Case: NATIONAL LAWYERS CAMPAIGN FOR JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND REFORMS Vs. UNION OF INDIA

what she had done and was supported by the other contemnors. In the light of such admission, the summary procedure followed by Pasayat, J. cannot be faulted. xxx xxx xxx 35. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no doubt contemplates issuance of notice and an opportunity to the contemnors to answer the charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of natural justice. However, where an incident of the instant nature takes place within the presence and sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to contempt in the face of the Court and is required to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself. This is necessary for the dignity and majesty of the courts to be maintained. When an object, such as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in a court proceeding, the object is not to merely scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower its dignity in the eyes of the public. 11. Leila David (6) (supra) has been followed in Ram Niranjan Roy v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2014) 12 SCC 11 thus: 16. Thus, when contempt is committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalise or humiliate the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong hand, that may result in scandalising the institution thereby lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. The courts exist for the people. The courts cherish the faith reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion of that faith, contempt committed in the face of the court need a strict treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court he has not tendered apology. Therefore, since the contempt was gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court, the learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence. This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. 12. In R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 , a three- Judge Bench of this Court examined the law and stated that a direction prohibiting the advocate from appearing in a Court for a specified period was a punishment that could be imposed in the contempt jurisdiction. After examining the judgments on the point, this Court held: 238. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. [(1998) 4 SCC 409] the direction prohibiting an advocate from appearing in court for a specified period was viewed as a total and complete denial of his right to practise law and the bar was considered as a punishment inflicted on him. [Though in para 80 of Supreme Court Bar Assn. case [(1998) 4 SCC 409] , as seen earlier (in para 230 herein), there is an observation that in a given case it might be possible for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the contemnor advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt.] In Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal [(2003) 2 SCC 45] it was seen not as punishment for professional misconduct but as a measure necessary to regulate the courts proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of the courts. We may respectfully add that in a given case a direction disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in court may not only be a measure to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self-protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of court proceedings. Let us, for example, take the case where an advocate is shown to have accepted money in the name of a judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or where an advocate is found tampering with the courts record; or where an advocate is found actively taking part in faking court orders (fake bail orders are not unknown in several High Courts!); or where an advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and abuse judges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a case transferred from an inconvenient court; or where an advocate is found to be in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiated allegation petitions against judicial officers and judges to the superior courts. Unfortunately, these examples are not from imagination. These things are happening more frequently than we care to acknowledge. 239. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustive but there may be other ways in which a malefactors conduct and actions may pose a real and imminent threat to the purity of court proceedings, cardinal to any courts functioning, apart from constituting a substantive offence and contempt of court and professional misconduct. In such a situation the court does not only have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon it to protect itself and save the purity of its proceedings from being polluted in any way and to that end bar the malefactor from appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time. 240. It is already explained in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal [(2003) 2 SCC 45] that a direction of this kind by the Court cannot be equated with punishment for professional misconduct. Further, the prohibition against appearance in courts does not affect the right of the lawyer concerned to carry on his legal practice in other ways as indicated in the decision. We respectfully submit that the decision in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India [(2003) 2 SCC 45] places the issue in correct perspective and must be followed to answer the question at issue before us. (emphasis supplied)

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]2. We are of the view that the only reason for taking the learned Senior Advocates name, without there being any relevance to his name in the present case, is to browbeat the Court and embarrass one of us.3. This is not the first time that this particular advocate has attempted to browbeat and insult Judges of this Court. In point of fact, the style of this particular advocate is to go on arguing, quoting Latin maxims, and when he finds that the Court is not with him, starts becoming abusive. We also find that this advocate is briefed to appear in hopeless cases and attempts, by browbeating the Court, to get discretionary orders, which no Court is otherwise prepared to give. We have found that the vast majority of appearances by this advocate before us have been in cases in which debtors have persistently defaulted, as a result of which their mortgaged properties have to be handed over to secured creditors to be sold in auction. It is at this stage that Shri Nedumpara is briefed to somehow put off the auction sale. Even the present Writ Petition is a case in which a review petition against the judgment of this Court in Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India, (2017) 9 SCC 766  has already been dismissed. With full knowledge that a second review petition is barred by Order 47, Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, Shri Nedumpara seeks a second review in the form of a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.9. When contempt is committed in the face of the Court, judges hands are not tied behind their backs. The majesty of this Court as well as the administration of justice both demand that contemptuous behavior of this kind be dealt with sternly. An early judgment of this Court in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice S. Teja Singh, 1954 SCR 454 proceeded cautiously, but made it clear that where a judge is personally attacked, it would be proper for the judge to deal with the matter himself, in cases of contempt in the face of the Court. This Court stated the law thus:We wish however to add that though we have no power to order a transfer in an original petition of this kind we consider it desirable on general principles of justice that a judge who has been personally attacked should not as far as possible hear a contempt matter which, to that extent, concerns him personally. It is otherwise when the attack is not directed against him personally. We do not lay down any general rule because there may be cases where that is impossible, as for example in a court where there is only one judge or two and both are attacked. Other cases may also arise where it is more convenient and proper for the Judge to deal with the matter himself, as for example in a contempt in facie curiae. All we can say is that this must be left to the good sense of the judges themselves who, we are confident, will comfort themselves with that dispassionate dignity and decorum which befits their high office and will bear in mind the oft quoted maxim that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done by all concerned and most particularly by an accused person who should always be given, as far as that is humanly possible, a feeling of confidence that he will receive a fair, just and impartial trial by Judges who have no personal interest or concern in his case.(at pp. 464-465) (emphasis supplied)10. In Leila David (2) v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 4 SCC 578 , two learned Judges differed on whether contempt in the face of the Court can be dealt with summarily, without any need of issuing notice to the contemnors, and whether punishment can be inflicted upon them there and then. Pasayat, J. held that this is, indeed, the duty of the Court. Ganguly, J. differed. A three-Judge Bench of this Court, in Leila David (6) v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 10 SCC 337 , settled the law, making it clear that Pasayat, J.s view was the correct view in law. This Court held:28. As far as the suo motu proceedings for contempt are concerned, we are of the view that Arijit Pasayat, J. was well within his jurisdiction in passing a summary order, having regard to the provisions of Articles 129 and 142 of the Constitution of India. Although, section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, lays down the procedure to be followed in cases of criminal contempt in the face of the court, it does not preclude the court from taking recourse to summary proceedings when a deliberate and wilful contumacious incident takes place in front of their eyes and the public at large, including Senior Law Officers, such as the Attorney General for India who was then the Solicitor General of India.29. While, as pointed out by Ganguly, J., it is a statutory requirement and a salutary principle that a person should not be condemned unheard, particularly in a case relating to contempt of court involving a summary procedure, and should be given an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against him/her, there are exceptional circumstances in which such a procedure may be discarded as being redundant.30. The incident which took place in the courtroom presided over by Pasayat, J. was within the confines of the courtroom and was witnessed by a large number of people and the throwing of the footwear was also admitted by Dr. Sarita Parikh, who without expressing any regret for her conduct stood by what she had done and was supported by the other contemnors. In the light of such admission, the summary procedure followed by Pasayat, J. cannot be faulted.xxx xxx xxx35. Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no doubt contemplates issuance of notice and an opportunity to the contemnors to answer the charges in the notice to satisfy the principles of natural justice. However, where an incident of the instant nature takes place within the presence and sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to contempt in the face of the Court and is required to be dealt with at the time of the incident itself. This is necessary for the dignity and majesty of the courts to be maintained. When an object, such as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding Officer in a court proceeding, the object is not to merely scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to scandalise the institution itself and thereby lower its dignity in the eyes of the public.11. Leila David (6) (supra) has been followed in Ram Niranjan Roy v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2014) 12 SCC 11 thus:16. Thus, when contempt is committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalise or humiliate the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong hand, that may result in scandalising the institution thereby lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. The courts exist for the people. The courts cherish the faith reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion of that faith, contempt committed in the face of the court need a strict treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High Court was not remorseful. He did not file any affidavit tendering apology nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was remorseful and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court he has not tendered apology. Therefore, since the contempt was gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court, the learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question of giving the appellant any opportunity to make his defence. This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be rejected.12. In R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 , a three- Judge Bench of this Court examined the law and stated that a direction prohibiting the advocate from appearing in a Court for a specified period was a punishment that could be imposed in the contempt jurisdiction. After examining the judgments on the point, this Court held:238. In Supreme Court Bar Assn. [(1998) 4 SCC 409] the direction prohibiting an advocate from appearing in court for a specified period was viewed as a total and complete denial of his right to practise law and the bar was considered as a punishment inflicted on him. [Though in para 80 of Supreme Court Bar Assn. case [(1998) 4 SCC 409] , as seen earlier (in para 230 herein), there is an observation that in a given case it might be possible for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the contemnor advocate to appear before it till he purges himself of the contempt.] In Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal [(2003) 2 SCC 45] it was seen not as punishment for professional misconduct but as a measure necessary to regulate the courts proceedings and to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of the courts. We may respectfully add that in a given case a direction disallowing an advocate who is convicted of criminal contempt from appearing in court may not only be a measure to maintain the dignity and orderly functioning of the courts but may become necessary for the self-protection of the court and for preservation of the purity of court proceedings. Let us, for example, take the case where an advocate is shown to have accepted money in the name of a judge or on the pretext of influencing him; or where an advocate is found tampering with the courts record; or where an advocate is found actively taking part in faking court orders (fake bail orders are not unknown in several High Courts!); or where an advocate has made it into a practice to browbeat and abuse judges and on that basis has earned the reputation to get a case transferred from an inconvenient court; or where an advocate is found to be in the habit of sending unfounded and unsubstantiated allegation petitions against judicial officers and judges to the superior courts. Unfortunately, these examples are not from imagination. These things are happening more frequently than we care to acknowledge.239. We may also add that these illustrations are not exhaustive but there may be other ways in which a malefactors conduct and actions may pose a real and imminent threat to the purity of court proceedings, cardinal to any courts functioning, apart from constituting a substantive offence and contempt of court and professional misconduct. In such a situation the court does not only have the right but it also has the obligation cast upon it to protect itself and save the purity of its proceedings from being polluted in any way and to that end bar the malefactor from appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time.240. It is already explained in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal [(2003) 2 SCC 45] that a direction of this kind by the Court cannot be equated with punishment for professional misconduct. Further, the prohibition against appearance in courts does not affect the right of the lawyer concerned to carry on his legal practice in other ways as indicated in the decision. We respectfully submit that the decision in Ex. Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India [(2003) 2 SCC 45] places the issue in correct perspective and must be followed to answer the question at issue before us.