Case: ALL INDIA COUNCIL FOR TECH. EDUCATION REP BY ITS MEMBER SECRETARY Vs. SHRI PRINCE SHIVAJI MARATHA BOARDING HOUSES COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE THROUGH ITS INCHARGE PRINCIPAL S

1987 Act. That would render the 1972 enactment unworkable. 59. The third distinguishing element of the 1972 Act is that the CoA is not the ultimate decision-making authority but it is the Central Government in relation to process of recognition of degree or diploma in architectural education or withdrawal thereof. Such decision is required to be taken after consultation with the CoA. But since CoA has been conferred with power to make regulations in relation to, inter-alia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions imparting architectural education, CoA?s role in such process is critical. The approval power of AICTE is direct. But in the event AICTE?s norms come into conflict with that of CoA, any report or representation the CoA may make to the Central Government would be dependent upon the decision of the Central Government. The Central Government?s decision, taken under the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a case would obviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to both the Councils constituted under the two statutes. 60. AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions imparting architectural education on the strength of definition of technical education, which has been defined to mean programmes of education, research and training in architecture. The duty of the AICTE to regulate ?technical education? is derived from the provisions of Section 10 of the 1987 Act. It has been contended on behalf of the CoA, referring to the provisions of Section 2 of the 1987 Act, that the context of regulating architecture education requires exclusion of the expression ?architecture? from the definition of technical education. In the case of Pushpa Devi and others (supra), it has been held that it is permissible for the Court to refer to ?internal and external context? while giving meaning to a definition contained in the interpretation clause of a statue. In this decision, it was observed that a word exhaustively expressed in the definition can have different meanings in different parts of a statute. Broadly, the same principle of construction has been adopted in the cases of Printers (Mysore) Ltd. and Another (supra) and Whirlpool Corporation (supra). In the case of K.V. Muthu (supra), it has been held:-"12. Where the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words ?unless the context otherwise requires,? the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.?61. So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether exclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e. architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of technical education. In our opinion, if the issue is examined in the external context, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a course would be inevitable. In the event AICTE?s stand is to be accepted and CoA?s role is eliminated from the recognition process of architectural qualification, then a person having a degree or diploma from an AICTE approved institution only would in effect not be entitled to enrollment in the register of architects and would not be able to represent himself as an architect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in the cases of Bharatidasan University (supra) and Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra), there would be two parallel authorities regulating architectural education. CoA would regulate universities and affiliated colleges imparting such education while AICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover, the authority of Central Government to recognize qualifications in architecture education would stand obliterated by a body, AICTE and that too in respect of certain categories of technical institutions only. 62. The authorities we have referred to are for the proposition that a meaning different to what is ascribed in the definition clause can be given to a word in different parts of a statute if the context so demands. The subject-dispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the word architecture from the definition of technical education. Such a course, in our opinion, is also a permissible tool of construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing from a statute. Here we reproduce the following passage from ?Bennion on Statutory Interpretation? by F A R Bennion, Fifth Edition published by Lexis Nexis (at page 972).? Strained construction We have the authority of Lord Reid for the statement that, to avoid an unworkable result, a strained construction may be justified even where the enactment is not grammatically ambiguous. Lord Reid said that cases where it has properly been held that one word can be struck out of a statute and another substituted include the case where without such substitution the provision would be unworkable.?63. We are of the opinion that in respect of the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987 Act, the definition of ?technical education? would have to be given such a construction and the word ?architecture? should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technical education. There would however be no substitution because the context would not demand it. This construction of the definition clause is necessary as the external context requires it to prevent an unworkable outcome in implementation of the 1987 Act. The principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far as the provisions relating to architecture education is concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become operational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is recognition of qualifications on architecture. The registration of an architect is dependent upon acquisition of such recognised qualification. The said Act cannot be held to have been repealed by implication for the sole reason of inclusion of the word ?architecture? in the definition of technical education. AICTE has failed to discharge its onus to establish the said provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]25. We find that both the statutes have provisions for approval and monitoring of architecture courses run by institutions. So far as the 1972 Act is concerned, the expression employed is recognition of qualification and the ultimate authority for granting or withdrawing recognition to degree or diploma courses in architectural education by different academic institutions is the Central Government. The CoA under the statutory scheme however has significant role in such decision making process. AICTE has also been empowered under the 1987 Act to lay down standards and norms for courses on architecture along with other subjects coming within the term ?technical education?. We have extracted relevant parts of Section 10 of the 1987 Act earlier in this judgment. Both the Councils also appear to have had proceeded with this understanding. In the decision of the Bombay High Court delivered in the case of Shri Prince Shivaji Maratha Boarding House?s Council of Architecture , (supra), it is recorded in the judgment under appeal that joint inspection was held in respect of the institution involved in that proceeding by AICTE and CoA. Moreover, under Section 3(3)(b), of the 1972 Act, the CoA is required to have two persons nominated by the AICTE. On the other hand, Section 3 (4) (m) of the 1987 Act stipulates that AICTE is to consist of representatives of various bodies, including a member to be appointed by the Central Government to represent the CoA. Section 10(k) of the 1987 Act requires AICTE to grant approval in consultation with the agencies concerned.From the nature of the dispute giving rise to these seven appeals, it is apparent that the shortcomings pointed out by the two regulatory bodies relate primarily to infrastructural facilities of the respective institutions. The power of the CoA to examine such infrastructural facilities at the time of considering the application for recognition or monitoring the quality of an institution recognized by the Council stems from Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 of the 1972 Act.So far as the two Regulations of 1994 under the 1987 Act produced before us on behalf of AICTE, the Regulations dated 20 th May, 1994 contemplates fixing approval norms and intake capacity to professional colleges. Clause 2 of this Regulation however exempts universities, university departments or colleges, government colleges, aided colleges and certain other institutions from its application. The next one has been made applicable to all new technical institutions including universities and subsisting technical institutions and lays down a detailed approval process through multi-tier decision making structure. The AICTE appears to have made subsequent Regulations time to time superseding the earlier ones in respect of the approval process, but barring the Regulations made in 2016, no other regulations has been produced before us. None of the Regulations produced before us however specify the actual norms but refer to standards and norms to be laid down for approval of technical institutions, which include institutions imparting architectural education.Similar provision is there under Section 43 of the 1972 Act. But no case has been made out that the memorandum to which reference has been made, has been published in the official gazette. This memorandum does not meet the requirement of valid exercise of power under the aforesaid two provisions by the Central Government so as to make it binding. This memorandum, at best, can be treated to be an advisory of the Ministry not having enforceable effect. Moreover, the aforesaid memorandum has been issued beyond the timeframe laid down under the provisions of the statutes reproduced in the said two sections of the respective Acts. The memorandum also cannot be treated to be an executive order under Article 77 of the Constitution of India.Learned counsel appearing for different institutions in this set of appeals have broadly supported the arguments advanced on behalf of CoA. Learned counsel for the Muslim Educational Association [the appellant in SLP(C) No.28121 of 2018] has assailed the decision of the Calicut University refusing to give affiliation to the said institution. Reference has been made to regulation 15(3) of the Minimum Standards of Architectural Education Regulation, 2015, which gives 3 years to provide the building for different infrastructural facilities for a college coming within the ambit of the said Act. In fact, it has been argued on behalf of the said institution that the University could not demand AICTE approval and within the State of Kerala, there were many institutions imparting architectural education solely on the basis of recognition granted under the 1972 Act.In the case of Bharathidasan University (supra), this Court found that in the 1987 Act, there is a distinction made by the legislature between a technical institution per se and certain other kinds of institutions over which some other kind of monitoring or supervision is there by properly constituted universities. That would be apparent from the definition of technical institution under the 1987 Act. Sections 10 (k) and (m) of the 1987 Act also specifically deal with technical institution. Thus the 1987 Act recognises the distinguishing feature of a technical institution not being a university. The Council constituted under it has supervisory and monitoring power over technical institutions not being a university imparting courses in technical education. This was one of the main reasoning as to why it was found by this Court in the case of Bharathidasan University (supra) that the said university would remain out of the regulatory ambit of the AICTE. Broadly the same logic was followed in the other authority, Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra). The case of Adhiyaman Educational and Research Institute and Others (supra), was distinguished in this decision and the relevant paragraphs in that regard have been referred to earlier in this judgment. None of the authorities cited on behalf of the AICTE, however, deals with a situation where there is a pre-existing Central legislation dealing with overlapping power on the same subject coming within the definition of ?technical education?.CoA in these appeals wants to establish its pre- dominance on the ground that the 1972 Act is a special Act and AICTE?s stand on the other hand is that the 1987 Act having come to the statue book on a later date, the provisions thereof ought to prevail when the same are in conflict with an earlier statute. As a proposition of law, we accept AICTE?s stand that there need not be complete identity in the subject-matters of the two rival statutes being tested in the yardstick of point of time of their commencement of operation. Again, as a proposition of law, the principle of law canvassed by the rival bodies are accepted tools of construction. But they require application having regard to the specific circumstances of a given case. It is not an absolute proposition of law that a later Act would always prevail over the former in the event there are clashing provisions even if there is no express provision ofspecial law implies a statute covering a particular subject specifically. The subject of conflict in the present proceedings is architectural education. The 1972 Act however does not solely deal with architectural education. The Act intends to control or regulate the profession of architects. It has two main features, one part dealing with regulating the profession of architect and the other part regulating architectural education. Significant portion of the statute deals with formation of the CoA but the function of that body is essentially to regulate and monitor the other two areas of this statue.Under both the statutes there are overlapping areas under which the respective Councils could make Regulations. Though these Acts, by themselves, do not come into direct conflict the inconsistencies have surfaced in implementing the power given to the Councils constituted under the respective enactments. AICTE contends that the later statute ought to prevail and as a corollary the regulations framed under the later statute should prevail. CoA wants its power to eclipse AICTE?s dominant role as a regulator in relation to architectural education on the strength of the 1972 Act being a special Act. The three regulations under the 1987 Act which have been brought to our notice do not directly lay down any specific norm or standard which ought to be followed. Such norms appear to have been set by the AICTE in pursuance of the aforesaid regulations. The two Regulations of 1994 do not lay down specifically such norms. The 2016 regulations has provision for Approval Process Hand Book which may be published from time to time laying down the manner in which approval shall be given.The case of Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Limited (supra) also gives primacy to the AICTE on the question of necessity for an engineering college to obtain approval from the AICTE. In this case, question arose on the point as to whether engineering degree courses operated by colleges could be conducted by open universities through distance learning mode in absence of approval by the AICTE. This case and the case of Parshvnath Charitable Trust and Others (supra) have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. These authorities cited on behalf of the AICTE however do not deal with conflict arising from two Regulations framed under two Central statutes, both conferring regulatory powers over a particular subject in the field of technical education on two different statutory bodies. The ratio of the decision in the case of Bharathidasan University (supra), expanded by the two Judge Bench judgment in the case of Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra) have been cited in support of CoA?s contention that the 1972 Act should be treated as a special statute and Regulations framed thereunder should override those framed under the 1987 Act.For the sole reason of there being overlapping subjects, Courts straightaway may not get into an exercise to find out if one statute intends to eclipse the other. But in the present set of appeals, intention of the legislature to override one by the other can be examined by analyzing the provisions of the two statutes. The duty of the regulatory bodies in a situation of this nature would be to come out with a unified regime, which this Court expected in the case of Municipal Council, Palia (supra). The two regulatory bodies in the field of architectural education however have not taken this approach and on the other hand have engaged themselves in a dispute over turf-control. In such a situation, under normal circumstances attempt should be made first at reconciliation of the competing statutory instruments. If that exercise fails, then the aim would be to find out what is the dominant purpose or principal subject-matter of a particular statute and then construe the conflicting provisions of the respective Regulations to match the dominant statutory purpose.Having regard to the disputes involved in each of these appeals, proper course for us would be to find out the decision of which of these two regulatory bodies ought to prevail. For this purpose, it is necessary to ascertain the dominant purpose of the two legislations covering the field of architectural education. Section 10 of the 1987 Act mandates the AICTE to undertake the duties on the subjects specified therein. But it has already been held by two Benches of this Court comprising of two Judges each in the cases of Bharathidasan University (supra) and Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra) that a university or its affiliate colleges could run courses in technical education without approval of the AICTE.The process of recognition and effect thereof are more expansive under the 1972 Act. All ?authorities? require recognition by the Central Government to conduct any degree or diploma course in architecture education to qualify for being recognised qualification. The CoA under the said Act plays a key role in the process of recognition. There is no exclusion or exemption of any institution from undergoing such recognition process except the subsisting ones at the time the Act became operational. The CoA has also wide monitoring power under Section 18 and 19 of the Act of every authority which grants recognized qualification under the said Act.Moreover, Section 17 of the said Act is armed with a non-obstante clause. The implication of the said clause in Section 17 of the 1972 Act is that to be on the register of architects in India, recognized qualification would be sufficient. There is no provision under the 1972 Act or in any Rule thereunder which would entitle a person trained from an AICTE approved technical institution in architecture to describe himself as an architect or get himself registered as such without recognised qualification under the 1972(2) of the said provision is not of much relevance for adjudication of the subject dispute. The scheme of the Act thus demonstrates that lack of recognized qualification under the 1972 Act would in substance disentitle a person from being registered as an architect. He would not be able to legally represent himself as an architect in India. This being the statutory mandate, CoA?s role in the process of recognition of qualification of an architect cannot be said to have been obliterated by the 1987 Act. It is a fact that 1987 Act is primarily concerned with setting-up and running of a technical institution and not with regulating the professions of individuals qualifying from such institutions. But under the 1972 Act, conducting a course on architectural education and regulating the profession of architect are statutorily interwoven. Recognition of degrees or diplomas in architecture cannot be amputated from the said Act and held to have been replaced by the 1987 Act. That would render the 1972 enactment unworkable.The third distinguishing element of the 1972 Act is that the CoA is not the ultimate decision-making authority but it is the Central Government in relation to process of recognition of degree or diploma in architectural education or withdrawal thereof. Such decision is required to be taken after consultation with the CoA. But since CoA has been conferred with power to make regulations in relation to, inter-alia, recognition norms and monitoring of institutions imparting architectural education, CoA?s role in such process is critical. The approval power of AICTE is direct. But in the event AICTE?s norms come into conflict with that of CoA, any report or representation the CoA may make to the Central Government would be dependent upon the decision of the Central Government. The Central Government?s decision, taken under the provisions of the 1972 Act in such a case would obviously prevail, the latter being an authority superior to both the Councils constituted under the two statutes.AICTE is exercising its power to regulate institutions imparting architectural education on the strength of definition of technical education, which has been defined to mean programmes of education, research and training in architecture. The duty of the AICTE to regulate ?technical education? is derived from the provisions of Section 10 of the 1987 Act. It has been contended on behalf of the CoA, referring to the provisions of Section 2 of the 1987 Act, that the context of regulating architecture education requires exclusion of the expression ?architecture? from the definition of technical education. In the case of Pushpa Devi and others (supra), it has been held that it is permissible for the Court to refer to ?internal and external context? while giving meaning to a definition contained in the interpretation clause of a statue. In this decision, it was observed that a word exhaustively expressed in the definition can have different meanings in different parts of a statute. Broadly, the same principle of construction has been adopted in the cases of Printers (Mysore) Ltd. and Another (supra) and Whirlpool Corporation (supra). In the case of K.V. Muthu (supra), it has beenWhere the definition or expression, as in the instant case, is preceded by the words ?unless the context otherwise requires,? the said definition set out in the section is to be applied and given effect to but this rule, which is the normal rule may be departed from if there be something in the context to show that the definition could not be applied.So far as these appeals are concerned, to altogether exclude architecture from the purview of AICTE, that expression, i.e. architecture would have to be dropped from the definition of technical education. In our opinion, if the issue is examined in the external context, which in this case would be the provisions of 1972 Act, such a course would be inevitable. In the event AICTE?s stand is to be accepted and CoA?s role is eliminated from the recognition process of architectural qualification, then a person having a degree or diploma from an AICTE approved institution only would in effect not be entitled to enrollment in the register of architects and would not be able to represent himself as an architect. Secondly, in view of the decisions of this Court in the cases of Bharatidasan University (supra) and Association of Management of Private Colleges (supra), there would be two parallel authorities regulating architectural education. CoA would regulate universities and affiliated colleges imparting such education while AICTE would supervise rest of the institutions. Moreover, the authority of Central Government to recognize qualifications in architecture education would stand obliterated by a body, AICTE and that too in respect of certain categories of technical institutions only.The authorities we have referred to are for the proposition that a meaning different to what is ascribed in the definition clause can be given to a word in different parts of a statute if the context so demands. The subject-dispute involved in these appeals requires omission of the word architecture from the definition of technical education. Such a course, in our opinion, is also a permissible tool of construction to prevent absurd or unworkable results flowing from a statute. Here we reproduce the following passage from ?Bennion on Statutory Interpretation? by F A R Bennion, Fifth Edition published by Lexis Nexis (at pageStrained construction We have the authority of Lord Reid for the statement that, to avoid an unworkable result, a strained construction may be justified even where the enactment is not grammatically ambiguous. Lord Reid said that cases where it has properly been held that one word can be struck out of a statute and another substituted include the case where without such substitution the provision would be unworkable.We are of the opinion that in respect of the provisions of Section 2 (g) of the 1987 Act, the definition of ?technical education? would have to be given such a construction and the word ?architecture? should be treated to have been inapplicable in cases where the AICTE imports its regulatory framework for institutions undertaking technical education. There would however be no substitution because the context would not demand it. This construction of the definition clause is necessary as the external context requires it to prevent an unworkable outcome in implementation of the 1987 Act. The principle of implied repeal cannot apply so far as the provisions relating to architecture education is concerned, on the basis of the 1987 Act having become operational. One of the dominant purposes of the 1972 Act is recognition of qualifications on architecture. The registration of an architect is dependent upon acquisition of such recognised qualification. The said Act cannot be held to have been repealed by implication for the sole reason of inclusion of the word ?architecture? in the definition of technical education. AICTE has failed to discharge its onus to establish the said provisions of the 1972 Act was repealed by implication.