Case: Mahant Sankarshan Ramanuja Das Goswami Etc., Etc Vs. The State Of Orissa And Another

Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31, provided that it had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent. By the definition clause, (Art. 31-A (2) (a) ), the expression "estate" was to have the same meaning in any local area, which it or its equivalent had in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area but was to include among others any inam.11. The contention of the appellants is really twofold. The first argument is that the benefit of Art. 31A might have been available to the original Act as it was a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes but not to the amending Act, which was not such a law but only amended a previous law by enlarging the definition of "estate". The second argument is that the word "estate" as defined in S. 2 (g) before its amendment did not apply to pre-settlement minor inams of lands as it applied only to an "inam estate", and an "inam estate" had the meaning which the definition of "estate" had in the Madras Estates Land Act, viz., only whole "inam villages" This, it is urged, follows from the provisions of S. 2 (q) of the Estates Abolition Act quoted earner.12. The first argument is clearly untenable. It assumes that the benefit of Art. 31A is only available to those laws which by themselves provide for compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes and not to laws amending such laws, the assent of the President notwithstanding. This means that the whole of the law, original and amending, must be passed again, and be reserved for the consideration of the President, and must be freshly assented to by him. This is against the legislative practice in this country. It is to be presumed that the President gave his assent to the amending Act in its relation to the Act it sought to amend, and this is more so, when by the amending law the provisions of the earlier law relating to compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes were sought to be extended to new kinds of properties. In assenting to such law, the President assented to new categories of properties being brought within the operation of the existing law, and he, in effect, assented to a law for the compulsory acquisition of public purposes of these new categories of property. The assent of the President to the amending Act thus brought in the protection of Art. 31A as a necessary consequence. The amending Act must be considered in relation to the old law which it sought to extend and the President assented to such an extension or in other words to a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes.13. The argument that this was not an acquisition of an inam estate comprising a whole village and thus outside the Abolition Act itself has no substance No doubt these minor inams were not of whole villages but of lands and the grant included both the warams and there were thus no intermediaries. But they were inams nevertheless, and the Constitution defined an estate as including any inam, and the amending Act merely followed that definition. The extended definition in the constitution and a similar extended definition in the Act thus exclude resort to the general definition clause in S. 2 (q) of the Abolition Act and the definition of "estate" in the Madras Estates Land Act. The definition of "estate" introduced by the amending Act is sufficiently wide to cover such minor inams and S. 2 (q) only applies, if a word or expression used in the Abolition Act is not defined therein. It the minor inams are already within the definition of the word "estate" there is no need to go to S. 2 (q) or to any local law defining the word. There can be no doubt that if the new definition of "estate" applies to minor inams, then they are affected by the Abolition Act. This, indeed, was conceded.14. Learned counsel for the appellants also urged, though somewhat faintly, that the ejusdem generis rule should be applied to the definition of "estate" in Art. 31A (2) (a) as also to the corresponding new definition in the Abolition Act. This argument proceeds upon an assumption for which there is no foundation. The ejusdem generis rule is applicable where a wide or general term has to be cut down with reference to the genus of the particular terms which precede the general words. This rule has hardly any application where certain specific categories are included in the definition. The ejusdem generis rule may be applicable to the general words "other similar grant" which would take their colour from the particular categories, "jagir, inam, or muafi", which precede them, but the word "inam" is not subject to the same rule. Once it is held that inams of any kind were included, it makes little difference if the inams were of lands and not of whole villages. So also the fact that the holders of such inams cannot be described as intermediaries, or that they comprised both the melwaram and the Kudiwaram rights. Such a distinction would have significance, if the law abolished only intermediaries and not inams which it did. Section of the Abolition Act says :"3 (1) The State Government may from time to time by notification, declare that the estate specified in the notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances."If the definition of the word estate" was wide enough to include a minor inam and a notification was issued, the consequences of S. 3 of the Abolition Act must follow. Such a law is not capable of being called in question on the ground that it abridges any fundamental right conferred by Arts 14 19 and 31, if it has been assented to by the President. The notification was thus valid, if the law was valid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. The combined effect of these provisions of the Constitution was that there could be no compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes; unless the law provided for payment of compensation, but the law could not be called in question on this ground if it had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had been assented to by him. The assent of the President was a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the law. By the amendment of the Constitution and the addition of Art. 31A, no such law was to be deemed to be void on the ground that it was inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31, provided that it had been reserved for the consideration of the President and had received his assent. By the definition clause, (Art. 31-A (2) (a) ), the expression "estate" was to have the same meaning in any local area, which it or its equivalent had in the existing law relating to land tenures in force in that area but was to include among others anyis to be presumed that the President gave his assent to the amending Act in its relation to the Act it sought to amend, and this is more so, when by the amending law the provisions of the earlier law relating to compulsory acquisition of property for public purposes were sought to be extended to new kinds of properties. In assenting to such law, the President assented to new categories of properties being brought within the operation of the existing law, and he, in effect, assented to a law for the compulsory acquisition of public purposes of these new categories of property. The assent of the President to the amending Act thus brought in the protection of Art. 31A as a necessary consequence. The amending Act must be considered in relation to the old law which it sought to extend and the President assented to such an extension or in other words to a law for the compulsory acquisition of property for publicdefinition of "estate" introduced by the amending Act is sufficiently wide to cover such minor inams and S. 2 (q) only applies, if a word or expression used in the Abolition Act is not defined therein. It the minor inams are already within the definition of the word "estate" there is no need to go to S. 2 (q) or to any local law defining the word. There can be no doubt that if the new definition of "estate" applies to minor inams, then they are affected by the Abolition Act. This, indeed, wasejusdem generis rule is applicable where a wide or general term has to be cut down with reference to the genus of the particular terms which precede the general words. This rule has hardly any application where certain specific categories are included in the definition. The ejusdem generis rule may be applicable to the general words "other similar grant" which would take their colour from the particular categories, "jagir, inam, or muafi", which precede them, but the word "inam" is not subject to the same rule. Once it is held that inams of any kind were included, it makes little difference if the inams were of lands and not of whole villages. So also the fact that the holders of such inams cannot be described as intermediaries, or that they comprised both the melwaram and the Kudiwaramthe definition of the word estate" was wide enough to include a minor inam and a notification was issued, the consequences of S. 3 of the Abolition Act must follow. Such a law is not capable of being called in question on the ground that it abridges any fundamental right conferred by Arts 14 19 and 31, if it has been assented to by the President. The notification was thus valid, if the law was valid.