Case: Dharam Das and Ors.  Vs. The State of Punjab and Ors.

by it that the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 and Sub-section (5) of Section 7 do not suffer from any Constitutional or other legal impediment. It was, however, pointed out by the High Court that the above plea was not taken in any of the Writ petitions except that in the petition filed by Dharam Das. 27. There seems to have been a divergence of opinion in the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of personal notice to be served under Sub-section (4) of Section 7 and even though it was served subsequent to g the notification under Sub-section (5) of Section 7 it was none-the-less determined by the rule of conclusive proof. But as the Full Bench of the High Court explained, and we concur with that explanation, once the provision of conclusive presumption under Sub-section (5) of Section 7 was held to be valid and Constitutional that question could not be allowed to be agitated or rebutted as that would militate against the conclusive nature of the statutory presumption. Nor having regard c to the object of the Act can that provision be considered to be unreasonable as these are only preliminary steps necessary for holding an enquiry which enquiry forms an essential part to the determination of the lis. To take advantage of preliminary steps to protract litigation is itself unreasonable. The presumption that the authorities enjoined by the Act to take certain steps will do so has been an irrebuttable presumption and if that does not affect substantial justice being done between the parties to the lis, no question of unreasonableness will arise. It may also be pointed out that before us it was contended that no notice was served on Bhag Singh. The Respondents Advocate, however, wanted to produce the notice on winch Bhag Singh had signed in token of his having received it, but that is a matter which we cannot entertain in this appeal. 28. It is also argued in Dharam Dass case that the right conferred by Section 8 of the Act on any hereditary office-holder confers that right only on a person who could trace his office as a hereditary officeholder from an unbroken line of Gurus to Chela and if there is any hiatus in that, such as for instance, the death of a Guru before he nominates his Chela or where a Guru marries and is disqualified and another person is appointed as a Mahant that person is not given the right to challenge the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 7. This contention, in our view, is unjustified for the simple reason that hereditary office has been defined in Clause (iv) of Sub-section (4) of Section 2 as meaning an office the succession to which before the first day of January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended territories, before the 1st day of November, 1956, as the case may be, devolved, according to hereditary right or by nomination by the office-holder for the time being and hereditary office-holder means the holder of a hereditary office. If a hereditary office-holder within the meaning of Clause (iv) of Section 2(4) cannot be found then Section 8 provides for a challenge to the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 7 by any twenty or more worshippers of the Gurdwara, each of whom is more than twenty-one years of age and was on the commencement of the Act a resident of a police station area in which the gurdwara is situated. Surely, if as is contended the Bhekh of a Sampradaya is entitled to nominate a successor where a Mahant could not nominate his successor, we presume that the Bhekh will have more than twenty worshippers who could challenge the notification. We cannot assume that the Bhekh which nominated the Mahant would be of less than twenty worshippers. If it had lesser number of worshippers than 20, it could hardly be called a Bhekh. There is, in our view, nothing unreasonable or discriminatory in this provision. As to whether a person is a hereditary office-holder at the time of the presentation of the petition under Section 8, will always be a case for the Tribunal to determine having regard to well-established rules of evidence by which Courts determine these matters. The assumption that if there is a break before 100 years of a succession between a Guru and Chela, the present incumbent will not be considered as a hereditary office-holder is purely hypothetical and this Court will not venture to express its view on such an assumption. It is for the Tribunal to apply the law for determining as to whether the person who challenges the notification is a hereditary office-holder and has locus standi to do so. 29. In Civil Appeal No. 1222 of 1969 the filing of the petition within ninety days prescribed under Section 8 is challenged as unreasonable. The period of limitation is by its very nature to some extent arbitrary but it has never been urged that the period prescribed in the Limitation Act is violative of Article 14 of the. Constitution, nor if such a position is taken can it be sustained. It is an elementary principle of justice that a person having a right should not sleep over it and must come forward as quickly as possible. The contingency that if a Mahant dies within a period of 90 days after the publication of the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 7 without nominating his successor there would be no time for the Bhekh to nominate the successor to the office or for the Bhekh to call a meeting to elect a successor of properties attached to the Gurdwara was forwarded, a declaration do not make the provision invalid. Ninety days is sufficient time for twenty or more worshippers to get together to challenge the notification which is designed to declare the gurdwara in which they are worshipping to be a Sikh Gurdwara and which offends their belief and worship.