Case: Laxman Vs. State Industrial Court &amp; Ors

what is meant by an "industrial dispute" in this definition can be ascertained by reference to Section 2 (12) under which any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee or between employers or employees is an industrial dispute. No doubt it was contended in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956 = (AIR 1957 SC 104 ) that where a person is dismissed, discharged or retrenched, the relationship of an employer and employee is terminated and there is no longer an industrial dispute. This very contention was negatived in that case for the obvious reason that the dispute or difference referred to in Section 2 (12) should be connected with an industrial matter arising between an employer and an employee, which industrial matter as defined in S.2(13) covers any matter relating to refusal to employ and includes questions pertaining to the dismissal or non-employment of any person. If so considered, since a question or reinstatement is an industrial dispute, the appellant would be an employee within the meaning of S.2(10) of the Act for the purposes of availing himself of the right under sub-s. (2) of S.16.Even under a restricted definition of the word "employee" under S.2(10) before the amendment, this Court in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd.s case, 1956 SCR 956 = (AIR 1957 SC 104 ) had held that a workman whose services had been terminated could have resort to sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act. The High Court thought that the decision is inapplicable as in that case an enquiry had been held before the employees services were terminated which amounted to an industrial dispute but in the instant case no such industrial dispute arose as it was a retrenchment simpliciter. We are unable to appreciate this distinction as in our view it is a distinction without a difference. The ratio in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956 = (AIR 1957 SC 104 ) is clearly applicable notwithstanding the amendment of S.2 (10) and S.16 of the Act. After pointing out that S. 2(k) of the Central Act and Sections 2 (12) and 2 (13) of the Act are substantially in pari materia, the ratio of Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1949 FCR 321 = (AIR 1949 FC 111) will be as much applicable to the one enactment as to the other, this Court pointed out in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956 at pp. 961 - 962 = (AIR 1957 SC 104):"We are also unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the inclusive clause in S.2(10) of the Act is an indication that the legislature did not intend to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service. In our opinion, that clause was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under Ss. 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall within S.2(10) and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that definition. On the other hand, S.16 of the Act expressly provides for relief being granted to dismissed employees by way of reinstatement and compensation, and that provision must become useless and inoperative. If we are to adopt the construction which the appellant seeks to put on the definition of employee in Sec. 2 (10). We must accordingly hold agreeing with the decision in 1949 FCR 321 = (AIR 1949 FC 111) (supra), that the definition of "employee" in the Act would include one who has been dismissed and the respondent cannot be denied relief only by reason of the fact that he was not in employment on the date of the application."This case was referred to and considered in Bannett Coleman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta, (1969) 2 Lab LJ 554 = (AIR 1970 SC 426 ). The case was under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Services and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, where a newspaper employee was defined in a language similar to that used in defining an "employee" under the Act and the Central Act. This Court took note of the amendment in the Act and even so held that both the decisions in the Western India Automobile Associations case, 1949 FCR 321 = (AIR 1949 FC 111) and the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956 = (AIR 1957 SC 104 ) were authorities for the view that an ex-employee would, for the purposes of the controversy before them, be a working journalist. The contention that Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, (1957) 1 Lab LJ 477 = (AIR 1957 SC 264 ) and Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, (1958) 1 Lab LJ 500 = (AIR 1958 SC 353 ) took a contrary view was examined and distinguished. It was, however, observed that even assuming that there is such a conflict as contended, it was not necessary to resolve it for the purposes of the problem before the Court, because the Act which was being considered there and the Central Act, the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Central Provinces Act with which we are concerned disclose a similar scheme under which an ex-employee is permitted to avail of the benefits of these provisions, the only requirmeent being that the claim in dispute must be one which has arisen or accrued whilst the claimant was in employment of the person against whom it is made.5. In view of what has been stated, we think the High Court was in error in holding that the application of the appellant could not be entertained by the Labour Commissioner. As this was the only question decided, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court for disposal according to law. The appellant will have his costs in this Court, one

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]4. It is contended that an "employee" having been defined as a person employed, the Legislature intended that the provisions of the Act should be availed of only by persons who were still in the employment at the time when an application was filed under the Act, and even if the employee who invokes the provisions of the Act can be considered to be a person who is dismissed, discharged or retrenched, it is not every such employee who has that right, but only those employee have the right to invoke the provisions of the Act who have been dismissed, discharged or retrenched and in respect of whom an industrial dispute is pending.In our view both these contentions are untenable. A combined reading of the definition of an "employee" in S. 2 (10) with S.2(12) and (13) would negative the submission that those who had cessed to be in service were not intended to be included within the definition of an "employee". When the Legislature is defining a word or term refers to certain matters as being included therein it does so because either that word or term does not generically include what is sought to be included or that it is anxious to dispel any doubt as to what is included therein is not so included and by abundanti cautela it is specifically shown as having been included in order to repel any such contention to the contra. Under Section 16 (2) an employee working in an industry to which a notification under sub-section (1) is applied can within six months of his dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for loss of wages. A person who applies within six months from the date of his dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension is certainly not employed on that date and yet if the argument of the respondents is accepted he is not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(10) and hence has no right to apply under sub-section (2) of Section 16.An employee dismissed, discharged or removed on account of any industrial dispute is certainly an employee under Section 2 (10). But what is meant by an "industrial dispute" in this definition can be ascertained by reference to Section 2 (12) under which any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee or between employers or employees is an industrial dispute.In view of what has been stated, we think the High Court was in error in holding that the application of the appellant could not be entertained