Case: ENGINEERING ANALYSIS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX &amp; ANR

108. After taking cognizance of these observations, the Committee considers that the option of withholding tax offers a practical way of allocating partial taxing rights in respect of income from digital economy, which shares attributes that may be similar to royalty or fee for technical services, and which can be complied in respect of B2B transactions by the process of withholding. However, such a tax on income would be feasible only if it is included in the tax treaties, which take precedence over Indian domestic laws, unless it is designed as a tax on the gross payment. (emphasis supplied) 162. These reports also do not carry the matter much further as they are recommendatory reports expressing the views of the committee members, which the Government of India may accept or reject. When it comes to DTAA provisions, even if the position put forth in the aforementioned reports were to be accepted, a DTAA would have to be bilaterally amended before any such recommendation can become law in force for the purposes of the Income Tax Act. 163. The learned Additional Solicitor General also sought to rely on a decision of the Audiencia Nacional (Spanish National Court) in Case No. 207019/1990 dated 28.02.1995 and a decision of the Tribunal Supremo (Spanish Supreme Court) in Case No. 8066/1994 dated 02.10.1999. Quite apart from the fact that he only presented certain extracts and not the entire judgment rendered in these cases, these authorities have no relevance to the appeals before us, having been decided on the basis of the taxation law of Spain. 164. The learned Additional Solicitor General then referred to the judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Customs v. G.M. Exports, (2016) 1 SCC 91, and in particular on the four propositions that were culled out in the context of the levy of an anti-dumping duty in consonance with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1994, as follows: 23. A conspectus of the aforesaid authorities would lead to the following conclusions: (1) Article 51(c) of the Constitution of India is a directive principle of State policy which states that the State shall endeavour to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. As a result, rules of international law which are not contrary to domestic law are followed by the courts in this country. This is a situation in which there is an international treaty to which India is not a signatory or general rules of international law are made applicable. It is in this situation that if there happens to be a conflict between domestic law and international law, domestic law will prevail. (2) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is passed pursuant to the said treaty, it is a legitimate aid to the construction of the provisions of such statute that are vague or ambiguous to have recourse to the terms of the treaty to resolve such ambiguity in favour of a meaning that is consistent with the provisions of the treaty. (3) In a situation where India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made in furtherance of such treaty, a purposive rather than a narrow literal construction of such statute is preferred. The interpretation of such a statute should be construed on broad principles of general acceptance rather than earlier domestic precedents, being intended to carry out treaty obligations, and not to be inconsistent with them. (4) In a situation in which India is a signatory nation to an international treaty, and a statute is made to enforce a treaty obligation, and if there be any difference between the language of such statute and a corresponding provision of the treaty, the statutory language should be construed in the same sense as that of the treaty. This is for the reason that in such cases what is sought to be achieved by the international treaty is a uniform international code of law which is to be applied by the courts of all the signatory nations in a manner that leads to the same result in all the signatory nations. 165. The conclusions in the aforestated paragraph have no direct relevance to the facts at hand as the effect of section 90(2) of the Income Tax Act, read with explanation 4 thereof, is to treat the DTAA provisions as the law that must be followed by Indian courts, notwithstanding what may be contained in the Income Tax Act to the contrary, unless more beneficial to the assessee. For all these reasons therefore, these submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General are rejected. 166. At this juncture, it is also important to point out that vide Circular No. 10/2002 dated 09.10.2002, the Revenue, after referring to section 195 of the Income Tax Act and deciding that a No Objection Certificate from the Department would not be necessary if the person making the remittance is to submit an undertaking along with the certificate of an accountant to the Reserve Bank of India [RBI], has itself made a distinction in the proforma of the certificate to be issued in Annexure B to the aforesaid Circular, between remittances for royalties (see Row No. 5) and remittances for supply of articles or computer software (see Row No. 7), as follows: ANNEXURE B CERTIFICATE Table (emphasis supplied) 167. The Revenue, therefore, when referring to royalties under the DTAA, makes a distinction between such royalties, no doubt in the context of technical services, and remittances for supply of computer software, which is then treated as business profits, taxable under the relevant DTAA depending upon whether there is a PE through which the assessee operates in India. This is one more circumstance to show that the Revenue has itself appreciated the difference between the payment of royalty and the supply/use of computer software in the form of goods, which is then treated as business income of the assessee taxable in India if it has a PE in India. CONCLUSION

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]25. The scheme of the Income Tax Act, insofar as the question raised before us is concerned, is that for income to be taxed under the Income Tax Act, residence in India, as defined by section 6, is necessary in most cases. By section 4(1), income tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates, as defined by section 2(37A) of the Income Tax Act, in respect of the total income of the previous year of every person. Under section 4(2), in respect of income chargeable under sub-section (1) thereof, income tax shall be deducted at source or paid in advance, depending upon the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Importantly, under section 5(2) of the Income Tax Act, the total income of a person who is a non-resident, includes all income from whatever source derived, which accrues or arises or is deemed to accrue or arise to such person in India during such year. This, however, is subject to the provisions of the Income Tax Act. Certain income is deemed to arise or accrue in India, under section 9 of the Income Tax Act, notwithstanding the fact that such income may accrue or arise to a non-resident outside India. One such income is income by way of royalty, which, under section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, means the transfer of all or any rights, including the granting of a licence, in respect of any copyright in a literary work.26. That such transaction may be governed by a DTAA is then recognized by section 5(2) read with section 90 of the Income Tax Act, making it clear that the Central Government may enter into any such agreement with the government of another country so as to grant relief in respect of income tax chargeable under the Income Tax Act or under any corresponding law in force in that foreign country, or for the avoidance of double taxation of income under the Income Tax Act and under the corresponding law in force in that country. What is of importance is that once a DTAA applies, the provisions of the Income Tax Act can only apply to the extent that they are more beneficial to the assessee and not otherwise. Further, by explanation 4 to section 90 of the Income Tax Act, it has been clarified by the Parliament that where any term is defined in a DTAA, the definition contained in the DTAA is to be looked at. It is only where there is no such definition that the definition in the Income Tax Act can then be applied. This position has been recognised by this Court in Azadi Bachao Andolan (supra), which held:21. The provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are expressly made subject to the provisions of this Act, which would include Section 90 of the Act. As to what would happen in the event of a conflict between the provision of the Income Tax Act and a notification issued under Section 90, is no longer res integra.28. A survey of the aforesaid cases makes it clear that the judicial consensus in India has been that Section 90 is specifically intended to enable and empower the Central Government to issue a notification for implementation of the terms of a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. When that happens, the provisions of such an agreement, with respect to cases to which they apply, would operate even if inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. We approve of the reasoning in the decisions which we have noticed. If it was not the intention of the legislature to make a departure from the general principle of chargeability to tax under Section 4 and the general principle of ascertainment of total income under Section 5 of the Act, then there was no purpose in making those sections subject to the provisions of the Act. The very object of grafting the said two sections with the said clause is to enable the Central Government to issue a notification under Section 90 towards implementation of the terms of DTACs which would automatically override the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the matter of ascertainment of chargeability to income tax and ascertainment of total income, to the extent of inconsistency with the terms of DTAC.27. The machinery provision contained in section 195 of the Income Tax