Case: RAJINDER KUMAR BANSAL &amp; ORS Vs. MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE &amp; ORS

entitled to possession even though the purpose may not be on that falls under Section 10(3)(a)(i)(ii) and (iii). Sub-section 10(3)(c) would also support the construction which I am putting on it, as the landlord who is occupying only a part of the building may apply to the Controller for an order directing a tenant occupying a portion of the building to put the landlord in possession if he required additional accommodation for residential purposes of or purposes of a business which he is carrying on. The purport of this sub-section would be that if the landlord is in occupation of a portion of a residential or non- residential building he would be entitled to the other portion, and I see no warrant in the section for restricting his right to activities which are commercial in nature. 8. ……..On a consideration of the decisions and on a consideration of the submissions made by the learned Counsel on either side, I am satisfied that the learned District Judge was right in holding that the carrying on the Thanneerpandal activity would be for purposes of business as required under Section (3) (a)(iii) of the Act. 12. We find that the High Court has distinguished the Full Bench judgment in Model Town Welfare Council not for good reasons. The rented land as defined in Section 2(f) of the Punjab Act is pari materia with definition of rented land in the Act. It has been held that the expression business appearing in Section 2(f) need not necessarily be commercial business carried on with a profit motive. The word includes within its scope a charitable business or a dealing in the interest of public or a section of the public. Therefore, use of land as club for a pavilion is in interest of section of the public. Thus, land let out to a club which for the purpose of construction and use of pavilion falls within the scope of Section 2(f) of the Act and thus eviction petition is maintainable under the Act. 13. The judgment in Haji Ismail Valid Mohmad was a case where the premises were let out to a club to hold entertainment programmes and music concerts. It was found that the activities of club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. A perusal of the said judgment shows that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 apply to premises let out to residence, education, business, trade or storage and also open land let out for building purposes. The argument was raised that the premises were let out for purposes of education. However, the High Court took the view that the premises let out to tenant were for promoting cultural activities. Therefore, the tenant was entitled to protection of Section 6 of the Act. It was the said finding which was reversed by the Court, the Court has held as under: 16. We regret, we cannot agree with this conclusion of law. The activities of the club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. They are certainly not for education. In our view, in the context in which the term education appears, it does not refer to such cultural activities or recreational activities as amounting to education. The basic purpose of the club activities relate to fraternizing among the members by playing indoor or outdoor games or otherwise. Such activities cannot lead to the conclusion that the premises were let for purposes of education and consequently the respondent/tenant was not entitled to the protection of the Act. We are thus constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the judgment of the lower appellate court and restore the judgment dated August 30, 1974 passed by the learned trial court. The appeal is allowed with costs. 14. The High Court has also relied upon Supreme Court judgments reported as Narain Swadeshi Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax AIR 1955 SC 176 , Senairam Doongarmall v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1961 SC 1579 , Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh AIR 1964 SC 1533 , as well as the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as Hazara Singh. The judgment reported in Senairam Doongarmall arises out of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 to determine the business income. The judgment reported as Narain Swadeshi Mills is to determine the existence of business under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. The judgment reported as Manipur Administration pertains to a control order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Each of the statute is enacted for a particular objective in mind. The definition in one statute cannot be used for interpreting the same word in another statute. The judgment of the High Court in Hazara Singh is renting of an agricultural land though within the municipal area. All these judgments are clearly not applicable to the present case where the rented land was let out to a club with an implied permission to construct. The Tenant has constructed a pavilion in the year 1911 and the said pavilion was mortgaged to the District Board. The District Boards were constituted as part of local self-Government under the Punjab District Boards Act, 1883. The said Act was repealed when the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was enacted. The only question requires to be examined was whether such sports activity can be said to be either business or trade. The Full Bench of the High Court was erroneous in holding that the land let out to the club used for pavilion is not for the purpose of business. 15. Learned Counsel for the State raised an argument that the huge amount of property tax has not been paid by the lessee or the successor. The fact is wholly inconsequential. Since the finding of fact was recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority has not been disputed, therefore, the order of the eviction was rightfully passed against the respondents.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]12. We find that the High Court has distinguished the Full Bench judgment in Model Town Welfare Council not for good reasons. The rented land as defined in Section 2(f) of the Punjab Act is pari materia with definition of rented land in the Act. It has been held that the expression business appearing in Section 2(f) need not necessarily be commercial business carried on with a profit motive. The word includes within its scope a charitable business or a dealing in the interest of public or a section of the public. Therefore, use of land as club for a pavilion is in interest of section of the public. Thus, land let out to a club which for the purpose of construction and use of pavilion falls within the scope of Section 2(f) of the Act and thus eviction petition is maintainable under the Act.13. The judgment in Haji Ismail Valid Mohmad was a case where the premises were let out to a club to hold entertainment programmes and music concerts. It was found that the activities of club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. A perusal of the said judgment shows that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 apply to premises let out to residence, education, business, trade or storage and also open land let out for building purposes. The argument was raised that the premises were let out for purposes of education. However, the High Court took the view that the premises let out to tenant were for promoting cultural activities. Therefore, the tenant was entitled to protection of Section 6 of the Act. It was the said finding which was reversed by the Court, the Court has held as under:16. We regret, we cannot agree with this conclusion of law. The activities of the club are more in the nature of cultural activities or recreational activities. They are certainly not for education. In our view, in the context in which the term education appears, it does not refer to such cultural activities or recreational activities as amounting to education. The basic purpose of the club activities relate to fraternizing among the members by playing indoor or outdoor games or otherwise. Such activities cannot lead to the conclusion that the premises were let for purposes of education and consequently the respondent/tenant was not entitled to the protection of the Act. We are thus constrained to set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the judgment of the lower appellate court and restore the judgment dated August 30, 1974 passed by the learned trial court. The appeal is allowed with costs.14. The High Court has also relied upon Supreme Court judgments reported as Narain Swadeshi Mills v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax AIR 1955 SC 176  , Senairam Doongarmall v. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 1961 SC 1579  , Manipur Administration v. Nila Chandra Singh AIR 1964 SC 1533  , as well as the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court reported as Hazara Singh. The judgment reported in Senairam Doongarmall arises out of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 to determine the business income. The judgment reported as Narain Swadeshi Mills is to determine the existence of business under the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940. The judgment reported as Manipur Administration pertains to a control order issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Each of the statute is enacted for a particular objective in mind. The definition in one statute cannot be used for interpreting the same word in another statute. The judgment of the High Court in Hazara Singh is renting of an agricultural land though within the municipal area. All these judgments are clearly not applicable to the present case where the rented land was let out to a club with an implied permission to construct. The Tenant has constructed a pavilion in the year 1911 and the said pavilion was mortgaged to the District Board. The District Boards were constituted as part of local self-Government under the Punjab District Boards Act, 1883. The said Act was repealed when the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 was enacted. The only question requires to be examined was whether such sports activity can be said to be either business or trade. The Full Bench of the High Court was erroneous in holding that the land let out to the club used for pavilion is not for the purpose of business.The fact is wholly inconsequential. Since the finding of fact was recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority has not been disputed, therefore, the order of the eviction was rightfully passed against the respondents.