Case: B. Prabhakara Rao Vs. Desari Panakalala Rao and Others and Others

be heard, subject to the limitations written into those provisions, those who fall under it or outside it have no right to bring in evidence or urge grounds as and when they please or at all unless the tribunal, in its discretion, chooses to accept such extra information. The first is a right of the representator the second is the power of the tribunal.We are strengthened in our general approach and particular construction by a ruling of this Court in New Prakash Transport(l) and two rulings of the High Courts, one of a Full Bench of the Madras High Court (AIR 1965 Madras 79) and the other a Division Bench of the Patna High Court to which one of us (Untwalia, J.) was a party (AIR 1964 Patna 154).9. In United Motor Works(2), the Patna Case, the Court observed:"It was also pointed out by the Supreme Court in that case that the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed there under do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a Court of Justice and no elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties interested have to be heard either before the Regional Transport Authority or before the Appellate Transport Authority. The principle is well established that in the absence of any such prescribed procedure the appellate authority may adopt any procedure which it thinks best for hearing the appeal provide always that the rules of natural justice are observed. The matter has been clearly put b y Lord Loreburn in the course of his speech in Board of Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179) as follows:"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. In the present instance, as in many others, what comes for determination is sometimes a matter to be settled by discretion, involving n o law. It will, I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind; but sometimes it will involve a matter of law as well as a matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that ill doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do no t think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradieting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view."Ramaswami C. J., (as he then was) also laid down:"It is. . . manifest t hat the power of the appellate authority is co-extensive with the power of the Regional Transport-Authority in this respect, and there is no reason why the appellate authority should not take these matters into consideration in deciding the appeal under s. 64 of the Act"It is trite that an appeal is a re-hearing and ordinarily appellate power is as wide as original power. The facts of the Patna case (supra) bear a close parallel to our case.Another point wit h which we are not concerned and also decided in the Patna judgment (one of the two writ petitions heard together) was challenged in the Supreme Court and reversed. That bears upon the interstate routes which does not arise in the instant appeal before us.In Cumbum Roadways(1) Kailsam J. (as he then was), speaking for the Full Bench, stressed the same view. The head note in the Report is sufficiently explicit and we quote:"The representator, who makes the representation other wise than under s. 57(4) will not have a right to have his objection heard and considered, but there is no prohibition against the authority taking the information furnished by the objector and acting on it after giving an opportunity to the affected party, to prove that the information is false or that it should not be acted upon. The jurisdiction of the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal to act upon any information, whether it was brought to its notice by the objector or by the Transport Authority cannot be questioned. But it is within the discretion of the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Tribunal to accept the information taking into account the relevant circumstances under which the information was brought before it. If the authority decides to accept, it is bound to ` give a reasonable opportunity to the affected person to show cause as to why the information should not be acted upon. r When the authority is acting on the information, but not as a representation by the objector, the person affected can not object to the authority considering the information on the ground that it was brought to its notice by one of the objectors without including the information in the representation made by the objector. The right of the representer as such is no doubt limited, for, he has no right to insist that any representation made otherwise than under s. 57(4) should be considered in the manner prescribed under s. 57(5). But that does not in any way debar the authority under s. 47(1) of the Act from taking the information into account for deciding to whom the permit should be given in the interests of the public."The decision of the Assam High Court (AIR 1959 Assam 183) brought to our notice by Shri Phadke does not really consider the issue from the position we have delineated and turns on approach which is not quite correct.10. Our conclusion therefore is that s. 15 is intra vires and, further that the said rule merely makes patent what is otherwise latent in the statutory provisions.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The decision of the Assam High Court (AIR 1959 Assam 183) brought to our notice by Shri Phadke does not really consider the issue from the position we have delineated and turns on approach which is not quiteconclusion therefore is that s. 15 is intra vires and, further that the said rule merely makes patent what is otherwise latent in the statutory provisions.