Case: Mohd. Shafi Vs. Additional District and Sessions Judge (VII), Allahabad and Others

is intended to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction, it must be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible into the protection afforded to the tenant. If the language of the Explanation is susceptible of two interpretations, we should prefer that which enlarges the protection of the tenant rather than that which restricts it. Bearing in mind this principle of interpretation, we may now approach the language of Explanation (iv) and try to arrive at its proper construction. 7. The word building is used thrice in Explanation (iv) and it is clear from the context in which it occurs that it is not intended to be used in its popular sense so as to mean the entire super-structure raised on the ground. The first time that the word building is used is in the expression the building under tenancy and it is obvious that it is the building under tenancy which is intended to be referred when the word building is used towards the end of the Explanation. It is in respect of the building under tenancy that a conclusive presumption is raised that it is bona fide required by the landlord. Now the building under tenancy cannot be the entire super-structure because what is contemplated by the Explanation is that the building under tenancy must be a part of a building and, therefore, it cannot be the whole super-structure. Here, the word building obviously means accommodation which is the subject-matter of tenancy. The question thus is : what is the sense in which the word building is used when it occurs for the second time in the Explanation. The context clearly indicates that the word building is there used to denote a unit, of which the accommodation under tenancy constitutes a part and the remaining part is in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes. The accommodation under tenancy and the accommodation in the occupation of the landlord together go to make up the building. The use of the word part is a clear pointer that the building, of which the accommodation under tenancy and the accommodation in the occupation of the landlord are parts, must be a unit. Where a superstructure consists of two or more tenements and each tenement is an independent unit distinct and separate from the other, the Explanation would be of no application, because each tenement would be a unit and not part of a unit. It is only where there is a unit of accommodation out of which a part is under tenancy and the remaining part is in the occupation of the landlord, that the Explanation would be attracted. To determine the applicability of the Explanation, the question to be asked would be, whether the accommodation under tenancy and the accommodation in the occupation of the landlord together constitute one unit of accommodation ? The object of the Legislature clearly was that where there is a single unit of accommodation, of which a part has been let out to a tenant, the landlord who is in occupation of the remaining part should be entitled to recover possession of the part let out to the tenant. It could never have been intended by the Legislature that where a super-structure consists of two independent and separate units of accommodation, one of which is let out to a tenant and the other is in the occupation of the landlord, the landlord should, without any proof of bona fide requirement, be entitled to recover possession of the tenement let out to the tenant. It is difficult to see what social object or purpose the legislation could have had in view in conferring such a right on the landlord. Such a provision would be plainly contrary to the aim and objective of the legislation. On the other hand, if we read the Explanation to be applicable only to those cases where a single unit of accommodation is divided by letting out a part to a tenant so that the landlord, who is in occupation of the remaining part, is given the right to evict the tenant and secure for himself possession of the whole unit, it would not unduly restrict or narrow down the protection against eviction afforded to the tenant. This construction would be more consistent with the policy and intendment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant, unless the landlord establishes his bona fide requirement of the accommodation under tenancy. We may point out that Mr. Justice Hari Swarup has also taken the same view in a well-considered judgment in Chunnoo Lal v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad ([1975] 1 ALR 362 (All HC)) and that decision has our approval. 8. Since the question as to the applicability of Explanation (iv) on the facts of the present case has not been considered by the High Court as well as the lower courts on the basis of the aforesaid construction of the Explanation, we must set aside the judgment of the High Court as also the order of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court with a direction to dispose it of in the light of the interpretation placed by us on the Explanation. It was contended before us on behalf of the appellant that since Explanation (iv) has been omitted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, respondent 3 was no longer entitled to take advantage of it and her claim for possession must fail. But the answer given by respondent 3 to this contention was that the omission of Explanation (iv) was in force at the date when respondent No. 3 filed her application for release, she had a vested right to obtain release of the rented premises in her favour by virtue of Explanation (iv) and that vested right was not taken away by the prospective omission of Explanation (iv) and hence she was entitled to rely on it despite its omission by U.P. Act 28 of 1976.