Case: N. MOTILAL &amp; ORS.  Vs. FAISAL BIN ALI &amp; ANR.

As noticed earlier the definition of the term landlord as well as the term tenant shows that the Act applies to contractual tenancies as well as cases of statutory tenants and their landlords. On some supposed general principles governing all Rent Acts it cannot be argued that such fixation can only be for the benefit of the tenants when the Act clearly lays down that both landlords and tenants can apply for fixation of fair rent. A close reading of the Act shows that the fair rent is fixed for the building and it is payable by whoever is the tenant whether a contractual tenant or statutory tenant. What is fixed is not the fair rent payable by the tenant or to the landlord who applies for fixation of fair rent but fair rent for the building, something like an incident of the tenure regarding the building. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the minority judgment delivered by Bhagwati, J. for himself and K.K. Mathew, J. although the minority judgment has held that landlord can make an application for determination of fair rent only after the determination of tenancy and during subsistence of contractual rent no application for fair rent can be given. We are bound by the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench in M/s. Raval & Co. We further notice that both the learned counsel have referred to seven-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodal Ammal (supra). Seven-Judge Bench had occasion to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in M/s. Raval & Co. (supra) which was quoted with approval. Referring to majority judgment in M/s. Raval & Co.s case seven- Judge Bench made following observation: 15………Alagiriswami J. at page 635 after having made that observation with reference to Bhaiya Panjalats case has said-Be that as it may, we are now concerned with the question of fixation of a fair rent. In our opinion the majority decision with regard to Section 4 was undoubtedly correct and the minority stretched the law, if we may say so with respect, too far to hold that Section 4 was not available to the landlord. It should be remembered, as we have said above, that the field of freedom of contract was encroached upon to a very large extent by the State Rent Acts. The encroachment was not entirely and wholly one sided. Same encroachment was envisaged in the interest of the landlord also and equity and justice demanded a fair play on the part of the legislature not to completely ignore the helpless situation of many landlords who are also compared to some big tenants sometimes weaker Section of the society. As for example a widow or a minor lets out a family house in a helpless situation to tide over the financial difficulty and later wants a fair rent to be determined. Again suppose for instance in a city there is an apprehension of external aggression, severe internal disturbances or spread of epidemics, A man in possession of his house may go to another town letting out his premises to a tenant financially strong and of strong, nerves at a rate comparatively much lower than the prevailing market rates. Later on, on the normalization of the situation as against the agreed rate of rent be approaches the Building Controller for fixing a fair rent in accordance with a particular State Rent Act. Why should she or he be debarred from doing so. The statute gives him the protection and enables the Controller to intervene to fix a fair rent as against the term of contract between the parties. In a large number of cases it is the tenant who gets this protection. But in some as in the case of Raval the landlord needs and gets the protection. But this is not a direct authority on the point of notice. 12. The above observation clearly indicates that majority view of the Constitution Bench expressed by Alagiriswami, J. was quoted with approval and the seven-Judge Bench held that the encroachment on the freedom of contract between the landlord and tenant has been envisaged for protecting both the tenant and landlord. The example as quoted in paragraph 15 as extracted above clearly indicates that denial of landlord in moving application for fixation of rent in several cases may operate against the interest of the landlord. 13. The Constitution Bench judgment in M/s. Raval & Co.s case as well as seven-Judge Bench judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiars case are binding which categorically had laid down that application for determination of fair rent can be made both by the landlord and tenant which can be made even during currency of contractual tenancy. We, thus, find the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants in the above regard without any substance. 14. The submission of the counsel for the appellants that the consideration on which property was purchased by the landlord in 2008 is equivalent to 20 months rent as enhanced by Rent Controller has no bearing on the issue which has been sought to be raised. The determination of the fair rent has to be made as per the provisions of the 1960 Act and the above submission in no manner advance the case of the appellant. 15. The last submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Central Government, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development has circulated a Model Rent Control Legislation to be adopted by all the States which precludes the landlord for making application for fixation of fair rent during the currency of contractual tenancy (which circular has also not been brought on record), suffice it to say that as per submission of the counsel for the appellants himself that Model Legislations are only guidelines, which in no manner, can have any effect on the statutory provisions of 1960 Act which are still occupying the field. No other submission has been advanced by the counsel for the appellants.