Case: M.P.E.B Vs. Jagdishchandra Sharma

to the charge proved. These aspects are well settled. In U.P. State Road Transport Corpn. vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma and others, (2000) 3 SCC 324 , this Court, after referring to the scope of interference with punishment under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, held that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of removal from service when the charge against the employee stood proved. It was also held that the jurisdiction vested with the Labour Court to interfere with punishment was not to be exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. It was necessary, in a case where the Labour Court finds the charge proved, for a conclusion to be arrived that the punishment was shockingly disproportionate to the nature of the charge found proved, before it could interfere to reduce the punishment. In Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and another, (2004) 8 SCC 200 , this Court after referring to the decision in State of Rajasthan vs. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417 , also pointed out the difference between the approaches to be made in a criminal proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding. This Court also pointed out that when charges proved were grave, vis-a-vis the establishment, interference with punishment of dismissal could not be justified. In Bharat Forge Company Ltd. vs. Uttam Manohar Nakate, 2005(1) SCALE 345, this Court again reiterated that the jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment should be exercised only when the punishment is shockingly disproportionate and that each case had to be decided on its facts. This Court also indicated that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, had to act within the four corners thereof. It could not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there existed a statutory provision in that behalf. The Tribunal or the Labour Court could not interfere with the quantum of punishment based on irrational or extraneous factors and certainly not on what it considers a compassionate ground. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this question, since the matter has been dealt with in detail in a recent decision of this Court in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. vs. N.B. Narawade, 2005(2) SCALE 302. This Court summed up the position thus: "It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to herein above and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the court, or the existence of any mitigating circumstances which requires to reduction of the sentence, or the past conduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment." It may also be noticed that in Orissa Cement Ltd. vs. V. Adikanda Sahu (1960(1) LLJ-518-SC) 590, this Court held that use of abusive language against a superior, justified punishment of dismissal. This Court stated punishment of dismissal for using abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate". If that be the position regarding verbal, assault, we think that the position regarding dismissal for physical assault, must be found all the more justifiable. Recently, in Employers, Management, Muriadih Colliery M/s. BCCL Ltd. vs. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, Through Workmen (JT 2005(2) SC 444 ) this Court after referring to and quoting the relevant passages from management of Krishnakali Tea Estate vs. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh and another (2004(7) SCALE 608) and The Management of Tournamulla Estate vs. Workmen (1973) 2 SCC 502 ) held:-"The courts below by condoning an act of physical violence have undermined the discipline in the organization, hence, in the above factual backdrop, it can never be said that the Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its authority under Section 11(A) of the Act to interfere with the punishment of dismissal." 9. In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of hitting and injuring his superior officer at the work place, obviously in the presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline in the organization. Discipline at the work place in an organization like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient working of the organization. When an employee breaches such discipline and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan, discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement, of collective interests of society at large. Obviously this idea is more relevant in considering the working of an organization like the employer herein or an industrial undertaking. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery. It is not violative of ones natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of the organization as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation, a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior officer supervising the work of the employee, with no extenuating circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not justified. It cannot certainly be termed unduly harsh or disproportionate. The Labour Court and the High Court in this case totally misdirected themselves while exercising their jurisdiction. The Industrial Court made the correct approach and came to the right conclusion.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]6. It is clear from the findings recorded and the materials available before us, that the charge against the employee of hitting a superior officer with an implement and causing him injury stood proved, as also his absence from duty without intimation. In fact, the Labour Court has found nothing wrong with the domestic enquiry wherein the charges were found to have been proved. The Labour Court also proceeded on the basis that the charges were proved. The Industrial Court in appeal accepted the finding that the charges against the employee were proved. The High Court also held that the charges against the employee stood proved on the facts of this case. The High Court also took note of the fact that the employee did not even challenge this part of the finding of the Labour Court in the appeal, he filed before the Industrial Court. Thus, it is clear that there is no reason for this Court to interfere with the finding that the charges against the employee stood proved, even assuming that the employee, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1340 of 2003, is permitted to raise the question regarding the proving of the charges against him. We were taken through the relevant materials. The materials clearly disclose that the charges were proved. We have, therefore, only to ask ourselves whether in the face of the charges proved, it was proper for the Labour Court or for the High Court to interfere with the punishment imposed by the employer.7. On a comparison, it is seen that Section 107A of the Act is almost a reproduction of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. Learned counsel also regard that its scope was the same as that of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.In the case on hand, the employee has been found guilty of hitting and injuring his superior officer at the work place, obviously in the presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline in the organization. Discipline at the work place in an organization like the employer herein, is the sine qua non for the efficient working of the organization. When an employee breaches such discipline and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. We have already referred to the views of this Court. To quote Jack Chan, discipline is a form of civilly responsible behaviour which helps maintain social order and contributes to the preservation, if not advancement, of collective interests of society at large. Obviously this idea is more relevant in considering the working of an organization like the employer herein or an industrial undertaking. Obedience to authority in a workplace is not slavery. It is not violative of ones natural rights. It is essential for the prosperity of the organization as well as that of its employees. When in such a situation, a punishment of termination is awarded for hitting and injuring a superior officer supervising the work of the employee, with no extenuating circumstance established, it cannot be said to be not justified. It cannot certainly be termed unduly harsh or disproportionate. The Labour Court and the High Court in this case totally misdirected themselves while exercising their jurisdiction. The Industrial Court made the correct approach and came to the rightit had been clearly found that the employee during work, had hit his superior officer with a tension screw on his back and on his nose leaving him with a bleeding and broken nose. It has also been found that this incident was followed by the unauthorized absence of the employee. It is in the context of these charges found established that the punishment of termination was imposed on the employee. The jurisdiction under Section 107A of the Act to interfere with punishment when it is a discharge or dismissal can be exercised by the Labour Court only when it is satisfied that the discharge or dismissal is not justified. Similarly, the High Court gets jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only when it finds that the punishment imposed, is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. These aspects are well settled.