Case: The Principal Secretary, Revenue Department, State of Telangana &amp; Anr Vs. B. Rangaswamy (Dead) By Lrs. &amp; Ors

of three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues to obtain declaration is applicable. On this aspect, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs has also relied on Daya Singh & Anr. vs. Gurdev Singh (dead) by Lrs. & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 194 and MST Rukhmabai vs. Lala Laxminarayan & Ors. AIR 1960 SC 335 to fortify his contention that the period of limitation in the instant case is to be computed from the date when the cause of action arose. The learned senior counsel for the defendant contends, even if that be the position, the letter dated 23.05.1976 was written by Sri. B. Ramaswamy when he was aware of the claim of the defendant in respect of the suit schedule property, which therefore ought to be reckoned as the cause of action. Further, the notification dated 29.07.1977 was published on 06.08.1977 when again the cause of action occurred, but the suit was filed only on 22.06.1981 beyond the period of three years and is therefore beyond limitation. However, a perusal of the plaint averments would disclose that the letter and notification referred above is not the be-all and end-all. There was subsequent correspondence in 1978 and 1979, more particularly when notices dated 06.05.1979 and 10.08.1979, were issued. The plaintiffs thereafter issued the notice dated 30.04.1980 under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. Since according to the plaintiff, the defendants continued to obstruct the peaceful possession of the property, suit was filed on 22.06.1081. The sequence would show that the cause of action has continued after it had first arisen and the suit was filed within the period of limitation provided for in law. We are therefore unable to accede to the contention of the learned senior counsel for the defendants. 14. The learned senior counsel further urged the contention of the suit being not maintainable for not filing the suit on behalf of the partnership firm. The contention is not necessary to be adverted in detail since the same was considered by the Trial Court while answering Issue No.4 and the said finding has not been disturbed by the High Court. In the instant case the question essentially is with regard to the title and identity of the property bearing Survey No.129/56. The plaintiff No.2 having purchased the same had filed the suit. Though certain averments were made with regard the property being used for the construction of Studio, being contiguous property, there is no concrete material on record to indicate the nature and constitution of the firm and the details of the firms property. In any event, the concurrent conclusion on that issue does not call for interference. 15. The learned senior counsel representing the defendants while adverting to the merits sought to refer to the documents filed along with I.A. No.137529 of 2021 to buttress their case further, in addition to the documents produced and marked before the trial court. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the documents produced for the first time before this Court along with the said application. It is his contention that the rigor of the provision contained in Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. would apply though the said provision has not been invoked in the application. 16. In that light, it would be appropriate for us to take note of the said application and at the outset consider as to whether the said documents are to be taken on record. Only in the circumstance of the documents being taken on record, the said documents can be referred to, for further consideration in accordance with law. In that view, a perusal of the application would indicate that the only reason assigned by the defendant is that the documents have been discovered recently from amongst the heap of records lying with the department. The learned senior counsel for the defendant relied on the decision in Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel vs. Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji AIR 1965 SC 669 and in Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Port of Mumbai 2004 (3) SCC 214 to contend that this court in exercise of its own jurisdiction could permit to even make good the deficiency by exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. Though on the proposition of law there can be no quarrel that in appropriate cases this court can exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution in order to serve the ends of justice, in our opinion, the circumstance in which the defendants are seeking to produce the documents in the instant case, in the manner as has been sought at present, such exercise of discretion is not justified. 17. On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, the suit was instituted as far back in the year 1981 and the suit for the first time was disposed of on 24.09.1982. The appeal was thereafter pending before the High Court till 26.06.1995, when the appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh disposal. Thereafter the suit was disposed of on 10.11.1998. The matter was once again pending before the High Court upto 01.04.2021 until the appeal was disposed of. Despite such long pendency of the matter and also there being an opportunity of filing the documents when the matter had been remanded to the Trial Court, no diligence was shown. In such circumstance the attempt made at this belated stage to bring on record additional documents would not be justified. Hence, it cannot be permitted by exercising the plenary power of this court in a matter where the right of the parties relating to immovable property is to be determined and when there was ample opportunity earlier. Further, in a proceeding relating to the civil suit, mere production and the documents being taken on record would not suffice since the documents are to be proved by exhibiting it in accordance with law, which exercise cannot be resorted to at this juncture.