Case: Muddada Chayana Vs. Karnam Narayana And Anr. Etc

provides for an appeal to the Tribunal from the decision of the Settlement Officer and it declares that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and not liabl e to be questioned in any Court of law. Section 16 imposes on every person, whether a land-holder or a ryot who becomes entitled to a ryotwari patta under the Act in respect of any land, the liability to pay to the Government the assessment t hat may be lawfully imposed on the land. Section 21 to 23 provide for the survey of estates, the manner of affecting ryotwari settlement and the determination of the land-revenue. Sections 55 to 68 occur under the heading "Miscellaneous". Section 55 provides for the collection of rent which had accrued before the notified date. Section 56 provides for the decision of certain disputes arising after an estate is notified. It provides for the decision of a dispute as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is. The dispute is required to be decided by the Settlement Officer. Against the decision of the Settlement Officer, an appeal is provided to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal is declared final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law.Now the Act broadly confers on every tenant in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands which were included or ought to have been included in his holding before the notified date and on the land-holder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of lands which belonged to him before the notified date as his private lands. The Act makes express provision for the determination of claims by landholders for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the alleged private lands. If there is provision for the determination of the claims of a landholder for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of his alleged private lands, surely, in an Act aimed at the abolition of intermediaries and the introduction of ryotwari settlement, there must be a provision for the determination of the claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta. Section 56(1) is clearly such a provision. But in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors (supra) it was held that an enquiry as to who was the lawful ryot was permissible under Section 56(1) (c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrear of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose. The conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed context in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held that Section 56(1) (c) occurred so closely on the heels of Section 55 and Section 56(1)(a) and (b), that the applicability of Section 56(1)(c) must be held to be "intimately and integrally connected" with those provisions. We think that the approach of the Full Bench was wrong. Apart from the fact that Section 55 and 56(1)(a), (b) and (c) occur under the heading "Miscellaneous", and, therefore, a contextual interpretation may not be quite appropriate, the Full Bench over looked the serious anomaly created by its conclusion. The anomaly is that while express provision is found in Section 15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by land-holders for the grant of ryotwari pattas., there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas. It would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries, is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1) (c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding has, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provision to the bounds of Section 55 and 56(1) (a) and (b) on the ground of "contextual interpretation". Interpretation of a statute, contextural or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthuyya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &ors. (supra) was wrongly decided in so far as it held that ambit of Section 56(1)(c) was controlled by Section 55 and Section 56(1) (a) and (b). We do not think it necessary to consider the matter in further detail in view of the elaborate consideration which has been given to the case by the later Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Muniswami Naidu (died) &Ors v. R. Venkata Reddi &Ors. (supra) except to add that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v. Sriramamurty:"Where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine question s as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as is otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that tribunals jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. Under the Act old rights were abolished and new rights were created. A lawful ryot is entitled to a patta, when a question arises whether a person is a lawful ryot or not, that question falls to be decided by the special Tribunal created by the Act". 3.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are, however, unable to see any justification for restricting the scope of Section 56(1)(c) in the manner suggested by Shri Sarathi. We will briefly indicate our reasons for holding that the scope of Section 56(1) (c) is not to be restricted as was done by the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. (supra). We are fortunately relieved of the necessity of considering the matter more elaborately in view of the fact that the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. on this part of the case has since been over-ruled by a Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in I. Munuswami Naidu (died) &Ors. v. R. Venkata Reddy &Ors. after a thorough and exhaustive consi deration of the question. We may also add here that until the decision in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors., for several years it was understood that Section 56(1) (c) conferred complete and exclusive jurisdiction on the Set tlement Officer to decide rival claims of ryots for the grant of ryotwari patta and Section 55 or 56(1)(a) and (b) were never understood as controlling Section 56(1)(c).A brief resume of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act relevant for our present purpose is permissible here. As stated in the preamble the Act was enacted to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the Rights of land-holders in permanently settled and certain other estates and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. Section 1(4) provides for the notification of estates and Section 3 enumerates the consequences of notifying an estate under Section 1(4) of the ActBut in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors (supra) it was held that an enquiry as to who was the lawful ryot was permissible under Section 56(1) (c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability to pay arrear of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no other purpose. The conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed context in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held that Section 56(1) (c) occurred so closely on the heels of Section 55 and Section 56(1)(a) and (b), that the applicability of Section 56(1)(c) must be held to be "intimately and integrally connected" with those provisions. We think that the approach of the Full Bench was wrong. Apart from the fact that Section 55 and 56(1)(a), (b) and (c) occur under the heading "Miscellaneous", and, therefore, a contextual interpretation may not be quite appropriate, the Full Bench over looked the serious anomaly created by its conclusion. The anomaly is that while express provision is found in Section 15 of the Act for the adjudication of claims by land-holders for the grant of ryotwari pattas., there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision for the adjudication of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari pattas. It would indeed be anomalous and ludicrous and reduce the Act to an oddity, if the Act avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on ryots and the abolition of intermediaries, is to be held not to contain any provision for the determination of the vital question as to who was the lawful ryot of a holding. The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not to leave them in the wilderness. When the Act provides a machinery in Section 56(1) (c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding has, it is not for the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining the provision to the bounds of Section 55 and 56(1) (a) and (b) on the ground of "contextual interpretation". Interpretation of a statute, contextural or otherwise must further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are, therefore, of the view that Cherukuru Muthuyya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &ors. (supra) was wrongly decided in so far as it held that ambit of Section 56(1)(c) was controlled by Section 55 and Section 56(1) (a) and (b). We do not think it necessary to consider the matter in further detail in view of the elaborate consideration which has been given to the case by the later Full Bench of five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T. Muniswami Naidu (died) &Ors v. R. Venkata Reddi &Ors. (supra) except to add that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya &Ors. would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v.