Case: R. L. Arora Vs. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others

invoked to resolve that ambiguity. It was not suggested that the words do not, as they stand, make sense. They do, only the sense which they convey makes the clause unconstitutional. No doubt, the meaning of a word may vary with the setting or context, but that is not the position here. One asks in vain "which is the word which is said to bear a different meaning from the natural normal, dictionary sense, because of the context or setting"?28. It was, however, urged that it could not have been the intention of Parliament to have intended the clause to mean what appears to be meaning which I have said the words bore. But this argument ignores the basic principle underlying all rules of statutory construction that the intention of the legislature has to be gathered only from the meaning of the words used, for they are the only means by which the intention of the law-maker could be gathered. It is only where there is an ambiguity and the words are capable of more than one construction that any extrinsic aid in the shape of the purpose of the legislature, or the object of the legislation come in for consideration. "Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit," said Tindal, C. J. in Warburton v. Loveland, (1832) 2 Dow and Cl (HL) 480 at p. 489."we must give effect to it whatever be the consequences, for in that case the words of the statute speak the intention of the legislature".29. Authority is not needed for the proposition that the intention of the legislature is not a matter to be speculated upon. Interpretation or construction cannot mean that a Court first reaches a conclusion as to what in its opinion the legislature intended, even though this involves attributing a meaning divorced from the words used, and then adjust the meaning to the conclusion it has reached. As was observed by Lord Watson in an oft quoted passage in Salomon v. A. Salomon and Co., (1897) AC 22 at p. 38 :-"Intention of the legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication."30. It was the same principle that was explained by Lord Herschell in Cox v. Hakes, (1890) 15 AC 506 at p. 528 when he said :". . . . . . It must be admitted that if the language of the legislature interpreted according to the recognised canons of construction involves this result, your Lordships must frankly yield to it, even if you should be satisfied that it was not in the contemplation of the legislature."31. The only way in which I am able to read the clause is to relate the words "public purpose" to the nature of the industry carried on by the company and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic aids or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammar, can the reference to public purpose be related to the building or work for which the acquisition is permitted to be made.32. The learned Attorney-General submitted that the provision could and ought to be read down and confined in its operation to acquisition for public purposes as properly understood; in other words, to sever the constitutional from the unconstitutional portions and uphold the former. I do not find it possible to adopt this approach in a clause worded like the one before us. On the construction of the clause which I hold is the only possible one to adopt, it means the State is empowered to compulsorily acquire land for companies which satisfy the description of being engaged in an industry which is essential for the life of the community whether or not the purpose for which the company proposes to use the land acquired is a public purpose. Where the purpose for which the acquisition could be made is indicated by the enactment and that purpose, is one which is primarily constitutionally permissible but the words employed for indicating the purposes might possibly include some outside the power of the legislature, an argument about reading down would require consideration. But in the clause now impugned there is no purpose indicated at all except that it is needed for a company which falls within a particular category. For such a situation I consider that there is no scope at all for invoking the principle of reading down.33. Again, where the provision gives a carte blanche to Government to acquire land for any purpose it is not possible to sustain the validity of such a law and strike down merely the particular acquisition where land is acquired for a purpose which is not a public purpose, for here the vice is in the law itself and not merely in the application.34. I am therefore, clearly of the opinion that cl. (aa) introduced by the Amending Act XXXI of 1962 is unconstitutional as violative of Art. 31(2).35. In this view it is unnecessary for me to consider the proper construction of S. 7 of the Amending Act. Under the terms of S. 7 of the Act, all acquisition of land made prior to June 20, 1962, even accepting construction which Mr. Setalvad pressed upon us, are deemed to have been made for a purpose falling within cl. (aa). If, as I have held, cl. (aa) is unconstitutional and void, it was not contended that S. 7 would be of any assistance to the respondents to sustain the acquisition of the petitioners land. I would, therefore, allow the petition and grant the reliefs prayed for therein.ORDER36.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are therefore of opinion that the literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is neither the only nor the true construction of cl. (aa) and that when cl. (aa) provides for acquisition of land needed for construction of some building or work it implieitly intends that the building or work which is to be constructed must be such as to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged or is about to be engaged. In short. the words "building or work used in cl. (aa) take their colour from the adjectival clause which governs the company for which the building or work is being constructed and acquisition under this clause can only be made where the company is engaged or is taking steps to engage itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose, and the building or work which the company is intending to construct is of the same nature namely, that it is a building or work which is meant to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work for which it is being constructed. It is, only in these cases where the company is engaged in an industry or work of that kind and where the building or work is also constructed for a purpose of that kind, which is a public purpose, that acquisition can be made under cl. (aa). As we read the clause we are of opinion that the public purpose of the company for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of the company. We are therefore of opinion that in the setting in which cl. (aa) appears and in the circumstances in which it came to be enacted, a literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is not the only construction of this clause and that there is another construction which in our opinion is a better construction, and which is that the public purpose of the company is also implicit in the purpose of the building or work which is to be constructed for the company and it is only for such work or building which subserves, the public purpose of the company that acquisition under cl. (aa) can be made. Thus there are two possible constructions of this clause, one a mere mechanical and literal construction based on rules of grammar and the other which emerged from the setting in which the clause appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and also from the words used therein, namely, acquisition being for a company which has a public purpose behind it, and therefore the building or work which is to be constructed and for which land is required must also have the same public purpose behind it, that animates the company making the construction. We are therefore clearly of opinion that two constructions are possible of this clause of which the second construction which is other than literal is the better one. It is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way will be consistent with the Constitution, and if another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction: (see Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, (1962) Sup 2 SCR 769 : (AIR 1962 SC 955  )). We are therefore of opinion that cl. (aa) does not permit acquisition of land for construction of some building or work for a company engaged or to be engaged in an industry or work, which is for a public purpose unless the building or work for which the land is acquired also subserves the public purpose of the industry or work in which the company is engaged. This is in our opinion the better construction of cl. (aa) taking into account the setting in which it appears and the circumstances in which it came to be enacted and the words used therein. If that is the true construction of cl. (aa) it cannot be said to contravene Art. 31(2), for the public purpose required therein is present where land is required for the construction of a building or work which must subserve the public purpose of the industry or work in which a company is engaged or is about to be engaged. Nor can it be said that the provision is hit by Art. 19 (1) (f), for it would in our opinion be a reasonable restriction on the right to hold property. We hold therefore that the clause so interpreted is not unconstitutional. We have already said that the amendments in S. 41 are only consequential to the insertion of cl. (aa) in S. 40 (1) and would therefore be equally valid andattack on it on the basis of Art. 31 (2) is that it makes an irrebuttable presumption that the acquisition was for a public purpose, though it may not be actually so and therefore contravenes Art. 31 (2) inasmuch as the result of this irrebuttable presumption is that acquisition which may not have been for a public purpose, is validated. We do not think that there is any force in this contention in view of the interpretation we have given to cl. (aa) introduced in S. 40 (1). The first fiction in S. 7 is that it shall be presumed that acquisitions before July 20, 1962, if they do not fall within cl. (a) or cl. (b) of S. 40 (1) shall be deemed to fall within cl. (aa). That means that building or work for which acquisition was made was required for a public purpose of the kind indicated in cl. (aa). It does not however follow from this that if the purpose was not of the kind indicated in cl. (aa) it will still be presumed that the acquisition was for the purpose mentioned in cl. (aa). All that the first deeming provision lays down is that where the public purpose does not come within cl. (a) or cl. (b) it should be deemed to come within cl. (aa), provided it is of a kind which can come within this clause. The intention behind this deeming provision clearly is to make the purpose of an acquisition made before July 20, 1962 which does not fall within cl. (a) or cl. (b) of S. 40(1) to be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa). On a reasonable interpretation, this deeming provision therefore only provides that where the purpose does not fall within cls. (a) and (b), it shall be deemed to fall under cl. (aa) and to be judged in accordance therewith. If in fact the purpose of any acquisition made before July 20, 1962, is such as does not fall within cl. (aa), the deeming provision would be of no avail. Thus the first of the two fictions introduced by S. 7 of the Amendment Act merely lays down that where a notification under S. 6 of the Act cannot be justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of the S. 40 (1), it will be judged in accordance with the provision contained in cl. (aa) and if it satisfies those provisions, the acquisition will be deemed