Case: Maharashtra General Kamgar Union Vs. State of Maharashtra &amp; Others

permission or refusal is not communicated by the authority within three months of the notice, the authority shall be deemed to have granted such permission on the expiry of the period of three months. Sub-Section (2) and (3) have to be read together because they prescribe the manner of granting or refusing permission in response to notice given under sub-section (1)(c) of section 25-N. Under sub-section (3) if grant of permission or refuse to grant permission is not communicated within 3 months the Government is deemed to have granted permission. Under sub-section (2) the Government may after making such inquiry as it considers fit grant or refuse such permission. Since any grant or refusal or permission after enquiry has to be done within the period of 3 months, such an enquiry by its very nature cannot be an elaborate enquiry into detailed working of the company in question and assessment of its economic viability and so on. Such a quasi judicial enquiry would probably take much longer than 3 months. The shortness of the period available for enquiry and deeming provisions of sub-section (3) indicate that the enquiry before granting or refusing to grant permission to retrench is a preliminary enquiry. Presumably it should show that prima facie the employer has a reasonable cause for retrenching the workmen in question. 6. Appellants contents that the 2nd respondents should have examined in detail the various transactions entered into by the 3rd respondents to ascertain whether the 3rd respondents can financially support the existing workmen. They rely on sub-section (7) of section 25-N of the Act and submit that the enquiry to be made by respondent No. 2 under sub-section (2) is similar to an enquiry under sub-section (7). In our view, however, an enquiry under sub-section (2) has no relation to proceeding contemplated under sub-section (7) of section 25-N. Sub-section (7) applies to a case where at the commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1976 a dispute relating to retrenchment is inter alia pending before a conciliation officer. In such a dispute there should be an allegation that retrenchment is by way of victimisation, in the alternative in such a dispute the appropriate Government should form an opinion that such retrenchment would not be in the interest of Industrial Peace. In these special circumstances the appropriate Government under sub-section (7) has the power to withdraw the dispute from inter alia, the Conciliation Officer. The appropriate Government may by a notification transfer such a dispute to an authority specified in that sub-section for consideration. The decision of such an authority is made final and binding or the parties under that sub-section. 7. An enquiry to be held by the authority so appointed under sub-section (7) is a totally different enquiry from the enquiry to be made by Government for granting or refusing permission under sub-section (2). An enquiry under sub-section (2) cannot be considered as similar to an enquiry under sub-section (7) as contended by the appellants. In our view, at the stage of permission any elaborate judicial or quasi judicial enquiry is not contemplated. The very scheme of section 25-N pracludes such an elaborate enquiry. In the present case the 2nd respondents has taken into account relevant circumstance before granting permission. He has given a fairly detailed reasoning for granting permission to respondents No. 3 to retrench some of the employees as stated in order. The order is in consonance with the provision of sub-section (2).8. The appellants have contended that they have now come across certain document to show some that profits were diverted by the 3rd respondents an allied concern. The 3rd respondents have filed an affidavits denying this allegation by giving a cogent explanation of the document so relied upon by the appellants. We do not see how all these disputes relating to the detailed working of the company and involving a scrutiny of contracts entered into by the Company with third parties in the normal course of its work can be gone into or re-opened by the authorities granting permission under section 25-N(2).9. It should be also be noted that granting of permission under section 25-N does not preclude either the industrial established or the workers from raising a dispute relating to such retrenchment and having it adjudicated upon before an Industrial Tribunal. Under Scheduled III, Item 10 of the said Act Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to retrenchment of workmen. This jurisdiction is not taken away by reason of the fact that an industrial establishment has obtained permission under section 25-N(2) for retrenchment of workers. Such permission is a condition precedent to retrenchment of workmen. Merits or demerits of the case can be adjudicated upon before the Industrial Tribunal. In view of this alternative remedy available to the appellants also, in our view it is not fit case where we should intervene in the order of 1st February, 1984. 10. Our attention was drawn to a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Workmen of Mukund Iron and Steel Works Ltd. v. Mukund Iron and Steel Works Ltd. and others)1, reported in (1982)1 L.L.J 140 (to which one of us was party). In that case permission to retrench granted under section 25-N was set aside because the Assistance Labour Commissioner while granting permission did not take into account an extremely relevant fact, namely, that work was available in the establishment for workers who were to be retrenched. The establishment had merely contended that such workmen would be given work only if workmen agreed to give certain quantity production as per agreed norms. Since the decision to grant permission did not take into account this very relevant circumstance the decision was set aside. The question of the nature of enquiry to be held under section 25-N(2) was not considered at all by the Division Bench in that case nor was this question raised before the Division Bench. The judgment therefore, is not much assistance in the present case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In our view, however, an enquiry under(2) has no relation to proceeding contemplated under) of sectionn (7) applies to a case where at the commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1976 a dispute relating to retrenchment is inter alia pending before a conciliation officer. In such a dispute there should be an allegation that retrenchment is by way of victimisation, in the alternative in such a dispute the appropriate Government should form an opinion that such retrenchment would not be in the interest of Industrial Peace. In these special circumstances the appropriate Government under(7) has the power to withdraw the dispute from inter alia, the Conciliation Officer. The appropriate Government may by a notification transfer such a dispute to an authority specified in thatfor consideration. The decision of such an authority is made final and binding or the parties under that7. An enquiry to be held by the authority so appointed under(7) is a totally different enquiry from the enquiry to be made by Government for granting or refusing permission under(2). An enquiry under(2) cannot be considered as similar to an enquiry under(7) as contended by the appellants. In our view, at the stage of permission any elaborate judicial or quasi judicial enquiry is not contemplated. The very scheme of sectionpracludes such an elaborate enquiry. In the present case the 2nd respondents has taken into account relevant circumstance before granting permission. He has given a fairly detailed reasoning for granting permission to respondents No. 3 to retrench some of the employees as stated in order. The order is in consonance with the provision of(2).8. The appellants have contended that they have now come across certain document to show some that profits were diverted by the 3rd respondents an allied concern. The 3rd respondents have filed an affidavits denying this allegation by giving a cogent explanation of the document so relied upon by the appellants. We do not see how all these disputes relating to the detailed working of the company and involving a scrutiny of contracts entered into by the Company with third parties in the normal course of its work can be gone into orIt should be also be noted that granting of permission under sectiondoes not preclude either the industrial established or the workers from raising a dispute relating to such retrenchment and having it adjudicated upon before an Industrial Tribunal. Under Scheduled III, Item 10 of the said Act Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to retrenchment of workmen. This jurisdiction is not taken away by reason of the fact that an industrial establishment has obtained permission under sectionfor retrenchment of workers. Such permission is a condition precedent to retrenchment of workmen. Merits or demerits of the case can be adjudicated upon before the Industrial Tribunal. In view of this alternative remedy available to the appellants also, in our view it is not fit case where we should intervene in the order of 1st February, 1984. 10. Our attention was drawn to a decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of (Workmen of Mukund Iron and Steel Works Ltd. v. Mukund Iron and Steel Works Ltd. and others)1, reported in (1982)1 L.L.J 140 (to which one of us was party). In that case permission to retrench granted under sectionwas set aside because the Assistance Labour Commissioner while granting permission did not take into account an extremely relevant fact, namely, that work was available in the establishment for workers who were to be retrenched. The establishment had merely contended that such workmen would be given work only if workmen agreed to give certain quantity production as per agreed norms. Since the decision to grant permission did not take into account this very relevant circumstance the decision was set aside. The question of the nature of enquiry to be held under sectionwas not considered at all by the Division Bench in that case nor was this question raised before the Division Bench. The judgment therefore, is not much assistance in the present case.