Case: State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others

Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot operate is that the plaintiffs ca use of action in the 1956 suit is totally different from the cause of action in the 1949 suit. See Pavana Reena Saminathan v. Palaniappa(I.A. 142.).18. This Court in Jai Chand Sawhney v. Union of India ([1970] S.C.R. 222.) held that in a suit for setting aside the order of dismissal and for arrears of salary a claim for salary for the period prior to three years of the suit would be barred. The reason given is that when the order of dismissal is set aside the Government servant is deemed to be in service throughout the period during which the order of dismissal remains operative. Once an order of dismissal is declared bad it is held to be bad from the date of dismissal and salary would be due from the date when the dismissal order was bad.19. The same view has been taken by this Court in Sakal Dean Sahai Srivastava v. Union of India([1974] 2 S.C.R 485.). In that case the plaintiff filed a suit on 27 November, 1962 for a declaration that from 1 July, 1949 the date of illegal reversion up to 30 September, 1959 the date of his retirement he was a railway employee.20. Relying on the decision of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhneys case and Sakal Deeps case (supra) counsel for Madhya Pradesh contended that the plaintiff would not be entitled to more than three years salary. The present case is not one of setting aside an order of dismissal simpliciter. When the plaintiff filed a suit in 1949 he could not ask for arrears of salary. Pursuant to the decree dated 30 August, 1953 in his favour he was reinstated on 1 2 December, 1953. Three features are to be borne in mind in appreciating the plaintiffs case from the point of view of limitation. First the plaintiff became entitled to salary for the period 16 September, 1943 up t o the date of reinstatement on 12 December, 1953, only when pursuant to the decree dated 30 August, 1953 there was actual reinstatement of the plaintiff on 12 December, 1953. Second, the plaintiff was again suspended on 19 January, 1954 and was dismissed on 23 February 1956. The Madhya Pradesh Government on 5 March, 1954 decided that during the period of first suspension till his reinstatement on 12 December, 1953 he was not entitled to salary. Again on 29 January, 1956 the Madhya Pradesh Government decided under Fundamental Rule 54(iii ) that during the period of suspension from 16 September 1943 to 12 December 1953 and again from 19 January 1954 to 23 February 1956 he would not be entitled to any payment of allowances.On these facts two consequences arise in the present appeal. First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from 16 September, 1943 till 12 December, 1953 when he was rein- stated and again suspended from 19 January, 1954 till 23 February, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on 6 October, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on 12 December, 1953. Second, during the period of suspension he was not entitled to salary under Fundamental Rule 53. Further decision to that effect was taken by the Madhya Pradesh Government on 28 January, 1956 under Fundamental Rule 54. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action for salary for the period of suspension did not accrue until he was reinstated on 12 December, 1953. The plaintiffs salary accrued only when he was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the orders of suspension and of dismissal.The rulings of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhneys case (supra) and Sakal Deeps case (supra) do. not apply to the present appeal because there was no aspect of any suspension order remaining operative until the fact of reinstatement pursuant to the decree.21. The plaintiffs cause of action for arrears of salary is this. When the plaintiff was reinstated on 12 December, 1953 pursuant to the decree dated 30 August, 1953 the plaintiff became entitled to salary which was suspended during the period of suspension. The plaintiff was again suspended from 19 January, 1954 and he was dismissed from service on 23 February, 1956. Therefore, when the plaintiff filed the suit on 6 October, 1956 his entire claim for salary is founded first on his reinstatement on 12 December, 1953 pursuant to the decree and second on the order of suspension dated 19 January, 1954 and the order of dismissal on 23 February 1956 which the plaintiff challenged as illegal.The original order of suspension on 16 September, 1943 as welt as the original dismissal dated 7 November, 194 5 was declared to be illegal by the decree dated 30 August, 1953. Therefore, when the plaintiff was reinstated on 12 December, 1953 it is then that the plaintiffs claim for salary accrued due. This salary was again suspended from 19 January, 1954. Dismissal on 23 February, 1956 was at a time when the plaintiff was still under suspension. The order of suspension does not put an end to his service. Suspension merely suspends the claim to salary. During suspension there is suspension allowance. See Khem Chand v. Union of India(1) where this Court said that the real effect of the order of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the service he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary. Under Fundamental Rule 52 the pay an d allowance of a Government servant who is dismissed or removed from service, cease from the date. of his dismissal or removal. Therefore, there would be no question of salary accruing or accruing due so long as orders of suspension and dismissal stand. The High Court was correct in the conclusion that the plaintiffs claim for salary accrued due only on the order of dismissal dated 23 February, 1956 being set aside.22.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Relying on the decision of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhneys case and Sakal Deeps case (supra) counsel for Madhya Pradesh contended that the plaintiff would not be entitled to more than three years salary. The present case is not one of setting aside an order of dismissal simpliciter. When the plaintiff filed a suit in 1949 he could not ask for arrears of salary. Pursuant to the decree dated 30 August, 1953 in his favour he was reinstated on 1 2 December, 1953. Three features are to be borne in mind in appreciating the plaintiffs case from the point of view of limitation. First the plaintiff became entitled to salary for the period 16 September, 1943 up t o the date of reinstatement on 12 December, 1953, only when pursuant to the decree dated 30 August, 1953 there was actual reinstatement of the plaintiff on 12 December, 1953. Second, the plaintiff was again suspended on 19 January, 1954 and was dismissed on 23 February 1956. The Madhya Pradesh Government on 5 March, 1954 decided that during the period of first suspension till his reinstatement on 12 December, 1953 he was not entitled to salary. Again on 29 January, 1956 the Madhya Pradesh Government decided under Fundamental Rule 54(iii ) that during the period of suspension from 16 September 1943 to 12 December 1953 and again from 19 January 1954 to 23 February 1956 he would not be entitled to any payment of allowances.On these facts two consequences arise in the present appeal. First, since the plaintiff was under suspension from 16 September, 1943 till 12 December, 1953 when he was rein- stated and again suspended from 19 January, 1954 till 23 February, 1956 when he was dismissed, his suit on 6 October, 1956 is within a period of three years from the date of his reinstatement on 12 December, 1953. Second, during the period of suspension he was not entitled to salary under Fundamental Rule 53. Further decision to that effect was taken by the Madhya Pradesh Government on 28 January, 1956 under Fundamental Rule 54. Therefore, the plaintiffs cause of action for salary for the period of suspension did not accrue until he was reinstated on 12 December, 1953. The plaintiffs salary accrued only when he was reinstated as a result of the decree setting aside the orders of suspension and ofrulings of this Court in Jai Chand Sawhneys case (supra) and Sakal Deeps case (supra) do. not apply to the present appeal because there was no aspect of any suspension order remaining operative until the fact of reinstatement pursuant to theplaintiffs cause of action for arrears of salary is this. When the plaintiff was reinstated on 12 December, 1953 pursuant to the decree dated 30 August, 1953 the plaintiff became entitled to salary which was suspended during the period of suspension. The plaintiff was again suspended from 19 January, 1954 and he was dismissed from service on 23 February, 1956. Therefore, when the plaintiff filed the suit on 6 October, 1956 his entire claim for salary is founded first on his reinstatement on 12 December, 1953 pursuant to the decree and second on the order of suspension dated 19 January, 1954 and the order of dismissal on 23 February 1956 which the plaintiff challenged as illegal.The original order of suspension on 16 September, 1943 as welt as the original dismissal dated 7 November, 194 5 was declared to be illegal by the decree dated 30 August, 1953. Therefore, when the plaintiff was reinstated on 12 December, 1953 it is then that the plaintiffs claim for salary accrued due. This salary was again suspended from 19 January, 1954. Dismissal on 23 February, 1956 was at a time when the plaintiff was still under suspension. The order of suspension does not put an end to his service. Suspension merely suspends the claim to salary. During suspension there is suspension allowance. See Khem Chand v. Union of India(1) where this Court said that the real effect of the order of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the service he is not permitted to work and is paid only subsistence allowance which is less than his salary. Under Fundamental Rule 52 the pay an d allowance of a Government servant who is dismissed or removed from service, cease from the date. of his dismissal or removal. Therefore, there would be no question of salary accruing or accruing due so long as orders of suspension and dismissal stand. The High Court was correct in the conclusion that the plaintiffs claim for salary accrued due only on the order of dismissal dated 23 February, 1956 being set aside.