Case: Maharaj Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others

out of fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to salvage public property for public use. Long argument is otiose to make out a legal grievance in such a stituation of peril and, after all, the star of processual actions pro bono publico has to be on the ascendant in a society where supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic rule of law is to fulfil iteslef. Locus standi has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jurisproducen of old. The legal dogmas of the quiet past are no. longer adequate to assail the social injustices of the stormy present. Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Area appurtenant : 22. The second, and from a practical point of view, equally potent ground of defence, is that appurtenant space envelops the whole area around the buildings and the suit for recovery of possession deserveses to be dismissed in toto. Let us examine thsi submision. 23. Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to settle (9indeed, it is deemed to be settled) with the intermediary certain items in the estate. That provisions has been set out earlier. The short enquiry is whether the entire land is appurtenant to the buildings. The contention of the defendant flows along these liens. The structures accepted by teh High Court as buildings within the scope of Section 9 were part of a cattle fair complex. Even the Mandir and the Oushadalaya fitted into the Hat total and the integrity of the whole could not be broken up without violating the long years of common enjoyment. It would also be a double injury : (a) to the defendant; and (b) to the community. The hat or mela could not be held by the defendant if the land were snatched away and the Government could do nothing on the land without the buildings belonging to the defendant. May be there is some sociological substance in the preesentation but the broader purpose of the section cannot be sacrificed to the marginal cases like the present. The larger objectivfe, is to settle with the former intermediary only such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian reform policy. 24. The key to the solution of the dispute lies in ascertaining whether land on which the cattle fair was being held was appurtenant to the buildings or not on the strength of its use for the Hat. The Solicitor General made a two-pronged attach on the defendants proposition. firstly, he argued that hats, bazars and meals were a distinct interest in the scheme of Indian agrestic life and agrarian law. This right had been virtually nationlised by the Actand only the State or the Gaon Sabha, save where Section 18 (a) to (c) otherwise provided, could hold a fair. A ruling by this Court on an analogous subject lends support to this contention (see State of Bihar v. Dulhin Shanti Devi, AIR 1967 SC 427 relating to Bihar Land Reforms Act). 25. The heated debate at the bar on this and allied aspects need not detain us further also because of our concurrence with the second contention of the Solicitor General that the large open spaces cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination, something incidental or ancillary or dependent is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably inplied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings? That much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor indidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real. 26. Appurtenance in relation to a dwelling or to a school, college ....... includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined - Butterwords, 2nd Edn. ). The word appurtenances has a distinct and definite meaning ..... Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned! Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression appurtenance. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not posible to content that those lands are covered by the expression appurtenances includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common.... but it does not include lands in addition to that granted. (Words and Phrases, supra) 27. In short, the touchstone of appurtenance is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the pricnipal subject granted by section 9, viz. buildings. 28. This conclusion is inevitable, although the contrary arguments may be ingenious. What the High Court has granted, viz., 5 yards of surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work in fact.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Reading the two sister sections together, certain clear conclusions emerge. Emphatically, three things happened on the coming into force of the Act. By virtue of Section 4 the right, title and interest of all intermediaries in every estate, including hasts, bazars and melas, stood terminated. Secondly, this whole bundle of interests came to be vested in the State, free from all encumbrances, the quality of the vesting being absolute. Thirdly, one and only one species of property in hats, bazars and melas was expressly excluded from the total vesting of estates in the State, viz., such as had been held on lands to which Section 18 (1) (a) to (c) applied.9. Pausing here for an interest, let us look back on the State which, through its Executive branch, vests a resumed estates in a Gaon Sabha, retaining power, at any time, and without conditions or even compensation (save for actual development work done), to divest the land so vested and make it over to another like local authority. In such a situation where the State remains the legal master with absolute powers of disposition over the land vested pro tempore in a particular Gaon Sabha, can it be postulated that it has no. legal interest in the preservation of that over which it has continuous power of operation, despite vesting estates in Gaon Sabhas on the wholesome political principle off decentralisation and local self-government, has and continues to have a constant hold on these estates, may be like a brooding omnipotence, descending, when it chooses, to take away what it had given possession of to a Sabha. This is plainly present legal interest in Government and a sort of precarium tenans in the Sabha, notwithstanding the illusory expression vesting which may mislead one into the impression that an absolute and permanent ownership has been created.11. Shri Shanti Bhusan did draw our attention to certain cousin status and other remotely related provisionsbut the soul of his submissions does not suffer by their omission in the discussion.12. The estates first vest in the State. The