Case: Thiruvalanchuli Vaithilingam Pillai Charities Vs. Vijayavalli Achi &amp; Others

that the share of the 1st defendant should go after her death to her representative. It has to be remembered that at the date of the judgment Kalyanasundaram was the legal representative of both Vaithilinga and Kamakshi It seems to us, therefore, to be a natural interpretation of the sentence in the judgment on which the respondents rely to hold that the word” representative had been used really as indicating Kalyanasundaram. We should also point out that in the earlier part of the judgment as also in the part on which, the respondents relied it was held that Vaithilinga and Kamakshi had by the deed been given only a life interest in the lands. It would not be a natural interpretation of the learned Judges judgment, to hold that having decided that under the deed Vaithilinga and Kamakshi held lands only for their lives he proceeded to decide that at their deaths, the lands would go to their respective representatives. The question was of the rights under the deed and if under the deed Vaithilinga and Kamakshi had only life interest in the lands, their ultimate destination had to be decided by the terms of the deed if it made any provision in that behalf which it did. Admittedly under the deed the lands were to go to Kalyanasundaram after the death of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi. The learned Subordinate Judge was not deciding any question of intestate succession to the lands on the death of these two.10. It also seems to us that in the portion of the judgment on which the respondents rely the learned Subordinate Judge only dealt with the question whether Kalyanasundaram who had been held not to be entitled to the entirety of the 100 acres was entitled to any portion of the lands. The real point in that connection, according to the learned Subordinate Judge was whether the deed has made Vaithilinga and Kamakshi joint tenants in respect of the 100 acres or tenants-in-common because it was only in the latter event that Kalyanasundaram might claim a half share in the lands on Vaithilingas death. Having held that the words of grant in the deed read by themselves created a tenancy-in-common in the lands in favour of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi, he proceeded to consider whether the words provide for the lands going to Kalyanasundaram on the deaths of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi it should lead to a different interpretation of the words of grant and held that they were not clear enough to do so. Having thus decided that Vaithilinga had a half share in the lands as a tenant-in-common with Kamakshi, he proceeded to consider whether the provision in the deed that Kalyanasundaram would get the lands after the life-time of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi could be interpreted to mean that though the lands were held as tenants in common by Vaithilinga and Kamakshi, Kalyanasundaram was not entitled to any part of the land till after the death of both of them and that till then, Kamakshi was entitled to them as she claimed. He answered the question in the negative and it was in that connection only that he said the proper interpretation of these words was that the share of Vaithilinga in the lands was given to his representative after his death and the share of Kamakshi to her representative after her death. He was only deciding that the words meant that on the death of each his or her share would devolve as provided in the deed and not pass to the persons who survived. On this basis he held that Kalyanasundaram was entitled on Vaithilingas death to the 50 acres which the latter held for his life. Kalyanasundaram did not claim as the legal representative of Vaithilinga but as the person named in the deed. He of course was Vaithilingas legal representative and obviously that is why the learned Subordinate Judge used these words to describe him. We are unable to hold that he was interpreting the deed as meaning that the share each of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi in the lands would go on their respective deaths to their legal representatives whoever they might be at the time. That was not a question that arose or he was asked to decide. We are therefore of the view that there is nothing in the judgment in Suit No. 54 of 1904 to operate as barring this suit by way of res judicata. It is of some interest to point out that the sale in execution on which the trustees-plaintiffs now represented by the appellants before us based their claim was expressly of Kalyanasundarams vested interest under the deed in the lands which were then in Kamakshis possession under the decree in Suit No. 54 of 1904. The trustees in that application for execution had alleged that Kalyanasundaram had such vested interest. The order directing the sale held that he had such a vested interest. The certificate of sale mentioned that Kalyanasundaram had a vested right in these lands. That would appear to be a decision binding on the respondents as Kalyanasundarams heir.11. The learned Counsel for the respondents stated that if we found ourselves in agreement with the appellants contention, we should refer the case back to the High Court for the decision of various other points that arose in it. This contention seems to us to be wholly unfounded. It is clear from the judgment of the High Court under appeal that before that Court the respondents confined their argument only to the question of res judicata. Besides this aspect of the matter the learned Counsel for the respondents was also unable to refer us to any point of any substance which could have been argued with plausibility in the High Court in support of the respondents’ case and was not argued. We find no reason to refer the case back to the High Court for decision of any outstanding point. We are clear that no other point remains to be decided.