Case: M/S. Voltas Ltd. Verses J.M. Demello &amp; Another Vs.

demand No. 9 and the Reference to the Meher Tribunal based on that demand contained anything which required its deletion, or the demand was for a new scheme of dearness allowance altogether and not merely for a revision of the existing scheme. It is true that neither demand No. 9 nor the Reference, nor the companys written statement before the Tribunal expressly mentioned the ceiling of Rs. 350/- per month. But the companys case before the Labour Court clearly was that there did exist in the prevailing scheme such a ceiling, that it was not mentioned in its reply before the Tribunal because demand No. 9 raised no controversy about it, nor did it call upon the Tribunal to delete it and that the controversy between the parties in that Reference related only to the question as to the basic bracket, percentages of variation and the increase in the minimum. 18. Upon such a case being before the Labour Court, that court had to and was competent to decide the question whether there was a ceiling in the existing scheme, and if so, whether it was deleted by the Tribunal, in other words, whether the demand was for doing away with the existing scheme and substituting it by a fresh scheme which had no ceiling. For that purpose, the Labour Court had necessarily to examine demand No. 9, the Reference, the pleadings of the parties, and lastly, the Meher Award, and incidental to such an in quiry it had to examine the question whether there was a ceiling in the scheme existing at the time of that demand and reference. (see in this connection Ramakrishna Ramnath v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nagpur, (1970) 2 Lab LJ 305 (SC) ). In doing so, the Labour Court had to examine the various stages the dearness allowance scheme had from time to time gone through. 19. Admittedly, the Bakhale award did contain the maximum. That scheme was revised by the circular dated November 16, 1953 by which the dearness allowance was linked with the cost of living and the maximum was raised from Rs. 165 to Rs. 300. That award was terminated and a fresh demand in respect of dearness allowance was made on August 18, 1956. The demand was that the scheme of dearness allowance "at present in force should be revised on the following lines .........." The demand resulted in the settlement dated August 30, 1957. Neither the demand nor the settlement contained any reference to the maximum of Rs. 300/- although it did exist in the existing scheme. The case of respondent 1 was that the said settlement did away with such a maximum and that from 1957 onwards there was no ceiling at all. This case was seriously controverted by the company which produced before the Labour Court the circular, dated March 12, 1959, by which it said that the maximum was raised from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 350/- with effect from April 1, 1959. The case of respondent 1 with regard to this contention of the company was (1) that no such circular was issued, at least to the knowledge of the union, and (2) that even if it was issued, it was confined to the officers of the company and did not apply to workmen. The Labour Court held that interpretation by respondent 1 that it applied to officers alone was not correct. The circular was issued to "all offices" of the company. It applied to all the employees of the company as is evident from its para 2 which stated as follows:"Dearness allowance will continue to be paid on usual basis at the rates applicable at each place subject to the maximum stated above." It also stated that it superseded all other previous circulars. If this circular was issued, as the Labour Court held it was there can be no doubt that (1) there was a ceiling in the scheme prevalent at that time, (2) that it was raised to Rs. 350/- and (3) that it applied to all the employees and not merely to the officers. The Labour Court also accepted the companys case that the circular was notified on the notice board of the company and that that amounted to a notice of a change under section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In any event, the change did not adversely affect the workmen. Nor was the question as to its validity before the Labour Court which used the circular as evidence of a ceiling existing in the scheme right from the time of the Bakhale award. 20. If from all this evidence before it the Labour Court came to the conclusion that a ceiling existed in the scheme of dearness allowance prevailing in the company at all the various stages and that deletion of such a ceiling was not the subject matter of either demand No. 9 it or of the reference before the Meher Tribunal, and that its award was confined to the revision only of the existing scheme in the three matters earlier referred to, it is not possible to say, that the decision of the Labour Court suffered from an error apparent on the face of its decision in respect of which a certiorari can justifiably be issued under Art. 226. The confines of jurisdiction under Art. 226 have been settled by a series of decisions of this Court, from among which we need mention only the case of Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, (1964) 5 SCR 64 = (AIR 1964 SC 477 ). There was no question of any estoppel also against the company against its raising the question of the ceiling in view of the finding by the Labour Court that the question of the ceiling was not the subject-matter of the reference before the Meher Tribunal. Such a conclusion of the Labour Court could not be interfered with by the High Court on any one of the well-known grounds on which only such interference is permissible.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]15. There can, therefore, be no doubt whatsoever that there was an existing scheme of dearness allowance, that workmen felt that it was not satisfactory and wanted its revision in certain particulars viz., in the percentages of variation, the basic bracket and the amount of the minimum. In paras 145 to 147 of its statement of claim before the Meher Tribunal, the union set out "the existing scheme for dearness allowance", the demand for a revision, viz., in the basic bracket in the percentages of variation and the minimum, and claimed that "the existing dearness allowance scheme failed to meet its object of neutralising the rise in the cost of living and also claimed, by citing dearness allowance paid by other companies, that the dearness allowance paid by the company was the lowest. In para 125 of its written statement the company, on the other hand, pleaded that the existing scheme was fair, having regard to the scales of pay, allowances and other terms and conditions and said that it was agreeable to have a revised scheme set out therein if the workmen did not press for revising the wage scales. In the revised scheme suggested by it, it adopted the variation percentages demanded by the workmen, but insisted that the minimum should remain the same, viz., Rs. 75/-. No doubt, neither the statement of claim by the union, nor the written statement of the company referred to the maximum and clearly for that reason the Tribunal also in its award did not refer to it and concerned itself with the contentions of the parties, (1) as to the basic bracket, (2) the percentages of variation (3) increase in the minimum16. The principal controversy between the parties, as is clear from the opening paragraphs of the Judgment of the Labour Court, was whether the scheme of dearness allowance, as revised by the Tribunal, contained the ceiling. As already stated, the case of respondent 1 was that he was entitled to the dearness allowance as set out in his application, that under the award there was no ceiling and that by paying Rs. 350/- per month, the company withheld from him the benefit accruing to him under the award. The company, on the other hand, alleged that though the award revised the scheme of dearness allowance as prevailing in the company, it did not affect the existing ceiling of Rs. 350/-, and therefore, there was no question of respondent 1 being deprived of any benefit due to him under the award. Thus, the controversy between the parties before the Labour Court was whether there was a ceiling in the existing scheme, and if so, whether the Meher award did away with that ceiling17. The award, of course, could not do away with such a ceiling, if it was there, unless demand No. 9 and the Reference to the Meher Tribunal based on that demand contained anything which required its deletion, or the demand was for a new scheme of dearness allowance altogether and not merely for a revision of the existing scheme. It is true that neither demand No. 9 nor the Reference, nor the companys written statement before the Tribunal expressly mentioned the ceiling of Rs. 350/- per month. But the companys case before the Labour Court clearly was that there did exist in the prevailing scheme such a ceiling, that it was not mentioned in its reply before the Tribunal because demand No. 9 raised no controversy about it, nor did it call upon the Tribunal to delete it and that the controversy between the parties in that Reference related only to the question as to the basic bracket, percentages of variation and the increase in the minimum18. Upon such a case being before the Labour Court, that court had to and was competent to decide the question whether there was a ceiling in the existing scheme, and if so, whether it was deleted by the Tribunal, in other words, whether the demand was for doing away with the existing scheme and substituting it by a fresh scheme which had no ceiling. For that purpose, the Labour Court had necessarily to examine demand No. 9, the Reference, the pleadings of the parties, and lastly, the Meher Award, and incidental to such an in quiry it had to examine the question whether there was a ceiling in the scheme existing at the time of that demand and reference. (see in this connection Ramakrishna Ramnath v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nagpur, (1970) 2 Lab LJ 305 (SC) ). In doing so, the Labour Court had to examine the various stages the dearness allowance scheme had from time to time gone through19. Admittedly, the Bakhale award did contain the maximum. That scheme was revised by the circular dated November 16, 1953 by which the dearness allowance was linked with the cost of living and the maximum was raised from Rs. 165 to Rs. 300. That award was terminated and a fresh demand in respect of dearness allowance was made on August 18, 1956. The demand was that the scheme of dearness allowance "at present in force should be revised on the following lines .........." The demand resulted in the settlement dated August 30, 1957. Neither the demand nor the settlement contained any reference to the maximum of Rs. 300/- although it did exist in the existing scheme. The case of respondent 1 was that the said settlement did away with such a maximum and that from 1957 onwards there was no ceiling at all. This case was seriously controverted by the company which produced before the Labour Court the circular, dated March 12, 1959, by which it said that the maximum was raised from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 350/- with effect from April 1, 1959. The case of respondent 1 with regard to this contention of the company was (1) that no such circular was issued, at least to the knowledge of the union, and (2) that even if it was issued, it was confined to the officers of the company and did not apply to workmen. The Labour Court held that interpretation by respondent 1 that it applied to officers alone was not correct. The circular was issued to "all offices" of the company. It applied to all the employees of the company as is evident from its para 2 which stated as follows:"Dearness allowance will continue to be paid on usual basis at the rates applicable at each place subject to the maximum stated above."It also stated that it superseded all other previous circulars. If this circular was issued, as the Labour Court held it was there can be no doubt that (1) there was a ceiling in the scheme prevalent at that time, (2) that it was raised to Rs. 350/- and (3) that it applied to all the employees and not merely to the officers. The Labour Court also accepted the companys case that the circular was notified on the notice board of the company and that that amounted to a notice of a change under section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In any event, the change did not adversely affect the workmen. Nor was the question as to its validity before the Labour Court which used the circular as evidence of a ceiling existing in the scheme right from the time of the Bakhale award20. If from all this evidence before it the Labour Court came to the conclusion that a ceiling existed in the scheme of dearness allowance prevailing in the company at all the various stages and that deletion of such a ceiling was not the subject matter of either demand No. 9 it or of the reference before the Meher Tribunal, and that its award was confined to the revision only of the existing scheme in the three matters earlier referred to, it is not possible to say, that the decision of the Labour Court suffered from an error apparent on the face of its decision in respect of which a certiorari can justifiably be issued under Art. 226. The confines of jurisdiction under Art. 226 have been settled by a series of decisions of this Court, from among which we need mention only the case of Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, (1964) 5 SCR 64   = (AIR 1964 SC 477  ). There was no question of any estoppel also against the company against its raising the question of the ceiling in view of the finding by the Labour Court that the question of the ceiling was not the subject-matter of the reference before the Meher Tribunal. Such a conclusion of the Labour Court could not be interfered with by the High Court on any one of the well-known grounds on which only such interference is permissible.