Case: Central India Coalfields Ltd. Calcutta Vs. Ram Bilas Shobnath

where the respondent had to discharge his duties. The tribunal was inclined to hold that the respondent could have been punished under Standing Order No. 37 provided his case fell under Standing Order No. 32. It was on this technical objection that the tribunal refused to approve the dismissal of the respondent. The appellant contends that the tribunal has erred in law in refusing to accord its approval to the respondents dismissal.5. It is common ground that quarters are provided by the appellant to its employees and they are situated on the coal bearing area at a distance of about 200 feet from the pit-mouth according to the appellant and at a distance of 2000 feet according to the respondent. Standing Order No. 29(5) provides that drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour constitutes misconduct which entails dismissal. Normally this Standing Order would apply to the behaviour on the premises where the workmen discharge their duties and during the hours of their work. It may also be conceded that if a quarrel takes place between workmen outside working hours and away from the coal premises that would be a private matter which may not fall within Standing Order No. 29(5); but in the special circumstances of this case it is clear that the incident took place in the quarters at a short distance from the coal bearing area and the conduct of the respondent which is proved clearly amounts both to drunkenness as well as riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour. In fact, as the enquiry officer in substance has found, unless the appellant took some action against the respondent, breach of peace was threatened and that is not a matter which complacence. Besides, if the tribunal thought as it appears to have done that since the incident happened in the companys quarters the management could take action provided the respondents case fell under Standing Order No. 32 read with Standing Order No. 37, it need not have allowed considerations of this character to influence its final decision particularly when the extent of its jurisdiction under S. 33(2)(b) was very limited. This is not a case where any mala fides can be attributed to the appellant or it can be said that the dismissal amounts to unfair labour practice. In the circumstances of this case the order of dismissal passed by the appellant against the respondent appears to be a straightforward matter and the tribunal may well have resisted the temptation of examining the validity of the said order in such a technical way. Besides, as we have already indicated, having regard to the special circumstances of this case we are not satisfied that the tribunal was right in holding that Standing Order No. 29(5) was inapplicable.6. It has been urged before us by Mr. Dipak Choudhri, on behalf of the respondent, that the enquiry held against the respondent was improper in that a formal charge-sheet was not served to him; and he also attempted to argue that the dismissal of the respondent is intended to victimise him because he is an active trade union worker. We are not impressed by either of the two arguments. The enquiry proceedings show that the officer told the respondent clearly what the complaint against him was. The complaint was in fact read out to him and, as we have already indicated, the respondents companion admitted the truth of the complaint made in the statement. It does not appear that the respondent wanted to cross-examine any of the parties who had complained against him and that an opportunity was refused to him so to do. It is abundantly clear from the record that in substance the respondent himself admitted all the facts though the pretended that he was too drunk and therefore did not remember what had really happened at the time. Therefore, this is not a case where there is any dispute as to the incident itself, and so the objection that the enquiry was improper cannot be sustained. Besides, it is significant that no such point was raised before the tribunal itself by the respondents representative. It is not possible for us to allow Mr. Choudhri to raise a point of mala fides for the first time in this appeal. That is a question of fact on which no material has been adduced by the respondent either before the enquiry officer or before the tribunal.7. Then Mr. Choudhri contended that the tribunal was justified in not approving the dismissal because the dismissal is an unduly sever punishment in this case. There are two obvious answers to this argument. In an enquiry under S. 33(2)(b) normally it is not open to the tribunal to consider whether the sentence proposed is unduly severe or not. Such a consideration may be relevant in dealing with an industrial dispute; and what is more important in this case,-the previous conduct of the respondent which the appellants Manager legitimately took into account more than justifies the respondents dismissal. The several occasions on which the respondent had been warned for his misconduct of one kind or another make a formidable reading. On most of the occasions he pleaded guilty, apologised and promised to behave better. Sometimes he put up a plea in defence and asked the appellant what difference did it make to the appellant if he was drunk provided his work was not affected. Even so the proceedings ended with a warning every time; and the last incident which gave rise to the present enquiry showed that the respondent had made a nuisance of himself to his co-workmen who bluntly told the appellant that in case serious action was not taken against the respondent it would be difficult for them to tolerate his misbehaviour which in effect conveyed their determination to teach him a lesson. That would obviously have meant disturbance of the peace. It is difficult to appreciate why the tribunal should have found it difficult to approve the dismissal of the respondent in such a case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. It is common ground that quarters are provided by the appellant to its employees and they are situated on the coal bearing area at a distance of about 200 feet from theaccording to the appellant and at a distance of 2000 feet according to the respondent. Standing Order No. 29(5) provides that drunkenness, fighting, riotous or disorderly or indecent behaviour constitutes misconduct which entails dismissal. Normally this Standing Order would apply to the behaviour on the premises where the workmen discharge their duties and during the hours of their work. It may also be conceded that if a quarrel takes place between workmen outside working hours and away from the coal premises that would be a private matter which may not fall within Standing Order No. 29(5); but in the special circumstances of this case it is clear that the incident took place in the quarters at a short distance from the coal bearing area and the conduct of the respondent which is proved clearly amounts both to drunkenness as well as riotous, disorderly and indecent behaviour. In fact, as the enquiry officer in substance has found, unless the appellant took some action against the respondent, breach of peace was threatened and that is not a matter which complacence. Besides, if the tribunal thought as it appears to have done that since the incident happened in the companys quarters the management could take action provided the respondents case fell under Standing Order No. 32 read with Standing Order No. 37, it need not have allowed considerations of this character to influence its final decision particularly when the extent of its jurisdiction under S. 33(2)(b) was very limited. This is not a case where any mala fides can be attributed to the appellant or it can be said that the dismissal amounts to unfair labour practice. In the circumstances of this case the order of dismissal passed by the appellant against the respondent appears to be a straightforward matter and the tribunal may well have resisted the temptation of examining the validity of the said order in such a technical way. Besides, as we have already indicated, having regard to the special circumstances of this case we are not satisfied that the tribunal was right in holding that Standing Order No. 29(5) was inapplicable.It has been urged before us by Mr. Dipak Choudhri, on behalf of the respondent, that the enquiry held against the respondent was improper in that a formalwas not served to him; and he also attempted to argue that the dismissal of the respondent is intended to victimise him because he is an active trade union worker.We are not impressed by either of the two arguments. The enquiry proceedings show that the officer told the respondent clearly what the complaint against him was. The complaint was in fact read out to him and, as we have already indicated, the respondents companion admitted the truth of the complaint made in the statement. It does not appear that the respondent wanted toany of the parties who had complained against him and that an opportunity was refused to him so to do. It is abundantly clear from the record that in substance the respondent himself admitted all the facts though the pretended that he was too drunk and therefore did not remember what had really happened at the time. Therefore, this is not a case where there is any dispute as to the incident itself, and so the objection that the enquiry was improper cannot be sustained. Besides, it is significant that no such point was raised before the tribunal itself by the respondents representative. It is not possible for us to allow Mr. Choudhri to raise a point of mala fides for the first time in this appeal. That is a question of fact on which no material has been adduced by the respondent either before the enquiry officer or before the tribunal.7.Then Mr. Choudhri contended that the tribunal was justified in not approving the dismissal because the dismissal is an unduly sever punishment in this case.There are two obvious answers to this argument. In an enquiry under S. 33(2)(b) normally it is not open to the tribunal to consider whether the sentence proposed is unduly severe or not. Such a consideration may be relevant in dealing with an industrial dispute; and what is more important in thisprevious conduct of the respondent which the appellants Manager legitimately took into account more than justifies the respondents dismissal. The several occasions on which the respondent had been warned for his misconduct of one kind or another make a formidable reading. On most of the occasions he pleaded guilty, apologised and promised to behave better. Sometimes he put up a plea in defence and asked the appellant what difference did it make to the appellant if he was drunk provided his work was not affected. Even so the proceedings ended with a warning every time; and the last incident which gave rise to the present enquiry showed that the respondent had made a nuisance of himself to hiswho bluntly told the appellant that in case serious action was not taken against the respondent it would be difficult for them to tolerate his misbehaviour which in effect conveyed their determination to teach him a lesson. That would obviously have meant disturbance of the peace. It is difficult to appreciate why the tribunal should have found it difficult to approve the dismissal of the respondent in such a case.