Case: Pandia Nadar And Ors Vs. The State Of Tamil Nadu And Ors

guidelines could be inferred as in Saurashtra case 1952 SCR 435 = (AIR 1952 SC 123 and Jyoti Pershads case (1962) 2 SCR 125 = (AIR 1961 SC 1602 ) the statute will not be hit by Article 14. Then again where the statute itself covers only a class of cases as in Haldars case (1960) 2 SCR 646 = (AIR 1960 SC 457 ) and Bajorias case 1954 SCR 30 = (AIR 1953 SC 404 ) the statute will not be bad. The fact that in such cases the executive will choose which cases are to be tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute. Therefore, the contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the special procedure, is not supported by reason or authority. "This Court then went on to apply those principles to the statutes under consideration in the following words:"The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is that premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorized persons occupying them. This is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power has been conferred. With such an indication clearly given in the statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court. Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be be a prolonged one to resort to the latter. Administrative officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion. In considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behaviour and not behaviour which is abnormal. It is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large onn the face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not, powerless. Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupants of Government and Corporation property and provided a special speedy procedure therefor is a clear guidance for the authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in the Northern India Caterers case (1967) 3 SCR 399 = (AIR 1967 SC 1581 ).It then went on to point out that the procedures laid down by the two Acts under consideration were not so harsh or onerous as to suggest that a discrimination would result if resort was made to the provisions of those two acts in some cases and to the ordinary Civil Court in other cases in the following words :-"Even though the officers deciding these questions would be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on oath, and requiring the discovery and production of documents are a valuable safeguard for the person affected. So is the provision for appeal to the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court in the city of Bombay, or to a District Judge in the districts who has got to deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safeguard as was recognized in Suraj Moll Mohtas case (1955) 1 SCR 448 = (AIR 1954 SC 545 ). The main difference between the procedure before an ordinary Civil Court and the executive authorities under these two Acts in that in one case it will be decided by a judicial officer trained in law and it might also be that more than one appeal is available. As against that there is only one appeal available in the other but it is also open to the aggrieved party to resort to the High Court under the provisions of Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. This is no less effective than the provision for a second appeal. On the whole, considering the object with which these special procedures were enacted by the legislature we would not be prepared to hold that the difference between the two procedures is so unconscionable as to attract the vice of discrimination. After all, Article 14 does not demand a fanatical approach. We, therefore, hold that neither the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act nor the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution".This decision would apply on all fours to the facts of the present case. In the result the writ petitions are dismissed.4. We must, however, mention that on behalf of the petitioners it was contended that they were still in possession. On the other hand on behalf of the State it was contended that three of the petitioners had been evicted even before this Court passed an order of stay.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]After an exhaustive discussion of all the relevant decisions this Court came to the conclusion that the principles deducible from those decisions were asa statute providing for a more drastic procedure different from the ordinary procedure covers the whole field covered by the ordinary procedure, as in Anwar Ali Sarkars case 1952 SCR 284 = (AIR 1952 SC 75  ) and Suraj Mall Mohatas case (1955) 1 SCR 448   = (AIR 1954 SC 545  ) without any guidelines as to the class of cases in which either procedure is to be resorted to, the statute will be hit by Article 14. Even there, as mentioned in Suraj Mall Mohtas case, a provision for appeal may cure the defect. Further, in such cases if from the preamble the surrounding circumstances, as well as the provisions of the statute themselves explained and amplified by affidavits, necessary guidelines could be inferred as in Saurashtra case 1952 SCR 435 = (AIR 1952 SC 123   and Jyoti Pershads case (1962) 2 SCR 125   = (AIR 1961 SC 1602  ) the statute will not be hit by Article 14. Then again where the statute itself covers only a class of cases as in Haldars case (1960) 2 SCR 646   = (AIR 1960 SC 457  ) and Bajorias case 1954 SCR 30   = (AIR 1953 SC 404  ) the statute will not be bad. The fact that in such cases the executive will choose which cases are to be tried under the special procedure will not affect the validity of the statute. Therefore, the contention that the mere availability of two procedures will vitiate one of them, that is the special procedure, is not supported by reason or authority. "This Court then went on to apply those principles to the statutes under consideration in the following words:"The statute itself in the two classes of cases before us clearly lays down the purpose behind them, that is that premises belonging to the Corporation and the Government should be subject to speedy procedure in the matter of evicting unauthorized persons occupying them. This is a sufficient guidance for the authorities on whom the power has been conferred. With such an indication clearly given in the statutes one expects the officers concerned to avail themselves of the procedures prescribed by the Acts and not resort to the dilatory procedure of the ordinary Civil Court. Even normally one cannot imagine an officer having the choice of two procedures, one which enables him to get possession of the property quickly and the other which would be be a prolonged one to resort to the latter. Administrative officers, no less than the courts, do not function in a vacuum. It would be extremely unreal to hold that an administrative officer would in taking proceedings for eviction of unauthorised occupants of Government property or Municipal property resort to the procedure prescribed by the two Acts in one case and to the ordinary Civil Court in the other. The provisions of these two Acts cannot be struck down on the fanciful theory that power would be exercised in such an unrealistic fashion. In considering whether the officers would be discriminating between one set of persons and another, one has got to take into account normal human behaviour and not behaviour which is abnormal. It is not every fancied possibility of discrimination but the real risk of discrimination that we must take into account. This is not one of those cases where discrimination is writ large onn the face of the statute. Discrimination may be possible but is very improbable. And if there is discrimination in actual practice this Court is not, powerless. Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature considered that the ordinary procedure is insufficient or ineffective in evicting unauthorised occupants of Government and Corporation property and provided a special speedy procedure therefor is a clear guidance for the authorities charged with the duty of evicting unauthorised occupants. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the majority in the Northern India Caterers case (1967) 3 SCR 399   = (AIR 1967 SC 1581  ).It then went on to point out that the procedures laid down by the two Acts under consideration were not so harsh or onerous as to suggest that a discrimination would result if resort was made to the provisions of those two acts in some cases and to the ordinary Civil Court in other cases in the following wordsthough the officers deciding these questions would be administrative officers there is provision in these Acts for giving notice to the party affected, to inform him of the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made, for the party affected to file a written statement and produce documents and be represented by lawyers. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code regarding summoning and enforcing attendance of persons and examining them on oath, and requiring the discovery and production of documents are a valuable safeguard for the person affected. So is the provision for appeal to the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court in the city of Bombay, or to a District Judge in the districts who has got to deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible, also a sufficient safeguard as was recognized in Suraj Moll Mohtas case (1955) 1 SCR 448   = (AIR 1954 SC 545  ). The main difference between the procedure before an ordinary Civil Court and the executive authorities under these two Acts in that in one case it will be decided by a judicial officer trained in law and it might also be that more than one appeal is available. As against that there is only one appeal available in the other but it is also open to the aggrieved party to resort to the High Court under the provisions of Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution. This is no less effective than the provision for a second appeal. On the whole, considering the object with which these special procedures were enacted by the legislature we would not be prepared to hold that the difference between the two procedures is so unconscionable as to attract the vice of discrimination. After all, Article 14 does not demand a fanatical approach. We, therefore, hold that neither the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act nor the provisions of the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 are hit by Article 14 of the Constitution".This decision would apply on all fours to the facts of the present case. In the result the writ petitions are dismissed.In this recent decision in Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay pronounced on 11-4-1974, (reported in AIR 1974 SC 2009  ) this Court had occasion to consider the constitutional validity of Chapter V-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act and the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act.