Case: Smt. Bhagwan Kaur Vs. State of Punjab and Others

provided.(2) Every tenant intending to acquire proprietary rights shall make an application in writing to the prescribed authority in the prescribed manner, containing the following particulars, namely -(a) the area and location of the land in respect of which the application is made;(b) the name of the landowner from whom proprietary rights are to be acquired;(c) such other particulars as may be prescribed.(3) The right conferred upon a tenant to acquire proprietary rights in respect of any land under this section may, if such tenant has sublet the land be exercised by the sub-tenant to the exclusion of the tenant."8. No objection was raised before the Tehsildar, the Collector or the Financial Commissioner that the respondents were not tenants within the definition in Section 20. During the course of discussion it, however, appeared that the inequity which has been noticed by the High Court may perhaps be obviated by giving close attention to the definition of the word "tenant" and applying it to Section 22. If this definition is applied it would appear that not only a tenant who held land which had been reserved by the landowner for his personal cultivation but also a tenant of a landowner who owns 30 standard acres or less of land and the land falls within his permissible limit, would be debarred from making an application under Section 22. It may be, though we do not decide the point in this case, that a landowner who has not reserved under Section 5, may at one stage after some tenants have exercised option under Section 22 fall within the description in Section 7-A(1)(b) of the Act. But, as we have said, this point was taken before the revenue authorities and it is too late now to allow the point to be raised because if this point was allowed to be raised various questions will have to be decided in order to finally decide the case. It would have to be decided if this interpretation was accepted as to at what stage landowner started falling under S. 7-A(1)(b). It may also be that this argument might be refuted on the ground that the tenants when they made the applications did fall within the definition under Section 20 as at that time the landowner owned more than 30 standard acres.9. Be that as it may, we have to decide the case on the points taken before the revenue authorities and the High Court. The main point that was urged before the High Court was that the provisions of Chapter IV-A, which was inserted into the Act by Pepsu Act XV of 1956, somehow helped the appellant. Section 32-A provides that no person shall be entitled to own or hold as landowner or tenant land under his personal cultivation within the State which exceeds in the aggregate the permissible limit, and further that for the purpose computing the permissible limit the provisions of clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 shall not apply. Clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 3 deals with the case when a landowner died within a period of six months from the commencement of the Presidents Act, and clause (e) thereof stipulates that "any transfer of land made by the landowner after the commencement of the Presidents Act and clause (e) thereof stipulates that "any transfer of land made by the landowner after the commencement of the Presidents Act shall be disregarded."10. Section 32-B of Chapter IV-A provides for returns by persons having land in excess of the ceiling in the following terms :"32-B. Any person, who on the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956, owns or holds as landowner or tenant land under his personal cultivation, which in the aggregate exceeds the permissible limit, shall, within a period of one month from the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Land (Amendment) Ordinance, 1958 furnish to the Collector a return giving the particulars of all his land in the prescribed form and manner and stating therein his selection of the parcel or parcels of land not exceeding in the aggregate the permissible limit which he desires to retain and the lands in respect of which he claims exemption from the ceiling under the provisions of this Chapter....... (Proviso omitted).11. It is the case of the appellant that she filed a return under Section 32-B. According to the respondents she was not entitled to file a return because she did not own or hold as landowner or tenant land under her personal cultivation which in the aggregate exceeded the permissible limit. The High Court held that Section 32-B applies only to a landowner owning or holding land under his personal cultivation which in the aggregate exceeds the permissible limit, and repelled the contention that the words "under his personal cultivation" applied only to a tenant and not to a landowner.12. It seems to us that although this interpretation leads to some hardship on some persons this is the correct meaning, and accordingly the appellant cannot take advantage of Section 32-B and the subsequent provisions in Chapter IV-A. If Chapter-IV-A is out of the way then if is difficult to hold that Section 22 does not apply. Section 22 clearly enables the respondents to put in applications to acquire proprietary rights as it was not contested that they were tenants within the definition of the word in Section 20.13. The learned counsel for the appellant further urges that the Act is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. This point is not open for any further discussion because this Court has held that this Act is protected by Article 31-A of the Constitution and cannot be challenged on the ground that it violates Article 14. (See Pritam Singh Chahil v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 930 : (1967) 2 SCJ 325.); and Inder Singh v. State of Punjab. (AIR 1967 SC 1776 : (1967) 3 SCR 603 : (1966) 1 SCJ 557.)

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It was only on July 25, 1966, that application was made to the High Court for setting aside the abatement. This application was dismissed by the High Court on March 20, 1967. The High Court (Narula, J.) held that the application was barred by time as it was not accompanied by application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This order has become final because no appeal to the Supreme Court was filed against the order. It is clear that the appeal insofar as it deals with the group of tenants of which Ram Pratap was a member hasare unable to appreciate how the fact that one petition was filed is relevant to the determination of the question of abatement. The other groups of tenants held separate lands, they had separate rights and they had been granted proprietary rights in separate lands and on separate terms. We are unable to hold that the whole appeal has abated.No objection was raised before the Tehsildar, the Collector or the Financial Commissioner that the respondents were not tenants within the definition in Section 20. During the course of discussion it, however, appeared that the inequity which has been noticed by the High Court may perhaps be obviated by giving close attention to the definition of the word "tenant" and applying it to Section 22. If this definition is applied it would appear that not only a tenant who held land which had been reserved by the landowner for his personal cultivation but also a tenant of a landowner who owns 30 standard acres or less of land and the land falls within his permissible limit, would be debarred from making an application under Section 22. It may be, though we do not decide the point in this case, that a landowner who has not reserved under Section 5, may at one stage after some tenants have exercised option under Section 22 fall within the description in Sectionof the Act. But, as we have said, this point was taken before the revenue authorities and it is too late now to allow the point to be raised because if this point was allowed to be raised various questions will have to be decided in order to finally decide the case. It would have to be decided if this interpretation was accepted as to at what stage landowner started falling under S.It may also be that this argument might be refuted on the ground that the tenants when they made the applications did fall within the definition under Section 20 as at that time the landowner owned more than 30 standard acres.It is the case of the appellant that she filed a return under Sectiong to therespondents she was not entitled to file a return because she did not own or hold as landowner or tenant land under her personal cultivation which in the aggregate exceeded the permissible limit.The High Court held that Sectionapplies only to a landowner owning or holding land under his personal cultivation which in the aggregate exceeds the permissible limit, and repelled the contention that the words "under his personal cultivation" applied only to a tenant and not to a landowner.12. It seems to us that although this interpretation leads to some hardship on some persons this is the correct meaning, and accordingly the appellant cannot take advantage of Sectionand the subsequent provisions in Chapteris out of the way then if is difficult to hold that Section 22 does not apply. Section 22 clearly enables the respondents to put in applications to acquire proprietary rights as it was not contested that they were tenants within the definition of the word in Section 20.This point is not open for any further discussion because this Court has held that this Act is protected by Articleof the Constitution and cannot be challenged on the ground that it violates Article 14. (See Pritam Singh Chahil v. The State of Punjab (AIR 1967 SC 930   : (1967) 2 SCJ 325.); and Inder Singh v. State of Punjab. (AIR 1967 SC 1776   : (1967) 3 SCR 603   : (1966) 1 SCJ 557.)