Case: SRI MARTHANDA VARMA (D) THR. LRs. &amp; ANR Vs. STATE OF KERALA &amp; ORS

in terms of Section 20 of the TC Act to advise the Ruler of Travancore. D) By Order dated 11.12.2013, Conservation and Restoration Committee was appointed for Structural Renovation and Restoration. E) Since the Executive Officer proceeded on leave, an Interim Administrative Committee was appointed vide Order dated 24.04.2014 for day to day functions relating to the Temple. F) By Orders dated 09.05.2017 and 04.07.2017, apart from reconstituting the Conservation Committee, a Selection Committee for Sreekovil was also appointed to select the suitable person having requisite knowledge. These Committees were constituted at the interim stage of the proceedings in this Court. 112. We may, at this stage, also refer to some of the Reports submitted by the Administrative Committee appointed by this Court:- i) In the Report dated 05.01.2018, it was reported that taking advantage of the fact that an ad hoc committee was at the helm of the affairs of the Temple, some of the occupants of the structures on East Nada, North Gate and Utsava Madom Building continued to be or were in illegal and unauthorized occupation and that requisite action to resume the possession of said structures from such occupants ought to be undertaken. ii) In the Report dated 01.01.2020, it was stated that from 04.01l.2019 to 20.12.2019, the offerings made by the devotees visiting the Temple, in the Kanikka amounted to Rs.5,68,96,260/- (Rupees Five Crores Sixty Eight Lakhs Ninety Six Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Only). iii) The Report dated 27.05.2020, under the signature of the District Judge, referred to the earlier Resolution dated 13.06.2017 and the direction issued by this Court in its Order dated 04.07.2017 requesting the State to nominate a panel of three officers from the Indian Audit and Accounts Service (IA &AS) to oversee the audit and accounts of the Temple and submit quarterly reports to the Administrative Committee. The Report stated:- I may also report that the Administrative Committee is perfectly in the darkness regarding the financial position and accounts of the Temple. Different District Judges discharged duties as Chairmen of the Administrative Committee during different periods since the inception of the Committee as per the directions of the Honble Supreme Court. So far, the respective Executive Officers, in charge of the financial matters of the Temple, have not produced either the budget proposals or the statement of accounts before the Administrative Committee. … … … The Executive Officer informed me that as the Principal Accountant General raised queries on the remuneration of the serving IAAS Officers and the State Government was not in a position to meet the expenses, the direction of the Honble Supreme Court could not be complied with. Subsequently, on 18.09.2017, the Administrative Committee resolved the following:- (i) The service of an IA & AS Officer is required to oversee the audit conducted by the Internal Auditor and Statutory Auditor. (ii) The service of a serving IA & AS Officer is required on foreign service terms. (iii) In addition, the services of two non IA & AS Officers, who are in service, is also required on foreign service terms to assist the IA & AS Officer. The Committee also authorized the Executive Officer to take up the matter with the Government and to bring the developments to the notice of the Honble Supreme Court. So far, the directions of the Honble Supreme Court to appoint an IA & AS Officer to oversee the internal audit and statutory audit has not been complied with. Still the Committee is in darkness on the financial position and accounts of the Temple. 113. The provisions of the TC Act with respect to the administration of the Temple are clear:- a) Under Section 18(2), the administration shall be conducted. Subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore, by an Executive Officer appointed by him. b) Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee composed of three members nominated by the Ruler of Travancore in terms of Section 20 is to advise the Ruler of Travancore in the discharge of his functions. The Statute has thus vested the power of appointing the Executive Officer and of forming the Advisory Committee, in the Ruler of Travancore. In the Note, the appellants have stated:- (i) The Trustee shall delegate his powers of administration under Section 18(2) to the Administrative Committee which shall administer the Temple through an Executive Officer to be appointed by the Committee. (ii) On all policy matters, the Trustee shall be guided by the advice of the Advisory Committee. 114. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival suggestions, the composition of the Committees as suggested by the appellants deserves acceptance, especially in light of the conclusions arrived by us that the Managership or the Shebaitship of the Temple continues with the Family. As against the administration contemplated by Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act in the hands of the Ruler of Travancore in absolute terms, the course now suggested by the appellants is quite balanced. The Composition of the Administrative Committee as suggested is broad based and would not be loaded in favour or against the Trustee. However, considering the fact that the present interim Administrative Committee headed by the District Judge is in seisin for the last more than five years, and various District Judges as Chairpersons of the Committee conducted themselves quite well, in our view, a minor change in the Administrative Committee suggested by the appellants in their Note is called for. Instead of a retired Indian Administrative Service Officer of the rank of Secretary to the Government of Kerala as the Chairperson of the Administrative Committee, in the interest of justice, the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram shall be the Chairperson of the Administrative Committee. Needless to say that the present Chairperson of the Interim Administrative Committee shall continue to be the Chairperson so long as he holds the post of the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The composition of the Advisory Committee will ensure that the administration of the Temple is conducted in a fair and transparent manner.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]46. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the parties advanced submissions with regard to the Reports of the learned Amicus Curiae and Mr. Vinod Rai. This exercise involved entering into various factual issues for the first time in this Court. Since no adequate opportunity was afforded to various stakeholders involved in the matter, we refrain from considering the issues arising from said Reports.the unequivocal stand taken by the appellants in the grounds of appeal that the Temple is a public temple and no claim can probably be made by the Petitioner or anyone to owning the Temple or its treasures and that what was being sought was only the right as a trustee of the Temple to manage and administer it, must be noted at the outset.The said stand was expressly referred to in the Order dated 21.07.2011 by this Court, and subsequent Orders, and the consideration of the instant case has been premised on the said stand.53. The account given by the High Court in para 4 of the judgment under appeal states that for over 200 years prior to the re-establishment of the princely state by Marthand Varma, the Temple was under the control of Ettarayogam (group of eight and a half) including Ettuveettil Pillamars and then refers to the battle between Marthand Varma and his loyalists on one hand and the Ettuveettil Pillamars on the other, whereafter Marthand Varma took full control of the State and the Temple. The High Court then states, … it is he (Marthand Varma) who reconstructed the Temple which was in bad shape after a major fire took place years back and installed a new idol.54. Though there may be different accounts and beliefs with regard to the origin and how the Temple was set up, every version accepts that the King of Travancore had a role in the administration of the Temple to begin with, and that he was the one who re-constructed the Temple after a major fire that occurred in the year 1686, and installed a new idol and took full control of the Temple. The King of Travancore was thus responsible for setting up the Temple, in the form that it stands today, and it was the King who installed the new idol, and since then the management of the Temple, till the Covenant was signed, had always been with the Kings of Travancore.56. The assertions referred to above were not denied or traversed. As a matter of fact, the stand in the affidavits filed on behalf of the State in the Courts below, accepts the position of the erstwhile royal family vis-à-vis the Temple and Sri Padmanabhaswamy.57. Leaving aside the issue of ownership as such status is not claimed by the appellant No.1 or any of the family members who have intervened, the fact remains that it is well accepted that the management of the Temple had all along been in the hands of the ruling family or the Travancore Palace. As stated by the State, that has been the traditional and customary belief. Such management has spanned, not for few years or decades, but dates back to centuries.59. The practices referred to in the earlier paragraph show that right from the conception of a child upto the death of any member of the erstwhile royal family, special prayers are offered and certain rituals are followed. Every