Case: State Of Bombay Vs. Sardar Venkat Rao Krishna Rao Gujar

for grant of certificate. All the same we allowed Mr. Bindra to urge the contention that ottas and chabutras are not included in the term "buildings" in S. 5(a) of the Act.9. The relevant portion of S. 5(a) of the Act reads thus:"Subject to the provisions in Ss. 47 and 63 - all open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes and in continuous possession for twelve years immediately before 1948-49; all open house-sites purchased for consideration; all buildings; within the limits of a village site belonging to or held by the outgoing proprietor or any other person shall continue to belong to or be held by such proprietor or other person, as the case may be; and the land thereof with areas appurtenant thereto shall be settled with him the State Government on such terms and conditions as it may determine:""Village site" means the abadi in an estate or a mahal.10. Section 5(a) is an exception to S. 4(1)(a) of the Act. No doubt, S 4(1)(a) provides for the vesting in the State of the land on which bazar is held. But reading that section along with S. 5(a) it is clear that where any buildings belonging to the proprietor exist on any portion of the abadi land that land, together with the land appurtenant to those building, had to be settled with the ex-proprietor. Land on which the bazar is held is part of the village abadi land and therefore, all buildings standing on such land would fall within S. 5(a) of the Act and would have to be settled with the ex-proprietor.11. The only question, therefore, is whether ottas and chabutras can be regarded as buildings. A perusal of that provision would show that where the ex-proprietor has spent money on constructing something within the limits of the village sites, that thing had to be settled with him. The word "buildings" should, therefore, be given its literal meaning as something which is built. Mr. Bindras contention, however, is that for a structure to be regarded as a building, it should have walls and a roof and in support of this contention he relied upon the decision in Moir v. Williams, (1892) 1 QB 264. In that case Lord Esher has observed that the building generally means all enclosures of brick and stone covered by a roof. But he has also made it clear that the meaning to be given to that word must depend upon the enactment in which the word is used and the context in which it is used. There, what was being considered was, the provisions of the Metropolitan Buildings Act, 1855 (18 and 19 Vict. c. 122) which dealt with residential houses. He also relied upon the decision in Morrison v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 1915-1 KB716 at p. 722. That was a case under the Finance (1909-10) Act, 1910 (10 Miw. 7, c. 8). The observations on which he relied are as follows:"It is quite clear that the expression buildings does not mean everything that can by any means be described as built; it means buildings in a more narrow sense than structures, because there are other structures of a limited class which under the terms of the sub-section may also be taken into consideration.:Far from these observations helping him they clearly show that the natural or ordinary meaning to be given to the word "buildings" is something which has been built That meaning would be modified if the provisions of law justify giving some other meaning. Finally he relied upon the decision in Samuel Small v. Parkway Auto Supplies, 49 Am LR 1363. The observations relied on by him are as follows:"The word building in its ordinary sense denotes a structure of edifice including a space within its walls and usually covered with a roof, such as a house, a church, a shop, a barn or a shed.* * * *The word building cannot be held to include every species of erection on land, such as fences, gates or other like structures. Taken in its broadest sense, it can mean only an erection intended for use and occupation as a habitation or for some purpose of trade, manufacture, ornament or use, constituting a fabric, such as a house, a store, a church a shed ..........."These observations must be considered in the context of the Act which was being construed and in the context in which they were made. There the Court had to consider whether erection of gasoline pumps and construction of underground gasoline tanks and pits with concrete sides sunken in the ground are within a restrictive covenant that no building of any kind shall be erected or maintained within a certain distance of a street. In the particular context buildings had, according to the Court, to be given it popular meaning. That case, therefore, does not assist the appellants.12. In our opinion the High Court was quite right in holding that even uncovered ottas and chabutras fall within the term "building" as used in S. 5(a) of the Act and, therefore, along with the land appurtenant to them they must be settled with the respondent.13. Mr. Bindra pointed out that the High Court was in error in asking the Government to settle the whole of Khasra No. 61/1 on the respondent because whereas its area is 12,85 acres, the land covered by the structures, including the appurtenant land, does not measure more than 2.85 acres. Mr. Purshottam Trikamdas, learned counsel for the respondent readily conceded this fact and said that the High Court has committed an error through an oversight and that all that the respondent wants is 2.85 acres of land and nothing more. Mr. Bindra then said that it would not be proper to give a direction to the Government to settle any particular area of the land and it should be left to the revenue authorities to determine the precise area covered by the structures and the passages separating these various structures. We agree with him.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It would also appear from grounds 5 and 6 in the special leave petition that what was really sought to be urged before this Court was the contention actually pressed by the learned Advocate-General in support of the application for grant of certificate.Section 5(a) is an exception to S. 4(1)(a) of the Act. No doubt, S 4(1)(a) provides for the vesting in the State of the land on which bazar is held. But reading that section along with S. 5(a) it is clear that where any buildings belonging to the proprietor exist on any portion of the abadi land that land, together with the land appurtenant to those building, had to be settled with the ex-proprietor. Land on which the bazar is held is part of the village abadi land and therefore, all buildings standing on such land would fall within S. 5(a) of the Act and would have to be settled with theperusal of that provision would show that where the ex-proprietor has spent money on constructing something within the limits of the village sites, that thing had to be settled with him. The word "buildings" should, therefore, be given its literal meaning as something which isobservations must be considered in the context of the Act which was being construed and in the context in which they were made. There the Court had to consider whether erection of gasoline pumps and construction of underground gasoline tanks and pits with concrete sides sunken in the ground are within a restrictive covenant that no building of any kind shall be erected or maintained within a certain distance of a street. In the particular context buildings had, according to the Court, to be given it popular meaning. That case, therefore, does not assist the appellants.12. In our opinion the High Court was quite right in holding that even uncovered ottas and chabutras fall within the term "building" as used in S. 5(a) of the Act and, therefore, along with the land appurtenant to them they must be settled with the respondent.