Case: Mohammad Ismail, Vs. Nanney Lal

of it within six weeks thereafter. At the most, therefore, he has to wait for about ten weeks from the order of the District Magistrate granting permission to find out whether he can safely institute a suit. But so far as the revisional powers of the State Government are concerned, there is no time limit fixed either for application by an aggrieved party or for the disposal thereof. It may be made at any time and the State Government is further authorised by this section (S. 7-F) to act suo motu. In such a state of affairs, it would not be right to hold that the landlord must wait indefinitely and find out whether the permission granted to him will be upheld by the State Government should the tenant make an application for revision of the order of the Commissioner.7. Apart from the above consideration, the words of S. 7-F in our opinion, indicate that the State Government can only exercise its jurisdiction to revise the order of the Commissioner before the actual institution of the suit. The language of S. 7-F shows that on the facts of the case before it the State Government must consider whether the grant of or refusal to grant permission for the filing of a suit should be upheld or not. The section does not seem to be aimed at invalidating a suit already instituted and can only operate at a stage before the landlord launches his proceeding. There is nothing in sub-s. (4) of S. 3 read with S. 7-F to show that a landlord should wait till the powers of the revising authorities have been exhausted.It the Legislature had so intended, it could have used words in sub-section (1) of S. 3 to indicate that the grant of permission by the District magistrate would also be subject to an order under S. 7-F. The same result might have been achieved by providing for the stay of a suit in case the State Government made an order under S. 7-F contrary to that of the Commissioner.8. Once a suit is validly instituted it must take its course and the decree passed therein must be given effect to unless the words of the statute render the decree inexecutable or liable to re-opening in a proper case on grounds mentioned in the statute. It was pointed out by this Court in Bhagwan Dass case C. A. No. 1617 of 1968,D/- 27-9-1968 = (AIR 1970 SC 971 ) that the Legislature had provided for a decree for eviction of a tenant passed before the commencement of the Act liable to be rendered inexecutable unless it was based on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-s. (3). The Legislature might, if so advised, have provided for a similar result in a case where the State Government had revoked the permission to sue granted by the Commissioner.9. It was also pointed out in Bhagwan Dass case, C. A. No. 1617 of 1968, D/- 27-9-1968 = (AIR 1970 SC 971 ) that it would make a mockery of the judicial process if we were to hold on the language of the sections as they stand at present, that irrespective of a decree being passed by the trial court being upheld in appeal by the High Court or by this Court, the order of the State Government would nullify all proceedings.10. There is nothing in the judgment of this Court in Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, 1965-3 SCR 218 = (AIR 1965 SC 1767 ) read with section 16 of the Act which would incline us to come to any different conclusion. On the strength of the decision in that case read in the light of S. 16, it was argued that the order of the State Government being quasi-judicial in nature S. 16 (inset)*placed the order of the State Government beyond the pale of scrutiny by a court of law. We cannot see any force in this argument. The permission to sue given by the Commissioner has no effect on the course of the trial of the issues involved in that suit. That permission is only a prerequisite to a suit as a notice under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court trying the suit for eviction has to find out whether a proper notice to quit was given and whether the tenancy was properly determined. It must also examine the grounds on the basis of which the landlord seeks to evict the tenant and decide for itself whether such grounds exist. Neither the District Magistrate for the Commissioner nor the State Government is obliged to disclose any reasons which may influence the said authorities in coming to their decision and the court is not called upon to examine whether the conclusion of any of the said authorities was properly arrived at.*Section 16. - Orders under the Act not to be questioned in any Court - No order made under this Act by the State Government or the District Magistrate shall be called in question in any Court.11. Learned counsel for the appellant would have us hold that S. 16 ousted the jurisdiction of the court to consider the propriety of any order of the State Government. In our view, that is not the effect of that section. The decision in 1965-3 SCR 218 = (AIR 1965 SC 1767 ) (supra) shows thatthe State Government must offer a reasonable opportunity to both the parties while it exercises its jurisdiction under S. 7-F and an order which is made in violation of the principles of natural justice may be quashed. Once the jurisdiction under S. 16 (7-F?) is properly exercised the court cannot examine the propriety of the order made thereunder.12. In our view, as already pointed out, jurisdiction under Section 7-F is only exercisable at a point of time anterior to the filing of a suit and Courts of law can therefore disregard any order under that section which is made after the filing of a suit.