male child born in the erstwhile royal family, is made Dasa of Sri Padmanabhaswamy while every female child is made Sevini through prescribed rituals. Special ceremonies are conducted at the time of Upanayanam of a male member and marriage of a female member of the erstwhile royal family. Even assuming that these practices are being or could possibly be followed by other families as well, in addition to these features, the facts that the Ruler is an obligatory participant in various temple rituals; that he has an Ekantha Darshan with Sri Padmanabhaswamy on all days in the morning hours where, except the Nambi, nobody else can remain present; that the Ruler has to take special permission whenever he leaves the town; and that whenever the deity is taken out in procession, the Ruler leads the procession with the sword drawn out, along with the heir apparent, establish the special relationship that the erstwhile royal family in general and the Ruler in particular, have always had with Sri Padmanabhaswamy. The ceremony of Dedication undertaken by the then ruler in 1750 A.D. bears testimony to such relationship as well as the deep devotion and sense of complete surrender before Sri Padmanabhaswamy. The Thrippati Danam, the translation of which is set out in paragraph 5, shows that all the lands and functions together with all rights and dignities, positions of honour and all other possessions that the royal family was enjoying hitherto before, were dedicated to Sri Padmanabhaswamy. Even the royal sword was placed with utmost reverence on the Ottakkal Mandapam leading to the Sanctum, which the King got back from the high priest. Every further acquisition by the King was always surrendered to Sri Padmanabhaswamy. The King and his successors thus ruled and conducted themselves as Padmanabhadasas and agents of Sri Padmanabhaswamy.60. Tested on any parameter, such as historical accounts, popular and customary beliefs, certain practices connected with the rituals and affairs of the Temple that mandatorily require the presence and participation of the Ruler, deep involvement of the members of ruling family and their connection with the Temple and Sri Padmanabhaswamy at various stages of their lives, The Thrippati Danam and its significance, and long recognised and accepted fact that the management of the Temple had always been with the Ruler, lead us to conclude that for centuries, the Temple had been under the exclusive management of successive Rulers from the ruling family of Travancore and that the Rulers of Travancore, till the signing of the Covenant, were in the capacity as Managers or Shebaits of the Temple.61. The Travancore Interim Constitution Act, 1123, which came into force on 24.03.1948 i.e. before the Covenant was entered into, is also a factor that points in the direction of the aforesaid conclusion. In terms of this Act, all matters connected with Sri Pandaravaka (which expression admittedly referred to the Temple and the extensive lands belonging to Sri Padmanabhaswamy) as well as Devaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments were stated to be under the exclusive control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore. This Act by itself does not determine the status of the Ruler of Travancore with respect to Sri Pandaravaka and the Dewaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments in Travancore, but is indicative of the requisite intent on part of the Ruler of Travancore to retain to himself the matters concerning administration and management of Sri Pandaravaka and Dewaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments.this Court in Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. The State of Rajasthan and others (1964) 1 SCR 561  to submit that mere right to manage the debutter property when no emoluments were being drawn by the Manager was not found to be protected under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India by a Bench of five Judges of this Court.This Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) had observed:-The temple of Shrinathji at Nathdwara holds a very high place among the Hindu temples in this country and is looked upon with great reverence by the Hindus in general and the Vaishnav followers of Vallabha in particular. As in the case of other ancient revered Hindu temples, so in the case of the Shrinathji temple at Nathdwara, mythology has woven an attractive web about the genesis of its construction at Nathdwara. Part of it may be history and part may be fiction, but the story is handed down from generation to generation of devotees and is believed by all of them to be true.… … …The question as to whether a Hindu temple is private or public has often been considered by judicial decision. A temple belonging to a family which is a private temple is not unknown to Hindu law. In the case of a private temple it is also not unlikely that the religious reputation of the founder may be of such a high order that the private temple founded by him may attract devotees in large numbers and the mere fact that a large number of devotees are allowed to worship in the temple would not necessarily make the private temple a public temple. On the other hand, a public temple can be built by subscriptions raised by the public and a deity installed to enable all the members of the public to offer worship. In such a case, the temple would clearly be a public temple. Where evidence in regard to the foundation of the temple is not clearly available, sometimes, judicial decisions rely on certain other facts which are treated as relevant. Is the temple built in such an imposing manner that it may prima facie appear to be a public temple? The appearance of the temple of course cannot be a decisive factor; at best it may be a relevant factor. Are the members of the public entitled to an entry in the temple? Are they entitled to take part in offering service and taking Darshan in the temple? Are the members of the public entitled to take part in the festivals and ceremonies arranged in the temple? Are their offerings accepted as a matter of right? The participation of the members of the public in the Darshan in the temple and in the daily Acts of worship or in the celebration of festival occasions may be a very important factor to consider in determining the character of the temple….…..If the temple is a public temple, under Hindu Law the idol of Shrinathji is a juridical person and so, the ownership of the temple and all its endowments including offerings made before the idol constitute the property of the idol….… … …That takes us to the question as the nature and extent of the Tilkayats rights in regard to the temple property. It is clear that the Tilkayat never used any income from the property of the temple for his personal needs or private purpose. It is true that the learned Attorney General suggested that this consistent course of conduct spreading over a large number of years was the result of what he described as self-abnegation on the part of the tilkayats from generation to generation and from Tilkayats point of view, it can be so regarded because the Tilkayat thought and claimed that the temple and his properties together constituted his private property. But once we reach the conclusion that the temple is a public temple and the properties belonging to it are the properties of the temple over which the Tilkayat has no title or right, we will have to take into account the fact that during the long course of the management of this temple, the Tilkayat has never claimed any proprietary interest to any part of the usufrcut of the properties of the temple for his private personal needs, and so, that proprietary interest of which Mr. Ameer Ali spoke in dealing with the position of the Mahant and the Shebait and to which this Court referred in the case of commissioner, Hindu Religious endowments, Madras 42 is lacking in the present case. What the Tilkayat can claim is merely the right to manage the property, to create lease in respect of the properties in a reasonable manner and the theoretical right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple; and be it noted that these rights could be exercised by the Tilkayat under the absolute and strict supervision of the Darbar of Udaipur. Now, the right to manage the property belonging to the temple, or the right to create a lease of the property on behalf of the temple, or the right to alienate the property for the purpose of the temple under the supervision of the Darbar cannot, in our opinion, be equated with the totality of the powers generally possessed by the Mahant or even the Shebait, and so, we are not prepared to hold that having regard to the character and extent of the rights which can be legitimately claimed by the Tilkayat even on the basis that he was a Mahant governed by the terms of the Firman, amount to a right to property under Article 19(1)(f) or constitute property under Article 31(2).Besides, we may add that even if it was held that these rights constituted a right to hold property their regulation by the relevant provisions of the Act would undoubtedly be protected by Art. 19(5). The temple is a public temple and what the legislature has purported to do is to regulate the administration of the properties of the temple by the Board of which the Tilkayat is and has to be a member. Having regard to the large estate owned by the Tilkayat and having regard to the very wide extent of the offerings made to the temple by millions of devotees from day to day; the legislature was clearly justified in providing for proper