Case: Akhil Bharat Gosewa Sangh and Ors.  Vs. State of A.P. and Ors.

export and development of scheduled products. It is the consistent policy of the Government of India to encourage export of meat and meat products, as would be evident from the following: Export of buffalo meat is on the OGL list. (i) Government of India in its Directive has stressed export of meat and meat products as thrust area. (ii) Current Foreign Trade Policy encourage export of meat. It provides for export of meat of buffalo provided it is accompanied by a certificate from the designated veterinary authority to the effect that meat or offal are from buffalo not used for breeding and mulching purposes. 65. It appears that the certificates that are to be or already issued was in conformity with the decision of the Constitution Benchs judgment in Mohd. Hanif Qureshis case reported in . It is the case of the Government as well as the abattoir that only those buffaloes which are unfit for mileching, breeding and draught were permitted to be slaughtered and are being slaughtered. We have already discussed the decline of cattle population because of the operation of Al-Kabeer in this judgment hereinbefore. In Mohd. Hanif Qureshis case reported in the issue was not whether the population of live stock was increasing or not but whether the population of healthy live stock was increasing, Although it was sought to be argued by the appellant that due to slaughter of buffaloes by Al-Kabeer, the population of healthy buffaloes was declining even then in view of our discussion made herein earlier, it must be confirmed that there, is no depletion of cattle/buffalo wealth due to operation of Al-Kabeer. Apart from that, it appears from the record that Al-Kabeer slaughterhouse was built in accordance with European Economic Community Standards and is one of the most modern, scientific, integrated slaughter houses in India with an installed capacity of 15000 MT. If in any way Al-Kabeer is directed to close down their factory the said action on the part, of the Central Government would be to discourage private entrepreneurs to invest in the meat industry which will affect the reputation of India in the export market of meat As we have already noted, the interim direction given by this Court on 12th March 1997 by which the production of Al-Kabeer was reduced to 50 %, the total export of meat from India, which is about 1,70,000 MT., did not reduce. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to direct at this stage to strike down the policy regarding meat export from India to foreign countries. We are of the view that the policy of the Central Government cannot be easily struck down only because there was slight decline of cattle growth nor it can be struck down before looking into the entire aspect of the matter. It is also well settled that policy decision of the Government cannot be interfered with or struck down merely on certain factual disputes in the matter. It is not open to the Court to strike down such decision until and unless a serious and grave error is found on the part of the Central Government or the State Government. Such being the position, we are unable to strike down this meat export policy of the Central Government, as in our view, it does not violate the constitutional provisions. That apart, the question regarding constitutionality as mentioned above was not argued before the High Court seriously. Accordingly, this submission of Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh is hereby rejected. 66. Apart from that, from the discussion made hereinabove, we find that it is also the consistent, policy of the Government of India to-encourage export of meat, and meat products. The current foreign trade policy also encourages export of meat provided that a designated veterinary authority certifies that it is not obtained from buffalo used for breeding and mulching purposes, it is true that in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur reported in AIR2006SC212 it has been held that the protection envisaged under Article 48 extended even to cattle that had ceased to be milch or draught, provided they fall within the category of milch and draught cattle. In State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur (supra) it has also been held that cattle forms the backbone of Indian agriculture and the remain useful throughout their lives. While dealing with Article 48 and 48A of the Constitution read with the fundamental rights, the Constitution Bench further held that both directive principles and fundamental duties must be kept in mind while assessing the reasonableness of legal restrictions placed upon fundamental rights. However, striking down a law or policy on the ground that it violates a directive principle or fundamental duty was not an issue before the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur (supra). It is true that in the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision it has been held that total prohibition of cow and cow progeny slaughter may be justified. However, it. has not been, held in that decision, that laws and policies which permit such slaughter are unconstitutional. Therefore, the position of law remains that the directive principles and fundamental duties cannot in themselves serve to invalidate a legislation or a policy. Moreover, the export policy itself permits only export of meat from buffaloes that are-certified as not useful formulching. breeding or draught purposes. Therefore, if properly implemented, it cannot be said that the policy will necessarily have adverse consequences, especially in view of the foreign exchange obtained through it. Accordingly, we are unable to accede to the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the meat export policy, as made by the Central Government must to be struck down. 67. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that meat export policy need not be struck down subject to constant review by the Central Government in the light of its potentially harmful effects on the economy of the country.