Case: Mahabir Jute Mills Ltd. Gorakhpur A Vs. Shibban Lal Saxena And Ors

(5) of the notification referred to above, nor S.3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act contained any provisions which required that the members of the Conciliation Board were to show their reports to another. All that was required was that they should send their reports to the Government through the Labour Commissioner. This was undoubtedly done. We are, therefore, unable to see any infraction of the rules of natural justice in the present case.9. Reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei and others [1967-II L.L.J. 266]. This case also does not appear to be of any assistance to the respondents, because in that case the entire procedure of inquiry held was in violation of the rules of natural justice. That, however, is not the position here.10. It was then contended by Mr. Gupte that after quashing the order of the Government refusing to make a reference and asking it to reconsider the same it was not open to the High Court to have given peremptory directions so as to circumscribe the statutory jurisdiction of the Government under S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Dispute Act. In our opinion this contention is well-founded and must prevail. Even if the High Court thought that the impugned order of the Government suffered from any legal infirmity all that it could have done was to have asked the Government to reconsider it but it had no jurisdiction to direct the Government how to act and how to exercise its statutory discretion which was conferred on it by S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. There was absolutely no warrant for the High Court in prohibiting the Government from considering the secret report of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer or that of the Labour Commissioner. The Government was fully entitled to consider the matter in its comprehensive aspects and the secret report of the Chairman of the Conciliation Board or that of the Labour Commissioner were undoubtedly relevant materials which the Government could have considered. The High Court could not debar the Government from considering those matters nor could it compel the Government to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the order of the High Court is not legally sustainable and must be quashed.11. The other point which arises for consideration is as to the relief which could be granted to the appellant. Mr. Gupte, counsel for the appellant, submitted that after the judgment of the High Court the Government had passed another order dated February 6, 1973, by which it has in consonance with the directions given by the High Court made a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was submitted that it was not at all proper for the Government to have revived a dead issue after more than twenty years and further as the order of the Government was based on the order of the High Court, if the order of the High Court was quashed the order of the Government making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal would fall automatically. We find ourselves in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant. There can be no doubt that the order of the Government dated February 6, 1973 is undoubtedly based on the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. This is proved by a letter written by Mr. Vishnu Prakash Up. Sachiv (Deputy Secretary), U.P. Government, to the Manager of the appellant Mills. The relevant portion of the latter after being translated in English runs thus :"I am directed to say that their Lordships of the High Court in their Judgment in Special Appeal No. 1963/915 State v. Shri Shiban Lal Sexena (M/s. Mahabir Jute Mills Sabjanwa) have ordered that the Government after taking the dissenting reports from both the parties should consider on the question whether the aforesaid dispute should be referred for adjudication.Therefore you are requested that within 10 days from the date of the receipt of this letter to send your dissenting report and whatever further you want to say on your behalf to the Government."A perusal of this letter clearly shows that the Government did not exercise its independent decision under S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but was guided mainly by the judgment of the High Court and the directions given in Special Appeal filed in the High Court. If the order of the High Court is quashed then it will undoubtedly materially affect the decisions of the Government in making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. Had the Government made the reference uninfluenced by the High Courts directions the legal situation would have been different.The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that no prayer was made by the appellant for quashing the order of the Government for making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, however, not necessary for the appellant to make such a prayer because of the High Courts order is quashed, then any subsequent proceeding which comes into existence as a result of the High Courts order would fall to the ground as a logical corollary of our finding. The learned counsel for the respondents after due consideration submitted that he would have no objection if the Government order for making a reference is quashed provided the Governments discretion to make a fresh reference to the Industrial Tribunal on the dispute is not fettered. We would, however, like to make it clear that the Government has sample discretion to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act if it so thinks fit. This Court in Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Western India Match Co., Workers Union and others, [1973-II L.L.J. 403]; clearly held that even if a reference was refused by the Government that will not debar the Government from making a reference at a later time if it is satisfied that in the changed circumstances a reference is necessary.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]High Court observed thus :"The function of the Government is administrative. In law administrative decisions are not generally required to be accompanied by a statement of reasons.There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act or the notification aforesaid requiring the State Government to state its reasons in support of its conclusions. There was nothing particular in the present case impelling the issuance of such a direction to the State Government."We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court on this point. In a diverse society such as ours the Government has to work through several administrative agencies which have got a very wide sphere and if every administrative order is required to give reasons it will bring the Governmental machinery to aled that while the rules of natural justice would apply to administrative proceedings, it is not necessary that the administrative orders should be speaking orders unless the statute specifically enjoins such a requirement. But we think it desirable that such orders should contain reasons when they decide matters affecting rights of parties.Coming to the first ground which weighed with the High Court in setting aside the order of the Government refusing to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal it seems to us that the High Court has proceeded on a completeof the real position and on a premise which is wrong of a point of fact. Having perused the materials placed before us, we find that there is no reliable material on the record at all to show that the Government order referred to above was based mainly on the secret report of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer or of the Labouraverment which has not been proved to be false manifestly shows that the Government before making the impugned order had considered all the aspects including the report of the Chairman and the members of the Conciliation Board, the Labour Commissioner and other surrounding circumstances. In these circumstances the finding of the Division Bench of the High Court that the order of the Government was based merely on the secret report of the Chairman or that of the Labour Commissioner is not sustainable. We fail to understand on what basis High Court has presumed that the Government acted solely on the secret report of the Regional Conciliationcan be no doubt that while the secret report of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer and the report of the Labour Commissioner, like other circumstances, had to be considered by the Government in making its overall assessment of the situation, there was no reason for excluding the secret report submitted by the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer at all. In these circumstances the first ground on which the Division Bench has set aside the Government order in refusing to refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal is not legally sound and cannot beis no provision in the notification or in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act which enjoins that the report submitted by the Chairman or any other members should be shown to one another. This also does not appear to be necessary. The High Court seems to think that because the Chairman did not show his secret report to the other members of the Board, this has resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice. We are, however, unable to agree with this line of reasoning. The principles of natural justice are got doubt very essential but they have got their own limits and cannot be stretched toofacts in Kraipaks case are quite different from the facts in the present case. In Kraipaks case the main grievance of the petitioner was that in the Selection Board which was constituted for recommending the promotion of the State Officers to the Indian Forest Service Cadre the Chief Conservator of Forests was also a member of the Board, although he himself was also a candidate for promotion to the Indian Forest Service Cadre. Thus what happened was that the Chief Conservator of Forests acted as a Judge in his own cause. This was undoubtedly a gross violation of the principles of natural justice because the very person who stood as a candidate also sat in the Selection Board which had to decide his own future as that of his rivals. Such is, however, not the case here. The Conciliation Board had completed its proceedings and the stage at which, according to the High Court, the rules of natural justice had to be applied was the stage of submitting the report. Full hearing was given to the parties concerned. Thus all the indicia of the principles of natural justice were present on the facts of the present case. In these circumstances we are satisfied that Kraipaks case (supra) could not be called into aid in support of the reasons given by the High Court. The procedure adopted in Kraipaks case was obviously so abhorrent to the notions of justice andthat rules of natural justice were at oncethe present case we have already pointed out that neither cl. (5) of the notification referred to above, nor S.3 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act contained any provisions which required that the members of the Conciliation Board were to show their reports to another. All that was required was that they should send their reports to the Government through the Labour Commissioner. This was undoubtedly done. We are, therefore, unable to see any infraction of the rules of natural justice in the presentour opinion this contention isand must prevail. Even if the High Court thought that the impugned order of the Government suffered from any legal infirmity all that it could have done was to have asked the Government to reconsider it but it had no jurisdiction to direct the Government how to act and how to exercise its statutory discretion which was conferred on it by S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. There was absolutely no warrant for the High Court in prohibiting the Government from considering the secret report of the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer or that of the Labour Commissioner. The Government was fully entitled to consider the matter in its comprehensive aspects and the secret report of the Chairman of the Conciliation Board or that of the Labour Commissioner were undoubtedly relevant materials which the Government could have considered. The High Court could not debar the Government from considering those matters nor could it compel the Government to exercise its discretion in a particular manner. In these circumstances we are satisfied that the order of the High Court is not legally sustainable and must befind ourselves in agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant. There can be no doubt that the order of the Government dated February 6, 1973 is undoubtedly based on the order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court. This is proved by a letter written by Mr. Vishnu Prakash Up. Sachiv (Deputy Secretary), U.P. Government, to the Manager of the appellant Mills. The relevant portion of the latter after being translated in English runs thus :"I am directed to say that their Lordships of the High Court in their Judgment in Special Appeal No. 1963/915 State v. Shri Shiban Lal Sexena (M/s. Mahabir Jute Mills Sabjanwa) have ordered that the Government after taking the dissenting reports from both the parties should consider on the question whether the aforesaid dispute should be referred for adjudication.Therefore you are requested that within 10 days from the date of the receipt of this letter to send your dissenting report and whatever further you want to say on your behalf to the Government."A perusal of this letter clearly shows that the Government did not exercise its independent decision under S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act but was guided mainly by the judgment of the High Court and the directions given in Special Appeal filed in the High Court. If the order of the High Court is quashed then it will undoubtedly materially affect the decisions of the Government in making a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. Had the Government made the reference uninfluenced by the High Courts directions the legal situation would have been different.We would, however, like to make it clear that the Government has sample discretion to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal under S.4K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act if it so thinks fit. This Court in Western India Match Company Ltd. v. Western India Match Co., Workers Union and others,L.L.J. 403]; clearly held that even if a reference was refused by the Government that will not debar the Government from making a reference at a later time if it is satisfied that in the changed circumstances a reference is necessary.