Case: Thakore Sobhag Singh Vs. Thakur Jai Singh &amp; Ors

rule of interpretation or in any judgment, decision, decree or order of any court. and notwithstanding any omission or defect "of form, procedure or want of any competent sanction or approval, it is hereby declared that the Jaipur Matmi Rules. 1945, published in the Jaipur Gazette Extraordinary, dated the 8th December, 1945, under Revenue Branch Notification No. 15941/Rev, dated 24th Novembers 1945, shall have and shall be deemed always to have had, the force of law and shall be treated as being and as having been an "existing Jagir law" within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act. 1952 (Rajasthan Act 6 of 1952) for the purpose of that Act as well as of the Rajasthan Jagir Decisions and Proceedings (Validation) Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 18 of 1955), and any other law relating to Jagirs or Jagirdars." But the Act did not supersede the judgment of the High Court. The Board of Revenue was therefore incompetent to consider and decide the question whether the Government may in the absence of the previous sanction of the Government refuse to recognise the adoption of Jai Singh.The Act again merely declares that the Matmi Rules shall be deemed always to have the force of law and shall be treated as being "existing Jagir law" within the meaning of Clause (d) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act 6 of 1932 and Rajasthan Act 18 of 1955. But the Act does not purport to give retrospective operation to the Jaipur Matmi Rules. It is futile then to contend that the Board of Revenue before determining the question as to the factum of adoption of Jai Singh was required to consider whether the adoption was invalid, because sanction of the Ruler of Jaipur was not previously obtained by Sabhal Singh before taking Jai Singh in adoption. 8.The High Court also held in the writ petition that on the death of the holder l of the Jagir without having any issue the Jagir will vest in his adopted son in act ordnance with the personal law. That finding is now res judicata and is binding upon the parties. Counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the High Court was an interlocutory order remanding the proceeding to the Board of Revenue, and on that account the decision of the High Court will not operate as res judicata either before the Board of Revenue or in this Court. We are unable to accept that contention. Against the order of the Board of Revenue rejecting the claim of Jai Singh to be recognized as the adopted son of Sabhal Singh, a writ petition was moved in the High Court and a prayer for quashing that order was made. The High Court dealt with the dispute on merits and held that the order of the Board of Revenue holding that because of the Matmi Rules the adoption of Jai Singh by Sabhal Singh without the previous sanctions of the Ruler could not be recognized for the purpose of determining the succession to the Jagir was erroneous. The High Court did in making the final order direct the Tribunal to decide the case in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made in the judgment, but the direction was, in our judgment, a surplusage. The High Court issued a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the Tribunal. It was unnecessary thereafter to direct or advise the Board of Revenue to perform its statutory duty to decide the dispute according to law. The Board of Revenue had to decide the dispute in accordance with the law declared by the High Court. All questions which had been expressly decided by the High Court on contest between the parties and other questions which must be deemed by necessary implication to have been decided were res judicata and could not be reopened before the Board of Revenue. In this appeal it is therefore not open to the appellant to contend that the decision of the High Court on the questions decided in the writ petition was erroneous. 9.It is unfortunate that the application for certificate to appeal to this Court filed by Sobhag Singh was erroneously rejected by the High Court. But that does not affect the binding character of the judgment of the High Court between the parties. Unless the decision of the High Court on those questions was set aside by appropriate proceeding in this Court, the judgment must be held binding between the parties. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant to contended that the right of Jai Singh as the adopted son to the Jagir had to be decided otherwise than in accordance with the personal law of Sabhal Singh. It is undisputed that according to the personal law applicable to Sabhal Singh, Jai Singh could have been adopted by him. 10.It was somewhat faintly contented by counsel for the appellant that if the judgment of the High Court is regarded as binding between the parties, the equal protection clause of the Constitution would be violated, and on that account also the judgment must he held invalid. The argument needs no serious consideration. It is difficult to appreciate the contention that two persons similarly situate were or could be differently treated by the judgment of the Board of Revenue, because the decision of the High Court operates as res judicata between the parties in one case. By the application of the rule of res judicata the appellant was not singled out for special or prejudicial treatment. It may suffice to observe that all adoptions according to the personal law in the State of Jaipur made by Jagirdars before the promulgation of the Matmi Rules are valid, even if no sanction of the Ruler was obtained to the adoptions. That rule applies to all adoptions by Japir cars in the State of Jaipur

