Case: Surendra Nath Bibra Vs. Stephen Court Ltd

matter is now before us.6. Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the defendant, contends that the decision in Ram Lal Dutts case, 70 Ind App 18 : (AIR 1943 PC 24), which the High Court and the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court had followed was distinguishable because in that case the tenancy was an agricultural tenancy and the tenant in that case had raised the point after the lapse of a number of years. He says that the doctrine of suspension of rent should be applied to the facts of this case because the plaintiff had deliberately not given possession of one bed-room. In the alternative he contends that the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court and the High Court should have made an order for apportionment of rent.7. We are unable to agree with Mr. Chatterjee that the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Lal Dutts case, 70 Ind App 18 : (AIR 1943 PC 24), can be distinguished on the ground urged by him. It is no doubt true that the Privy Council was concerned with an agricultural tenancy but the Privy Council decided the appeal on a matter of principle, the principle being that the doctrine enunciated in Neale v. Mackenzie, (1836) 150 ER 635, should not be regarded as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience in India in all circumstances. It is interesting to note that the subject-matter of the lease in (1836) 150 ER 635, was a dwelling house and land attached to it, and it was eight acres of the land which was attached to the house that the tenant had been kept out of possession. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the doctrine laid down in (1836) 150 ER 635, is too inflexible and cannot be applied to all cases. As observed by Sir George Rankin, the doctrine cannot be justified as a dependable rule to be adhered to notwithstanding hard cases. On the one hand it does not seem equitable that when a tenant enjoys a substantial portion of the property of the landlord, leased to him, without much inconvenience, he should not pay any compensation for the use of the property; in other words, to borrow the language of Sir George Rankin, that he should enjoy a windfall. On the other hand it is unfair that if a tenant is not given possession of a substantial portion of the property, he should be asked to pay any compensation for the use of the property while he is taking appropriate measures for specific performance of the contract. It seems to us that it will depend on the circumstances of each case whether a tenant would be entitled to suspend payment of the rent or whether he should be held liable to pay proportionate part of the rent. On the facts of this case we are of the opinion that the tenant is not entitled to suspend the payment of rent but he must pay a proportionate part of the rent.8. We may make it clear that like the Privy Council in Ram Lal Dutts case, 70 Ind App 18: (AIR 1948 PC 24), we are not deciding that the doctrine of suspension of rent should or should not "be applied at all to cases of eviction of the lessee by the lessor from a part of the land, and if so, whether it is limited to rents reserved as a lump sum, and whether it is a rigid or discretionary rule - these questions will call for careful review when they are presented by the facts of a particular case".In view of this we need not consider cases like Hakim Sardar Bahadur v. Tej Parkash Singh, AIR 1962 Punj 385; Jatindra Kumar Seal v. Rai-Mohan Rai, AIR 1961 Assam 52; and Nilkantha Pati v. Kshitish Chandra, (AIR 1951 Cal 338 ).9. The High Court rejected the plea of apportionment of rent on the ground that the defendant had not taken a specific plea to this effect in the written statement. The second ground given by the High Court was that it would be unreasonable to thrust a relief on the defendant unless he himself chooses one or more of the alternative reliefs available to him. Further, no prayer was made before the High Court to amend the written statement to include this relief.10. In our opinion, the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court should have remanded the case for calculation of the proportionate rent for the portion of the premises taken possession of by the defendant. In our view, the High Court has taken too technical a view. It would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover the full rent when he has not delivered possession of the whole of the premises in question.11. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, urges that the defendant had paid rent voluntarily for four months - this fact also is relied on by the High Court - and, therefore, we should not remand the case. But we find that three months rent was paid in advance as security deposit, and hence there is no force in the contention.12. Mr. Sarjoo Prasad finally contends that as this appeal arises from an application under S. 115 of Civil Procedure Code and Art. 227 of the Constitution, we should not interfere with the decision of the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court even though it be erroneous. A similar point was raised before the High Court and although the High Court found some substance in the point it chose to go into the merits of the case and not dismiss the application on this ground. It must be remembered that the application was also under Art. 227 of the Constitution, and although ordinarily Art. 227 should be used sparingly, on the facts of this case we are satisfied that the High Court was right in not throwing out the application on this ground.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is no doubt true that the Privy Council was concerned with an agricultural tenancy but the Privy Council decided the appeal on a matter of principle, the principle being that the doctrine enunciated in Nealev. Mackenzie, (1836) 150 ER635, should not be regarded as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience in India in all circumstances. It is interesting to note that the subject-matter of the lease in (1836) 150 ER 635, was a dwelling house and land attached to it, and it was eight acres of the land which was attached to the house that the tenant had been kept out of possession. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the doctrine laid down in (1836) 150 ER 635, is too inflexible and cannot be applied to all cases. As observed by Sir George Rankin, the doctrine cannot be justified as a dependable rule to be adhered to notwithstanding hard cases. On the one hand it does not seem equitable that when a tenant enjoys a substantial portion of the property of the landlord, leased to him, without much inconvenience, he should not pay any compensation for the use of the property; in other words, to borrow the language of Sir George Rankin, that he should enjoy a windfall. On the other hand it is unfair that if a tenant is not given possession of a substantial portion of the property, he should be asked to pay any compensation for the use of the property while he is taking appropriate measures for specific performance of the contract. It seems to us that it will depend on the circumstances of each case whether a tenant would be entitled to suspend payment of the rent or whether he should be held liable to pay proportionate part of the rent. On the facts of this case we are of the opinion that the tenant is not entitled to suspend the payment of rent but he must pay a proportionate part of the rent.8. We may make it clear that like the Privy Council in Ram Lal Dutts case, 70 Ind App 18: (AIR 1948 PC 24), we are not deciding that the doctrine of suspension of rent should or should not "be applied at all to cases of eviction of the lessee by the lessor from a part of the land, and if so, whether it is limited to rents reserved as a lump sum, and whether it is a rigid or discretionary rule - these questions will call for careful review when they are presented by the facts of a particular case".In view of this we need not consider cases like Hakim Sardar Bahadur v. Tej Parkash Singh, AIR 1962 Punj 385; Jatindra Kumar Seal v. Rai-Mohan Rai, AIR 1961 Assam 52; and Nilkantha Pati v. Kshitish Chandra, (AIR 1951 Cal 338  ).9. The High Court rejected the plea of apportionment of rent on the ground that the defendant had not taken a specific plea to this effect in the written statement. The second ground given by the High Court was that it would be unreasonable to thrust a relief on the defendant unless he himself chooses one or more of the alternative reliefs available to him. Further, no prayer was made before the High Court to amend the written statement to include this relief.10. In our opinion, the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court should have remanded the case for calculation of the proportionate rent for the portion of the premises taken possession of by the defendant. In our view, the High Court has taken too technical a view. It would be inequitable to allow the plaintiff to recover the full rent when he has not delivered possession of the whole of the premises inshould not interfere with the decision of the Full Bench of the Small Causes Court even though it be erroneous. A similar point was raised before the High Court and although the High Court found some substance in the point it chose to go into the merits of the case and not dismiss the application on this ground. It must be remembered that the application was also under Art. 227 of the Constitution, and although ordinarily Art. 227 should be used sparingly, on the facts of this case we are satisfied that the High Court was right in not throwing out the application on this ground.We are unable to agree with Mr. Chatterjee that the decision of the Privy Council in Ram Lal Dutts case, 70 Ind App 18 : (AIR 1943 PC 24), can be distinguished on the ground urged bywe find that three months rent was paid in advance as security deposit, and hence there is no force in the contention.