Case: Tika Ram  Vs. State Of U.P.

High Court. Other contentions on merits65. Apart from these contentions, both Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel, as also Shri Qamar Ahmed, Learned Counsel again raised the same questions of facts like the non-publication of Sections 4 and 6 notifications. Insofar as that is concerned, we have mentioned it only for rejecting the contention. After the judgment of the High Court we will not go into that question again being a pure question of fact. Similar is the question raised about the land belonging to the cooperative society and the release of the same. We do not think that that question needs to be answered in the wake of the High Courts judgment. The High Court judgment is absolutely correct in that behalf. In our considered opinion, even if the Government had taken a decision not to acquire the land belonging to the cooperative society as far as possible, there is nothing wrong if such lands were acquired. What is to be seen is the bona fides of the Government behind the decision to acquire the lands. On that account no fault can be found with the concerned notifications under Sections 4 and 6.66. Similar contentions were raised regarding the possession. We do not propose to go into the question of facts and questions relating to the individual claims. We have noted that the respondents herein having specifically claimed that the possession of the lands has already been taken. Therefore, accepting that claim, as has been done by the High Court, we would not go into those questions of fact.67. To put the record straight, there is enough evidence in shape of the stand taken by the LDA in its counter affidavit before the High Court, where it was asserted that the possession was already taken. Even in the present Civil Appeal, the same stand is reported with reference to a particular date, i.e., 21.5.1985 that the possession was taken and there is also a true copy of the Panchanama on record. Insofar as the Civil Appeal Nos. 2116-2118 (Tika Ram & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.) are concerned, it was urged by the appellants that in the affidavit of State of U.P. before the High Court, the date of taking possession was mentioned as 30.3.1986 and, therefore, it was urged that the possession could not have been taken on 21.5.1985 as per record. The Learned Senior Counsel for the LDA pointed out that this was incorrect and the correct date of taking possession was only 21.5.1985, while the possession of some plots was handed over to the LDA on 30.3.1986. This is apart from the fact that in todays context, when the whole township is standing, this question goes to the backdrop. In the face of Panchanama, which is on record, we would endorse the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken on 21.5.1985. 68. Shri Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the LDA also found fault with the Sale Deed in favour of Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd., which is being represented by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel. It was urged that its claim was based on the Sale agreement, which was executed one day before the publication of Section 4 Notification in the Gazette, i.e., 8.12.1984. It is admitted case that the Sale Deed was registered on 22.1.1986, which is clearly a date beyond the date of Section 4 notification. It is already held by this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam Vs. Kalra Properties Ltd. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 124 and Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1996 (11) SCC 698 that if any purchases of the land are made after the publication of Section 4(1) notification, landlords in this case would not get any right or entitlement to question the validity of the title of the State based on the acquisition. Obviously, the claim of this society is on the basis of the Agreement of Sale dated 7.4.1983. It was reported by the Learned Senior Counsel that Shri Hukum Chand Gupta also expired on 27.7.1983 and ultimately, the Sale Deed was executed on 7.12.1984. We do not want to go into this question of fact, but we will certainly go with and endorse the finding of the High Court in this behalf that the society had purchased the land after the issuance of notification.69. It was urged by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that there was a policy to give back 25% of the acquired land to the cooperative societies. This was suggested on the basis of various letters on record, suggesting that LDA was considering the revision. Shri Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for LDA pointed out that once the land was acquired and the possession had been taken, Section 48 did not apply. Besides, according to the Learned Senior Counsel, the policy applied to the cooperative societies, who had land before the acquisition process begins. This was obviously with the object to safeguard the interests of the members of the society. The Learned Senior Counsel was at pains to point out that there is no such disclosure as to who were the members of the society. According to the Learned Senior Counsel, the society was nothing, but a front piece set up for obtaining 25% of the land. Therefore, the rent of the 25% of the land was not acceptable. It was also pointed out that the Sale Agreement was also entered into a day before the publication of the notification in the Gazette and the registration of the Sale Deed was also done much after the notification was published and, therefore, this policy, even if there is one, would not be applicable to the society in question. We would not, therefore, accept that claim that Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. should be given back 25% of the land acquired, which is again not possible in view of the township having come up in Gomti Nagar.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]21. As regards the further arguments on merits, Learned Senior Counsel and, more particularly, the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the LDA pointed out that the challenge to the land acquisitions on merits could not survive, particularly, in view of the fact that in all the land acquisitions, possessions were already taken and the awards were already passed. Both the Learned Counsel pointed out that in case of Ujariyaon Housing Schemethe Government had shown its bona fides by allowing the notifications therein to lapse and thereby, the interests of the land holders covered in Ujariyaon Housing Schemewere safeguarded, particularly, because that scheme had not been completed. However, Ujariyaon Housing Schemewas long back completed and could not be rejuvenated now, finding fault with the process of land acquisition covered between Section 4 and Section 18 thereof. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the delay in filing the writ petitions is also liable to be taken into account since it is likely to cause prejudice to those for whom the schemes were framed. As regards the urgency clause, Learned Counsel urged that the land was very urgently required for urban housing and after the acquisition there has been large scale development and utilization on the acquired land and thousands of constructions have been made and the schemes have been evolved leading to allotments to third parties. Now at this stage, if the notifications were to be quashed it would seriously prejudice the interest of the large number of people and the High Court was right in dismissing the Writ Petitions on this ground. The Learned Counsel further argued that in this case it must be noted that there are no allegations of mala fides or any evidence in support of it.e appeals were also opposed by respondent No. 9 Avadh School who supported the arguments on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh and LDA. The respondent No.9 Avadh School pointed out that the land was granted to it by LDA for 99 years dated 01.12.1995 whereas the Writ Petition challenging the same bearing No. 2220 (L/A)/1996 from which the Civil Appeal No. 2650/1998 arose was filed only later on, in the year 1996. It was pointed out that thel had already paid the entire amount due to the LDA. It was also pointed out that the total constructed area on the land is 26,000 square feet. It was urged that considering the laudable objects of the scheme, the school was developed and further considering its progress in the matter of infrastructure and the standard of education, it would be too late to cancel the acquisition of land a portion of which was allegedly allotted by the LDA.23. Learned Counsel on behalf of LDA referred to the history of case law and reiterated upon the validity of the UP Act No.5 of 1991. The Learned Counsel also reiterated that the declaration under Section 6 (1) was different from a published declaration. The contention, therefore, was that considering the scheme of the Act, the declaration referred to in Section 6 is public or notified declaration. Taking that clue, it is argued that there will be no difficulty if Sections 2 and 3 of the Validating Act are properly understood. It was argued that the Validating Act removes the defect pointed out in the case of Radhey Shyam (cited supra) and also the validating provisions and, therefore, it is not a case of simplicitor overruling of the judgment of the Supreme Court.24. Learned Counsel for LDA also opposed reference to Larger Bench. It was further pointed that since the schemes of Ghaziabad Development Authority(GDA) and Meerut Development Authority(MDA) were already upheld, the dispute in Ujariyaonscheme of LDA involved only 150 bighas whereas the notification pursuant to Ujariyaone involved 1776 acres of land and barring the appellants, everybody had accepted this scheme. Learned Counsel seriously disputed the claim in Tika Rams case and contended that the landowners had already accepted the compensation. In case of Pratap Sahakari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd., it was pointed out that the sale agreement in that case was that there was no passing of consideration and even transfers were subsequent to Section 4 notification. Therefore, it was contended that the sale deed and the agreement of sale were created to take advantage of the policy decision of the State for giving back 25 per cent of the developed land to the Society for its members. The bona fides of the Pratap Sahakari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. were, therefore, seriously questioned by the Counsel. It was also pointed out that the land involved in this case was already taken over in the year 1985 and the same also stood utilized inasmuch as the whole township had come up thereupon. Learned Counsel also relied on the principle of staire decisis insofar as the validity of the UP Amendment Act is concerned.25. Learned Counsel further argued that there was no question of future operation of the proviso as it was not concerned in this case. It was pointed out that only two appeals of UjariyaonScheme were concerned, with that question. However, in that case the notification was published in the year 1991 and the Section 6 declaration was signed and published in the year 1992. Therefore, there was no question of simultaneous publication and, therefore, the issue of reference to the Larger Bench was aand could not be gone into. It is pointed out that the case of Meerut Development Authority (cited supra) was the complete answer to the validation aspect as that issue had arisen directly. It was further argued that there was no question of discriminating