administration of the properties of the temple. The restrictions imposed by the Act must, therefore, be treated as reasonable and in the interests of the general public.71. In the aforesaid case, this Court was called upon to consider the matter in the context of challenge to the Nathadwara Temple Act, 1959 (Rajasthan Act 13 of 1959), inter alia, on the grounds that said Act violated the rights guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(f), 25(1), 26 (b) & (c) and 31(2) of the Constitution. The Act under challenge, enacted by the State, had sought to change the management which was earlier in the hands of the Tilkayat. On facts, it was noticed that the petitioner therein was appointed as Tilkayat (Manager of the Temple) under a Firman issued by the Rana of Udaipur on December 31, 1934 which provided that the Udaipur Darbar had absolute right to supervise that the property dedicated to the shrine was used for legitimate purpose and to take any measures for the management of the shrine. It was held by this Court that said Firman was law by which the affairs of said temple and succession to the office of the Tilkayat were governed after its issue. This Court thereafter held:-Having regard to the unambiguous and emphatic words used in clause 1 of the Firman and having regard to other drastic provisions contained in its remaining clauses, we are inclined to think that this Firman made the Tilkayat for the time being a Custodian, Manager and Trustee, and nothing more. As a Custodian or Manager, he had the right to manage the properties of the temple, subject, of course, to the overall supervision of the Darbar, the right of the Darbar in that behalf being absolute. He was also a Trustee of the said property and the word trustee in the context must mean trustee in the technical legal sense. In other words, it is not open to the Tilkayat to claim that he has rights of a Mahant or a Shebait; his rights are now defined and he cannot claim any higher rights after the Firman was issued.In the backdrop of the finding that the Tilkayat could not claim rights of a Mahant or a Shebait, the challenge on the grounds that said Act violated the rights under the Constitution was negated.On the other hand, after considering the relevant decisions on the point, in Angurbala Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 , this Court had very clearly observed, that even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the debutter property which partially has the character of a proprietary right. In the decision of a Bench of seven Judges in Shirur Mutt Case 42 the decision in Angurbala Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 was referred to with approval. In the recent decision of the Constitution Bench in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) (2020) 1 SCC 1 , the concerned portion from Angurbala Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 was also quoted in paragraph 434.In the premises, in our view, mere factum that no emoluments are attached to the office of the Shebait would not make any difference to the character of the right and interest of the Shebait. Though this conclusion is based on the decisions referred to above, reference may additionally be made to Para 5.5 of the Book titled The Hindu Law of Religious Endowments and Charitable Trusts, 4 th Edition edited by Hon. P.B. Gajendragadkar, former Chief Justice of India, which points in the same direction.72. The principles that emerge from the long line of decisions referred to in the preceding paragraphs can thus be summed up:-(i) According to Hindu law, when the worship of a thakoor has been founded, the Shebaitship is held to be vested in the heirs of the founder, in default of evidence that he has disposed of it otherwise, or there has been some usage, course of dealing, or some circumstances to show a different mode of devolution. (Gossamee Sree Greedharreejee vs. Rumanlolljee Gossamee 16 M.I.A.137 : (1889) L.R. 16 I.A. 137 )(ii) Unless the founder has disposed of the Shebaitship in any particular manner - and this right of disposition is inherent in the founder - or except when usage or custom of a different nature is proved to exist, Shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance from the founder. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 )(iii) The legal character of a Shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property. As regards the administration of the debutter, his position is analogous to that of a trustee; yet, he is not precisely in the position of a trustee in the English sense, because under Hindu Law, property absolutely dedicated to an idol, vests in the idol, and not in the shebait. (Profulla Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte (1979) 3 SCC 409 )(iv) Shebaitship in its true legal conception involves two ideas: The ministrant of the deity and its manager; it is not a bare office but an office together with certain rights attached to it. (Monohar Mukherjee vs. Bhupendra Nath Mukherjee and Ors. I.L.R.(1933) 60 Cal. 452 )(v) The effect of the decisions in Ganesh vs. Lal Behary (1935-36) 63 I.A. 448 and Bhaba Tarini Debi vs. Asha Lata Debi AIR 1943 PC 89 : (1943) ILR 2 P.C. 137 as the Privy Council pointed out in the latter case, was to emphasise the proprietary element in the Shebaiti right and to show that though in some respects an anomaly, it was an anomaly to be accepted as having been admitted into Hindu law from an early date. (The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) SCR 1005 )(vi) It is settled by the pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in Vidya Varuti v. Balusami AIR 1922 PC 123 : 48 I.A. 302 that the relation of a Shebait in regard to debutter property is not that of a trustee to trust property under the English law. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 )(vii) In a Hindu religious endowment the entire ownership of the dedicated property is transferred to the deity or the institution itself as a juristic person and the Shebait or Mahant is a mere manager. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 )(viii) In the conception of Mahantship, as in Shebaitship, both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. The personal or beneficial interest of the Mahant in the endowments attached to an institution is manifested in his large powers of disposal and administration and his right to create derivative tenures in respect to endowed properties; and these and other rights of a similar character invest the office of the Mahant with the character of proprietary right which, though anomalous to some extent, is still a genuine legal right. (The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) SCR 1005 )(ix) Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the Shebait, he enjoys some sort of right or interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception of Shebait both the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest, are mixed up and blended together; and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is the presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests Shebaitship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidents of property. (Angurbala Mullick vs. Debabrata Mullick AIR 1951 SC 293 : (1951) SCR 1125 )(x) Succession to Mahantship of a Math or religious institutions is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment. (Sital Das vs. Sant Ram and others AIR 1954 SC 606 )(xi) The rule of custom should prevail in all cases and if any aberrations have to be corrected such correction must take us in the direction of re-establishing the rule of custom. (His Holiness Digya Darshan Rajendra Ram Doss v. Devendra Doss (1973) 1 SCC 14 )(xii) It is not open to the Court to lay down a new rule of succession or to alter the rule of succession completely. (His Holiness Digya Darshan Rajendra Ram Doss v. Devendra Doss (1973) 1 SCC 14 )(xiii) In the absence of an expressly appointed or identified Shebait, the law has ensured the protection of the properties of the idol by the recognition of a de facto Shebait. (M. Siddiq through LRs vs. Mahant Suresh Das and others (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) (2020) 1 SCC 1 . 