Case: State Of U.P Vs. Dr. Rajinder Prakash Mittal

been gaining momentum day by day and ultimately on the ill fated night it had culminated to this occurrence. 37. The next point for our consideration is whether the respondent was present in the house in the early morning of the day of occurrence or whether he had gone out of the house to treat a patient. In other words, whether the defence of alibi is true or not. PW-2 states that he saw the respondent even at 7.15 a.m. when he had been to the scene house carrying snacks in a basket. PW-4, the Head Constable was the first official to go to the scene house by chance on seeing a crowd which was attracted by the acrid smoke, emanating from the bed room. He testifies to the fact that at the time when he went to the house at about 8.00 a.m. he found the respondent standing inside the room in his night dress and quarrelling with PW-2 over the death of the deceased. PW-3, the Superintendent of Police, arrived at the scene at about 9.15 a.m. and found the respondent present. Thus, the evidence of PWs 2 to 4 positively establishes the fact that the respondent was very much present in the scene house, even in the early morning, falsifying his plea of alibi. 38. The case of the respondent that PW-2 and his brother arrived at the scene only at 11.15 a.m., that too on his information is belied by the testimony of PWs 4 and 10. The evidence of PW-4 is that PW-2 and his brother were found in the scene house even at 8.00 a.m. PW-10 has deposed that baskets containing snacks and sweets were lying scattered in the courtyard even at 8.30 a.m. which basket is stated to have been brought by PW-2. 39. If the respondent had returned from home after paying a visit to his patient by 8.00 a.m., as he now claims, he would not have been found in his night dress. The very fact that he was standing in his night dress at 8.00 a.m. demonstrably shows that the respondent had not left the house on his professional visit but he was very much present in the house. PW-6 (who was in service under the respondent for 4 year) and PW-9 who claims to have taken the respondent to attend on one Shashi have been treated as hostile witnesses. CWs 1 and 2, who support the defence theory are none other than the mother and brother of the respondent whose testimony is highly tainted. On a careful scanning of their evidence, we hold that no safe reliance could be placed on their testimony especially in view of the overwhelming circumstantial evidence falsifying their statements supporting the plea of alibi. 40. On an overall survey of the evidence, we are in full agreement with the observation of the Trial Court, holding that "his explanation that he was not present in the house at the time is patently false". The High Court has placed much reliance on the evidence of not only CWs 1 and 2 but also of the hostile witnesses PWs 6 and 9 for holding that the respondent was not in the house in the early morning, which finding of the High Court is absolutely untenable and in utter disregard of the evidence.41. Even though we are not finding the respondent guilty solely on his false explanation, yet that explanation assumes much significance because it is for the respondent to come forward with an acceptable and plausible explanation explaining the circumstances under which the deceased had met with her end, since, in our considered opinion, the respondent was in the company of his wife on the previous night and was found in the bed room in the early morning.42. Though the respondent has deliberately feigned ignorance and incredibly denied his complicity, the overwhelming persuasive circumstances attending the case and the crucial inculpatory evidence bear chilling testimony unmistakably proving the gruesome offence of murder and its diabolical execution and unerringly establishing the guilt of the respondent beyond all reasonable doubts.43. For all the reasons stated above, we, on our independent appraisal and evaluation of the evidence in accordance with the principle laid down in Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT 1992(1) SC 258 unhesitatingly hold that the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court is logical, tenable, and reasonably sustainable and that the High Court after holding that the death of the deceased was homicidal has gone wrong in recording the impugned order of acquittal on erroneous and incredulous reasons. Hence the judgment of the High Court has become liable to be set aside. 44. Mr. Kohli, the learned counsel finally made a fervent but inexorable plea, submitting that since the occurrence took place in the year 1971 and that more than 14 years have now elapsed since the delivery of the judgment by the High Court in October 1977, this court be pleased not to disturb the finding of acquittal at this length of time. We gave our anxious consideration to the above submission, but we feel that this plea has to be summarily rejected when the facts and the impelling circumstances surrounding the present case cry for justice which in turn demands for awarding proper punishment according to law. In our view, if the impugned judgment of acquittal reversing the well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court, convicting the respondent is affirmed, it will be nothing but a mockery of justice and will also amount to prepetration of gross and irreparable injustice. Moreover, when a judgment appealed against suffers from illegality or manifest error or perversity, warranting an interference at the hands of an Appellate Court in the interest of justice on substantial and compelling reasons, the mere delay in the disposal of the said appeal will never serve as a ground for non- interference and on the other hand, the Appellate Court is duty bound to set at naught the miscarriage of justice.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]36. As regards the motive, the High Court has held that there was nothing to aggravate the situation on the day of the occurrence for the respondent to take this extreme measure of putting her to death. This reasoning of the High Court is quite inconceivable, for the simple reason that there could be no evidence as to what had happened during the night of 11/12th October 1971 as the victim herself is dead. However, as we have discussed in the earlier part of this judgment, all was not well with the spouses and their strained relationship had been gaining momentum day by day and ultimately on the ill fated night it had culminated to this occurrence.On an overall survey of the evidence, we are in full agreement with the observation of the Trial Court, holding that "his explanation that he was not present in the house at the time is patently false". The High Court has placed much reliance on the evidence of not only CWs 1 and 2 but also of the hostile witnesses PWs 6 and 9 for holding that the respondent was not in the house in the early morning, which finding of the High Court is absolutely untenable and in utter disregard of the evidence.41. Even though we are not finding the respondent guilty solely on his false explanation, yet that explanation assumes much significance because it is for the respondent to come forward with an acceptable and plausible explanation explaining the circumstances under which the deceased had met with her end, since, in our considered opinion, the respondent was in the company of his wife on the previous night and was found in the bed room in the early morning.42. Though the respondent has deliberately feigned ignorance and incredibly denied his complicity, the overwhelming persuasive circumstances attending the case and the crucial inculpatory evidence bear chilling testimony unmistakably proving the gruesome offence of murder and its diabolical execution and unerringly establishing the guilt of the respondent beyond all reasonable doubts.43. For all the reasons stated above, we, on our independent appraisal and evaluation of the evidence in accordance with the principle laid down in Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, JT 1992(1) SC 258  unhesitatingly hold that the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court is logical, tenable, and reasonably sustainable and that the High Court after holding that the death of the deceased was homicidal has gone wrong in recording the impugned order of acquittal on erroneous and incredulous reasons. Hence the judgment of the High Court has become liable to be setgave our anxious consideration to the above submission, but we feel that this plea has to be summarily rejected when the facts and the impelling circumstances surrounding the present case cry for justice which in turn demands for awarding proper punishment according to law. In our view, if the impugned judgment of acquittal reversing the well reasoned judgment of the Trial Court, convicting the respondent is affirmed, it will be nothing but a mockery of justice and will also amount to prepetration of gross and irreparable injustice. Moreover, when a judgment appealed against suffers from illegality or manifest error or perversity, warranting an interference at the hands of an Appellate Court in the interest of justice on substantial and compelling reasons, the mere delay in the disposal of the said appeal will never serve as a ground for non- interference and on the other hand, the Appellate Court is duty bound to set at naught the miscarriage of justice.