Case: Gyasuddin Khan @ Mohd.Gyaduddin Khan Vs. State Of Bihar

context, we may quote the pertinent observations made by Sarkaria j. speaking for the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singhs case: "As we read Sections 354(3) and 235(2) and other related provisions of the Code of 1973, it is quite clear to us that for making the choice of punishment or for ascertaining the existence or absence of special reasons in that context, the Court must pay due regard both to the crime and the criminal. What is the relative weight to be given to the aggravating and mitigating factors, depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. More often than not, these two aspects are so intertwined that it is difficult to give a separate treatment to each of them. This is so because style is the man. In many cases, the extremely cruel or beastly manner of the commission of murder is itself a demonstrated index of the depraved character of the perpetrator. That is why, it is not desirable to consider the circumstances of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal in two separate watertight compartments. In a sense, to kill is to be cruel and therefore all murders are cruel. But such cruelty may vary in its degree of culpability. And it is only when the culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity that special reasons can legitimately be said to exist." (emphasis supplied) 17. It was then pointed out that: "No exhaustive enumeration of aggravating circumstances is possible. But this much can be said that in order to qualify for inclusion in the category of aggravating circumstances which may form the basis of special reasons in Section 354(3), circumstances found on the facts of a particular case, must evidence aggravation of an abnormal or special degree". (emphasis supplied) In Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab (1933 (3) SCC 470), this Court after referring to the guidelines adverted to in Bachan Singhs case applied the following working test to reach the conclusion whether a particular case warrants death sentence; "(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence? (b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but no impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?" 18. Now, we shall turn our attention to the relevant facts and circumstances having a bearing on the question of sentence. The appellant was aggrieved by the action of Hawaldar Ram Pandey in taking him to task for his lapses or indisciplined behaviour. Even then, no sensible person caring for his own future and the future of his family would risk to avenge the alleged wrong done to him by taking recourse to the extreme step of killing the Hawaldar openly in the presence of all his colleagues. This act of killing Ram Pandey with no apparently motive to derive an advantage or gain out of it reveals the mental state of the appellant. Such an abnormal and desperate behaviour on the part of the appellant unfolds his attitude and personality. We get a picture of the appellant as an over-sensitive, over-emotional, self-centred and hot headed person utterly lacking in restraint and foresight. In fact, PW7s evidence does throw light on these characteristics of the appellant, when he describes the accused as Manbhadhu and Manshokh. It seems to us that he had almost a paranoid tendency which had driven him to the extreme step of taking away the life of his superior official without thinking of the obvious consequences that would befall on him and his family. The feelings of humiliation, mental tension, indignation and retribution towards his officer have apparently overtaken him. The result was that he acted in a state of extremely perturbed and imbalanced mind. In fact, one of the witnesses, namely PW4 spoke to the fact that the accused was very much disturbed after the action initiated by the deceased Ram Pandey. 19. The mental condition or state of mind of the accused is one of the factors that has been legitimately taken into account in various cases and that can be taken into account in considering the question of sentence. There are various cases in which the Court having regard to the disturbed or imbalanced state of mind of the accused at the time of commission of offence, thought it fit not to impose the death sentence vide: Shamshul Kanwar vs. State of U.P. (1995 (4) SCC 430 ), Lehna vs. State of Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76 ), and Om Prakash vs. State of Haryana (1999 (3) SCC 19 ). 20. In Francis vs. State of Kerala (1975 (3) SCC 825 ), the following pertinent observations were made: "Nevertheless, in deciding whether the case merits the less severe of the two penalties prescribed for murder a history of relations between the parties concerned, the background, the context, or the factual setting of the crime, and the strength and nature of the motives operating on the mind of the offender, are relevant considerations. The state of feelings and mind produced by these, while insufficient to bring in an exception may suffice to make the less severe sentence more appropriate." The killing of two other police men without premeditation and without any motive whatsoever further reveals that these acts were done out of panic reaction and in a state of frenzy. It is not a case where it can be said with certitude that the murderous attacks were diabolical in conception and cruel in execution as pointed out in Bachan Singhs case (supra). Nor can it be said that "the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the offender reveal that the criminal is a menace to the society or that the collective consciousness of the community would be shocked" if the death sentence is not inflicted in the instant case. Above all, the sentence of death has been haunting him for considerable time.