Case: Kays Construction Company Private Limited Vs. Its Workmen

reinstatement of the clerks in question.14. The decision in this appeal has emphasized that in dealing with industrial disputes the tribunals should not be unduly influenced by academic questions of law and that they should make an attempt to deal with the merits of each case according to its facts and circumstances. As pointed out in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal, 1957 SCR 335 : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 329 ) " the functions of industrial tribunals while adjudicating upon disputes referred to them for adjudication are quite different from those of arbitration tribunals that deal in matters of commercial dispute".This Court then held that an industrial dispute did arise between the respondent purchaser and the appellants and that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in reversing the award principally on the consideration of the abstract point of law as to the rights and liabilities of the successor like the respondent.15. Mr. Sastri fairly conceded that if facts found by the tribunal in the present case are accepted as correct then the present case would be substantially similar to the case of Dahingeapara Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 1026 (supra). He, however, contends that there is one material point on which the present ease can be distinguished. In the present ease, according to Mr. Sastri, no industrial dispute really arose between the appellant an respondent 1. His argument is that the employees, the claim for whose reinstatement has raised the present dispute are not workmen of the appellant and he suggests that it is not shown that respondent 1 union has on its register any of the appellants workmen.Mr. Sastri concedes that it is well settled that a dispute which validly gives rise to a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act need not necessarily be a dispute directly between an employer and his workmen. The definition of the expression industrial dispute is wide enough to cover a dispute raised by the employers workmen in regard to the non-employment of others who may not be his workmen at the material time.He, however contends that none of the appellants workmen has taken up the present dispute and so an industrial dispute cannot be said to arise between the appellant and respondent 1 and that makes the reference invalid. There is no doubt that one of the points made by respondent 1 was that the appellant is the continuer of, and successor to, respondent 2 and that respondent 1 had taken up the cause of the employees mentioned in the annexure who had not been employed by the appellant. If the appellants case was that respondent 1 could not raise an industrial dispute in this matter since none of the workmen of the appellant was its member, it should have taken this plea before the tribunal. No doubt it does appear that the appellant desired that persons who wanted employment under it should discontinue their connection with the union and Mr. Sastri wanted to refer to the evidence of Dr. Trivedi, the President of the Union, in support of his argument that such of the workmen whom the appellant has employed can be safely taken to have resigned their connection with the union. We do not think that it is open to Mr. Sastri to take such a plea at this stage. The statements made by Dr. Trivedi to which Mr. Sastri has referred clearly show that Dr. Trivedi was not prepared to issue the requisite certificates to the workmen who wanted employment with the appellant that they had ceased to be the members of the union. All that Dr. Trivedi asked the General Secretary of the Union to do was to issue statements of the outstanding dues of the workmen in question so that they might produce the said certificates to the management of the appellant in their effort to satisfy the management that they were not members of the union because they had not cleared off their dues. The workmen apparently adopted this device to obtain employment from the appellant; but that cannot assist Mr. Sastris argument because the record shows that most of them, after obtaining employment, wrote back to the union that they continued to be the members of the union; apart from this consideration, however, the plea sought to be raised by Mr. Sastri is a plea of fact which affected the tribunals jurisdiction and having regard to the case specifically set out by respondent 1. against the appellant it was clearly necessary for the appellant to have made out this plea in clear terms. Evidence could then have been led on the point to enable the tribunal to decide whether respondent 1 was entitled to raise the present dispute with the appellant as an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act and whether the reference to it was valid. On the record as it stands there would be no justification for assuming that respondent 1 which has raised the present dispute cannot do so because none of the appellants employees is its member and so it cannot claim to represent them.16. Thus the only ground on which Mr. Sastri attempted to distinguish the present case from the case of the Workmen of Dahingeapara Tea Estate, ((S) AIR 1957 SC 329 ) (supra) fails and so we must hold that the view taken by this Court in the said case governs the decision of the present appeal. A valid reference was made to the tribunal in regard to an industrial dispute between the appellant and respondent 1 and the tribunal, having considered the relevant facts, has come to the conclusion that the workmen in question have been improperly locked out and are entitled to reinstatement. Having regard to the material findings of fact recorded by the tribunal in the present case, we do not think that the validity of the award can be challenged by the appellant on abstract legal grounds sought to be raised by Mr. Sastri before us.