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. We have carefully examined the Report of the Krishnan Committee, and its recommendation for allowing the establishment, of the slaughter house. From a plain reading of the report and its recommendation, it cannot be doubted that the Krishnan Committee was in favour of the establishment of the slaughter house subject to the condition that it should raise its own cattle required by it - initially to the extent of half and ultimately to the full extent. The committee also opined that if the company was not willing to or not in a position to raise its own cattle then the company may not to be allowed to run or its capacity may be utilised to meet the existing requirement by diverting the cattle from the existing slaughter houses. From this recommendation, it may be said that the existing slaughter houses, big and small, government and private, were to be closed down and the slaughter house of the company would be utilised to meet, the present domestic requirements. It also appears from the record that before forwarding this report to the Central Government, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Andhra Pradesh appended a Reference note which may not be required to be noted for our present purpose.23. From the above noted observations of this Court in the appeals, we find that the propriety of the Krishnan Committee report could be considered after the receipt of the material and report from the Central Government. Therefore, it cannot be said that by the aforesaid order of this Court at the intermediary stage this Court in fact rejected the report of the Krishuan Committee. On the other hand, it was made clear that such a report can be considered after submitting of the report of the Central Government in compliance with the directions made by this Court, as noted herein earlier. In compliance with the directions made by this Court in its order, a report was submitted and a further order in continuance of the order dated 25th October 1994, was also passed by this Court in the aforesaid appeals reported in Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh and Ors. v. State of A.P. and Ors. [1997]2SCR1040 . From this order, it appears that the Central Government had constituted an inter-Ministerial committee headed by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Food Processing Industry and three other Members.In our view, this submission of the appellants, at this stage, cannot be accepted. At the outset, we may say that this question was not seriously argued by the learned Counsel of the appellants before us, although in the written submissions filed by them, this question was tentatively raised. Since a submission was made on this account, we feel it appropriate to deal with this question. Before we deal with this question in detail, we may note that for the first time in this Court the appellants have alleged the fact that the Al-Kabeer unit (company) is located within 13 km. from the standard urban limits of the city of Hyderabad which falls within the prohibited zone.31. Even assuming, distance prohibition would be applicable to the case of Al-Kabeer (company), we are still of the view that this distance prohibition may not stand in the way of Al-Kabeer from getting an industrial licence for the purpose of setting up the abattoir at the site in question. It is an admitted fact that in the application for grant of licence, Al-Kabeer (the Company), had stated the exact location where they were going to set up the abattoir, that is to say in Rudraram Village in the District of Medak of the State of Andhra Pradesh. When this application was processed by the Central Government, a thorough enquiry must have been made by it and only thereafter industrial licence was issued to, the Company. It is true that before issuance of licence, LOT was issued by the Central Government only wherein, this location requirement was stated in a printed form. It is an admitted position that the Central Government did not make any query from the company about the distance between Rudraram Village, where the site is located, and the urban limits of the city of Hyderabad.In our view, Sub-section 2 of Section 11 of the Act. by which conditions can he imposed as to the location of the undertaking by the Central Government is only directory and it would be open to the Central Government, to issue licence without, giving any conditions to the company as to the location of the undertaking. It is significant to note that the legislature in Sub-section 2 of Section 11 has used the word may.33. By issuing the Industrial licence to the Company, even after knowing the proposed location of the unit, it must be said that the Central Government waived the location requirements, as mentioned in its LOI with regard to this unit.Clause (2) of Paragraph 3 of the Notification specified the list of villages falling within the prohibited zone for which, location approval from. The Central Government would be necessary except for non-polluting industries such as electronics, computer software and printing industries. In the present case, the activity of the company, does not fall in the category of non-polluting industries. However, this notification contains two lists. One list is A and the other is B. List A specified all the villages within the standard urban area of Hyderabad. Patancheru which falls within Medak District and is within the compilation of 25 km. from the periphery of the standard urban area of Hyderabad falls under list B. Therefore, in terms of the distance there was requirement of obtaining an industrial licence by - virtue of the Notification dated 3rd February 1992 of the State Government. In view of the admitted fact that industrial licence was granted by the Central Govt. on 11.11.1992 and permission to run the slaughter house was also granted by the State Government on the basis of the Industrial policy of the State Govt. of 3rd February, 1992, we are unable to hold that, distance prohibition could be considered to be a ground either for cancellation of the industrial licence or for closing down the unit.36. It also appears from the record that the Industrial licence was granted by the Central Government on the strong recommendation of the State Government The unit commenced production in April 1993 after dismissal of a batch of Writ Petitions challenging the permissions granted by various authorities to commence production including that of the APPCB. The unit achieved its full production in December 1993 and since then it is earning valuable and substantial foreign exchange for our country. Above all, the question on location, as noted herein earlier, was neither raised seriously before the High Court nor before us. It must also be noted that, in this regard various State authorities had granted permissions for the abattoir to be constructed and function at the selected site and production has been continuing for the last 10 to 15 years. That apart, the question on location requirement is always a question of fact which cannot be permitted to be raised at this stage before us. However, we keep it open to the Central Government and the State Government to consider the distance prohibition as indicated in the LOI and the Notification and General Order of the State Government for the purpose of shifting the site to some other alternative place which would satisfy the location conditions. Subject to the above, this question is answered in favour of the Al-Kabeer (company).39. From a careful consideration of the rival submissions of the parties on the question of environmental pollution, we find that this question was not seriously argued by the appellants during the course of hearing that the company had violated the norms under Environment Protection Rules, 1986. Thus we may not permit the appellant to raise this question before us. However, as environmental pollution has now become a public nuisance, we thought it fit to go into this question and decide the same.40. We have carefully examined the rival submissions made before us by the learned Counsel for the parties on the aforesaid question. From the record it appears that the recommendations regarding environment made by Krishnan Committee so far as the abattoir is concerned, were accepted by the Central Government as would be evident from this Courts order dated 12th March, 1997. It also appears from the record that Al-Kabeer Company had invested huge amount for installation of elaborate anti-pollution equipment, and operates the same with consent obtained from APPCB. It is true that the standards prescribed by APPCB for Al-Kabeer while issuing its consent for slaughtering operation to begin, were indeed in violation of the Environment Protection Rules in so far as they prescribe a lower standard than was mandated by the aforesaid Rules. Under Rule 3 of the Rules, the State Boards are permitted to prescribe higher standards than those mentioned in the Rules but are not permitted to lower the standard. Considering the fact that the permission to operate the abattoir was granted by the APPCB, the State Government and also by various authorities of the State 10 to 15 years back and considering the fact that Al-Kabeer had installed elaborate anti-pollution equipment, by investing huge amount, we are of the view that Al-Kabeer must be directed to comply with the Environment Protection Rules by lowering down the pollution levels at the abattoir to permissible limits, rather than to direct closure of the abattoir of the company. It also appears that the samples which were collected by the Department of Water and Waste Water Examination, Institute of Preventive Medicine, Narayanguda, Hyderabad from Al-Kabeers abattoir indicated violation of the standards prescribed under Environment Protection Rules. Though Al-Kabeer has installed elaborate anti-pollution equipment, it would be of no consequence if such equipment is in reality not bringing down the level of pollution below permissible limits. However, it cannot be overlooked that Al-Kabeer is continuing its operation for more than 10 years without any objection from the APPCB, Therefore, considering all the circumstances, we are of the view that directly ordering closure of Al-Kabeer Abattoir is not called for; rather directions may be given to APPCB to rectify its consent order in accordance with the Environment Protection Rules and also to direct Al-Kabeer to strictly comply with that, rectified consent order and Environment Protection Rules. In the event abattoir fails to comply with such directions from the APPCB, it would be open to the authorities to direct closure of the Al-Kabeer unit. We are taking this view keeping in mind that the appellants had not seriously argued, during the course of hearing before this Court, that the company had in fact violated the standards laid down in the Environment Protection Act and Rules.41. It may also be noted that in the interim judgment dated 12.3.1997 reported in [1997]2SCR1040 , this Court has noted the conclusions of the Central Government. Committee in paragraph 2 wherein, it has recorded that the Committee had accepted the suggestions and recommendations made by the Krishnan Committee with regard to pollution of air and water. It has also been noted therein that the Environmental Audit Report and the Environmental Management Firm Report along with the Environmental Management Plan prepared by the company are acceptable. As already noted , the company has installed elaborate anti-pollution equipment, imported as well as indigenous. The company has been operating only after obtaining consent from APPCB which is regularly renewed. Insofar as standards for discharge of effluents from slaughter house and meat processing are concerned, the same is prescribed under Rule 3 read with entry 50-B of Schedule I of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986. In this connection Entry 50-B (b) of Schedule 1 of Environment Protection Rules 1986 is relevant as it prescribes the B.O.D., suspended solidsoil and grease limits. At this juncture it is also to be noted that Ministry of Environment, Government of India, by its letter dated 29th May 1995 fixed the standards for Al-Kabeer Exports Pvt. Ltd. at 100 B.O.D. and 30 B.O.D. for slaughterhouse and meat, processing respectively. As Al-Kabeer has been operating on the basis of the norms specified by the Central Government and considering the fact that- Al-Kabeer unit has been operating for more than 10 years without, any objection form APPCB and keeping in mind the economic policy of the Central Government, we are of the view that Al-Kaber may not be, at this stage, directed to stop their operation and close the unit. In view of our discussion made hereinbefore, and as APPCB reserves the right to take action against Al-Kabeer for violation of the terms and conditions imposed in its permission, it would be open for APPCB to direct Al-Kabeer to rectify the level of pollution below prescribed limits and in the event that it is not done they may direct Al-Kabeer to close down its abattoir. As noted hereinbefore, it is of course true that the prescribed limit of pollution by APPCB was in violation of the Environment Protection Rules, therefore in our view, directions must be given to APPCB to rectify its consent order and directions be given by them to the abattoir to comply with that rectified consent order in accordance with Rule 3 of the Environment Protection Rules.Learned counsel appearing for Shri Tukkoji contended that the consent order was in derogation of the light of Shri Tukkoji to information in violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. According to Shri Tukkoji, he was not only entitled to receive the reports of the analysts relating to the effects of the functioning of the abattoir but also to file objections prior to the issuance of N.O.C. This contention was accepted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court but was rejected by the Division Bench. The Division Bench In the impugned judgment observed as follows-On a prima, facie view of the various provisions of the Water Act and the corresponding provisions of the Air Act, in particular the provisions of Sections 16, 17, 20 and 25 of the Water Act we are not inclined to hold at this stage that a third parts 7 has any right to seek information or material from the State Board at or before granting of consent by it under Section 25(3) of the Water Act. It is not as if aggrieved party is left without a remedy. After consent is granted... any third party who feels aggrieved... can make a complaint to the Court of a First Class Magistrate... Apart, from that, the State Board has ample powers to review its order granting consent by modifying or revoking any existing condition....(Emphasis supplied)44. We do not find any reason to disagree with this view of the Division Bench of the High Court.In this connection, we examined Section 25 of the Water Act in depth and, in our view, Section 25 of the Water Act does not confer any right on members of the public to demand information from the APPCB prior to issuance of NOG. Therefore, it cannot be held, that the NOG was vitiated by reason of non-disclosure of information to the appellant Tukkoji prior to its issuance.45. Thus, first question of Shri Tukkoji as argued by his learned Counsel has no merit and it is hereby rejected.45. Thus, first question of Shri Tukkoji as argued by his learned Counsel has no merit and it is hereby rejected.47. From the record, it appears that at the relevant time the Chairman and the Member Secretary of the APPCB did not possess these statutorily required qualifications. The observation of the High Court in the judgment that some of the members of the APPCB were scientific experts, does not address this specific breach of the statutory requirement. In this connection, we, however, need to look into the provisions under Section 11 of the Water Act, which provides in terms that No act or proceeding of a Board or any committee thereof shall be called in question on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in or any defect in the constitution of, the Board or such committee, as the case may be. Therefore, applying Section 11 of the Act which clearly provides that 110 act or proceeding of APPCB or any committee thereof shall be called in question, it can safely be concluded that even if there was some defect in the composition of the APPCB, that would not invalidate the consent order issued by it.54. As noted herein earlier, we have not only carefully examined the Krishnan Committee report but also the other reports submitted toy the Central Government in pursuance of the directions made by this Court in its earlier orders in 1994 and 1997. On cattle depletion the Krishnan Committee noted that the operation of Al-Kabeer would adversely affect the cattle population in and around the region unless 50% of the demand of the abattoir was met through breeding of cattle by Al-Kabeer itself. Before we go into this question we may note that the A.P. Act was enacted in the year 1977 (Act 11 of 1977), By this Act, the Legislature has regulated the slaughter of all bovine animals including buffaloes. Under section 6(1) no animal is allowed to be slaughtered unless a certificate in writing from the competent authority is obtained certifying that the animal is fit for slaughter. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act prohibits slaughtering of animals unless the competent authority grants a certificate in respect of an animal that it is not likely to become economical for the purpose of breeding, mulching or draught. After carefully reading the conditions for obtaining a permission from the competent authority to slaughter an animal, we find, that slaughtering an animal requires the following;(a) Only old and useless buffaloes can be slaughtered.(b) Buffaloes fit formulching, breeding or draught cannot be slaughtered.