Case: M/S Bansal Wire Industries Ltd Vs. State Of U.P

arises in cases before us due to this feature. As we have pointed out, the statement of reasons for amendment spoke of Section 14(iv) as a `"definition" of "iron and steel". A definition is expected to be exhaustive. Its very terms may, however, show that it is not meant to be exhaustive. For example, a purported definition may say that the term sought to be defined "includes" what it specifies, but, in that case, the definition itself is not complete." 30. It is thus clear, that if the object of newly substituted clause (iv) of Section 14 of the Central Act was to make iron and steel taxable as one substance, the item could have been "Goods of iron and steel" or, to be more clear, "Iron and steel irrespective of change of form or shape or character of goods made out of them". The more natural meaning, therefore is that each item specified in Section 14(iv) forms a separate species for each series of sales. When one commercial commodity is, by manufacturing process etc., transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for sales tax purposes. If iron bars were drawn into "wire", such wire shall be a different taxable commodity. 31. Parliament can restrict powers of State Government to tax "declared goods". Section 2(c) of the Central Act defines "declared goods" as those declared under Section 14 of Central Act as `goods of special importance in Inter State Trade or Commerce. Section 14 of the Central Act gives a list of such goods and Section 15 specifies restrictions on power of States to tax such goods. 32. This Court in the case of Rajasthan Roller Flour Mills Assn. vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 1994 Supp (1) SCC 413, observed as under:- "16. ...... "that is to say" assigned in Strouds Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edn.) Vol. 5 at page 2753 to the following effect:"That is to say.-- (1) `That is to say is the commencement of an ancillary clause which explains the meaning of the principal clause. It has the following properties: (1) it must not be contrary to the principal clause; (2) it must neither increase nor diminish it; (3) but where the principal clause is general in terms it may restrict it:....."17. ................."The quotation, given above, from Strouds Judicial Dictionary shows that, ordinarily, the expression, `that is to say is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined. Such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word `includes is generally employed ... but, in the context of single point sales tax, subject to special conditions when imposed on separate categories of specified goods, the expression was apparently meant to exhaustively enumerate the kinds of goods in a given list. The purpose of an enumeration in a statute dealing with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales. Otherwise, the listing itself loses all meaning and would be without any purpose behind it." 33. It is thus clear, that the language used in entry no. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the items which are mentioned there are "tools, alloy and special steel". By using the words "of any of the above categories" in entry Nos. (ix) would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to entry no (xv). However, entry (xvi) of Clause (iv) would be included in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry "tool, alloy and special steel" being not applicable to entry (xv), the contention of the counsel for the appellant has to be rejected. It is, therefore, held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of clause (iv) of Section 14 of Central Sales Tax Act.34. It is a settled principle of law that the words used in the section, rule or notification should not be rendered redundant and should be given effect to. It is also one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of any statue that some meaning must be given to the words used in the section. Expression "Wire rods and wires" which is mentioned in item no. (xv) would not and cannot cover the expression "tools, alloy and special steels" of entry no. (ix) nor it would refer to the expression "Iron and Steel" as each item used in entry nos. (ix) and (xv) are independent items not depending on each other at all as has been held in the case of Pyare Lal Mehrotra (supra).35. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, we find support from the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Hansoli Devi reported in (2002) 7 SCC 273 wherein this Court held that it is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the words used in the statute.36. Besides, in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment. In a taxing statute nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look fairly at the language used.37. Therefore, the findings and the decision arrived at by the High Court that stainless steel wire is not covered under the entry of "tools, alloys and special steels" in entry no. (ix) and, therefore, does not fall under "Iron and Steel" as defined under Section 14(iv) of the Central Act have to be upheld. Hence, the said commodity cannot be treated as a declared commodity under Section 14 of the Central Act and provision of Section 15 of the Central Act does not apply to the facts of the present appeals.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]26. In the aforesaid decision in Pyare Lal Mehrotra (supra) the very word "that is to say", as per Section 14 of the Central Act was considered and it was held that originally expression "that is to say" is employed to make clear and fix the meaning of what is to be explained or defined and that such words are not used, as a rule, to amplify a meaning while removing a possible doubt for which purpose the word "includes" is generally employed. In the context of Section 14 of the Central Act, this Court in the said decision held that the expression "that is to say" is used in Section 14 apparently to mean to exhaustively enumerate the kinds of goods in a given list. It was also held in the said decision that the purpose of an enumeration in a statute dealing with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales.Therefore, in view of the position settled by this Court, it is clearly established that so far the items as mentioned in clause (iv) of Section 14 of the Central Act is concerned, each of the categories falling under "iron and steel" constitutes a new species and each one of them is separate commodity for the purposes of sales tax.28. The expression "of any of the above categories" appearing in entry Nos. (ix) and (xvi) of clause (iv) of Section 14 of the Central Act would indicate that they would each be items referred in the preceding items. Therefore, even the expression "of any of the above categories" in entry No. (ix) of clause (iv) would only relate to steel and alloy produced for any of the materials mentioned in item nos. (i) to (viii). Thus "stainless steel wire" produced by the appellant cannot be read into item no. (xv) which reads as "wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanized, aluminized, tinned or coated such as by copper".It is thus clear, that if the object of newly substituted clause (iv) of Section 14 of the Central Act was to make iron and steel taxable as one substance, the item could have been "Goods of iron and steel" or, to be more clear, "Iron and steel irrespective of change of form or shape or character of goods made out of them". The more natural meaning, therefore is that each item specified in Section 14(iv) forms a separate species for each series of sales. When one commercial commodity is, by manufacturing process etc., transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for sales tax purposes. If iron bars were drawn into "wire", such wire shall be a different taxable commodity.It is thus clear, that the language used in entry no. (ix) is plain and unambiguous and that the items which are mentioned there are "tools, alloy and special steel". By using the words "of any of the above categories" in entry Nos. (ix) would refer to entries (i) to (viii) and it cannot and does not refer to entry no (xv). However, entry (xvi) of Clause (iv) would be included in entry (xvi) particularly within the expression now therein any of the aforesaid categories. Therefore, the specific entry "tool, alloy and special steel" being not applicable to entry (xv), the contention of the counsel for the appellant has to be rejected. It is, therefore, held that the stainless steel wire is not covered within entry (ix) of clause (iv) of Section 14 of Central Sales Tax Act.34. It is a settled principle of law that the words used in the section, rule or notification should not be rendered redundant and should be given effect to. It is also one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of any statue that some meaning must be given to the words used in the section. Expression "Wire rods and wires" which is mentioned in item no. (xv) would not and cannot cover the expression "tools, alloy and special steels" of entry no. (ix) nor it would refer to the expression "Iron and Steel" as each item used in entry nos. (ix) and (xv) are independent items not depending on each other at all as has been held in the case of Pyare Lal Mehrotra (supra).35. In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, we find support from the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Hansoli Devi reported in (2002) 7 SCC 273 wherein this Court held that it is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the words used in the statute.36. Besides, in a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said and there is no room for any intendment. In a taxing statute nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look fairly at the language used.37. Therefore, the findings and the decision arrived at by the High Court that stainless steel wire is not covered under the entry of "tools, alloys and special steels" in entry no. (ix) and, therefore, does not fall under "Iron and Steel" as defined under Section 14(iv) of the Central Act have to be upheld. Hence, the said commodity cannot be treated as a declared commodity under Section 14 of the Central Act and provision of Section 15 of the Central Act does not apply to the facts of the present appeals.