Case: State of Punjab Vs. Iqbal Singh &amp; Others

1983 and was published in the Gazette of India, Extra, dated 26th December, 1983. The trial court rendered its judgment on 23rd February, 1984 and it does not appear if the prosecution concentrated on section 113A, Evidence Act, for otherwise it would have tried to place, on record the exact date of marriage to take advantage of the presumption arising thereunder. The High Court referred to this provision but did not say anything in regard to its application. Being a rule of evidence it could perhaps have been invoked if proof regarding the exact date of marriage was laid. Since there is no cogent evidence that the marriage was solemnised within seven years from the date of incident we need not dilate on that point. 8. The law underwent a further change with the introduction of section 304B in the Penal Code and section 113B in the Evidence Act by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Where the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and evidence reveals that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any of his relative for or in connection with any demand for dowry, such death is described as dowry death under section 304B for which the punishment extends to imprisonment for life but not less than imprison-ment for seven years, By section 113B, Evidence Act the court has to raise a presumption of dowry death if the same has taken place within seven years of marriage and there is evidence of the woman having been subjected to cruelty and/or harassment. 9. The legislative intent is clear to curb the menace of dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind this legislative intent. It must be remembered that since such crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, independent and direct evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the Evidence Act tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are establish-ed and the unfortunate event has taken place within seven years of marriage. This period of seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. If a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his family members section 498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. If such cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable to be punished under section 304B, I.P.C. When the question at issue is whether a person is guilty of dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses that immediately before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty and/or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, sec-tion 113B, Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Of course if there is proof of the person having intentionally caused her death that would attract section 302, I.PC. Then we have a situation where the husband or his relative by his willful conduct creates a situation which he knows will drive the woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the case would squarely fall within the ambit of sec-tion 306, I.P.C. In such a case the conduct of the person would tantamount to inciting or provoking or virtually pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which would compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing suicide. In the present case the facts clearly reveal from the divorce deed Exh. D-2 that the relations between the husband and the wife were strained even in 1977. There is intrinsic evidence in that document that the wife apprehended blood shed and harm to her children. Before the execu-tion of this document she had sought police protection by her application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April, 1983 her efforts to secure a transfer from the school where she was harassed by the Head Master were frustrated by her husband. Her husband had kept up the pressure for extra-dowry since her marriage and had stepped it up after the demise of her father on learning that her mother had received the G P. Fund, Gratuity, etc., due to her father. Since she and her mother and brother were not able to meet this demand she was subjected to considerable torture. Added to that was the anxiety caused by her husbands conduct at trying to frustrate her efforts to seek a transfer from the school where she was serving. The last straw on the camels back fell when she was severely beaten on the previous day i.e. 6th June, 1983, as is evident from her letter of 7th June, 1983. An atmosphere of terror was created to push her into taking the extreme step. It would seem it was a carefully chalked out strategy to provoke her into taking the extreme step to kill herself and her children as she apprehended that they will be much more misreable after she is dead and gone. In this fact-situation can it be said that the husband had not been responsible in creating circumstances which would provoke or force her into taking the only alternative left open to her, namely suicide? Can it be said that the husband did not realise where he was leading her by his willful conduct? We think in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court had rightly convicted the husband under section 306 I.P.C.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. The legislative intent is clear to curb the menace of dowry deaths, etc., with a firm hand. We must keep in mind this legislative intent. It must be remembered that since such crimes are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes and in secrecy, independent and direct evidence is not easy to get. That is why the legislature has by introducing sections 113A and 113B in the Evidence Act tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts are establish-ed and the unfortunate event has taken place within seven years of marriage. This period of seven years is considered to be the turbulent one after which the legislature assumes that the couple would have settled down in life. If a married woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his family members section 498A, I.P.C. would be attracted. If such cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband or his relative for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry immediately preceding death by burns and bodily injury or in abnormal circumstances within seven years of marriage, such husband or relative is deemed to have caused her death and is liable to be punished under section 304B, I.P.C. When the question at issue iswhether a person is guilty of dowry death of a woman and the evidence discloses that immediately before her death she was subjected by such person to cruelty and/or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, sec-tion 113B, Evidence Act provides that the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowryOf course if there is proof of the person having intentionally caused her death that would attract section 302, I.PC. Then we have a situation where the husband or his relative by his willful conduct creates a situation which he knows will drive the woman to commit suicide and she actually does so, the case would squarely fall within the ambit of sec-tion 306, I.P.C. In such a case the conduct of the person would tantamount to inciting or provoking or virtually pushing the woman into a desperate situation of no return which would compel her to put an end to her miseries by committing suicide. In the present case the facts clearly reveal from the divorce deed Exh. D-2 that the relations between the husband and the wife were strained even in 1977. There is intrinsic evidence in that document that the wife apprehended blood shed and harm to her children. Before the execu-tion of this document she had sought police protection by her application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April, 1983 her efforts to secure a transfer from the school where she was harassed by the Head Master were frustrated by her husband. Her husband had kept up the pressure for extra-dowry since her marriage and had stepped it up after the demise of her father on learning that her mother had received the G P. Fund, Gratuity, etc., due to her father. Since she and her mother and brother were not able to meet this demand she was subjected to considerable torture. Added to that was the anxiety caused by her husbands conduct at trying to frustrate her efforts to seek a transfer from the school where she was serving. The last straw on the camels back fell when she was severely beaten on the previous day i.e. 6th June, 1983, as is evident from her letter of 7th June, 1983. An atmosphere of terror was created to push her into taking the extreme step. It would seem it was a carefully chalked out strategy to provoke her into taking the extreme step to kill herself and her children as she apprehended that they will be much more misreable after she is dead and gone. In this fact-situation can it be said that the husband had not been responsible in creating circumstances which would provoke or force her into taking the only alternative left open to her, namely suicide? Can it be said that the husband did not realise where he was leading her by his willful conduct? We think in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court had rightly convicted the husband under section 306 I.P.C. We think that the High Court committed an error in reversing the conviction. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the High Courts order and restore the order of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court. We cannot countenance the plea for reduction of his sentence. No order on his C.M.P10. So far as his sisters involvement is concerned, we think the evidence falls short of proof beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the High Courts orderBut counsel overlooks the fact that there is intrinsic evidence in the divorce deed that their marital life was unhappy and she apprehended blood shed as well as harm to the children even after they parted companyThis letter was written on 17th April, 1983 whereas the incident in question occurred on 7th June, 1983 i.e., more than 1½ months thereafter. The immediate cause for the extreme step taken by the deceased is clearly reflected in the two letters of 7th June, 1983. Therefore, the inference drawn by the learned counsel for the respondents from the letter of 17th April, 1983 cannot advance the defence set up by the accused persons. Iqbal Singh filed a written statement jointly with Kulwant Kaur wherein he stated that he had not helped his wife to secure a transfer as the family was having a good residence in the village and this was the real cause of quarrel between the two. The statement shows that the factum of quarrel between the husband and wife is not seriously disputed. The nature of correspondence he was carrying on with the Headmaster is not difficult to judge. He then states that he had purchased the plot in the name of his wife for Rs. 12,500 but he does not disclose the source from which the consideration for the plot came. He further states that his wife was earning Rs. 900 per month and therefore, he could never have entertained an intention to push her to committing suicide. It would, therefore, appear from the evidence placed on record that the relations between the deceased and Iqbal Singh were strained because of the latters demand for extra dowry and they worsened to such an extent that the deceased decided to put an end to her life.The trial court rendered its judgment on 23rd February, 1984 and it does not appear if the prosecution concentrated on section 113A, Evidence Act, for otherwise it would have tried to place, on record the exact date of marriage to take advantage of the presumption arising thereunder. The High Court referred to this provision but did not say anything in regard to its application. Being a rule of evidence it could perhaps have been invoked if proof regarding the exact date of marriage was laid. Since there is no cogent evidence that the marriage was solemnised within seven years from the date of incident we need not dilate on that pointIn the present case the facts clearly reveal from the divorce deed Exh. D-2 that the relations between the husband and the wife were strained even in 1977. There is intrinsic evidence in that document that the wife apprehended blood shed and harm to her children. Before the execu-tion of this document she had sought police protection by her application/letter dated 12th October, 1977. Then in April, 1983 her efforts to secure a transfer from the school where she was harassed by the Head Master were frustrated by her husband. Her husband had kept up the pressure for extra-dowry since her marriage and had stepped it up after the demise of her father on learning that her mother had received the G P. Fund, Gratuity, etc., due to her father. Since she and her mother and brother were not able to meet this demand she was subjected to considerable torture. Added to that was the anxiety caused by her husbands conduct at trying to frustrate her efforts to seek a transfer from the school where she was serving. The last straw on the camels back fell when she was severely beaten on the previous day i.e. 6th June, 1983, as is evident from her letter of 7th June, 1983. An atmosphere of terror was created to push her into taking the extreme step. It would seem it was a carefully chalked out strategy to provoke her into taking the extreme step to kill herself and her children as she apprehended that they will be much more misreable after she is dead and gone. In this fact-situation can it be said that the husband had not been responsible in creating circumstances which would provoke or force her into taking the only alternative left open to her, namely suicide? Can it be said that the husband did not realise where he was leading her by his willful conduct? We think in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court had rightly convicted the husband under section 306 I.P.C.