Case: Lajwanti Vs. Lal Chand And Ors

the Act did not apply to involuntary dismantling of factories and that the issue raised by the Subordinate Judge in this connection did not arise but in fact it had been decided against the landlord by the High Court in Revision. According to him, the order of the High Court went to show that S. 3 of Act XX of 1948 covered delivery of possession even in execution of the order of the Rent Controller for otherwise the revision application would have been accepted by him straightway. In the result he dismissed the execution petition. 9. The appellant went up in Second Appeal to the High Court at Chandigarh. A single Judge of that Court dismissed the appeal. The decree-holder filed a Letters Patent Appeal. Although of the view that delivery of possession was not barred in execution of the decree by Act XX of 1948, the Division Bench concluded that so far as the parties before it were concerned, the matter had become res judicata in consequence of the decisions of the executing court and the first appellate court on the first execution application and the decision of a single Judge in revision on the previous occasion in the second execution application. S. 3, sub-s- (1) of East Punjab Act XX of 1948 provides as follows:"No person shall, without the written permission of the State Government or of an officer authorised in this behalf by the State Government, dismantle any factory or remove from a factory any spare parts kept for maintaining the machinery of the factory in order." The Act which contains only eight sections makes no reference to any decree for possession against the owner of a factory. By ordering delivery of possession of the premises, the executing court does not make an order for dismantling a factory and a bailiff charged with execution of a warrant for possession does not infringe the above provision of law by rendering possession of the property to the decree-holder. So far as the judgment-debtor, the owner of the factory, is concerned it would be his look-out to take the matter up with the State Government if necessary, and we have no doubt that in a case like this where there is no collusion between the decree-holder and the judgment-debtors the State Government would not prosecute the judgment-debators or refuse to accord sanction to the judgment-debtors for removal of the machinery from the premises of which they could not lawfully continue in possession. 10. It appears that the Subordinate Judge, the District Judge and the Judges of the Punjab High Court were all of the view that the Act did not bar the delivery of possession in execution of a decree. 11. In our opinion there was no final order about the inexecutability of the decree on the first application for execution which was consigned to the record room by order dated July 25, 1953. Further, the judgment of the learned single judge of the Punjab High Court dated July 13, 1955 did not decide the question as to whether the decree for possession would be inexecutable in view of Act XX of 1948. He stated expressly that it was not possible for him to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat the provisions of S. 3 of Punjab Act XX o 1948 and being unable to come to a decision on the record he remanded the matter to the court of execution. He found himself unable to interpret the section on the evidence before him. The proceedings subsequent to the remand order culminated in the order of the Division Bench from which the present appeal arises. The order dated July 13, 1955 was not a final order which put a seal on the proceedings. 12. The course of litigation subsequent to the order for eviction in 1950 is truly amazing. For 17 years the decree-holder has been unable to reap the fruits of the decree although practically all the courts felt that the Act of 1948 could not be called in aid by the judgment-debtors to resist execution by delivery of possession. We cannot but condemn in very strong terms the attitude of the judgment-debtors who to say the least, are persons who have little regard for sanctity of their own solemn promise made before a court of law. On June 29, 1950 in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1950 they stated on oath that they had reached an agreement with the landlord that they would "remain on the premises only up till 31st March 1951 when they would of their own accord vacate the premises" and on their failure to do so the landlord would be entitled to take out execution against them. Even before the time to vacate the premises came one of the judgment debtors filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the decree-holder from obtaining possession in terms of the consent order of 29th June,1950. The suit was dismissed on July 11, 1951. The judgment-debtors also most the appeal filed against that dismissal. At every step and turn for nearly two decades they have successfully resisted delivery of possession by raising an illusory plea. 13. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that even now his clients can urge the plea that the decree was not executable because of the provisions of Act XX of 1948. According to him, the agreement was in contravention of statute and the respondents could not be estopped from pleading or proving facts which would render the agreement void. His case was that Act XX of 1948 being in force on June 29, 1950 any agreement arrived at between the parties in contravention of its provisions would not be binding on the parties. No exception can be taken to the broad proposition of law but no question of estoppel ever arose in this case because Act XX of 1948 did not operate as a bar to the delivery of possession of premises in execution of a decree.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]11. In our opinion there was no final order about the inexecutability of the decree on the first application for execution which was consigned to the record room by order dated July 25, 1953. Further, the judgment of the learned single judge of the Punjab High Court dated July 13, 1955 did not decide the question as to whether the decree for possession would be inexecutable in view of Act XX of 1948. He stated expressly that it was not possible for him to decide whether the execution of the decree would defeat the provisions of S. 3 of Punjab Act XX o 1948 and being unable to come to a decision on the record he remanded the matter to the court of execution. He found himself unable to interpret the section on the evidence before him. The proceedings subsequent to the remand order culminated in the order of the Division Bench from which the present appeal arises. The order dated July 13, 1955 was not a final order which put a seal on the proceedings12. The course of litigation subsequent to the order for eviction in 1950 is truly amazing. For 17 years the decree-holder has been unable to reap the fruits of the decree although practically all the courts felt that the Act of 1948 could not be called in aid by the judgment-debtors to resist execution by delivery of possession. We cannot but condemn in very strong terms the attitude of the judgment-debtors who to say the least, are persons who have little regard for sanctity of their own solemn promise made before a court of law. On June 29, 1950 in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No. 89 of 1950 they stated on oath that they had reached an agreement with the landlord that they would "remain on the premises only up till 31st March 1951 when they would of their own accord vacate the premises" and on their failure to do so the landlord would be entitled to take out execution against them. Even before the time to vacate the premises came one of the judgment debtors filed a suit for a perpetual injunction to restrain the decree-holder from obtaining possession in terms of the consent order of 29th June,1950. The suit was dismissed on July 11, 1951. The judgment-debtors also most the appeal filed against that dismissal. At every step and turn for nearly two decades they have successfully resisted delivery of possession by raising an illusory plea13. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that even now his clients can urge the plea that the decree was not executable because of the provisions of Act XX of 1948. According to him, the agreement was in contravention of statute and the respondents could not be estopped from pleading or proving facts which would render the agreement void. His case was that Act XX of 1948 being in force on June 29, 1950 any agreement arrived at between the parties in contravention of its provisions would not be binding on the parties. No exception can be taken to the broad proposition of law but no question of estoppel ever arose in this case because Act XX of 1948 did not operate as a bar to the delivery of possession of premises in execution of a decree.