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]13. In the instant case, though the issues relating to survey and re-survey of the land had arisen keeping in view the identity of the property being the question, the fact remains that the suit is not predicated on that basis to qualify to be a suit under Section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh and Boundaries Act, 1923 to invoke the limitation period of two years provided therein. On the other hand, the suit is one for declaration of title and identity of the property, claiming it to be located within the boundaries of a particular survey number. In that view, as rightly contended by the learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs, the period of limitation as provided in Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides the period of three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues to obtain declaration is applicable.However, a perusal of the plaint averments would disclose that the letter and notification referred above is not the be-all and end-all. There was subsequent correspondence in 1978 and 1979, more particularly when notices dated 06.05.1979 and 10.08.1979, were issued. The plaintiffs thereafter issued the notice dated 30.04.1980 under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code. Since according to the plaintiff, the defendants continued to obstruct the peaceful possession of the property, suit was filed on 22.06.1081. The sequence would show that the cause of action has continued after it had first arisen and the suit was filed within the period of limitation provided for in law. We are therefore unable to accede to the contention of the learned senior counsel for the defendants.The contention is not necessary to be adverted in detail since the same was considered by the Trial Court while answering Issue No.4 and the said finding has not been disturbed by the High Court. In the instant case the question essentially is with regard to the title and identity of the property bearing Survey No.129/56. The plaintiff No.2 having purchased the same had filed the suit. Though certain averments were made with regard the property being used for the construction of Studio, being contiguous property, there is no concrete material on record to indicate the nature and constitution of the firm and the details of the firms property. In any event, the concurrent conclusion on that issue does not call for interference.16. In that light, it would be appropriate for us to take note of the said application and at the outset consider as to whether the said documents are to be taken on record. Only in the circumstance of the documents being taken on record, the said documents can be referred to, for further consideration in accordance with law. In that view, a perusal of the application would indicate that the only reason assigned by the defendant is that the documents have been discovered recently from amongst the heap of records lying with the department. The learned senior counsel for the defendant relied on the decision in Ramanbhai Ashabhai Patel vs. Dabhi Ajithkumar Fulsinji AIR 1965 SC 669  and in Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Port of Mumbai 2004 (3) SCC 214  to contend that this court in exercise of its own jurisdiction could permit to even make good the deficiency by exercising the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. Though on the proposition of law there can be no quarrel that in appropriate cases this court can exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution in order to serve the ends of justice, in our opinion, the circumstance in which the defendants are seeking to produce the documents in the instant case, in the manner as has been sought at present, such exercise of discretion is not justified.17. On the other hand, as rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel appearing for the plaintiffs, the suit was instituted as far back in the year 1981 and the suit for the first time was disposed of on 24.09.1982. The appeal was thereafter pending before the High Court till 26.06.1995, when the appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court for fresh disposal. Thereafter the suit was disposed of on 10.11.1998. The matter was once again pending before the High Court upto 01.04.2021 until the appeal was disposed of. Despite such long pendency of the matter and also there being an opportunity of filing the documents when the matter had been remanded to the Trial Court, no diligence was shown. In such circumstance the attempt made at this belated stage to bring on record additional documents would not be justified. Hence, it cannot be permitted by exercising the plenary power of this court in a matter where the right of the parties relating to immovable property is to be determined and when there was ample opportunity earlier. Further, in a proceeding relating to the civil suit, mere production and the documents being taken on record would not suffice since the documents are to be proved by exhibiting it in accordance with law, which exercise cannot be resorted to at this juncture. In that view, we see no reason to permit the production of the documents at this stage. Accordingly, I.A. No.137529 of 2021 is rejected.21. Having noted the oral evidence tendered by the said witnesses, it is evident that keeping in view the nature of the controversy, the oral evidence would not be sufficient to resolve the controversy relating to the identity of the property. Insofar as the plaintiff No.2 having entered into a sale transaction and having purchased an extent of 2 acres 10 guntas in Survey No.129/56, the same cannot be in dispute since the same is under a registered document but the issue is; which was the property that was actually conveyed. Though for convenience a sketch was attached to the sale deed and it is marked as Exhibit A-4, in view of the dispute raised by the defendants that there is a plot of government land to the east of Survey No.129/73 being the west of Survey No.129/56, this aspect of the matter requires consideration since the question essentially is as to whether the identity of the land is established by the plaintiff with reference to the land which is purportedly purchased as land located in Survey No.129/73 under another sale deed at Exhibit A-5. The sketch along with all the sale deeds are not an authenticated record but is prepared for the convenience inter se between the parties to the sale deed and does not bind anyone else.22. Notwithstanding the fact that we have rejected the application seeking production of the additional documents which included certified copies of various sale deeds under which the family of Raja Dharam Karan had sold different extents of land to different purchasers, the sale transactions being under registered documents is in the public domain and the chart of flow of title referred to by learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs and the consideration by High Court has indicated the different sale deeds starting from the transaction under which Syed Riaz Ahmed sold the total extent of 8 acres 12 guntas to Raja Dharam Karan under the document dated 27.03.1945. Though the extent of 2 acres 10 guntas was sold to the plaintiff No.2 from out of the said extent of 8 acres 12 guntas under document dated 03.09.1964, it is also indicated that from the property bearing Survey No.129/56 an extent of 2 acres 20 guntas was sold to Moulvi Syed Taqui Bilgrami. Another extent of 2 acres 16 guntas was sold to Natwara Nanda. Further, an extent of 2 acres 16 guntas was sold to Merry Nandi. That apart, an extent of 2 acres 20 guntas was sold to B. Balaiah. In addition to the said transactions, the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff No.2 was to the extent of 2 acres 10 guntas.23. Apart from the fact that various extents in Survey No.129/56 were sold to different persons, the document at Exhibit A-1 whereunder Syed Riaz Ahmed sold 8 acres 12 guntas in Survey No.129/56 to Raja Dharam Karan Bahadur indicated the western boundary as nala which is claimed by the defendants as the government nala. The learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs no doubt contended that the mere mentioning of nala can only mean that it is a drain and it cannot be a reference to government property being situated on the western side. Even if the said contention is taken note of, in the nature of the evidence presently available on record and in the circumstance where the plaintiff had sought for a declaration to the effect that the property measuring 2 acres 10 guntas forms a part of Survey No.129, rather than to rely on the weakness of the evidence tendered by the defendant it was for the plaintiff to prove their case. From the document at Exhibit A-5, which is the sale deed dated 03.09.1964 whereunder Smt. Saroja Devi has purchased 5 acres 38 guntas in Survey No.129/73 from R. Jayanthi Devi, it is seen that it is also a portion of the total extent of land in the said Survey No. 129/73, which consisted of 11 acres 10 guntas. The boundary shown to the said document also does not conclusively prove the case of the plaintiff. On the other hand, when it is the case of the plaintiffs that Smt. B. Saroja Devi, a partner in the plaintiff No.1 establishment had purchased a portion of the property bearing Survey No.129/73 and that the plaintiff No.2 had purchased a portion of the property in Survey No.129/56, more particularly in the circumstance when the property bearing Survey No.129/56 was sold in different bits to various purchasers, if the plaintiff was to seek the relief as prayed in the present suit, it was necessary for the plaintiff to bring on record the various sale deeds for the different extents of the land in Survey No.129/56 and Survey No.129/73 so as to indicate the extent and the boundaries under each of the sale deeds from the eastern most point of Survey No.129/56 so as to progress towards the western boundary and establish that the last extent of property purchased by the plaintiff No.2 was within the total extent contained in Survey No.129/56 and that the portion so purchased is not physically located in the land belonging to the government and no extent of land belonging to the government has been included in the sale deed by purporting it to be the sale of private land bearing Survey