Case: NEKKANTI RAMA LAKSHMI Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

granted lands. It provided that for an application to be made by a interested person to the Assistant Commissioner for restoration of such land. 2 Section 5. Resumption and restitution of granted lands. - (1) where, on application by any interested person or on information given in writing by any person or suo moto, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section (1) of section 4, he may.- (a) by order take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession thereof in such manner as may be prescribed: Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard; (b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir, such land shall be deemed to have vested in the Government free form all encumbrances. The Government may grant such land to a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to grant of land. [(1A) After an enquiry referred to in sub-section (1) the Assistant Commissioner may, if he is satisfied that transfer of any granted land is not null and void pass an order accordingly.] (2) [Subject to the order of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 5-A, any order passed] under [sub-section (1) and (1-A) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Assistant Commissioner in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. (3) For the purposes of this section, where any granted land is in the possession of a person, other than the original grantee or his legal heir, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 4. It also provided for exercise of suo motu power. 5. Rajappa, son of Kriyappa (rr.2 herein) made an application for restoration of such land to himself by an application dated 24.03.2004, i.e. approximately after 25 years of the Act came into force. 6. As stated earlier, the Assistant Commissioner, Davanagere rejected that application. The appellate authority allowed the application and the High Court upheld the order of the appellate authority. This appeal is preferred by the Second purchaser of the said land. 7. Shri R.S. Hedge appearing for the appellant urged several grounds. It is contended by Shri Hegde that proceedings are void for non-joinder of the first purchaser of the land. It is further contended that the non alienation period, i.e., period for which Kriyappa could not have transferred the land was not 15 years but was 10 years under the Rules of the land and, therefore, transfer was legal having been made after 10 years. However, the applicant had not produced the original grant, and, therefore, it was not possible for the purpose to come to a conclusion that the transfer was in breach of the non alienation period. We, however, find that one of the points raised on behalf of the appellant deserves acceptance. That point is that the application for restoration of the land was made by the heir of Kriyappa after unreasonably long period, i.e. 25 years from the Act came into force. Section 4 of the Act itself has a ubiquitous effect in it, annulling the transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of the Act. as null and void. The Act does not specify how much before the commencement of the Act. Thus on a plain and critical reading of the Act, it seems that it covers proceedings made in time before the Act was enacted. However, we are not called upon to deal with the reasonableness of this provision and we do not propose to say anything on this. The validity of the Act has been upheld by a judgment of this Court in Machegowda and Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 1984(3) SCC 301. 8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We, however, find that one of the points raised on behalf of the appellant deserves acceptance. That point is that the application for restoration of the land was made by the heir of Kriyappa after unreasonably long period, i.e. 25 years from the Act came into force. Section 4 of the Act itself has a ubiquitous effect in it, annulling the transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of the Act. as null and void. The Act does not specify how much before the commencement of the Act. Thus on a plain and critical reading of the Act, it seems that it covers proceedings made in time before the Act was enacted. However, we are not called upon to deal with the reasonableness of this provision and we do not propose to say anything on this. The validity of the Act has been upheld by a judgment of this Court in Machegowda and Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., 1984(3) SCC 301.This Section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. v. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. & Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also in the case of Ningappa v. Dy. Commissioner & Ors. (C.A. No. 3131 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2011) reiterated a settled position in law that whether Statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the Statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1st January, 1939 to 31st December, 1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in the Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background that this Court upheld that it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent-Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground.