Case: Fateh Bibi Etc Vs. Charan Dass

four relations by the Act. 14. In the case before us we have already pointed out that Charanji Lal was the absolute owner of the property and therefore there was no question of the property being held in coparcenary and there is no controversy that the property was not disposed of by will by Charanji Lal. Therefore, prima facie the Act will apply to the estate of Charanji Lal if it can be held that the succession to his estate opened only when his sister Maya Devi died on March 25, 1950. 15. The question is: When did succession open to the estate of Charanji Lal. Was it on the date when he died, i. e., August 22, 1925; or was in when his sister Maya Devi died, viz., March 25, 1950? 16. In this connection we may refer to the decisions in Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi, ILR 17 Lah 356 = (AIR 1936 Lah 124); ILR 58 All 1041 = (AIR 1936 All 507 ) (FB); Pokhan Dusadh v. Mst. Manoa, ILR 16 Pat 215 = (AIR 1937 Pat 117 ) (FB); ILR (1937) Mad 948 = (AIR 1937 Mad 699 ) (FB) and Bindeshari Singh v. Baij Nath Singh, ILR 13 Luck 380 = (AIR 1937 Oudh 402). In all these cases the last male holder had died before the date of the Act and the estate was in the possession of a life - estate holder either a widow or a mother who died after the coming into force of the Act. It has been held in all these decisions that the succession to the estate of the last male-holder must be considered to open only on the termination of the life-estate and the Act will apply in considering the heirs of the last male holder at the termination of the life estate. 17. It is not necessary for us to refer to any of these decisions in great detail as the matter has been considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lala Duni Chand v. Mt. Anar Kali, 73 Ind App 187 = (AIR 1946 PC 173 ): The Judicial Committee had held that the Act which altered the order of succession of certain persons mentioned therein and which came into operation on February 21, 1929 applies not only to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate on or after February 21, 1929 but also to the case of such a male dying intestate before that date if he was succeeded by a female heir who died after that date. The Judicial Committee, has further held that succession in such cases to the estate of the last Hindu male who died intestate did not open until the death of the life-estate holder. It has also been held that during the lifetime of the life-estate holder, the reversioners in Hindu Law have no vested interest in the estate and that they have a mere spes successionis.It was contended before the Judicial Committee that the words Hindu male dying intestate occurring in the preamble to the Act connotes the future tense, of a Hindu male dying after the Act has come into force. This contention was rejected by the Judicial Committee, which observed as follows: In the argument before their Lordships reliance was placed on the words dying intestate in the Act as connoting the future tense, but their Lordships agree with the view of the Lahore High Court in ILR 17 Lah 356 = (AIR 1936 Lah 124) that the words are a mere description of the status of the deceased and have no reference, and are not intended to have any reference, to the time of the death of a Hindu male. The expression merely means in the case of intestacy of a Hindu male. To place this interpretation on the Act is not to give a retrospective effect to its provisions, the material point of time being the date when the succession opens, namely, the death of the widow. We are in entire agreement with the above observations of the Judicial Committee and accordingly hold that the point of time for the applicability of the Act is when the succession opens, viz., when the life estate terminates. In consequence, it must be further held that the questions as to who is the nearest reversionary heir, or what is the class of reversionary heirs will fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives. The death of a Hindu female life-estate holder opens the inheritance to the reversioners and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to the estate. 18.We hold that the Act applies also to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and has been succeeded by a female heir who died after that date. In this case, on the findings recorded by all the Courts, the last female heir died only on March 25, 1950 and, under the Act, the plaintiff, as the sisters son of Charanji Lal, is entitled to succeed to his estate, in preference to the defendant who is only a paternal uncle. We have already pointed out that the paternal uncle is postponed to the four relations referred to in the Act, the last of whom is the sisters son. 19. Before we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opened even on November 26, 1946 when Bishen Devis (the mothers) life estate terminated and it must be held that even Maya Devi, the sister of Charanji Lal, must be considered to have succeeded to the property of her brother, in her own right as a preferential heir under the Act, though the estate, taken by her under Section 3 (b) will only be a life-estate. No doubt these aspects have not been raised before any of the Courts, nor even before us.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]13. We are of the opinion that the decision of the Letters Patent Bench is correct. No doubt, originally the view taken by some of the High Courts was that the Act applies only if the last male holder dies after the coming into force of the Act and it will have no retrospective application to cases of Hindu males dying intestate before the date of the Act. That view has now been given the go-by as is seen from the later decisions to which we shall refer presently. But before we refer to those decisions, we shall quote the observations of this Court in Annagouda Nathgouda Patil v. Court of Wards, 1952 SCR 208     at p. 215 = (AIR 1952 SC 60   at pp. 63-64) regarding the object and scope of the ActWe are in entire agreement with the above observations of the Judicial Committee and accordingly hold that the point of time for the applicability of the Act is when the succession opens, viz., when the life estate terminates. In consequence, it must be further held that the questions as to who is the nearest reversionary heir, or what is the class of reversionary heirs will fall to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives. The death of a Hindu female life-estate holder opens the inheritance to the reversioners and the one most nearly related at the time to the last full owner becomes entitled to the estate18.We hold that the Act applies also to the case of a Hindu male dying intestate before the Act came into operation and has been succeeded by a female heir who died after that date. In this case, on the findings recorded by all the Courts, the last female heir died only on March 25, 1950 and, under the Act, the plaintiff, as the sisters son of Charanji Lal, is entitled to succeed to his estate, in preference to the defendant who is only a paternal uncle. We have already pointed out that the paternal uncle is postponed to the four relations referred to in the Act, the last of whom is the sisters son19. Before we conclude, we may state that in this case the succession can be considered to have opened even on November 26, 1946 when Bishen Devis (the mothers) life estate terminated and it must be held that even Maya Devi, the sister of Charanji Lal, must be considered to have succeeded to the property of her brother, in her own right as a preferential heir under the Act, though the estate, taken by her under Section 3 (b) will only be a life-estate. No doubt these aspects have not been raised before any of the Courts, nor even before us.