Case: Mangan Lal Deoshi Vs. Mohammad Moinul Haoque &amp; Others

into their possession.5. Now, sub-section (1) of section 17 of the Registration Act, enumerates five categories of documents of which registration is made compulsory which include "(d) leases of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent;". Sub-section (2) however provided that "nothing in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) applies to.... (vi) any decree or order of court." It may be mentioned in passing that this clause was amended with affect from the 1st April, 1930, by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, so as to exclude from the scope of the exception compromise decrees comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit. But the amendment cannot affect the document here in question which came into existence in 1923. Before the amendment, the clause was held to cover even compromise decrees comprising immovable property which was not the subject matter of the suit : [Vide Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. [47 Cal. 485 : P.C.]. That decision applies to the present case and obviates the objection that because the compromise in question covered also the remaining 5, 300 bighas which were not the subject-matter of the title suit of 1921, it was outside the scope of the exception in sub-section (2), clause (vi).6. The only question, therefore, is whether the compromise decree is a "lease" [which expression includes "an agreement to lease" by the definition in section 2(7)] within the meaning of cl. (d) of sub-section (1). It is obvious that if the compromise decree falls within clause (d) of sub-section (1) it would not be protected under clause (vi) of sub-section (2) which excepts only documents falling under the categories (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). The High Court was of opinion that, on a proper construction of the terms of the compromise, it did not fall under clause (d). Manohar Lall J., who delivered the leading judgment, observed :"It was a tripartite agreement embodied in the decree of the court and was, therefore, exempt from registration. It will be observed also that so far as the defendants were concerned, their possession of the 500 bighas was not interfered with and they still remained in possession as the lessees, but instead of paying the royalty to the plaintiffs it was agreed between all the parties that the defendants would pay the royalty in future to Shibsaran and Sitaram. If the matter had stood there the learned Advocate for the appellant could not have seriously contested the position, but he vehemently argued that when the agreement was not to pay the same amount of royalty or commission as previously agreed to but an altered amount of royalty and commission, the document should be held to fall within the mischief of section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act. The answer to this contention is, as I have stated just now, to be found in the Full Bench decision of this court;"[see Chara Chandra Mitras case [3 P.J. 255]. It was there held that a mere alteration of the rent reserved does not make the transaction a new lease so as to bring it within clause (d) of sub-section (1).7. We are unable to share this view. It oversimplifies the compromise transaction which, in our opinion, involves much more than a mere alteration of the royalties stipulated for in the previous pattas executed by Kumar. Nor can we accept the suggestion of Mr. Chatterjee for the respondents that the compromise operated as an assignment to the Singhs by Kumar of the latters reversion under the "lease granted to the Deoshis and all that the latter did was to acknowledge the Singhs as their landlords and attorn to them. On this view it was said that the transaction would not fall under clause (d), although it would fall under clause (b) but then would be saved by the exception in clause (vi) of sub-section (2). The argument, however, overlooks that Kumar had leased the area of 5, 800 bighas to the Singhs by his patta dated 11th March, 1921, and the compromise by providing that the Singhs should pay the reduced royalty of 1a. 9p. per ton in respect of the whole area preserved Kumars reversion intact. He could not therefore be deemed to have assigned any part of his interest in 5, 800 bighas as landlord to the Singhs who continue to hold the entire extent as tenants under him. What the compromise really did was, as stated already, to bring the Singhs and the Deoshis into a new legal relationship as under-lessor and under-lessee in respect of 500 bighas which were the subject-matter of the title suit; in other words, its legal effect was to create a perpetual underlease between the Singhs and the Deoshis which would clearly fall under clause (d) but for the circumstance that it was to take effect only on condition that the Singhs paid Rs. 8, 000 to Kumar within 2 months thereafter. As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Hemanta Kumars case [47 Cal. 485 at p. 494]"An agreement for a lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include, must, in their Lordships opinion, be a document which effects an actual demise and operates as a lease... The phrase which in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must in their opinion relate to some document which creates a present and immediate interest in the land."8. The compromise decree expressly provides that unless the sum of Rs. 8, 000 was paid within the stipulated time the Singhs were not to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed property. Until the payment was made it was impossible to determine whether there would be any underlease or not. Such a contingent agreement is not within clause (d) and although it is covered by clause (b), is excepted by clause (vi) of sub-section (2).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are unable to share this view. It oversimplifies the compromise transaction which, in our opinion, involves much more than a mere alteration of the royalties stipulated for in the previous pattas executed by Kumar. Nor can we accept the suggestion ofMr. Chatterjee for the respondents that the compromise operated as an assignment to the Singhs by Kumar of the latters reversion under the "lease granted to the Deoshis and all that the latter did was to acknowledge the Singhs as their landlords and attorn to them.On this view it was said that the transaction would not fall under clause (d), although it would fall under clause (b) but then would be saved by the exception in clause (vi) of sub-section (2). The argument, however, overlooks that Kumar had leased the area of 5, 800 bighas to the Singhs by his patta dated 11th March, 1921, and the compromise by providing that the Singhs should pay the reduced royalty of 1a. 9p. per ton in respect of the whole area preserved Kumars reversion intact. He could not therefore be deemed to have assigned any part of his interest in 5, 800 bighas as landlord to the Singhs who continue to hold the entire extent as tenants under him. What the compromise really did was, as stated already, to bring the Singhs and the Deoshis into a new legal relationship as under-lessor and under-lessee in respect of 500 bighas which were the subject-matter of the title suit; in other words, its legal effect was to create a perpetual underlease between the Singhs and the Deoshis which would clearly fall under clause (d) but for the circumstance that it was to take effect only on condition that the Singhs paid Rs. 8, 000 to Kumar within 2 monthscompromise decree expressly provides that unless the sum of Rs. 8, 000 was paid within the stipulated time the Singhs were not to execute the decree or to take possession of the disputed property. Until the payment was made it was impossible to determine whether there would be any underlease or not. Such a contingent agreement is not within clause (d) and although it is covered by clause (b), is excepted by clause (vi) of sub-section (2).