Case: Institute Of Law  Vs. Neeraj Sharma

struck down as invalid……….’61. The Court also referred to the reasons recorded in the orders passed by the Minister for award of dealership of petrol pumps and gas agencies and observed: (Common Cause case, SCC p. 554, para 24)‘24. … While Article 14 permits a reasonable classification having a rational nexus to the objective sought to be achieved, it does not permit the power to pick and choose arbitrarily out of several persons falling in the same category. A transparent and objective criteria/procedure has to be evolved so that the choice among the members belonging to the same class or category is based on reason, fair play and non-arbitrariness. It is essential to lay down as a matter of policy as to how preferences would be assigned between two persons falling in the same category….’62. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. the Court unequivocally rejected the argument based on the theory of absolute discretion of the administrative authorities and immunity of their action from judicial review and observed: (SCC pp. 236, 239-40)‘29. It can no longer be doubted at this point of time that Article 14 of the Constitution of India applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional…….” In the light of the above mentioned cases, we have to record our finding that the discretionary power conferred upon the public authorities to carry out the necessary Regulations for allotting land for the purpose of constructing a public educational institution should not be misused.30. We further hold that the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution in terms of Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the State is within its competence to prohibit “commercialization of education”. 31. In Modern School v. Union of India and Others [(2004) 5 SCC 583] (supra), this Court has held thus :- “72. So far as allotment of land by the Delhi Development Authority is concerned, suffice it to point out that the same has no bearing on the enforcement of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder but indisputably the institutions are bound by the terms and conditions of allotment. In the event such terms and conditions of allotment have been violated by the allottees, the appropriate statutory authorities would be at liberty to take appropriate step as is permissible in law.” 32. We, therefore, disregard the plea of charitable intention or philanthropic goal behind the establishment of the appellant educational institution as the establishment of the same does not serve any public interest and we cannot allow the allottee to make money or profiteer with the aid of the public property.33. Further, on a careful evaluation of the statutory object behind clause 18 of the “Allotment of Land to Educational Institutions (Schools)Rules Etc. on Lease Hold basis in Chandigarh Scheme, 1996” no systematic exercise has been undertaken by the Administration of Chandigarh to identify the needs of different kinds of professional institutions required to be established in Chandigarh. We thus concur with the reasoning of the High Court in the impugned orders that the Screening Committee comprising of senior and responsible functionaries allotted the institutional sites in favour of the allottee without following any objective criteria and policy. The Screening Committee acted in a manner which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in the judgments cited above in allotting the land in question in favour of the first appellant. We, therefore, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that the policy followed by the Chandigarh Administration where the allotment of land was done in favour of the appellant-Institute without giving any public notice and in the absence of a transparent policy based upon objective criteria and without even examining the fact that the Union Territory of Chandigarh is already under extreme pressure of over population and even in the case of allotment of school sites by making no attempt to enforce clause 18 of the Scheme, 1996, thereby confining the said provision merely to the statute book, is arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust and is opposed to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.34. We now come to the opinion expressed by the then Chief justice in his order which was concurred by the nominated Judge hearing the Civil Misc. Applications that although different reasons have been recorded by the members of the Division Bench in their order who have disposed of CWP No.6916 of 2004, the conclusion arrived at by them was the same. Therefore, the order passed by the then Chief Justice cannot be said to have rendered a different opinion so as to attract the applicability of Rule 31 of Chapter 4, para F, of the High Court Rules and Orders, read with clause 26 of the Letters Patent.35. A perusal of the directions contained in the orders of the High Court reveals a common effect, i.e. the allotment of the institutional plot made in favour of the appellant-Institute stands cancelled as it did not conform to the constitutional philosophy enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This was also conceded by the learned nominated Judge of the High Court hearing the Civil Misc. No.5016 of 2005 and Civil Misc. No. 6173 of 2005. Thus, there appears to be absolutely no point of difference or divergence between the then Chief justice and the companion puisne Judge, who have issued directions to the Administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It has rightly been pointed out by the nominated Judge that there may apparently seem to be a difference in the thought process and also the relative rigour of the expressions used by both the learned Judges, yet, it has not been possible to conclude that there was any divergence in the directions recorded in their separate views.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]21. We will first consider and answer the question of maintainability of the Writ Petition and locus standi of the writ petitioner, the respondent No. 1 herein who has filed the writ petition.22. The property in question belongs to the Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration. Under our constitutional philosophy, it is a public property and therefore, belongs to the people. Hence, the Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration is the trustee of the land whose duty is to see that the property is allotted in favour of eligible persons by following the procedure laid down by the Chandigarh Administration, and the same should not be allowed to be squandered or sold away by it at a throw away price as it has been done in the instant case as pointed out by its Audit Department itself that there is a clear loss of about Rs.139 crores to the public exchequer.23. It has also come to our notice that the settlement of the land in question in favour of the appellant-Institute was done within a few days without following the mandatory procedure for the allotment of land. We do not doubt the intention of the appellants to set up the law institute, however, their private interest is pitted against the public interest. The loss to the public exchequer could have been easily avoided had the land in question been settled by way of public auction inviting applications from eligible persons.24. Further, as stated in the writ petition, the petitioner is a resident of State of Punjab and is also an Income Tax Payee. It has neither been shown nor proved by the appellants that he is a (i) meddlesome interloper (ii) that he is acting under malafide intention or (iii) that he has been set up by someone for settling his personal scores with Chandigarh Administration or the allottee. Dealing with the question of locus standi of the writ petitioner, we would like to refer to certain decisions of this Court to hold that the writ petition filed by the first respondent is a public interest litigation to protect public interest. In the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.) Sindri & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [AIR 1981 SC 344 , (1981) 1 SCC 568 ], the constitutional Bench of this Court has held as……Where does the citizen stand, in the context of the democracy of judicial remedies, absent an ombudsman? In the face of (rare, yet real) misuse of administrative power to play ducks and drakes with the public exchequer, especially where developmental expansion necessarily involves astronomical expenditure and concomitant corruption, do public bodies enjoy immunity from challenge save through the post-mortem of parliamentary organs. What is the role of [pic]the judicial process, read in the light of the dynamics of legal control and corporate autonomy?XXX XXX XXX47. ……Nevertheless, the broad parameters of fairness in administration, bona fides in action, and the fundamental rules of reasonable management of public business, if breached, will become justiciable.48. If a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the court will not be ajar for him. But, if he belongs to an organisation which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot be told off at the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered. I, therefore, take the view that the present petition would clearly have been permissible under Articlesupplied)Similarly, in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Anr. [(1981) Supp SCC 87], this Court has categorically laid down the law in relation to locus standi as underthere is a public wrong or public injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is contrary to the Constitution or the law, any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest can maintain an action for redressal of such public wrong or public injury. The strict rule of standing which insists that only a person who has suffered a specific legal injury can maintain an action for judicial redress is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives standing to any member of the public who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper but who has sufficient interest in the proceeding. There can be no doubt that the risk of legal action against the State or a public authority by any citizen will induce the State or such public authority to act with greater responsibility and care thereby improving the administration of justice……It is also necessary to point out that if no one can have standing to maintain an action for judicial redress in respect of a public wrong or public injury, not only will the cause of legality suffer but the people not having any judicial remedy to redress such public wrong or public injury may turn to the street and in that process, the rule of law will be seriously impaired….19. There is also another reason why the Rule of locus standi needs to be liberalised. Today we find that law is being increasingly used as a device of organised social action for the purpose of bringing about socio-economic change. The task of national reconstruction upon which we are engaged has brought about enormous increase in developmental activities and law is being utilised for the purpose of development, social and economic. It is creating more and more a new category of rights in favour of large sections of people and imposing a new category of duties on the State and the public officials with a view to reaching social justice to the common man……. In other words, the duty is one which is not correlative to any individual rights. Now if breach of such public duty were allowed to go unredressed because there is no one who has received a specific legal injury or who was entitled to participate in the proceedings pertaining to the decision relating to such public duty, the failure to perform such public duty would go unchecked and it would promote disrespect for the rule of law. It would also open the door for corruption and inefficiency because there would be no check on exercise of public power except what may be provided by the political machinery, which at best would be able to exercise only a limited control and at worst, might become a participant in misuse or abuse of power. It would also make the new social collective rights and interests created for the benefit of the deprived sections of the community meaningless and ineffectual.20. ………If public duties are to be enforced and social collectiverights and interests are to be protected, we have to utilise the initiative and zeal of public-minded persons and organisations by allowing them to move the court and act for a general or group interest, even though, they may not be directly injured in their own rights. It is for this reason that in public interest litigation — litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective,rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing. What is sufficient interest to give standing to a member of the public would have to be determined by the court in each individual case. It is not possible for the court to lay down any hard and fast rule or any straitjacket formula for the purpose of defining or delimiting. It has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the court………XXX XXX