Case: Rananjaya Singh Vs. Baijnath Singh And Others

electors and 1 Polling Agent and 2 relief agents for each polling booth and 1 messenger at each polling booth. The contravention of the provisions of Sections 77 read with Rr. 117 and 118 and Schedules V and VI is made a corrupt practice by Section 123(7). Section 123(7) clearly shows that in order to amount to a corrupt practice the excess expenditure must be incurred or authorised by a candidate or his agent and the employment of extra persons must likewise be by a candidate or his agent.3. The charge against the appellant was interalia, that the Manager, Assistant Manager, 20 Ziladars of Amethi estate and their peons on orderlies had worked for the appellant in connection with the election. The tribunal took the view - we think quite erroneously - that although the estate belonged to the father of the appellant, nevertheless, as the appellant was the heir apparent and actually looked after the estate on behalf of the old and infirm proprietor, these servants of the estate were "virtually" his "own" servants and could properly be regarded as having been employed for payment by the appellant.The learned Advocate appearing for the respondent frankly and properly conceded that he could not support this part of the finding of the tribunal. He, however, contended, relying on the language used in Section 77, that if the number of persons who worked for payment in connection with the election exceeded the maximum number specified in Scheduled VI, the case fell within the mischief of the relevant sections and the rules, no matter who employed them or who made payments to them. It is true that Section 77 uses the words "who may be employed for payment" without indicating by whom employed or paid but it must be borne in mind that the gist of a corrupt practice as defined in Section 123(7) is that the employment of extra persons and the incurring or authorising of excess expenditure must be by the candidate or his agent. The provisions of Rr. 117 and 118 are to be read in the light of this definition of a corrupt practice.Indeed, these rules follows the language of Section 123(7) in that they prohibit the employment of persons other than or in addition or those specified in Scheduled VI and the incurring or authorising of expenditure in excess of the amount specified in Scheduled V and in both cases by a candidate or his agent. Section 77 must, therefore, be read in a manner consonant with Section 123(7) and Rr. 117 and 118. In this view of the matter the observation made by Phillimore, J. in ---Joseph Forster Wilson v. Sir Christopher Furness, 6 OMally and Hardcastles Report of Election Cases, p.1 at p. 6 (A). relied on by the appellant and referred to in the judgment of the tribunal are quite apposite.There can be no doubt that in the eye of the law these extra persons were in the employment of the father of the appellant and paid by the father and they were neither employed nor paid by the appellant. The case, therefore, does not fall within Section 123(7) at all and if that be so, it cannot come within Section 124(4).It obviously was a case where a father assisted the son in the matter of the election. These persons were the employees of the father and paid by him for working in the estate. At the request of the father they assisted the son in connection with the election which strictly speaking they were not obliged to do. Was the position in law at all different from the position that the father had given those employees a holiday on full pay and they voluntarily rendered assistance to the appellant in connection with his election? We think not. It is clear to us that qua the appellant these persons were neither employed nor paid by him. So far as the appellant was concerned they were mere volunteers and the learned Advocate for the respondents admits the employment of volunteers does not bring the candidate within the mischief of the definition of corrupt practice as given in Section 123(7).The learned Advocate, however, contended that such a construction would be against the spirit of the election laws in that candidates who have rich friends or relations would have an unfair advantage over a poor rival. The spirit of the law may well be an elusive and unsafe guide and the supposed spirit can certainly not be given effect to in opposition to the plain language of the sections of the Act and the rules made thereunder. If all that can be said of these statutory provisions is that construed according to the ordinary, grammatical and natural meaning of their language they work injustice by placing the poorer candidates at a disadvantage the appeal must be to Parliament and not to this Court.4. On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules and the arguments advanced before us we are of opinion that the appellant cannot in the circumstances of this case be held to be guilty of any corrupt practice under Section 123(7) as alleged against him. It follows from this that not having incurred any expenditure over and above what was shown by him in his return of election expenses he cannot be said to have concealed such expenditure and, therefore, he cannot be held to have been guilty of any minor corrupt practice under Section 124(4) of the Act.5. In the view we have taken, namely, that these extra men were not employed or paid by the appellant, it is unnecessary, for the purpose of this appeal, to discuss the question whether, if ones own servants are also utilized or employed in the conduct of the election their salary for the period they are so utilised or employed should be regarded as election expenses and shown in the return. On that we prefer not to express any opinion on this occasion.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The tribunal took the view - we think quite erroneously - that although the estate belonged to the father of the appellant, nevertheless, as the appellant was the heir apparent and actually looked after the estate on behalf of the old and infirm proprietor, these servants of the estate were "virtually" his "own" servants and could properly be regarded as having been employed for payment by thecan be no doubt that in the eye of the law these extra persons were in the employment of the father of the appellant and paid by the father and they were neither employed nor paid by the appellant. The case, therefore, does not fall within Section 123(7) at all and if that be so, it cannot come within Section 124(4).It obviously was a case where a father assisted the son in the matter of the election. These persons were the employees of the father and paid by him for working in the estate. At the request of the father they assisted the son in connection with the election which strictly speaking they were not obliged to do. Was the position in law at all different from the position that the father had given those employees a holiday on full pay and they voluntarily rendered assistance to the appellant in connection with his election? We think not. It is clear to us that qua the appellant these persons were neither employed nor paid by him. So far as the appellant was concerned they were mere volunteers and the learned Advocate for the respondents admits the employment of volunteers does not bring the candidate within the mischief of the definition of corrupt practice as given in Section 123(7).On a consideration of the relevant provisions of the Act and the rules and the arguments advanced before us we are of opinion that the appellant cannot in the circumstances of this case be held to be guilty of any corrupt practice under Section 123(7) as alleged against him. It follows from this that not having incurred any expenditure over and above what was shown by him in his return of election expenses he cannot be said to have concealed such expenditure and, therefore, he cannot be held to have been guilty of any minor corrupt practice under Section 124(4) of the Act.