Case: The Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee Bangalore Vs. The State of Karnataka &amp; Ors

can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the landowners as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non- payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b). 366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition. We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that all judgments rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183] are overruled in view of the interpretation made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in Indore Development Authority (supra). There has been a trend of land owners filing fresh cases seeking lapse of acquisition on the basis of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, although such land owners may have earlier unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition notifications. Such land owners may have had the benefit of interim orders of stay of further proceedings in the acquisition process or dispossession resulting in a delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of the compensation and consequently in taking over possession of the acquired land. There being a delay in the passing of the award owing to interim orders granted by the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners cannot now take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award has been made and consequently there has been no payment or deposit of the compensation and that possession of the acquired land continues with them. The land owners having had the benefit of interim orders granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them against the acquisition cannot take benefit under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The High Court or the civil courts which may have granted interim orders in favour of the land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the land owners. 10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, the view taken by the High Court while declaring the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case Indore Development Authority (supra). Even the same is also not disputed by Shri C. U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore, the common judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petitions and declaring that the acquisition proceedings with respect to the lands in question have lapsed under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be quashed and set aside. 11. As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues were raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894 and though other points for consideration were raised/framed by the High Court reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues are adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other alternative but to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for deciding the writ petitions afresh and to adjudicate on all the other issues, other than the lapse of acquisitions under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High Court ought to have adjudicated on all the issues raised and ought not to have decided and disposed of the writ petitions, adjudicating only on one issue which has been found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not applied its mind to this aspect of the matter and has simply dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant herein.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Despite the fact that a number of issues/grounds were raised before the High Court on the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings, the learned Single Judge decided only one issue, namely, whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. Whereas a number of issues/grounds were raised and as such the original reliefs sought (acquisition proceedings under Act 1894) were the main reliefs which were required to be dealt with and considered, unfortunately, the learned Single Judge did not give findings on the other issues/grounds and on the reliefs sought and as observed hereinabove, disposed of the writ petitions considering only one relief/ground, namely, whether the acquisition proceedings have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act. When a number of submissions were made on the other issues/grounds, we are of the opinion that the High Court ought to have considered the other issues and ought to have given the findings on other issues also. Because of not deciding the other issues and deciding the matter only on one issue and thereafter when the decision on such one issue, is held to be bad in law for the reasons stated hereinbelow, this Court has no other alternative but to remand the matters to the learned Single Judge for deciding the Writ Petitions afresh on all other issues.8.3 By way of analogy we observe that while considering Order 14 Rule 2 (as amended w.e.f. 01.02.1977), this Court in the case of Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties & Ors, (2020) 6 SCC 557,  has observed and held that after the amendment w.e.f. 01.02.1977, though Order 14 Rule 2(2) enables the court to decide the issue of law as a preliminary issue in case the same relates to (i) jurisdiction of court or (ii) a bar to suit created by any law for the time being in force, a departure has been made in amended provision whereby now it mandates the court to pronounce judgment on all issues notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue. It is further observed that intendment behind this departure is to avoid remand in an appealable case for deciding other issues.9. Now, so far as the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court declaring that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under sub--section (2) of Section 24 of the Act, 2013, is concerned, the same is unsustainable in view of the decision of the Constitution bench of this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). This Court has concluded in paragraph 365 and 366 as under: -365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183  : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183  : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353  : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 298] cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412  : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 426] , the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether or has to be read as nor or as and was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment.366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.366.3. The word or used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as nor or as and. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.366.4. The expression paid in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the landowners as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non- payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.We wish to emphasise that this Court has opined that all judgments rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation Vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki [(2014) 3 SCC 183]  are overruled in view of the interpretation made to Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, in Indore Development Authority (supra). There has been a trend of land owners filing fresh cases seeking lapse of acquisition on the basis of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, although such land owners may have earlier unsuccessfully filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition notifications. Such land owners may have had the benefit of interim orders of stay of further proceedings in the acquisition process or dispossession resulting in a delay in the making of the award and payment/deposit of the compensation and consequently in taking over possession of the acquired land. There being a delay in the passing of the award owing to interim orders granted by the High Court or even by the civil courts, where suits may have been filed against acquiring bodies, the land owners cannot now take advantage of the same so as to contend that no award has been made and consequently there has been no payment or deposit of the compensation and that possession of the acquired land continues with them. The land owners having had the benefit of interim orders granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them against the acquisition cannot take benefit under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. The High Court or the civil courts which may have granted interim orders in favour of the land owners, ought to consider the aforesaid aspect before applying Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 in favour of the land owners.10. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra) to the facts of the case on hand, the view taken by the High Court while declaring the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013, is unsustainable and is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in the case Indore Development Authority (supra). Even the same is also not disputed by Shri C. U. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original writ petitioners – original land owners. Therefore, the common judgment and order passed by the High Court allowing the writ petitions and declaring that the acquisition proceedings with respect to the lands in question have lapsed under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013 cannot stand and the same deserve to be quashed and set aside.11. As observed hereinabove, though a number of other issues were raised on the legality of the acquisition proceedings under the Act, 1894 and though other points for consideration were raised/framed by the High Court reproduced hereinabove, since none of the issues are adjudicated by the High Court on merits, we have no other alternative but to remand the matter to the learned Single Judge for deciding the writ petitions afresh and to adjudicate on all the other issues, other than the lapse of acquisitions under sub--section (2) of section 24 of the Act, 2013. At the cost of repetition, we observe that the High Court ought to have adjudicated on all the issues raised and ought not to have decided and disposed of the writ petitions, adjudicating only on one issue which has been found to be erroneous. The Division Bench has also not applied its mind to this aspect of the matter and has simply dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant herein.