Case: Shramik Utkarsha Sabha Vs. Raymond Woollen Mills Limited

have encaged in such unfair labour practices complained of by them. ( 15 ) WE may also add that Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act No. 1 of 1972 curtails not only the right of an employee to appear and act or allowed to be represented in proceeding of unfair labour practices stipulated therein but also prohibits the right of Trade Unions other than the representative union. It is difficult for us to draw the conclusion that the proceedings other than that stipulated in Sub-section (2) of 21, the representative union has no legal right to appear and act on behalf of the employees and that right could be exercised by other trade unions in the field.( 16 ) HAVING held that the representative union has a right to represent the employees it is necessary now to consider whether the appellant Union spells out any other right to be joined as a party respondent. We have already pointed out that there is no material on record to come to the conclusion that some of the employees of the respondent No. 1 Company have become the members of the appellant union. It appears that the appellant union with the intention to establish the fact that they also have a hold on the employees have adopted a backdoor method to make an entry as a rival union in the industry. If the appellant union is so sure of having substantial membership it should not have hesitated to take steps of getting themselves recognised as a representative union by taking recourse to relevant provisions under the B. I. R. Act. The appellant not having adopted that procedure is a clear pointer to the fact that they cannot establish their claim of having large membership with them. Actually the aim of the appellant union appears to be to somehow gam entry in the industry of respondent No. 1 company so that it could create chaos in already charged atmosphere and also achieve the object of propagating membership which presently they have none or is very meagre. By this we however do not desire to lay down that the trade unions other than the representative one cannot carry out the trade union activities by propagating for membership by legal, just and constitutional means. ( 17 ) IN the application filed by the appellant-union it was also contended that the ad-interim order passed by the Industrial Court in the original complaint is detrimental to the appellant because it tends to curb their legitimate right to carry on the trade union activities. In this connection it is alleged that the Secretary of the appellant union could not address the meeting near the Company on 24. 1. 1991. It appears from the averments made in the application that the appellant learnt about the order through police authorities which perhaps led them to abandon the idea of holding the meeting. With these contentions it was urged on behalf of the appellant that their right to carry on trade union activities was seriously impaired and, therefore, the interim order passed deserves to be struck down being unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights.( 18 ) WE find absolutely no substance in the contention raised and canvassed. An ingenious mode is found out by the appellant to attack the interim order which right they do not have since having failed to establish their locus standi to appear and defend the proceedings. The appellants, therefore, cannot challenge the interim orders judicially passed by such indirect means. In any event, the appellant union could have held the meeting which they had really proposed to hold, a little distance away from the restrained limits specified in the interim order in case they were certain of their following. A slight curb or the restriction imposed in disturbed circumstances cannot be taken advantage of to contend that their constitutional rights to carry on trade union activities is infringed. If the contentions raised and canvassed were to be accepted it would make the Courts below impossible to function. We say so because it would always be open for a trade union more so by a rival union to impose itself in a pending proceeding and stall the same with the result that the purpose for which the proceeding was initiated should stand frustrated. We hence do not agree that the appellant right to carry on the trade union activities is in any manner infringed. ( 19 ) IT was then urged that the learned Industrial Court had granted reliefs without properly perusing the complaint which is absolutely vague, lacking in material particulars and without joining proper parties. According to the appellant no prima facie case is made out to grant interim relief as prayed for by the respondent No. 1 company. For this purpose the appellant relied upon Sections 27 and 28 of Act No. 1 of 1972 and Regulation 100 of the Industrial Court regulations, 1975. Since we have already held that the appellant has no locus standi to appear and act as a party respondent, we refrain from deciding this question. Even otherwise, it is for the learned Court below to find out whether the allegations in the complaint constitute unfair labour practices within the ambit of Items 5 and 6 of Schedule III of the Act No. 1 of 1972 at the appropriate stage. In case the learned Court finds that the allegations are factually vague, lacking in material particular and want of proper parties, the complaint would be dismissed. The final order would, however, depend upon the pleadings of both the parties. For the time being the learned Court below has passed the order by way of interim reliefs in the circumstances then prevailing. We do not find any ground to interfere with it more so while exercising writ jurisdiction. It may be relevant to observe here the ad-interim order was confirmed by the learned Court below even before the application was moved by the appellant to join them as party respondent.