Act is inextricably linked with the charging provision contained in section 9 read with section 4 of the Income Tax Act, as a result of which, a person resident in India, responsible for paying a sum of money, chargeable under the provisions of [the] Act, to a non-resident, shall at the time of credit of such amount to the account of the payee in any mode, deduct tax at source at the rate in force which, under section 2(37A)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, is the rate in force prescribed by the DTAA. Importantly, such deduction is only to be made if the non- resident is liable to pay tax under the charging provision contained in section 9 read with section 4 of the Income Tax Act, read with the DTAA. Thus, it is only when the non-resident is liable to pay income tax in India on income deemed to arise in India and no deduction of TDS is made under section 195(1) of the Income Tax Act, or such person has, after applying section 195(2) of the Income Tax Act, not deducted such proportion of tax as is required, that the consequences of a failure to deduct and pay, reflected in section 201 of the Income Tax Act, follow, by virtue of which the resident-payee is deemed an assessee in default, and thus, is made liable to pay tax, interest and penalty thereon. This position is also made amply clear by the referral order in the concerned appeals from the High Court of Karnataka, namely, the judgment of this Court in GE Technology (supra).31. It will be seen that section 194E of the Income Tax Act belongs to a set of various provisions which deal with TDS, without any reference to chargeability of tax under the Income Tax Act by the concerned non- resident assessee. This section is similar to sections 193 and 194 of the Income Tax Act by which deductions have to be made without any reference to the chargeability of a sum received by a non-resident assessee under the Income Tax Act. On the other hand, as has been noted in GE Technology (supra), at the heart of section 195 of the Income Tax Act is the fact that deductions can only be made if the non- resident assessee is liable to pay tax under the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the first place.32. Thus, the judgment of this Court in PILCOM (supra), dealing with a completely different provision in a completely different setting, has no application to the facts of this case.34. A reading of the aforesaid provisions leads to the following conclusions. Under section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, a literary work includes a computer programme and a computer programme has been defined under section 2(ffc) of the Copyright Act to mean a set of instructions expressed in words, codes, schemes or in any other form capable of causing a computer to perform a particular task or achieve a particular result.35. Though the expression copyright has not been defined separately in the definitions section of the Copyright Act, yet, section 14 makes it clear that copyright means the exclusive right, subject to the provisions of the Act, to do or authorise the doing of certain acts in respect of a work. When an author in relation to a literary work which includes a computer programme, creates such work, such author has the exclusive right, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act, to do or authorise the doing of several acts in respect of such work or any substantial part thereof. In the case of a computer programme, section 14(b) specifically speaks of two sets of acts – the seven acts enumerated in sub-clause (a) and the eighth act of selling or giving on commercial rental or offering for sale or for commercial rental any copy of the computer programme. Insofar as the seven acts that are set out in sub-clause (a) are concerned, they all delineate how the exclusive right that is with the owner of the copyright may be parted with, i.e., if there is any parting with the right to reproduce the work in any material form; the right to issue copies of the work to the public, not being copies already in circulation; the right to perform the work in public or communicate it to the public; the right to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work; the right to make any translation of the work; the right to make any adaptation of the work; or the right to do any of the specified acts in relation to a translation or an adaptation.36. In essence, such right is referred to as copyright, and includes the right to reproduce the work in any material form, issue copies of the work to the public, perform the work in public, or make translations or adaptations of the work. This is made even clearer by the definition of an infringing copy contained in section 2(m) of the Copyright Act, which in relation to a computer programme, i.e., a literary work, means reproduction of the said work. Thus, the right to reproduce a computer programme and exploit the reproduction by way of sale, transfer, license etc. is at the heart of the said exclusive right.What is conspicuous by its absence is the phrase regardless of whether such copy has been sold or given on hire on earlier occasions.38. Importantly, no copyright exists in India outside the provisions of the Copyright Act or any other special law for the time being in force, vide section 16 of the Copyright Act. When the owner of copyright in a literary work assigns wholly or in part, all or any of the rights contained in section 14(a) and (b) of the Copyright Act, in the said work for a consideration, the assignee of such right becomes entitled to all such rights comprised in the copyright that is assigned, and shall be treated as the owner of the copyright of what is assigned to him (see section 18(2) read with section 19(3) of the Copyright Act). Also, under section 30 of the Copyright Act, the owner of the copyright in any literary work may grant any interest in any right mentioned in section 14(a) of the Copyright Act by licence in writing by him to the licensee, under which, for parting with such interest, royalty may become payable (see section 30A of the Copyright Act). When such licence is granted, copyright is infringed when any use, relatable to the said interest/right that is licensed, is contrary to the conditions of the licence so granted. Infringement of copyright takes place when a person makes for sale or hire or sells or lets for hire or offers for sale or hire or distributes…so as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, vide section 51(b) of the Copyright Act. Importantly, the making of copies or adaptation of a computer programme in order to utilise the said computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, or to make up back-up copies as a temporary protection against loss, destruction or damage so as to be able to utilise the computer programme for the purpose for which it was supplied, does not constitute an act of infringement of copyright under section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act. In short, what is referred to in section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act would not amount to reproduction so as to amount to an infringement of copyright.39. Section 52(1)(ad) is independent of section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act, and states that the making of copies of a computer programme from a personally legally obtained copy for non-commercial personal use would not amount to an infringement of copyright. However, it is not possible to deduce from this what is sought to be deduced by the learned Additional Solicitor General, namely, that if personally legally obtained copies of a computer programme are to be exploited for commercial use, it would necessarily amount to an infringement of copyright. Section 52(1)(ad) of the Copyright Act cannot be read to negate the effect of section 52(1)(aa), since it deals with a subject matter that is separate and distinct from that contained in section 52(1)(aa) of the Copyright Act.42. The subject matter of each of the DTAAs with which we are concerned is income tax payable in India and a foreign country. Importantly, as is now reflected by explanation 4 to section 90 of the Income Tax Act and under Article 3(2) of the DTAA, the definition of the term royalties shall have the meaning assigned to it by the DTAA, meaning thereby that the expression royalty, when occurring in section 9 of the Income Tax Act, has to be construed with reference to Article 12 of the DTAA.43. Thus, by virtue of Article 12(3) of the DTAA, royalties are payments of any kind received as consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of a literary work, which includes a computer programme or software.45. A reading of the aforesaid distribution agreement would show that what is granted to the distributor is only a non-exclusive, non-transferable licence to resell computer software, it being expressly stipulated that no copyright in the computer programme is transferred either to the distributor or to the ultimate end-user. This is further amplified by stating that apart from a right to use the computer programme by the end-user himself, there is no further right to sub-license or transfer, nor is there any right to reverse-engineer, modify, reproduce in any manner otherwise than permitted by the licence to the end-user. What is paid by way of consideration, therefore, by the distributor in India to the foreign, non-resident manufacturer or supplier, is the price of the computer programme as goods, either in a medium which stores the software or in a medium by which software is embedded in hardware, which may be then further resold by the distributor to the end-user in India, the distributor making a profit on such resale. Importantly, the distributor does not get the right to use the product at all.46. When it comes to an end-user who is directly sold the computer programme, such end-user can only use it by installing it in the computer hardware owned by the end-user and cannot in any manner reproduce the same for sale or transfer, contrary to the terms imposed by the EULA.47. In all these cases, the licence that is granted vide the EULA, is not a licence in terms of section 30 