Case: Devi Multiplex  Vs. State Of Gujarat

by promissory estoppel to exclude the cost of corrugated fibreboard containers from the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment of excise duty for the period 24-5-1976 to 2-11-1982.”36. The limitations to the doctrine delineated in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills3 however, were also reaffirmed when it was said: (SCC pp. 387-88, para 13)“[T]hat there can be no promissory estoppel against the legislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can the Government or public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition. It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires; if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority.” 19. Coming to the facts of the present case, we find that the Scheme definitely promised incentives in the form of Tax holiday of 5-10 years in respect of exemptions from Sales Tax, Turnover Tax, Electricity Duty, Luxury Tax and Entertainment Tax upto 100 per cent of capital investment if a new unit was registered after 1.8.1995 and appropriate investment in fixed capital assets was made. It also promised an initial period of two years for going operational in the first instance, extendable by further period of two years subject to satisfactory progress to be found by the State Level Committee. Even thereafter, the Unit could still approach the State Government for further extension. This was part of the core of the Scheme, which invited investment in tourism units promising tax holiday as stated above. Based on such representation, various units including that of the appellants having come forward and altered their position, the State Government would certainly be bound by the principles of Promissory Estoppel. The State Government was thus estopped from going back on the promise so made in the Scheme and could not have curtailed the period and the opportunity specifically made available within which the project could be completed so as to avail the benefits under the Scheme. We find nothing in the present case on the basis of which there could possibly be room to say that it would be inequitable to hold the State Government to its promise. Out of 108 TRCs issued under the Scheme, the burden that the Government was well aware and thought that it could comfortably bear, only 19 or 20 units have been established and are functional. In any case, the impact of incentives so offered under the Scheme and the consequential burden must have been weighed carefully when such promise was made and the Scheme was formed. We may respectfully refer to the following observations of this Court in S.V.A. Steel Re- Rolling Mills Ltd. and others v. State of Kerala and others (2014) 4 SCC 186 )to which one of us (Anil R. Dave, J.) was a party: “30. Before laying down any policy which would give benefits to its subjects, the State must think about pros and cons of the policy and its capacity to give the benefits. Without proper appreciation of all the relevant factors, the State should not give any assurance, not only because that would be in violation of the principles of promissory estoppel but it would be unfair and immoral on the part of the State not to act as per its promise.” 20. Furthermore, the Scheme as framed on 20.12.1995 formed the basis of a statutory notification under Section 29 of Act 16 of 1977 and as such the core components of the Scheme had acquired a statutory status. By virtue of said Section 29, the notification dated 14.2.1997 was required to be laid for not less than 30 days before the State Legislature. If the State Government was desirous of amending, varying or rescinding said notification dated 14.2.1997, the subsequent G.R. dated 28.06.2000 ought to have been translated in a statutory notification under Section 29 of the Act 16 of 1977. In the absence of such steps having been undertaken, G.R. dated 28.06.2000 could not in any way detract from or dilute the effect of the Scheme which had acquired statutory status. 21. We therefore hold that the appellants were entitled to have full benefit and advantage of Clause 10 of the Scheme and the curtailment of the period and opportunity available under said Clause 10 of the Scheme by subsequent G.R. dated 28.06.2000 was bad and ineffective.22. The record indicates that the progress of the project of the appellants was greatly hampered as a result of major earth quake in the State on 26.01.2001 and large scale communal riots in the State in February 2002. The State Level Committee was satisfied that the commencement and continuation of the project was so affected as a result of these major difficulties and had granted initial extension of six months but the appellants had benefit of only few days out of such extension. The subsequent request for further extension which was backed with relevant certificate from the Chartered Accountant certainly persuaded the State Level Committee to find that the facts justified grant of further extension but it felt it had lost the power to grant such extension because of G. R. dated 28.06.2000. In the light of the view that we have taken, the State Level Committee was still competent to consider the request for grant of extension.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]This first level of extensions for a total period of two years could be granted by the State Level Committee and even if a unit was unable to go into operation after availing such extensions, it could still apply to the Government for further extension. Clauses 8 and 8.1 dealt with incentives and period of eligibility which would go up to ten years after a unit was found to be fully eligible. These clauses clearly show that such stages or eventualities would survive even after the expiry of period of the operation of the Scheme. The reading of the Scheme further shows that no fresh application and TRCs could be granted after the period of operation but those who had crossed the threshold and were given TRC, could have the full benefit of the stages contemplated in Section 10. In our considered view, it would be incorrect to say that all the clauses including Clause 10 would cease to operate after the period of operation had come to an end. It being the clear intent that such stages and eventualities ought to survive even after the expiry of the Scheme, we reject the submission advanced on behalf of the State.17. Clause 7 of the Scheme classifies projects in different categories and for a Large Scale Tourism Unit, with which we are presently concerned, fixed capital investment was required to be more than Rs.90 lakhs. The Scheme definitely promised an initial period for completion of the project under Clause 10 (a) as two years after the initial effective steps were under taken by the concerned unit. Clause 10 (b) further promised an extension for two years subject to State Level Committee being satisfied that an individual unit had experienced difficulties in implementing the project. A unit was therefore promised the availability of an opportunity, depending upon the individual fact situation, to pray for extension up to two years. Clause 10(C) further entitled such unit to approach the State Govt. even after the aforesaid aggregate period of four years for further extension. In our view, Clause 10 was one of the core features of the Scheme based on which eligible units were invited to make capital investment of more than Rs. 90 Lakhs with a promise of incentives under Clause 8. Having given such promise, based on which the appellants incurred capital expenditure, the question now arises as regards applicability of doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.Coming to the facts of the present case, we find that the Scheme definitely promised incentives in the form of Tax holiday ofyears in respect of exemptions from Sales Tax, Turnover Tax, Electricity Duty, Luxury Tax and Entertainment Tax upto 100 per cent of capital investment if a new unit was registered after 1.8.1995 and appropriate investment in fixed capital assets was made. It also promised an initial period of two years for going operational in the first instance, extendable by further period of two years subject to satisfactory progress to be found by the State Level Committee. Even thereafter, the Unit could still approach the State Government for further extension. This was part of the core of the Scheme, which invited investment in tourism units promising tax holiday as stated above. Based on such representation, various units including that of the appellants having come forward and altered their position, the State Government would certainly be bound by the principles of Promissory Estoppel. The State Government was thus estopped from going back on the promise so made in the Scheme and could not have curtailed the period and the opportunity specifically made available within which the project could be completed so as to avail the benefits under the Scheme.We therefore hold that the appellants were entitled to have full benefit and advantage of Clause 10 of the Scheme and the curtailment of the period and opportunity available under said Clause 10 of the Scheme by subsequent G.R. dated 28.06.2000 was bad and ineffective.22. The record indicates that the progress of the project of the appellants was greatly hampered as a result of major earth quake in the State on 26.01.2001 and large scale communal riots in the State in February 2002. The State Level Committee was satisfied that the commencement and continuation of the project was so affected as a result of these major difficulties and had granted initial extension of six months but the appellants had benefit of only few days out of such extension. The subsequent request for further extension which was backed with relevant certificate from the Chartered Accountant certainly persuaded the State Level Committee to find that the facts justified grant of further extension but it felt it had lost the power to grant such extension because of G. R. dated 28.06.2000. In the light of the view that we have taken, the State Level Committee was still competent to consider the request for grant of extension.