Case: Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Company Ltd Vs. Salem Erode Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. Employe

(AIR 1964 SC 914 ). During the course of the hearing of this appeal some arguments were urged before us on the question about the relation between terms and conditions of service governing working hours, leaves, and the like and the wages paid to the employees. Mr. Ramamurthi who appeared for the respondents conceded that the terms and conditions in regard to leave or working hours can be changed; but he contended that the increase in the working hours or the reduction or earned leave should not be permitted to be introduced without taking into account the question about the coursequent increase in the wage structure itself; and it was with a view to combat this contention that Mr. Setalvad referred us to the decision in the Associated Cement Co.s case, 1964-1 Lab LJ 12 : (AIR 1964 SC 914 ) (supra). In that case, the question of holidays, working hours and wages were all referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its decision. The matter which arose for the decision of this Court in the appeals which were brought to this Court in that case, was, inter alia, in regard to holidays. The Tribunal had allowed 21 holidays, whereas this Court reduced the number to 16. Dealing with the question about the normal working hours, this Court observed that"once a conclusion about the normal working hours is reached after considering the optimum working hours on a consideration of all the relevant factors, industrial adjudication cannot hesitate to give effect to its conclusion merely because the workmen would have been entitled to more wages at overtime rates if the hours of work had been fixed at less."Mr. Setalvad relies upon this observation. But we think it wold be unreasonable to read this observation in isolation, because in very next sentence, this Court has added that it is true that in fixing the proper wage scale, the question of workload and the matter of working hours cannot be left wholly out of consideration, though it further observed that many other factors including the need of the workmen, the financial resources of the employer, the rates of wage prevailing in other industries in the region, have all to be considered in deciding the wage-scale. It appears that in that case, the Tribunal itself had held that 21 holidays erred on the side of excessive liberality, and yet it did not reduce that number. That is why this Court reduced the number of holidays from 21 to 16. This decision, in our opinion, does show that where industrial adjudication has to deal with an industrial dispute in relation to wage structure, working hours, and holidays, it must consider the problem comprehensively and in prescribing the working hours, and making provision for holidays and leave with or without pay, amongst other relevant factors, the wages paid to the employees have no doubt to be taken into account. But these considerations do not arise in the present proceedings, because what the appropriate authorities under the Act had to consider was whether two sets of Standing Orders should be permitted under the same establishment or not.25. The last case to which reference must be made is Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling, 1960-1 SCR 348 : (AIR 1959 SC 1279 ). In that case, the Standing Order had been certified under the Act prior to its amendment. The relevant Standing Order had relation to the age of retirement of the employees under the establishment in question. When the Standing Order was certified, its fairness and reasonableness could not have been examined by the Certifying Authority. After it was certified, the employer sought to give effect to the age of retirement in regard to employees who were already in its employment; and that gave rise to an industrial dispute. The employees who were already in the employment of the employer, contended that prior to the certification of the Standing Order, there was no age of retirement in the concern and they urged that the certified Standing Order could not affect their right to continue in the employment so long as they were fit to discharge their duties. It was in the context of this dispute that the question arose as to whether the certified Standing Order applied to the previously existing employees. The Labour Appellate Tribunal against whose decision the appeal was brought to this Court by the appellant Guest, Keen Williams Private Ltd. had held that the certified Standing Order could not apply to the employees who were already in the employment of the appellant. This Court affirmed the view expressed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the certified Standing Order could not affect the rights of the previous employees; nevertheless, it was held that the question of prescribing an age of retirement for them could be considered in the proceedings before the Court and under the special circumstances to which reference has been made in the judgment, it was thought that the age of superannuation for prior employees could be reasonably and fairly fixed at 60 years. This decision again is not of any assistance, because the matter came to this Court from an industrial dispute which was the subject-matter of industrial adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal and all that this Court did was to fix an age of superannuation for workmen who had been employed prior to the date of the certification of the relevant Standing Order, at 60, and that course was adopted under the special and unusual circumstances expressly stated in the course of the judgment. As we have already pointed out, the question as to whether two sets of Standing Orders can be certified under the provisions of the Act, did not fall to be considered in that case. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority committed no error of law in refusing to certify the modified Standing Orders submitted by the appellant in the present proceedings.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]25. The last case to which reference must be made is Guest, Keen, Williams Private Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling, 1960-1 SCR 348  : (AIR 1959 SC 1279  ). In that case, the Standing Order had been certified under the Act prior to its amendment. The relevant Standing Order had relation to the age of retirement of the employees under the establishment in question. When the Standing Order was certified, its fairness and reasonableness could not have been examined by the Certifying Authority. After it was certified, the employer sought to give effect to the age of retirement in regard to employees who were already in its employment; and that gave rise to an industrial dispute. The employees who were already in the employment of the employer, contended that prior to the certification of the Standing Order, there was no age of retirement in the concern and they urged that the certified Standing Order could not affect their right to continue in the employment so long as they were fit to discharge their duties. It was in the context of this dispute that the question arose as to whether the certified Standing Order applied to the previously existing employees. The Labour Appellate Tribunal against whose decision the appeal was brought to this Court by the appellant Guest, Keen Williams Private Ltd. had held that the certified Standing Order could not apply to the employees who were already in the employment of the appellant. This Court affirmed the view expressed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal that the certified Standing Order could not affect the rights of the previous employees; nevertheless, it was held that the question of prescribing an age of retirement for them could be considered in the proceedings before the Court and under the special circumstances to which reference has been made in the judgment, it was thought that the age of superannuation for prior employees could be reasonably and fairly fixed at 60 years. This decision again is not of any assistance, because the matter came to this Court from an industrial dispute which was the subject-matter of industrial adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal and all that this Court did was to fix an age of superannuation for workmen who had been employed prior to the date of the certification of the relevant Standing Order, at 60, and that course was adopted under the special and unusual circumstances expressly stated in the course of the judgment. As we have already pointed out, the question as to whether two sets of Standing Orders can be certified under the provisions of the Act, did not fall to be considered in that case. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority committed no error of law in refusing to certify the modified Standing Orders submitted by the appellant in the present proceedings.Prior to the enactment of the Act, industrial establishment used to employ workmen on different terms and conditions of service and they used to enter into separate agreements with employees on an ad hoc basis. It was precisely with the object of avoiding this anomalous position that the Act has been passed and an obligation has been imposed upon the industrial establishments to have their Standing Orders certified by the appropriate authorities. Therefore, we do not think Mr. Setalvad is right in contending that it is open to an industrial establishment to have two sets of Standing Orders certified in relation to leave and holidays provided that the modified Standing Orders apply to future entrants and the existing Standing Orders apply to entrants who are already in the employment of the establishment.The result, therefore, appears to be that in regard to the certification of the Standing Order, the Act provides for aCode. The Certifying Officer is given the power to consider questions of fairness and reasonableness as well as the other question indicated by S. 4 (a) and (b). An appeal is provided against the decision of the Certifying Officer and in case a dispute arises as to the interpretation or the application of the Standing Order, a remedy is provided by S. 13A. Besides, as we have already pointed out, a right is given both to the employer and the workmen to move the appropriate authorities for modification of the existing Standing Orders. That is why we do not think that Mr. Setalvad is right in contending that the Certifying Officer as well as the appellate authority erred in law in refusing to certify the modified Standing Orders submitted by the appellant for certification.