Case: Maganti Subramanyan Vs. The State Of Andhra Pradesh

landholders from selling mortgaging, converting into ryoti land, leasing or otherwise assigning or alienating any communal or forest land in an estate without the previous sanction of the District Collector, on or after the date on which the Ordinance which preceded the Act came into force, namely, the 27th June, 1947. Section 4 (1) provided that: Any transaction of the nature prohibited by Section 3 which took place in the case of any communal or forest land, on or after the 31st day of October 1939 . . . . .shall be void and inoperative and shall not confer or take away, or be deemed to have conferred or taken away, any right whatever on or from any party to the transaction: * * * * * This sub-section had a proviso with several clauses. Out attention was drawn to Clauses (iii), (iv) and (v) of the proviso but in our opinion none of these provisos was applicable to the facts of the case so as to exclude the operation of sub-section (1) of Section 4. Under sub-section (3) of Section 4. If any dispute arises as to the validity of the claim of any person to any land under clauses (i) to (v) of the proviso to sub-section (1), it shall be open to such person or to any other person interested in the transaction or to the State Government, to apply to the District Judge of the district in which the land is situated, for a decision as to the validity of such claim. Under sub-section (4) the District Judge to whom such application is made was valid or not after giving notice to all persons concerned and where the application was not made by the State Government, to the Government itself, and his decision was to be final. Madras Act XXVI of 1948 was passed on April 19, 1949 being an Act to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the rights of land-holders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the Province of Madras, and the introduction of ryotwari settlement in such estates.Apparently because of the preamble to the Act it was contended that with the enactment of the repeal of the Permanent Settlement by the Act of 1948 which also provided for the acquisition of the rights of land-holders in permanently settled estates, the Act stood repealed. We fail to see how because of the preamble to the Act it can be said that it stood repealed by the enactment of the later Act unless there were express words to that effect or unless there was necessary implication. It does not stand to reason to hold that the alienation of large blocks of land which were rendered void under the Act became good by reason of the passing of the later Act. Our attention was drawn on Section 63 of the later Act which provided that: If any question arises whether any land in an estate is a forest or is situated in a forest, or as to the limits of a forest, it shall be determined by the Settlement Officer, subject to an appeal to the Director within such time as may be prescribed and also to revision by the Board of Revenue. In terms the section was only prospective and it did not seek to impeach any transaction which was effected before the Act and was not applicable to transactions anterior to the Act.In our opinion Section 56 (1) of the later Act to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel does not fall for consideration in this case and the disputes covered by that section do not embrace the question before us. 5. Madras General Clauses Act, 1 of 1891 deals with the effect of repeals of statutes. Section 8 of sub-section (f) thereof provides that; Where any Act, to which this Chapter applies, repeals any other enactment, then the repeal shall not- (a) to (c) * * * (f) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such fine, penalty forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. This shows that even if there was a repeal any investigation started before the repeal would have to be continued and legal proceedings under the Act could be prosecuted as if the repealing Act had not been passed. 6. There is also no force in the contention that unless there was a notification under Section 2 (b) of the Act declaring a particular land to be forest land, a particular of the Act would be excluded.The definition of forest land in that section is an inclusive one and shows that forest land would include not only waste land containing trees, shrubs and pasture lands but also any other class of lands declared by Government to be forest land. This does not mean that before a piece of land could be said to be a firest land there would have to be a notification by the Government under the Act. 7. Lastly, counsel contended that sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the later Act as originally enacted applied to forest lands and therefore the later Act became applicable thereto. The original section was however substituted, for another by Section 9 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1956 which was to be deemed to have come into force on April 19, 1949 being the date on which the Act of 1948 originally came into force. The section as it now stands did not confer any jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to determine any question as to whether any land was forest land within the meaning of the Act and consequently the adjudication by the District Judge under sub-section (4) of Section 4 was quite competent.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In terms the section was only prospective and it did not seek to impeach any transaction which was effected before the Act and was not applicable to transactions anterior to the Act.In our opinion Section 56 (1) of the later Act to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel does not fall for consideration in this case and the disputes covered by that section do not embrace the question before usThis shows that even if there was a repeal any investigation started before the repeal would have to be continued and legal proceedings under the Act could be prosecuted as if the repealing Act had not been passed7. Lastly, counsel contended thatsub-section (1) of Section20 of the later Act as originally enacted applied to forest lands and therefore the later Act became applicable thereto.The original section was however substituted, for another by Section 9 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) (Amendment) Act, 1956 which was to be deemed to have come into force on April 19, 1949 being the date on which the Act of 1948 originally came into force. The section as it now stands did not confer any jurisdiction on the Settlement Officer to determine any question as to whether any land was forest land within the meaning of the Act and consequently the adjudication by the District Judge under sub-section (4) of Section 4 was quite competent.