Case: Pyare Lal Sharma Vs. Managing Director and Ors

means almost wholetime in politics. Company job and active politics cannot go together. The position of the civil servants who are governed by Article 311 is entirely different but a provision like grounds (c) and (d) in Regulation 16.14 concerning the employees of companies/corporations/public undertakings is within the competence of the management. 18. We do not agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that three months notice or pay in lieu thereof was to be given to Sharma under Regulation 16.14. It is clear from the plain language of the regulation that three months notice or pay in lieu, is only required when termination is under ground (a) or (b). Regarding (c) and (d), the regulation provides for a 15 days notice to explain the conduct satisfactorily and there is no requirement of any other notice or pay in lieu thereof. 19. We may now take up the third point. Sharma was appointed as Chemical Engineer by the Board of Directors. The powers of the Board of Directors to appoint officers of Sharmas category were delegated to the Managing Director on September 12, 1974 and as such from that date the Managing Director became the appointing authority. Needless to say that employees of the company are not civil servants and as such they can neither claim the protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India nor the extension of that guarantee on parity. There is no provision in the Articles of Association or the regulations of the company giving same protection to the employees of the company as is given to the civil servants under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. An employee of the company cannot, therefore, claim that he cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Since on the date of termination of Sharmas services the Managing Director had the powers of appointing authority, he was legally competent to terminate Sharmas services. 20. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the fourth point though the same did not find favour with the Division Bench. Grounds (c) and (d) in Regulation 16.14, exclusively and individually, are sufficient to terminate the services of an employee. Once it is established to the satisfaction of the authority that an employee remains on unauthorised absence from duty, the only action which can be taken is the termination of his services. Similar is the case when an employee takes part in the active politics. The finding in the termination order regarding taking part in active politics cannot be sustained because no notice in this respect was given to Sharma but the order of termination can be supported on the ground of remaining on unauthorised absence from duty. This Court in State of Orissa v. Vidyabhushan Mohapatra (1963 Supp 1 SCR 648) and Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh ((1969) 1 SCR 548) has held that if the order can be supported on one ground for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed it is not for the courts to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority punishing the public servant. Thus there is no force in this argument. 21. This takes us to the last point which we have discovered from the facts. Regulation 16.14 before amendment consisted of only clauses (a) and (b) relating to abolition of post and unfitness on medical ground. The company had no authority to terminate the services of an employee on the ground of unauthorised absence without holding disciplinary proceedings against him. The regulation was amended on April 20, 1983 and grounds (c) and (d) were added. Amended regulation could not operate retrospectively but only from the date of amendment. Ground (c) under which action was taken came into existence only on April 20, 1983 and as such the period of unauthorised absence which could come within the mischief of ground (c) has to be the period posterior to April 20, 1983 and not anterior to that date. The show-cause notice was issued to Sharma on April 21, 1983. The period of absence indicated in the show-cause notice is obviously prior to April 20, 1983. The period of absence prior to the date of amendment cannot be taken into consideration. When prior to April 20, 1983 the services of person could not be terminated on the ground of unauthorised absence from duty under Regulation 16.14 then it is wholly illegal to make the absence during that period as ground for terminating the services of Sharma. It is basic principle of natural justice that no one can be penalised on the ground of a conduct which was not penal on the day it was committed. The date of show-cause notice being April 21, 1983 the unauthorised absence from duty which has been taken into consideration is from December 20, 1982 to April 20, 1983. Whole of this period being prior to the date of amendment of Regulation 16.14 the same could not be made as a ground for proceeding under ground (c) of Regulation 16.14. The notice served on the appellant was thus illegal and as a consequence the order of termination cannot be sustained and has to be set aside. 22. When the termination order is set aside by the courts normally the servant becomes entitled to back wages and other consequential benefits. This case has a chequered history. From 1976 onwards there has been continuous litigation and mistrust between the parties. The facts which we have narrated above go to show that Sharma has equally contributed to this unfortunate situation. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case we order that 60 per cent of the back wages be paid to Sharma. Money already received by Sharma under order of this Court or the High Court shall be adjusted and the balance paid to him. If the money already paid to Sharma is more than what we have ordered then there shall be no recovery from him.