Case: Shah Ashu Jaiwant Vs. State Of Maharashtra

for which the. Til seeds were kept was quite immaterial.5. It is true that mens rea in the ordinary or usual sense of this term is not required for proving an offence defined by Section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is enough if an article of adultered food is either manufactured for sale, or stored, or sold or distributed in contravention of any provision of the Act or of an y rule made there under. Nevertheless, the prosecution has to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that what Was stored or sold was `food. The charge was that the Til seeds sold were unfit for human consumption. This necessarily meant that it was part of the prosecution case that the Til seeds with which we are concerned were meant for human consumption. Recently, this Court has held in Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administration, (A. 1. R. 1975 S. C. 1309 # 1318) that, although mens rea, in the ordinarily understood sense, may not be needed to be proved in such cases, yet, the purpose for which articles of food covered by the Act are manufactured, distributed or sold was that they `.should reach the consumer to be used as food". Thus, the use` the article sold was not entirely irrelevant. It is more correct to say that it is presumed from the nature of the article itself or the circumstances and manner of offering it for sale. Where circumstances raise a genuine doubt on the question whether what was kept by a seller was "food" at all, this must be resolved by evidence in the case. After all, if what is stored or sold in a shop was neither "food" nor meant to be so used could a person be prosecuted on the ground that he sold it in an adulterated condition ?It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the whole object of the Act was to prevent adulteration of "food" meant for Human consumption. Our attention was invited to a passage from Pyare Lal etc. v, New Delhi Municipal Committee &Anr([1967] 3 S.C.R. 747 @ 755.), where this Court said:``The object of this Act WAS to ensure that food which the public could buy was inter aha prepared, packed, and stored under sanitary condition so as not to be injurious to the health of the people consuming it".Section 2. sub. s.(v) of the Act lays down:"(V)food means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes-(a) any article which ordinarily enters into, or is used in the composition of preparation of human food, and(b) any flavouring matter or condiments";6. Hence, where Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale or storage or distribution of certain types of food`, it necessarily denotes articles intended for human consumption as food. It becomes the duty of the prosecution to prove that the article which is the subject matter of an offence is ordinarily used for human consumption as food whenever reasonable doubts arise this question. It is self-evident that certain articles, such as milk, or bread, or butter, or food grains are meant for human consumption as food. These are matters of common knowledge. Other articles may be presumed to be meant for human consumption from representations made about them or from circumstances in which they are offered for sale. What is the position in this respect about black Til seeds with which we are concerned here?7. It is submitted that it is a matter of common knowledge that black Til seeds are not used as food. Even if this be true, it is not so widely known a fact that we could take judicial notice of it. It is also urged that, when the case of the appellant, supported by his cash memo, is that the particular black `Til" seeds where meant to be sold only for pooja for being burnt like incense or thrown into fire in the course of pooja. it cannot be said that this case had been repelled by the mere statement of the Food Inspector that they can be used as food also. Such a statement amounted at least to a partial admission that they arc used for Pooja. Therefore, it is urged, they could have been kept for the purpose of being sold 11 only as a substance used for pooja and not as human food. It is pointed out that there is nothing in evidence on this question, to dislodge the statement of the accused. We find no evidence on record to show the actual manner in which such seeds are used in the course of Pooja. Therefore, the view of the High Court that they could be consumed by people after the performance of pooja rests on bare conjecture. There had to be credible evidence to show that black; til seeds are ordinarily used as food. If that were so, the burden would have shifted on to the shoulders of the accused to prove that what he had stored was not really food meant for human consumption but an article kept for a special use. We are left in doubt on this question on the evidence in this case. We think that the appellant must get the benefit of that doubt.As already indicated above, we are not impressed by the nature of the evidence led by the prosecution. We cannot entirely ignore the fact that the signatures of Tambe are absent on all those documents on which they would have been present if Section 10(7) of the Act had been strictly complied with. We think that it is more likely, for the reasons already given by us, that Tambe was not there ll at all to witness the occurrence. If that be so, the evidence of the prosecuting Food Inspector, who said that Tambe was there, cannot be implicitly relied upon in this case. It is quite unsafe to base the appellants conviction on such shaky foundations.8.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We have considered the question whether it actually corroborates or contradicts the Food Inspectors account. It seems to us that there is such vagueness and apparent contradiction in the pictures conveyed by Tambe and the Food Inspector that Tambes testimony tends to demolish more than to corroborate the version of the Food Inspector on points of fact in issue k indicates that Tambe was probably not present at the time when the seeds were sold by the appellant to the Food Inspector.The Presidency Magistrate, after examining the whole evidence, had concluded that the version of the appellant, that there was a tall; about t he actual purpose for which the Til seeds at his shop were meant, was more probable because it was supported by what the appellant had written on the cash memo when he sold these Til seeds o the Food Inspector. After all, the appellant, who ha d a grain shop, must have known that the Food Inspector could prosecute him if he kept adulterated foodstuffs for sale for human consumption. If, as the analysts report showed, these black Til seeds were full of cocoons, visible to the naked e ye, nobody could be expected to purchase them for consumption as food. The learned Magistrate, after finding that it was more probable that there was talk about the purpose for which the Til seeds were kept in the accuseds shop. despite the Food Inspectors denial about such talk, held that the purpose for which the. Til seeds were kept was quiteis true that mens rea in the ordinary or usual sense of this term is not required for proving an offence defined by Section 7 ofthe Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 hereinafter referred to as the Act). It is enough if an article of adultered food is either manufactured for sale, or stored, or sold or distributed in contravention of any provision of the Act or of an y rule made there under. Nevertheless, the prosecution has to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that what Was stored or sold was `food. The charge was that the Til seeds sold were unfit for human consumption. This necessarily meant that it was part of the prosecution case that the Til seeds with which we are concerned were meant for humanwhere Section 7 prohibits manufacture, sale or storage or distribution of certain types of food`, it necessarily denotes articles intended for human consumption as food. It becomes the duty of the prosecution to prove that the article which is the subject matter of an offence is ordinarily used for human consumption as food whenever reasonable doubts arise this question. It is self-evident that certain articles, such as milk, or bread, or butter, or food grains are meant for human consumption as food. These are matters of common knowledge. Other articles may be presumed to be meant for human consumption from representations made about them or from circumstances in which they are offered forfind no evidence on record to show the actual manner in which such seeds are used in the course of Pooja. Therefore, the view of the High Court that they could be consumed by people after the performance of pooja rests on bare conjecture. There had to be credible evidence to show that black; til seeds are ordinarily used as food. If that were so, the burden would have shifted on to the shoulders of the accused to prove that what he had stored was not really food meant for human consumption but an article kept for a special use. We are left in doubt on this question on the evidence in this case. We think that the appellant must get the benefit of that doubt.As already indicated above, we are not impressed by the nature of the evidence led by the prosecution. We cannot entirely ignore the fact that the signatures of Tambe are absent on all those documents on which they would have been present if Section 10(7) of the Act had been strictly complied with. We think that it is more likely, for the reasons already given by us, that Tambe was not there ll at all to witness the occurrence. If that be so, the evidence of the prosecuting Food Inspector, who said that Tambe was there, cannot be implicitly relied upon in this case. It is quite unsafe to base the appellants conviction on such shaky foundations.