between the UjariyaonIII Scheme, and, therefore, there was no question of breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was argued that in Ujariyaon, the award was made by the Collector within the time prescribed, so there was no question of discrimination between UjariyaonII Schemes where the award was not made within time. Therefore, it was lapsed and hence, there was necessity of a fresh notification. As regards the question of validity of Section 17 of the Act, it was mainly in Tika Rams appeal, it was pointed out by Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel that the reference to the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar v. State of U.P. reported in AIR 1952 SC 75 and State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (cited supra) was not called for. In support of his argument Shri Dwivedi pointed out that Anwar Ali Sarkars case (cited supra) was distinguished in the later decisions of Kathi Ranning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra reported in 1952 SCR 435 and Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of West Bengal reported in 1953 SCR 30. It was pointed out that it was now crystallized law that if the Legislature indicates the policy which inspired it and the object which it seeks to attain then it can leave selective application of the law to be made by the Executive Authority. Learned Counsel relied on R.K. Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar reported in 1959 SCR 279  and In re: Special Courts Bills, 1978 reported in 1979 (1) SCC 380. It was pointed out that the criteria of "urgency" and "emergency" in the instant case have been prescribed in the context of the exercise of power of eminent domain and this power under the Constitution of India can be exercised only for public purpose.26. Learned Counsel argued that the process of acquisition begins only when there is a public purpose and in such situation the effectuation of public purpose does not brook any delay and requires quick implementation, then alone the power under Section 17 (1) read with Section 17 (4) can be exercised. The Learned Counsel firmly admits that the criterion of "emergency" is still narrower category and there is sufficient guideline in(2) of Section 17. Therefore, the Counsel argues that the true criteria being clear guidelines, they are not arbitrary. It was further argued that there is no discretion in the matter of applied urgency clause to these acquisitions in question. Carrying the same argument further, Learned Counsel firmly admitted that Section 5A is a protection to the land acquisition and should not be lightly dispensed with. He also admitted that there are cases where it was held that the mere existence of urgency is not enough and State Government must independently apply its mind to the need of dispensing with Section 5A enquiry. Further it is pointed out that the High Court had considered this aspect in details and recorded the finding that the land was acquired for planning and development of housing accommodations. It was pointed out that the High Court had also looked into the records and it found that there was sufficient material for forming opinion that the land was needed urgently for developing a new township known as Gomti Nagar. Learned Counsel also pointed out to the finding of the High Court to the effect that the township had already come into the existence and the houses were allotted to thousands of people.27. Relying on Keshav Das v. State of U.P. reported in 1995 (6) SCC 240 , Learned Counsel urged that it has been held in the above ruling that where the possession of the land was already taken during the acquisition process and construction had been made and completed, the question of urgency and exercise of duty under Section 17 (4) of the Act could not be raised at a belated stage. Therefore, Learned Counsel insisted that the situation is no different in the present case. Further relying on Aditya Bhagat v. State of Bihar reported in 1974 (2) SCC 501 and Om Prakash v. State of U.P. reported in 1998 (6) SCC 1 , Learned Counsel urged that as compared to the total acquisition, the appellants land holding is limited to only 150 bighas of land and in such circumstances the Court should not block the acquisition. As regards the question ofof compensation under Section 17 (3) and (3A) of the Act, Learned Counsel pointed out that the documents filed in support of their plea were never filed before the High Court whereas this Writ Petition was pending for as long as 13 years and even after filing the special leave petition, it was pending for about 10 years. The documents came to be filed only after 8 years. Since the document involved question of fact, applications made in this behalf, namely, I.A. Nos.f 2006, were liable to be rejected. It was pointed out that the documents filed along with the said I.As. were not authenticated and verified by the appellant. The sources from which the documents emanated were also not indicated. It was further pointed out that) of Section 3(3A) of Section 17 are not attracted to a case where the power under Section 17 (4) has been exercised and Section5A has been dispensedIt is again pointed out that Section 17 (3) and (3A) do not provide consequences ofnt of estimated compensation in terms of the said provision and the Act does not say that the if possession and development have been taken and the development work has been done without compliance of the provisions then the taking of possession and the work done would become illegal. Learned Counsel further pointed out that all that it provided for was the payment of interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on the amount of compensation where compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession. In support of this argument the Counsel relied on S.P. Jain v. State of U.P. reported in 1993 (4) SCC 369 and State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi & Ors. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 1 . In fact, this judgment is a complete answer to the questions raised by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. It holds Section 3 to be valid and also holds that it had cured the defect. The judgment also takes care of the contention that there was no necessity to raise the urgency clause in these acquisitions and the exercise of raising the urgency clause was not bona fide. Various other judgments were referred by Shri Trivedi which we have included in the earlier part of the judgment like S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore (cited supra), ITW Signode India Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (cited supra), Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan & Ors. (cited supra), Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (cited supra), Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narayan (cited supra), Virender Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana (cited supra), I.N. Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh (cited supra) and Janpad Sabha v. C.P. Syndicate (cited supra). In view of the specific questions of this very act having been considered in Meerut Development Authoritys case (cited supra) there would be no necessity to go into the principles laid down in aforementioned cases in details here.34. The next argument of Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel was that the Amending Act did not remove the defect. In our opinion, the contention is incorrect in view of the fact that this question was considered and concluded in Meerut Development Authoritys case (cited supra). The same applies to the further question challenging Section 3 of the Amending Act wherein it is provided that the notification would not be invalid on the ground that declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on the same day on which the notification under Section 4 of the Act was published or on any other date prior to the date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. We have already pointed out that this Section was also considered specifically in paragraph 7 where it is quoted. Further in paragraph 16 which we have quoted, this question is specifically answered. We, therefore, need not dilate on that issue here.35. At this juncture, we must note the argument raised in the present case that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 04.12.1984 but was published on 08.12.1984. Therefore, in reality, the proviso did not actually cure the defect. It is because of the wording used to the effect "a declaration under Section 6 in respect of the land may be made either simultaneously with or at any time after the publication in the official Gazette of the notification under Section 4."36. Learned Counsel pointed out that in the present case, Section 6 declarations were made earlier to the publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. They further pointed out in proviso again the wording used is "declaration may be made." Learned Counsel, therefore, argued that even reading Sections 2 and 3 of the Amending Act, the defect is not cured as the proviso empowers to "make a declaration" and does not refer to "notification of declaration" under Section 6(2). The Learned Counsel, therefore, intended that it is not permissible to supply words (casus omissus) to the proviso and, therefore, if the proviso is read as it is, then it conflicts with the language of Section 3 which speaks not of declaration, but "publication of Section 6 notification". We do not think that the contention iseven a situation where Section 6 declaration was made prior to the publication of notification under Section 4, was held to be covered and cured under Section 3, the validity of which was confirmed by this Court. It would, therefore, be futile to argue that the Act did not cure the defect and on that account, the provision is bad. In our opinion, added proviso would have to be read along with and in the light of Section 3 of the amending Act which clearly envisages a situation of the declaration under Section 6 being published in the official Gazette on the same date on which notification under Section 4(1) of the principal Act was published in official Gazette or on any day prior to the date of publication of such notification as defined in Section 4(1) of the principal Act (emphasis supplied). Therefore, what is contemplated in proviso is the "publication" of notification. Since this position was not happily obtained in the proviso, the Court in MDAs case (cited supra), in paragraph 14, commented that proviso was not happily worded.We are also of the opinion that the word `a declaration in proviso to Section 17 (4) as inserted by the Validating Act would mean published or a notified declaration under Section 6 (2) of the Act when it is read in the light of Section 3 which refers to and validates not merely "a declaration", but the publication thereof in official Gazette. As such we do not find anything wrong even if the declaration is prior in time and its notification is simultaneous with the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. The two authorities cited above, namely, Ghaziabad Development Authoritys case and Meerut Development Authoritys case have taken the same view and we are in respectful agreement with the same.40. It was then argued that Section 17 (4) of the Act as amended by the Amending Act is ultra vires of the Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution as it nearly overrules the decision of this Court in State of UP v. Radhey Shyam Nigam (cited