Case: DODDAMUNIYAPPA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS Vs. MUNISWAMY

trial Court. On an appeal being preferred by respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4), the First Appellate Court allowed the appeal vide judgment and decree dated 27 th August, 1969. The second appeal being R.S.A. No. 69 of 1970 preferred by the present appellant (defendant no. 1) before the High Court came to be dismissed, thus, the decree became final. Respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) put the decree to execution and a deed of reconveyance was executed and possession of the subject property was restored to respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) on 7 th March, 1974 and on execution of a decree, it assumed the character of a joint family property in the hands of respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4).21. It is at the stage of Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974 preferred at the instance of the appellant (defendant no. 1), the compromise was executed between the parties on 25 th March, 1976 and part of the possession of the subject property was restored to the appellant(defendant no. 1).22. After the restoration of possession of the subject property on 7 th March, 1974, the title of the property reassumed its original character of joint family property in the hands of respondent nos. 7 to 9 (defendants nos. 2 to 4) and has created the right of inheritance of respondent nos. 1 to 6 in the joint family property and indisputedly, they were neither consulted nor made parties to the said compromise.23. It is well settled and held by this Court in Smt. Dipo Vs. Wassan Singh and Others (supra) that the property inherited from the father by his sons becomes joint family property in the hands of the sons. The relevant portion is as under:-"2. ………..Property inherited from paternal ancestors is, of course, ?ancestral property? as regards the male issue of the propositus, but it is his absolute property and not ancestral property as regards other relations. In Mullas Principles of Hindu Law (15th Edn.), it is stated at p. 289:?. . . if A inherits property, whether movable or immovable, from his father or fathers father, or fathers fathers father, it is ancestral property as regards his male issue. If A has no son, sons son, or sons sons son in existence at the time when he inherits the property, he holds the property as absolute owner thereof, and he can deal with it as he pleases. . . .* * *A person inheriting property from his three immediate paternal ancestors holds it, and must hold it, in coparcenary with his sons, sons sons and sons sons sons, but as regards other relations he holds it, and is entitled to hold it, as his absolute property.?Again at p. 291, it is stated:?The share which a coparcener obtains on partition of ancestral property is ancestral property as regards his male issue. They take an interest in it by birth, whether they are in existence at the time of partition or are born subsequently. Such share, however, is ancestral property only as regards his male issue. As regards other relations, it is separate property, and if the coparcener dies without leaving male issue, it passes to his heirs by succession.?24. Indisputedly, respondent nos. 1 to 6 (original plaintiffs) were not parties to the compromise dated 25 th March, 1976 and the subject property at that time was joint family property and the compromise entered into between the parties would not bind the rights of respondent nos. 1 to 6(grandsons of propositus Chikkanna).25. It is an admitted fact on record that the property was purchased by Chikkanna from his sister Thayamma and respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) have inherited the property after death of propositus Chikkanna. Respondent nos. 1 to 6 are children of respondent nos. 7 and 8(defendants nos. 2 and 3), it would be an ancestral property in their hands and indisputedly respondent nos. 1 to 6 are neither parties to the proceedings nor consented when the compromise decree was executed in Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974 (Exhibit P-8) dated 7 th March, 1974 and admittedly the same would not be binding upon their share over the property.26. It goes without saying that the compromise would bind the share of respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) as they are party to the compromise which was entered into Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974 and has been rightly recorded by the High Court under its impugned judgment. We find no error in a finding of fact which calls for any further interference of this Court.27. We find substance on the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that after the decree of the suit was put in execution a deed reconveyancing the subject property to respondent nos. 7 to 9 (defendants nos. 2 to 4) was executed and were put in possession on 7 th March, 1974, mere filing of an Execution Appeal would not take away the efficacy of the reconveyance decree already passed and the execution stands effected and the right, title and interest in the subject property could not be defeated by the compromise to which respondent nos. 1 to 6 (plaintiffs) were not parties and as such, the said compromise would not bind the share of respondent nos. 1 to 6.28. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant(s) that respondent nos. 1 to 6 failed to establish the existence of the property in the hands of any member in the joint family property or give rise to any presumption that the property is coparcenary property is misplaced for the reason that the factual matrix of which a detailed reference has been made indicates that the property in the hands of respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) of a joint family and confers on the property the character of coparcenary property in the hands of respondent nos. 1 to 6.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]22. After the restoration of possession of the subject property on 7 th March, 1974, the title of the property reassumed its original character of joint family property in the hands of respondent nos. 7 to 9 (defendants nos. 2 to 4) and has created the right of inheritance of respondent nos. 1 to 6 in the joint family property and indisputedly, they were neither consulted nor made parties to the said compromise.Indisputedly, respondent nos. 1 to 6 (original plaintiffs) were not parties to the compromise dated 25 th March, 1976 and the subject property at that time was joint family property and the compromise entered into between the parties would not bind the rights of respondent nos. 1 to 6(grandsons of propositus Chikkanna).25. It is an admitted fact on record that the property was purchased by Chikkanna from his sister Thayamma and respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) have inherited the property after death of propositus Chikkanna. Respondent nos. 1 to 6 are children of respondent nos. 7 and 8(defendants nos. 2 and 3), it would be an ancestral property in their hands and indisputedly respondent nos. 1 to 6 are neither parties to the proceedings nor consented when the compromise decree was executed in Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974 (Exhibit P-8) dated 7 th March, 1974 and admittedly the same would not be binding upon their share over the property.26. It goes without saying that the compromise would bind the share of respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) as they are party to the compromise which was entered into Execution Appeal No. 2 of 1974 and has been rightly recorded by the High Court under its impugned judgment. We find no error in a finding of fact which calls for any further interference of this Court.27. We find substance on the submission of learnedcounsel for the respondents that after the decree of the suit was put in execution a deed reconveyancing the subject property to respondent nos. 7 to 9 (defendants nos. 2 to 4) was executed and were put in possession on 7 th March, 1974, mere filing of an Execution Appeal would not take away the efficacy of the reconveyance decree already passed and the execution stands effected and the right, title and interest in the subject property could not be defeated by the compromise to which respondent nos. 1 to 6 (plaintiffs) were not parties and as such, the said compromise would not bind the share of respondent nos. 1 to 6.e submission of learned counsel for the appellant(s) that respondent nos. 1 to 6 failed to establish the existence of the property in the hands of any member in the joint family property or give rise to any presumption that the property is coparcenary propertyis misplaced for the reason that the factual matrix of which a detailed reference has been made indicates that the property in the hands of respondent nos. 7 to 9(defendants nos. 2 to 4) of a joint family and confers on the property the character of coparcenary property in the hands of respondent nos. 1 to 6.