Case: Sambudamurthi Mudaliar Vs. State Of Madras And Anr

succession is regulated by usage. It was said that according to the usage of the temple the trustees were elected for a period of one year each at a meeting of the members of the Sengunatha Mudaliar Community and so the appellant must be held to be a trustee within the meaning of S. 6 (9) of Act 19 of 1951. In our opinion, there is no. warrant for this argument. The phrase regulated by usage in S. 6 (9) of the Act must be construed along with the phrase succession to this office and when so construed that part of the definition would only apply where the ordinary rules of succession under the Hindu Law are moditied by usage and succession has to be determined in accordance with the modified rules. The word succession in relation to property and rights and interests in property generally implies passing of an interest from one person to another (vide in Re. Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937, 1941 FCR 12 =(AIR 1941 FC 72). It is now well established that the office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of property. This is so whether the trustee has a beneficial interest of some sort or not. (see Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary, 63 Ind App 448 = (AIR 1936 PC 318 ) and Bhabatarini v. Ashalata, 70 Ind App 57 = (AIR 1943 PC 89 ). Ordinarily a shebaitship or the office of dharmakarta is vested in the heirs of the founder unless the founder has laid down a special scheme of succession or except when usage or custom to the contrary is proved to exist Mukherjea J., in Angurbala Mullick v. Debabrata Mullick, 1951 SCR 1125 = (AIR 1951 SC 293 ) delivering the judgment of this Court observed : Unless, therefore the founder has disposed of the shebaitship in any particular manner - and this right of disposition is inherent in the founder - or except when usage or custom of a different nature is proved to exist, shebaitship like any other species of heritable property follows the line of inheritance from the founder. In the case of mutts, whose heads are often celibates and sometimes sanyasis, special rules of succession obtain by custom and usage. In Sital Das v. Sort Ram, AIR 1954 SC 606 the law was taken as well settled that succession to mahantship of a mutt or religious institution is regulated by custom or usage of the particular institution except where the rule of succession is laid down by the founder himself who created the endowment In that case the custom in matters of succession to mahantship was that the assembly of bairagis and worshippers of the temple appointed the successor; but the appointment had to be made from the disciples of the deceased mahant if he left any, and failing disciples, any of his spiritual kindred. Such a succession was described as not hereditary in the sense that on the death of an existing mahant, his chela does not succeed to the office as a matter of course, because the successor acquires a right only by appointment and the authority to appoint is vested in the assembly of the bairagis and the worshippers. In Sri Mahant Paramananda Das Goswami v. Radha.krishna Das, 51 MLJ 258 - (AIR 1926 Mad 1012 ), the Madras High Court took the view that where succession to the mahantship is by nomination by the holder in office, it is not a hereditary succession. In that case Venkatasubba Rao, J., said : If the successor owes his title to nomination or appointment, that is, his succession depends on the volition of the last incumbent and does not rest upon independent title. I am inclined to the view that the office cannot be said to be hereditary. Krishnan, J., stated as follows : - Where succession is by nomination by the holder in office of his successor it seems to be impossible to contend that it is a hereditary succession. Hereditary succession is succession by the heir to the deceased under the law, the office must be transmitted to the successor according to some definite rules of descent which by their own force designate the person to succeed. There need be no. blood relationship between the deceased and his successor but the right of the latter should not depend upon the choice of any individual. It is true that the artificial definition of hereditary trustee in Section 6 (9) of the Act would include even such cases. 4. But the election to the office of trustee in the present case is for fixed period of one year and not for life. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the office of the appellant is hereditary within the meaning of Section 6 (9) of the Act. It is not to say that there is a succession of As office to another when on the efflux of the period for which A was appointed there is a vacancy and B is elected to that vacancy. It is quite possible that for that vacancy A himself might be re-elected because a retiring trustee is eligible for re-election. The possibility of A being the successor of A himself is not merely an anomaly, it is an impossible legal position. No. man can succeed to his own office. In Blacks Law Dictionary the word succession is defined as follows : - The devolution of title to property under the law of descent and distribution. The right by which one set of men may, by succeeding another set, acquire a property in all the goods, movables, and other chattles of a corporation. The fact of the transmission of the rights estates, obligations and charges of a deceased person to his heir or heirs. The view we have taken is borne out by the reasoning of the Madras High Court in state of Madras v. Ramakrishna, ILR (1957) Mad 1084 = (AIR 1957 Mad 758 ).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The definition includes three types of cases :(1) succession to the office of trusteeship devolving by hereditary right;(2) succession to such office being regulated by usage; and(3) succession being specifically provided for by the founder on condition that the scheme of such succession is still in force.It is not the case of the appellant that the trustees of the temple of the Kumaran Koil are hereditary trustees because their office devolves by hereditary right or because succession to that office is specifically provided for by the founderIn our opinion, there is no. warrant for this argument. The phrase regulated by usage in S. 6 (9) of the Act must be construed along with the phrase succession to this office and when so construed that part of the definition would only apply where the ordinary rules of succession under the Hindu Law are moditied by usage and succession has to be determined in accordance with the modified rules. The word succession in relation to property and rights and interests in property generally implies passing of an interest from one person to another (vide in Re. Hindu Womens Right to Property Act 1937, 1941 FCR 12 =(AIR 1941 FC 72). It is now well established that the office of a hereditary trustee is in the nature of property. This is so whether the trustee has a beneficial interest of some sort or not. (see Ganesh Chunder Dhur v. Lal Behary, 63 Ind App 448 = (AIR 1936 PC 318  ) and Bhabatarini v. Ashalata, 70 Ind App 57 = (AIR 1943 PC 89  ). Ordinarily a shebaitship or the office of dharmakarta is vested in the heirs of the founder unless the founder has laid down a special scheme of succession or except when usage or custom to the contrary is proved to existIt is true that the artificial definition of hereditary trustee in Section 6 (9) of the Act would include even such cases4. But the election to the office of trustee in the present case is for fixed period of one year and not for life. It is, therefore, difficult to hold that the office of the appellant is hereditary within the meaning of Section 6 (9) of the Act. It is not to say that there is a succession of As office to another when on the efflux of the period for which A was appointed there is a vacancy and B is elected to that vacancy. It is quite possible that for that vacancy A himself might be re-elected because a retiring trustee is eligible for re-election. The possibility of A being the successor of A himself is not merely an anomaly, it is an impossible legal position. No. man can succeed to his own officeThe view we have taken is borne out by the reasoning of the Madras High Court in state of Madras v. Ramakrishna, ILR (1957) Mad 1084 = (AIR 1957 Mad 758  ).