Case: Mangal Singh &amp; Ors Vs. Shrimati Rattno &amp; Anr

to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for Rajkumar that it was not property within the meaning of S. 14 of the Act."In that case, it will be noticed that the widow died, while the suit for partition was still pending, and she was not in actual physical or constructive possession of the property which was held to be possessed by her at the time of her death. Only a preliminary decree declaring her right to the share had been passed. That decree was passed before the Act came into force and the widow died after the Act came into force. On these facts, the Court came to the finding that the disputed property was possessed by the widow; and this finding was given despite the circumstance that she was not in actual possession or constructive possession of the property, but had merely obtained the right to the property under the preliminary decree. The principle laid down in that case, thus, supports the broader meaning given to the expression "possessed by" indicated by us earlier.12. The last case of this Court brought to our notice is Eramma v. Veerupana, AIR 1966 SC: 1879. That was a converse case in which the female Hindu, in fact, did not possess any legal right or title to the property, though she was actually in physical possession of it. It was held:"The property possessed by a female Hindu, as contemplated in the section, is clearly property to which she has acquired some kind of title whether before or after the commencement of the Act. It may be noticed that the Explanation to S. 14 (1) sets out the various modes of acquisition of the property by a female Hindu and indicates that the section applies only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired some kind of title however restricted the nature of her interest may be. The words "as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner" as given in the last portion of sub-section (1) of S. 14 clearly suggest that the legislature intended that the limited ownership of a Hindu female should be changed into full ownership. In other words S. 14 (1) of the Act contemplates that a Hindu female who, in the absence of this provision, would have been limited owner of the property, will now become full owner of the same by virtue of this section. The object of the section is to extinguish the estate called "limited estate" or widows estate" in Hindu Law and to make a Hindu woman, who, under the old law, would have been only a limited owner, a full owner of the property with all powers of disposition and to make the estate heritable by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last male holder."In the concluding part, it was held:"It follows, therefore, that the section cannot be interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of a female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere trespasser. In other words, the provisions of S. 14 (1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a Hindu female who is in possession of the property of the last male holder on the date of the commencement of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any right to property."This case also, thus, clarifies that the expression "possessed by" is not intended to apply to a case of mere possession without title, and that the legislature intended this provision for cases where the Hindu female possesses the right of ownership of the property in question. Even mere physical possession of the property without the right of ownership will not attract the provisions of this section. This case also, thus, supports our view that the expression "possessed by" was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership and, while the Hindu female possesses the rights of ownership, she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled The section will, however, not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could? in no manner, exercise her rights of ownership in that property any longer.13. In this view that we have taken. it does not appear to be necessary for us to refer to the decisions of the various High Courts which were cited before us by learned counsel, for the appellants. The cases mentioned were: Patelin v. Satvabati Naikani, AIR 1958 Ori 75 ; Ganesh Mahanta v. Sukria Bewa, AIR 1963 Ori 167 ; Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh. AIR 1958 Pat 581 Ram Gulam Singh v. Palakdhari Singh, AIR 1961 Pat 60 , Nathuni Prasad Singh v. Mst. Kachnar Kuer, AIR 1965 Pat 160 and Mst. Mukhtiar Kaur v. Mst. Kartar Kaur, AIR 1966 Punj 31. All these were cases relating to situations where the widow had made some alienation of her rights in the property and none of them was concerned with a case where the female Hindu might have been dispossessed by a trespasser. The reasons given by the High Courts in those cases are, therefore, of no assistance in deciding the applicability of S. 14 (1) of the Act to a case of the nature before us.14. On the interpretation of S. 14 (1) of the Act that we have accepted above, it must be held that the property involved in the present suit was possessed by Smt. Harnam Kaur when she died in the year 1958 and, consequently, Smt. Rattno and, after her, the present respondents must be deemed to have succeeded to those rights.We have already mentioned above that it was not disputed that, if it is held that Smt. Harnam Kaur had become full owner of this property, it would pass on her death to Smt. Rattno. As a result, the decision given by the High Court must be upheld.