Case: Munshi &amp; Ors Vs. Richpal &amp; Ors

Pepsu, the case, as rightly observed by the court of first instance, was governed by sections 7 and 7A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, which in view of section 4 of that Act have an overriding effect and provide as under:--"4. Act to over ride other laws--Save, as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law or any usage, agreement, settlement, grant, sanad or any decree or order of any court or other authority.7. Termination of tenancy.--(1) No tenancy shall be terminated except in accordance with the provisions of this Act or except of any of the following grounds, namely:--(b) that the tenant has failed to pay rent within a period of six months after it falls due;Provided that no tenant shall be ejected under this clause unless he has been afforded an opportunity to pay the arrears of rent within a further period of six months from the date of the decree or order directing his ejectment and he had failed to pay such arrears during that period;(c) that the tenant, not being a widow, a minor, an unmarried woman, a member of the Armed Forces of the Union or a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of physical or mental infirmity has after commencement of the Presidents Act sublet without the consent in writing of the landowner, the land comprising his tenancy or any part thereof;(d) that the tenant has, without sufficient cause, failed to cultivate personally such land in the manner and to the extent customary in the locality in Which such land is situated;(e) that the tenant has used such land or any part thereof in a manner which is likely to render the l and unfit for the purpose for which it was leased to him;(f) that the tenant, on demand in writing by the landowner, has refused to execute a kabuliyat agreeing to pay rent in respect of his tenancy in accordance with the provisions of sections 9 and 10.(2)..............................7A. Additional grounds for termination of tenancy in certain cases.--(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), a tenancy subsisting at the commencement of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Second Amendment) Act, 1956 may be terminated on the following grounds in addition to the grounds specified in section 7, namely:-(a) that the land comprising the tenancy has been reserved by the land-owner for his personal cultivation in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II:(b) that the landowner owns thirty standard acres or less of land and the land falls within the permissible limit;Provided that no tenant shall be ejected under this subsection-(i) from any area of land if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant does not exceed five standard acres,(ii) from an area of five standard acres, if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds five standards acres. until he is allowed by the State Government alternative land of equivalent value in standard acres.(2) No tenant, who immediately preceding the commencement of the Presidents Act has held any land continuously for a period of twelve years or more under the same land-owner or his predecessor in title, shah be ejected on the grounds specified in sub-section (1)-(a) from any area of land, if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant does not exceed fifteen standards acres, or(b) from an area of fifteen standards acres, if the area under the personal cultivation of the tenant exceeds fifteen standard acres;provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the tenant of a landowner who both, at the commencement of the tenancy and the commencement of the Presidents Act, was a widow, a minor, an unmarried woman, a member of the Armed Forces of the Union or a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of physical or mental infirmity.Explanation. In computing the period of twelve years, the period during which any land has been held under the same land-owner or his predecessor in title by the father, brother or son of the tenant shall be included.(3) For the purpose of computing under sub-sections (1) and (2) the area of land under the personal cultivation of a tenant, any area of land owned by the tenant and under his personal cultivation shall be included."2. It cannot, in view of the above noted provisions of law and the decision of this Court in Rikh Ram & Anr. v. Ram Kumar & Ors. ([1975] 2 S.C.C. 318.) be disputed that an order or decree directing eviction of a tenant is necessary to be obtained to bring about a determination of the tenancy. A fortiori, a person who has been in possession of land with the right to possess it continues to hold the land and to be a tenant in spite of having been wrongfully put out of possession especially if he has initiated proceedings for recovery of possession. As in the instant case, it has been concurrently found by all the courts below that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was a tenant of the suit land on the date of sale and it has not been alleged much less proved that his tenancy was, thereafter determined or terminated on any of the grounds set out in sections 7 and 7A of the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 and he h ad admittedly applied to the Tehsildar for restoration of his possession, he cannot but be deemed to be a tenant of the suit land on the date of the sale as well as on all other material dates and thus fully qualified and entitled to pre-empt the land. We must fairly state that our judgment is based on the provisions of law brought to our notice by counsel and our conclusion is confined to the interpretation of the Acts referred to above.3.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Though the l earned counsel for the appellants cited a few cases in support of his contention but did not unfortunately bring to our notice the decision of this Court in Dindyal &Anr. v. Raja Ram ([1971] 1 S.C.R. 298.) which may in an appropriate case require reconsideration by a larger bench of this Court, we think, he cannot be allowed canvass the aforesaid point. A reference to the record of the case shows that the point now sought to be agitated before us was not raised by the appellants either in their written statement or in the grounds of the three appeals preferred by them before the courts below. All that appeals from the record to have. been urged by them in the grounds of the aforesaid appeals was that the evidence had not been properly appraised and that in the absence of any lease deed in his favour or any receipt evidencing payment of rent by him to the vendor, mere entries in the khasra girdawaries were not enough to establish that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was a tenant of the suit land under the vendor at the time of thecannot, in view of the above noted provisions of law and the decision of this Court in Rikh Ram & Anr. v. Ram Kumar & Ors. ([1975] 2 S.C.C. 318.) be disputed that an order or decree directing eviction of a tenant is necessary to be obtained to bring about a determination of the tenancy. A fortiori, a person who has been in possession of land with the right to possess it continues to hold the land and to be a tenant in spite of having been wrongfully put out of possession especially if he has initiated proceedings for recovery of possession. As in the instant case, it has been concurrently found by all the courts below that the plaintiff-pre-emptor was a tenant of the suit land on the date of sale and it has not been alleged much less proved that his tenancy was, thereafter determined or terminated on any of the grounds set out in sections 7 and 7A ofthe Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955 and he h ad admittedly applied to the Tehsildar for restoration of his possession, he cannot but be deemed to be a tenant of the suit land on the date of the sale as well as on all other material dates and thus fully qualified and entitled to pre-empt the land. We must fairly state that our judgment is based on the provisions of law brought to our notice by counsel and our conclusion is confined to the interpretation of the Acts referred to above.