Case: Babu Lal Vs. Sheonath Das

under S. 7-A (1) of the Act. By an order dated March 23, 1957, under S. 7-A (2) respondent No. 5 directed the tenant to vacate the accommodation by March 24, 1957. By another order dated December 2, 1957, under S. 7-A(3) respondent No. 5 directed S. O. P. S. Chowk to evict the tenant and put the allottee in occupation of the accommodation. The tenant filed a writ petition challenging the orders of respondent No. 5. The writ petition was dismissed and the tenant was relegated to a suit. A special appeal from this order filed by the tenant was also dismissed. On September 9, 1958, the tenant filed the present suit asking for a declaration that the orders passed by respondent No. 5 were without jurisdiction and for consequential reliefs. The trial Court dismissed the Suit. The appellate Court reversed this decree and decreed the suit. On second appeal, the High Court restored the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. The tenant has now filed this appeal by special leave. 2. In this appeal the tenant challenges the orders passed by respondent No. 5 under sub-s. (2) of S. 7 and sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 7-A of the Act. Section 7 (2) is in these terms :-"7. (1) (a) .......................... (b) ................................... (c) .................................. (2) The District Magistrate may by general or special order require a landlord to let or not to let to any person any accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant." 3. Under S. 7 (2), the District Magistrate can pass an order in respect of an accommodation which is or has fallen vacant or about to fall vacant. The accommodation must either be vacant nor about to fall vacant before he can pass the order under S. 7(2). If the accommodation is neither vacant nor about to fall vacant, when the order under S. 7 (2) is passed, the order is void and is without jurisdiction. 4. Counsel for the tenant submitted that the District Magistrate has no power to pass an order of allotment under S. 7 (2) unless the accommodation is or has fallen vacant. This submission is based on a misconception. The District Magistrate can pass an order under S. 7 (2) not only when the accommodation is or has fallen vacant but also when it is about to fall vacant. On the materials on the record there can be no doubt that the accommodation was about to fall vacant when respondent No. 5 passed the order under S. 7(2). Before passing the order, he issued notices to the landlords and the tenant. On January 5, 1957, the landlords stated before him in writing that the accommodation was about to be vacated by the tenant. On January 22, 1957, the tenant stated before him in writing that he was going to leave the accommodation in a months time. On February 12, 1957, the tenant again made a statement before him that he wanted to vacate the shop as the decree for ejectment had been passed against him. The declared intention of the tenant that he was about to vacate the accommodation coupled with the decree for ejectment show that on February 20, 1957, the accommodation was on the point of becoming vacant or was about to fall vacant. As a matter of fact in the court below the appellant did not contend that on February 20, 1957 the accommodation was not about to fall vacant. His contention was that as the accommodation had not actually fallen vacant, respondent of No. 5 had no power to pass the order under S.7 (2). 5. Counsel next submitted that even though respondent No. 5 might have powers to pass an order under S. 7 (2) when the accommodation was about to fall vacant, the and order could take effect only when the accommodation fell vacant. We cannot accept this contention. The order dated February 20, 1957 directed the landlords to let the accommodation to the allottee. Respondent No. 5 had power to pass this order. The order took effect immediately. 6. Counsel for the tenant submitted that the proceedings under S. 7-A were without jurisdiction. Now the District Magistrate can take action under S. 7-A"where an order requiring any accommodation to be let or not to let has been duly passed under sub-section (2) of Section 7 and the District Magistrate believes or has reason to believe that any person has in contravention of the said order, occupied the accommodation or any part thereof". Counsel submitted that as the tenant was in occupation of the accommodation before the passing of the order under S. 7(2), he cannot be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order. This contention is supported by the decision in Ram Lal v. Shiv Mani Singh, 1962 All LJ 260, but we cannot agree with the broad statement in this case that the continuance after the allotment order of an occupation previous to the order cannot be an occupation in contravention of the order. It is a question of fact in each case whether a person in occupation of the accommodation since before the allotment order can be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order (see R. K. Khandelwal v. Moti Lal Chawla, AIR 1964 All 221 ). In the instant case after the allotment order was passed, the landlords agreed to accept the appellant as a tenant at enhanced rent. This letting and the continuance of occupation by the appellant under it were in direct breach of the allotment order. 7. In the circumstances, the appellant can well be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order. The respondent No. 5 had, therefore, jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under sub-section (1) of S. 7-A and to pass the orders under sub-ss. (2) and (3) of S. 7-A. The propriety of this order cannot be questioned in this suit. 8.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]his submission is based on a misconception. The District Magistrate can pass an order under S. 7 (2) not only when the accommodation is or has fallen vacant but also when it is about to fall vacant. On the materials on the record there can be no doubt that the accommodation was about to fall vacant when respondent No. 5 passed the order under S. 7(2). Before passing the order, he issued notices to the landlords and the tenant. On January 5, 1957, the landlords stated before him in writing that the accommodation was about to be vacated by the tenant. On January 22, 1957, the tenant stated before him in writing that he was going to leave the accommodation in a months time. On February 12, 1957, the tenant again made a statement before him that he wanted to vacate the shop as the decree for ejectment had been passed against him. The declared intention of the tenant that he was about to vacate the accommodation coupled with the decree for ejectment show that on February 20, 1957, the accommodation was on the point of becoming vacant or was about to fall vacant. As a matter of fact in the court below the appellant did not contend that on February 20, 1957 the accommodation was not about to fall vacant. His contention was that as the accommodation had not actually fallen vacant, respondent of No. 5 had no power to pass the order under S.7 (2)We cannot accept this contention. The order dated February 20, 1957 directed the landlords to let the accommodation to the allottee. Respondent No. 5 had power to pass this order. The order took effect immediatelyThis contention is supported by the decision in Ram Lal v. Shiv Mani Singh, 1962 All LJ 260,but we cannot agree with the broad statement in this case that the continuance after the allotment order of an occupation previous to the order cannot be an occupation in contravention of the order. It is a question of fact in each case whether a person in occupation of the accommodation since before the allotment order can be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order (see R. K. Khandelwal v. Moti Lal Chawla, AIR 1964 All 221  ). In the instant case after the allotment order was passed, the landlords agreed to accept the appellant as a tenant at enhanced rent. This letting and the continuance of occupation by the appellant under it were in direct breach of the allotment order.In the circumstances, the appellant can well be said to have occupied the accommodation in contravention of the order. The respondent No. 5 had, therefore, jurisdiction to initiate proceedings undern (1) of S.A and to pass the orders under. (2) and (3) of S.. The propriety of this order cannot be questioned in this suit.