Case: The General Manager, Southern Railway Vs. Rangachari

that the State ought to be satisfied that any backward class of citizens is not adequately represented in its services. This condition precedent may refer either to the numerical inadequacy of representation in the services or even to the qualitative inadequacy of representation. The advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes requires not only that they should have adequate representation in the lowest rung of services but that they should aspire to secure adequate representation in selection posts in the services as well. In the context the expression adequately represented imports considerations of "size" as well as "values," numbers as well as the nature of appointments held and so it involves not merely the numerical test but also the qualitative one. It is thus by the operation of the numerical and a qualitative test that the adequacy or otherwise of the representation of backward classes in any service has to be judged; and if that be so, it would not be reasonable to hold that the inadequacy of representation can and must be cured only by reserving a proportionately higher percentage of appointments at the initial stage. In a given case the State may well take the view that a certain percentage of selection posts should also be reserved, for reservation of such posts may make the representation of backward classes in the services adequate, the adequacy of such representation being considered qualitatively. If it is conceded that "posts" in the context refer to posts in the services and that selection posts in the services and that selection posts may be reserved but should be filled only in the manner suggested by the respondent then we see no reason for holding that the reservation of selection posts cannot be implemented by promoting suitable members of backward class of citizens to such posts as the circulars intend to do.27. We must in this connection consider an alternative argument that the word "posts" must refer not to selection posts but to posts filled by initial appointments. On this argument reservation of appointments means reservation of certain percentage in the initial appointments and reservation of posts means reservation of initial posts which may be adopted in order to expedite and make more effective the reservation of appointments themselves. On this construction the use of the word "posts" appears to be wholly redundant. In our opinion, having regard to the fact that we are construing the relevant expression reservation of appointments" in a constitutional provision it would be unreasonable to assume that the reservation of appointments would not include both the methods of reservation, namely, reservation of appointments by fixing a certain percentage in that behalf as well as reservation of certain initial posts in order to make the reservation of appointments more effective. That being so, this alternative argument which confines the word "posts" to initial posts seems to us to be entirely unreasonable. On the other hand, under the construction by which the word "posts" includes selection posts the use of the word "posts" is not superfluous but serves a very important purpose. It shows that reservation can be made not only in regard to appointments which are initial appointments but also in regard to selection posts which may fall to be filled by employees after their employment.This construction has the merit of interpreting the words "appointments" and "posts" in their broad and liberal sense and giving effect to the policy which is obviously the basis of; the provisions of Art. 16 (4). Therefore, we are disposed to take the view that the power of reservation which is conferred on the State under Art. 16 (4) can be exercised by the State in a proper case not only by providing for reservation of appointments but also by providing for reservation of selection posts. This construction, in our opinion, would serve to give effect to the intention of the Constitution-makers to make adequate safeguard for the advancement of backward classes and to secure for their adequate representation in the services. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the High Court was in error in holding that the impugned circulars do not fall within Art. 16 (4).28. It is true that in providing for the reservation of appointments or posts under Art. 16 (4) the State has to take into consideration the claims of the members of the backward classes consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency of administration. It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of administration is of such paramount importance that it would be unwise and impermissible to make any reservation at the cost of efficiency of administration. That undoubtedly is the effect of Art. 335. Reservation of appointments or posts may theoretically and conceivably mean same impairment of efficiency; but the risk involved in sacrificing efficiency of administration must always be borne in mind when any State sets about making a provision for reservation of appointments or posts. It is also true that the reservation which can be made under Art. 16 (4) is intended merely to give adequate representation to backward communities. It cannot be used for creating monopolies or for unduly or illegitimately disturbing the legitimate interests of other employees. In exercising the powers under Art. 16 (4) the problem of adequate representation of the backward class of citizens must be fairly and objectively considered and an attempt must always be made to strike a reasonable balance between the claims of backward classes and the claims of other employees as well as the important consideration of the efficiency of administration; but, in the present case, as we have already seen, the challenge to the validity of the impugned circulars is based on the assumption that the said circulars are outside Art. 16 (4) because the posts referred to in the said Article are posts outside the cadre of services and in any case, do not include selection posts. Since, in our opinion, this assumption is not well founded we must hold that the impugned circulars are not unconstitutional.-