of the Copyright Act, which transfers an interest in all or any of the rights contained in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act, but is a licence which imposes restrictions or conditions for the use of computer software. Thus, it cannot be said that any of the EULAs that we are concerned with are referable to section 30 of the Copyright Act, inasmuch as section 30 of the Copyright Act speaks of granting an interest in any of the rights mentioned in sections 14(a) and 14(b) of the Copyright Act. The EULAs in all the appeals before us do not grant any such right or interest, least of all, a right or interest to reproduce the computer software. In point of fact, such reproduction is expressly interdicted, and it is also expressly stated that no vestige of copyright is at all transferred, either to the distributor or to the end-user. A simple illustration to explain the aforesaid position will suffice. If an English publisher sells 2000 copies of a particular book to an Indian distributor, who then resells the same at a profit, no copyright in the aforesaid book is transferred to the Indian distributor, either by way of licence or otherwise, inasmuch as the Indian distributor only makes a profit on the sale of each book. Importantly, there is no right in the Indian distributor to reproduce the aforesaid book and then sell copies of the same. On the other hand, if an English publisher were to sell the same book to an Indian publisher, this time with the right to reproduce and make copies of the aforesaid book with the permission of the author, it can be said that copyright in the book has been transferred by way of licence or otherwise, and what the Indian publisher will pay for, is the right to reproduce the book, which can then be characterised as royalty for the exclusive right to reproduce the book in the territory mentioned by the licence.48. An instructive judgment of this Court in this respect is to be found in State Bank of India v. Collector of Customs, (2000) 1 SCC 727 . In this case, the State Bank of India imported a consignment of computer software and manuals from Kindle Software Ltd., Dublin, Ireland, and cleared the goods for home consumption, and filed an application before the Additional Collector of Customs, claiming a refund of customs duty. After setting out section 14 of the Customs Act 1962 and rule 9(1)(c) of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988, the Court stated:9. Now, if we refer to the interpretative note relating to Rule 9(1)(c) it says that royalties and licence fees may include, among other things, payments in respect to patents, trademarks and copyrights. There is, however, an exception which says that the charges for the right to reproduce the imported goods in the country of importation shall not be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods in determining the customs value. Further payments made by the buyer for the right to distribute or resell the imported goods shall not be added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods if such payments are not a condition of the sale for the exports to the country of importation of the imported goods.11. What we have now to see is if under the agreement SBI has the right to reproduce the imported software and for that purpose SBI has paid royalties and licence fee which have been added to the price actually paid for the imported software for use at the principal place called the Support Centre. If that is so under the press note no customs duty is leviable on the royalty so paid. This takes us to the relevant terms of the agreement which would indicate as to whether or not the royalty/licence fees needed to be included in the value of the imported goods.49. The contention of the State Bank of India that the countrywide licence fee paid by it by way of royalty was for the reproduction of the said software and was thus exempt from customs duty, was turned down by this Court as follows:17. The question that arises for consideration is if licence fee charged towards countrywide use of software in the second invoice could be the charges for the right to reproduction and were these added to the price actually paid or payable for the imported goods. If we refer to the agreement, software is not sold to SBI as such but it was to remain the property of Kindle. There is no other value of the software indicated in the agreement except the licence fee. Price is payable only for allowing SBI to use the software in a limited way at its own centres for a limited period and that is why the amount charged is called the licence fee. After five years SBI is required to pay only recurring licence fee. Countrywide use of the software and reproduction of software are two different things and licence fee for countrywide use cannot be considered as the charges for the right to reproduce the imported goods. Under the agreement copying, storage, removal, etc. are under the strict control of Kindle and all copies are the property of Kindle. SBI can use the software for its internal requirements only. Licence has been given to SBI to use the property of Kindle at its branches and not for reproduction of the software as claimed by SBI. The words in the agreement are specific that SBI shall pay the licensor the initial licence fee and the recurring licence fees for use under the provisions of this agreement.50. The Court then made an important observation, stating:21. Reproduction and use are two different things. Now under the agreement user is specifically limited to licence sites. The transaction as a whole is to be seen. The press note is of no help to SBI. Rule 9(1)(c) and the interpretative note thereto did not apply as nothing was added to the price actually paid for the imported goods by way of royalties etc. Refund would be allowable only if there was something added on to the royalty payment which was not in the present case. The invoice originally presented was complete in itself. The second invoice was not filed along with the bill of entry. In the second invoice also it is the licence fee for the right to use countrywide and it is not the right to reproduce as claimed by SBI. Schedule I to the agreement is module and copies are modalities for the use of software by SBI with various restrictions. If we again refer to clause 6.4 of the agreement there is a complete restraint on SBI which says SBI shall not use, print, copy, reproduce or disclose the software or documentation in whole or in part except as is expressly permitted by the agreement nor shall SBI permit any of the foregoing. SBI is also barred from allowing access to its software or documentation except what is permitted under the agreement. Again SBI is barred from selling, charging or otherwise making the software or documentation available to any person except what is expressly permitted under the agreement. Clause 6.5 of the agreement says that SBI shall not copy or permit copying of the software supplied to it by Kindle save as may be strictly required for delivery to licence sites. The terms of the agreement also apply to the copies.Though this judgment has been delivered under the Customs Act 1962, yet the important differentiation made between the right to reproduce and the right to use computer software has been recognized by this judgment. Whereas the former would amount to a parting of copyright by the owner thereof, the latter would not.This argument has no legs to stand on. It is settled law that in all such cases, the real nature of the transaction must be looked at upon reading the agreement as a whole. Thus, in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1966) 2 SCR 828 , one of the questions that was raised before this Court was as to the execution of a sale letter acknowledging the sale of a vehicle. This sale letter was dealt with by the Court as follows:The appellants are financiers and their business is to advance loans on favourable terms on the security of vehicles. This is effected by obtaining a promissory-note for repayment of the amount advanced, and a hire-purchase agreement which provides a mechanism for recovery of the amount. It is true that a sale letter is obtained from the customer, but the consideration for the sale letter is only the balance remaining payable to the dealer, after giving credit against the price of the vehicle the amount paid by the customer. The application for a loan, and the letter addressed to the appellants undertaking to insure the vehicle expressly mention that a loan is asked for and granted on the security of the motor-vehicle under the hire- purchase agreement. It is the customer who insures the vehicle, and in the books of the Motor Vehicle Authorities he remains, with the consent of the appellants, owner of the vehicle. Undue importance to the acknowledgment of sale in the sale letter and the recital of sale in the bill and in the receipt cannot therefore be attached. These documents — sale letter, bill and receipt — must be read with the application for granting a loan on the security of the vehicles, the letter in which the customer requests the appellants to pay the balance of the price remaining to be paid by him to the dealer, the promissory-note executed by him for that amount, the undertaking to insure the vehicle, and intimation to the Motor Vehicles Authorities to make note of the hire- purchase agreement.The true effect of a transaction may be determined from the terms of the agreement considered in the light of the surrounding circumstances. In each case, the Court has, unless prohibited by statute, power to go behind the documents and to determine the nature of the transaction, whatever may be the form of the documents. An owner of goods who purports absolutely to convey or acknowledges to have conveyed goods and subsequently purports to hire them under a hire-purchase agreement is not estopped from proving that the real bargain was a loan on the security of the goods. If there is a bona fide and completed sale of goods, evidenced by documents, anterior to and independent of a subsequent and distinct hiring to the vendor, the transaction may not be regarded as a loan transaction, even