Case: COUNCIL OF ARCHITECTURE Vs. MR. MUKESH GOYAL &amp; ORS

a phenomenal scale. A large variety of buildings, many of extreme complexity and magnitude like multi-storeyed office buildings, factory buildings, residential houses, are being constructed each year. With this increase in the building activity, many unqualified persons calling themselves as Architects are undertaking the construction of buildings which are uneconomical and quite frequently are unsafe, thus bringing into disrepute the profession of architects. Various organisations, including the Indian Institute of Architects, have repeatedly emphasised the need for statutory regulation to protect the general public from unqualified persons working as architects. With the passing of this legislation, it will be unlawful for any person to designate himself as „architect unless he has the requisite qualifications and experience and is registered under the Act. … 3. The legislation protects the title architects but does not make the design, supervision and construction of buildings as an exclusive responsibility of architects. Other professions like engineers will be free to engage themselves in their normal vocation in respect of building construction work provided that they do not style themselves as architects. (Emphasis supplied) The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Architects Act makes it evident that the legislature was undoubtedly concerned with the risk of unqualified persons undertaking the construction of buildings leading to costly and dangerous buildings. In guarding against this risk, the legislature first set out a minimum standard of statutorily recognised qualifications to be met before an individual is designated as an architect under the Architects Act. This is done by Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act. Next, the legislature created two classes of individuals: the first class consisted of registered architects satisfying these minimum qualifications and a second class of unregistered individuals who did not satisfy these minimum qualifications. This is the effect of Sections 2(a), 17, 23 and 35 of the Architects Act. Crucially, the legislature chose to define an architect as an individual registered under the Architects Act and not as an individual practicing architecture or any cognate activities. Thus, the legislature limited the regulatory regime created by the Architects Act to the first class of individuals. In protecting the public from the risk of the second class, untrained individuals, the legislature had two options: first it could bar this second class of individuals from engaging in the profession altogether (as it had done with physicians and advocates); or alternatively it could prevent this second class of individuals from calling themselves Architects. The Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that the legislature chose the second option and in fact went to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated that with the passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to designate himself as an architect. Further, it is expressly stated that the legislation protects the title of architect but does not grant registered architects an exclusive right to undertake the design, supervision and construction of buildings. Other cognate professions or unregistered individuals may continue to carry out these activities provided that they do not refer to themselves as A rchitects. 30. It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the practice of architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals. As opposed to the case of physicians or surgeons under the Indian Medical Council Act or advocates under the Advocates Act, the legislature consciously chose to employ a less stringent measure in the case of architects, merely prohibiting unregistered individuals from using the title and style of architect. It is not for this Court to delve into why the legislature made this choice. However, during the course of these proceedings a cogent and pragmatic reason for this choice has been placed before this Court, by the learned Attorney General of India and by way of the erudite opinion of Chief Justice Raveendran in the decision in Mukhesh Kumar Manhar to which we may briefly advert. 31. The profession of architecture involves a wide range of activities including inter alia: (i) Taking instructions from clients and preparing designs; (ii) Site evaluation and analysis; (iii) Site design and development; (iv) Structural design; (v) Design of sanitary, plumbing, sewage, drainage, and water supply structures; (vi) Design and structural integration of electrical and communications systems; (vii) Incorporation of heating, air-conditioning, ventilation and other mechanical systems including fire detection and prevention systems; and (viii) Periodic inspection and evaluation of construction work. These activities are undertaken by architects but are also carried out by architects in concert with a range of other actors including draughtspersons, builders, engineers, and designers. If the legislature were to impose an absolute prohibition against unregistered individuals from =practicing architecture there would be considerable confusion as to what activities formed the practice of architecture and what did not. It may have resulted in a host of other legitimate professionals being barred from engaging in the design, supervision and construction of buildings merely because they were not registered under the Architects Act. Further, as the learned Attorney General of India brought to our attention, these varied professions form essential cogs in the overall machinery of construction in India and the design, supervision and construction of new structures cannot be done by architects alone. It would be unreasonable from a regulatory perspective to ask all professions touching upon the construction of new structures to obtain a degree in architecture. 32. Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly specialised profession requiring the possession of minimum educational qualifications. However, architects are by and large engaged by means of a contract for services. In other words, architects provide a set of specialised services towards the larger goal of construction. Architects are not embarking on construction independently of other actors. By virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the services of an individual calling themselves an A rchitect is assured that such an individual possesses statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent to complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the legislature protects the common person from untrained individuals.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]21. The order of this Court dated 14 February 2017 states that the High Court was in error in rejecting the contention of the appellant that practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to the architects.The appellant was the Council of Architecture. The order is based on the premise that the contention of the Council of Architecture before the High Court of Bombay was that the practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to architects.The order stated that the High Court was wrong in rejecting this contention. Therefore, the order of this Court dated 14 February 2017 clearly sought to lay down the proposition that the practice under the Architects Act, 1972 is not restricted only to architects.Having laid down this proposition, it would appear that the use of the word not in the next line is inadvertent . In the previous sentence the court expounded the position that the practice of architecture cannot be restricted to registered architects under the Architects Act. Hence, it would be an incorrect interpretation of the order to hold that in the very next line, the court would have laid down a contrary proposition. Therefore, the effect of the order as a whole is to lay down the principle that individuals can practice as architects even if they are not registered under the Architects Act. The subsequent order of this Court dated 11 September 2017 which quotes and follows the earlier order should also be read in this light. Therefore, the two orders of this Court do not further the case urged by the appellant but support the position set out by the Union of India, succinctly advanced in the submissions of the learned Attorney GeneralTherefore, a plain reading of Section 37 clearly supports the proposition that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture from using the title and style of Architect and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing the activities undertaken by architects such as the design, supervision and construction of buildingsThese submissions are ultimately premised on the argument that even if a plain reading of Section 37 does not support the argument of a prohibition on practice this Court must nonetheless read the provision to include a prohibition on practice in order to avoid defeating the object and purpose of the Architects Act28. It is well settled that the first and best method of determining the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen by the legislature to have the force of law. In other words, the intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of the statute itself. However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute must be construed in light of the object and purpose with which the legislature enacted the statute as a whole. Where it is contended that a particular interpretation would lead to defeating the very object of a legislation, such an interpretative outcome would clearly be absurd or unreasonableThe Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Architects Act makes it evident that the legislature was undoubtedly concerned with the risk of unqualified persons undertaking the construction of buildings leading to costly and dangerous buildings. In guarding against this risk, the legislature first set out a minimum standard of statutorily recognised qualifications to be met before an individual is designated as an architect under the Architects Act. This is done by Sections 14, 15 and 17 of the Act. Next, the legislature created two classes of individuals: the first class consisted of registered architects satisfying these minimum qualifications and a second class of unregistered individuals who did not satisfy these minimum qualifications. This is the effect of Sections 2(a), 17, 23 and 35 of the Architects Act. Crucially, the legislature chose to define an architect as an individual registered under the Architects Act and not as an individual practicing architecture or any cognate activities. Thus, the legislature limited the regulatory regime created by the Architects Act to the first class of individuals. In protecting the public from the risk of the second class, untrained individuals, the legislature had two options: first it could bar this second class of individuals from engaging in the profession altogether (as it had done with physicians and advocates); or alternatively it could prevent this second class of individuals from calling themselves Architects. The Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that the legislature chose the second option and in fact went to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated that with the passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to designate himself as an architect. Further, it is expressly stated that the legislation protects the title of architect but does not grant registered architects an exclusive right to undertake the design, supervision and construction of buildings. Other cognate professions or unregistered individuals may continue to carry out these activities provided that they do not refer to themselves as A rchitects30. It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the practice of architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals. As opposed to the case of physicians or surgeons under the Indian Medical Council Act or advocates under the Advocates Act, the legislature consciously chose to employ a less stringent measure in the case of architects, merely prohibiting unregistered individuals from using the title and style of architect. It is not for this Court to delve into why the legislature made this choice. However, during the course of these proceedings a cogent and pragmatic reason for this choice has been placed before this Court, by the learned Attorney General of India and by way of the erudite opinion of Chief Justice Raveendran in the decision in Mukhesh Kumar Manhar to which we may briefly advertIf the legislature were to impose an absolute prohibition against unregistered individuals from =practicing architecture there would be considerable confusion as to what activities formed the practice of architecture and what did not. It may have resulted in a host of other legitimate professionals being barred from engaging in the design, supervision and construction of buildings merely because they were not registered under the Architects Act. Further, as the learned Attorney General of India brought to our attention, these varied professions form essential cogs in the overall machinery of construction in India and the design, supervision and construction of new structures cannot be done by architects alone. It would be unreasonable from a regulatory perspective to ask all professions touching upon the construction of new structures to obtain a degree in architecture32. Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly specialised profession requiring the possession of minimum educational qualifications. However, architects are by and large engaged by means of a contract for services. In other words, architects provide a set of specialised services towards the larger goal of construction. Architects are not embarking on construction independently of other actors. By virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the services of an individual calling themselves an A rchitect is assured that such an individual possesses statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent to complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the legislature protects the common person from untrained individuals33. For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the High Court of Allahabad on the first question and hold that Section 37 of the Architects Act does not prohibit individuals not registered under the Architects Act from undertaking the practice of architecture and its cognate activities35. While we have held that Section 37 does not prohibit the practice of architecture by unregistered individuals, it certainly does prohibit unregistered individuals from using the title and style of architect. Under the scheme of the Architects Act, only individuals possessing the statutorily recognised minimum educational qualifications can apply for registration as an Architect under the Act. Registration as an architect under the statute is thus a guarantee of possessing certain minimum educational qualifications. Section 37 prohibits unregistered individuals from designating themselves or referring to themselves as architects. The consequence of this regulatory regime is that when an individual is called an Architect a reasonable person would assume that they are a registered architect under the Architects Act and as a consequence possess the requisite educational qualifications and specialised knowledge associated with architects36. If an individual is appointed to a post titled Associate Architect, Architect or Senior Architect, they undoubtedly refer to themselves and are referred to by others as Architects. Holding a post using the term Architect has the real-world consequence of being referred to as an architect. This is not a matter of mere nomenclature. As noted above, architecture is a specialised field of study. Crucially, the scheme of the Architects Act provides a direct nexus between the minimum educational qualifications required to be obtained, registration as an architect under the Act and the prohibition against the use of the title of A rchitect by those not registered under the Act. If a government post is titled Architect or Associate Architect, such a person certainly use s the title and style of architect and consequently there is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by the Act. This assumption finds statutory backing in Section 35 of the Architects Act which provides that any reference to an architect in any other law shall be deemed to mean an architect registered under the Architects Act. To promote an individual who does not possess a degree in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled Architect, Associate Architect or of a similar style using the title or style of architect would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of title contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act37. In the present case, we recognise the power of NOIDA to provide and modify the minimum eligibility criteria for promotion of candidates to the posts of Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect. We further recognise that the authority has significant discretion in how it chooses to title the various posts under its supervision. However, to permit NOIDA to continue to title a post that includes individuals who are not registered architects under the Architects Act as Associat e Architect would result in a violation of Section 37 of the Architects Act. In the case of Tulya Gogoi the High Court of Gauhati expressly held that the prohibition on the use of title and style of architect contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act applies to both private individuals and government employees. The reasoning of the High Court on this issue commends itself for our acceptance. The text of Section 37 makes no distinction between government employees and private individualsThe distinction made by the Allahabad High Court, that the Promotion Policy 2005 was passed under a state legislation, namely the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, and thus did not need to comport with the terms of the Architects Act as a central legislation is incorrect38. The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act provides NOIDA with the power to make rules for the management of its internal affairs. In exercise of this power, NOIDA formulated the Service Regulations of 1981. Rule 16 of the Service Regulations sets out thefor posts under NOIDAs authority. By clause (iv) of Rule 16 NOIDA has the power to modify the sources of recruitment for posts under its supervision. It is in exercise of this power that NOIDA formulated the Promotion Policy of 2005 which sets out the sources and qualifications for recruitment in its various departments. It is well established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also ultra vires other primary legislation. Where the provisions of a primary legislation (the Architects Act) are contradictory to the provisions of a delegated legislation (the Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail. This principle is well established and has received articulation by this Court on several occasions. In Indian Express Newspapers v Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641    Justice Venkataramiah speaking for a three- judge Bench of this Court stated:75. A piece of subordinate legislation does not carry the same degree of immunity which is enjoyed by a statute passed by a competent Legislature. Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. This is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation. It may also be question on the ground that it is unreasonable, unreasonable not in the sense of not being reasonable, but in the sense that it is manifestly arbitrary. …The distinction made by the Allahabad High Court, that the Promotion Policy 2005 was passed under a state legislation, namely the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, and thus did not need to comport with the terms of the Architects Act as a central legislation is