Case: Mirdad and Others Vs. Board of Revenue and Others

after obtaining a decision of the Board of Revenue on the rights of the parties. In the records, the defendants respondents were shown as "Adhivasis" and they have continued to be so recorded.7. In 1958, Smt. Bhagwani applied to the Sub-Divisional Officer for correction of consolidation records, but, this application was dismissed on August 12, 1959, on the ground that the village had been de-notified on November 1, 1958, under Section 52 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, so that no jurisdiction was left for correction in the course of consolidation proceedings. He took the view that the remedy, if any, of the aggrieved parties, lay only through a declaration of rights by a competent Court. In other words, what was entered in revenue records in the course of consolidation proceedings could only be corrected, if at all, on the results of a regular trial and decision by an appropriate authority.8. The area of the contest between the two sides was then shifted to compensation proceedings under Chapter IX-A of the Act where Smt. Bhagwani had objected that the respondents should have been entered only as "Asamis" and not as "Adhivasis". These objections were rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer on July 11, 1960. An appeal against that, and then a second appeal filed by Smt. Bhagwani against the appellate Courts order were dismissed on merits. After that, Smt. Bhagwani had filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court. Shri Kesho Ram and then his transferees had continued this litigation on behalf of Smt. Bhagwani who died on November 27, 1962. The writ petition of Smt. Bhagwani was dismissed on September 19, 1962. That dismissal by a learned single Judge was the subject-matter of what is known as a "Special Appeal" in the Allahabad High Court which was heard and dismissed by a Division Bench on January 18, 1972. The judgment of that bench is under appeal before us.9. It appears that Smt. Bhagwani and her adopted son Kesho Ram had filed another suit also for the ejectment of the defendants under Section 202/209 of the Act. This was decreed by the trial Court and this decree was affirmed by the Additional Commissioner on appeal on September 11, 1967, against which the defendants had gone up to the Board of Revenue in second appeal. That second appeal was placed before the Board of Revenue together with an earlier appeal. The Board of Revenue held, by its order dated July 30, 1970, that findings in proceedings under Chapter IX-A were material and admissible for purposes of deciding questions of right in regular suits. It, however, stayed the hearing of this appeal as well as another appeal pending before it in connected proceedings the nature of which is not quite clear to us as the record is not before us. It is, however, clear that the stay order of the Board of Revenue was intended to operate only during the pendency of the two special appeals which were heard together by the High Court and disposed of by the judgment under appeal now before us. It is also clear from the judgment under appeal that the learned for the appellants before us had challenged the findings recorded in Chapter IX-A by the Board of Revenue whereas the learned Counsel for the respondents had submitted that the Revenue Courts had no jurisdiction at all to decide, in compensation proceedings under Chapter IX-A of the Act, whether a person is an "Adhivasis" or "Asami" and hence, Smt. Bhagwanis objection in those proceedings, raising a question of right of title, was not maintainable at all.10. In Sukhram Singh v. Smt. Harbheji (1969) 3 SCR 752 : (1969) 1 SCC 609 ), this Court held that compensation proceedings, under Section 240H contained in Chapter IX-A of the Act, could, in accordance with the procedure for reference on a question of title, cover also decisions on questions of right.11. On the special facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court sent for all the records, in various proceedings, from the Board of Revenue and took upon itself to dispose them of after deciding the crucial and decisive question on which the parties were at issue according to amended provisions of Section 21(1) (h) of the Act. The decision of the High Court was in line with the view of this Court in Sukhram Singhs case. As the decision of the High Court was correct on merits on the decisive question, the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that only the Board itself could set aside its own remand order and that the amended law could not be taken into account by authorities subordinate to it does not seem to us to be substantial enough to deserve consideration as a ground of interference under the exceptional powers of this Court under Article 136. Even if any objections could be taken to the propriety of the procedure adopted by the High Court in sending for all the records of connected matters also pending before the Board of Revenue, by consent of both sides, and deciding them with others before it in order to put an end to an unnecessarily long and tortuous litigation, we cannot be induced to interfere. Apart from the fact that applications for writs of certiorari can sometimes be made to remove proceedings from one Court to another, the unusual procedure adopted does not affect the merits of the case on what is really decisive. We think that the High Court had rightly applied the amended law to patent facts of the case on the finding the Smt. Bhagwanis husband was not disabled so that she had lost the right to regain possession. The defendants respondents had also been in possession long enough to acquire immunity from eviction at the instance of Smt. Bhagwani or her representatives in interest who had slept over their rights too long to be permitted to registrate the question again after ten years from July 11, 1956.12.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. On the special facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court sent for all the records, in various proceedings, from the Board of Revenue and took upon itself to dispose them of after deciding the crucial and decisive question on which the parties were at issue according to amended provisions of Section 21(1) (h) of the Act. The decision of the High Court was in line with the view of this Court in Sukhram Singhs case. As the decision of the High Court was correct on merits on the decisive question, the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants that only the Board itself could set aside its own remand order and that the amended law could not be taken into account by authorities subordinate to it does not seem to us to be substantial enough to deserve consideration as a ground of interference under the exceptional powers of this Court under Article 136. Even if any objections could be taken to the propriety of the procedure adopted by the High Court in sending for all the records of connected matters also pending before the Board of Revenue, by consent of both sides, and deciding them with others before it in order to put an end to an unnecessarily long and tortuous litigation, we cannot be induced to interfere. Apart from the fact that applications for writs of certiorari can sometimes be made to remove proceedings from one Court to another, the unusual procedure adopted does not affect the merits of the case on what is really decisive. We think that the High Court had rightly applied the amended law to patent facts of the case on the finding the Smt. Bhagwanis husband was not disabled so that she had lost the right to regain possession. The defendants respondents had also been in possession long enough to acquire immunity from eviction at the instance of Smt. Bhagwani or her representatives in interest who had slept over their rights too long to be permitted to registrate the question again after ten years from July 11, 1956.