Case: Mumbai International Airport Pvt. Ltd Vs. Regency Convention Centra &amp; Hotels

specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half share, the court may permit the other co-owner who contends that `D has only one-fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one-fourth share; alternatively the court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the vendor-defendant to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to specific performance, that is whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. In other words, the court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party. 13. If the principles relating to impleadment, are kept in view, then the purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be non-existent. The observations in Kasturi and Sumtibai are with reference to the facts and circumstances of the respective case. In Kasturi, this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. In Sumtibai, this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor did Kasturi lay down that no one, other than the parties to the contract and their legal representatives/transferees, can be impleaded even as a proper party. 14. On a careful examination of the facts of this case, we find that the appellant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. As noticed above, the appellant is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein. First respondent -plaintiff in the suit has not sought any relief against the appellant. The presence of the appellant is not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit for specific performance. Nor is its presence necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the matters in issue in the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent-plaintiff against AAI. A person who expects to get a lease from the defendant in a suit for specific performance in the event of the suit being dismissed, cannot be said to be a person having some semblance of title, in the property in dispute. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that in view of section 12A of the Act when AAI granted a lease of the premises of an airport, to carry out any of its functions enumerated in section 12 of the said Act, the lessee who has been so assigned any function of AAI, shall have the powers of AAI, necessary for the performance of such functions in terms of the lease. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of this provision, it should be deemed that the appellant has stepped into the shoes of AAI so far as the Airport premises are concerned. This contention has no merit. The appellant as lessee may certainly have the powers of AAI necessary for performance of the functions that have been assigned to them. What has been assigned is the function of operation, management and development agreement with reference to the area that been demised. Obviously the appellant as lessee of the Airport cannot step into the shoes of AAI for performance of any functions with reference to an area which has not been demised or leased to it. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that Mumbai airport being one of the premier airports in India with a very high and ever increasing passenger traffic, needs to modernise and develop every inch of the airport land; that the suit land was a part of the airport land and that for the pendency of first respondents suit within an interim order, AAI would have included the suit land also in the lease in its favour. It was submitted that therefore a note was made in the lease that the land measuring 31000 sq.m. was not being made a part of the lease but may become part of the demised premises subject to the court verdict. This does not in any way help the appellant to claim a right to be impleaded. If the interim order in the suit filed by the first respondent came in the way of granting the lease of the suit land, it is clear that the suit land was not leased to appellant. The fact that if AAI succeeded in the suit, the suit land may also be leased to the appellant is not sufficient to hold that the appellant has any right, interest or a semblance of right or interest in the suit property. When appellant is neither claiming any right or remedy against the first respondent and when first respondent is not claiming any right or remedy against the appellant, in a suit for specific performance by the first respondent against AAI, the appellant cannot be a party. The allegation that the land is crucial for a premier airport or in public interest, are not relevant to the issue.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. On a careful consideration, we find that there is no conflict between the two decisions. The two decisions were dealing with different situations requiring application of different facets of sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1. This is made clear in Sumtibai itself. It was observed that every judgment must be governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found; that a little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the precedential value of a decision and that even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect; that there is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case. The decisions in Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay [1992 (2) SCC 524 ] and Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra [1995 (3) SCC 147 ] also explain in what circumstances persons may be added as parties13. If the principles relating to impleadment, are kept in view, then the purported divergence in the two decisions will be found to be non-existent. The observations in Kasturi and Sumtibai are with reference to the facts and circumstances of the respective case. In Kasturi, this Court held that in suits for specific performance, only the parties to the contract or any legal representative of a party to the contract, or a transferee from a party to the contract are necessary parties. In Sumtibai, this Court held that a person having semblance of a title can be considered as a proper party. Sumtibai did not lay down any proposition that anyone claiming to have any semblance of title is a necessary party. Nor did Kasturi lay down that no one, other than the parties to the contract and their legal representatives/transferees, can be impleaded even as a proper party14. On a careful examination of the facts of this case, we find that the appellant is neither a necessary party nor a proper party. As noticed above, the appellant is neither a purchaser nor the lessee of the suit property and has no right, title or interest therein. First respondent -plaintiff in the suit has not sought any relief against the appellant. The presence of the appellant is not necessary for passing an effective decree in the suit for specific performance. Nor is its presence necessary for complete and effective adjudication of the matters in issue in the suit for specific performance filed by the first respondent-plaintiff against AAI. A person who expects to get a lease from the defendant in a suit for specific performance in the event of the suit being dismissed, cannot be said to be a person having some semblance of title, in the property in disputeThis contention has no merit. The appellant as lessee may certainly have the powers of AAI necessary for performance of the functions that have been assigned to them. What has been assigned is the function of operation, management and development agreement with reference to the area that been demised. Obviously the appellant as lessee of the Airport cannot step into the shoes of AAI for performance of any functions with reference to an area which has not been demised or leased to itThis does not in any way help the appellant to claim a right to be impleaded. If the interim order in the suit filed by the first respondent came in the way of granting the lease of the suit land, it is clear that the suit land was not leased to appellant. The fact that if AAI succeeded in the suit, the suit land may also be leased to the appellant is not sufficient to hold that the appellant has any right, interest or a semblance of right or interest in the suit property. When appellant is neither claiming any right or remedy against the first respondent and when first respondent is not claiming any right or remedy against the appellant, in a suit for specific performance by the first respondent against AAI, the appellant cannot be a party. The allegation that the land is crucial for a premier airport or in public interest, are not relevant to the issue.