supra). We have already dealt with this issue and pointed out that this question was specifically dealt with in the two judgments of Lucknow Development Authority and Meerut Development Authority (cited supra).supra).41. It was further argued by Shri Trivedi that the Amending Act is ultra vires the Article 300 A of the Constitution inasmuch as it deprives the petitioner of higher compensation as may be admissible pursuant to the fresh acquisition proceedings after 1987. Three cases have been relied upon, namely, State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni & Ors. reported in 1983 (2) SCC 33 , T.R. Kapoor & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1986 Suppl. SCC 584 and Union of India v. Tushar Rajan Mohanty reported in 1994 (5) SCC 450 , wherein it is held that the Legislature cannot create prospective or retrospective law so as to contravene the fundamental rights and that the law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. We have absolutely no quarrel with that, however, we fail to understand as to how it applies here. For establishing their rights, the appellants would have to establish that the State Government was required, in law, to make a fresh acquisition and could not continue with the old one. We have already held that we are not convinced by the argument that there was anything wrong with the old proceedings which came to be validated by the Amending Act. We have also found that the Amending Act was a perfectly valid legislation. In that view, the challenge must fail.We do not think that there is any need to refer any of the questions raised above in view of our observations in the earlier paragraphs, as the schemes of Ghaziabad Development Authority and Meerut Development Authority have already been upheld by this Court in the earlier decisions. Secondly, the basic objective of the Validating Act was to protect the scheme during the periodonly and subsequently, there has been no such case of simultaneous notification in the State of Uttar Pradesh for the last two decades, as stated by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the LDA. Even in respect of Ujariyaon Housing Schemethe declaration under Section 6 of the Act is published much after the publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act. Thirdly, as has been done in MDAs case (cited supra) we have held that Section 17 (4) proviso has to be read together with and in the light of Section 3 of the amending Act and not de hors of each other in view of the statement of objects and reasons of that Act. It must be realized that this Court ironed the creases in the proviso added to Section 17(4) in MDAs case (cited supra). Fourthly, in one of the appeals before us in Civil Appeal Nos.(Tika Ram & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.) represented by Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel, the land owners have already accepted the compensation, while in the matter of Civil Appeal No. 3415 of 1998 (Pratap Sahkari Grih Nirman Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.), the title of Society itself has been found to be infirm and not established as per the findings of the High Court. It is obvious that registration of the Sale Deed in respect of the Society is subsequent to the notification under Section 4 of the Act and, therefore, inconsequential. The agreements in favour of that Society do not show that there was any consideration passed. Again, the possession of the land has already been taken, as claimed by the LDA, way back in the year 1985 for which there are documents like Panchanama and the whole township has now come up, persons have built their houses. As far as the sixth point of reference is concerned, we would deal with the same separately in this judgment as we do not agree with the proposition made in that point. Lastly, as held in the cases of Mishri Lal (Dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Dhirendra Nath (Dead) by L.Rs. reported in 1999 (4) SCC 11 and Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in 2005(2) SCC 673, the principle of Stare Decisis would apply. In this case, their Lordships referred to observations by Lord Reid and quoted seven principles regarding the bindingAs has been observed in Para 47, we would not take up the above topic. It was urged by the Learned Counsel that the State Government, though it acquired the possession under Section 17 of the Act, did not pay the 80% of compensation, as required under Section 17 of the Act and on that account, the whole exercise was bad. We do not think that the proposition is correct.The Learned Senior Counsel argued that in case where the accelerated possession is required to be taken, Section 17(1) of the Act, as also Section 17(2) of the Act would be attracted and such possession can be taken immediately after the publication of Section 9(1). Section 17(3) of the Act provides that in every case under Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) of the Act, the Collector shall offer compensation for standing crops and trees or other damage at the time of taking possession. The Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that the expression"under either of theion (3) is attracted only when the possession is taken under(1) or (2) of Section 17 of the Act. He, therefore, contended that where Sectionis dispensed with under Section 17(4) of the Act, twoi.e., (3) and (3A) of Section 17 of the Act would not apply. The argument is clearly incorrect. By this, the attempt is to dissect(4) in two parts, firstly, where(1) and (2) are applicable and secondly, where the enquiry under Sectionis dispensed with. That is not the import of the language. Section 17 has to be read in full. It plainly reads that where the possession is taken with the aid of Section 