Case: Western India Theatres Ltd Vs. Cantonment Board, Poona, Cantonment

the impugned tax is not covered by this entry at all. This entry, according to him, contemplates a law imposing taxes on persons who receive or enjoy the luxuries or the entertainments or the amusements and, therefore, no law made with respect to matters covered by this entry can impose a tax on persons who provide the luxuries. entertainments or amusements, for the last mentioned persons themselves receive or enjoy no luxury or entertainment or amusement, but simply carry on their profession, trade or calling. Learned counsel urges that the impugned law is really one with respect to matters specified in entry 46, namely, taxes on professions, trades, callings and employments and, therefore, cannot exceed Rs 100 per annum under S. 142A of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Rs. 250 per annum under Art. 276(2) of the Constitution. We are unable to accept this argument as sound.7. As pointed out by this Court in Navinchandra Mafatlal v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City, 1955 SCR 829: ((S) AIR 1955 SC 58 ), following certain earlier decisions referred to therein, the entries in the legislative list should not be read in a narrow or restricted sense and that each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it. It has been accepted as well settled that in construing such an entry conferring legislative powers the widest possible construction according to their ordinary meaning trust be put upon the words used therein. In view of this well established rule of interpretation, there can be no reason to construe the words "taxes on luxuries or entertainments or amusements" in entry 50 as having a restricted meaning so as to confine the operation of the law to be made thereunder only to taxes on persons receiving the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements.The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and amusements as objects on which the tax is to be imposed. If the words are to be so regarded, as we think they must, there can be no reason to differentiate between the giver and the receiver of the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements and both may, with equal propriety, be made amenable to the tax.It is true that economists regard an entertainment tax as a tax on expenditure and, indeed, when the tax is imposed on the receiver of the entertainment, it does become a tax on expenditure, but there is no warrant for holding that entry 50 contemplates only a tax on moneys spent on luxuries, entertainments or amusements. The entry, as we have said, contemplates a law with respect to these matters regarded as objects and a law which imposes tax on the act of entertaining is within the entry whether it falls on the giver or the receiver of that entertainment.Nor is the impugned tax a tax imposed for the privilege of carrying on any trade or calling. It is a tax imposed on every show, that is to say, on every instance of the exercise of the particular trade, calling or employment. If there is no show, there is no tax.A lawyer has to pay a tax or fee to take out a license irrespective of whether or not he actually, practises. That tax is a tax for the privilege of having the right to exercise the profession if and when the person taking out the license chooses to do so.The impugned tax is a tax on the act of entertainment resulting in a show. In our opinion therefore, S. 73 is a law with respect to matters enumerated in entry 50 and not entry 46 and the Bombay legislature had ample power to enact this law.8. The only other point urged before us is that the notification is violative of the equal protection clause of our Constitution in that it has ticked out the appellants cinema houses or discriminatory treatment by imposing on it a tax at the rate of Rs. 10 per show, while a tax of only Rs. 5 per show is imposed on other cinema houses. The meaning, scope, and effect of the provisions of Art. 14 of our Constitution have been fully dealt with, analysed and laid down by this Court in Budhan Choudhury v. State of Bihar, 1955 SCR 1045: ((S)AIR 1955 SC 191 ) and Rama Krishna Dalmia v. S. R. Tendolkar, Civil Appeals Nos. 455-457 of 1957: (AIR 1958 SC 538 ). It appears, however, from the record that no issue was raised and no evidence was adduced by the appellant before the trial court showing that them were other cinema Houses similarly situate as trial of the appellants cinema Houses.It may not be unreasonable or improper if a higher tax is imposed on the shows given by a cinema house which contains large seating accommodation and is situate in fashionable or busy localities where the number of visitors is more numerous and in more affluent circumstances than the tax that may be imposed on shows given in a smaller cinema house containing less accommodation and situate in some localities where the visitors are less numerous or financially in less affluent circumstances, for the two cannot, in those circumstances, be said to be similarly situate.There was, however, no material on which the trial court could or we may now come to a decision as to whether there had been any real discrimination in the facts and circumstances of this case. It may be that the appellant may in some future proceeding adduce evidence to establish that there are other cinema houses similarly situate and that the imposition of a higher tax on the appellant is discriminatory as to which we say nothing; but all we need say is that in this suit the appellant has not discharged the onus that was on him and, on the material on record, it is impossible for us to hold in this case that there has been any discrimination in fact.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are unable to accept this argument asappears, however, from the record that no issue was raised and no evidence was adduced by the appellant before the trial court showing that them were other cinema Houses similarly situate as trial of the appellants cinema Houses.It may not be unreasonable or improper if a higher tax is imposed on the shows given by a cinema house which contains large seating accommodation and is situate in fashionable or busy localities where the number of visitors is more numerous and in more affluent circumstances than the tax that may be imposed on shows given in a smaller cinema house containing less accommodation and situate in some localities where the visitors are less numerous or financially in less affluent circumstances, for the two cannot, in those circumstances, be said to be similarly situate.There was, however, no material on which the trial court could or we may now come to a decision as to whether there had been any real discrimination in the facts and circumstances of this case. It may be that the appellant may in some future proceeding adduce evidence to establish that there are other cinema houses similarly situate and that the imposition of a higher tax on the appellant is discriminatory as to which we say nothing; but all we need say is that in this suit the appellant has not discharged the onus that was on him and, on the material on record, it is impossible for us to hold in this case that there has been any discrimination inhas been accepted as well settled that in construing such an entry conferring legislative powers the widest possible construction according to their ordinary meaning trust be put upon the words used therein. In view of this well established rule of interpretation, there can be no reason to construe the words "taxes on luxuries or entertainments or amusements" in entry 50 as having a restricted meaning so as to confine the operation of the law to be made thereunder only to taxes on persons receiving the luxuries, entertainments, or amusements.The entry contemplates luxuries, entertainments, and amusements as objects on which the tax is to beentry, as we have said, contemplates a law with respect to these matters regarded as objects and a law which imposes tax on the act of entertaining is within the entry whether it falls on the giver or the receiver of that entertainment.Nor is the impugned tax a tax imposed for the privilege of carrying on any trade or calling. It is a tax imposed on every show, that is to say, on every instance of the exercise of the particular trade, calling or employment. If there is no show, there is no tax.A lawyer has to pay a tax or fee to take out a license irrespective of whether or not he actually, practises. That tax is a tax for the privilege of having the right to exercise the profession if and when the person taking out the license chooses to do so.The impugned tax is a tax on the act of entertainment resulting in a show. In our opinion therefore, S. 73 is a law with respect to matters enumerated in entry 50 and not entry 46 and the Bombay legislature had ample power to enact this law.