Case: Durga Prasad Vs. Narayan Ramchandaani (D) Thr. Lrs

have been normally residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death. The term used in the section is ‘heir’ which implies that not any of the family member residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but only the heirs of tenant normally residing with him/her. The words “normally residing with him” suggests that only those heirs would inherit the tenancy rights of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course and not temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant and not occasionally. In the present case, the appellant claims that he has been carrying on business in the property along with his deceased sister Lalita and had been ordinarily living with her because of the medical business they were running. The appellant being the brother of deceased-Lalita had no reason to normally reside with his married sister. Be it noted, in her written statement filed in the release application, Lalita has not averred that her brother-appellant Durga Prasad was living with her and that he was taking care of her. As rightly held by the Courts below, Durga Prasad is neither a ‘heir’ within the meaning of Section 3(a) nor fall under the definition of ‘family’ as per Section 3(g) of the Act.15. As discussed earlier, originally Lalita’s father-in-law-Hem Ram Sharma took the premises on rent in the year 1940. After his death, Lalita Devi’s husband-Baldev became the tenant of the suit property and after Baldev’s death, Lalita become the tenant of the suit property. During the pendency of the appeal before the First Appellate Court, Lalita expired on 06.07.2013. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord moved a substitution application before the appellate court to substitute the appellant who is the real brother of deceased-Lalita. On that application, the appellant was impleaded as a defendant-respondent in the said appeal. As pointed out by the High Court, the present appellant may have been ‘rightly’ or ‘wrongly’ substituted after the demise of his sister. Merely because the appellant has been substituted in the place of tenant-Lalita, the appellant cannot become a ‘heir’ who normally resided with the tenant Lalita.16. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on Ganesh Trivedi (supra), wherein this Court found, as a matter of fact, that brother was residing in the tenanted premises and, therefore, tenancy rights will devolve upon him on the death of original tenant within the meaning of Section 3(a)(g) read with Section 12(1)(b) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. This is evident from the following observation made in paras (9) and (10) of judgment which are reproduced as under:“9. The brother of a tenant is not included in the definition of “family”. However, the present one is not a case where the tenant Suraj Prasad had during his lifetime taken up residence elsewhere and/or allowed the suit premises to be occupied by his brother. Deo Narain, being the real brother of late Suraj Prasad, the tenant, had come to stay with his brother and was residing along with him as such, even at the time of death of Suraj Prasad. It will not therefore be correct to say that applicability of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the Act was attracted to the suit premises during the lifetime of Suraj Prasad and a deemed vacancy had occurred. On the death of Suraj Prasad tenancy rights devolved on Deo Narain, he being the only heir. He too became a “tenant” within the meaning of clause (a) of Section 3. The decision of the High Court cannot, therefore, be faulted.10. There is yet another reason why no interference with the impugned order of the High Court is called for. Shri Upadhyay, the learned counsel for Respondents 1 to 3 invited our attention to the pleadings and pointed out that admittedly the sale deed executed by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi in favour of Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, contains recitals to the effect that the former owner-landlord was well aware of Deo Narain occupying the suit premises after the death of Suraj Prasad, that he was acknowledged by the landlord as tenant in the premises, and that rent was also paid by Deo Narain to the landlord under receipts issued by the landlord though Deo Narain had fallen into some arrears of rent at the time of sale of the suit premises in favour of the appellant. Such admissions made by Jagdamaba Prasad Awasthi are binding on Ganesh Trivedi, the appellant, inasmuch as the same are contained in the sale deed by which title has been derived by the appellant and thereunder the appellant has stepped into the shoes of the previous owner-landlord. Deo Narain’s status as tenant in occupation of the suit premises, cannot, therefore, be doubted or disputed by the appellant.”The aforesaid decision has been rendered in view of proven facts in the said case and, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case.17. Upon appreciation of the facts and evidence, the first appellate court and the High Court rightly held that the appellant is neither an ‘heir’ as visualized under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 nor ‘family’ within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act and that the appellant is in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and is liable to be evicted. The High Court has directed the District Magistrate to pass appropriate orders under Section 16 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 on the release application of the landlord without further delay preferably within three weeks from the date of judgment of the High Court that is 09.03.2015. Father-in-law of Lalita had taken the suit premises on rent in the year 1940. In the facts and circumstances of the case, without relegating the matter to the District Magistrate to pass orders on the release application of the respondent-landlord, we deem it appropriate to direct the appellant to hand over vacant possession to the respondent-landlord.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. In the present case, we are dealing with the case as to who would becomeon the death of Lalita. Hence, the definition ofis not relevant for the purposes of determining as to who would become tenant on the death of tenant Lalita. The only question falling for consideration is whether the appellant-brother of the tenant Lalita is anunder Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.is not defined in the Act.is a person who inherits or may inherit by law. Section 3(1)(f) of the Hindu Succession Act definesmeans any person, male or female, who is entitled to succeed to the property of an intestate under thishas to be given the same meaning as would be applicable to the general law of succession. In the present case, as pointed out by the High Court, the deceased tenant-Lalita being a hindu female, the devolution of tenancy will be determined under Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act.In the present case, the suit property was taken on rent by the father-in-law of deceased tenant-Lalita that is Hem Ram Sharma and after his death, his son Baldev (husband of Lalita) became tenant of the suit property. Upon his death, Lalita became the tenant of the suit property. Upon death of Lalita, in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, in the absence of any son or daughter of deceased Lalita, the tenancy would devolve upon the heirs of her husband. Since the appellant does not fall under the category ofhusband, the tenancy of the suit property will not devolve on him nor can he be called as anunder Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972.Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the appellant is an heir of Lalita, for devolution of tenancy, on the death of Lalita, the appellant has to be awithin the meaning of Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972. As per Section 3(a)(1), in the case of residential building, in the event of death of a tenant, for heirs to be treated as tenant, the statute requires them to prove that they have been normally residing with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death. The term used in the section iswhich implies that not any of the family member residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but only the heirs of tenant normally residing with him/her. The wordssuggests that only those heirs would inherit the tenancy rights of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course and not temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant and not occasionally. In the present case, the appellant claims that he has been carrying on business in the property along with his deceased sister Lalita and had been ordinarily living with her because of the medical business they were running. The appellant being the brother of deceased-Lalita had no reason to normally reside with his married sister. Be it noted, in her written statement filed in the release application, Lalita has not averred that her brother-appellant Durga Prasad was living with her and that he was taking care of her. As rightly held by the Courts below, Durga Prasad is neither awithin the meaning of Section 3(a) nor fall under the definition ofas per Section 3(g) of the Act.Upon appreciation of the facts and evidence, the first appellate court and the High Court rightly held that the appellant is neither anas visualized under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 norwithin the meaning of Section 3(g) of the Act and that the appellant is in unauthorized occupation of the suit premises and is liable to be evicted. The High Court has directed the District Magistrate to pass appropriate orders under Section 16 of the U.P. Act XIII of 1972 on the release application of the landlord without further delay preferably within three weeks from the date of judgment of the High Court that is 09.03.2015. Father-in-law of Lalita had taken the suit premises on rent in the year 1940. In the facts and circumstances of the case, without relegating the matter to the District Magistrate to pass orders on the release application of the respondent-landlord, we deem it appropriate to direct the appellant to hand over vacant possession to the respondent-landlord.