Case: Savanth (K.) Vs. Mysore Road Transport Corporation &amp; Anr

scale at Rs. 190/-. Dissatisfied with this fixation, the appellant made a representation to the management urging that his initial pay in the revised scale ought to have been fixed at Rs. 220/- and that it had been wrongly fixed at Rs. 190/-. 4. On August 1, 1961, a Corporation styled as the Mysore State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation) was constituted under section 3 of the Road Trans port Corporation Act (Act 34 of 1951). By virtue of a notification issued by the Government of Mysore Under section 34 of the Act, the Corporation took over the business of the, Transport Department together with all its liabilities as the sole successor of the Department. In view of the fact that the said notification protected the service conditions of the employees of the erstwhile Transport Department, the appellant opted for service under the Corporation and kept on pursuing the earlier representation made by him for fixation of his initial pay as on April 1, 1957 at Rs. 220/- in terms of the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement. The efforts made by him in t his behalf having proved ineffective, the appellant made an application on December 2O, 1965 before the Labour Court under section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming that his initial pay as on 1, 1957 had been wrongly fixed by the management of the Transport Department at Rs. 190/- as against Rs. 220/to which he was entitled by virtue of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement. The appellant also claimed increase in his dearness allowance in terms of the said agreement. Holding that the appellants pay had to be fixed at Rs. 220/-P.M. in the pay scale of Rs. 175-15325 with a dearness allowance of Rs. 50/- P.M. as on April 1, 1957, the Labour Court by its order dated September 30, 1966 allowed the claim of the appellant and directed the Corporation to pay him a sum of Rs. 3, 345.29 p. on account of the benefit claimed by him. The Order was challenged by the Corporation before the High Court of Mysore by means of a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. By its aforesaid judgment and order dated December 14, 1970, the High Court allowed the petition and held that the erstwhile management of the Transport Department was right in fixing the initial pay of the appellant at- Rs. 190/-. It is against this judgment and order that the appellant has come up in appeal to this Court by special leave, as already stated.In the absence of the appellant who has chosen not to appear despite service, the learned Attorney General has taken us through the material on the record and has urged that the High Court was right in reversing the order of the Labour Court and upholding the contention of the Corporation that the initial pay of the appellant could be fixed only at Rs. 190/- and not at Rs. 220/- as claimed by the appellant. 5. We have given our careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Attorney General but are unable to agree with him. 6. A plain reading of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement reproduced above makes it crystal clear that the pay of the appellant as on April 1, 1957 in the then existing scale of Rs. 150-10-200 being admittedly Rs. 150/- i.e. less than the minimum pay of the revised scale of Rs. 1 75-15-325, it had, according to clause 4(a) of the agreement, to be fixed at Rs. 175/- which is the minimum of the aforementioned revised scale. Now the appellant having put in more than six years service and his case being clearly outsi de the pale of the prohibition envisaged by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Agreement, he had to be granted the benefit of three advance increments in terms of the formula contained in sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the Agreement which would take his initial pay to Rs. 220/-. The second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Agreement which is heavily relied upon on behalf of the Corporation has no applicability to the present case as that part would operate only in those cases which fall within the prohibition contemplated by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 i.e. where the increase in the minimum pay in the revised scale over the pay in the scale which existed on April 1, 1957 exceeds Rs. 25/- plus one increment in the new scale i.e. if it exceeds Rs. 25/- plus Rs. 15/- totalling Rs. 40/-. As in the instant case the increase of the minimum pay in the new scale does not exceed Rs. 40/-, the second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 which is residuary cannot be invoked by the Corporation. The High Court was, therefore, patently in error in holding that the case of the appellant was covered not by the first part of sub clause (c) of clause 4 but by the second part thereof. I n so holding, it Obviously overlooked the significance of the words "in other cases" occurring at the commencement of the second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4. The said words make it abundantly clear that it is only where a case does not fall within the purview of the first part of sub clause (c) of clause 4 that it would be governed by the second part of the sub-clause. As the case of the appellant was not covered by the ban imposed by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement, he could not have been denied the benefit , of the advance increments which accrued to him under sub-clause (b) thereof. Accordingly, the order of the High Court which suffers from a patent error cannot be sustained. 7. In

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]A plain reading of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement reproduced above makes it crystal clear that the pay of the appellant as on April 1, 1957 in the then existing scale ofRs.150-10-200 being admittedlyRs.150/- i.e. less than the minimum pay of the revised scale ofRs.1 75-15-325, it had, according to clause 4(a) of the agreement, to be fixed atRs.175/- which is the minimum of the aforementioned revised scale. Now the appellant having put in more than six years service and his case being clearly outsi de the pale of the prohibition envisaged by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Agreement, he had to be granted the benefit of three advance increments in terms of the formula contained in sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the Agreement which would take his initial pay toRs.220/-. The second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Agreement which is heavily relied upon on behalf of the Corporation has no applicability to the present case as that part would operate only in those cases which fall within the prohibition contemplated by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 i.e. where the increase in the minimum pay in the revised scale over the pay in the scale which existed on April 1, 1957 exceedsRs.25/- plus one increment in the new scale i.e. if it exceedsRs.25/- plusRs.15/- totallingRs.40/-. As in the instant case the increase of the minimum pay in the new scale does not exceedRs.40/-, the second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 which is residuary cannot be invoked by the Corporation. The High Court was, therefore, patently in error in holding that the case of the appellant was covered not by the first part of sub clause (c) of clause 4 but by the second part thereof. I n so holding, it Obviously overlooked the significance of the words "in other cases" occurring at the commencement of the second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4. The said words make it abundantly clear that it is only where a case does not fall within the purview of the first part of sub clause (c) of clause 4 that it would be governed by the second part of the sub-clause. As the case of the appellant was not covered by the ban imposed by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement, he could not have been denied the benefit , of the advance increments which accrued to him under sub-clause (b) thereof. Accordingly, the order of the High Court which suffers from a patent error cannot ben the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore that of the Labour CourtA plain reading of clause 4 of the Industrial Truce Agreement reproduced above makes it crystal clear that the pay of the appellant as on April 1, 1957 in the then existing scale ofRs.150-10-200 being admittedlyRs.150/- i.e. less than the minimum pay of the revised scale ofRs.1 75-15-325, it had, according to clause 4(a) of the agreement, to be fixed atRs.175/- which is the minimum of the aforementioned revised scale. Now the appellant having put in more than six years service and his case being clearly outsi de the pale of the prohibition envisaged by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Agreement, he had to be granted the benefit of three advance increments in terms of the formula contained in sub-clause (b) of clause 4 of the Agreement which would take his initial pay toRs.220/-. The second part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 of the Agreement which is heavily relied upon on behalf of the Corporation has no applicability to the present case as that part would operate only in those cases which fall within the prohibition contemplated by the first part of sub-clause (c) of clause 4 i.e. where the increase in the minimum pay in the revised scale over the pay in the scale which existed on April 1, 1957 exceedsRs.25/- plusone increment in the new scale i.e. if it exceedsRs.25/- plusRs.15/- totallingRs.40/-. As in the instant case the increase of the minimum pay in the new scale does not exceedRs.We have given our careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned Attorney General but are unable to agree with him.