Case: Kalya Singh Vs. Genda Lal &amp; Others

110. (of SCR) - (at p. 1196 of AIR). "The money was not distributed among the voters directly but was given to Panchayats and the public at large. It was to be used for the good of those for and those against the candidate. No doubt they had the effect of pushing forward his claims but that was inevitable even if no money was spent, but good administration changed the peoples condition. We cannot, therefore, hold that there was any corrupt practice. If there was good evidence that the Minister bargained directly or indirectly for votes, the result might have been different but there was no such evidence."It would thus be noticed that there must be a bargain for votes either directly with the voters or indirectly through someone else. The voter may not be a direct party in the bargain but must be shown to have an indirect interest in it.9. In Abdul Hussains case (Civil Appeal No. 915 of 1974) = (reported in AIR 1975 SC 1612 ) Krishna Iyer J., in his judgment delivered on his and on behalf of Sarkaria J, did not find the fact proved in that case to bring it within the ambit of S. 123 (1) (A) (b). The third learned Judge (A. Alagiriswami J.) did not record any finding to the contrary. Even so while interpreting the scope and ambit of S. 123 (1) of the Act certain observations were made in the majority judgment which were pressed into service by respondent no. 1 while the others were relied on by the appellant. Accepting the argument of Mr. Garg (vide page 1995 of the cyclostyled copy issued by the Supreme Court Bar Association) AIR 1975 SC 1612 it was said" what the law aims at is a blow on the purchase of the franchise by direct or indirect methods. You may buy influence of important persons which is bad in morality but not yet in law." Another passage (vide page 1996 of the cyclostyled copy) AIR 1975 SC 1612 which occurs in that judgment runs thus: "The crucial point is the nexus between the gratification and the voters, one being the consideration for the other, direct or indirect." The two passages extracted above squarely supported the contention of the appellant. While a few others which are being quoted below were pressed into service by learned counsel for respondent no. 1. The said passages at page 1995 are:"If the candidate pays money to a V.I.P. of the locality to use his good offices and canvass votes for him, it is a borderline case, but if the money is paid as consideration for votes promised to be secured by him using his sway, it is bribery even though indirectly exercised. If the Mulla had been paid the money striking a bargain for getting the votes in his ambit of influence, it is electoral corruption. On the other hand, if it is money received for the purpose of organising effectively the election campaign by hiring workers, going round the places in car, meeting people and persuading them to vote for the candidate, it is proper election expense. In between these two extremes lies the case of a man who just receives a large sum of money, pockets it himself and promises to use his good offices to secure votes. This is a gray area. We are not called upon to pronounce on it in this case......................The touchstone in all these cases of payment of gratification is to find out whether the money is paid in reasonable measure for work to be done or services to be rendered. Secondly, whether the services as offered amount to a bargain for getting votes or merely to do propaganda or to persuade voters to vote for the candidate, it being left to the voters not to respond to the persuasion. It is a plain case if a voters to vote paid for his vote, It is direct. It is equally plain if the payment is made to a close relation as inducement for the vote, The same is the case if it is paid to a local chief on the under standing that he will get plead the votes in his pocket borough in consideration for the payment."The third learned Judge in his separate note did not join in the views expressed in the passages just extracted above from the majority decision and said "I consider it, therefore, unnecessary to discuss whether if money is paid or offered as consideration for votes promised to be secured by a person using his influence it is bribery or not. It is a good policy not to discuss in a judgment questions which do not arise out of the facts of the case." The observations of Krishna Iyer J, which were relied on behalf of respondent no. 1 may occasion a debate or dispute if in a given case the facts so warrant. But it will be a futile exercise to do so in this case as the findings recorded against the appellant by the High Court are clearly outside the observations relied on by respondent no. 1. It was not a case where money was paid to respondent no. 3 as consideration for votes promised or as a bargain for getting votes. It was a money paid to him to retire from the contest and to do propaganda and persuade the voters to vote for the appellant. In spite of the propaganda and the appeal of respondent no. 3 the voters were left free not to respond to his persuasion. In no view of the matter, therefore, it is possible to sustain the judgment of the High Court holding the appellant guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123 (1) (A) (b) of the Act. That being so, it is plain that respondent no. 3 also must be exonerated of the charge levelled and found against him of bribery within the meaning of Section 123 (1) (B) (b).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is significant to note from sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (A) that post-facto payment of any gratification as a reward will be bribery only if it is paid to the person or the elector mentioned in thesemoney is paid to an elector to vote for a particular candidate undoubtedly it is a direct inducement to him to vote at an election. If money is paid to a third person in which payment of money an elector has got any direct or indirect interest and which induces him to vote at an election in favour of a particular candidate then also the inducement is brought about as a result of the payment of the gratification. But the point of difficulty may arise where any gratification is void by or on behalf of a candidate to a third person for procuring some votes of some electors who may be under his (third persons)are inclined to think that mere payment of any gratification to a third person for securing or procuring some votes in favour of a particular candidate without the establishment of any nexus between the money and the inducement to the voter will not be sufficient to prove that the voter is indirectly induced on account of the payment of gratification to the third person. The dictionary meaning of the word "induce" is to "prevail on, persuade". The gratification must have some connection or reflection, direct or indirect, in persuading the voter to vote or refrain from voting at an election. If the inducement to the voter is not caused by the payment of the gratification to a third person but by the persuasion or influence (not undue influence) of such third person it will not be possible to say that the gratification had any indirect inducement to the voter. Payment of any gratification to any person to work or canvass at an election is outside the ambit of the definition. It will make little difference if the worker or the canvassor on payment of gratification promises or indulges in fall-talk of securing or procuring some votes for a particular candidate. If the inducement to the voter is free from the shade or colour of the gratification paid to the third person, it will not be bribery. If, however, the inducement in a given case is coloured or shaded by the payment of the gratification to a third person then it would be an indirect inducement to the voter himself within the frame of the definition. In other words it is the fact of payment to the third person that must induce the voter. It is not enough that the third person induces the voter. The frame of any definition, more often than not, is capable of being made flexible. But the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made loose and kept tight as far as possible.7. On the facts found in this case, respondent No. 3 after having retired from the contest merely canvassed to the voters some of whom may be his so called voters, to vote for the appellant. Distribution of the pamphlet and announcement in the meeting held on the 23rd February, 72 to that end did not transgress the limit and make the act an indirect inducement to the voters to cast vote for the appellant on account of payment of the gratification by him to the thirdwas not a case where money was paid to respondent no. 3 as consideration for votes promised or as a bargain for getting votes. It was a money paid to him to retire from the contest and to do propaganda and persuade the voters to vote for the appellant. In spite of the propaganda and the appeal of respondent no. 3 the voters were left free not to respond to his persuasion. In no view of the matter, therefore, it is possible to sustain the judgment of the High Court holding the appellant guilty of corrupt practice within the meaning of S. 123 (1) (A) (b) of the Act. That being so, it is plain that respondent no. 3 also must be exonerated of the charge levelled and found against him of bribery within the meaning of Section 123 (1) (B) (b).