Case: A. Navinchandra Steels Private Limited Vs. SREI Equipment Finance Limited &amp; Ors

mentioned in paragraph 31 of Action Ispat (supra). 25. It is settled law that a secured creditor stands outside the winding up and can realise its security dehors winding up proceedings. In M.K. Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras, (1955) 2 SCR 374 , this Court held: The position of a secured creditor in the winding up of a company has been thus stated by Lord Wrenbury in Food Controller v. Cork [1923 Appeal Cases 647]: The phrase outside the winding up is an intelligible phrase if used, as it often is, with reference to a secured creditor, say a mortgagee. The mortgagee of a company in liquidation is in a position to say the mortgaged property is to the extent of the mortgage my property. It is immaterial to me whether my mortgage is in winding up or not. I remain outside the winding up and shall enforce my rights as mortgagee. This is to be contrasted with the case in which such a creditor prefers to assert his right, not as a mortgagee, but as a creditor. He may say I will prove in respect of my debt. If so, he comes into the winding up. It is also summarised in Palmers Company Precedents Vol. II, page 415: Sometimes the mortgagee sells, with or without the concurrence of the liquidator, in exercise of a power of sale vested in him by the mortgage. It is not necessary to obtain liberty to exercise the power of sale, although orders giving such liberty have sometimes been made. The secured creditor is thus outside the winding up and can realise his security without the leave of the winding up Court, though if he files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his security he is bound under Section 231 (corresponding with Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act) to obtain the leave of, the winding up Court before he can do so although such leave would almost automatically be granted. Section 231 has been read together with Section 228(1) and the attachment, sequestration, distress or execution referred to in the latter have reference to proceedings taken through the Court and if the creditor has resort to those proceedings he cannot put them in force against the estate or effects of the Company after the commencement of the winding up without the leave of the winding up Court. The provisions in Section 317 are also supplementary to the provisions of Section 231 and emphasise the position of the secured creditor as one outside the winding up, the secured creditor being, in regard to the exercise of those rights and privileges, in the same position as he would be under the Bankruptcy Act. The corresponding provisions of the Indian Companies Act have been almost bodily incorporated from those of the English Companies Act and if there was nothing more, the position of the secured creditor here also would be the same as that obtaining in England and he would also be outside the winding up and a sale by him without the intervention of the Court would be valid and could not be challenged as void under Section 232(1), Indian Companies Act. (at pages 383, 384) This principle has been followed in Central Bank of India v. Elmot Engineering Co., (1994) 4 SCC 159 ( at paragraph 14), Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Srinivas Agencies, (1996) 4 SCC 165 ( at paragraph 2), and Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai v. Indian Oil Corpn., (1998) 4 SCC 302 ( at paragraph 12). 26. Indiabulls, a secured creditor of the corporate debtor, viz. SRUIL, has, in enforcement of its debt by a mortgage, sold the mortgaged property outside the winding up. The aforesaid sale is the subject matter of proceedings in the Bombay High Court filed by the provisional liquidator. If the aforesaid sale is set aside, the asset of SRUIL that has been sold will come back to the provisional liquidator for the purposes of winding up. If the sale is upheld, equally, there are other assets of SRUIL which continue to be in the hands of the provisional liquidator for the purposes of winding up. We may also add that on the facts of this case, though no application for transfer of the winding up proceeding pending in the Bombay High Court has been filed, the Bombay High Court has itself, by the orders dated 28.11.2019 and 23.01.2020, directed the provisional liquidator to hand over the records and assets of SRUIL to the IRP in the Section 7 proceeding that is pending before the NCLT. No doubt, this has not yet been done as the IRP has not yet been able to pay the requisite amount to the provisional liquidator for his expenses. 27. Dr. Singhvi and Shri Ranjit Kumar have vehemently argued that SREI has suppressed the winding up proceeding in its application under Section 7 of the IBC before the NCLT and has resorted to Section 7 only as a subterfuge to avoid moving a transfer application before the High Court in the pending winding up proceeding. These arguments do not avail the Appellant for the simple reason that Section 7 is an independent proceeding, as has been held in catena of judgments of this Court, which has to be tried on its own merits. Any suppression of the winding up proceeding would, therefore, not be of any effect in deciding a Section 7 petition on the basis of the provisions contained in the IBC. Equally, it cannot be said that any subterfuge has been availed of for the same reason that Section 7 is an independent proceeding that stands by itself. As has been correctly pointed out by Shri Sinha, a discretionary jurisdiction under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot prevail over the undoubted jurisdiction of the NCLT under the IBC once the parameters of Section 7 and other provisions of the IBC have been met.