Case: Pyare Lal Etc Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee &amp; Anr

article 998 at page 586 headed "regulation of street trading." The learned author thus summarised the law in England :-"Subject to certain exceptions it is unlawful for any person to engage in street trading in or from a stationary position in any street within a metropolitan borough, or to engage in street trading in any designated street whether or not in or from a stationary position, unless he is authorised to do so by a street trading licence. * * * * Nothing in the foregoing provisions (1) restricts the right of any person to carry on the business of a pedlar or hawker in accordance with a pedlars certificate or hawkers licence which he holds; or (2) applies to the sale of or exposure or offer for sale of newspapers or periodicals by any person who does not use in connection with the sale, etc., any receptacle which occupies a stationary position in a street other than a receptacle which is exclusively used in connection with the sale etc., * * *". It would appear that street trading is regulated by certain statutes in England and we have nothing of the kind here. On the basis of the above passage, it cannot be said that persons in India have a lawful right to pursue street trading and such trading may be regulated but not altogether prevented. On the authority of Roberts v. Hopwood, 1925 AC 578 it was argued by learned counsel that Section 173 at best gave a discretion to the committee to regulate street trading and therefore the same has to the exercised reasonably and could not altogether be prevented. Reference was also made to Pyx Granite Co. v. Ministry of Housing, 1958-1 All ER 625 where it was held that the planning authority under the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947 was not at liberty to use their powers for an ulterior object, however desirable that object may seem to them to be in the public interest. In our view, none of these decisions have any bearing on the question before us.There was no ulterior object behind the resolution of the N. D. M. C. in this case. Clearly the presence of the stall-holders on public streets and sale of cooked food was against public hygiene and S. 173(1) could be availed of to stop the same.Learned counsel also cited the case of C.S.S. Motor Service v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 279 . There it was argued that the petitioners had a right to carry on motor transport business and that this was a right guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. It was held that the regulation of motor traffic must be determined with the object of serving the interests of the public. Further it was held that a system of licensing which had for its object the regulation of trade was not repugnant to Article l9 (1) (g). We do not think that the observations in that case are of any assistance to the appellants before us. 10. As a branch of the above argument it was also contended that the resolution under Section 173 on which the municipal committee relied in this case gave uncontrolled power to the committee to do what they pleased. 11. It was argued that under the guise of regulation the committee sought to take away the right of the petitioner and others to carry on their trade at their sweet will. Reliance was placed in this connection on a judgment of the House of Lords in Westminster Corporation v. London and North Western Rly., 1905 AC 426. There it was observed that a public body invested with statutory powers must take care not to exceed or abuse them and that it must act in good faith and reasonably. We do not think that these observations help the appellant because it has not been shown to us that there was any bad faith which prompted the N. D. M. C. to pass the resolution complained of, nor did they act unreasonably. 12. It was argued however that the counter affidavit of the respondent as regards the allocation of alternative sites was not correct and comment had been made thereon by the learned single Judge of the High Court. However that may be, it is apparent from the judgment that not all the squatters applied for alternative accommodation and not all of them approved of the sires which were allotted to them. It was beyond the jurisdiction of the N. D. M. C. to provide persons like the appellants with sites at Ramakrishnapuram. That was under the jurisdiction of the Director of Estates and it appears that this authority had been approached for helping persons like the appellants.Further no question of discrimination can arise because all the hawkers/squatters did not apply for such sites or could not be provided with such sites.The resolution of 30th April, 1965 clearly showed that the N. D. M. C. was out to stop the sale of cooked food including tea, kulche, choley etc., inasmuch as the sale of cooked food presented an exceptionally difficult problem because facilities like running water, sewer connection etc. necessary for the minimum standard of sanitation could not be made available. 13. It appears to us that this series of litigation was the result of the N. D. M C. allowing trade of a kind on public streets which it should have never allowed. Out of sympathy for them the N. D. M. C. had permitted the continuance of the trade for a long time. But no exception can be taken to their exercise of power under Section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act to eradicate the evil. After all every person has a right to pass and re-pass along a public street.He cannot be heard to say that he has a fundamental right to carry on street trading and particularly in a manner which is bound to create insanitary and unhygienic conditions in the neighbourhood.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In our opinion the bye-laws under Section 188 (u) had to be made for an altogether different purpose.Sections 172 and 173 are generally aimed at preventing any encroachments over public streets which cause obstruction thereon.The expression "goods for sale" in clause (c) of Section 173(1) or "stall" in clause (e) of Section 173 (1) have to be read in that connection. The placing of goods for sale or erecting stalls in public street may be allowed by the municipality on stated occasions as in the case of some festivals etc. Again it may be necessary to seek the permission of the municipality to make holes or excavation on any street or remove materials from beneath any street or to take up or alter the pavement or deposit building materials thereon for the purpose of erecting a new building or making an alteration to an existing one and the power to regulate the conditions for grant of permission and the fees to be paid in connection therewith by bye-laws under Section 188 has that object in view.Section 188 was not designed for the purpose of framing bye-laws to regulate the conditions on which persons like the petitioner could be allowed to carry on trade on public streets and thus create permanent unhygienic conditions thereon. This should never have been permitted by the municipality and the fact that it has by resolution under Section 173 purported to stop that practice cannot go against itIt would appear that street trading is regulated by certain statutes in England and we have nothing of the kind here. On the basis of the above passage, it cannot be said that persons in India have a lawful right to pursue street trading and such trading may be regulated but not altogether preventedIn our view, none of these decisions have any bearing on the question before us.There was no ulterior object behind the resolution of the N. D. M. C. in this case. Clearly the presence of the stall-holders on public streets and sale of cooked food was against public hygiene and S. 173(1) could be availed of to stop the sameWe do not think that the observations in that case are of any assistance to the appellants before usWe do not think that these observations help the appellant because it has not been shown to us that there was any bad faith which prompted the N. D. M. C. to pass the resolution complained of, nor did they act unreasonablyHowever that may be, it is apparent from the judgment that not all the squatters applied for alternative accommodation and not all of them approved of the sires which were allotted to them. It was beyond the jurisdiction of the N. D. M. C. to provide persons like the appellants with sites at Ramakrishnapuram. That was under the jurisdiction of the Director of Estates and it appears that this authority had been approached for helping persons like the appellants.Further no question of discrimination can arise because all the hawkers/squatters did not apply for such sites or could not be provided with such sites.The resolution of 30th April, 1965 clearly showed that the N. D. M. C. was out to stop the sale of cooked food including tea, kulche, choley etc., inasmuch as the sale of cooked food presented an exceptionally difficult problem because facilities like running water, sewer connection etc. necessary for the minimum standard of sanitation could not be made available13. It appears to us that this series of litigation was the result of the N. D. M C. allowing trade of a kind on public streets which it should have never allowed. Out of sympathy for them the N. D. M. C. had permitted the continuance of the trade for a long time. But no exception can be taken to their exercise of power under Section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act to eradicate the evil. After all every person has a right to pass and re-pass along a public street.He cannot be heard to say that he has a fundamental right to carry on street trading and particularly in a manner which is bound to create insanitary and unhygienic conditions in the neighbourhood.