Case: State Of Bihar Vs. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singhand Others

used in its ordinary well-accepted sense, of the person "who holds the land under the proprietor or a tenure-holder for the purpose of cultivation" and the word "under-raiyat " used in the equally well accepted and ordinary sense of "a person who holds land under a raiyat for the purpose of cultivation." It is necessary to remember in this connection that Art. 31A as first enacted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act did not contain these words "raiyat, under-raiyat"; and that after the First Amendment the definition ran thus:-"the expression rights, in relation to an estate shall include any rights vesting in a proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder or other intermediary and any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue."15. It was the Fourth amendment which in the year 1958 inserted the words "raiyat, under-raiyat" immediately after the words "tenure-holder". At that time laws had already been passed in most of the States for the acquisition of the rights of intermediaries in the estates; rights of raiyats or under-raiyats who might answer the description" intermediary" were also within the definition because of the use of the words "or other intermediary". The only reason for specifically including the rights of "raiyats" and "under-raiyats" in the definition could therefore be to extend the protection of Art. 31A to laws providing for acquisition by the State Government of rights of these "raiyats" or "under-raiyats". In the circumstances and in the particular setting in which the words "raiyat" or "under-raiyat" were introduced into the definition, it must be held that the words "or other intermediary" occurring at the end, do not qualify or colour the meaning to be attached to the tenures newly added.16. Another contention raised in support of the argument that the impugned law is not for acquisition of a right in an estate is that the right to hold a Mela is not a right in the lands at all. This contention is wholly unsound. Holding a hat, or bazaar or mela is only a mode of user by the owner of his land. Just as he can enjoy the land belonging to him in other ways, he can use it for the purpose of having a concourse of people-buyers and sellers and others for a hat or bazaar or mela-subject, as in the case of other user to the requirement that no nuisance is created and the legal rights of others are not infringed. Consequently, the right to hold a Mela has always been considered in this country to be an interest in land, an interest which the owner of the land can transfer to another along with the land or without the land.There can be no doubt therefore that the right of the proprietor of an estate to hold a Mela on his own land is a right in the "estate, being appurtenant to his ownership of the land; so also the right of a tenure-holder, who it has to be remembered is the owner of the land subject only to the payment of rent to the proprietor, to hold a mela on land forming part of the tenure.It is true that a licence to hold a Mela on anothers land in which no interest is transferred is not an interest in land; but there is no question here of the acquisition of any licence to hold a Mela at another persons land.The argument that the impugned law was not a law for acquisition of a right in the "estate" because the right to hold a mela was not a right in the land must therefore be rejected.17. Lastly, it was contended that long before the date of the amending Act the "estates" had ceased to exist as a consequence of the notifications issued under S. 3 of the Parent Act and consequently whatever was being acquired in 1959 could not be a right in an "estate". Here also we have to take note of the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were made retrospective with effect from the date of the original enactment so that we have to project ourselves to September 25, 1950, the date of the original enactment, and consider whether on that date the law provided for acquisition of a right in an "estate". Undoubtedly the "estates" did exist on that date and so the acquisition retrospectively provided for from that date was acquisition of a right in an estate.18. Even if we ignore the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were given retrospective effect there is no warrant for saying that what was being acquired was not a right in an "estate." "Estate" was defined in the Bihar Tenancy Act to mean "any land included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue-free lands prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force by the Collector of a District." It is not disputed before us that in spite of the fact that in consequence of notifications under Section 3 of the Act the "estates" had become vested in the State, these registers continued to be maintained at least up to the date of the Amending Act and even later. The position therefore is that the "estates" have become vested in the State but have still not ceased to be "estates".19. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of rights in an "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution and consequently even if we assume that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 32 they are not void on that ground. The conclusion cannot therefore be escaped that the ex-intermediaries have not and the State has the right to hold melas on the Bakasht lands of which they have become occupancy raiyats under the provisions of S. 6.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]That however is no reason to think that this legislation is not also concerned with land reform. It is however unnecessary for us to consider this question further, for whether it is a law as regards land reform or not, it is clearly and entirely as regards acquisition of property. The question of the legislature having attempted legislation not within its competence by putting it into the guise of legislation within its competence does not even arise. The conclusion that necessarily follows is that the amending legislation was within the legislative competence of the Bihar Legislature under Art. 246 of thecomplete answer to this question is furnished in favour of the State if this is a law within the saving provisions of Art. 31A. Art. 31A was enacted in the Constitution by the Constitution (First Amendment Act) with retrospective effect from the commencement of the Constitution. It was further amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, also with retrospective effect from the date of the commencement of the Constitution. This Article, provides inter alia, that notwithstanding anything contained in Art. 13, no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein.........shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Arts. 19, 31 and 14 of the Constitution. Is the amending legislation a law "providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate or of any rights therein?" Two arguments have