Case: Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P Vs. S. R. Brothers, Kanpur

in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or technical meaning of such terms, but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, that is to say, to their commercial sense. In the course of the judgment, after referring to certain decisions, including the decisions from Australian, Canadian and English Courts, it was observed:"The result emerging from these decisions is that while construing the word "coal" in entry 1 of Part III of Schedule II, the test that would be applied is what would be the meaning which persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give to that word. A sales tax statute, being one levying a tax on goods must, in the absence of a technical term or a term of science or art, be presumed to have used an ordinary term as coal according to the meaning ascribed to it in common parlance. Viewed from that angle both a merchant dealing in coal and a consumer wanting to purchase it would regard coal not in its geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include charcoal in the term coal. It is only when the question of the kind or variety of coal would arise that a distinction would be made between coal and charcoal, otherwise both of them would in ordinary parlance as also in their commercial sense be spoken as coal." It may be pointed out that the entry in the case cited read "coal including coke in all its forms". In Sales Tax Commissioner, U. P. v. Ladha Singh Mal Singh, (1971) 28 STC 325 = (AIR 1971 SC 2221 ) cloth manufactured by means of power-looms was held by this Court not to fall within the words "cloth manufactured by mills" in the Notification dated June 8, 1948, issued under S. 3A of the Act and the sale of such cloth was held not liable to be taxed at the higher rate of 6 Ps. in a rupee. According to this decision powerloom cloth in popular language is never associated with mill cloth. In view of these and some other decisions the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be said in fairness, did not dispute that the words with which we are concerned must be construed in the sense which is imputed to them by the persons who deal in and who consume such articles. 6. "Food colours" and "syrup essence" being themselves known articles of common use, the question arises whether the words and expressions used in entries 10 and 37 of the List are intended to take within their fold goods popularly known in common parlance by the names of "food colours" and "syrup essences". 7. It cannot be gainsaid that "food colours" and "syrup essences" are edible goods whereas "dyes and colours and compositions thereof" and "scents and perfumes" as specified in entries nos. 10 and 37 of the List do not seem prima facie to connote that they are edible goods.This is the reasoning of the High Court and it appears to us to be both logical and rational. Indeed, except for items like salt in entry no. 34, the "sugar manufactured by mills" (entry no. 40) and "Banaspati, including refined coconut oil" (entry no. 43) which is capable of being used as medium for cooking is prima facie edible there does not seem to be any other edible article included in the List. Item no. 25 speaks of "oils of all kinds other than edible oils manufactured on Ghanis by human or animal power". This scheme suggests that, apart from the undoubted edible goods, in cases where the import of the specified goods is wide enough to include both edible and non-edible category then the intention has been clearly expressed whether or not to include edible goods. Now in the case of entries nos. 10 and 37 we are inclined to think in agreement with the High Court that these entries are not intended to extend to edible colours like food colours and to edible essence like syrup essences. It would indeed be straining the meanings of the words and expressions in those entries as understood in popular commercial sense to include edible colours and essence. If the intention of the State Government was to include food colours in entry No. 10 and syrup essences in entry no. 37 then in our view these goods could easily have been specified by their own popularly known description. In any event assuming that another view as to the meaning of these entries is possible we have not been persuaded to hold that the view taken by the High Court is so grossly erroneous that we should interfere on special leave appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution. 8. Shri Manchanda made a passing reference to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 framed under Ss. 4 and 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 37 of 1954 and pointed out that R. 23 postulates addition of colouring matter to an article of food when permitted. This, according to the argument, suggests that the word colour as used in entry no. 10 of the list of the Notification in question has been used in a broad enough sense so as to take within its fold edible colour or food colour. We are not impressed by this argument. Rule 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules indeed seems to go against the submission. 9. The appellants learned counsel had at one stage suggested that the goods intended to be taxed under S. 3A of the Act are all luxury goods and therefore food colours and syrup essences which are normally used by comparatively richer class of society should be presumed to have been intended to be included in items nos. 10 and 37 of the List. On closer scrutiny of the List, however, this point was rightly not developed.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. It cannot be gainsaid that "food colours" and "syrup essences" are edible goods whereas "dyes and colours and compositions thereof" and "scents and perfumes" as specified in entries nos. 10 and 37 of the List do not seem prima facie to connote that they are edible goods.This is the reasoning of the High Court and it appears to us to be both logical and rational. Indeed, except for items like salt in entry no. 34, the "sugar manufactured by mills" (entry no. 40) and "Banaspati, including refined coconut oil" (entry no. 43) which is capable of being used as medium for cooking is prima facie edible there does not seem to be any other edible article included in the List. Item no. 25 speaks of "oils of all kinds other than edible oils manufactured on Ghanis by human or animal power". This scheme suggests that, apart from the undoubted edible goods, in cases where the import of the specified goods is wide enough to include both edible and non-edible category then the intention has been clearly expressed whether or not to include edible goods. Now in the case of entries nos. 10 and 37 we are inclined to think in agreement with the High Court that these entries are not intended to extend to edible colours like food colours and to edible essence like syrup essences. It would indeed be straining the meanings of the words and expressions in those entries as understood in popular commercial sense to include edible colours and essence. If the intention of the State Government was to include food colours in entry No. 10 and syrup essences in entry no. 37 then in our view these goods could easily have been specified by their own popularly known description. In any event assuming that another view as to the meaning of these entries is possible we have not been persuaded to hold that the view taken by the High Court is so grossly erroneous that we should interfere on special leave appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution.