Case: State Of Mysore And Anr Vs. H. Srinivasamurthy

to the respondent, and was identically situated, was accorded the same treatment. It is urged that this principle of policy r was ignored in the case of the respondent, and he was without reason singled out for unfair discriminatory treatment. It is pointed out that his so-called "reversion" to the parent Department in 1958 for a short period, was a misnomer. It was not a reduction in rank, nor a break in the continuity of his service. Moreover, it was, as the Public Service Commission found, undeserved and could not, by any stretch of reasoning, be considered a ground for meting out discriminatory treatment to the respondent.8. We find a good deal of force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for the respondent.Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In that case, the Government of the then State of Mysore, by a notification dated December 12, 1949, directed that the promotions of 63 petitioners therein, from the post of Surveyors as Assistant Engineers were to take effect from that date irrespective of the dates on which they were put in charge of sub-divisions. But by a notification dated May 17, 1950, the Government showed a concession to a different batch of 41 Surveyors, who had been placed in charge of different sub-divisions between March 1944 and January 1946, by promoting them as Assistant Engineers, with effect from the dates of occurrence of vacancies, according to seniority. In November 1958, another batch of 107 persons were similarly promoted as Assistant Engineers with retrospective effect from 1st November 1956, when the new State of Mysore emerged under the States Reorganization Act. The petitioners therein filed a writ petition praying for the issue of mandamus directing the State to fix their seniority, also, on the basis that they had become Assistant Engineers from the dates on which the vacancies to which they-had been posted had occurred. The High Court dismissed petition. On appeal, this Court ; held that the concession shown to the batch of 41 persons who had been appointed before the petitioners and to the batch of 107 persons who had been appointed thereafter, were mere ad hoc concessions and not something which they could. claim as of right. It was observed that there was no service rule which the State Government had transgressed, nor the State had evolved any principle to be followed in respect of persons who were promoted to the rank of Assistant Engineers from surveyors.9. It may be noted that the grant of the relief prayed for by the 63 petitioners, would have unsettled and caused wholesale alterations of the seniority list with regard to the entire cadre of Engineers thus affecting persons who were not before the Court and who would have been r condemned unheard. Further, acceptance of the petitioners contentions would have unsettled pre-Constitution matters, and it would have been directly productive of results going against s. 115(7) of the States Re-organization Act. Furthermore, the petitioners in that case . claimed to be promoted with effect from past dates. There was no , principle of policy or service rule on the basis of which they could ` claim such promotions as of right. Lastly, the petitioners in that case were found guilty of serious laches.10. Such impediments in the way of the relief claimed by the respondent, do not exist in the present case. It appears to us that the acceptance of the respondents contentions in the present case cannot lead to any untoward results such as were apprehended in Rajalakshmiahs case (supra). Indeed, it has not been shown that the absorption of the respondent with effect from November, 1949, would adversely affect even Narayanaswamy Chetty, who was admittedly junior to him in the parent Department.On the` other hand, it is an undisputed fact that sit other employees, who were similarly situated, were absorbed from the dates on which they initially joined duty, after deputation to the Polytechnics. It is not the case of the appellant that this principle whereby the absorption in the Department of Technical Education was related back to the date on which a person initially came on deputation, was ever departed from, excepting in the case of the respondent. This being the case, the High Court was right in holding that the State Government had evolved a principle "that if a person was deputed to the Department of Technical Education from another department and he stayed on in that other department for a reasonable long time his absorption in that department should be made to relate back to the date on which he was initially sent". There was no justification whatever to depart from this principle of policy in the case of the respondent, who was, in all material respects, in the same situation as K. N. Chetty. very rightly, the High Court has held that his "impermissible reversion" for a short while in 1955 to the parent department was no ground to hold that he was not similarly situated as K. Nariayanaswamy Chetty. This so-called reversion to the parent Department for a short period- in 1955-56, could not by any reckoning, be treated as a break in his service, this period having been treated as leave. Nor did it amount u to reduction in rank. In any case, this reversion was not ordered owing to any fault of the respondent. It is not the appellants case " that the respondents work in the Department of Technical Education was found unsatisfactory or that he was not otherwise suitable or qualified to hold the post of Tailoring Instructor in that Department. That he was suitable to be absorbed in that post, is manifest from the recommendation of the Public Service Commission and is implicit in the impugned order, itself. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that in the special circumstances of this case, the High Court was fully justified in granting the relief, it did, to the respondent.11.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We find a good deal of force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for themay be noted that the grant of the relief prayed for by the 63 petitioners, would have unsettled and caused wholesale alterations of the seniority list with regard to the entire cadre of Engineers thus affecting persons who were not before the Court and who would have been r condemned unheard. Further, acceptance of the petitioners contentions would have unsettled pre-Constitution matters, and it would have been directly productive of results going against s. 115(7) of the States Re-organization Act. Furthermore, the petitioners in that case . claimed to be promoted with effect from past dates. There was no , principle of policy or service rule on the basis of which they could ` claim such promotions as of right.  Lastly, the petitioners in that case were found guilty of seriousimpediments in the way of the relief claimed by the respondent, do not exist in the present case. It appears to us that the acceptance of the respondents contentions in the present case cannot lead to any untoward results such as were apprehended in Rajalakshmiahs case (supra). Indeed, it has not been shown that the absorption of the respondent with effect from November, 1949, would adversely affect even Narayanaswamy Chetty, who was admittedly junior to him in the parent Department.On the` other hand, it is an undisputed fact that sit other employees, who were similarly situated, were absorbed from the dates on which they initially joined duty, after deputation to the Polytechnics. It is not the case of the appellant that this principle whereby the absorption in the Department of Technical Education was related back to the date on which a person initially came on deputation, was ever departed from, excepting in the case of the respondent. This being the case, the High Court was right in holding that the State Government had evolved a principle "that if a person was deputed to the Department of Technical Education from another department and he stayed on in that other department for a reasonable long time his absorption in that department should be made to relate back to the date on which he was initially sent". There was no justification whatever to depart from this principle of policy in the case of the respondent, who was, in all material respects, in the same situation as K. N. Chetty. very rightly, the High Court has held that his "impermissible reversion" for a short while in 1955 to the parent department was no ground to hold that he was not similarly situated as K. Nariayanaswamy Chetty. This so-called reversion to the parent Department for a short period- in 1955-56, could not by any reckoning, be treated as a break in his service, this period having been treated as leave. Nor did it amount u  to reduction in rank. In any case, this reversion was not ordered owing to any fault of the respondent. It is not the appellants case " that the respondents work in the Department of Technical Education was found unsatisfactory or that he was not otherwise suitable or qualified to hold the post of Tailoring Instructor in that Department. That he was suitable to be absorbed in that post, is manifest from the recommendation of the Public Service Commission and is implicit in the impugned order, itself. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of opinion that in the special circumstances of this case, the High Court was fully justified in granting the relief, it did, to the respondent.