fulfilment of the purpose of the Act, the setting in which the cornerstone for the statutory edifice is laid and the categorical langtuage used, especially free from all encumbrances, leave no. doubt in our minds, nor was it dispute before us, that this intiial vesting is absolute and inaugurates the scheme of abolition. The consequences of vesting articulated by Section 6 only underscore this conclusion.Had drafting skills been better, this unlovely ambiguity could have been avoided. But courts have no. choice but to take the test as it is. Zeroing in on the relevant provisions, we are inclined to concur with the High Court.With certificate one may asert that the State has that minimal interest to follow the proprietary fortunes of the estate so as to entitle it to take legal action to interdict its getting into alien hands.In the instant case the Act contemplates taking over of all zamindari rights as part of land reforms. however, instead of centralising management of all estates at State level, to stimulate local self-government, the Act gives an enabling power - not obligatory duty - to make over these estates to Gaon Sabhas which, so long as they are in their hands, will look after them through management committees which wil be under the statutory control of Government under Section 126. Apart from management, no. power is expressly vested in the Sabhas to dispose of the estates absolutely.; The fact that as a body corporate it can own and sell property does not mean that the estates vested in a sabha can be finally sold away, in the teeth of the provisions striking a contrary note. For, under Section 117 (6), if, for any reasons of better management or other, the State (Government is but the operational arm of the State and cannot, as contended, be delinked as a separate entity, in this context) - the State thinks fit to amend or cancel the earrlier vesting declaration or notification, it can totally deprive the Sabha of, and resume from it, any estate. This plenary power to emasculate or extinguish the Sabhas right to the estate is tell-tale. True, this cut-back on the amplitude of the vesting is not an incident of the estate created but is provided for by the Act itself. Even so, we have to envision, int erms of realty law, what are the natujre and incidents of the intests vested in the Sabha - fall ownership divestible under no. circumstances or partial estate with the paramount interest still surviving in praesenti in the State?15. It is reasonable to harmonize the statutory provisions to reach a solution which will be least incognruous with legal rights we are cognisant of in current jurisprudence. Novelty is not a favoured child of the law. So it is right to fix the estate created by Section 117 into familiar moulds, if any. Such an approach lends to the position that the vesting in the State was absolute but the vesting in the Sabha was limited to possession and management subject to divestiture by Government. Is such a construction of vesting in two diferent senses in the same section, sound? yes. It is, because vesting is a word of slippery import and has many meanings. The context controls the test and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. That is why even definition clauses allow themselves to be modifified by contextual compulsions. So the sense of the situation suggests that in Section 117 (1) of the Act vested in the State carries a pleanary connotaion, while shall vest in the Gaon Sabha imports a qualified disposition confined to the right to full possession and enjoyment so long as it lasts. Lexicographic support is forthcoming, for this meaning.17. There is thus authority for the position that the expression vest is of fluid or flexible content and can, if the context so dictates, bear the limited sense of being in posession and enjoyment. Indeed, to postulate vesting of absolute title int he Gaon Sabha by virtue of the declaration under Section 117 (1) of the Act is to stultify Section 117 (1) of the Act is to stultify section 117 (6). Not that the legislature cannot create a right to divest what has been completely vested but that an explanation of the term vesting which will rationalise and integrate the initial vesting and the subsequent resumptin is preferable, more plausible and better fulfills the purpose of the Act. We hold that the State has title to sustain the action in ejectment.18. Aside from this stand, it is easy to take the view that the 1st plaintiff, is a person aggreived and has the competent to carry an appeal agaisnt the dismissal of the suit. Of course, he who has a proprietary right, which has been or is threatned to be violated, is surely and aggreived person. A legal injury creates a remedial right in the injured person. But the right to a remedy apart, a larger circle of persons can move the Court for the protection or defence or enforcement of a civil right or to ward off or claim compensation for a civil wrong, even if they are not proprietarily or personally linked with the cause of action. The nexus between the lies and the plaintiff need not necessarily be personal, although it has to be more than a wayfarers allergy to an unpalatable episode. A person aggreived is an expression which has expanded with the larger urgenceis and felt necessiuties of our times.Dabholkar (1976) 1 SCR 306   = (AIR 1975 SC 2092  ) gives the updated answer :The test is whether the words person aggrieved include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicallly affects his interest(p. 315 of SCR) = (at p. 2098 of AIR)American jurisproducen has recognised, for instance, the expanding importance of consumer protection in the economic system and permitted consumer organisations to initiate or intervene in actions, although by the narrow rule of locus standi, such a course could not have been justified (see p. 807 - New York University Law Reveiw, Vol. 46, 1971). In fact, citizen organisation have recently been campaigning for using legal actions for protection of community interest, braodiening the scope of standing in legal proceedings (see p. 403 - Bosten Unviersity Law Reveiw, Vol. 51, 1971)In the well-known case of Attorney General of the Gambia v. Peirra Serr NJie, (161), Lord Denning observed about the Attorney-Generals standing thus :........ The word person aggrieved are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his itnerest. (pp. 324-325 of SCR) = (at p. 2105 of AIR).. Where a wrong against community itnerest is done, no locus standi will not always be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing th ewrongdoes in court. In the case before us, Government, in the spacious sense of person aggreived ius comfortably placed. Its right of resumption from the Gaon Sabha, meant to be exercised in public interest, will be seriously jeopardised if the estate slips into the hands of a trespasser. The estate belonged to the State, is vested in the Gaon Sabha for community benefit, is controlled by the State through directions to the Land Management Committee and is liable to be divested without ado any time. The wholesome object of th elegislature of cautiously decentralised vesting of estates in local self-governning units will be frustrated, if the State, the watch-dog of the whole project, is to be a helpless spectator of its purposeful bountry being wasted or lost. It must act, out of fidelity to the goal of the statute and the continuing duty to salvage public property for public use. Long argument is otiose to make out a legal grievance in such a stituation of peril and, after all, the star of processual actions pro bono publico has to be on the ascendant in a society where supineness must be substituted by activism if the dynamic rule of law is to fulfil iteslef. Locus standi has a larger ambit in current legal semantics than the accepted, individualistic jurisproducen of old. The legal dogmas of the quiet past are no. longer adequate to assail the social injustices of the stormy present. Therefore, the State, in the present case, is entitled to appeal under Section 96 of theCode of Civil Procedure.23. Section 9 of the Act obligates the State to settle (9indeed, it is deemed to be settled) with the intermediary certain items in the estate. That provisions has been set out earlier.The short enquiry is whether the entire land is appurtenant to the buildings.The contention of the defendant flows along these liens. The structures accepted by teh High Court as buildings within the scope of Section 9 were part of a cattle fair complex. Even the Mandir and the Oushadalaya fitted into the Hat total and the integrity of the whole could not be broken up without violating the long years of common enjoyment. It would also be a double injury : (a) to the defendant; and (b) to the community. The hat or mela could not be held by the defendant if the land were snatched away and the Government could do nothing on the land without the buildings belonging to the defendant. May be there is some sociological substance in the preesentation but the broader purpose of the section cannot be sacrificed to the marginal cases like the present. The larger objectivfe, is to settle with the former intermediary only such land as is strictly appurtenant to buildings, all the rest going to the State for implementation of the agrarian reform policy.24. The key to the solution of the dispute lies in ascertaining whether land on which the cattle fair was being held was appurtenant to the buildings or not on the strength of its use for the Hat. The Solicitor General made a two-pronged attach on the defendants proposition. firstly, he argued that hats, bazars and meals were a distinct interest in the scheme of Indian agrestic life and agrarian law. This right had been virtually nationlised by the Actand only the State or the Gaon Sabha, save where Section 18 (a) to (c) otherwise provided, could hold a fair. A ruling by this Court on an analogous subject lends support to this contention (see State of Bihar v. Dulhin Shanti Devi, AIR 1967 SC 427   relating to Bihar Land Reforms Act)25. The heated debate at the bar on this and allied aspects need not detain us further also because of our concurrence with the second contention of the Solicitor General that the large open spaces cannot be regarded as appurtenant to the terraces, stands and structures. What is integral is not necessarily appurtenant. A position of subordination, something incidental or ancillary or dependent is implied in appurtenance. Can we say that the large spaces are subsidiary or ancillary to or inevitably inplied in the enjoyment of the buildings qua buildings? That much of space required for the use of the structures as such has been excluded by the High Court itself. Beyond that may or may not be necessary for the hat or mela but not for the enjoyment of the chabutras as such. A hundred acres may spread out in front of a club house for various games like golf. But all these abundant acres are unnecessary for nor indidental to the enjoyment of the house in any reasonable manner. It is confusion to miss the distinction, fine but real.27. In short, the touchstone of appurtenance is dependence of the building on what appertains to it for its use as a building. Obviously, the hat, bazar or mela is not an appurtenance to the building. The law thus leads to the clear conclusion that even if the buildings were used and enjoyed in the past with the whole stretch of vacant space for a hat or mela, the land is not appurtenant to the pricnipal subject granted by section 9, viz. buildings.28. This conclusion is inevitable, although the contrary arguments may be ingenious. What the High Court has granted, viz., 5 yards of surrounding space, is sound in law although based on guess-work in fact.26. Appurtenance in relation to a dwelling or to a school, college ....... includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined - Butterwords, 2nd Edn. ). The word appurtenances has a distinct and definite meaning ..... Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned! Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression appurtenance. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not posible to content that those lands are covered by the expression appurtenances includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common.... but it does not include lands in addition to that granted. (Words and Phrases, supra)26. Appurtenance in relation to a dwelling or to a school, college ....... includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined - Butterwords, 2nd Edn. ). The word appurtenances has a distinct and definite meaning ..... Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject-matter of the devise or grant, and which would, in truth, pass without being specially mentioned! Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression appurtenance. If some other purpose was being fulfilled by the building and the lands, it is not posible to content that those lands are covered by the expression appurtenances includes all the incorporeal hereditaments attached to the land granted or demised, such as rights of way, of common.... but it does not include lands in addition to that granted. (Words and Phrases, supra)