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In the opinion of the High Court, the Jagir devolved according to the personal law applicable to the last holder, and the personal law included the custom or usage relating to the particular Jagir; that the custom or usage applicable to the Jagir in question was that the adopted son must be a direct male lineal descendant of the original grantee, and that Nahar Singh was the original grantee of the Jagir in question and Jai Singh as a descendant of Nahar Singh was entitled to take the Jagir if it was proved that the adoption had been made in accordance with the personal law, that the Matmi Rules had no statutory force because it was not proved that assent of the Ruler of Jaipur had been given thereto, and that even assuming that the Rules were "existing Jagir law" they did not govern adoptions made before they were brought into force. An application for certificate to appeal to this Court against the judgment of the High Court under Article 133 of the Constitution was rejected on the ground that the dispute had not been finally decided and a number of issues remained to be decided8.The High Court also held in the writ petition that on the death of the holder l of the Jagir without having any issue the Jagir will vest in his adopted son in act ordnance with the personal law. That finding is now res judicata and is binding upon the parties. Counsel for the appellant contended that the order passed by the High Court was an interlocutory order remanding the proceeding to the Board of Revenue, and on that account the decision of the High Court will not operate as res judicata either before the Board of Revenue or in this Court. We are unable to accept that contention. Against the order of the Board of Revenue rejecting the claim of Jai Singh to be recognized as the adopted son of Sabhal Singh, a writ petition was moved in the High Court and a prayer for quashing that order was made. The High Court dealt with the dispute on merits and held that the order of the Board of Revenue holding that because of the Matmi Rules the adoption of Jai Singh by Sabhal Singh without the previous sanctions of the Ruler could not be recognized for the purpose of determining the succession to the Jagir was erroneous. The High Court did in making the final order direct the Tribunal to decide the case in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made in the judgment, but the direction was, in our judgment, a surplusage. The High Court issued a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the Tribunal. It was unnecessary thereafter to direct or advise the Board of Revenue to perform its statutory duty to decide the dispute according to law. The Board of Revenue had to decide the dispute in accordance with the law declared by the High Court. All questions which had been expressly decided by the High Court on contest between the parties and other questions which must be deemed by necessary implication to have been decided were res judicata and could not be reopened before the Board of Revenue. In this appeal it is therefore not open to the appellant to contend that the decision of the High Court on the questions decided in the writ petition was erroneous9.It is unfortunate that the application for certificate to appeal to this Court filed by Sobhag Singh was erroneously rejected by the High Court. But that does not affect the binding character of the judgment of the High Court between the parties. Unless the decision of the High Court on those questions was set aside by appropriate proceeding in this Court, the judgment must be held binding between the parties. It is, therefore, not open to the appellant to contended that the right of Jai Singh as the adopted son to the Jagir had to be decided otherwise than in accordance with the personal law of Sabhal Singh. It is undisputed that according to the personal law applicable to Sabhal Singh, Jai Singh could have been adopted by him10.It was somewhat faintly contented by counsel for the appellant that if the judgment of the High Court is regarded as binding between the parties, the equal protection clause of the Constitution would be violated, and on that account also the judgment must he held invalid. The argument needs no serious consideration. It is difficult to appreciate the contention that two persons similarly situate were or could be differently treated by the judgment of the Board of Revenue, because the decision of the High Court operates as res judicata between the parties in one case. By the application of the rule of res judicata the appellant was not singled out for special or prejudicial treatment. It may suffice to observe that all adoptions according to the personal law in the State of Jaipur made by Jagirdars before the promulgation of the Matmi Rules are valid, even if no sanction of the Ruler was obtained to the adoptions. That rule applies to all adoptions by Japir cars in the State of Jaipur