Case: Ahmedabad Mfg. &amp; Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd Vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand &amp; Ors

the nature of the work done by the malis in this case and that, therefore, the appellant cannot appropriately ask this Court to determine these questions which a awaiting decision by the Industrial Court, also relied on Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar, (1964) 2 SCR 838 = (AIR 1964 SC 355 ) and on J. K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills (supra). In the former case the respondents there employed by a contractor to remove press mud from the sugar factory were held to be workmen employed by the factory because removing press mud was considered ordinarily to be a part of the sugar industry. The latter case is an authority for the proposition that an employee engaged in any work or operation which is incidentally connected with the main industry is a workmen if other requirements of S. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947 are satisfied and that the malis in that case were workers within the meaning of S. 2 of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 28 of 1947.The bungalows and gardens on which the mails in that case worked were a kind of amenity supplied by the mills to its officers and on this reasoning the malis were held to be engaged in operations incidentally connected with the main industry carried on by the employer. It was by relying on the ratio of this decision that the High Court in the present case came to the conclusion that the workers in order to come within the definition of "employee" need not necessarily be directly connected with the manufacture of textile fabrics. This decision is binding on us and indeed Shri Desai also fairly accepted its ratio. He only contended that the malis employed by a contractor unless directly connected with the textile operation cannot get the benefit of this decision.16. In our view on the conclusions of the High Court which have not been shown to be erroneous justifying interference it is not possible to reverse its decision on the basis of the abstract submission advanced by Shri Desai. As observed in J. K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills case, (1964) 3 SCR 724 = (AIR 1964 SC 737 ) (supra), the problem has to be looked at from the considerations of social justice which has become an integral part of our industrial law. This concept of social justice has a comprehensive sweep and it is neither pedantic nor one-sided but is founded on socio-economic equality. It demands a realistic and pragmatic approach for resolving the controversy between capital and labour by weighing it on an even scale with the consciousness that industrial operations in modern times have become complex and complicated and for the efficient and successful functioning of an industry various amenities for those working in it are deemed as essential for a peaceful and healthy atmosphere. The High Court has left open for the decision by the Industrial Court the question as to the nature of the work done by the respondents for determining whether or not, in view of the fact that they are employed through a contractor and not directly, their case falls within S. 3 (13). This is what the High Court has said :"It was urged by Mr. Patel that the garden in which the petitioners were working as gardeners was not situated within the premises of the mill and that the garden area included a large area of offices of some other concerns, a Government Post Office and Museum which were open to public and some quarters for workers as well as assistants and officers of a hospital. It was also urged by Mr. Patel that the garden area comprised of the above buildings and the area round the caustic plant factory as well as the field at Dani Limda in respect of which an agreement was entered into with the contractor for keeping the trees and plants in proper trim. It appears that this contention made on behalf of the mills was not considered by the Industrial Court as it appears from para 7 of the order of the Industrial Court because according to the Industrial Court, looking to the nature of the work done by the petitioners and to the fact that they were not directly employed by the employer but through a contractor, they could not be covered within the scope of Section 3 (13) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Since this contention has not been considered by the Industrial Court, we do not wish to express any opinion as regards the merits of this contention and it would be open to Respondent no. 1 to raise the contention before the Industrial Court which will decide on the merits of the contention if raised.Subject to this, the order of the Second Labour Court Ahmedabad dated 9th August, 1963 passed in Application No. 2005 of 1962 and the order of the Industrial Court, Ahmedabad dated 5th February, 1964 passed in Appeal (I.C.) no. 123 of 1963 must be quashed and set aside and we direct that the matter should now be decided by the Industrial Court in the light of the observations made above."17. There is no cogent ground why this matter should be decided by this Court and not by the Industrial Court in the normal course as directed by the High Court. In our opinion the order of the High Court is legally correct and is also eminently just and fair. We are unable, therefore, to agree with Mr. Desai that this order requires any interference. The principle followed by the High Court is the one which was laid down by this Court in J. K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills case, (1964) 3 SCR 724 = (AIR 964 SC 737) (supra). The decisions of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court were based on misconception of the legal position and the High Court was within its authority to interfere under Art. 227 of the Constitution to quash them.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. Before considering these points it would not be out of place to mention that in the certificate of fitness granted by the High Court is not indication about the precise point or points which induced the High Court to certify the case to be fit for appeal under Clause (c) of Article 133 (1) . This clause though couched in general terms is intended to apply to special cases in which the question raised is of such great public or private importance as deserves appropriately to be authoritatively settled by this Court. This clause of course does not in terms say so but it has always been so construed. The question whether or not to certify a given case to be fit for appeal under this clause is a matter for the judicial discretion of the High Court. The word "certify" used in this clause suggests that the High Court is expected to apply its mind before certifying the case to be fit for appeal. The mere grant of a certificate would, however, not preclude this Court from determining whether the conditions prerequisite for the grant are satisfied. It is, therefore, always desirable and expedient for the High Court to give its reasons for granting the certificate. That would assist this Court better in appreciating if the conditions pre-requisite are satisfied. In the application for certificate in the present case a number of grounds were stated for securing it. We are unable to find from the certificate as to which ground was considered by the High Court to be important enough to justify the certificate.11. Not, in this case the respondents in fact questioned before us the competence of the High Court to grant the certificate of fitness but the objection raised by Shri Shukla was based only on the submission that Article 133 is inapplicable because the impugned order is not a final order. We may first deal with this preliminarydecision, therefore, does not assist us on the precise question raised. The next decision relied upon by Mr. Desai, is reported as Hakim Singh v. J. C. Mills Ltd. 1963 MPLJ 714. In that case the mills had employed a contractor to supply packing material. The contractor because of the nature of his work was given a room in the mills premises for preparing a particular packing material. An employee of the contractor applied to the Industrial Court for relief under the provisions of the Act. It was held that he could not be deemed to be an employee of the mills because the work which was carried on by the employer of the petitioner was not a part of the industrial undertaking. While commenting on the scope of S. 3 (13) (a) and S. 3 (14) (e) of the act which define the words "employee" and "employer", it was said that for the purpose of these provisions, there must be an industrial undertaking owned by somebody: some work, which is ordinary part of the undertaking must have been entrusted by the owner to the contractor: that contractor must be employing an employee: that employee can then by the combined operation of these provisions insist upon being treated as employee of the owner himself, the obvious idea behind this scheme being that the owner of an industrial undertaking should not be allowed to evade responsibilities towards his employees which are imposed by the labour laws, by entrusting a part or whole of the undertaking to a contractor. The actual decision of this case is on different facts and is clearly not of much help though the observations regarding the purpose of the provisions of the definitions admit of no controversy. Reliance was further placed by Shri Desai on the decision of this Court in M/s. Godavari Sugar Mills Ltd. v. D. K. Worlikar, (1960) 3 SCR 305   = (AIR 1960 SC 842  ) where a notification applicable to the manufacture of sugar and its by-products was held not to cover the head-office of the sugar mills at Bombay and the employees engaged there, when the head-office was separated from the factories by hundreds of miles. The notification was held not to cover sugar industry as such. Shri Desai also sought support from Devijibhai M. Chokshi v. Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Co. Ltd. 1958-2 Lab LJ 126 (a decision of the Industrial Court, Bombay) which dealt with running of a retail shop; New India Tannis v. Aurora Singh Mojbi AIR 1957 Cal. 613   a case of doing repairs to the machinery of the factory and from S. M. Ghose v. National Sheet and Metal Works Ltd. AIR 1950 Cal. 548  , a case of an employee of a contractor engaged to paint the premises. Both the Calcutta decisions are under the Workmens Compensation Act.In our view on the conclusions of the High Court which have not been shown to be erroneous justifying interference it is not possible to reverse its decision on the basis of the abstract submission advanced by Shri Desai. As observed in J. K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills case, (1964) 3 SCR 724   = (AIR 1964 SC 737  ) (supra), the problem has to be looked at from the considerations of social justice which has become an integral part of our industrial law. This concept of social justice has a comprehensive sweep and it is neither pedantic nor one-sided but is founded on socio-economic equality. It demands a realistic and pragmatic approach for resolving the controversy between capital and labour by weighing it on an even scale with the consciousness that industrial operations in modern times have become complex and complicated and for the efficient and successful functioning of an industry various amenities for those working in it are deemed as essential for a peaceful and healthy atmosphere. The High Court has left open for the decision by the Industrial Court the question as to the nature of the work done by the respondents for determining whether or not, in view of the fact that they are employed through a contractor and not directly, their case falls within S. 3 (13). This is what the High Court has saidwas urged by Mr. Patel that the garden in which the petitioners were working as gardeners was not situated within the premises of the mill and that the garden area included a large area of offices of some other concerns, a Government Post Office and Museum which were open to public and some quarters for workers as well as assistants and officers of a hospital. It was also urged by Mr. Patel that the garden area comprised of the above buildings and the area round the caustic plant factory as well as the field at Dani Limda in respect of which an agreement was entered into with the contractor for keeping the trees and plants in proper trim. It appears that this contention made on behalf of the mills was not considered by the Industrial Court as it appears from para 7 of the order of the Industrial Court because according to the Industrial Court, looking to the nature of the work done by the petitioners and to the fact that they were not directly employed by the employer but through a contractor, they could not be covered within the scope of Section 3 (13) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Since this contention has not been considered by the Industrial Court, we do not wish to express any opinion as regards the merits of this contention and it would be open to Respondent no. 1 to raise the contention before the Industrial Court which will decide on the merits of the contention if raised.Subject to this, the order of the Second Labour Court Ahmedabad dated 9th August, 1963 passed in Application No. 2005 of 1962 and the order of the Industrial Court, Ahmedabad dated 5th February, 1964 passed in Appeal (I.C.) no. 123 of 1963 must be quashed and set aside and we direct that the matter should now be decided by the Industrial Court in the light of the observations made above.There is no cogent ground why this matter should be decided by this Court and not by the Industrial Court in the normal course as directed by the High Court. In our opinion the order of the High Court is legally correct and is also eminently just and fair. We are unable, therefore, to agree with Mr. Desai that this order requires any interference. The principle followed by the High Court is the one which was laid down by this Court in J. K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills case, (1964) 3 SCR 724   = (AIR 964 SC 737) (supra). The decisions of the Labour Court and the Industrial Court were based on misconception of the legal position and the High Court was within its authority to interfere under Art. 227 of the Constitution to quash them.