Case: Rentala Latchaiah &amp; Ors Vs. Chimmapudi Subrahmanyam

by the Collector and that they had held possession for many years but not for a period sufficient to create a right of occupancy. Accordingly they were within the class termed in the Bengal Tenancy Act as non-occupancy ryots. Under S. 5 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act a ryot means primarily "a person who has acquired a right to hold land for the purpose of cultivating it by himself, or by members of his family, or by hired servants, or with the aid of partners, and includes also the successors in interest of persons who have acquired such a right." Section 4 of the Act specified non-occupancy ryots as one of the classes of tenants under that Act. Under S. 3 (3) of the Act, a tenant means "a person who holds land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent for that land to that person." The High Court held that the defendants were clearly liable to pay for use and occupation of the land and in the light of the definition of "rent" in S. 3 (5) it had to be held that the defendants were ryots and, therefore, non-occupancy ryots within the terms of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The High Court finally observed:"It may seem anomalous that the defendants, who have no title from the plaintiffs directly, or through their predecessors in estate, should thus be protected as non-occupancy ryots from ejectment as trespassers at the plaintiffs free will: but it seems to us that this is in accordance with the general spirit of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which regards a landlord as a rent receiver and as able to eject a tenant or cultivator of the soil, not an under-tenant, only for certain specified reasons and conditions, none of which here exist. If the defendants had acquired a right of occupancy by occupation for twelve years, they would have been protected from ejectment, and as non-occupancy ryots they are also protected except as specially provided." 8. It will, therefore, be noticed that the scheme of the Bengal Tenancy Act was entirely different from the provisions of the Act we have to construe. There occupancy ryots were protected altogether from ejectment but so long as they were non-occupancy ryots they were also protected except under conditions mentioned in S. 44. Here too the Act would have protected them if their original induction was lawful so that they could be said to be lawfully cultivating the lands. 9. The other decision of the Calcutta High Court is that in Binad Lala Pakrashi v. Kalu Pramanik. (1893) ILR 20 Cal 708 . In this case the plaintiffs who were proprietors sought to oust the defendants from certain lands which they were cultivating in Barakahali village. Previously thereto, there was a dispute regarding these; lands between the plaintiff and the trustee of the late D. N. Tagore who claimed them as the reformed lands of village Modhupur. The plaintiffs were dispossessed of the lands in consequence of the order of a Magistrate who in a proceedings, under S. 145, Cr. P. C. declared possession to be with the trustees. The lower Courts found that the defendants were settled on the land by the trustees but they had not acquired a right of occupancy at the time the suits were brought against them by the plaintiffs in January 1889. Meanwhile in 1878 the plaintiffs had sued the trustees and obtained decrees which were confirmed in appeal by the High Court In January 1886 the plaintiffs took possession of the lands as against the trustees and then they brought suits to eject the defendants as trespassers. They had not received rent from the defendants or in any way admitted their tenancy The trial Court decreed the suits in favour of the plaintiffs but these were upset in appeal by the District Court on the authority of Mohima Chunder Sahas case, (1890)ILR 17 Cal 45 According to the Full Bench:"The possession of the land in question for the purpose of cultivating it was acquired a good many years ago by the defendants from the persons who at that time were in actual possession of the zamindari within which it was situated, and who were then the only persons who could give possession of the lands of the zamindari to cultivators." The Full Bench held that although they had established their right to the zamindari the plaintiffs could not treat the cultivators as trespassers and obtain khas possession of the lands from them. Referring to S. 5 (2) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the learned Chief Justice said:"The possession and interest in the land which the defendants acquired from the persons in possession of the zamindari was a right to hold it for the purpose of cultivating it as against all the world except the true owners of the zamindari, and against them unless they proved a title to the zamindari paramount to that of the plaintiffs landlords. This was. I think, a right to hold the land for the purpose of cultivating it within the meaning of S. 5, Cl. 2 the defendants are ryots, and the only right of the person who has obtained possession of the zamindari is to the rent payable for the land, and not to the khas possession of the land itself, unless they can do so under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. 10. The facts in the Calcutta cases were different from the case before us and the Bengal Tenancy Act gave protection to persons cultivating the land in circumstances which do not obtain here. It would, therefore, not be right to hold. on the basis of the decisions in the Calcutta High Court, that although the person who inducted the tenants on the land was found to be a trespasser on the date of such induction, the tenants continued to have a right to be on the land against the will of the true owner.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]4. The appellants before this Court never were the tenants of Ramalingayya. They were inducted on the land by his widow after the decree of the suit for declaration of title and possession in favour of the adopted son. After the passing of the decree, the possession of the widow could only be that of a trespasser and it was not open to her to create any right in the land in favour of anybodyThis would indeed be a very strange provision of the law and would if upheld, amount to encouraging trespass on the land by persons who had no shadow of title and creating rights in favour of others although they themselves had no title to the land. The meaning of the word asami shikmi" in the definition of the tenant in S. 2 (v) does not appear from any provision of the Act but our attention was drawn to the Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, S. 2 (13), according to which "asami shikmi means a lessee, whether holding under an instrument or under an oral agreement, and includes a mortgage of an asami shikmis rights with possession but does not include a lessee holding directly under Government". In our opinion, this does not help the appellants for the definition shows that a person who claims to be an asami shikmi had to be a lessee either holding under a document of lease or under an oral agreement5. The position might have been different if the appellants had been inducted on the lands by the widow after her recognition as a pattedar by the revenue authorities and before the disposal of the suit against her; but, we are not concerned with that situation. The High Court had considered at some length the question whether she could create any tenancy rights when there was an injunction restraining her from alienating any property. We do not think it was necessary to go into that question for normally the order of injunction which was passed as an interlocutory measure would not survive the decree of the trial CourtSuch is not the position in the case before us. Kaveramma did not induct the tenants on the land in the normal course of management of the property. She put them in possession when she had lost her right to be there and consequently the decision of this Court in Dahya Lalas case 1963 (3) SCR l = (AIR 1964 SC 1320  ), can be of no assistance to the appellants before us8. It will, therefore, be noticed that the scheme of the Bengal Tenancy Act was entirely different from the provisions of the Act we have to construe. There occupancy ryots were protected altogether from ejectment but so long as they were non-occupancy ryots they were also protected except under conditions mentioned in S. 44. Here too the Act would have protected them if their original induction was lawful so that they could be said to be lawfully cultivating the landsThis was. I think, a right to hold the land for the purpose of cultivating it within the meaning of S. 5, Cl. 2 the defendants are ryots, and the only right of the person who has obtained possession of the zamindari is to the rent payable for the land, and not to the khas possession of the land itself, unless they can do so under the provisions of the Tenancy Act10. The facts in the Calcutta cases were different from the case before us and the Bengal Tenancy Act gave protection to persons cultivating the land in circumstances which do not obtain here. It would, therefore, not be right to hold. on the basis of the decisions in the Calcutta High Court, that although the person who inducted the tenants on the land was found to be a trespasser on the date of such induction, the tenants continued to have a right to be on the land against the will of the true owner.