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Section 4 of the Telangana Act, 1960 provides for determination of fair rent9. The above provision gives right to both the tenant and the landlord of a building to make an application for fixing fair rent. The provision of Section 4(1) cannot be read in a manner that it is not applicable with regard to the contractual tenancy. The Rent Control Legislations are enacted to protect both tenant and the landlord. In the event the submission of the appellants is accepted that during the currency of the contract of tenancy, no one can file application for fixing of fair rent, the said provision shall operate detrimental to both the tenant and the landlord. This can be explained by taking an illustration. A tenant, who is in urgent need of premises, entered into a contract with landlord where he had to agree to pay an unreasonable higher rent during the force of circumstances, if the tenant has no right to make an application for fixing of fair rent during the currency of tenancy, the said provision will harshly operate against the tenant. The concept of determination of fair rent is to operate equal for the tenant as well as the landlord. The object of the Act is that neither the landlord should charge more than the fair rent of the premises nor tenant should be forced to pay higher rent than the fair rent. The statutory scheme brought in the statute by way of Section 4 which is a beneficial both to the tenant as well as the landlord11. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the minority judgment delivered by Bhagwati, J. for himself and K.K. Mathew, J. although the minority judgment has held that landlord can make an application for determination of fair rent only after the determination of tenancy and during subsistence of contractual rent no application for fair rent can be given. We are bound by the majority opinion of the Constitution Bench in M/s. Raval & Co. We further notice that both the learned counsel have referred to seven-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar vs. Yesodal Ammal (supra). Seven-Judge Bench had occasion to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in M/s. Raval & Co. (supra) which was quoted with approval. Referring to majority judgment in M/s. Raval & Co.s case seven- Judge Bench made following observation:15………Alagiriswami J. at page 635 after having made that observation with reference to Bhaiya Panjalats case has said-Be that as it may, we are now concerned with the question of fixation of a fair rent. In our opinion the majority decision with regard to Section 4 was undoubtedly correct and the minority stretched the law, if we may say so with respect, too far to hold that Section 4 was not available to the landlord. It should be remembered, as we have said above, that the field of freedom of contract was encroached upon to a very large extent by the State Rent Acts. The encroachment was not entirely and wholly one sided. Same encroachment was envisaged in the interest of the landlord also and equity and justice demanded a fair play on the part of the legislature not to completely ignore the helpless situation of many landlords who are also compared to some big tenants sometimes weaker Section of the society. As for example a widow or a minor lets out a family house in a helpless situation to tide over the financial difficulty and later wants a fair rent to be determined. Again suppose for instance in a city there is an apprehension of external aggression, severe internal disturbances or spread of epidemics, A man in possession of his house may go to another town letting out his premises to a tenant financially strong and of strong, nerves at a rate comparatively much lower than the prevailing market rates. Later on, on the normalization of the situation as against the agreed rate of rent be approaches the Building Controller for fixing a fair rent in accordance with a particular State Rent Act. Why should she or he be debarred from doing so. The statute gives him the protection and enables the Controller to intervene to fix a fair rent as against the term of contract between the parties. In a large number of cases it is the tenant who gets this protection. But in some as in the case of Raval the landlord needs and gets the protection. But this is not a direct authority on the point of notice12. The above observation clearly indicates that majority view of the Constitution Bench expressed by Alagiriswami, J. was quoted with approval and the seven-Judge Bench held that the encroachment on the freedom of contract between the landlord and tenant has been envisaged for protecting both the tenant and landlord. The example as quoted in paragraph 15 as extracted above clearly indicates that denial of landlord in moving application for fixation of rent in several cases may operate against the interest of the landlord13. The Constitution Bench judgment in M/s. Raval & Co.s case as well as seven-Judge Bench judgment in V. Dhanapal Chettiars case are binding which categorically had laid down that application for determination of fair rent can be made both by the landlord and tenant which can be made even during currency of contractual tenancy. We, thus, find the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants in the above regard without any substance14. The submission of the counsel for the appellants that the consideration on which property was purchased by the landlord in 2008 is equivalent to 20 months rent as enhanced by Rent Controller has no bearing on the issue which has been sought to be raised. The determination of the fair rent has to be made as per the provisions of the 1960 Act and the above submission in no manner advance the case of the appellant15. The last submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the Central Government, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development has circulated a Model Rent Control Legislation to be adopted by all the States which precludes the landlord for making application for fixation of fair rent during the currency of contractual tenancy (which circular has also not been brought on record), suffice it to say that as per submission of the counsel for the appellants himself that Model Legislations are only guidelines, which in no manner, can have any effect on the statutory provisions of 1960 Act which are still occupying the field. No other submission has been advanced by the counsel for the appellants.