Case: Dhian Singh Sobha Singh &amp; Another Vs. The Union Of India

the owner is entitled to a reasonable hire. If the wrongdoer had asked the owner for permission to use the goods, the owner would be entitled to ask for a reasonable remuneration as the price of his permission. The wrongdoer cannot be better off by doing wrong than he would be by doing right. He must therefore pay a reasonable hire. 55. Mr. B. Sen, who appeared on behalf of the respondent, urged before us on the authority of Anderson v. Passman, 1835-7 C and P 193 (Z), that as the gist of the grievance is mere unlawful detention, the damages will be nominal unless the plaintiff proves that he has suffered special damage. This position is, however, of no avail to the respondent because it cannot be said that the appellants grievance here is merely in regard to the wrongful detention of the trucks. The appellants in this instant case have also claimed to recover from the respondent future damages from the date of detention till the date of delivery of the trucks and apart from any claim laid in special damages, these are damages which naturally flow for the wrongful act of the respondent and which the appellants would be entitled to recover in the event of non-delivery of the trucks to them by the respondent. 56. This is certainly not a case of nominal damages. As Earl of Halsbury L. C. pointed out in Owners of the Steamship Mediana v. Owners, Master and Crew of Lightship Comet 1900 AC 113 at p. 118 (ZI): the unlawful keeping back of what belongs to another person is of itself a ground for real damages, not nominal damages at all. The quantum of damages may be big or small but it does not make any difference to the principle. The principle of assessing the damages is the same and that is that where by the wrongful act of one man something belonging to another is either itself so injured as not to e capable of being used or is taken away so that it cannot be used at all, that of itself is a ground for damages. (Ibid p. 116). 57. In the case before us the appellants were the owners of the two trucks and they used to hire out the same to others. Hiring out of the trucks was regular business of theirs and if the said trucks had been re-delivered by the respondent to them on August 1,1942 they would have immediately put the same to the user viz., that of hiring them out to outsiders and earning thereby a certain sum by way of rent for each truck per day. The appellants might not have been able to hire them out for every day of the period of wrongful detention by the respondent viz., from August 1,1942 to July 7, 1944. As the learned Judges of the High Court have observed, there might be days when the days when the trucks would be out of use; there might be days when the trucks would lie idle for repairs and overhaul and so forth; that would only go to reduce the number of days for which the appellants would be entitled to recover the damages for such wrongful detention. If the learned Judges of the High Court had on taking all the circumstances into consideration arrived at the figure of Rs. 5,953 as the amount of hire which could have been reasonably earned by the appellants in the event of the re-delivery of the trucks by the respondent to them on August 1,1942, their judgment in this behalf could not have been successfully impeached. What they did, however was to confine the appellants claim to Rs. 5,953 on the ground that the appellants had claimed that amount in the first instance and had paid the court-fee on the same. They, therefore, took it that that sum of Rs. 5,953 represented a fair amount of damages for wrongful detention of the trucks according to the appellants. 58. We are of opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in adopting this basis for the award of damages. The payment of court fee stamp of Rs.5,953 was certainly not conclusive against the appellants because on its being pointed out by the Office of the Registrar, the appellants paid an additional court-fee stamp of Rs. 1,279-11-0 on February 28, 1945, and that was done because the appellants did not confine their claim merely to the said sum of Rs. 5,953. If, according to the judgment of the learned Judges of the High Court the appellants were entitled to damages for the wrongful detention of the said two trucks at the rate of Rs. 17 per day per truck from August 1,1942 to 7-71944, they ought to have made a reasonable calculation of the number of days for which the trucks would have been put to use by the appellants and awarded damages to the appellants accordingly. This, however, they failed to do. 59. In our opinion, the appellants are entitled to recover such damages from the respondent at the rate of Rs. 17 per truck per day for such reasonable period between August 1, 1942 to July 7, 1944, for which the appellants would have hired out the trucks to outside parties.The trucks were in a fairly good running conditions but were old models of 1938 and it will be quite reasonable to hold that they would have been in commission approximately for one year during that period. Calculating the hire of these trucks at the rate of Rs. 17 per truck per day the total amount of damages which the appellants would be entitled to recover from the respondent works out at Rs. 12,410. The appellants would therefore be entitled to recover over and above the sum of Rs. 5,953 already awarded to them by the High Court an additional sum of Rs. 6,457 by way of damages for wrongful detention of the said trucks by the respondent.