Case: Chairman, Ramappa Gundappa Sahakari Samyukta Besava Sangha Limited &amp; Another Vs. State of Mysore &amp; Others

covered by the present appeal,and is "in supersession of all orders issued so far in connection with the disposal of galper lands".7. As pointed out above, adjoining owners enjoyed a weightage in getting the lands for seasonal cultivation under the 1931 resolution of Government but that stood superseded by the 1953 memorandum of Government which give a list of priorities in regard to persons who should be eligible for getting leases of tank-bed lands. Local landless backward class people forming themselves into co-operative societies were given the highest preference, and we have no doubt that they form a class which the State may well encourage. It is not only open to the State but may be desirable that local landless backward class members should be given special advantages more so when they form themselves into co-operatives, and we see a fulfilment of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution in this Government memorandum of December, 1953. However, we are not concerned with any aspect of this Government memorandum except to this extent that it has been passed in supersession of Ex.D of 1931.8. The sole point that falls for decision is whether the High Court right in holding that the Government resolution of 1931 confers on the writ petitioners (respondents 4 and 5 herein) a right "to cultivate the lands in perpetuity conditionally on the payment of the amounts due on account of the land revenue for the same and on the fulfilment of the other terms incorporated in Ex.D". Certainly, if an indefeasible right in property has been vested in the petitioners, as the High Court thinks, there may be something to be said in favour of its ultimate finding, but we have no doubt whatever that the land belonged to Government, that it was free to give leases or rights to cultivate to whomsoever it chose, that its policies could change from time to time in accordance with its own social objectives and that any order modifying or nullifying the earlier policy decision by a subsequent resolution cannot be deprivatory of anyones rights. At the most, the 1931 decision of Government raised hopes and expectations. What is more, the right to cultivate was precarious and seasonal depending on the recession of the water level during summer, and it is impossible to predicate the vesting of any right in the adjoining owners on the strength of Ex.D. In short, the writ petitioners had no right to property created in their favour by Ex.D of 1931, and in its absence the writ petition itself was unsustainable.9. If every policy statement or direction of Government regarding disposal of State Government were construed as irreversibly creating right to property in prospective beneficiaries strange consequences would follow. An administrative decision of the last century would hold Government prisoner perpetually and deny it the power to alter its policies and programmes, according to its understanding of the needs of the people. Moreoever, how can an interest in immovable property and that in perpetuity - be created by a mere Government proceeding? Nor could the Bombay Land Revenue Code confer such right in real property, merely from the circumstance that seasonal cultivation was permitted by the State to be carried on by neighbouring landholders. The provisions of the Code pressed into inept service by the contesting respondents cannot by statutory operation transform an ephemeral permission to cultivate Government land into a permanent estate in it. For we cannot predicate a tenure, much less an unlimited tenure here, as contemplated in Section 68. It is a curious social sidelight of this erroneous construction that even if tank beds and reservoirs get silted up by ploughing up the top soil the State will be helpless to prevent it even though the area is part of the irrigation project.10. The village of Gudas, in which the property is situate, eventually became a part of the State of Karnataka on the reorganisation of States on November 1, 1956. It was thereafter that on August 24, 1967 the appellant co-operative society was registered, professedly formed by landless labourers belonging to backward communities in Gudas village. The society made an application for the grant of the lands in dispute on lease and the Tehsildar did grant it on September 4, 1967. The term of the said lease was 10 years, and the lease itself was executed on September 15, 1967. Thereupon the adjacent owners, who would have enjoyed a preferential right under Ex.D, moved the Government for cancellation of the lease granted by the Tehsildar in favour of the appellant and for the grant of the lease in their favour. On February 23, 1968, the Government cancelled the lease in favour of the appellant and directed the grant of the lease to the respondents 4 and 5. When this cancellation of the appellants lease came to its notice. Government was moved for reconsideration of its policy decision and for regrant of the lease in the societys favour. The social policy of Government swayed it in favour of the appellant society and on July 17, 1968, the impugned order was passed by the first respondent the Government directing the Divisional Commissioner to grant the lease of the lands in question in favour of the appellant society. It was this order which was successfully challenged in the High Court by the present respondents 4 and 5.11. We have already observed that neither the 1931 resolution nor the 1953 memorandum creates rights in any person. Government has laid down its policy from time to time in these resolution. Since respondents 4 and 5 could not found a claim for a grant of lease or a right in property based on Ex.D, the allowance of the writ petition by the High Court was clearly wrong. Nor are we disposed to think that we should decide the rights of the appellant before us and in any case the period of the lease granted in favour of the appellant society has expired.