Case: State Of Orissa Vs. Chandra Sekhar Singh Bhoi Etc

in the Government under s. 45 as amended, there is compulsory acquisition of land which may be laid only if the law provides for payment to the landholder for extinction of his interest, the market value of that part of the surplus land which is within the ceiling limit under the principal Act. This argument found favour with the High Court. In their view the expression "law in force" must be "construed only in the constitutional sense and not in the sense of its actual operativeness", and on that account it must be held that "there was a ceiling limit already provided by the principal Act as it was law in force within the meaning of that expression as used in the second proviso to Art. 31 -A". They proceeded then to hold that s. 47 of the Act as amended provided -for payment of compensation at a rate which is less than the market value of the land falling within the ceiling limit as originally fixed under Act 16 of 1960, and the guarantee of the second proviso to Art. 31-A of the Constitution is on that account infringed. We are unable to accept this process of reasoning. The right to compensation which is not less than the market value under any law providing for the acquisition by the State of any land in an estate in the personal cultivation of a person is -guaranteed by the second Proviso only where the land is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force. A law cannot be said to be in force unless it is brought into operation by legislative enactment, or by the exercise of authority by a delegate empowered to bring it into operation. The theory of a statue being "in operation in a constitutional sense" though it is not in fact in operation has, in our judgment, no validity.Again Ch. IV of the principal Act was repealed by the Amending Act 15 of 1965. Article 31-A proviso 2 guarantees to a person, for compulsory acquisition of his land, the right to compensation which is not less than the market value, when the land is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under a law for the time being in force. On the plain words of the proviso the law prescribing the ceiling limit must be in force at the date of acquisition. In the present case the law relating to the ceiling limit viz.Ch. IV of the principal Act was never made operative by a notification, and was repealed by Act 15 of 1965. The ceiling limit under S. 47 of the principal Act was on that account inapplicable to the landholders who challenged the validity of S. 45 of the amending Act.9. The decision of this Court A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti and Anr. ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196.) on which the High Court relied lends no support to the views expressed by them. In that case the Travancore State Legislature enacted Act 14 of 1124 M.E to provide for investigating cases of evasion of tax. The Act was to come into force by s. 1(3) on the date appointed by the State Government by notification. The States of Travancore and Cochin merged on July 1, 1949 and formed the United State of Travancore and Cochin. By Ordinance I of 1124 M.E. all existing laws of the Travancore State were to continue in force in the United State. By a notification the Government of the United State brought the Travancore Act 14 of 1124 (M.E.) into force, and referred cases of certain tax-payers for investigation to the Commission appointed in that behalf. The tax-payers challenged the authority of the Commission to investigate the cases. They contended that the Travancore Act 14 of 1124 (M.E.) not being a law in force when the United State was formed, the-notification bringing the Act into force was ineffective. The Court rejected that plea. Section 1(3) of Travancore Act 14 of 1123 (M.E.) was existing law on July 1, 1949, and continued to remain in force by virtue of Ordinance 1 of 1124 (M.E.). The notification issued in exercise of the power under s. 1(3) of the Travancore Act 14 of 1124 (M.E.); the reference of the cases of the petitioners, the appointment of the authorised officials and the proceedings under the Act could not be questioned because s. 1(3) was existing law on July 1, 1949.In A. Thangal Kunju Mudaliar case ([1955] 2 S.C.R. 1196.) the contention that Travancore Act 14 of 1124 (M.E.) was not law in force until a notification was issued bringing into operation the provisions of the Act, authorising the appointment of a Commission, and referring the cases of tax-payers to the Commission, was rejected. The Court held that s. 1(3) was in operation on July 1, 1949 and the power to bring into force the provisions of the Travancore Act was exercisable by the successor State. It was not held that the other provisions of the Act were in force even before an appropriate notification was issued. In the case in hand S. 1(3) of -the principal Act was in force, but Ch. IV of the Act was not brought into force. The argument that provisions of the Act which by a notification could have been but were not brought into force, must still be deemed to be law in force, derives no support from the case relied upon.10. Section 1(3) of Act 16 of 1960 is undoubtedly a law in force, but until the power is exercised by the State Government to issue an appropriate notification, the provisions of Ch. IV could not be deemed to be law in force, and since no notification was issued before Ch. IV of the principal Act was repealed, there was no ceiling limit applicable to the landholders under any law for the time being in force which attracted the application of the second proviso to Art. 31-A.11.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]By the amendment made in the Constitution by the 17th Amendment Act the principal Act is incorporated in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution with effect from june 20, 1964. The Act is therefore not liable to be attacked on the plea that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III Constitution. But the power to repeal or amend the Act incorporated in the Ninth Schedule is not thereby taken away. the enactment of the the of the competent Legislature to amending Act passed after the (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 does not therefore qualify for the protection of Art.are unable to accept this process of reasoning. The right to compensation which is not less than the market value under any law providing for the acquisition by the State of any land in an estate in the personal cultivation of a person is -guaranteed by the second Proviso only where the land is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force. A law cannot be said to be in force unless it is brought into operation by legislative enactment, or by the exercise of authority by a delegate empowered to bring it into operation. The theory of a statue being "in operation in a constitutional sense" though it is not in fact in operation has, in our judgment, no validity.Again Ch. IV of the principal Act was repealed by the Amending Act 15 of 1965. Article 31-A proviso 2 guarantees to a person, for compulsory acquisition of his land, the right to compensation which is not less than the market value, when the land is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under a law for the time being in force. On the plain words of the proviso the law prescribing the ceiling limit must be in force at the date of acquisition. In the present case the law relating to the ceiling limit viz.Ch. IV of the principal Act was never made operative by a notification, and was repealed by Act 15 of 1965. The ceiling limit under S. 47 of the principal Act was on that account inapplicable to the landholders who challenged the validity of S. 45 of the amendingargument that provisions of the Act which by a notification could have been but were not brought into force, must still be deemed to be law in force, derives no support from the case relied1(3) of Act 16 of 1960 is undoubtedly a law in force, but until the power is exercised by the State Government to issue an appropriate notification, the provisions of Ch. IV could not be deemed to be law in force, and since no notification was issued before Ch. IV of the principal Act was repealed, there was no ceiling limit applicable to the landholders under any law for the time being in force which attracted the application of the second proviso to Art. 31-A.