by the Labour Commissioner. As this was the only question decided, we allow these appeals, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the case to the High Court for disposal according to law. The appellant will have his costs in this Court, onemay be observed that S.2 (10) before its amendment included an employee discharged on account of any dispute relating to a change in respect of which a notice was given under Section 31 or 32 of the Act. It will be seen that S.31 dealt. With the procedure to be followed by an employer desiring change in the standing orders or in respect of any industrial matter mentioned in Sch.II, Section 32 dealt. With the procedure to be followed by a representative of employees desiring change in the standing orders or in respect of any other industrial matter. One of the industrial matters referred to in item 3 of Sch. II is "Dismissal of any employee except in accordance with law or as provided for in the standing orders settled under Section 30 of this Act". This definition of "employee" in S.2(1) appears to have been enlarged by the amendment by including an employee dismissed, discharged or removed on account of any industrial dispute and not necessarily confined only to any dispute relating to a change in respect of which notice is given under S.31 or 32 of the Act. The High Court appears to have read the definition of "employee" in S.2 (10) as contemplating two categories of persons(1) consisting of persons who are actually in the employment of the employer at the date of the application; and (2) of those who have ceased to be in the employment prior to the date of the application, the reason for ceasing to be an employee being "dismissal, discharge or removal on account of any industrial dispute". In its view, the words of the definition did not include allbut only specified categories which have to be correlated to any industrial dispute, and as there was no industrial dispute between Laxman and the employer prior to the termination of his service. Laxman cannot be considered to be an "employee" within the meaning of S.2 (10) of the Act. A decision of this Court in Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. Nagpur v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan, 1956 SCR 956   = (AIR 1957 SC 104  ) was referred to, but the High Court sought to distinguish it on the ground that in that case the employee had been dismissed after an inquiry which involved an industrialthe view of the High Court, therefore, a plain reading of the definition of the term "employee" in S.2 (10) shows that the only category of persons who, though not in actual employment at the date of the application included within that term is of persons who areand were dismissed, discharged or removed on account of any industrial dispute of any industrial dispute which dispute must precede the dismissal, discharge or removal, and that their dismissal, discharge or removal must be the result of suchour view both these contentions are untenable. A combined reading of the definition of an "employee" in S. 2 (10) with S.2(12) and (13) would negative the submission that those who had cessed to be in service were not intended to be included within the definition of an "employee". When the Legislature is defining a word or term refers to certain matters as being included therein it does so because either that word or term does not generically include what is sought to be included or that it is anxious to dispel any doubt as to what is included therein is not so included and by abundanti cautela it is specifically shown as having been included in order to repel any such contention to the contra. Under Section 16 (2) an employee working in an industry to which a notification under(1) is applied can within six months of his dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for loss of wages. A person who applies within six months from the date of his dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension is certainly not employed on that date and yet if the argument of the respondents is accepted he is not an employee within the meaning of Section 2(10) and hence has no right to apply under(2) of Section 16.An employee dismissed, discharged or removed on account of any industrial dispute is certainly an employee under Section 2 (10). But what is meant by an "industrial dispute" in this definition can be ascertained by reference to Section 2 (12) under which any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee or between employers or employees is an industrialvery contention was negatived in that case for the obvious reason that the dispute or difference referred to in Section 2 (12) should be connected with an industrial matter arising between an employer and an employee, which industrial matter as defined in S.2(13) covers any matter relating to refusal to employ and includes questions pertaining to the dismissal orof any person. If so considered, since a question or reinstatement is an industrial dispute, the appellant would be an employee within the meaning of S.2(10) of the Act for the purposes of availing himself of the right under(2) of S.16.Even under a restricted definition of the word "employee" under S.2(10) before the amendment, this Court in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd.s case, 1956 SCR 956   = (AIR 1957 SC 104  ) had held that a workman whose services had been terminated could have resort to(2) of Section 16 of the Act. The High Court thought that the decision is inapplicable as in that case an enquiry had been held before the employees services were terminated which amounted to an industrial dispute but in the instant case no such industrial dispute arose as it was a retrenchment simpliciter. We are unable to appreciate this distinction as in our view it is a distinction without a difference. The ratio in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956   = (AIR 1957 SC 104  ) is clearly applicable notwithstanding the amendment of S.2 (10) and S.16 of the Act. After pointing out that S. 2(k) of the Central Act and Sections 2 (12) and 2 (13) of the Act are substantially in pari materia, the ratio of Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1949 FCR 321 = (AIR 1949 FC 111) will be as much applicable to the one enactment as to the other, this Court pointed out in the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956     at pp. 961962 = (AIR 1957 SCcase was referred to and considered in Bannett Coleman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta, (1969) 2 Lab LJ 554 = (AIR 1970 SC 426  ). The case was under the Working Journalists (Conditions of Services and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955, where a newspaper employee was defined in a language similar to that used in defining an "employee" under the Act and the Central Act. This Court took note of the amendment in the Act and even so held that both the decisions in the Western India Automobile Associations case, 1949 FCR 321 = (AIR 1949 FC 111) and the Central Provinces Transport Services Ltds case, 1956 SCR 956   = (AIR 1957 SC 104  ) were authorities for the view that anwould, for the purposes of the controversy before them, be a working journalist. The contention that Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, (1957) 1 Lab LJ 477 = (AIR 1957 SC 264  ) and Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, (1958) 1 Lab LJ 500 = (AIR 1958 SC 353  ) took a contrary view was examined and distinguished. It was, however, observed that even assuming that there is such a conflict as contended, it was not necessary to resolve it for the purposes of the problem before the Court, because the Act which was being considered there and the Central Act,the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, the Central Provinces Act with which we are concerned disclose a similar scheme under which anis permitted to avail of the benefits of these provisions, the only requirmeent being that the claim in dispute must be one which has arisen or accrued whilst the claimant was in employment of the person against whom it is made.