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]24.It is clear therefore that a bailor in the event of the non-delivery of the goods by the bailee on a demand made by him in that behalf is entitled at his election to sue the bailee either for wrongful conversion of the goods or the wrongful detention thereof and if the bailor pursues his remedy against the bailee for wrongful detention of the goods it would be no answer for the bailee to say that he was guilty of wrongful conversion of the goods at an earlier date which fact of conversion of the goods the plaintiff knew or ought to have known at or about that time and is therefore not liable to the plaintiff for wrongful detention thereof. It is the option of the plaintiff to pursue either remedy against the bailee just as it suits him having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the bailee cannot be heard to say anything to the contrary for the simple reason that he cannot take advantage of his won wrong and cannot ask the plaintiff to chose a remedy with may be less beneficial to him26. In the present case, however, we are not fettered by any such consideration. The respondent was the bailee of the two trucks and was bound to return the same to the appellants on the termination of the bailment. The bailment came to an end on August 1, 1942, and the appellants attended the office of the Officer Commanding 4 M. T. T. Centre, Kamptee on the said date for having the trucks re-delivered to them. When the said trucks were not so delivered the appellants immediately on August 14, 1948, gave the statutory notice to the res under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The period of the said notice expired on or about October 14, 1942, and the appellants filed their action for wrongful detention on January 8, 1943. There was no delay on the part of the appellants which would spell out any intention on their part to take advantage of the rising market or to waive their remedy in wrongful conversion with a view to take advantage of the statute of litigation. There is no evidence to show that the market value of the trucks had appreciated perceptibly between August 1, 1942, and January 8, 1943, and it is significant to note that the only claim which the appellants had made in their notice dated August 4, 1942, was for specific delivery of the said trucks by the respondent. Even though the appellants knew that the said trucks had been re-delivered by the respondent to Surjan Singh and they could have, if they had been so minded, sued the respondent for wrongful conversion of the said trucks, they elected to have the said trucks re-delivered to them and asked for the specific delivery thereof and filed their action for wrongful detention of the said trucks. They were, in our opinion, perfectly entitled to do so and we have to consider the further questions that arise before us on the basis that the action for wrongful detention had been rightly instituted by the appellants against the respondentIn our judgment an assessment of the value of the goods detained (and not subsequently returned) at the date of the accrual of the cause of action (i.e., of the refusal of the plaintiffs demand) must presuppose that on that date the plaintiff abandoned his property in the goods: and such a premise is inconsistent with the pursuit by the plaintiff of his action of detinue. The significance of the date of the refusal of the plaintiffs demand is that the defendants failure to return the goods after that date becomes and continues to be, wrongful. Moreover, the plaintiff may recover damages in respect of the wrongful detention after that date, e.g., where the plaintiff has suffered loss from a fall in value of the goods between the date of the defendants refusal and the date of actual return, (See Willan v, Archer, (1847) 5 CB 318 (S) and such damages must equally continue to run until the return of the goods or (in default of return) until payment of their value. There is (as appears from the forms of judgment mentioned) a clear distinction between the value of the goods claimed in default of their return and damages for their detention, whether returned or not. The date of the refusal of the plaintiffs demand is the date from which the latter commence to run, but appears to be irrelevant to the former and cannot convert a claim for the return of the goods into a claim for payment of their value on that date52.It is, therefore, clear that in actions for wrongful detention the plaintiff is entitled on default of the defendant in re-delivering the goods to him, to payment in the alternative of the value of the goods thus wrongfully detained as at the date of the verdict or judgment, in other words, at the date of the decree. We are, therefore, of opinion, that the appellants were entitled to recover from the respondent the value of the said trucks which, as has been already stated, was Rs. 7,000 in the alternative on default committed by the respondent in redelivery of the same to the appellants58. We are of opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in adopting this basis for the award of damages. The payment of court fee stamp of Rs.5,953 was certainly not conclusive against the appellants because on its being pointed out by the Office of the Registrar, the appellants paid an additional court-fee stamp of Rs. 1,279-11-0 on February 28, 1945, and that was done because the appellants did not confine their claim merely to the said sum of Rs. 5,9559. In our opinion, the appellants are entitled to recover such damages from the respondent at the rate of Rs. 17 per truck per day for such reasonable period between August 1, 1942 to July 7, 1944, for which the appellants would have hired out the trucks to outside parties.The trucks were in a fairly good running conditions but were old models of 1938 and it will be quite reasonable to hold that they would have been in commission approximately for one year during that period. Calculating the hire of these trucks at the rate of Rs. 17 per truck per day the total amount of damages which the appellants would be entitled to recover from the respondent works out at Rs. 12,410. The appellants would therefore be entitled to recover over and above the sum of Rs. 5,953 already awarded to them by the High Court an additional sum of Rs. 6,457 by way of damages for wrongful detention of the said trucks by the respondent