Case: Jugal Kishore Patnaik Vs. Ratnakar Mohanty

be permissible for the appellant to take an inconsistent stand in appeal and urge that those objections had been filed in collusion with the. respondent. Apart from that, we find that according to section 100 (1 ) (e) of the Act, if the High Court is of the opinion that any nomination has been improperly rejected, it shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. In view of the imperative nature of the provision, it is open to question as to whether the courts cam in the event of an improper rejection of nomination, afford relief to the successful candidate on the score that the objections resulting in the improper rejection of the nomination, were collusive. Whether the legislature would do something in the matter is essentially for the legislature to decide. We need not, however, dilate upon this aspect of this case in the face of our finding that the appellant has clearly admitted in the written statement that the objections which were filed about the validity of the nomination papers of the respondent were not collusive but were genuine.13. Lastly, Mr. Singh has assailed the finding of the High Court on issue No. (3). Although during the course of the trial of the election petition the appellant relied upon 15 items to show that the respondent had entered into works contracts with the State Government, in this Court Mr. Singh has , confined his argument to only two items, namely, item No. (1) and item No. (8). Item No. (1) relates to an advance of Rs. 100 for repair of Erein School. The case of the respondent is that the above amount was received by him as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Rahanj and that the said work had to be executed by that Gram Panchayat and not by the respondent personally. The High Court accepted the stand of the respondent, and we find no cogent ground to take a different view. Ex. 43 is letter dated December 3, 1968 signed by the Sub-Divisio nal Officer Bhadrak to the Certificate Officer for recovery of Rs. 7, 017/-. This letter shows that the aggregate sum of Rs. 7, 017, of which Rs. 100 was a part, constituted the fund of the Gram Panchayat.. Order dated May 25, 1965 of the Block Development Officer also shows that the work on account of which Rs. 100 were paid had to be executed through the agency of Rahani Gram Panchayat. To similar effect is the statement of PW 9 Khageswar Roy. Block Development Officer. The evidence of this witness shows that the amount in question was given to the Gram Panchayat for repair work. The above material, in our opinion, , clearly shows that the contract for the execution of the repair work, which is the subject matter of item No. (1 ), was not entered into with the respondent in his personal capacity and that the said work had to be. executed by the Gram Panchayat. 14. So far as item No. (8) is concerned, the same relates to work of wooden culvert No. 9 on Jamujhari Khirkona road. Ex. 55 is the written agreement relating to this contract. Perusal of the agreement makes it clear that the tender in respect of this work was accepted on behalf of the Modern Labour Co-operative Contract Society, of which the respondent was the President. The document thus shows that it was not the respondent but the society which entered into contract to the execution of the above work, and the respondent signed the document in his capacity as the President of that Society. 15. Apart from the above, we agree with the High Court that the above contract was not subsisting on the date of the filing of the nomination paper. The agreement for the execution of the above work was dated May 8, 1964. On November 24., 1966 an order was made by the Block Development Officer that the construction work of the culvert had been completed since long and final measurements too had already been made. The total work was found to be worth Rs. 4, 253.7 0. It was further observed in the order that Rs. 722 should be paid on account of the above work after deducting the previous advances and cost of the material. The contractor was directed to return the material used in the tubewell. The above order of the Block Development Officer shows that the cost of the material and the amounts advanced to tile respondent were deducted before direction was given for payment of Rs. 722 to the contractor. Mr. Singh has laid particular stress upon the direction in the order of the Block Development Officer that the contractor should return the material used in the tubewell. In respect of the material used in the tubewell, it appears to us that the said material was also returned by the contractor the same day the order was made. According to the testimony of RW 11 J.K. Satpathy Block Development Officer, if the material required to be returned as per that last order was not returned, the final bill amount in respect of that work could not have been paid. Rs. 722 were, however, admittedly paid on November 24, 1966. The factum of that payment clearly points to the conclusion that the contractor returned the material used in the tubewell before the payment of Rs. 722 was made to him. There is also nothing to show that any demand was mad e to the contractor subsequent to 1966 for return of the material used in the tubewell. The absence of any such demand, even though a long period has elapsed since 1966, clearly goes to show that no, material used in the, tubewell remained with the contractor. It cannot, therefore be said that the said contract was subsisting on the date the respondent filed his nomination paper. We consequently uphold the finding of the High Court on items (1) and (8) under issue No. (3).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]8. There are, in our opinion, some broad facts of the case which lend support to the finding of the High Court on issue No. (1 ) that the election petition was accompanied by an attested copy signed by the respondent. Endorsement dated April 15, 1974 made by an officer of the High Court shows that a copy of the election petition had been flied. We find no cogent reason as to why an officer of the High Court should make a false endorsement on the petition if, , in fact, no such copy had been filed. As regards the factum of the, attestation of the copy by the respondent under his own signature we find that the appellant cannot in the very nature of things assert positively that the copy had not been attested by the respondent as, according to. him, he did not see that copy. The copy was also not available on the record as the same had been affixed at the residence of the appellant when he, according to the report of the process server, declined to accept the summons. Before summons were issued to the appellant, the following endorsement was made by an officer of the High Court in respect of t he election petition flied by the respondent:t Nil.e see no cogent ground to question the correctness of this endorsement which clearly lends support to the inference that the copy filed with the petition had been attested by the respondent and that the petition did not suffer from lack of compliance with the: procedural requirement.It is, in our opinion not necessary to express opinion about three of the nomination papers as we find that one of the, nomination papers in. any case did not suffer from any such alleged infirmity. This nomination paper of the respondent was signed by Lakshmikant