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The full Bench of the Punjab & Harayana High Court in its detailed judgment has considered several aspects in the light of the contentions advanced before it which contentions have been repeated before us. Before we examine the impugned provisions, it is necessary to state that in order to remedy a situation arising out of certain historical landmarks of Sikh struggle to retain their shrines which had come into the possession of persons subscribing to non-Sikh faiths, the Act was passed. The Sikhs believe in the ten Gurus-the last of whom was Guru Gobind Singh. They further believe that there is no other Guru after Guru Gobind Singh who enjoined on his followers that after him they, should consider Guru Granth Sahib as the Guru. They do not subscribe to idol worship and polytheism, nor do they have any Samadhi in their shrines. The teaching of Sikhs was against asceticism. They believe in Guru Granth Sahib, which is a Rosary of sacred poems, exhortations, etc. During the time of the Sikh Gurus, the Gurdwaras were under their direct supervision and control or under their Masends or missionary agents. After the death of Guru Gobind Singh the Panth is recognised as the corporate representative or the Guru on earth and thereafter they were managed by the Panth through their Granthis and other sewadars who were under direct supervision of the local Sangat or congregation. During Maharaja Ranjit Singhs time Sikhism became the religion of  the State and large estates and Jagirs were granted to the Gurdwaras, apart from the Jagirs which had been earlier granted during the Mugal period.The position of the Gurdwaras changed during British regime. The (Mahants who were in charge of the Sikh Gurdwaras could either be a Sikh Mahant or Udasi Mahant.It may here be stated that the Udasis were, not Sikhs. While the teachings of Sikhs were against asceticism and were opposed to Hindu rites, the Udasis though using the same sacred writings as the Sikhs, kept up much more of the old Hindu practices, followed asceticism, were given to the veneration of Samadhis or Tombs and continue the Hindu rites concerning birth, marriage and Shradh. (See Hem Singh v. Basant Das 63 I.A. 180, 201 Though there was no reconciliation between the Sikhs and Udasis, it did not matter if the Mahant of a Sikh Gurdwara was not a Sikh Mahant because the Panth or Sangat exercised control over the Gurdwaras. After the death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh when the power of the Sikhs had waned and they were disorganised and dejected, the non-Sikh Mahants asserted their control and denied to the Panth or the Sangat rights over those Gurdwaras. After the Sikhs had recovered from their frustration caused by the defeat of the Sikh Rajas they began to assert their rights by filing suits and embarking on litigation for the recovery of their holy shrines.16. A canvass of the provisions of the Act presents four situations- (i) where the Legislature in its judgment considers a Gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara and places it in Sen. 1 to which the provisions, of Sections 3 to 6 are applicable; (ii) in respect of the institutions contained in Sch. II no petition under Section 7 can be entertained unless the institution is deemed to be excluded from specification in Sch. I under the provisions of Section 4 by a notification made after the expiry of ninety days from the commencement of the Act, or, in the case of the extended territories, after the expiry of one hundred and eighty days from the commencement of the Amending Act; (iii) in respect of other Gurdwaras fifty or more Sikh worshippers of a Gurdwara fulfilling the requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 can pray to have the Gurdwara declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara and thereafter the provisions of Sections 7 to 11 would become relevant. That claim can be forwarded by the State Government to a Tribunal under Section 14 and enquired into by it under Section 16. If the Tribunal finds that the Gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara subject to its finding being confirmed by the High Court in appeal, it shall cease in have any jurisdiction over it thereafter, subject of course to any claim made in accordance with the provisions of Section 8 praying for the restoration