Case: Mithilesh Kumar Sinha and Ors Vs. Returning Officer for Presidential Election and Ors

the Act. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed and Ors. AIR1975SC1288 , the constitutional validity of Sections 5B and 5C of the Act was upheld. In Charan Lal Sahu and Ors. v. Giani Zail Singh and Anr. [1984]2SCR6 , the necessity of precise, specific and unambiguous pleadings in such an election petition was emphasised; the requirements for raising the ground of undue influence under Section 18 of the Act were reiterated; the irrelevance of the plea of suitability of a candidate in the petition was indicated; the absence of any requirement by the candidate of the oath prescribed by Article 84(a) was stated while indicating the requirements in an election petition for raising a triable issue. It was also emphasised that the right arising out of elections including that the right to contest or challenge an election are not common law rights but are creatures of the statutes which create, confer or limit those rights and, therefore, for deciding the question whether an election can be set aside on any alleged ground, the courts have to function within the framework of that law and not travel beyond it. Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for the Constitution Bench in a similar situation also observed as under: It is regrettable that election petitions challenging the election to the high Office of the President of India should be filed in a fashion as cavalier as the one which characterises these two petitions. The petitions have an extempore appearance and not even a second look, leave alone a second thought appears to have been given to the manner of drafting these petitions or to the contentions raised therein. In order to discourage the filing of such petitions, we would have been justified in passing a heavy order of costs against the two petitioners. But that is likely to create a needless misconception that this Court, which has been constituted by the Act as the exclusive forum for deciding election petitions whereby a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election is challenged, is loathe to entertain such petitions. It is of the essence of the functioning of a democracy that election to public offices must be open to the scrutiny of an independent tribunal. A heavy order of costs in these two petitions, howsoever justified on their own facts, should not result in nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion. Therefore, we refrain from passing any order of costs and, instead, express our disapproval of the light-hearted and indifferent manner in which these two petitions are drafted and filed. (at p.17) 50. What appears to have dissuaded the Court then in making a heavy order of costs in a similar situation appears to have lost its force since then in view of the even more cavalier fashion in which these petitions continue to be filed a decade later. 51. In Mithilesh Kumar v. Sri R. Venkataraman and Ors. [1988]1SCR525 , it was reiterated that Section 18 of the Act is exhaustive of the grounds on which such an election can be declared void. We have already quoted the observations of Venkataramiah, J. at p. 537 deprecating the cavalier fashion in which the very same petitioner had then also filed the election petition. 52. We have referred to these decisions for the only reason that in both these petitions, a roving challenge to the election has been made by casually mentioning several provisions and even more casually stating that some of them are unconstitutional without indicating any basis for the challenge. It is unnecessary to dilate further. 53. Before parting with the matters we are constrained to observe that it is now time to make suitable provisions to prevent entertaining such frivolous petitions filed in a cavalier fashion requiring the hearing by a Bench of five Judges of this Court. The only purpose served by such frivolous petitions is the giving of some undue publicity to the petitioner which appears to be the sole purpose of filing such a petition. Obviously, use of the Court as a forum for this purpose must not be permitted. The election petitions under the Representation of the People Act challenging elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures are required to be heard by a Single Judge of the High Court. In view of the greater importance of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections the forum for trial of such election petitions is the Supreme Court and in accordance with the rules framed by the Court these petitions are heard by a Bench of five Judges. Experience has shown that the solemnity and significance attaching to such petitions has been reduced to a farce by the cavalier fashion in which resort is had to this remedy. The mere fact that the entire gamut of both these petitions is fully covered by several earlier decisions of this Court to some of which these very petitioners were parties shows that the existing provisions are inadequate to prevent such abuse of the process of law. It is now necessary to make suitable amendments in the provisions for screening of such frivolous petitions and provisions is required to be made for trial only of serious petitions raising triable issues by a Bench of five Judges of this Court. We consider it our duty to make these observations to invite attention of all concerned to this felt need requiring suitable action in this direction. 54. On giving our anxious consideration to the reason given by Chandrachud, CJ. in Charan Lal Sahu and Ors., v. Giani Zail Singh and Anr. [1984]2SCR6 for not making an order of costs while dismissing those petitions in a similar situation filed a decade earlier, we think the further decline during the last decade indicates that mere observations of this kind do not have the desired effect. We are constrained to take the view that some stringent measure like mandatory requirement of security deposit of a reasonable amount for costs for entertaining the election petition is needed to provide some check.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]21. We may mention that many of the facts stated by us treating them as averments in support of the petition are not contained in the petition. However, for the benefit of the petitioner, we have read even the list of dates filed by him as a part of the petition. We also permitted the petitioner to file certain documents during the course of his arguments on which he relied and have taken them into account. The petitioner finally submitted that Section 17 of the Act requires a full trial of the election petition irrespective of the deficiency in the pleadings and the Court has no power to dismiss the election petition at this stage without going through the entire trial.22. Having given our anxious consideration to the matter, we are left in no doubt that this election petition must be dismissed at the threshold since any further pendency of the same would be a sheer waste of time of this Court, needless public expense and prolongation of abuse of the process of this Court.23. As earlier indicated, the election petition being deficient in material particulars without going into the effect of the deficiency for the purpose of deciding the question of maintainability of the petition, we permitted the petitioner to file several documents at the stage of hearing which include copies of the nomination papers of the candidates and record of the scrutiny proceedings made by the Returning Officer. The nomination paper of petitioner Mithilesh Kumar Sinha bears serial number 60 which was delivered to the Returning Officer at 12.50 p.m. on 24.6.1992 by Mithilesh Kumar himself. The decision of the Returning Officer recorded on petitioners nomination paper on scrutiny made on 25.6.1992 is as under:This nomination paper of Shri Mithilesh Kumar at Sr. No. 60 has ten proposers out of which one proposer at Sr. No. 6 namely, Shri Jawahar Prasad Singh has not appended his signature. It, therefore, falls short of required number of proposers. Besides, Shri Surendra Sharma who is a proposer of Shri Mithilesh Kumar has already subscribed to the nomination paper at Sr. No. 45 of Shri Ram Jethmalani as seconder. His signature is, therefore, inoperative on the present nomination paper. Similarly, Shri Prem Nath Jaiswal, Shri Saryug Mandal, Shri Raj Kumar Mahasetha, Shri Binod Kumar Roy and Shri Madhu Singh who are seconders of Shri Mithilesh Kumar has already subscribed to the nomination paper at Sr. No. 45 of Shri Ram Jethmalani as seconders and as such their signatures also become inoperative on the nomination paper of Shri Mithilesh Kumar. I, therefore, reject the nomination paper Under Section 5E(3)(c) of the said Act.24. The reasons for rejection of petitioners nomination paper given by the Returning Officer show that there was deficiency in the required number of proposers as one of the named proposers Jawahar Prasad Singh had not appended his signature. In addition, Surendra Sharma, a proposer of Mithilesh Kumar had, already subscribed to the nomination paper of Ram Jethmalani as seconder which had been filed earlier and, therefore, his signature was inoperative in accordance with Section 5B(5). Similarly, Prem Nath Jaiswal, Saryug Mandal, Raj Kumar Mahasetha, Binod Kumar Roy and Madhu Singh who were seconders of Mithilesh Kumar Sinha had already subscribed to the nomination paper of Ram Jethmalani as seconders which has been filed earlier and as such their signatures also became inoperative on the nomination paper of Mithilesh Kumar. The reason for rejection of petitioners nomination paper, therefore, was that the same did not comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 5B(1)(a) which made it obligatory for the Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper of Mithilesh Kumar at the time of scrutiny Under Section 5E(3)(c).25. It is to get over this difficulty that the petitioner Mithilesh Kumar Sinha contends that the word delivered in Section 5B(5) should be construed as subscribed.There is no scope for any ambiguity in the meaning of the word deliver in this context in Sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) prescribes the requirement of a certified copy of the entry relating to the candidate in the electoral roll to accompany each nomination paper. Sub-section (3) then says that the Returning Officer shall not accept any nomination paper which is not presented to him within the hours specified in Sub-section (1). Sub-section (4) requires rejection of any nomination paper not received before the specified hour on the last date appointed for the purpose or to which the certified copy referred to in Sub-section (2) is not attached. Then comes Sub-section (5) with which we are concerned in the present case. It is in this context that Sub-section (5) forbids an elector to subscribe, whether as proposer or as seconder, more than one nomination paper at he same election and also prescribes the consequence of its noncompliance by providing that in the case of non-compliance of this mandate in the first part of Sub-section (5), his signature shall be inoperative on any paper other than the one first delivered. It is the meaning of the word deliver in this context in Sub-section (5) which is to be construed.27. As indicated the difference in the meaning of the words deliver and subscribe is clearly brought out in Sub-section (1) and the same words used in Sub-section (5) in the same context must have the same meaning. The plain meaning of Sub-section (5) is that no elector can subscribe, whether as proposer or as seconder, more than one nomination paper at the same election; and if he does so or, in other words, if any elector subscribes more than one nomination paper at the same election, whether as proposer or seconder, then his signature shall be inoperative on any nomination paper other than the one which has been first delivered to the Returning Officer as required by Sub-section (1). This means that an elector can subscribe as proposer or seconder only one nomination paper at the same election and where he subscribes more than one nomination paper at the same election then except for the nomination paper which is first delivered to the Returning Officer, his signature on any nomination paper delivered subsequently to the Returning Officer shall be inoperative or inefffective. It is clear that the elector having the right to sponsor only one candidate and, therefore, to subscribe as proposer or seconder only one nomination paper, that right is exhausted the moment a nomination paper subscribed by him has been delivered to the Returning Officer and the question of his signature on any nomination paper delivered subsequently to the Returning Officer being operative does not arise. No inquiry into that question is contemplated by the Returning Officer where more than one nomination paper subscribed by the same elector is delivered to the Returning Officer, since the statute provides that the right of an elector to propose or second a candidate being exercisable only once, it is exhausted the moment the first nomination paper subscribed by him is delivered to the Returning Officer. There is thus no scope for construing the word deliver as subscribe in Sub-section (5) as suggested by the petitioner since the two words have different connotation and are also used for different purposes not only in Sub-section (5) but also in Sub-section (1) of Section 5B in the same context. The meaning of these words in the two sub-sections of Section 5B must be the same. The construction made by the petitioner of Sub-section (5) of Section 5B must, therefore, be rejected.28. In view of the clear statement made by the petitioner at the hearing, which is also borne out from the documents filed by him, the nomination paper of Shri Ram Jethmalani subscribed by some common electors was first delivered to the Returning Officer as required by Section 5B(1)(a) and, therefore, the signatures of the common electors on the subsequently delivered nomination paper of petitioner were inoperative by virtue of Section 5B(5). The obvious result, therefore, is that the subsequently delivered nomination paper of the petitioner, Mithilesh Kumar Sinha, was not subscribed by at least ten electors as proposers and at least ten electors as seconders as required by Section 5B(1)(a) which made it incumbent on the Returning Officer to reject the petitioners nomination paper on the ground contained in Section 5E(3)(c). This is the reason given by the Returning Officer for rejecting the petitioners nomination paper as required by Section 5E(7). This conclusion is inevitable even assuming, as claimed by the petitioner that his nomination paper was subscribed by ten electors as proposers and ten electors as seconders, including the inoperative common signatures, and ignoring the fact appearing from the nomination paper that there was numerical deficiency of one signature since Jawahar Prasad Singh named as a proposer had not appended his signature on the nomination paper.29. The requirement of Section 14A that an election petition calling in question a Presidential election has to be presented by any candidate at such election or by twenty or more electors joined together as petitioners is for the obvious reason that the requirement for a valid nomination at a Presidential election according to Section 5B(1)(a) is the nomination of a candidate by at least ten electors as proposers and an equal number as seconders i.e. in all by at least twenty electors. A person entitled to claim himself as a duly nominated candidate at the election must have at least twenty electors subscribing his valid nomination paper as proposers and seconders. The law could never have