XXX23. We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legalsupplied)Further, in the case of Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [( 2005) 1 SCC 590 ], this Court held that Public Interest Litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection. It has to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to citizens. The aim of Public Interest Litigation should be to redress genuine public wrong or public injury.25. It is clear to us that the respondent No. 1-the writ petitioner has filed a bonafide writ petition and he has the necessary locus. There is an apparent favour shown by the Union Territory of Chandigarh in favour of the appellant-Institute which is a profit making company and it has not shown to this Court that the allotment of land in its favour is in accordance with law. Hence, we are of the view that there is a strong reason to hold that the writ petition is maintainable in public interest. We completely agree with the views taken by the High Court, wherein it has rightly held that the writ petition is a Public Interest Litigation and not a Private Interest Litigation. The writ petition in question is the first petition filed by the first respondent and his first endeavor to knock the doors of the constitutional court to protect the public interest by issuing a writ of certiorary.26. The appellants have miserably failed to show the malafide intention on the part of the respondent No. 1 in filing writ petition and we agree with the view of the then Chief Justice in his order who has held that he is a public spirited person. The cause ventilated by him is definitely worth consideration and the record of the AAO (Audit) submitted to the Chandigarh Administration proves the allegations made by him. Further it is observed that His Excellency, the Governor of Punjab-cum-Administrator, Chandigarh has rightly come to the conclusion in his decision that the impugned allotment of land in favour of the first appellant-Institute requires taking up of corrective steps. The Administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh has conferred largesse on the appellant-Institute by allotting land in its favour for inadequate consideration without following procedure. Therefore, we hold that the writ petition filed by the first respondent is maintainable as the allotment of the land in question made in favour of the first appellant-Institute is arbitrary, illegal and the same is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.We have carefully considered and examined the question of the legality of the allotment order of the land made in favour of the appellant-Institute. It is submitted on behalf of the first respondent that the allotment of public land at throw away price or at no price to the private educational institutions with an avowed object to serve the public interest is contrary to the theory ofat serve the pious cause of literacy.30. We further hold that the fundamental right to establish and run an educational institution in terms of Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the State is within its competence to prohibit2. We, therefore, disregard the plea of charitable intention or philanthropic goal behind the establishment of the appellant educational institution as the establishment of the same does not serve any public interest and we cannot allow the allottee to make money or profiteer with the aid of the public property.33. Further, on a careful evaluation of the statutory object behind clause 18 of theof Land to Educational Institutions (Schools)Rules Etc. on Lease Hold basis in Chandigarh Scheme,no systematic exercise has been undertaken by the Administration of Chandigarh to identify the needs of different kinds of professional institutions required to be established in Chandigarh. We thus concur with the reasoning of the High Court in the impugned orders that the Screening Committee comprising of senior and responsible functionaries allotted the institutional sites in favour of the allottee without following any objective criteria and policy. The Screening Committee acted in a manner which is contrary to the principles laid down by this Court in the judgments cited above in allotting the land in question in favour of the first appellant. We, therefore, conclude that the High Court has rightly held that the policy followed by the Chandigarh Administration where the allotment of land was done in favour of the appellant-Institute without giving any public notice and in the absence of a transparent policy based upon objective criteria and without even examining the fact that the Union Territory of Chandigarh is already under extreme pressure of over population and even in the case of allotment of school sites by making no attempt to enforce clause 18 of the Scheme, 1996, thereby confining the said provision merely to the statute book, is arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust and is opposed to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.34. We now come to the opinion expressed by the then Chief justice in his order which was concurred by the nominated Judge hearing the Civil Misc. Applications that although different reasons have been recorded by the members of the Division Bench in their order who have disposed of CWP No.6916 of 2004, the conclusion arrived at by them was the same. Therefore, the order passed by the then Chief Justice cannot be said to have rendered a different opinion so as to attract the applicability of Rule 31 of Chapter 4, para F, of the High Court Rules and Orders, read with clause 26 of the Letters Patent.35. A perusal of the directions contained in the orders of the High Court reveals a common effect, i.e. the allotment of the institutional plot made in favour of the appellant-Institute stands cancelled as it did not conform to the constitutional philosophy enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This was also conceded by the learned nominated Judge of the High Court hearing the Civil Misc. No.5016 of 2005 and Civil Misc. No. 6173 of 2005. Thus, there appears to be absolutely no point of difference or divergence between the then Chief justice and the companion puisne Judge, who have issued directions to the Administration of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. It has rightly been pointed out by the nominated Judge that there may apparently seem to be a difference in the thought process and also the relative rigour of the expressions used by both the learned Judges, yet, it has not been possible to conclude that there was any divergence in the directions recorded in their separate views.