Case: Arun Bhatiya Vs. HDFC Bank &amp; Ors

Act, which was enacted to protect the welfare and interest of consumers. It will be helpful to look at the specific provisions of law relied upon by the appellant. The relevant provision, namely, section 2(1)(d)(ii) of the 1986, reads as under: (d) consumer means any person who, - (ii) hires or avails of any services for a consideration which has been paid or promised or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment and includes any beneficiary of such services other than the person who hires or avails of the services for consideration paid or promised, or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment, when such services are availed of with the approval of the first mentioned person but does not include a person who avails of such services for any commercial purposes. Explanation – For the purposes of this clause, commercial purpose does not include use by a person of goods bought and used by him and services availed by him exclusively for the purposes of earning his livelihood by means of selfemployment. 15. Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 defines deficiency as: (g) deficiency means any fault, imperfection, shortcoming, or inadequacy in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is required to be maintained by or under any law for the time being in force or has been undertaken to be performed by a person in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service; 16. A two-judge bench of this Court consisting of Justice D K Jain and Justice H L Dattu (as the Chief Justice was then) in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Sanjay Shankarsa Mamarde (2010) 7 SCC 489 observed that the scope of deficiency as defined under clause 2(1)(g) of the 1986 Act is wide and is to be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The court observed: 20. It is manifest from the language employed in the clause that its scope is also very wide but no single test as decisive in the determination of the extent of fault, imperfection, nature and manner of performance, etc. required to be maintained can be laid down. It must depend on the facts of the particular case, having regard to the nature of the service to be provided. 17. The expression service has been defined in Section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act as follows: (o) service means service of any description which is made available to potential users and includes, but not limited to, the provision of facilities in connection with banking, financing, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical or other energy, board or lodging or both, housing construction, entertainment, amusement or the purveying of news or other information, but does not include the rendering of any service free of charge or under a contract of personal service; 18. A bench of this Court in Vodafone Idea Cellular Limited v. Ajay Kumar Agarwal (2022) 6 SCC 496 (of which one of us, Dr Justice DY Chandrachud, was part) explained that service of every description will fall within the ambit of the definition of services under section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act. The relevant extract reads as follows: 12. The definition of the expression service is couched in wide terms. The width of statutory language emerges from the manner in which the definition is cast. Parliament has used the expression service of any description which is made available to potential users. The definition employs the means and includes formula. The means part of the definition incorporates service of any description. The inclusive part incorporates services by way of illustration, such as facilities in connection with banking, finance, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical and other energy, board or lodging and housing construction. The inclusive part is prefaced by the clarification that the services which are specified are not exhaustive. This is apparent from the expression but not limited to. The last part of the definition excludes (i) the rendering of any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of personal service. Parliament has confined the exclusion only to two specified categories. The initial part of the definition however makes it abundantly clear that the expression service is defined to mean service of any description. In other words, a service of every description would fall within the ambit of the statutory provision. 19. The respondent bank does not dispute that the appellant, along with his father, opened a joint FD with the bank. A person who avails of any service from a bank will fall under the purview of the definition of a consumer under the 1986 Act. As a consequence, it would be open to such a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies provided under the 1986 Act. 20. There was a manifest error on the part of the SCDRC in declining to entertain the consumer complaint on merits. Whether the appellant is able to establish his case is a matter which has to be decided within the parameters of law as it emerges from the provisions of the 1986 Act. The essence of the complaint of the appellant is that there was a deficiency on the part of the respondent bank in proceeding to credit the proceeds of a joint FD exclusively to the account of his father. The SCDRC ought to have determined whether the complaint related to deficiency of service as defined under the 1986 Act. The SCDRC had no justification to relegate the appellant to pursue his claim before a civil court. The appellant did not, in the proceedings before the SCDRC, raise any claim against his father. Therefore, the SCDRC was wrong deducing that there was dispute between appellant and his father. Assuming that there was a dispute between the appellant and his father, that was not the subject matter of the consumer complaint. The complaint that there was a deficiency of service was against the bank.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]16. A two-judge bench of this Court consisting of Justice D K Jain and Justice H L Dattu (as the Chief Justice was then) in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Sanjay Shankarsa Mamarde (2010) 7 SCC 489  observed that the scope of deficiency as defined under clause 2(1)(g) of the 1986 Act is wide and is to be determined on the basis of the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The court observed:20. It is manifest from the language employed in the clause that its scope is also very wide but no single test as decisive in the determination of the extent of fault, imperfection, nature and manner of performance, etc. required to be maintained can be laid down. It must depend on the facts of the particular case, having regard to the nature of the service to be provided.18. A bench of this Court in Vodafone Idea Cellular Limited v. Ajay Kumar Agarwal (2022) 6 SCC 496  (of which one of us, Dr Justice DY Chandrachud, was part) explained that service of every description will fall within the ambit of the definition of services under section 2(1)(o) of the 1986 Act. The relevant extract reads as follows:12. The definition of the expression service is couched in wide terms. The width of statutory language emerges from the manner in which the definition is cast. Parliament has used the expression service of any description which is made available to potential users. The definition employs the means and includes formula. The means part of the definition incorporates service of any description. The inclusive part incorporates services by way of illustration, such as facilities in connection with banking, finance, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical and other energy, board or lodging and housing construction. The inclusive part is prefaced by the clarification that the services which are specified are not exhaustive. This is apparent from the expression but not limited to. The last part of the definition excludes (i) the rendering of any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of personal service. Parliament has confined the exclusion only to two specified categories. The initial part of the definition however makes it abundantly clear that the expression service is defined to mean service of any description. In other words, a service of every description would fall within the ambit of the statutory provision.19. The respondent bank does not dispute that the appellant, along with his father, opened a joint FD with the bank. A person who avails of any service from a bank will fall under the purview of the definition of a consumer under the 1986 Act. As a consequence, it would be open to such a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies provided under the 1986 Act.20. There was a manifest error on the part of the SCDRC in declining to entertain the consumer complaint on merits. Whether the appellant is able to establish his case is a matter which has to be decided within the parameters of law as it emerges from the provisions of the 1986 Act. The essence of the complaint of the appellant is that there was a deficiency on the part of the respondent bank in proceeding to credit the proceeds of a joint FD exclusively to the account of his father. The SCDRC ought to have determined whether the complaint related to deficiency of service as defined under the 1986 Act. The SCDRC had no justification to relegate the appellant to pursue his claim before a civil court. The appellant did not, in the proceedings before the SCDRC, raise any claim against his father. Therefore, the SCDRC was wrong deducing that there was dispute between appellant and his father. Assuming that there was a dispute between the appellant and his father, that was not the subject matter of the consumer complaint. The complaint that there was a deficiency of service was against the bank.