intended that a person without satisfying the requirement of Section 5B(1)(a) can claim to have been duly nominated as a candidate at an election even if he did not have twenty electors behind him as proposers and seconders to validly sponsor him as a candidate. If an election petition according to Section 14A cannot be presented by less than twenty electors joined together as petitioners, it cannot obviously be presented by the alternative mode of a candidate as the petitioner who was not validly nominated by at least twenty electors. This requirement of Section 14A(1) is a clear indication that a person cannot claim to have been duly nominated as a candidate at the Presidential election unless he had satisfied the mandatory requirements of Section 5B(1)(a) and Section 5C.31. It is also settled by the decisions of this Court that in order to have the requisite locus standi as a candidate within the meaning of Section 13(a) for being entitled to present such an election petition in accordance with Section 14A of the Act the petitioner must be duly nominated as a candidate in accordance with Section 5B(1)(a) and Section 5C. Unless it is so the petitioner cannot even claim to have been duly nominated as a candidate at the election as required by Section 13(a). The above conclusion in respect to the nomination paper of the petitioner, Mithilesh Kumar Sinha, from the facts set out by him in the petition, stated by him at the hearing and evident from the documents filed by him makes it clear that the petitioner, Mithilesh Kumar Sinha, has no locus standi to challenge the election of the returned candidate, Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma as he is not competent to present the election petition in accordance with Section 14A of the Act read with Order XXXIX Rule 7 of Supreme Court Rules. Even otherwise the ground under Section 18(1)(c) of the Act of wrongful rejection of his nomination paper urged in the election petition does not give rise to a triable issue on the above facts and the irresistible conclusion therefrom. The material facts to make out a prima facie case of existence of that ground are lacking in the pleadings and squarely negatived by petitioners own statement.36. The earlier decisions of this Court have clearly negatived the petitioners further contention that the Court is bound to continue this trial even though no triable issue arises and he does not have the requisite locus standi merely because of Section 17 of the Act. The cited cases including one filed by the very same petitioner show rejection of similarly defective petitions at the threshold. The trial commences with the presentation of the election petition and an order of dismissal of the petition made at this stage on the ground that it is not maintainable being barred by any law or not disclosing any cause of action is a dismissal at the conclusion of the trial since no further step in the trial of such a petition is contemplated. This is how the word trial in Section 17 of the Act must be understood, if Section 17 is to govern the dismissal of all petitions including dismissal at the threshold. This view also harmonises Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules which applies by virtue of Order XXXIX Rule 34 as repeatedly held by this Court.37. The Election Petition No. 1 of 1992is, therefore, liable to be dismissed as not maintainable, for the reasons given. The other vague and general grounds urged by this petitioner are considered later along with similar points taken by the petitioner inElection Petition No. 2 of 1992Election Petition No. 2 of 1992There is no such averment made in the election petition nor was any such assertion made even at the hearing by the petitioner. There is thus no foundation for this further declaration sought by the petitioner in the relief claimed by him at serial number 9 in the prayer clause. The election petition is, therefore, to be confined essentially to the ground contained in Section 18(1)(c) of wrongful acceptance of the nomination papers of the other three candidates.39. No doubt in the election petition several other things have been said but they do not amount to averment of material facts to constitute or raise any other ground contained in Section 18 of the Act. A passing reference to what may be termed as undue influence does appear in the petition but the averments do not satisfy the requirement of pleadings even according to the ordinary standard much less the more stringent requirements of Sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act. At the hearing also the petitioner addressed us mainly on the ground of wrongful acceptance of nomination papers of the other three candidates relying particularly on the objections raised by him before the Returning Officer as mentioned earlier. We would, therefore, now consider maintainability of the petition on the ground contained in Section 18(1)(c) of the Act. A reference to some other grounds mentioned vaguely and generally is made later.40. The petitioners case appearing from his pleadings as well as arguments is that the nomination papers of the other three candidates were wrongly accepted even though they contained incomplete description of the candidates, their proposers and