Case: P. Krishna Menon Vs. The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Mysore, Travancore-Coch

properly be called the carrying on of a vocation by him. 11. Then the other point to be decided is, whether the payments made by Levy were income received by the appellant from his vocation of teaching Vedanta. A very large number of authorities, both Indian and English, have been pressed upon us in the course of the argument. These cases illustrate the application of the well settled principle that in the case of a voluntary payment, no tax can be levied on it if it had been made for reasons purely personal to the donee and unconnected with his office or vocation while it will be taxable if it was made because of the office or vocation of the donee. We do not consider it profitable to discuss them in this case. Also it seems to us that the present case it too plain to require any authority. The only point is, whether the moneys were received by the appellant by virtue of his vocation. Mr. Sastri contended that the facts showed that the payments were purely personal gifts. He drew our attention to the affidavit of Levy where it is stated "all sums of money paid into his account by me have been gifts to mark my esteem and affection for him and for no other reason". But Levy also there said, "I have had the benefit of his teachings on Vedanta." It is important to remember however that the point is not what the donor thought he was doing but why the donee received it. So Collins M. R. in Herbert v. McQuade, 1902-2 KB 631, referring to Inland Revenue v. Strang, (1878) 1 Tax Cas 207, said at p. 649,"Now that judgment, whether or not the particular facts justified it, is certainly an affirmation of a principle of law that a payment may be liable to income-tax although it is voluntary on the part of the persons who made it, and that the test is whether, from the standpoint of the person who receives it, it accrues to him in virtue of his office; if it does, it does not matter whether it was voluntary or whether it was compulsory on the part of the persons who paid it.That seems to me to be the test; and if we once get to this - that the money has come to or accrued to, a person by virtue of his office - it seems to me that the liability to income-tax is not negatived merely by reason of the fact that there was no legal obligation on the part of the persons who contributed the money to pay it." 12. It is well established that in cases of this kind the real question is, as Rowlatt J. put it in Reed v. Seymour, 1926-1 KB 588, "But is it in the nature of a personal gift or is it a remuneration?", an observation which was quoted with approval by Viscount Cave, L. C. when the case went up to the House of Lords with the addition "If the latter, it is subject to the tax; if the former, it is not": see Seymour v. Reed, 1927 AC 554. We find it impossible to hold in this case that the payments to the appellant had not been made in consideration of the teaching imparted by him. Levy admitted that he had received benefit from the teaching of the appellant. It is plain to us that it was because of the teaching that the gift had been made. It is true that Levy said that he made the gifts to mark his esteem and affection for the appellant. But such emotions and therefore the gifts, were clearly the result of the teaching imparted by the appellant. Mr. Sastri contends that that may be so, but we have no right to follow the successive causes and as a result thereof link the gift with the teaching. An argument of this kind seems to have been advanced in Blakiston v. Cooper, 1909 AC 104 and dealt with by Lord Ashbourne in the following words :"It was suggested that the offerings were made as personal gifts to the vicar as marks of esteem and respect. Such reasons no doubt played their part in obtaining and increasing the amount of the offerings, but I cannot doubt that they were given to the vicar as vicar and that they formed part of the profits accruing by reason of his office." We have no doubt in this case that the imparting of the teaching was the causa causans of the making of the gift; it was not merely a causa sine qua non.The payments were repeated and came with the same regularity as Levys visits to the appellant for receiving instructions in Vedanta. We do not feel impressed by Mr. Sastris contention that the first payment of Rs. 2,41,103-11-3 was too large a sum to be paid as consideration. In any case we are not concerned in this case with that payment. We are concerned with payments which are of much smaller amounts and as to which it has not been said that they were too large to be a consideration for the teaching. And one must not forget that these are cases of voluntary payments and the question of the appraisement of the value of the teaching received in terms of money is not very material. If the first payment was too big to have been paid for the teaching received, it was too big to have been given purely by way of gift. 13. In the view that we take, namely, that the payments with which we are concerned, were income arising from the vocation of the appellant as a teacher of Vedanta, no question of exemption under S. 4(3) (vii) of the Act arises. In order that a payment may be exempted under that Section, it has to be shown that it did not arise from the exercise of a vocation. 1

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. We find no difficulty in thinking that teaching is a vocation if not a profession. It is plainly so and it is not necessary to discuss the various meanings of the word vocation for the purpose or to cite authorities to support this view. Nor do we find any reason why, if teaching is a vocation, teaching of Vedanta is not. It is just as much teaching, and therefore, a vocation, as any other teaching. It is said that in teaching Vedanta the appellant was only practising religion. We are unable to see why teaching of Vedanta as a matter of religion is not carrying on of a vocation. In any case the question does not really arise, for whether the appellant was, in teaching Vedanta, practicing religion, is of course a finding of fact. It may be that Vedanta could be taught as a practice of religion but it could of course also be taught as any other philosophy or school of thought. The statement of case in this case does not contain any finding that in teaching Vedanta the appellant was practising religionWe think that these contentions lack substance.We do not appreciate the significance of saying that in order to become a vocation an activity must be organised. If by that a continuous, or as was said, a systematic activity, is meant, we have to point out that it is well known that a single act may amount to the carrying on of it business or profession.It is unnecessary to discuss this question further as we find no want of system or continuity in the activity of the appellant. He had gathered a large number of disciples around him and was instructing them in Vedanta regularly. Levy came all the way from England at regular intervals to obtain such instructions. All this clearly indicates organisation and system10. Again, it is well established that it is not the motive of the person doing an act which decides whether the act done by him is the carrying on of a business, profession or vocation. If any business, profession or vocation in fact produces an income, that is taxable income and none the less because it was carried on without the motive of producing any income.This, we believe, is too well established on the authorities now to be questioned4. We find it impossible to hold in this case that the payments to the appellant had not been made in consideration of the teaching imparted by him. Levy admitted that he had received benefit from the teaching of the appellant. It is plain to us that it was because of the teaching that the gift had been made. It is true that Levy said that he made the gifts to mark his esteem and affection for the appellant. But such emotions and therefore the gifts, were clearly the result of the teaching imparted by the appellantWe have no doubt in this case that the imparting of the teaching was the causa causans of the making of the gift; it was not merely a causa sine qua non.The payments were repeated and came with the same regularity as Levys visits to the appellant for receiving instructions in Vedanta. We do not feel impressed by Mr. Sastris contention that the first payment of Rs. 2,41,103-11-3 was too large a sum to be paid as consideration. In any case we are not concerned in this case with that payment13. In the view that we take, namely, that the payments with which we are concerned, were income arising from the vocation of the appellant as a teacher of Vedanta, no question of exemption under S. 4(3) (vii) of the Act arises. In order that a payment may be exempted under that Section, it has to be shown that it did not arise from the exercise of a vocation.