Case: JOGI RAM Vs. SURESH KUMAR &amp; ORS

property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub- s. (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of express terms like property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2). (6) The words possessed by used by the Legislature in s. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title. (7) That the words restricted estate used in s. 4(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s.14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee. 30. In our view the relevant aspect of the aforesaid conclusion is para 4 which opines where sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere. 31. We may add here that the objective of Section 14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. If we were to hold so it would imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be the objective, in our view. 32. The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. We are, thus, of the view that it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life interest in her favour. The natural sequittur is that the respondents cannot inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained. 33. On consideration of the second aspect, we must begin by stating that the sequence of litigations can hardly be said to classify the respondents as bona fide purchasers. The first endeavour was by the daughter of Ram Devi by seeking what is undoubtedly a collusive decree when she had no interest in the property. She then sought to create lease interest in the property. Both these aspects were held against Ram Devi and her daughter right till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining that Ram Devi had only a limited estate in the property. Despite having lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds were intervening factors even during the pendency of the litigation which went against the vendor Ram Devi. 34. We may also notice that the reliance on Shakuntla Devi (supra) case by the High Court is misplaced as the factual scenario cannot be said to be identical. In fact the most crucial aspect was that the Will in question was dated 1.10.1935, a pre-1956 Will which is the distinguishing factor. The same factual scenario prevailed in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy (supra) case. We must also notice that the High Court wrongly proceeded on the basis that the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents because there was change in law after the first round of litigation. There is, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were much prior in time. We have already stated that the rights of the respondents are derived only from Ram Devi and once the judgment is binding on Ram Devi it cannot be said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour of third parties and that too was done during the pendency of the litigation. We believe from the facts on record that the transactions in question are not only not bona fide but dubious in character to somehow deny the appellant rights conferred under the Will respondents being third parties. The repeated endeavour of Ram Devi and her daughter did not succeed earlier and cannot be permitted to succeed qua the purchasers from Ram Devi. Conclusion:

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]17. There is no doubt that Section 14 of the said Act is the part of the said Act to give rights of a property to a Hindu female and was a progressive step. Sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act makes it clear that it applies to properties acquired before or after the commencement of the said Act. Any property so possessed was to be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The Explanation to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the said Act defines the meaning of property in this sub-section to include both movable and immovable property acquired by the female Hindu by inheritance or devise or a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, or by her skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever, including stridhana. The Explanation is quite expansive.18. Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act is in the nature of a proviso. It begins with a non-obstante clause. Thus, it says that nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court.... etc. where a restricted estate in such property is prescribed. In our view the objective of sub-Section (2) above is quite clear as enunciated repeatedly by this Court in various judicial pronouncements, i.e., there cannot be a fetter in a owner of a property to give a limited estate if he so chooses to do including to his wife but of course if the limited estate is to the wife for her maintenance that would mature in an absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the said Act.The Will while conferring a limited estate on Ram Devi, Tulsi Ram had clearly stated that she will earn income from the property for her livelihood. The income, thus, generated from the property is what has been given for maintenance and not the property itself. The next clarification is that after the lifetime of Ram Devi, the appellant will get the ownership of the remaining half portion also. It is specified that in case Ram Devi pre-deceases Tulsi Ram, then all the properties would go absolutely to the appellant and that the other children will have no interest in the property. We may note that Tulsi Ram had six children. One son and four daughters are from the first wife and Bimla Devi was the daughter from the second wife. At the stage when the Will was executed one of the daughters was unmarried and the Will also provided that in case for performing the marriage Ram Devi needs money she will have the right to mortgage the property and earn money from the same and will further have the right to gain income even prior to the marriage.20. We have set forth the terms and conditions of the Will to understand the intent of the testator. The testator is, at least, clear in terms that the income derived from the property is what is given to the second wife as maintenance while insofar as the properties are concerned, they are divided half and half with the appellant having an absolute share and the wife having a limited estate which after her lifetime was to convert into an absolute estate of the appellant.The distinction which was sought to be made was that Shakuntla Devi (supra) case was wrongly relied upon as the Will in that case was dated 1.10.1935 and it was, thus, a pre-1956 Will and, thus, that judgment was not precedent for factual scenario in question. The suit property was a self-acquired property of Tulsi Ram and, thus, he was competent to execute the Will.23. We may note that learned counsel for the appellant did seek to contend that since possession of the property was taken over by the appellant and Ram Devi was not in possession thereof, she cannot claim the benefit of Section 14(1) of the said Act (Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 75  and Gaddam Ramakrishna Reddy & Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy & Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 602) . We may, however, note that in our perspective that is not a material consideration as the possession is stated to have been taken over in pursuance of the decree of the trial court.25. We have extracted the relevant portions of the enactment, the document in question being the Will and have already opined on the interpretation of the Will. The submissions of the learned counsel for the parties have, thus, to be appreciated in the conspectus of the same.27. We are of the view that both these questions have to be answered in favour of the appellant and for that reason the impugned judgment is unsustainable.28. We would first like to turn to the seminal judgment in V. Tulasamma & Ors. (supra) case. In para 20 the propositions emerging in respect of incidents and characteristics of a Hindu womans right to maintenance