73. As laid down by this Court, when the idol is installed and the temple is constructed or an endowment is founded, the shebaitship is vested in the founder and unless the founder himself has disposed of the shebaitship in a particular manner or there is some usage or custom or circumstances showing a different mode of devolution, the shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance from the founder; and it is not open to the Court to lay down a new rule of succession or alter the rule of succession. It has also been laid down that the shebaitship has the elements of office and property, of duties and personal interest blended together and they invest the office of the shebait with the character of proprietary right. It has further been laid down that the shebait is the custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman and the human ministrant; is entitled to deal with the temporal affairs and to manage the property of the idol; and even where no emoluments are attached to the office of the shebait, he has the right or interest in the endowed property which has the characteristics of a proprietary right.If the instant case is considered on the touchstone of these settled principles, it is clear that after the major fire that occurred in the year 1686, the Temple was reconstructed and a new idol was installed by the King of Travancore Shri Marthand Varma and since then right upto the day the Covenant was signed, the management of the Temple had always been with the Kings of Travancore. The shebaitship or the managership of the Temple passed on to the succeeding Kings, coming from the royal family of Travancore. This chain was unbroken till the then Ruler of Travancore signed the Covenant in May 1949.It may be noted here that on 10.08.1947 a proclamation was issued by the Ruler declaring that in matters of succession to the Rulership and to the throne and for all other purposes, the royal family was governed by the Marumakkathayam law, as modified by the custom and usage of the royal family. In a matter raising issues of succession to certain properties of the Ruler of Travancore, this Court in Revathinnal Balagopala Varma 13 had found that the devolution in the royal family was from Ruler to Ruler. The shebaitship of the Temple had also passed from Ruler to Ruler consistent with the principles of succession otherwise applicable to the royal family.74. We must thus conclude that as on the day when the Covenant was entered into by the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore, apart from other incidents which normally follow the rulership, he was holding the office of Shebait of the Temple and represented a continuous and unbroken line of successive Shebaits traced from the original founder; and being a Shebait of the Temple, he was having all the rights and interest as laid down by decisions referred to hereinabove.77. Sub-Article b of Article VIII used the expression now vested in trust in the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore and thus acknowledged the factum that the administration in respect of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the Temple was already vested in the Ruler of Covenanting State of Travancore. Sub-Article b further contemplated that with effect from the appointed day, the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the Temple would be subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore. This Sub-Article was the centre of debate and fulcrum of submissions by the learned counsel appearing for various parties.78. According to the Covenant, insofar as the transfer of sovereign power and all incidental aspects connected therewith were concerned, the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore was involved at two stages. Under the first stage, the transfer was contemplated from him in his capacity as the Head of the Covenanting State of Travancore in favour of the United State and under the second stage as Rajpramukh of the United State he was obliged to execute an Instrument of Accession in terms of Article IX. On and with effect from the appointed day in terms of the Covenant, his role as the Head of the State of Travancore came to an end and he became the Rajpramukh of the United State, in whom certain powers and rights got vested by virtue of Articles VI, VII and X. Theoretically, as Rajpramukh, he could as well be vested with powers of suspension, remission or commutation of death sentences in respect of the entire area of the United State but the intent was to retain such powers in the erstwhile Ruler of Cochin State, who had no role in the new dispensation with respect to the United State and for this reason, Article XXI used the expression the Rulers of Travancore and Cochin. The fact that this was a departure and as an exception to the general mechanism is evident from the expression Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding provisions of this Covenant . Therefore, despite generality of the earlier Articles of the Covenant, only with respect to matters specified in Article XXI, the Ruler of Travancore continued to have the powers which he was enjoying as the Head of the State of Travancore before the Covenant came into effect. Thus, wherever the Covenant wanted him to continue to exercise certain powers which as Head of the State of Travancore had resided or vested in him, the Covenant made an express exception and stipulated so.A) As discussed above, the only place in the Covenant where the person who signed as the Ruler of the Covenanting State would continue to enjoy his erstwhile powers as the Head of that Covenanting State, was Article XXI. The references as the Ruler of the Covenanting State and as the Ruler of Travancore or as the Ruler of Cochin in rest of the Articles, were only by way of reference to the person concerned, and not by way of reference to or because of his official capacity as the Ruler. This gets fortified by proviso to Sub-Article d of Article VIII, in terms of which the Ruler of Cochin would continue to exercise regulation and control with respect to rituals and ceremonies in certain temples. Upon the Covenant coming into effect, he had lost his capacity as the Head of the erstwhile State of Cochin. Thus, the retention of the powers under said proviso in him was not because he had any official status as Head of the State after the appointed day in terms of the Covenant but only with a view to describe and locate the person concerned. A person answering the description in said proviso would continue to exercise such power. Similar thought can, therefore, be validly entertained that the description in the latter part of Sub-Article b of Article VIII was only to refer to or locate the person.B) Furthermore, the historical background and the association of the royal family with the Temple and the nature of Shebaitship held by a successive line of Rulers from time to time, were such that the Covenant designedly let the management of the affairs of the Temple – with the royal family, and in the hands of the Ruler of Travancore, principally because his official capacity or status as the erstwhile Head of the State apparently had nothing to do with the capacity as Shebait of the Temple.As discussed in the earlier segment, the Shebaitship was always in the royal family and the Ruler represented the unbroken line of Shebaits. Not only the excerpts from the book written by Mr. V.P. Menon indicate the deep sense of attachment and devotion of the ruling family to the Temple and Sri Padmanabhaswamy, but some reflection in that behalf is also to be noticed in the White Paper on the Indian States which was initially prepared in July 1948 and updated in March 1950 by Government of India, Ministry of States. It dealt with the United State of Travancore and Cochin in paragraphs 139 to 145. Paragraphs 141 and 142 dealt with Devaswoms-Hindu Temples and properties attached to them in the two States including that of the temple of Sri Padmanabhaswamy as under:-141. One of the special features of the Covenant is the arrangement in respect of Devaswoms – Hindu temples – and property attached to them in the two States including the temple of Shri Padmanabhaswami the tutelary deity of the ruling family of Travavancore. In Travancore alone, apart from this important shrine, on the maintenance of which the State was spending over Rs.1 million per annum, there are 348 major Devaswoms and 1123 minor Devaswoms. Large revenues are derived by the State from the properties which were attached to these Devaswoms and provision was made by the State for the maintenance of Devaswoms, from time to time, at varying figures. Hindu opinion in the State was unanimous that not only should the continued payment of the existing allotments for the maintenance of Devaswoms be guaranteed but that adequate compensation should also be given in respect of the properties of the Devaswoms taken over by the State since 1912, and the profits derived from them. The annual contribution thus claimed ranged from rupees ten to twenty millions. The Covenant now provides for a fixed contribution of Rs.5.1 millions for the maintenance of Devaswoms in Travancore out of which a sum of Rs.600,000 is to be contributed towards the maintenance of the Shri Padmanabhaswami temple.142. The most important departure from the past practice, which the provisions of the Covenant regarding the Devaswoms involve, is that, except in the case of Shri Padmanabhaswami temple, in the management of which the Ruler will be assisted by an Advisory Committee, the administration of Devaswoms will vest in two Boards to be set up in these States on which not only the orthodox Hindus but the Harijans also will be represented. This introduces a far-reaching temple reform in that under the arrangement prescribed in the Covenant the Harijans will secure a share both in the control of the temples and appointments in the Devaswoms Department, a position hitherto denied to them.It may be mentioned here that said White Paper generally gave account of all such Covenants entered into by various Rulers of the erstwhile Indian States and except the Temple of Sri Padmanabhaswamy which was specifically dealt with in the Covenant that we are presently concerned with, no other temple in any such Indian State was so specifically and separately dealt with. In that sense, Article VIII of the Covenant has certain unique features.In terms of aforestated Article VII (2) the vesting was in favour of the Raj Pramukh, and not in favour of any concerned Ruler. The Raj Pramukh, in terms of Article III of said Covenant was to be elected by the Council of Rulers. Consequently, though Gangajali Fund was constituted by the then Maharaja of Gwalior, the control was not vested in the Ruler of Gwalior, but in the Raj Pramukh. This also meant that the vesting was in his official capacity as Raj Pramukh, who could be any other Ruler, and not strictly the Ruler of Gwalior.Article VII (2) of said