of the hereditary office-holder or a person who would have succeeded to such office-holder under the system of management prevailing before the first day of January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended territories, before the 1st day of November, 1956, in respect of which the Tribunal shall continue to have jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that it was a Sikh Gurdwara with respect to which either there was no appeal to the High Court or the High Court had confirmed the finding of the Tribunal, that fact would be intimated to the State Government and the State Government shall, as soon as may be, publish a notification declaring such gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara, and the provisions of Part III shall apply thereto with effect from the date of the publication of such notifications (vide Section 17); and (iv) where after the expiry of one year from the commencement of the Act or in the case of the extended territories from the commencement of the Amending Act as the case may be or of such further period as the State Government may have fixed under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 7 two or more persons having interest in any gurdwara in respect of which no notification declaring the gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara has been published under the provisions of the Act may, with the consent of the Deputy Commissioner of the district in which such Gurdwara is situated, institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the principal court of original jurisdiction or in any other court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the gurdwara is situated praying for any of the reliefs specified in Section 92 of the Code H of Civil Procedure, 1908 and may in such suit pray that the pro-visions of Part III be applied to such gurdwara: (see Section 38). Subsections (2) to (6) of Section 38 prescribe the procedure for the inquiry.17. In so far as Lachman Dasss appeal is concerned the Gurdwara Panjaur Padshahi Pehli was included as item 249 in Sch. I by Section 50 of the Punjab Act I of 1959. It is contended that the appellant has been denied a right of hearing by reason of which he has been precluded from challenging that the Gurdwara is not a Sikh Gurdwara but a Udasi Gurdwara and that the provisions of the Act are arbitrary, unreasonable and offends his fundamental rights under Articles 14,19. It is true that a denial of a right to be heard as expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem whether by legislative or executive action or in any other manner is abhorrent to a civilised society; it is destructive of the elementary principles of justice according to which every citizen has to be judged and is contrary to the cherished notions of the rule of law which is the sheet-anchor and the umbilicus of the democratic system of Government embodied in our Constitution.This had reference to Section 148-B which added to the Board constituted under Section 43 additional members till the next election of the new board under Section 43-A. Section 148-C made provisions in respect of employees of the Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala and the local committee functioning under it. Section 148-E made special provisions regarding the assets and liabilities of Interim Gurdwara Board, Patiala. It provided that all lands and buildings (together with all interests of whatsoever nature or kind therein) belonging to the Interim Gurdwara Board, all assets, including stores, articles, and movable properties belonging to the Interim Gurdwara Board immediately before such commencement and utilised for or in connection with the Interim Gurdwara Board shall pass to and vest in the Board. Similarly Clauses (c), (d) and (e) made provision for debts, rents and suits etc. Section 148-F made provision for removal of difficulties/ In this way the Amending Act gave continuity to the vesting of the Gurdwara Pinjore Padhshahi Pehli in the Interim Gurdwara Board and to manage it even after_ the Amending Act, without creating any kind of hiatus in the control and management of such Gurdwaras. The Pinjore Gurdwara was declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara long prior to the Constitution and was managed by the Interim Gurdwara Board constituted by the Firman which was the law of the Pepsu State having the force of law even after the Constitution by virtue of Article 372 and continued to be law till it was repealed and substituted by a law made by a competent Legislature. The appellant had no manner of right during the entire period from 1946 till long after the Amending Act nor did he even assert his right thereto since then until the filing of the Writ Petition and cannot be allowed to challenge now the lactum that the Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara.22. In our view these contentions have no force and must be rejected. The allegation of the appellant in his Writ petition paragraph- 9(d) was that the State Government when preparing the two schedules did not make any enquiry, never served any notice on the appellant asking him to explain as to whether it was an Udasi institution or a Sikh Gurdwara, and arbitrarily included Gurdwara Panjaur sahib, in Udasi institution, in Sch. I which is against the principles of natural justice. In reply thereto in paragraph 9(d) respondents 1 and 3 denied these allegations and averred that the Institution was a Sikh Gurdwara and was under the management of the Interim Gurdwara Board in the erstwhile Pepsu territory. Respondent 2 also while admitting that the appellant was in possession of the Gurdwara and the property attached therewith said that possession was on behalf of the said Gurdwara. Respondent 2 further, while emphatically denying that the Gurdwara was an Udasi institution, asserted that the institution was a Sikh Gurdwara. Annexure A-I was relied upon by the appellant to show that nothing had been stated therein that the Gurdwara was under the management of the Interim Gurdwara Board. This annexure related to an entry in last Jamabandi for the year 1954-55 in which Column I showed the number of the Khata and in the second column name of the owner was described as Gurdwara Sahib Panjore Malik Be ehatman, Mahant Lachhman Das Chela Mahant Isher Dass caste Udasi, resident of village Panjore, Mohtmim. In the third column the name of the cultivator was given. There is nothing in this entry which shows that the Gurdwara was an Udasi Gurdwara or the Lachhman Dass was not working under the management of the Interim Gurdwara Board. The words Be chetmam and Mohtmim clearly show that he was only managing it. This is not inconsistent with the allegations that many of the Sikh Gurdwaras were managed by Udasis nor is it inconsistent with the fact that under the Firmans the Interim Gurdwara Board which was in management of the Gurdwara could get the affairs of the Gurdwara looked after by others under their supervision. For this reason perhaps originally the vires of the provisions of the Act was not specifically agitated in the original petition. It was only subsequently that an attempt was made to have amended. Be that as it may it cannot be said that the question of the management of the impugned Gurdwaras was not raised, la paragraph 2 of the affidavit of Kehar Singh Mann the deponent stated that the Sikh Gurdwaras in the State of Pepsu fell into three categories-(1) Gurdwaras owned and managed by the Government; (2) Gurdwaras which were managed by the Interim Gurdwara Board established by the Ruler of the erstwhile State of Patiala by order of the Ijlas-i-khas December, 1946; and (3) Gurdwaras which were privately managed by the Local Committees. The Government by notification No. 48 Gurdwaras dated February 1, 1957, constituted a committee consisting of M.L.As and M.L.Cs to submit its report for suitable amendments being made in the Act covering the Gurdwaras situated in Pepsu and after obtaining the relevant data the Committee submitted its report on September 14, 1957 which is R-I a copy of which was attached to the affidavit of Kehar Singh Mann. These recommendations of the Committee were accepted and the Amending Act was introduced. The full Bench in its judgment referred to the basis on which certain historical Sikh Gurdwaras of erstwhile Pepsu area were included in Sch. I and others not so included. According to the Advisory Committees report;All the Gurdwaras managed by Government and the Interim Gurdwara Board should not be included in Schedule I. While recommending the inclusion of Gurdwaras mentioned in the attached lists, the Committee has given due consideration to the religious and historical importance of the Gurdwaras and their economy. It was felt that the inclusion of all the Gurdwaras managed by the Interim Gurdwara Board in Schedule I and Section 85 of the Act, would be conducive to inconvenience and complications in the management of some of the Gurdwaras. The Committee has, therefore, not recommended the inclusion of some of the Gurdwaras in Schedule I.The full Bench also further stated that the appellant has not claimed himself to be the owner of the institution divined and described in item No. 249 of the Sch. I and therefore has no locus standi to claim that the said institution should have been included in that Schedule.23. It is, therefore, clear that the question whether Gurdwara Pinjore Padhshahi Pehli was a Sikh Gurdwara or was an Udasi Gurdwara had been determined as early as 1946 by the Firman of the Maharaja of Patiala. The fact that the appellant alleges that he was in possession of the Gurdwara is of little moment because if the law vested the management in the Interim Gurdwara Board the possession of the appellant could either be permissible or hostile. In either case the status of the Gurdwara as a Sikh Gurdwara had been determined before the Constitution and since it was a pre-Constitution law which declared so the appellant cannot challenge it on the ground of violation of his fundamental rights. Even if the appellant continued to be in possession he has not acquired a right of management when once that right was vested in another body. That