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]13. In this appeal also the larger question about the liability of the successor qua the workmen in the employment of his predecessor under the principles of industrial adjudication was raised; but the learned Judges thought that it was not necessary to decide the said abstract question of law.Nevertheless they examined the merits of the rival contentions between the parties and held that the decision of the tribunal directing reinstatement of certain workmen was right and the contrary view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal was not justified. It appears that the respondent in the said case was the purchaser of the tea estate in question, By Cl. 9 of the agreement of sale the purchaser had been expressly given the option of taking such members of the staff of the tea estate as it shall in its absolute discretion consider useful and efficient for running the tea estate. This agreement was made on November 7, 1953 but had to come into force on January 1, 1954. On December 22, 1953, the respondent gave notice to certain employees. On December 30, 1953, the vendor purported to terminate the services of its employees with effect from December 31, 1953. It appeared that the respondent had employed all labourers and three of the clerks who were in the employment of the vendor. Sixteen clerks were, however, not employed by him. The respondents employees thereupon raised an industrial dispute in regard to theof the said sixteen clerks. The tribunal had ordered their reinstatement but the Labour Appellate Tribunal had reversed the award of the tribunal on the ground that the respondent as purchaser of the tea estate was not bound to reinstate them. This Court set aside the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal and restored the award of the tribunal for the reinstatement of the clerks in question.14. The decision in this appeal has emphasized that in dealing with industrial disputes the tribunals should not be unduly influenced by academic questions of law and that they should make an attempt to deal with the merits of each case according to its facts and circumstances. As pointed out in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal, 1957 SCR 335  : ( (S) AIR 1957 SC 329  ) " the functions of industrial tribunals while adjudicating upon disputes referred to them for adjudication are quite different from those of arbitration tribunals that deal in matters of commercial dispute".This Court then held that an industrial dispute did arise between the respondent purchaser and the appellants and that the Labour Appellate Tribunal was in error in reversing the award principally on the consideration of the abstract point of law as to the rights and liabilities of the successor like the respondent.15.Mr. Sastri fairly conceded that if facts found by the tribunal in the present case are accepted as correct then the present case would be substantially similar to the case of Dahingeapara Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 1026   (supra). He, however, contends that there is one material point on which the present ease can be distinguished. In the present ease, according to Mr. Sastri, no industrial dispute really arose between the appellant an respondent 1. His argument is that the employees, the claim for whose reinstatement has raised the present dispute are not workmen of the appellant and he suggests that it is not shown that respondent 1 union has on its register any of the appellants workmen.Mr. Sastri concedes that it is well settled that a dispute which validly gives rise to a reference under the Industrial Disputes Act need not necessarily be a dispute directly between an employer and his workmen.The definition of the expression industrial dispute is wide enough to cover a dispute raised by the employers workmen in regard to theof others who may not be his workmen at the material time.He, however contends that none of the appellants workmen has taken up the present dispute and so an industrial dispute cannot be said to arise between the appellant and respondent 1 and that makes the reference invalid. There is no doubt that one of the points made by respondent 1 was that the appellant is the continuer of, and successor to, respondent 2 and that respondent 1 had taken up the cause of the employees mentioned in the annexure who had not been employed by the appellant. If the appellants case was that respondent 1 could not raise an industrial dispute in this matter since none of the workmen of the appellant was its member, it should have taken this plea before the tribunal. No doubt it does appear that the appellant desired that persons who wanted employment under it should discontinue their connection with the union and Mr. Sastri wanted to refer to the evidence of Dr. Trivedi, the President of the Union, in support of his argument that such of the workmen whom the appellant has employed can be safely taken to have resigned their connection with the union. We do not think that it is open to Mr. Sastri to take such a plea at this stage. The statements made by Dr. Trivedi to which Mr. Sastri has referred clearly show that Dr. Trivedi was not prepared to issue the requisite certificates to the workmen who wanted employment with the appellant that they had ceased to be the members of the union. All that Dr. Trivedi asked the General Secretary of the Union to do was to issue statements of the outstanding dues of the workmen in question so that they might produce the said certificates to the management of the appellant in their effort to satisfy the management that they were not members of the union because they had not cleared off their dues. The workmen apparently adopted this device to obtain employment from the appellant; but that cannot assist Mr. Sastris argument because the record shows that most of them, after obtaining employment, wrote back to the union that they continued to be the members of the union; apart from this consideration, however, the plea sought to be raised by Mr. Sastri is a plea of fact which affected the tribunals jurisdiction and having regard to the case specifically set out by respondent 1. against the appellant it was clearly necessary for the appellant to have made out this plea in clear terms. Evidence could then have been led on the point to enable the tribunal to decide whether respondent 1 was entitled to raise the present dispute with the appellant as an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act and whether the reference to it was valid. On the record as it stands there would be no justification for assuming that respondent 1 which has raised the present dispute cannot do so because none of the appellants employees is its member and so it cannot claim to represent them.16. Thus the only ground on which Mr. Sastri attempted to distinguish the present case from the case of the Workmen of Dahingeapara Tea Estate, ((S) AIR 1957 SC 329  ) (supra) fails and so we must hold that the view taken by this Court in the said case governs the decision of the present appeal. A valid reference was made to the tribunal in regard to an industrial dispute between the appellant and respondent 1 and the tribunal, having considered the relevant facts, has come to the conclusion that the workmen in question have been improperly locked out and are entitled to reinstatement. Having regard to the material findings of fact recorded by the tribunal in the present case, we do not think that the validity of the award can be challenged by the appellant on abstract legal grounds sought to be raised by Mr. Sastri before us.