Case: Himalayan Tiles &amp; Marbles (P) Ltd Vs. Francis Victor Coutinho (Dead) By Lrs &amp; Ors

etc., shall be deemed always as valid as if the provisions of Section 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the amending Act, were in the force at all material times; and (d) that by virtue of Section 7 validity to the acquisition is given to all actions taken in connection therewith in spite of any judgment, decree or order of any court to the contrary. 17. We are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first condition adumbrated by this Court, viz., that there must be a complete acquisition before Section 7 could validate the same, has not been fulfilled at all. In this view of the matter we need not go into the other conditions indicated by this Court. 18. It was contended by Mr. Desai that according to the unchallenged pleadings of the respondents including the government, which was a party before the District Court and also before the Single Judge of the High Court, there is nothing to show that after the issue of notification the government had taken possession of the land so that it could be said that the land had vested in the government in which case alone the acquisition proceedings would have been completed. In this connection, our attention was drawn to para 1 of the petition filed by the respondents before the High Court, which runs thus :"The petitioners have become the owners of the said lands by inheritance, and the present lands records in respect of said lands stand in the name of the petitioners. There is no dispute between the petitioners and the respondents that the petitioners are the owners of the said immovable property. The petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties." 19. According to this averment, it is clearly pleaded that in spite of the notifications, the possession had not been given to the government and the respondents (petitioners before the High Court) were still in possession of the properties in question. A similar averment has been made in para 15 of the petition which may be extracted thus : The petitioners say that they are still in possession of the said lands and possession of the said lands has not been taken away from them and the tenants of the petitioners numbering about 53 at present are in physical occupation of the same. 20. It was also alleged that the government had threatened the petitioners in the High Court that possession would be taken through police but despite such threats given by the government, the petitioners are still in possession of the said lands and the structures were in possession of the tenants. The government in its reply affidavit did not deny these averments. On the other hand, they admitted the same. Para 8 of the reply-affidavit may be extracted thus : With reference to paragraph 1 of the petition, I believe the contents thereof to be substantially correct though as stated above the petitioners names do not appear as occupants or owners in the record of rights relating to the land in question. Similarly in para 21 of the reply, the contents of para 15 of the petition were admitted and further the fact that possession was with the petitioners, was not denied but was admitted to be correct. Para 21 of the reply-affidavit runs thus : With reference to paragraph 15 of the petition, I believe the contents thereof to be substantially correct. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, drew our attention to a letter sent by the respondents and went on to show that possession of only one acre of land has been taken by the government. Even the High Court clearly found that possession had not been fully delivered to the government after the notification. In this connection, the Division Bench observed as follows :On the question of possession being delivered to the government the petitioners specifically averred at the end of paragraph 15 of the petition : "The petitioners further say that notwithstanding the said letter and the threat therein contained the petitioners are still in possession of the said lands and their tenants are occupying the said structures standing thereon and possession thereof has not been taken by the respondents". They made similar averments at the end of paragraph 1 of the petition, that "the petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties". 22. Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondents and the petition was contested only by the State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as its interests were fully safeguarded by the government it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court. Even so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the government and thus no title vested in the government despite the notification acquiring the land. In these circumstances, therefore, it is unmistakably clear that the properties not having vested in the government the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by Section 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail. Dr. Chitale however, suggested that out of 2.2 acres, possession of one acre may have been taken by the government. Assuming that to be so, until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of Section 7 of the amending Act. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of Section 7 of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilled.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. It seems to us that the definition of a person interested given in Section 18 is an inclusive and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the government, after acquisition, it stood transferred to the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation14. Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principals of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital ? For instance, the land in acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was for too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by Section 18(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench17. We are, however, satisfied that in the instant case the first condition adumbrated by this Court, viz., that there must be a complete acquisition before Section 7 could validate the same, has not been fulfilled at all. In this view of the matter we need not go into the other conditions indicated by this Court22. Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondents and the petition was contested only by the State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as its interests were fully safeguarded by the government it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court. Even so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the government and thus no title vested in the government despite the notification acquiring the land. In these circumstances, therefore, it is unmistakably clear that the properties not having vested in the government the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by Section 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail. Dr. Chitale however, suggested that out of 2.2 acres, possession of one acre may have been taken by the government. Assuming that to be so, until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of Section 7 of the amending Act. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of Section 7 of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the acquisition proceedings suffer, has been fulfilledIn this connection, the Division Bench observed as follows :On the question of possession being delivered to the government the petitioners specifically averred at the end of paragraph 15 of the petition : "The petitioners further say that notwithstanding the said letter and the threat therein contained the petitioners are still in possession of the said lands and their tenants are occupying the said structures standing thereon and possession thereof has not been taken by the respondents". They made similar averments at the end of paragraph 1 of the petition, that "the petitioners were at all times and still are in possession of the said immovable properties"22. Admittedly, the appellant did not appear before the Single Judge in the writ petition filed by the respondents and the petition was contested only by the State. Perhaps the appellant may have thought that as its interests were fully safeguarded by the government it was not necessary for it at that stage to appear before the High Court. Even so, the pleas of both the parties taken together clearly show that the entire possession of the property did not pass to the government and thus no title vested in the government despite the notification acquiring the land. In these circumstances, therefore, it is unmistakably clear that the properties not having vested in the government the acquisition was not complete and its invalidity could not be cured by Section 7 of the amendment Act as pointed out by this Court in the case referred to above. On this ground alone the appellant must fail. Dr. Chitale however, suggested that out of 2.2 acres, possession of one acre may have been taken by the government. Assuming that to be so, until the possession of the entire land acquired was taken by the government, the acquisition could not be a complete acquisition so as to attract the operation of Section 7 of the amending Act. In this view of the matter, we are satisfied that the appellant has failed to prove that one of the essential conditions for application of Section 7 of the amending Act, which would cure the infirmities from which the acquisition proceedings suffer, has been