Covenant and the consequential legislation are clear indication that even where a Trust was constituted for certain charitable purposes by the then Maharaja of Gwalior, the administration of such Trust was not vested in the Ruler of Gwalior. On the other hand, the Trust, in terms of the Covenant itself, was directed to be vested in the Raj Pramukh in his official capacity.In comparison, the vesting of administration of the Temple in the instant case was not only acknowledged by the Covenant to be in trust with the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore but such administration was to continue subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore even after the Covenant. This illustration further emphasizes that the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore was not in any official capacity.D) It is also pertinent to note here that other Devaswoms and Endowments in the erstwhile State of Travancore also used to be under the control of the erstwhile Ruler of Travancore. Going by the Travancore Interim Constitution Act which is referred to in detail in paragraph 10 hereinabove, though such control was to be retained by the ruling family, the Covenant expressed clearly to the contrary. Sub-Article c of Article VIII acknowledged that administration with respect to said other Devaswoms and Endowments and other properties was earlier under the management of the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore. It, however, stated that with effect from the appointed day in terms of the Covenant, such management would now vest in Travancore Devaswom Board. This part also finds mention in the relevant paragraphs of the White Paper as quoted above.Thus, wherever the official capacity of the Head of the State was responsible for enabling the Ruler to be in charge of the management or administration, upon ceasing to have such capacity, the erstwhile Ruler would have nothing to do with the management of such other Devaswoms or Endowments. In contrast, the case with respect to the Temple and other properties referred to in Sub-Article b stands on a completely different footing.In the premises, it must be held that the expression the Ruler of Travancore used in the latter part of Sub-Article b of Article VIII was only by way of reference and the purport of said Sub-Article was not to invest the said authority and power because he was the Ruler or enjoyed and represented any official status.The survey of the concerned Articles of the Covenant as set out in paragraph 11 hereinabove shows that wherever special attributes or rights were designed to be conferred upon and restricted to the present Ruler, the Covenant was quite specific. Articles IV and XIV are clear instances in that behalf. On the other hand, whenever the person, who as the Ruler, had signed the Covenant was to be referred, the expressions used in the Covenant had been the Ruler of the Covenanting State or the Ruler of Travancore. These expressions were only to identify the person who was the Ruler as stated earlier. Thus, the rights such as the entitlements to Privy Purses and the ownership, use and enjoyment of private properties and so also to personal rights, privileges, titles and dignities were concerned, they were assured to the Ruler of the Covenanting State . In addition, certain rights were also granted to the members of the family and succession to the Gaddi, personal rights and privileges was expressly assured. Whether those rights or entitlements were intended to be enjoyed by the successor to the person who signed the Covenant, would depend upon the nature and content of such right or entitlement. In so far as the right with respect to Privy Purse payable to the Ruler of Travancore was concerned, it was expressly limited or confined to the present Ruler, and obviously no successor could claim such entitlement. But rest of the incidents or entitlements referred to in said Articles were without such restriction. Additionally, once succession to the Gaddi of each Covenanting State and to the personal rights and privileges etc. was guaranteed in accordance with law and custom by Article XVII, these incidents were designed to be available for enjoyment by the succeeding generations or successors according to law and custom. If the matter is considered purely from the perspective of Shebaitship of the Temple, or the right of administration referred to in the latter part of Sub- Article b of Article VIII, going by the general law of Shebaitship as discussed in the earlier segment, and the succession according to law and custom, every successor to the Ruler who signed the Covenant would be entitled to such right. There is nothing in any of the Articles which even purports to limit or restrict such devolution.81. In the circumstances, it must be concluded that Article VIII of the Covenant not only acknowledged and accepted the factum that the administration with respect to the Temple, its properties, as well as with respect to Pandaravaga properties, had already vested in the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore, but the said Article expressly continued the same status and stipulated that such administration shall be conducted subject to the supervision and control of the Ruler of Travancore, the meaning of which expression has already been dealt with and deduced earlier.83. Soon thereafter, the TC Act came into force. The relevant provisions of the TC Act have already been extracted earlier. Chapter III of the TC Act specifically dealt with Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and matters pertaining to the administration of the Temple. Said Chapter III of the TC Act is consistent with the latter part of Sub-Article b of Article VIII of the Covenant and stipulates inter alia that the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties and funds of the Temple vested in trust in the Ruler of Travancore and the sum of Rs.6 lakhs contributed in terms of Sub- Section 1 of Section 18 of the TC Act shall be conducted, subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore by an Executive Officer appointed by him. Said Chapter III did not confer any right or benefit for the first time, where none existed earlier but gave statutory recognition to what was acknowledged and accepted in the latter part of Sub-Article b of Article VIII of the Covenant to be the continuing status. Section 20 of the TC Act then deals with the constitution of Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee, which is also in tune with said Article VIII of the Covenant.Two features must be noticed at this stage. Insofar as incorporated or unincorporated Devaswoms are concerned, consistent with the stipulations of Sub-Article c of Article VIII of the Covenant, the control and administration in respect of such Devaswoms is vested in Travancore Devaswom Board as stated in Section 15 of the TC Act. There are certain machinery provisions which deal with the manner in which the affairs of the Devaswom Board would be conducted, with which we are not presently concerned. Secondly, Sub- Section 2 of Section 62 of the TC Act, in tune with proviso to Sub-Article d of Article VIII of the Covenant provides that despite the vesting of administration in Cochin Devaswom Board, the regulation and control of rituals and ceremonies in the temples referred to therein would continue to be exercised by the Ruler of Cochin. Thus, all material and relevant facets emanating from various provisions of the Covenant pertaining to the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and all other properties of the Temple, so also, the management and control of all other Devaswoms and religious endowments were dealt with by the TC Act in a manner which was completely consistent with the relevant provisions contained in the Covenant.84. As stated in paragraph 16 hereinabove, orders passed by the President of India that Rulers of Indian States had ceased to be recognized as Rulers of respective Indian States were under challenge in Madhav Rao Scinda 12 , in which case the issues regarding the impact of Articles 291, 362, 363 and 366(22) of the Constitution as well as the effect of legislative measures brought in pursuance of the provisions of Article 362 were considered by this Court.85. Hidayatulla, C.J., found Article 291 to be a special provision for the source of payment of Privy Purses and the same thought was expressed in paragraph 126 by the majority Judgment which also found the structure of Article 362 to be different. Unlike Article 291, which itself was the source for payment of Privy Purses, Article 362 stipulated that due regard shall be had to the guarantees or assurances given under any covenant or agreement while exercising legislative or executive power. Thus, the source for enjoyment of personal rights, privileges and dignities referred to in Article 362 would be in the statutory provisions enacted in terms of the obligation spelt out in Article 362. To the extent any legislative measure was undertaken, or executive power was exercised, with due regard to the guarantees or assurances given under any covenant or agreement, the source would be in such measure or exercise.86. Insofar as the present segment is concerned, it must, therefore, be concluded that the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India as well as that of the TC Act did not, in any way, upset or abridge the status enjoyed by the Ruler of Travancore as Shebait of the Temple and also did not, in any manner, adversely impact the right of administration vested in the Ruler of Travancore. As a matter of