Case: The Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd Vs. The State of Bihar

market committee requires the appellant to bear the burden of the market fee. It is obvious, as seen earlier, that charge of market fee is on the buyer of branded tea and not on the seller thereof, like the appellant. The purchasers of branded market tea manufactured by the appellant who purchase the said produced in market areas governed by the Union of India have made no grievance in this connection. Even otherwise, as seen earlier, once the wide definition of `agricultural produce as found in the Market Act governs such sale transactions and when Section 15 of the Act covers such transactions, the charge under Section 27 would obviously get settled on these transaction. As a logical corollary thereof, even if the appellant may have to act as a collecting agent for the market committee concerned, as per its legal obligation in given circumstances, that by itself cannot exonerate it, once the statutory scheme of the Act covers transactions of sale of branded tea carried out by the appellant in the market area governed by Union of India. 172. Contention found in para 10 of the written submissions are to be stated to be rejected. Once the sale transactions of packed tea are governed by the sweep of the Union of India, and once such sale transactions have to be regulated as per the machinery of the Union of India, on the applicability of Section 15 of the Act, the entire infrastructure available for resulting such sale transactions at the market yard or sub-market yards whose benefit would obviously be available to the appellant cannot entitle the appellant to contend that its fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is violated. To say the least, it would be a reasonable restriction on exercise of such a right. It is pertinent to note that the appellant has not challenged the vires of Section 27 of Union of India. It is difficult to appreciate the submission that compelling the sealed and packed tea to be brought into the market yard and to be auctioned thereof cannot be considered to advance the public interest in any manner. Public interest obviously gets advanced as the sale transactions will get related by the infrastructural machinery at the market yard and sub-market yards concerned, where such transactions take place. The contention that the Bihar Act would be unconstitutional cannot be countenanced for twin reasons. Firstly, such a contention was not canvassed either before the High Court or before this Court in the present proceedings. Secondly, in any case, on the applicability of the Act once the transaction of sale of packed tea takes place in the market area, it cannot but be said to be imposing reasonable restriction under Article 19 sub-article (6) on the appellants fundamental right. The appellant, as a seller of manufactured tea, has not to bear any burden of the imposed market fee on sale transactions. All that it gets is the benefit of the infrastructural facilities made available by the market committee for regulating such transactions and if the appellants is likely to get more price for its branded tea by subjecting its sale transactions to auction, the said provision instead of adversely affecting the appellant would, on the contrary, be more beneficial to it. May be, the appellant from commercial point of view may not like to charge higher price for the packed tea from its customers but that does not mean that the infrastructural facilities made available by the market committees to the appellant to get more price of its branded tea if so desired by it can be construed in any way to be adversely affecting its commercial business interests. For obvious reasons, therefore, none of the contentions found in the written submissions can advance the case of the appellants and they necessarily have to stand repelled. 173. These were the only contentions canvassed by learned Counsel in support of the appeal and as they fail, the inevitable result is that this appeal fails and will be liable to be dismissed. FINAL ORDER : 174. As a net result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore the following orders are passed : 1. SUGAR GROUP MATTERS : 175. These appeals, namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 398 and 399/1977, 234/1995, 8163/1994, 7432/1994 2632-33/1982, 1282/1995 are allowed. The judgments and orders passed by the High Court impugned in these appeals are set aside. The Writ Petition No. 1250/1986 filed by the petitioner will stand allowed accordingly as detailed in this judgment subject to the riders mentioned hereinabove. 176. Civil Appeal Nos. 4500-05 of 1992, so far as they seek to challenge the levy of market fee on sugar are concerned, will stand allowed. The respective six petitions filed before the High Court dealing with levy of market fee on sugar will stand allowed. 177. Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9684 of 1992 will stand allowed to the extent Civil Writ Petition No. 5974 of 1988 filed before the High Court deals with the contentions regarding market fee on sugar. Instead of the relief granted by the High Court limiting to the non-levy of market fee on sugar after 2.5.1977, it is directed that levy of market fee on sugar for the entire period covered by the writ petition will be treated to be unauthorised. 178. This judgment will have only prospective operation and will not affect past transactions entered into prior to the date of this judgment. 2. WHEAT PRODUCTS LIKE ATTA, MAIDA, SUZI, ETC. 179. These appeals, namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 2951, 2952 and 2953 of 1992, 3505 and 3506 of 1992 and 829/1993 are dismissed. 3. VEGETABLE OIL MATTERS : 180. Civil Appeal No. 1427 of 1979 is dismissed. 181. Civil Appeal Nos. 4500-05 of 1992, so far as they deal with levy of market fee on Vanaspati Oil are concerned, will stand dismissed and the High Courts decision in all six writ petitions pertaining to levy of market fee on edible oil shall remain confirmed.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]On a conjoint reading of these two notifications, therefore, it can be seen that exemption under Section 42 of the Act was confined to excluding the operation of Section 15(2) of the Act qua these sugar factories. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the exemption notification is treated to cover entire Section 15 even then once the transactions of sale and purchase take place within the market area, charge under Section 27 would get settled on these transaction. It was further submitted that there is enough return benefit made available to the sugar factories admittedly situated within the market area. That in fact, their service centres are also declared to bet yards even beyond the factory gate. That they utilise the link roads made available by the market committees for brining sugarcane produce to the factory premises by giving facility of swift transportation. Thus the sugarcane as a raw material is brought to the factory premises before it gets dried up. This yields better quality and larger quantity of sugar and molasses. In addition thereto facilities of supply of necessary information regarding the prevalent prices of sugarcane are made available by the market committees. But even apart from that, the market committees can act as a mediator in enabling the sugarcane growers to get better price of sugarcane above the minimum price fixed under the Control Order and the Sugarcane Act and this role of the market committees would be beneficial not only tot he producers of sugarcane but also to the factories which can be assured of appropriate good quality sugarcane purchased from the sugarcane growers. It is, therefore, wrong to suggest that there is no quid pro quo between the charge of market fee and the payment thereof by the sugarcane factories, that the infrastructure facilities made available to the industry as a whole have to be seen and transactions are not to be dissected for finding out the quid pro quo between charging of the market fee and the burden thereof borne by the sugar companies. It was, therefore, contended that none of the submissions canvassed by the learned senior Counsel for the appellants deserved to be accepted9. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions, we now proceed to deal with the twin contentions submitted for our consideration by the learned senior Counsel for the appellants in support of these appeals. However, before we deal with the merits of these contentions, the question of locus standi of the appellants is required to be considered at the outset12. In the light of the aforesaid provisions, it is obvious that the sugar factories operating in the market area within the jurisdiction of the market committee concerned can be said to be buyers of sugarcane, as `agriculture produce. Their purchase centres are situated within the market area. As submitted by the learned senior Counsel for the respondents, all the purchase centres at which the appellant sugar factories purchase sugarcane as raw material are not only situated within the market area but are also declared ast yards. In fact the entire Bihar State is comprised of various market areas within the jurisdiction of different market committees. If that is so, it has to be held that when the charge under Section 27 of paying market fee is imposed on the sugar factories as buyers of sugarcane within the market area, they have to be treated to be having sufficient locus standi as buyers of sugarcane to challenge the imposition of market fee on their purchase transactions. On this aspect, the learned senior Counsel for the respondents did not contest. However, their submission was that when purchased sugarcane is processed at the factories and converted into sugar and molasses and when such sugar and molasses are sold by the sugar factories, the charge of market fee on these sale transactions would settle on the buyers of sugar and molasses who have not made any grievance about payment of market fee. That may be so, however, the fact remains that if the sugar factories sell manufactured sugar and molasses out of the purchases raw13. This takes us to the consideration of the main twin contentions canvassed by the learned senior Counsel for the appellants for our consideration14. So far this contention is concerned, we have to keep in view the relevant provisions of the Market Act, Sugar Act as well as the Orders under the Essential Commodities Act15. In the first instance, we shall deal with the transactions of purchase of sugarcane by the sugar factories functioning in the market areas falling within the jurisdiction of respective market committees constituted under the Market Act. The Market Act has been enacted by the Bihar Legislature as per the legislature power vested in it by Entries 26, 27 and 28 of List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. These entries read as under :59. Learned senior Counsel for the respondents was right when he contended in the aforesaid decision before this Court that the merkits of the reasoning whicxh appealed to the High Court were not gone into as the appeal arising from the judgment on thispoint was not pressed. However, the fact remains that the aforesaid reasoning of the Karnataka High Court remained untouched by thsi Court, nor was it dissented from. The facts of the present case project even a stronger situation, so far as the appelalnts are concerned. Whatever shortfall is found in the Sugar (Control) Order has been supplemented by the Sugarcane Act by the Bihar legialation itself. Reasoning which appealed to the Karnataka High Court in the above judgment rendered in absence of a separate comlementary legislation by the Karnataka Legislature gets further strenghtened in tthe light of the Sugarcane Act in the present case. Cosnequently on a conjoint reading of the Sugarcane Order as well as the Sugarcane Act, an inevitable conclusion has to be reached that the regulation of sale and purchase of sugarcane in the entire market area for which the genreal Act, namely, the Market Act is enacted, is fully governed and highlighted by these two special provisons harmoniously operating in the very same field. Therefore, there would remain no occasion for the State Authority to retionalise and reasonably visualise and need forregualting the purchas,de sale as well as storage of sugarcane in the market area concerned. The wide sweep of general notification of Section 3 of the Market Act, therefore, will have to be read down by excluding from its general sweep sugarcane and its products as the definition of `agricultrual produce as noted earlier would otherwise include not only primary produce of agriculture but also any other commodity processed or manufactured out of such primary agricultural produce. That is precisely the reason why the State of Bihar having realised the futility of theneed about controlling and regulating the sale and purchase of sugarcane in the market area by the sugar factories excluded the operation of Section 15 of the Act, which noted earlier, is the soul of the Act, the entire machinery avaibale to themarket committee to regulate such transactions would get out of picture and there would be no room for the market committee to supply any infrstructural facility or other benefits to the seller of such agricultural produce on the one hand and the purchaser thereof on the otherIt is also not possible to agree with the contention of the learned senior Counsel Shri Dwivedi that the Sugarcane Act of 1981 does not expressly purport to exclude the Market Act, especially when the Bihar Legislature that had enacted the former Act was aware of the Market Act, 1960 holding the field. That this circumstance shows that the legislature purposely did not exclude the applicability of the Market Act so far as the purchase and sale of sugarcane in market areas were concerned. However, this contention by itself cannot clinch the issue. If the very same legislature had felt that existing general Act was sufficient to foot the bill, then there would have been remained no occasion for the very same legislature to enact a special Act for control, regulation, sale and purchase of sugarcane after passage of 21 years. Therefore, the latter Act clearly envisaged carving out of a special field for regulating the sale and purchase of sugarcane and to that extent pro tanto it excluded the operation of the Market Act for that commodity. The intention of the legislature is thus very clear on this aspect. But apart from that, intention of itse State of Bihar itself is also clear when it excluded Section 15 of the Market Act in exercise of its exemption power under Section 42 of the Market Act. It is difficult to appreciate the contention of the learned senior Counsel that Section 15 of the Market Act is not the case of the Act. On a conjoint reading of Sections 3, 4, 15, 27 and 30 of the Act it has to be held that it is only because of the operation of Section 15 covering the sale and purchase transactions of agricultural produce that the market committee can effectively discharge its functions entrusted to it by the Act. But for Section 15 there would remain no occasion for the market committee to effectively regulate the sale and purchase transactions of the agricultural produce concerned. Section 15 mandates the sellers and producers of agricultural produce to operate in the notified market yard or sub market yards and only at these places the market committee through its officers and servants can discharge its functions effectively by regulating these transactions and for that purpose all the infrastructural facilities would be available. The entire machinery provisions enacted for the purpose would fulcrum round the vibrant operation of Section 15. Once Section 15is excluded qua any agricultural produce the entire machinery of the Market Act would come to a grinding halt so far as such an excluded `agricultural produce is concerned. Sugarcane is one such produce as we have already seen earlier. Consequently, qua such a produce the general sweep of the Market Act will be a total. Logically, therefore, there would remain no occasion for the market committee to justify levy of market fee under Section 27 of the Act read with Section 30 on these transactions. On a conjoint reading of Sections 27 and 30 of the Market Act, it becomes clear that a market committee which has to effectively control and regulate