Case: Shibsankar Nandy Vs. Prabartak Sangha And Ors

urge, as it was purely a question as to the constitutional validity of Section 24. The contention was that the right of transfer enacted in that section was founded solely on the consideration of vicinage and therefore constituted an unreasonable restriction on the guaranteed right of respondents 2 and 3 and the appellant under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. In this connection he relied upon Bhau Ram v. Baijnath Singh, (1962) Supp (3) SCR 724: (AIR 1961 SC 1327 ) where by a majority judgment this Court struck down Section 10 of the Rewa State Pre-emption Act, 1946. That section provided for pre-emption on the ground of vicinage and it was held that such a restriction on the right of the vendor to sell his property to a purchaser of his choice at a price settled between them was unreasonable. It was observed that besides there being no advantage to the general public from such a law, the real reason behind a law of pre-emption on the basis of vicinage was to prevent stranger, i. e., people belonging to different religion, race or caste, from acquiring property in any area populated by a particular fraternity or class of people. Such a proviso could not be considered reasonable in view of the prohibition under Art. 15 of the Constitution of discrimination only on the ground of religion, race, caste, etc. It may however be observed that the Court in that decision considered certain provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and Berar Land Revenue Code, 1928 also and refused to strike down certain provisions of those Acts where apart from vicinage there were other factors on the consideration of which the right of pre-emption was enacted. The decision therefore is an authority only for the proposition that where such a restriction is laid down exclusively on the ground of vicinage it might be liable to be struck down as an unreasonable restriction. This is illustrated by Ram Sarup v. Munshi, (1963) 3 SCR 858 : (AIR 1963 SC 553 ) where Section 15 (a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by Act 10 of 1960 was held valid on the ground that the restriction on the right of free alienation imposed by that provision was intended to preserve the integrity of the village and the village community and to implement the agnatic rule of succession and that both of them were reasonable and calculated to further the interests of the general public. 12. An examination of the different provisions of the Act and its scheme shows that contiguity is not the sole consideration for which Section 24 was enacted. Chapter III of the Act deals with tenants and confers on them diverse rights. Section 6 permits a tenant holding non-agricultural land to erect pucca structures, to dig a tank and to fell, utilise or dispose of the timber of any trees planted by such a tenant. Under Section 7 if the tenancy was created before the commencement of the Transfer of Property Act or its origin is unknown or if created after the commencement of that Act but the land is held thereunder for a period of 12 years or more or where the tenancy is for a shorter term but the tenant has continued to hold the land with the express or implied consent of the landlord and the period in the aggregate is not less than twelve years such a tenant cannot be ejected except only on the solitary ground that he has used such land in a manner which renders it unfit for use for the purposes of the tenancy. Under that section the interests of such a tenant are made heritable and are capable of being transferred or bequeathed in the same manner and to the extent as the other immovable property of the tenant. Where any non-agricultural land is held under a lease in writing for a period of not less than 12 years Section 8 confers on the tenant on the expiry of such period the option of successive renewals of such lease on fair and reasonable conditions as to rent as may be agreed upon between the parties or decided by the court in the absence of such agreement. It further provides that such a tenant cannot be ejected either during the term provided by the lease or during its renewal except on the solitary ground that he has used such land in a manner which renders it unfit for use for the purposes of such tenancy. Chapter IV of the Act in like manner confers substantial rights on under-tenants. It is only when a non-agricultural tenant transfers his rights in the leased land to a third party that the provisions of Sections 23 and 24 are attracted and in such an eventuality the immediate landlord who has interest in such land and has contiguous land in his actual possession is given the right to apply for the transfer of such land in his favour provided that the court is satisfied that such land is required for any of the purposes set out in Section 4. 13. The scheme of the Act clearly is to afford security of tenure to tenants and under-tenants even to the extent of making their rights transferable and heritable. It is only when such land is sought to be transferred that the immediate landlord is given the right to have it transferred to himself instead of to a third party. These provisions clearly reflect the true object of the legislature in enacting Section 24. That object is to have an adjustment of rights of landlords and tenants. The consideration of the land being contiguous is therefore not the sole consideration as in the case of (1962) Supp (3) SCR 724: (AIR 1961 SC 1327 ) (Supra).The restriction contained in Section 24 cannot by any means be treated as an unreasonable restriction. Consequently the contention as to the constitutional invalidity of Section 24 cannot be accepted

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In view of the clear finding by the Additional District Judge it can no longer be disputed that the land in question is contiguous to the land in actual possession of the 1st respondent Association. There is also no reason why the finding of the High Court that the land is bona fide required by the 1st respondent Association for expansion of its educational institution should be disturbed. The Trial Court held that it was bona fide required by the 1st respondent and though the Additional District Judge did not expressly give any finding it appears as the High Court has stated that that fact was not challenged before him. The proviso to S. 24, however, requires that though such land may be needed bona fide the use for which it is needed must be for any of the purposes set out in S. 4. Since the land is not required for a hostel or residential purpose of the 1st respondent or its employees it cannot fall under Cl.(a) but the case would seem to fall under Cl. (b) and in any event under Cl. (c). As aforesaid, the objects of the 1st respondent are inter alia to promote education, arts, etc., by utilising, improving and developing properties and business. Since the case of the 1st respondent is that it requires the land in question for expansion of its educational activities, the land in dispute is required for its business purposes, viz., to develop, improve its properties or in any event for the "other purposes", viz., to carry out its educational objects for which the land in its actual possession is being utilised. There is, therefore, no difficulty in holding that Cl. (b) of the proviso is satisfiedIt is true that by reason of the perpetual lease in favour of respondents 2 and 3 in respect of the land in dispute the first respondent Association had only the right of receiving rent from them but that makes no difference to the position that the first respondent was the immediate landlord of respondents 2 and 3 in regard to the land in question. Therefore there can be no doubt that both section 23 and Section 24 were attracted to the transfer made by respondents 2 and 3 and under Section 24 the first respondent as their immediate landlord became entitled to apply for transferThis contention also cannot be accepted, for an "intermediary" as defined in S. 2 (1) (i) of that Act means "a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure holder, or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and in relation to mines and minerals, a lessee or a sub-lessee". It is thus obvious that the 1st respondent being itself a non-agricultural tenant in respect of the entire land including the land in dispute it does not fall within this definition. Not being thus an intermediary it is impossible to say that its interests in the land in dispute vested in the State or that therefore it was not entitled to apply under Section 24The scheme of the Act clearly is to afford security of tenure to tenants and under-tenants even to the extent of making their rights transferable and heritable. It is only when such land is sought to be transferred that the immediate landlord is given the right to have it transferred to himself instead of to a third party. These provisions clearly reflect the true object of the legislature in enacting Section 24. That object is to have an adjustment of rights of landlords and tenants. The consideration of the land being contiguous is therefore not the sole consideration as in the case of (1962) Supp (3) SCR 724: (AIR 1961 SC 1327  ) (Supra).The restriction contained in Section 24 cannot by any means be treated as an unreasonable restriction. Consequently the contention as to the constitutional invalidity of Section 24 cannot be accepted