Case: Pandit Shree Krishna Selot Vs. Ramcharan Pujari

election was materially affected so far as it concerned the appellant. On issue No. 8(e) the appellant examined Nanhe (P.W. 33), Puttobai (P.W. 34), Mst. Parvatibai (P.W. 37) and Nanda (P.W. 38) who all stated that Laxman Namdeo had induced them to vote for the Jan Sangh candidate inside the polling booth. The High Court found the evidence of these witnesses to be unreliable. Mr. Rameshwar Nath took us through the evidence of these witnesses and we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court on this point.7. With regard to issue No. 4, Mr. Rameshwar Nath confined his argument to the meeting of 16th February, 1967 held at village Bara. The allegation of the appellant is that the respondent and Kunjansingh had addressed a meeting in the market at Bara on 16-2-1967 and distributed the hand-bills similar to Ex. P. 1 there. It is admitted by the respondent that he had addressed the meeting. But he denied having made any appeal on the ground of religion and has denied that the hand-bill Ex. P. 1 had been distributed there. The appellant examined five witnesses, Balmakund (P.W. 18), Ghasiram (P.W. 19). Jagannath Prasad Jain (P. W. 20), Motilal (P.W. 21) and Nathulal (P.W. 22), in support of his case on this point. Except Jagannath Prasad all other witnesses said that in the speech delivered by the respondent it was stated that "to cast one vote in favour of Congress was committing the sin of killing a cow". The High Court has held that no such allegation was made in the election petition, and so, the evidence of P.Ws. 18, 19, 21 and 22 on this point could not be believed. As regards the distribution of hand-bills, the oral evidence is conflicting to some extent. P.W. 19 and P.W. 21 said that after Ramcharan Pujari and Kunjansingh addressed the meeting, hand-bills similar to Ex.P. 1 were distributed by the appellant. Jagannath Prasad (P.W. 20) did not say anything about the distribution of any hand-bills. Balmukand (P.W. 18) said that Ramcharan Pujari addressed the meeting but the distribution of hand-bills was made by both the respondent and Kunjansingh. Nathulal (P. W. 21) said that only respondent had addressed the meeting and he only distributed the hand-bills. In rebuttal of the evidence, Ramcharan Pujari examined himself and one more witness Hazarilal Tamrakar (R.W. 4). On scrutiny of the evidence given by both the parties in the case, the High Court has reached the conclusion that the evidence given on behalf of the appellant was not credible and there was no proof that on 16-2-1967 the respondent made any appeal on the ground of religion in the meeting held at Bara market. The High Court further held that the distribution of hand-bills similar to Ex.P. 1 was not established. We see no reason to differ from the finding of the High Court.But even on the assumption that the evidence adduced by the appellant is true, the case will not fall within the mischief of Section 123(2)(a)(ii) and (b) of the Act, which read as follows :"123. The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act :X X X X XX X X X XX X X X X(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his election agent, or of any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of any electoral right :Provided that -(a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause any such person as is referred to therein who -X X X X X(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure,shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause;(b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause".8. According to the appellants evidence the respondent said at the meeting "Congress Government slaughters the cows. She spoils the culture of Hindu religion. Hindu religion cannot be protected by Congress". "If one vote is cast for Congress, it is equal to slaughter of a cow". (See the evidence of P.W. 18, Balmakund). In Ex.P. 1, it is said that "Congress wants to continue the slaughter of bullocks". It is not the allegation of the appellant that the respondent said that "the voters will commit the sin of cows-slaughter if they vote for Congress". On the contrary the allegation is that the Congress Party was out to kill the bullocks and cows. The leaflet Ex.P. 1 is levelled against the Congress Party, and there is no invocation of divine displeasure upon the voters who chose to vote for the Congress Party. It follows that the case does not fall within the definition of "undue influence" under Section 123(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. Mr. Rameshwar Nath referred to the decision of this Court in Narbada Prasad v. Chhagan Lal & Others where it was held that the statement "if the voters voted for the Congress Party they would be committing the sin of go-hatya", was tantamount to an attempt to induce the voters to believe that they would become or would be rendered an object of divine displeasure within the meaning of Section 123(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. As we have already pointed out, the alleged statement of the respondent in the present case is different and the principle laid down by this Court in Narbada Prasads case (supra) is not applicable. We hold that issue No. 4 was rightly answered against the appellant.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]As regards Issue No. 12, two witnesses Ram Singh (P.W. 41) and Dhokal (P.W. 42) were examined on behalf of the appellants. Ramsingh deposed that in the last election he worked as a poling agent of the appellant at Kharmau polling station. The respondent had given him Rs. 35/- two or three days before the date of the polling. The respondent had told him at that time that he should secure the votes of his acquaintances for him without any payment. If he could not succeed in such an attempt, then he should pay Re. 1/- to each voter and get his vote polled for the respondent. In cross-examination, Ramsingh admitted that he had not rendered any account of Rs. 35/- which he had received from Ramcharan Pujari, Dhokal (P.W. 42) said that he received Re. 1/- from Ramsingh to vote for the respondent and his wife had also received Re. 1/- from Ramsingh. In cross-examination he admitted that Ramsingh straight away told him that he should vote for "Deepak" and gave Re. 1/- each to him and to his wife. According to Dhokal, no attempt was at all made by Ramsingh to persuade him to vote for Ramcharan Pujari without any payment. It is manifest that both Ramsingh and Dhokal are participants in an illegal act and therefore unless there is some independent corroboration of their evidence it is not possible to place reliance thereon. No such corroborative evidence was produced in this case on behalf of the appellant. The High Court was not hence prepared to accept the statement of either Ramsingh or Dhokal as truthful. We see no reason to differ from the High Court in its estimate