Case: M/S Savita Chemicals (Pvt) Ltd Vs. Dyes &amp; Chemical Workers Union &amp; Anr

concerned during the arriving of such settlement and if a strike is resorted to by the union of workmen on that ground, it could not be said that the said strike would be hit by the provisions of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act. As a result of the aforesaid conclusion, it must be held that the impugned strike notice was not violative of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act so far as the grievance regarding computation of privilege leave was concerned. The Labour Court had patently erred in mis-reading the relevant provisions of the Act and the express terms of the settlement while reaching the conclusion that the impugned notice refers to the grievance regarding non-implementation of the settlement terms in connection with privilege leave and had, therefore, violated the aforesaid provisions of the Act. This patent error was rightly set aside by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227. 17. It was further contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant that, in any case, the impugned strike notice was also violative of the aforesaid provisions, in connection with the settlement regarding demand No. 26 providing for medical check-up. It, therefore, becomes necessary to look at the terms of the settlement on the said demand. It reads as under : "Demand No. 26 : Medical Check Up : The Company shall get at its expense all the confirmed workmen medically examined i.e. X-ray, blood and Urine examination and medical check up at the beginning of the year and the reports obtained. If during this check up any workman is found suffering from any ailments arising out of the chemicals of gas emanating from the process in the factory the management will bear the medical expenses for his immediate and initial treatment." So far as this contention is concerned, Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant is on a still weaker footing. The settlement regarding medical check up deals with the rights of the workmen to get medical re- imbursement and the procedure for the medical examination of the workmen suffering from any ailment or disease. This right would arise under the settlement in connection with those workmen who have already got afflicted by occupational ailments. This has nothing to do with the grievance found in the impugned strike notice regarding the health hazards suffered by the workmen and preventive measures required to be taken by the company in this connection. This grievance found in the notice is based on the dictum "prevention is better than cure". The settlement regarding demand No. 26 pertaining to medical check up deals with the procedure to be followed and the rights available to the workman after he has suffered from occupational diseases. The strike notice referred to an independent grievance in connection with the situation wherein a disease on proper preventive measures could be avoided. It also referred to various health hazards due to the working conditions of the workmen. These grievances are entirely foreign to the terms of the settlement regarding medical check up. We fail to appreciate as to how the Labour Court could persuade itself to hold that the terms of settlement regarding demand No. 26 were also sought to be contravened by the impugned demands in the notice. The said finding of the Labour Court, to say least, was totally contrary to the express terms of the settlement of demand No. 26. Such a patently erroneous finding had to be set aside by the High Court in writ proceedings and no fault can be found with the High Court in undertaking such an exercise. The valiant attempt of Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant, for getting the impugned strike declared as illegal on this ground is found to be wholly without any substance. It must, therefore, be held that the impugned strike notice was not violative of provisions of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act and had nothing to do with settlement on demand Nos. 14 and 26. The third point for determination is to be answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of Respondent No. 1. Point No. 4 : 18. So far as this point is concerned, placing reliance on various decisions of this court namely, Harish Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, 1955(1) SCR 1104, Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals Assam and others, 1958 SCR 1240 and Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 1467 , learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that unless there was a patent error committed by the Labour Court, the High Court under Article 227 could not have interfered with the findings of the Labour Court as if it was hearing an appeal. There cannot be any dispute on the said settled legal position. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court could not have set aside any finding reached by the lower authorities where two views were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad and suffering from clear errors of law. As we have already discussed earlier while considering point Nos. 1 and 3, the finding reached by the Labour Court on the relevant terms were patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. The said patently illegal findings, could not have been countenanced under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court and the High Court would have failed to exercise its jurisdiction if it had not set aside such patently illegal findings of the Labour Court. Consequently, on this point the appellant has no case. Point No. 4 is, therefore, answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. Point No. 5 : 19. In view of our conclusions on the aforesaid points, the inevitable result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs. 20.