Case: Kartar Singh Vs. The Union of India

of principles of natural justice as necessary documents were not supplied to the appellant and (31 that this is not a case which the High Court should have dismissed in limine,9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dhebar, sought permission to produce some additional documents but we did not accede to his request because the order of the Central Board of Revenue places reliance only on the four facts or inferences mentioned in the order and no reference was made therein to any other documents.10. It seems to us that the order of the Central Board of Revenue is liable to be quashed on the ground that no reasonable tribunal could arrive at the finding arrived at by the Central Board of Revenue. The learned Counsel points out that the first fact relied on is that Kartar Singh gave shelter to Mukand Singh, He says that either the word “shelter” has been used loosely, or if it has not been used loosely, there is no evidence to show that Kartar Sirgh knew that Mukand Singh was a person concerned in importing contraband gold. He further says that nothing follows from the second fact mentioned in the order because there is no proof that the appellant knew that the magazines contained contraband gold. He further urged that there is no evidence that these foreign magazines are usually employed for concealment of gold and that the appellant knew about this fact. He further says that the fourth fact relied on equally does not show that he knew that any parcels had been addressed to him. Mukand Singh might have told his confederates to address the parcels in the name of the appellant without having secured his consent. He further says that the Board had accepted his version that he was never in correspondence with Mukand Singh.11. There is force in the above contentions. In Radha Krishan Bhatia v. Union of India it was held, as stated in the head-note, that “the mere finding of fact recorded by the Collector of Customs in this case about the smuggled gold being recovered from the person of the ap­pellant was not sufficient to conclude that the appellant was ‘concerned’ in the illegal importation of the smuggled gold into the country and therefore liable for penalty under Section 167(8) of the Act.” That case was a stronger case for the Customs authorities. In this case no evert act on the part of Kartar Singh has been alleged or proved, and it is difficult to say that the four facts relied on can necessarily lead a reasonable tribu­nal to the conclusion that the appellant was concerned in the importation of gold within Section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act.12. The learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the orders passed by the Central Board of Revenue and the Government of India are administrative orders and cannot be quashed under art 226 of the Constitution. This point is, however, concluded against him by a number of decisions of this Court. In Shawnwanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs S. K. Das, J., speaking for the Court, overruled a similar contention. He observed at p. 829 as follows:“The other point relates to the view expressed by the High Court in the order under appeal that an order of confiscation or penalty under the Sea Customs Act is a mere administrative or executive act, in respect of which no application for a writ of certiorari lies. It is necessary to state that the point is now concluded by two recent decisions of this Court. In F. W. Roy v. Collector of Customs this Court held that the imposition of a fine under s. 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act was really a quasijudicial act and in the later decision of Leo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent District Jail, Amritsar. It has been held that in imposing confiscation and penalties under the Sea Customs Act, the Collector acts judicially. Therefore, the view that an order of confiscation or penalties under the Sea Customs Act is a mere administrative or executive act is no longer tenable.”13 The learned Counsel relies on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sugan Chand Sarsogi v Commissioner of Income tax, Calcutta, relating to Section 33A(2) of the Income-tax Act. but that decision was over­ruled by this Court in Dwarka Nath v. Income tax Officer.14. The learned Counsel then contends that the appellant should have come up in appeal under art. 136 of the Constitution if he desired to challenge the order on its merits. He says that in view of British India Steam Navigation Co. Lid. v. Jasjit Singh, Additional Collector of Customs, only a point of jurisdiction can be raised. He relies on the following observations of Gajendragadkar, C. J.“We have heard all these matters together because they raise the same question which was raised for our decision by the appellant in C. A. No. 770 of 1962. If these matters had not been placed to­gether for hearing along with the said civil appeal, we would not have entertained them, except C.A. No. 299 of 1963. This latter appeal has been brought against the decision of the Calcutta High Court and the only point which could have been argued by the appellant would be one of jurisdiction, since the appellant had moved the said High Court under art. 226, and that too against the order of the Collector of Customs.”It seems to us that what the learned Chief Justice was saying was that on the facts of that case the only point which could have been argued would be one of jurisdiction. Apparently, on the facts of that case no other point could have arisen. But it is now well-established that under art. 226 point other than of jurisdiction can also be gone into.15. In view of our decision on the first point raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant it is not necessary to discuss the other point raised by him.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. The learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. Dhebar, sought permission to produce some additional documents but we did not accede to his request because the order of the Central Board of Revenue places reliance only on the four facts or inferences mentioned in the order and no reference was made therein to any otherIt seems to us that the order of the Central Board of Revenue is liable to be quashed on the ground that no reasonable tribunal could arrive at the finding arrived at by the Central Board ofthis case no evert act on the part of Kartar Singh has been alleged or proved, and it is difficult to say that the four facts relied on can necessarily lead a reasonableto the conclusion that the appellant was concerned in the importation of gold within Section 167(8) of the Sea Customsseems to us that what the learned Chief Justice was saying was that on the facts of that case the only point which could have been argued would be one of jurisdiction. Apparently, on the facts of that case no other point could have arisen. But it is nowthat under art. 226 point other than of jurisdiction can also be gone into.15. In view of our decision on the first point raised by the learned Counsel for the appellant it is not necessary to discuss the other point raised by him.