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. Having heard learned counsel for all the parties, it is important to restate a few fundamentals. Given the object of the IBC as delineated in paragraphs 25 to 28 of Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17 [Swiss Ribbons], it is clear that the IBC is a special statute dealing with revival of companies that are in the red, winding up only being resorted to in case all attempts of revival fail. Vis-à-vis the Companies Act, which is a general statute dealing with companies, including companies that are in the red, the IBC is not only a special statute which must prevail in the event of conflict, but has a non-obstante clause contained in Section 238, which makes it even clearer that in case of conflict, the provisions of the IBC will prevail.15. In Allahabad Bank v. Canara Bank, (2000) 4 SCC 406 , this Court had to deal with whether the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 [RDB Act] was a special statute qua the Companies Act, 1956. This Court held that the Companies Act is a general Act and does not prevail against the RDB Act, which was a later Act and which has a non-obstante clause that clearly excludes the provisions of the Companies Act in case of conflict. This was stated by the Court as follows:Special law v. general law38. At the same time, some High Courts have rightly held that the Companies Act is a general Act and does not prevail under the RDB Act. They have relied upon Union of India v. India Fisheries (P) Ltd. [AIR 1966 SC 35 : (1965) 3 SCR 679 : (1965) 57 ITR 331 ].39. There can be a situation in law where the same statute is treated as a special statute vis-à-vis one legislation and again as a general statute vis-à-vis yet another legislation. Such situations do arise as held in LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur [(1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111 : AIR 1980 SC 2181 ]. It was there observed:… for certain cases, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes, it may be special and the court cannot blur a distinction when dealing with the finer points of law.For example, a Rent Control Act may be a special statute as compared to the Code of Civil Procedure. But vis-à-vis an Act permitting eviction from public premises or some special class of buildings, the Rent Control Act may be a general statute. In fact in Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India [AIR 1966 SC 135 : (1965) 3 SCR 665 ] (already referred to), this Court has observed that vis-à-vis the LIC Act, 1956, the Companies Act, 1956 can be treated as a general statute. This is clear from para 19 of that judgment. It was observed:Further, the provisions of the special Act, i.e., the LIC Act, will override the provisions of the general Act, viz., the Companies Act which is an Act relating to companies in general.(emphasis in original)Thus, some High Courts rightly treated the Companies Act as a general statute, and the RDB Act as a special statute overriding the general statute.Special law v. special law40. Alternatively, the Companies Act, 1956 and the RDB Act can both be treated as special laws, and the principle that when there are two special laws, the latter will normally prevail over the former if there is a provision in the latter special Act giving it overriding effect, can also be applied. Such a provision is there in the RDB Act, namely, Section 34. A similar situation arose in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. [(1993) 2 SCC 144] where there was inconsistency between two special laws, the Finance Corporation Act, 1951 and the Sick Industries Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The latter contained Section 32 which gave overriding effect to its provisions and was held to prevail over the former. It was pointed out by Ahmadi, J. that both special statutes contained non obstante clauses but that the1985 Act being a subsequent enactment, the non obstante clause therein would ordinarily prevail over the non obstante clause in Section 46-B of the 1951 Act unless it is found that the 1985 Act is a general statute and the 1951 Act is a special one. (SCC p. 157, para 9)Therefore, in view of Section 34 of the RDB Act, the said Act overrides the Companies Act, to the extent there is anything inconsistent between the Acts.17. In Madras Petrochem Ltd. v. BIFR, (2016) 4 SCC 1 , this Court had to deal with whether a predecessor statute to the IBC, which has been repealed by the IBC, namely, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, prevails over the SARFAESI Act to the extent of inconsistency therewith. This Court noted that in the case of two statutes which contain non-obstante clauses, the later Act will normally prevail, holding:36. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions shows that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 prevails in all situations where there are earlier enactments with non obstante clauses similar to the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. Where there are later enactments with similar non obstante clauses, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 has been held to prevail only in a situation where the reach of the non obstante clause in the later Act is limited—such as in the case of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996—or in the case of the later Act expressly yielding to the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, as in the case of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Where such is not the case, as in the case of Special Courts Act, 1992, it is the Special Courts Act, 1992 which was held to prevail over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.37. We have now to undertake an analysis of the Acts in question. The first thing to be noticed is the difference between Section 37 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 and Section 34 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 37 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 does not include the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 unlike Section 34(2) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Section 37 of the Securities and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 