Mahapotra (PW 3 ) as proposer. Evidence of this witness dearly shows that he signed, the nomination paper as proposer of the respondent after the various columns in that paper had been filled in. Nothing has been brought to our notice as to why the statement of the witness in this respect be not accepted. As at least one of the nomination papers filed by the respondent was in compliance with the legal requirement, . the High Court, in our opinion, correctly decided issue No. (2). In view of the above finding, it is not necessary to express opinion on the point as to whether a nomination paper should be hold to be invalid in case the signature of the proposer is obtained before filling in the columns of the nomination paper.This submission too is bereft of force. According to section 82 of the Act, a petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition where the petitioner, in addition to claiming a declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidates has, been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates. It is further provided that if allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition against any other candidate, he too shall be joined as a respondent. In the present case, there was no prayer made by the respondent in the election petition that he or any other person should be declared to have been duly elected. There was also no allegation of corrupt practice against any candidate. In the circumstances, the requirements of law should be held to be fully satisfied when the respondent impleaded the successful candidate, namely, the appellant, as a respondent in the petition.The appellant, who has been duly elected, , should not, according to the contention, suffer because of any order made on such collusive objections. In this respect we find that .there is no factual basis for the assertion that the objections which were raised by Balaram Sahu about the validity of the nomination papers of the respondent were of collusive character. On the contrary, the appellant in the course of his written statement stated in respect of the objections as under:At the time of the scrutiny valid and genuine objections were filed against the petitioner on the ground that there was subsisting contract between the petitioner and the Government of Orissa and as such he was disqualified to be a candidate12. In view of the unequivocal assertion of the appellant in the written statement that the objections were valid and genuine, it would not be permissible for the appellant to take an inconsistent stand in appeal and urge that those objections had been filed in collusion with the. respondent. Apart from that, we find that according to section 100 (1 ) (e) of the Act, if the High Court is of the opinion that any nomination has been improperly rejected, it shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. In view of the imperative nature of the provision, it is open to question as to whether the courts cam in the event of an improper rejection of nomination, afford relief to the successful candidate on the score that the objections resulting in the improper rejection of the nomination, were collusive. Whether the legislature would do something in the matter is essentially for the legislature to decide. We need not, however, dilate upon this aspect of this case in the face of our finding that the appellant has clearly admitted in the written statement that the objections which were filed about the validity of the nomination papers of the respondent were not collusive but were genuine.The High Court accepted the stand of the respondent, and we find no cogent ground to take a different view. Ex. 43 is letter dated December 3, 1968 signed by the Sub-Divisio nal Officer Bhadrak to the Certificate Officer for recovery of Rs. 7, 017/-. This letter shows that the aggregate sum of Rs. 7, 017, of which Rs. 100 was a part, constituted the fund of the Gram Panchayat.. Order dated May 25, 1965 of the Block Development Officer also shows that the work on account of which Rs. 100 were paid had to be executed through the agency of Rahani Gram Panchayat. To similar effect is the statement of PW 9 Khageswar Roy. Block Development Officer. The evidence of this witness shows that the amount in question was given to the Gram Panchayat for repair work. The above material, in our opinion, , clearly shows that the contract for the execution of the repair work, which is the subject matter of item No. (1 ), was not entered into with the respondent in his personal capacity and that the said work had to be. executed by the Gram Panchayat.14. So far as item No. (8) is concerned, the same relates to work of wooden culvert No. 9 on Jamujhari Khirkona road. Ex. 55 is the written agreement relating to this contract. Perusal of the agreement makes it clear that the tender in respect of this work was accepted on behalf of the Modern Labour Co-operative Contract Society, of which the respondent was the President. The document thus shows that it was not the respondent but the society which entered into contract to the execution of the above work, and the respondent signed the document in his capacity as the President of that Society15. Apart from the above, we agree with the High Court that the above contract was not subsisting on the date of the filing of the nomination paper. The agreement for the execution of the above work was dated May 8, 1964. On November 24., 1966 an order was made by the Block Development Officer that the construction work of the culvert had been completed since long and final measurements too had already been made. The total work was found to be worth Rs. 4, 253.7 0. It was further observed in the order that Rs. 722 should be paid on account of the above work after deducting the previous advances and cost of the material. The contractor was directed to return the material used in the tubewell. The above order of the Block Development Officer shows that the cost of the material and the amounts advanced to tile respondent were deducted before direction was given for payment of Rs. 722 to the contractor. Mr. Singh has laid particular stress upon the direction in the order of the Block Development Officer that the contractor should return the material used in the tubewell. In respect of the material used in the tubewell, it appears to us that the said material was also returned by the contractor the same day the order was made. According to the testimony of RW 11 J.K. Satpathy Block Development Officer, if the material required to be returned as per that last order was not returned, the final bill amount in respect of that work could not have been paid. Rs. 722 were, however, admittedly paid on November 24, 1966. The factum of that payment clearly points to the conclusion that the contractor returned the material used in the tubewell before the payment of Rs. 722 was made to him. There is also nothing to show that any demand was mad e to the contractor subsequent to 1966 for return of the material used in the tubewell. The absence of any such demand, even though a long period has elapsed since 1966, clearly goes to show that no, material used in the, tubewell remained with the contractor. It cannot, therefore be said that the said contract was subsisting on the date the respondent filed his nomination paper. We consequently uphold the finding of the High Court on items (1) and (8) under issue No. (3).