Case: Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (D) By Lr.  Vs. Ramesh Chandra Agarwal

the winding up of companies.(3) For the purposes of jurisdiction to wind up companies, the expression "registered office" means the place which has longest been the registered office of the company during the six months immediately preceding the presentation of the petition for winding up." 19. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions leaves no manner of doubt that thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court has not been ousted. The civil court, in the instant case, was concerned with the rival claims of the parties as to whether one party has illegally been dispossessed by the other or not. Such a suit, apart from the generally law, would also be maintainable in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In such matters of the court would not be concerned even with the question as to title/ownership of the property. 20. In India, it is title, that a person cannot be forcibly dispossessed except in accordance with law. (See Lallu Yeshwant Singh (dead) by legal representations vs. Rao Jagdish Singh and others AIR 1968 SC 620 at Page 622). 21. In Suvvari Sanyasi Apparao and Another vs. Bodderpalli Lakshminarayana and another (1962) Supp. 1 SCR 8), this Court upon considering the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 observed that the matter relating to ownership of the press is a matter of general law and the Court, thus, must follow that law. It was observed that a declared keeper of the press is not necessarily the owner thereof so as to be able to confer title to the press upon another. 22. The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all dispute of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it is well-settled, would normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil courts jurisdiction is ousted. (See Sahebgouda (dead) by Lrs. and others vs. Ogeppa and others (2003(3) Supreme 13). Even otherwise, the civil courts jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956. 23. In R. Prakasam vs. Sree Narayana Dharma Paripalana Yogam (1980) (50) CC 611), it has been held that: ".... The purpose of s.2(11) read with s.10 is only to enable the shareholders to decide as to which court they should approach for remedy, in respect of that particular matter. It is difficult to construe the definition clause as one conferring jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise; and even s.10 refers only to "the court having jurisdiction under this Act", i.e. where such jurisdiction is conferred by the Act, as under Sections 107, 155, 163(2), 237, 397, 425, etc. In other words, the conferment of jurisdiction on "the court" is not under s.10, but by other provisions of the Act like those enumerated above. If, on the other hand, Sections 2(11) and 10 are construed as not only nominating the courts, but also conferring exclusive jurisdiction on them, the specific provisions in the other sections conferring jurisdiction on the court to deal with the matters covered by them will become redundant. It may be that where the Act specifies the company court as the forum for complaint in respect of a particular matter, the jurisdiction of the civil court would stand ousted to that extent. This depends, as already noticed, on the language of the particular provisions (like Sections 107, 155, 397 and others) and not on Sections 2(11) and 10..." 24. Yet again in Maharaja Exports and Another vs. Apparels Exports Promotional Council (1986 (60) CC 353), the Delhi High Court held: "Under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred. Unlike some statutes, the Companies Act does not contain any express provision barring the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts in matters covered by the provisions of the Act. In certain cases like winding-up of companies, the jurisdiction of civil courts is impliedly barred.Where a person objects to the election of directors and claims a decree for a declaration that he was one of the directors, there is no provision which bars the civil court either expressly or by implication from trying such a suit."In the present suit also, besides other reliefs, the plaintiff has sought a declaration that all the 27 members of the existing executive committee are not entitled to hold the respective offices in view of the judgment of this court and further that the 18 members of the executive committee who have retired by rotation are not entitled to continue in office as members of the executive committee. The judgment, referred to above, fairly and squarely applies to the facts of the present case and there is no reason to oust the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the present suit. Under these circumstances, this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants." 25. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the civil suit was maintainable. In any event, we fail to understand and rather it is strange as to how the High Court while rejecting relief to the original plaintiff, (late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal), granted a similar relief in favour of the first respondent herein.26. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside. The matters are remitted to the Collector/High Court for a fresh decision on merits as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove. 27.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]17. At the outset, we may observe that when a disputed question as regard the right of one partner against the other to file a declaration in terms of the provisions of the Act had arisen for consideration, the High Court was not correct in issuing a subsequent direction in the review petition. Such a jurisdiction the High Court did not have. The conflicting rights of the parties were required to be determined in accordance with law by the statutory authority. Such a dispute, it goes without saying, should be determined as expeditiously as possible inasmuch as the dispute involved rival claims of the parties to the lis to run and manage newspaper business. In any event, while directing the statutory authority to dispose of the matter in accordance with law; it does not stand to any reason as to why a party to the lis was given such liberty so as to file an application for stay of inquiry by the District Magistrate till the disposed of the civil suit particularly when the High Court itself was of the opinion that the suit was not maintainable. We fail to see any reason as to why one party to the lis should be given unfair advantage over another in the matter of enforcement of statutory rights under the said Act. The orders of the High Court are, thus, absolutely contradictory to and inconsistent with each other, and do not stand a moments scrutiny. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside with a direction to the Appellate Board to hear out and dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible but not later than three months from the date of communication of this order. It would be open to the Appellate Board to consider the question of adequately compensating the appellants herein on monetary terms in the event it comes to the conclusion that the appeal was liable to be dismissed.A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions leaves no manner of doubt that thereby the jurisdiction of the civil court has not been ousted. The civil court, in the instant case, was concerned with the rival claims of the parties as to whether one party has illegally been dispossessed by the other or not. Such a suit, apart from the generally law, would also be maintainable in terms of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In such matters of the court would not be concerned even with the question as to title/ownership of the property.The dispute between the parties was eminently a civil dispute and not a dispute under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon the civil courts to determine all dispute of civil nature unless the same is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication. Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision seeking to bar jurisdiction of civil court requires strict interpretation. The court, it iswould normally lean in favour of construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who asserts that the civil courts jurisdiction is ousted. (See Sahebgouda (dead) by Lrs. and others vs. Ogeppa and others (2003(3) Supreme 13). Even otherwise, the civil courts jurisdiction is not completely ousted under the Companies Act, 1956.In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the civil suit was maintainable. In any event, we fail to understand and rather it is strange as to how the High Court while rejecting relief to the original plaintiff, (late Dwarka Prasad Agarwal), granted a similar relief in favour of the first respondent herein.26. The impugned orders are, therefore, set aside. The matters are remitted to the Collector/High Court for a fresh decision on merits as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months, keeping in view the observations made hereinabove.