Case: Yeshwantrao Laxmanrao Ghatge &amp; Anr Vs. Baburao Bala Yadav And Ors

in Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. But then the overriding effect of Section 52A will have its play and operation, only if, by the time it came into force, Section 28 had not extinguished the right to the property in question. Otherwise not. In Mahanti Biseshwar Dass v. Sashinath Jha (AIR 1943 Pat 289 : 22 Pat 133 : 208 IC 129) a Bench of the Patna High Court pointed out that where the right of the plaintiff had become barred by limitation before the amending Act of 1929 was passed the mere institution of the suit after 1929 cannot have the effect of reviving that right. By the Amending Act of 1929 in Section 10 of the Limitation Act it was provided that no suit instituted against a person in whom property had become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns for the purposes mentioned in the section would be barred by any length of time. From the category of assigns, assigns for valuable consideration were left out. The question before the Patna High Court in the case referred to above was whether the amendment brought about in the year 1929 could revive a right which was extinguished, dead and gone prior to 1929. In that connection the answer given was in the negative. The view so expressed in the Patna decision is perfectly sound and correct, and no decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. Under Section 52A of the Bombay Act even assignees for a valuable consideration have been roped in to save the suit from the bar of any period of limitation. But then on an application of the principle referred to above it is plain that Section 52A could not have the effect of reviving an extinguished right.8. In Mst. Allah Rakhi v. Shah Mohammad Abdur Rahim (AIR 1934 PC 77 : 61 IA 50 : 66 MLJ 431) Sir Lord Lancelot Sanderson delivering the judgment on behalf of the Board ruled that in regard to a suit brought on January 29, 1826 "the question whether it was then barred by limitation must depend upon the law of limitation which was applicable to the suit at that time". The provisions of the Amendment Act of 1929 which had come into force on January 1, 1929 were held to be inapplicable. Of Course, even in the light of the old section it was held that the suit was not barred by limitation and the decree of the High Court was affirmed. Krishnan, J. in the case of Balram Chunnilal v. Durgalal Shivnarain (AIR 1968 MP 81 : 1967 MP LJ 384) expressed a view identical to the one expressed by the Patna High Court (vide end of paragraph 36, page 86, column 1).9. Mr. Datar placed reliance upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dev Chavta v. Ganesh Mahadeo Deshpande (AIR 1970 Bom 412 : 72 Bom LR 469) in order to take advantage of Section 52A of the Act. The ratio of the case has to be appreciated in the background of the facts found therein. The principles of law as enunciated cannot be fully and squarely applied. But yet the decision, if we may say so with respect, is correct. This would be on the footing that the decision given by the Assistant Charity Commissioner under Section 79 read with Section 80 of the Act was conclusive and final. He had exclusive jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether the suit land belonged to the trust. He had so decided it on November 5, 1954. The suit was filed on July 21, 1955. In that view, the High Court was right in holding that a suit filed under Section 50 of the Act was not barred under Section 52A because the decision of the Assistant Charity Commissioner given in 1954 had declared the property to be a trust property and which decision was final.10. For the reasons stated above, it is clear that the appellants could not take advantage of Section 52A of the Act in respect of the properties at 1A to 1D and 1F to 1G. Argument put forward by Mr. Datar to show that the claim was not barred in the year 1955 when Section 52A came into force was absolutely devoid of any substance. It was against the stand taken in the High Court and does not merit any detailed discussion in our judgment.11. Coming to property at 1E now, we must confess at the outset that during the course of argument at one time, we thought that this property having been sold in the year 1947 by plaintiff 1, the right to the property was not extinguished under Section 28 of the Limitation Act in the year 1955. Therefore, although the suit was instituted in the year 1961, beyond 12 years of 1947, it would perhaps be saved under Section 52A from the bar of limitation. But on a closer scrutiny and on appreciation of the argument of the other side in the light of the finding recorded by the High Court, we did not feel persuaded to give relief to the appellants even in regard to property at 1E. The High Court has found that plaintiff 1 had acquired title to property 1E by adverse possession long before 1947. He dealt with this property as his own. Even when the trust was declared as a Public Trust by the Charity Commissioner in or about the year 1954, the property at 1E was not shown as a trust property. The sale, therefore, in the year 1947 by plaintiff 1 conveyed a good title to the purchaser. The lost right to this property long before 1947 could not be saved and revived in the Year 1955 or 1961 by Section 52A of the Act. We, therefore, hold in agreement with the High Court that the suit was barred by limitation in regard to this property also.12.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. In our judgment, there is no substance in any of the points urged on behalf of the appellants. The possession of the purchasers was adverse in respect of all the properties at 1A to 1D and 1F to 1H from the very beginning. By such adverse possession those who had come in possession of these properties had acquired an indefeasible title under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. It is not necessary to decide in this case as to which of the articles in the first Schedule of the said Limitation Act applied to this case. Whether it was articles 134, 134A, 134B, 142 or 144 the claim had become barred long, long before the year 1955. The effect of Section 28 of the Limitation Act was that right to the property was extinguished resulting in conferment of a title by adverse possession on the persons in possession of the concerned properties. It is well-known that the effect of Section 28 of the Limitation Act is not only to bar the remedy but also extinguish the right. The right to the property itself was dead and gone. It could not be revived by a provision like the one contained in Section 52A of theis well-established proposition of law that the law of limitation fixing a period of limitation for the initiation of any suit or proceeding is a procedural law and not a substantive one. Section 52A had, by no stretch of imagination, the effect of reviving an extinguished and lost claim and giving life to a dead horse. If the claim was not barred and the right to the property was not extinguished when Section 52A came into force, then a suit instituted thereafter could not be defeated under any of the articles of the Limitation Act of 1908 or even of the new Limitation Act of 1963. In express terms it overrides the provisions of the Limitation Act including the provision in Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908. But then the overriding effect of Section 52A will have its play and operation, only if, by the time it came into force, Section 28 had not extinguished the right to the property in question. Otherwise not. In Mahanti Biseshwar Dass v. Sashinath Jha (AIR 1943 Pat 289   : 22 Pat 133 : 208 IC 129) a Bench of the Patna High Court pointed out that where the right of the plaintiff had become barred by limitation before the amending Act of 1929 was passed the mere institution of the suit after 1929 cannot have the effect of reviving that right. By the Amending Act of 1929 in Section 10 of the Limitation Act it was provided that no suit instituted against a person in whom property had become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assigns for the purposes mentioned in the section would be barred by any length of time. From the category of assigns, assigns for valuable consideration were left out. The question before the Patna High Court in the case referred to above was whether the amendment brought about in the year 1929 could revive a right which was extinguished, dead and gone prior to 1929. In that connection the answer given was in the negative. The view so expressed in the Patna decision is perfectly sound and correct, and no decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. Under Section 52A of the Bombay Act even assignees for a valuable consideration have been roped in to save the suit from the bar of any period of limitation. But then on an application of the principle referred to above it is plain that Section 52A could not have the effect of reviving an extinguished right.In Mst. Allah Rakhi v. Shah Mohammad Abdur Rahim (AIR 1934 PC 77 : 61 IA 50 : 66 MLJ 431) Sir Lord Lancelot Sanderson delivering the judgment on behalf of the Board ruled that in regard to a suit brought on January 29, 1826 "the question whether it was then barred by limitation must depend upon the law of limitation which was applicable to the suit at that time". The provisions of the Amendment Act of 1929 which had come into force on January 1, 1929 were held to be inapplicable. Of Course, even in the light of the old section it was held that the suit was not barred by limitation and the decree of the High Court was affirmed. Krishnan, J. in the case of Balram Chunnilal v. Durgalal Shivnarain (AIR 1968 MP 81   : 1967 MP LJ 384) expressed a view identical to the one expressed by the Patna High Court (vide end of paragraph 36, page 86, column 1).For the reasons stated above, it is clear that the appellants could not take advantage of Section 52A of the Act in respect of the properties at 1A to 1D and 1F to 1G. Argument put forward by Mr. Datar to show that the claim was not barred in the year 1955 when Section 52A came into force was absolutely devoid of any substance. It was against the stand taken in the High Court and does not merit any detailed discussion in our judgment.Coming to property at 1E now, we must confess at the outset that during the course of argument at one time, we thought that this property having been sold in the year 1947 by plaintiff 1, the right to the property was not extinguished under Section 28 of the Limitation Act in the year 1955. Therefore, although the suit was instituted in the year 1961, beyond 12 years of 1947, it would perhaps be saved under Section 52A from the bar of limitation. But on a closer scrutiny and on appreciation of the argument of the other side in the light of the finding recorded by the High Court, we did not feel persuaded to give relief to the appellants even in regard to property at 1E. The High Court has found that plaintiff 1 had acquired title to property 1E by adverse possession long before 1947. He dealt with this property as his own. Even when the trust was declared as a Public Trust by the Charity Commissioner in or about the year 1954, the property at 1E was not shown as a trust property. The sale, therefore, in the year 1947 by plaintiff 1 conveyed a good title to the purchaser. The lost right to this property long before 1947 could not be saved and revived in the Year 1955 or 1961 by Section 52A of the Act. We, therefore, hold in agreement with the High Court that the suit was barred by limitation in regard to this property also.