Case: The State of Jharkhand and Ors Vs. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., Ranchi and Anr

a situation. Rather, the petitioner has come before this Court due to arbitrariness in State action which led to the non-fulfillment of their legitimate expectations. (iii) The defence of unjust enrichment 49. Nor is the court inclined to accept the plea of unjust enrichment - the High Court has not ordered a refund at all since the duty has been paid. The respondent cannot be deprived of an adjustment of the excess duty paid. Further, the States submission that there was no pleading by the respondent in the High Court on whether the amount being claimed as rebate/deduction had been passed on by the respondent to its customers is factually incorrect. In the writ petition filed before the High Court, the respondent specifically asserted that the burden of differential amount of electricity duty, realized by the State from the respondent herein, was not passed by the latter to its customers, either directly or indirectly or in any other manner. The relevant excerpt of the pleading in the respondents writ petition reads thus: 41. That, at this stage, it is most humbly stated and submitted that if the amount of 50% of the electricity duty is refunded to the Petitioner, the same would not lead to unjust enrichment in the hands of the Petitioner as the Petitioner has not passed on the burden of differential amount of electricity duty, realized by Respondent-State from the Petitioner, to its customers either directly or indirectly or in any other manner. 42. That it is most humbly stated and submitted that for the period in question 100% of electricity duty has been realized from the Petitioner by Respondent-State of Jharkhand and, thus, extra 50% of the electricity duty has been borne by the Petitioner out of the own pocket and the burden of the same cannot be passed by the Petitioner to its customers. 43. That it is most humbly stated and submitted that the Petitioner is a manufacturer of Sponge Iron and M.S. Billet and the price of the said commodity is market driven and is controlled by the market. The amount of electricity duty paid by the Petitioner was out of its own pocket affecting the gross profit of the Petitioner on sale of its final product. It is categorically reiterated herein that burden of the amount of electricity has not been passed on by the Petitioner to its customers. As regards the petitioners reliance on the nine judge Bench decision of this Court in Mafatlal Industries (supra), we would like to advert to the holding in the majority opinion of Justice B P Jeevan Reddy, speaking for himself and four other learned judges, in the following terms: 108(iii). A claim for refund, whether made under the provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition (ii) above, can succeed only if the Petitioner/Plaintiff alleges and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. Whether the claim for restitution is treated as a constitutional imperative or as a statutory requirement, it is neither an absolute right nor an unconditional obligation but is subject to the above requirement, as explained in the body of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can legitimately claim its refund. But where such person does not come forward or where it is not possible to refund the amount to him for one or the other reason, it is just and appropriate that that amount is retained by the State, i.e., by the people. There is no immorality or impropriety involved in such a proposition. The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person. In the present case, as we have previously held, the present respondent did not collect the electricity duty from both ends, to deploy the above phrasing. As a result, this doctrine has no application to the facts of the case at hand. 50. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161 a two judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari, outlined the ingredients of unjust enrichment in the following terms: 152. Unjust enrichment has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another. Applying this definition to the facts of the case at hand, the doctrine of unjust enrichment could have been attracted if the respondent had passed on the electricity duty to its customers and then retained the refund occasioned by the 50 per cent rebate in its own pocket. This is not demonstrated to be the factual position and hence, the respondent cannot be denied relief on the application of the doctrine. I. Conclusion

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]21. The alacrity expected by the Industrial Policy 2012 of the State of Jharkhand did not find a resonance in its administrative apparatus. The High Court has justifiably referred to this as a case of bureaucratic lethargy. As a matter of first principle, there can be no gainsaying the fact that when a statute, such as the Bihar Act 1948, empowers the state to grant an exemption from its provisions, the State has the discretion to determine the date from which and the period over which the exemption will operate. An individual or entity cannot compel the State to issue a notification providing for an exemption or to insist upon the terms on which the government does so. Whether an exemption should be issued and if so, the terms for the exemption, have to be determined by the State. But this case does not rest on that principle nor did the claim of the respondent require the High Court to make a departure from it. The Industrial Policy 2012 contained a representation that a rebate/deduction would be granted. It held out a