regarding the credibility of the two witnesses. We hold that Issue No. 12 was rightly decided by the High Court against the appellant.appellant.5. As regards Issue No. 5, the appellant has examined G.S. Chhina (P.W. 29), S. O. Baratha, Sukhdin (P.W. 44), Jamuna Pradas (P.W. 45) and Bandolal (P.W. 50). The evidence of G.S. Chhina (P.W. 29) is to the effect that the respondent had convened a meeting in the Jain Temple at Baratha and his workers Khubchand (P.W. 11) and Dr. Deepchand (P.W. 12) were present at the meeting. Khubchand told the meeting that member of the Jain Community should vote for the Jan Sangh candidate and not for the Congress candidate as the Congress was not preventing the slaughter of cows which was against the principle of Ahimsa. It is alleged that after the said appeal the Jain voters were asked to take oath to vote for the Jan Sangh candidate and not for the Congress candidate. The High Court has disbelieved the evidence of G.S. Chhina (P.W. 29) holding that there was no adequate reason why the witness should go to Jain Temple on that day for purpose of attending the meeting. As regards Sukhdin (P.W. 44) and Jamuna Prasad (P.W. 45), the High Court observed that the story of the oath being taken by the Jain voters was not mentioned in the election petition and was a subsequent development. Jamuna Prasad (P.W. 45) referred in support of his evidence to a letter Ex.P. 12 said to have been written on 16-2-1967 by the witness to his relation Bandolal (P.W. 50). The High Court has held that Ex.P. 12 was concocted subsequently for the purpose of this case and that the evidence of Jamuna Prasad (P.W. 45) and Bandolal (P.W. 50) as regard Ex.P. 12 was false. Mr. Rameshwar Nath read the contents of the original letter Ex.P. 12 during the course of the hearing. The language of the letter suggest that it was carefully drafted after taking legal advice and could not have been written in the normal course of Jamuna Prasad (P.W. 45). In our opinion, the High Court has taken a correct view of the evidence and this issue must be answered against the appellant.6. With regard to issue No. 8, the finding of the High Court is that Laxman Ramdeo, Presiding Officer, was an old associate of the respondent and was detained along with him in jail about the year 1947-48. The High Court further held that an oral warning was given to Laxman Ramdeo not to campaign for Jan Sangh candidate. As regards the change of the polling booth, the High Court has found that the place of polling booth at Mudari Bujurg was changed to the new school about half a furlong away from the old school. But there is not allegation made in the election petition that due to the change of place of voting, the result of the election so far as it concerned the respondent had been materially affected. According to Section 100 (i)(d)(iv) of the Act if there had been any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of the Act or any rules or orders made under the Act, the appellant must show that the result of the election in so far it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected, if he wants the election of the returned candidate to be declared void. There is no evidence on this point and even assuming that the polling booth was first fixed to be the old school and it was subsequently changed by Laxman Namdeo without the permission of the appropriate authority, the election cannot be held to be void in the absence of any proof that the result of the election was materially affected so far as it concerned the appellant. On issue No. 8(e) the appellant examined Nanhe (P.W. 33), Puttobai (P.W. 34), Mst. Parvatibai (P.W. 37) and Nanda (P.W. 38) who all stated that Laxman Namdeo had induced them to vote for the Jan Sangh candidate inside the polling booth. The High Court found the evidence of these witnesses to be unreliable. Mr. Rameshwar Nath took us through the evidence of these witnesses and we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the High Court on thisscrutiny of the evidence given by both the parties in the case, the High Court has reached the conclusion that the evidence given on behalf of the appellant was not credible and there was no proof that on 16-2-1967 the respondent made any appeal on the ground of religion in the meeting held at Bara market. The High Court further held that the distribution of hand-bills similar to Ex.P. 1 was not established. We see no reason to differ from the finding of the High Court.But even on the assumption that the evidence adduced by the appellant is true, the case will not fall within the mischief of Section 123(2)(a)(ii) and (b) of the Act, which read as followsThe following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act :X X X X XX X X X XX X X X X(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his election agent, or of any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of any electoral right :Provided that -(a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause any such person as is referred to therein who -X X X X X(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure,shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause;(b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause".According to the appellants evidence the respondent said at the meeting "Congress Government slaughters the cows. She spoils the culture of Hindu religion. Hindu religion cannot be protected by Congress". "If one vote is cast for Congress, it is equal to slaughter of a cow". (See the evidence of P.W. 18, Balmakund). In Ex.P. 1, it is said that "Congress wants to continue the slaughter of bullocks". It is not the allegation of the appellant that the respondent said that "the voters will commit the sin of cows-slaughter if they vote for Congress". On the contrary the allegation is that the Congress Party was out to kill the bullocks and cows. The leaflet Ex.P. 1 is levelled against the Congress Party, and there is no invocation of divine displeasure upon the voters who chose to vote for the Congress Party. It follows that the case does not fall within the definition of "undue influence" under Section 123(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. Mr. Rameshwar Nath referred to the decision of this Court in Narbada Prasad v. Chhagan Lal & Others where it was held that the statement "if the voters voted for the Congress Party they would be committing the sin of go-hatya", was tantamount to an attempt to induce the voters to believe that they would become or would be rendered an object of divine displeasure within the meaning of Section 123(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. As we have already pointed out, the alleged statement of the respondent in the present case is different and the principle laid down by this Court in Narbada Prasads case (supra) is not applicable. We hold that issue No. 4 was rightly answered against the appellant.