Case: Workmen In Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras Vs. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Madras

21 October, 1965 and, after drawing the attention of the workman concerned to the chargesheet and his reply, asked him whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty. On the workman pleading not guilty the witness on the side of the management were examined. The workman was given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and, after those witnesses had been examined, and cross-examined the worker was asked to state whether he had anything further to say. Exhibit M. 9 further shows that the senior labour officer has stated that he will place the proceedings before the mill-manager who will send for the worker and give his decision. When the secretary of the staff union later on made a representation that the extent of the damage which could be attributed to the conduct of the worker was to be ascertained as that information might have a bearing on the question of the punishment to be imposed. The senior labour officer, in view of this representation, again summoned the worker and placed before him the particulars regarding the quantum of damage. The worker indicated that he did not wish to examine the assistant in the finished warehouse from whom the particulars had been collected. Finally the labour officer has stated that the mill-manager would look into the evidence and give his decision. It will, therefore, be seen that excepting collecting the necessary materials and placing them before the mill-manager for the purpose of enabling the latter, who is the authority to impose a punishment under the standing orders, to come to a conclusion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the worker, the senior labour officer had not expressed any opinion regarding the merits of the case. That is as it should be in view of the limited function that the senior labour officer was discharging.12. Exhibits M. 10 and M. 11 clearly show that the mill-manager, after elaborately going into the various items of evidence collected under Ex. M. 9 and after giving a fair and full opportunity to the worker to explain the circumstance bearing against him in the evidence, has recorded a finding that the worker concerned is guilty of misconduct and in consequence, passed the order of dismissal.13. As the findings recorded by the mill-manager are not under challenge before us it became unnecessary to consider the various items of evidence into account by the mill-manager for holding the worker guilty of misconduct. The question naturally arises whether the mill-manager has acted legally in delegating to the senior labour officer, in the case, the task of collecting the necessary evidence. We do not find any such prohibition in the standing order. The requirement is that the enquiry is to be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. As pointed out by this Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court [(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1331 at 1345] :". . . the exercise of the power to appoint or dismiss an officer is the exercise not of a judicial power but of an administrative power. It is nonetheless so, by reason of the fact that an opportunity to show cause and an enquiry simulating judicial standards have to precede the exercise there of. It is well recognized that a statutory functionary exercising such a power cannot be said to have delegated his functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent official to enquire and report. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. That cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so provides . . . is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power."We have already pointed out that in the case before us the function of the senior labour officer was only to collect the necessary evidence in respect of the charges and place it before the mill-manager. There is no standing order prohibiting the mill-manager from so authorizing the senior labour officer. The order finding the worker guilty, and in consequence dismissing him from service, was passed by the mill-manager. Therefore, in our opinion, the enquiry proceedings cannot be held to have contravened the provisions of standing order 14.14. In the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the senior labour officer he had no authority to record any findings on the basis of the evidence recorded by him. On the other hand it is the mill-manager the authority competent to impose the punishment, that has gone into the evidence and ultimately found the worker guilty of misconduct and imposed the punishment of dismissal. Therefore, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, nor is this a case of an enquiry being conducted by one officer and the finding being recorded by another.15. There is no warrant for the criticism levelled by the appellant that the senior labour officer has acted both as the prosecutor and the judge when he recorded the evidence in his case. No doubt there was no officer separately conducting the prosecution on the side of the management; but what the labour officer had done, as evidenced by Ex. M. 9, was to put questions to the witnesses and elicit answers and allow the worker to cross-examine those witnesses. Similarly he has also taken the statements of the worker and asked for clarification from him wherever necessary. Therefore the enquiry proceedings, as held by the labour court, have been completely fair and impartial. In fact we find that even after the evidence was closed on 29 October, 1965 when the secretary of the staff union desired the senior labour officer to collect materials regarding the extent of damage, as that might go to mitigate the offence, if any, committed by the worker, the labour officer reopened the proceedings on 2 November, 1965 after intimation to the workers. The worker was made aware of the particulars of damage collected and his comments regarding those particulars have been recorded by the labour officer and the entire proceedings have been forwarded by him to the mill-manager.