No.129/56. The plaintiff having failed to produce the said documents has not proved their case to enable the trial court to come to a conclusion that the property which the plaintiffs are claiming is factually a part of Survey No.129. Instead, when the defendants attempted to produce the same before the High Court in order to place the matter in its perspective, the High Court rebuked the defendants for not producing the same earlier and drew adverse presumption.In that regard, a perusal of the cross-examination indicates that the letters dated 15.06.1978 and 23.05.1976 were confronted to PW- 1. Though PW-1 denied that he had given such letter to the government and claimed that there was no government land between the two Sy. Nos. and further though he denies the suggestion that his brother applied to the government, he has thereafter added, since his brother is not the owner, he cannot make such request. Though such a statement is made, what cannot be lost sight of, is that the document is on behalf of the plaintiffs more particularly the plaintiff No.1 i.e. Bhagyanagar Studio. The letters are on its letter head and the signatory Sri B. Ramaswamy was not only the brother of plaintiff No.2 but also a partner along with plaintiff No.2 and Smt. B. Saroja Devi and the reference with regard to the construction to be made as a composite unit is stated with reference to Survey Nos.129/73 and 129/56 for plaintiff No.1 Studio. Further, the said letters are produced by the defendants from their records and the letter has been addressed by the plaintiff within a short duration from the period the sale deed dated 03.09.1964 has come into existence. The fact that the letter is dated 23.05.1976 and G.O. of Municipal Administration approving construction is dated 29.03.1976 cannot be a mere coincidence. This would indicate that from the beginning after approval was given and construction commenced the plaintiff was aware that there was a claim by the government to an extent of property which is located between the two extents in Survey No.129/73 and 129/56 when objection was taken relating to extended construction. In that circumstance when the suit is ultimately filed indicating the cause of action as the obstruction caused by the defendants and the defendants not heeding to the notice dated 30.04.1980 issued under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the plaintiff was required to produce the necessary document as already indicated, to establish that out of the total extent of land in Survey No.129/56, even after the sale of the different extents by the family of Raja Dharam Karan the extent as sold to the plaintiff No.2 was still available in Survey No.129/56 and therefore they are entitled to a declaration that the land purchased by them was a part of Survey No.129. Though the plan at Exhibit A-19 relating to the survey plot of Survey No.129/73 dated 10.07.1942 is produced, from the location of the property indicated it does not conclusively show the eastern boundary as claimed by the plaintiffs. In that light, a perusal of the judgment passed by the trial court indicates that the trial court has taken into consideration the evidence available on record and has analysed the same in its correct perspective.27. In that background, a perusal of the judgment passed by the High Court would indicate that it has proceeded as if the burden which had been cast on the defendant has not been discharged though the issues framed had cast the burden on the plaintiff not only with regard to the title but also identity of the suit schedule property and also correctness of the plaint schedule property. It is noted that the High Court in fact has relied more on the oral evidence of the plaintiff and has commented that the trial court has wrongly relied on the document at Exhibit B-1. The nature of the documents indicated above and the manner in which the plaintiff was required to establish its case in a circumstance where it was claiming that the properties are contiguous was in the circumstance that there was a challenge raised by the defendants to the identity and description of boundaries rather than title. It is in that context Exhibit B-3 that was addressed earlier in point of time and B-1 subsequently becomes relevant. As noted, the said documents were produced from the records of the defendant and mere denial at this point of time more particularly when the dispute between the parties has continued ever since the plaintiff purchased the property and sought to establish their right over the same. However, the High Court in para 96 to 98 has placed it out of context as if the Trial Court has proceeded only by treating the letters as admission. What is necessary to be taken note is that, excluding the property bearing Survey No.403 with its old No. as 151/1 if the plaintiff has purchased any other extent in Survey No.129/56 the defendants have no claim over the same. It is in that light, the High Court was required to examine the matter since what is to be established by the plaintiff was the identification and correctness of the exact location of the land.28. It is no doubt seen that the High Court in para 23 to 29 of the judgment has adverted to take note of the documents produced by the plaintiff at Exhibits A-1 to A-11 and A-19, more particularly Exhibit A-3. Further, the evidence tendered by PW- 1, PW-4 and PW-5 was also taken note of. From the analysis thereto the emphasis is on document at Exhibit A-3, whereunder the plaintiff