Case: Smt. Prabhawati Vs. Dr. Pritam Kaur

14, 1966. ORDER Subject; Smt. Prabhawati versus Dr. Pritam Kaur, regarding a portion of premises No. 11 Rampur Mandi Road, Dehra Dun. With reference to her petition dated April 2, 1965. Smt. Prabhawati is informed that after a careful examination of the records of the case and consideration of the version of the opposite party and also in view of other facts relevant to the case, it appears expedient in the ends of justice that the petitioner should not be dispossessed from the disputed premises. Therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 7-F of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, the Governor is pleased to revoke the permission under Section 3 of the said Act granted by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer Dehradun and confirmed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut vide his orders dated March 30, 1965, passed in revision No. 13, to file a Civil Suit of ejectment against the petitioner from the premises in dispute. Sd/- B. N. Chaturvedi Anu. Sachiv." 11. One would search this order in vain for the reason that persuaded the State Government to allow the revision petition. Not a single reason is given for setting aside the order of the Commissioner. But if one delves into the records of the Government as the High Court of Allahabad did, one is left with a feeling that the note of the Irrigation Minister must have weighted heavily on the concerned authority. Our experience in dealing with litigation of this type does not embolden us to say that what happened in his case is a rare exception to the rule. 12. It may also be noted that when the revision petition was pending before the State Government, some busybody by name Ramesh Puri wrote a letter to the Minister for Food and Civil Supply on May 16, 1966 recommending the case of the appellant. In his letter he set forth his qualifications as a "social worker and fighter for freedom since childhood. That letter appears to have found a respectable place in the records of the case. One can only regret for this sorry state of affairs. 13. The appellant has found a match in the respondent. It is interesting to note to note how the respondent cleverly queered the pitch against the appellant. We have earlier noticed that it was at her instance the High Court had quashed the order of the State Government and directed the State Government to rehear and dispose of the revision petition according to law. Soon after getting that order, she tried to over-reach that order by filing a suit for eviction the very next day after the High Court passed its order. The High Court of Allahabad as well as this Court have held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining the required permission under Section 3 (1) does not cease to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under Section 7-F during the pendency of the suit - See Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath, (1969) 2 SCR297 = (AIR 1970 SC 971 ) and Mohammed Ismail v. Nanney Lal, (1969) 3 SCR 394 = (AIR 1970 SC 1919 ). In a rather desperate bid to take some advantage from those decisions, the respondent appears to have rushed to the Civil Court even before the ink on the High Courts order had dried up. Having instituted the suit she presented to the Government what according to her was a fait accompli. The State Government as mentioned earlier felt that the revision petition before it became infructuous because of the institution of the suit. Unfortunately the High Court concurred with that view. 14. Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the appellant contended before us that no sooner the High Court set aside the order of the Government and directed the State Government to rehear and dispose of the matter according to law, the interim order of stay passed by the State Government stood revived. In support of that contention of his, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Patna High Court in Bankim Chandra v. Chandi Prasad, AIR 1956 Pat 271 the decisions of the Madras High Court in Tavvala Veeraswami v. Pulim Ramanna, ILR 58 Mad 721 = (AIR 1935 Mad 365 FB and Saranatha Aiyangar v. Muthiah Mooppanar, 65 Mad LJ 844 = (AIR 1934 Mad 49 ) and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sushila Bali Dasi v. Guest Keen Williams Ltd. ILR (1949)1Cal 177. We do not think it is necessary to consider that contention in this appeal. The principle of law contended for by Mr. Tarkunde, has several facets; but there is not need to go into those facets in this appeal. In our opinion this appeal has to succeed on a much broader ground. No party to a litigation can be permitted to frustrate the decision rendered by having recourse to trickery. The true effect of the order made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the question whether the respondent should be permitted to file a suit for ejectment of the appellant or not must be gone into and decided afresh by the State Government. One of the implications flowing from that order is that the respondent is precluded from filing the intend suit for eviction till the State Government decided the revision petition. Otherwise the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed. The respondent cannot be permitted to obstruct the implementation of that direction and that too a direction given at her instance. Consequently it was not open to the respondent to file the suit before the revision petition was disposed of by the State Government. In our opinion, the suit filed by the respondent was a premature one. Such a suit does not bar the State Government from disposing of the order made by the High Court. The State Government was not justified in dismissing the revision petition as being infructuous.