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In any event the respondent No. 2 enjoys the special privilege of getting their annual membership subscription deducted directly from the salary of the employees who are members of that Union and such a privilege cannot be curtailed even by the Court unless the employee himself applies to the employer not to do so or revoked the authority granted to the representative union. Such deductions are permissible deductions not liable to be questioned at least by an unrecognised union. We hence cannot accept that the appellant union has substantial membership and that they have a right to defend suchare dealing with this point notwithstanding our finding given above. it was contended that merely because the respondent No. 2 is a recognised and representative union it cannot deprive other Trade Unions from representing the employees who are its members under Act No. 1 of 1972. In this context reliance was heavily placed upon(2) of Section 21 of the Act No. 1 of 1972 and section 27a of the B. I. R. Act. It was urged that the two provisions read together the recognised union like respondent No. 2 have a right to represent the employees only to the extent specified therein. In particular it was submitted that the right of a recognised union to represent employees under the B. I. R. Act was unlimited but it is not so under the Act No. 1 of 1972. We will shortly point out that the submissions are devoid of any merits and must beno doubt is left that a recognised and an approved union has every right to appear and act in every proceeding irrespective of the fact whether those employees are members of the Union or not with certain exceptions as carved out also under sectionof the B. I. R. Act. That section specifically provides that no employee shall be allowed to appear and act in any proceeding under the B. I. R. Act except through the representative of employees and the representative of employees is provided for in Section 30 of the Act. A representative union is first in the order of preference. No doubt, Sectionalso provides for some exceptions because the Section begins by the words "save as provided in sections 32, 33 and 33a" with which we are not presently concerned. An unequivocal right is hence established that the representative union have the sole privilege of representing employees in an industry and that right is not taken away or in any manner affected in proceedings under act No. 1 of 1972. For alt purposes a recognised union continues to be a representative union and shall remain as such till the recognition is lost orappellant not having adopted that procedure is a clear pointer to the fact that they cannot establish their claim of having large membership with them. Actually the aim of the appellant union appears to be to somehow gam entry in the industry of respondent No. 1 company so that it could create chaos in already charged atmosphere and also achieve the object of propagating membership which presently they have none or is very meagre. By this we however do not desire to lay down that the trade unions other than the representative one cannot carry out the trade union activities by propagating for membership by legal, just and constitutionalthese contentions it was urged on behalf of the appellant that their right to carry on trade union activities was seriously impaired and, therefore, the interim order passed deserves to be struck down being unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights.( 18 ) WE find absolutely no substance in the contention raised and canvassed. An ingenious mode is found out by the appellant to attack the interim order which right they do not have since having failed to establish their locus standi to appear and defend the proceedings. The appellants, therefore, cannot challenge the interim orders judicially passed by such indirect means. In any event, the appellant union could have held the meeting which they had really proposed to hold, a little distance away from the restrained limits specified in the interim order in case they were certain of their following. A slight curb or the restriction imposed in disturbed circumstances cannot be taken advantage of to contend that their constitutional rights to carry on trade union activities is infringed. If the contentions raised and canvassed were to be accepted it would make the Courts below impossible to function. We say so because it would always be open for a trade union more so by a rival union to impose itself in a pending proceeding and stall the same with the result that the purpose for which the proceeding was initiated should stand frustrated. We hence do not agree that the appellant right to carry on the trade union activities is in any manner19 ) IT was then urged that the learned Industrial Court had granted reliefs without properly perusing the complaint which is absolutely vague, lacking in material particulars and without joining proper parties. According to the appellant no prima facie case is made out to grant interim relief as prayed for by the respondent No. 1 company. For this purpose the appellant relied upon Sections 27 and 28 of Act No. 1 of 1972 and Regulation 100 of the Industrial Court regulations, 1975. Since we have already held that the appellant has no locus standi to appear and act as a party respondent, we refrain from deciding this question. Even otherwise, it is for the learned Court below to find out whether the allegations in the complaint constitute unfair labour practices within the ambit of Items 5 and 6 of Schedule III of the Act No. 1 of 1972 at the appropriate stage. In case the learned Court finds that the allegations are factually vague, lacking in material particular and want of proper parties, the complaint would be dismissed. The final order would, however, depend upon the pleadings of both the parties. For the time being the learned Court below has passed the order by way of interim reliefs in the circumstances then prevailing. We do not find any ground to interfere with it more so while exercising writ jurisdiction. It may be relevant to observe here theorder was confirmed by the learned Court below even before the application was moved by the appellant to join them as party respondent.