Case: Om Prakash Gupta Etc Vs. Dig Vijendrapal Gupta Etc

section 21, sub-section (2) of section 24, sections 24A, 24B, 24C or sub-section (3) of section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed: Explanation I. For the purposes of this sub- section: (a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority havin g jurisdiction and in the case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the ea rliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervi sing the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time:.. 8. The precise contention on behalf of the appellant is that the exemption created by this sub-section does not embrace buildings constructed prior to the enforcement of the Act. In support of his contention, Mr. Sanghi, relied upon Rattan Lal Shinghal v. Smt. Murti Devi.(1) The same contention was raised by him in that case also and a Division Bench of thi s Court accepted the contention and held that Act 13 of 1972 was prospective and applied only to buildings brought into being de novo after the Act came into force. In that case there is no discussion except this bald observation. This Court in a subs equent case Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati(2) held to the contrary. It is on this account that the present appeals were referred to a larger Bench. There is no ambiguity in the language of sub-section (2) of section 2 and in the absence of any ambigui ty there is no question of taking any external aid for the interpretation of the sub-section. In plain words the sub-section contemplates that the Act shall not apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which i ts construction is completed. It nowhere says that the building should have been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to interpret it in the way the learned counsel for the appellant seeks to interpret it, we would be adding words to the sub-section, which is not permissible. Primarily the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislature must be found in th e words used by the legislature itself. The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and, therefore, capable of two interpretations. In the present case the language of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act is explici t and unambiguous and it is not capable of two interpretations.As a second limb to the first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment, and that if this be so, the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court on 23rd of March, 1978. In order to appreciate this argument it will be expedient to refer to Explanation I to sub-section (2) of section 2 which has already been extracted. Explanation I provides that the building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authorities having jurisdiction, and in case of a building subject to assessment the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect and where the said dates are different, the e arliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time. A perusal of Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation would b e taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment, thereof. If there is an assessment, as in the present case it is, it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction and in that view of the matter the building had not become more than ten years old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court, and therefore there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant. Further, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. There is yet another reason why section 39 will have no application to the present case. In view of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years and if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable. Considered from any angle the Act has no application to t he present case and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39. The suit has, therefore, been rightly decreed by the courts below.We find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr. Sanghi. The counsel for the appell ants in the other appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sanghi. 9.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]A perusal of Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of occupation would b e taken to be the date of completion of the construction only when there is no report or record of the completion of the construction or no assessment, thereof. If there is an assessment, as in the present case it is, it will be the date of the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the construction and in that view of the matter the building had not become more than ten years old on the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court, and therefore there was no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellantFurther, in order to attract section 39 the suit must be pending on the date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of July, 1972 but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was filed on 23rd of March, 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. There is yet another reason why section 39 will have no application to the present case. In view of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years and if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to say that section 39 thereof would be applicable. Considered from any angle the Act has no application to t he present case and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39. The suit has, therefore, been rightly decreed by the courts below.We find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr. Sanghi. The counsel for the appell ants in the other appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sanghi.