Case: Priya Laxmi Mills Ltd Vs. Mazdoor Mahajan Mandal, Baroda

purpose of---"(a) compelling any of the employees directly affected by such closing, suspension or refusal or any other employees of his, or(b) aiding any other employer in compelling persons employed by him, to accept any term or condition of or affecting employment."This definition-is differently worded from what is there in the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947. We, however, find that in the Trade Disputes Act, 1929, lock-out is similarly defined as in the present Act.By section 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, lock-out:"means the closing of a place of employment, or the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him".This Court, while interpreting the above definition, in Management of Kairbetta Estate, Kotesiri v. Rajamanickam and others, ([1960] 3 S.C.R. 371.) observed as follows:--"Even so, the essential character of a lockout continues to be substantially the same. Lockout can be described as the entithesis of a strike. Just as a strike is a weapon available to the employees for enforcing their industrial demands, a lock-out is a weapon available to the employer to persuade by a coercive process the employees to see his point of view and to accept his demands."5. It should, however, be made clear that lock-out can be declared also for reasons similar to those described in the present notice of lock-out. In that case although it will be lock-out in another sense, it may not be a lock-out within the meaning of section 3 (24) of the Act. That kind of a lock-out with the avowed object of preventing violence and threat to life and property may even be justified on facts in a given case. In such a situation it may be difficult to prove that it is an illegal lock-out since in an illegal lock-out the sole object is to compel the workmen to accept the terms of the employer which the workers consider as unreasonable and oppressive.In the instant case although we do not approve of the Labour Courts observations in the order to a possible effect that threats and gheraoes "are the normal behaviour when an occasion like this takes place", we cannot say that its ultimate conclusion after appreciation of the evidence is such that it may call for interference in an application under Article 136 of the Constitution.6. The Labour Court has given a finding at paragraph 15 of the as follows:--"Coming now to the other important ingredient viz. intention on the part of the management to compel the workers directly affected by such closing to accept any term or condition affecting employment, it appears that there was such an intention on the part of the management. The opponent company, because of the financial difficulties which they were facing wanted the workers to agree to accept lay-off and also agree to accept wages not on the specified days as per the existing awards, etc. but as and when the management could pay ...... In my opinion, therefore it could be s aid that all the ingredients of an illegal lockout were present in this case".7. The Labour Court has taken note of the fact that there was no evidence of any violence being caused to the property of the mill notwithstanding the presence of a huge crowd said to be in a riotous mood. The tribunal also took the view that the officers were not confined in. their rooms as such as represented but they themselves did not like to come out perhaps due to apprehension. The Labour Court was of opinion that the situation was not of such a grave nature which called for such a drastic step like a lock-out. The Labour Court seems to be of the further view that since the management has been in continuous financial difficulties heading towards a closure and closure would have put the management under an obligation to pay compensation under section 25 FFF under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, opportunity was taken to declare a lock-out on the slightest opportunity. It is not possible for us to reappraise the evidence and come to a different conclusion on the facts in this appeal. We are also unable to hold that the conclusions of the Labour Court are perverse or even against the weight of evidence on record. The only question, therefore, that survives is whether on the finding of t he Labour Court the lock-out is illegal.8. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that item 6(ii) in Schedule Iii to the Act which deals with the unemployment of persons previously employed in the industry concerned cannot govern a case of lay off. According to counsel lay off is not unemployment since the relationship of master and servant is not snapped. We are unable to accept this contention. Lay off is not defined in the Act but has been defined in section (KKK) of the Industrial Disputes Act:"lay-off (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions ) means the failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw materials or the accumulation, of stocks or the breakdown of machinery or for any other reason to give employment to a workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been retrenched".X X X X X9. Even according to the dictionary meaning, lay off means to discontinue work or activity; to dismiss or discharge temporarily. When workers are in employment and they are laid of, that immediately results in their unemployment, howsoever temporary, and such an unemployment will clearly come under item 6(ii) in Schedule III of the Act. It is not disputed that "unemployment" is an industrial matter as defined under section 3(18) of the Act. Since unemployment is an industrial matter under item 6(ii) of Schedule III to the Act, the lock-out which has been found by the Labour Court to have direct connection with lay of is clearly illegal under section 98(1)(a) of the Act.10.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The Labour Court has taken note of the fact that there was no evidence of any violence being caused to the property of the mill notwithstanding the presence of a huge crowd said to be in a riotous mood. The tribunal also took the view that the officers were not confined in. their rooms as such as represented but they themselves did not like to come out perhaps due to apprehension. The Labour Court was of opinion that the situation was not of such a grave nature which called for such a drastic step like a lock-out. The Labour Court seems to be of the further view that since the management has been in continuous financial difficulties heading towards a closure and closure would have put the management under an obligation to pay compensation under section 25 FFF underthe Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, opportunity was taken to declare a lock-out on the slightest opportunity. It is not possible for us to reappraise the evidence and come to a different conclusion on the facts in this appeal. We are also unable to hold that the conclusions of the Labour Court are perverse or even against the weight of evidence on record. The only question, therefore, that survives is whether on the finding of t he Labour Court the lock-out isaccording to the dictionary meaning, lay off means to discontinue work or activity; to dismiss or discharge temporarily. When workers are in employment and they are laid of, that immediately results in their unemployment, howsoever temporary, and such an unemployment will clearly come under item 6(ii) in Schedule III of the Act. It is not disputed that "unemployment" is an industrial matter as defined under section 3(18) of the Act. Since unemployment is an industrial matter under item 6(ii) of Schedule III to the Act, the lock-out which has been found by the Labour Court to have direct connection with lay of is clearly illegal under section 98(1)(a) of the Act.