representation that a notification would be issued in a month. These were solemn commitments made by the State of Jharkhand. What remained was their implementation by issuing a notification, which was to be done within one month. The State government evidently intended to implement and act in pursuance of its commitment. For, ultimately, it did issue a notification. But it did so on 8 January 2015 - after a period of a month envisaged under the Industrial Policy 2012 had dragged on for nearly three years.22. It is time for the State government to take notice of the observations of the High Court in regard to administrative lethargy. If the object of formulating the industrial policy is to encourage investment, employment and growth, the administrative lethargy of the State apparatus is clearly a factor which will discourage entrepreneurship. The policy document held out a solemn representation. It contemplated the grant of a rebate/deduction from the payment of electricity duty not only to new units but to existing units as well who had or would set up captive power plants. The State, in the present case, held out inter alia a solemn representation in terms of Clauses 32.10 and 35.7(b) of the entitlement of the exemption for a period of five years from the date of production. Besides this, it also contemplated in Clause 38(b) that a follow-up exemption notification would be issued within one month. That period of one month stretched on interminably with the result that the purpose and object of granting the exemption would virtually stand defeated. The net result was that when belatedly, the State government issued a notification under Section 9 of Bihar Act 1948 on 8 January 2015, it was prospective. As a consequence, by the time that the exemption notification was issued, a large part of the term for which the exemption was to operate in terms of the Industrial Policy 2012 had come to an end.23. The State government was evidently inclined to grant the exemption. This is not a case where due to an overarching requirement of public interest, the State government decided to override the representation which was contained in the Industrial Policy 2012. To the contrary, it sought to implement the representation albeit in fits and starts. Firstly, there was a delay of three years in the issuance of the notification. Secondly, by making the notification prospective, it deprived units such as the respondent of the full benefit of the exemption which was originally envisaged in terms of the Industrial Policy 2012.24. In this backdrop, the High Court has, with justification, adverted to two decisions of this Court. In Kalyanpur Cement (supra), an industrial policy had been notified in 1995 in the State of Bihar. The policy contained a provision for monitoring and reviewing and envisaged that all departments and organizations would issue a follow-up notification to give effect to the policy within one month. This was similar to clause 38(b) of the policy in the present case. No notification was issued by the State of Bihar to give effect to the industrial policy, which lapsed on 31 August 2000. The claim to sales tax exemption by the unit was rejected by the State government on the ground that it had decided not to grant an incentive to a sick industrial unit. A follow-up notification was issued during the pendency of the case before this Court. In the backdrop of these facts, this Court speaking through Justice S. S. Nijjar, observed:85. Even if we are to accept the submissions...that the provisions contained in Clause 24 were mandatory, the time of one month for issuing the notification could only have been extended for a reasonable period. It is inconceivable that it could have taken the Government three years to issue the follow-up notification. We are of the considered opinion that failure of the appellants to issue the necessary notification within a reasonable period of the enforcement of the Industrial Policy, 1995 has rendered the decisions dated 6-1-2001 and 5-3-2001 wholly arbitrary. The appellant cannot be permitted to rely on its own lapses in implementing its Policy to defeat the just and valid claim of the Company. For the same reason we are unable to accept the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that no relief can be granted to the Company as the Policy has lapsed on 31-8-2000. Accepting such a submission would be to put a premium and accord a justification to the wholly arbitrary action of the appellant, in not issuing the notification in accordance with the provisions contained in Clause 24 of the Industrial Policy, 1995.25. In the decision in Manuelsons Hotels Private Limited vs. State of Kerala (supra), speaking through Justice Rohinton F Nariman, the Court had to construe a notification dated 11 July 1986 of the Government of Kerala enabling those engaged in tourism promotional activities to become automatically eligible for concessions/ incentives as provided to the industrial sector from time to time. An amendment to the Kerala Building Tax Act 1975 was made with effect from 6 November 1990 giving an exemption as promised in 1986 and the amendment was deleted with effect from 1 March 1993. Relying on the earlier decision of this Court inter alia in Motilal Padampat (supra), this Court held:3... The non-exercise of such discretionary power is clearly vitiated on account of the application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel in terms of this Courts judgments in Motilal Padampat [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR 641 ] and Nestle [State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 465 ]. This is for the reason