Case: CHAIRMAN/MANAGING DIRECTOR, U.P. POWER CORPORATION LTD.  Vs. RAM GOPAL

expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters…... 16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept 8over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala (2009) 2 SCC 479 , this Court observed thus: 17. It is also well-settled principle of law that delay defeats equity. …It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. (emphasis supplied) 17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 610 this Court while considering the claim of candidates who, despite being higher in merit, exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that: 27. …It becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance of justice or injustice in entertaining the petition or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time. 18. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in-rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in-rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015) 1 SCC 347 , laying down that: 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence. (Emphasis applied) 19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari Lal in service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in-rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the Respondents rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it apparent from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to approach the court-of-law in time on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he seems to be under the assumption that the termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and that he can agitate the same at his own sweet-will. Neither of these three assumptions are true, as elaborated by us earlier. CONCLUSION

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length, we find that the impugned order of the High Court is legally untenable and cannot be sustained for at least three glaring reasonsi) Erroneous conclusion of termination order being non-speaking11. First, the Division Benchs finding that no reason has been assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the respondent, is vividly erroneous. This Court had earlier vide order dated 22.11.1993 passed in Civil Appeal No. 7123 of 1993 overruled the High Courts finding of non- reasoned termination in Shyam Behari Lals case and had held that the termination order was in fact a speaking order, with the reason for termination being writ large and clearly given. The High Courts findings thus undoubtedly fall foul of the observations made by this Court and the impugned order hence ought to be set-aside on this count aloneii) Lack of similarity between Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal12. Second, Quite palpably, the High Court has erred in concluding that the Respondents claim fell squarely within the four corners of its previous decision in Shyam Behari Lals case. The relied-upon judgment dated 30.05.1997 determined unequivocally that there was no merit in the writ petition and that Shyam Behari Lals claim was liable to be dismissed. It was only on account of pending litigation and interim directions of courts that Shyam Behari Lal had spent 17 years in employment of UPPCL. Paying heed to these equitable considerations, and not as a matter of any legal right, the High Court urged the employer to sympathetically consider his case for retention in employment. This conclusion of the High Court was not appealed by any party and has undoubtedly attained finality. Hence, it is clear in law that Shyam Behari Lals termination was legal, and that he had no right of continuation in service, let alone reinstatement as sought in the present case.13. At the outset, it is apparent that Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal share little similarity. Whereas the former had remained in service for over seventeen years (except a brief period between August to November in 1978) and had fought his case tooth and nail, the Respondent has not been in the employment of UPPCL since 1978. The fact-situation in Shyam Behari Lals case was unique and altogether different from that of Ram Gopal, and there arises no reason to seek or grant parity. Even otherwise, it is a settled canon of common law that equity acts in personam and not in rem. Hence, there could be no extension of parity between the case of Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal (Respondent)iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the Respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in 1990)15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been barred by limitation in 199018. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in-rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts.19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari Lal in service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in-rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the Respondents rescue. It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it apparent from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to approach the court-of-law in time on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he seems to be under the assumption that the termination order is illegal, that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and that he can agitate the same at his own sweet-will. Neither of these three assumptions are true, as elaborated by us earlier16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept 8over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced.