Case: Vinod Kumar Chowdhry Vs. Narain Devi Taneja

make the Sub-section suffer from a constitutional invalidity. It is an accepted rule of interpretation that if a provision can be construed in a manner which upholds its legal or constitutional validity it should if possible be so construed rather than the other way round. We do feel that the language used is not happy but then it would not be doing violence to it if it is construed as just above stated. Secondly, the scheme of the Act and the object of the introduction of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA into it by the Amending Act make us form the opinion that Sub-section (8) of Section 25B is exhaustive of the rights of appeal and revision in relation to the proceedings held under that Chapter. Before the enforcement of the Amending Act. All disputes between a land-lord and his tenant were liable to be dealt with according to a uniform pro-cedure before the Controller as also in appeal and second appeal. No distinction was made between one kind of dispute and another. When it was felt that the procedure prescribed in the Act defeated, by reason of the delay involved, the very purpose of an application made under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, especially in the case of landlords who themselves held accommodation allotted by the Government or a local authority which they were required to vacate. Section 14A and Chapter III were introduced by the Amending Act so as to cut down the time-factor drastically, so much so that a tenant was required to obtain leave from the Controller for contesting an application for his eviction before he could put up his defence, and the Controller was given the power to refuse leave and straightway pass an order of eviction if he found that the grounds disclosed by the tenant in support of his right to dispute the landlord?s claim were not such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. Sub-section (7) further simplified the procedure on contest being allowed, even though Sub-section (2) of Section 37 itself provided for a procedure far simpler than ordinarily obtains in proceedings before a civil Court. Then there is Sub-section (8) which provides for the abolition of the right of appeal and second appeal and replaces it by a power in the High Court to revise an order passed by the Controller. That provision, as a part of the overall picture painted, must necessarily be construed as laying down procedure exclusive of that provided in Sections 38 and 39, and we hold that the four cases relied upon by the High Court in rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the tenant were correctly decided. 8. In the way of the above interpretation of Sub-section (8) of Sec-tion 25B, the provisions of Sub-section (10) thereof do not pose a hurdle. All that Sub-section (10) States is that the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction covered by Sub-section (1) shall be the same as the procedure for disposal of other applications by Controllers, except as provided in Chapter IIIA. Sub-section (8) as interpreted by us governs an applica-tion covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 25B and expressly takes away the right of appeal or second appeal, while providing the remedy of revision instead. As we have held the provisions of Sub-section (8) to be exhaustive of the remedies available to a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller in applications triable under Chapter IIIA, such applications fall outside the category of those which can be disposed of like other applications under-Sub-section (10) read with the provisions contained in other Chapters of the Act. 9. As a result of the above discussion we hold that the remedy of the landlady against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court as laid down in the proviso to Sub-section (8) of Section 25B, even though it was an order not directing, but refusing, recovery of possession of the premises in dispute. 10. Another contention raised on behalf of the tenant was that the order passed by the High Court while revising that of the Controller was illegal inasmuch as it did not specifically contain a direction that the land-lady would not be entitled to obtain possession of the premises in dispute before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order. The contention seeks support from the provisions of Sub-section (7) of section 14 of the Act which states:?Where an order for the recovery of possession of any premises is made on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1)the landlord shall not be entitled to obtain possession thereof before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of the order.? Now this Sub-section does not at all require that an order for the recovery of possession of any premises should contain a direction of the type above mentioned. On the other hand, the Sub-section itself declares that such an order would not be executable before a certain period has expired. The declaration is part of the law of the land and would be operative as such so that the landlady would not be entitled to execute the order made by the High Court in her favour before the expiry of six months from the date thereof notwithstanding the fact that the terms of Sub-section (7) have not been made a part of that order." 11. The only other ground urged in support of the appeal was that the landlady had prayed for the tenant?s eviction from only a part of the premises and that such eviction could not legally be granted to her. The contention embraces a question of fact which has been decided against the tenant by the High Court and for reconsidering which we do not find any reason.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Our reasons in this behalf are two-fold. Firstly, if an order in favour of the landlord alone was meant to be covered by Sub-section (8), an order refusing such relief would be liable to be called in question by way of an appeal or second appeal under Section 38 so that there would be two pro-cedures for the end-product of the Controller?s proceedings being called in question; one when the same is in favour of the landlord, and another whenit goes against him, which would obviously entail discrimination and make the Sub-section suffer from a constitutional invalidity. It is an accepted rule of interpretation that if a provision can be construed in a manner which upholds its legal or constitutional validity it should if possible be so construed rather than the other way round. We do feel that the language used is not happy but then it would not be doing violence to it if it is construed as just above statedSecondly, the scheme of the Act and the object of the introduction of Section 14A and Chapter IIIA into it by the Amending Act make us form the opinion that Sub-section (8) of Section 25B is exhaustive of the rights of appeal and revision in relation to the proceedings held under that Chapter. Before the enforcement of the Amending Act. All disputes between a land-lord and his tenant were liable to be dealt with according to a uniform pro-cedure before the Controller as also in appeal and second appeal. No distinction was made between one kind of dispute and another. When it was felt that the procedure prescribed in the Act defeated, by reason of the delay involved, the very purpose of an application made under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, especially in the case of landlords who themselves held accommodation allotted by the Government or a local authority which they were required to vacate. Section 14A and Chapter III were introduced by the Amending Act so as to cut down the time-factor drastically, so much so that a tenant was required to obtain leave from the Controller for contesting an application for his eviction before he could put up his defence, and the Controller was given the power to refuse leave and straightway pass an order of eviction if he found that the grounds disclosed by the tenant in support of his right to dispute the landlord?s claim were not such as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. Sub-section (7) further simplified the procedure on contest being allowed, even though Sub-section (2) of Section 37 itself provided for a procedure far simpler than ordinarily obtains in proceedings before a civil Court. Then there is Sub-section (8) which provides for the abolition of the right of appeal and second appeal and replaces it by a power in the High Court to revise an order passed by the Controller. That provision, as a part of the overall picture painted, must necessarily be construed as laying down procedure exclusive of that provided in Sections 38 and 39, and we hold that the four cases relied upon by the High Court in rejecting the contention raised on behalf of the tenant were correctly decided8. In the way of the above interpretation of Sub-section (8) of Sec-tion 25B, the provisions of Sub-section (10) thereof do not pose a hurdle. All that Sub-section (10) States is that the procedure for the disposal of an application for eviction covered by Sub-section (1) shall be the same as the procedure for disposal of other applications by Controllers, except as provided in Chapter IIIA. Sub-section (8) as interpreted by us governs an applica-tion covered by Sub-section (1) of Section 25B and expressly takes away the right of appeal or second appeal, while providing the remedy of revision instead. As we have held the provisions of Sub-section (8) to be exhaustive of the remedies available to a person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller in applications triable under Chapter IIIA, such applications fall outside the category of those which can be disposed of like other applications under-Sub-section (10) read with the provisions contained in other Chapters of the Act9. As a result of the above discussion we hold that the remedy of the landlady against the order of the Controller in the present case was by way of revision (and revision only) of that order by the High Court as laid down in the proviso to Sub-section (8) of Section 25B, even though it was an order not directing, but refusing, recovery of possession of the premises in disputeNow this Sub-section does not at all require that an order for the recovery of possession of any premises should contain a direction of the type above mentioned. On the other hand, the Sub-section itself declares that such an order would not be executable before a certain period has expired. The declaration is part of the law of the land and would be operative as such so that the landlady would not be entitled to execute the order made by the High Court in her favour before the expiry of six months from the date thereof notwithstanding the fact that the terms of Sub-section (7) have not been made a part of that order.