17(2), the compensation must fall in advance as per the provisions of Section 3A. In fact, Section 3A has been brought on the legislature with the sole purpose of providing a compensation for the possession taken. That is why 80% of the estimated compensation is to be paid because even thereafter, the award proceedings would go on and the total compensation would be decided upon. The attempt on the part of the Learned Senior Counsel to read that the payment of compensation is not required where Sectionenquiry is dispensed with, would be doing violence to the language, firstly, of Section 3A and secondly, of(4) itself. The clear legal position is that the dispensation of Sectionenquiry is only and only to enable the State Government to take possession under(1) and (2) of Section 17. A third category cannot be created so as to avoid the payment of compensation. The contention is, therefore, clearlythe whole acquisition be set atour considered view, even if the compensation is not paid or is short of 80%, the acquisition would not suffer. One could imagine the unreasonableness of the situation. Now suppose, there is state of emergency as contemplated in Section 17(2) of the Act and the compensation is not given, could the whole acquisition come to a naught? It would entail seriousCourt took the view that once the possession was taken under Section 17 of the Act, the Government could not withdrew from that position under Section 18 and even the provisions of Sectionwere not attracted. That was of course a case where the award was not passed under Sectionafter taking of the possession. A clear cut observation came to be made in that behalf in Para 12, to the effect that thewith Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisitionclear cut observation came to be made in that behalf in Para 12, to the effect that thewith Section 17 of the Act, insofar as, payment of compensation is concerned, did not result in lapsing of the land acquisitionproceedings. The law laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (cited supra) was approved. The Court also relied on the decision in P. Chinnanna Vs. State of A.P. reported in 1994 (5) SCC 486 and Awadh Bihari Yadav Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1995 (6) SCC 31 , where similar view was taken regarding the land acquisition proceedings not getting lapsed. The only result that may follow by thewould be the payment of interest, as contemplated in Section 34 and the proviso added thereto by 1984 Act. In that view, we do not wish to further refer the matter, as suggested by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel and Shri Qamar Ahmad, Learned Counsel for the appellants. Therefore, even on the sixth question, there is no necessity of any reference.Learned Senior Counsel then urged that the provisions of the amending Act and also the provisions of Land Acquisition Act like Section 17 (4) are invalid on the test of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is pointed out by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel that in GDAs case (cited supra) the impugned notification was held to be valid in view of the amendment made to Section 17 (4) of the Act. However, there was no challenge to the validity of Section 17 (4) of the Act in the said case. Similarly, it was argued that in MDA v. Satbir Singh [1996 (11) SCC 462 ], the Court had made observation in paragraph 8 that the validity of Section 17 (4) was upheld in GDAs case (cited supra), whereas in fact it was not tested in GDAs case (cited supra) at all. It was further urged that the validity of the Act was not tested with respect to its inconsistency with Article 14 and Article 300A of the Constitution of India. In this behalf it was argued by the Learned Counsel that there was an observation to the effect in paragraph 14 that the proviso was not happily worded. But a reading of it would clearly give us an indication that the proviso to(4) introduced by Section 2 of the Amendment Act 5 of 1991 would deal with both the situations ,namely, the notification published on or after September 24, 1984 but before January 11, 1989 as also the declaration to be simultaneously published subsequent thereto. It was further argued that if we read the proviso in the manner that we have already done then it would be a case of casus omissus being supplied by the Court. We have already taken all these arguments into consideration. In view of the interpretation given by us to Section 3 and the proviso and the necessity of reading the two provisions in the light of each other, there would be no occasion of supplying casus omissus and the argument in that behalf must fail.55. Insofar as the validity on the backdrop of Article 14 is concerned, it is true that in paragraph 8 there has been an observation that the validity of the proviso added by the State Legislature by way of an amendment to Section 17 (4) of the Act has been upheld by the two Judge Bench decision in GDAs case (cited supra). However, when we see the rest of the judgment it can be said that no such question was considered. However, the fact remains that in GDAs case (cited supra), the validity was not questioned or doubted and the challenged Section was interpreted and treated to be valid by theour opinion, reading paragraph 14 of this judgment in its correct perspective would repel the argument of the appellants that the provision is arbitrary in any manner or has the effect of creating impermissible classification. In our opinion, the language of paragraph 14 does not help the petitioners. If the petitioners in MDAs case (cited supra) did not specifically address the Court on the question of Constitutional validity of the Amending Act (as is being claimed by the appellants), we do not think it will be permissible for the petitioners