Case: Maloon Lawrence Cecil D' Souza Vs. Union Of India &amp; Ors

seniority list was according issued.5. The petition has been resisted by the respondents and the affidavit of P. S. Mehra. Under-Secretary to the Government of India. Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue and Insurance has been filed in opposition to the petition.6. It has been argued by Mr. Ram Panjwani on behalf of the petitioner that as he was promoted Assistant Commissioner on August 19, 1955 while respondents 4 to 26 were promoted to that post subsequent to that date, the petitioner should be shown senior to those respondents. We find it difficult in accede to this contention. The fact that the petitioner was promoted as Assistant Commissioner prior to respondents 4 to 26 would not make him senior to respondents 4 to 26 because according to the seniority list issued on the basis of 1952 Seniority Rules the above mentioned respondents were senior to the petitioners. The seniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondent 4 to 26 has to be determined in the light of proposition No. 2 laid down by this Court in Karniks case. AIR 1970 SC 2092 (supra), according to which between an officer promoted earlier and another officer senior to him, but who was not considered in the meeting when the former was promoted, seniority in the list of Income-tax Officers will be reflected in the higher cadre. As respondents 4 to 26 were admittedly shown senior to the petitioner in the list as on October 1, 1956 prepared in accordance with 1952 Rules, their seniority qua the petitioner would be reflected in the higher cadre of Assistant Commissioners. It has not been shown to us that the names of respondents 4 to 26 were also considered in the meeting wherein a decision was taken to promote the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner, Assuming that a decision to promote respondents 4 to 26 to the posts of Assistant Commissioners was taken at the same meeting in which it was decided to promote the petitioner, in that event proposition No. 1 in Karniks case (supra) would be attracted. Even in such a contingency the seniority of respondents 4 to 26 qua the petitioner would be reflected in the list of Assistant Commissioners. In the seniority list of Assistant Commissioners issued in 1958. the petition was shown junior to respondents 4 to 26 in conformity with the Seniority list of 1956. In the matter of confirmation to the post of Assistant Commissioner six out of respondent 4 to 26 were confirmed earlier than the petitioner, while the rest of them were confirmed at the same time, as the petitioner. The impugned list of seniority circulated in 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitioner and respondents 4 to 26 as determined in 1956.7. The case of S. K. Ghosh v. Union of India. (1968) 3 SCR 631 = (AIR 1968 SC 1385 ) to which reference has been made on behalf of the petitioners can be of no assistance to him as that case related to rules for recruitment to the grade of Directors of Postal Service in Indian postal Service. So far as the seniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondent 4 to 26 is concerned the matter is governed by 1952 Seniority Rules and those rules as already mentioned have been the subject of the decision of this court in Karniks case. AIR 1970 SC. 2092 (supra). In view of the direct decision of this Court relating to the precise question with which we are concerned it is not necessary, in our opinion, to refer to other rules.8. The matter can also be looked at from another angle. The seniority of the petitioner qua respondents 4 to 26 was determined as long ago as 1956 in accordance with 1952 Rules. The said seniority was reiterated in the seniority list issued in 1958. The present writ petition was filed in 1971.The petitioner in our opinion, cannot be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years. The fact that a seniority list was issued in 1971 in pursuance of the decision of this Court in Karniks case AIR 1970 SC 2092 (supra) would not clothe the petitioner with a fresh right to challenge the fixation of his seniority qua respondents 4 to 26 as the seniority list of 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitioner qua those respondents as already determined in 1956.Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst public servants because of stale claims made after lapse of 14 or 15 years. It is essential that any one who feels aggrieved with an administrative decision affecting ones seniority should act with due diligence and promptitude and not sleep over the matter. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner before us for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but that representation was rejected in 1961. No cogent ground has been shown as to why the petitioner became quiescent and took no diligent steps to obtain redress.9. Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapses of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like ones position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Baking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We find it difficult in accede to this contention. The fact that the petitioner was promoted as Assistant Commissioner prior to respondents 4 to 26 would not make him senior to respondents 4 to 26 because according to the seniority list issued on the basis of 1952 Seniority Rules the above mentioned respondents were senior to theseniority of the petitioner vis-a-vis respondent 4 to 26 has to be determined in the light of proposition No. 2 laid down by this Court in Karniks case. AIR 1970 SC 2092  (supra), according to which between an officer promoted earlier and another officer senior to him, but who was not considered in the meeting when the former was promoted, seniority in the list of Income-tax Officers will be reflected in the higher cadre. As respondents 4 to 26 were admittedly shown senior to the petitioner in the list as on October 1, 1956 prepared in accordance with 1952 Rules, their seniority qua the petitioner would be reflected in the higher cadre of Assistant Commissioners. It has not been shown to us that the names of respondents 4 to 26 were also considered in the meeting wherein a decision was taken to promote the petitioner as Assistant Commissioner, Assuming that a decision to promote respondents 4 to 26 to the posts of Assistant Commissioners was taken at the same meeting in which it was decided to promote the petitioner, in that event proposition No. 1 in Karniks case (supra) would be attracted. Even in such a contingency the seniority of respondents 4 to 26 qua the petitioner would be reflected in the list of Assistant Commissioners. In the seniority list of Assistant Commissioners issued in 1958. the petition was shown junior to respondents 4 to 26 in conformity with the Seniority list of 1956. In the matter of confirmation to the post of Assistant Commissioner six out of respondent 4 to 26 were confirmed earlier than the petitioner, while the rest of them were confirmed at the same time, as the petitioner. The impugned list of seniority circulated in 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitioner and respondents 4 to 26 as determined in 1956.The matter can also be looked at from another angle. The seniority of the petitioner qua respondents 4 to 26 was determined as long ago as 1956 in accordance with 1952 Rules. The said seniority was reiterated in the seniority list issued in 1958. The present writ petition was filed in 1971.The petitioner in our opinion, cannot be allowed to challenge the seniority list after lapse of so many years. The fact that a seniority list was issued in 1971 in pursuance of the decision of this Court in Karniks case AIR 1970 SC 2092  (supra) would not clothe the petitioner with a fresh right to challenge the fixation of his seniority qua respondents 4 to 26 as the seniority list of 1971 merely reflected the seniority of the petitioner qua those respondents as already determined in 1956.Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there should be no sense of uncertainty amongst public servants because of stale claims made after lapse of 14 or 15 years. It is essential that any one who feels aggrieved with an administrative decision affecting ones seniority should act with due diligence and promptitude and not sleep over the matter. No satisfactory explanation has been furnished by the petitioner before us for the inordinate delay in approaching the Court. It is no doubt true that he made a representation against the seniority list issued in 1956 and 1958 but that representation was rejected in 1961. No cogent ground has been shown as to why the petitioner became quiescent and took no diligent steps to obtain redress.9. Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapses of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like ones position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Baking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of someview of the direct decision of this Court relating to the precise question with which we are concerned it is not necessary, in our opinion, to refer to other rules.