Case: M/S. Nagarjuna Construction Co. Ltd Vs. Govt. Of A.P.

than that the substantial requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justice". Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of justice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase ‘justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done. 39. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression ‘civil consequences encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 40. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord Cranworth defined it as ‘universal justice. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase ‘the requirements of substantial justice, while in Arthur John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884-85(10) App. Case 229, 240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase ‘the substantial requirement of justice. In Vionet v. Barrett (1885(55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as ‘the natural sense of what is right and wrong. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionets case (supra) chose to define natural justice as ‘fundamental justice. In Ridge v. Baldwin (1963(1) WB 569, 578), Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with ‘fair-play in action a phrase favoured by Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 (2) SCR 621 ). In re R.N. (An Infaot) (1967 (2) B617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural justice as ‘a duty to act fairly. In fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment (1976 WLR 1255) Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as ‘a fair crack of the whip while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex Parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the homely phrase ‘common fairness. 41. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is ‘nemo judex in causa sua or ‘nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, ‘no man shall be a judge in his own cause. Coke used the form ‘aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars (Co. Litt. 1418), that is, ‘no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party. The form ‘nemo potest esse simul actor et judex, that is, ‘no one can be at once suitor and judge is also at times used. The second rule is ‘audi alteram partem, that is, ‘hear the other side. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form ‘audietur at altera pars is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely ‘qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit that is, ‘he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right (See Bosewells case (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, ‘justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. Whenever an order is struck down as invalid being in violation of principles of natural justice, there is no final decision of the case and fresh proceedings are left upon. All that is done is to vacate the order assailed by virtue of its inherent defect, but the proceedings are not terminated.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]26. Additionally, it is noticed the High Court has relied on certain records which purportedly contain the inspection notes of the sites from where the appellants had excavated the material. It is to be noted that for the first time before the High Court these records were produced. Since there was no reference to the so called inspection notes at any point of time the question of the appellant pleading prejudice because of non-supply of the same does not arise. The High Court observed that since the appellant had not demanded for the inspection notes during hearing of the revision there was no question of any prejudice. The approach is clearly wrong. At no point of time, not even at the time of hearing of revision petition or in the revisional order there is any reference to the so called inspection notes. Added to that, the High Court did not consider the effect of the stand taken by the Government earlier.The High Court did not accept the view expressed by a learned Single Judge while disposing of writ petition No.4579 of 2001 filed by one of the sub contractors M/s Gayatri Projects Ltd. Though that order was not challenged by the Department, the Division Bench thought that the decision was not proper. In any event, that question is of no relevance in the present case. The High Court rightly observed that since the amendments referred to, were introduced after the expiry of the contract period they were really of non consequence.29. Looked at from any angle the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.The basic principles of natural justice seem to have been disregarded by the State Government while revising the order. It acted on materials which were not supplied to the appellants. Additionally the High Court for the first time made reference to the report/inspection notes which was not even referred to by the State Government while exercising revisional