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. The factual matrix relevant for consideration of this point indicates, as noted earlier, that there was a settlement arrived at between the appellant company and Respondent No. 1 union on 8th March, 1982 which, amongst others, settled demand Nos. 14 and 26 regarding privilege leave and medical check-up. We will have occasion to deal with the terms of settlement regarding these demands a little later when we will deal with point No. 3. It is sufficient for the present to mention that the aforesaid settlement was for three years valid up to December, 1984. It is during the subsistence of the aforesaid settlement that Respondent No. 1 union sent a letter of demand to the Factory Manager of the appellant company on 14th March, 1984, as noted earlier. It will be relevant at this stage to refer to the exact wording of the saidis obvious that it was not the case of the appellant company before the Labour Court that the impugned strike was contrary to the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. In fact, as seen earlier, it was not the case of the appellant company that Respondent No. 1 Union was a recognised union under the Act at the relevant time when it gave the impugned notice. Consequently, the appellants case before the Labour Court for getting the strike declared illegal was based only on the violation of Section 24(1)(a) and (i) of the Act. The Labour Court has also treated the proceedings accordingly and the ultimate decision rendered by the Labour Court is also the effect that the strike notice of 14th March, 1983 was no notice in law and violative of provisions of Section 24(1)(i). In substance, the Labour Court had no occasion to consider the question whether it was violative also of Section 24(1)(b) of thetherefore, becomes obvious that it is not open to learned senior counsel for the appellant Shri Bhandare to submit that the impugned strike notice was violative of the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, this point does not arise for our consideration and must be held to be redundant and is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It must, therefore, be held while answering this point that the impugned strike notice cannot be said to be violative of the provision of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act for the aforesaid reasons.So far as this point is concerned, it requires a more closer scrutiny. As we have seen earlier, there was also a binding settlement between the parties in connection with demand Nos. 14 and 26. We shall first deal with settlement on demand No. 14 regarding Privilegemere look at the settlement on this Item shows that it was agreed between the parties that the then existing practice of granting 12 days privilege leave for each completed 240 days work per year and one day more for every additional 12 days of work beyond 240 days was to continue and in all other respects the provisions of Factory Act and existing rules were to apply. Now, the question is whether any part of this settlement on privilege leave was sought to be by-passed or challenged in the impugned notice so as to get voided on the touchstone of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act. The said provision lays down that "Illegal strike" means a strike which is commenced or continued during any period in which any settlement or award is in operation, in respect of any of the matters covered by the settlement or award. The question is whether the proposed strike, amongst others, was concerning the grievances in connection with any matter "covered" by the settlement. A conjoint reading of relevant clauses of settlement on demand No. 14 regarding Privilege Leave shows that it was settled between the parties that during the continuation of the settlement, a workman would be entitled to claim only 12 days for 240 days of work and 1 day for every additional 12 days of work beyond 240 days thereafter in a given year. It was not the case of Respondent No. 1 Union in the impugned notice of strike that they wanted any more days of privilege leave after 240 days of work in a year by way of grant of privilege leave vis-a-vis the number of days worked during the year. The impugned strike notice, as noted earlier, recited an entirely different grievance, namely, that there were illegal changes brought about in the matter of computing privilege leave. Actual and correct computation of privilege leave on the basis of actual days worked in a year for concerned workers was not covered by the terms of the settlement. This grievance pertained to non- implementation of the agreed settlement regarding privilege leave and had nothing to do with the claim for any extra privilege leave in addition to that which was agreed to between the parties. To take an analogy, the rights crystalised in the decree stand on an entirely different footing as compared to the grievance in execution proceedings regarding non-implementation of the settled rights under the decree. The grievance made in the impugned strike notice did not pertain to any modification of the crystalised rights regarding privilege leave granted to the workmen under the settlement but it pertained to an entirely different grievance based on a situation which was posterior to settlement of rights and obligations regarding privilege leave between the parties. Thus, as seen earlier, this grievance about non-implementation of the crystalised terms of settlement cannot be said to be a matter "covered" by the settlement for purposes of the definition of "illegal strike", referred to above. It can be said to be amounting to a grievance in connection with non- implementation of the settlement in its true and correct perspective. That, if course, would also amount to allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of the employer as reflected by a conjoint reading of Section 26 and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act, as noted earlier. But the allegation of unfair labour practice on the part of the management has nothing to do with the question whether it also amounts to going behind the settlement. Thus, the strike notice referred to a claim which arose subsequent to the settlement in connection with non-implementation of the main terms of the settlement. The Labour Court was patently in error when it took the view that because of the alternative remedy available to the workmen of filing a complaint about alleged unfair labour practice on the part of the management, they could not have resorted to a more drastic remedy of strike under the provisions of the Maharashtra Act. Nothing in this Act could be relied upon to show that if any grievance of the workmen is covered by unfair labour practice alleged against the employer, they cannot resort to strike. However, learned senior counsel for the appellant Shri Bhandare, rightly submitted that such a more drastic remedy was of the last resort. He was also right when he submitted that when a less drastic remedy was available, the workmen should have resorted to the same for maintaining industrial peace and production. However, that would be in the realm of trade union policy. It may be more prudent for a union of workmen, with a view to having industrial peace and continued production as well as for not disrupting continuity of employment of workmen, to resort to negotiations, and that if needed, to go in the Labour Court with complaint under Section 28 on the ground of unfair labour practice by the employer for the alleged non-implementation of the settlement. It may also be an ideal solution of the problems. But what is ideal may not necessarily be filed by a more militant body of workmen. It may in the long run, prove to be a more drastic remedy for the workmen as they would suffer pangs of unemployment