Case: Satish Kumar Gupta And Etc. Etc Vs. State Of Haryana And Ors. Etc

directed to produce the relevant records in respect of the proceedings relating to land acquisition involved in these matters. There shall be stay of the effect and operation of the impugned order during the pendency of these petitions. List the matters after four weeks. In the meanwhile, all the respondents are at liberty to file written statements, if any."][15* Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karnataka, SLP(C)No. 19819 of 2013, order dated 24-3-2015(SC), wherein it was directed: "Heard Ms. Kiran Suri, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in SLPS(C)Nos. 31624-25 of 2014 in part. List all the matters as part for further hearing. Vide order dated 17-11-2014, learned counsel for the State as well as the learned counsel for KIADB were directed to produce the relevant records in respect of the proceedings relating to land acquisition involved in these matters, record as well as the records relating to allotment of land. However, as per office records, nothing has been produced so far. In this view of the matter, the learned counsel for the State as well as the learned counsel for KIADB are directed to comply with the order dated 17-11-2014 and produce the relevant records in respect of the proceedings relating to land acquisition and the allotment of land involved in these matters before the next date of hearing. List the matters on 15-4-2015."]14. We are in respectful agreement with the above view in Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya (supra) and Peerappa Hanmantha (supra). No contrary view of this Court has been brought to our notice. The judgments relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable as already held by this Court.15. In Himalayan Tiles (supra) the acquisition was under Part-VII of the Act. In Santosh Kumar (supra) the question was whether award of the Collector could be challenged, to which this Court answered in the negative except on the ground of fraud, corruption or collusion. In Neyvely Lignite (supra) again the acquisition was under Part-VII of the Act and in that context this Court held that the expression "person interested" could include a company or local authority for whose benefit the land was acquired. The post-acquisition allottee cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated at par with beneficiary for whom the land was acquired. In U.P. Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra), the matter dealt with was in the context of statutory authority for whom the land was acquired. Delhi Development Authority v. Bhola Nath Sharma (dead) by Lrs. and ors., 2011(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 820 : 2011(1) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 296 : (2011) 2 SCC 54 was a case in the context of beneficiary for whom the land was acquired.16. The only other justification in the impugned judgment which has been relied upon by the respondents is lack of sincerity on the part of the State authority for whose benefit the acquisition has been made viz. HSIDC, which by itself cannot be a valid ground to permit post-acquisition allottee to be treated as a necessary or proper authority under Order I Rule 10 of CPC to proceedings for determination of compensation. The view taken in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained on any principle or precedent.17. We may now refer to an order of this Court dated 15th July, 2004 which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment in para 31. There is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law could not be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand.18. Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party.19. The other part of the impugned order permitting additional evidence and remanding the case for fresh decision is uncalled for. No case was made out for permitting additional evidence on settled principles under Order XLI Rule 27 of CPC. The provision is reproduced below:-"27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if -(a) the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause,The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission."20. It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case N. Kamalam v. Ayyaswami, 2001(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 193 : (2001) 7 SCC 503 : para 19. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.21. We may also refer to the argument that this Court, while remanding the matter in the earlier round, had given liberty to the MSIL to file an application for impleadment or to act as an intervenor which implied that such application was to be accepted. We do not find any merit in this contention also. It cannot be held that any right was crystalised by the said observation and such prayer had to be considered according to law. We have already held that the post-acquisition allottee had no right in the matter.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. To determine the question whether the post-acquisition allottee of land is necessary or proper party or has any locus to be heard in the matter of determination of compensation, we may refer to the scheme of the Act. The acquisition may either be for a "public purpose" as defined under Section 3(f) or for a company under Part-VII of the Act. If the acquisition is for a public purpose (as the present case), the land vests in the State after the Collector makes an award and the possession is taken. Till the award is made, no person other than State comes into the picture. Once the land vests in the State, the acquisition is complete. Any transferee from the State is not concerned with the process of acquisition. The State may transfer the land by public auction or by allotment at any price with which the person whose land is acquired has no concern. The mere fact that the Government chooses to determine the allotment price with reference to compensation price determined by the Court does not provide any locus to an allottee to contest the claim for enhancement of compensation.We are in respectful agreement with the above view in Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya (supra) and Peerappa Hanmantha (supra). No contrary view of this Court has been brought to our notice. The judgments relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable as already held by this Court.The only other justification in the impugned judgment which has been relied upon by the respondents is lack of sincerity on the part of the State authority for whose benefit the acquisition has been made viz. HSIDC, which by itself cannot be a valid ground to permit post-acquisition allottee to be treated as a necessary or proper authority under Order I Rule 10 of CPC to proceedings for determination of compensation. The view taken in the impugned judgment cannot be sustained on any principle or precedent.17. We may now refer to an order of this Court dated 15th July, 2004 which has been relied upon in the impugned judgment in para 31. There is no consideration of the principle of law and thus, the said order without there being contest on the principle of law could not be treated as a precedent for deciding the legal issue at hand.18. Accordingly, we hold that the post-acquisition allottee has no locus to be heard in the matter and is neither a necessary nor a proper party.It is clear that neither the Trial Court has refused to receive the evidence nor it could be said that the evidence sought to be adduced was not available despite the exercise of due diligence nor it could be held to necessary to pronounce the judgment. Additional evidence cannot be permitted to fill-in the lacunae or to patch-up the weak points in the case N. Kamalam v. Ayyaswami, 2001(4) R.C.R.(Civil) 193 : (2001) 7 SCC 503   : para 19. There was no ground for remand in these circumstances.21. We may also refer to the argument that this Court, while remanding the matter in the earlier round, had given liberty to the MSIL to file an application for impleadment or to act as an intervenor which implied that such application was to be accepted. We do not find any merit in this contention also. It cannot be held that any right was crystalised by the said observation and such prayer had to be considered according to law. We have already held that the post-acquisition allottee had no right in the matter.