Case: Union Of India &amp; Ors Vs. M/S. Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd

of S. 115 of the Evidence Act, it is still open to a party who has acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution.21. In Ahmad Yar Khan v. Secretary of State, (1901) 28 Ind App 211 (PC), the plaintiffs claimed title to a canal supplied with water from the Sutlej having been constructed at great expense by their predecessors for purposes of irrigation with the sanction and encouragement of the Government, partly on Government lands and partly on the lands of private owners under arrangements with them. It was held that the plaintiffs became proprietors of the canal and entitled to have the waters of the Sutlej admitted into it so long as it was used for the purpose for which it was originally designed. Similarly in Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Sourujmull, (1880) LR 5 Cal 669 Garth G. J., observed that a man may be estopped not only from giving particular evidence, but from doing any act or relying upon any particular argument or contention, which the rules of equity and good conscience prevent him from using as against his opponent.22. Counsel for the Union invited our attention to the observations made by Patanjali Sastri, J., in Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay, 1952 SCR 43 = (AIR 1931 SC 469). The learned Judge observed that equity cannot be enforced so as to violate an express statutory provision and he was therefore unable to share the view expressed by Jenkins, C. J., in (1904) ILR 29 Bom 580 In 1952 SCR 43 = (AIR 1951 SC 469 ) the facts were these: Acting upon a representation made by the Government of Bombay, the Municipal Commissioner of Bombay had given up certain old markets and had constructed new markets on a site made available to the Municipality by the Government at considerable expense. The Resolution under which the Government had granted the land stated expressly that no rent should be charged to the Municipality as the markets will be like other buildings for the benefit of the whole community. When the Collector of Bombay sought to enhance the land revenue, the Corporation sued for a declaration that the order of assessment was ultra vires and that it was entitled to hold the land for ever without payment of any assessment. The High Court of Bombay held that the Government had lost its right to assess the land in question because of the equity arising on the facts of the case in favour of the Municipality and a limitation on the right of the Government to assess under S. 8 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act arose. A majority of the Judges of this Court held that the Government was not, under the circumstances of the case, entitled to assess land revenue on the land in question, because the Corporation had taken possession of the land in terms of the Government resolution and had continued in such possession openly, uninterruptedly and as of right for over 70 years, and had thereby acquired the limited title it had been prescribing for during the period, the right to hold the land in perpetuity free of rent. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J., observed that even if it be assumed that there was no representation in fact that the land was rent-free at the time when it was given to the Municipality, if there was a holding out of promise that no rent will be charged in the future, the Government must be deemed in the circumstances of the case to have bound themselves to fulfil it, and a Court of Equity must prevent the perpetration of a legal fraud. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., observed at p. 63 :" Whether it is the equity recognised in Ramsdens case, or it is some other form of equity, is not of much importance, Courts must do justice by the promotion of honesty and good faith, as far as it lies in their power."Patanjali Sastri, J., expressed a contrary view holding that the express provisions of the statute could not be overridden by considerations of equity.23. Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen. We agree with the High Court that the impugned order passed by the Textile Commissioner and confirmed by the Central Government imposing cut in the import entitlement by the respondents should be set aside and quashed and that the Textile Commissioner and the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports be directed to issue to the respondents import certificates for the total amount equal to 100 per cent of the f. o. b value of the goods exported by them unless there is some decision which falls within Clause 10 of the Scheme in question.24. The facts which give rise to the ether appeals are substantially the same as the facts in Civil Appeal No. 885 of 1967 except that in four out of those appeals the exporters had appeared before the Committee appointed by the Textile Commissioner and had explained the circumstances in which the exports were made by them. But it is common ground that the report of the Committee was not made available to them and the Textile Commissioner, before he passed the orders, did not call for their explanations. It must therefore be held that enquiry in a manner consonant with the rules of justice was not made in the case of those four exporters also.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]are unable to accede to the contention that the executive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment. Under our constitutionalno person may be deprived of his right or liberty except in due course of and by authority of law: if a member of the executive seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or liberty otherwise than in exercise of power derived from the lawcommon or statutethe Courts will be competent to, and indeed would be bound to, protect the rights of the aggrieved citizen.11. The orders which the Central Government may issue in exercise of the power conferred by Section 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act may be executive or legislative. In exercise of that power, the Order was issued on December 7, 1955, that was clearly legislative in character. It appears that prior to the issuance of this notification several orders had been issued under the Defence of India Rules and under the Imports and Exports Act dealing with the grant of licences to import certain classes of goods. Those orders which are set out in the IVth Schedule to the Order were repealed by Clause 12 of the Order of 1955, and machinery for granting licences was set up by the Order dated December 7, 1955.It cannot he assumed merely because the Imports Trade Policy is general in terms and deals with the grant of licences for import of goods and related matters, it is statutory in character. The Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, authorises the Central Government to make provisions prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling impost, export, carriage etc. of the goods and by the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, dated December 7, 1955, and by the provisions which were sought to be repealed restrictions already imposed. The order was clearly legislative in character. The Import Trade Policy was evolved to facilitate the mechanism of the Act and the orders issued thereunder. Even granting that the Import Trade Policy notifications were issued in exercise of the power under Section 3 of the imports and Exports (Control) Act, l947, the order as already observed authorised the making of executive or administrative instructions as well as legislative directions. It is not the form of the order, the method of its publication or the source of its authority, but its substance, which determines its true character.A large majority of the paragraphs of the Import and Export Schemes are in the form of instructions to departmental officers and advice to persons engaged in the export and import business with their foreign Counterparts. It may be possible to pick out paragraphs from the Scheme which appear in isolation to be addressed generally and have direct impact upon the rights and liberties of the citizens. But a large number of paragraphs of the Scheme refer to matters of procedure of departmental officers and heterogeneous material: it sets out forms of applications, the designations of licensing authorities, amounts of application and licensing fees, last dates for applications, intermixed with definitions of Established Importers, Actual users, New comers and others and details of different schemes such as Quota Registration Schemes, Export Promotion Schemes etc. There is no pattern of order or logical sequence in the policy statement: it is a jumble of executive instructions and matters which impose several restrictions upon the rights of citizens. Some of the provisions which impose restrictions upon citizens in the exercise of their right to carry on trade without statutory limits may be open to serious objections, but we do not find it necessary to embark upon an enquiry whether the provisions which authorises the issue of import entitlement certificate for the full f. o. b. value of the goods exported is legislative in character. Granting that it is executive in character, this Court has held that the Courts have the power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the Schemes upon the departmental authorities.In these cases it was clearly ruled that where a person has acted upon representations made in an Export Promotion Scheme that import licences upto the value of the goods exported will be issued, and had exported goods, his claim for import licence for the maximum value permissible by the Scheme could not be arbitrarily rejected. Reduction in the amount of import certificate may be justified on the ground of misconduct of the exporter in relation to the goods exported, or on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position or other matters which have a bearing on the general interests of the State. In the present case, the Scheme provides for grant of import entitlement of the value, and not upto the value, of the goods exported. The Textile Commissioner was, therefore, in the ordinary course required to grant import certificate for the full value of the goods exported he could only reduce that amount after enquiry contemplated by Clause 10 of the Scheme.In each of the three cases, the Court observed that the Court was competent to grant relief in appropriate cases, if, contrary to the Scheme, the authority declined to grant a licence or import certificate or the authority acted, arbitrarily. Therefore even assuming that the provisions relating to the issue of Trade Notices offering inducement to the prospective exporters are in character executive,the Union Government and its officers are, on the authorities of this Court not entitled at their mere whim to ignore the promises made by the Government. We cannot therefore accept the plea that the Textile Commissioner is the sole judge of the quantum of import licence to be granted to an exporter, and that the Courts are powerless to grant relief, if the promised import licence is not given to an exporter who has acted to his prejudice relying upon the representation. To concede to the Departmental authorities that power would be to strike at the very root of the rule of law.17. By the Export Promotion Scheme for woollen textiles as extended to exports to Afghanistan, the exporters were invited to get themselves registered with the Textile Commissioner for exporting woollen goods, and it was represented that the exporters will be entitles to import raw materials of the total amount equal to 100 per cent of the f. o. b. value of the exports. Machinery for scrutiny of the applications and the issue of import entitlement was provided by Section 9 of the Scheme, and the Textile Commissioner was invested with the authority to determine whether in any given case the declared value of the goods exported was higher than the real value of the goods and to assess the correct value of the goods exported and to issue import certificates on the basis of such assessed value Undoubtedly the Textile Commissioner had authority, if it was found that a fraudulent attempt was made to secure an import certificate in excess of the true value of the goods exported to reduce the import certificate. But the authority vested in the Textile Commissioner by the rules even though executive in character was from its nature an authority to deal with the matter in manner consonant with the basic concept of justice and fairplay, if he made an order