Case: Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram locharam alias Brijramand &amp; Others

based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz, the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in S.10 were shown to have existed when the Court made the order. Satisfaction of the Court which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. It at some stage the Court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it before the parties invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement it is possible to postulate that the Court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based - If the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry". 26. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar the principle that emerges is that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement itself. Admission is true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admission admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admission. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the rival as evidence are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong. 27. We do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in Section 12 (3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act merely because the tenant had made an application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at the time of passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs.15/- per month the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the compromise was thus an admission of the material facts which constituted a ground for eviction under S.12 (3)(a). Rent was admittedly payable by the month since the application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn, there was no dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent. Further the rent was admittedly in arrears for a period of more than six months, so much so that in the present case the tenant had neglected to pay the balance of arrears amounting to Rs.152/50, even long after the decree and the landlord was compelled to recover the same by execution. 28. The case of Jeshwant Rai Mulukchand, (1965) 2 SCR 350 = (AIR 1965 SC 1419 ) (supra), cited by Mr. Dholakia does not advance his stand. In that case there was a serious dispute regarding the amount of standard rent though the final order of standard rent was passed by the Court of small Causes, neither the landlord nor the tenant accepted the determination and each side questioned the amount by filing Revision Petitions. In the present case however no dispute regarding the standard rent was subsisting at the time of compromise. That dispute was put an end to by the compromise, itself. 29. Be that as it may in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity is taken the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree if the decree on the face of it discloses some material on the basis of which the Rent Courtcould besatisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial courts jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressly finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was material on the basis of which the Rent Courtcouldhave - as distinguished frommusthave - been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12 (3) (a) the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. All these three Acts lay down specific grounds more or less similar on which a decree or order of eviction can be passed by the Rent Court or the Tribunal exercising exclusive jurisdiction. In the Delhi Rent Act, such grounds are specified in a consolidated from under S.13, while the same thing has been split up into two and provided in two Sections 912 and 13) in the Bombay Rent Act which represent the negative and positive parts of the same pattern. Taken together they are exhaustive of the grounds on which the Rent Court is competent to pass a decree of possession. Similarly, IN THE Madras Rent Act, the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, are tiven in Ss. 10, 14 and 1616. It will thus be seen that the Delhi Rent Act expressly forbid the Rent Court or the Tribunal from passing a decree or order of eviction on a ground which is not any of the grounds mentioned in the relevant sections of those statutes. Nevertheless, such a prohibitory mandate to the Rent Court that it shall not travel beyond the statutory grounds mentioned in Ss. 12 and 13 and to the parties that they shall not contractor out of those statutory grounds is inherent in the public policy built into the statute (Bombay Rent Act)23. The case before u falls wellnigh within the ratio of Seshadris case (1973) 1 SCC 761   = (AIR 1973 SC 1311  ) (supra). Therein K. K. Chari, who was under an eviction order purchased the suit premises in the same city for his occupation. Seshadri was then the tenant of the suit premises under the vendor, and after the purchase, he attorned in favour of the appellant and had been paying rent to him Chari issued notices under S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy of Seshadri. Since Seshadri did not surrender possession, Chari filed a suit for eviction under S.10 (3) (a) (i) of the Madras Act mainly on the ground that he required the premises for his bona fide use and occupation. Seshadri controverted Charis claim. As the commencement of the enquiry, Chari was examined before the Court. He particularly testified how he had purchased the house for his own occupation. He also filed a number of documents to establish that the requirement of premises for his own occupation was true. Seshadri did not refer to cross-examine Chari. About 1 1/2 months thereafter, both the parties entered into a compromise in these terms :"(1) The respondent hereby withdraws his defence in the aforesaid petition and submits to decree for eviction unconditionally(2) The respondent prays that time for vacating up to June 5, 1969 might please be given and the petitioner agrees to the same(3) The respondent agrees to vacate the petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to the petitioner on or before the said date viz. June 5, 1969, without fail under any circumstances and undertakes not to apply for extension of time(4) It is agreed by both the parties that this memo of compromise is executable as a Decree of Court."24. The Court, after referring to the petition of the landlord being under S.10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act on the ground of his own occupation passed the following order :"Compromise memo filed and recorded by consent eviction is ordered granting time to vacate till June 5, 1969 No costs"27. We do not find any force in the contention of Mr. Dholakia, that the facts admitted in the compromise, itself were insufficient to make out even a prima facie ground for eviction mentioned in Section 12 (3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act merely because the tenant had made an application for fixation of standard rent, which was still pending at the time of passing of the decree. By admitting to pay the arrears of rent and mesne profits at the rate of Rs.15/- per month the tenant had clearly withdrawn or abandoned his application for fixation of standard rent. The admission in the compromise was thus an admission of the material facts which constituted a ground for eviction under S.12 (3)(a). Rent was admittedly payable by the month since the application for fixation of fair rent stood withdrawn, there was no dispute with regard to the amount of standard rent. Further the rent was admittedly in arrears for a period of more than six months, so much so that in the present case the tenant had neglected to pay the balance of arrears amounting to Rs.152/50, even long after the decree and the landlord was compelled to recover the same by execution29. Be that as it may in cases where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of its being a nullity is taken the Executing Court is not competent to go behind the decree if the decree on the face of it discloses some material on the basis of which the Rent Courtcould besatisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case it must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing Court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial courts jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is not necessary for it to go further and question the presumed or expressly finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was material on the basis of which the Rent Courtcouldhave - as distinguished frommusthave - been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the Executing Court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super Court sitting in appeal over the decision of the Rent Court. Since in the instant case there was a clear admission in the compromise, incorporated in the decree of the fundamental facts that could constitute a ground for eviction under S.12 (3) (a) the Executing Court was not competent to go behind the decree and question its validity.