Case: Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Guntur Vs. Ramdev Tobacco Company

can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. The cardinal rule on interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the statue gives a different indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. But unless there is a genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specific words 6. There can be little doubt that the words other legal proceeding are wide enough to include adjudication and penalty proceedings under the Act. Even the learned Additional Solicitor General did not contend to the contrary but what he said was that since this wide expression is preceded by particular words of a certain genus, namely, words indicating reference to proceedings taken in courts only, the wide words must be limited to things ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding words and should, therefore, receive a limited meaning to exclude proceedings of the type in question. There can be no doubt that suit or prosecution are those judicial or legal proceedings which are lodged in a court of law and not before any executive authority, even if a statutory one. The use of the expression instituted in Section 40(2) strengthens this belief. Since the sub-section has been construed by this Court in Raju case ( 1972 (2) SCC 410 : 1972 SCC(Cri) 738 : 1973 (1) SCR 812 ) not to be confined in its application to only government servants but to extend to others including the assessees and since the words for anything done or ordered to be done under this Act are found to be comprehensive enough to include acts of non-compliance or omissions to do what the Act and the rule enjoin, the limitation prescribed by Section 40(2) would undoubtedly hit the adjudication and penalty proceedings unless the expression other legal proceeding is read ejusdem generis to limit its ambit to legal proceedings initiated in a court of law 7. The scope of Section 40(2) as it stood before its amendment pursuant to Raju case ( 1972 (2) SCC 410 : 1972 SCC(Cri) 738 : 1973 (1) SCR 812 ) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Universal Cables Ltd. v. Union of India ((1977) 1 ELT (J) 92 (MP)), wherein the question raised for determination was whether penalty proceedings taken under Rule 173-Q for the infraction of Rule 173-C with a view to evading payment of duty fell within the expression other legal proceeding used in the said sub-section. The High Court conceded that the expression when read in isolation is wide enough to include any proceeding taken in accordance with law, whether so taken in a court of law or before any authority or tribunal but when read with the preceding words suit or prosecution it must be given a restricted meaning. This is how the High Court expressed itself at page J 106 : (ELT p. J 106) "Now the language of Section 40(2) is : no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be instituted. Suit and prosecution which precede the expression other legal proceeding can be taken only in a court of law." * After stating the expanse of the ejusdem generis rule, as explained in Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Excise Collector, Tripura ( 1972 (2) SCC 442 : 1972 AIR(SC) 1863, 1868) (Sutherland, Volume 2 pages 339-400) the High Court observed that there was no indication in the said sub-section or elsewhere in the Act that the said general words were intended to receive their wide meaning and were not to be construed in a limited sense with the aid of the ejusdem generis rule. A departmental proceeding like penalty proceedings were, therefore, placed outside the scope of the said sub-section. This view was quoted with approval by a learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in C.C. Industries v. H.N. Ray ( 1980 (6) ELT 442 , 453 (Bom)). These two cases, therefore, clearly support the view canvassed before us the learned Additional Solicitor General 8. We have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions. In consider in the scope of the expression other legal proceeding we have confined ourselves to the language of sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Act before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and should not be understood to express any view on the amended provision. On careful consideration we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions that the wide expression other legal proceeding must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words suit and prosecution as they constitute a genus. In this view of the matter we must uphold the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the penalty and adjudication proceedings in question did not fall within the expression other legal proceeding employed in Section 40(2) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and therefore, the said proceedings were not subject to the limitation prescribed by the said sub-section 9. Mr. Nambiar, the learned counsel for the respondents strongly argued that we should not entertain the submission based on the ejusdem generis rule since it was not raised before the High Court. That indeed is true but being a pure question of law we have thought it fit to entertain the same. We, therefore do not entertain this objection

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]5. The rule of ejusdem generis is generally invoked where the scope and ambit of the general words which follows certain specific words (which have some common characteristic and constitute a genus) is required to be determined. By the application of this rule the scope and ambit of the general words which follow certain specific words constituting a genus is restricted to things ejusdem generis with those preceding them, unless the context otherwise requires. General words must ordinarily bear their natural and larger meaning and need not be confined ejusdem generis to things previously enumerated unless the language of the statute spells out an intention to that effect. Courts have also limited the scope of the general words is cases where a large meaning is likely to lead to absurd and unforeseen results. To put it differently, the general expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred to by the preceding specified things constituting a genus, unless of course from the language of the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so limited and no absurdity or unintended and unforeseen complication is likely to result if they are allowed to take their natural meaning. The cardinal rule on interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the statue gives a different indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. But unless there is a genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words, there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any application where the general words precede specificWe have given our careful consideration to the submission made on behalf of the appellant, reinforced by the view expressed in the aforesaid two decisions. In consider in the scope of the expression other legal proceeding we have confined ourselves to the language of sub-section (2) of Section 40 of the Act before its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and should not be understood to express any view on the amended provision. On careful consideration we are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions that the wide expression other legal proceeding must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding words suit and prosecution as they constitute a genus. In this view of the matter we must uphold the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General that the penalty and adjudication proceedings in question did not fall within the expression other legal proceeding employed in Section 40(2) of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by Act 22 of 1973 and therefore, the said proceedings were not subject to the limitation prescribed by the saidMr. Nambiar, the learned counsel for the respondents strongly argued that we should not entertain the submission based on the ejusdem generis rule since it was not raised before the High Court.That indeed is true but being a pure question of law we have thought it fit to entertain the same. We, therefore do not entertain this objection