Case: Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh Vs. State of Punjab

him from leaving his place by terrifying him to some extent. It is not possible to believe the embellished version of the witnesses that Sadhu Singh was present at the altercation between his father and the Mahant or that he loaded the gun after he himself had intervened in the altercation, or that there was the conversation alleged by the witness between him and the Mahant. It also appears that the story that the accused took aim before firing at the Mahant or that he said that he had never allowed in the past anybody to go like that from his house is a subsequent introduction in the case to add gravity to the offence committed by the accused.11. In -Pritam Singh v. The State, , this Court held that it will not grant special leave to appeal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against and that only those points can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when leave is asked for. It is well established that this court does not by special leave convert itself into a court to review evidence for a third time. Where, however, the court below fails in apprehending the true effect of a material change in the versions given by the witnesses immediately after the occurrence and the narrative at the trial with respect to the nature and character of the offence, it seems to us that in such a situation it would not be right for this court to affirm such a decision when it occasions a failure of justice. While dealing with this question the High Court made the following significant observations:"So far as the F.I.R. is concerned, all that can be said is that it was not stated therein in so many words that the deceased was fired at by the appellant and further that the firing was accidental. As regards the first point, it is no doubt true that the F. I. R. does not contain clear words that Amar Singh saw the appellant firing at the deceased, but reading the document as a whole there can be no doubt that it was as a result of the shot fired by the appellant that the deceased was hit and ultimately died. . . . . . . . Then as I have already observed, S. Dara Singh, counsel for the appellant, has not been able to convince us that there is a single difference which goes to the root of the case. The following are the main features of the story:(i) That the deceased went to the chubara of the appellant accompanied by Chand Singh and Amar Singh.(ii) That the appellant was then present at the chubara and was having a drink party which consisted of himself, Nand Singh and his father Harnam Singh.(iii) That for some time everything went off quite smoothly until the deceased took a bit of opium out of the dabia offered to him by Harnam Singh at the instance of the appellant. The remark made by Harnam Singh was resented by the deceased and he at once got ready to leave the place.(iv) That the appellant expressed his annoyance at the conduct of the deceased in leaving his house so abruptly and his efforts to persuade the deceased to stay on were not successful; and(v) That the appellant went out of the chubara with his gun and cartridges and when he thought that the deceased had made up his mind to go away he fired a shot at him.On all these points the testimony of the eye-witnesses is consistent and unanimous. The only difference between their statements is that they are not all agreed as to the exact stage at which the appellant went out of the chubara and the precise words that he and the deceased exchanged. In my opinion, the differences are not only not material but they can be easily explained."12. It seems to us that the High Court was in error in thinking that there was not a single difference between the statements made by the witnesses in the first information report and the statements made at the trial, which went to the root of the case. As above pointed out, the whole version as to the nature and character of the act of the accused had been completely changed. An act which on the facts stated in the first information report and on the statements made to the police may well be regarded either accidental or rash and negligent, has been deliberately made to look like an act of deliberate murder. If such a difference does not go to the root of the case it is difficult to conceive what else can fall within that class of cases. We are therefore of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the accused was guilty of the offence of murder under Section 302, I. P. C. On the materials placed on the record it could not be held proved that he had any intention of firing at the Mahant. He seems to have pulled the trigger without aiming at the Mahant in a state of intoxication in order to see that by the gun fire the Mahant was prevented from leaving his place. It was a wholly rash and negligent act on his part or at the worst was an act which would amount to manslaughter. It could not be held to constitute an offence of murder. No intention of causing death or an intention of causing such bodily injury as being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death could be ascribed to the accused or readily inferred in the circumstances of this case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is apparent that from the stage of the first information report to the final stage of the trial the witness has been giving different accounts of the actual happening. At the earlier stage it was not said that Sadhu Singh was present at the talk between his father and the Mahant which created some resentment between them, or that Sadhu Singh aimed the gun at the Mahant after loading it in the presence of the witness, or that he told him that he would not let him go as in the past he had not allowed anybody to leave his house in this fashion. There is a clear attempt on the part of the witness to make it appear that the firing which was either accidental or an act of bravado on the part of the accused in order to stop the Mahant from leaving his house, was an act of intentional killing.On a careful reading of the evidence of theand the different statements that have been made by them it is quite clear that the incident happened in a very short time and suddenly. There was no previous enmity between the deceased and the accused. On the other hand, the accused was very respectful to the Mahant and wasto show all hospitality to him. It seems that he was anxious that the Mahant should not go away from his house without taking meals and spending the night with him, and seeing that the Mahant was going away, in all probability he let go his gun without aiming it at the Mahant in order to prevent him from leaving his place by terrifying him to some extent. It is not possible to believe the embellished version of the witnesses that Sadhu Singh was present at the altercation between his father and the Mahant or that he loaded the gun after he himself had intervened in the altercation, or that there was the conversation alleged by the witness between him and the Mahant. It also appears that the story that the accused took aim before firing at the Mahant or that he said that he had never allowed in the past anybody to go like that from his house is a subsequent introduction in the case to add gravity to the offence committed by the accused.11. InPritam Singh v. The State, , this Court held that it will not grant special leave to appeal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution unless it is shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist, that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against and that only those points can be urged at the final hearing of the appeal which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when leave is asked for. It is well established that this court does not by special leave convert itself into a court to review evidence for a third time. Where, however, the court below fails in apprehending the true effect of a material change in the versions given by the witnesses immediately after the occurrence and the narrative at the trial with respect to the nature and character of the offence, it seems to us that in such a situation it would not be right for this court to affirm such a decision when it occasions a failure of justice.It seems to us that the High Court was in error in thinking that there was not a single difference between the statements made by the witnesses in the first information report and the statements made at the trial, which went to the root of the case. As above pointed out, the whole version as to the nature and character of the act of the accused had been completely changed. An act which on the facts stated in the first information report and on the statements made to the police may well be regarded either accidental or rash and negligent, has been deliberately made to look like an act of deliberate murder. If such a difference does not go to the root of the case it is difficult to conceive what else can fall within that class of cases. We are therefore of the opinion that the High Court was clearly in error in holding that the accused was guilty of the offence of murder under Section 302, I. P. C. On the materials placed on the record it could not be held proved that he had any intention of firing at the Mahant. He seems to have pulled the trigger without aiming at the Mahant in a state of intoxication in order to see that by the gun fire the Mahant was prevented from leaving his place. It was a wholly rash and negligent act on his part or at the worst was an act which would amount to manslaughter. It could not be held to constitute an offence of murder. No intention of causing death or an intention of causing such bodily injury as being sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death could be ascribed to the accused or readily inferred in the circumstances of this case.