(c) Cow and its progeny including calves of cows and calves of buffaloes cannot be slaughtered.56. As noted herein earlier, in the interim direction made by this Court in these appeals on 12th March 1997 [1997]2SCR1040 , this Court directed the Central Govt, to give a report after studying the impact and effect of the working of Al-Kabeer upon the buffalo population of the Telangana Region of Andhra Pradesh and also of the areas adjacent to Al-Kabeer, two years after the commencement of the operations by Al-Kabeer, The Central Government in pursuance of the said direction made on 12th March 1997 filed a fresh report on 15th September 1997. From a reading of the said report, it appears to us that the expert committee of the Central Govt. had examined all issues, as directed by this Court in its judgment dated 12th March 1997.58. On behalf of the appellant, it was argued that in the Central Govt. report figures/statistics were misleading inasmuch as it had taken an average of four years before the commencement, of operations of A1-Kabeer and again of four year figures after the commencement of operations by Al-Kabeer. According to the appellants, the correct way was to see the figures immediately preceding the start of operations by AI-Kabeer and thereafter to see the figures two years after commencement of operation of Al-Kabeer. In our view, this submission is fallacious and cannot be accepted. The committee of the Central Govt. has correctly taken the figures of a block period of four years before commencement of operations and again figures of a block period of four years alter commencement of operations by Al-Kabeer. This is in view of the fact that statistics/figures of one particular year cannot represent or give a proper picture as the number of animals/buffaloes/cattle can very well vary due to natural calamities large scale migration in view of urbanization etc. We do not find any thing to say that the committee of the Central Govt. had gone wrong by proceeding on that basis and it was justified to take a block period of four years which would certainly indicate the trend or show whether there was any steep or persistent decline after the commencement of operations of Al-Kabeer. We must not forget that this Court has also seen that there is no sharp decline or consistent reduction in the number of useful buffaloes year after year after the commencement of operations of Al-Kabeer. The figures/statistics as given by the Central Govt. in its report dated 15.9.1997 as well as the 16th Quinquennial and 17 th Quinquennial Census would clearly indicate that there is an increase in the number of buffaloes and there is no reduction or decline much less a steep decline in the number of buffaloes in the Telangana region, as argued by the appellant.59. The appellant sought to challenge the veracity and correctness of the figures given in the report of the Central Govt. as well as in the Quinquennial census. In our view, this submission is devoid of merit. It is now well-settled by various decisions of this Court that the findings of expert bodies in technical and scientific matters would not ordinarily be interfered with by courts in the exercise of their power under Article 226 of the Constitution or by this Court under Article 136 or 32 of the Constitution. For this proposition, reliance can be placed on the decision of this Court in the case Systopic Laboratories (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Dr. Prein Gupta and Ors. 1994 Suppl.(1) SCC 160. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of this decision clearly give the answer on the question whether the findings of expert body in technical and scientific matters can be interfered with by the Court either under Article 226 or by this Court under Article 32 or 136 of the Constitution. Paragraph 19 is re-produced below:Having considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Solicitor General in this regard, we must express our inability to make an assessment, about the relative merits of the various studies and reports which have been placed before us. Such an evaluation is required to be done by the Central Government while exercising its powers under Section 26A of the Act on the basis of expert advice and the Act makes provision for obtaining such advice through the Hoard and the DCC.(Emphasis supplied)Para 20 is as follows:The learned Counsel for the petitioners have urged that these studies and reports had been submitted on behalf of the petitioners and other manufacturers before the Sub-Committee of the DCC as well as the Experts Committee but there has been no proper consideration of the same by the experts as well as the DCC and the Board. In this context, it has been submitted that no medical expert in the field of clinical medicine in the treatment of asthma was associated in the committees and such-experts alone could make a proper evaluation of the said studies. We find no substance in this contention. We have pursued the minutes of the meetings of the Board, the Subcommittee of the DCC as well as the Experts Committee. The minutes show that, the material that was submitted on behalf of the manufacturers of the drugs in question was examined by the members and it is not possible to hold that there has been no proper consideration of the said material by the Experts Committee or the Subcommittee of the DCC. The complaint that experts in clinical medicine were not associated with the Committee does not appear to be justified. The minutes of the meetings of the experts to consider the views of the affected manufacturers, who represented against the proposed withdrawal of certain formulations moving in the market, which were held on September 8, 1987, October 16/17, 1987 and January 15/ 16, 1989 show that among the members were included Dr. O.D. Gulati, Dean, CAM Medical College, Karansad and Dr. J.P. Wali, Assistant Professor of Medicine, AIIMS. New Delhi, Dr. M. Durairaj Consultant, Cardiologist, Director of Cardiology, Poona Hospital and Research center, Pune was also member of the Sub-Committee and had attended the meeting held on January 15/16, 1988. It cannot, therefore, be said that, the medical experts in clinical medicine were not associated in the Experts Committee for evaluation of the material that was furnished by the manufacturers.(Emphasis supplied)60. Similar is the view expressed by this Court in K. Vasudevan Nair and Ors. v. U.O.I. and Ors. (1991)IILLJ420SC . We have in detail noticed the report of the Krishnan Committee and its recommendations in the earlier part of this judgment. In our view. Krishnan Committee has also not recommended closure of the unit because of cattle depletion but. on the other hand suggested some measures that may be taken to minimize cattle depletion.61. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the discussions made hereinabove and after considering the reports submitted by the committee of the Central Govt and the 16th and 17th Quinquennial census and report of the Krishnan Committee , we do not find any reason to show our concern that the functioning of Al-Kabeer abattoir would result in depletion of buffalo population in the Hinterland of the abattoir.In the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat and Ors. reported in AIR2006SC212 , it has also been held that in view of the position that exists now i.e. adequate availability of cattle feed resources, the question of striking down total ban on slaughter of old cattle For scarcity of fodder resources would not arise at all. In our view, this position cannot be disputed. However, in the present case, we are concerned with the A.P. Act, 1977 which does not impose a total ban on slaughter of a particular type bovine animal, whereas in Mirzapurs case (Supra) this Court dealt with the provisions of Bombay Animal Preservation (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1994 which imposes a total ban on slaughter of cow and its progeny. So far as the A.P. Act, 1977 is concerned, there is no total ban on slaughter of buffaloes. Therefore, in our view, this submission of the Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh cannot at all be accepted, as we are not concerned with the case of striking clown a particular provision which imposes fan absolute prohibition of slaughter of particular types of bovine animals. In Mirzapur case, it was, however, not held that permitting slaughter of bovine cattle by itself is unconstitutional. This being the position, we are not in agreement with the learned Counsel for the appellant that Submission No. (h) can come to their assistance for the purpose of banning of slaughter of buffaloes by Al-Kabeer.In our view, as the policies taken by the Central Govt. and APEDA, which is a creation of the Parliament for promotion of export and product development of scheduled products, the question of striking down of the policy cannot arise. However, it will be always open to the Court to direct the Central Govt. or the State Government to renew or review its policy and to make a fresh policy at. any time if they find it to be expedient, to do so. As noted herein earlier, APEDA is a statutory authority created by an Act of Parliament for promotion of export and product development of scheduled products, Scheduled Product has been defined in Section 2(i) of the Act which means any of the agricultural or processed food products included in the Schedule.As noted herein earlier, APEDA is a statutory authority created by an Act of Parliament for promotion of export and product development of scheduled products, Scheduled Product has been defined in Section 2(i) of the Act which means any of the agricultural or processed food products included in the Schedule.Item No. 2 to the Schedule of the Act of 1985 mandates that APEDA shall promote export and development of scheduled products. It is the consistent policy of the Government of India to encourage export of meat and meat products65. It appears that the certificates that are to be or already issued was in conformity with the decision of the Constitution Benchs judgment in Mohd. Hanif Qureshis case reported in . It is the case of the Government as well as the abattoir that only those buffaloes which are unfit for mileching, breeding and draught were permitted to be slaughtered and are being slaughtered. We have already discussed the decline of cattle population because of the operation of Al-Kabeer in this judgment hereinbefore. In Mohd. Hanif Qureshis case reported in the issue was not whether the population of live stock was increasing or not but whether the population of healthy live stock was increasing, Although it was sought to be argued by the appellant that due to slaughter of buffaloes by Al-Kabeer, the population of healthy buffaloes was declining even then in view of our discussion made herein earlier, it must be confirmed that there, is no depletion of cattle/buffalo wealth due to operation of Al-Kabeer. Apart from that, it appears from the record that Al-Kabeer slaughterhouse was built in accordance with European Economic Community Standards and is one of the most modern, scientific, integrated slaughter houses in India with an installed capacity of 15000 MT. If in any way Al-Kabeer is directed to close down their factory the said action on the part, of the Central Government would be to discourage private entrepreneurs to invest in the meat industry which will affect the reputation of India in the export market of meat As we have already noted, the interim direction given by this Court on 12th March 1997 by which the production of Al-Kabeer was reduced to 50 %, the total export of meat from India, which is about 1,70,000 MT., did not reduce. For the reasons aforesaid, we are unable to direct at this stage to strike down the policy regarding meat export from India to foreign countries. We are of the view that the policy of the Central Government cannot be easily struck down only because there was slight decline of cattle growth nor it can be struck down before looking into the entire aspect of the matter. It is also well settled that policy decision of the Government cannot be interfered with or struck down merely on certain factual disputes in the matter. It is not open to the Court to strike down such decision until and unless a serious and grave error is found on the part of the Central Government or the State Government. Such being the position, we are unable to strike down this meat export policy of the Central Government, as in our view, it does not violate the constitutional provisions. That apart, the question regarding constitutionality as mentioned above was not argued before the High Court seriously. Accordingly, this submission of Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh is hereby rejected.66. Apart from that, from the discussion made hereinabove, we find