Case: N. S. Gujral Vs. Custodian Of Evacuee Property &amp; Anr

a notification under Section 12 of the 1954-Act did not in any way affect the appellants right to acquire hold and dispose of his property. In the circumstances, the appellant cannot claim protection under Article 19 (1) (f) at all with respect to the property in suit and it is not necessary to consider whether S. 12 could be saved under Article 19 (5).We therefore agree with the High Court that the appellant cannot claim that Section 12 is ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) and therefore the notification made thereunder affects his fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.10. Further the argument that Sec. 12 is bad under Article 14 has also no force. The contention under this head is that the creditors who have decrees against non-evacuees can execute their decrees against the properties of non-evacuees, but the creditors having decrees against evacuees cannot execute them against their properties after they had vested in the Central Government by a notification under Section 12 of the 1954-Act; and this amounts to discrimination under Article 14. But it is well settled that the Constitution does not contemplate equality of all laws or application of all laws equally to every person. There is a clear classification between evacuee property and non-evacuee property. There is a clear nexus between the object to be achieved by the enactment of the 1954-Act namely, rehabilitation of evacuees from Pakistan and the provision in Section 12 by which the property of evacuees in India is to be utilised for such rehabilitation. There is therefore no infringement of Article 14 in the circumstances.11. Lastly it is urged on behalf of the appellant on the buds of the decision of this Court in Raja Bhanupratap Singh, (1966) 1 SCR 304 = (AIR 1966 SC 245 ) that the appellant was entitled to ask the Custodian to consider his case under Section 10 (2) (n) read with Section 10 (1) of the 1950 Act, and for that purpose it is necessary to decide the main question raised in the suit, namely, that the releasedeeds of 1947 in favour of the wives were of no effect and therefore the property, though evcauee property, was the property of the judgment-debtors of the appellant namely, Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt. It is also pointed out that the notification of June, 3, 1955 was only with respect to immovable property and there was nothing to show that the Central Government had issued a notification under Section 14 (1) (b) of the l594-Act relating to cash balance, if any, lying with the Custodian on the date the property was acquired.12. It is urged that all that the notification of June 3, 1955 means is that as from that date no action could be taken against the property in suit or its income. But if there was any money with the Custodian on the date of vesting and if no order had been passed in respect thereof under Section 14 (1) (b), the appellant would be entitled to ask the Custodian to consider whether he should be paid anything out of the moneys lying with the Custodian provided he could establish that the property was the property of his judgment-debtors, namely, Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt and not of their wives. The declaration that the appellant sought was wide in terms inasmuch as he claimed that he was entitled to have his claim adjusted against the proceeds of the said building and these proceeds will include any income of a period before the date of vesting under the notification under Section 12. It is urged that as such it is necessary to decide the issue whether the release deeds of April 1947 were fictitious and fraudulent intended to defeat and delay the creditors and therefore the property belonged to Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt. If that is held in his favour by the civil courts he would be entitled to go to the Custodian and ask him to pass an order in his favour under Section 10 (2) (n) read with Section 10 (1) and pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date the property vested in the Central Government under the notification under Section 12.13. We are of opinion that there is force in this contention. Though the appellant cannot claim to proceed against the property in suit or its income after the date on which it vested in the Central Government by virtue of the notification under Section 12, he can ask the Custodian to pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date of such vesting if he can satisfy him in the manner provided in Section 10 (2) (n) read with Sec. 10 (1) of the 1950-Act.We therefore direct that when the case goes back to the trial court as ordered by the High Court, the trial court will decide the issue whether the deeds of release of April 1947 are fictitious and fraudulent intended to defeat and delay the creditors and not binding on the appellant If the trial Court decides in favour of the appellant it will then be open to him to approach the Custodian under Section 10 (2) (n) read with Section 10 (1) for such orders as the Custodian thinks fit to pass with respect to moneys, if any, lying with him on the date of vesting. It may be mentioned that learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this property in fact vested in the Central Government by some notification in 1968 and not by the notification dated June 3, 1955, as mentioned in the plaint. On the other side it has been submitted that some orders have been passed by the Central Government under section 14 (1) (b). These are matters which may require to be gone into by the trial court and for that purpose it may be necessary to amend the plaint and the written statement, and this we permit.14.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]At no time did the appellant have any right whatsoever in the property which vested in the Central Government on the issue of the notification under Sec. 12 It may be that if the owners had not become evacuees and if the property had not been declared evacuee property the appellant might have proceeded against that property in execution of his decree. It may also be that he cannot do so now after the said notification under Section 12. But section 12 does not in our opinion interfere with the appellants right to acquire, hold and dispose of his property, namely, the decrees against Mohd. Sabar and Noor Mohd. Butt. As the appellant had no interest in the property in suit, the fact that it was acquired by the Central Government by a notification under Section 12 of the 1954-Act did not in any way affect the appellants right to acquire hold and dispose of his property. In the circumstances, the appellant cannot claim protection under Article 19 (1) (f) at all with respect to the property in suit and it is not necessary to consider whether S. 12 could be saved under Article 19 (5).We therefore agree with the High Court that the appellant cannot claim that Section 12 is ultra vires Article 19 (1) (f) and therefore the notification made thereunder affects his fundamental right to acquire, hold and dispose of property.r the argument that Sec. 12 is bad under Article14 has also no force. The contention under this head is that the creditors who have decrees against non-evacuees can execute their decrees against the properties of non-evacuees, but the creditors having decrees against evacuees cannot execute them against their properties after they had vested in the Central Government by a notification under Section 12 of the 1954-Act; and this amounts to discrimination under Article 14. But it is well settled that the Constitution does not contemplate equality of all laws or application of all laws equally to every person. There is a clear classification between evacuee property and non-evacuee property. There is a clear nexus between the object to be achieved by the enactment of the 1954-Act namely, rehabilitation of evacuees from Pakistan and the provision in Section 12 by which the property of evacuees in India is to be utilised for such rehabilitation. There is therefore no infringement of Article 14 in the circumstances.11.We are of opinion that there is force in this contention. Though the appellant cannot claim to proceed against the property in suit or its income after the date on which it vested in the Central Government by virtue of the notification under Section 12, he can ask the Custodian to pay him out of the moneys lying with him on the date of such vesting if he can satisfy him in the manner provided in Section 10 (2) (n) read with Sec. 10 (1) of the 1950-Act.We therefore direct that when the case goes back to the trial court as ordered by the High Court, the trial court will decide the issue whether the deeds of release of April 1947 are fictitious and fraudulent intended to defeat and delay the creditors and not binding on the appellant If the trial Court decides in favour of the appellant it will then be open to him to approach the Custodian under Section 10 (2) (n) read with Section 10 (1) for such orders as the Custodian thinks fit to pass with respect to moneys, if any, lying with him on the date of vesting. It may be mentioned that learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this property in fact vested in the Central Government by some notification in 1968 and not by the notification dated June 3, 1955, as mentioned in the plaint. On the other side it has been submitted that some orders have been passed by the Central Government under section 14 (1) (b). These are matters which may require to be gone into by the trial court and for that purpose it may be necessary to amend the plaint and the written statement, and this we permit.