Case: Girija Prasad Paul Vs. Corporation of Calcutta &amp; Others

them being that the estates and the rights of intermediaries in the estates, to which the declaration applies, shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances, and every non-agricultural tenant holding land under an intermediary shall hold the same directly under the State. It is not disputed that, if the notification applied to this estate, the rights of the Corporation and of the Banerjees, whatever they were, would cease and would vest in the State. It is, therefore, claimed by Mr. Chatterjee on behalf of the State. Unfortunately, he has not made out any such case in the plaint, nor has he asked for a declaration that he is a tenant of the State, nor has he made the State Government a party to the suit. On these grounds alone, the plaintiffs contention that he was a tenant protected by this Act will have to be rejected. Assuming, however, that he can be permitted to claim to be a tenant of the State, he must, in the first instance, show that, even for the purpose of this Act, he was a non-agricultural tenant whose rights have been specifically protected under this Act. As already pointed out, since the tenancy of the Banerjees had been terminated in 1946, the plaintiff, who was a sub-lessee of the Banerjee, could not claim to be either a tenant or a sub-lessee of the Banerjees, could not to be either a tenant or a sub-tenant in the year 1955. Secondly, Section 6(1)(h) of this Act provides :"Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (2) but subject to the other provisions of that sub-section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting .................. where the intermediary is a local authority, - land held by such authority, notwithstanding such land or any part thereof may have been let out by such authority : Provided that where any land which has been let out by any local authority is retained by such authority under this clause, no person holding such land shall have any right of occupancy therein, and every such person shall be bound to deliver possession of the land to the local authority when required by it for its purposes." This provision would show that the Corporation was entitled to retain the estate, and no person, not even the Banerjees, could have any right of occupancy therein and would be bound to deliver possession of the land when required by the local authority, viz., the Corporation. The Corporation has been seeking to take possession of this land from the plaintiff right from 1951, i.e., since before the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 came into force and, therefore, the plaintiff can have no right to retain possession of the land even if we assume that the plaintiff was a person holding such land within the contemplation of the proviso. As a matter of fact, after the tenancy had been terminated, he had no title to hold the land and his mere resistance to possession from 1951 would not make him a holder of the land for the purposes of the proviso. 13. Mr. Chatterjee, however, brought to our notice that Section 6(1)(h), as it originally stood prior to its amendment in 1960, applied only to land held "in khas for public purposes" by the local authority and not to land not held in khas by the local authority. The original words "in khas for public purposes" were omitted from the clause as we now find it by the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1960 with retrospective effect, that is to say, with effect from the date of the original enactment. We must, therefore, hold that the words "in khas for public purposes" in clause (h) were not there at all at any time. No argument, therefore, can be based on the ground that the present clause (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 was different from the clause as it was initially enacted. 14. In the result, it is clear that both the statutes, on which the plaintiff based his right to tenancy, do not help him. It would, therefore, necessarily follow that he was liable to be evicted in execution of the decree in Title Suit No. 78 of 1947. He first resisted the decree in the name of defendant No. 6 and, after that attempt failed, he started this new litigation in 1958 keeping the Corporation out of possession for all this period. Since the plaintiffs claim on merits fails, his suit was rightly dismissed. 15. It appears that the High Court dismissed the suit also on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Article 11-A of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. Apart from Article 11-A, one should have thought that, on the very face of it, the suit for declaration filed on November 14, 1958 was barred under Article 120 of that Act. The facts, already referred to, show that he was served with a show-cause notice through Court on April 26, 1951 why the decree should not be executed against him and, as a matter of fact, he had entered appearance on behalf of M/s. Reliance Development and Engineering Ltd., on May 19, 1951 and falsely alleged that all his interest in the sub-lease had been transferred to the Company. He had known quite well then that, whatever his rights were, he was losing them. In order to save his possession in the execution proceedings, he put forward false objections on behalf of a third party of which he was himself the Managing Agent and Director. Therefore, the cause of action for the suit for declaration would arise in May or June, 1951 and his present suit filed in 1958 would be prima facie barred. However, it is not necessary to pursue the defence of limitation in this appeal, because it is liable to be dismissed on merits.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]This provision would show that the Corporation was entitled to retain the estate, and no person, not even the Banerjees, could have any right of occupancy therein and would be bound to deliver possession of the land when required by the local authority, viz., the Corporation. The Corporation has been seeking to take possession of this land from the plaintiff right from 1951, i.e., since before the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 came into force and, therefore, the plaintiff can have no right to retain possession of the land even if we assume that the plaintiff was a person holding such land within the contemplation of the proviso. As a matter of fact, after the tenancy had been terminated, he had no title to hold the land and his mere resistance to possession from 1951 would not make him a holder of the land for the purposes of the provisoWe must, therefore, hold that the words "in khas for public purposes" in clause (h) were not there at all at any time. No argument, therefore, can be based on the ground that the present clause (h) ofn (1) of Section 6 was different from the clause as it was initially enacted14. In the result, it is clear that both the statutes, on which the plaintiff based his right to tenancy, do not help him. It would, therefore, necessarily follow that he was liable to be evicted in execution of the decree in Title Suit No. 78 of 1947. He first resisted the decree in the name of defendant No. 6 and, after that attempt failed, he started this new litigation in 1958 keeping the Corporation out of possession for all this period. Since the plaintiffs claim on merits fails, his suit was rightly dismissed15. It appears that the High Court dismissed the suit also on the ground that it was barred by limitation under ArticleA of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908. Apart from Article, one should have thought that, on the very face of it, the suit for declaration filed on November 14, 1958 was barred under Article 120 of that Act. The facts, already referred to, show that he was served with ae notice through Court on April 26, 1951 why the decree should not be executed against him and, as a matter of fact, he had entered appearance on behalf of M/s. Reliance Development and Engineering Ltd., on May 19, 1951 and falsely alleged that all his interest in thee had been transferred to the Company. He had known quite well then that, whatever his rights were, he was losing them. In order to save his possession in the execution proceedings, he put forward false objections on behalf of a third party of which he was himself the Managing Agent and Director. Therefore, the cause of action for the suit for declaration would arise in May or June, 1951 and his present suit filed in 1958 would be prima facie barred. However, it is not necessary to pursue the defence of limitation in this appeal, because it is liable to be dismissed on merits.