purchased the extent of 2 acres 10 guntas in Survey No.129/56 from the heirs of Raja Dharam Karan. The evidence of PW-4 was relied upon to take note that he had attested the sale deed at Exhibit A-3. The evidence of PW-5 i.e., the vendor No.5 in the said document was relied upon. Based on the said evidence, the High Court noted the purchase of the property made by the plaintiff No.2 and the schedule indicated to the said document. The title of the plaintiffs vendor to a larger extent of the property than what was sold to the plaintiff No.2 was taken note by referring to Exhibit A-1. On that aspect of the matter, though such consideration has been made by the High Court, the fact that the plaintiff No.2 had intended to purchase an extent of 2 acres 10 guntas in Survey No.129/56, in any event, was not in dispute and the Trial Court has also accepted the said position as rightly noted by the High Court. However, the dispute arose since the question which required consideration was as to whether the purported sale of Survey no.129/56 to an extent of 2 acres 10 guntas under the said sale deed is in fact a portion of the property which was really located in Survey No.129/56 or as to whether the vendors having sold different extent from the larger extent of property to the various other purchasers, were left with an extent of land measuring 2 acres 10 guntas to be sold to the plaintiff No.2.29. That aspect of the matter assumes relevance in the context of the documents that were sought to be produced by the defendants who were the respondents before the High Court by filing I.A. No.2 of 2021 under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. The High Court having taken note of the decision in the case of Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by Lrs Vs. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust & Others (2005) 2 SCC 476,  in Wadi Vs. Amilal & Others (2015) 1 SCC 677,  MIS. NETWORX INC. Vs. K.R. MOHAN REDDY (2006) SCC Online AP 812, Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil v. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi (1987) 1 SCC 221 and in H.S. Goutham. Vs. Rama Murthy Anr. Etc. 2021 SCC Online SC 87 and keeping in view the parameters laid down in considering an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C has found it appropriate to reject the application.32. It is no doubt true that the said applications in the year 2008 were made without prejudice to their right, since their appeal was still pending. Further even though as held by the High Court it cannot be construed as an admission, one cannot lose sight of the fact that in the nature of the entire controversy the said applications become relevant. Firstly, what is to be kept in perspective is also the fact that even before the suit was filed, the documents at Exhibits B-1 and B-3 had come into existence whereunder a request was made to allot the said lands. As already noted though an attempt was made to contend that the plaintiff No.2 who was examined as PW-1, in his cross- examination stated that the said letter was not submitted by him and his brother was not authorised, what cannot be lost sight of is that the plaintiff No.1 is the Bhagyanagar Studio and the plaintiff in their averments to the plaint have indicated that the property purchased in Survey No.129/73 and 129/56 were pooled into the activities of the studios. As noted earlier, the communication is addressed on behalf of the Studio by the brother of plaintiff No.2 who was also a partner and the letter dated 23.05.1976 refers to the fact of the property having been purchased by the partners of the Studio. In the said letter even though there is no categorical admission, the fact remains that at that stage itself they have taken note of the fact that a claim was made by the Patwari of Shaikpet Village and by the Revenue Inspector that there is a piece of land of 2 acres in between their lands and had mooted the proposal for allotment. It is in that background we have observed hereinabove that the defendants had raised the challenge to the claim of the plaintiff to the land which is immediately adjacent to Survey No.129/73 and in that circumstance instead of asserting their title at that stage they had resorted to seek allotment. It is in that circumstance the burden was heavier on the plaintiff when the suit was instituted subsequently and in that context, we had indicated that the proof of the entire extent was necessary to be shown to prove the identity of the property which was purchased by the plaintiff No.2 and thus to establish the same not to be the property belonging to the government.33. The High Court thereafter in paragraphs 47 to 55 has proceeded to observe with regard to the pleading in the written statement and in that regard, has commented that the evidence sought to be produced by the defendants is not supported by the pleadings. In that regard, certain decisions of this court have been extracted and noted with emphasis and a conclusion has been reached in para 56 to indicate that the said documents sought to be relied on by the defendants have no relevance to support the case set up by the defendants. As repeatedly indicated by us, the plaintiffs having sought for declaration were to prove the case. To the extent, the defendant had contended with regard to the government property, in support of the pleading in the written statement the defendant had relied on the documents at Exhibits B-2, B-4 and B-5 to indicate that