Case: Lakshmana Nadar And Others Vs. R. Ramier

should live together amicably as of one family. If the two could not agree and live together amicably, my wife would pay Rs. 4, 000 and separate him and then my wife would enjoy all the remaining properties with absolute rights. If both of them would live together amicably, Muthu Arunachala Chetty himself would enjoy the properties which remain after the death of the widow." It was held upon the construction of the will that the nephew, who lived amicably with the widow till his death, had a vested interest at testators death which could not be defeated by a testamentary disposition by the widow in favour of a stranger. This decision only decides that case and is not very relevant in this enquiry.Reference was also made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mst. Bhagwati Devi v. Chowdry Bholonath Thakur [(1874-75) 2 I.A. 256.]. This was a case of a gift inter vivos. The gift to Mst. Chunderbutti, his wife, was in these terms :-"the remaining milkiut and minhai estates, together with the amount of ready money, articles, slaves, and all household furniture I have placed in the possession of Mst. Chunderbutti Thakurain, my wife, to be enjoyed during her lifetime, in order that she may hold possession of all the properties and milkiut possessed by me, the declarant, during her lifetime, and by the payment of government revenue, appropriate the profits derived therefrom, but that she should not by any means transfer the milkiut estates and the slaves; that after the death of my aforesaid wife the milkiut and household furniture shall devolve on Girdhari Thakur, my karta (adopted son)."13. The subordinate judge held that Chunderbutti got an estate for life with the power to appropriate profits and Girdhari got a vested remainder on her death. The High Court took a different view and held that Chunderbutti took the estate in her character as a Hindu widow. The Privy Council on this will held as follows :-"Their Lordships do not feel justified, upon mere conjecture of what might probably have been intended, in so interpreting it as materially to change the nature of the estate taken by Chunderbutti. If she took the estate only of a Hindu widow, one consequence, no doubt, would be that she would be unable to alienate the profits, or that at all events, whatever she purchased out of them would be an increment to her husbands estate, and the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover possession of all such property, real and personal. But, on the other hand, she would have certain rights as a Hindu widow; for example, she would have the right under certain circumstances, if the estate were insufficient to defray the funeral expenses or her maintenance, to alienate it altogether. She certainly would have the power of selling her own estate; and it would further follow that Girdhari would not be possessed in any sense of a vested remainder, but merely of a contingent one. It would also follow that she would completely represent the estate, and under certain circumstances the statute of limitations might run against the heirs to the estate, whoever they might be.Their Lordships see no sufficient reason for importing into this document words which would carry with them all these consequences, and they agree with the subordinate judge in construing it according to its plain meaning."14. These observations have to a certain extent relevance to the present case but on the facts this case is also distinguishable. This will was couched in different language than the will in the present case. There was a clear prohibition, forbidding the widow to make any transfers of the milkiut estates and the slaves.Reference was also made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Lallu v. Jagmohan [(1898) I.L.R. 22 Bom. 409.]. The will there ran as follows :-"When I die, my wife named Suraj is owner of that property. And my wife has powers to do in the same way as I have absolute powers to do when I am present, and in case of my wifes death, my daughter Mahalaxmi is owner of the said property after that."15. It was held that Suraj took only a life estate under the will, with remainder over to Mahalaxmi after her death and the bequest to Mahalaxmi was not contingent on her surviving Suraj, but that she took a vested remainder which upon her death passed to her heirs.16. After considering the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds have been made out for disturbing the unanimous opinion of the two courts below on the construction of this will. Both the learned counsel eventually conceded that the language used in the will was consistent with the testators intention of conferring a life estate in the English sense as well as with the intention of conferring a Hindu widows estate. It was, however, urged by Mr. Rajah Iyer that as no express or implied power of alienation for purposes of all legal necessities was conferred on the widow, that circumstance negatived the view that the testator intended to confer upon his widow a Hindu widows estate as she would get in case of intestacy. He also emphasized that the words of the gift over to the daughter as supporting his construction which was further reinforced by the words of the will limiting the widows estate "till your lifetime" and of the omission from therein of words such as malik etc., while describing the widows estate. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar, on the other hand, contended that the absence of any words in the will restricting her powers of alienation and putting a restraint on them, suggested a contrary intention and that the daughters estate was described as coming into being after the estate of the widow and was not conferred on her simultaneously with the widow, and this connoted according to the notions of Hindus a full Hindu widows estate.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]At one time it was a moot point whether a Hindu widows estate could be created by will, it being an estate created by law, but it is now settled that a Hindu can confer by means of a will on his widow the same estate which she would get by inheritance. The widow in such a case takes as a demisee and not as an heir. The courts primary duty in such cases is to ascertain from the language employed by the testator "what were his intentions", keeping in view the surrounding circumstances, his ordinary notions as a Hindu in respect to devolution of his property, his family relationships etc.; in other words, to ascertain his wishes by putting itself, so to say, in his armchair.Considering the will in the light of these principles, it seems to us that Lakshminarayana Iyer intended by his will to direct that his entire properties should be enjoyed by his widow during her lifetime but her interest in these properties should come to an end on her death, that all these properties in their entirety should thereafter be enjoyed as absolute owners by his daughter and her heirs with powers of alienation, gift, exchange and sale from generation to generation. He wished to make his daughter a fresh stock of descent so that her issue, male or female, may have the benefit of his property. They were the real persons whom he earmarked with certainty as the ultimate recipients of his bounty. In express terms he conferred on his daughter powers of alienation by way of gift, exchange, sale, but in sharp contrast to this, on his widow he conferred no such powers. The direction to her was that she should enjoy the entire properties including the outstandings etc. and these shall thereafter pass to her daughters. Though no restraint in express terms was put on her powers of alienation in case of necessity, even that limited power was not given to her in express terms. If the testator had before his minds eye his daughter and her heirs as the ultimate beneficiaries of his bounty, that intention could only be achieved by giving to the widow a limited estate, because by conferring a full Hindu widows estate on her the daughter will, only have a mere spas successions under the Hindu law which may or may not mature and under the will her interest would only be a contingent one in what was left indisposed of by the widow. It is significant that the testator did not say in the will that the daughter will enjoy only the properties left undisposed of by the widow. The extent of the grant, so far as the properties mentioned in the schedule are concerned, to the daughter and the widow is the same. Just as the widow was directed to enjoy the entire properties mentioned in the schedule during her lifetime in like manner the daughter and her heirs were also directed to enjoy the same properties with absolute rights from generation to generation. They could not enjoy the same properties in the manner directed if the widow had a full Hindu widows estate and had the power for any purpose to dispose of them and did so. If that was the intention, the testator would clearly have said that the daughter would only take the properties remaining after the death of thewas held that Suraj took only a life estate under the will, with remainder over to Mahalaxmi after her death and the bequest to Mahalaxmi was not contingent on her surviving Suraj, but that she took a vested remainder which upon her death passed to herconsidering the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the opinion that no sufficient grounds have been made out for disturbing the unanimous opinion of the two courts below on the construction of this will. Both the learned counsel eventually conceded that the language used in the will was consistent with the testators intention of conferring a life estate in the English sense as well as with the intention of conferring a Hindu widows estate. It was, however, urged by Mr. Rajah Iyer that as no express or implied power of alienation for purposes of all legal necessities was conferred on the widow, that circumstance negatived the view that the testator intended to confer upon his widow a Hindu widows estate as she would get in case of intestacy. He also emphasized that the words of the gift over to the daughter as supporting his construction which was further reinforced by the words of the will limiting the widows estate "till your lifetime" and of the omission from therein of words such as malik etc., while describing the widows estate. Mr. Krishnaswami Iyengar, on the other hand, contended that the absence of any words in the will restricting her powers of alienation and putting a restraint on them, suggested a contrary intention and that the daughters estate was described as coming into being after the estate of the widow and was not conferred on her simultaneously with the widow, and this connoted according to the notions of Hindus a full Hindu widows estate.