for the purpose of that clause, as if that clause existed at the relevant time, though in actual fact it did not. The first fiction therefore in our opinion goes no further than this and does not provide that even though the purpose of acquisition does not fall within cl. (aa), it will still be deemed to be a public purpose. In this view of the matter, we are of opinion that the attack on S. 7 on the basis of Art. 31 (2) must fail.We may in this connection refer to the words "as valid as if" appearing in S. 7 of the Amendment Act, because they are in our opinion the key words for the purpose of interpreting the extent of the validity conferred on acquisitions before July 20, 1962. What the second fiction provides is that an acquisition made before that date shall be as valid as if the provisions of Ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act were in force at all material times. The force of the words "as valid as if" clearly is that the validity of acquisitions made before July 20, 1962 has to be judged on the basis that cl. (aa) was in force at the material time and in accordance therewith. The validity therefore is not absolute; it is conditioned by the fact that it will be as valid as if cl. (aa) was in force; so that if it could not be valid even if cl. (aa) was in force and could not be justified under the terms of that clause, the validity conferred by S.7 of the Amendment Act will not attach to it. This in our opinion is the force of the words "as valid as if" and the validity it has conferred is not absolute as contended on behalf of the petitioner and will not apply to those acquisitions which would not be valid if they could not be justified on the basis of cl. (aa) assuming it to be in force at the material time. In this view the attack under Art. 14 as well as Art. 31 (2) fails, for in neither case can acquisition be valid whether made before July 20, 1962 or thereafter, unless the conditions of cl. (aa) aresee no force in this contention. Section 7 opens with the words "notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court" and the validity conferred by it on acquisitions made before July 20, 1962 is thus notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court. These are the usual words to be found in validating legislation where the intention is to validate some action which would otherwise be invalid and which may have been declared invalid by any court. The purpose of such words in a validating legislation is to declare valid what has been held invalid by courts and once the legislature declares such action valid all steps taken in connection therewith are validated to the extent of validation. The result of the validation is that notifications or other steps taken which may otherwise have been invalid become valid. Further an acquisition also even though it may have been struck down by a court would be validated if it has been made in the sense that property in the land to be acquired has vested in Government either under S. 16 or S. 17(1) of the Act. It is not in dispute in this case that the property has vested in Government under Section 17(1) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the purpose of the company was a public purpose, namely, manufacture of textile machinery parts and that the acquisition was also for the construction of works for that purpose. In the circumstances we fail to see how it can be said that rights of the petitioner have not been affected at all by the validating provision in S. 7 of the Act. The contention under this head alsohave not been able to understand exactly what is meant by this. As we have already said, it is not in dispute that the purpose of the company is a public purpose, namely, production of textile machinery parts and the land is acquired for construction of works for that purpose. The agreement shows that the land is required for the construction of a work, namely, a factory for the manufacture of textile machinery and parts and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. One term of the agreement is that the company, its successors and assignees will use the said land for the aforesaid purpose and for no other purpose without the previous sanction in writing of the State Government. Another term provides that if the said land or any part or parts thereof shall no longer be required by the company, then the company will forthwith relinquish and restore the same after removing all buildings and structure to the Governor at a price equal to the amount paid by it under the Act. It is clear therefore that the land cannot be used for any other purpose and it will have to be restored to the Government if it is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired. In this connection reference may be made to S. 44-A introduced by the Amendment Act which lays down that "no company for which any land is acquired under this Part shall be entitled to transfer the said land or any part thereof by sale, mortgage gift, lease or otherwise except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government". This provision also provides a safeguard that the land will only be used for the public purpose for which it is acquired and not otherwise. The aforesaid terms in the agreement in our opinion satisfy the condition that the land will be used for the public purpose for which it was being acquired and for no other. Therefore the acquisition is for a public purpose as provided in cl. (aa).We do not think it is the purpose of the Act that the agreement should provide for regulation or control of the products of a company, which probably means that Government should control the quantum of production and distribution or the price of the produced articles. This in our opinion is foreign to the purpose of the Act. All that the Act requires is that before land is transferred to the company by the Government, the agreement, should provide that