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. We may straightaway say that these observations of the labour court are erroneous. The labour court has misunderstood the decisions of this Court on this point. This Court has held that standing orders, which have been certified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, become part of the statutory terms and conditions of service between the industrial employer and his employees and that they will govern the relations between the parties - vide Workers of Dewan Tea Estate and others v. their management [1964 - I L.L.J.due regard to the enquiry proceedings in this case, evidenced by Ex. M. 7 to M. 11 we are satisfied that the enquiry in this case has been conducted by the mill-manager.11. It was the mill-manager who furnished the chargesheet to the workman under Ex. M. 7 charging him with misconduct under standing order 13(d). The senior labour officer had been authorized by the mill-manager to record the evidence and collect the necessary materials. The senior labour officer commenced the proceedings on 21 October, 1965 and, after drawing the attention of the workman concerned to the chargesheet and his reply, asked him whether he was pleading guilty or not guilty. On the workman pleading not guilty the witness on the side of the management were examined. The workman was given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and, after those witnesses had been examined, and cross-examined the worker was asked to state whether he had anything further to say. Exhibit M. 9 further shows that the senior labour officer has stated that he will place the proceedings before the mill-manager who will send for the worker and give his decision. When the secretary of the staff union later on made a representation that the extent of the damage which could be attributed to the conduct of the worker was to be ascertained as that information might have a bearing on the question of the punishment to be imposed. The senior labour officer, in view of this representation, again summoned the worker and placed before him the particulars regarding the quantum of damage. The worker indicated that he did not wish to examine the assistant in the finished warehouse from whom the particulars had been collected. Finally the labour officer has stated that the mill-manager would look into the evidence and give his decision. It will, therefore, be seen that excepting collecting the necessary materials and placing them before the mill-manager for the purpose of enabling the latter, who is the authority to impose a punishment under the standing orders, to come to a conclusion regarding the guilt or otherwise of the worker, the senior labour officer had not expressed any opinion regarding the merits of the case. That is as it should be in view of the limited function that the senior labour officer was discharging.As the findings recorded by the mill-manager are not under challenge before us it became unnecessary to consider the various items of evidence into account by the mill-manager for holding the worker guilty of misconduct. The question naturally arises whether the mill-manager has acted legally in delegating to the senior labour officer, in the case, the task of collecting the necessary evidence. We do not find any such prohibition in the standing order. The requirement is that the enquiry is to be in conformity with the principles of naturalhave already pointed out that in the case before us the function of the senior labour officer was only to collect the necessary evidence in respect of the charges and place it before the mill-manager. There is no standing order prohibiting the mill-manager from so authorizing the senior labour officer. The order finding the worker guilty, and in consequence dismissing him from service, was passed by the mill-manager. Therefore, in our opinion, the enquiry proceedings cannot be held to have contravened the provisions of standing order 14.14. In the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the senior labour officer he had no authority to record any findings on the basis of the evidence recorded by him. On the other hand it is the mill-manager the authority competent to impose the punishment, that has gone into the evidence and ultimately found the worker guilty of misconduct and imposed the punishment of dismissal. Therefore, there is no violation of the principles of natural justice, nor is this a case of an enquiry being conducted by one officer and the finding being recorded by another.15. There is no warrant for the criticism levelled by the appellant that the senior labour officer has acted both as the prosecutor and the judge when he recorded the evidence in his case. No doubt there was no officer separately conducting the prosecution on the side of the management; but what the labour officer had done, as evidenced by Ex. M. 9, was to put questions to the witnesses and elicit answers and allow the worker to cross-examine those witnesses. Similarly he has also taken the statements of the worker and asked for clarification from him wherever necessary. Therefore the enquiry proceedings, as held by the labour court, have been completely fair and impartial. In fact we find that even after the evidence was closed on 29 October, 1965 when the secretary of the staff union desired the senior labour officer to collect materials regarding the extent of damage, as that might go to mitigate the offence, if any, committed by the worker, the labour officer reopened the proceedings on 2 November, 1965 after intimation to the workers. The worker was made aware of the particulars of damage collected and his comments regarding those particulars have been recorded by the labour officer and the entire proceedings have been forwarded by him to the mill-manager.