that it is also the consistent, policy of the Government of India to-encourage export of meat, and meat products. The current foreign trade policy also encourages export of meat provided that a designated veterinary authority certifies that it is not obtained from buffalo used for breeding and mulching purposes, it is true that in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur reported in AIR2006SC212 it has been held that the protection envisaged under Article 48 extended even to cattle that had ceased to be milch or draught, provided they fall within the category of milch and draught cattle. In State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur (supra) it has also been held that cattle forms the backbone of Indian agriculture and the remain useful throughout their lives. While dealing with Article 48 and 48A of the Constitution read with the fundamental rights, the Constitution Bench further held that both directive principles and fundamental duties must be kept in mind while assessing the reasonableness of legal restrictions placed upon fundamental rights. However, striking down a law or policy on the ground that it violates a directive principle or fundamental duty was not an issue before the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur (supra). It is true that in the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision it has been held that total prohibition of cow and cow progeny slaughter may be justified. However, it. has not been, held in that decision, that laws and policies which permit such slaughter are unconstitutional. Therefore, the position of law remains that the directive principles and fundamental duties cannot in themselves serve to invalidate a legislation or a policy. Moreover, the export policy itself permits only export of meat from buffaloes that are-certified as not useful formulching. breeding or draught purposes. Therefore, if properly implemented, it cannot be said that the policy will necessarily have adverse consequences, especially in view of the foreign exchange obtained through it. Accordingly, we are unable to accede to the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the meat export policy, as made by the Central Government must to be struck down.67. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that meat export policy need not be struck down subject to constant review by the Central Government in the light of its potentially harmful effects on the economy of the country.81. As noted herein earlier, we find from the reliefs claimed in all the three aforesaid Writ Petitions, a prayer was made seeking a writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to strictly enforce the provisions of Sections 4, 8 to 11 and 18 of the 1964 Act in Chamarajnagar Taluk of Mysore District, Coorg District, Kodagu District and also to direct the State Government to establish institutions for taking care of cows and other animals in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Act at the earliest.82. In paragraph 8, the High Court concluded in the impugned order on this relief in favour of the appellants and found that it is needless to state that the Government and its officers are required to strictly enforce and implement the provisions of the Act.That being the conclusion made by the High Court in the body of the judgment, in respect of Question No, 1, we. feel it proper at this stage to direct the State Government and its instrumentalities to strictly enforce and implement the provisions of Sections 4, 8 to 11 and 18 of the 1964 Act without, going into this question in detail. It is needless to state that statutory provisions are required to be strictly complied with and therefore it is the duty of the State authorities to comply with the aforesaid provisions of the 1964 Act.According to the appellants, the view taken in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Ors. v. State of Bihar [1959]1SCR629 decision-vis-a-vis relationship between Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights requires modification in the light or the decision in the case of Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala AIR1973SC1461 and subsequent decisions. We need not deal with this aspect of the matter in detail in view of the recent decision of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur AIR2006SC212 . The decision of this Court in the case of Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Ors. v. State of Bihar [1959]1SCR629 has now been over-ruled on this point by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Mirzapur case. Therefore, this question is decided in favour of the appellants. In Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Ors. v. State of Bihar [1959]1SCR629 the contention that a law enacted to give effect to Directive Principles cannot be held to be violative of fundamental rights was rejected on the ground that:a harmonious interpretation has to be placed upon the Constitution and so interpreted it means that the State should certainly implement the directive principles but it must do so in such a way that its laws do not take away or abridge the fundamental rights, for otherwise the protecting provisions of Chapter III will be a mere rope of sand.( Emphasis supplied).85. This view was, however, not accepted in the aforesaid Constitution Bench decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur AIR2006SC212 . The Constitution Bench noted that after the decision in Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala AIR1973SC1461 the position is:A restriction placed on any fundamental right aimed at securing Directive Principles will be held as reasonable and hence intra vires subject to two limitations : first that it does not run in clear conflict with the fundamental right, and secondly that. It has been enacted within the legislative competence of the enacting legislature under Part XI Chapter I of the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied )In Paragraph 22 of the decision in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur it has been held as follows:The restrictions which can be placed on the rights listed in Article 19(1) are not, subject only to Articles 19(2) to 19(6); the provisions contained in the Chapter on Directive Principles of State Policy can also be pressed into service and relied on for the purpose of adjudging the reasonability of restrictions placed on the fundamental rights.Further, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur so far as Articles 48, 48A and also Article 51A(g) are concerned the following was held:It is thus clear that faced with the question of testing the constitutional validity of any statutory provision or an executive act, or for testing the reasonableness of any restriction cast by law on the exercise of any fundamental right, by way of regulation, control or prohibition, the Directive Principles of State Policy and Fundamental Duties as enshrined in Article 51A of the Constitution play a significant role... The decision in Quareshi-l in which the relevant provisions of the three impugned legislations were struck down on the singular ground of lack of reasonability, would have been decided otherwise if only Article 48 was assigned its full and correct meaning and due weightage was given thereto and Articles 48A and 51A(g) were available in the body of the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)86. In view of the aforesaid admitted position in law, we therefore hold the question No. 2, as framed, must be decided in favour of the appellants. This question, even though decided in favour of the appellants would not materially affect the decision of this appeal.88. Such being the position and in view of the Constitution Bench decision as aforesaid, it can no longer be held that the protection recommended, by this part of the directive under Article 48 of the Constitution can be said to be confined only to cows and calves and those animals which are presently capable of yielding milk or of doing work as draught cattle. The aforesaid Constitution Bench decision has clarified that the protection under Article 48 of the Constitution also extends to cattle which at one time were milch or draught but which have ceased to be such. A submission was made by the learned Counsel for the parties on the usefulness of cattle. In 1958 Quareshis case it was held that cattle becomes useless alter a certain age which is for the Legislature to determine and thereafter their maintenance is a burden on the economy of the country. This position has also been negatived by the decision of the Constitution Bench in the aforesaid case, and it has been held by this Court as follows:We have found that bulls and bullocks do not become useless merely by crossing a particular age....The increasing adoption of non conventional energy sources like Bio-gas plants justify the need for bulls and bullocks to live their full, life inspite of their having ceased to be useful for the purpose of breeding and draught.( Emphasis supplied )89. Following the aforesaid findings and on the basis of the findings that our economy has adequate cattle feed resources and alternative sources of nutrition, in the case of State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur, it was held as under:The Legislature has correctly appreciated the needs of its own people and recorded the some in the Preamble of the impugned enactment and the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to it. In the light of the material available in abundance before us, there is no escape from the conclusion that_ the protection conferred, by impugned enactment on cow progeny is needed in the interest of Nations economy. Merely because it. may cause inconvenience or some dislocation to the butchers, restriction imposed by the impugned enactment does not cease to be in the interest of the general public. The former must yield to the latter.(Emphasis supplied)90. Therefore, in our view, the interpretation of Article 48 of the Constitution has now been widened and milch and draught cattle include cattle which have become permanently incapacitated to be used for milch and draught purposes. Hence, this question is deckled in favour of the appellants. Though, this question has been decided in favour of the appellants, it does not. make any material difference to the final decision of this case. It is the decision on the next issue i.e. issue No. 4 that will have impact on final directions to be issued in this case.92. In State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur the impugned Act therein, provided for prohibition on slaughter of certain types of cattle. The Constitution Bench of this Court in that case held such a legislation to be constitutional in the light of the finding that the legislation was in furtherance of the directive in Article 48 of the Constitution! and any enactment which, furthers the cause in the directive principles of State Policy cannot be held to be unconstitutional. It was however, not held that permitting slaughter of bovine cattle by itself is unconstitutional. In the case at hand, Section 5 of the 1964 Act does not provide for a total prohibition, on slaughter of bovine cattle. That being the case, declaring Section 5 of the 1964 Act as unconstitutional and directing the State Government, to impose a total ban on slaughter of bovine cattle, as requested by the appellants, would lead to judicial legislation and would encroach upon the powers of the Legislature. Therefore, the prayer of the appellants in issue No. 4 to issue a writ, to the State Government to totally prohibit slaughter of bovine cattle is rejected.93. In view of our discussions made hereinabove, even though the Mirzapur decision supports the submission of the appellants on the questions Nos. 2 and 3, the issuance of writ of Mandamus to compel total prohibition of cattle slaughter would only amount to judicial legislation and would encroach upon the powers of the Karnataka Legislature, as held by the High Court, which, in our view, was the right approach made by it. That being the position, we are of the view that the question of declaring total ban on slaughter of cattle cannot be permitted and Section 5 of the Act cannot be said to be ultra vires of the Constitution.