Case: State of Madras Vs. Kunnakudi Melamatam &amp; Another

from the order of, the Deputy Commissioner, and under S. 62 of the Act, any party aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner might within ninety days of the order institute a suit in the Court against the order. Section 93 of the Act read :"No suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of law, except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act." 9. Now, one of the disputes in this suit is whether the institution is a religious institution within the meaning of Act XIX of 1951. Specific provision is made in Ss. 57, 61 and 62 of the Act for determination of that dispute by the Deputy Commissioner, the Commissioner and eventually by a suit instituted in a Court under S. 62. The present suit is not brought under or in conformity with S.62 and consequently, in so far as the suit claims the relief of injunction restraining the levy of contribution and audit fees under Act XIX of 1951, it is barred by S. 93 of the Act: The decision of the Board dated February 12, 1932 was given under Act II of 1927 and was final for purposes of that Act, but it is not final for purposes of Act XIX of 1951. 10. We shall next consider the claim of injunction restraining the levy of contribution and audit fees under Act II of 1927, By its order dated February 12, 1932, the Board had decided that the institution was outside the purview of Act II of 1927. That decision was given under S. 84(1) of the Act. No application was made to the Court to modify or set aside the decision in accordance with S. 84(2). Consequently by the express words of S. 84(2), the decision of the Board became final, and for purposes of Act II of 1927, the correctness of the decision is not now open to challenge on the ground that it is erroneous. But Mr. Chetty argued that the decision, though binding on the institution, is not binding on the Board. We cannot accept this contention. The decision is final and binding on the Board also for purposes of Act II of 1927. Mr. Chetty argued secondly that in view of Ss. 13 and 15 of the Madras General Clauses Act (Madras Act I of 1891) the Board could decide the question whether the plaintiff is a religious institution as often as occasions arose, and its power was not exhausted by the decision given on February 12, 1932. This argument is misconceived. The Sections relied upon do not authorise revocation or annulment of a decision, which has become final. Mr. Chetty next contended that the character of the institution was changed by the will of Ganapathiswamigal, dated December 12, 1935, and consequently, the decision dated February 12, 1932 ceased to be binding under Act II of 1927. This contention must Also be rejected. Ganapathiswamigal had no power to change the character of the institution, and, as a matter of fact, he did not purport to do so by his will. Mr. Chetty next contended that by making the assessment of the contributions under S. 70 of the Act, the Board gave a decision under Section 84(1) that the institution was a Math as defined in the Act, and that decision has become final under S.84 (2). There is no substance in this contention. The order of assessment is not produced. It is not shown that any dispute then arose whether the institution was a Math as defined in the Act, or that the Board decided that dispute by its order of assessment. 11. Mr. Chetty argued that by reason of S. 103(i) of Act XIX of 1951, all contributions under Act II of 1927 are payable under Act XIX of 1951 and the assessment and demand in respect of those contributions are enforceable under the latter Act and consequently the suit challenging such assessment and demand is barred by S. 93 of Act XIX of 1951. There is no substance in this contention. As the institution was not Math within the meaning of Act II of 1927 in view of the final decision of the Board dated February 12, 1932 the contributions demanded under Act II of 1927 were not legally payable to the Board under that Act. Consequently, those contributions were not payable under Act XIX of 1951, and the assessment and demand in respect thereof were not enforceable under the latter Act by reason of S. 103(i)thereof. Section 93 of Act XIX of 1951 did not bar a suit pending on the date of commencement of the Act claiming an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Act II of 1927 on the ground that the institution was outside the purview of Act II of 1927. 12. Mr. Chetty lastly contended that in view of the conduct of Muthuramalingam asking the Board to interfere with the management of the institution on the ground that it is a Math, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that it is not a Math within the purview of Act II of 1927. This contention must be rejected. The Board could not levy contribution from an institution which was not a Math under Act II of 1927 having regard to the final decision of the Board dated February 12, 1932. Estoppel could not confer on the Board a power which it did not otherwise possess under the Act. Moreover, it is not shown that by reason of the acts of Muthuramalingam, the Board came to believe that the institution was a Math and to act upon such belief. The plaintiff is not estoppel by any act or conduct of Muthuramalingam from contending that it is not a Math within the meaning of Act II of 1927.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In view of our conclusions on other points, we think that it is not open to us to decide in this appeal whether the institution is a Math within the meaning of those Acts, and the point must be left open7. The suit, as it stands now, is a composite suit, claiming two different reliefs, namely, (1), an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Act II of 1927, and (2) an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Act XIX of 1951. The two reliefs must be considered separatelyWe cannot accept this contention. The decision is final and binding on the Board also for purposes of Act II of 192710. We shall next consider the claim of injunction restraining the levy of contribution and audit fees under Act II of 1927, By its order dated February 12, 1932, the Board had decided that the institution was outside the purview of Act II of 1927. That decision was given under S. 84(1) of the Act. No application was made to the Court to modify or set aside the decision in accordance with S. 84(2). Consequently by the express words of S. 84(2), the decision of the Board became final, and for purposes of Act II of 1927, the correctness of the decision is not now open to challenge on the ground that it is erroneousThis argument is misconceived. The Sections relied upon do not authorise revocation or annulment of a decision, which has become finalThis contention must Also be rejected. Ganapathiswamigal had no power to change the character of the institution, and, as a matter of fact, he did not purport to do so by his willThere is no substance in this contention. The order of assessment is not produced. It is not shown that any dispute then arose whether the institution was a Math as defined in the Act, or that the Board decided that dispute by its order of assessmentThere is no substance in this contention. As the institution was not Math within the meaning of Act II of 1927 in view of the final decision of the Board dated February 12, 1932 the contributions demanded under Act II of 1927 were not legally payable to the Board under that Act. Consequently, those contributions were not payable under Act XIX of 1951, and the assessment and demand in respect thereof were not enforceable under the latter Act by reason of S. 103(i)thereof. Section 93 of Act XIX of 1951 did not bar a suit pending on the date of commencement of the Act claiming an injunction restraining the levy of contributions and audit fees under Act II of 1927 on the ground that the institution was outside the purview of Act II of 1927This contention must be rejected. The Board could not levy contribution from an institution which was not a Math under Act II of 1927 having regard to the final decision of the Board dated February 12, 1932. Estoppel could not confer on the Board a power which it did not otherwise possess under the Act. Moreover, it is not shown that by reason of the acts of Muthuramalingam, the Board came to believe that the institution was a Math and to act upon such belief. The plaintiff is not estoppel by any act or conduct of Muthuramalingam from contending that it is not a Math within the meaning of Act II of 1927.