Case: Gobald Motor Service Ltd. &amp; Another Vs. R. M. K. Veluswami &amp; Others

credit should be given in assessing the damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts, for what was given to him under the Law Reform Act, 1934. So too, in Ellis v. Raine, 1939-2 KB 180 where the parents of an infant, who had been negligently killed in an accident, claimed damages under both the Acts, Goddard, L. J., reaffirmed the view that where the parties who would benefit from the damages awarded under the Fatal Accidents Acts were the same as those who would benefit from the damages awarded under the Law Reform Act, the damages under the Fatal Accidents Acts must be reduced by the amount given as loss under the Law Reform Act. Finally the same view has been reaffirmed and restated with clarity in 1942 AC 601. There Lord Macnmillan described the nature of the two heads thus at p. 610:"The rights of action in the two cases are quite distinct and independent. Under the Law Reform Act the right of action is for the benefit of the deceaseds estate; under the Fatal Accidents Acts the right of action is for the benefit of the deceaseds dependents. But, inasmuch as the basis of both causes of action may be the same, namely, negligence of a third party which has caused the deceaseds death, it was natural to provide that the rights of action should be without prejudice the one to the other. It is quite a different thing to read the provision as meaning that in assessing damages payable to dependants under the Fatal Accidents Acts no account is to be taken of any benefit which the dependants may indirectly obtain from an award under the Law Reform Act through participation in the deceaseds estate. . . . . . . . . . . . , it is appropriate that any benefit taken indirectly by a dependant by way of participation in an award under the Law Reform Act should be taken into account in estimating the damages awarded to that dependant under the Fatal Accidents Acts."Lord Wright addressed himself to the same question and answered it at p. 614 thus;"The injury suffered by the individual from the death cannot be computed without reference to the benefit also accruing from the death to the same individual from whatever source."The principle in its application to the Indian Act has been clearly and succinctly stated by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Secretary of State v. Gokal Chand, ILR 6 Lah 451: (AIR 1925 Lah 636). In that case, Sir Shadi Lal, C. J., observed at p. 453 (of ILR Lah.) : (at p. 636 of AIR) thus :"The law contemplates two sorts of damages: the one is the pecuniary loss to the estate of the deceased resulting from the accident; the other is the pecuniary loss sustained by the members of his family through his death. The action for the latter is brought by the legal representatives, not for the estate, but as trustees for the relatives beneficially entitled; while the damages for the loss caused to the estate are claimed on behalf of the estate and when recovered form part of the assets of the estate."An illustration may clarify the position. X is the income of the estate of the deceased, Y is the Yearly expenditure incurred by him on his dependants (we will ignore the other expenditure incurred by him). X-Y, i. e., Z, is the amount he saves every year. The capitalised value of the income spent on the dependants, subject to relevant deductions, is the pecuniary loss sustained by the members of his family through his death. The capitalised value of his income, subject to relevant deductions, would be the loss caused to the estate by his death. If the claimants under both the heads are,the same, and if they get compensation for the entire loss caused to the estate, they cannot claim again under the head of personal loss the capitalised income that might have been spent on them if the deceased were alive. Conversely, if they got compensation under S. 1 representing the amount that the deceased would have spent on them, if alive, to that extent there should be deduction in their claim under S. 2 of the Act in respect of compensation for the loss caused to the estate. To put it differently, if under S. 1 they got capitalised value of Y, under S. 2 they could get only the capitalised value of Z, for the capitalised value of Y+Z, i.e., X, would be the capitalised value of his entire income.12. The law on this branch of the subject may be briefly stated thus : The rights of action under Ss. 1 and 2 of the Act are quite distinct and independent. If a person taking benefit under both the sections is the same, he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim, that is, if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under S. 1 of the Act, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation under S. 2 and vice versa.13. In the instant case, under S.1 of the Act both the courts gave compensation to plaintiffs 2 to 7 in a sum of Rs. 25,200/-. This sum was arrived at by taking into consideration, inter alia, the reasonable provision the deceased, if alive, would have made for them. Under S. 2 both the courts awarded damages for the loss to the estate in a sum of Rs. 5,000/-.That figure represents the damages for the mental agony, suffering and loss of expectation of life. There was no duplication in