Case: MOHAMMADE YUSUF &amp; ORS Vs. RAJKUMAR &amp; ORS.

12. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurudwara Sahib Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala reported in 2014(3) MPLJ 36 has settled that declaratory decree based on plea of adverse possession cannot be claimed and adverse possession can be used only as shield in defence by the defendant. It has been held that:- 7. In the Second Appeal, the relief of ownership by adverse possession is again denied holding that such a suit is not maintainable. There cannot be any quarrel to this extent the judgments of the courts below are correct and without any blemish. Even if the plaintiff is found to be in adverse possession, it cannot seek a declaration to the effect that such adverse possession has matured into ownership. Only if proceedings filed against the appellant and appellant is arrayed as defendant that it can use this adverse possession as a shield/defence.13. The plea of the petitioner based upon Sec.27 of the Limitation Act is found to be devoid of any merit since it relates to the extinction of the right of the lawful owner after expiry of the Limitation Act, but in view of the judgment of the supreme court in the matter of Gurudwara Sahib (supra), the petitioner cannot claim himself to be the owner automatically after the expiry of the said limitation. 9. The judgment of Gurdwara Sahib Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and Another (supra) has now been expressly overruled by a Three Judge Bench judgment in Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others Vs. Manjit Kaur and Others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 . This Court held in the above case in paragraph 62 that once 12 years period of adverse possession is over, even owners right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner. In paragraph 62, following has been laid down: 62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years period of adverse possession is over, even owners right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owners title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit. 10. In paragraph 61, this Court has expressly overruled the Gurdwara Sahib Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and Another (supra). 11. In view of the pronouncement of this Court by Three Judge Bench judgment in Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others Vs. Manjit Kaur and Others (supra), the very basis of the High Court for holding that compromise deed dated 04.10.1985 requires registration is knocked out. The present is not a case where there is any allegation that the decree dated 04.10.1985 is a collusive decree. The decree dated 04.10.1985 was in favour of the plaintiff of 7 biswa land, survey No.203 and for remaining land of survey No.203, it was held that it belonged to defendants. 12. In Bhoop Singh (supra), this Court held that the earlier decree required registration for the reasons as mentioned in paragraph 19. The reasons given in paragraph 19 of the above case has no application in the facts of the present case. 13. This Court in Som Dev and Others Vs. Rati Ram and Another, (2006) 10 SCC 788 while explaining Section 17(2)(vi) and Section 17(1)(b) and (c) held that all decree and orders of the Court including compromise decree subject to the exception as referred that the properties that are outside the subject matter of the suit do not require registration. In paragraph 18, this Court laid down following: - 18. ……………But with respect, it must be pointed out that a decree or order of a court does not require registration if it is not based on a compromise on the ground that clauses (b) and (c) of Section 17 of the Registration Act are attracted. Even a decree on a compromise does not require registration if it does not take in property that is not the subject-matter of the suit……………………. 14. In facts of the present case, the decree dated 04.10.1985 was with regard to property, which was subject matter of the suit, hence not covered by exclusionary clause of Section 17(2)(vi) and present case is covered by the main exception crafted in Section 17(2)(vi), i.e., any decree or order of a Court. When registration of an instrument as required by Section 17(1)(b) is specifically excluded by Section 17(2)(vi) by providing that nothing in clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to any decree or order of the Court, we are of the view that the compromise decree dated 04.10.1985 did not require registration and learned Civil Judge as well as the High Court erred in holding otherwise.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]6. A compromise decree passed by a Court would ordinarily be covered by Section 17(1)(b) but sub- section(2) of Section 17 provides for an exception for any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by virtue of sub-section(2)(vi) of Section 17 any decree or order of a Court does not require registration. In sub-clause(vi) of sub-section (2), one category is excepted from sub-clause(vi), i.e., a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding. Thus, by conjointly reading Section 17(1)(b) and Section 17(2)(vi), it is clear that a compromise decree comprising immovable property other than which is the subject matter of the suit or proceeding requires registration, although any decree or order of a Court is exempted from registration by virtue of Section 17(2)(vi). A copy of the decree passed in Suit No.250-A of 1984 has been brought on record as Annexure P-2, which indicates that decree dated 04.10.1985 was passed by the Court for the property, which was subject matter of the suit. Thus, the exclusionary clause in Section 17(2)(vi) is not applicable and the compromise decree dated 04.10.1985 was not required to be registered on plain reading of Section 17(2)(vi)9. The judgment of Gurdwara Sahib Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and Another (supra) has now been expressly overruled by a Three Judge Bench judgment in Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others Vs. Manjit Kaur and Others, (2019) 8 SCC 729 .  This Court held in the above case in paragraph 62 that once 12 years period of adverse possession is over, even owners right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner. In paragraph 62, following has been laid down:62. We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years period of adverse possession is over, even owners right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. In case of dispossession by another person by taking law in his hand a possessory suit can be maintained under Article 64, even before the ripening of title by way of adverse possession. By perfection of title on extinguishment of the owners title, a person cannot be remediless. In case he has been dispossessed by the owner after having lost the right by adverse possession, he can be evicted by the plaintiff by taking the plea of adverse possession. Similarly, any other person who might have dispossessed the plaintiff having perfected title by way of adverse possession can also be evicted until and unless such other person has perfected title against such a plaintiff by adverse possession. Similarly, under other articles also in case of infringement of any of his rights, a plaintiff who has perfected the title by adverse possession, can sue and maintain a suit10. In paragraph 61, this Court has expressly overruled the Gurdwara Sahib Vs. Gram Panchayat Village Sirthala and Another (supra)11. In view of the pronouncement of this Court by Three Judge Bench judgment in Ravinder Kaur Grewal and Others Vs. Manjit Kaur and Others (supra), the very basis of the High Court for holding that compromise deed dated 04.10.1985 requires registration is knocked out. The present is not a case where there is any allegation that the decree dated 04.10.1985 is a collusive decree. The decree dated 04.10.1985 was in favour of the plaintiff of 7 biswa land, survey No.203 and for remaining land of survey No.203, it was held that it belonged to defendants14. In facts of the present case, the decree dated 04.10.1985 was with regard to property, which was subject matter of the suit, hence not covered by exclusionary clause of Section 17(2)(vi) and present case is covered by the main exception crafted in Section 17(2)(vi), i.e., any decree or order of a Court. When registration of an instrument as required by Section 17(1)(b) is specifically excluded by Section 17(2)(vi) by providing that nothing in clause (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to any decree or order of the Court, we are of the view that the compromise decree dated 04.10.1985 did not require registration and learned Civil Judge as well as the High Court erred in holding otherwise13. This Court in Som Dev and Others Vs. Rati Ram and Another, (2006) 10 SCC 788    while explaining Section 17(2)(vi) and Section 17(1)(b) and (c) held that all decree and orders of the Court including compromise decree subject to the exception as referred that the properties that are outside the subject matter of the suit do not require registration. In paragraph 18, this Court laid down following: -18. ……………But with respect, it must be pointed out that a decree or order of a court does not require registration if it is not based on a compromise on the ground that clauses (b) and (c) of Section 17 of the Registration Act are attracted. Even a decree on a compromise does not require registration if it does not take in property that is not the subject-matter of the suit…………………….