been advanced on behalf of the ex-intermediaries to convince us that it is not such a law. The first argument is that what the amending legislation provides for is not "acquisition" at all within the meaning of Art. 31A as it is not "acquisition" for a public purpose. It has been urged that the purpose is a mere augmentation of revenue.8. It does not appear to us that when the right of holding the Mela is taken over by the State the only purpose is the augmentation of revenue. There is scope for thinking that the legislature believed that melas would be better run and be more in the interests of the general public when run by the State than when they are left without control in the hands of private individuals with whom the profit motive is likely to be the sole guiding principle. It is unnecessary however to answer this question for, in our opinion, a law, may be a law providing for "acquisition" even though the purpose behind the acquisition is not a public purpose.9. It is important to notice that the constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act made important alterations in Art. 31 also. One of the amendments of Art. 31 was that cl. 2 now provides that no property shall be compulsorily acquired, (1) save for a public purpose, and (2) save by authority of a law which contains provisions for compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on which and the manner in which the compensation is to be determined and given. Then, Art. 31A provides inter alia that a law providing for "acquisition" will not be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges a right conferred by Art. 31. Reading the two articles together as they stand after the fourth amendment of the Constitution it becomes obvious that when Art. 31A speaks of a law of "acquisition" it contemplates a law which may be for acquisition, though not for a public purpose and lays down that even though this will be in violation of the fundamental right guaranteed by the first part of Art. 31 (2) the law will not be void because of suchhas to be noticed that the impugned provisions amending S. 4 and S. 6 and S. 7(b) have been given retrospective effect so that the parent Act of 1950 has to be read as containing on the very date of its enactment provisions in these sections not as originally enacted but as they stood after the amendment of 1959. In deciding whether rights of raiyats were being acquired or not we have to forget what happened in consequence of the unamended S. 6. Projecting ourselves to the date September 25. 1950, when the Presidents assent to the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 1950, was published in the Gazette and reading the Act as containing S. 4 and S. 6 as amended and also S. 7(b) it cannot but be held that what were being acquired by means of these provisions of the amending legislation giving retrospective effect were certain rights of the intermediaries. These intermediaries had not on September 25, 1950. ceased to be intermediaries and the fact that under the unamended provisions of S 6 they later on became occupancy raiyats should not be allowed to confuse the fact that the acquisition of certain properties by the amending legislation being itself with effect from September 25. 1950, what was being provided for was acquisition of intermediaries rights.It was the Fourth amendment which in the year 1958 inserted the words "raiyat, under-raiyat" immediately after the words "tenure-holder". At that time laws had already been passed in most of the States for the acquisition of the rights of intermediaries in the estates; rights of raiyats or under-raiyats who might answer the description" intermediary" were also within the definition because of the use of the words "or other intermediary". The only reason for specifically including the rights of "raiyats" and "under-raiyats" in the definition could therefore be to extend the protection of Art. 31A to laws providing for acquisition by the State Government of rights of these "raiyats" or "under-raiyats". In the circumstances and in the particular setting in which the words "raiyat" or "under-raiyat" were introduced into the definition, it must be held that the words "or other intermediary" occurring at the end, do not qualify or colour the meaning to be attached to the tenures newlycan be no doubt therefore that the right of the proprietor of an estate to hold a Mela on his own land is a right in the "estate, being appurtenant to his ownership of the land; so also the right of a tenure-holder, who it has to be remembered is the owner of the land subject only to the payment of rent to the proprietor, to hold a mela on land forming part of the tenure.It is true that a licence to hold a Mela on anothers land in which no interest is transferred is not an interest in land; but there is no question here of the acquisition of any licence to hold a Mela at another persons land.The argument that the impugned law was not a law for acquisition of a right in the "estate" because the right to hold a mela was not a right in the land must therefore bealso we have to take note of the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were made retrospective with effect from the date of the original enactment so that we have to project ourselves to September 25, 1950, the date of the original enactment, and consider whether on that date the law provided for acquisition of a right in an "estate". Undoubtedly the "estates" did exist on that date and so the acquisition retrospectively provided for from that date was acquisition of a right in an estate.18. Even if we ignore the fact that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act were given retrospective effect there is no warrant for saying that what was being acquired was not a right in an "estate." "Estate" was defined in the Bihar Tenancy Act to mean "any land included under one entry in any of the general registers of revenue-paying lands and revenue-free lands prepared and maintained under the law for the time being in force by the Collector of a District." It is not disputed before us that in spite of the fact that in consequence of notifications under Section 3 of the Act the "estates" had become vested in the State, these registers continued to be maintained at least up to the date of the Amending Act and even later. The position therefore is that the "estates" have become vested in the State but have still not ceased to be "estates".19. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the impugned provisions of the Amending Act is a law providing for the acquisition by the State of rights in an "estate" within the meaning of Art. 31A of the Constitution and consequently even if we assume that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the rights conferred by Arts. 14, 19 and 32 they are not void on that ground. The conclusion cannot therefore be escaped that the ex-intermediaries have not and the State has the right to hold melas on the Bakasht lands of which they have become occupancy raiyats under the provisions of S. 6.