there was an extent of property other than the property bearing Survey No.129/56 which was wedged between Survey No.129/56 and Survey No.129/73. Though much was made about the resurvey not being notified, that would become relevant insofar as the indication of the property as Survey No.403 but that cannot negate the fact that the property existed there and the number assigned was a different one. To that extent the Trial Court had in fact taken note of the Survey No.151/1. In fact, the High Court having extracted the deposition of the PW-1 has sought to give much credence to the same with regard to the Town Survey records being wrongly prepared behind the back of PW-1 and the Survey No.403 being carved out. Such challenge had not been laid by the plaintiff in the forum provided, but merely have stated so in the evidence which could not have weighed with the High Court, when the larger issue based on substantive evidence relating to the identity of the property was to be taken note. The High Court though has taken note of the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 to find fault with the documents at Exhibits B-2, B-4 and B-5 relied on by the defendants, what cannot be lost sight of is that from the evidence of the said witnesses what flows is that the initial survey was conducted in the year 1916 and the revision survey was conducted in the year 1942. The town survey was conducted and completed between 1965-1970. The survey and the resurvey were much prior to the purchase of the property by plaintiff No.2 in the year 1964. The survey No. which is shown as 403 in the revision even if it is taken note that as put in the comparative statement by the High Court it is 151/1 in Exhibit B-2 and 151/1, 129/108 in Exhibit B-4 and B-5 and is alleged that it is tampered as 403/108 in Exhibit B-4, as already indicated above, the fact remains that there was an extent of the property situate between Survey No.129/73 and 129/56. The order dated 04.08.1998 in CRP No.2781/1998 relied upon though allowed the application seeking for original of initial survey map has declined prayer for production of initial survey map and revised survey records. The evaluation of the said evidence is essentially in the context of the plaintiffs seeking a declaration that the property purchased by them under the sale deed dated 03.09.1964 is a part of Survey No.129 which aspect can only be considered in the context of the vendor having purchased the property which is possessed and owned by the vendor and is conveyed without including any other property. To that extent, from the evidence produced by the plaintiff, the proof was insufficient and therefore in that context, the Trial Court had dismissed the suit. The High Court in fact though has rendered an elaborate judgment has proceeded at a tangent.34. Insofar as the aspect relating to possession, the High Court has adverted to this aspect of the matter in para 106 onwards and has found fault with the Trial Court that despite there being abundant documentary evidence the Trial Court has wrongly dealt with the issue of adverse possession. In fact, the high court has failed to understand the context in which the consideration with regard to possession had arisen. As noted, if the title to the property along with its identity had been established, the possession would automatically follow from the date of purchase on 03.09.1964. However, in the instant case though the execution of a sale deed purportedly conveying an extent in Survey No.129/56 was proved, the fact as to whether the extent as indicated in the sale deed was actually located in the Survey No.129/56 was not established by the plaintiffs from the discussion made by the Trial Court as well as indicated by us above. If that be the position, even if, the plaintiffs had actually come in physical possession of the extent of property which is not actually situate in Survey No.129/56 and is the property which is claimed as the government property, the possession to be declared to have been perfected by adverse possession will have to pass the test to claim such right. It is in that context it was alternatively contended that the plaintiffs had also stated that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. It is in that context that the Trial Court firstly having noted that there are no documents to indicate possession has also taken note that the purchase being in the year 1964 and the suit being filed in the year 1981 the statutory period of 30 years to acquire right by way of adverse possession also does not arise. The High Court no doubt has taken into account the evidence of PW-1 who has stated that he has been in possession from the date of purchase. The fact also remains that subsequently when the compound wall was constructed it was demolished and it is the very case of the plaintiffs that since there was interference the suit was filed. Therefore, even if possession was taken by the plaintiff, in the context of claiming title, there is no other material. As already taken note by us, pursuant to the purchase, the mutation proceedings and the assessment for tax if any made has also not been brought on record by way of evidence. Therefore, in the context of the possession sought to be protected based on title, when the identity of the property is not established despite purchase claimed under the registered sale deed the relief as prayed for would not be available and therefore the Trial Court was justified in that regard.