fact, the relevant provisions of the TC Act afforded statutory flavour to the status contemplated by Article VIII of the Covenant.D] Effect of the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 197187. The Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as the nature of this Constitutional Amendment; the newly incorporated Article 363A and the amended definition of Ruler in Article 366(22) have been set out in paragraph 17 hereinabove. As the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicated, the concept of rulership with Privy Purses and special privileges was found to be incompatible with egalitarian social order and as such it was decided to terminate the Privy Purses and privileges of the Rulers so also it was decided to terminate expressly the recognition already granted to such Rulers and to abolish Privy Purses and extinguish all rights and obligations in respect of Privy Purses. This Constitutional Amendment deleted Articles 291 and 362; and inserted Article 363A which now expressly stipulates inter alia that any person who was recognized to be the Ruler of an Indian State or his Successor, shall, cease to be recognized, as such Ruler or Successor, and all rights, liabilities and obligations in respect of Privy Purses stand extinguished. Article 366(22) was also accordingly amended and in terms of the amended definition, Ruler now means, inter alia, the person who was recognized as the Ruler of an Indian State or as a successor to such Ruler, before the commencement of said Constitutional Amendment. With the deletion of Article 291, the rights, liabilities and obligations with respect to Privy Purses stood extinguished. The guiding principles emanating from Article 362 that in exercise of legislative or executive power, due regard shall be had to the guarantee or assurance given in any Covenant or agreement referred to in Article 291 also ceased to exist.Thus, unlike Privy Purses, the termination of which was intended to be immediate and therefore the source for Privy Purses, namely, Article 291 itself was deleted, the deletion of Article 362 by itself would not result in cessation of every privilege or personal right with respect to which due regard was had while exercising legislative power in terms of Article 362 before its deletion. The source being in the statutory enactments, despite deletion of Article 362, if the concerned legislations continue to remain in operation, the personal rights or privileges could still be enjoyed. That is precisely why, on the strength of various statutory provisions certain benefits in the form of personal rights or privileges are still available. It is for the concerned legislatures to take appropriate steps in accordance with law, either to terminate the effect and operation of extension of such benefits or allow them to operate or lessen the extent and cause gradual changes as was sought to be undertaken by 1972 Act.90. Thus, if the provisions of the TC Act to the extent it enacted Chapter III of Part I dealing with Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple and related provisions are taken to be an exercise by the concerned Legislature with due regard to the assurances and guarantees in covenant or agreements in terms of Article 362 as it existed then even with deletion of Article 362 the concerned provisions would still be operative so long as appropriate steps are not taken by the concerned Legislature.91. As is evident from the White Paper referred to hereinabove, the assurances and guarantees given in the covenants or agreements entered into with various Rulers normally had four elements; i) that certain sums shall be payable to the Rulers by way of Privy Purses; ii) that certain properties mentioned as private properties of the Ruler would vest in the Ruler in his personal capacity; iii) that succession to the Gaddi would go strictly by the prevalent law and custom; and iv) that personal rights, privileges and dignities enjoyed by the Rulers and in some cases by the members of the family of the Ruler, would continue to be available.92. Out of the aforesaid four elements, the elements (i) and (iv) were covered by Articles 291 and 362 as they stood before being deleted. The effect of such deletion has been discussed and dealt with. The elements (ii) and (iii) are normal incidents which were not within the scope of said Articles 291 and 362. Despite the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971, the private properties of the Ruler would continue to be available for normal succession and devolution in accordance with the law and custom. Though concepts such as Ruler or Rulership have ceased to operate, succession to the Gaddi as an incident may still operate. For instance, there could be a sword or any other ceremonial weapon, or a sarpech, or heirloom jewellery, which must go by rule of primogeniture, as against the normal way of succession with regard to other personal properties. All such incidents have not been terminated. The clear example is in clause (iv) of sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 which uses the expression jewellery in the possession of any Ruler, not being his personal property which had been recognized as his heirloom. Such items or properties which fall in or are connected strictly with element (iii), may descend along with succession to the Gaddi and by very nature must remain impartible. On the other hand, if normal principles of succession are applied, at any given level of succession, such items or properties recognized as heirloom may be required to be shared amongst more than one person and would therefore cease to be impartible.93. These four elements were covered by Articles XIV, XV, XVII and XVI respectively in the Covenant in the present case. However, apart from the said four assurances, the Covenant also dealt with an additional and important aspect in Article VIII(b). It accepted and acknowledged that the administration with respect to the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties, and the property of the Temple which was also vested in the Ruler of the Covenanting State would continue to be conducted in the manner stipulated therein, subject to the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore. The effect of such Article and the fact that such vesting was not in the capacity as Ruler has already been dealt with. It has also been concluded that the expression The Ruler of Travancore was only to locate and describe the person who would be in control and supervision of the administration.94. In the premises, we must conclude that the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 did not in any way impact or affect the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and the properties of the Temple, which continued to be under the control and supervision of the Ruler of Travancore.E] Effect of the death of the person who had signed the Covenant as the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore95. As stated in paragraph 21 hereinabove, Sree Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma who had signed the Covenant as the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore, passed away on 19.07.1991.97. The discussion in the first and second segments hereinbefore have led us to conclude that as on the day when the Covenant became effective, the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore, was holding the office of Shebait of the Temple, which was not in his official capacity as the Ruler; and that the effect of Sub Article (b) of Article VIII was not to invest any new authority and power in him for the first time because of his official status, but an acknowledgement of the existing authority and power already vested in him. It has also been concluded by us that the expression Ruler of Travancore in the Covenant and in the TC Act was only to identify the person, and that the official status of the Ruler of Travancore had no relation with such administration.The principles emanating from various decisions which were considered in the first segment have been culled out by us in para 72 hereinabove. If according to the settled principles, the Shebaitship is like any other heritable property which would devolve in accordance with custom or usage, and that the rule of custom must prevail in all cases, even after the death of the erstwhile Ruler of Travancore in 1991, the Shebaitship of the Temple being unconnected with the official status of the person who signed the Covenant, must devolve by the applicable laws of succession and custom.The proclamation issued on 10.08.1947 as referred to in paragraph 8 hereinabove clearly states the applicable principles of succession. The decision of this Court in Revathiannal 13 is also to similar effect. Thus, going by concerned principles of succession and custom, the successor can easily be located.99. The definitions of Ruler in Articles 363 and 366(22) thus do not ipso facto have any application to the provisions of the TC Act, unless the TC Act expressly stipulates so or impliedly refers to such definitions either under Article 363 or under Article 366(22). With the deletion of Articles 291 and 362, the scope of definition in Article 366(22) to find a particular Ruler for conferral of advantages referred to in both the Articles, has ceased to have any significance. However, the concept of the Ruler and Rulership, as discussed hereinabove are still relevant insofar as certain legislations and provisions are concerned. Many of these legislations, normally define the expression themselves, or by reference incorporate the