Case: T. N. Raghunatha Reddy Vs. Mysore State Transport Authority

Section 68-F (2) and resolved to take the following action under Section 68-F (2) of the M. V. Act, 1939, (as appended hereto)."11. It seems to us that this is not a correct way of interpreting the Scheme. The scheme, as approved, was published in the Government Gazette under Section 68-D (3) on January 25, 1968, and on March 1, 1968, the Mysore undertaking applied under Section 68-F (1) to operate buses from January 1968 (1969 (?)) or a later date. As held by this Court in Abdul Gafoor v. State of Mysore, (1962) 1 SCR 909 = (AIR 1961 SC 1556 ) "when a scheme prepared and published under Section 68-C has been approved and an application has been made in pursuance of the scheme and in the proper manner as specified in Chapter IV nothing more remains to be decided by the Regional Transport Authority and it has no option to refuse the grant of the permit" and "when taking action under Section 68-F (1) the Regional Transport Authority does not exercise any quasi-judicial function and acts wholly in a ministerial capacity". It seems to us that even if the date of publication may not be the appropriate date - we do not decide that it is not an appropriate date - at least the date on which the transport undertaking applies under Sec. 68-F (1) for a permit must be the date with reference to which the expression "existing permit holder" must be interpreted. If this is the crucial date, then it is quite clear that the appellant was not an existing permit holder because he did not obtain his countersignature till July, 1968.12. The observations of Raghubar Dayal, J. in Sri Satyanarayana Transports (P) Ltd., Guntur v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, Civil Appeal No. 347 of 1961, D/-3-10-1961 do not assist the appellant. In that case the Court was dealing with the objection that it was the duty of the Road Transport Corporation to furnish the date of implementation of each scheme as a part of the proposal, the date being a material particular. In this connection the Court observed:"The question whether the State Government can fix a date or not is not for determination in this appeal and we do not express any opinion on that point. Suffice it to say that the Regional Transport Authority has the power to fix a date after the scheme has been approved by the State Government, as it is that authority which has, under Section 68-F, to issue a permit to the State Transport Undertaking for plying motor vehicles and to cancel existing permits. The date up to which the existing permits are to continue and the date for the State Transport Undertaking to commence plying motor vehicles should be such that there be a continuity of transport service on the notified route and that here be no dislocation of transport arrangements."The Court was not considering the crucial date for the purpose of interpreting the expression existing permit holder" in a scheme.13. Apart from that the appellant must fail on the ground that he was not a permit holder at all even if the crucial date be January 1, 1969. His countersignature must be deemed to have lapsed when the High Court dismissed the writ petitions in which the Kolar scheme had been stayed on October 7, 1968. In our opinion the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting the countersignature "subject to the decision of the High Court of Mysore about the validity of the Nationalisation Scheme of Kolar Pocket," in the context which we have reproduced above, means that if the writs failed the countersignature would automatically lapse. It will be recalled that this Court held in the Samarth Transport Co. v. The Regional Transport Authority (1961) 1 SCR 631 at page 639 = (AIR 1961 SC 93 at page 96) that the Regional Transport Authority is within its rights not to entertain an application if the Scheme had been approved and published. This Court observed:"The Regional Transport Authority is authorized for the purpose of giving effect to an approved scheme to refuse to entertain an application for renewal of any other permit. This power does not depend upon the presentation of an application by the State Transport Undertaking for a permit. This power is exercisable when it is brought to the notice of the Authority that there is an approved scheme and, to give effect to it, the application for renewal cannot be entertained."The Regional Transport Authority must have been aware of this and it must be because of the stay order that the countersignature was granted to the appellant by it.14. In view of our decision that the appellants countersignature lapsed when the writ petitions were dismissed, the second point does not arise.15. Regarding the third point, we were unable to appreciate how an inter-State agreement overrides the provisions of Chapter IV-A. inter-State agreement is not law and to hold that an inter-State agreement overrides Chapter IV-A would be to completely disregard the provisions of Section 68-B of the Act which provides that "the provisions of this Chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law." In this connection reference was made to Article 162 and Article 298 of the Constitution. But we were unable to appreciate what relevance these articles have to the point at issue. Assuming that a State has power to enter into agreement with another State in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162, and under article 298 it can carry on trade or business, we are unable to see what light these facts throw on the question before us.16. We stopped the learned counsel from developing the fourth point because this point was not taken up in the High Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]14. In view of our decision that the appellants countersignature lapsed when the writ petitions were dismissed, the second point does not arise.15. Regarding the third point, we were unable to appreciate how an inter-State agreement overrides the provisions of Chapter IV-A. inter-State agreement is not law and to hold that an inter-State agreement overrides Chapter IV-A would be to completely disregard the provisions of Section 68-B of the Act which provides that "the provisions of this Chapter and the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in Chapter IV of this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law." In this connection reference was made to Article 162 and Article 298 of the Constitution. But we were unable to appreciate what relevance these articles have to the point at issue. Assuming that a State has power to enter into agreement with another State in exercise of its executive powers under Article 162, and under article 298 it can carry on trade or business, we are unable to see what light these facts throw on the question before us.16. We stopped the learned counsel from developing the fourth point because this point was not taken up in the High Court.