Case: M.P. Rural Agrl.Extension Offrs.Asson Vs. State Of M.P.

equal work is applicable among equals, it cannot be applied to un-equals. Relief to an aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for equal work can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the court that invidious discrimination is practised by the State in prescribing two different scales for the two classes of employees without there being any reasonable classification for the same. If the aggrieved employees fail to demonstrate discrimination, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be enforced by court in abstract. The question what scale should be provided to a particular class of service must be left to the executive and only when discrimination is practised amongst the equals, the court should intervene to undo the wrong, and to ensure equality among the similarly placed employees. The court however cannot prescribe equal scales of pay for different class of employees. 19. A Bench of three Judges in which two of us were parties reiterated the same principle in Taun K. Roy and others (supra). 20. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that deposit the fact that the employees have been performing similar duties and functions and their posts are interchangeable, a valid classification can be made on the basis of their educational qualification. The observation of Krishna Iyer, J., in V. Balasubramanyam (supra) although is interesting but it appears that the fact of the matter involved therein did not warrant application of the said principle. 21. The view of Subba Rao, J., in Lachhman Dass vs. State of Punjab and others (AIR 1963 SC 222 ) was a minority view., Venkatarama Aiyar, J., therein speaking for the majority held: .. The law is now well settled that while Art. 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation directed against one individual or class of individuals, it does not forbid reasonable classification, and that for this purpose even one person or group of persons can be a class. Professor Willis says in his Constitutional Law p.580 a law applying to one person or one class or persons is constitutional if there is sufficient basis or reason for it. This statement of the law was approved by this Court in Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India, 1950 SCR 869. (AIR 1951 SC 41 ). There the question was whether a law providing for the management and control by the Government of a named company, the Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company Ltd., was bad as offending Art. 14. It was held that even a single Company might, having regard to its features, be a category in itself and that unless it was shown that there were other Companies similarly circumstanced, the legislation must be presumed to be constitutional and the attack under Art. 14 must fail. In Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. S.R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 at p. 297: (AIR 1958 SC 538 at p. 547) this Court again examined in great detail this scope of Art. 14, and in enunciating the principles applicable in deciding whether a law is in contravention of that Article observed: that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others that single individual may be treated as class by himself. 22. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, a valid classification based on educational qualification for the purpose of grant of pay has been upheld by the Constitution Bench of this Court in P. Narasinga Rao (supra). 23. In B. Basavalingappa (supra) , a two-judge Bench of this Court did not notice the earlier binding precedents of this Court. In fact one of them, K.N. Singh, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, a party to the subsequent decision in Mewa Ram Kanojia (supra). In that case no material was brought on records on the basis of which it could be contended that there was any substantial difference at that time between the two classifications although they were described differently. It was in that situation observed: ... It was argued that a diploma is a higher qualification than a certificate. But neither there is any curriculum on record nor any other material to draw that inference. On the contrary this circumstance that at the time when respondent was recruited a diploma holder or a certificate holder both were entitled to be recruited as an Instructor on the same pay scale indicates that in those days the two were considered to be alike. 24. In Pramod Bhartiya (supra), Jeevan Reddy, J. categorically held that burden to prove that a discrimination has been committed is upon the petitioners. In that case petitioners failed to discharge their burden. 25. Yet again in Shyam Babu Verma (supra), N.P. Singh, J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench observed: .. The nature of work may be more or less the same but scale of pay may vary based on academic qualification or experience which justifies classification. The principles of equal pay for equal work should not be applied in a mechanical or casual manner. Classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable. In equality of the men in different groups excludes applicability of the principle of equal pay for equal work to them... 26. True it may be that when recommendations are made by a Pay Commission, evaluation of job must be held to have been made but the same by itself may not be a ground to enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto and made rules to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot be said to arbitrary or discriminatory. 27. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made for our interference with the impugned judgment.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is trite that the Pay Commission on or about 13.10.1982 and in the year 1999 desired and recommended that the same scale of pay be given to the Extension Officers irrespective of their educational qualification, but it is not in dispute that the recommendations of the Pay Commission were not accepted by the State. The relevant portion of the recommendations of the Pay Commission and the order of the State GovernmentAlthough the Pay Commission is considered to be an expert body, the State in its wisdom an in furtherance of a valid policy decision may or may not accept its recommendations. The State in exercise of of its jurisdiction conferred upon it by the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India can unilaterally make or amend the conditions of service of its employees by framing appropriate rules. The State in terms of the said provision is also entitled to give a retrospective effect thereto. A policy decision had been adopted by the State that the post of Extension Officers shall be filled up only by graduates. Such a policy decision ex facie cannot be termed to be arbitrary or irrational attracting the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution of India14. Article 14, it is trite, does not forbid a reasonable classification. 15. Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification subject to the conditions that it is based on an intelligible differentia and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieve16. Constitutional interpretation is a difficult task. Its concept varies from statute to statute, fact to fact, situation to situation and subject matter to subject matter. A classification based on educational qualification has been applied by a Constitution Bench of this Court as far back as in 1968 in P. Narasinga Rao (supra), wherein it was observed: It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated. Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of the general rule of equality laid down in Art. 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured, Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection26. True it may be that when recommendations are made by a Pay Commission, evaluation of job must be held to have been made but the same by itself may not be a ground to enforce the recommendations by issuing a writ of or in the nature of mandamus although the State did not accept the same in toto and made rules to the contrary by evolving a policy decision which cannot be said to arbitrary or discriminatory. 27. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made for our interference with the impugned judgment.