Case: Om Prakash And Others Vs. State Of Utter Pradesh

had existed. 21. To us, the apprehension expressed by Mr. Mehta appears to be unfounded. 22. The Proviso in question created only a disability. The effect of the repeal is to remove that disability or restriction on the landowners right to receive 15 per cent solatium u/S. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. Further, the assessment of compensation is not a matter past and closed. It is still pending in reference before the Tribunal. The repeal is final and unconditional. There is nothing in the repealing Act which saves such pending references from its operation. The Tribunal, therefore, will have to take cognizance of the repeal and for the purpose of disposing of the reference treat the Proviso as having never existed. Thus, the validity or otherwise of modification (i) has become, more or less, academic. 23. The last contention of Mr. Mehta is that by virtue of Section 577 of the Adhiniyam, the provisions of Section 364 (4) which peremptorily requires a Scheme to be completed up to the date of the award, within a period of five years, had become applicable to the Mumfordganj Housing Scheme, also. Since this Scheme - proceeds the argument - has not been completed within the requisite time-limit it has come to an end by operation of law, with consequent release of the appellants property. 24. Mr. Dikshit contends that section 365 (4) cannot apply to this Scheme, because the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 under which it was initiated had no such provision. The point pressed into argument is that so long as this Scheme is not superseded by any notification or order under clause (a) to Section 577, it will continue to be in force without any time-limit. 25. Mr. Ganpule, appearing for the Mahapalika has, in the alternative chosen to steer a middle course. His stand is that even if Section 365 (4), applies to this Scheme then also the time-limit of five years will start running from the date of the commencement of the Adhiniyam i.e. February 1, 1960. 26. In order to appreciate the contentions canvassed, it will be profitable to set out the material parts of Section 365 (4) and Section 577, as they stood at the relevant time hereunder:"365 (1) ... ... ... (2) ... ... ... (3) ... ... ... (4) All acquisition of land and interest in land for an improvement scheme authorised under this Chapter shall be completed at least up to the stage of making of awards within a period of five years from the date of the notification of the scheme under Section 363 any land in respect of which the acquisition is not so completed and the owner and occupier thereof shall cease to be subject to any liabilities under this Chapter; Provided that the State Government may in any particular case before the expiry of such period and for reasons to be recorded in writing extend the period by one year.... x x x." Section 577: "Continuation of appointments taxes, budget, estimate, assessment etc. - Save as expressly provided by the provisions of this Chapter or by a notification issued under Section 579 - (a) any appointment, delegation notification, notice tax, order, direction scheme licence permission, registration, rule, bye-law, regulation form made, issued, imposed or granted under...the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919...in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act continue in force until it is superseded by any appointment, delegation, notification, notice, tax, order, direction. Scheme, licence, permission, registration rule, bye-law or form made, issued imposed or granted under this Act or any other law as aforesaid, as the case may be; (b) any notice or notification or sanction of any improvement scheme for the area included in the City issued under the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919....shall be deemed to have been issued under this Act, and all further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme may be taken accordingly; (c) all proceedings for acquisition of land whether in pursuance of any scheme of improvement or otherwise initiated under the U. P. Town Improvement Act, 1919....may be continued as if they had been initiated under this Act; (d) to (g) .... ... ..." 27. The interpretation suggested by Mr. Dikshit is possible, only if we read clause (a) of Section 577 in isolation and do not give full effect to the words "in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" occurring in that clause. Such an interpretation, we think, with respect, will lead to manifest contradiction and absurdity. It will mean that while fresh Scheme initiated under the Adhiniyam must be completed with speed within the prescribed time-limit, far older schemes commenced under the repealed Act, - where the need for expeditious disposal is the greatest - can continue indefinitely for any length of time. The whimsical construction can be avoided if we read clause (a) along with clauses (b) and (c) of the same section, and give it a reasonable meaning with the aid of the legal fiction implicit in those clauses. Thus construed, the Scheme in the instant case, though notified under S. 42 of the repealed Act in 1944, would, in view of the deeming provision in clause (b) of S. 577, be deemed to have been notified under Section 363 of the Adhiniyam, on the date on which the Adhiniyam came into force i.e. on February 1, 1960. The five-year period specified in S. 365 (4) therefore, will be deemed to have commenced from February 1, 1960. The Collector had made his award on April 13, 1961 much within the time-limit prescribed by S. 365 (4). 