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In deciding the scope and ambit of the fundamental right of equality of opportunity guaranteed by this Article it is necessary to bear in mind that in construing the relevant Article a technical or pedantic approach trust be avoided. We must have regard to the nature of the fundamental right guaranteed and we must seek to ascertain the intention of the Constitution by construing the material words in a broad and general way. If the words used in the Article are wide in their import they must be liberally construed in all their amplitude. Thus construed it would be clear that matters relating to employment cannot be confined only to the initial matters prior to the act of employment. The narrow construction would confine the application of Art. 16 (1) to the initial employment and nothing else; but that clearly is only one of the matters relating to employment. The other matters relating to employment would inevitably be the provision as to the salary and periodical increments therein, terms as to leave, as to gratuity, as to pension and as to the age of superannuation. These are all matters relating to employment and they are, and must be, deemed to be included in the expression "matters relating to employment" in Art.16 (1).Similarly, appointment to any office which means appointment to an office like that of the Attorney-General or Comptroller and Auditor- General must mean not only the initial appointment to such an office but all the terms and conditions of service pertaining to the said office. What Art.16 (1) guarantees is equality of opportunity to all citizens in respect of all the matters relating to employment illustrated by us as well as to an appointment to any office as explained by us.15. This equality of opportunity need not be confused with absolute equality as such. What is guaranteed is the equality of opportunity and nothing more.Art.16 (1) or (2) does not prohibit the prescription of reasonable rules for selection to any employment or appointment to any office. Any provision as to the qualifications for the employment or the appointment to office reasonably fixed and applicable to all citizens would certainly be consistent with the doctrine of the equality of opportunity; but in regard to employment, like other terms and conditions associated with and incidental to it, the promotion to a selection post is also included in the matters relating to employment, and even in regard to such a promotion to a selection post all that Art. 16 (1) guarantees is equality of opportunity to all citizens who enterthe narrow construction of Art.16 (1), even if such a discriminatory course is adopted by the State in respect of its employees that would not be violative of the equality of opportunity guaranteed by Art. 16 ( 1). Such a result could not obviously have been intended by the Constitution.In this connection it may be relevant to remember that Art. 16 (1) and (2) really give effect to the equality before law guaranteed by Art. 14 and to the prohibition of discrimination guaranteed by Art. 15 (1). The three provisions form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. If that be so, there would be no difficulty in holding that the matters relating to employment must include all matters in relation to employment both prior, and subsequent, to the employment which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of suchof the matters relating to employment in respect of which equality of opportunity has been guaranteed by Art. 16 (1) and (2) do not fall within the mischief of non-obstante clause in Art. 16 (4). For instance, it is not denied by the appellants that the conditions of service relating to employment such as salary increment, gratuity, pension and the age of super-annuation there can be no exception even in regard to the backward classes of citizens. In other words, these matters relating to employment are absolutely protected by the doctrine of equality of opportunity and they do not form the subject-matter of Art. 16 (4). That is why we have just observed that part of the ground covered by Art. 16 (1) and (2) is admittedly outside the scope of Art. 16 (4). The point in dispute is: Is promotion to a selection post which is included in Art. 16 (1) and (2) covered by Art. 16 (4) or is it not ? It is on this point that there is a sharp controversy between theour opinion, the answer to this question must be in the negative. The argument that legislative history about the use of the relevant words is decisively in favour of excluding service posts from the purview of Art. 16 (4) ignores the fact that there can be no legislative history for the provisions of Art. 16 (4) which have found a place in the Constitution for the first time. Besides, it is not correct to assume that even the legislative history shows that "posts" always and inevitably meant posts outside services though it may be conceded that in the majority of corresponding constitutional provisions they do refer to ex-serviceour opinion, it would, therefore, be unreasonable to treat the word "posts" as a term of art and to clothe it inexorably with the meaning of ex-cadre posts. It is the context in which the word "posts" is used which must determine itsthe main, if not the sole, reason given by the High Court in support of its conclusion does not appear to us to be well founded, and so Art. 16 (4) must be construed on the basis that both "appointments" and "posts" to which its operative clause refers are appointments and posts in the services under the State. Incidentally, we may repeat what we have already pointed out that the tenor of the judgment under appeal shows that if the High Court had construed the word "posts" as posts inside the services, it would not have issued the writ in favour of theany case reservation must work from the bottom and reservation cannot be permitted to allow direct appointment to selection posts as the impugned circulars seek to do. It may be conceded that reservation of appointments or posts may be made in the manner suggested by Mr. Kumaramangalam. It may also be assumed that giving retrospective effect to reservations may well cause heart-burning or dissatisfaction amongst the general class of employees and in that sense it would be an act of wisdom not to give effect to reservation retrospectively. But, with the propriety or the -wisdom of the policy underlying the circulars we are not directly concerned. Even if it be assumed that it would be open to the State to adopt the method suggested by Mr. Kumaramangalam to give effect to the power of reservation in order to make the representation of the backward classes adequate in its services does it follow that it is the only method permissible under Art. 16 (4) ? We are inclined to hold that the answer to this question cannot be in favour of the respondent. If it is conceded that selection posts can be reserved it is difficult to see how it would be open to the respondent to contend that these reserved selection posts must be filled only prospectively and not retrospectively. The concession that selection posts can be reserved on which the argument is based itself provides the answer to the argument that if the said posts can be reserved the reserved posts can be filled either prospectively or retrospectively. In adopting the latter course there can be no violation of the constitutional provision contained in Art. 16our opinion, having regard to the fact that we are construing the relevant expression reservation of appointments" in a constitutional provision it would be unreasonable to assume that the reservation of appointments would not include both the methods of reservation, namely, reservation of appointments by fixing a certain percentage in that behalf as well as reservation of certain initial posts in order to make the reservation of appointments more effective. That being so, this alternative argument which confines the word "posts" to initial posts seems to us to be entirely unreasonable. On the other hand, under the construction by which the word "posts" includes selection posts the use of the word "posts" is not superfluous but serves a very important purpose. It shows that reservation can be made not only in regard to appointments which are initial appointments but also in regard to selection posts which may fall to be filled by employees after their employment.This construction has the merit of interpreting the words "appointments" and "posts" in their broad and liberal sense and giving effect to the policy which is obviously the basis of; the provisions of Art. 16 (4). Therefore, we are disposed to take the view that the power of reservation which is conferred on the State under Art. 16 (4) can be exercised by the State in a proper case not only by providing for reservation of appointments but also by providing for reservation of selection posts. This construction, in our opinion, would serve to give effect to the intention of the Constitution-makers to make adequate safeguard for the advancement of backward classes and to secure for their adequate representation in the services. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the High Court was in error in holding that the impugned circulars do not fall within Art. 16 (4).28. It is true that in providing for the reservation of appointments or posts under Art. 16 (4) the State has to take into consideration the claims of the members of the backward classes consistently with the maintenance of the efficiency of administration. It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of administration is of such paramount importance that it would be unwise and impermissible to make any reservation at the cost of efficiency of administration. That undoubtedly is the effect of Art. 335. Reservation of appointments or posts may theoretically and conceivably mean same impairment of efficiency; but the risk involved in sacrificing efficiency of administration must always be borne in mind when any State sets about making a provision for reservation of appointments or posts. It is also true that the reservation which can be made under Art. 16 (4) is intended merely to give adequate representation to backward communities. It cannot be used for creating monopolies or for unduly or illegitimately disturbing the legitimate interests of other employees. In exercising the powers under Art. 16 (4) the problem of adequate representation of the backward class of citizens must be fairly and objectively considered and an attempt must always be made to strike a reasonable balance between the claims of backward classes and the claims of other employees as well as the important consideration of the efficiency of administration; but, in the present case, as we have already seen, the challenge to the validity of the impugned circulars is based on the assumption that the said circulars are outside Art. 16 (4) because the posts referred to in the said Article are posts outside the cadre of services and in any case, do not include selection posts. Since, in our opinion, this assumption is not well founded we must hold that the impugned circulars are not unconstitutional.-