Case: State Of Madras Vs. G. Sundaram

provided for the enquiry by the Tribunal and the subsequent proceedings differs from similar procedure under the Rules in a way which is prejudicial to the interests of the Police Officer. We need not elaborately deal with these contentions as this Court had to deal with substantially the same contentions in Jagannath Prasad Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1962) 1 SCR 151 : (AIR 1961 SC 1245 ). That case related to a Police Officer in Uttar Pradesh. The contentions raised were that the order dismissing him was unauthorized because the Governor had no power under S. 7 of the Police Act V of 1861 and the regulations framed thereunder to pass the order and further, even if the Governor could dismiss the Police Officer, a mode of enquiry prejudicial to the appellant in that case had been adopted out of two alternative modes of enquiry and, therefore, the proceedings of the Tribunal which enquired into the charges against him were void on account of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It may be mentioned that the appellant in that case was a Deputy Superintendent of Police and the Act applicable to him was the Police Act of 1861. Section 7 of that Act is practically identical with S.10 of the Madras Act. The rule making power under both the Acts is with the State Government. The rules made by the Uttar Pradesh Government, are known as the Police Regulations. The U. P. Government made the Administrative Tribunal Rules in the exercise of powers conferred inter alia by S. 7 of the 1861 Act just as the Madras Tribunal Rules were framed by the Governor of Madras in the exercise of powers conferred by S. 211 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and of all other powers enabling the Governor to make rules. Such powers include the powers under S.10 of the Police Act. In Jagannath Prasads case. (1962) 1 SCR 151 : (AIR 1961 SC 1245 ), it was said at p. 159 : (at p. 1250 of AIR) : By virtue of Art. 313, the Police Regulations as well as the Tribunal Rules in so far as they were not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution remained in operation after the Constitution. The authority vested in the Inspector-General of Police and his subordinates by S. 7 of the Police Act was not exclusive. It was controlled by the Government of India Act 1935, and the Constitution which made the tenure of all civil servants of a Province during the pleasure of the Governor of that Province. The plea that the Governor had no power to dismiss the appellant from service and such power could only be exercised by the Inspector General of Police and the officers named in S. 7 of the Police Act is, therefore, without substance. 16. It can be similarly said in the present case that the Tribunal rules are applicable to the respondent, that the Governor had the power to retire him compulsorily and that consequently the Governor could refer the enquiry into the allegations against the respondent to the Tribunal. 17. We have carefully compared the provisions of R. 8 of the Tribunal Rules with R. 3(b) of the Police Rules which lay down the procedure to be followed is substantially the same. The Police officer proceeded against is furnished with the appropriate charges he has to meet. The enquiry is conducted in his presence. The Police Officer is entitled to cross-examine the witness examined to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. He can put in a written statement of defence and can argue orally in person. The procedure followed agrees in substance with what is laid down in the rules and is in accordance with the requirements of natural justice. It is not complained that there had been any irregularities in the course of the enquiry which prejudiced the respondent. The only difference between the provisions of the Tribunal Rules and the Police Rules is said to be that the Tribunal Rules do not provide for an appeal against the order of the Government while under the Police Rules an appeal is provided under R. 5. 18. If the order is of compulsory retirement passed by the State Government, the appeal lies to the Governor. The Tribunal Rules do not say that the order of the Government which is the authority competent to impose a penalty in cases enquired into by the Tribunal would be appealable or not. There is no reason why R. 5 of the Police Rules will not apply to the order passed by Government after having the enquiry into the allegations against the Police officer conducted by a Tribunal when an appeal lies against its order on the basis of an inquiry conducted through any other authority. The rules do not specify the authority which is to enquire into the various complaints against a Police officer governed by those rules. They provide an appeal against the order of the State Government imposing any penalty referred to in R. 2 which would include an order made by the Government after considering the report of the Tribunal. 19. The record in the present case shows that the respondent did prefer an appeal to the Governor of Madras for reinstatement and that that appeal was rejected. It follows, therefore, that this contention about the enquiry by the Tribunal being prejudicial and about the respondent having been prejudicial has no substance as an appeal against the State Government is not barred under the Tribunal Rules and as factually the respondent did prefer an appeal against the order of compulsory retirement. 20. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was in error in quashing the order of the State Government retiring the respondent compulsorily on the ground that the evidence during the inquiry proceedings by the Tribunal was not sufficient to establish the charges against him beyond reasonable doubt.