28. In the above view of the matter, we negative the contention of Mr. Mehta. 29. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the impugned modifications (i), (ii) and (iii) suffer from the vice of discrimination and as such, contravene the guarantee of equal protection of laws enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The mere fact that where the land is to be compulsorily acquired for a Scheme costing less than Rupees 10/- lakhs under Chapter XIV, no prior permission of the State is required for issuing the necessary notifications under Sections 357 and 363 of the Adhiniyam (which take the place of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act), it does not mean that in such cases, the acquiring authority is the Mahapalika and not the State Government15. The caption of this para read along with its contents shows that the land has first to be acquired by the Collector for the Government and thereafter it is transferred by the Government to the Mahapalika only on payment of its costs. In this connection it is important to recall the provisions of Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which has not in any way been modified by the Adhiniyam. According to Section 16 "when the Collector has made his award under Section 11, he may take possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". Thus, it is clear beyond all manner of doubt that whenever land is to be compulsorily acquired for the Mahapalika - be it for a purpose of the Scheme under Chapter XIV or for any other purpose under Section 130 - the acquiring authority is the Government. There is no material difference between the impugned provisions of the Adhiniyam and those which were in question before this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trusts case, (1973) 1 SCC 500  = (AIR 1973 SC 689 ) (supra). The ratio of the aforesaid case therefore will apply fully to the impugned provisions mentioned at (i), (ii) and (iii)16.There can be no dispute that the Government can acquire land for a public purpose including that of the Mahapalika or other local body, either under the unmodified Land Acquisition act, 1894, or under that Act as modified by the Adhiniyam. If it chooses the first course, then the land-owners concerned will be entitled to better compensation, including 15% solatium; the potential value of the land etc; nor will there be any impediment or hurdle - such as that enacted by Section 372 (1) of the Adhiniyam - in the way of such land-owners, dissatisfied by the Collectors award, to approach the Court under Section 18 of that Act. If the Government, for the same purpose, resorts to the land Acquisition Act as modified by the Adhiniyam, the land-owner (s) concerned will suffer from all the disabilities or restrictions envisaged by the modifications. In this way, the impugned legislation enables the Government to discriminate in the matter of acquiring land between similarly situated landowners17. The impugned modifications do not satisfy the well-known tests of reasonable classification which is permissible for the purpose of legislation. It is not founded on any intelligible differentia, nor has this differentia a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, namely, compulsory acquisition of land for a public purpose. It is not necessary to dilate further on this point as this matter stands concluded by this Courts decision in Nagpur Improvement Trusts case by the ratio of which we are bound27. The interpretation suggested by Mr. Dikshit is possible, only if we read clause (a) of Section 577 in isolation and do not give full effect to the words "in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act" occurring in that clause. Such an interpretation, we think, with respect, will lead to manifest contradiction and absurdity. It will mean that while fresh Scheme initiated under the Adhiniyam must be completed with speed within the prescribed time-limit, far older schemes commenced under the repealed Act, - where the need for expeditious disposal is the greatest - can continue indefinitely for any length of time. The whimsical construction can be avoided if we read clause (a) along with clauses (b) and (c) of the same section, and give it a reasonable meaning with the aid of the legal fiction implicit in those clauses. Thus construed, the Scheme in the instant case, though notified under S. 42 of the repealed Act in 1944, would, in view of the deeming provision in clause (b) of S. 577, be deemed to have been notified under Section 363 of the Adhiniyam, on the date on which the Adhiniyam came into force i.e. on February 1, 1960. The five-year period specified in S. 365 (4) therefore, will be deemed to have commenced from February 1, 1960. The Collector had made his award on April 13, 1961 much within the time-limit prescribed by S. 365 (4)29. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the impugned modifications (i), (ii) and (iii) suffer from the vice of discrimination and as such, contravene the guarantee of equal protection of laws enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution.