Case: The New Theaters (Carnatic Talkies) Ltd., Coimbatore Vs. N. Vajrapani Naidu

now stood modified. Whereas the original s. 9 (1) provided for the making of an application by the tenant within a specified period to the court for an order directing the landlord to sell the land for a price to be fixed by the court, and the court was required to fix the price according to the lowest market value prevalent within seven years preceding the date of the order, and to order, within a period to be determined by the court, the tenant to pay into court or otherwise as directed the price so fixed, the amended s. 9 (1) is divided into two clauses. Clause (a) entitles the tenant, within an identical period, to apply to the court for an order requiring the landlord to sell, for a price to be fixed by the court, the whole, or part of, the ex tent of the land specified in the application. The court can now direct the sale of a part only of the land mentioned in the application and is not compelled to pass an order in respect of the entire land. Clause (b) provides that the court will fi rst decide the minimum extent of the land necessary for convenient enjoyment by the tenant, and thereafter the court will fix the price of such minimum extent of land or of the extent of the land specified in the application, whichever is less. Furthermore, the price is to be the average market value of the three years immediately preceding the date of the order. We are clear in our mind that if the suit was pending on the date when the amendments in the principal Act were brought into force, the amended provisions of the Act will govern the disposal of the suit.Now, the appellant had already filed C.M.P. No. 1835 of 1958 praying for directions under s. 9 for the sale of the site. On that application Panchapakesa Iyer J. had passed an order dated July 28, 1958 holding the appellant entitled to purchase the site on paying the full market value current on that date, and had directed the trial court to appoint a Commissioner to fix the value of the site. The order did not dispose of the application and the suit, for under the original s. (3) the statute contemplated an order by the court, after it was satisfied that the tenant had paid the price determined by it, directing the conveyance of the land by the landlord to the tenant. It was only after such order was made that the application and the suit would stand concluded. In Gnanaprakasam and Another v. Mahboob Bi and others, a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court held that even where the original court had made an order fixing the price of the land and directing its payment by the tenant, the application filed by the tenant could not be regarded as at an end so long as final orders directing execution of conveyance and delivery of possession were not passed. The stage for passing such order had not been reached yet when the principal Act was amended by Act XIII of 1960. The suit continued pending on the date when the amendments took effect. And consequently, it was now governed by the provisions of the amended s.9. We may reiterate that the order dated July 28, 1958 did not complete the proceeding in the suit. It constituted one stage only in the suit, and inasmuch as the suit was now to be disposed of in accordance with the amended statute the incomplete proceeding had to give way to the operation of the amended statute. As the scheme under the original section stood superseded by the scheme enacted under the amended sections the order of July 2 8, 1958 stood aborted and pursuant to the amended section fresh proceedings had to be taken by the court in order to dispose of the suit.The respondent, therefore, filed C.M.P. No. 7241 of 1960 praying for a review of the order dated July 28, 1 958 in the light of the amended s.9. In other words, the court was now called upon to dispose of the application of the appellant, not in the light of the provisions of the original s.9 but on the basis of the provisions of the amend ed s.9. We are of opinion that the trial court is right in taking the view, and the High Court in affirming it, that C.M.P. No. 1883 of 1968 and the suit had to be disposed of on the basis of the provisions of the amended s.9. The contention to the contrary raised by the appellant must fail.7. We are also unable to accept the other contention of the appellant that the respondent should have invoked the benefit of the amended s. 9 in the appeal pending in this Court, and that not having done so it was not open to the respondent to apply for relief in the court below after the appeal had been disposed of by this Court. It is apparent that the scope of the appeal filed in this Court was restricted to the validity of s.9 and s. 12 of the unamended Madras City Tenants Protection Act. It must be remembered that the order of Panchapakesa Iyer J, when gave rise to that appeal, was made before the Act was amended in 1960, and this Court concerned itself solely with the validity of the unamended statutory provisions. In fact, perusal of its judgment will show that this Court declined to consider the operation of the amendments brought about in 1960. In the circumstances, it is not possible to urge that the respondent might, or ought to, have insisted on relief under the amended s.9 in the appeal pending in this Court. It was, therefore, open to the respondent after the disposal of the appeal by this Court to apply to the court below for an order in terms of the amended s.9.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are clear in our mind that if the suit was pending on the date when the amendments in the principal Act were brought into force, the amended provisions of the Act will govern the disposal of the suit.Now, the appellant had already filed C.M.P. No. 1835 of 1958 praying for directions under s. 9 for the sale of the site. On that application Panchapakesa Iyer J. had passed an order dated July 28, 1958 holding the appellant entitled to purchase the site on paying the full market value current on that date, and had directed the trial court to appoint a Commissioner to fix the value of the site. The order did not dispose of the application and the suit, for under the original s. (3) the statute contemplated an order by the court, after it was satisfied that the tenant had paid the price determined by it, directing the conveyance of the land by the landlord to the tenant. It was only after such order was made that the application and the suit would standthe scheme under the original section stood superseded by the scheme enacted under the amended sections the order of July 2 8, 1958 stood aborted and pursuant to the amended section fresh proceedings had to be taken by the court in order to dispose of the suit.The respondent, therefore, filed C.M.P. No. 7241 of 1960 praying for a review of the order dated July 28, 1 958 in the light of the amended s.9. In other words, the court was now called upon to dispose of the application of the appellant, not in the light of the provisions of the original s.9 but on the basis of the provisions of the amend ed s.9. We are of opinion that the trial court is right in taking the view, and the High Court in affirming it, that C.M.P. No. 1883 of 1968 and the suit had to be disposed of on the basis of the provisions of the amended s.9. The contention to the contrary raised by the appellant must fail.7. We are also unable to accept the other contention of the appellant that the respondent should have invoked the benefit of the amended s. 9 in the appeal pending in this Court, and that not having done so it was not open to the respondent to apply for relief in the court below after the appeal had been disposed of by this Court. It is apparent that the scope of the appeal filed in this Court was restricted to the validity of s.9 and s. 12 of the unamended Madras City Tenants Protection Act. It must be remembered that the order of Panchapakesa Iyer J, when gave rise to that appeal, was made before the Act was amended in 1960, and this Court concerned itself solely with the validity of the unamended statutory provisions. In fact, perusal of its judgment will show that this Court declined to consider the operation of the amendments brought about in 1960. In the circumstances, it is not possible to urge that the respondent might, or ought to, have insisted on relief under the amended s.9 in the appeal pending in this Court. It was, therefore, open to the respondent after the disposal of the appeal by this Court to apply to the court below for an order in terms of the amended s.9.