Case: Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi  Vs. State Of Gujarat

clear that reference to the subsequent provisions of the Act to the date of publication of declaration has to be determined as the last of the dates of the publication and the giving of public notice. As the date of publication by local publication was the last at that point of time i.e. 15-3- 1991, the award on 25-3-1992 was not beyond the prescribed period of limitation." 16) In Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by LRs vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 85 , Panta, J. speaking for the Bench held: "17. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit the landowner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the declaration under Section 6. In ordinary course, therefore, when the Government fails to make an award within two years of the declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of the provisions of Section 11-A, the proceedings will lapse. The period of two years referred to in Section 11-A shall be computed by counting from the last of the publication dates, as per the prescribed modes of publication.25. Again, in Bihar State Housing Board v. State of Bihar this Court reiterating the proposition of law has held that modes of publication of declaration prescribed under Section 6(2) are conjoint and cumulative and all of them must be resorted to and completed. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act necessarily makes it abundantly clear that the last of the dates of the publication and giving of such public notice shall "hereinafter" be referred to as the date of publication of the declaration and limitation period of two years for making award under Section 11-A has to be counted as the last of the dates out of the three modes of publication specified in Section 6 of the Act." 17) In the case on hand, it is clearly indicated in the reply affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the notification under Section 6 was last published on 19.04.1990, by affixing a copy of the Notification on the notice board of the office of City Mamlatdar, Surat and also by affixing the same in ward No.4 of Surat city. Hence the period of two years stipulated in Section 11A would begin to run from 19.04.1990 and, therefore, the publication of the Award under Section 11 of the Act on 18.04.1992 was within the stipulated time limit of two years. In such circumstances, this contention also is liable to be rejected as devoid of any merit.18) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that inasmuch as the respondents, by a notification, has changed the classification of the land in question and designated as "residential use" at this moment, they are not permitted to set up a school in the land in question. In the counter affidavit filed by the Director of Planning, Surat Municipal Corporation has highlighted that the land in question has been reserved for school purpose in the development plan sanctioned by the State Government under the provisions of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976. As per Section 20 of the said Act, the acquiring body, namely, Surat Municipal Corporation is required to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act as the impugned land is reserved for school purpose. Further, inasmuch as the land in question is kept under reservation for school in the sanctioned development plan for the State Government under Section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act, it is the duty of the Corporation to acquire the land for implementing the provisions of the same. In view of the same, this contention is also liable to be rejected.19) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants has also submitted that in view of existence of many schools in and around the vicinity, there is no need to establish a school in the land of the appellants. In respect of the said claim, the Director of Planning, Surat Municipal Corporation, in the counter affidavit has stated that there is no municipal school near the site in question and that the schools of the Corporation which are located in Begampura, Moti Talkies, Mumbaivad, Shetranjivad, Viramgami Maholla are very far from the land under acquisition and due to increase in population in the city of Surat, they are justified in establishing a school for providing primary education to the children in the said area. In respect of `need and `necessity, it is for the Government and their authorities to take a decision considering various aspects. If such a decision is taken based on materials it is not for the Court to doubt their claim. It is also stated that the Surat Municipal Corporation is required to pay the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs.10,54,901.95 and the said amount has already been deposited with the Government Treasury on 27.05.1992. In view of the above information, the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants is to be rejected.20) Finally, learned senior counsel for the appellants, by drawing our attention to the recent decision of this Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. Union of India and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 398 submitted that in view of the strict conditions issued by this Court for establishing a school particularly in a crowded city, the respondents cannot fulfill those conditions and on this ground also the acquisition proceeding is liable to be dropped. It is true that in view of what had happened in Lord Krishna Middle School in Kumbakonam in the State of Tamil Nadu, this Court issued several directions and conditions, safety measures and standards for establishing a school. In our view, it is the duty of the State and their educational authorities to adhere to all those conditions before commencing a school in the land in question.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]17) In the case on hand, it is clearly indicated in the reply affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the notification under Section 6 was last published on 19.04.1990, by affixing a copy of the Notification on the notice board of the office of City Mamlatdar, Surat and also by affixing the same in ward No.4 of Surat city. Hence the period of two years stipulated in Section 11A would begin to run from 19.04.1990 and, therefore, the publication of the Award under Section 11 of the Act on 18.04.1992 was within the stipulated time limit of two years. In such circumstances, this contention also is liable to be rejected as devoid of any merit.18) Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted that inasmuch as the respondents, by a notification, has changed the classification of the land in question and designated as "residential use" at this moment, they are not permitted to set up a school in the land in question. In the counter affidavit filed by the Director of Planning, Surat Municipal Corporation has highlighted that the land in question has been reserved for school purpose in the development plan sanctioned by the State Government under the provisions of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976. As per Section 20 of the said Act, the acquiring body, namely, Surat Municipal Corporation is required to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act as the impugned land is reserved for school purpose. Further, inasmuch as the land in question is kept under reservation for school in the sanctioned development plan for the State Government under Section 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act, it is the duty of the Corporation to acquire the land for implementing the provisions of the same. In view of the same, this contention is also liable to be rejected.19) Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants has also submitted that in view of existence of many schools in and around the vicinity, there is no need to establish a school in the land of the appellants. In respect of the said claim, the Director of Planning, Surat Municipal Corporation, in the counter affidavit has stated that there is no municipal school near the site in question and that the schools of the Corporation which are located in Begampura, Moti Talkies, Mumbaivad, Shetranjivad, Viramgami Maholla are very far from the land under acquisition and due to increase in population in the city of Surat, they are justified in establishing a school for providing primary education to the children in the said area. In respect of `need and `necessity, it is for the Government and their authorities to take a decision considering various aspects. If such a decision is taken based on materials it is not for the Court to doubt their claim. It is also stated that the Surat Municipal Corporation is required to pay the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs.10,54,901.95 and the said amount has already been deposited with the Government Treasury on 27.05.1992. In view of the above information, the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants is to be rejected.20) Finally, learned senior counsel for the appellants, by drawing our attention to the recent decision of this Court in Avinash Mehrotra vs. Union of India and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 398 submitted that in view of the strict conditions issued by this Court for establishing a school particularly in a crowded city, the respondents cannot fulfill those conditions and on this ground also the acquisition proceeding is liable to be dropped. It is true that in view of what had happened in Lord Krishna Middle School in Kumbakonam in the State of Tamil Nadu, this Court issued several directions and conditions, safety measures and standards for establishing a school. In our view, it is the duty of the State and their educational authorities to adhere to all those conditions before commencing a school in the land in question.