Case: Chairman-Cum-Managing Director  Vs. Bharat Chandra Behera

to the factum of the appointment of the first respondents elder brother having fructified under the scheme meant for "land displaced persons" as a validly nominated person of the family, whose land was acquired by NALCO, it will have to be held that the availability of the said benefit had come to an end once and for all. Once the benefit under the said scheme was duly availed, there would be no scope for anyone to approach NALCO for appointment for any other person under the said scheme in the absence of any provision providing for making such a claim. 15. It was not brought to the notice of this Court or for that matter before the Division Bench of the High Court any such provision under the scheme providing for any assistance/benefit under the category of "land displaced persons" entitling other members of the family to claim for subsequent employment on the ground that the nominee who was validly appointed earlier lost his life in an accident in the course of his appointment. In such a situation, the only scope was to make a claim under the scheme of "compassionate appointment". But, when the respondent did not fit in any of the beneficiaries, under the scheme of "compassionate appointment", the appellants rightly declined his claim. 16. Once we steer clear of the said scheme provisions the only other aspect to be considered is the factum of appointment of two persons by name Sanjay Bhutia and Bijay Dwibedi whose brother Alekh Bhutia and Sanjaya Dwibedi, who were earlier appointed under the very same scheme on 03.08.1985 and 07.06.1986 respectively died in accidents and in whose place their brothers, namely, Sanjay Bhutia and Bijay Dwibedi came to be appointed in 1985 and 1995 respectively. In so far as the said appointments are concerned, the same is not disputed by the appellants. In fact, in the additional affidavit, filed on behalf of the appellants in the High Court, it has been admitted by the appellants. It is, however, contended that such appointments were not in accordance with the scheme. It is further stated therein that noticing such claims in the year 2004 a scheme called "NALCO Employees Family Financial Assistance Rehabilitation Scheme" was brought into effect on 02.06.2004 under which some financial assistance came to be provided to the family of the deceased brother of the respondent. 17. Having noted the above facts placed before the Court, which have been heavily relied upon by the Division Bench to grant the relief under the impugned order, we only state that when once it was found that those two appointments were irregular and not strictly in accordance with the scheme providing for appointment in the case of land displaced persons, it can only be stated that the same would be hit by the principle of one illegality cannot be the basis for committing another. In other words, two wrongs do not make one right. In this context useful reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Union of India and another vs. International Trading Co. and another reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437. Paragraph 13 can be usefully referred, which reads as under: "13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of permission granted to the thirty two vessels. As highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as the thirty two vessels are concerned, but it cannot come to the aid of the respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short "the Constitution") cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality." 18. Therefore, the appointments of Sanjay Bhutia and Bijay Dwibedi though came to be made in the place of death of their brothers in accidents, in the year 1986 and 1995, the same cannot be quoted as valid precedent for the first respondent to claim employment. In other words, as there is no provision for claiming such appointment on the death of validly nominated person whose appointment already taken place under the scheme meant for "land displaced persons" and there being no provision for making any other appointment for the very same family under the said scheme, the very claim of the first respondent was not maintainable in law. The Division Bench, unfortunately, failed to appreciate the said position, instead proceeded to give a direction to the appellants to consider the claim of the first respondent for providing an appointment in the place of his deceased brother. The said order of the Division Bench cannot, therefore, be sustained. As noted by us under the "compassionate appointment" guidelines as well there is no scope for considering the claim of the first respondent, inasmuch as, the said guidelines provide for compassionate appointment only to the spouse or the dependant son or unmarried dependant daughter. Therefore, the first respondent had no right to claim for employment in NALCO either under the scheme for "land displaced persons" or by way of "compassionate appointment" pursuant to the death of his deceased elder brother Trilochan Behera. 19.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]we are of the considered opinion that the High Court failed to examine the issue in the proper perspective. We say so because we find that the appointment relating to land given cases, as well as compassionate appointment in NALCO are governed by specific schemes and the Division Bench of the High Court unfortunately failed to examine those schemes before issuing the ultimate direction to theof Land Displaced Person/substantially affected person. The head of the family shall indicate in writing his/her nomination from among the family members so listed above whom he/she would desire to get the assistance offered by the company. The nomination made by the head of the family shall be duly authenticated by the concerned revenue authority of the Government. Generally, the nomination once made will not be allowed to be changed except in special circumstances. But in no case, he/she will be allowed to change the nomination more than once. Wherever the State Government agrees, the change in nomination shall also be authenticated by the concerned Revenue Authority of theconspectus consideration of the above provisions under the scheme makes it clear that in respect of a claim under the category of a "land displaced persons", owned by a family, it is for the head of the family to nominate one among his family members who is his dependant, that such nomination under special circumstances would be allowed to be changed once, that such nominated person would be authenticated by the concerned Revenue Officer and befitting the qualification possessed by such a nominee, the appointment would be made. To be more precise, the provision for changing the nominee under special circumstances is far different from anyone seeking for appointment of an alternate candidate in the place of originally nominated person whose employment for no fault of NALCO ceased to survive due to unforeseen circumstances like death, etc. To put it differently, the provisions contained in the scheme does not provide for appointment of an alternate candidate in the place of originally nominated person whose appointment had already taken effect and for whatsoever reason the said appointment did not survive laterappointments of Sanjay Bhutia and Bijay Dwibedi though came to be made in the place of death of their brothers in accidents, in the year 1986 and 1995, the same cannot be quoted as valid precedent for the first respondent to claim employment. In other words, as there is no provision for claiming such appointment on the death of validly nominated person whose appointment already taken place under the scheme meant for "land displaced persons" and there being no provision for making any other appointment for the very same family under the said scheme, the very claim of the first respondent was not maintainable in law. The Division Bench, unfortunately, failed to appreciate the said position, instead proceeded to give a direction to the appellants to consider the claim of the first respondent for providing an appointment in the place of his deceased brother. The said order of the Division Bench cannot, therefore, be sustained. As noted by us under the "compassionate appointment" guidelines as well there is no scope for considering the claim of the first respondent, inasmuch as, the said guidelines provide for compassionate appointment only to the spouse or the dependant son or unmarried dependant daughter. Therefore, the first respondent had no right to claim for employment in NALCO either under the scheme for "land displaced persons" or by way of "compassionate appointment" pursuant to the death of his deceased elder brother Trilochan Behera.