relating to the recovery of possession of any premises and confers jurisdiction on the Courts mentioned in Section 28 to entertain the matter pending before the nominee of the Registrar. But it is said that the Registrar is not a Court within the meaning of Section 28 of the Act. This Court held in Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamurhi Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., 1967-3 SCR 163 =(AIR 1967 SC 1494 ) that the Assistant Registrar, Co-operative Societies, acting under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1935, was functioning as a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. It was urged before us that the Registrar is also a Court for the purposes of S. 28 of the Rent Act. We need not decide this question because it seems to us that the jurisdiction of the Registrar is ousted on broader considerations.33. Both Section 91 of the Act and Section 28 of the Rent Act start by excluding "anything contained in any other law". As observed by this Court in Shri Ram Narain v. Simla Banking Industrial Co., Ltd., 1956 SCR 603 at p. 615 = (AIR 1956 SC 614 at p. 622),"it is, therefore, desirable to determine the overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant provisions in these two acts, in a given case, on much broader considerations of the purpose and policy underlying the two Acts and the clear intendment conveyed by the language of the relevant provisions therein."We may mention that the two Acts which this Court had to deal with in that case were the Banking Companies Act, 1949 (X of 1949) and the Displaced Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (LXX of 1951).34. The preamble of the Rent Act states;"Whereas it is expedient to amend and consolidate the law relating to the control of rents and repairs of certain premises, of rates of hotels and lodging houses and evictions."Section 4 of the Rent Act exempts certain premises from its operation but it does not exempt premises belonging to cooperative societies. It is common ground that the Rent Act applies to the premises in question, Section 11 of the Rent Act deals with the fixing of standard rent and Section 12 provides that"a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act",and it lays down procedure for the filing of a suit for the recovery of possession by landlord and for other matters. Section 13 provides that a landlord may recover possession of any premises under certain conditions. Section 28 provides for jurisdiction of the Courts to deal with the suits and proceedings. Section 29 provides for appeals.35. If the matter is heard by the Registrar, none of these provisions would apply. We can hardly imagine that it was the intention of the legislattlre to deprive tenants in buildings owned by co-operative societies of the benefits given by the Rent Act.It seems to us that the Act was passed, in the main, to shorten litigation, lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the societies. But under the Rent Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act.. It seems to us that the two acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply. In view of these considerations we are of the opinion that Section 91 of the Act does not affect the provisions of Section 28 of the Rent Act.36. We may now refer to the incidental points raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant.37. In our opinion, the High Court has jurisdiction to go into the disputed questions of fact and to quash an interlocutory order even though some sort of alternative remedy exists under Sec. 154 of the Act. Section 154 of the Act inter alia enables the State Government to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them. This remedy can hardly be treated as an altemative remedy for the purposes of deciding the questions raised by the petitioners.38. It is not necessary to deal with the third point raised by the learned Counsel for the Bank, namely, that the Registrar when making an order under Section 91 (2) of the Act, is concerned only with the averments in the plaint. Even if it is so it does not disable the petitioners from raising the point that on the facts as presented by them the provisions of Sec. 91 of the Act did not apply to the dispute.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]16. The answer depends on the words used in the Act. Although number of cases have been cited to us on similar expressions contained in various other Acts, both Indian and English, in the first instance, it is advisable to restrict the enquiry to the terms of the enactment itself, because the legislatures have been changing the words and expanding the scope of references to arbitrators or to the Registrars step byIn this case, the society is abank and ordinarily abank cannot be said to be engaged in business when it lets out properties owned byTherefore, it seems to us that the present dispute between a tenant and a member of the bank in a building which has subsaqently been acquired by the Bank cannot be said to be a dispute touching the business of the Bank, and the appeal should fail on this short ground.While we agree that the nature of business which a society does can be ascertained from the objects of the society, it is difficult to subscribe to the proposition that whatever the society does or is necessarily required to do for the purpose of carrying out its objects can be said to be part of its business. We however, agree that the word "touching" is very wide and would include any matter which relates to or concerns the business of a society, but we are doubtful whether the word "affects" should also be used in defining the scope