Case: Textile Labour Association, Bhadra Ahmedabad Vs. Ahmedabad Mill Owners Association, Ahmedabad

Hidayatullah, C.J.1. On September 19, 1969 the Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad and the Ahmedabad Mill-owners Association, Ahmedabad entered into a compromise in Civil Appeal No. 1605 of 1966. This compromise was recorded by us, but we left it over for consideration as Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966 was to be heard. The two appeals have been filed by different parties against the same award and the party in Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966 was not agreeable to the compromise and did not wish to implement it. Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966 was set down today for hearing.2. A question has been raised whether the compromise entered into the Textile Labour Association, Ahmedabad is binding upon the party in Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966. On an examination of the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, we are of opinion that the compromise is binding upon all the employees who are holding out and who are parties to Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966. Under Section 27-A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, it is provided that except as provided in Sections 32 and 33, no employee shall be allowed to appear or act in any proceedings under the Act except through the representative of the employees. The expression Representative of employees is defined in Section 30 of the Act and it gives in preferential order the persons who can be said to be representative of employees. The first in the list in the representative Union for such industry. Mr. Gokhale appearing on behalf of the 13 persons who are not accepting the compromise and who wish to press Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966, admits that the Textile Labour Association is the representative Union for his industry. He contends, however, that his clients can press their claim in spite of the compromise entered into by the representative union of the industry and he relies upon the provisions of Section 32 and 33 of the Act which are excepted from the operation of Section 27-A. Reading these two sections, we find that it is quite clearly stated in the provisos to the two sections that no individual is allowed to appeal in any proceeding in which the representative Union has appeared as the representative of the employees. It is not necessary to quote the two sections. Each of them contains an identical proviso, i.e., the character of the representative Union and the binding force of any agreement or action taken by the representative Union. In this case the Textile Labour Association has appeared before us and therefore we are of opinion that the provision to Section 32 and 33 do not entitle any other employee to come before us and plead against the action of the representative Union in accepting the compromise; nor do we think that they can press their claim when once the representative union of the employees has entered into a valid compromise which has been accepted by this Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]On an examination of the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, we are of opinion that the compromise is binding upon all the employees who are holding out and who are parties to Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966. Under Sectionof the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, it is provided that except as provided in Sections 32 and 33, no employee shall be allowed to appear or act in any proceedings under the Act except through the representative of the employees. The expression Representative of employees is defined in Section 30 of the Act and it gives in preferential order the persons who can be said to be representative of employees. The first in the list in the representative Union for such industry.Mr. Gokhale appearing on behalf of the 13 persons who are not accepting the compromise and who wish to press Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 1966, admits that the Textile Labour Association is the representative Union for his industry. He contends, however, that his clients can press their claim in spite of the compromise entered into by the representative union of the industry and he relies upon the provisions of Section 32 and 33 of the Act which are excepted from the operation of SectionReading these two sections, we find that it is quite clearly stated in the provisos to the two sections that no individual is allowed to appeal in any proceeding in which the representative Union has appeared as the representative of the employees. It is not necessary to quote the two sections. Each of them contains an identical proviso, i.e., the character of the representative Union and the binding force of any agreement or action taken by the representative Union. In this case the Textile Labour Association has appeared before us and therefore we are of opinion that the provision to Section 32 and 33 do not entitle any other employee to come before us and plead against the action of the representative Union in accepting the compromise; nor do we think that they can press their claim when once the representative union of the employees has entered into a valid compromise which has been accepted by this Court.