Case: P.P. Enterprises Etc Vs. Union of India and Others Etc

the right of the citizens where the necessities of the situation demand. The restrictions must be in public interest and are imposed by striking a just balance between th e deprivation of right and the danager or evil sought to be avoided. If the restrictions imposed appear to be consistent with the directive principles of State policy they would have to be upheld as the same would be in public interest and manifestly reasonable. Further, restrictions may be partial, complete, permanent or temporary but they must bear a close nexus with the object in the interest of which they are imposed. Another important test is that restriction should not be excessive or arbitrary. The court must examine the direct and immediate import of - the restrictions on the rights of the citizens and determine if the restric tions are in larger public interest while deciding the question that they contain the quality of reasonableness. In such cases a doctrinaire approach should not be made but care should be taken to see that the real purpose which is sought to be achieved by restricting the rights of the citizens is sub-served. At the same time, the possibility of an alternative scheme which might have been but has not been enforced would not expose the restrict ions to challenge on the ground that they are not reasonable."12. Judged in that light and on an overall consideration of the various aspects of the matter, restrictions put by the impugned order can by no means be said to be unreasonable. It is only regulatory and not prohibitory.13. We now take up the last contention, namely, the impugned order being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned counsel seeks to invoke Article 14 on two grounds: (1) the impu gned order applies two standards, one for the dealers, at Calcutta, who had been authorised to keep 3, 500 quintals at one time, while the dealers at other places have been authorised to keep only 250 quintals in cities with a population of one lakh or more, and only 100 quintals in other towns with a population of less than one lakh.14. The fixation of limits for storing sugar in Calcutta and other places is not arbitrary but is based on reasonable classification. The government is the best judge of the situation in a particular State and that quantity of sugar will meet the exigencies of the situation at a particular place is purely a governmental function. For one, Calcutta serves as a feeder line to meet the requiremen ts of sugar to the eastern part of the country, and therefore, the stocks of sugar to be held by the dealers in Calcutta are not required for consumption in Calcutta alone Besides, Calcutta being far away from the sugar manufacturing units in Bih ar and Uttar Pradesh, from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar is transported by the wholesale dealers in railway wagons which take sometime unusually longer time in transit. These and various other factors have been taken into consideration by the Government while fixing the storage limits of sugar for the dealers in Calcutta.15. His second ground for invoking Article 14 of the Constitution is that the impugned order is unreasonable and impracticable in that no dealer can be sur e of the sale of sugar on any particular day. If per chance a dealer is not able to dispose of the excess sugar on a particular. day he would expose himself to punishment under the Act. No provision has been made in the order or in the rules for the purchase by the Government of the excess sugar. For the State it was contended that similar orders with regard to wheat came up for consideration in this Court in Suraj Mal Kailash Chand Ors. v. Union of India &Anr. and Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan Ors. etc. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &ors. etc.(2) when this Court upheld the validity of these orders. In view of the decision of this Court in those cases it is not open to Shri Shanti Bhushan to challenge the constitutional vali dity of the impugned order.Shri Shanti Bhushan, however, refutes the argument and says that those decisions do not stand in the way of the petitioners. The situation with regard to wheat was quite different inasmuch . s clause 25 of the im pugned order in Sutlaj Mals case (supra) provided that the State Government or the Collector or the Licensing Authority may issue directions to any dealer with regard to purchase, sale, disposal, storage or exhibition of the price and stock l ist of all or any of the trade articles. But there is no such provision in the impugned order in the instant case and, therefore, the dealers can expose themselves to punishment merely because at any particular point of time the stock was in exces s of the prescribed limits. Bishambhar Dayals case (supra) also related to wheat. There was a scheme for the procurement of wheat by the State Government but there is no such scheme in respect of sugar. This fact distinguishes the present case for the facts-of the aforesaid decision.16. The argument though attractive cannot be accepted. Over the years sugar has become a scare commodity and people have to purchase it even at a prohibitive price. In the circumstances it A cannot be exp ected that the dealers would not be able to sell the sugar in their stock. There is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent market price. If in a rare case there is difficulty on that score we hope and trust that the concerned Government would allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners are permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any. In any case, in some given case there may be some hardship but it cannot be said on that account that the impugned order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The language of section 3 (1) coupled with clause (d) of subsection (2) of section 3 is wide enough to cover the impugned order. Section 3 (1) authorises the Central Government to pass an order for regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution of an essential commodity and trade and commerce therein if it is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient to do so for securing the equitable distribution and availability. at a fair price of the essential commodity. The same power has been made more specific by clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 3, which provides for regulating by licences. p ermits or otherwise, the storage, transport, distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of, any essential commodity. Sugar, which term includes khandsari, is an essential commodity and over the years it has become a scarce commodity. In the public interest it became essential to pass the impugned order to secure its equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. To that end it became necessary to prevent hoarding and black-marketing. The expression " to secure their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices" is wide enough to cover the impugned order. Likewise, the expression "storage and distribution" used in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 3 should be giv en a liberal construction to give effect to the legislative intent of public welfare. So construed, the impugned order is fully protected and is not ultra vires section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 195 5.This leads us to th e second contention, namely, the impugned order being violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of The Constitution inasmuch as it imposed unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on trade orfacts of the present cases are materially different from the facts of H . Sanjeeviahs case (supra). In that case the impugned provisos to rule 2 completely prohibited the transport of the forest produce between sun-set and sun- rise. But in the cases in hand the direction enjoined a recognised dealer not to k eep sugar in stock at any time in excess of the quantity specified therein. It only seeks to regulate the limit of storage of sugar and does not prohibit its storage. The case of H. Sanjeeviah, therefore, is not of much help to the petitionersnow take up the last contention, namely, the impugned order being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned counsel seeks to invoke Article 14 on two grounds: (1) the impu gned order applies two standards, one for the dealers, at Calcutta, who had been authorised to keep 3, 500 quintals at one time, while the dealers at other places have been authorised to keep only 250 quintals in cities with a population of one lakh or more, and only 100 quintals in other towns with a population of less than onefixation of limits for storing sugar in Calcutta and other places is not arbitrary but is based on reasonable classification. The government is the best judge of the situation in a particular State and that quantity of sugar will meet the exigencies of the situation at a particular place is purely a governmental function. For one, Calcutta serves as a feeder line to meet the requiremen ts of sugar to the eastern part of the country, and therefore, the stocks of sugar to be held by the dealers in Calcutta are not required for consumption in Calcutta alone Besides, Calcutta being far away from the sugar manufacturing units in Bih ar and Uttar Pradesh, from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar is transported by the wholesale dealers in railway wagons which take sometime unusually longer time in transit. These and various other factors have been taken into consideration by the Government while fixing the storage limits of sugar for the dealers insecond ground for invoking Article 14 of the Constitution is that the impugned order is unreasonable and impracticable in that no dealer can be sur e of the sale of sugar on any particular day. If per chance a dealer is not able to dispose of the excess sugar on a particular. day he would expose himself to punishment under the Act. No provision has been made in the order or in the rules for the purchase by the Government of the excessargument though attractive cannot be accepted. Over the years sugar has become a scare commodity and people have to purchase it even at a prohibitive price. In the circumstances it A cannot be exp ected that the dealers would not be able to sell the sugar in their stock. There is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent market price. If in a rare case there is difficulty on that score we hope and trust that the concerned Government would allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners are permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any. In any case, in some given case there may be some hardship but it cannot be said on that account that the impugned order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.