which was not consonant with the basic concepts of justice and fairplay his proceeding was open to scrutiny and rectification by the Courts. The Textile Commissioner acted upon a report of the Committee appointed by him and before that Committee the respondents had no opportunity to present their case. He collected evidence ex parte and did not disclose it to the respondents and without giving an opportunity to them to represent their case reduced the import certificate. In dealing with a representation made by the respondent, the Government of India also declined either to make available the evidence on which the Textile Commissioner had acted or to give a hearing to the respondents. The Textile Commissioner and the Union of India did not purport to act in exercise of the power under Clause 10 of the Scheme: they have sought to support the order on the plea that the subjective satisfaction, of the Textile Commissioner is determinative of the extent of the import certificate which may be granted to thethe respondents are not seeking to enforce any contractual right they are seeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which is laid upon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the Scheme and we are of the view that even if the Scheme is executive in character,the respondents who were aggrieved because of the failure to carry out the terms of the Scheme were entitled to seek resort to the Court and claim that the obligation imposed upon the Textile Commissioner by the Scheme be ordered to be carried out.19. We hold that the claim of the respondents is appropriately founded upon the equity which arises in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the Union of India in the Export Promotion Scheme, and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the belief that the Government would Carry out the representation made by it. On the facts proved in this case, no ground has been suggested before the Court for exempting the Government from the equity arising out of the acts done by the exporters to their prejudice relying upon the representation. This principle has been recognised by the Courts in India and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in several cases. In Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. Secretary of State. (1904) ILR 29 Bom 580 it was held by the Bombay High Court that even though there is no formal contract as required by the statute, the Government may be bound by a representation made by it. In that case in answer to a requisition by the Government of Bombay addressed to the Municipal Commissioner to remove certain fish and vegetable markets to facilitate the construction of an arterial road, the Municipal Commissioner offered to remove the structures if the Government would agree to rent to the Municipality other land mentioned in his letter at a nominal rent. The Government accepted the suggestion and sanctioned the application of the Municipal Commissioner for a site for stabling and establishing the new markets. The Municipal Commissioner then took possession of the land so made available and constructed stables, workshops and chawls thereon.years thereafter the Government of Bombay served notices on the Municipal Commissioner determining the tenancy and requesting the Commissioner to deliver possession of the land occupied by the markets, and to pay in the meantime rent at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per annum. The Municipality declined to pay the rent and the Secretary of State for India filed a suit against the Municipal Commissioner for a declaration that the tenancy of the Municipality created by Government Resolution of December 9, 1865, stood determined and for an order to pay rent at the rate of Rs 12,000 per annum. It was urged before the High Court of Bombay that the events which had transpired had created an equity in favour of the Municipality which afforded an answer to the claim of the Government to eject the Municipality Jenkins. C. J., delivering the judgment of the Courtdoctrine involved in this phase of the case is often treated as one of estoppel, but I doubt whether this is a correct, though it may be a convenient name to apply.It differs essentially from the doctrine embodied in Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act, which is not a rule of equity but is a rule of evidence that was formulated and applied in Courts of law; while the doctrine with which I am now dealing, takes its origin from the jurisdiction assumed by Courts of Equity to intervene in the case of, or to preventreferring to Ramsdenv. Dyson, (1866) LR 1 HL 129 (170)the learned Chief Justice observed that the Crown comes within the range of equity and proceeded to examine whether the facts of the case invited the application of that principle.20. This case, is in our judgment, a clear authority that even though the case does not fall within the terms of S. 115 of the Evidence Act, it is still open to a party who has acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution.Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen. We agree with the High Court that the impugned order passed by the Textile Commissioner and confirmed by the Central Government imposing cut in the import entitlement by the respondents should be set aside and quashed and that the Textile Commissioner and the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports be directed to issue to the respondents import certificates for the total amount equal to 100 per cent of the f. o. b value of the goods exported by them unless there is some decision which falls within Clause 10 of the Scheme in question.24. The facts which give rise to the ether appeals are substantially the same as the facts in Civil Appeal No. 885 of 1967 except that in four out of those appeals the exporters had appeared before the Committee appointed by the Textile Commissioner and had explained the circumstances in which the exports were made by them. But it is common ground that the report of the Committee was not made available to them and the Textile Commissioner, before he passed the orders, did not call for their explanations. It must therefore be held that enquiry in a manner consonant with the rules of justice was not made in the case of those four exporters also.