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. One would search this order in vain for the reason that persuaded the State Government to allow the revision petition. Not a single reason is given for setting aside the order of the Commissioner. But if one delves into the records of the Government as the High Court of Allahabad did, one is left with a feeling that the note of the Irrigation Minister must have weighted heavily on the concerned authority. Our experience in dealing with litigation of this type does not embolden us to say that what happened in his case is a rare exception to the rule12. It may also be noted that when the revision petition was pending before the State Government, some busybody by name Ramesh Puri wrote a letter to the Minister for Food and Civil Supply on May 16, 1966 recommending the case of the appellant. In his letter he set forth his qualifications as a "social worker and fighter for freedom since childhood. That letter appears to have found a respectable place in the records of the case. One can only regret for this sorry state of affairs13. The appellant has found a match in the respondent. It is interesting to note to note how the respondent cleverly queered the pitch against the appellant. We have earlier noticed that it was at her instance the High Court had quashed the order of the State Government and directed the State Government to rehear and dispose of the revision petition according to law. Soon after getting that order, she tried to over-reach that order by filing a suit for eviction the very next day after the High Court passed its order. The High Court of Allahabad as well as this Court have held that a suit validly instituted after obtaining the required permission under Section 3 (1) does not cease to be maintainable because of any order made by the State Government under Section 7-F during the pendency of the suit - See Bhagwan Das v. Paras Nath, (1969) 2 SCR297 = (AIR 1970 SC 971 ) and Mohammed Ismail v. Nanney Lal, (1969) 3 SCR 394 = (AIR 1970 SC 1919 ). In a rather desperate bid to take some advantage from those decisions, the respondent appears to have rushed to the Civil Court even before the ink on the High Courts order had dried up. Having instituted the suit she presented to the Government what according to her was a fait accompli. The State Government as mentioned earlier felt that the revision petition before it became infructuous because of the institution of the suit. Unfortunately the High Court concurred with that view14. Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for the appellant contended before us that no sooner the High Court set aside the order of the Government and directed the State Government to rehear and dispose of the matter according to law, the interim order of stay passed by the State Government stood revived. In support of that contention of his, he has placed reliance on the decision of the Patna High Court in Bankim Chandra v. Chandi Prasad, AIR 1956 Pat 271  the decisions of the Madras High Court in Tavvala Veeraswami v. Pulim Ramanna, ILR 58 Mad 721  = (AIR 1935 Mad 365  FB and Saranatha Aiyangar v. Muthiah Mooppanar, 65 Mad LJ 844 = (AIR 1934 Mad 49 ) and the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sushila Bali Dasi v. Guest Keen Williams Ltd. ILR (1949)1Cal 177. We do not think it is necessary to consider that contention in this appeal. The principle of law contended for by Mr. Tarkunde, has several facets; but there is not need to go into those facets in this appeal. In our opinion this appeal has to succeed on a much broader ground. No party to a litigation can be permitted to frustrate the decision rendered by having recourse to trickery. The true effect of the order made by the High Court in the writ petition was that the question whether the respondent should be permitted to file a suit for ejectment of the appellant or not must be gone into and decided afresh by the State Government. One of the implications flowing from that order is that the respondent is precluded from filing the intend suit for eviction till the State Government decided the revision petition. Otherwise the direction given by the High Court would remain unobeyed. The respondent cannot be permitted to obstruct the implementation of that direction and that too a direction given at her instance. Consequently it was not open to the respondent to file the suit before the revision petition was disposed of by the State Government. In our opinion, the suit filed by the respondent was a premature one. Such a suit does not bar the State Government from disposing of the order made by the High Court. The State Government was not justified in dismissing the revision petition as being infructuous.