awarding damages under both the heads. No material has been placed before us to enable us to take a different view in regard to the amount of compensation under S. 2 of the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]That apart, it cannot be said that the bus maintained an even pace throughout. The High Court, on the basis of the evidence and on broad probabilities, held that the speed at which the bus was driven was excessive, having regard to the nature of the ground on which the accident happened; and having gone through the evidence, we are quite satisfied that the said finding was justified on the material placed before them. It must, therefore, be held that there was negligence on the part of the driver.5. Apart from the positive evidence, in the present case the accident took place not on the main road, but on the off-side uprooting the stone at the drain and attacking a tamarind tree 25 feet away from the said stone with such a velocity that its bark was peeled off and the bus could stop only after travelling some more distance from the said tree. The said facts give rise to a presumption that the accident was caused by the negligence of thesaid principles directly apply to the present case. Here, the events happened tell their own story and there is a presumption that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the appellants. But it is said that this presumption was rebutted by proof that the accident was due to the rear central bolt of the bus suddenly giving way. The High Court, after considering the relevant evidence, held that it was not possible to hold that the accident was caused by the break in the bolt. We have gone through the evidence and we do not see any flaw in thatthe present case, admittedly, on account of the negligence of the driver in the course of his employment the said accident happened, and, therefore, the appellants are liablewould be seen from the said mode of estimation that many imponderables enter into the calculation. Therefore, the actual extent of the pecuniary loss to the respondents may depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately, but must necessarily be an estimate, or even partly a conjecture. Shortly stated, the general principle is that the pecuniary loss can be ascertained only by balancing on the one hand the loss to the claimants of the future pecuniary benefit and on the other any pecuniary advantage which from whatever source comes to them by reason of the death that is, the balance of loss and gain to a dependant by the death must bethe courts below have, on relevant. material placed before them, ascertained the said amount as damages under the first head, we cannot in second appeal disturb the said finding except for compelling reasons.Assuming that Rajaratnam had not died, he would have spent, having regard to his means and status in life, a minimum of Rs. 250/- on respondents 2 to 7; and his income, as indicated by the evidence, would certainly be more than that amount. The yearly expenditure he had to incur on the members of the family would have been about Rs. 3,000/- and the sum of Rs. 25,200/would represent the said expenditure for just over 8 years9. In the circumstances, the balance of loss and gain to the dependant by the death of Rajaratnam, in the sense stated by Lord Wright and Viscount Simon, could not be less than Rs. 25,200/-; indeed, having regard to the circumstances of the case, it is a moderate sum; it is rather a conservative estimate. We, therefore, accept that figure as representing the damages for respondents 2 to 7 in respect of their claim under the head of pecuniary loss to them by the death of Rajaratnam.10. The last contention raises an interesting point. Under S. 2 of the Act the respondents 2 to 7 were awarded Rs. 5,000/as damages for loss of expectation of life. It was contended that this amount should go in reduction of Rs. 25,200/- awarded under S. I of the Act on the ground that otherwise it would be duplication of damages in respect of the same wrong.The law on this branch of the subject may be briefly stated thus : The rights of action under Ss. 1 and 2 of the Act are quite distinct and independent. If a person taking benefit under both the sections is the same, he cannot be permitted to recover twice over for the same loss. In awarding damages under both the heads, there shall not be duplication of the same claim, that is, if any part of the compensation representing the loss to the estate goes into the calculation of the personal loss under S. 1 of the Act, that portion shall be excluded in giving compensation under S. 2 and vice versa.13. In the instant case, under S.1 of the Act both the courts gave compensation to plaintiffs 2 to 7 in a sum of Rs. 25,200/-. This sum was arrived at by taking into consideration, inter alia, the reasonable provision the deceased, if alive, would have made for them. Under S. 2 both the courts awarded damages for the loss to the estate in a sum of Rs. 5,000/-.That figure represents the damages for the mental agony, suffering and loss of expectation of life. There was no duplication in awarding damages under both the heads. No material has been placed before us to enable us to take a different view in regard to the amount of compensation under S. 2 of the Act.