states that the said Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of four Acts, namely, the Companies Act, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. It is clear that the first three Acts deal with securities generally and the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 deals with recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. Interestingly, Section 41 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 makes amendments in three Acts—the Companies Act, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, and the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. It is of great significance that only the first two Acts are included in Section 37 and not the third i.e. the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. This is for the obvious reason that the framers of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 intended that the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 be covered by the non obstante clause contained in Section 35, and not by the exception thereto carved out by Section 37. Further, whereas the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 is expressly mentioned in Section 37, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 is not, making the above position further clear. And this is in stark contrast, as has been stated above, to Section 34(2) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banksand FinancialInstitutions Act, 1993, which expressly included the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The new legislative scheme qua recovery of debts contained in the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 has, therefore, to be given precedence over the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, unlike the old scheme for recovery of debts contained in the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.18. Indeed, this position has been echoed in several judgments of this Court. In Jaipur Metals & Electricals Employees Organization v. Jaipur Metals & Electricals Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 227 [Jaipur Metals], this Court, in dealing with whether proceedings under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 were to be transferred to the NCLT under the IBC, held:19. However, this does not end the matter. It is clear that Respondent 3 has filed a Section 7 application under the Code on 11-1-2018, on which an order has been passed admitting such application by NCLT on 13-4-2018. This proceeding is an independent proceeding which has nothing to do with the transfer of pending winding-up proceedings before the High Court. It was open for Respondent 3 at any time before a winding-up order is passed to apply under Section 7 of the Code. This is clear from a reading of Section 7 together with Section 238 of the Code which reads as follows:238. Provisions of this Code to override other laws.—The provisions of this Code shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.20. Shri Daves ingenious argument that since Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 is amended by the Eleventh Schedule to the Code, the amended Section 434 must be read as being part of the Code and not the Companies Act, 2013, must be rejected for the reason that though Section 434 of the Companies Act, 2013 is substituted by the Eleventh Schedule to the Code, yet Section 434, as substituted, appears only in the Companies Act, 2013 and is part and parcel of that Act. This being so, if there is any inconsistency between Section 434 as substituted and the provisions of the Code, the latter must prevail. We are of the view that NCLT was absolutely correct in applying Section 238 of the Code to an independent proceeding instituted by a secured financial creditor, namely, the Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. This being the case, it is difficult to comprehend how the High Court could have held that the proceedings before NCLT were without jurisdiction. On this score, therefore, the High Court judgment has to be set aside. NCLT proceedings will now continue from the stage at which they have been left off. Obviously, the company petition pending before the High Court cannot be proceeded with further in view of Section 238 of the Code. The writ petitions that are pending before the High Court have also to be disposed of in light of the fact that proceedings under the Code must run their entire course. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the High Courts judgment [Jaipur Metals and Electricals Ltd., In re, 2018 SCC OnLine Raj 1472].20. In Duncans Industries Ltd. v. AJ Agrochem, (2019) 9 SCC 725 , this Court was faced with a situation of conflict between Section 16-G(1)(c) of the Tea Act, 1953, under which winding up/liquidation proceedings were to take place (and which could not take place without prior consent of the Central Government), and a proceeding initiated under Section 9 of the IBC. After relying upon the judgment of this Court in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407  and Swiss Ribbons (supra), this Court held:7.4. Section 16-G(1)(c) refers to the proceeding for winding up of such company or for the appointment of receiver in respect thereof. Therefore, as such, the proceedings under Section 9 IBC shall not be limited and/or restricted to winding up and/or appointment of receiver only. The winding up/liquidation of the company shall be the last resort and only on an eventuality when the corporate insolvency resolution process fails. As observed by this Court in Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. [Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17 : AIR 2019 SC 739 ], referred to hereinabove, the primary focus of the legislation while enacting IBC is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management and from a corporate debt by liquidation and such corporate insolvency resolution process is to be completed in a time-bound manner. Therefore, the entire corporate insolvency resolution process as such cannot be equated with winding up proceedings. Therefore, considering Section 238 IBC, which is a subsequent Act to the Tea Act, 1953, shall be applicable and the provisions of IBC shall have an overriding effect over the Tea Act, 1953. Any other view would frustrate the object and purpose of IBC. If the submission on behalf of the appellant that before initiation of proceedings under Section 9 IBC, the consent of the Central Government as provided under Section 16-G(1)(c) of the Tea Act is to be obtained, in that case, the main object and purpose of IBC, namely, to complete the corporate insolvency resolution process in a time-bound manner, shall be frustrated. The sum and substance of the above discussion would be that the provisions of IBC would have an overriding effect over the Tea Act, 1953 and that no prior consent of the Central Government before initiation of the proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 IBC would be required and even without such consent of the Central Government, the insolvency proceedings under Section 7 or Section 9 IBC initiated by the operational creditor shall be maintainable.22. In Action Ispat (supra), this Court was faced with a proceeding in which a winding up petition had been admitted by the High Court and then transferred to the NCLT to be tried as a proceeding under the IBC. After referring to the judgments in Jaipur Metals (supra), Forech (supra), and Kaledonia (supra), and after setting out various Sections dealing with winding up of companies under the Companies Act, 2013, this Court then held:20. What becomes clear upon a reading of the three judgments of this Court is the following:(i) So far as transfer of winding up proceedings is concerned, the Code began tentatively by leaving proceedings relating to winding up of companies to be transferred to NCLT at a stage as may be prescribed by the Central Government.(ii) This was done by the Transfer Rules, 2016 [Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016] which came into force with effect from 15.12.2016. Rules 5 and 6 referred to three types of proceedings. Only those proceedings which are at the stage of pre-service of notice of the winding up petition stand compulsorily transferred to the NCLT.(iii) The result therefore was that post notice and pre admission of winding up petitions, parallel proceedings would continue under both statutes, leading to a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. This led to the introduction of the 5th proviso to section 434(1)(c) which, as has been correctly pointed out in Kaledonia [Kaledonia Jute & Fibres Pvt. Ltd. v. Axis Nirman & Industries Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 943], is not restricted to any particular stage of a winding up proceeding.(iv) Therefore, what follows as a matter of law is that even post admission of a winding up petition, and after the appointment of a Company Liquidator to take over the assets of a company sought to be wound up, discretion is vested in the Company Court to transfer such petition to the NCLT. The question that arises before us in this case is how is such discretion to be exercised?xxx xxx xxx31. Given the aforesaid scheme of winding up under Chapter XX of the Companies Act, 2013, it is clear that several stages are contemplated, with the Tribunal retaining the power to control the proceedings in a winding up petition even after it is admitted. Thus, in a winding up proceeding where the petition has not been served in terms of Rule 26 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959 at a pre-admission stage, given the beneficial result of the application of the Code, such winding up proceeding is compulsorily transferable to the NCLT to be resolved under the Code. Even post issue of notice and pre admission, the same result would ensue. However, post admission of a winding up petition and after the assets of the company sought to be wound up become in custodia legis and are taken over by the Company Liquidator, section 290 of the Companies Act, 2013 would indicate that the Company Liquidator may carry on the business of the company, so far as may be necessary, for the beneficial winding up of the company, and may even sell the company as a going concern. So long as no actual sales of the immovable or movable properties have taken place, nothing irreversible is done which would warrant a Company Court staying its hands on a transfer application made to it by a creditor or any party to the proceedings. It is only where the winding up proceedings have reached a stage where it would be irreversible, making it impossible to set the clock back that the Company Court must proceed with the winding up, instead of transferring the proceedings to the NCLT to now be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Code. Whether this stage is reached would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case.23. A conspectus of the aforesaid authorities would show that a petition either under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC is an independent proceeding which is unaffected by winding up proceedings that may be filed qua the same company. Given the object sought to be achieved by the IBC, it is clear that only where a company in winding up is near corporate death that no transfer of the winding up proceeding would then take place to the NCLT to be tried as a proceeding under the IBC. Short of an irresistible conclusion that corporate death is inevitable, every effort should be made to resuscitate the corporate debtor in the larger public interest, which includes not only the workmen of the corporate debtor, but also its creditors and the goods it produces in the larger interest of the economy of the country. It is, thus, not possible to accede to the argument on behalf of the Appellant that given Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 / Section 279 of the Companies Act, 2013, once a winding up petition