Case: Bhuwalka Steel Indus. Ltd Vs. Bombay Iron &amp; Steel Labour Bd.

Timber Merchants Association Ltd., specifying that the direct labourers of the employer doing loading/unloading work would not be covered by the said Act. Though these two letters were never procured, they were produced before us. Further, a reference is made to the letter of Mathadi Board (Bombay Iron and Steel Labour Board) dated 17.11.1983, wherein the Mathadi Board understood and applied the Act only to that special class of workers doing loading and unloading operations in scheduled employments, who were in the regular employments of an employer and, therefore, were not protected by other applicable labour legislations. It was also urged that only after the impugned judgment was passed, the Mathadi Boards have started asking the employers to register them under the Act even if they are engaging regular full time workers. It was urged that in Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. v. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), the Mathadi Board had taken such a position and they could not now turn back from their stance. From this, the learned Senior Counsel urged that since the State Government itself understood the provision in a particular manner, such understanding should be honoured by the Courts. 40. The argument is clearly erroneous for the simple reason that it is not the task of the State Government, more particularly, the Executive Branch to interpret the law; that is the task of the Courts. Even if the State Government understood the Act in a particular manner, that cannot be a true and correct interpretation unless it is so held by the Courts. Therefore, how the State Government officials understood the Act, is really irrelevant. The learned Senior Counsel, in his address, relied on the decision in Godawat Pan Masala Products I.P. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., IV (2004) SLT 908=2004 (7) SCC 68 , and more particularly, para 32 therein. There, Hon’ble Srikrishna, J. accepted the meaning of the concerned provision as it was understood by the State authorities. However, the learned Judge was careful enough to say that: “While this may not be really conclusive, it certainly indicates the manner of the State authority viewing its power and the Rules under which it was exercising the power. The Court can certainly take into account this situation on the doctrine of contemporanea expositio.” Therefore, this cannot be viewed to be an absolute doctrine. There are number of authorities, which speak about the powers of the Court, vis-a-vis, this doctrine. It has been held in Clyde Navigation Trustees v. Laird, 1883 (8) AC 658; Assheton Smith v. Owen, 1906 (1) Ch.D 179; Goldsmiths’ Co. v. Wyatt, 1907 (1) KB 95; Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra, AIR 1962 SC 159 ; Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 828 ; J.K. Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 191 ; Doypack Systems Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 782 that even if the person who dealt with the Act understood it in a particular manner, that does not prevent the Court in giving to the Court, its true construction. It is pointed out in the decision in Doypack Systems Ltd. v. Union of India (cited supra) that the doctrine is confined to the construction of ambiguous language used in very old statutes where indeed the language itself have had a rather different meaning in those days. The Learned author Justice Shri G.P. Singh, in his celebrated treatise quoted that: “Subject to use made of contemporary official statements and statutory instruments the principle of contemporanea expositio is not applicable to a modern statute.” Same subject has been dealt with in Punjab Traders v. State of Punjab, 1991 (1) SCC 86. Considering this settled position, we do not think we are in a position to accept the contention raised. Same logic applies that even if the Mathadi Board’s stand was somewhat contradictory in the case of Irkar Sahu’s & Anr. v. Bombay Port Trust (cited supra), it did not really create a bar against it from changing its stance for a correct interpretation of Section 2(11) of the Mathadi Act. 41. The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any Central legislation, whether made before or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both cover the same field. An exception to this lies in Sub-Article (2), which preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that this challenge is in the nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the State Act. Such was not the challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of the Act has already been upheld. Article 254 does not provide a guide for the interpretation of a State statute. The appellants are also not certain about the proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was received on 5.6.1969, since the said proposal could not be located by them. Therefore, all the arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential assent under Article 254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this question was never before the Full Bench and in our opinion, the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument on the ground that this was not the case of the appellants. Therefore, reliance placed on the decisions in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd., V (2002) SLT 555=2002 (8) SCC 182 ; and Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 1996 (3) SCC 15 , is of no consequence. The argument is thus rejected.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]41. The next argument was based on Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It was suggested that the said Article prescribes that in the matters falling in the Concurrent List, any Central legislation, whether made before or after a State legislation, supersede such State legislation, if they both cover the same field. An exception to this lies in Sub-Article (2), which preserves and protects a State enactment to the extent it has received the assent of the Vice President. Needless to say that this challenge is in the nature of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the provision of the State Act. Such was not the challenge. The appellants never urged that the Act was constitutionally invalid and in fact, the constitutional validity of the Act has already been upheld. Article 254 does not provide a guide for the interpretation of a State statute. The appellants are also not certain about the proposal of the assent of the Vice President, which was received on 5.6.1969, since the said proposal could not be located by them. Therefore, all the arguments must fall to the ground once the Presidential assent under Article 254(2) is received to the Act. This is apart from the fact that the grounds on the basis of Article 254 cannot be used for the interpretation of the Act. In strict sense, this question was never before the Full Bench and in our opinion, the Full Bench rightly rejected this argument on the ground that this was not the case of the appellants. Therefore, reliance placed on the decisions in Kaiser-I-Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. National Textile Corporation Ltd., V (2002) SLT 555=2002 (8) SCC 182 ; and Thirumuruga Kirupa Nanda Variyar Thavathiru Sundara Swamigal Medical Educational and Charitable Trust v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., 1996 (3) SCC 15 , is of no consequence. The argument is thus