Case: Braithwaite &amp;. (India) Ltd Vs. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation

of any period of authorised leave, lock-out or legal strike. It did not lay down that other payments made to an employee under other circumstances were also to be deemed to be wages. A legal fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted it. In the Bengal Immunities Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1955-2 SCR 603 at p. 646 = (AIR 1955 SC 661 at p. 680), this Court, dealing with the Explanation to Article 286 (1) of the Constitution, as it existed before 11th September, 1956, held :-"Whichever view is taken of the Explanation, it should be limited to the purpose the Constitution-makers had in view when they incorporated it in clause 1. It is quite obvious that it created a legal fiction Legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose."Applying the same principle, we have to hold that the Explanation to Section 11 is not to be utilised for interpreting the general definition of "wages" given in Section 2 (22) of the Act and is to be taken into account only when the word "wages" requires interpretation for purposes of sections 40 and 41 of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be held that remuneration payable under a scheme is to be covered by the word "wages", if the terms of contract of employment are taken to have been fulfilled. What is really required by the definition is that the terms of the contract of employment must actually be fulfilled. It is, therefore, not correct to hold that because payments made to an employee for no service rendered during the period of lock-out, or during the period of legal strike, would be wages, Inam paid under that scheme must also be deemed to be wages.6. The second reason which led the High Court to hold against the appellant was that, according to that Court, the Scheme contained an offer by the employer for payments to the employees for service rendered by them, and that offer was accepted by the employees impliedly by having worked on the terms of the Notice and having received payments on that basis. The mere fact that a reward for good work offered by the employer is accepted by the employee after he has successfully satisfied the requirement laid down by the employer for earning reward cannot mean that this payment becomes a part of contract of employment. In fact in this case, there was no questions of offer by the appellant and acceptance by the employees as a condition of their service. The employees were already working in accordance with the terms of their contract of employment when the employer decided to make this extra payment if the employees did successfully what they were already expected to do under that contract. It cannot, therefore, he held that this payment of Inam ever became even an implied term of the contract of employment of the employees of the appellant. This Court in Bala Subrahmanya Rajaram v. B. G. Patil, 1958 SCR 1504 at p. 1508 = (AIR 1958 SC 518 at p. 520) had to interpret the meaning of word "wages" as defined in the Payment of Wages Act. where also wages were defined as remuneration which would be payable if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled. The Court expressed its opinion in the following words -"Now the question is whether the kind of bonus contemplated by this definition must be a bonus that is payable as a clause of the contract of employment. We think it is, and for this reason."Thereafter, the Court proceeded to examine whether bonus was, in fact, payable as a clause of the contract of employment. The word "wages" in the Act having been defined in similar terms, a remuneration paid to an employee can only be covered by the definition of "wages", if it is payable under a clause of the contract of employment. As we have indicated earlier, there was no express clause in the contract of employment of the employees of the appellant laying down the payment of Inam, and the Scheme when brought into force, expressly excluded it from the contract of employment. The forms on which the Inam was payable were also not consistent with the Scheme having become a part of the contract of employment.7. In this connection, counsel appearing for the respondent brought to our notice one other feature of the Scheme which was not relied upon by the High Court to hold that this Inam was wages. That term is contained in the last paragraph of the Scheme where after stating that the Company reserved the right to withdraw- the Scheme altogether without assigning any reason or revise targets and any condition of the Scheme at its sole discretion, went on to add that the Company also reserved the right to discontinue the scheme at the end of any period, if the scheme is found to be in any respect unworkable or to be a source of labour discontent or for any other reason. It was urged that the fact that the Scheme could only be discontinued at the end of a prescribed period and not in the midst of a period showed that the Inam was payable as one of the conditions of contract of employment of the employees. We do not think that there is any force in this submission. It was against a one-sided promise on behalf of the appellant not to deny this payment of Inam during a period for which the Inam Scheme had already been notified by the appellant, but such an assurance on behalf of the appellant does not indicate that the employees could claim that a right to receive the Inam had accrued to them as an implied condition of contract of employment. The decision given by the High Court has, therefore, to be set aside.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In this case, therefore, we have to confine our decision to the interpretation of the first part of the definition ofappears to us that, on a correct interpretation of the terms of the Scheme, the High Court committed an error in holding that the payment of this Inam had become a term of the contract of employment of theThe features of the Scheme, which indicate that the Payment of Inam did not become a term of the contract of employment, are clear from the Scheme itself. The first is that this payment of Inam was not amongst the original terms of contract of employment of the employees. In those terms, there was no offer of any reward or prize to be paid for any work done by the employees. The employees were expected to work for certain periods at agreed rates of wages which, in some cases, were hourly rated and, in some, monthly rated. This Inam Scheme was introduced at a later stage in Dec. 1955. The only offer under the Scheme was to make incentive payments, if certain specified conditions were fulfilled by the employees. Even though this offer of incentive payment was made, the appellant, in clear words, reserved the right to withdraw the Scheme altogether without assigning any reason or to revise its conditions at its sole discretion. Clearly, if the right to the Inam had become an implied condition of the contract of employment, the employer could not withdraw that right at its discretion without assigning any reason, nor could the employer vary its conditions without agreement from the employees concerned. The payment of the Inam was dependent upon the employees exceeding the target of output appropriately