Case: Sri Vijaylakshmi Rice Mills, New Contractors Company Etc Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh

submission, counsel has contended that as the prices fixed by the Government are me ant for the entire season, the appellants have to be paid at the controlled price as fixed vide the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964, regardless of the dates an which the supplies were made. We cannot accede to this contention. It is no doubt true that the literal meaning of the word "substitute" is "to replace but the question before us is from which date the substitution or replacement of the new Schedule took effect. There is no deeming clause or some such provision in the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964 to indicate that it was intended to have a retrospective effect. It is a well recognized rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospectivity, may be inferred, a notification takes effect from the date it is issued and not from any prior date. The principle is also well settled that statutes should not be construed so as to create new disability or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the Amending Act came into force. (See Mani Gopal Mitra v. The State of Bihar.4. The aforesaid sales in the instant cases having been made by the appellants before the coming into force of the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964, and the property in the goods having passed to the Government of Andhra Pradesh on the dates the supplies were made, t he appellants had to be paid only at the controlled price obtaining on the dates the sales were effected and not at the increased price which came into operation subsequently. This view is in consonance with the provisions of section 3 of the Act and the Andhra Pradesh Rice Procurement (Levy) order, 1959 which clearly indicate that the price payable to the dealers and Millers for the supplies of rice made by them is the control price obtaining on the date when the sale is made. Similar view is taken in the unreported decision dated April 20, 1962 of this Court in K. Appayya Shambhague and Co. v. The State of Mysore &Anr. where it was laid down that the order made under section 3(2) (f) of the Act are offers of sale which the person on whom a requisition is served has no option but to accept and that the price that has to be paid is the controlled price fixed by the Government under section 3(2) (c) of the Act on the date when he goods are ascertain ed or when the property in the goods passes to the buyer. This decision was followed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in The Union of India, represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi v. Kanuri Damodariah &Co. Alluri Venkatanarasiah, where it was held that an order under section 3(2) (f) amounts to an agreement for sale and the price payable for the quantities of rice supplied is a price payable in accordance with the price notified under the provisions of section 3(3) of the Act.In the instant cases, the sale having been made before the coming into force of the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964, the appellants cannot justifiably claim the benefit of the increased price specified in the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964. The acceptance of the contention raised on behalf of the appellants will lead to grave consequences. It will have the effect of reopening the transactions past and closed and would thus give rise to lots of difficulties.5. Mr. Nariman has, in support of his contention, relied on the following passage occurring at p. 394 in Craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edition):-"Explanatory and declaratory Acts retrospectiveWhere a Statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, or, as Parke J. (afterwards Baron Parke) said in R. V. Dursley (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 465, 469 "to `explain a former statute, " the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. Thus in Att.-Gen v. Poughtt (1816) 2 Price 381, 392, it appeared that by a Customs Act of 187 3 (53 Geo. 3, c. 33) a duty was imposed upon hides of 9s. 4d., but the Act omitted to state that it was to be 9s. 4d. per cwt., and to remedy this omission another Customs Act 53 Geo. c. 105) was passed later in the same y ear. Between the passing of these two Acts some hides were exported, and it was contended that they were not liable to pay the duty 9s. 4d. per cwt., but Thomson C. B., in giving judgment for the Attorney General, said: "The duty in this instant was in fact imposed by the first Act, but the gross mistakes of the omission of the weight for which the sum expressed was to have been payable occasioned the amendment made by the subsequent Act, but that had reference to the former statute as soon as it passed, and they must be taken together as if they were one and the same Act."Where an Act is in its nature declaratory, the presumption against construing it retrospectively is inapplicable."6. This passage has, in our opinion, no bearing on the question before us in view of the fact that the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964 is neither explanatory nor declaratory, as sought to be interpreted by the counsel.7. The contention of Mr. Nariman that the controlled prices fixed by the Central Government for sale of rice are seasonal prices not being based upon any cogent material cannot also be accepted.8. The High Court was, therefore, right in allowing the aforesaid appeals preferred by the respondent and reversing the judgment and decrees passed by the Subordinate Judge, Machilipatnam.9.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We cannot accede to this contention. It is no doubt true that the literal meaning of the word "substitute" is "to replace but the question before us is from which date the substitution or replacement of the new Schedule took effect. There is no deeming clause or some such provision in the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) order, 1964 to indicate that it was intended to have a retrospective effect. It is a well recognized rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospectivity, may be inferred, a notification takes effect from the date it is issued and not from any prior date. The principle is also well settled that statutes should not be construed so as to create new disability or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the Amending Act came intocontention of Mr. Nariman that the controlled prices fixed by the Central Government for sale of rice are seasonal prices not being based upon any cogent material cannot also beHigh Court was, therefore, right in allowing the aforesaid appeals preferred by the respondent and reversing the judgment and decrees passed by the Subordinate Judge, Machilipatnam.