Case: Rawalmal Naraindas &amp; Sons Vs. B. Amarnath

building, a unit with separate door number on the ground floor which was leased out to the appellant-tenant was admittedly a non-residential `building, which attracted the applicability of the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Section 10(3)(c) would apply in a case where out of the leased premises, a part thereof is in occupation of the landlord who in that event can apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he was carrying on, as the case may be. Part of the building referred to in clause (c) of the sub-section 3 of Section 10 of the Act has to be understood in the context of the definition of the word `building under Section 2(iii) of the Act. If the building within the meaning of Section 2(iii) is indivisible, the same has to be taken as an entity for the purpose of deciding the issue regarding eviction and cannot be further split or its scope widened by having regard to the loose general meaning of the word `building. We are of the opinion that the appellant is not justified in contending that the entire building was a single unit though having different door numbers for different portions of the building and that all the courts below have rightly overruled such a contention. 5. Shri Mishra has also tried to persuade us to hold that the conversion of the building being contrary to Section 18 of the Act, disentitled the landlord to seek eviction. Such a plea is more hypothetical than real. The decisions relied upon have no reliance in the instant case particularly when no such plea was raised before the courts below. The reliance of the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Surjit Kaur, 1987(3) SCC 711 is of no help to him. In that case, this Court while dealing with East Punjab Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 found that the Amending Act therein had enlarged the definition of `non residential building in the parent Act by making `a building let out under a single tenancy for use for the purpose of business or trade and also for the purpose of residence to be also a non-residential building. Such is not the position under the Act. Even in that case the Court had observed, "having taken up such a stand the appellant cannot reprobate and contend that the lease of the hall was of a composite nature and as such the benefit of the enlarged definition of a `non-residential building given in the Amendment Act would enure to his aid in the case." Similarly, the reliance of the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Shri Balaganesan Metals v. Shri M.N. Shammugham Chetty and others, 1987(2) SCR 1173 is of no help to him. In that case admittedly, the landlords had filed a petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) ACt, 1960 praying for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for the purpose of additional accommodation for their residential needs. Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Act is in pari materia with Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. In that case, there was no dispute regarding the applicability of Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) as admittedly the landlords had sought eviction under Section 10(3)(c). In that context it was observed :- "Yet another noteworthy feature to be borne in mind is that Section 10(3)(c) is governed by two provisos which is not the case when eviction orders are made under any of the sub-clauses of Section 10(30(a). The first proviso enjoins the Controller to reject the application of landlord under Section 10(3)9c) for additional accommodation, even where the need of the landlord is found to be genine, if the hardship caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord by the said order. The second proviso empowers the controller to give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding three months in the aggregate to vacate the portion in his occupation and put the landlord in possession thereof. Obviously the second proviso has been made to facilitate the tenant to find alternate residential or non-residential accommodation elsewhere, since the landlord who is already in possession of a portion of the building can put up with the hardship of inadequate accommodation for a period of three months at the most.The above analytical consideration of the relevant provisions bring out clearly the fallacy contained in and the untenability of the contention that the ground floor occupied by the appellant is a distinct and separate unit and as such the respondents cannot seek his eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act." This court also referred to the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in K. Parasuramaih v. Lakshmamma, AIR 1965 A.P. 220 wherein it was held that if a landlord satisfies the Controller that he wanted additional accommodation in the same building for his residential or non-residential requirements, then notwithstanding the user to which the tenant was putting in the leased portion, the landlord was entitled to an order of eviction so that he could re-adjust additional accommodation in the manner convenient to him and it was not necessary that the additional accommodation sought for should be used by the landlord for the same purpose for which the tenant sought to be evicted was using it. 6. We are satisfied that the judgment impugned is based upon concurrent findings of fact of the Rent Controller and of the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, which have been appropriately appreciated by the High Court, in the light of the provisions of the Act requiring no interference. The pleas raised before us are not tenable being bereft of sound legal foundations. The appeal which has no merit is liable to he dismissed.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Accepting such a plea at this stage would render the provisions of the Act ineffective inasmuch as the definition of the word `building incorporated in Section 2(iii) of the Act would be rendered futile. The building or part of the building as leased out has to be deemed to be a `building for the purposes of eviction proceedings and a part of the building cannot be permitted to be a part thereof the whole building. The building, a unit with separate door number on the ground floor which was leased out to thewas admittedly a`building, which attracted the applicability of the provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Section 10(3)(c) would apply in a case where out of the leased premises, a part thereof is in occupation of the landlord who in that event can apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for purposes of a business which he was carrying on, as the case may be. Part of the building referred to in clause (c) of the3 of Section 10 of the Act has to be understood in the context of the definition of the word `building under Section 2(iii) of the Act. If the building within the meaning of Section 2(iii) is indivisible, the same has to be taken as an entity for the purpose of deciding the issue regarding eviction and cannot be further split or its scope widened by having regard to the loose general meaning of the word `building. We are of the opinion that the appellant is not justified in contending that the entire building was a single unit though having different door numbers for different portions of the building and that all the courts below have rightly overruled such adecisions relied upon have no reliance in the instant case particularly when no such plea was raised before the courts below. The reliance of the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Vinod Kumar Arora v. Surjit Kaur, 1987(3) SCC 711 is of no help to him. In that case, this Court while dealing with East Punjab Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Act, 1982 found that the Amending Act therein had enlarged the definition of `non residential building in the parent Act by making `a building let out under a single tenancy for use for the purpose of business or trade and also for the purpose of residence to be also abuilding. Such is not the position under the Act. Even in that case the Court had observed, "having taken up such a stand the appellant cannot reprobate and contend that the lease of the hall was of a composite nature and as such the benefit of the enlarged definition of abuilding given in the Amendment Act would enure to his aid in the case." Similarly, the reliance of the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgment of this Court in Shri Balaganesan Metals v. Shri M.N. Shammugham Chetty and others, 1987(2) SCR 1173 is of no help to him. In that case admittedly, the landlords had filed a petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) ACt, 1960 praying for eviction of the tenant on the ground of bona fide requirement for the purpose of additional accommodation for their residential needs. Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Act is in pari materia with Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. In that case, there was no dispute regarding the applicability of Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) as admittedly the landlords had sought eviction under Section 10(3)(c). In that context it was observedanother noteworthy feature to be borne in mind is that Section 10(3)(c) is governed by two provisos which is not the case when eviction orders are made under any of theof Section 10(30(a). The first proviso enjoins the Controller to reject the application of landlord under Section 10(3)9c) for additional accommodation, even where the need of the landlord is found to be genine, if the hardship caused to the tenant by an order of eviction will outweigh the advantage to the landlord by the said order. The second proviso empowers the controller to give the tenant a reasonable time not exceeding three months in the aggregate to vacate the portion in his occupation and put the landlord in possession thereof. Obviously the second proviso has been made to facilitate the tenant to find alternate residential oraccommodation elsewhere, since the landlord who is already in possession of a portion of the building can put up with the hardship of inadequate accommodation for a period of three months at the most.The above analytical consideration of the relevant provisions bring out clearly the fallacy contained in and the untenability of the contention that the ground floor occupied by the appellant is a distinct and separate unit and as such the respondents cannot seek his eviction under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act."