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. Apart from the above consideration, the words of S. 7-F in our opinion, indicate that the State Government can only exercise its jurisdiction to revise the order of the Commissioner before the actual institution of the suit. The language of S. 7-F shows that on the facts of the case before it the State Government must consider whether the grant of or refusal to grant permission for the filing of a suit should be upheld or not. The section does not seem to be aimed at invalidating a suit already instituted and can only operate at a stage before the landlord launches his proceeding. There is nothing in sub-s. (4) of S. 3 read with S. 7-F to show that a landlord should wait till the powers of the revising authorities have been exhausted.It the Legislature had so intended, it could have used words in sub-section (1) of S. 3 to indicate that the grant of permission by the District magistrate would also be subject to an order under S. 7-F. The same result might have been achieved by providing for the stay of a suit in case the State Government made an order under S. 7-F contrary to that of the Commissioner.8. Once a suit is validly instituted it must take its course and the decree passed therein must be given effect to unless the words of the statute render the decree inexecutable or liable to re-opening in a proper case on grounds mentioned in the statute. It was pointed out by this Court in Bhagwan Dass case C. A. No. 1617 of 1968,D/- 27-9-1968 = (AIR 1970 SC 971  ) that the Legislature had provided for a decree for eviction of a tenant passed before the commencement of the Act liable to be rendered inexecutable unless it was based on any of the grounds mentioned in sub-s. (3). The Legislature might, if so advised, have provided for a similar result in a case where the State Government had revoked the permission to sue granted by the Commissioner.9. It was also pointed out in Bhagwan Dass case, C. A. No. 1617 of 1968, D/- 27-9-1968 = (AIR 1970 SC 971  ) that it would make a mockery of the judicial process if we were to hold on the language of the sections as they stand at present, that irrespective of a decree being passed by the trial court being upheld in appeal by the High Court or by this Court, the order of the State Government would nullify all proceedings.10. There is nothing in the judgment of this Court in Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, 1965-3 SCR 218   = (AIR 1965 SC 1767  ) read with section 16 of the Act which would incline us to come to any different conclusion. On the strength of the decision in that case read in the light of S. 16, it was argued that the order of the State Government being quasi-judicial in nature S. 16 (inset)*placed the order of the State Government beyond the pale of scrutiny by a court of law. We cannot see any force in this argument. The permission to sue given by the Commissioner has no effect on the course of the trial of the issues involved in that suit. That permission is only a prerequisite to a suit as a notice under S. 80 of theCode of Civil Procedure. The court trying the suit for eviction has to find out whether a proper notice to quit was given and whether the tenancy was properly determined. It must also examine the grounds on the basis of which the landlord seeks to evict the tenant and decide for itself whether such grounds exist. Neither the District Magistrate for the Commissioner nor the State Government is obliged to disclose any reasons which may influence the said authorities in coming to their decision and the court is not called upon to examine whether the conclusion of any of the said authorities was properly arrivedour view, that is not the effect of that section. The decision in 1965-3 SCR 218 = (AIR 1965 SC 1767  ) (supra) shows thatthe State Government must offer a reasonable opportunity to both the parties while it exercises its jurisdiction under S. 7-F and an order which is made in violation of the principles of natural justice may be quashed. Once the jurisdiction under S. 16 (7-F?) is properly exercised the court cannot examine the propriety of the order made thereunder.12. In our view, as already pointed out, jurisdiction under Section 7-F is only exercisable at a point of time anterior to the filing of a suit and Courts of law can therefore disregard any order under that section which is made after the filing of aour view, that is not the effect of that section. The decision inSCR 218 = (AIR 1965 SC 1767  ) (supra) shows thatthe State Government must offer a reasonable opportunity to both the parties while it exercises its jurisdiction under S.and an order which is made in violation of the principles of natural justice may be quashed. Once the jurisdiction under S. 16is properly exercised the court cannot examine the propriety of the order madeour view, that is not the effect of that section. The decision inSCR 218 = (AIR 1965 SC 1767  ) (supra) shows thatthe State Government must offer a reasonable opportunity to both the parties while it exercises its jurisdiction under S.and an order which is made in violation of the principles of natural justice may be quashed. Once the jurisdiction under S. 16thereunder.12. In our view, as already pointed out, jurisdiction under Sectionis only exercisable at a point of time anterior to the filing of a suit and Courts of law can therefore disregard any order under that section which is made after the filing of a