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]15. Mr. Pyare Lal Sharma appeared in person and argued his case. He has been of no assistance to us. During the course of arguments we suggested to Mr. Sharma to engage a counsel which he declined. We also repeatedly offered to him to have the service of a counsel engaged by the court but he did not agree and insisted on arguing the case himself17. We see no arbitrariness in Regulation 16.14. The regulation has been framed to meet four different eventualities which may arise during the service of a company employee. Under this regulation services of an employee may be terminated (a) if his post is abolished or (b) if he is declared on medical grounds to be unfit for further service or (c) he remains on unauthorised absence or (d) if he takes part in active politics. In the case of (a) and (b) three months notice to a permanent employee and one month notice to temporary employee or pay in lieu thereof is to be given. In case of (c) and (d) a show-cause notice, to explain his conduct satisfactorily, is to be given. So far as grounds (a) and (b) are concerned there cannot be any objection. When a post is abolished or an employee is declared medically unfit for further service the termination is the obvious consequence. In the case of abolition of post the employee may be adjusted in some other post if legally permitted. Ground (c) has also a specific purpose. "Remains on unauthorised absence" means an employee who has not respect for discipline and absents himself repeatedly and without any justification or the one who remains absent for a sufficiently long period. The object and purport of the regulation is to maintain efficiency in the service of the company. The provision of show-cause notice is a sufficient safeguard against arbitrary action. Regarding ground (d) "active politics" means almost wholetime in politics. Company job and active politics cannot go together. The position of the civil servants who are governed by Article 311 is entirely different but a provision like grounds (c) and (d) in Regulation 16.14 concerning the employees of companies/corporations/public undertakings is within the competence of the management18. We do not agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that three months notice or pay in lieu thereof was to be given to Sharma under Regulation 16.14. It is clear from the plain language of the regulation that three months notice or pay in lieu, is only required when termination is under ground (a) or (b). Regarding (c) and (d), the regulation provides for a 15 days notice to explain the conduct satisfactorily and there is no requirement of any other notice or pay in lieu thereof19. We may now take up the third point. Sharma was appointed as Chemical Engineer by the Board of Directors. The powers of the Board of Directors to appoint officers of Sharmas category were delegated to the Managing Director on September 12, 1974 and as such from that date the Managing Director became the appointing authority. Needless to say that employees of the company are not civil servants and as such they can neither claim the protection of Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India nor the extension of that guarantee on parity. There is no provision in the Articles of Association or the regulations of the company giving same protection to the employees of the company as is given to the civil servants under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India. An employee of the company cannot, therefore, claim that he cannot be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. Since on the date of termination of Sharmas services the Managing Director had the powers of appointing authority, he was legally competent to terminate Sharmas services20. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the fourth point though the same did not find favour with the Division Bench. Grounds (c) and (d) in Regulation 16.14, exclusively and individually, are sufficient to terminate the services of an employee. Once it is established to the satisfaction of the authority that an employee remains on unauthorised absence from duty, the only action which can be taken is the termination of his services. Similar is the case when an employee takes part in the active politics. The finding in the termination order regarding taking part in active politics cannot be sustained because no notice in this respect was given to Sharma but the order of termination can be supported on the ground of remaining on unauthorised absence from duty. This Court in State of Orissa v. Vidyabhushan Mohapatra (1963 Supp 1 SCR 648) and Railway Board v. Niranjan Singh ((1969) 1 SCR 548) has held that if the order can be supported on one ground for which the punishment can lawfully be imposed it is not for the courts to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority punishing the public servant. Thus there is no force in this argument21. This takes us to the last point which we have discovered from the facts. Regulation 16.14 before amendment consisted of only clauses (a) and (b) relating to abolition of post and unfitness on medical ground. The company had no authority to terminate the services of an employee on the ground of unauthorised absence without holding disciplinary proceedings against him. The regulation was amended on April 20, 1983 and grounds (c) and (d) were added. Amended regulation could not operate retrospectively but only from the date of amendment. Ground (c) under which action was taken came into existence only on April 20, 1983 and as such the period of unauthorised absence which could come within the mischief of ground (c) has to be the period posterior to April 20, 1983 and not anterior to that date. The show-cause notice was issued to Sharma on April 21, 1983. The period of absence indicated in the show-cause notice is obviously prior to April 20, 1983. The period of absence prior to the date of amendment cannot be taken into consideration. When prior to April 20, 1983 the services of person could not be terminated on the ground of unauthorised absence from duty under Regulation 16.14 then it is wholly illegal to make the absence during that period as ground for terminating the services of Sharma. It is basic principle of natural justice that no one can be penalised on the ground of a conduct which was not penal on the day it was committed. The date of show-cause notice being April 21, 1983 the unauthorised absence from duty which has been taken into consideration is from December 20, 1982 to April 20, 1983. Whole of this period being prior to the date of amendment of Regulation 16.14 the same could not be made as a ground for proceeding under ground (c) of Regulation 16.14. The notice served on the appellant was thus illegal and as a consequence the order of termination cannot be sustained and has to be set aside22. When the termination order is set aside by the courts normally the servant becomes entitled to back wages and other consequential benefits. This case has a chequered history. From 1976 onwards there has been continuous litigation and mistrust between the parties. The facts which we have narrated above go to show that Sharma has equally contributed to this unfortunate situation. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case we order that 60 per cent of the back wages be paid to Sharma. Money already received by Sharma under order of this Court or the High Court shall be adjusted and the balance paid to him. If the money already paid to Sharma is more than what we have ordered then there shall be no recovery from him