seconders. This contention is based on the contents of the nomination papers. A perusal of the nomination papers of all the candidates with reference to Form 2 read with Rule 4 of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Rules, 1974 shows that there is no defect, deficiency or ambiguity in the nomination papers of any of the four candidates including this petitioner whose nomination papers were accepted by the Returning Officer. This petitioners nomination paper is similar in contents. The petitioners grievance was confined mainly to columns 2 and 4 of Form 2. Column 2 requires the full name of the proposers/seconders and column 4 requires mention of the State/Union Territory in/from which they were elected. A bare perusal of the nomination papers of the four candidates which had been accepted by the Returning Officer shows that these requirements were duly complied with and there was no ambiguity in respect of the name or any other prescribed particular of the prospers and seconders in these nomination papers. The petitioner contended that the description of the candidates, the proposers and seconders requires some more particulars to be given. However, no further particular mentioned by the petitioner is the requirement of the rules or the prescribed form of the nomination paper. Thus no defect in any of these nomination papers to make out even a prima facie ground under Section 18(1)(c) of wrongful acceptance of any of these nomination papers is either pleaded or shown to raise a triable issue on this point. We may here also refer to Sub-section (5) of Section 5E which provides that the Returning Officer shall not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect which is not of a substantial character. No defect of any kind much less a defect of substantial character in any nomination paper which was accepted has been pleaded or shown by the petitioner to require any further examination of this question or framing an issue for the purpose. The election petition does not, therefore, disclose any cause of action for trial of the ground contained in Section 18(1)(c) of the Act.41. The only other ground to which a casual reference appears to have been made in the petition and was referred in passing at the hearing is that contained in Section 18(1)(a) which has to be read along with Section 18(2). The casual reference is to the ground of undue influence. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to the contents of paras 2, 5 and 6 of the petition on which reliance was placed by the petitioner and which are treated by him as material averments for raising the grounds under Section 18 of the Act. We have already considered the ground relating to Section 18(1)(e) to which para 2 of the petition relates. Para 6(a) contains several sub-paras. Sub-para (1) says that the nomination papers were presented by one single proposer and not by ten proposers and further that the proposers and seconders included the Prime Minister, Central Ministers, Chief Ministers and Members of Parliament. No attempt was made by the petitioner to show that this constitutes a ground under Section 18(1) of the Act or that it amounts to the violation or non-compliance of any law. Moreover, Section 5B providing for presentation of nomination paper and requirements of a valid nomination does not prescribe any such requirement. Sub-para (2) says that the other three candidates are above 65 years of age. This too is irrelevant and no attempt was made to rely on it. Sub-paras (3) and (4) are similarly irrelevant and the petitioner made no attempt at the hearing to rely on them as a ground under Section 18 of the Act. There is no requirement of law to file the complete electoral roll except a certified copy of the entry relating to the candidate in the electoral roll according to Section 5B(2) of the Act. Sub-para (5) is misconceived in view of the Explanation to Article 58 of the Constitution. Sub-para (6) is the only remaining sub-para wherein an attempt to plead the ground contained in Section 18(1)(a) is made. There is no additional requirement of oath by the candidates as settled by the earlier decisions of this Court and, therefore, this part of sub-para (6) needs no further consideration. The remaining para contains the averment that the Returning Officer, Shri Sudershan Agrawal was given an extension of one year by the returned candidate Dr. Shanker Dayal Sharma as Vice-President of India which is illegal and amounts to undue influence. The averment in sub-para (6) relating to the constituently validity of some provisions is concluded by earlier decisions of this Court apart from being beyond the scope of the election petition. There is no averment as to how the extension of one year given to Shri Sudershan Agrawal is illegal and no particulars of the bald assertion of undue influence have even been mentioned.42. A bare perusal of Section 171-C I.P.C. shows that the ingredients of undue influence at elections are many and they have to be read into the meaning of the offence of undue influence in Section 18(1)(a) of the Act. Before a ground under Section 18(1)(a) of the Act can be said to be pleaded raising a triable issue in the election petition it must be shown that material facts to constitute