Case: Dr.(Mrs.) Roshan Sam Boyee Vs. B.R. Cotton Mills Ltd.

therein. In the circumstances which we have already set out earlier, we are of the view that re- spondent no. 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to contem pt and must be held to have committed contempt by giving the said undertaking and instructing its counsel to give the clarification of the meaning of the said undertaking as aforestated knowing fully well that it was not in possession of the suit premises and was not in a position to give possession of the suit premises to the appellant in execu- tion of the decree in favour of the appellant or otherwise. It is significant that the claim of sub-tenancy set up by respondent no. 2 is pursuant to an alleged resolution of respondent no. 1. We have also no doubt that respondent no. 2 was a party to this breach of the undertaking being com-mitted and, in fact, it was he at whose instance respondent no. 1 committed the breach of the undertaking as aforestat- ed. We are, of course, quite conscious of the fact that the proceedings in the contempt are quasi-criminal in nature, that the law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted and that the requirements of that law must be str ictly complied with before any person can be committed for contempt. Howev- er, as we have pointed out, respondent no. 1 gave an under- taking based on an implication or assumption which was false to its knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent 391 n o. 2. Respondent no. 2 was equally instrumental in the giving of this undertaking. This implication or assumption was made explicit by the clarification given by the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 as set out earlier. Respondent no. 2 was e qually responsible for instructing counsel to give this clarification which was false to the knowledge of both, respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Both respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2 have tried to deceive the Court and the appellant. In view of t his, we fail to see how it can be said that they are not guilty of contempt. Even assuming that a view were to be taken that no contempt has been technically established against respondents Nos 1 and 2 (with which view we do not agree), we cannot allow the matter to rest there and fail to take any action and, in particular, we cannot allow respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to thwart the execution of the decree in this manner at this stage and continue to remain in possession of the suit premises. We find some support for the course of action which we are taking from the decision of this Court in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sh.K.M.M. Shetty and others, 1989 (4) JT 573 where, on facts which bear some similarity to the facts of this case, a Division Bench of this Court held that"it is settled law that breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt." *At the same time, we are conscious of the factthat we cannot altogether foreclose the claim set up by respondent no. 2 in the declaratory suit filed by him in the Court of Small Causes t o establish that he is a sub-tenant of the suit premises and entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. However, we are firmly of the view that by reason of any interim order obtained in that suit and till that claim is finally established, the appellant can no longer be deprived of the possession of the said premises pursuant to the decree for eviction obtained by her. All the necessary parties to that suit are before us and have had and adequate opportunity to be heard. In these circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court and pass in its place the following order: The Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay who has already b een appointed by our order dated January 25, 1990 shall take possession of the suit premises from the present agent and shall appoint the appellant as his agent in respect of the suit premises and hand over possession to the appellant of the suit premises on such terms and conditions as the Court Receiver may think fit but with the limitation 392 that the royalty for use and occupation of the suit premises shall be limited to the actual outgoings plus a sum of Rs.200 per month in order to meet unforeseen contingencies. This order shall be complied with within a period of eight weeks from a copy of this order being served on the Court Receiver. It is clarified that the possession of the prem- ises will be taken from whoever might be in possession thereof and, if the Court Receiver finds any difficulty in obtaining possession, he shall take the necessary assistance from the police authorities. It is further clarified that this order shall supersede any interim orders which might have been passed by the Court of Small Causes or the Bombay City Civil Court or any other Court excepting this Court. In the event of respondent no. 2 being able to finally estab- lish his right to the sub-tenancy of the suit premises asclai med by him in the declaratory suit in the Court of Small Causes, it shall be open to him to apply for vacation or variation of this order as he may be advised. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to pay the appellant the costs of this appeal fixed at Rs.20, 0 00 the liability for the payment of the said aggregate amount being joint and several as between respond- ents Nos. 1 and 2. As far as respondent no. 3 is concerned, we do not propose to take any action against him.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We find that under clause (1 ) of Article 142 of the Constitution, it is provided that this court in exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it and any decree so pa ssed or order so made shall be enforced throughout the territory of India in the manner set out therein. In the circumstances which we have already set out earlier, we are of the view that re- spondent no. 1 is guilty of misconduct amounting to contem pt and must be held to have committed contempt by giving the said undertaking and instructing its counsel to give the clarification of the meaning of the said undertaking as aforestated knowing fully well that it was not in possession of the suit premises and was not in a position to give possession of the suit premises to the appellant in execu- tion of the decree in favour of the appellant or otherwise. It is significant that the claim of sub-tenancy set up by respondent no. 2 is pursuant to an alleged resolution of respondent no. 1. We have also no doubt that respondent no. 2 was a party to this breach of the undertaking being com-mitted and, in fact, it was he at whose instance respondent no. 1 committed the breach of the undertaking as aforestat- ed. We are, of course, quite conscious of the fact that the proceedings in the contempt are quasi-criminal in nature, that the law of contempt has to be strictly interpreted and that the requirements of that law must be str ictly complied with before any person can be committed for contempt. Howev- er, as we have pointed out, respondent no. 1 gave an under- taking based on an implication or assumption which was false to its knowledge and to the knowledge of respondent 391 n o. 2. Respondent no. 2 was equally instrumental in the giving of this undertaking. This implication or assumption was made explicit by the clarification given by the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 as set out earlier. Respondent no. 2 was e qually responsible for instructing counsel to give this clarification which was false to the knowledge of both, respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Both respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2 have tried to deceive the Court and the appellant. In view of t his, we fail to see how it can be said that they are not guilty of contempt. Even assuming that a view were to be taken that no contempt has been technically established against respondents Nos 1 and 2 (with which view we do not agree), we cannot allow the matter to rest there and fail to take any action and, in particular, we cannot allow respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to thwart the execution of the decree in this manner at this stage and continue to remain in possession of the suit premises. We find some support for the course of action which we are taking from the decision of this Court in Noorali Babul Thanewala v. Sh.K.M.M. Shetty and others, 1989 (4) JT 573 where, on facts which bear some similarity to the facts of this case, a Division Bench of this Court held that"it is settled law that breach of an injunction or breach of an undertaking given to a court by a person in a civil proceeding on the faith of which the court sanctions a particular course of action is misconduct amounting to contempt." *At the same time, we are conscious of the factthat we cannot altogether foreclose the claim set up by respondent no. 2 in the declaratory suit filed by him in the Court of Small Causes t o establish that he is a sub-tenant of the suit premises and entitled to the protection of the Bombay Rents, Hotel Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947. However, we are firmly of the view that by reason of any interim order obtained in that suit and till that claim is finally established, the appellant can no longer be deprived of the possession of the said premises pursuant to the decree for eviction obtained by her. All the necessary parties to that suit are before us and have had and adequate opportunity to be heard. In these circumstances, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court