applicable to him. But though primarily the right to receive the Inam depended on the efficient working of the employees, there was another clause which laid down that, if the target were not achieved due to lack of orders, lack of materials, breakdown of machinery, lack of labour, strike", lockouts,or any other reason whatsoever, no Inam was to be awarded. This condition is clearly inconsistent with the payment of Inam having become an implied term of the contract of employment, because Inam became nonpayable even if the production target was not achieved for reasons for which the employees were not at all to blame.If the employer did not receive sufficient orders for sale of its output, or there was lack ofor there wasbreakdown of machineryand as a result during the period for which the Inam was notified, it became impossible for the employee to achieve the minimum target fixed, there was no liability on the appellant to pay the Inam. Such exemption from payment of the Inam on ground for which the employees could not be blamed and possibly for which the appellant itself might be responsible clearly shows that the payment of this Inam was not enforceable as one of the terms of the contract of employment, whether implied or express.The appellant had also laid down that if any deterioration of workmanship was noticed on the part of the employees in order to achieve the targets prescribed for earning the Inam, the Scheme could be abandoned forthwith. It was also made clear to the workmen in the Scheme that this payment of reward was in no way connected with or part of wages.It was on these conditions that the employees were receiving the Inam. Thus, though there was a payment to the employees and since that payment depended on their achieving certain targets, it has to be held to be remuneration, this payment of Inam cannot be held to have become a term of the contract of employment.5. The High Court, in arriving at the contrary decision, referred to the Explanation to section 41 of the Act and held on its basis that, even if the terms of contract of employment are deemed to have been fulfilled the remuneration paid would be wages. The Explanation lays down that for the purposes of sections 40 and 41, wages shall be deemed to include payment to an employee in respect of any period of authorised leave,or legal strike. It appears to us that the High Court committed an error in applying this legal fiction which was meant for sections 40 and 41 of the Act only, and extending it to the definition of wages, when dealing with the question of payment in the nature of Inam under the Scheme started by the appellant.The fiction in the Explanation was a very limited one and it only laid down that wages were to be deemed to include payment to an employee in respect of any period of authorised leave,or legal strike. It did not lay down that other payments made to an employee under other circumstances were also to be deemed to be wages. A legal fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and there is no justification for extending it beyond the purpose for which the legislature adopted it. In the Bengal Immunities Co. Ltd. v. State of BiharSCR 603 at p. 646 = (AIR 1955 SC 661  at p. 680), this Court, dealing with the Explanation to Article 286 (1) of the Constitution, as it existed before 11th September, 1956, heldview is taken of the Explanation, it should be limited to the purpose thehad in view when they incorporated it in clause 1. It is quite obvious that it created a legal fiction Legal fictions are created only for some definitethe same principle, we have to hold that the Explanation to Section 11 is not to be utilised for interpreting the general definition of "wages" given in Section 2 (22) of the Act and is to be taken into account only when the word "wages" requires interpretation for purposes of sections 40 and 41 of the Act. It cannot, therefore, be held that remuneration payable under a scheme is to be covered by the word "wages", if the terms of contract of employment are taken to have been fulfilled. What is really required by the definition is that the terms of the contract of employment must actually be fulfilled. It is, therefore, not correct to hold that because payments made to an employee for no service rendered during the period ofor during the period of legal strike, would be wages, Inam paid under that scheme must also be deemed to be wages.6. The second reason which led the High Court to hold against the appellant was that, according to that Court, the Scheme contained an offer by the employer for payments to the employees for service rendered by them, and that offer was accepted by the employees impliedly by having worked on the terms of the Notice and having received payments on that basis. The mere fact that a reward for good work offered by the employer is accepted by the employee after he has successfully satisfied the requirement laid down by the employer for earning reward cannot mean that this payment becomes a part of contract of employment. In fact in this case, there was no questions of offer by the appellant and acceptance by the employees as a condition of their service. The employees were already working in accordance with the terms of their contract of employment when the employer decided to make this extra payment if the employees did successfully what they were already expected to do under that contract. It cannot, therefore, he held that this payment of Inam ever became even an implied term of the contract of employment of the employees of the appellant. This Court in Bala Subrahmanya Rajaram v. B. G. Patil, 1958 SCR 1504   at p. 1508 = (AIR 1958 SC 518  at p. 520) had to interpret the meaning of word "wages" as defined in the Payment of Wages Act. where also wages were defined as remuneration which would be payable if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled. The Court expressed its opinion in the followingthe question is whether the kind of bonus contemplated by this definition must be a bonus that is payable as a clause of the contract of employment. We think it is, and for thisthe Court proceeded to examine whether bonus was, in fact, payable as a clause of the contract of employment. The word "wages" in the Act having been defined in similar terms, a remuneration paid to an employee can only be covered by the definition of "wages", if it is payable under a clause of the contract of employment. As we have indicated earlier, there was no express clause in the contract of employment of the employees of the appellant laying down the payment of Inam, and the Scheme when brought into force, expressly excluded it from the contract of employment. The forms on which the Inam was payable were also not consistent with the Scheme having become a part of the contract ofdo not think that there is any force in this submission. It was against apromise on behalf of the appellant not to deny this payment of Inam during a period for which the Inam Scheme had already been notified by the appellant, but such an assurance on behalf of the appellant does not indicate that the employees could claim that a right to receive the Inam had accrued to them as an implied condition of contract of employment. The decision given by the High Court has, therefore, to be set aside.