Case: Workmen of Kankanee Colliery and Amlabad Colliery (Of Bhowra Kankanee Collieries, Limited ) Vs. Their Employers and Another

accepted this plea and held that the two references were invalid and decided those references in favour of the employees. The present appeal is directed against that order of the tribunal. 4. In this special appeal, again, the main point urged before us was that the tribunal was incorrect in holding that under the agreement dated 14 January, 1955, the service rules or Karamchand Thapar & Bros. became applicable to these workmen. The view taken by the tribunal was that demand (5) in the charter of demands had been dropped by the workmen under Cl. (5) of the agreement and, consequently, this plea was no longer open to the workmen. On proper interpretation of the charter of demands and the terms of the agreement, we are of the view that the tribunal was correct in giving this decision. 5. In the charter of demands the workmen themselves made a distinction between service conditions of the employees and the existing facilities and privileges on the one side and service rules and other conditions contained in the standing orders on the other side. In demands (1), (2) and (3) there was mention of service conditions, including their grading, increments, leave, etc., as also of existing facilities and privileges including medical facilities, free supply of kerosene, electricity, accommodation and other materials, and the pension scheme. In demand (5) the employees separately desired that the employees should not be governed by the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros., Ltd., and that the certified standing orders earlier in force in the collieries should only be followed. Normally, the contention raised on behalf of the employees that service conditions include all service rules would be correct, but, in this case, it it clear that the workmen had themselves made a distinction between service conditions, facilities, privileges and pension scheme mentioned in demands (1), (2) and (3) and the service rules mentioned in demand (5). The service rules mentioned in demand (5) were clearly indicated as not being covered by the service conditions facilities and privileges mentioned in demands (1) to (3). In the agreement, under Cl. (3), it was laid down that the existing service conditions and facilities were to be continued, excepting pension. In that clause, there was no mention of service rules or standing orders. It is clear that Cl. (3) of the agreement related to demands (1) to (3), and that is why in this clause the expression used was "service conditions and facilities" and there was no mention of either service rules or standing orders. A distinction having been made between service conditions and facilities mentioned in demands (1) to (3), and the service rules and standing orders mentioned in demand (5), it has to be held that Cl. (3) of the agreement only laid down the continuance of those service conditions and facilities which fell within the scope of demands (1), (2) and (3), and did not include service rules and standing orders which were separately the subject-matter of demand (5). Under Cl. (5) of the agreement, all order demands, which were not specifically mentioned in the earlier four clauses, were dropped by the union. Demand (5) was thus one of the demands dropped, which necessarily means that the employees gave up their demand that they should not be governed by the service rules or Karamchand Thapar & Bros. Their dropping of this demand clearly meant that they agreed to be governed by those service rules, and, in these circumstances, the tribunal was perfectly right in holding that while this agreement was still in force, the workmen were not entitled to raise an industrial dispute challenging the applicability of the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros, to them.Learned counsel for the appellant, in the alternative, urged that the tribunal, after holding that the settlement was binding, should have proceeded further to decide whether the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros., including rule 11(c) relating to retirement on superannuation at the age of 55 years, did or did not become applicable to the workmen who were earlier in service and whose earlier service rules in the collieries did not lay down any such age of superannuation. We do not think that in this case the tribunal was called upon to go any further into this aspect. As we have held earlier, the terms of the agreement show that the workmen then employed in the collieries agreed to be governed by the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros., Ltd. These rules included the rule relating to superannuation at the age of 55 years. The workmen having themselves acquiesced into applicability of these rules under this agreement, there was no bar to applying that rule even to those workmen who were earlier in service and were taken over by Karamchand Thapar & Bros. when they acquired the collieries. 6. In this connexion, learned counsel for the appellants referred us to the decisions of this Court in Guest, Keen, Williams (Private), Ltd. v. P. J. Sterling and others [1959 - II L.L.J. 405] and in Workmen of Kettlewell Bullen & Co., Ltd. v. Kettlewell Bullen & Co., Ltd. [1964 - II L.L.J. 146]. In both those cases, this Court had occasion to consider the applicability of a rule relating to retirement on superannuation to workmen who were employed prior to the enforcement of that rule. The cases do not, however, help the appellants, as this court, while laying down the principle that a new rule will not ordinarily apply to previously employed workmen, accepted the principle that the new rule can become applicable if the employees accept the new rule as applicable to themselves or acquiesce in it. In the case before us, as we have indicated earlier, the agreement dated 14 January, 1955 shows that the workmen acquiesced in the applicability of the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros., Ltd., to themselves, and, consequently, the retirement of the eleven workmen under rule 11(c) of those rules was perfectly valid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The view taken by the tribunal was that demand (5) in the charter of demands had been dropped by the workmen under Cl. (5) of the agreement and, consequently, this plea was no longer open to the workmen. On proper interpretation of the charter of demands and the terms of the agreement, we are of the view that the tribunal was correct in giving this decisionNormally, the contention raised on behalf of the employees that service conditions include all service rules would be correct, but, in this case, it it clear that the workmen had themselves made a distinction between service conditions, facilities, privileges and pension scheme mentioned in demands (1), (2) and (3) and the service rules mentioned in demand (5). The service rules mentioned in demand (5) were clearly indicated as not being covered by the service conditions facilities and privileges mentioned in demands (1) to (3). In the agreement, under Cl. (3), it was laid down that the existing service conditions and facilities were to be continued, excepting pension. In that clause, there was no mention of service rules or standing orders. It is clear that Cl. (3) of the agreement related to demands (1) to (3), and that is why in this clause the expression used was "service conditions and facilities" and there was no mention of either service rules or standing orders. A distinction having been made between service conditions and facilities mentioned in demands (1) to (3), and the service rules and standing orders mentioned in demand (5), it has to be held that Cl. (3) of the agreement only laid down the continuance of those service conditions and facilities which fell within the scope of demands (1), (2) and (3), and did not include service rules and standing orders which were separately ther of demand (5). Under Cl. (5) of the agreement, all order demands, which were not specifically mentioned in the earlier four clauses, were dropped by the union. Demand (5) was thus one of the demands dropped, which necessarily means that the employees gave up their demand that they should not be governed by the service rules or Karamchand Thapar & Bros. Their dropping of this demand clearly meant that they agreed to be governed by those service rules, and, in these circumstances, the tribunal was perfectly right in holding that while this agreement was still in force, the workmen were not entitled to raise an industrial dispute challenging the applicability of the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros, to themWe do not think that in this case the tribunal was called upon to go any further into this aspect. As we have held earlier, the terms of the agreement show that the workmen then employed in the collieries agreed to be governed by the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros., Ltd. These rules included the rule relating to superannuation at the age of 55 years. The workmen having themselves acquiesced into applicability of these rules under this agreement, there was no bar to applying that rule even to those workmen who were earlier in service and were taken over by Karamchand Thapar & Bros. when they acquired the collieriesThe cases do not, however, help the appellants, as this court, while laying down the principle that a new rule will not ordinarily apply to previously employed workmen, accepted the principle that the new rule can become applicable if the employees accept the new rule as applicable to themselves or acquiesce in it. In the case before us, as we have indicated earlier, the agreement dated 14 January, 1955 shows that the workmen acquiesced in the applicability of the service rules of Karamchand Thapar & Bros., Ltd., to themselves, and, consequently, the retirement of the eleven workmen under rule 11(c) of those rules was perfectly valid.