Case: Oriental Ins.Co.Ltd Vs. Dyamavva

by entry in the notice book. 9. Sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 8 extracted above, leave no room for any doubt, that when a workman during the course of his employment suffers injuries resulting in his death, the employer has to deposit the compensation payable, with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner. Payment made by the employer directly to the dependants is not recognized as a valid disbursement of compensation. The procedure envisaged in Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, can be invoked only by the employer for depositing compensation with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner. Consequent upon such suo motu deposit of compensation (by the employer) with the Workmans Compensation Commissioner, the Commissioner may (or may not) summon the dependants of the concerned employee, to appear before him under sub-section (4) of Section 8 aforesaid. Having satisfied himself about the entitlement (or otherwise) of the dependants to such compensation, the Commissioner is then required to order the rightful apportionment thereof amongst the dependants, under sub-sections (5) to (9) of Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. Surplus, if any, has to be returned to the employer. 10. As against the aforesaid, where an employer has not suo-motu initiated action for payment of compensation to an employee or his/her dependants, inspite of an employee having suffered injuries leading to the death, it is open to the dependants of such employee, to raise a claim for compensation under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. Sub- section (1) of Section 10 prescribes the period of limitation for making such a claim as two years, from the date of occurrence (or death). The remaining sub-sections of Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 delineate the other procedural requirements for raising such a claim. 11. Having perused the aforesaid provisions and determined their effect, it cleanly emerges, that the Port Trust had initiated proceedings for paying compensation to the dependants of the deceased Yalgurdappa B. Goudar suo motu under Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. For the aforesaid purpose, the Port Trust had deposited a sum of Rs.3,26,140/- with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner on 4.11.2003. Thereupon, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner, having issued noticed to the claimants (dependants of the deceased Yalgurdappa B. Goudar), fixed 20.4.2004 as the date of hearing. On the aforesaid date, the statement of the widow of Yalgurdappa B. Goudar, namely, Dyamavva Yalgurdappa was recorded, and thereafter, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner by an order dated 29.4.2004 directed the release of a sum of Rs.3,26,140/- to be shared by the widow of the deceased and his daughter in definite proportions. 12. The issue to be determined by us is, whether the acceptance of the aforesaid compensation would amount to the claimants having exercised their option, to seek compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The procedure under Section 8 aforesaid (as noticed above) is initiated at the behest of the employer suo motu, and as such, in our view cannot be considered as an exercise of option by the dependants/claimants to seek compensation under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The position would have been otherwise, if the dependants had raised a claim for compensation under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. In the said eventuality, certainly compensation would be paid to the dependants at the instance (and option) of the claimants. In other words, if the claimants had moved an application under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, they would have been deemed to have exercised their option to seek compensation under the provisions of the Workmens compensation Act. Suffice it to state that no such application was ever filed by the respondents-claimants herein under Section 10 aforesaid. In the above view of the matter, it can be stated that the respondents- claimants having never exercised their option to seek compensation under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, could not be deemed to be precluded from seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 13. Even though the aforesaid determination, concludes the issue in hand, ambiguity if at all, can also be resolved in the present case, on the basis of the admitted factual position. The first act at the behest of the respondents-claimants for seeking compensation on account of the death of Yalgurdappa B. Goudar, was by way of filing a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on 30.5.2003. The aforesaid claim petition was the first claim for compensation raised at the hands of the respondents-claimants. If the question raised by the appellant has to be determined with reference to Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the same is liable to be determined on the basis of the aforesaid claim application filed by the respondents-claimants on 30.5.2003. The compensation deposited by the Port Trust with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner for payment to the respondents-claimants was much later, on 4.11.2003. The aforesaid deposit, as already noticed above, was not at the behest of the respondents-claimants, but was based on a unilateral suo motu determination of the employer (the Port Trust) under Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The first participation of Dayamavva Yalgurdappa, in the proceedings initiated by the Port Trust under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, was on 20.4.2004. Having been summoned by the Workmens Commissioner, she got her statement recorded before the Commissioner on 20.4.2004. But well before that date, she (as well as the other claimants) had already filed a claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, on 30.5.2003. Filing of the aforesaid claim application under Section 166 aforesaid, in our view constitutes her (as well as, that of the other dependants of the deceased) option, to seek compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The instant conclusion would yet again answer the question raised by the appellant herein, under Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in the same manner, as has already been determined above.