Case: Kuldeep Singh Vs. Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi

required to be verified. For the said purpose, the applications were required to be strictly scrutinized. [See Ashok Lenka (supra)] 27. Unless, therefore, an accrued or vested right had been derived by the Appellants, the policy decision could have been changed. What would be an acquired or accrued right in the present situation is the question. 28. In Director of Public Works and Another v. HO PO Sang and Others [(1961) AC 901], the Privy Council considered the said question having regard to the repealing provisions of Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, 1947 as amended on 9th April, 1957. It was held that having regard to the repeal of Sections 3A to 3E, when applications remained pending, no accrued or vested right was derived stating: In summary, the application of the second appellant for a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on him which was preserved after the repeal of sections 3A-E, but merely conferred hope or expectation that the Governor in Council would exercise his executive or ministerial discretion in his favour and the first appellant would thereafter issue a certificate. Similarly, the issue by the first appellant of notice of intention to grant a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on the second appellant which was preserved after the repeal, but merely instituted a procedure whereby the matter could be referred to the Governor in Council. The repeal disentitled the first appellant from thereafter issuing any rebuilding certificate where the matter had been referred by petition to the Governor in Council but had not been determined by the Governor. [See also Lakshmi Amma alias Echuma Amma v. Devassy 1970 KLT 204.] 29. The question again came up for consideration in Howrah Municipal Corpn. and Others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Others [(2004) 1 SCC 663] wherein this Court categorically held: The context in which the respondent Company claims a vested right for sanction and which has been accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation to ownership or possession of any property for which the expression vest is generally used. What we can understand from the claim of a vested right set up by the respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the Court for its consideration, it had a legitimate or settled expectation to obtain the sanction. In our considered opinion, such settled expectation, if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is, that the respondent Company which can have no control over the manner of processing of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rule-making power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G.T. Road and other wards, such settled expectation has been rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law. The claim based on the alleged vested right or settled expectation cannot be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into force by the State Government by amending the Building Rules and not by the Corporation against whom such vested right or settled expectation is being sought to be enforced. The vested right or settled expectation has been nullified not only by the Corporation but also by the State by amending the Building Rules. Besides this, such a settled expectation or the so-called vested right cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued thereupon. 30. In Union of India and Others v. Indian Charge Chrome and Another [(1999) 7 SCC 314] , again this Court emphasized: The application has to be decided in accordance with the law applicable on the date on which the authority granting the registration is called upon to apply its mind to the prayer for registration 31. In S.B. International Ltd. and Others v. Asstt. Director General of Foreign Trade and Others [(1996) 2 SCC 439] , this Court repelled a contention that the authorities cannot take advantage of heir own wrong, viz., delay in issuing the advance licence stating: We have mentioned hereinbefore that issuance of these licences is not a formality nor a mere ministerial function but that it requires due verification and formation of satisfaction as to compliance with all the relevant provisions 32. In a case of this nature where the State has the exclusive privilege and the citizen has no fundamental right to carry on business in liquor, in our opinion, the policy which would be applicable is the one which is prevalent on the date of grant and not the one, on which the application had been filed. If a policy decision had been taken on 16.9.2005 not to grant L-52 licence, no licence could have been granted after the said date. 33. In any event the period for which licences could be directed to the appellants has since expired. This Court, thus, cannot direct grant of licence for the next year only because some licences had been granted after 9th March, 2005. Article 14 of the Constitution of India carries with it a positive concept. Equality cannot be claimed in illegalities. [See State of U.P. v. Raj Kumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCJ 713 ] We have moreover noticed hereinbefore, the statement made by the learned Additional Solicitor General that steps would be taken for cancellation of licences of those licensees who had been granted licence after the said date. We do not intend to make any further observation in regard thereto. 34. It is true that some licences had been granted, but the same cannot by itself be a ground to issue a writ of mandamus, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants have no legal right in respect thereof. 35.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In a case of this nature where the State has the exclusive privilege and the citizen has no fundamental right to carry on business in liquor, in our opinion, the policy which would be applicable is the one which is prevalent on the date of grant and not the one, on which the application had been filed. If a policy decision had been taken on 16.9.2005 not to grant L-52 licence, no licence could have been granted after the said dateIn any event the period for which licences could be directed to the appellants has since expired. This Court, thus, cannot direct grant of licence for the next year only because some licences had been granted after 9th March, 2005. Article 14 of the Constitution of India carries with it a positive concept. Equality cannot be claimed in illegalities. [See State of U.P. v. Raj Kumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCJ 713 ] We have moreover noticed hereinbefore, the statement made by the learned Additional Solicitor General that steps would be taken for cancellation of licences of those licensees who had been granted licence after the said date. We do not intend to make any further observation in regard theretoIt is true that some licences had been granted, but the same cannot by itself be a ground to issue a writ of mandamus, particularly in view of the fact that the appellants have no legal right in respect thereof