Case: Nirmal Enem Horo Vs. Jahan Ara Jaipal Singh

marriage ended in a divorce. In the course of her evidence in the previous petition, namely, Election Petition No. 2 of 1970 it seems to have been elicited that she had married Mr. Jaipal Singh on 7-5-1954 and that the decree nisi had been made absolute on 6-5-1954. It was contended before the learned Judge that in view of Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 Mrs. Jaipal Singh could not enter into a second marriage until after the expiry of six months from the date the decree had been made absolute. The learned Judge pointed out that this very point had been taken before the Supreme Court in the previous petition and, therefore, must be deemed to have been finally decided. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the bar under Sections 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 was a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence in the former election petition and consequently it was deemed to be a matter directly and substantially in issue in the previous election petition and, therefore, cannot be allowed to be raised in the present petition.8. This Courts judgment in the previous petition clearly goes to show that this Court refused to entertain this ground as it had not been pleaded or pressed before the trial court, Mr. Anthony, appearing for Mr. Horo in that appeal had distinctly raised this point as is seen from para 11 of the judgment at page 1844 of the report. That point was disposed of by this Court with these observations to be found in para 12."As regards tile first point it was never canvassed or argued before the High Court. No plea was taken by Shri Horo in the written statement that there could be no valid marriage between the respondent and late Shri Jaipal Singh owing to the provisions contained in S. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 until after the lapse of a period of six months from the date the decree of divorce was made absolute. None of the issues which were framed by the High Court involves the question now sought to be agitated based on the provisions of S. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act. It appears that advantage is sought to be taken from the statement of the respondent about the dates when the decree absolute was granted and when the marriage took place between the respondent and late Shri Jaipal Singh. In the absence of any pleadings or issues no material has been placed on the record to show that in view of the provisions of Section 57 of the aforesaid Act there could not be a valid marriage according to the Munda customary law. It must be remembered that the respondent contracted a marriage with late Shri Jaipal Singh according to Munda rites and ceremonies and not as one Christian marrying another Christian. Nor was the matter pursued in cross-examination of the respondent and she was not asked as to how she could get over the bar of S. 57 in the way of remarriage before the expiry of the prescribed period. In these circumstances we do not consider that such a point can be allowed to be agitated for the first time before this court."9. The above passage goes to show that the point was finally disposed of. Some snap answers given by the respondent in her evidence in that case were sought to be exploited in this court for the purpose of supporting a new argument under S. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 although there was no plea either in the pleadings or in the arguments before the learned Judge who decided the petition. The observations proceed on the basis that it was open to the parties to put forward the plea which Mr. Horo later put forward before the Supreme Court and since the same was not done, this court could not permit the plea to be taken for the first time in this court.It is not as if this court kept the matter open for re-agitation. It definitely ruled out the plea because it was not pressed before the learned Judge who dealt with the election petition. Mr. Anthony submitted that the question of res judicata does not arise under Explanation 4 of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the expression "any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence" postulates knowledge of a fact by the party making the defence. He further submitted that Mr. Horo could not possibly know about the past of Mrs. Jaipal Singh and his only source of knowledge at the time was Mrs. Jaipal Singh herself. The answer to this is already given in the judgment. If Mr. Horos source of information was Mrs. Jaipal Singh when she was in the witness box it was open to him as pointed out in the judgment to pursue the cross-examination with a view to show that the bar under Section 57 of the Divorce Act would be effective. Even after getting the two dates in the course of the evidence no body thought of Section 57, which may either be because counsel appearing for Mr. Horo then or Mr. Horo himself did not believe the dates given by Mrs. Jaipal Singh to be accurate or because they did not want to make any capital of the snap answers given in the course of the evidence since the point was not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue. The judgment clearly suggests that it was open to agitate the matter before the High Court hearing the petition on the basis of Section 57. But the point was not pressed and must be deemed to have been given up. That was why this court did not allow the point to be raised in appeal. In these circumstances it is not open to re-agitate it between the parties in a subsequent proceeding.