Case: Gulam Abbas Vs. Haji Kayyum Ali &amp; Ors

the attendant circumstances and the whole course of conduct of which it forms a part. In other words, the principle of an equitable estoppel, far from being opposed to any principle of Muslim law will be found, on investigation, to be completely in consonance with it. 12. As already indicated, while the Madras view is based upon the erroneous assumption that a renunciation of a claim to inherit in future is in itself illegal or prohibited by Muslim law, the view of the Allahabad High Court, expressed by Suleman, C. J., in Latafat Hussains case, AIR 1936 All 573 (supra), while fully recognising that "under the Mahomedan law relinquishment by an heir who has no interest in the lifetime of his ancestor is invalid and void", correctly lays down that such an abandonment may, nevertheless, be part of a course of conduct which may create an estoppel against claiming the right at a time when the right of inheritance has accrued. After considering several decisions, including the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Asa Beevis case, ILR 41 Mad 365 = (AIR 1918 Mad 119) (supra), Suleman, C. J., observed at page 575 :"The question of estoppel is really a question arising under the Contract Act and the Evidence Act, and is not a question strictly arising under the Mahomedan Law". He pointed out (at pages 575-576) :"It has been held in this Court that contingent reversioners can enter into a contract for consideration which may be held binding on them in case they actually succeed to the estate : See 19 All LJ 799 = (AIR 1922 All 297 ) and 21 ALJ 235 = (AIR 1923 All 387 ). It was pointed out in 24 All LJ 873, at pp. 876-877 = (AIR 1926 All 715), that although a reversionary right cannot be the subject of a transfer, for such a transfer is prohibited by Section 6, T. P. Act, there was nothing to prevent a reversioner from so acting as to estop himself by his own conduct from subsequently claiming a property to which he may succeed. Among other cases reliance was placed on the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ILR 40 All 487 = (AIR 1918 PC 70), where a reversioner was held bound by a compromise to which he was a party". 13. Incidentally, we may observe that, in Mohammad Ali Khan v. Nisar Ali Khan, AIR 1928 Oudh 67 the Oudh Chief has relied upon Hurmoot-ool-Nisa Begums case, (1871) 17 Suth WR 108 (PC) (supra) to hold that "according to Mahomedan Law there may be renunciation of the right to inheritance and such renunciation need not be express but may be implied from the ceasing or desisting from prosecuting a claim maintainable against another". 14. As we are clearly of opinion that there is nothing in law to bar the application of the principle of estoppel, contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act against the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 4, upon the totality of facts found by the final Court of facts, which were apparently accepted by the High Court, it is not necessary for us to deal at length with the question whether the facts found could give rise to the inference of a "family settlement" in a technical sense. 15. It is true that in Latafat Hussains case, AIR 1936 All 573 (supra), Suleman, C. J., had observed that the conclusion of the Subordinate Court, that there had been an arrangement between a husband and a wife "in the nature of a family settlement which is binding on the plaintiff", was correct. This was held upon circumstances which indicated that a husband would not have executed a deed of Wakf if the wife had not relinquished her claim to inheritance. In other words, an arrangement which may avoid future disputes in the family, even though it may not technically be a settlement or definition of actually disputed claims, was referred to broadly as a "family arrangement". It was in this wide sense that, in the case before us also, the first appellate Court had considered the whole set of facts and circumstances examined by it to be sufficient to raise the inference of what it described as "a family settlement". 16. As our law relating to family arrangements is based on English law, we may refer here to a definition of a family arrangement in Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 17, p. 215-216 where we find : "A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour". We also find there : "The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term family arrangement is applied". It is pointed out there : "Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements". 17. As we have already indicated, it is enough for the decision of this case that the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 were estopped by their conduct, on an application of Section 115 Evidence Act, from claiming any right to inheritance which accrued to them, on their fathers death, covered by the deeds of relinquishment for consideration, irrespective of the question whether the deeds could operate as legally valid and effective surrenders of their spes successions. Upon the facts and circumstances in the case found by the Courts below we hold that the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 could not, when rights of inheritance vested in them at the time of their fathers death, claim these as such a claim would be barred by estoppel.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]14. As we are clearly of opinion that there is nothing in law to bar the application of the principle of estoppel, contained in Section 115 of the Evidence Act against the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 4, upon the totality of facts found by the final Court of facts, which were apparently accepted by the High Court, it is not necessary for us to deal at length with the question whether the facts found could give rise to the inference of a "family settlement" in a technical sense15. It is true that in Latafat Hussains case, AIR 1936 All 573 (supra), Suleman, C. J., had observed that the conclusion of the Subordinate Court, that there had been an arrangement between a husband and a wife "in the nature of a family settlement which is binding on the plaintiff", was correct. This was held upon circumstances which indicated that a husband would not have executed a deed of Wakf if the wife had not relinquished her claim to inheritance. In other words, an arrangement which may avoid future disputes in the family, even though it may not technically be a settlement or definition of actually disputed claims, was referred to broadly as a "family arrangement". It was in this wide sense that, in the case before us also, the first appellate Court had considered the whole set of facts and circumstances examined by it to be sufficient to raise the inference of what it described as "a family settlement"16. As our law relating to family arrangements is based on English law, we may refer here to a definition of a family arrangement in Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol. 17, p. 215-216 where we find : "A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour". We also find there : "The agreement may be implied from a long course of dealing, but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term family arrangement is applied". It is pointed out there : "Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements"17. As we have already indicated, it is enough for the decision of this case that the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 were estopped by their conduct, on an application of Section 115 Evidence Act, from claiming any right to inheritance which accrued to them, on their fathers death, covered by the deeds of relinquishment for consideration, irrespective of the question whether the deeds could operate as legally valid and effective surrenders of their spes successions. Upon the facts and circumstances in the case found by the Courts below we hold that the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 could not, when rights of inheritance vested in them at the time of their fathers death, claim these as such a claim would be barred by estoppel.