Case: M/S.L.K.Trust Vs. Edc Ltd.

record does not indicate that the appellant had filed any proceedings either to obtain specific performance of the agreement to sell entered into between it and the respondent No. 1 nor the appellant had initiated any proceedings for obtaining possession of the property in question. If in fact the contract had been concluded between the parties as is claimed by the appellant the appellant would not have failed to obtain possession of the property after execution of registered deed in its favour. These facts, thus, indicate that there was no concluded contract between the appellant and the Respondent No.1. 27. This Court cannot ignore the fact that on September 27, 2006 the respondent No. 3 had deposited cheques of Rs.9.25 crores in favour of the first respondent and Rs.5.90 crores in favour of the respondent No. 2. The bonafide of the first respondent can be seen from the fact that these cheques were not immediately encashed, and as on January 2007, the total amount lying with the first respondent and the respondent No. 2 paid by the respondent No.3 was Rs.24.15 crores as against the redemption amount of Rs.18.40 crores. As the respondent No.3 had made payment to redeem the property which was accepted by respondent No.1 and as respondent No.1 had agreed to permit the respondent No.3 to redeem the property in question, a prayer was made to permit respondent No.3 to withdraw Writ Petition No. 601 of 2006 which can neither be regarded as arbitrary nor as illegal nor contrary to the decision of this Court dated August 24, 2006 rendered in Special Leave Petition (Civil) 4957 of 2006. Similarly, as the grievance of the respondent No.3 did not survive, the modification of the order of status quo granted earlier at the instance of the respondent No. 3 who was petitioner in the writ petition, also cannot be held to be bad in law because if the status quo order had not been modified the respondent No.1 would not have been in a position to accept the offer of respondent No.3 to permit it to redeem the property which would have been in derogation of right of the respondent No. 3 to redeem the property as recognized by Section 60 of the Transfer Property Act. 28. On over all view of the matter, this Court finds that there is no substance in the challenge to the two orders dated April 7, 2008 modifying the order of status quo and order dated April 9, 2008 permitting the Respondent No.3 to withdraw Writ Petition No. 601 of 2006 warranting inference of this Court in appeals arising by grant of special leave filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the two appeals which are directed against orders dated April 7, 2008 and April 9, 2008 respectively have no substance and are liable to be dismissed.29. The Court, further, finds that the appellant-trust has filed Contempt Petition under Article 129 of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of Supreme Court Rules 1966 and Rule-3(C) and Section 2(b) read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the respondents for willfully disobeying and acting against the order passed by this Court on August 24, 2006 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4957 of 2006. The contention raised by the appellant is that the respondents have deliberately and willfully violated the order passed by this Court on August 24, 2006 by passing resolutions dated February 20, 2008 and April 8, 2008 passed by the Board of Directors of the respondent No.1 and, therefore, appropriate action should be initiated against the respondents. On behalf of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 it was contended that the Contempt Petition is not maintainable in as much as this Court had not passed any direction or order that was needed to be carried out by the respondents and, therefore, the question of violation of order of this Court does not arise at all. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that some observations made by this court here and there while dismissing the Special Leave Petition cannot be construed as direction of the Court at all. It was explained by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that this Court had neither modified the order of the High Court dated February 22, 2006 nor had given any direction to any of the parties to carry out its order or the order of the High Court but the Court had simply upheld the dismissal order passed by the High Court by dismissing Special Leave Petition. What was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was that contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act necessarily presupposes a clear and willful violation of a direction or order of the court or an undertaking given to a court and as those elements are missing so far as the facts of the present case are concerned the Contempt Petition filed by the Petitioner should be dismissed.30. On consideration of rival submissions advanced at the Bar this Court is of the view that as was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents the exercise of right of redemption in accordance with Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act was neither a subject matter of Writ Petition No. 19 of 2006 nor it was subject matter of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4957 of 2006 which is clear from the enumeration of the main points by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 19 of 2006, which was whether there was a concluded contract. This Court had never prohibited the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 from exercising right of redemption nor restrained the respondent No.1 from considering the proposal of the Respondent No.3 to permit it to redeem the disputed property and had in fact expressed strongly that the respondent No. 1 should take that action which is in its best interest.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]28. On over all view of the matter, this Court finds that there is no substance in the challenge to the two orders dated April 7, 2008 modifying the order of status quo and order dated April 9, 2008 permitting the Respondent No.3 to withdraw Writ Petition No. 601 of 2006 warranting inference of this Court in appeals arising by grant of special leave filed under Article 136 of the Constitution. Therefore, the two appeals which are directed against orders dated April 7, 2008 and April 9, 2008 respectively have no substance and are liable to be dismissed.29. The Court, further, finds that the appellant-trust has filed Contempt Petition under Article 129 of the Constitution read with Order XLVII of Supreme Court Rules 1966 and Rule-3(C) and Section 2(b) read with Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 against the respondents for willfully disobeying and acting against the order passed by this Court on August 24, 2006 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4957 of 2006. The contention raised by the appellant is that the respondents have deliberately and willfully violated the order passed by this Court on August 24, 2006 by passing resolutions dated February 20, 2008 and April 8, 2008 passed by the Board of Directors of the respondent No.1 and, therefore, appropriate action should be initiated against the respondents. On behalf of the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 it was contended that the Contempt Petition is not maintainable in as much as this Court had not passed any direction or order that was needed to be carried out by the respondents and, therefore, the question of violation of order of this Court does not arise at all. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that some observations made by this court here and there while dismissing the Special Leave Petition cannot be construed as direction of the Court at all. It was explained by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 that this Court had neither modified the order of the High Court dated February 22, 2006 nor had given any direction to any of the parties to carry out its order or the order of the High Court but the Court had simply upheld the dismissal order passed by the High Court by dismissing Special Leave Petition. What was pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 was that contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act necessarily presupposes a clear and willful violation of a direction or order of the court or an undertaking given to a court and as those elements are missing so far as the facts of the present case are concerned the Contempt Petition filed by the Petitioner should be dismissed.30. On consideration of rival submissions advanced at the Bar this Court is of the view that as was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents the exercise of right of redemption in accordance with Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act was neither a subject matter of Writ Petition No. 19 of 2006 nor it was subject matter of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4957 of 2006 which is clear from the enumeration of the main points by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 19 of 2006, which was whether there was a concluded contract. This Court had never prohibited the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 from exercising right of redemption nor restrained the respondent No.1 from considering the proposal of the Respondent No.3 to permit it to redeem the disputed property and had in fact expressed strongly that the respondent No. 1 should take that action which is in its best interest.