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We should suppose that if such was the interpretation of the deed by the learned Subordinate Judge, his judgment might operate as res judicata barring the claim of the appellants in the present suit for the claim through Kalyanasundaram who was a party to the earlier suit. The question appears to us to be whether this sentence in this judgment amounts to a decision operating as res judicata. It is unnecessary to refer to the decision on the point of res judicata; it is enough to say that a decision can operate as res judicata if it was necessary for the purpose of the case in which it had been given. There is no dispute between the parties on this point.8. Now, it seems to us perfectly clear that no question arose in Suit No. 54 of 1904 as to the person who would succeed after her death to any property that might come to Kamakshi under a decree made in it. It was not necessary for the learned Subordinate Judge for the decision of any of the disputes that arose in that suit to say to whom the lands that went to Kamakshi would go on her death. It would, therefore, appear that the sentence in the judgment in Suit No. 54 of 1904 on which the learned Counsel for the respondents relied could not operate as res judicata barring the present suit.It has to be remembered that at the date of the judgment Kalyanasundaram was the legal representative of both Vaithilinga and Kamakshi It seems to us, therefore, to be a natural interpretation of the sentence in the judgment on which the respondents rely to hold that therepresentative had been used really as indicating Kalyanasundaram. We should also point out that in the earlier part of the judgment as also in the part on which, the respondents relied it was held that Vaithilinga and Kamakshi had by the deed been given only a life interest in the lands. It would not be a natural interpretation of the learned Judges judgment, to hold that having decided that under the deed Vaithilinga and Kamakshi held lands only for their lives he proceeded to decide that at their deaths, the lands would go to their respective representatives. The question was of the rights under the deed and if under the deed Vaithilinga and Kamakshi had only life interest in the lands, their ultimate destination had to be decided by the terms of the deed if it made any provision in that behalf which it did. Admittedly under the deed the lands were to go to Kalyanasundaram after the death of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi. The learned Subordinate Judge was not deciding any question of intestate succession to the lands on the death of these two.10. It also seems to us that in the portion of the judgment on which the respondents rely the learned Subordinate Judge only dealt with the question whether Kalyanasundaram who had been held not to be entitled to the entirety of the 100 acres was entitled to any portion of the lands. The real point in that connection, according to the learned Subordinate Judge was whether the deed has made Vaithilinga and Kamakshi joint tenants in respect of the 100 acres orbecause it was only in the latter event that Kalyanasundaram might claim a half share in the lands on Vaithilingas death. Having held that the words of grant in the deed read by themselves created ain the lands in favour of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi, he proceeded to consider whether the words provide for the lands going to Kalyanasundaram on the deaths of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi it should lead to a different interpretation of the words of grant and held that they were not clear enough to do so. Having thus decided that Vaithilinga had a half share in the lands as awith Kamakshi, he proceeded to consider whether the provision in the deed that Kalyanasundaram would get the lands after thelifetime of Vaithilingaand Kamakshi could be interpreted to mean that though the lands were held as tenants in common by Vaithilinga and Kamakshi, Kalyanasundaram was not entitled to any part of the land till after the death of both of them and that till then, Kamakshi was entitled to them as she claimed. He answered the question in the negative and it was in that connection only that he said the proper interpretation of these words was that the share of Vaithilinga in the lands was given to his representative after his death and the share of Kamakshi to her representative after her death. He was only deciding that the words meant that on the death of each his or her share would devolve as provided in the deed and not pass to the persons who survived. On this basis he held that Kalyanasundaram was entitled on Vaithilingas death to the 50 acres which the latter held for his life. Kalyanasundaram did not claim as the legal representative of Vaithilinga but as the person named in the deed. He of course was Vaithilingas legal representative and obviously that is why the learned Subordinate Judge used these words to describe him. We are unable to hold that he was interpreting the deed as meaning that the share each of Vaithilinga and Kamakshi in the lands would go on their respective deaths to their legal representatives whoever they might be at the time. That was not a question that arose or he was asked to decide. We are therefore of the view that there is nothing in the judgment in Suit No. 54 of 1904 to operate as barring this suit by way of res judicata. It is of some interest to point out that the sale in execution on which thenow represented by the appellants before us based their claim was expressly of Kalyanasundarams vested interest under the deed in the lands which were then in Kamakshis possession under the decree in Suit No. 54 of 1904. The trustees in that application for execution had alleged that Kalyanasundaram had such vested interest. The order directing the sale held that he had such a vested interest. The certificate of sale mentioned that Kalyanasundaram had a vested right in these lands. That would appear to be a decision binding on the respondents as Kalyanasundaramscontention seems to us to be wholly unfounded. It is clear from the judgment of the High Court under appeal that before that Court the respondents confined their argument only to the question of res judicata. Besides this aspect of the matter the learned Counsel for the respondents was also unable to refer us to any point of any substance which could have been argued with plausibility in the High Court in support of thecase and was not argued. We find no reason to refer the case back to the High Court for decision of any outstanding point. We are clear that no other point remains to be decided.