the ale and purchase of agricultural produce brought for sale and purchase in the market area as enjoined by Section 15 can effectively discharge its functions and spend its funds for supplying Â the necessary infrastructure for this purpose as laid down by Section 30To that extent that the learned senior Counsel is right. However, as we have seen earlier, Entry 28 of List II dealing with `Markets and Fairs has to be read jointly with Entries 26 and 27 dealing with Trade and Commerce and once the State Legislation deals with these topics then it also squarely invokes legislative powers under Entry 33 of List III. That is precisely the entry under which the Sugarcane Act, 1981 can be said to have been enacted81. This takes us to the consideration of the statutory control of sale of molasses by sugar factories functioning in the market area. It has to be kept in view that molasses is at of the sugar industry and the sale of molasses by the Sugar factories is wholly controlled by the statutory provisions containing in the Bihar Molasses (Control) Act, 1947Wheat is a produce of agricultural, therefore, any product resulting after processing such basic raw material or which results after process of manufacture is carried on qua such basic raw material would remain agricultural produce. Shri Ranjit Kumar fairly stated that he has not challenged the vires of Section 2(1)(a) but in his submission items 14 to 16 as found in the Schedule to the Act under the caption `Cereals are wrongly included as agricultural produce as they are not produce of agriculture. Moment the artificial definition of agricultural produce as aforesaid holds the field, as a logical corollary these three disputed items would squarely get covered by the sweep of the term `agricultural produce and hence their inclusion in the schedule enacted under Section 2(1)(a) as types of cereals cannot be found fault with. These wee the only contentions canvassed by Shri Ranjit Kumar in support of his appeals. As they fail the inevitable result is that all the civil appeals would be liable to be dismissed115. In the light of the express provisions concerning the relevant items of the Schedule to the Act to which we have referred, it has to be held that on the material before the High Court in connection with the ingredients of the aforesaid two products of the appellant, it could not be effectively shown by the respondents beyond any doubt that these two products also were `agricultural produce being Animal Husbandry Products of `milk in ad form. Consequently, there was no occasion for the respondent authorities to insist that the appellant for the sale of the aforesaid two products within the market area governed by the Market Act in the State of Bihar was required to take any licence under that Act. It is not the case of the appellant that any market fee was required to be charged from him by the market committee. The only grievance made was that the appellant was required to take licence under the Market Act. Hence the question of refund of any market fee would not survive for consideration in the present case. This appeal will have to be allowed and the Writ Petition filed by the appellant in the High Court also consequently will have to be allowed by quashing the impugned notice calling upon the appellant to take licences under the Market ActThey purchase tea leaves in auction under the Tea Act held at different centres outside the State of Bihar and manufacture after proper blending tea by packing it in suitable packings having labels showing different qualities of tea like green label tea, red label tea etc. That because the appellant imports manufactured tea only for the purpose of sale in Bihar markets, it cannot be said that the machinery of the Market Act which is essentially meant to regulate the sale and purchase of agricultural produce, gets attracted. That the Market Act is, in substance, meant to cover agricultural produce which are first grown in the market area and then sold within the same area. It was also contended that tea was not one of the scheduled items earlier covered by the Act enacted as early as in 1960. That only after 16 years in 1976, tea was added as one of the items in the Schedule to the Act under the caption `Miscellaneous item No. XII as sub item 30 being Tea (leaf and dust). It was submitted that this addition to the Schedule was made by the State of Bihar in exercise of its power under Section 39 of the Act which confers power on the State Government by notification to add any of the items to be treated as `agricultural produce for being specified in the Schedule. That this addition was made after the basic notification under Section 3 of the Act was issued declaring the intention of the State to regulate the purchase, sale, storage and process of agricultural produce in such areas as may be specified in the notification. This basic notification which was followed by the procedure of inviting objections and suggestions had culminated into declaration of market area under Section 4. That initially as the item of tea was not in the Schedule, it was obviously not sought to be subjected to the regulation under the Act. Consequently, its purchase, sale, storage and process were obviously not intended to be covered by the Act. But when tea was added as an item in the Schedule in 1976 the procedure contemplated by Section 3 was obviously not undergone, and no objections were invited. Section 4(a) of the Act which was inserted by way of clarification in 1993 also made it clear that the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 shall not apply to the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 39 to amend the Schedule by addition of any item of agricultural produce not specified therein120. The very scheme and purpose underlying the enactment of the Market Act shows that only those agricultural produce which are grown within the market area and whose sale in the first instance is to be regulated and also the subsequent sale of any manufactured item out of such basic agricultural produce raw material taking place within the market area are required to be regulated by the Act so that illiterate and ignorant agriculturists who would, otherwise, suffer at the hands of middlemen and may not get adequate price for their products and due compensation for the toil undertaken by them in producing these agricultural commodities, may get adequate return for their products. The benevolent provisions of the regulatory scheme of the Act are essential to protect the agriculturists from exploitation of middlemen. In this connection, our attention was drawn to the salient observations highlighting the basic purpose for enactment of such the Market Acts as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in M.C.V.S. Arunachala Nadar case (supra). Shri Shanti Bhushan submitted that the large scale manufacturers like Lipton Tea (India) Ltd. who manufacture tea outside the State in their sophisticated factories having latest machinery are not illiterate agriculturist producers of agricultural goods and commodities in their fields and do not require protection under the Act. That as these salient ensures of the Act are not kept in view by the State Authorities while inserting entry of tea in the Schedule, the said Act on the part of the State authorities was clearly ultra vires and incompetent121. In any case, as the purchase and sale of tea were governed by the comprehensive provisions of the Central Act, namely, the Tea Act, 1953, the said Act would wholly govern transactions of purchase and sale of tea by the appellant and to that extent the Market Act would stand superseded or at least the statutory intention of regulating the purchase, sale, storage and processing of tea as per the provisions of Section 3 of the Market Act would stand completely negated. Hence, on that ground also the insertion of this item in the Schedule would remain unauthorised and consequently the insistence on the part of the authorities that the sale transactions should be carried on only within the market yard ort yard was clearly illegal and violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of India122. It was lastly contended by Shri Shanti Bhushan that no quid pro quo existed between the demand for market fee by the market committees and the sale transactions effected by appellants selling agents so far as tea in packed tins was concerned. No infrastructural facilities were available for or required to be supplied to the sellers of such tea123. Learned senior counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, tried to salvage the situation by submitting that even though the Tea Act may control the sale and purchase of tea which is a highly monopolistic and export earning commodity, once the blended tea in deliverable state duly packed in tins and other packages by the appellant tea company enters the Bihar markets for sale, it cannot be said that the sale of this commodity cannot be treated to be sale of agricultural produce by the appellant within the market area in the State of Bihar as agricultural produce defined by Section 2(1)(a), would cover not only the purchase and sale of agricultural produce in its raw form but also in its processed and manufactured form as per the wide sweep of the said definition. He submitted that it cannot be disputed that tea in its raw form is an agricultural produce because tea leaves are grown in tea gardens and then they are plucked and processed in tea factories and after blending the manufactured tea in deliverable State becomes available to be sold in wholesale markets and then in the retain markets. That even though the appellants factory manufacturing the blended tea may be outside the State of Bihar, the moment the blended tea in packed form is sold in the State of Bihar in the market areas concerned, it cannot be said that the provisions of the Market Act would not apply to such sale transactions. On a conjoint reading of Section 2(1)(a) and the Schedule under Miscellaneous item XIIm 30, therefore, it has to be held that the Market Act would squarely get attracted to regulate the sale of such produce of tea by the appellant in the Bihar markets. So far as the Tea Act is concerned, it is submitted that it only regulates the sale of plucked tea from the tea gardens and provides machinery for sale by auction of such tea at the relevant centres and even in such auction when the appellant purchases these roasted tea leaves, it cannot be said that the Tea Act would cover any further transactions of manufactured tea out of the purchased tea leaves by auction purchasers like the appellant at its factories situated outside the Bihar State. That auction purchased tea leaves are processed by the appellant and blending work is done thereafter. That what is relevant for the applicability of the Market Act is the fact that this manufactured tea packed in suitable packets and tins is brought for sale within the market area in the Bihar State and