that non-exercise of such power is itself an arbitrary act which is vitiated by non-application of mind to relevant facts, namely, the fact that a G.O. dated 11-7-1986 specifically provided for exemption from building tax if hotels were to be set up in the State of Kerala pursuant to the representation made in the said G.O. True, no mandamus could issue to the legislature to amend the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, for that would necessarily involve the judiciary in transgressing into a forbidden field under the constitutional scheme of separation of powers. However, on facts, we find that Section 3-A was, in fact, enacted by the Kerala Legislature by suitably amending the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975 on 6-11-1990 in order to give effect to the representation made by the G.O. dated 11-7-1986. We find that the said provision continued on the statute book and was deleted only with effect from 1-3-1993. This would make it clear that from 6-11-1990 to 1-3-1993, the power to grant exemption from building tax was statutorily conferred by Section 3-A on the Government. And we have seen that the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Section 3-A expressly states that the said section was introduced in order to fulfil one of the promises contained in the G.O. dated 11-7-1986. We find that the appellants, having relied on the said G.O. dated 11-7-1986, had, in fact, constructed a hotel building by 1991. It is clear, therefore, that the non-issuance of a notification under Section 3-A was an arbitrary act of the Government which must be remedied by application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, as has been held by us hereinabove. The ministerial act of non-issue of the notification cannot possibly stand in the way of the appellants getting relief under the said doctrine for it would be unconscionable on the part of the Government to get away without fulfilling its promise.26. Before the High Court, the State of Jharkhand sought to sustain its action on the ground that though the follow-up notification under Section 9 was issued on 8 January 2015, no outer limit for the issuance of a notification was prescribed and there was no vested right on the part of the respondent to get the notification implemented from an earlier date or to obtain the benefit of the policy until it was implemented by a follow-up notification. The decision in Kalyanpur Cement (supra) was sought to be distinguished on the ground that in that case no follow-up notification had been issued at all until the policy lapsed. In sum and substance, the objection was that the writ petitioner - the respondent here - had no vested right to claim that a follow-up notification should be issued and that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not, in the facts, apply.In National Buildings Construction Corporation vs. S. Raghunathan, (1998) 7 SCC 66. (National Buildings Construction Corpn.), a three Judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice S. Saghir Ahmad, held that:18. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has its genesis in the field of administrative law. The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country, are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice. It was in this context that the doctrine of legitimate expectation was evolved which has today become a source of substantive as well as procedural rights. But claims based on legitimate expectation have been held to require reliance on representations and resulting detriment to the claimant in the same way as claims based on promissory estoppel.However, it is important to note that this observation was made by this Court while discussing the ambit of the doctrine of legitimate expectation under English Law, as it stood then. As we have discussed earlier, there was a substantial conflation or overlap between the doctrines of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel even under English Law since the former was often invoked as being analogous to the latter. However, since then and since the judgment of this Court in National Buildings Construction Corporation (supra), the English Law in relation to the doctrine of legitimate expectation has evolved. More specifically, it has actively tried to separate the two doctrines and to situate the doctrine of legitimate expectations on a broader footing. In Regina (Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd) vs. East Sussex County Council, [2003] 1 WLR 348. the House of Lords has held thus:33. In any case, I think that it is unhelpful to introduce private law concepts of estoppel into planning law. As Lord Scarman pointed out in Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578, 616, estoppels bind individuals on the ground that it would be unconscionable for them to deny what they have represented or agreed. But these concepts of private law should not be extended into the public law of planning control, which binds everyone. (See also Dyson J in R vs. Leicester City Council, Ex p Powergen UK Ltd. [2000] JPL 629, 637.)34. There is of course an analogy between a private law estoppel and the public law concept of a legitimate expectation created by a public authority, the denial of which may amount to an abuse of power... But it is no more than an analogy because remedies against public authorities also have to take into account the interests of the general public which the authority exists to promote. Public law can also take into account the hierarchy of individual rights which exist under the Human Rights Act 1998, so that, for example, the individuals right to a home is accorded a high degree of protection (see Coughlans case, at pp 254-255) while ordinary property rights are in general far more limited by considerations of public interest: see R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) vs. Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389.35. It is true that in early cases such as the Wells case [1967] 1 WLR 1000 and Lever Finance Ltd vs. Westminster (City) London Borough Council [1971] 1 QB 222, Lord Denning MR used the language of estoppel in relation to planning law. At that time the public law concepts of abuse of power and legitimate expectation were very undeveloped and no doubt the analogy of estoppel seemed useful.....It seems to me that in this area, public law has already absorbed whatever is useful from the moral values which underlie the private law concept of estoppel and the time has come for it to stand upon its own two feet.More recently, in NOIDA Entrepreneurs Assn. vs. NOIDA, (2011) 6 SCC 508  a two-judge bench of this Court, speaking through Justice B. S. Chauhan, elaborated on this relationship in the following terms:39. State actions are required to be non-arbitrary and justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Action of the State or its instrumentality must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Functioning of a democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination. The rule of law prohibits arbitrary action and commands the authority concerned to act in accordance with law. Every action of the State or its instrumentalities should neither be suggestive of discrimination, nor even apparently give an impression of bias, favouritism and nepotism. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law.41. Power vested by the State in a public authority should be viewed as a trust coupled with duty to be exercised in larger public and social interest. Power is to be exercised strictly adhering to the statutory provisions and fact situation of a case. Public authorities cannot play fast and loose with the powers vested in them. A decision taken in an arbitrary manner contradicts the principle of legitimate expectation. An authority is under a legal obligation to exercise the power reasonably and in good faith to effectuate the purpose for which power stood conferred. In this context, in good faith means for legitimate reasons. It must be exercised bona fide for the purpose and for none other...]As such, we can see that the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation is one of the ways in which the guarantee of non-arbitrariness enshrined under Article 14 finds concrete expression.43. Applying the abovementioned principles in the present case, we are unable to perceive any substance in the submission of the State which was urged in defense before the High Court. Not only did the State in the present case hold out a solemn representation, this representation was founded on its stated desire to encourage industrialization in the State. The policy document spelt out:(i) The nature of the incentives;(ii) The period during which the incentives would be available; and(iii) The time limit within which follow-up action would be taken by the State government through its departments for implementing the Industrial Policy 2012.44. The State having held out a solemn representation in the above terms, it would be manifestly unfair and arbitrary to deprive industrial units within the State of their legitimate entitlement. The State government did as a matter of fact, issue a statutory notification under Section 9 but by doing so prospectively with effect from 8 January 2015 it negated the nature of the representation which was held out in the Industrial Policy 2012. Absolutely no justification bearing on reasons of policy or public interest has been offered before the High Court or before this Court for the delay in issuing a notification. The pleadings are completely silent on the reasons for the delay on the part of the government and offer no justification for making the exemption prospective, contrary to the terms of the representation held out in the Industrial Policy 2012.45. It is one thing for the State to assert that the writ petitioner had no vested right but quite another for the State to assert that it is not duty bound to disclose its reasons for not giving effect to the exemption notification within the period that was envisaged in the Industrial Policy 2012. Both the accountability of the State and the solemn obligation which it undertook in terms of the policy document militate against accepting such a notion of state power. The state must discard the colonial notion that it is a sovereign handing out doles at its will. Its policies give rise to legitimate expectations that the state will act according to what it puts forth in the public realm. In all its actions, the State is bound to act fairly, in a transparent manner. This is an elementary requirement of the guarantee against arbitrary state action which Article 14 of the Constitution adopts. A deprivation of the entitlement of private citizens and private business must be proportional to a requirement grounded in public interest. This conception of state power has been recognized by this Court in a consistent line of decisions. As an illustration, we would like to extract this Courts observations in National Buildings Construction Cororation (supra):The Government and its departments, in administering the affairs of the country are expected to honour their statements of policy or intention and treat the citizens with full personal consideration without any iota of abuse of discretion. The policy statements cannot be disregarded unfairly or applied selectively. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness is akin to violation of natural justice.46. Therefore, it is clear that the State had made a representation to the respondent and similarly situated industrial units under the Industrial Policy 2012. This representation gave rise to a legitimate expectation on their behalf, that they would be offered a 50 per cent rebate/deduction in electricity duty for the next five years. However, due to the failure to issue a notification within the stipulated time and by the grant of the exemption only prospectively, the expectation and trust in the State stood violated. Since the State has offered no justification for the delay in issuance of the notification, or provided reasons for it being in public interest, we hold that such a course of action by the State is arbitrary and is violative of Article 14.47. We have not been impressed with the submission of the State on the technicalities of the respondent not having filed in its assessment returns, a claim for exemption from electricity duty. What is significant is that since no exemption notification had been issued under Section 9, a writ petition was initially filed before the High Court by Usha Martin Limited. As a result of the writ petition, an exemption notification was issued on 8 January 2015. Now it is correct that in the case of FYs 2012-13 and 2013-14, the orders of assessment were passed on 8 December 2015 and 16 December 2016, which was after the date of the exemption notification. However, the fact remains that so long as the clause in the exemption notification granting it prospective effect continued to hold the field, the assessing officer as a creature of the statute was bound to enforce the terms of the exemption and accordingly denied any exemption for a period prior to 8 January 2015. The only remedy which was available to the respondent, was to challenge the terms of the exemption notification which it did by instituting writ proceedings before the High Court under Article 226.In High Court of Judicature of Patna vs. Madan Mohan Prasad, (2011) 9 SCC 65  a two judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Justice J M Panchal, held thus:19. The contention advanced on behalf of the appellant that the writ petition was filed by Respondent 1 on 10-11-1990 i.e. seven years after he had superannuated from service, and therefore, the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, cannot be accepted. The impugned judgment nowhere shows that such a point was argued by the appellant before the High Court. No grievance is made in the memorandum of SLP that point regarding delay and laches was argued before the High Court but the same was not dealt with by the High Court when impugned judgment was delivered.This finds support in the judgment of this Court in Dayal Singh vs. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 593. where a three judge Bench, speaking through Justice S B Sinha, held thus:41. It was submitted that the respondents having filed a writ petition after a period of eight years, the same ought not to have been entertained. Primarily a question of delay and laches is a matter which is required to be considered by the writ court. Once the writ court has exercised its jurisdiction despite delay and laches on the part of the respondents, it is not for us at this stage to set aside the order of the High Court on that ground alone particularly when we find that the impugned judgment is legally sustainable.Mr Bharuka is also correct in submitting that the State cannot possibly contend that the result of the delay has led to it altering its position to its detriment. Nor is it a case where third parties may be affected as a consequence of a delay in instituting writ proceedings.This submission finds support in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. vs. Dolly Das, (1999) 4 SCC 450  where a two judge Bench, speaking through Justice S Rajendra Babu, noted thus:8. So far as the contention regarding laches of the respondent in filing the writ petition is concerned, delay, by itself, may not defeat the claim for relief unless the position of the appellant had been so altered which cannot be retracted on account of lapse of time or inaction of the other party. This aspect being dependent upon the examination of the facts of the case and such a contention not having been raised before the High Court, it would not be appropriate to allow the appellants to raise such a contention for the first time before us. Besides, we may notice that the period for which the option of renewal has been exercised has not come to an end. During the subsistence of such a period certainly the respondent could make a complaint that such exercise of option was not available to the appellants and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the High Court could be invoked even at a later stage. Further, the appellants are not put to undue hardship in any manner by reason of this delay in approaching the High Court for a relief.In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court on the ground of delay alone when the judgment is based on legally sustainable principles. The delay of the respondent in filing a writ petition by itself should not defeat the claim unless the position of the State has been so altered that it cannot be retracted on account of a lapse of time or the inaction of the writ petitioner. The State has not in the present case either pleaded or argued any hardship if the respondent were to be granted relief. Finally, the decisions in Bhailal Bhai (supra) and Suganmal (supra) related to a petitioner seeking a refund of an illegally collected tax. In the present case, we are not concerned with such a situation. Rather, the petitioner has come before this Court due to arbitrariness in State action which led to the non-fulfillment of their legitimate expectations.49. Nor is the court inclined to accept the plea of unjust enrichment - the High Court has not ordered a refund at all since the duty has been paid. The respondent cannot be deprived of an adjustment of the excess duty paid. Further, the States submission that there was no pleading by the respondent in the High Court on whether the amount being claimed as rebate/deduction had been passed on by the respondent to its customers is factually incorrect. In the writ petition filed before the High Court, the respondent specifically asserted that the burden of differential amount of electricity duty, realized by the State from the respondent herein, was not passed by the latter to its customers, either directly or indirectly or in any other manner. The relevant excerpt of the pleading in the respondents writ petition reads thus:41. That, at this stage, it is most humbly stated and submitted that if the amount of 50% of the electricity duty is refunded to the Petitioner, the same would not lead to unjust enrichment in the hands of the Petitioner as the Petitioner has not passed on the burden of differential amount of electricity duty, realized by Respondent-State from the Petitioner, to its customers either directly or indirectly or in any other manner.42. That it is most humbly stated and submitted that for the period in question 100% of electricity duty has been realized from the Petitioner by Respondent-State of Jharkhand and, thus, extra 50% of the electricity duty has been borne by the Petitioner out of the own pocket and the burden of the same cannot be passed by the Petitioner to its customers.43. That it is most humbly stated and submitted that the Petitioner is a manufacturer of Sponge Iron and M.S. Billet and the price of the said commodity is market driven and is controlled by the market. The amount of electricity duty paid by the Petitioner was out of its own pocket affecting the gross profit of the Petitioner on sale of its final product. It is categorically reiterated herein that burden of the amount of electricity has not been passed on by the Petitioner to its customers.As regards the petitioners reliance on the nine judge Bench decision of this Court in Mafatlal Industries (supra), we would like to advert to the holding in the majority opinion of Justice B P Jeevan Reddy, speaking for himself and four other learned judges, in the following terms:108(iii). A claim for refund, whether made under the provisions of the Act as contemplated in Proposition (i) above or in a suit or writ petition in the situations contemplated by Proposition (ii) above, can succeed only if the Petitioner/Plaintiff alleges and establishes that he has not passed on the burden of duty to another person/other persons. His refund claim shall be allowed/decreed only when he establishes that he has not passed on the burden of the duty or to the extent he has not so passed on, as the case may be. Whether the claim for restitution is treated as a constitutional imperative or as a statutory requirement, it is neither an absolute right nor an unconditional obligation but is subject to the above requirement, as explained in the body of the judgment. Where the burden of the duty has been passed on, the claimant cannot say that he has suffered any real loss or prejudice. The real loss or prejudice is suffered in such a case by the person who has ultimately borne the burden and it is only that person who can legitimately claim its refund. But where such person does not come forward or where it is not possible to refund the amount to him for one or the other reason, it is just and appropriate that that amount is retained by the State, i.e., by the people. There is no immorality or impropriety involved in such a proposition.The doctrine of unjust enrichment is a just and salutary doctrine. No person can seek to collect the duty from both ends. In other words, he cannot collect the duty from his purchaser at one end and also collect the same duty from the State on the ground that it has been collected from him contrary to law. The power of the Court is not meant to be exercised for unjustly enriching a person.In the present case, as we have previously held, the present respondent did not collect the electricity duty from both ends, to deploy the above phrasing. As a result, this doctrine has no application to the facts of the case at hand.50. In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161  a two judge Bench of this Court, speaking through Justice Dalveer Bhandari, outlined the ingredients of unjust enrichment in the following terms:152. Unjust enrichment has been defined by the court as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience. A person is enriched if he has received a benefit, and he is unjustly enriched if retention of the benefit would be unjust. Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains money or benefits which in justice and equity belong to another.Applying this definition to the facts of the case at hand, the doctrine of unjust enrichment could have been attracted if the respondent had passed on the electricity duty to its customers and then retained the refund occasioned by the 50 per cent rebate in its own pocket. This is not demonstrated to be the factual position and hence, the respondent cannot be denied relief on the application of the doctrine.