Case: Hota Venkata Surya Sivarama Sastry Vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh

there are two views possible: (1) that having regard to the Abolition Act referring to and as it were incorporating the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, the estates to which the Abolition Act could apply are only those which being Estates within the Estates Land Act, are also wholly within the operation of the Abolition Act. In other words, even if a few acres of an estate as defined in the Estates Land Act were outside the operation of the Abolition Act, it would not be an estate which could be taken over. (2) The other view attributing a crucial value to the policy and purpose underlying the legislation, viz., a reform of land tenures and landholding by the elimination of intermediaries to treat any land held on the tenures specified and within the territorial operation of the Act as falling within the category of estates liable to be taken over and vested in Government. We consider that the latter view is to be preferred as being in accord with the intention of the law and as subserving its purposes. In this connection it cannot be overlooked that the entire argument of learned Counsel is built up on the definitions of an estate in S. 2 of the Abolition Act (read with Section 1 (3) of that Act), and that the definitions contained there could be applied on the terms of the opening words of that section only unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. The position could possibly be better explained in these terms: Assume that Regulation IV of 1951 was not enacted. Could the State Government take over that portion of the estate which was within the operation of the Abolition Act or does the definition of an estate and the reference S. 1 (3) to S. 3 (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act of l908 preclude the State from taking over that portion because the Act does not extend to the entirety of the estate? It appears to us that this question is capable of being answered only in one way, viz., that the definition of an estate in the Abolition Act must be limited to that portion of an estate which is within the operation of the Act. Any other construction would mean that if that Act did not apply to a few square yards in an estate it ceases to be an estate governed by the Act, which, in our opinion, would be plainly contrary to the intention of the enactment as gathered from its preamble and operative provisions. Let us suppose that instead of the problem created by a portion of the estate being in a Scheduled area and, therefore, though within the State outside the normal legislative power of the State Legislature, a permanently Settled estate had by reason of say the States Reorganisation, fell both within the territory of the Madras and the Andhra States, with the result that the taking over under the Abolition Act could be operative only in regard to that portion within the State of Madras. Could it then be contended that the portion of the estate within the State of Madras did not fall within the definition of an estate and so could not be taken over by notification under S. 1 (4) of the Act. Indeed, the answer of the learned Counsel for the appellants to such a question was that it could be taken over but for the reason that in such a case the portions outside the State territory could not be an estate within the Madras Estates Land Act at all and that in consequence the inter-relation between the unit constituting the estate under the Estates Land Act and the concept of an estate under the Abolition Act was not disrupted. But this, however, hardly suffices as a complete answer for even after a portion of the estate becoming situated in a State other than Madras the State might still be governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, though applied as the law of the new State. What is relevant in the illustration is that along with the concept of the unit constituting the estate being taken over, there is also underlying it, another principle, viz., that it is sufficient if the entirety of the estate over which the State Legislature has competence is taken over. In such a taking over the difficulty suggested by learned Counsel in working out the scheme of the Act, would not arise because the portion taken over will constitute the estate and the compensation for that unit will be worked out on the basis laid down in S. 24 and those following. The other portions of the estate which are beyond the territorial operation of the enactment would continue to remain unaffected, so that the State Government could not be in a position to take them over. 18. We accordingly consider that the first notification, dated August 15, 1950, apart from its being binding and not open to challenge in these proceedings by the appellants, is valid and effective in law to vest the portion to which it related in the State Government. We then have Regulation IV of 1951 which brought the other portion of the estate to which the Abolition Act did not originally extend within the operation of that enactment. If, after this change in the law, the Government did not take over the rest of the estate, it would be open to the objection that the State Government had artificially split up the estate into two parts and had taken over or rather retained in its possession one part, and that notwithstanding that the Act posited the unit constituting an estate being taken over, had departed from that principle. The impugned notification, therefore, far from being invalid, was necessary to be issued in order to satisfy the very principle which learned Counsel for the appellants submits - as the one underlying the scheme of the Abolition Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds].In our opinion, the High Court has rightly rejected this contention, because even if the Permanent-Settlement Regulation did not apply there could be no dispute that the Polavaram zamindari was a permanently-settled estate, because its peishcush was fixed and from the kabuliyat which was executed by the proprietor it is clear that it conforms to the pattern of the sanads and kabuliyats issued under the Madras Permanent-Settlement Regulation (XXV of 1802)Learned Counsel, no doubt, conceded that the taking over of those portions of Gangole A and Gangole C which were within the operation of the Abolition Act before its extension to the Scheduled areas not having been challenged he would not be entitled to any relief in respect of the portion of the estate covered by the first notification, but his argument was that that would not preclude him from disputing the validity of the last notification vesting those portions of the two estates which were within the Scheduled areas in the StateWe might premise the discussion by observing that learned Counsel is right in his submission that the Abolition Act does not contemplate or make provision for the taking over of particular portions only of estates and that if the State Government having power to take over the entirety of an estate chose, however, to exclude certain portions of it from the operation of a vesting notification and took over only defined portions of an estate, this could be open to serious challenge on the ground that it was not contemplated by the scheme of the enactment. But the acceptance of this principle does not, in our opinion, compel us to answer the question propounded by the learned Counsel for the appellants in his favou16. As already pointed out learned Counsels submission was that not merely the