Case: New India Assurance Co. Ltd Vs. Asha Rani &amp; Others

the insurer must be held liable and accordingly directed the compensation amount to be paid by the insurance company. The insurer carried an appeal to the High Court, but the High Court disposed of the appeal solely on the ground that the case is covered by the decision of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Company vs. Sat Pal Singh and others (2000) 1 Supreme Court Cases 237 . 6. Mr. Rawat, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the decision in Mallawwas case on which the Tribunal relied upon is a decision interpreting the provisions of the old Act of 1939, and in fact that decision cannot be of any assistance. In view of the fact that Section 95(1) proviso (ii) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, is not the same as Section 147 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994. Mr. Rawat contended that the decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. vs. Satpal Singh is undoubtedly based on an interpretation of the proviso to Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but that decision cannot be held to be good law in as much as the Court has not borne in mind the relevant provisions as it stood nor has it considered the effect of the amendment that was brought about in 1994 as well as the purpose of such amendment. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contended that the subsequent amendment that was brought about in the year 1994 is merely clarificatory in nature and does not bring about any substantive change and further the Act being a beneficial one, construction which is beneficial to the victims of the accident should be followed. Judged from that angle, the decision of this Court in New India Assurance Company vs. Sat Pal Singh and others (supra) does not require any re-consideration. 7. Under the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 the requirements of policies and limits of liability had been provided in Section 95. Proviso to Section 95(1) of the said Act unequivocally states that the policy shall not be required in case of a good vehicle for passengers being carried in the said vehicle. In Mallawwa (Smt.) and others vs. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and others (supra) while approving the earlier decision of the Court in Pushpabai Purshottam Udeshis case - (1977) 2 SCC 749, the Court construed the provisions of Section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and held that while the expression any person and the expression every motor vehicle are in wide terms but by proviso (ii) it restricts the generality of the main provision by confining the requirement to cases where the vehicle is a vehicle in which passengers are carried for hire or reward or by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, therefore, the vehicle had to be vehicle in which passengers are carried. The Court further held that the goods vehicle cannot be held to be a passenger vehicle even if the vehicle was found to be used on some stray occasions for carrying passengers for hire or reward. Undoubtedly Mallawwas case (supra) was dealing with a situation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. 8. In Satpals case (supra) the Court assumed that the provisions of Section 95(1) of Motor Vehicles Act 1939 are identical with Section 147(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as it stood prior to its amendment. But a careful scrutiny of the provisions would make it clear that prior to the amendment of 1994 it was not necessary for the insurer to insure against the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle. On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amended Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46 of Act 6 of 1991 by which expression injury to any person in the original Act stood substituted by the expression injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid amendment Act of 1994, even if widest interpretation is given to the expression to any person it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicle. The objects and reasons of clause 46 also states that it seeks to amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of liability under the Insurance Policy. It is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existed expression injury to any person is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]On an erroneous impression this Court came to the conclusion that the insurer would be liable to pay compensation in respect of the death or bodily injury caused to either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative when being carried in a goods vehicle the accident occurred. If the Motor Vehicles Amended Act of 1994 is examined, particularly Section 46 of Act 6 of 1991 by which expression injury to any person in the original Act stood substituted by the expression injury to any person including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle the conclusion is irresistible that prior to the aforesaid amendment Act of 1994, even if widest interpretation is given to the expression to any person it will not cover either the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in the vehicleIt is no doubt true that sometimes the legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but a plain meaning being given to the words used in the statute, as it stood prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent to its amendment in 1994 and bearing in mind the objects and reasons engrafted in the amended provisions referred to earlier, it is difficult for us to construe that the expression including owner of the goods or his authorised representative carried in the vehicle which was added to the pre-existed expression injury to any person is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing statute. On the other hand it clearly demonstrates that the legislature wanted to bring within the sweep of Section 147 and making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even in case of a goods vehicle, the owner of the goods or his authorised representative being carried in a goods vehicle when that vehicle met with an accident and the owner of the goods or his representative either dies or suffers bodily injury.