Case: Competent Authority Vs. Barangore Jute Factory

land in the favour of the Central Government. 9. The aspect of possession of land having been taken by the Competent Authority, is an important issue for consideration in this case. Vesting of land in the Central Government has been held to be not in accordance with the law. The other statutory requirement which needs to be complied before taking possession is deposit of compensation. Under S.3E(1) possession can be taken only after the land vests in the Central Government and the amount determined by the Competent Authority as compensation under S.3G has been deposited under sub-s.(1) of S.3H. In the present case in view of an order dated 3rd April,2002 passed by the High Court final compensation could not be determined by the competent Authority. Therefore, there could not be a valid deposit of amount finally determined as required under S.3E(1) of the Act, which means the possession could not have been taken. But the fact is that possession was taken on 19th February, 2003 on deposit of provisional amount of compensation. The NHAI had in fact applied for permission of court to take possession of the land under acquisition. But without any order being passed on that application, it hastened to take possession after giving only one days notice when the Act requires 60 days notice. Moreover, the possession is to be taken through the Commissioner of Police or the Collector. This was not done. Neither of the three statutory requirements for taking possession were fulfilled. Thus taking of possession of the lands in the present case is in total violation of the statutory provisions. The learned counsel for the acquiring authority submits that possession was taken on basis of oral observations of the court. This is a totally misconceived plea. Court orders are always in black and white. Oral orders are never passed. Moreover, this plea is wrong because the Division Bench observed in its order dated 27th March,2003 that it never dealt with question of possession. The result is that taking possession of the land sought to be acquired cannot be said to be in accordance with law in this case and does not improve matters for the NHAI. 10. At this stage we would like to note that the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners made reference to a publication in the nature of a brochure issued by the West Bengal Government wherein it is mentioned that motels / shops / petrol pumps etc. will also come up in the area where the acquired land is situate. On this basis it was sought to be argued that such use of the acquired land would be contrary to the use mentioned in S.3A of the Act and, therefore, is not permissible. There was lot of controversy on this aspect between the parties particularly, on the ground that this plea was being taken at this belated stage when the respondents had no opportunity to give a proper reply thereto. We have mentioned this only for the reason that the issue has come up during the course of hearing. We do not consider it necessary to go into this aspect, in view of the fact that we have held in this judgment that the basic acquisition notification itself is not in accordance with law. 11. Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. 12. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action. 13. Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. There are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of the notification so that the land owners are adequately compensated. Reference may be made to: (a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Rajkumar Johri and others (1992 (1)SCC 328 ) (b) Gauri Shankar Gaur and Others. v. State of UP and Others. (1994 (1) SCC 92 ) (c) Haji Saeed Khan and Others. v. State of UP and Others. (2001 (9) SCC 513 ) In that direction the next step is what should be the crucial date in the facts of the present case for determining the quantum of compensation. We feel that the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date when possession of the land was taken by the respondents from the writ petitioners. This date admittedly is 19th February, 2003

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. So far as the question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of S.3A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of land in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law. While dealing with the question of brief description of land in the acquisition notifications, reference was made to some judgments of this Court where acquisition Notifications under S.4 of the Land Acquisition Act had come up for consideration on account of challenge being leveled on ground of vagueness of the Notifications. In most of these cases, Plan of the area under acquisition was made part of the notifications to show that the requirement of description of land was met. This lead us to inquire whether there was any site plan forming part of the impugned NotificationWe are inclined to accept that there was no Plan accompanying the impugned Notification. During the course of hearing we were shown a Plan which we are unable to link with the impugned Notification. This was a 1996 PWD Plan. The PWD is a department of the State Government. The impugned Notification is by the Central Government. The NHAI is established under a Central Act. The Competent Authority under S.3 of the Act is appointed by the Central Government. Therefore, this State Government Plan of 1996 (the impugned Notification is of 1998) is of no assistance. The impugned judgment of the High Court emphasises the need for a Plan. It is clear from the judgment of the High Court that no Plan was produced before it. The absence of any reference to a Plan in the impugned Notification and in fact non availability of any Plan linked to the Notification, fortifies the argument that the description of the land under acquisition in the impugned Notification fails to meet the legal requirement of a brief description of the land which renders the Notification invalid7. The absence of plan also renders the right to file objections under S.3C(1) nugatory. In the absence of a Plan, it is impossible to ascertain or know which part of acquired land was to be used and in what manner. Without this knowledge no objections regarding use of land could be filed. Since the objection regarding use of the land had been given up by the writ petitioners, we need not go any further in this aspect. We would, however, like to add that unlike S.5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under S.4 of the said Act, S.3C(1) of the National Highways Act gives a very limited right to object. The objection can be only to the use of the land under acquisition for purposes other than those under sub-s.3A(1). The Act confers no right to object to acquisition as such. This answers the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the NHAI that failure to file objections disentitles Writ Petitioners to object to the acquisition. The Act confers no general right to object, therefore, failure to object becomes irrelevant. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of this court in Delhi Administration vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Others (1999 (7) SCC 44 ). In our view, this judgment has no application in the facts of the present case where right to object is a very limited right. The case cited is a case under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under S.5A. Failure to exercise that right could be said to be acquiescence. The National Highways Act confers no such right. Under this Act there is no right to object to acquisition of land except on the question of its user. Therefore, the present objection has to be decided independently of the right to file objections. De hors the right to file objection, the validity of the Notification has to be considered. Failure to file objection to the notification under S.3C, therefore, cannot non suit the Writ Petitioners in this case. Thelearned counsel supporting the acquisition submitted that the delay in filing the Writ Petition is fatal to the case of landowners.It is true that 11th June, 1998 Notification was challenged only in September, 2001 by filing the Writ Petition. But if the Notification violates the very statute from which it derives its force, will delay in challenging it clothe it with legitimacy? The Act requires the Notification to be issued in a particular manner with brief particulars of land being acquired. The Notification in this case fails to meet this requirement. We have held it to be bad in law. It has no legs to stand. The conduct of the opposite party cannot be used to make it stand. Moreover, the Writ Petitioners have explained the reasons for the delay in filing the Writ Petition. The Company which owns the lands had been deregistered. It is a Company registered in the U.K. It had to be revived. Revival came in mid 2001 whereafter the action was taken. Thus we find no merit in the argument about delay in challenging the Notification rendering the challenge liable to be rejected8. Coming to the point regarding filing of claim for compensation on behalf of the Company by its General Manager with complete details of the land under acquisition, we must note that at the relevant time in 1998 and thereafter till 2001, the Writ Petitioner Company had no existence. On account of demands of workers of the factory and to meet other statutory demands, a committee was appointed by the High Court in the winding up proceedings pending before it to run the factory. The claim for compensation was filed by somebody as the General Manager of the Company. He had no authority to do so. The committee had to manage only the factory and had nothing to do with ownership issues. So far as details of land under acquisition contained in the claim is concerned, it is based on material contained in the impugned Notification and the Appendix. Filing of such a claim by somebody who had no authority to do so, cannot deprive the owners of their right to challenge the acquisition of the lands owned by the Company. Therefore, neither delay in filing the Writ Petition nor filing of claim for compensation can stand in the way of the Writ Petitioners in seeking relief in these proceedings. About the argument based on vesting of the land in the Central Government, it is to be seen that if the initial Notification is bad, all steps taken in pursuance thereof will fall with it. Vesting under S.3D(2) arises on a declaration by the Central Government under S.3D(1).The declaration is the result of disposal of objections under S.3C. Each step is a consequence of earlier step and in that sense all the steps are linked to initial Notification for acquisition under S.3A(1) and (2). This initial Notification has been held to be not in accordance with law. When the foundation goes rest of the edifice falls. The invalid Notification under S.3(A) renders all subsequent steps invalid. Therefore, vesting of land in the Central Government in the present case cannot be said to be lawful and it does not advance the case of the Competent Authority or the NHAI. Taking possession of the land is yet another step in the same sequence and is again subject to the initial Notification being held valid. The initial Notification having been invalidated, there can be no legal or valid vesting of land in the favour of the Central Government9. The aspect of possession of land having been taken by the Competent Authority, is an important issue for consideration in this case. Vesting of land in the Central Government has been held to be not in accordance with the law. The other statutory requirement which needs to be complied before taking possession is deposit of compensation. Under S.3E(1) possession can be taken only after the land vests in the Central Government and the amount determined by the Competent Authority as compensation under S.3G has been deposited under sub-s.(1) of S.3H. In the present case in view of an order dated 3rd April,2002 passed by the High Court final compensation could not be determined by the competent Authority. Therefore, there could not be a valid deposit of amount finally determined as required under S.3E(1) of the Act, which means the possession could not have been taken. But the fact is that possession was taken on 19th February, 2003 on deposit of provisional amount of compensation. The NHAI had in fact applied for permission of court to take possession of the land under acquisition. But without any order being passed on that application, it hastened to take possession after giving only one days notice when the Act requires 60 days notice. Moreover, the possession is to be taken through the Commissioner of Police or the Collector. This was not done. Neither of the three statutory requirements for taking possession were fulfilled. Thus taking of possession of the lands in the present case is in total violation of the statutory provisions. The learned counsel for the acquiring authority submits that possession was taken on basis of oral observations of the court. This is a totally misconceived plea. Court orders are always in black and white. Oral orders are never passed. Moreover, this plea is wrong because the Division Bench observed in its order dated 27th March,2003 that it never dealt with question of possession. The result is that taking possession of the land sought to be acquired cannot be said to be in accordance with law in this case and does not improve matters for the NHAI11. Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the landowners.Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems12. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action. We express no opinion about other statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise the same, if available.