definition as given in Article 363; for example, Section 87B of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. No such provision was made in the TC Act. The question therefore, is whether the expression Ruler of Travancore as appearing in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act is capable of being understood to include his successors according to custom.100. A perusal at Sections 15, 62 and Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act clearly shows that these provisions were put on the Statute Book having due regard to the Covenant. Since the source of these provisions lies in the Covenant, and there being no definition of Ruler of Travancore, or for that matter Ruler of Cochin, one has to consider the relevant Articles of the Covenant to assess or understand the significance of the said provisions of the TC Act. Sections 15, 62 and Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act were enacted principally to give effect to Article VIII and generally to give effect to the Covenant.101. In the earlier segments, we have already concluded that Article VIII had clearly used the expression now vested in trust in the Ruler while speaking about the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties, and the properties of the Temple. The Covenant thus, not only acknowledged such status, but in sub-Article b of Article VIII, intended to continue the status where such person would continue to exercise control and supervision over the administration of the Temple. This was in the backdrop of the long standing association of the ruling family with the Temple, and the Shebaitship held by the continuous line of Rulers. The expression Ruler of Travancore used in the provisions of the TC Act must therefore be understood in the same light. As held earlier, the Covenant never intended to restrict, or do away, with the right of administration already vested in the Ruler of Travancore, and such expression was not intended to be confined to the present incumbent, or the person who had signed as the Ruler of the Covenanting State of Travancore. Going by the normal incidents of Shebaitship including the heritability, the context in which the expression was used in Article VIII of the Covenant, and carried in the provisions of the TC Act, it must be held that such expression must include the successors to the person who had signed the Covenant.102. Apart from the Covenant, the expression Ruler of Travancore as used in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act did not depend upon any other enactment or instrument to look for the successor to the Ruler of Travancore, nor is there any express or implied intendment to go by the definition of Ruler either under Article 363 or 366(22) of the Constitution. The Covenant speaks of succession, according to law and custom, and that is how the successor must be identified. As Hidayatullah, C.J., opined in paragraphs 53 and 72 (Quoted in paragraph 84 hereinabove) of his Judgment in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia (1971) 1 SCC 85 decided on 15.12.1970 the definition in Article 366(22) as it then stood was merely a key to find a particular Ruler, and that the selection of a successor to the Ruler was required to be worked out under the Covenant. The method of selecting the successor under Article 366(22) as it then stood was not by way of any different formula or principle but was rooted in the concerned law and custom. That being the underlying principle as available from the Covenant, there would not be any difficulty in identifying the successor as and when the occasion arises.103. At the same time, if the submission that the expression Ruler of Travancore in the TC Act must be made dependent on the recognition, is accepted, it would lead to incalculable inconvenience and prejudice. First, it was never the intention of the Legislature to make such an expression dependent upon any recognition. Secondly, there is no power in the President of India, after the Constitution (Twenty Sixth Amendment) Act, 1971 to grant any such recognition. Thirdly, the consequence of such an interpretation would mean that the unbroken line of succession to the Shebaitship would stand terminated making the entire Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act meaningless and redundant. Consequently, the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandaravaga properties and the properties of the Temple would suffer immense prejudice. Section 15 of the Act which vested the rights, authority and jurisdiction in respect of Devaswoms and Hindu Religious Endowments in the Travancore Board is also inapplicable to Chapter III of Part I. This would result in a complete void. The Legislature could not be ascribed of such an intention. On the other hand, the Legislature must be taken to be well aware that the Shebaitship was heritable, and remained in the royal family for few centuries in an unbroken line of succession. It is for this reason, consistent with the termsof the Covenant, a special dispensation was made in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act.104. It may be relevant to note that the State in two affidavits filed in the Suits as referred to hereinabove, has taken a clear stand that the Temple is managed by the Travancore Palace. These affidavits were filed by responsible officers of the State, well after the death of the then Ruler in 1991. The understanding on part of the State machinery, or the officials by itself can never be the determining criteria, but that is a relevant factor to be taken note of, as observed by this Court in National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater, Bombay (1969) 1 SCC 541 para 5 and in Desh Bandhu Gupta and Co. and others vs. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd. (1979) 4 SCC 565 para 9.105. In the instant case, since the Shebaitship had vested in the Ruler of Travancore, not in his official capacity, the normal incident of heritability must get attached to the office of such Shebaitship in accordance with governing principles of succession and custom. Therefore, when it comes to the matter concerning the administration of the Temple, Sri Pandavaraga properties and the properties of the Temple, the expression the Ruler of Travancore as appearing in Chapter III of Part I of TC Act must mean the successor in accordance with the prevalent law and custom. In the process one need not go to the definition of Ruler either under Article 366(22) or under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. Consistent with the principles that have been culled out in para 72 hereinabove, after the death of the person who was in control and supervision of the administration, the heritable interest must devolve in accordance with the customary rights.106. Further, unless and until the line of succession of the Shebaitship and in-charge of the administration, is completely extinct, there can be no question of escheat as observed by the High Court. In Kutchi Lal Rameshwar Ashram Trust Evam Anna Kshetra Trust v. Collector, Haridwar (2017) 16 SCC 418 , this Court had an occasion to consider the issue of escheat in the context of a Public Trust. In that case, after the death of one Mohanlal in whose name patta of the property was secured, the Collector had concluded that the property vested in the State Government by operation of law. Setting aside the decision of the High Court which had affirmed the conclusions of the Collector, this Court observed:-20. Section 29 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 has been invoked by the Collector. Section 29 provides as follows:29. Failure of heirs.—If an intestate has left no heir qualified to succeed to his or her property in accordance with the provisions of this Act, such property shall devolve on the Government; and the Government shall take the property subject to all the obligations and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject.Section 29 embodies the principle of escheat. The doctrine of escheat postulates that where an individual dies intestate and does not leave behind an heir who is qualified to succeed to the property, the property devolves on the Government. Though the property devolves on the Government in such an eventuality, yet the Government takes it subject to all its obligations and liabilities. The State in other words does not take the property (at SCC p. 113, para 12) as a rival or preferential heir of the deceased but as the lord paramount of the whole soil of the country , as held in State of Punjab v. Balwant Singh 1992 Supp (3) SCC 108 . This principle from Halsburys Laws of England 4 th Edn., Vol.17, Para 1439 was adopted by this Court while explaining the ambit of Section 29. Section 29 comes into operation only on there being a failure of heirs. Failure means a total absence of any heir to the person dying intestate. When a question of escheat arises, the onus rests heavily on the person who asserts the absence of an heir qualified to succeed to the estate of the individual who has died intestate to establish the case. The law does not readily accept such a consequence. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (1983) 3 SCC 118 , a Bench of three Judges of this Court formulated the principle in the following observations:272. It is well settled that when a claim of escheat is put forward by the Government the onus lies heavily on the appellant to prove the absence of any heir of the respondent anywhere in the world. Normally, the court frowns on the estate being taken by escheat unless the essential conditions for escheat are fully and completely satisfied. Further, before the plea of escheat can be entertained, there must be a public notice given by the Government so that if there is any claimant anywhere in the country or for that matter in the world, he may come forward to contest the claim of the State. In the instant case, the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh merely satisfied themselves by appearing to oppose the claims of the respondent-plaintiffs. Even if they succeed in showing that the plaintiffs were not the nearest reversioners of the late Maharaja, it does not follow as a logical corollary that the failure of the plaintiffs claim would lead to the irresistible inference that there is no other heir who could at any time come forward to claim the22. In Rambir Das v. Kalyan Das (1997) 4 SCC 102 a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court dealt with a case of shebaitship. Citing the authority of Justice B.K. Mukherjeas celebrated Tagore Law Lectures with approval, this Court took note of the position of law elucidated in the lectures: (Rambir Das case (1997) 4 SCC 102 , SCC p. 105, para 3)3. … As shebaitship is property, it devolves like any other property according to the ordinary Hindu law of inheritance. If it remains in the founder, it follows the line of founders heirs; if it is disposed of absolutely in favour of a grantee, it devolves upon the heirs of the latter in the ordinary way and if for any reason the line appointed by the donor fails altogether, Shebaitship reverts to the family of the founder.On the question of escheat, B.K. Mukherjea, J. observes thus: (SCC p. 106, para 3)3. … As there is always an ultimate reversion to the founder or his heirs, in case the line of shebaits is extinct, strictly speaking no question of escheat arises so far as the devolution of shebaitship is concerned. But cases may be imagined where the founder also has left no heirs, and in such cases the founders properties may escheat to the State together with the endowed property. In circumstances like these, the rights of the State would possibly be the same as those of the founder himself, and it would be for it to appoint a shebait for the debutter property. It cannot be said that the State receiving a dedicated property by escheat can put an end to the trust and treat it as secular property.In other words, even in a situation where a founder or his line of heirs is extinct, and the properties escheat to the State, the State which receives a dedicated property is subject to the trust and cannot treat it in the manner of a secular property. In fact, we may note, Section 29 expressly stipulates that the State shall take the property subject to all the obligations and liabilities to which an heir would have been subject.23. In deciding this case, this Court must also bear in mind the settled principle that unless the founder of a math or religious institution has laid down the principle governing succession to the endowment, succession is regulated by the custom or usage of the institution. This principle was enunciated over six decades ago by this Court in Sital Das v. Sant Ram AIR 1954 SC 606 , rendered by B.K. Mukherjea, J., speaking for a Bench of four Judges: (AIR p. 609, para 9)9. In the appeal before us the contentions raised by the parties primarily centre round the point as to whether after the death of Kishore Das, the plaintiff or Defendant 3 acquired the rights of Mahant in regard to the Thakardwara in dispute. The law is well settled that succession to Mahantship of a Math or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution, except where a rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment. As the Judicial Committee laid down [Vide Genda Puri v. Chatar Puri 13 Ind App – page 105 (PC)(A), IA at p. 105] in one of the many cases on this point: (SCC OnLine; In determining who is entitled to succeed as Mohunt, the only law to be observed is to be found in the custom and practice, which must be proved by testimony, and the claimant must show that he is entitled according to the custom to recover the office and the land and property belonging to it. Mere infirmity of the title of the defendant, who is in possession, will not help the25. The principle that the law does not readily accept a claim to escheat and that the onus rests heavily on the person who asserts that an individual has died intestate, leaving no legal heir, qualified to succeed to the property, is founded on a sound rationale. Escheat is a doctrine which recognises the State as a paramount sovereign in whom property would vest only upon a clear and established case of a failure of heirs. This principle is based on the norm that in a society governed by the Rule of Law, the court will not presume that private titles are overridden in favour of the State, in the absence of a clear case being made out on the basis of a governing statutory provision. To allow administrative authorities of the State—including the Collector, as in the present case—to adjudicate upon matters of title involving civil disputes would be destructive of the Rule of Law. The Collector is an officer of the State. He can exercise only such powers as the law specifically confers upon him to enter upon private disputes. In contrast, a civil court has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters involving civil disputes except where the jurisdiction of the court is taken away, either expressly or by necessary implication, by statute. In holding that the Collector acted without jurisdiction in the present case, it is not necessary for the Court to go as far as to validate the title which is claimed by the petitioner to the property. The Court is not called upon to decide whether the possession claimed by the Trust of over forty- five years is backed by a credible title. The essential point is that such an adjudicatory function could not have been arrogated to himself by the Collector. Adjudication on titles must follow recourse to the ordinary civil jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.107. In the circumstances, we hold that the death of Sree Chithira Thirunal Balarama Varma who had signed the Covenant, would not in any way affect the Shebaitship of the Temple held by the royal family of Travancore; that after such death, the Shebaitship must devolve in accordance with the applicable law and custom upon his successor; that the expression Ruler of Travancore as appearing in Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act must include his natural successors according to law and custom; and that the Shebaitship did not lapse in favour of the State by principle of escheat.A) In Bala Shankar Maha Shanker Bhattjee and Others vs. Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State (1995) Supp 1 SCC 485 the basic issue was whether Kalika Mataji Temple was a public Trust. The High Court found, inter alia, that by Sanad No.19, Scindias in their capacity as sovereign Rulers had passed on their obligations in respect of the temple to the British Government by a treaty concluded between them in 1860. After considering various decisions on the point, the principles were noted by this Court as under: -19. A place in order to be a temple, must be a place for public religious worship used as such place and must be either dedicated to the community at large or any section thereof as a place of public religious worship. The distinction between a private temple and public temple is now well settled. In the case of former the beneficiaries are specific individuals; in the latter they are indeterminate or fluctuating general public or a class thereof. Burden of proof would mean that a party has to prove an allegation before he is entitled to a judgment in his favour. The one or the other of the contending parties has to introduce evidence on a contested issue. The question of onus is material only where the party on which it is placed would eventually lose if he failed to discharge the same. Where, however, parties joined the issue, led evidence, such evidence can be weighed in order to determine the issue. The question of burden becomes academic.20. An idol is a juristic person capable of holding property. The property endowed to it vests in it but the idol has no beneficial interest in the endowment. The beneficiaries are the worshippers. Dedication may be made orally or can be inferred from the conduct or from a given set of facts and circumstances. There need not be a document to evidence dedication to the public. The consciousness of the manager of the temple or the devotees as to the public character of the temple; gift of properties by the public or grant by the ruler or Government; and long use by the public as of right to worship in the temple are relevant facts drawing a presumption strongly in favour of the view that the temple is a public temple. The true character of the temple may be decided by taking into consideration diverse circumstances. Though the management of a temple by the members of the family for a long time, is a factor in favour of the view that the temple is a private temple, it is not conclusive. It requires to be considered in the light of other facts or circumstances. Internal management of the temple is a mode of orderly discipline or the devotees are allowed to enter into the temple to worship at particular time or after some duration or after the headman leaves the temple are not conclusive. The nature of the temple and its location are also relevant facts. The right of the public to worship in the temple is a matter of inference.