notification, dated January 14, 1953, but also the earlier one dated August 15, 1950 (as modified by the one dated September 5, 1950) was invalid as providing for vesting, of parts only of an estate and not of it as a unit. It would also follow that if the first notification, dated August 15, 1950 was valid the impugned notification which by its operation effected the vesting of the entirety of the estate in the State could not be open to challenge as violating the principle invoked by learned Counsel17. We are necessarily, therefore, driven to consider the validity of the first notification, dated August 15, l950 in dealing with the validity of the impugned notification of January 14, 1953. In considering this matter it is, necessary to recall some of the provisions of the Abolition Act. Section 2 (3) defines an estate as meaning inter alia a zamindari estate. No doubt, as stated already, where the Abolition Act operates over the whole of a zamindari estate, it does not contemplate the Government taking over a portion only of such estate. But in saying this it should not be assumed that if in respect of a single estate two notifications were issued, say on the same date which together vested the entirety of the estate in the State under S. 3, either notification or both together would be invalid or ineffective. The reason for this must obviously be that the intention of the Government was to take over the entire estate - though it was being given effect to by the issue of two notifications. That would not obviously be the same thing as the Government having the liberty to pick and choose certain of the villages or certain portions of an estate leaving out others. If the Abolition Act as enacted does not extend to the entirety. of an estate as defined in the Estate Land Act but only to a portion thereof, the question would be whether that portion of the estate which is within the operation of the Act is an estate within the meaning of the Act or not.On this matter there are two views possible: (1) that having regard to the Abolition Act referring to and as it were incorporating the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act, the estates to which the Abolition Act could apply are only those which being Estates within the Estates Land Act, are also wholly within the operation of the Abolition Act. In other words, even if a few acres of an estate as defined in the Estates Land Act were outside the operation of the Abolition Act, it would not be an estate which could be taken over. (2) The other view attributing a crucial value to the policy and purpose underlying the legislation, viz., a reform of land tenures and landholding by the elimination of intermediaries to treat any land held on the tenures specified and within the territorial operation of the Act as falling within the category of estates liable to be taken over and vested in Government. We consider that the latter view is to be preferred as being in accord with the intention of the law and as subserving its purposes. In this connection it cannot be overlooked that the entire argument of learned Counsel is built up on the definitions of an estate in S. 2 of the Abolition Act (read with Section 1 (3) of that Act), and that the definitions contained there could be applied on the terms of the opening words of that section only unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. The position could possibly be better explained in these terms: Assume that Regulation IV of 1951 was not enacted. Could the State Government take over that portion of the estate which was within the operation of the Abolition Act or does the definition of an estate and the reference S. 1 (3) to S. 3 (2) of the Madras Estates Land Act of l908 preclude the State from taking over that portion because the Act does not extend to the entirety of the estate? It appears to us that this question is capable of being answered only in one way, viz., that the definition of an estate in the Abolition Act must be limited to that portion of an estate which is within the operation of the Act. Any other construction would mean that if that Act did not apply to a few square yards in an estate it ceases to be an estate governed by the Act, which, in our opinion, would be plainly contrary to the intention of the enactment as gathered from its preamble and operative provisions. Let us suppose that instead of the problem created by a portion of the estate being in a Scheduled area and, therefore, though within the State outside the normal legislative power of the State Legislature, a permanently Settled estate had by reason of say the States Reorganisation, fell both within the territory of the Madras and the Andhra States, with the result that the taking over under the Abolition Act could be operative only in regard to that portion within the State of Madras. Could it then be contended that the portion of the estate within the State of Madras did not fall within the definition of an estate and so could not be taken over by notification under S. 1 (4) of the Act. Indeed, the answer of the learned Counsel for the appellants to such a question was that it could be taken over but for the reason that in such a case the portions outside the State territory could not be an estate within the Madras Estates Land Act at all and that in consequence the inter-relation between the unit constituting the estate under the Estates Land Act and the concept of an estate under the Abolition Act was not disrupted. But this, however, hardly suffices as a complete answer for even after a portion of the estate becoming situated in a State other than Madras the State might still be governed by the Madras Estates Land Act, though applied as the law of the new State. What is relevant in the illustration is that along with the concept of the unit constituting the estate being taken over, there is also underlying it, another principle, viz., that it is sufficient if the entirety of the estate over which the State Legislature has competence is taken over. In such a taking over the difficulty suggested by learned Counsel in working out the scheme of the Act, would not arise because the portion taken over will constitute the estate and the compensation for that unit will be worked out on the basis laid down in S. 24 and those following. The other portions of the estate which are beyond the territorial operation of the enactment would continue to remain unaffected, so that the State Government could not be in a position to take them over18. We accordingly consider that the first notification, dated August 15, 1950, apart from its being binding and not open to challenge in these proceedings by the appellants, is valid and effective in law to vest the portion to which it related in the State Government. We then have Regulation IV of 1951 which brought the other portion of the estate to which the Abolition Act did not originally extend within the operation of that enactment. If, after this change in the law, the Government did not take over the rest of the estate, it would be open to the objection that the State Government had artificially split up the estate into two parts and had taken over or rather retained in its possession one part, and that notwithstanding that the Act posited the unit constituting an estate being taken over, had departed from that principle. The impugned notification, therefore, far from being invalid, was necessary to be issued in order to satisfy the very principle which learned Counsel for the appellants submits - as the one underlying the scheme of the Abolition Act.