Case: Randhir Singh Vs. Union of India and Others

abstract doctrine which had nothing to do with Art. 14. We shall presently point out how the principle, "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine but one of substance. Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi v. Union of India is not itself of any real assistance to us since what was decided there was that there could be different scales of pay for different grade s of a service. It is well known that there can be and there are different grades in a service, with varying qualifications for entry into a particular grade, the higher grade often being a promotional avenue for officers of the lower grade. The higher qualifications for the higher grade, which may be either academic qualifications or experience based on length of service, reasonably sustain the classification of the officers into two grades with different scales of pay. Th e principle of equal pay for equal work would be an abstract doctrine not attracting Art. 14 if sought to be applied to them.5. It is true that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a funda mental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. Equal pay for equal work for both men and wom en means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some thing to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work the y do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax eva ders is discriminatory, whether a particular Governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the takeover of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutiona l and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane they may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word Socialist must mean something. Even if it does not mean To each according to his need, it must atleast mean equal pay for equal work. The principle of equal pay for equal work is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g, Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour. Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 33 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been in corporated in several western labour codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bar gaining agreements. In accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federal Republic, and clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance (vide: International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy p. 265). The preamble of the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation recognises the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value as constituting one of the means of achieving the improvement of condit ions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 in the light of the Preamble and Art. 39(d) we are o f the view that the principle Equal pay for Equal work is deducible from those Article and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing the different scales of pay do idential work under the same employer.6. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture with the powers, functions and privileges of a police officer, their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay fo r equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is true that the principle of equal pay for equal work is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a funda mental right. But it certainly is a Constitutional goal. Art. 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. Equal pay for equal work for both men and wom en means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Art. 14 of the Constitution enjoins the state not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Art. 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean some thing to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work the y do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equalare o f the view that the principle Equal pay for Equal work is deducible from those Article and may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classification though these drawing the different scales of pay do idential work under the samecannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Delhi Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers in service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If anything, by reason of their investiture with the powers, functions and privileges of a police officer, their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others ? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of equal pay fo r equal work is not a principle which the Courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational.