Case: Union Of India, Vs. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. (P) Ltd

Singh, (1906) 34. Ind App 27 (PC)."9. In view of this decision we must overrule the contention, of the learned counsel on this point because the Tribunal has found that the Railway was ready with the required evidence and no prejudice had been caused to it.10. Section 41(1)(c) of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, reads. as follows:"41 (1) Any complaint that a railway administration-(a) is contravening the provisions of Section 28, or(b) is charging for the carriage of any commodity between two stations a rate which is unreasonable, or(c) is levying any other charge which is unreasonable may be made to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall hear and decide any such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter."Sections 29 (1) and 29 (2) read thus:"29 (1) The Central Government may by general or special order fix maximum and minimum rates for the whole or any part of a railway and prescribe the conditions in which such rates will apply;(2) The Central Government may, by a like order, fix the rates of any other charges for the whole or any part of a railway and prescribe the conditions in which such rates of charges shall apply."The word "rate" is defined in S. 2 (13) thus:"rate" includes any fare, charge or other payment for the carriage of any passenger, animal or goods."11. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that this Court in 1967-3 SCR 219 = (AIR 1968 SC 22 ). correlated Section 41 (1) (c) to "any other charges" mentioned in Section 29 (2), and if the definition of the word "rate" is applied to Section 29 (2) it would mean that only charges for carriage of goods and not hauling charges could be complained against under Section 41 (1) (c). Bhargava, J., speaking for the Court observed at p. 226 (of SCR) = (at p. 26 of AIR):"It is clear that a complaint under Section 41 (1) (b) relates to fixation of a rate relating to charges mentioned in S. 29 (1), while Section 41 (1) (c) relates to a complaint in respect of any other charge mentioned in, Section 29 (2). It appears to us, in these circumstances, that the expression "any other charge" used in Section 29 (2) and Section 41 (1) (c) cannot be given the narrow meaning of covering a charge in respect of the statutory duty of the railway so as to exclude charges made or levied by the Railway for other services."After giving various reasons, Bhargava, J., concluded:"It is enough to hold for the purposes of this case that at least the charges for carriage of goods from parts of the rail- way to points or places, not forming part of the railway, will certainly be covered by the expression "any other charge" used in Section 41 (1) (c), so that the complaint in the present case was competently entertained by the Tribunal."12. It is true that the argument sought to be raised now has not been dealt with before, but it seems to us that the answer to this is simple. The definition of "rate" cannot be applied to the expression "rates of any other charges". Here the word "rates" merely means the scale or amount of any other charges. The definition of the word "rate" cannot possibly be applied to Section 29 (2) of the Act.13. Coming to the third point, the Tribunal after reviewing the evidence came to the following conclusion:"From the above discussions of the evidence, it is clear that the goods consigned to the complainants mills and despatched from the mills cannot be effectively handled at the goods shed siding without the use of the assisted siding. Under the existing facilities at the station it is practically impossible to deal with the complainants traffic at the goods shed. Any attempt in that direction would involve very heavy expenditure on the part of the railway and would also involve larger time and work as compared. with time and labour involved in handling this traffic at the assisted siding. In other words, by handling complainants, traffic at the assisted siding the railway is really incurring less of cost and less of work than it would have to incur in attempting to deal with the traffic at the goods shed siding.... Additional charge can be levied only for any special or extra service that may be rendered in any particular instance. The services rendred by the respondent railway in connection with the handling of complainants goods traffic at the assisted siding cannot be said to be any special or extra service because the services rendered in that connection have been found to be definitely less than the services which the respondent railway had to render for handling these goods at the goods shed siding as a statutory obligation even on the freight levied from the complainants. In view of the conditions prevailing at Majhowlia station the railway is really in an advantageous position, financially and otherwise, in handling the complainants goods at the assisted siding instead of at the goods shed siding. It follows, therefore, that the respondent railway is not entitled to levy any charge, in addition to the freight already levied, for the handling of the complainants goods at the assisted siding at this station which involves only a portion of the service which the railway is obliged to render in handling these goods at the goods shed siding. In other words the claim for the haulage charge for the shunting operation done at the assisted siding is unjustified and unsustainable."14. This is a finding of fact made by the Tribunal and no reason has been shown for displacing this pure finding of fact. The Tribunal has mentioned ample evidence from which it could reasonably come to the conclusion arrived at by it. It must be remembered that we are not sitting as a regular court of appeal from decision of the Tribunal, and in such cases we do not ordinarily go into questions of fact.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. In view of this decision we must overrule the contention, of the learned counsel on this point because the Tribunal has found that the Railway was ready with the required evidence and no prejudice had been caused to it.It is true that the argument sought to be raised now has not been dealt with before, but it seems to us that the answer to this is simple. The definition of "rate" cannot be applied to the expression "rates of any other charges". Here the word "rates" merely means the scale or amount of any other charges. The definition of the word "rate" cannot possibly be applied to Section 29 (2) of the Act.This is a finding of fact made by the Tribunal and no reason has been shown for displacing this pure finding of fact. The Tribunal has mentioned ample evidence from which it could reasonably come to the conclusion arrived at by it. It must be remembered that we are not sitting as a regular court of appeal from decision of the Tribunal, and in such cases we do not ordinarily go into questions of fact.