Case: THE STATE OF GUJARAT Vs. MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH

public servant to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among public servants. Hence, it would be inappropriate to limit the contents of the definition clause by a construction which would be against the spirit of the statute. Bearing in mind this principle, when we consider the case of the appellant, we have no doubt that he is a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. Clause (viii) of Section 2(c) of the present Act makes any person, who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty, to be a public servant. The word office is of indefinite connotation and, in the present context, it would mean a position or place to which certain duties are attached and has an existence which is independent of the persons who fill it. (emphasis supplied) 49. In order to appreciate the amplitude of the word public servant, the relevance of the term public duty cannot be disregarded. Public duty is defined under Section 2(b) of the PC Act, which is reproduced below: 2(b) public duty means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. 50. Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Act indicates that any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at large has any interest is called a public duty. The first explanation to Section 2 further clarifies that any person who falls in any of the categories stated under Section 2 is a public servant whether or not appointed by the government. The second explanation further expands the ambit to include every person who de facto discharges the functions of a public servant, and that he should not be prevented from being brought under the ambit of public servant due to any legal infirmities or technicalities. 51. In the present case, on a prima-facie evaluation of the statements of the Gaurav D. Mehta (the Vice-Chancellor); Mr. Pragneshkumar Rameshbhai Trivedi (account officer of Sumandeep Vidhyapith University) and other witnesses it appears that the present respondent was the final authority with regard to the grant of admission, collection of fees and donation amount. 52. The charge sheet specifically discloses that the respondent allegedly was collecting certain extra amount over the prescribed fees on the pretext of allowing the students to fill up their examination forms. Therefore, paying the respondent the alleged amount was a condition precedent before filling up the forms, to appear for the examinations. Specifically, in the complaint, it was alleged that the respondent had demanded an amount of Rupees Twenty Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused Bharat Savant, failing which the daughter of the complainant would not have been permitted to appear in the examination. In our opinion, the fact that there were a large number of cheques which were found during the raid is more than sufficient to establish a grave suspicion as to the commission of the alleged offence. 53. The respondent has vehemently stressed upon the fact that he is admittedly a trustee of the Sumandeep Charitable Trust and has no connection with the Sumandeep University. But, it ought to be noted that the courts below have failed to analyze the connection between the trust and the University, as well as the relationship of the respondent with the university. Prima facie, a grave suspicion is made out that the respondent was rendering his service by dealing with the students and the examination aspect of the University. But a detailed appreciation of evidence is called for before one can reach a conclusion as to the exact position of the respondent vis-à-vis the University. 54. At this stage, we may note that the jurisdiction of this Court, with regards to Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not be excercised by conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferences. This Court, in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, 1979 (3) SCC 4 , had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 227 CrPC and it held as under: 7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus: If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. The words not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him. 55. Further, in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2010 (9) SCC 368 , this Court, inter alia, observed : 21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge: … (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial…

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]22. There is no gainsaying that nations are built upon trust. It is inevitable that in a democracy one needs to rely on those with power and influence and to trust them of being transparent and fair. There is no doubt that any action which is driven by the self- interest of these powerful individuals, rather than the public interest, destroys that trust. Where this becomes the norm, democracy, the economy and the rule of law, all take a beating, ultimately putting the whole nation at risk. Corrupt societies often spring from the examples set at the highest levels of government, but small-scale corruption can be equally insidious. In this regard, the PC Act was formulated to bring about transparency and honesty in public life, as indicated by its objects and reasons. We need to keep the aforesaid legislative intention in mind while interpreting the provisions of the PC Act24. The golden rule of interpretation for any penal legislation is to interpret the same strictly, unless any constitutional considerations are involved, and in cases of ambiguity, the benefit of the same should enure in favour of the accused. Having said so, we need to clarify that strict interpretation does not necessarily mean literal interpretation in all cases, rather the interpretation should have regards to the genuine import of the words, taken in their usual sense [refer Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1 ]25. However, we are concerned herein with interpreting the provisions of the PC Act. There is no dispute that corruption in India is pervasive. Its impact on the nation is more pronounced, due to the fact that India is still a developing economy. Presently, it can be stated that corruption in India has become an issue which affects all walks of life. In this context, we must state that although anti-corruption laws are fairly stringent in India, the percolation and enforcement