Case: National Radio Corporation Vs. Their Workmen

the appellant to post back the said eight workmen to the factory at Moti Nagar, Najafgarh Road, and allow them to work in their respective posts as before. It is against this award that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.8. Mr. Rameshwar Nath for the appellant argued that the principal point on which wanted a decision from this Court was in regard to the power of the appellant to transfer its employees from the Moti Nagar factory to the new factory at Nangloi. He contends that the view taken by the tribunal about the scope and effect of the relevant standing order 7(c)(a) is erroneous. We do not propose to decide this point in the present appeal because, in our opinion, the other finding recorded by the tribunal that the impugned transfers amount to victimization is enough to dispose of the present appeal. We are, therefore, not expressing any opinion of the correctness or the validity of the conclusion recorded by the tribunal about the scope and effect of the said standing order. In fact, we are dealing with the present appeal on the assumption that the appellant has the power to transfer its employees from one factory to another.Turning then to the finding about mala fides recorded by the tribunal, Mr. Rameshwar Nath attempted to argue that the said finding is not supported by any evidence. In the alternative, he urged that it is perverse. We do not think there is any substance in either of the two pleas thus raised by Mr. Rameshwar Nath. The tribunal has elaborately examined the oral evidence led both by the respondents and the appellant. It has considered the documents on which the respondents relied and it has come to the conclusion that the oral evidence led by the employees is more reliable than that led on behalf of the appellant. That is a pure matter of appreciating evidence and the appellant is not entitled to ask this Court to reappreciate the said evidence in an appeal under Art. 136. The evidence which the tribunal has believed shows that the relations between the appellant and the sangh have been strained for considerable time past and that the appellants manager told some of the employees under orders of transfer that the transfer orders would be revoked if they resigned from the sangh. Besides, there are two other facts which have been found by the tribunal that strongly corroborate its conclusions about the mala fides of the transfers. It appears that the first transfer order was passed on 7 January, 1961 (Ex. M. 23) and it would be recalled that licence was given for expansion to the appellant on 16 January, 1961. It is thus clear that the first order of transfer was passed even before the licence for expansion was obtained. It is suggested that the transfer was made in anticipation of obtaining a licence. That, in our opinion, cannot be accepted as a sensible explanation. Besides, the tribunal was not satisfied that at that time any machinery had been purchased by the appellant for the new factory at all and so, it held that at least the first transfer order was passed not bona fide, but with a view to teach a lesson to the employees concerned.The other fact found by the tribunal is that as a result of the struggle which was going on between the appellant and the members of the sangh, the appellant deliberately held out a threat of closing down the factory, and so, put up a notice of closure (Ex. W. 10). The appellants denied that such a notice was put up on the board and in fact, it examined Baz Singh to show that no such notice was types and it was only types notices that were put on the notice board. The tribunal has disbelieved this evidence and has accepted the story of the respondents that such notice was put up on the notice board; as a result of the tension between the sangh and the management, the only object of doing so was to threaten the sangh.9. It also appears that the appellant had sent an advertisement to the Hindustan Times purporting to put its undertaking for sale. This was another attempt made by the appellant to frighten its employees. The explanation given on behalf of the appellant was that the proprietor found that the concern was in financial difficulties, and so, he was thinking of winding it up and going abroad. This explanation also has been rejected by the tribunal. The tribunal has observed that it is not shown that the proprietor had applied for a passport, and the documentary evidence shows that his story, that the business was running in loss, is absolutely untrue. Fortunately, the factory has made very good progress. The number of its workmen has increased from 24 to 200 in three years between 1957 and 1960 and during the same period, its turnover has shown as remarkable progress. Thus, it would be seen that these two facts strongly corroborate the conclusion of the tribunal that the appellant was not acting bona fide when it purported to issue orders of transfer in question. As we have already said, the appellant cannot challenge the correctness or propriety of these findings of fact in its appeal under Art. 136; and the contention that these findings are not supported by any evidence, or, in the alternative, are perverse, is patently ill-founded.The result is that the award of the tribunal is confirmed on the basis of the finding of the tribunal that the impugned transfers amounted to victimization and were the result of unfair labour practice. There can be no doubt that even if the appellant has the right to transfer its employees from one factory to another, the present transfers cannot be justified because they have not been effected bona fide for ordinary, normal reason of trade or business, but have been the result of an unfair labour practice.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We do not propose to decide this point in the present appeal because, in our opinion, the other finding recorded by the tribunal that the impugned transfers amount to victimization is enough to dispose of the present appeal. We are, therefore, not expressing any opinion of the correctness or the validity of the conclusion recorded by the tribunal about the scope and effect of the said standing order. In fact, we are dealing with the present appeal on the assumption that the appellant has the power to transfer its employees from one factory totribunal has elaborately examined the oral evidence led both by the respondents and the appellant. It has considered the documents on which the respondents relied and it has come to the conclusion that the oral evidence led by the employees is more reliable than that led on behalf of the appellant. That is a pure matter of appreciating evidence and the appellant is not entitled to ask this Court to reappreciate the said evidence in an appeal under Art. 136. The evidence which the tribunal has believed shows that the relations between the appellant and the sangh have been strained for considerable time past and that the appellants manager told some of the employees under orders of transfer that the transfer orders would be revoked if they resigned from the sangh. Besides, there are two other facts which have been found by the tribunal that strongly corroborate its conclusions about the mala fides of the transfers. It appears that the first transfer order was passed on 7 January, 1961 (Ex. M. 23) and it would be recalled that licence was given for expansion to the appellant on 16 January, 1961. It is thus clear that the first order of transfer was passed even before the licence for expansion was obtained. It is suggested that the transfer was made in anticipation of obtaining a licence. That, in our opinion, cannot be accepted as a sensible explanation. Besides, the tribunal was not satisfied that at that time any machinery had been purchased by the appellant for the new factory at all and so, it held that at least the first transfer order was passed not bona fide, but with a view to teach a lesson to the employees concerned.The other fact found by the tribunal is that as a result of the struggle which was going on between the appellant and the members of the sangh, the appellant deliberately held out a threat of closing down the factory, and so, put up a notice of closure (Ex. W. 10). The appellants denied that such a notice was put up on the board and in fact, it examined Baz Singh to show that no such notice was types and it was only types notices that were put on the notice board. The tribunal has disbelieved this evidence and has accepted the story of the respondents that such notice was put up on the notice board; as a result of the tension between the sangh and the management, the only object of doing so was to threaten the sangh.9. It also appears that the appellant had sent an advertisement to the Hindustan Times purporting to put its undertaking for sale. This was another attempt made by the appellant to frighten its employees. The explanation given on behalf of the appellant was that the proprietor found that the concern was in financial difficulties, and so, he was thinking of winding it up and going abroad. This explanation also has been rejected by the tribunal. The tribunal has observed that it is not shown that the proprietor had applied for a passport, and the documentary evidence shows that his story, that the business was running in loss, is absolutely untrue. Fortunately, the factory has made very good progress. The number of its workmen has increased from 24 to 200 in three years between 1957 and 1960 and during the same period, its turnover has shown as remarkable progress. Thus, it would be seen that these two facts strongly corroborate the conclusion of the tribunal that the appellant was not acting bona fide when it purported to issue orders of transfer in question. As we have already said, the appellant cannot challenge the correctness or propriety of these findings of fact in its appeal under Art. 136; and the contention that these findings are not supported by any evidence, or, in the alternative, are perverse, is patentlyresult is that the award of the tribunal is confirmed on the basis of the finding of the tribunal that the impugned transfers amounted to victimization and were the result of unfair labour practice. There can be no doubt that even if the appellant has the right to transfer its employees from one factory to another, the present transfers cannot be justified because they have not been effected bona fide for ordinary, normal reason of trade or business, but have been the result of an unfair labour practice.