these are the transactions of sale of manufactured tea out of the basic agricultural produce tea leaves that would attract the sweep of the Market Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the Tea Act. That once the Market Act applies to such sale transactions, the entire infrastructural facilities would be available to the appellant as these sales have to take place in the market yard ort yards as required by Section 15 of the Act. Once the appellant gets the benefit of this infrastructure, it cannot be said that no sufficient quid pro quo is made available under the Act by the market committees concerned to justify them to levy the market fee from the buyers of tea. That so far as the appellant is concerned, there is no burden of paying market fee as a seller of manufactured tea. The burden will be borne by the buyers who are not making any grievance in this connectionBut on a closer scrutiny, the said contention does not appear to be well sustained. Section 2(1)(a) of the Market Act, as seen earlier, includes in the definition of agricultural produce to only the primary produce grown in the field but also covers all processed ord agricultural produce as specified in the Schedule. In the light of the aforesaid wide sweep of this definition, it cannot be said that tea leaves which are produced in the gardens being primary agricultural produce would cease to be agricultural produce one they got processed. After plucked tea leaves are processed by roasting them and then by subjecting them to further process of blending and ultimately packing them in suitable packets they still remain all the same agricultural produce so manufactured out of the basic agricultural raw material `tea leaves. It is also not in dispute that Tea (leaf and dust) is a Scheduled item. Once that is so, sale of manufactured tea in packed condition within the market area would squarely attract the charge under Section 27 of the Act which, as noted earlier, is widely worded. The movement the agricultural produce as defined by Section 2(1)(a), is bought or sold in the market area, Section 27 would get attracted to cover such transaction. It is also pertinent to note that Section 15n (1) of the Act is applicable in the present case to cover such transactions of sale of packed tea within the market areas of the concerned market committees governed by the Act. Save and except such quantity as may be prescribed for retail sale or personal consumption to be outside the sweep of Section 15(1) of the Act, rest of these sale transactions regarding manufactured agricultural produce would remain governed by the sweep of the Act. On a conjoint reading of Section 2(1)(a) and Section 15 and the relevant entry in the Schedule, there is no escape from the conclusion that whether the manufactured agricultural produce has undergone manufacturing process within the market area or not or whether such agricultural produce in its rw form is grown in the market area or outside or whether the processed `agricultural produce is important only for sale within the market area, the applicability of the Act cannot be said to be ruled out to cover all these types of sale transactions130. The Tea Act of 1953 provides for control by the Union Government of the Tea Industry, including the control, in pursuance of the International Agreement now in force, of the cultivation of tea in, and of the export of tea from, India and for that purpose to establish a Tea Board and levy a duty of excise on tea produced in IndiaThis is a hypothetical question raised which does not require any answer obviously at this stage. As and when in future such an eventuality occurs, then the question of continuation of regulation of sale and purchase transactions to Tea (leaf and dust) by retaining this item in the Schedule may have to be examined. But as the statutory provisions stand at present, in the absence of any such existing Order under Section 30n (1) Clauses (a) and (b) by the Central Government, the field remains wide open and at least it was definitely open when the State Government introduced the Entry of Tea (leaf and dust) in the Schedule to Union of India in 1976. This exercise, by no stretch of imagination, could be said to be unauthorised, illegal or amounting ton of mind. The second contention, therefore, is answered in negative against the appellant and in favour of the respondent. That takes us to the consideration of contention No. 3162. Once it is held that the Union of India covers the transitions of sale of packed blended tea in sealed packets and receptacles by the appellants stockist in the market areas concerned especially when these transactions take place in the market yard ort yards as laid down by Section 15 of the Act which remains fully operative to cover such transactions, there is no escape from the conclusion that the entire infrastructure facilities for regualtion of such sale transactions as made available by the market committee concerned would ensure for the benefit of sellers of such packed blended tea171. Contention in para 9 of the written submissions is also devoid of any merit. It is not the case of the appellant that the sale of manufactured tea in Bihar markets within the market area of the concerned market committee requires the appellant to bear the burden of the market fee. It is obvious, as seen earlier, that charge of market fee is on the buyer of branded tea and not on the seller thereof, like the appellant. The purchasers of branded market tea manufactured by the appellant who purchase the said produced in market areas governed by the Union of India have made no grievance in this connection. Even otherwise, as seen earlier, once the wide definition of `agricultural produce as found in the Market Act governs such sale transactions and when Section 15 of the Act covers such transactions, the charge under Section 27 would obviously get settled on these transaction. As a logical corollary thereof, even if the appellant may have to act as a collecting agent for the market committee concerned, as per its legal obligation in given circumstances, that by itself cannot exonerate it, once the statutory scheme of the Act covers transactions of sale of branded tea carried out by the appellant in the market area governed by Union of India172. Contention found in para 10 of the written submissions are to be stated to be rejected. Once the sale transactions of packed tea are governed by the sweep of the Union of India, and once such sale transactions have to be regulated as per the machinery of the Union of India, on the applicability of Section 15 of the Act, the entire infrastructure available for resulting such sale transactions at the market yard ort yards whose benefit would obviously be available to the appellant cannot entitle the appellant to contend that its fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is violated. To say the least, it would be a reasonable restriction on exercise of such a right. It is pertinent to note that the appellant has not challenged the vires of Section 27 of Union of India. It is difficult to appreciate the submission that compelling the sealed and packed tea to be brought into the market yard and to be auctioned thereof cannot be considered to advance the public interest in any manner. Public interest obviously gets advanced as the sale transactions will get related by the infrastructural machinery at the market yard andt yards concerned, where such transactions take place. The contention that the Bihar Act would be unconstitutional cannot be countenanced for twin reasons. Firstly, such a contention was not canvassed either before the High Court or before this Court in the present proceedings. Secondly, in any case, on the applicability of the Act once the transaction of sale of packed tea takes place in the market area, it cannot but be said to be imposing reasonable restriction under Article 19e (6) on the appellants fundamental right. The appellant, as a seller of manufactured tea, has not to bear any burden of the imposed market fee on sale transactions. All that it gets is the benefit of the infrastructural facilities made available by the market committee for regulating such transactions and if the appellants is likely to get more price for its branded tea by subjecting its sale transactions to auction, the said provision instead of adversely affecting the appellant would, on the contrary, be more beneficial to it. May be, the appellant from commercial point of view may not like to charge higher price for the packed tea from its customers but that does not mean that the infrastructural facilities made available by the market committees to the appellant to get more price of its branded tea if so desired by it can be construed in any way to be adversely affecting its commercial business interests. For obvious reasons, therefore, none of the contentions found in the written submissions can advance the case of the appellants and they necessarily have to stand repelled173. These were the only contentions canvassed by learned Counsel in support of the appeal and as they fail, the inevitable result is that this appeal fails and will be liable to be dismissed174. As a net result of the aforesaid discussion, therefore the following orders are passed :1. SUGAR GROUP MATTERS :175. These appeals, namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 398 and 399/1977, 234/1995, 8163/1994, 7432/1994, 1282/1995 are allowed. The judgments and orders passed by the High Court impugned in these appeals are set aside. The Writ Petition No. 1250/1986 filed by the petitioner will stand allowed accordingly as detailed in this judgment subject to the riders mentioned hereinabove5 of 1992, so far as they seek to challenge the levy of market fee on sugar are concerned, will stand allowed. The respective six petitions filed before the High Court dealing with levy of market fee on sugar will stand allowed177. Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 9684 of 1992 will stand allowed to the extent Civil Writ Petition No. 5974 of 1988 filed before the High Court deals with the contentions regarding market fee on sugar. Instead of the relief granted by the High Court limiting to they of market fee on sugar after 2.5.1977, it is directed that levy of market fee on sugar for the entire period covered by the writ petition will be treated to be unauthorised178. This judgment will have only prospective operation and will not affect past transactions entered into prior to the date of this judgment2. WHEAT PRODUCTS LIKE ATTA, MAIDA, SUZI, ETC179. These appeals, namely, Civil Appeal Nos. 2951, 2952 and 2953 of 1992, 3505 and 3506 of 1992 and 829/1993 are dismissed3. VEGETABLE OIL MATTERS :180. Civil Appeal No. 1427 of 1979 is dismissed5 of 1992, so far as they deal with levy of market fee on Vanaspati Oil are concerned, will stand dismissed and the High Courts decision in all six writ petitions pertaining to levy of market fee on edible oil shall remain confirmed.