of the word "touching".22. One other limitation on the "dispute" may also be placed and that is that the word "dispute covers only those disputes which are capable of being resolved by the Registrar or his nominee. It seems to us very doubtful that the word "dispute" would include a dispute between a landlord society and a tenant when the landlord society has not been set up for the purpose of constructing or buying and letting out houses. In the presence of various rent Acts which give special privileges to tenants it would be difficult to say that such disputes were intended to be referred to the Registrar.Of course, this result may also follow from the interpretation of the Rent Act and theSocieties Act by applying other principles of construction.The appeal must also fail on the ground that even if it is a dispute touching the business of the society within the meaning of Section 91 (1) of the Act, it is not a dispute between a society and a member or a person claiming through a member.It seems to us that before a person can be said to claim through a member, the claim should arise through a transaction or dealing which the member entered into with the society as a member. If a member entered into a transaction with the society not as a member but as a stranger, then he must be covered, if at all, by the provisions of Section 91(1) (a) or (c). But once it is held that the original transaction was entered into by the member with the society as a member then any person who claims rights or title through that member must come within the provisions of Section 91 (1)reasoning of the Nagpur High Court does not appeal to us. Even if the expression "business of asociety" occurring in the Rule is treated as not restricted to the dealings with the members of the society only but to include business which thesocieties under the law are empowered to transact, this does not mean that whenever a member enters into any transaction whatsoever with the society and a dispute arises out of that transaction then that dispute is a dispute between the society and a member of the society within the meaning of Rule 26. The High Court did not rest its conclusion on the words "or any office" occurring in R. 26, although it referred to the meaning of the word "Officer. Therefore, we need not consider whether the decision can be sustained on that part of the Rule.29. In our opinion, the view expressed by the Madras, Bombay and Kerala High Courts is preferable to the view expressed by the Madhya Pradesh and the Nagpur High Courts.It seems to us that when the original owner executed the lease, he was not acting as a member but as a mortgagor in possession, and therefore, the Banks claim does not fall within Section 91 (1) (b) of theThe scheme of the various Rent Acts and the public policy underlying them are clear; the policy is to give protection to the tenants. Various powers have been conferred on the authorities under the Rent Acts to grant protection to the tenants against ejectment and other reliefs claimed by the landlords.section expressly bars the jurisdiction of other Courts to entertain any suit, proceeding or application between a land. lord and tenant relating to the recovery of possession of any premises and confers jurisdiction on the Courts mentioned in Section 28 to entertain the matter pending before the nominee of the Registrar.was urged before us that the Registrar is also a Court for the purposes of S. 28 of the Rent Act. We need not decide this question because it seems to us that the jurisdiction of the Registrar is ousted on broader considerations.If the matter is heard by the Registrar, none of these provisions would apply. We can hardly imagine that it was the intention of the legislattlre to deprive tenants in buildings owned bysocieties of the benefits given by the Rent Act.It seems to us that the Act was passed, in the main, to shorten litigation, lessen its costs and to provide a summary procedure for the determination of the disputes relating to the internal management of the societies. But under the Rent Act a different social objective is intended to be achieved and for achieving that social objective it is necessary that a dispute between the landlord and the tenant should be dealt with by the Courts set up under the Rent Act and in accordance with the special provisions of the Rent Act. This social objective does not impinge on the objective underlying the Act.. It seems to us that the two acts can be harmonised best by holding that in matters covered by the Rent Act, its provisions, rather than the provisions of the Act, should apply. In view of these considerations we are of the opinion that Section 91 of the Act does not affect the provisions of Section 28 of the Rent Act.In our opinion, the High Court has jurisdiction to go into the disputed questions of fact and to quash an interlocutory order even though some sort of alternative remedy exists under Sec. 154 of the Act. Section 154 of the Act inter alia enables the State Government to call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any other matter of any officer subordinate to them. This remedy can hardly be treated as an altemative remedy for the purposes of deciding the questions raised by the petitioners.38. It is not necessary to deal with the third point raised by the learned Counsel for the Bank, namely, that the Registrar when making an order under Section 91 (2) of the Act, is concerned only with the averments in the plaint. Even if it is so it does not disable the petitioners from raising the point that on the facts as presented by them the provisions of Sec. 91 of the Act did not apply to the dispute.