Case: The State Of Madhya Pradesh Vs. G. C. Mandawar

different slabs of pay is obnoxious to Article 24. Secondly, within any gives slab, the scheme places all the employees in the same position, except that in the lowest ranks a slightly higher rate is fixed for resident in the cities of Nagpur and Jabulpore, which again has not been attacked as discriminatory. These being the features of the scheme, there can be no room for the contention that it has made any discrimination.9. Mr. Nambiar does not contend that there is anything in the scheme or in the Resolution adopting it, which brings it within the prohibition enacted in Article14. His contention is that the Committee whose recommendations were accepted by the Government adopted the rates suggested in the report of the Commission as regards Government servants who drew a monthly salary of over Rs. 400, but when they came to those employees who drew a monthly salary of Rs. 400 or less, they discarded the rates by the Commission, and instead, adopted different and lower rates and that this was discrimination hit by Article14. In other words, the impugned Resolution, though valid in itself as not infringing Article 14 becomes void under that provision, when it is taken in conjunction with the report of the Commission. We do not find anything in Article 14 which supports this somewhat startling contention. Under the Constitution, the Union and the State are distinct entitles each having its own executive and legislature, with their powers well-defined. Article 12 defines "the State" as including the Government and the legislature of each of the State. Article 13(2) enacts that the State shall not make any laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Part III; and Article 14 enacts that,"The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India."On these provisions, the position is that when a law is impugned under Article13, what the Court has to decide is whether that law contravenes any of the provisions of Part III. If it decides that it does, it has to declare that it void; if it decides that it does not, it has to uphold it. The power of the Court to declare a law void under Article 13 has to be exercised with reference to the specific legislation which is impugned. It is conceivable that when the same legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they for one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But such a course is not open where, as here, the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Government and by different legislatures. Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its provisions are discriminatory. Nor does not it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two enactments. The sources of authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application.The result, therefore, is that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Commission and sanctioned by the Central Government can furnish no ground for holding that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Committee and adopted by the appellant is repugnant to Article14. It may no doubt sound hard that Government servants doing work of a similar kind and working it may be, even in the same place, should receive different allowances; but the rights of the parties have to be decided on legal considerations, and it is impossible to hold that the Resolution in question is bad under Article 14.10. It was argues on behalf of the appellant that the assumption underlying the argument of the respondent with reference to Article 14 that the Committee had adopted the Report of the Commission in part and rejected it in part was itself without foundation. In the view we have taken on the applicability of Article 14, this question has no practical importance; but as all the materials have been placed before us, we may briefly express our opinion thereon. In paragraph 80 of the Report the Committee observed that while the Commission based its scale on the cost of living index, they themselves adopted the current level of prices as the basis for fixation of dearness allowance. In paragraph 83 they further observed that in fixing the scale on the basis of the cost of living index the element of pay had also been taken into account, but that as they had revised the scale of basic pay, they were not including it in fixing the dearness allowance.In paragraph 31, they observed that unlike the Commission they were taking into consideration the financial resources of the State in fixing the scale. Thus, the Committee approached the problem from a different angle, and applied different principles in fixing the scale of dearness allowance; and if the two schemes produced the same results at some stages, that was due to coincidence and not to adoption of the report of the Commission by the Committee.Mr. Nambiar also referred us to two Resolution of the appellant dated 4-1-1951 and 6-10-1951 adopting the scale fixed by the Commission in respect of certain other categories. That has no bearing on the question whether the Committee whose recommendations were approved by the Government had adopted in part the Report of the Commission so as to result in discrimination. The facts stated above show that the Committee went into the matter independently, and viewed the question from a different standpoint; and in formulating the scheme which they did, they did not adopt the Report of the Commission, though they derived considerable assistance from it.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Under this provision, it is a matter of discretion with the local Government whether it will grant dearness allowance and if so, how much. That being so, the prayer for mandamus is clearly misconceived, as that could be granted only when there is the applicant a right to compel the performance of some duty cast on the opponent. Rule 44 of the Fundamental Rules confers no right on the Government servant to the grant of dearness allowance; it imposes no duty on the State to grant it. It merely confers a power on the State to grant compassionate allowance at its own discretion, and no mandamus can issue to compel the exercise of such a power. Nor, indeed, could any other writ or direction be issued in respect of it, as there is no right in the applicant which is capable of being protected orwe are not concerned in the present proceedings with any debt payable by the Government. The claim is not to recover arrears of dearness allowance which had accrued due under the rules in force relating thereto. The claim now put forward is to compel the Government to grant dearness allowance at a particular rate, and under Rule 44 of the Fundamental Rules, such a claim is a matter of grace and not a matter of right.Now, the scheme which has been adopted in the impugned Resolution is firstly that dearness allowance is to be paid to the employees on a scale graded according to pay, different rates being adopted for different slabs and there being a progressive reduction of the rate from the lowest to the highest category. No contention allowance for different rates of dearness allowance for different slabs of pay is obnoxious to Article 24. Secondly, within any gives slab, the scheme places all the employees in the same position, except that in the lowest ranks a slightly higher rate is fixed for resident in the cities of Nagpur and Jabulpore, which again has not been attacked as discriminatory. These being the features of the scheme, there can be no room for the contention that it has made anydo not find anything in Article 14 which supports this somewhat startling contention. Under the Constitution, the Union and the State are distinct entitles each having its own executive and legislature, with their powers well-defined. Article 12 defines "the State" as including the Government and the legislature of each of the State. Article 13(2) enacts that the State shall not make any laws taking away or abridging the rights conferred by Partthese provisions, the position is that when a law is impugned under Article13, what the Court has to decide is whether that law contravenes any of the provisions of Part III. If it decides that it does, it has to declare that it void; if it decides that it does not, it has to uphold it. The power of the Court to declare a law void under Article 13 has to be exercised with reference to the specific legislation which is impugned. It is conceivable that when the same legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they for one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But such a course is not open where, as here, the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Government and by different legislatures. Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject its provisions are discriminatory. Nor does not it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two enactments. The sources of authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application.The result, therefore, is that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Commission and sanctioned by the Central Government can furnish no ground for holding that the scale of dearness allowance recommended by the Committee and adopted by the appellant is repugnant to Article14. It may no doubt sound hard that Government servants doing work of a similar kind and working it may be, even in the same place, should receive different allowances; but the rights of the parties have to be decided on legal considerations, and it is impossible to hold that the Resolution in question is bad under Articleparagraph 80 of the Report the Committee observed that while the Commission based its scale on the cost of living index, they themselves adopted the current level of prices as the basis for fixation of dearness allowance. In paragraph 83 they further observed that in fixing the scale on the basis of the cost of living index the element of pay had also been taken into account, but that as they had revised the scale of basic pay, they were not including it in fixing the dearness allowance.