though the reason for which it was entered into was to raise money. If the real transaction is a loan of money secured by a right of seizure of the goods, the property ostensibly passes under the documents embodying the transaction, but subject to the terms of the hiring agreement, which become part of the buyers title, and confer a licence to seize. When a person desiring to purchase goods and not having sufficient money on hand borrows the amount needed from a third person and pays it over to the vendor, the transaction between the customer and the lender will unquestionably be a loan transaction. The real character of the transaction would not be altered if the lender himself is the owner of the goods and the owner accepts the promise of the purchaser to pay the price or the balance remaining due against delivery of goods. But a hire- purchase agreement is a more complex transaction. The owner under the hire-purchase agreement enters into a transaction of hiring out goods on the terms and conditions set out in the agreement, and the option to purchase exercisable by the customer on payment of all the instalments of hire arises when the instalments are paid and not before. In such a hire-purchase agreement there is no agreement to buy goods; the hirer being under no legal obligation to buy, has an option either to return the goods or to become its owner by payment in full of the stipulated hire and the price for exercising the option. This class of hire- purchase agreements must be distinguished from transactions in which the customer is the owner of the goods and with a view to finance his purchase he enters into an arrangement which is in the form of a hire-purchase agreement with the financier, but in substance evidences a loan transaction, subject to a hiring agreement under which the lender is given the license to seize the goods.In the light of these principles the true nature of the transactions of the appellants may now be stated. The appellants are carrying on the business of financiers: they are not dealing in motor-vehicles. The motor-vehicle purchased by the customer is registered in the name of the customer and remains at all material times so registered in his name. In the letter taken from the customer under which the latter agrees to keep the vehicle insured, it is expressly recited that the vehicle has been given as security for the loan advanced by the appellants. As a security for repayment of the loan, the customer executes a promissory- note for the amount paid by the appellants to the dealer of the vehicle. The so-called sale letter is a formal document which is not made effective by registering the vehicle in the name of the appellants and even the insurance of the vehicle has to be effected as if the customer is the owner. Their right to seize the vehicle is merely a licence to ensure compliance with the terms of the hire-purchase agreement. The customer remains qua the world at large the owner and remains in possession, and on condition of performing the covenants, has a right to continue to remain in possession. The right of the appellants may be extinguished by payment of the amount due to them under the terms of the hire- purchase agreement even before the dates fixed for payment. The agreement undoubtedly contains several onerous covenants, but they are all intended to secure to the appellants recovery of the amount advanced. We are accordingly of the view that the intention of the appellants in obtaining the hire-purchase and the allied agreements was to secure the return of loans advanced to their customers, and no real sale of the vehicle was intended by the customer to the appellants. The transactions were merely financing transactions.52. There can be no doubt as to the real nature of the transactions in the appeals before us. What is licensed by the foreign, non-resident supplier to the distributor and resold to the resident end-user, or directly supplied to the resident end-user, is in fact the sale of a physical object which contains an embedded computer programme, and is therefore, a sale of goods, which, as has been correctly pointed out by the learned counsel for the assessees, is the law declared by this Court in the context of a sales tax statute in Tata Consultancy Services v. State of A.P., 2005 (1) SCC 308 (see paragraph 27).54. There is no doubt that section 9 of the Income Tax Act refers to persons who are non-residents and taxes their income as income which is deemed to accrue or arise in India, thus, making such persons assessees under the Income Tax Act, who are liable to pay tax. There is also no doubt that the person responsible for paying spoken of in section 195 of the Income Tax Act is not a non-resident assessee, but a person resident in India, who is liable to make deductions under section 195 of the Income Tax Act when payments are made by it to the non-resident assessee. The submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General is answered by the judgment of this Court in GE Technology (supra). This judgment, after setting out section 195 of the Income Tax Act, held:8. The most important expression in Section 195(1) consists of the words chargeable under the provisions of the Act. A person paying interest or any other sum to a non- resident is not liable to deduct tax if such sum is not chargeable to tax under the IT Act. For instance, where there is no obligation on the part of the payer and no right to receive the sum by the recipient and that the payment does not arise out of any contract or obligation between the payer and the recipient but is made voluntarily, such payments cannot be regarded as income under the IT Act.9. It may be noted that Section 195 contemplates not merely amounts, the whole of which are pure income payments, it also covers composite payments which have an element of income embedded or incorporated in them. Thus, where an amount is payable to a non-resident, the payer is under an obligation to deduct TAS in respect of such composite payments. The obligation to deduct TAS is, however, limited to the appropriate proportion of income chargeable under the Act forming part of the gross sum of money payable to the non-resident. This obligation being limited to the appropriate proportion of income flows from the words used in Section 195(1), namely, chargeable under the provisions of the Act. It is for this reason that vide Circular No. 728 dated 30-10-1995 CBDT has clarified that the tax deductor can take into consideration the effect of DTAA in respect of payment of royalties and technical fees while deducting TAS. It may also be noted that Section 195(1) is in identical terms with Section 18(3-B) of the 1922 Act.11. While deciding the scope of Section 195(2) it is important to note that the tax which is required to be deducted at source is deductible only out of the chargeable sum. This is the underlying principle of Section 195. Hence, apart from Section 9(1), Sections 4, 5, 9, 90, 91 as well as the provisions of DTAA are also relevant, while applying tax deduction at source provisions.13. If the contention of the Department that the moment there is remittance the obligation to deduct TAS arises is to be accepted then we are obliterating the words chargeable under the provisions of the Act in Section 195(1). The said expression in Section 195(1) shows that the remittance has got to be of a trading receipt, the whole or part of which is liable to tax in India. The payer is bound to deduct TAS only if the tax is assessable in India. If tax is not so assessable, there is no question of TAS being deducted. (See Vijay Ship Breaking Corpn. v. CIT [(2010) 10 SCC 39 : (2009) 314 ITR 309 ] .)14. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. Section 195 falls in Chapter XVII which deals with collection and recovery. Chapter XVII-B deals with deduction at source by the payer. On analysis of various provisions of Chapter XVII one finds the use of different expressions, however, the expression sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act is used only in Section 195. For example, Section 194-C casts an obligation to deduct TAS in respect of any sum paid to any resident. Similarly, Sections 194-EE and 194-F inter alia provide for deduction of tax in respect of any amount referred to in the specified provisions. In none of the provisions we find the expression sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act, which as stated above, is an expression used only in Section 195(1). Therefore, this Court is required to give meaning and effect to the said expression. It follows, therefore, that the obligation to deduct TAS arises only when there is a sum chargeable under the Act.18. If the contention of the Department that any person making payment to a non-resident is necessarily required to deduct TAS then the consequence would be that the Department would be entitled to appropriate the monies deposited by the payer even if the sum paid is not chargeable to tax because there is no provision in the IT Act by which a payer can obtain refund. Section 237 read with Section 199 implies that only the recipient of the sum i.e. the payee could seek a refund. It must therefore follow, if the Department is right, that the law requires tax to be deducted on all payments. The payer, therefore, has to deduct and pay tax, even if the so-called deduction comes out of his own pocket and he has no remedy whatsoever, even where the sum paid by him is not a sum chargeable under the Act. The interpretation of the Department, therefore, not only requires the words chargeable under the provisions of the Act to be omitted, it also leads to an absurd consequence. The interpretation placed by the Department would result in a situation where even when the income has no territorial nexus with India or is not chargeable in India, the Government would nonetheless collect tax. In our view, Section 195(2) provides a remedy by which a person may seek a determination of the appropriate proportion of such sum so chargeable where a proportion of the sum so chargeable is liable to tax.20. We find no merit in these contentions. As stated hereinabove, Section 195(1) uses