Case: Manohar Lal Vs. Vinesh Anand

way with reasonable legal justification and that in such cases, ethical considerations operate and ought to operate.25. In that uncertain state of law, the Law Commission observed in paragraph 15.99 of its Report that it felt that in any concrete case this question is bound into create problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change in law for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code. It felt that the term `Court for the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) should mean a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court, properly so called, but where a tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the attributes of a court, it might be regarded as a court only if declared by the Act to be a court for the purposes of Section 195. Indubitably, the introduction of the inclusive clause in the definition of `Court in sub-section (3) of Section 195 has brought about a change in the law. No rule is more firmly established than the principles enunciated in Heydon case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] which have been continually cited with approval not only by the English courts but also by the Privy Council as well as this Court. The principles laid down in Heydon case have been enunciated in Craises on Statute Law, 6th Edn. at p. 96 as follows :That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered : (1) what was the common law before the making of the Act, (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, (3) what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, (4) The true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the act pro bono publico.These rules are still in full form and effect, with the addition that regard must now be had not only to the existing law but also to prior legislation and to the judicial interpretation thereof. The court applied the rule in Heydon case in Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 in the construction of Article 286 of the Constitution. After referring to the state of law prevailing in the then provinces prior to the Constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter State trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercising of taxing powers by the different provincial legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus, S.R. Das, Actg, C.J. speaking for himself and Vivian Bose and Jafer Imam, JJ. proceeded to say : (SCR p. 635)It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of the interstate trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the Constitution-makers adopted Article 286 of the Constitution.....An illustration of the application of the rules is also furnished in the construction of Section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act, 1955. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the court after referring to the previous state of the law, to the mischief that continued under that law and to the resolutions passed by different State legislatures under Article 252(1) of the Constitution authorising Parliament to pass the Act, stated : (SCR p. 939)Having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill."17. Balirams decision (supra) has taken into consideration the entire judicial precedent available till the date of the judgment and came to a conclusion upon reliance of the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment in Puhupram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968 MPLJ 629 that the same lays down the correct law. This Court observed:"36. ..........The least that is required of a court is the capacity to deliver a `definitive judgment, and merely because the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a court. That being so, it must be held that a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the appropriate government under Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is not a court for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code."18. Needless to record here that on a proper appreciation of judgment in Baliram (supra), there cannot be two opinions as to the scope and effect of Section 195(3) of Code and we thus record our concurrence with the view expressed by this Court in Baliram. The law thus laid down by the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta (supra) cannot be said to be good law and thus stands over-ruled even on the basis of the state of law under the 1940 Act (being a repealed statute presently). 19. On the wake of the aforesaid, we are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions made in support of the appeal that the Arbitrator can be termed to be a Court within the meaning of section 195 of the Cr. Procedure Code, as such question of applicability of Section 340 Cr.P.Code in a proceeding before the Arbitrator does not and cannot arise. The issue thus is answered in the negative. The Appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In almost every case except the very plainest, it would be possible to decide the issue either way with reasonable legal justification and that in such cases, ethical considerations operate and ought to operate.25. In that uncertain state of law, the Law Commission observed in paragraph 15.99 of its Report that it felt that in any concrete case this question is bound into create problem of interpretation and accordingly suggested a change in law for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code. It felt that the term `Court for the purposes of clauses (b) and (c) should mean a Civil, Revenue or a Criminal Court, properly so called, but where a tribunal created by an Act has all or practically all the attributes of a court, it might be regarded as a court only if declared by the Act to be a court for the purposes of Section 195. Indubitably, the introduction of the inclusive clause in the definition of `Court in sub-section (3) of Section 195 has brought about a change in the law. No rule is more firmly established than the principles enunciated in Heydon case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a: 76 ER 637] which have been continually cited with approval not only by the English courts but also by the Privy Council as well as this Court. The principles laid down in Heydon case have been enunciated in Craises on Statute Law, 6th Edn. at p. 96 as follows :That for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered : (1) what was the common law before the making of the Act, (2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, (3) what remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, (4) The true reason of the remedy. And then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and to add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the act pro bono publico.These rules are still in full form and effect, with the addition that regard must now be had not only to the existing law but also to prior legislation and to the judicial interpretation thereof. The court applied the rule in Heydon case in Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 in the construction of Article 286 of the Constitution. After referring to the state of law prevailing in the then provinces prior to the Constitution as also to the chaos and confusion that was brought about in inter State trade and commerce by indiscriminate exercising of taxing powers by the different provincial legislatures founded on the theory of territorial nexus, S.R. Das, Actg, C.J. speaking for himself and Vivian Bose and Jafer Imam, JJ. proceeded to say : (SCR p. 635)It was to cure this mischief of multiple taxation and to preserve the free flow of the interstate trade or commerce in the Union of India regarded as one economic unit without any provincial barrier that the Constitution-makers adopted Article 286 of the Constitution.....An illustration of the application of the rules is also furnished in the construction of Section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act, 1955. In R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930 Venkatarama Ayyar, J. speaking for the court after referring to the previous state of the law, to the mischief that continued under that law and to the resolutions passed by different State legislatures under Article 252(1) of the Constitution authorising Parliament to pass the Act, stated : (SCR p. 939)Having regard to the history of the legislation, the declared object thereof and the wording of the statute, we are of opinion the competitions which are sought to be controlled and regulated by the Act are only those competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial degree on skill."17. Balirams decision (supra) has taken into consideration the entire judicial precedent available till the date of the judgment and came to a conclusion upon reliance of the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment in Puhupram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1968 MPLJ 629  that the same lays down the correct law. This Court observed:"36. ..........The least that is required of a court is the capacity to deliver a `definitive judgment, and merely because the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a court. That being so, it must be held that a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the appropriate government under Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is not a court for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code."18. Needless to record here that on a proper appreciation of judgment in Baliram (supra), there cannot be two opinions as to the scope and effect of Section 195(3) of Code and we thus record our concurrence with the view expressed by this Court in Baliram. The law thus laid down by the Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta (supra) cannot be said to be good law and thus stands over-ruled even on the basis of the state of law under the 1940 Act (being a repealed statute presently).