the ingredients of the offence of undue influence have at least been pleaded in the election petition. The petitioner has not made any attempt to pay even lip-service to these requirements and has chosen to merely repeat the words undue influence in the election in the petition without any attempt to plead material facts raising that ground. Obviously for this reason the petitioner did not even attempt, at the hearing, to advert to this ground with any degree of seriousness.43. It is, therefore, obvious that even though the petitioner, Kaka Joginder Singh inElection Petition No. 2 of 1992has the locus standi to present the petition as required by Section 14A of the Act read with Order XXXIX Rule 7 of Supreme Court Rules, yet material facts and the grounds on which the relief of declaration of the election of the returned candidate void is sought have not been pleaded to disclose any cause of action or raise any triable issue. The net result, therefore, is the same as inElection Petition No. 1 of 1992and this petition also is liable to be dismissed sustaining the preliminary objection. It must be held that the election petition does not disclose any cause of action and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed by virtue of the Rules 2 and 5 of Order XXXIX and Rule 6 of Order XXIII read with Rule 34 of Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules and the mandatory provisions of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952.44. What we have already said is sufficient to dispose of both the election petitions taking into consideration all that can qualify in the two petitions as relevant or requiring consideration. The exercise of filtering out the relevant from the irrelevant in the both these petitions has been tedious. InElection Petition No. 1 of 1992this task has been more difficult on account of the recalcitrance and ambience of petitioner Mithilesh Kumar Sinha who persisted in continuing his arguments by submitting some more written submissions even after the case was closed for judgment on conclusion of the hearing. There was nothing of substance or use therein, in addition to what he had said earlier. The language used by Mithilesh Kumar Sinha at some places in his written submissions is also intemperate. It is doubtful that he did so unwittingly and the impression we get is that all his actions have been deliberate. We strongly deprecate this attitude and conduct of petitioner Mithilesh Kumar Sinha who has clearly misused the indulgence granted by the Court to him as a petitioner-in-person. Ordinarily we would have rephrased from saying so in the judgment, but we do so since we find that such an indication by us to him during the hearing has not had the desired effect.46. It is obvious that the above observations of Venkataramiah, J. have not had the desired effect on petitioner Mithilesh Kumar Sinha. One of the tenuous submissions of Mithilesh Kumar Sinha before us was that no sitting Judge of the Supreme Court is competent to hear his petition since they are all likely to be influenced by the President of India and, therefore, his petition should be heard by a Bench comprising of all the sitting Judges as well as all the retired Judges of the Supreme Court. This would indicate the extent to which this Courts time has been wasted by such frivolous pleas. Suitable steps to prevent such attempts in future must be taken in larger public interest.47. We may make a passing reference to some of the earlier decisions of this Court in which some similar points mentioned casually and vaguely by these petitioners without laying any foundation have been rejected. Both these petitioners are far too deficient by even the most liberal standard of pleadings when the standard in election petitions is more strict.48. A Bench of seven Judges in Charan Lal Sahu v. Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy [1978]3SCR1 , apart from dealing with the locus standi to file election petition under the Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections Act, 1952, also considered and negatived the challenge to constitutional validity of certain provisions while stating the scope of Articles 58 and 71 of the Constitution of India.49. In Shri Baburao Patel and Ors. v. Dr. Zakir Husain and Ors. [1968]2SCR133 , it was held that a candidate standing for election to the office of the President was not required to take any oath for becoming eligible for election as President; and the nature of pleadings required for constituting the ground of undue influence under Section 18 of the Act based on canvassing by the Prime Minister and Ministers was also indicated. In Shiv Kirpal Singh v. Shri V.V. Giri [1971]2SCR197 , apart from indicating once again the requirements for constituting the ground of undue influence under Section 18 of the Act, it was also held that so challenge to the election can be made on grounds other than those mentioned in Section 18 of the Act. In Charan Lal Sahu v. Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed and Ors. AIR1975SC1288 , the constitutional validity of Sections 5B and 5C of the Act was upheld. In Charan Lal Sahu and Ors. v. Giani Zail Singh and Anr. [1984]2SCR6 , the necessity of precise, specific and unambiguous pleadings in such an election petition was emphasised; the requirements for raising the ground of undue influence under Section 18 of the Act were reiterated; the irrelevance of the plea of suitability of a candidate in the petition was indicated; the absence of any requirement by the candidate of the oath prescribed by Article 84(a) was stated while indicating the requirements in an election petition for raising a triable issue. It was also emphasised that the right arising out of elections including that the right to contest or challenge an election are not common law rights but are creatures of the statutes which create, confer or limit those rights and, therefore, for deciding the question whether an election can be set aside on any alleged ground, the courts have to function within the framework of that law and not travel beyond it. Chandrachud, CJ. speaking for the Constitution Bench in a similar situation also observed as under:It is regrettable that election petitions challenging the election to the high Office of the President of India should be filed in a fashion as cavalier as the one which characterises these two petitions. The petitions have an extempore appearance and not even a second look, leave alone a second thought appears to have been given to the manner of drafting these petitions or to the contentions raised therein. In order to discourage the filing of such petitions, we would have been justified in passing a heavy order of costs against the two petitioners. But that is likely to create a needless misconception that this Court, which has been constituted by the Act as the exclusive forum for deciding election petitions whereby a Presidential or Vice-Presidential election is challenged, is loathe to entertain such petitions. It is of the essence of the functioning of a democracy that election to public offices must be open to the scrutiny of an independent tribunal. A heavy order of costs in these two petitions, howsoever justified on their own facts, should not result in nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion. Therefore, we refrain from passing any order of costs and, instead, express our disapproval of the light-hearted and indifferent manner in which these two petitions are drafted and filed.50. What appears to have dissuaded the Court then in making a heavy order of costs in a similar situation appears to have lost its force since then in view of the even more cavalier fashion in which these petitions continue to be filed a decade later.52. We have referred to these decisions for the only reason that in both these petitions, a roving challenge to the election has been made by casually mentioning several provisions and even more casually stating that some of them are unconstitutional without indicating any basis for the challenge. It is unnecessary to dilate further.53. Before parting with the matters we are constrained to observe that it is now time to make suitable provisions to prevent entertaining such frivolous petitions filed in a cavalier fashion requiring the hearing by a Bench of five Judges of this Court. The only purpose served by such frivolous petitions is the giving of some undue publicity to the petitioner which appears to be the sole purpose of filing such a petition. Obviously, use of the Court as a forum for this purpose must not be permitted. The election petitions under the Representation of the People Act challenging elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures are required to be heard by a Single Judge of the High Court. In view of the greater importance of the Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections the forum for trial of such election petitions is the Supreme Court and in accordance with the rules framed by the Court these petitions are heard by a Bench of five Judges. Experience has shown that the solemnity and significance attaching to such petitions has been reduced to a farce by the cavalier fashion in which resort is had to this remedy. The mere fact that the entire gamut of both these petitions is fully covered by several earlier decisions of this Court to some of which these very petitioners were parties shows that the existing provisions are inadequate to prevent such abuse of the process of law. It is now necessary to make suitable amendments in the provisions for screening of such frivolous petitions and provisions is required to be made for trial only of serious petitions raising triable issues by a Bench of five Judges of this Court. We consider it our duty to make these observations to invite attention of all concerned to this felt need requiring suitable action in this direction.54. On giving our anxious consideration to the reason given by Chandrachud, CJ. in Charan Lal Sahu and Ors., v. Giani Zail Singh and Anr. [1984]2SCR6 for not making an order of costs while dismissing those petitions in a similar situation filed a decade earlier, we think the further decline during the last decade indicates that mere observations of this kind do not have the desired effect. We are constrained to take the view that some stringent measure like mandatory requirement of security deposit of a reasonable amount for costs for entertaining the election petition is needed to provide some check.