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]13. The defence witnesses account was rightly disbelieved by the trial Court and the High Court. First of all, it must be noted that these witnesses never came forward to give their version before the police. There is no explanation as to why they should, as law abiding citizens, withhold the important information. The defence witnesses 1 to 5 came forward with an omnibus version that ten to fifteen persons armed with rifles and guns came from the east of the police picket and began firing after surrounding the picket. Some of them stated that they noticed some persons inside the camp falling to ground after receiving the shots and further stated that they noticed some policemen running away. According to the witnesses, none of those alleged miscreants could be identified by them. The trial Court at paras 18 and 19 discarded their evidence on a critical analysis and probabilities. The discussion of the High Court is at paragraph 22. We are in agreement with the trial Court and the High Court that the defence evidence is not trustworthy14. In the light of the overwhelming and unimpeachable evidence, it has been established beyond shadow of doubt that the appellant killed the three policemen, namely, Ram Pandey (Hawaldar), Chandrashekar Singh (S.I.) and Bhagirath Singh (Hawaldar) with then picked up from the chowki of Ram Pandey. The conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC is therefore upheld18. Now, we shall turn our attention to the relevant facts and circumstances having a bearing on the question of sentence. The appellant was aggrieved by the action of Hawaldar Ram Pandey in taking him to task for his lapses or indisciplined behaviour. Even then, no sensible person caring for his own future and the future of his family would risk to avenge the alleged wrong done to him by taking recourse to the extreme step of killing the Hawaldar openly in the presence of all his colleagues. This act of killing Ram Pandey with no apparently motive to derive an advantage or gain out of it reveals the mental state of the appellant. Such an abnormal and desperate behaviour on the part of the appellant unfolds his attitude and personality. We get a picture of the appellant as and and hot headed person utterly lacking in restraint and foresight. In fact, PW7s evidence does throw light on these characteristics of the appellant, when he describes the accused as Manbhadhu and Manshokh. It seems to us that he had almost a paranoid tendency which had driven him to the extreme step of taking away the life of his superior official without thinking of the obvious consequences that would befall on him and his family. The feelings of humiliation, mental tension, indignation and retribution towards his officer have apparently overtaken him. The result was that he acted in a state of extremely perturbed and imbalanced mind. In fact, one of the witnesses, namely PW4 spoke to the fact that the accused was very much disturbed after the action initiated by the deceased Ram Pandey21. In conclusion we would like to say that the facts of the case on hand are quite close to the facts of Randhir Basu vs. State of West Bengal (2000 (3) SCC 161 ) and Allauddin Mian vs. State of Bihar (1989 (3) SCC 5 ) in which the Court did not choose to impose death sentence in multiple murder cases. The indiscriminate killing ofn resorted to by a member of disciplined force is no doubt an aggravating factor but it is offset by other mitigating circumstances discussed above and we are, therefore, inclined to hold that death sentence is not the appropriate sentence in the instant case. We, therefore, set aside the judgment under appeal insofar as it has confirmed the sentence of death while maintaining the conviction under Section 302 IPC. The appellant is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000/and in default of payment of fine to undergo imprisonment for a period of six months22. The conviction under Section 27 of the Arms Act cannot however be sustained. The gravamen of the second charge framed against the appellant is that he used then and SLR for the unlawful purpose of killing the three persons. There is no evidence to the effect that the weapon used, namely, answers the description of prohibited arms within the meaning of Section 2(1)(i) of the Arms Act. The report of the Sergeant Major to whom the weapons were sent was only to the effect that they were in working condition. There was no discussion whatsoever either by the trial Court or by the High Court in regard to the offence under Section 27. We are not inclined at this stage to probe further and address the question whether then of Ram Pandey which was used in the commission of the crime is a prohibited arm within the meaning of Section 2(1)(i) though, in all likelihood, it may be. It is not appropriate to convict the appellant under Section 27(3) in which the extreme punishment of death is provided for. Hence the conviction of the appellant under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959 is hereby set asideResultantly, the appeal is allowed to the extent set out above.