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]4. On merits, we are of the opinion that the decision given by the High Court against the defendants-appellants must be upheld. The first appellate Court, which was the final Court for deciding questions of fact, clearly recorded a finding that the Karewa marriage alleged to have been entered into by the plaintiff, Smt. Harnam Kaur, with Ishar Singh, defendant No. 4, was not proved. That finding of fact was binding on the High Court and was rightly accepted by it. It is no longer open to the appellants to challenge that finding of fact in this CourtOn this Finding, it has to he held that the rights to the land, to which Smt. Harnam Kaur had succeeded as widow of Labhu were not lost by her until her death, and that her dispossession by defendants 1 to 3 in the year 1954 was illegal. They had no right to this land in preference to Smt. Harnammay be mentioned that there was no dispute in the High Court, nor was it disputed before us that, if it be held that S.14 of the Act had become applicable and Smt. Harnam Kaur became full owner of this land, her rights would pass on her death to Smt. Rattno and, subsequently, Oil the latters death, to the present respondents in thisdo not think that any such interpretation can be placed on the words used by this Court. Section 14 (1) covers any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act. On the face of it, property acquired after the commencement of the Act by a female Hindu could not possibly be possessed by her at the commencement of the Act. This Court when it made the comments relied upon by learned counsel, was in fact. concerned with a case of a female Hindu, who had acquired the right to the property before the commencement of the Act, but was alleged to be no longer possessed of it because of having adopted a son before the commencement of the Act. It was in these circumstances that the Court in that particular case was concerned with the question whether the female Hindu was possessed of the property in dispute or not at the time the Act came into force. The Court was not laying down any general principle that S. 14 (1) will not be attracted at all to cases where the female Hindu was not possessed of the property at the date of the commencement of the Act. In fact, there are no words used in S. 14 (1) which would lead to the interpretation that the property must be possessed by the female Hindu at the date of the commencement of the Act. It appears to us that the relevant date, on which the female Hindu should be possessed of the property in dispute must be the date on which the question of applying the provisions of S. 14 (1) arises. If, on that date, when the provisions of this section are sought to be applied, the property is possessed by a female Hindu, it would be held that she is full owner of it and not merely a limited owner. Such a question may arise in her own lifetime, or may arise subsequently when succession to her property opens on her death. The case before us falls in the second category, because Smt. Harnam Kaur was a limited owner of the property before the commencement of the Act, and the question that has arisen is whether Smt Rattno was entitled to succeed to her rights in this disputed property on her death which took place in the year 1958 after the commencement of thecase, thus, explains why, in cases of alienation or a gift made by a widow, even though that alienation or gift may not be binding on a reversioner, the property will not be held to be possessed by the widow, because the alienation or the gift would be binding on her for her life-time and she, a least, would not possess any such rights under which she could obtain actual or constructive possession from her transferee or donee. Having completely parted with her legal rights in the property, she could not be said to be possessed of that property anycase also, thus, supports our view that the expression "possessed by" was used in the sense of connoting state of ownership and, while the Hindu female possesses the rights of ownership, she would become full owner if the other conditions mentioned in the section are fulfilled The section will, however, not apply at all to cases where the Hindu female may have parted with her rights so as to place herself in a position where she could? in no manner, exercise her rights of ownership in that property anythese were cases relating to situations where the widow had made some alienation of her rights in the property and none of them was concerned with a case where the female Hindu might have been dispossessed by a trespasser. The reasons given by the High Courts in those cases are, therefore, of no assistance in deciding the applicability of S. 14 (1) of the Act to a case of the nature before us.14. On the interpretation of S. 14 (1) of the Act that we have accepted above, it must be held that the property involved in the present suit was possessed by Smt. Harnam Kaur when she died in the year 1958 and, consequently, Smt. Rattno and, after her, the present respondents must be deemed to have succeeded to those rights.We have already mentioned above that it was not disputed that, if it is held that Smt. Harnam Kaur had become full owner of this property, it would pass on her death to Smt. Rattno. As a result, the decision given by the High Court must behowever, appears that, on the pleadings of parties and the nature of the dispute that came to be settled by the lower Courts, it cannot be held that this appeal must abate as a whole, or must fail because of its abatement against Ishar Singh on his death. We have already mentioned that, though the plaintiff, Smt. Harnam Kaur, had come forward with the allegation that she had been dispossessed by all the four defendants 1 to 4, Ishar Singh, defendant No. 4, in his written statement repudiated this claim. He put forward the plea that he had not dispossessed the plaintiff and, further, supported the claim of the plaintiff by pleading that there had been no karewa marriage between them. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court. It was decreed by the first appellate Court only against defendants 1 to 3, treating Ishar Singh as a pro forma defendant. In these circumstances, it is obvious that, when the case came up before the High Court, the dispute was confined between Smt. Rattno, legal representative of the original plaintiff on the one side, and defendants 1 to 3 on the other. Defendants 1 to 3 sought vacation of the decree for possession which had been granted against them in favour of Smt. Rattno. Ishar Singh, against whom the suit had not been decreed at all, thus became an unnecessary party. In these circumstances, even if Ishar Singh had not been impleaded as respondent in the High Court, the relief claimed by defendants 1 to 3 in that Court against Smt. Rattno could have been granted without bringing into effect any contradictory decrees. In the appeal in this Court also, in these circumstances, Ishar Singh was an unnecessary party and, consequently, the failure to implead his legal representatives as respondents in the appeal after his death does not affect the right of defendants 1 to 3 to claim the relief for which they have come up to this Court in appeal. The preliminary objection, therefore, fails and isuse of the expression "possessed by" instead of the expression "in possession of", in our opinion, was intended to enlarge the meaning of thisappears to us that the expression used in S. 14 (1) of the Act was intended to cover cases of possession in law also, where lands may have descended to a female Hindu and she has not actually entered into them. It would, of course, cover the other cases of actual or constructive possession. On the language of S. 14 (1), therefore, we hold that this provision will become applicable to any property which is owned by a female Hindu, even though she is not in actual, physical or constructive possession of that property.The third case of this Court brought to our notice is that of S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar, 1962 Supp (3) SCR 418: (AIR 1962 SC 1493  ). In that case, a Digamber Jain of the Porwal sect died in 1934 leaving behind his widow, his son and threeHis son died in 1939. In 1952 a son of one of the grandsons filed a suit for partition of the joint family properties, while the widow was still alive. While the suit was still pending, the widow died. Amongst other questions arising in the partition suit one question that arose was whether the 1/4th share of the widow declared in the preliminary decree was possessed by her and whether, on her death, it descended to her grandsons in accordance with the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the Act. Dealing with this question, this Court explained the scope of S. 14 (1) by stating that, by S. 14 (1), the Legislature sought to convert the interest of a Hindu female which, under the Sastric Hindu law, would have been regarded as a limited interest into an absolute interest. It was held that, by S. 14 (1), manifestly, it was intended to convert the interest, which a Hindu female has in property, however restricted the nature of that interest under the Sastric Hindu law may be, into absolute estate. It was also noticedthe Sastric Hindu law, the share given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons or her grandsons was in lieu of her right to maintenance, and she was not entitled to claim partition. But the Legislature, by enacting the Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937, made a significant departure in that branch of the law the Act gave a Hindu widow the same interest in the property which her husband had at the time of his death, and if the estate was partitioned, she became owner in severally of her share, subject, of course, to the restrictions on disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the estate on death actual orthese principles to the facts of that case, it wasthe light of the scheme of the Act and its avowed purpose, it would be difficult, without doing violence to the language used in the enactment, to assume that a right declared in property in favour of a person under a decree for partition is not a right to property. If, under a preliminary decree, the right in favour of a Hindu male, be regarded as property, the right declared in favour of a Hindu female must also be regarded as property. The High Court was, therefore, in our judgment, in error in holding that the right declared in favour of Khilonabai was not possessed by her, nor are we able to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for Rajkumar that it was not property within the meaning of S. 14 of thethat case, it will be noticed that the widow died, while the suit for partition was still pending, and she was not in actual physical or constructive possession of the property which was held to be possessed by her at the time of her death. Only a preliminary decree declaring her right to the share had been passed. That decree was passed before the Act came into force and the widow died after the Act came into force. On these facts, the Court came to the finding that the disputed property was possessed by the widow; and this finding was given despite the circumstance that she was not in actual possession or constructive possession of the property, but had merely obtained the right to the property under the preliminary decree. The principle laid down in that case, thus, supports the broader meaning given to the expression "possessed by" indicated by us earlier.In this view that we have taken. it does not appear to be necessary for us to refer to the decisions of the various High Courts which were cited before us by learned counsel, for the appellants. The cases mentioned were: Patelin v. Satvabati Naikani, AIR 1958 Ori 75  ; Ganesh Mahanta v. Sukria Bewa, AIR 1963 Ori 167  ; Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh. AIR 1958 Pat 581   Ram Gulam Singh v. Palakdhari Singh, AIR 1961 Pat 60  , Nathuni Prasad Singh v. Mst. Kachnar Kuer, AIR 1965 Pat 160   and Mst. Mukhtiar Kaur v. Mst. Kartar Kaur, AIR 1966 Punj 31. Allthese were cases relating to situations where the widow had made some alienation of her rights in the property and none of them was concerned with a case where the female Hindu might have been dispossessed by a trespasser. The reasons given by the High Courts in those cases are, therefore, of no assistance in deciding the applicability of S. 14 (1) of the Act to a case of the nature before us.