Case: Rajendra Nagar Adarsh Grah Nirman S.S.Ld Vs. State Of Rajasthan

our founding faith, even if judicially sanctified. Subba Rao J. hit the nail on the head when he cautioned in Lachhman Das v. State of Punjab [1963] 2 SCR 353 :‘The doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give a practical content to the said doctrine. Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basic for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the Article of its glorious content. That process would inevitably end in substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality; the fundamental right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws may be replaced by the doctrine of classification.’The quintessence of the constitutional code of equality is brought out also by Bose, J. in Bidi Supply Co. case Bidi Supply Co. v. The Union of India and Ors. [1956] 29 ITR 717 (SC) .The truth is that it is impossible to be precise, for we are dealing, with intangibles and though the results are clear it is impossible to pin the thought down to any precise analysis. Article 14 sets out, to my mind, an attitude of mind, -a way of life, rather than a precise rule of law. It embodies a general awareness in the consciousness of the people at large of. something that exists and which is very real but which cannot be pinned down to any precise analysis of fact save to say in a given case that it falls this side of the line or that, and because of that decisions on the same point will vary as conditions vary, one conclusion in one part of the country and another somewhere else; one decision today and another tomorrow when the basis of society has altered and the structure of current social thinking is different. It is not the law that alters but the changing conditions of the times and Article 14 narrows down to a question of fact which must be (determined by the highest Judges in the land as each case arises.” (iii) In continuation of the aforesaid, learned counsel also placed reliance on E.P. Royappa vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 ; Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 ; Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ; and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722. 55. We have examined the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. The instant contention is based on a factual assertions, namely, that the Government of Rajasthan acted arbitrarily and in a discriminatory fashion, by deliberately and intentionally leaving out of the acquisition process, land belonging to highly placed influential persons. Before venturing to examine the instant contention advanced at the behest of the appellants, it is necessary to determine, whether the factual position, at the time of acquisition was, as is being alleged by the appellants. Unfortunately, our determination on the instant aspect of the matter is contrary to the assertions advanced at the hands of the appellants. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, reference may be made to paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, wherein, it was asserted as under : “It would be relevant to mention that the argument raised about certain lands of IAS & IPA officials being selectively left-out is without any substance. This argument would only suffice if the land belonging to the IAS/IPS officials on the date on of acquisition. This is apart from the fact that certain lands would be left out in acquisition proceedings. It is relevant to mention that no land belongs to any IAS/IPS official on the date of acquisition and any subsequent purchase would not invalidate the acquisition proceedings. Thus, the finding on this aspect does not suffer from any legal infirmity.” The aforesaid factual position has not been denied on behalf of the appellants before this Court. Thus viewed, it is apparent that the land which was left out, and which falls between the two blocks of land acquired, cannot be stated to have been owned by influential bureaucrats or police officers, at the time when the acquisition in question was made. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it is not possible for us to conclude, that the leaving out the land between the two blocks of acquired land, and further that, the choice of acquisition of the appellants’ land to the exclusion of the land left out of acquisition, was vitiated for reasons of fraud, mala fides, arbitrariness or discrimination. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit even in the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants. 56. It is necessary to record herein that the challenge raised at the behest of the appellants, to the acquisition of land made by the Government of Rajasthan, for the Railways, was vehemently opposed by the official respondents for a variety of reasons. More particularly on the grounds of delay and latches, as also, locus standi of the appellants to assail the acquisition proceedings. Had we dealt with the objections raised by the respondents and found merit therewith, it may not have been necessary for us to examine the merits of the claim raised by the appellants before us. We may acknowledge, that at the first blush, the objections raised by the official respondents did not seem to be bereft of merit. Yet, since the issues canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants raised important issues of law, we considered it just and appropriate to deal with them in order to settle the legal proposition canvassed. Having recorded our conclusions on the issues canvassed before us, we are of the view, that it is no longer necessary for us to deal with the objections/submissions canvassed on behalf of the official respondents.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]22. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the issue canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants, we are of the view that it is necessary in the first instance to determine the subject of legislative competence. If the determination of legislative competence so determined falls in the realm of the Parliament, then the contemplated appropriate Government would be the Central Government. Whereas, if the legislative competence falls in the realm of the State Legislatures, then the appropriate Government in the facts and circumstances of the present case would be the State Government. During the course of hearing, while examining the issue of legislative competence, our attention was invited to entry 33 of the Union List, entry 36 of the State List and entry 42 of the Concurrent List (of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India).its determination with reference to public purpose (relatable to acquisition proceedings), this Court in the judgment referred to hereinabove, clearly held, that public purpose may be relatable to the Central Government, alternatively, it may be relatable to the State Government. Besides the aforesaid two alternatives, there is also a third alternative, namely, a situation wherein the public purpose is a general public purpose, which is neither exclusively relatable to the Central Government and/or fully relatable to the State Government. The third alternative, would be a situation, wherein the cause in question furthers a common public purpose and is relatable both to a Union and a State cause.Viewed dispassionately, we are satisfied, that even the second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, has trappings of the first contention. To succeed on the basis of the second contention, it is critical for the appellants to succeed on the first. Therefore, if the appellants succeed to establish, that acquisition in the present case, could only have been made by the Union Government, they would simultaneously be able to establish, that they had been deprived of their property in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution, i.e., without following the procedure established by law.law.32. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the matter under consideration, we are of the view, that reliance on entry 33 (of list I of the Seventh Schedule), and on entry 36 (of list II of the Seventh Schedule), and finally on entry 42 (of list III of the Seventh Schedule), is only for the purpose of avoiding and getting around, the real issue. Entries in list I, bring the listed subjects within the legislative competence of the Parliament. Entries in list II demarcate subjects falling within the legislative competence of the State Legislatures. Entries in list III pertain to subjects on which joint legislative competence is vested with the Parliament, as also, the State Legislatures. Needless to mention, that the Constitution vests superiority in enactments made by the Parliament, on subjects enumerated in list III, of the Seventh Schedule (in case of conflict between the legislations enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislatures). Statutory provisions enacted in the manner expressed above, regulate, not only the substance of the legislation, but also modulate the procedure to administer the substance of the legislation.legislation.34. It is in the background of the conclusions recorded in the aforegoing two paragraphs, that we must understand the scope of executive authority vested in the Central Government under Article 73 of the Constitution. There is no dispute whatsoever, that the subject matter under consideration is regulated by the Acquisition Act. As such, the freedom of executive power vested in the Central Government must be deemed to have been curtailed, so as to be exercised in consonance with the provisions of the Acquisition Act. The preceding proposition is the natural consequence of giving effect to the proviso under Article 73(1) of the Constitution ofhe vires of theprovisions of the Acquisition Act relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have not been assailed, we are inclined to unhesitatingly hold that the procedure contemplated under the Acquisition Act, is liable to be followed in matters pertaining to governmental acquisitions, of private land. In absence of compliance therewith, the process of acquisition made thereunder, would be liable to be set aside. We are of the view, that Sections 4 and 6 lay down mandatory procedural provisions, which require to be followed in letter and spirit, in matters pertaining to acquisition of private lands.35. For the reasons recorded in the foregoing paragraphs, we are of the view, that reliance on different entries in different lists of the Seventh Schedule, at the behest of the learned counsel for the appellants, may turn out to be wholly inconsequential, in so far as the present controversy is concerned. It needs emphasis, that entries in different lists, have been relied upon only to demarcate the executive domain. To impress upon us, that the jurisdiction to acquire land in the facts of the present case, fell within the exclusive domain of the Central Government, in a very subtle manner, the submission has clearly changed over to a wrong track. Herein the substance of law, as also, the procedure regulating acquisition, flows out of the Acquisition Act.vires of theAcquisition Act is not under challenge. Therefore, the Acquisition Act, which demarcates the jurisdictional areas between the Union and the States will provide an answer to the issue of jurisdiction canvassed, and not the entries in different lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. More so, because the subject of acquisition is now placed in list III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India (in entry 42), and as such, the Parliament as also the State Legislatures, have concurrent jurisdiction in respect thereof. As such, it would be fully justified for Parliament (as it has done through the Acquisition Act), to demonstrate the areas of jurisdiction. All the same, we shall endeavour to record the submissions advanced on behalf of theother words, prior to the above amendment, State Legislature had the exclusive jurisdiction to enact law for acquisition of private lands, falling within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned State. The said jurisdiction was now concurrently shared with the Parliament. The said jurisdiction was invoked by the Parliament when it enacted the Acquisition Act. Therefore, in the ultimate analysis the submission advanced by the learned counsel, would not serve the purpose of the appellants herein, inasmuch as, it is not possible for us to read into entry 42 of list III of the Seventh Schedule, the cumulative effect of entries 31 and 36 (of lists I and II respectively of the Seventh Schedule). Hither to before, the jurisdiction of Parliament (and consequently of the Union executive), would extend only to acquisition of land/properties for purposes of the Union. We are satisfied to hold, that consequent upon the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the jurisdictional limitations on the subject of acquisition would emerge from a valid legislation made under entry 42 (in list III of the Seventhe the validity of theAcquisition Act has not been assailed by the appellants, we shall accept the same to be a valid legislation enacted under entry 42 (in list III of the Seventh Schedule).From the deliberations recorded above, there is no room for any dispute, that the interpretation of the termed to in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act would lead to the correct determination of the executive Government competent to acquire the land under reference. Indubitably, the answer to the issue would emerge from the definition ofthe term ‘appropriatein Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, wherein, the expression ‘appropriatehas been linked to the purpose of acquisition. In such a contingency, theanswer to the query, as to which of the two Governments (Central Government, or the concerned State Government) would satisfy the test of, one will necessarily have to carefully view the real effect of the words engaged to define the said term in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act. Section 3(ee) aforementioned is being extractedthe expression "appropriate Government" means in relation to acquisition of land for the purposes of the Union, the Central Government, and, in relation to acquisition of land for any other purposes, the Stateperusal of Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, leaves no room for any doubt, that the authority to acquire land has been divided between the Central executive and the State executive. In situations where an acquisition is entirelythe purposes of theSection 3(ee) aforementioned clearly postulates, that the Union executive would have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land. The terminology engaged in Section 3(ee) of the Acquisition Act, for expressing the area of jurisdiction of the State executive (in the matter of acquisition of land), is not analogous or comparable with that engaged while spelling out the jurisdiction of the Union executive. Section 3(ee), it may be noted, does not express, that in matters of acquisition which are entirely for purposes of a State, the jurisdiction would vest with the concerned State executive. Noticeably, the words engaged to express the jurisdiction of the State executive, are extremely wide, so as to accommodate all acquisitions which are not entirelypurposes of theThis intention of the legislature has been recorded by using the wordsrelation to acquisition of land for any other(i.e., other thanfor the purpose of the2. We are of the view, that the determination on the first issue canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel, would inevitably depend on the purpose for which the land in question came to be acquired. If the purpose of acquisition is exclusively for the Union, then the Union/Central Government will have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land. If the purpose of acquisition is exclusively for a State, then the concerned State Government will have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land. And if the purpose of acquisition is,(i.e., a purpose which is neither exclusively relatable to the Central Government and/or fully relatable to the State Government), yet again, the concerned State Government will have the exclusive jurisdiction to acquire the land.The correspondence between the Railways and the Government of Rajasthan preceding the notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act, is the material correspondence on the basis whereof a finding will have to be recorded, on the issue in hand, one way or the other. The desire for transfer of land belonging to the State Government, and thereafter, the desire to furnish land consequent upon its acquisitionto the Railways, leaves no room for any doubt, that the Railways desired the State of Rajasthan to contribute land, for the proposed project. Ordinarily this would be unthinkable, except when the project would directly or indirectly benefit the State as well. Ordinarily, the setting up of a Zonal Office would mean better administration for the Railways establishment. It is difficult to understand how, for the purpose of its own administration, the Railways could repeatedly implore the Government of Rajasthan, in the first instance to transfer land under State ownership to the Railways, and thereafter, make an alternative request to the Government of Rajasthan, to acquire land and to transfer the same to the Railways free of cost. The only reason which one can infer for such an adjuration, ascertainable from the letters referred to above is, that the residents of the State of Rajasthan would also benefit from the establishment of the said Zonal Office. This issue was impressed upon by the Railways, by asserting that better transportation facilities would become available to the public and private entities having a nexus to the State. And therefore, the Railways considered it appropriate to involve the Stateparticipation in the project, in the manner indicated above. The letter addressed by the Union Minister of Railways dated 30.12.1996 is a clear pointer to the above inference. In the said letter, the Union Minister for Railways particularly highlighted the fact that the setting up of the North-Western Railways Zone Complex would improve train services in Rajasthan, which in turn, would benefit the State of Rajasthan. It is, therefore, that in the first instance, transfer of Government land was sought by the Railways. When that did not materialize, the Government was asked to acquire land, and provide it free of cost to the Railways. From the above deliberations, we may record our conclusions as follows. Setting up the North-Western Railway Zonal Complex at Jaipur, would lead to better administration for the Railways, and in that sense it would serve the purpose of the Union. Additionally, it would improve train services in Rajasthan and would accordingly meet the expectations of public and private entities of the area. This would serve the purpose of the State. We would therefore unhesitatingly record, that the situation in hand can be described as one wherein the public purpose isa general publicwhich is neither exclusively relatable to the Central Government and/or fully relatable to the Statehereby affirm, that the State Government had the jurisdiction to acquire the land under reference, because it duly satisfied the requirement ofthe term ‘appropriatereferred to in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisitionis, therefore, apparent that in the process of acquisition, no procedural lapse has been pointed out. The only illegality pleaded and canvassed for the annulment of the acquisition proceedings was, thatthe term ‘appropriateused in Sections 4 and 6 of the Acquisition Act was wrongly assumed, as the Government of Rajasthan. It was submitted, that it ought to have been the Union/Central Government.It is necessary to record herein that the challenge raised at the behest of the appellants, to the acquisition of land made by the Government of Rajasthan, for the Railways, was vehemently opposed by the official respondents for a variety of reasons. More particularly on the grounds of delay and latches, as also, locus standi of the appellants to assail the acquisition proceedings. Had we dealt with the objections raised by the respondents and found merit therewith, it may not have been necessary for us to examine the merits of the claim raised by the appellants before us. We may acknowledge, that at the first blush, the objections raised by the official respondents did not seem to be bereft of merit. Yet, since the issues canvassed at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants raised important issues of law, we considered it just and appropriate to deal with them in order to settle the legal proposition canvassed. Having recorded our conclusions on the issues canvassed before us, we are of the view, that it is no longer necessary for us to deal with the objections/submissions canvassed on behalf of the official respondents.