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. Sub-sections (1) to (3) of Section 8 extracted above, leave no room for any doubt, that when a workman during the course of his employment suffers injuries resulting in his death, the employer has to deposit the compensation payable, with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner. Payment made by the employer directly to the dependants is not recognized as a valid disbursement of compensation. The procedure envisaged in Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, can be invoked only by the employer for depositing compensation with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner. Consequent upon such suo motu deposit of compensation (by the employer) with the Workmans Compensation Commissioner, the Commissioner may (or may not) summon the dependants of the concerned employee, to appear before him under sub-section (4) of Section 8 aforesaid. Having satisfied himself about the entitlement (or otherwise) of the dependants to such compensation, the Commissioner is then required to order the rightful apportionment thereof amongst the dependants, under sub-sections (5) to (9) of Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. Surplus, if any, has to be returned to the employer10. As against the aforesaid, where an employer has not suo-motu initiated action for payment of compensation to an employee or his/her dependants, inspite of an employee having suffered injuries leading to the death, it is open to the dependants of such employee, to raise a claim for compensation under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. Sub- section (1) of Section 10 prescribes the period of limitation for making such a claim as two years, from the date of occurrence (or death). The remaining sub-sections of Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 delineate the other procedural requirements for raising such a claim11. Having perused the aforesaid provisions and determined their effect, it cleanly emerges, that the Port Trust had initiated proceedings for paying compensation to the dependants of the deceased Yalgurdappa B. Goudar suo motu under Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. For the aforesaid purpose, the Port Trust had deposited a sum of Rs.3,26,140/- with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner on 4.11.2003. Thereupon, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner, having issued noticed to the claimants (dependants of the deceased Yalgurdappa B. Goudar), fixed 20.4.2004 as the date of hearing. On the aforesaid date, the statement of the widow of Yalgurdappa B. Goudar, namely, Dyamavva Yalgurdappa was recorded, and thereafter, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner by an order dated 29.4.2004 directed the release of a sum of Rs.3,26,140/- to be shared by the widow of the deceased and his daughter in definite proportionsThe procedure under Section 8 aforesaid (as noticed above) is initiated at the behest of the employer suo motu, and as such, in our view cannot be considered as an exercise of option by the dependants/claimants to seek compensation under the provisions of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The position would have been otherwise, if the dependants had raised a claim for compensation under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. In the said eventuality, certainly compensation would be paid to the dependants at the instance (and option) of the claimants. In other words, if the claimants had moved an application under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, they would have been deemed to have exercised their option to seek compensation under the provisions of the Workmens compensation Act. Suffice it to state that no such application was ever filed by the respondents-claimants herein under Section 10 aforesaid. In the above view of the matter, it can be stated that the respondents- claimants having never exercised their option to seek compensation under Section 10 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, could not be deemed to be precluded from seeking compensation under Section 166 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 198813. Even though the aforesaid determination, concludes the issue in hand, ambiguity if at all, can also be resolved in the present case, on the basis of the admitted factual position. The first act at the behest of the respondents-claimants for seeking compensation on account of the death of Yalgurdappa B. Goudar, was by way of filing a claim petition under Section 166 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1988on 30.5.2003. The aforesaid claim petition was the first claim for compensation raised at the hands of the respondents-claimants. If the question raised by the appellant has to be determined with reference to Section 167 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act,, the same is liable to be determined on the basis of the aforesaid claim application filed by the respondents-claimants on 30.5.2003. The compensation deposited by the Port Trust with the Workmens Compensation Commissioner for payment to the respondents-claimants was much later, on 4.11.2003. The aforesaid deposit, as already noticed above, was not at the behest of the respondents-claimants, but was based on a unilateral suo motu determination of the employer (the Port Trust) under Section 8 of the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923. The first participation of Dayamavva Yalgurdappa, in the proceedings initiated by the Port Trust under the Workmens Compensation Act, 1923, was on 20.4.2004. Having been summoned by the Workmens Commissioner, she got her statement recorded before the Commissioner on 20.4.2004. But well before that date, she (as well as the other claimants) had already filed a claim petition under Section 166 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act,, on 30.5.2003. Filing of the aforesaid claim application under Section 166 aforesaid, in our view constitutes her (as well as, that of the other dependants of the deceased) option, to seek compensation underthe Motor Vehicles Act,The instant conclusion would yet again answer the question raised by the appellant herein, under Section 167 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act,, in the same manner, as has already been determined above.