Case: J.J.Irani  Vs. State Of Jharkhand

Here the Inspector was himself part of the team, which conducted the preliminary inquiry between 5th and 6th March, 1989. As observed earlier, the inquiry is a detailed investigation going into all aspects of the occurrence. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that the Inspector of Factories, who undertook a detailed inquiry into the accident along with the Chief Inspector of Factories, remained ignorant that the offences in question have been allegedly committed. It is proper to assume that an officer, conducting an investigation, comes to know what has happened, that being the only purpose of the investigation.16. We find that it has not been disputed at any stage that the complainant was not associated with and did not participate in the preliminary investigation from 5th to 6th March 1989 along with the Chief Inspector of Factories. This is obvious from the letter/report of preliminary investigation dated 08.03.1989. The Inspector must be taken as having acquired knowledge of the alleged commission of the offence soon before or at least on 08.03.1989, when the report of preliminary investigation was sent to the Commissioner of Labour, Bihar. In fact, a perusal of allegations of the offence against the appellants, makes it clear that an inquiry or investigation at the site of the accident was not necessary in order to gain knowledge of the alleged breach. For instance, the failure to submit ?Plans of Pandals and Structures? as required under Section 6(1)(aa) of the Act read with Rule 8 of the Bihar Factory Rules, 1950; not drawing up an ?on-sight? Emergency Plan and Disaster Control for the Pandals and Structures as required under Section 41B(4) of the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987 are alleged breaches, which could have been ascertained even from the office record of the Inspector. The third breach is not taking precautions in case of fire as envisaged under Section 38 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with Rule 62 of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 or providing a safe means of escape in the event of fire for all persons, and providing necessary equipment and facilities for extinguishing fire, can be easily and must have been ascertained at the first inspection of the site. We are clearly of the view that it was not necessary for the Inspector to have waited to receive the report on 23.04.1990 from the Government under cover of the letter dated 21.04.1990 directing him to file a complaint for the prosecution of the appellants. We thus agree with the view of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur and disagree with the view of the High Court. 17. Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the State/respondent pointed out that whilst these Criminal Revision Petitions against the judgments of the Chief Judicial Magistrate in the three criminal cases were pending in the High Court, Writ Petition 232 of 1991 was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India against State of Bihar, TISCO and its directors and officers to which the Inspector of Factories, Jamshedpur was also a party. This Writ Petition was filed by victims on behalf of themselves and all other persons affected by the fire. A prayer was made in the Writ of Mandamus ordering prosecution of Directors and Officers of TISCO for negligence in organizing of the function. A prayer for appropriate compensation was also made in the said Writ Petition. By Preliminary Order dated 15.12.1993, this Court after laying down certain principles of compensation directed that the retired Chief Justice Mr. Chandrachud should determine the compensation. It was then directed as follows: ?Pending further orders, the following criminal cases shall be stayed:?1. G.R. Case No. : 365-A/89 pending in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Jamshedpur.2. Crl. Rev. Nos. 212, 213 and 214 of 1991 pending before Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court.? 18. Chief Justice Chandrachud (Retd.) eventually assessed the compensation in November, 2000 for an aggregate sum of Rs.5.47 crores. Finally, this Court disposed of the Writ Petition on 16.8.2001 [reported as (2001) 8 SCC 197 ] after observing that Criminal Revision Petitions had been stayed by its earlier Order dated 15.12.1993. This Court then enhanced the aggregated compensation amount by adding a certain amount on compassionate grounds. The Writ Petition was accordingly disposed of.19. It was argued by Mr. Tapesh Kumar Singh that the above sequence of events meant that the Criminal Revisions before the High Court remained stayed notwithstanding the disposal of the Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, and therefore, it could not have proceeded to decide the matter. We fail to understand this submission coming from the State. In the first place, there is no warrant for assuming, unless specifically directed or necessarily intended, that an interim order such as the Stay of proceedings before a lower forum continues even if the proceedings in the higher forum is disposed of. This Court has made observations to that effect in PremChandra Agarwal and Another v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation and Others, (2009) 11 SCC 479. In any case, in this case the parties understood that the true position was that the Stay had ceased to operate and argued the matter on that understanding before the High Court. What is more surprising is that this contention comes from the State, which has succeeded before the High Court.Accordingly, we see no reason whatsoever to consider this submission any further. We are informed that in pursuance of the Order of this Court in LataWadhwa and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 197 the TISCO has deposited an amount of Rs. 6.95 crores in the Registry of the Supreme Court. Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants has very fairly submitted that the appellants and TISCO have no grievance whatsoever in making any payment to the victims by way of compensation since the accident was a terrible tragedy. Shri Nariman submitted that the TISCO has not treated any litigation in this matter as an adversarial litigation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]15. We have heard the matter and considered the issue at length and we find ourselves unable to uphold the reasoning of the High Court. Jambekar?scase (supra) is of no assistance in deciding the present case. In that case this Court accepted that from a reading of the report of the incident it was difficult for anyone to come to the conclusion that an offence under Section 21(1)(iv)(c) has been committed. The Inspector?s statement that the report did not convey to him any knowledge that the offence was committed was accepted and this Court concluded that the Inspector did not acquire the knowledge of the ‘commission of the offence? when he received the report. The case before us is entirely different. Here the Inspector was himself part of the team, which conducted the preliminary inquiry between 5th and 6th March, 1989. As observed earlier, the inquiry is a detailed investigation going into all aspects of the occurrence. In these circumstances it is not possible to hold that the Inspector of Factories, who undertook a detailed inquiry into the accident along with the Chief Inspector of Factories, remained ignorant that the offences in question have been allegedly committed. It is proper to assume that an officer, conducting an investigation, comes to know what has happened, that being the only purpose of the investigation.16. We find that it has not been disputed at any stage that the complainant was not associated with and did not participate in the preliminary investigation from 5th to 6th March 1989 along with the Chief Inspector of Factories. This is obvious from the letter/report of preliminary investigation dated 08.03.1989. The Inspector must be taken as having acquired knowledge of the alleged commission of the offence soon before or at least on 08.03.1989, when the report of preliminary investigation was sent to the Commissioner of Labour, Bihar. In fact, a perusal of allegations of the offence against the appellants, makes it clear that an inquiry or investigation at the site of the accident was not necessary in order to gain knowledge of the alleged breach. For instance, the failure to submit ?Plans of Pandals and Structures? as required under Section 6(1)(aa) of the Act read with Rule 8 of the Bihar Factory Rules, 1950; not drawing up an ?on-sight? Emergency Plan and Disaster Control for the Pandals and Structures as required under Section 41B(4) of the Factories (Amendment) Act, 1987 are alleged breaches, which could have been ascertained even from the office record of the Inspector. The third breach is not taking precautions in case of fire as envisaged under Section 38 of the Factories Act, 1948 read with Rule 62 of the Bihar Factories Rules, 1950 or providing a safe means of escape in the event of fire for all persons, and providing necessary equipment and facilities for extinguishing fire, can be easily and must have been ascertained at the first inspection of the site. We are clearly of the view that it was not necessary for the Inspector to have waited to receive the report on 23.04.1990 from the Government under cover of the letter dated 21.04.1990 directing him to file a complaint for the prosecution of the appellants. We thus agree with the view of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jamshedpur and disagree with the view of the Highwe see no reason whatsoever to consider this submission any further. We are informed that in pursuance of the Order of this Court in LataWadhwa and Others v. State of Bihar and Others, (2001) 8 SCC 197  the TISCO has deposited an amount of Rs. 6.95 crores in the Registry of the Supreme Court. Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel, appearing for the appellants has very fairly submitted that the appellants and TISCO have no grievance whatsoever in making any payment to the victims by way of compensation since the accident was a terrible tragedy. Shri Nariman submitted that the TISCO has not treated any litigation in this matter as an adversarial litigation.