Case: State of Haryana &amp; Others Vs. Devander Sagar &amp; Others

be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narsimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu AIR 1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)was rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case. 11. The Division Bench has predicated its decision to set aside the Notification as well as the Declaration on Padma Sundara Rao, which ironically the previous Division Bench had failed to follow. The decision of the Constitutional Bench in Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in Section 6(1) is clear and unambiguous, and the time period cannot be stretched as this would not be in keeping with the legislative intent. The contention of the Appellant State that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 is a continuation of the initial Declaration is thus clearly erroneous, as such a finding would be in the face of the strict interpretation of time prescribed by Padma Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section 6. Had the Legislature intended to allow for such a continuation, it would have done so by specifically providing for it, as it has done for periods covered by orders of stay and injunction. Furthermore, the Appellant State cannot place reliance on an erroneous Order which caused grave prejudice to the rights of the Respondents. It would be apt to mention the legal principle that no party should suffer for the mistake of the Court. Since compensation is calculated based on the value of the land on the date of the Section 4 Notification, the Order of the Division Bench dated 12.1.2004 resulted in the landowners getting compensation at 2001 rates even though the Award was finally passed in 2006 and the compensation is yet to be paid to the Respondents. Had the Division Bench Order struck down only the Declaration, which in turn would have resulted in the entire acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State would have had to reinitiate acquisition proceedings, resulting in the Respondents receiving compensation at the market rates current at the time of the fresh Notification. We therefore find that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 cannot be upheld merely by virtue of the previous Division Bench’s erroneous and prejudicial Order. We are in agreement with the decision of the High Court in the impugned Judgment and consequently dismiss the Appeal.C.A. Nos. 459-460 of 201112. We are of the opinion that the substance of the issues in question in this batch of petitions are analogous to those in Civil Writ Petition No. 1123 of 2006 which has been assailed in Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, save for the difference that it is the Haryana Urban Development Authority which has filed the Appeal. In that light, the findings made in the preceding Appeal apply squarely to this batch of Appeals as well, and are decided in the same terms.C.A. Nos. 461-462 of 201113. The factual scenario in these Appeals is different from Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, in that compensation has been paid to the Contesting Respondents, whose land is now in the possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority. Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the passing of an award, payment of compensation and taking of possession, all of which are met here. Furthermore, the Contesting Respondents in these Appeals had not been parties before the Division Bench in its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not explicitly state that it would apply to all the landowners affected by the impugned acquisition process, it was limited in scope to the parties before it, for reasons that we have already discussed herein. It would also be pertinent to note that the Contesting Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008 was passed. We find that till the date of the 12.3.2008 Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to the acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and therefore they could not seek to challenge it by placing reliance on a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit.14. A number of Proforma Respondents were impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order dated 12.4.2013, and we are not aware of whether the acquisitions with regard to their land has become final. However, these Proforma Respondents first challenged the acquisition by filing a writ petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008. It is thus clear that these Respondents, too, initially consented to the acquisition process and only challenged it belatedly by seeking to rely upon a favourable Judgment that did not relate or pertain to them. The

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu AIR 1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)was rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.The Division Bench has predicated its decision to set aside the Notification as well as the Declaration on Padma Sundara Rao, which ironically the previous Division Bench had failed to follow. The decision of the Constitutional Bench in Padma Sundara Rao held that the language in Section 6(1) is clear and unambiguous, and the time period cannot be stretched as this would not be in keeping with the legislative intent. The contention of the Appellant State that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 is a continuation of the initial Declaration is thus clearly erroneous, as such a finding would be in the face of the strict interpretation of time prescribed by Padma Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of Section 6. Had the Legislature intended to allow for such a continuation, it would have done so by specifically providing for it, as it has done for periods covered by orders of stay and injunction. Furthermore, the Appellant State cannot place reliance on an erroneous Order which caused grave prejudice to the rights of the Respondents. It would be apt to mention the legal principle that no party should suffer for the mistake of the Court. Since compensation is calculated based on the value of the land on the date of the Section 4 Notification, the Order of the Division Bench dated 12.1.2004 resulted in the landowners getting compensation at 2001 rates even though the Award was finally passed in 2006 and the compensation is yet to be paid to the Respondents. Had the Division Bench Order struck down only the Declaration, which in turn would have resulted in the entire acquisition lapsing, the Appellant State would have had to reinitiate acquisition proceedings, resulting in the Respondents receiving compensation at the market rates current at the time of the fresh Notification. We therefore find that the Declaration dated 30.12.2004 cannot be upheld merely by virtue of the previous Divisionerroneous and prejudicial Order. We are in agreement with the decision of the High Court in the impugned Judgment and consequently dismiss the Appeal.C.A. Nos. 459-460 of 201112. We are of the opinion that the substance of the issues in question in this batch of petitions are analogous to those in Civil Writ Petition No. 1123 of 2006 which has been assailed in Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, save for the difference that it is the Haryana Urban Development Authority which has filed the Appeal. In that light, the findings made in the preceding Appeal apply squarely to this batch of Appeals as well, and are decided in the same terms.C.A. Nos. 461-462 of 201113. The factual scenario in these Appeals is different from Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, in that compensation has been paid to the Contesting Respondents, whose land is now in the possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority. Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the passing of an award, payment of compensation and taking of possession, all of which are met here. Furthermore, the Contesting Respondents in these Appeals had not been parties before the Division Bench in its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not explicitly state that it would apply to all the landowners affected by the impugned acquisition process, it was limited in scope to the parties before it, for reasons that we have already discussed herein. It would also be pertinent to note that the Contesting Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008 was passed. We find that till the date of the 12.3.2008 Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to the acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and therefore they could not seek to challenge it by placing reliance on a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit.14. A number of Proforma Respondents were impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order dated 12.4.2013, and we are not aware of whether the acquisitions with regard to their land has become final. However, these Proforma Respondents first challenged the acquisition by filing a writ petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008. It is thus clear that these Respondents, too, initially consented to the acquisition process and only challenged it belatedly by seeking to rely upon a favourable Judgment that did not relate or pertain to them.