Case: Sahebzada Mohammad Kamgar Shah Vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deoand Others

the letter. In the very first sentence of the letter the Receiver is saying that sum of Rs. 4,993-6-1 as shown in the enclosure to the document was according to him due to the Dhalbhum Raj for the year 1930 on account of royalty; to this he was adding a statement in the second sentence that as soon as this statement of dues was accepted as correct a cheque in payment thereof would be sent. To say that however was not to say that earlier statement of what is due is subject to the acceptance of the accounts. The idea in the second sentence clearly was that in case the statement of what was due was not accepted as correct the matter will have to be decided by further discussion before payment will be made. This second sentence cannot by any stretch of imagination be read as a condition to the statement made in the first sentence. Similarly the first sentence in the second paragraph of the letter as regards the sum of Rs. 31,944-8-3 being royalty up to the end of December 1929 is, as we read the letter, made independent of what was stated in the following sentence and was not subject thereto. The argument that these acknowledgments were conditional acknowledgments has therefore been rightly rejected by the High Court.24. The second contention urged by the learned counsel is that in any case acknowledgment by the Receiver of an estate is not an acknowledgment by an agent of the owners of the estate "duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of Explanation II of S. 19 of the Limitation Act, and so is not an acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19(1) of the Limitation Act.25.According to the learned counsel "duly authorised in this behalf" in Explanation II of S. 19 means "duly authorised by the debtor" and does not include duly authorised by law or by an order of the Court.For this proposition we can find no support either in authority or principle. Explanation II to S. 19 of the Limitation Act in saying "for the purposes of this section signed means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf" has not limited in any way the manner in which the authority can be given.The view taken in this matter by a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Annapagonda v. Sangadiappa, ILR 26 Bom 221, that "duly authorised" would include duly authorised either by the action of the party indebted or by force of law or order of the Court has been followed in other High Courts also(Vide Rashbehary v. Anand Ram, ILR 43 Cal 211 : (AIR 1916 Cal 107); Ramcharan Das v. Gaya Prasad, ILR 30 All 422 (FB); Lakshumanan v. Sadayappa, AIR 1919 Mad 816 and Thankamma v. Kunhamma, AIR 1919 Mad 370), and in our opinion represents the correct state of law.26. Mr. Jha has next argued that, in any case, law does not authorise the Receiver of an Estate to make acknowledgments of debt due from the estate. For this proposition he has relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Currimbhai v. Ahmedali, ILR 58 Bom 505: (AIR 1933 Bom 91). In that case it was held that an acknowledgment by an official assignee will not amount to an acknowledgment by an agent of the debtor. Thought this case does not deal strictly with the case of a Receiver, Mr. Jha has relied on the reasoning therein as supporting his contention. Our attention has been drawn by Mr. Sanyal, on behalf of the respondent to the fact that a contrary view has been taken in 35 Mad LJ 571: (AIR 1919 Mad 816). Mr. Sanyal has argued that in respect of a debt due from the estate the receiver of the estate fully represents the owners of the estate and that once it is held, as it must be, that the receiver had authority to pay the debt. Mr. Sanyal argues, it must necessarily be held that acknowledgment of a debt as incidental to the Receivers duties in respect of the payment of the debts, is also within his authority. So, he argues that in every case an acknowledgment by a Receiver is an acknowledgment by a duly authorised agent of the debtor.27. The above is a brief indication of the arguments on either side on Mr. Jhas contention that the Receiver has no authority to acknowledge the debts on behalf of the Estate. It is unnecessary for us however to decide for the purpose of the present appeal the question whether a Receiver is an agent of the owners of the estate of which he is the Receiver for the purposes of an acknowledgment of a debt under S. 19 of the Limitation Act.28. In the present case the suit is based on the second lease of 1919 which was executed in favour of the then Receiver. The acknowledgments by which limitation is claimed to have been saved is by a previous Receiver of the Estate through whom the appellant who is the present Receiver has derive his liability to pay the debts. Section 19 is therefore in terms applicable as the acknowledgments have been signed personally by those previous Receivers and no recourse is needed by the plaintiff to the second part of Explanation II.This position was indeed fairly conceded by Mr. Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under S. 19 of the Limitation Act.29. There can be no doubt that the acknowledgments on which the plaintiff relies are acknowledgments within the meaning of S. 19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in respect of the period prior to August 12, 1953. The Courts below were therefore right in rejecting the defendants plea of limitation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]12. In his attempt to establish that by this later lease the lessor granted a lease even of those minerals which had been excluded specifically by clause 16 of the earlier lease, Mr. Jha has arrayed in his aid several well established principles of construction. The first of these is that the intention of the parties to a document of grant must be ascertained first and foremost from the words used in the disposition clause, understanding the words used in their strict, natural grammatical sense and that once the intention can be clearly understood from the words in the disposition clause this interpreted it is no business of the courts to examine what the parties may have said in other portions of the document. Next it is urged that it if does appear that the later clauses of the document purport to restrict or cut down in any way the effect of the earlier clause disposing of property the earlier clause must prevail. Thirdly it is said that if there be any ambiguity in the disposition clause taken by itself, the benefit of that ambiguity must be given to the grantee, the rule being that all documents of grants must be interpreted strictly as against the grantor. Lastly it was urged that where the operative portion of the document can be interpreted without the aid of the preamble, the preamble ought not and must not be looked into.13. The correctness of these principles is too well established by authorities to justify any detailed discussion. The task being to ascertain the intention of the parties, the cases have laid down that that intention has to be gathered by the words used by the parties themselves. In doing so the parties must be presumed to have used the words in their strict grammatical sense. If and when the parties have first expressed themselves in one way and then go on saying something, which is irreconcilable with what has gone before, the courts have evolved the principle on the theory that what once had been granted cannot next be taken away, that the clear disposition by an earlier clause will not be allowed to be cut down by a later clause. Where there is ambiguity it is the duty of the court to look at all the parts of the document to ascertain what was really intended by the parties. But even here the rule has to be borne in mind that the document being the grantors document it has to be interpreted strictly against him and in favour of theis in our opinion unthinkable that such a clause as this fourth clause would be included in respect of sub-lessees unless it was also the intention of the parties that the lessee himself would be bound by the provisions of cl. 16 of the principal lease. The view that this must have been the intention is strengthened by the concluding words of this lease which provide in substance that notwithstanding anything in the later lease the principal lease would be valid and subsisting. Here also there would be no point in saying that the principal lease would be valid and subsisting as regard merely the minerals which had been specifically granted by the principal lease. As regards the principal lease being binding in respect of those minerals, there could be no doubt whatsoever and the concluding clause of the 1919 lease would be unnecessary and meaningless. As regards the metals and minerals which are excluded by cl. 16 there might however be some scope for arguments to what would prevail. But for some apprehension in the mind of the grantor perhaps on account of cl. 6 that there might be some scope of difference as regards the metals and minerals mentioned an cl. 16 of the earlier clause, the inclusion of this clause in the principal lease itself would perhaps be unnecessary. It was as a safeguard against that uncertainty that the concluding sentence of the later lease uses the words that we find.15. It appears to us reasonable therefore to hold that of the two meanings of which the words in the disposition clause are capable, the meaning that the parties intended that the minerals excluded by clause 16 of the principal lease were not covered by the present grant but would remain excluded, should be accepted.The second contention urged by the learned counsel is that in any case acknowledgment by the Receiver of an estate is not an acknowledgment by an agent of the owners of the estate "duly authorised in this behalf" within the meaning of Explanation II of S. 19 of the Limitation Act, and so is not an acknowledgment within the meaning of S. 19(1) of the Limitation Act.The above is a brief indication of the arguments on either side on Mr. Jhas contention that the Receiver has no authority to acknowledge the debts on behalf of the Estate. It is unnecessary for us however to decide for the purpose of the present appeal the question whether a Receiver is an agent of the owners of the estate of which he is the Receiver for the purposes of an acknowledgment of a debt under S. 19 of the Limitation Act.In the present case the suit is based on the second lease of 1919 which was executed in favour of the then Receiver. The acknowledgments by which limitation is claimed to have been saved is by a previous Receiver of the Estate through whom the appellant who is the present Receiver has derive his liability to pay the debts. Section 19 is therefore in terms applicable as the acknowledgments have been signed personally by those previous Receivers and no recourse is needed by the plaintiff to the second part of Explanation II.This position was indeed fairly conceded by Mr. Jha who agreed that in view of this it was not necessary for us to decide whether the Receiver of an Estate is by that fact itself an agent of the owners of the estate duly authorised to make acknowledgments under S. 19 of the Limitation Act.29. There can be no doubt that the acknowledgments on which the plaintiff relies are acknowledgments within the meaning of S. 19 of the Limitation Act and save limitation in respect of the period prior to August 12, 1953. The Courts below were therefore right in rejecting the defendants plea of limitation.