Case: MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI &amp; ORS Vs. PANNA MAHESH CHANDRA DAVE &amp; ANR.

High Court within a weeks time from the date of receipt of the order to enable the said Authority to decide and submit a report expeditiously preferably within a period of eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. List the other Special Leave Petitions after Report is received from the Legal Services Authority of the Bombay High Court. 12. Pursuant to the said order, the Secretary of the High Court Legal Services Committee, Bombay filed a report dated 07.02.2019. The important findings recorded in the Report of the High Court Legal Services Committee are (1) that the assessment certificate issued by the Corporation shows the existence of superstructures from a period prior to 1961 (2) that some of the respondents in the special leave petitions were issued with notices under Section 3Z(2) (i) of the Slum Act and that they are eligible for permanent alternative accommodation, as they have produced electricity bill Gumasta Licence etc. from a period prior to 1995 while the cut-off date was only 01.01.2000 and (3) that the other respondents are also eligible for permanent alternative accommodation, as their superstructures were duly assessed in the year 1961 and indisputably, those structures were demolished on 26.10.2017. 13. The Municipal Corporation has filed an affidavit of objections to the Report of the High Court Legal Services Committee. It is claimed in the said affidavit that the respondents did not produce any proof of existence of superstructures prior to the Datum Line of 1962; that the shop owners failed to submit any valid, legal proof; that the land under reference was not declared as a slum under the Slum Act; that the owner of the land Smt. Geeta Angare had not submitted the names of the eligible tenants; that out of 11 structures, the occupants of 4 structures were already found eligible for alternate accommodation; that out of the remaining 7 structures, 3 have been assessed to tax and that, therefore, in addition to the 4 structures declared eligible earlier, 3 more may become eligible for alternative accommodation. 14. Drawing our attention to the various documents and also to the Report of the High Court Legal Services Committee, it was strenuously contended by Mr. Shekhar Naphade that the grant of alternate accommodation cannot be claimed by the respondents as a matter of right, unless they fulfill the parameters fixed by the Municipal Corporation and that the ad-hoc identification of parties for the grant of alternate accommodation without any supporting documents would create huge disparities. The learned Senior Counsel has also assailed the findings of the High Court Legal Services Committee on the ground that those findings were not supported by any documentary evidence. 15. We have carefully considered the contentions of the learned senior counsel for the Municipal Corporation. We should point out at the outset that the legal heirs of the original owner of the land were the petitioners in one writ petition and eleven persons claiming to be the tenants, were the petitioners in the other writ petitions. Insofar as persons claiming to be the owners of the land are concerned, the Municipal Corporation itself had conceded before the High Court that they were willing to offer TDR. In paragraph 15 of the affidavit in reply filed by the Municipal Corporation in Writ Petition No. 3090 of 2017, it was stated by the Municipal Corporation as follows: I say that the respondents Nos.2 to 4 are willing to grant the necessary benefit such as TDR to the rightful owner of the plot of land which is affected by road widening scheme. I say that the petitioner No.1 had contacted the officers at R/North Ward as regarding the issuance of TDR. The petitioner No.1 had attended the meeting in Asst. Municipal Commissioner, R/North office on 11 th November, 2017, when she was informed that she has to contact the office of Chief Engineer (DP) along with relevant papers. I say that the petitioner had agreed and given assurance to the respondent that she will contact the said office for granting her TDR in lieu of land being acquired for the purpose of road widening. I understand that petitioner No.1 has not contacted the office of Chief Engineer (OP) for the reasons best known to her. 16. After having stated so in their affidavit in reply, the Municipal Corporation ought not to have come up with a special leave petition even in respect of Writ Petition No.3090 of 2017. In fact one of the two substantial questions of law sought to be raised, which we have extracted earlier, also concedes the position taken the Corporation that the respondents 1 to 3 in Special Leave Petition No.18376 of 2018 are entitled to relief. Therefore, we do not know how and why the Corporation is blowing hot and cold. 17. Insofar as those eleven tenants are concerned, the Corporation agreed both before the High Court and before this Court that four of them are entitled to alternate accommodation. Therefore, the special leave petitions filed in respect of those four have also been disposed of by the order dated 05.12.2018. 18. Therefore, we are left only with seven tenants. In the affidavit of objections filed to the Report of the High Court Legal Services Committee, the Corporation has conceded that three out of those seven tenants are also eligible. Therefore, ultimately the dispute has boiled down only to four tenants. 19. The High Court has recorded a finding of fact that the Municipal Corporation demolished the superstructures and took possession in a high handed manner. The Legal Services Committee has recorded a finding that the superstructures were in existence from a period prior to 1961. These findings of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, unless the findings shock our conscience. The findings of the High court are not perverse. Therefore, we find absolutely no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We should point out at the outset that the legal heirs of the original owner of the land were the petitioners in one writ petition and eleven persons claiming to be the tenants, were the petitioners in the other writ petitions. Insofar as persons claiming to be the owners of the land are concerned, the Municipal Corporation itself had conceded before the High Court that they were willing to offer TDR. In paragraph 15 of the affidavit in reply filed by the Municipal Corporation in Writ Petition No. 3090 of 2017, it was stated by the Municipal Corporation as follows:I say that the respondents Nos.2 to 4 are willing to grant the necessary benefit such as TDR to the rightful owner of the plot of land which is affected by road widening scheme. I say that the petitioner No.1 had contacted the officers at R/North Ward as regarding the issuance of TDR. The petitioner No.1 had attended the meeting in Asst. Municipal Commissioner, R/North office on 11 th November, 2017, when she was informed that she has to contact the office of Chief Engineer (DP) along with relevant papers. I say that the petitioner had agreed and given assurance to the respondent that she will contact the said office for granting her TDR in lieu of land being acquired for the purpose of road widening. I understand that petitioner No.1 has not contacted the office of Chief Engineer (OP) for the reasons best known to her16. After having stated so in their affidavit in reply, the Municipal Corporation ought not to have come up with a special leave petition even in respect of Writ Petition No.3090 of 2017. In fact one of the two substantial questions of law sought to be raised, which we have extracted earlier, also concedes the position taken the Corporation that the respondents 1 to 3 in Special Leave Petition No.18376 of 2018 are entitled to relief. Therefore, we do not know how and why the Corporation is blowing hot and cold17. Insofar as those eleven tenants are concerned, the Corporation agreed both before the High Court and before this Court that four of them are entitled to alternate accommodation. Therefore, the special leave petitions filed in respect of those four have also been disposed of by the order dated 05.12.201818. Therefore, we are left only with seven tenants. In the affidavit of objections filed to the Report of the High Court Legal Services Committee, the Corporation has conceded that three out of those seven tenants are also eligible. Therefore, ultimately the dispute has boiled down only to four tenants19. The High Court has recorded a finding of fact that the Municipal Corporation demolished the superstructures and took possession in a high handed manner. The Legal Services Committee has recorded a finding that the superstructures were in existence from a period prior to 1961. These findings of fact cannot be interfered with by this Court in a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, unless the findings shock our conscience. The findings of the High court are not perverse. Therefore, we find absolutely no grounds to interfere with the judgment of the High Court.