of the same are sometimes criticized as being ineffective. Due to this, the constitutional aspirations of economic and social justice are sacrificed on a daily basis. It is in the above context that we need to resolve the issues concerned hereinherein. It is a settled law that technical definitions under one statute should not be imported to another statute which is not in pari materia with the first. The UGC Act and the PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct in their purpose, operation and object. The preamble of the UGC Act states that it is an Act to make provision for the co-ordination and determination of standards in Universities, and for that purpose, to establish a University Grants Commission. On the other hand, the PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of corruption in the country. As such, the extension of technical definitions used under one Act to the other might not be appropriate, as the two Acts are not in pari materia with one anotherIt is for the same reasoning that we are of the opinion that the High Courts reliance on the judgment of this Court in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro, (2018) 1 SCC 468 was not appropriate, as the same was with reference to enactments relating to administration/regulation of universities, and is unconnected with the objects of the PC Act33. This brings us to the conclusion that purport of UGC Act cannot be borrowed under the PC Act, and that an independent meaning needs to be provided for the term University as occurring under the PC Act. In India, there are 12,206 Universities under Section 2(f) and 12B of the UGC Act, as of 31.07.2019. While there are about 124 deemed universities across India, as of 23.06.2008. The education sector in India has seen a general rise. There is no dispute that the education sector, which is a very important service sector in the country, has seen various scandals34. On a perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observe that the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public duty performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative intention was to not provide an exhaustive list of authorities which are covered, rather a general definition of public servant is provided thereunder. This provides an important internal evidence as to the definition of the term University35. The use of any is critical in our understanding as to the term University. We are aware of the line of authorities, wherein this Court has reduced the impact of term any to not mean every [See Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, (1952) S.C.R. 1122]. However, we cannot accept such a view as the context in which the present dispute emanates, differs from the above44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not only to prevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be considered public servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials, to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-State, it cannot be stated that a Deemed University and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a University simpliciter, and the officials therein45. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the High Court was incorrect in holding that a Deemed University is excluded from the ambit of the term University under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act50. Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Act indicates that any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at large has any interest is called a public duty. The first explanation to Section 2 further clarifies that any person who falls in any of the categories stated under Section 2 is a public servant whether or not appointed by the government. The second explanation further expands the ambit to include every person who de facto discharges the functions of a public servant, and that he should not be prevented from being brought under the ambit of public servant due to any legal infirmities or technicalities51. In the present case, on a prima-facie evaluation of the statements of the Gaurav D. Mehta (the Vice-Chancellor); Mr. Pragneshkumar Rameshbhai Trivedi (account officer of Sumandeep Vidhyapith University) and other witnesses it appears that the present respondent was the final authority with regard to the grant of admission, collection of fees and donation amount52. The charge sheet specifically discloses that the respondent allegedly was collecting certain extra amount over the prescribed fees on the pretext of allowing the students to fill up their examination forms. Therefore, paying the respondent the alleged amount was a condition precedent before filling up the forms, to appear for the examinations. Specifically, in the complaint, it was alleged that the respondent had demanded an amount of Rupees Twenty Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused Bharat Savant, failing which the daughter of the complainant would not have been permitted to appear in the examination. In our opinion, the fact that there were a large number of cheques which were found during the raid is more than sufficient to establish a grave suspicion as to the commission of the alleged offenceBut, it ought to be noted that the courts below have failed to analyze the connection between the trust and the University, as well as the relationship of the respondent with the university. Prima facie, a grave suspicion is made out that the respondent was rendering his service by dealing with the students and the examination aspect of the University. But a detailed appreciation of evidence is called for before one can reach a conclusion as to the exact position of the respondent vis-à-vis the University54. At this stage, we may note that the jurisdiction of this Court, with regards to Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not be excercised by conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferencesThis Court, in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, 1979 (3) SCC 4 ,  had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 227 CrPC and it held as under:7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doingThe words not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him55. Further, in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2010 (9) SCC 368 ,  this Court, inter alia, observed :(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial…