Case: K.Venkataramiah Vs. A. Seetharama Reddy &amp; Ors

these documents. We also directed the Tribunal to record the evidence adduced in proof of these two registers and submit the same to the High Court for consideration in the above appeal. The Tribunal accordingly recalled R.W. 8, the Head Master, Government Muslim High School, Kurnool, and also examined R.W. 10, the Head Master of the same school for the years 1936 to 1945. The Register of Admissions and Withdrawals relating to the School from 7-7-1919 to 15-1-1938 is marked as exhibit R-19 and the register from 30-6-1926 to 14-2-1949 is marked as Exhibit R-20. The entries in the two register relating to the 1st respondent are Exhibits R-21 and R- 24. 16. In view of what the High Court has stated in this passage it is not possible to say that the High Court made the order for admission of additional evidence without applying its mind. It seems clear that High Court thought, on a consideration of the evidence, in the light of the arguments that had been addressed already before it that it would assist them to arrive at the truth on the question of Seetharam Reddys age if the entries in the admission registers of the school were made available. It was vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was such a volume of evidence before the High Court that it could not be seriously suggested that the Court required any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. The requirement, it has to be remembered, was the requirement of the High Court, and it will not be right for us to examine the evidence to find out whether we would have required such additional evidence to enable us to pronounce judgment. Apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under R. 27 (1) (b) of the Code. 17. It is easy to see that such requirement of the Court to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause is not likely to arise ordinarily unless some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent on an examination of the evidence. That is why in Parsotim Thakur v. Lal Mohar Thakur, 53 Ind App 254 : (AIR 1931 PC 143 ) the Privy Council while discussing whether additional evidence can be admitted observed : It may be required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, but in either case it must be the Court that requires it. This is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but when on examine the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent. 18. As the Privy Council proceeded to point out : It may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move the Court to supply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the Court upon its appreciation of the evidence as it stands. 19. We are satisfied that in the present case the High Court allowed additional evidence to be admitted as it required such evidence either to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause within the meaning of R. 27 (1) (b) of O. 41 of the Code. The contention that the decision of the High Court on the question of the respondents age was vitiated by reason of it being based on inadmissible evidence, must therefore fail. 20. Another difficulty in the appellants way may also be mentioned. As has been said above the appellant did file before the High Court a petition objecting to the reception of additional evidence. We find it stated however in the High Court a petition objecting to the reception of additional evidence. We find it stated however in the High Courts order refusing the application for a certificate under Art. 133(1) (c) of the Constitution that no. objection that the requirements of O. 41 R. 21, C. P. C. were not satisfied was raised either at the time when the court directed the Tribunal to record the statements or at the time when the court directed the Tribunal to record the statements or at the time of the hearing of the appeal. This order was passed by the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Chandrasekhara Sastry who had made the order allowing admission of additional evidence and also heard the appeal. We are bound to bold therefore that though the appellant did make an application objecting to the admission of additional evidence he did not press that application. 21. On the principle laid down in Jagarnath Pershad v. Hanuman Pershad 36 Ind App 221 (PC) that when additional evidence was taken with the assent of both sides or without objection at the time it was taken, it is not open to a party to complain of it later on, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that the additional evidence was taken in this case in breach of the provisions of law. 22. There is nothing therefore that would justify us in interfering with the findings of facts on which the High Court based its decision.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. The High Court also came to the same conclusion on this issue as regards Seetharam Reddys age. In coming to this conclusion it has relied not only on the vakalatnama Ex. R-3 mentioned above but also on four other documents. viz, Exs. R-5 and R-6, which the Tribunal rejected as unreliable and Exs. R-19 and R-20 which were not tendered in evidence before the Tribunal but came before the High Court is additional evidence. The appellant contends that the High Court acted without jurisdiction in admitting additional evidence9. We are clearly of opinion that even if it was found that the High Court erred in taking the additional evidence that would not be a case of lack of jurisdiction but would be an error in the exercise of jurisdictionWe are aware of no. case in which the correctness of this view has been doubted. It is worth noticing that when the 1908 Code was framed and O. 41 R. 27 took the place of the old S. 568, the legislature was content to leave the provision as it was and did not think it necessary to say anything to make the requirement of recording reasons imperative. It is true that the word shall is used in R. 27(2), but that by itself does not make it mandatory. We are therefore of opinion that the omission of the High Court to record reasons for allowing additional evidence does not vitiate such admission16. In view of what the High Court has stated in this passage it is not possible to say that the High Court made the order for admission of additional evidence without applying its mind. It seems clear that High Court thought, on a consideration of the evidence, in the light of the arguments that had been addressed already before it that it would assist them to arrive at the truth on the question of Seetharam Reddys age if the entries in the admission registers of the school were made available. It was vehemently urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that there was such a volume of evidence before the High Court that it could not be seriously suggested that the Court required any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. The requirement, it has to be remembered, was the requirement of the High Court, and it will not be right for us to examine the evidence to find out whether we would have required such additional evidence to enable us to pronounce judgment. Apart from this, it is well to remember that the appellate court has the power to allow additional evidence not only if it requires such evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment but also for any other substantial cause. There may well be cases where even though the court finds that it is able to pronounce judgment on the state of the record as it is, and so, it cannot strictly say that it requires additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment, it still considers that in the interest of justice something which remains obscure should be filled up so that it can pronounce its judgment in a more satisfactory manner. Such a case will be one for allowing additional evidence for any other substantial cause under R. 27 (1) (b) of the Code19. We are satisfied that in the present case the High Court allowed additional evidence to be admitted as it required such evidence either to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause within the meaning of R. 27 (1) (b) of O. 41 of the Code. The contention that the decision of the High Court on the question of the respondents age was vitiated by reason of it being based on inadmissible evidence, must therefore fail21. On the principle laid down in Jagarnath Pershad v. Hanuman Pershad 36 Ind App 221 (PC) that when additional evidence was taken with the assent of both sides or without objection at the time it was taken, it is not open to a party to complain of it later on, the appellant cannot now be heard to say that the additional evidence was taken in this case in breach of the provisions of law22. There is nothing therefore that would justify us in interfering with the findings of facts on which the High Court based its decision.