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]7. It is well settled now that a High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by a competent Tribunal in a properly conducted departmental enquiry except when it be shown that the impugned findings were not supported by any evidence. It was so held in State of Orissa v. Murlidhar, AIR 1963 SC 404  , where it was said at p. 408 :Whether or not the evidence on which the Tribunal relied was satisfactory and sufficient for justifying its conclusion would not fall to be considered in a writ petition. That in effect is the approach initially adopted by the High Court at the beginning of its judgment. However, in the subsequent part of the judgment the High Court appears to have been persuaded to appreciate the evidence for itself, and that, in our opinion, is not reasonable or legitimate10. It is, therefore, clear that the High Court was in error in reappreciating the evidence before the Tribunal and recording the conclusion that that evidence did not establish the charges against the respondent. This is the only ground on which the Letters Patent Appeal has been allowed by the Division Bench, all other points urged by the respondent having been rejected by it. In the present appeal, the respondent has attempted to support the decision of the High Court under appeal on the ground that the findings recorded by the High Court on the said other points are erroneous. We will, therefore deal with the said points one by one12. Firstly, an order of compulsory retirement does not amount to an order of dismissal and, therefore, does not come within the language of this section. Secondly, the provisions of this section are subject to the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution, and to the rules framed by the State Government under the Police Act. If the order of compulsory retirement amounts, in the circumstances of this case, to an order of dismissal, the Constitutional requirement of Art. 311 that the respondent could not have been dismissed from service by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed has been satisfied. The respondent must have been appointed to the Police Service in 1929 by an authority subordinate to the State Government and, therefore, the State Government was competent to dismiss him. R. 4 specifies the authority which may impose any of the penalties prescribed in R. 2 on a member of the service specified in column 1 of the Schedule to the Rules and states that it shall be the authority specified in the corresponding entry under columns 2 to 8, therefore, whichever is relevant or any higher authority. According to the entry in the Schedule, the authority competent to order compulsory retirement, removal or dismissal of an Inspector of Police in the districts, is the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. The State Government is an authority higher than the Deputy Inspector-General of Police. This cannot be gainsaidWe do not agree with this contention16. It can be similarly said in the present case that the Tribunal rules are applicable to the respondent, that the Governor had the power to retire him compulsorily and that consequently the Governor could refer the enquiry into the allegations against the respondent to the Tribunal17. We have carefully compared the provisions of R. 8 of the Tribunal Rules with R. 3(b) of the Police Rules which lay down the procedure to be followed is substantially the same. The Police officer proceeded against is furnished with the appropriate charges he has to meet. The enquiry is conducted in his presence. The Police Officer is entitled to cross-examine the witness examined to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. He can put in a written statement of defence and can argue orally in person. The procedure followed agrees in substance with what is laid down in the rules and is in accordance with the requirements of natural justice. It is not complained that there had been any irregularities in the course of the enquiry which prejudiced the respondent. The only difference between the provisions of the Tribunal Rules and the Police Rules is said to be that the Tribunal Rules do not provide for an appeal against the order of the Government while under the Police Rules an appeal is provided under R. 518. If the order is of compulsory retirement passed by the State Government, the appeal lies to the Governor. The Tribunal Rules do not say that the order of the Government which is the authority competent to impose a penalty in cases enquired into by the Tribunal would be appealable or not. There is no reason why R. 5 of the Police Rules will not apply to the order passed by Government after having the enquiry into the allegations against the Police officer conducted by a Tribunal when an appeal lies against its order on the basis of an inquiry conducted through any other authority. The rules do not specify the authority which is to enquire into the various complaints against a Police officer governed by those rules. They provide an appeal against the order of the State Government imposing any penalty referred to in R. 2 which would include an order made by the Government after considering the report of the Tribunal19. The record in the present case shows that the respondent did prefer an appeal to the Governor of Madras for reinstatement and that that appeal was rejected. It follows, therefore, that this contention about the enquiry by the Tribunal being prejudicial and about the respondent having been prejudicial has no substance as an appeal against the State Government is not barred under the Tribunal Rules and as factually the respondent did prefer an appeal against the order of compulsory retirement20. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court was in error in quashing the order of the State Government retiring the respondent compulsorily on the ground that the evidence during the inquiry proceedings by the Tribunal was not sufficient to establish the charges against him beyond reasonable doubt.