Case: The Jhagrakhan Collieries Ltd Vs. Shri G.C. Agrawal, Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur and Ors

does not stand a close examination.13. We have already noticed that ac cording to the scheme of s. 18, read with s. 2(d), an agreement, made otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings, to be a settlement within the meaning of the Act must be a written agreement signed in the manner prescribed by the Rules framed under the Act. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Ramamurthy, learned Counsel for the Respondents an implied agreement by acquiescence, or conduct such as acceptance of a benefit under an agreement in which the worker acquiescing or accepting the benefit was not a party being outside the purview of the Act, is not binding on such a worker either under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (3) of s. 18. It follows, therefore, that even if 99% of the workers have impliedly accepted the agreement arrived at on October 22, 1969, by drawing V.D.A., under it, it will not-whatever its effect under the general law-put an end to the dispute before the Labour Court and make it functus officio under the Act.14. The refusal of the Labour Court to allow the appellant to lead evidence at this stage, has not caused any prejudice to the appellant. The issue decided as a preliminary issue involved a question of law which could be decided on the, basis of material on record. For its it was not necessary to prove that 99% of the workers had accepted the agreement dated October 22, 1969. Even on an assumption of that fact in favour of the Company, the claim before the Labour Court could not be deemed to have been settled qua respondents 4 to 173.15. Furthermore. the decision of the Labour Court neither debars the appellant from bringing on record evidence relevant to the issues; which still remain to be decided, nor does it rule out the agreement dated October 22, 1969, for all purposes. Indeed, the Labour Court has in its order, towards the end, expressly said that the settlement, dated October 22, 1969, can be binding under s. 18 (1) of the Act between the contracting parties.16. In view of the above, we would negative contention (2) canvassed by Mr. Malhotra.17. This takes us to the third contention. Assuming that the Act does not inhibit the employers and the workmen from arriving at a settlement during the pendency of proceedings under s. 33-C(2) of the Act, such a settlement, not being one arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings would be enforceable only against the parties thereto. In the present case, Respondents 4 to 173 and others who were not parties to the settlement dated October 22, 1969, would not be bound by it.18. In the case of Amalgamated Coffee Estates Ltd. v. Their workmen (supra) cited by Mr. Malhotra, pending the appeals by the management before this Court, the subject-matter of the award were settled between most of the managements and most of their employees represented by certain Unions. An application was made requesting the Court to dispose of the appeals in terms of such settlement. It was opposed on behalf of some of the employees. This Court called for a finding from the Industrial Tribunal on this issue"In view of the fact that admittedly a large number of workmen employed by the appellants have accepted payments consistently with the terms of the agreements set up by the employers. in their present petition, is it shown by the respondents that the said agreement is not valid and binding on them ?"19. The Tribunal submitted the finding that in every estate payments were made in terms of the settlement and such payments were voluntary and knowingly accepted by the workmen. It also held that the terms of the settlement were fair. This Court accepted the finding of the Tribunal holding that "the settlement appears to us also to be a fair one". It therefore, decided the appeals in terms of the settlement.20. It will be seen that the decision in Amalgamated Coffee Estates case (supra) stands on its own facts. There the appeals arose, out of an award of the Special Industrial Tribunal for plantations in a dispute between 228 coffee, tea and rubber estates in South India and their employees referred to it under S. 10(1) whereas the instant appeal arises out of proceedings under S. 33-C(2) for the recovery of money on the basis of the Wage Boards award and the dispute, if any, is about the computation of V.D.A. in implementation of that award. The scope of S. 33-C(2) is not the same as that of s. 10(1) of the Act. In East India Coal Company Ltd. Banares Colliery, Dhanbad v. Raweshwar and Ors.([1968] 1 L.L. J. 6.) this Court held that although the scope of s. 33-C(2) is wider than that of a 33-C(1), cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under S. 10(1) are outside the purview of S. 33 C(2). The provisions of S. 33-C are, broadly speaking, in the nature of executing provisions.21. An appeal being a rehearing of the case, in Amalgamated Coffee Estates case, the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the dispute in a just manner was co-extensive with that of the Tribunal to which it was referred under s. 10(1). This Court found in agreement with the re port of the Tribunal that the settlement arrived at between the most of the Unions representing most of the workers and the managements was fair and conducive to industrial peace, and therefore, it was just and appropriate to decide the dispute and dispose of the appeals in terms of the settlement.22. In the case before us, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not only circumscribed by s 33-C(2) but the matter also is yet at the initial stage. The controversy between the parties still re mains to be determined on merits. We. therefore, do not think it necessary to say anything more with regard to contention No. 3 than what we have broadly indicated above.23.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]As analysis of. the above definition would show that it contemplates only two kinds of settlement (i) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation, proceedings under the Act and (ii) a written agreement between the employer and the workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. But a written agreement of the latter kind in order to fall within the definition must satisfy two more conditions, namely: (a) it must have been signed by the parties thereto in the prescribed manner, and (b) a copy thereof must have been sent to the authorities indicated in s.is clear from a perusal of Section 18, that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is binding not only on the actual parties to the industrial dispute but also on the heirs, successors or assigns of the employer on the one hand, and all the workmen in the establishment, present or future, on the other. In extending the operation of such a settlement beyond the parties thereto, sub-section (3) of the Section departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to the principle of collective bargaining. Thus, had Mr. B. D. Sharma been a duly appointed Conciliation Officer, the settlement arrived at in the conciliation proceedings, duly conducted by him under Section 12, would have been binding on the entire body of the workers including Respondents 4 to 173 represented by the Federation. and others who are members of the Sabha. Since the finding of the High Court to the effect that the settlement between the Panchayat and the management cannot be deemed to be settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under the Act, now stands unassailed. the aforesaid sub-section (3) cannot be invoked to make it binding on Respondents 4 tothat the Act does not inhibit the employers and the workmen from arriving at a settlement during the pendency of proceedings under s. 33-C(2) of the Act, such a settlement, not being one arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings would be enforceable only against the parties thereto. In the present case, Respondents 4 to 173 and others who were not parties to the settlement dated October 22, 1969, would not be bound bywill be seen that the decision in Amalgamated Coffee Estates case (supra) stands on its own facts. There the appeals arose, out of an award of the Special Industrial Tribunal for plantations in a dispute between 228 coffee, tea and rubber estates in South India and their employees referred to it under S. 10(1) whereas the instant appeal arises out of proceedings under S. 33-C(2) for the recovery of money on the basis of the Wage Boards award and the dispute, if any, is about the computation of V.D.A. in implementation of that award. The scope of S. 33-C(2) is not the same as that of s. 10(1) of the Act. In East India Coal Company Ltd. Banares Colliery, Dhanbad v. Raweshwar and Ors.([1968] 1 L.L. J. 6.) this Court held that although the scope of s. 33-C(2) is wider than that of a 33-C(1), cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under S. 10(1) are outside the purview of S. 33 C(2). The provisions of S. 33-C are, broadly speaking, in the nature of executingappeal being a rehearing of the case, in Amalgamated Coffee Estates case, the jurisdiction of the Court to decide the dispute in a just manner was co-extensive with that of the Tribunal to which it was referred under s. 10(1). This Court found in agreement with the re port of the Tribunal that the settlement arrived at between the most of the Unions representing most of the workers and the managements was fair and conducive to industrial peace, and therefore, it was just and appropriate to decide the dispute and dispose of the appeals in terms of thethe case before us, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not only circumscribed by s 33-C(2) but the matter also is yet at the initial stage. The controversy between the parties still re mains to be determined on merits. We. therefore, do not think it necessary to say anything more with regard to contention No. 3 than what we have broadly indicated above.