to raise this point which was admittedly not raised either in GDAs case (cited supra) or MDAs case (cited supra). Petitioners would not be permitted to take such a course [see Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Shambhu Nath Mukherji & Ors. reported in AIR 1978 SC 8 ]. We need not go in that question since MDAs case (cited supra) is a Larger Bench decision.56. However, this is apart from the fact that in our opinion there can be no question of Section 17 (4) proviso or the provisions of the Amending Act being invalid in any way. We, therefore, do not feel necessary to refer this case on this issue to a Larger Bench, particularly, in respect of the validity of the provisionsArticle 14 of the Constitution. We do not find the provisions in any manner arbitrary or making impermissible classifications or suggesting invidious discrimination nor can the provisions in the amending Act can be termed as "arbitrary" providing no guidingour opinion, it will not be necessary to go into that question as the present appeals pertaining to Ujariyaon Housing Schemeare relating only to the period between 24.9.1984 and 11.1.1989. It is stated by the Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the LDA that only two appeals pertain to Ujariyaon Housing Schemeand even in that case, the notifications were published in the year 1991 and the issue of simultaneous publication of notification does not arise, as Section 6 declaration was signed and published in 1992. Therefore, there will be no need to go into the academic question whether Amending Act applies only to the period between 24.9.1984 and 11.1.1989 or even the subsequent period. Further, even if, as held in MDAs Case (cited supra), it applied to the subsequent period, it does not infringe Article 14 for the reasons given by uswe have considered this argument in the earlier part of the judgment we again reiterate that the argument is clearly incorrect. The Validation Act did not confer any discretion on the State Government to apply its provisions to a particular scheme and then issue notifications. It was a one time exercise for validating a particular scheme by amending the Act which has already been found to be valid in MDAs case (cited supra). Again Ujariyaon Housing Schemedid not lapse because of the decision of the Government. Since the award was not made within the time prescribed by the Section 11A of the Act, it had the effect of lapsing the notifications. Therefore, the State Government was left with no other way and had to issue a fresh notification. In Ujariyaon Housing Schemethe award was made by the Collector within the time and, therefore, those notifications were not affected. Therefore, the argument that there was invidious discrimination in between the two schemes has tois apart from the fact that we are of the opinion that there is nothing wrong with the Amending Act insofar as its Constitutional validity is concerned. We have already rejected the argument that there was any discrimination between Ujariyaon Part II and Ujariyaon Part III schemes. We are convinced with the explanation given by the State Government as to why Ujariyaon Part III scheme was left out of the consideration of validation. Indeed the acquisition therein could not have been validated on account of the time having lapsed for doing so. Once Sections 2 and 3 and the proviso are read in the manner indicated in MDAs case (cited supra) as also in the light of observations made by us, no question remains of any Constitutional invalidity. We are not at all impressed by the contention raised that the Amending Act cannot pass the test of Article 14. We holdhave already pointed out that this group of cases would be of no help to the appellants, particularly, because the fact situation and the controversy involved in the present matter is entirely different. We do not agree with the Learned Counsel that there is any classification, much less any impermissible classification and any group has been treated favourably as against another group or that the law has treated a group more favourably than the other, refusing equal protection to such group. As regards the general principles from Anwar Ali Sarkars case (cited supra) as also from State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh reported in AIR 1980 SC 319 , we must point out that ultimately this Court culled out the principle that if the Legislature indicates a policy which inspires it and the object which it seeks to attain, then the selective application of the law can be left to the discretion of the Executive authority [see Kedar Nath Bajorias case reported in 1953 SCR 30]. Such law has been approved in R.K. Dalmias case (cited supra) as also in In Re: Special Courts Bill (citedour opinion, these two criteria provide clear guidelines and cannot be held as arbitrary. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samitis case and Pista Devis case (cited supra), this Court has laid down that mere existence of urgency is not enough and the Government must further consider the matters objectively as to the dispensation with Section 5A permissible under that particular situation. Section 17 of the Act has existed on the statute book for a long time and on a number of occasions the applicable criteria of urgency and emergency have been tested by the Courts on account of the Government actions in that behalf being challenged. Wherever the Courts have found that urgency did not exist in reality or the dispensation of Section 5A was not considered separately such notifications have been struck down on a number of occasions. However, we do not see any reasonable argument having been made against the Constitutionalthere can be no dispute on the principles, we do not think that the principle are applicable to the present