Case: M/S. Mutha Associates  Vs. State Of Maharashtra

words is not enough. What is necessary is to give full particulars of such allegations and to set out the material facts specifying the particular person against whom such allegations are made so that he may have an opportunity of controverting such allegations. The requirement of law is not satisfied insofar as the pleadings in the present case are concerned and in the absence of necessary particulars and material facts, we fail to see how the learned Judge could come to a finding that the State Government was guilty of factual mala fides, corruption and underhand dealing. 43. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 165 , the Court held that in the absence of particulars, the Court would be justified in refusing to conduct an investigation into the allegations of malafides. 44. In Minor A Paeeiakaruppan v. Sobha Joseph (1971) 1 SCC 38 , this Court held that even when the Court examining the validity of an action may find a circumstance to be disturbing it cannot uphold the plea of malafides on ground of mere probabilities. A note of caution was similarly sounded by this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974) 4 SCC 3 , where the Court held that it ought to be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts particularly when imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has high responsibility in the administration. The following passage from the decision is apposite: 92. Secondly, we must not also overlook that the burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. Here the petitioner, who was himself once the Chief Secretary, has flung a series of charges of oblique conduct against the Chief Minister. That is in itself a rather extraordinary and unusual occurrence and if these charges are true, they are bound to shake the confidence of the people in the political custodians of power in the State, and therefore, the anxiety of the Court should be all the greater to insist on a high degree of proof. In this context it may be noted that top administrators are often required to do acts which affect others adversely but which are necessary in the execution of their duties. These acts may lend themselves to misconstruction and suspicion as to the bona fides of their author when the full facts and surrounding circumstances are not known. The Court would, therefore, be slow to draw dubious inferences from incomplete facts placed before it by a party, particularly when the imputations are grave and they are made against the holder of an office which has a high responsibility in the administration. Such is the judicial perspective in evaluating charge of unworthy conduct against ministers and other high authorities, not because of any special status which they are supposed to enjoy, nor because they are highly placed in social life or administrative set up-these considerations are wholly irrelevant in judicial approach-but because otherwise, functioning effectively would become difficult in a democracy. It is from this standpoint that we must assess the merits of the allegations of mala fides made by the petitioner against the second respondent. 45. The charge of malafides levelled against the appellant-Mr. Rane, the then Minister was not supported by any particulars. The writ petition filed by APMC did not provide specific particulars or details of how the decision taken by minister was influenced by Mutha Associates or by any other person for that matter. The averments made in the writ petition in that regard appeared to be general and inferential in nature. Such allegations were, in our opinion, insufficient to hold the charge of malice in fact levelled against the minister proved. 46. It is true that the High Court has enumerated certain stark irregularities in the decision making process or the use of material obtained on behalf of the back of the beneficiary of the acquisition as also the denial of fair opportunity to the beneficiary to present its case before the minister yet those irregularities do not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the minister had acted malafide. Failure to abide by the principles of natural justice are consideration of material not disclose to a party or non-application of mind, to the material available on record may vitiate the decision taken by the authority concerned and may even constitute malice in law but the action may still remain bonafide and in good faith. It is trite that every action taken by a public authority even found untenable cannot be dubbed as malafide simply because it has fallen short of the legal standards and requirements for an action may continue to be bonafide and in good faith no matter the public authority passing the order has committed mistakes or irregularities in procedures or even breached the minimal requirements of the principles of natural justice. The High Court has attributed to the Minister appellant in Civil Appeals No.2856-2857 of 2002, malafides simply because the order passed by him was found to be untenable in law. Such an inference was not in our view justified, no matter the circumstances enumerated by the High Court may have given rise to a strong suspicion that the minister acted out of extraneous considerations. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be proof of the charge of malafide. It is only on clear proof of high degree that the court could strike down an action on the ground of malafide which standard of proof was not, in our opinion, satisfied in the instant case. To the extent the High Court held the action of the minister to be malafide, the impugned order would require correction and Civil Appeals No.2856 and 2857 of 2002 allowed. 47.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The High Court was, in our opinion, perfectly justified in holding that the order passed by the Minister lacked objectivity and was hasty without due and proper consideration of the relevant circumstances and the material on record. There is, in our view, no infirmity in the said findings nor was any serious attempt made before us by learned counsel for the appellants to demonstrate that the Minister had indeed acted in a fair objective and dispassionate manner while directing the withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings on the twin grounds that have been scrutinised by the High Court and rightly found to be untenable. We are satisfied that the order passed by the Minister directing withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings was bad not only because it was arbitrary, lacked objectivity and ignored the material on record but also because the said order was passed without offering to the APMC a fair and reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. That the order was not notified was only an additional reason that rendered the order legally unsupportable which the High Court rightly quashedThe charge of malafides levelled against the appellant-Mr. Rane, the then Minister was not supported by any particulars. The writ petition filed by APMC did not provide specific particulars or details of how the decision taken by minister was influenced by Mutha Associates or by any other person for that matter. The averments made in the writ petition in that regard appeared to be general and inferential in nature. Such allegations were, in our opinion, insufficient to hold the charge of malice in fact levelled against the minister proved46. It is true that the High Court has enumerated certain stark irregularities in the decision making process or the use of material obtained on behalf of the back of the beneficiary of the acquisition as also the denial of fair opportunity to the beneficiary to present its case before the minister yet those irregularities do not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the minister had acted malafide. Failure to abide by the principles of natural justice are consideration of material not disclose to a party or non-application of mind, to the material available on record may vitiate the decision taken by the authority concerned and may even constitute malice in law but the action may still remain bonafide and in good faith. It is trite that every action taken by a public authority even found untenable cannot be dubbed as malafide simply because it has fallen short of the legal standards and requirements for an action may continue to be bonafide and in good faith no matter the public authority passing the order has committed mistakes or irregularities in procedures or even breached the minimal requirements of the principles of natural justice. The High Court has attributed to the Minister appellant in Civil Appeals No.2856-2857 of 2002, malafides simply because the order passed by him was found to be untenable in law. Such an inference was not in our view justified, no matter the circumstances enumerated by the High Court may have given rise to a strong suspicion that the minister acted out of extraneous considerations. Suspicion, however, strong cannot be proof of the charge of malafide. It is only on clear proof of high degree that the court could strike down an action on the ground of malafide which standard of proof was not, in our opinion, satisfied in the instant case. To the extent the High Court held the action of the minister to be malafide, the impugned order would require correction and Civil Appeals No.2856 and 2857 of 2002 allowed.