Case: State Of A.P Vs. C. Uma Maheswara Rao

548 ) the appellant who was working as a local foreman, was found to have accepted a sum of Rs. 375 from a railway contractor. The appellants explanation was that he had borrowed the amount as he was in need of money for meeting the expenses of the clothing of his children who were studying in school. The Special Judge accepted the evidence of the contractor and held that the money had been taken as a bribe, that the defence story was improbable and untrue, that the presumption under Section 4 of the Act had to be raised and that the presumption had not been rebutted by the appellant and accordingly convicted him under Section 161 IPC and Section 5 of the Act. On appeal the High Court held that on the facts of that case the statutory presumption under Section 4 had to be raised, that the explanation offered by the appellant was improbable and palpably unreasonable and that the presumption had not been rebutted, and upheld the conviction. The appellant contended, on appeal in this Court, inter alia: (i) that the presumption under Section 4 could not be raised merely on proof of acceptance of money but it had further to be proved that the money was accepted as a bribe, (ii) that even if the presumption arose it was rebutted when the appellant offered a reasonably probable explanation. This Court, dealing with the presumption under Section 4, observed that such presumption arose when it was shown that the accused had received the stated amount and that the said amount was not legal remuneration. The word gratification in section 4(1) was to be given its literal dictionary meaning of satisfaction or appetite or desire, it could not be construed to mean money paid by way of a bribe. The High Court was justified in raising the presumption against the appellant as it was admitted that he had received the money from the contractor and the amount received was other than legal remuneration. On the facts the explanation given by the accused. In agreement with the opinion of the High Court was held to be wholly unsatisfactory and unreasonable. In Dhanvantrai vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1964 SC 575 ) it was observed that in order to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act what the prosecution has to prove is that the accused person has received gratification other than legal remuneration and when it is shown that he has received a certain sum of money which was not a legal remuneration, then, the condition prescribed by this section is satisfied and the presumption thereunder must be raised. In Jhangan vs. State of U.P. 1968 (3) SCR 766 ) the above decisions were approved and it is observed that mere receipt of money is sufficient to raise the presumption under Section 4(1) of the Act." 25. In C.I. Emden vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1960 SC 548 ) and V.D. Jhangan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (1966 (3) SCR 736 ) it was observed that if any money is received and no convincing, credible and acceptable explanation is offered by the accused as to how it came to be received by him, the presumption under Section 4 of the old Act is available. When the receipt is admitted it is for the accused to prove as to how the presumption is not available as perforce the presumption arises and becomes operative. 26. These aspects were highlighted recently in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. V. Vasudev Rao (JT 2003(9) SC 119 ). 27. The evidence of PW-1 cannot be ignored on the ground that he had earlier made grievances against some other officials. The Trial Court had carefully analysed his evidence and found the same to be credible. Even if PW-2 did not support the prosecution version on some aspects yet his evidence also prove giving of money. The Evidence of PW-1 coupled with those of PWs 3 and 5 is sufficient to bring home the accusations. Further, the High Court seems to have made out a new case about the alleged date of complaint. A bare reading of the contents of the complaint and the date put in the complaint as evident from Exts. P-3 and P-3A clearly show that the High Court was not correct in saying that the date of the document is 20.12.1991. Additionally, this plea was not raised before the Trial Court. There was even no suggestion about that aspect. Learned counsel for A-1 and A-2 submitted that suggestions were there which is not so. What was suggested was the documents were not prepared at the time they were claimed to be. There is a gulf of difference between time and date. In any event such a plea has not been taken before the courts below. It being essentially a question of fact, the High Court could not have made out a new case regarding correctness of the date. As noted above, the views of the High Court were also not correct when the document is itself looked at. Much stress was laid on the accused persons not being the final authority in the tender matter. As noted in Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel vs. The State of Gujarat (1976) (3) SCC 46 ) the question whether a person has authority to do the act for which bribe is accepted is of no consequence.28. Keeping in view the legal principles as can be culled out from decisions referred to above, applying the fact situation to them the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in directing acquittal. Not only the correct legal position was not kept in view but the analysis of the factual position is also found to be erroneous. That being so, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Custodial sentence of one year for each of the proved offence would meet the ends of justice, with the fine and default stipulation stipulated by the Trial Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]27. The evidence of PW-1 cannot be ignored on the ground that he had earlier made grievances against some other officials. The Trial Court had carefully analysed his evidence and found the same to be credible. Even if PW-2 did not support the prosecution version on some aspects yet his evidence also prove giving of money. The Evidence of PW-1 coupled with those of PWs 3 and 5 is sufficient to bring home the accusations. Further, the High Court seems to have made out a new case about the alleged date of complaint. A bare reading of the contents of the complaint and the date put in the complaint as evident from Exts. P-3 and P-3A clearly show that the High Court was not correct in saying that the date of the document is 20.12.1991. Additionally, this plea was not raised before the Trial Court. There was even no suggestion about that aspect. Learned counsel for A-1 and A-2 submitted that suggestions were there which is not so. What was suggested was the documents were not prepared at the time they were claimed to be. There is a gulf of difference between time and date. In any event such a plea has not been taken before the courts below. It being essentially a question of fact, the High Court could not have made out a new case regarding correctness of the date. As noted above, the views of the High Court were also not correct when the document is itself looked at. Much stress was laid on the accused persons not being the final authority in the tender matter. As noted in Chaturdas Bhagwandas Patel vs. The State of Gujarat (1976) (3) SCC 46 ) the question whether a person has authority to do the act for which bribe is accepted is of no consequence.28. Keeping in view the legal principles as can be culled out from decisions referred to above, applying the fact situation to them the inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in directing acquittal. Not only the correct legal position was not kept in view but the analysis of the factual position is also found to be erroneous. That being so, the judgment of the High Court is set aside. Custodial sentence of one year for each of the proved offence would meet the ends of justice, with the fine and default stipulation stipulated by the Trial Court.