Case: Hiralal Kapur Vs. Prabhu Choudhury

respondent referred, lays down no different principle. 9. So far as the second point is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon two decisions of this Court in Mohanlal v, Kodni (1979-3 SCR 12) and in Subramania Mudaliar v. Kolapur Traders (1981-4 SCC 511) . In the former, it was held that the profession of a lawyer is “business” within the meaning of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The latter is a decision to a like effect. These decisions are not of much help in the context of the present case and of the provisions of clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Here the landlord is seeking to recover posses­sion of a residential premises. There is, as we have already held, a single tenancy in favour of the respondent for a residential purpose. Though learned counsel for the respondent invited us to say that, so far as the hall was concerned, the premises were being used by a trust and, hence for a non-residential purpose, we cannot permit him to raise this plea. Such a plea was not taken before the High Court. Against the order of the High Court, the respondent had also filed a special leave petition to this Court which has been dismissed. It is therefore not open to the respondent to urge this point before us. The only point taken before the High Court was that the petitioner could not get relief because the use of the hall by a lawyer as his office and library could not amount to a residential requirement. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to this question. 10. In our opinion, the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted in the extreme form in which it is urged here. It may be that in a case where a lawyer seeks to evict a tenant on the ground that the entire premises sought to be got vacated are solely needed by him for use as his office and library, his requirement may not satisfy the requirements of clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). But this is quite different from saying that where the premises are sought to be got vacated for use as a residence and, the landlord being a lawyer desires to use a part of such residence as a study, office or library, such use would be a non-residential use. Any professional man of standing would necessarily have to set apart a portion of his residence for such purposes and the premises does not cease to be his residence because of that. In the present case, the petitioner seeks eviction of the suit premises for his bona fide residential requirement and the use of the hall as an office is only incidental to such a requirement. In ascertaining the bona fide need of residence, in the case of a lawyer, the fact that a room has to be used as an officer cannot be a consideration extraneous to the scope and content of clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). 11. To test our conclusion, we may see what the position would be in the converse, case. If, in the present case, the petitioner had stated that he required the hall because he had no living room in the premises which he was occupying as the only room there was being, or had to be, used by him as an office, the petitioner’s claim could not have been rejected, for he would then have needed the hall clearly as part of his residential requirement. The decision in Khanna v. Batra (1966-2 DL.T. 306) illustrates this. There, an advocate, had asked for eviction of a tenant from the first floor as the ground floor premises occupied by him were not sufficient for his needs for purposes of residence and office. The Rent Control Tribunal held that since the appellant intended to convert existing residential accommodation in his possession into an office and library for the use of his clerk and clients, such a user was not permissible in law. Reversing this conclusion, Grover J. observed: “It seems to me that the Rent Control Tribunal was clearly in error in thinking that merely because the appellant wanted to use the accommodation in his possession for professional purposes, he could not claim benefit of the provision contained in clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. It was this error which led to the conclusion at which the Rent Control Tribunal arrived upholding the decision of the Controller on the second point, namely, the requirement of the appellant on personal grounds. I cannot, therefore, accede to the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the finding of the Rent Controller Tribunal with regard to the personal need or requirement was one of fact and thus immune from challenge in the second appeal.” 12. Should the position is different in this case? Merely because the petitioner has come forward with an;honest plea that he intends to use a part of his residence as an office, should a different result follow, particularly in a case like this where ill-health compels him to have his office at home? Should the result depend on the jugglery of pleadings or the substance of the matter? We think the substance should prevail. In our opinion, where a landlord applies for the possession of his residential premises, his bona fide requirement of the premises for his residential purposes will not stand vitiated merely because he intends to use a portion of the premises for purposes of his office, library or study.13. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of the Rent Controller on this point as well. This is no doubt a mixed question of fact and law but, for the reasons given earlier, we are inclined to agree with the conclusion of the Rent Controller.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]7. We are inclined to agree with this submission of the landlord. The initial tenancy was only an oral tenancy. Nevertheless there were two witnesses who deposed that the original tenancy agreement was only between the petitioner and the respondent. At that time, admittedly, there was no question of Balkunj being the tenant in respect of any portion of the premises. All that the respondent says is that subsequently cheques were being issued in the name of Balkunj also and that this must be taken to lead to an inference that the petitioner had accepted Balkunj as its tenant. It is very difficult to accept this argument.The finding of the Rent Controller that there was only a single tenancy was essentially a finding of fact based on the material andto which we have adverted and we are also inclined to accept the conclusion of the Rent Controller as the correct one. We also agree with the landlord that this is a finding with which the High Court should not have interfered. Though under Section 25(B)(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the powers of the High Court are somewhat wider than similar powers of revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is well established by a series of decisions of this Court that the power of revision under the Rent Control Acts does not entitle the High Court to enter into the merits of the factual controversies between the parties and to reverse findings of fact in this regard. It is sufficient, in this context, to refer to the decision of this Court in Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad (1987-3 SCC 538) which was reviewed earlier decisions. The decision in Sushila Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain (1987-2 SCC 219) , to which counsel for the respondent referred, lays down no different principle.In our opinion, the contention of the respondent cannot be accepted in the extreme form in which it is urged here. It may be that in a case where a lawyer seeks to evict a tenant on the ground that the entire premises sought to be got vacated are solely needed by him for use as his office and library, his requirement may not satisfy the requirements of clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1). But this is quite different from saying that where the premises are sought to be got vacated for use as a residence and, the landlord being a lawyer desires to use a part of such residence as a study, office or library, such use would be a non-residential use. Any professional man of standing would necessarily have to set apart a portion of his residence for such purposes and the premises does not cease to be his residence because of that. In the present case, the petitioner seeks eviction of the suit premises for his bona fide residential requirement and the use of the hall as an office is only incidental to such a requirement. In ascertaining the bona fide need of residence, in the case of a lawyer, the fact that a room has to be used as an officer cannot be a consideration extraneous to the scope and content of clause (e) of the proviso to Sectionour opinion, where a landlord applies for the possession of his residential premises, his bona fide requirement of the premises for his residential purposes will not stand vitiated merely because he intends to use a portion of the premises for purposes of his office, library or study.13. We are, therefore, of opinion that the High Court should not have interfered with the findings of the Rent Controller on this point as well. This is no doubt a mixed question of fact and law but, for the reasons given earlier, we are inclined to agree with the conclusion of the Rent Controller.