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. It appears that Mrs. Jaipal Singh is a Ceylonese Tamil Christian. Her first marriage was with Mr. Curtis. But that marriage ended in a divorce. In the course of her evidence in the previous petition, namely, Election Petition No. 2 of 1970 it seems to have been elicited that she had married Mr. Jaipal Singh onand that the decree nisi had been made absolute onIt was contended before the learned Judge that in view of Section 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 Mrs. Jaipal Singh could not enter into a second marriage until after the expiry of six months from the date the decree had been made absolute. The learned Judge pointed out that this very point had been taken before the Supreme Court in the previous petition and, therefore, must be deemed to have been finally decided. The learned Judge was of the opinion that the bar under Sections 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 was a matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence in the former election petition and consequently it was deemed to be a matter directly and substantially in issue in the previous election petition and, therefore, cannot be allowed to be raised in the present petition.8. This Courts judgment in the previous petition clearly goes to show that this Court refused to entertain this ground as it had not been pleaded or pressed before the trial court, Mr. Anthony, appearing for Mr. Horo in that appeal had distinctly raised this point as is seen from para 11 of the judgment at page 1844 of the report. That point was disposed of by this Court with these observations to be found in pararegards tile first point it was never canvassed or argued before the High Court. No plea was taken by Shri Horo in the written statement that there could be no valid marriage between the respondent and late Shri Jaipal Singh owing to the provisions contained in S. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 until after the lapse of a period of six months from the date the decree of divorce was made absolute. None of the issues which were framed by the High Court involves the question now sought to be agitated based on the provisions of S. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act. It appears that advantage is sought to be taken from the statement of the respondent about the dates when the decree absolute was granted and when the marriage took place between the respondent and late Shri Jaipal Singh. In the absence of any pleadings or issues no material has been placed on the record to show that in view of the provisions of Section 57 of the aforesaid Act there could not be a valid marriage according to the Munda customary law. It must be remembered that the respondent contracted a marriage with late Shri Jaipal Singh according to Munda rites and ceremonies and not as one Christian marrying another Christian. Nor was the matter pursued inof the respondent and she was not asked as to how she could get over the bar of S. 57 in the way of remarriage before the expiry of the prescribed period. In these circumstances we do not consider that such a point can be allowed to be agitated for the first time before this court.The above passage goes to show that the point was finally disposed of. Some snap answers given by the respondent in her evidence in that case were sought to be exploited in this court for the purpose of supporting a new argument under S. 57 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 although there was no plea either in the pleadings or in the arguments before the learned Judge who decided the petition. The observations proceed on the basis that it was open to the parties to put forward the plea which Mr. Horo later put forward before the Supreme Court and since the same was not done, this court could not permit the plea to be taken for the first time in this court.It is not as if this court kept the matter open forIt definitely ruled out the plea because it was not pressed before the learned Judge who dealt with the election petition. Mr. Anthony submitted that the question of res judicata does not arise under Explanation 4 of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the expression "any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence" postulates knowledge of a fact by the party making the defence. He further submitted that Mr. Horo could not possibly know about the past of Mrs. Jaipal Singh and his only source of knowledge at the time was Mrs. Jaipal Singh herself. The answer to this is already given in the judgment. If Mr. Horos source of information was Mrs. Jaipal Singh when she was in the witness box it was open to him as pointed out in the judgment to pursue thewith a view to show that the bar under Section 57 of the Divorce Act would be effective. Even after getting the two dates in the course of the evidence no body thought of Section 57, which may either be because counsel appearing for Mr. Horo then or Mr. Horo himself did not believe the dates given by Mrs. Jaipal Singh to be accurate or because they did not want to make any capital of the snap answers given in the course of the evidence since the point was not raised in the pleadings nor put in issue. The judgment clearly suggests that it was open to agitate the matter before the High Court hearing the petition on the basis of Section 57. But the point was not pressed and must be deemed to have been given up. That was why this court did not allow the point to be raised in appeal. In these circumstances it is not open toit between the parties in a subsequent proceeding.