Case: Laljee Dubey &amp; Others Vs. Union of India &amp; Others

a rule framed by the President of India.12. In view of the division the question was referred to the third learned Judge as to whether the letter dated 17 November, 1953 constituted a rule framed by the President under Article 309. The third learned Judge held that the letter was of a composite nature. There were ad hoc directions in respect of certain checkers. The letter also laid down some conditions of service which would apply to the remaining checkers. The letter did not constitute a rule framed by the President of India under Article 309. The letter merely contained an order of an administrative or executive nature. This view of the third learned Judge became the majority view of the High Court.13. Counsel on behalf of the appellants contended that the letter dated 17 November, 1953 should be implemented because the Government accepted the recommendation of Kalyanwala Committee. Counsel for the appellants submitted these reasons. Denial of the benefits of the order to the appellants is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Other checkers performing duties similar to those of the appellants have been granted the benefit of the order contained in the letter dated 17 November, 1953 whereas the appellants who are similarly situate have been arbitrarily denied the benefit of the same.14. In the recent decision in Purshottam Lal v. Union of India, (1973) 1 SCC 651 = (AIR 1973 SC 1088 ) this Court held that the Government was bound to implement the recommendations of the Second Pay Commission and if the Government did not implement the report regarding some employees only there would be a breach of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution In Purshottam Lal case, (1973) 1 SCC 651 = (AIR 1973 SC 1088 ) (supra) the Government of India set up a Commission called the "Second Pay Commission" to enquire into emoluments and conditions of service of Central Government employees purshottam Lal and others were employed in the Forest Research Institute and Colleges, Dehra Dun. They were Research Assistants. Their contention was that their case was covered by the recommendations of the Commission. On 2 August, 1960 the Government issued a notification giving effect to the recommendations of the Pay Commission. On 21 June, 1962 the Government of India revised the pay scales of the petitioners and stated that the revision of the pay scales of the petitioners would take effect from the date of the issue of the order. The petitioners contended that the revised pay scales of similar posts in similar sister institutes of the Research Institute under the same Ministry had been implemented from 1 July, 1959 according to the Second Pay Commission recommendations, and, therefore, the petitioners were entitled to the benefit of the retrospective date, viz, 1 July, 1959. The Government contended that it was for the Government to accept the recommendations of the Pay Commission and while doing so to determine what categories of employees should be taken to have been included in the terms of reference. This Court did not accept the contention of the Government. The Government made reference in respect of all Government employees. The Government accepted the recommendations. Therefore, the Government was bound to implement the recommendations in respect of all Government employees. The reason given by this Court was that if the Government did not implement the Report regarding some employees only there would be a breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.15. In the present case the letter dated 17 November, 1953 shows that the President of India gave sanction to the recommendations of Kalyanwala Committee. The authorities admitted some of the persons as lower division clerks and left others to their own posts. The direction containing the sanction of the President indicates that checkers who had the requisite qualifications, viz., passing the matriculation examination or in the alternative three years continuous service in the department were to be put in the category of lower division clerks. The letter dated 17 November, 1953 divided checkers into two groups. The first group consisted of checkers who possessed the necessary qualifications as laid down in that order. The second group consisted of those who did not possess that qualification. In the case of persons of the first group the authorities concerned could not have any option to make any selection among such persons. The direction in that letter indicates that such persons should be classified as lower division clerks. In the case of the second group, viz., those who did not fulfil the qualification requirements it was left open to the authorities to exercise their discretion and classify some of the checkers in the post of lower division clerk if they considered them to be fit and suitable to serve in those posts. The appellants were, therefore, entitled to be designated as lower division clerks, in accordance with the directions contained in the letter dated 17 November 1953. There has been arbitrary discrimination against the appellants.16. In another decision in Union of India v. K. P. Joseph, not yet reported in Supreme Court Reports but reported in AIR 1973 SC 303 = (1973 Lab IC 191) this Court considered whether a general order described as Office Memorandum providing for certain benefits to ex-military personnel on re-employment on the basis of their length of actual military service conferred any right relating to conditions of service. This Court held that the persons mentioned in the order were entitled to have their pay fixed in the manner specified in the order and that was part of the conditions of service.17. It is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether the letter dated 17 November, 1953 became a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution. For the purposes of the appeal it is sufficient to hold that the letter has been accepted by the authorities and given effect to in case of some of the employees belonging to the same group as the appellants.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Denial of the benefits of the order to the appellants is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Other checkers performing duties similar to those of the appellants have been granted the benefit of the order contained in the letter dated 17 November, 1953 whereas the appellants who are similarly situate have been arbitrarily denied the benefit of the same.In the present case the letter dated 17 November, 1953 shows that the President of India gave sanction to the recommendations of Kalyanwala Committee. The authorities admitted some of the persons as lower division clerks and left others to their own posts. The direction containing the sanction of the President indicates that checkers who had the requisite qualifications, viz., passing the matriculation examination or in the alternative three years continuous service in the department were to be put in the category of lower division clerks. The letter dated 17 November, 1953 divided checkers into two groups. The first group consisted of checkers who possessed the necessary qualifications as laid down in that order. The second group consisted of those who did not possess that qualification. In the case of persons of the first group the authorities concerned could not have any option to make any selection among such persons. The direction in that letter indicates that such persons should be classified as lower division clerks. In the case of the second group, viz., those who did not fulfil the qualification requirements it was left open to the authorities to exercise their discretion and classify some of the checkers in the post of lower division clerk if they considered them to be fit and suitable to serve in those posts. The appellants were, therefore, entitled to be designated as lower division clerks, in accordance with the directions contained in the letter dated 17 November 1953. There has been arbitrary discrimination against the appellants.It is not necessary to express any opinion as to whether the letter dated 17 November, 1953 became a rule under Article 309 of the Constitution. For the purposes of the appeal it is sufficient to hold that the letter has been accepted by the authorities and given effect to in case of some of the employees belonging to the same group as the appellants.