have been crystallised as under:20. Thus on a careful consideration and detailed analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the Shastric Hindu Law on the subject, the following propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and characteristics of a Hindu womans right to maintenance:(1) that a Hindu womans right to maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her even if he has no property. If the husband has property then the right of the widow to maintenance becomes an equitable charge on his property and any person who succeeds to the property carries with it the legal obligation to maintain the widow;(2) though the widows right to maintenance is not a right to property but it is undoubtedly pre-existing right in property, i.e. it is a jus ad rem not jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who can get a charge created for her maintenance on the property either by an agreement or by obtaining a decree from the civil court;(3) that the right of maintenance is a matter of moment and is of such importance that even if the joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of the widows right to maintenance, the purchaser is legally bound to provide for her maintenance;(4) that the right to maintenance is undoubtedly a pre- existing right which existed in the Hindu Law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;(5) that the right to maintenance flows from the social and temporal relationship between the husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife becomes a sort (I.L.R. 27 Mad. 45 . (2) I.L.R. 18 Bom. 452) of co-owner in the property of her husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate nature; and(6) that where a Hindu widow is in possession of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the person who succeeds to the property or purchases the same is in a position to make due arrangements for her maintenance.29. In the light of the aforesaid passage, Sections 14(1) & 14(2) of the said Act were entered by the Court. The word possessed was held to be used in a wide sense not requiring a Hindu woman to be an actual or physical possession of the property and it would suffice if she has a right in the property. The discussion in para 33 thereafter opines that the intention of the Parliament was to confine sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act only to two transactions, viz., a gift and a will, which clearly would not include property received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance or at a partition. The intention of the Parliament in adding the other categories to sub-section (2) was merely to ensure that any transaction under which a Hindu female gets a new or independent title under any of the modes mentioned in Section 14(2) of the said Act. The conclusions were thereafter set forth in para 62 of the judgment as under:62. We would now like to summarise the legal conclusions which we have reached after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned above; on the question of law involved in this appeal as to the interpretation of s. 14(1) and (2) of the Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus:(1) The Hindu females right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms. And must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends, sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.(3) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of s. 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.(4) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the females limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub- s. (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.(5) The use of express terms like property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2).(6) The words possessed by used by the Legislature in s. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.(7) That the words restricted estate used in s. 4(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s.14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.30. In our view the relevant aspect of the aforesaid conclusion is para 4 which opines where sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the said Act would apply and this does inter alia applies to a Will which may create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and is not a recognition of a pre-existing right. In such cases of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) of the said Act will not operate in that sphere.31. We may add here that the objective of Section 14(1) is to create an absolute interest in case of a limited interest of the wife where such limited estate owes its origin to law as it stood then. The objective cannot be that a Hindu male who owned self-acquired property is unable to execute a Will giving a limited estate to a wife if all other aspects including maintenance are taken care of. If we were to hold so it would imply that if the wife is disinherited under the Will it would be sustainable but if a limited estate is given it would mature into an absolute interest irrespective of the intent of the testator. That cannot be the objective, in our view.32. The testator in the present case, Tulsi Ram, had taken all care for the needs of maintenance of his wife by ensuring that the revenue generated from the estate would go to her alone. He, however, wished to give only a limited lift interest to her as the second wife with the son inheriting the complete estate after her lifetime. We are, thus, of the view that it would be the provisions of Section 14(2) of the said Act which would come into play in such a scenario and Ram Devi only had a life interest in her favour. The natural sequittur is that the respondents cannot inherit a better title than what the vendor had and, thus, the view taken by the trial court and the first appellate court is the correct view and the sale deeds in favour of the respondents cannot be sustained.33. On consideration of the second aspect, we must begin by stating that the sequence of litigations can hardly be said to classify the respondents as bona fide purchasers. The first endeavour was by the daughter of Ram Devi by seeking what is undoubtedly a collusive decree when she had no interest in the property. She then sought to create lease interest in the property. Both these aspects were held against Ram Devi and her daughter right till the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation clearly opining that Ram Devi had only a limited estate in the property. Despite having lost right till the Supreme Court, the sale deeds were intervening factors even during the pendency of the litigation which went against the vendor Ram Devi.34. We may also notice that the reliance on Shakuntla Devi (supra) case by the High Court is misplaced as the factual scenario cannot be said to be identical. In fact the most crucial aspect was that the Will in question was dated 1.10.1935, a pre-1956 Will which is the distinguishing factor. The same factual scenario prevailed in Jupudy Pardha Sarathy (supra) case. We must also notice that the High Court wrongly proceeded on the basis that the first round of litigation would not create any binding precedents because there was change in law after the first round of litigation. There is, in fact, no change in law as all the judgments were much prior in time. We have already stated that the rights of the respondents are derived only from Ram Devi and once the judgment is binding on Ram Devi it cannot be said that she can create rights contrary to the judgment in favour of third parties and that too was done during the pendency of the litigation. We believe from the facts on record that the transactions in question are not only not bona fide but dubious in character to somehow deny the appellant rights conferred under the Will respondents being third parties. The repeated endeavour of Ram Devi and her daughter did not succeed earlier and cannot be permitted to succeed qua the purchasers from Ram Devi.