and starvation not only for themselves but also for the members of their families. But only because such better and more prudent remedy was available, it cannot be said that the extreme step of strike resorted to by the Union by not following such remedy was per se illegal unless it fell within the four- corners of Section 24(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Act. It is also easy to visualise that the same Mahrashtra legislature which enacted Section 24(1)(i) also enacted Schedule IV Item 9 be treating it to be an unfair labour practice on the part of the employer. The Maharashtra Act laid down two separate provisions in connection with illegal strike as well as unfair labour practice by the employer. What is unfair labour practice on the part of the employer cannot be pressed in service by the management to show that workers making grievances regarding the same could not have resorted to the strike in connection with the same unfair labour practice and if they did so the strike only on that score became an illegal strike, especially when it was not contrary to any of the provisions of Section 24(1). In any case, the grievance regarding non-implementation of the settlement is not treated by the legislature to be a matter "covered" by the settlement as both these topics are separately dealt with it by enacting Section 24(1)(i) on the one hand and Schedule IV Item 9 of the Act on the other.16. But leaving aside these aspects of the matter, it becomes clear that the intention of the legislature by enacting 24(1)(i) is that during any period in which any settlement is in operation if strike is resorted to by the union or the workmen in connection with any matter "covered" by the settlement the strike would be illegal. Therefore, it must be shown that the strike has been resorted to in connection with any matter covered by the settlement. It, therefore, necessarily means that the terms of the settlement, when read, must indicate that they encompassed any matter which is made the subject matter of the strike notice. We must see the express terms of settlement with a view to finding out as to which matters are covered by the settlement. This necessarily would connote that the settlement in express terms must refer to a matter which is subsequently made a subject matter of notice of strike. When we turn to the settlement of demand No. 14 regarding privilege leave, we find that how 12 days leave for the first 240 days of work in a year and 1 day for every additional 12 days worked beyond 240 days worked are computed in a given year, is not a mater which is at all indicated or mentioned in the settlement. All that the settlement has guaranteed is the right of the workmen to earn 12 days privilege leave for 240 days worked in a year and additional one day for every 12 days beyond 240 days worked in afar as this contention is concerned, Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant is on a still weaker footing. The settlement regarding medical check up deals with the rights of the workmen to get medical re- imbursement and the procedure for the medical examination of the workmen suffering from any ailment or disease. This right would arise under the settlement in connection with those workmen who have already got afflicted by occupational ailments. This has nothing to do with the grievance found in the impugned strike notice regarding the health hazards suffered by the workmen and preventive measures required to be taken by the company in this connection. This grievance found in the notice is based on the dictum "prevention is better than cure". The settlement regarding demand No. 26 pertaining to medical check up deals with the procedure to be followed and the rights available to the workman after he has suffered from occupational diseases. The strike notice referred to an independent grievance in connection with the situation wherein a disease on proper preventive measures could be avoided. It also referred to various health hazards due to the working conditions of the workmen. These grievances are entirely foreign to the terms of the settlement regarding medical check up. We fail to appreciate as to how the Labour Court could persuade itself to hold that the terms of settlement regarding demand No. 26 were also sought to be contravened by the impugned demands in the notice. The said finding of the Labour Court, to say least, was totally contrary to the express terms of the settlement of demand No. 26. Such a patently erroneous finding had to be set aside by the High Court in writ proceedings and no fault can be found with the High Court in undertaking such an exercise. The valiant attempt of Shri Bhandare, learned senior counsel for the appellant, for getting the impugned strike declared as illegal on this ground is found to be wholly without any substance. It must, therefore, be held that the impugned strike notice was not violative of provisions of Section 24(1)(i) of the Act and had nothing to do with settlement on demand Nos. 14 and 26. The third point for determination is to be answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of Respondent No. 1.So far as this point is concerned, placing reliance on various decisions of this court namely, Harish Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and others, 1955(1) SCR 1104, Nagendra Nath Bora and another v. The Commissioner of Hills Division & Appeals Assam and others, 1958 SCR 1240  and Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation, AIR 1984 SC 1467 , learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that unless there was a patent error committed by the Labour Court, the High Court under Article 227 could not have interfered with the findings of the Labour Court as if it was hearing an appeal. There cannot be any dispute on the said settled legal position. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court could not have set aside any finding reached by the lower authorities where two views were possible and unless those findings were found to be patently bad and suffering from clear errors of law. As we have already discussed earlier while considering point Nos. 1 and 3, the finding reached by the Labour Court on the relevant terms were patently erroneous and de hors the factual and legal position on record. The said patently illegal findings, could not have been countenanced under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court and the High Court would have failed to exercise its jurisdiction if it had not set aside such patently illegal findings of the Labour Court. Consequently, on this point the appellant has no case. Point No. 4 is, therefore, answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of theview of our conclusions on the aforesaid points, the inevitable result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to costs.