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]7. As pointed out above, adjoining owners enjoyed a weightage in getting the lands for seasonal cultivation under the 1931 resolution of Government but that stood superseded by the 1953 memorandum of Government which give a list of priorities in regard to persons who should be eligible for getting leases oflands. Local landless backward class people forming themselves intosocieties were given the highest preference, and we have no doubt that they form a class which the State may well encourage. It is not only open to the State but may be desirable that local landless backward class members should be given special advantages more so when they form themselves intoand we see a fulfilment of the Directive Principles of State Policy in Part IV of the Constitution in this Government memorandum of December, 1953. However, we are not concerned with any aspect of this Government memorandum except to this extent that it has been passed in supersession of Ex.D of 1931.8. The sole point that falls for decision is whether the High Court right in holding that the Government resolution of 1931 confers on the writ petitioners (respondents 4 and 5 herein) a right "to cultivate the lands in perpetuity conditionally on the payment of the amounts due on account of the land revenue for the same and on the fulfilment of the other terms incorporated in Ex.D". Certainly, if an indefeasible right in property has been vested in the petitioners, as the High Court thinks, there may be something to be said in favour of its ultimate finding, but we have no doubt whatever that the land belonged to Government, that it was free to give leases or rights to cultivate to whomsoever it chose, that its policies could change from time to time in accordance with its own social objectives and that any order modifying or nullifying the earlier policy decision by a subsequent resolution cannot be deprivatory of anyones rights. At the most, the 1931 decision of Government raised hopes and expectations. What is more, the right to cultivate was precarious and seasonal depending on the recession of the water level during summer, and it is impossible to predicate the vesting of any right in the adjoining owners on the strength of Ex.D. In short, the writ petitioners had no right to property created in their favour by Ex.D of 1931, and in its absence the writ petition itself was unsustainable.9. If every policy statement or direction of Government regarding disposal of State Government were construed as irreversibly creating right to property in prospective beneficiaries strange consequences would follow. An administrative decision of the last century would hold Government prisoner perpetually and deny it the power to alter its policies and programmes, according to its understanding of the needs of the people. Moreoever, how can an interest in immovable property and that in perpetuitybe created by a mere Government proceeding? Nor could the Bombay Land Revenue Code confer such right in real property, merely from the circumstance that seasonal cultivation was permitted by the State to be carried on by neighbouring landholders. The provisions of the Code pressed into inept service by the contesting respondents cannot by statutory operation transform an ephemeral permission to cultivate Government land into a permanent estate in it. For we cannot predicate a tenure, much less an unlimited tenure here, as contemplated in Section 68. It is a curious social sidelight of this erroneous construction that even if tank beds and reservoirs get silted up by ploughing up the top soil the State will be helpless to prevent it even though the area is part of the irrigation project.10. The village of Gudas, in which the property is situate, eventually became a part of the State of Karnataka on the reorganisation of States on November 1, 1956. It was thereafter that on August 24, 1967 the appellantsociety was registered, professedly formed by landless labourers belonging to backward communities in Gudas village. The society made an application for the grant of the lands in dispute on lease and the Tehsildar did grant it on September 4, 1967. The term of the said lease was 10 years, and the lease itself was executed on September 15, 1967. Thereupon the adjacent owners, who would have enjoyed a preferential right under Ex.D, moved the Government for cancellation of the lease granted by the Tehsildar in favour of the appellant and for the grant of the lease in their favour. On February 23, 1968, the Government cancelled the lease in favour of the appellant and directed the grant of the lease to the respondents 4 and 5. When this cancellation of the appellants lease came to its notice. Government was moved for reconsideration of its policy decision and for regrant of the lease in the societys favour. The social policy of Government swayed it in favour of the appellant society and on July 17, 1968, the impugned order was passed by the first respondent the Government directing the Divisional Commissioner to grant the lease of the lands in question in favour of the appellant society. It was this order which was successfully challenged in the High Court by the present respondents 4 and 5.11. We have already observed that neither the 1931 resolution nor the 1953 memorandum creates rights in any person. Government has laid down its policy from time to time in these resolution. Since respondents 4 and 5 could not found a claim for a grant of lease or a right in property based on Ex.D, the allowance of the writ petition by the High Court was clearly wrong. Nor are we disposed to think that we should decide the rights of the appellant before us and in any case the period of the lease granted in favour of the appellant society has expired.