controversy. We have already given a reference of the case of Ishwarlal Girdharlal Joshi etc. Vs. State of Gujarat (cited supra). The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents invited our attention to the findings recorded by the High Court, with which we are satisfied. We must observe that merely because the decision of the Government on question of urgency is not justiciable, it does not mean that Section 17(4) of the Act isHigh Court was, undoubtedly, correct in holding that there was no necessity of a notice since the satisfaction required on the part of the Executive is a subject of satisfaction, which can only be assailed on the ground that there was no sufficient material to dispense with the enquiry or the order suffers from malice. We will deal with the question as to whether there was an urgency and what is the nature of urgency required. We, therefore, do not think that(1) (3A) and (4) of Section 17 of the Act suffer, as there is no notice provided in thosebefore the possession isthe present case we have seen the judgment of the High Court which has gone into the records and has recorded categorical finding that there was sufficient material before the State Government and the State Government has objectively considered the issue of urgency. Even before this Court, there were no allegations of mala fides. A notice can be taken of the fact that all the lands which were acquired ultimately came to be utilized for the scheme. We, therefore, reject the argument that there was no urgency to justify dispensation of Section 5A inquiry by applying the urgencyHigh Court has correctly come to the conclusion that there was all the justification for invoking the urgency clause and taking the possession for the lands in question. We endorse the said finding of the High Court. Other contentions on merits65. Apart from these contentions, both Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel, as also Shri Qamar Ahmed, Learned Counsel again raised the same questions of facts like theof Sections 4 and 6 notifications. Insofar as that is concerned, we have mentioned it only for rejecting the contention. After the judgment of the High Court we will not go into that question again being a pure question of fact. Similar is the question raised about the land belonging to the cooperative society and the release of the same. We do not think that that question needs to be answered in the wake of the High Courts judgment. The High Court judgment is absolutely correct in that behalf. In our considered opinion, even if the Government had taken a decision not to acquire the land belonging to the cooperative society as far as possible, there is nothing wrong if such lands were acquired. What is to be seen is the bona fides of the Government behind the decision to acquire the lands. On that account no fault can be found with the concerned notifications under Sections 4 and 6.66. Similar contentions were raised regarding the possession. We do not propose to go into the question of facts and questions relating to the individual claims. We have noted that the respondents herein having specifically claimed that the possession of the lands has already been taken. Therefore, accepting that claim, as has been done by the High Court, we would not go into those questions of fact.67. To put the record straight, there is enough evidence in shape of the stand taken by the LDA in its counter affidavit before the High Court, where it was asserted that the possession was already taken. Even in the present Civil Appeal, the same stand is reported with reference to a particular date, i.e., 21.5.1985 that the possession was taken and there is also a true copy of the Panchanama on record. Insofar as the Civil Appeal Nos.(Tika Ram & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.) are concerned, it was urged by the appellants that in the affidavit of State of U.P. before the High Court, the date of taking possession was mentioned as 30.3.1986 and, therefore, it was urged that the possession could not have been taken on 21.5.1985 as per record. The Learned Senior Counsel for the LDA pointed out that this was incorrect and the correct date of taking possession was only 21.5.1985, while the possession of some plots was handed over to the LDA on 30.3.1986. This is apart from the fact that in todays context, when the whole township is standing, this question goes to the backdrop. In the face of Panchanama, which is on record, we would endorse the finding of the High Court that the possession was taken onthe claim of this society is on the basis of the Agreement of Sale dated 7.4.1983. It was reported by the Learned Senior Counsel that Shri Hukum Chand Gupta also expired on 27.7.1983 and ultimately, the Sale Deed was executed on 7.12.1984. We do not want to go into this question of fact, but we will certainly go with and endorse the finding of the High Court in this behalf that the society had purchased the land after the issuance of notification.69.It was urged by Shri Trivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that there was a policy to give back 25% of the acquired land to the cooperative societies. This was suggested on the basis of various letters on record, suggesting that LDA was considering the revision. Shri Dwivedi, Learned Senior Counsel for LDA pointed out that once the land was acquired and the possession had been taken, Section 48 did not apply. Besides, according to the Learned Senior Counsel, the policy applied to the cooperative societies, who had land before the acquisition process begins. This was obviously with the object to safeguard the interests of the members of the society. The Learned Senior Counsel was at pains to point out that there is no such disclosure as to who were the members of the society.