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]5. Now, it may be pointed out straightway that if Explanation (iv) to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is applicable in the present case, the question of comparing the relative hardship of the appellant and respondent 3 would not arise and respondent 3 would straightway be entitled to an order of eviction as soon as she shows that the conditions specified in the Explanation are satisfied.language of the proviso is clear and explicit and it requires the Prescribed Authority to take into account the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant only in those cases which are not covered by the Explanation. If a case falls within the Explanation, the proviso would have no application and it would not be necessary to consider the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant in deciding whether or not to make an order of eviction.High Court seemed to take the view that the finding of the Prescribed Authority that Explanation (iv) was applicable in the present case was a finding of fact and since this finding of fact was affirmed by the District Court in appeal, it was not competent to the High Court to interfere with it in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and that was presumably the reason why the High Court accepted the hypothesis that the case was covered by Explanation (iv). But this view of the High Court is plainly erroneous because the question whether Explanation (iv) is attracted in the present case would depend on the applicability to the facts, of the correct interpretation of the Explanation and it would, therefore, clearly be a mixed question of law and fact, and if the High Court found that in reaching its conclusion on this question the District Court proceeded on a wrong interpretation of the Explanation, the High Court could certainly correct the error and set aside the conclusion reached by the District Court.6. It is apparent even on a cursory reading of Explanation (iv) that the language employed by the Legislature in expressing its intent is extremely clumsy. This is a glaring example of how the Legislature can by inapt and ill-considered drafting create uncertainty and promote litigation. It appears that sometimes the legislature forgets that laws are intended for human beings and they should be so framed that an ordinary man can understand their true import and meaning. The language in which the legislation is couched must be simple and plain so that even a man in the Clapam bus, or if we may indigenise this expression a man in the DTC bus should be able to follow its mandate and injunction without the possibility of doubt or error. Here, unfortunately the language of Explanation (iv) is such that we have to grope our way in a chaos of verbal darkness and try to arrive at the correct legislative meaning with great diffidence and hesitation. But there is one principle of interpretation which offers some guidance in the interpretation of the rather obscure language of this Explanation and it is that since the Explanation raises a conclusive presumption in favour of the landlord in a legislation which is intended to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction, it must be construed strictly against the landlord so as to cut as little as possible into the protection afforded to the tenant. If the language of the Explanation is susceptible of two interpretations, we should prefer that which enlarges the protection of the tenant rather than that which restricts it. Bearing in mind this principle of interpretation, we may now approach the language of Explanation (iv) and try to arrive at its proper construction.object of the Legislature clearly was that where there is a single unit of accommodation, of which a part has been let out to a tenant, the landlord who is in occupation of the remaining part should be entitled to recover possession of the part let out to the tenant. It could never have been intended by the Legislature that where a super-structure consists of two independent and separate units of accommodation, one of which is let out to a tenant and the other is in the occupation of the landlord, the landlord should, without any proof of bona fide requirement, be entitled to recover possession of the tenement let out to the tenant. It is difficult to see what social object or purpose the legislation could have had in view in conferring such a right on the landlord. Such a provision would be plainly contrary to the aim and objective of the legislation. On the other hand, if we read the Explanation to be applicable only to those cases where a single unit of accommodation is divided by letting out a part to a tenant so that the landlord, who is in occupation of the remaining part, is given the right to evict the tenant and secure for himself possession of the whole unit, it would not unduly restrict or narrow down the protection against eviction afforded to the tenant. This construction would be more consistent with the policy and intendment of the legislation which is to protect the possession of the tenant, unless the landlord establishes his bona fide requirement of the accommodation under tenancy. We may point out that Mr. Justice Hari Swarup has also taken the same view in a well-considered judgment in Chunnoo Lal v. Additional District Judge, Allahabad ([1975] 1 ALR 362 (All HC)) and that decision has our approval8. Since the question as to the applicability of Explanation (iv) on the facts of the present case has not been considered by the High Court as well as the lower courts on the basis of the aforesaid construction of the Explanation, we must set aside the judgment of the High Court as also the order of the District Court and remand the case to the District Court with a direction to dispose it of in the light of the interpretation placed by us on the Explanation.