land would be used for the purpose for which it was acquired and for no other. The Act has nothing to do with the control or regulation of the products of the company and gives no power to Government in that behalf. Nor do we think it was necessary in order that the public purpose mentioned in cl. (aa) is carried out to have any further term in the agreement besides those which have been provided in the agreement in this case. The contention that the acquisition in the present case was not for a public purpose as the agreement does not provide for the control and regulation of the product of the company must thereforeintention of the previous owner whatever it may be does not in our opinion enter into the question at all, so far as the validity of the acquisition is concerned provided the acquisition is for a public purpose. Whether the land should be acquired or not is a matter which may be urged under S. 5-A of the Act which gives the owner of the land the right to object to the acquisition, and it is for Government to decide whether the objection should be allowed or rejected. Once the Government decides that the objection should be rejected and that the acquisition is needed for a public purpose the validity of the notification under S. 6 and the subsequent action thereafter cannot be challenged on the ground that the previous owner himself intended to use the land for some public purpose. In this connection our attention is invited to the observations of this Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, (1950) SCR 621   at p. 687 : (AIR 1950 SC 222   at p. 246) where it was observed that "under certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot be to the general interest of the community to requisition the property of one refugee for the benefit of another refugee". These observations in our opinion have no relevance to the matter under consideration. We are concerned here with acquisition for a public purpose, which is undisputed. This is not a case of a house of one person being requisitioned for another; this is a case of constructing some work which will be useful to the public and will subserve the public purpose of the production of textile machinery and its parts for the use of the general public. In these circumstances we are of opinion that there being a definite public purpose behind the acquisition in the present case, the acquisition would be justified under the Act irrespective of the intention of the previous owner of the land to use it for some other public purpose. The contention under this head must alsois said that there is discrimination between a public company and a Government company for which land can be acquired under cl. (aa) on the one hand and a private company or an individual on the other. It is true that acquisition for the purpose of cl. (aa) can only be made for a Government company or a public company and cannot be made for a private company or an individual; but there is in our opinion a clear classification between a public company and a Government company on the one hand and a private company and an individual on the other, which has reasonable nexus with the objects to be achieved under the law. The intention of the legislature clearly is that private individuals and private companies which really consist of a few private individuals banded together should not have the advantage of acquiring land even though they may be intending to engage in some industry or work which may be for a public purpose inasmuch the enrichment consequent on such work goes to private individuals or to a group of them who have formed themselves into a private company. Public companies on the other hand are broad based and Government companies are really in a sense no different from Government, though for convenience of administration a Government company may be formed, which thus becomes a separate legal entity. Thus in one case the acquisition results in private enrichment while in the other it is the public which gains in every way. Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind cl. (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must therefore alsofeel unable to accept this as a possible construction of the words used. For that construction to be adopted even the transposition of the words "for a public purpose" to an earlier point after the words "for a company" would not be sufficient assuming the rules of grammar permitted such a course; for, then it wold leave out the description or categorisation of the company for which the land is needed, and in such a situation the entire object of the amendment would be frustrated, as it would not be a condition that the industry in which the company is engaged is one which is required in public interest. Even if the clause were re-written so as to introduce the words "for a public purpose" earlier and also retain them where it occurs now, the construction for which Mr. Setalvad contends cannot result, for then it would not make much sense, for the words "for a public purpose" if transposed earlier would not convey the meaning which Mr. Setalvad says that convey, because the construction which learned counsel suggests is that the clause means that the land is needed for the construction of the factory and other essential buildings for a company engaged in an industry which serves the national interest. By no transposition of the words actually used in the clause can such a transformation bequite agree that if the language were flexible in the sense that in could be read so as to make it refer only to cases of acquisition for a public purpose, this could and ought to be done. But this assumes that the clause is reasonably capable of two interpretations; one which would render it unconstitutional and the other which even though it be a little strained, would make it constitutional, then the Court would lean in favour of the latter construction.