Case: State Of Bihar  Vs. Universal Hydrocarbons Co.Ltd. &amp; Anr Etc

expression "coal" within section 14(ia). The relevant extract of the judgment is as under : "It is not disputed that if petroleum coke is covered by clause (i) of section 14 which reads coal including coke in all its forms the State was not competent to levy tax at a rate exceeding the one given in section15(a) of the Central Act. The High Court was of the view that the word coal includes coke in all its forms in clause (i) of section14 of the Central Act and must be taken to mean coke derived from coal. In other words it must be coke which had been derived or acquired from coal by following the usual process of heating or burning. The contention, therefore, or the appellant was negatived that petroleum coke was covered by the aforesaid provision of the Central Act.This decision fully supports the respondent. The fact that calcined petroleum coke is a different commodity is of little consequence, In interpreting the scope of hides and skins which fall under section14(iii) of the Act, this Court in Mahi Traders case held at pages 236-237 of STC; 734-735 of SCC as under : "....... According to him the products purchased and sold are not different even under the classification by way of the dichotomy between raw and dressed hides and skins under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. Under the Central Sales Tax Act, the appellant is in a much better position, because all the hides and skins are brought together in one entry. Whether raw or dressed, the product falls under the same entry....... The operations involved in leather manufacture however fall into three groups. Pre-tanning operations include soaking, liming, deliming, bating and pickling, and post-tanning operations are splitting and shaving, neutralising, bleaching, dyeing, fat-liquoring and stuffing, setting out, samming, drying, staking and finishing. These operations bring about chemical changes in the leather substance and influence the physical characteristics of the leather, and different varieties of commercial leather are obtained by suitably adjusting the manufacturing operations. These processes need not be gone into in detail but the passages relied upon clearly show that hides and skins are termed leather even as soon as the process of tanning is over an the danger of their putrefaction is put an end to. The entry in the CST Act, however, includes within its scope hides and skins until they are dressed. This, as we have seen, represents the stage when they undergo the process of finishing and assume a form in which they can be readily utilised for manufacture of various commercial articles. In this view, it is hardly material that coloured leather may be a form of leather or may even be said to represent a different commercial commodity. The statutory entry is comprehensive enough to include the products emerging from hides and skins until the process of dressing or finishing is done." This is enough to conclude the case against the appellant. However, since reliance is placed on Pyare Lal Malhotras case, we have to make a brief reference to the same. That case dealt with the scope of the entry 14(iv) of the Act, iron and steel "that is to say". The interpretation of this phrase "that is to say" loomed large. It was held in paragraphs 13 and 14 (page 326 of STC; 806 of AIR), as under : "It is true that the question whether goods to be taxed have been subjected to a manufacturing process so as to produce a new marketable commodity, is the decisive test in determining whether an excise duty is leviable or no on certain goods. No doubt, in the law, dealing with the sales tax, the taxable event is the sale and not the manufacture of goods. Nevertheless, if the question is whether a new commercial commodity has come into existence or not, so that its sale is a new taxable event, in the sales tax law, it may also become necessary to consider whether a manufacturing process, which has altered the identity of the commercial commodity, has taken place. The law of sales tax in also concerned with goods of various descriptions. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine when they ceased to be goods of one taxable description and become those of a commercially different category and description. It appears to us that the position has been simplified by the amendment of the law, as indicated above, so that each of the categories falling under iron and steel constitutes a new species of commercial commodity more clearly now. It follows that when one commercial commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sale tax." * The position here is entirely different. There is no such phrase under section14(ia) of the Act. In the case of "oil-seeds" occurring under section14(iv) of the Act, similar phraseology, namely, "that is to say" occurs. This Court is sait Rikhaji Furtarnal v. State of Andhra Pradesh; held in paragraph 4 as under : "Mr. Rangam appearing in support of the appeals contended that there was a circular of Government of India with reference to the provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act as to what would be included within the meaning of oil-seeds and all the five items referred to here were included in the circular as being oil-seeds. It is difficult for us to accept his submission that after the Act has been amended reliance is available to be placed on the circular. On the basis of the test indicated by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra we must hold that the expression that is to say employed in the definition in the statute with reference to oil-seeds is exhaustive and is not illustrative. Since on amendment these five items are no more included in oil-seeds, the appellant is not entitled to claim the benefit".This vital distinction cannot be lost sight of. Therefore, the argument of the appellant has to be rejected.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In the instant case, the respondent purchases R.P.C. and after subjecting that to a process of manufacture C.P.C. is produced. When exemption was sought to be claimed on the ground that both these items will fall under section14(ia) of the Act, that was rejected by the JointHigh Court in the impugned judgment considered the scope of the phrase "that is to say". Thereafter it proceeded to hold that C.P.C. is a form of R.P.C. and, therefore, the exemption under section15(b) of the Act would be available.We have already, referred to entry relating to coke occurring under section14(ia) of the Act. When the entry says "coke in all its forms", there is no possibility of bringing coke of different forms except under this entry. The Joint Commissioner has clearly held that both raw petroleum coke and calcined petroleum coke, though different commercial commodities are "declared goods". However, he held that by process of manufacture, raw petroleum coke has lost its original identity and has resulted in a new product, namely, calcined petroleum coke. Therefore, according to him, the benefit under section15(b) of the Act could be availed of only if the same goods are subject tolevy of tax. He opined the use of words "such goods" under section15(b) of the Act are of significance.We are totally unable to accept this line of reasoning. Once the entry is "coke in all its forms" irrespective of the fact raw petroleum coke loses its original identity or in the process of manufacture calcined petroleum coke is produced, cannot take calcined petroleum coke out of the purview of this entry. In more or less identical situation, this Court held in India Carbons case that petroleum coke is one form of coal governed by the expression "coal" within sectionHigh Court was of the view that the word coal includes coke in all its forms in clause (i) of section14 of the Central Act and must be taken to mean coke derived from coal. In other words it must be coke which had been derived or acquired from coal by following the usual process of heating or burning. The contention, therefore, or the appellant was negatived that petroleum coke was covered by the aforesaid provision of the Central Act.This decision fully supports the respondent. The fact that calcined petroleum coke is a different commodity is of little consequence, In interpreting the scope of hides and skins which fall under section14(iii) of the Act, this Court in Mahi Traders case held at pageshe position here is entirely different. There is no such phrase under section14(ia) of the Act. In the case ofoccurring under section14(iv) of the Act, similar phraseology, namely, "that is to say"vital distinction cannot be lost sight of. Therefore, the argument of the appellant has to be rejected.