Case: District Council Of United Khasi &amp; Jaintia Hills&amp; Ors. Etc Vs. Miss Sitimon Sawian Etc

plains, than the construction which would extend the District Councils power of making laws to the transfer of land. The report of the Sub-Committee referred to earlier clearly supports this construction. The passages from the report to which our attention has been drawn do not show that power to make laws for transfer of land was recommended to be vested in the District Councils. On the other hand, the recommendations contained in the report were restricted to the power to control only use and occupation of the land and it was this limited power which was recommended to be vested in the District Councils. The would be clear from the following passage in the report."Accepting this then as a fundamental feature of the administration of the hills, we recommend that the Hill Districts should have powers of legislation over occupation or use of land other than land comprising reserved forest under the Assam Forest Regulation of 1891 or other law applicable. The only limitation we would place upon this is to provide that the local councils should not require payment for the occupation of vacant land by the Provincial Government for public purposes or prevent the acquisition of private land, also required for public purposes, on payment of compensation." 11. The argument that in construing the provisions conferring power to legislate the words should be interpreted broadly and no narrow or pedantic interpretation should be placed upon them is, in our opinion, inapplicable to the case in hand. The power of legislation conferred on bodies like the District Councils which concerns us must be confined strictly within the limits prescribed by the plain language used and the doctrine of wide construction seems to be somewhat inapt. We are not concerned with the provisions conferring plenary nature of legislative power on the Parliament or State Legislatures in which case the appellants argument may be more appropriately accepted. We consider it proper at this stage to refer to Para 12 of the Sixth Schedule which provides:"12. Application of Acts of Parliament and of the Legislature of the State of autonomous districts and autonomous regions - (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution- (a) no Act of the Legislature of the State in respect of any of the matters specified in paragraph 3 of this Schedule as matters with respect to which a District Council or a Regional Council may make laws, and no Act of the Legislature of the State prohibiting or restricting the consumption of any non-distilled alcoholic liquor shall apply to any autonomous district or autonomous region unless in either case the District Council for such district or having jurisdiction over such region by public notification so directs and the District Council in giving such direction with respect to any Act may direct that the Act shall in its application to such district or region or any part thereof have effect subject to such exceptions or modifications as it thinks fit; (b) the Governor may, by public notification, direct that any Act of Parliament or of the Legislature of the State to which the provisions of cl. (a) of this sub-paragraph do not apply shall not apply to any autonomous district or an autonomous region, or shall apply to such district or region or any part thereof subject to such exceptions or modification as he may specify in the notification. (2) Any direction given under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph may be given so as to have retrospective effect". It is clear from this provision read with para 3 (1) (a) already reproduced, that the District Councils unlike the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not intended to be clothed with plenary power of legislation. Their power to make laws is expressly limited by the provisions of the Sixth Schedule which has created them and they can do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe their power. It is beyond the domain of the courts to enlarge constructively their power to make laws. 12. The proviso to para 3 (1) (a) merely serves to ensure that no law made by the Regional and District Councils with respect to allotment, occupation or use or setting apart of land as mentioned in that clause, shall have the effect of preventing compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, by the Government of Assam in accordance with the law in force authorising such acquisition. This proviso by no means enlarges the scope of the power conferred on the Regional and District Councils by cl. (a) and indeed it has not been so claimed by the learned Attorney-General. A proviso may undoubtedly be sometimes inserted to allay fears considered by some to be unfounded. But the question must ultimately come back to the point whether or not power to make laws conferred by cl. (a) includes the power to do so with respect to transfer of land and this must turn upon the exact language and its primary meaning. The simple words used in cl. (a) are incapable of bearing the construction suggested by the learned Attorney-General and the provision found in the proviso does not in any way alter the operative effect of this clause. 13. The preamble of the impugned Act no doubt does speak of the necessity to make provisions with respect to "transfer, allotment, occupation or use of land for any purpose likely to promote the interests of the inhabitants thereof" but the subject of transfer is clearly beyond the scope of the law making power conferred on the District Council by the Constitution and to that extent, therefore, the impugned Act which means S.3 thereof is void being beyond the jurisdiction of the District Council. 14. On the view we have taken of the plain meaning of para 3 (1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule it is unnecessary to consider the other points relating to the violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. This Court normally does not decide points which are not strictly necessary for disposing of the appeal before it. 15. Thes

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It therefore seems to us to be quite clear that the framers of the Constitution wanted to confine the power of the District Councils to make laws under Para 3 (1) (a) to the distribution or setting apart, of the land mentioned therein only for the purposes of occupation or use as expressly stated therein, without intending to extend that power to transfer of land. This construction is not only in accord with the real sense discernible from the plain meaning of the language used in this clause, but it also serves more effectively to carry out the manifest purpose, policy and scheme underlying the provisions of the Constitution namely, protection of the hill people in the North-Eastern Hills Districts against exploitation by the more sophisticated outsiders from the plains, than the construction which would extend the District Councils power of making laws to the transfer of land. The report of the Sub-Committee referred to earlier clearly supports this construction. The passages from the report to which our attention has been drawn do not show that power to make laws for transfer of land was recommended to be vested in the District Councils. On the other hand, the recommendations contained in the report were restricted to the power to control only use and occupation of the land and it was this limited power which was recommended to be vested in the District Councils. The would be clear from the following passage in the report"Accepting this then as a fundamental feature of the administration of the hills, we recommend that the Hill Districts should have powers of legislation over occupation or use of land other than land comprising reserved forest under the Assam Forest Regulation of 1891 or other law applicable. The only limitation we would place upon this is to provide that the local councils should not require payment for the occupation of vacant land by the Provincial Government for public purposes or prevent the acquisition of private land, also required for public purposes, on payment of compensation."13. TheIt is clear from this provision read with para 3 (1) (a) already reproduced, that the District Councils unlike the Parliament and the State Legislatures are not intended to be clothed with plenary power of legislation. Their power to make laws is expressly limited by the provisions of the Sixth Schedule which has created them and they can do nothing beyond the limits which circumscribe their power. It is beyond the domain of the courts to enlarge constructively their power to make laws15. Theproviso to para 3 (1) (a) merely serves to ensure that no law made by the Regional and District Councils with respect to allotment, occupation or use or setting apart of land as mentioned in that clause, shall have the effect of preventing compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, by the Government of Assam in accordance with the law in force authorising such acquisition. This proviso by no means enlarges the scope of the power conferred on the Regional and District Councils by cl. (a) and indeed it has not been so claimed by the learned Attorney-General. A proviso may undoubtedly be sometimes inserted to allay fears considered by some to be unfounded. But the question must ultimately come back to the point whether or not power to make laws conferred by cl. (a) includes the power to do so with respect to transfer of land and this must turn upon the exact language and its primary meaning. The simple words used in cl. (a) are incapable of bearing the construction suggested by the learned Attorney-General and the provision found in the proviso does not in any way alter the operative effect of this clausee preamble of theimpugned Act no doubt does speak of the necessity to make provisions with respect to "transfer, allotment, occupation or use of land for any purpose likely to promote the interests of the inhabitants thereof" but the subject of transfer is clearly beyond the scope of the law making power conferred on the District Council by the Constitution and to that extent, therefore, the impugned Act which means S.3 thereof is void being beyond the jurisdiction of the District CouncilOn the view we have taken of the plain meaning of para 3 (1)(a) of the Sixth Schedule it is unnecessary to consider the other points relating to the violation of Art.14 of the Constitution. This Court normally does not decide points which are not strictly necessary for disposing of the appeal before it.