is admitted, the winding up petition should trump any subsequent attempt at revival of the company through a Section 7 or Section 9 petition filed under the IBC.What is clear by this Section is that a compromise or arrangement can also be entered into in an IBC proceeding if liquidation is ordered. However, what is of importance is that under the Companies Act, it is only winding up that can be ordered, whereas under the IBC, the primary emphasis is on revival of the corporate debtor through infusion of a new management.24. On facts also, in the present case, nothing can be said to have become irretrievable in the sense mentioned in paragraph 31 of Action Ispat (supra).25. It is settled law that a secured creditor stands outside the winding up and can realise its security dehors winding up proceedings. In M.K. Ranganathan v. Govt. of Madras, (1955) 2 SCR 374 , this Court held:The position of a secured creditor in the winding up of a company has been thus stated by Lord Wrenbury in Food Controller v. Cork [1923 Appeal Cases 647]:The phrase outside the winding up is an intelligible phrase if used, as it often is, with reference to a secured creditor, say a mortgagee. The mortgagee of a company in liquidation is in a position to say the mortgaged property is to the extent of the mortgage my property. It is immaterial to me whether my mortgage is in winding up or not. I remain outside the winding up and shall enforce my rights as mortgagee. This is to be contrasted with the case in which such a creditor prefers to assert his right, not as a mortgagee, but as a creditor. He may say I will prove in respect of my debt. If so, he comes into the winding up.It is also summarised in Palmers Company Precedents Vol. II, page 415:Sometimes the mortgagee sells, with or without the concurrence of the liquidator, in exercise of a power of sale vested in him by the mortgage. It is not necessary to obtain liberty to exercise the power of sale, although orders giving such liberty have sometimes been made.The secured creditor is thus outside the winding up and can realise his security without the leave of the winding up Court, though if he files a suit or takes other legal proceedings for the realisation of his security he is bound under Section 231 (corresponding with Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act) to obtain the leave of, the winding up Court before he can do so although such leave would almost automatically be granted. Section 231 has been read together with Section 228(1) and the attachment, sequestration, distress or execution referred to in the latter have reference to proceedings taken through the Court and if the creditor has resort to those proceedings he cannot put them in force against the estate or effects of the Company after the commencement of the winding up without the leave of the winding up Court. The provisions in Section 317 are also supplementary to the provisions of Section 231 and emphasise the position of the secured creditor as one outside the winding up, the secured creditor being, in regard to the exercise of those rights and privileges, in the same position as he would be under the Bankruptcy Act.The corresponding provisions of the Indian Companies Act have been almost bodily incorporated from those of the English Companies Act and if there was nothing more, the position of the secured creditor here also would be the same as that obtaining in England and he would also be outside the winding up and a sale by him without the intervention of the Court would be valid and could not be challenged as void under Section 232(1), Indian Companies Act.(at pages 383, 384)This principle has been followed in Central Bank of India v. Elmot Engineering Co., (1994) 4 SCC 159 ( at paragraph 14), Industrial Credit and Investment Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Srinivas Agencies, (1996) 4 SCC 165 ( at paragraph 2), and Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai v. Indian Oil Corpn., (1998) 4 SCC 302 ( at paragraph 12).26. Indiabulls, a secured creditor of the corporate debtor, viz. SRUIL, has, in enforcement of its debt by a mortgage, sold the mortgaged property outside the winding up. The aforesaid sale is the subject matter of proceedings in the Bombay High Court filed by the provisional liquidator. If the aforesaid sale is set aside, the asset of SRUIL that has been sold will come back to the provisional liquidator for the purposes of winding up. If the sale is upheld, equally, there are other assets of SRUIL which continue to be in the hands of the provisional liquidator for the purposes of winding up. We may also add that on the facts of this case, though no application for transfer of the winding up proceeding pending in the Bombay High Court has been filed, the Bombay High Court has itself, by the orders dated 28.11.2019 and 23.01.2020, directed the provisional liquidator to hand over the records and assets of SRUIL to the IRP in the Section 7 proceeding that is pending before the NCLT. No doubt, this has not yet been done as the IRP has not yet been able to pay the requisite amount to the provisional liquidator for his expenses.These arguments do not avail the Appellant for the simple reason that Section 7 is an independent proceeding, as has been held in catena of judgments of this Court, which has to be tried on its own merits. Any suppression of the winding up proceeding would, therefore, not be of any effect in deciding a Section 7 petition on the basis of the provisions contained in the IBC. Equally, it cannot be said that any subterfuge has been availed of for the same reason that Section 7 is an independent proceeding that stands by itself. As has been correctly pointed out by Shri Sinha, a discretionary jurisdiction under the fifth proviso to Section 434(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot prevail over the undoubted jurisdiction of the NCLT under the IBC once the parameters of Section 7 and other provisions of the IBC have been met.