Case: Dhananjoy Das Vs. District Magistrate &amp; Anr

grounds are based must be available to the Government, but there may be cases where there is delay or difficulty in collecting the exact date or it may not be convenient to set out all the facts in the first communication. If the second communication contains no further conclusion of fact from facts, but only furnishes all or some of the fats on which the first mentioned conclusion was founded it is obvious that no fresh ground for which the order of detention was made is being furnished to the detained person by the second communication which follows sometime after the first communication."33. Next reliance was placed on Bidya Deb Barma v. District Magistrate, Tripura, Agartala, 1969 1 SCR 562 : (AIR 1969 SC 323 ). In that case also the impugned order was challenged on the ground of vagueness inasmuch as the ground did not give any details since no particulars of time, place and circumstances had been mentioned and relevant and irrelevant matters had also been included. In the circumstances of the case this Court negatived the contention and observed:"The grounds begin by stating generally what the activities were. They consisted of instigation of tribal people to practise jhuming and preventing the authorities from delivering paddy to Government under the procurement schemes. This instigation it is said was through mass and secret meetings and resulted in violent resistance to Government. Having said this the grounds then specify the places where and the dates on which the meetings were held and the date on which and place at which the resistance took place. In our judgment more detailed information was not necessary to give the detenus an opportunity to make their representations."34. In Vakil Singh v. State of J. & K. AIR 1974 SC 2337 this Court observed:"Grounds within the contemplation of S. 8(1) of the Act means materials on which the order of detention is primarily based. Apart from conclusions of facts grounds have a factual constituent, also. They must contain the pith and substance of primary facts but not subsidiary facts or evidential details. This requirement as to the communication of all essential constituents of grounds was complied with in the present case. The basic facts, as distinguished from factual details, were incorporated in the material communicated to the detenu. He was told the name of the notorious PAK agent and courier ..... through whom he was supplying the information about the Indian Army. He was informed about the places in Pakistan which he was visiting. He was further told that in lieu of the supply of this information he had been receiving money from Pakistan. Nothing more was required to be intimated to enable him to make an effective representation. The facts which were not disclosed were not basic facts and their non-disclosure did not affect the petitioners right of making a representation."35. After analysing the various cases cited on either side we are of the view that the question whether a particular ground is vague will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case because vagueness is a relative term. What may be vague in one case may not be so in similar circumstances of the other case. If the basic facts have been given in a particular case constituting the grounds of detention which enable the detenu to make an effective representation, merely because meticulous details of facts are not given will not vitiate the order of detention. We have meticulously examined paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention and we are satisfied that basic facts have been given to enable the appellant to make an effective representation. Of course, it would have been better if other minute details had also been given36. Lastly we take up the plea raised on behalf of the appellant that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention only make out a case for maintenance of law and order and not of public order. The difference between the expressions law and order and public order has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court on various occasions. In Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (AIR 1966 SC 740 ) (supra) this Court observed:"What was meant by the maintenance of public order was the prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder which the authority was necessary to prevent in view of the emergent situation created by external aggression : whereas the expression maintenance of law and order may mean prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance only."Again, the distinction was brought out in Ashoke Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 , to which one of us was a party. This Court observed:"The true distinction between the areas of "public order" and "law and order" lies not in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of "law and order" and "public order" is a fine one but this does not mean that there can be no overlapping. Acts similar in nature but committed in different contexts and circumstances might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."37. The situation in Assam is a grave one and the agitation on the issue of foreigners has been going on for years and it has taken an ugly and serious turn, and the statements of facts made in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention in the prevalent circumstances in Assam relate to the maintenance of public order in view of the law laid down in the above case

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. There is no doubt that if the first paragraph of the grounds constitute the grounds of detention, it is vague and the order of detention must be quashed on the ground of vagueness with regard to the statement contained therein. Therefore,the main question for consideration in this case is whether the first paragraph of the grounds is merely introductory or a preamble or aprelude. Shri Rangarajan contends that there could be no prelude or preamble to the grounds. Article 22(5) of the Constitution provides for supplying the grounds of detention.Be that as it may, the observations referred to above do not indicate that there can be no preamble or introductory para in the grounds of detention. There is no bar to have introductory paragraphs in the grounds. The observations only mean all allegations of facts which have led to the passing of the order of detention will form part of the grounds of detention. It is, therefore, difficult to accept the contention that there could be no introductory para in theThe grounds of detention read as a whole leave no room for doubt that paragraph 1 of the grounds of detention was only by way of introduction or as a preamble. In substance, it only indicates the modus operandi adopted by the various organisations to the current agitation on foreigners issue in Assam. The 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the grounds of detention allege a specific part played by the appellant in that agitation. On a perusal of grounds of detention as a whole we are satisfied that the view taken by the High Court that the 1st paragraph of the grounds of detention was only a preamble, prelude, or introductory para is correct. If this be the position them the vagueness in the 1st paragraph cannot be made a ground of attack on the impugned order14. The Advocate General feebly sought to contend that assuming that 1st paragraph of the grounds also constituted the grounds for detention there was no vagueness inasmuch as the material facts detailed in paragraphs 2 and 3 were sufficient to enable the appellant to make an effective representation. For example, bundh referred to in paragraph 1 has been detailed in the 2nd paragraph, non-co-operation referred to in paragraph 1 has also been clarified by necessary implication in para 2 inasmuch as Rasta Roko programme or creating obstacles in the roads necessarily helped the non-co-operation by preventing people from attending their offices or performing their statutory duties15. In the view that we have taken that the 1st paragraph of the grounds is only introductory it is not necessary to deal with this aspect of the matter at length16. This takes us to the vagueness in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention which specifically refer to the part played by the appellant in the agitation on specificIt must, however, be kept in mind that it is not what a party chose to put a gloss on the grounds of detention but it is the document itself which will be taken to be the proof of what weighed with the detaining authority while passing the order of detention and it is for the Court to decide whether certain paragraphs of the grounds of detention were only by way of introduction or preamble or constitute the grounds of detention itself. As observed earlier, we have meticulously perused the grounds of detention and the tenor of the document read as a whole indicates that the 1st paragraph of the grounds of detention is only by way of introduction orAfter analysing the various cases cited on either side we are of the view that the question whether a particular ground is vague will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case because vagueness is a relative term. What may be vague in one case may not be so in similar circumstances of the other case. If the basic facts have been given in a particular case constituting the grounds of detention which enable the detenu to make an effective representation, merely because meticulous details of facts are not given will not vitiate the order of detention. We have meticulously examined paragraphs 2 and 3 of the grounds of detention and we are satisfied that basic facts have been given to enable the appellant to make an effective representation. Of course, it would have been better if other minute details had also been given36. Lastly we take up the plea raised on behalf of the appellant that the facts alleged in the grounds of detention only make out a case for maintenance of law and order and not of public order. The difference between the expressions law and order and public order has been the subject matter of consideration by this Court on various occasions.