the expression sum chargeable under the provisions of the Act. We need to give weightage to those words. Further, Section 195 uses the word payer and not the word assessee. The payer is not an assessee. The payer becomes an assessee-in-default only when he fails to fulfil the statutory obligation under Section 195(1). If the payment does not contain the element of income the payer cannot be made liable. He cannot be declared to be an assessee-in-default.21. The abovementioned contention of the Department is based on an apprehension which is ill-founded. The payer is also an assessee under the ordinary provisions of the IT Act. When the payer remits an amount to a non-resident out of India he claims deduction or allowances under the Income Tax Act for the said sum as an expenditure. Under Section 40(a)(i), inserted vide the Finance Act, 1988 w.e.f. 1-4-1989, payment in respect of royalty, fees for technical services or other sums chargeable under the Income Tax Act would not get the benefit of deduction if the assessee fails to deduct TAS in respect of payments outside India which are chargeable under the IT Act. This provision ensures effective compliance with Section 195 of the IT Act relating to tax deduction at source in respect of payments outside India in respect of royalties, fees or other sums chargeable under the IT Act. In a given case where the payer is an assessee he will definitely claim deduction under the IT Act for such remittance and on inquiry if the AO finds that the sums remitted outside India come within the definition of royalty or fees for technical service or other sums chargeable under the IT Act then it would be open to the AO to disallow such claim for deduction. Similarly, vide the Finance Act, 2008 w.e.f. 1-4-2008 sub-section (6) has been inserted in Section 195 which requires the payer to furnish information relating to payment of any sum in such form and manner as may be prescribed by the Board. This provision is brought into force only from 1-4-2008. It will not apply for the period with which we are concerned in these cases before us. Therefore, in our view, there are adequate safeguards in the Act which would prevent revenue leakage.24. In our view, Section 195(2) is based on the principle of proportionality. The said sub-section gets attracted only in cases where the payment made is a composite payment in which a certain proportion of payment has an element of income chargeable to tax in India. It is in this context that the Supreme Court stated: (Transmission Corpn. case [(1999) 7 SCC 266 : (1999) 239 ITR 587 ] , SCC p. 274, para 10)10. … If no such application is filed income tax on such sum is to be deducted and it is the statutory obligation of the person responsible for paying such sum to deduct tax thereon before making payment. He has to discharge the obligation [to TDS].If one reads the observation of the Supreme Court, the words such sum clearly indicate that the observation refers to a case of composite payment where the payer has a doubt regarding the inclusion of an amount in such payment which is exigible to tax in India. In our view, the above observations of this Court in Transmission Corpn. case [(1999) 7 SCC 266 : (1999) 239 ITR 587 ] which is put in italics has been completely, with respect, misunderstood by the Karnataka High Court to mean that it is not open for the payer to contend that if the amount paid by him to the non-resident is not at all chargeable to tax in India, then no TAS is required to be deducted from such payment. This interpretation of the High Court completely loses sight of the plain words of Section 195(1) which in clear terms lays down that tax at source is deductible only from sums chargeable under the provisions of the IT Act i.e. chargeable under Sections 4, 5 and 9 of the IT Act.25. Before concluding we may clarify that in the present case on facts ITO(TDS) had taken the view that since the sale of the software concerned, included a licence to use the same, the payment made by the appellant(s) to foreign suppliers constituted royalty which was deemed to accrue or arise in India and, therefore, TAS was liable to be deducted under Section 195(1) of the Act. The said finding of ITO(TDS) was upheld by CIT(A). However, in the second appeal, ITAT held that such sum paid by the appellant(s) to the foreign software suppliers was not a royalty and that the same did not give rise to any income taxable in India and, therefore, the appellant(s) was not liable to deduct TAS. However, the High Court did not go into the merits of the case and it went straight to conclude that the moment there is remittance an obligation to deduct TAS arises, which view stands hereby overruled.55. What is made clear by the judgment in GE Technology (supra) is the fact that the person spoken of in section 195(1) of the Income Tax Act is liable to make the necessary deductions only if the non-resident is liable to pay tax as an assessee under the Income Tax Act, and not otherwise. This judgment also clarifies, after referring to CBDT Circular No. 728 dated 30.10.1995, that the tax deductor must take into consideration the effect of the DTAA provisions. The crucial link, therefore, is that a deduction is to be made only if tax is payable by the non-resident assessee, which is underscored by this judgment, stating that the charging and machinery provisions contained in sections 9 and 195 of the Income Tax Act are interlinked.56. This conclusion is also echoed in Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613,  wherein the following observations were made on the scope and applicability of section 195 of the Income Tax Act:171. Section 195 casts an obligation on the payer to deduct tax at source (TAS, for short) from payments made to non- residents which payments are chargeable to tax. Such payment(s) must have an element of income embedded in it which is chargeable to tax in India. If the sum paid or credited by the payer is not chargeable to tax then no obligation to deduct the tax would arise. Shareholding in companies incorporated outside India (CGP) is property located outside India. Where such shares become subject-matter of offshore transfer between two non-residents, there is no liability for capital gains tax. In such a case, question of deduction of TAS would not arise.172. If in law the responsibility for payment is on a non- resident, the fact that the payment was made, under the instructions of the non-resident, to its agent/nominee in India or its PE/Branch Office will not absolve the payer of his liability under Section 195 to deduct TAS. Section 195(1) casts a duty upon the payer of any income specified therein to a non-resident to deduct therefrom TAS unless such payer is himself liable to pay income tax thereon as an agent of the payee. Section 201 says that if such person fails to so deduct TAS he shall be deemed to be an assessee-in- default in respect of the deductible amount of tax (Section 201).173. Liability to deduct tax is different from assessment under the Act. Thus, the person on whom the obligation to deduct TAS is cast is not the person who has earned the income. Assessment has to be done after liability to deduct TAS has arisen. The object of Section 195 is to ensure that tax due from non-resident persons is secured at the earliest point of time so that there is no difficulty in collection of tax subsequently at the time of regular assessment.57. The absurd consequence that the resident in India, after making the deduction/payment, would not then get any excess payment made by way of refund when regular assessment takes place, as the non- resident assessee alone would be entitled to such refund, is also pointed out in paragraph 18 of the judgment in GE Technology (supra). It was after keeping all this in view that this Court then set aside the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated 24.09.2009 and remanded the case to the High Court for a decision of the question on merits, i.e., on the sole question as to whether the ITAT was justified in holding that the amounts paid by the appellants to the foreign software suppliers did not amount to royalty, as a result of which, no liability to deduct TDS arose.58. Even otherwise, a look at Article 12(2) of the India-Singapore DTAA would demonstrate the fallacy of the aforesaid submission of the learned Additional Solicitor General. Under Article 12(2) of the India- Singapore DTAA, royalties may be taxed in the Contracting State in which they arise (India) and according to the laws of that Contracting State (Indian laws), if the recipient is a beneficial owner of the royalties, and the tax so charged is capped at the rate of 10% or 15%. If the learned Additional Solicitor General is correct in his submission, as the DTAA would then not apply, royalty would be liable to be taxed in India at the rate mentioned in the Income Tax Act which can be much higher than the DTAA rate, as a result of which, the deduction made under section 195 of the Income Tax Act by the person responsible would have to be a proportion of a much higher sum than the tax that is ultimately payable by the non-resident assessee. This equally absurd result cannot be countenanced given the fact that the person liable to deduct tax is only liable to deduct tax first and foremost if the non- resident person is liable to pay tax, and second, that if so liable, is then liable to deduct tax depending on the rate mentioned in the DTAA.59. Further, tearing an article of a specific DTAA, namely Article 30 of the India-USA DTAA, out of context in order to buttress his submission, in a manner far removed from the actual rationale behind that provision, does not commend itself to us.60. Obviously, the logic behind Article 30 of the India-USA DTAA is for reasons connected with USAs municipal taxation laws, and has nothing to do with Indian municipal law governing the liability of persons to deduct tax at source under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. This is reinforced by the fact that the OECD Commentary on Articles 30 and 31 acknowledges the fact that the entry into force provisions, unlike the rest of the provisions in the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, depend on the domestic laws of Contracting States, as follows:COMMENTARY ON ARTICLES 30 AND 31 CONCERNING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE AND THE TERMINATION OF THE CONVENTION3. It is open to Contracting States to agree that the Convention shall enter into force when a specified period has elapsed after the exchange of the instruments of ratification or after the confirmation that each State has completed the procedures required for such entry into force.4. No provisions have been drafted as to the date on which the Convention shall have effect or cease to have effect, since such provisions would largely depend on the domestic laws of the Contracting States concerned. Some of the States assess tax on the income received during the current year, others on the income received during the previous year, others again have a fiscal year which differs from the calendar year. Furthermore, some conventions provide, as regards taxes levied by deduction at the source, a date for the application or termination which differs from the date applying to taxes levied by assessment.61. For all these reasons, we do not permit the learned Additional Solicitor General to have a second bite at the same cherry, albeit through the ingenious argument made by him based on Article 30 of the India-USA DTAA.62. In order to ascertain whether the question which was posed by this Court in GE Technology (supra) was correctly answered by the High Court of Karnataka vide the impugned judgment dated 15.10.2011,(CIT v. Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., (2012) 345 ITR 494.) the first expression that has to be considered by us is the expression royalty.63. Firstly, it will be seen that when Article 12 of the India-Singapore DTAA defines the term royalties in sub-article (3) thereof, it does so stating that such definition is exhaustive – it uses the expression means. Secondly, the term royalties refers to payments of any kind that are received as a consideration for the use of or the right to use any copyright in a literary work. As opposed to this, the definition contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, is wider in at least three respects:i. It speaks of consideration, but also includes a lump-sum consideration which would not amount to income of the recipient chargeable under the head capital gains;ii. When it speaks of the transfer of all or any rights, it expresslyincludes the granting of a licence in respect thereof; andiii. It states that such transfer must be in respect of any copyright of any literary work.64. However, even where such transfer is in respect of copyright, the transfer of all or any rights in relation to copyright is a sine qua non under explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act. In short, there must be transfer by way of licence or otherwise, of all or any of the rights mentioned in section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the Copyright Act.65. In State of Madras v. Swastik Tobacco Factory, (1966) 3 SCR 79 , this Court construed the words in respect of used in rule 5(1)(i) of the Madras General Sales Tax (Turnover and Assessment) Rules 1939, as follows:The House of Lords in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Coutts & Co. [(1963) 2 All ER 722, 732], in the context of payment of estate duty, construed the words in respect of in Section 5(2) of the Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict, c. 30) and observed that the phrase denoted some imprecise kind of nexus between the property and the estate duty. The House of Lords in Asher v. Seaford Court Estates Ltd. [LR 1950 AC 608] in construing the provisions of Section 2, sub- section (3) of Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 17), held that theexpression in respect of m ust be read as equivalent toattributable. The Privy Council in Bicher Ltd. v. CIT [(1962) 3 All ER 294] observed that the said words could mean more than consisting of or namely.It is not necessary to refer to other decisions. It may be accepted that the said expression received a wide interpretation, having regard to the object of the provisions and the setting in which the said words appeared. On the other hand, Indian tax laws use the expression in respect of as synonymous with the expression on: see Article 288 of the Constitution of India; Section 3 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922; Sections 3(2) and 3(5), Second Proviso, of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939; Section 3(1-A) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944; and Section 9 of the Kerala Sales Tax Act. We should not be understood to have construed the said provisions, but only have referred to them to state the legislative practice. Consistent with the said practice, Rule 5(1)(i) of the Rules uses the same expression. When the said Rule says excise duty paid in respect of the goods, the excise duty referred to is the excise duty paid under Section 3(1), read with the Schedule of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (1 of 1944). Under the said Section, read with the Schedule, excise duty is levied on the goods described in the Schedule. Therefore, when Rule 5(1)(i) of the Rules refers to the duty paid in respect of the goods to the Central Government, it necessarily refers to the duty paid on the goods mentioned in the Schedule. As the duty exempted from the gross turnover is the duty so paid under the Central Act, read with the Schedule, the expression in respect of in the context can only mean excise duty paid on goods. In our view, the expression in respect of the goods in Rule 5(1)(i) of the Rules means only on the goods. Even if the word attributable is substituted for the words in respect of, the result will not be different, for the duty paid shall be attributable to the goods. If it was paid on the raw material it can be attributable only to raw material and not to the goods. We, therefore, hold that only excise duty paid on the goods sold by the assessee is deductible from the gross turnover under Rule 5(1)(i) of the Rules.66. The aforesaid meaning accords with the meaning to be given to the expression in respect of contained in explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act.67. The insertion of sub-sections (v), (vi) and (vii) in section 9(1) of the Income Tax Act, by way of an amendment through the Finance Act 1976,(Act 66 of 1976, (w.e.f 1-6-1976).) was to introduce source-based taxation for income in the hands of a non-resident by way of interest, royalty and fees for technical services. In Carborandum & Co. v. CIT, (1977) 2 SCC 862,  this Court, applying residence-based rules of taxation, held that the technical service fees received by the non-resident assessee (relatable to the assessment year 1957-1958) could only be deemed to accrue in India if such income could be attributed to a business connection in India. In the facts of that case, since no part of the foreign assessees operations were carried on in India, the technical services being rendered wholly in foreign territory, it was held that no part of the technical service fees received by the foreign assessee accrued in India.69. Consequently, section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act was brought into force. The definition of royalty contained in explanation 2(v) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act includes the transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of any copyright, literary, artistic or scientific work.71. The transfer of all or any rights (including the granting of a licence) in respect of any copyright, in the context of computer software, is referable to sections 14(a), 14(b) and 30 of the Copyright Act. As has been held hereinabove, the expression in respect of is equivalent to in or attributable to. Thus, explanation 2(v) to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, when it speaks of all of any rights…in respect of copyright is certainly more expansive than the DTAA provision, which speaks of the use of, or the right to use any copyright. This has been recognised by the High Court of Delhi in CIT v. DCM Limited, ITA Nos. 87-89/1992 in its judgment dated 10.03.2011, as follows:9. A bare perusal of Article XIII(3) would show that the expression payments of any kind is circumscribed by the latter part of the definition which speaks of consideration received (including in the form of rentals) for use of or right to use intellectual properties. The Tribunal, in our view, rightly observed that the CIT(A) had erred in coming to the conclusion that the expression payments of any kind was broad enough to include even an outright sale. To drive home this point the Tribunal, once again, has correctly drawn a distinction between the definition of royalty as appearing in the DTAA and that which finds mention in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the I.T. Act. A perusal of the provisions of the said explanation would show that it brings within the ambit of royalty a wider range of transactions which would include payments made for transfer of all or any right in patents, inventions, model, design, etc. apart from payments based for use of such right, patent, innovation, model, design, secret formula or process or trade mark or similar property. As a matter of fact, a perusal of clause (i) of explanation 2 of section 9(1)(vi) of the I.T. Act would show that transfer of all or any right could take place by execution of licences as well, which was the methodology adopted by Tate and the assessee in the present case…72. However, when it comes to the expression use of, or the right to use, the same position would obtain under explanation 2(v) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, inasmuch as, there must, under the licence granted or sale made, be a transfer of any of the rights contained in sections 14(a) or 14(b) of the Copyright Act, for explanation 2(v) to apply. To this extent, there will be no difference in the position between the definition of royalties in the DTAAs and the definition of royalty in explanation 2(v) of section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act.73. Even if we were to consider the ambit of royalty only under the Income Tax Act on the footing that none of the DTAAs apply to the facts of these cases, the definition of royalty that is contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act would make it clear that there has to be a transfer of all or any rights which includes the grant of a licence in respect of any copyright in a literary work. The expression including the granting of a licence in clause (v) of explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, would necessarily mean a licence in which transfer is made of an interest in rights in respect of copyright, namely, that there is a parting with an interest in any of the rights mentioned in section 14(b) read with section 14(a) of the Copyright Act. To this extent, there will be no difference between the position under the DTAA and explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act.A reference to the Memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill 2012 set out hereinabove, would make it clear that the expression as mentioned in Explanation 2 in sub-para (i) of the aforesaid Memorandum shows that explanation 4 was inserted retrospectively to expand the scope of explanation 2(v). In any case, explanation 2(v) contains the expression, the transfer of all or any rights which is an expression that would subsume any right, property or information and is wider than the expression any right, property or information. It is therefore difficult to accept Shri Pardiwalas argument that explanation 4 does not expand the scope of the expression royalty as contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act.77. It is equally difficult to accept the learned Additional Solicitor Generals submission that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi)of the Income Tax Act is clarificatory of the position as it always stood, since 01.06.1976, for which he strongly relied upon CBDT Circular No. 152 dated 27.11.1974. Quite obviously, such a circular cannot apply as it would then be explanatory of a position that existed even before section 9(1)(vi) was actually inserted in the Income Tax Act vide the Finance Act 1976. Secondly, insofar as section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act relates to computer software, explanation 3 thereof, refers to computer software for the first time with effect from 01.04.1991, when it was introduced, which was then amended vide the Finance Act 2000. Quite clearly, explanation 4 cannot apply to any right for the use of or the right to use computer software even before the term computer software was inserted in the statute. Likewise, even qua section 2(o) of the Copyright Act, the term computer software was introduced for the first time in the definition of a literary work, and defined under section 2(ffc) only in 1994 (vide Act 38 of 1994).78. Furthermore, it is equally ludicrous for the aforesaid amendment which also inserted explanation 6 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, to apply with effect from 01.06.1976, when technology relating to transmission by a satellite, optic fibre or other similar technology, was only regulated by the Parliament for the first time through the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, much after 1976. For all these reasons, it is clear that explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act is not clarificatory of the position as of 01.06.1976, but in fact, expands that position to include what is stated therein, vide the Finance Act 2012.This statement, again, in no manner furthers the case of the Revenue that explanation 4 is merely clarificatory of the legal position as it always stood. Likewise, Notification No. 21/2012 dated 13.06.2012, which deals with section 194J of the Income Tax Act, does no more than providing that a transferee is exempt from deducting TDS under section 194J when TDS has already been deducted under section 195 on the payment made in the previous transfer of the same software which the transferee acquires without any modification. In any case, this notification being issued on 13.06.2012, i.e., after explanation 4 was inserted vide the Finance Act 2012, it would not assist the Revenue in asserting that explanation 4 clarifies the legal position as it always stood.81. This question is answered by two latin maxims, lex non cogit ad impossibilia, i.e., the law does not demand the impossible and impotentia excusat legem, i.e., when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law, the alleged disobedience of the law is excused. Recently, in the judgment in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1 delivered by this Court, this Court applied the said maxims in the context of the requirement of a certificate to produce evidence by way of electronic record under section 65B of the Evidence Act, 1872 and held that having taken all possible steps to obtain the certificate and yet being unable to obtain it for reasons beyond his control, the respondent in the facts of the case, was relieved of the mandatory obligation to furnish a certificate. In so holding, this Court referred to previous judgments dealing with the doctrine of impossibility and concluded as follows:47. However, a caveat must be entered here. The facts of the present case show that despite all efforts made by the respondents, both through the High Court and otherwise, to get the requisite certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act from the authorities concerned, yet the authorities concerned wilfully refused, on some pretext or the other, to give such certificate. In a fact-circumstance where the requisite certificate has been applied for from the person or the authority concerned, and the person or authority either refuses to give such certificate, or does not reply to such demand, the party asking for such certificate can apply to the court for its production under the provisions aforementioned of the Evidence Act, CPC or CrPC. Once such application is made to the court, and the court then orders or directs that the requisite certificate be produced by a person to whom it sends a summons to produce such certificate, the party asking for the certificate has done all that he can possibly do to obtain the requisite certificate. Two Latin maxims become important at this stage. The first is lex non cogit ad impossibilia i.e. the law does not demand the impossible, and impotentia excusat legem i.e. when there is a disability that makes it impossible to obey the law, the alleged disobedience of the law is excused. This was well put by this Court in Presidential Poll, In re [Presidential Poll, In re, (1974) 2 SCC 33] as follows : (SCC pp. 49-50, paras 14-15)14. If the completion of election before the expiration of the term is not possible because of the death of the prospective candidate it is apparent that the election has commenced before the expiration of the term but completion before the expiration of the term is rendered impossible by an act beyond the control of human agency. The necessity for completing the election before the expiration of the term is enjoined by the Constitution in public and State interest to see that the governance of the country is not paralysed by non-compliance with the provision that there shall be a President of India.15. The impossibility of the completion of the election to fill the vacancy in the office of the President before the expiration of the term of office in the case of death of a candidate as may appear from Section 7 of the 1952 Act does not rob Article 62(1) of its mandatory character. The maxim of law impotentia excusat legem is intimately connected with another maxim of law lex non cogit ad impossibilia. Impotentia excusat legem is that when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law that impotentia excuses. The law does not compel one to do that which one cannot possibly perform. Where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over it, there the law will in general excuse him. Therefore, when it appears that the performance of the formalities prescribed by a statute has been rendered impossible by circumstances over which the persons interested had no control, like the act of God, the circumstances will be taken as a valid excuse. Where the act of God prevents the compliance with the words of a statute, the statutory provision is not denuded of its mandatory character because of supervening impossibility caused by the act of God. (See Brooms Legal Maxims, 10th Edn. at pp. 162-63 and Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edn. at p. 268.)It is important to note that the provision in question in Presidential Poll, In re [Presidential Poll, In re, (1974) 2 SCC 33] was also mandatory, which could not be satisfied owing to an act of God, in the facts of that case. These maxims have been applied by this Court in different situations in other election cases — See Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad [Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, (1999) 8 SCC 266] (at paras 17 and 21); Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter) [Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election matter), (2002) 8 SCC 237] (at paras 130 and 151) and Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth [Raj Kumar Yadav v. Samir Kumar Mahaseth, (2005) 3 SCC 601] (at paras 13 and 14).48. These Latin maxims have also been applied in several other contexts by this Court. In Cochin State Power & Light Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Kerala [Cochin State Power & Light Corpn. Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1965) 3 SCR 187 : AIR 1965 SC 1688 ] , a question arose as to the exercise of an option of purchasing an undertaking by the State Electricity Board under Section 6(4) of the Electricity Act, 1910. The provision required a notice of at least 18 months before the expiry of the relevant period to be given by such State Electricity Board to the State Government. Since this mandatory provision was impossible of compliance, it was held that the State Electricity Board was excused from giving such notice, as follows : (1965) 3 SCR 187 , at p. 193 : AIR pp. 1691-92, para 88. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 expressly vests in the State Electricity Board the option of purchase on the expiry of the relevant period specified in the licence. But the State Government claims that under sub-section (2) of Section 6 it is now vested with the option. Now, under sub-section (2) of Section 6, the State Government would be vested with the option only where a State Electricity Board has not been constituted, or if constituted, does not elect to purchase the undertaking. It is common case that the State Electricity Board was duly constituted. But the State Government claims that the State Electricity Board did not elect to purchase the undertaking. For this purpose, the State Government relies upon the deeming provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 6, and contends that as the Board did not send to the State Government any intimation in writing of its intention to exercise the option as required by the sub-section, the Board must be deemed to have elected not to purchase the undertaking. Now, the effect of sub- section (4) read with sub-section (2) of Section 6 is that on failure of the Board to give the notice prescribed by sub-section (4), the option vested in the Board under sub-section (1) of Section 6 was liable to be divested. Sub-section (4) of Section 6 imposed upon the Board the duty of giving after the coming into force of Section 6 a notice in writing of its intention to exercise the option at least 18 months before the expiry of the relevant period. Section 6 came into force on 5-9-1959, and the relevant period expired on 3-12-1960. In the circumstances, the giving of the requisite notice of 18 months in respect of the option of purchase on the expiry of 2-12-1960, was impossible from the very commencement of Section 6. The performance of this impossible duty must be excused in accordance with the maxim, lex non cogitia ad impossibilia (the law does not compel the doing of impossibilities), and sub-section (4) of Section 6 must be construed as not being applicable to a case where compliance with it is impossible. We must, therefore, hold that the State Electricity Board was not required to give the notice under sub-section (4) of Section 6 in respect of its option of purchase on the expiry of 25 years. It must follow that the Board cannot be deemed to have elected not to purchase the undertaking under sub-section (4) of Section 6. By the notice served upon the appellant, the Board duly elected to purchase the undertaking on the expiry of 25 years. Consequently, the State Government never became vested with the option of purchasing the undertaking under sub-section (2) of Section 6. The State Government must, therefore, be restrained from taking further action under its notice, Ext. G, dated 20-11-1959.49. In Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey [Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey, (1987) 4 SCC 398] , the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia was applied in the context of the applicability of a mandatory provision of the Registration Act, 1908, as follows : (SCC pp. 402-03, paras 6-7)6. We have to bear in mind two maxims of equity which are well settled, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit — An act of the court shall prejudice no man. In Brooms Legal Maxims, 10th Edn., 1939 at p. 73 this maxim is explained that this maxim was founded upon justice and good sense; and afforded a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. The above maxim should, however, be applied with caution. The other maxim is lex non cogit ad impossibilia (Brooms Legal Maxims, p. 162) — The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and the administration of it, said Sir W. Scott, with reference to an alleged infraction of the revenue laws, must yield to that to which everything must bend, to necessity; the law, in its most positive and peremptory injunctions, is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of laws must adopt that general exception in the consideration of all particular cases.7. In this case indisputably during the period from 26-7-1978 to December 1982 there was subsisting injunction preventing the arbitrators from taking any steps. Furthermore, as noted before the award was in the custody of the court, that is to say, 28-1- 1978 till the return of the award to the arbitrators on 24-11-1983, arbitrators or the parties could not have presented the award for its registration during that time. The award as we have noted before was made on 28-11-1977 and before the expiry of the four months from 28-11-1977, the award was filed in the court pursuant to the order of the court. It was argued that the order made by the court directing the arbitrators to keep the award in the custody of the court was wrong and without jurisdiction, but no arbitrator could be compelled to disobey the order of the court and if in compliance or obedience with court of doubtful jurisdiction, he could not take back the award from the custody of the court to take any further steps for its registration then it cannot be said that he has failed to get the award registered as the law required. The aforesaid two legal maxims — the law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform and an act of the court shall prejudice no man would, apply with full vigour in the facts of this case and if that is the position then the award as we have noted before was presented before the Sub-Registrar, Arambagh on 25-11-1983 the very next one day of getting possession of the award from the court. The Sub-Registrar pursuant to the order of the High Court on 24-6-1985 found that the award was presented within time as the period during which the judicial proceedings were pending that is to say, from 28-1-1978 to 24-11-1983 should be excluded in view of the principle laid down in Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court [Tarapada Dey v. District Registrar, Hooghly, 1986 SCC OnLine Cal 101 : AIR 1987 Cal 107] , therefore, in our opinion, was wrong in holding that the only period which should be excluded was from 26-7-1978 till 20-12-1982. We are unable to accept this position. 26-7-1978 was the date of the order of the learned Munsif directing maintenance of status quo and 20-12-1982 was the date when the interim injunction was vacated, but still the award was in the custody of the court and there is ample evidence as it would appear from the narration of events hereinbefore made that the arbitrators had tried to obtain the custody of the award which the court declined to give to them.(emphasis in original)50. These maxims have also been applied to tenancy legislation — see B.P. Khemka (P) Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick [B.P. Khemka (P) Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, (1987) 2 SCC 407] (at para 12), and have also been applied to relieve authorities of fulfilling their obligation to allot plots when such plots have been found to be unallottable, owing to the contravention of the Central statutes — see Hira Tikkoo v. State (UT of Chandigarh) [Hira Tikkoo v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2004) 6 SCC 765] (at paras 23 and 24).51. On an application of the aforesaid maxims to the present case, it is clear that though Section 65-B(4) is mandatory, yet, on the facts of this case, the respondents, having done everything possible to obtain the necessary certificate, which was to be given by a third party over whom the respondents had no control, must be relieved of the mandatory obligation contained in the said sub-section.82. As a matter of fact, even under the Income Tax Act, the High Court of Bombay has taken a view, applying the aforestated maxims in the context of the provisions of the relevant DTAAs, to hold that persons are not obligated to do the impossible, i.e., to apply a provision of a statute when it was not actually and factually on the statute book.85. It is thus clear that the person mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act cannot be expected to do the impossible, namely, to apply the expanded definition of royalty inserted by explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, for the assessment years in question, at a time when such explanation was not actually and factually in the statute.87. The first and most comprehensive authority dealing with the question raised in these appeals is by the AAR in its ruling in Dassault Systems, K.K., In Re., (2010) 322 ITR 125 (AAR) [Dassault (AAR)]. In that case, the applicant was a company incorporated under the laws of Japan, which marketed licensed computer software products, through a distribution channel comprising value added resellers [VAR], who were independent third-party resellers in the business of selling software to end-users. The question posed by the AAR to itself was as follows:Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the payment received by Dassault Systems K.K. (hereinafter referred to as the the applicant) from sale of software products to independent third party resellers will be taxable as business profits under Article 7 of the India-Japan Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (India-Japan DTAA or Treaty) and will not constitute royalties and fee for technical services as defined in Article 12 of India-Japan DTAA?88. After setting out Article 12 of the India-Japan DTAA, which is in the same terms as Article 12 of the India-Singapore DTAA and the other DTAAs that we are concerned with, and after adverting to the definition of royalty that is contained in explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi) of the Income Tax Act, the AAR then set out, from the locus classicus on copyright law, the following passage:Before entering into a discussion on the applicability of the royalty definition, it is appropriate to recapitulate certain basic principles concerning the copyright as a legal concept. We may, in this connection, refer to some passages from the classic treatise of Copinger and Skone James on Copyright (1999 Edn):