Case: State Of U.P Vs. Smt. Sarjoo Devi &amp; Ors

of the Gaon Sabha to ejectment from the land, on payment of such compensation as ma y be prescribed."4. A conjoint reading of the provisions of these two sections would show that the Chairman, member or society of a committee referred to in section 121 can make an application to the Collector for ejectment of a person only if the land of which he is in possession is of the description specified in section 212 i.e. (1) if it was recorded as customary pasture land or (2) if it was a customary common pasture land. The evidence adduced in the case does not at all show that the suit land was recorded as customary pasture land nor does it show that it was in fact customary common pasture land. On the contrary, the appellants own record clearly negatives its-case. In Exhibits 2 and 45 which are copies of settlement Khatoni of 1323 Fasli, the land in question is clearly recorded as Parti with long thatching grass. Again in Khatoni of 1357 Fasli (1950 A.D.), the land is recorded as "Parti tit for cultivation". The courts below were, therefore, perfectly right in holding that there is no evidence to support the appellants contention that the land in question was either recorded as customary common pasture land or had ever been used as customary pasture land or pasture land in any year. Manifestly therefore, the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad acted without jurisdiction and the impugned order passed by him directing the ejectment of the respondent No. 1 was wholly illegal, ineffective, null and void and not it all binding on respondent No. 1.Point No. 2:-The second point urged by Mr, Dixit is also devoid of substance. Even a cursory glance at sub-section (7) of section 212-A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act reproduced above is enough to show that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad, under section 212-A is not final and it is open to the party against whom the order of ejectment is passed to institute a suit to establish the right claimed by it. It is only when the suit instituted by the person sought to be ejected fails that the order of ejectment becomes conclusive. The aforesaid order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad cannot, therefore, be held to, be final and the suit brought by respondent No. 1 to establish her right was clearly maintainable.5. Point No. 3:-For a decision of this point, it is essential to refer to sections 3(14) and 19 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, which read as follows:"3 (14). Land (except in sections 109, 143 and 144 and Chapter VII means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming.""19. All land held or deemed to have been held on the data immediately preceding the date of vesting by any person as(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) hereditary tenant(v)(vi)(vii)(viii)(iX)shall, have in cases provided for in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 18, be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such person who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled except as provided in sub-section (2) of section 18, to take or retain, possession as a sirdar thereof.."6. A bare perusal of the definition of the word "land as contained in section 3(14) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act which is reproduced above would show that it is not necessary for the land to fall within the purview of this definition that it must be actually under cultivation or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture. The requirement of the definition is, in our opinion, amply satisfied if the land is either held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture. The world "held" occurring in the above definition, which is a pa pple. of the word "hold" is of wide import. In the Unabridged Edition of "The Random House Dictionary of the English Language", t he word "hold" has been inter alia stated to mean "to have the ownership or use of; keep as ones own." In The Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt (1959 Edition), the word "hold" has been interpreted as meaning "to have as tenant".In Strouds Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition), the distinction between holding and occupation is sought to be brought out by quoting the following observations by Littledale, J. in R. v. Ditcheat (9 B & C 108.)."There is a material difference between a holding and an occupation. A person may hold, though he does not occupy. A tenant is a person who holds of another; he does not necessarily occupy.In Websters New Twentieth Century Dictionary (Second Edition), it is stated that in legal parlance, the word "held" means to possess by legal titled. Relying upon this connotation, this Court in Budhan Singh & Anr. v. Nabi Bux & Anr. ([1970] 2 S.C.R. 10.), interpreted the word "held" in section. 9 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act as meaning possession by legal title."7. In the instant case, it has been concurrently found by the courts below on the basis of evidence adduced in the case that the land in question was let out to respondent No. 1 by the aforesaid intermediaries in May, 1950 (1357 Fasli) for growing crops; that she brought a substantial portion thereof under cultivation, paid rent to Girdhar Das and Purshottam Das in 1951 and 1952 proper receipts; that she has been regularly paying revenue to the appellant and that she has all along lawfully continued to hold the land for purposes connected with agriculture. It is also established from the appellants own revenue record that respondent No. 1 was holding the land as a hereditary tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that she fulfilled all the requisite conditions and became a sirdar of the land on the date of vesting under section 19 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act.8.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]conjoint reading of the provisions of these two sections would show that the Chairman, member or society of a committee referred to in section 121 can make an application to the Collector for ejectment of a person only if the land of which he is in possession is of the description specified in section 212 i.e. (1) if it was recorded as customary pasture land or (2) if it was a customary common pasture land. The evidence adduced in the case does not at all show that the suit land was recorded as customary pasture land nor does it show that it was in fact customary common pasture land. On the contrary, the appellants own record clearly negatives its-case. In Exhibits 2 and 45 which are copies of settlement Khatoni of 1323 Fasli, the land in question is clearly recorded as Parti with long thatching grass. Again in Khatoni of 1357 Fasli (1950 A.D.), the land is recorded as "Parti tit for cultivation". The courts below were, therefore, perfectly right in holding that there is no evidence to support the appellants contention that the land in question was either recorded as customary common pasture land or had ever been used as customary pasture land or pasture land in any year. Manifestly therefore, the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad acted without jurisdiction and the impugned order passed by him directing the ejectment of the respondent No. 1 was wholly illegal, ineffective, null and void and not it all binding on respondent No.he second point urged by Mr, Dixit is also devoid of substance. Even a cursory glance at sub-section (7) of section 212-A of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act reproduced above is enough to show that the order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad, under section 212-A is not final and it is open to the party against whom the order of ejectment is passed to institute a suit to establish the right claimed by it. It is only when the suit instituted by the person sought to be ejected fails that the order of ejectment becomes conclusive. The aforesaid order passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Khalilabad cannot, therefore, be held to, be final and the suit brought by respondent No. 1 to establish her right was clearlybare perusal of the definition of the word "land as contained in section 3(14) of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act which is reproduced above would show that it is not necessary for the land to fall within the purview of this definition that it must be actually under cultivation or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture. The requirement of the definition is, in our opinion, amply satisfied if the land is either held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture. The world "held" occurring in the above definition, which is a pa pple. of the word "hold" is of wide import. In the Unabridged Edition of "The Random House Dictionary of the English Language", t he word "hold" has been inter alia stated to mean "to have the ownership or use of; keep as ones own." In The Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt (1959 Edition), the word "hold" has been interpreted as meaning "to have as tenant".In Strouds Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition), the distinction between holding and occupation is sought to be brought out by quoting the following observations by Littledale, J. in R.v. Ditcheat (9 B & Cthe instant case, it has been concurrently found by the courts below on the basis of evidence adduced in the case that the land in question was let out to respondent No. 1 by the aforesaid intermediaries in May, 1950 (1357 Fasli) for growing crops; that she brought a substantial portion thereof under cultivation, paid rent to Girdhar Das and Purshottam Das in 1951 and 1952  proper receipts; that she has been regularly paying revenue to the appellant and that she has all along lawfully continued to hold the land for purposes connected with agriculture. It is also established from the appellants own revenue record that respondent No. 1 was holding the land as a hereditary tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting. There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that she fulfilled all the requisite conditions and became a sirdar of the land on the date of vesting under section 19 of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act.