Firman of an erstwhile Ruler of a Princely State was law and continued to be law till repealed or substituted by a competent Legislature has been concluded by the decisions of this Court in Ameerunnissa Begum and Ors. v. Mahaboob Begum and Ors. [1953]4SCR404 anti State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Shri Sajjanlal Panjawat and Ors. [1974] 1 S.C.R. 500 at p. 511. In view of the legal position an attempt was made to describe the Firman of the Maharaja of Patiala referred to above as an administrative order not having the force of law. With this submission we are unable to agree. A glance at the Firman leaves no manner of doubt that it vested the management and possession of the Gurdwaras in a body created by it, with a Constitution and Membership quorum etc. It could only be administrative if the Gurdwaras in respect of which the management was vested were already vested in the State but that will be fatal to the case of the appellants. The very fact that pending a comprehensive law the Maharaja was issuing the Finnan itself shows that it is a law. The pleadings clearly raised the question of the locus standi of the appellant to assert that the Gurdwara was not a Sikh Gurdwara and it was clearly asserted that the possession of the appellant was on behalf of the said Gurdwara which is not inconsistent with the fact that the possession and management of it was vested in the Interim Gurdwara Board. It was contended by the learned Advocate for the appellant that if the pre-Constitution law takes away rights for an interim period then the rights existed after the interim period and is subject to the Constitution. But even if this proposition is admitted, and it is not necessary to express our view, the assumption on which it is based is invalid. No doubt the Maharaja of Patiala envisaged a comprehensive law to replace his Firmans but by that time the State of Patiala was merged and the law embodied by the Firmans which was continued to be the law after the merger was replaced by the Amending Act which provided for the Interim Gurdwara Board being in possession and management during the transition period. In Sri Jagadguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Gavimittt v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad [1964]8SCR252 a scheme had been framed before the Constitution and Section 103(d) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, properly construed, gave an operative force to the earlier schemes framed under the Madras Act 2 of 1_973 as though they were framed under the Act 19 of 1951. It was not intended by this section that those schemes must be examined and retrained in the light of the relevant provisions of the Act. In these circumstances it was held that although the scheme in question had not been completely implemented before the Constitution, that was no ground for examining its provision in the light of Article 19 of the Constitution. The fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution are not retrospective in operation and the observations made by this Court in Seth Shanti Sarup v. Union of India AIR1955SC624 were not applicable to that case.24. The complaint in the appeals relating to Sell. I Gurdwaras is that the mere publication of a declaration of a consolidated list under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is by virtue of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 conclusive proof of the fact that the application made under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 was in fact made by a Sikh or any present office holder of the Gurdwara in question specified in Sch. I of the Act that the notification and the consolidated list had been published in the prescribed manner at the headquarters of the District etc. and the fact that the State Government sent by registered post a notice of the claim etc. to each of the persons named in the list as being in possession of any such right etc. i.e. of the requisites of Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 3. The appellant Dharam Das further complains that Sub-section (5) of Section 7 bars an inquiry into the fact whether the persons who made the application under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 were in fact fifty or more or not, whether such persons were in fact Sikh worshippers of the Gurdwaras or not, and whether each one of them was more than twenty-one years of age or not at the relevant time. The publication of this notification is to be conclusive proof of the compliance with the requirements of Sub-sections (1) to (4) of Section 7. These provisions have been challenged as offending Article 14 because the impugned presumptions have the effect of taking away the rights which are available to the parties in con testing their suits under Section 38 thus driving a wedge of invidious discrimination between cases tried under Part I of the Act on the one hand and those tried under Part II of the Act (Section 38) on the other; that the said presumptions are pieces of substantive law and not merely rules of evidence; and that the presumptions in question have the effect of taking away certain defences which are normally open to a litigant in an ordinary legal proceedings, i.e. the plea as to g the locus standi of claimant either under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 or under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 by pleading and proving that such claimants did not possess the requisite qualifications entitling them to make the claim in dispute. These very contentions were urged before the High Court and negatived by it on a detailed consideration by reference to the case law.25. It must not be forgotten that the whole object of the Act was to reduce the chances of protracted litigation in a matter involving the religious sentiments of a large section of a sensitive people proud of their heritage. The long history of the struggle of the Sikhs to get back their religious shrines to which reference has been made in the Sikh historical books make it amply clear that the intensity of the struggle, sacrifice and shedding of blood had made the Government of the day realize that a speedy remedy should be devised and accordingly the procedures prescribed in Sections 3 and 7 have been innovated by the Act. The provision of law which shuts out further enquiry and makes a notification in respect of certain preliminary steps conclusive, does not involve the exercise of any judicial function. It has been so held in Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripal and Ors. [1966]1SCR650 . Though this case and the case of Izhor Ahmad Khan and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. [1962] Su 3 S.C.R. 235 had been cited before the High Court as supporting the contention that Sub-section (4) of Section 3 and Sub-section (5) of Section 7 are liable to be struck down as they are equivalent to an ex-parte judgment of the legislature given against the petitions on the relevant point, the High Court on an examination of this case held that the ratio supported a contrary conclusion. In Izhar Ahmed Khans case Sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Citizenship Act provided that if any question arises as to whether, when or how any person has acquired the citizenship of another country, it shall be determined by such authority, in such manner, and having regard to such rules of evidence as may be prescribed in that behalf. Under the above provision Rule 3 of Sch; 111 of the Citizenship Rules, 1956 was framed and it was this rule that was challenged. The Court while up-holding it examined the question as to when it could be said that the conclusive presumption prescribed by the statute fell within the ambit of the rules of evidence and when it could not be so said. If rebuttable presumptions are within the domain of the law of evidence, irrebuttable presumptions would also be within the domain of that branch of the law. Even though the rule provided for a conclusive presumption, the majority held that it prescribed a rule of evidence. That was a case of a rule made under a statutory provision but Sub-section (4) of Section 3 and Sub-section (5) of Section 7 of the Act are rules of evidence prescribed by the Legislature which is competent to provide, for irrebuttable and conclusive presumptions not only as mere rules of evidence but even as substantive pieces of law so long as the relevant provisions are within the legislative competence of the Legislature and are not otherwise unConstitutional.26. In Municipal Board, Hapurs case also the majority decision of this Court held that when a Legislature says that an. enquiry into the truth or otherwise of a fact shall stop at a given stage and that fact is taken to be conclusively proved, no question of discrimination would arise. In fact that case specifically held that the provisions of law which shuts out. further enquiry and makes a notification in respect of certain preliminary steps conclusive, does not involve the exercise of any judicial function. It was pointed out that the Evidence Act is full of such fictions. In fact under Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act it is on the receipt of a list duly forwarded under the provisions of Sub-section (1) that the State Government is expected to publish a notification, the publication of which is made a conclusive proof of certain facts by Sub-section (4) of Section 3. As pointed out by the High Court the use of the expression duly forwarded in relation to an application under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 shows that the State Government is expected to satisfy itself before the issue of a notification under Sub-section (2) of Section 3, that the application in question is a proper application under Sub-section (1), and has been duly forwarded, which implies that the application has been made by a Sikh or by the present office-holder of a Gurdwara specified in Sch. I, and that effect it has fulfilled the requirements of Sub-section (1) of Section 3. We agreement with this conclusion of the High Court for the reasons given by it that the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 and Sub-section (5) of Section 7 do not suffer from any Constitutional or other legal impediment. It was, however, pointed out by the High Court that the above plea was not taken in any of the Writ petitions except that in the petition filed by Dharam Das.27. There seems to have been a divergence of opinion in the Punjab & Haryana High Court in respect of personal notice to be served under Sub-section (4) of Section 7 and even though it was served subsequent to g the notification under Sub-section (5) of Section 7 it was none-the-less determined by the rule of conclusive proof. But as the Full Bench of the High Court explained, and we concur with that explanation, once the provision of conclusive presumption under Sub-section (5) of Section 7 was held to be valid and Constitutional that question could not be allowed to be agitated or rebutted as that would militate against the conclusive nature of the statutory presumption. Nor having regard c to the object of the Act can that provision be considered to be unreasonable as these are only preliminary steps necessary for holding an enquiry which enquiry forms an essential part to the determination of the lis. To take advantage of preliminary steps to protract litigation is itself unreasonable. The presumption that the authorities enjoined by the Act to take certain steps will do so has been an irrebuttable presumption and if that does not affect substantial justice being done between the parties to the lis, no question of unreasonableness will arise. It may also be pointed out that before us it was contended that no notice was served on Bhag Singh. The Respondents Advocate, however, wanted to produce the notice on winch Bhag Singh had signed in token of his having received it, but that is a matter which we cannot entertain in this appeal.This contention, in our view, is unjustified for the simple reason that hereditary office has been defined in Clause (iv) of Sub-section (4) of Section 2 as meaning an office the succession to which before the first day of January, 1920, or, in the case of the extended territories, before the 1st day of November, 1956, as the case may be, devolved, according to hereditary right or by nomination by the office-holder for the time being and hereditary office-holder means the holder of a hereditary office. If a hereditary office-holder within the meaning of Clause (iv) of Section 2(4) cannot be found then Section 8 provides for a challenge to the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 7 by any twenty or more worshippers of the Gurdwara, each of whom is more than twenty-one years of age and was on the commencement of the Act a resident of a police station area in which the gurdwara is situated. Surely, if as is contended the Bhekh of a Sampradaya is entitled to nominate a successor where a Mahant could not nominate his successor, we presume that the Bhekh will have more than twenty worshippers who could challenge the notification. We cannot assume that the Bhekh which nominated the Mahant would be of less than twenty worshippers. If it had lesser number of worshippers than 20, it could hardly be called a Bhekh. There is, in our view, nothing unreasonable or discriminatory in this provision. As to whether a person is a hereditary office-holder at the time of the presentation of the petition under Section 8, will always be a case for the Tribunal to determine having regard to well-established rules of evidence by which Courts determine these matters. The assumption that if there is a break before 100 years of a succession between a Guru and Chela, the present incumbent will not be considered as a hereditary office-holder is purely hypothetical and this Court will not venture to express its view on such an assumption. It is for the Tribunal to apply the law for determining as to whether the person who challenges the notification is a hereditary office-holder and has locus standi to do so.29. In Civil Appeal No. 1222 of 1969 the filing of the petition within ninety days prescribed under Section 8 is challenged as unreasonable. The period of limitation is by its very nature to some extent arbitrary but it has never been urged that the period prescribed in the Limitation Act is violative of Article 14 of the. Constitution, nor if such a position is taken can it be sustained. It is an elementary principle of justice that a person having a right should not sleep over it and must come forward as quickly as possible. The contingency that if a Mahant dies within a period of 90 days after the publication of the notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 7 without nominating his successor there would be no time for the Bhekh to nominate the successor to the office or for the Bhekh to call a meeting to elect a successor of properties attached to the Gurdwara was forwarded, a declaration do not make the provision invalid. Ninety days is sufficient time for twenty or more worshippers to get together to challenge the notification which is designed to declare the gurdwara in which they are worshipping to be a Sikh Gurdwara and which offends their belief and worship.