Case: M/S GEO MILLER &amp; CO.PVT.LTD Vs. CHAIRMAN, RAJASTHAN VIDYUT UTPADAN NIGAM LTD

It is relevant to note that the findings in Hari Shankar Singhania were made in the specific context of a family settlement. This Court specifically observed that such a settlement is to be treated differently from a formal commercial settlement, and that efforts should be made to promote family settlements without the obstruction of technicalities of limitation, etc. Hence this Court was not dealing with a mercantile dispute such as in the present case. In Shree Ram Mills Ltd (supra), this Court found that the parties were continuously at loggerheads over joint development of certain land. They had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to settle their dispute, however the respondent cancelled this Memorandum; hence the dispute was referred to arbitration under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act. This Court, upon considering the complete history of negotiation between the parties which was placed before it, on the facts of that case, concluded that the claim would not be barred by limitation as there was a continuing cause of action between the parties. Having perused through the relevant precedents, we agree that on a certain set of facts and circumstances, the period during which the parties were bona fide negotiating towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, in such cases the entire negotiation history between the parties must be specifically pleaded and placed on the record. The Court upon careful consideration of such history must find out what was the breaking point at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This breaking point would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The threshold for determining when such a point arises will be lower in the case of commercial disputes, where the partys primary interest is in securing the payment due to them, than in family disputes where it may be said that the parties have a greater stake in settling the dispute amicably, and therefore delaying formal adjudication of the claim. Moreover, in a commercial dispute, while mere failure to pay may not give rise to a cause of action, once the applicant has asserted their claim and the respondent fails to respond to such claim, such failure will be treated as a denial of the applicants claim giving rise to a dispute, and therefore the cause of action for reference to arbitration. It does not lie to the applicant to plead that waited for an unreasonably long period to refer the dispute to arbitration merely on account of the respondents failure to settle their claim and because they were writing representations and reminders to the respondent in the meanwhile. 11. We are of the considered opinion that the decisions in Hari Shankar Singhania and Shree Ram Mills Ltd. (supra) will not be applicable to the appellants case as in these cases the entire negotiation history of the parties had been made available to this Court. In the present case, the appellant company vaguely stated before this Court that it was involved in negotiation with the respondents in the 14 years preceding the application dated 4.10.1997 before the Settlement Committee. However it did not place on record any evidence to show when it had first made a representation to the respondent in respect of the outstanding amounts, and what was the history of their negotiation with the respondents such that it was only in 1997 that they thought of approaching the Settlement Committee. Further, they have not brought anything on record to show that they were required to proceed before the Settlement Committee before requesting the appointment of an arbitrator. The arbitration clause does not stipulate any such requirement. We therefore find that the appellant companys case has a certain element of mala fide in so far as it has made detailed submissions in respect of its communications with the respondents subsequent to 4.10.1997, but has remained conspicuously silent on the specific actions taken to recover the payments due prior to that date. Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 this Court can presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. Hence, in the absence of specific pleadings and evidence placed on record by the appellant with respect to the parties negotiation history, this Court cannot accept the appellants contention that it was only after the respondents letter dated 18.12.1999 that the appellant could have contemplated arbitration in relation to the outstanding amounts. Even if we were to include the time spent proceeding before the Settlement Committee, the limitation period, at the latest, would have started running from 4.10.1997 which is when the appellant made a representation to the Settlement Committee and the Committee failed to respond to the same. It is further relevant to note that even the respondents letter dated 18.12.1999 does not completely repudiate the appellants claims but requests the submission of certain documents for verification. Hence it was not so radical a departure from the prevailing situation at that time so as to give a finding that the appellant could not have contemplated arbitration prior to the aforesaid letter. We also find it pertinent to add that the appellants own default in sleeping over his right for 14 years will not constitute a case of undue hardship justifying extension of time under Section 43(3) of the 1996 Act or show sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appellant should have approached the Court for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8(2) of the 1940 Act within the appropriate limitation period. We agree with the High Courts observation that the entire dispute seems concocted so as to pursue a monetary claim against the respondents, taking advantage of the provisions of the 1996 Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is settled law that the date of commencement of arbitration proceedings for the purpose of deciding which Act applies, upon a conjoint reading of Sections 21 and Section 85(2)(a) of the 1996 Act, shall be regarded as the date on which notice was served to the other party requesting appointment of an arbitrator (See Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd, (2004) 7 SCC 288 ; Shettys Constructions Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Konkan Railway Construction and Another, (1998) 5 SCC 599 )Though strictly speaking the 1996 Act came into force from 22.8.1996, for all practical purposes it is deemed to have been effective from 25.1.1996, which is when the Arbitration and Conciliation Ordinance, 1996 came into force. Hence if the date of notice was prior to 25.1.1996, the 1940 Act will apply. If the date of notice was on or after 25.1.1996, the 1996 Act will apply to the arbitral proceedings though the arbitration clause contemplated proceedings under the 1940 Act (See Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2001) 6 SCC 356 : O.P. Malhotra on The Law and Practice of Arbitration, Justice Indu Malhotra ed., 3 rd . edn, 2014 at page 1915). In Milkfood Ltd (supra) as well, the arbitration agreement was governed by the provisions of the 1940 Act. The appellant sent a notice to the respondent for appointment of an arbitrator on 14.9.1995. Hence this Court held that the 1940 Act would applyIn the present case, since notice was served to the respondent in 2002, the provisions of the 1996 Act will be deemed to apply to the present Arbitration Applications filed by the appellantWe also find the decision in Panchu Gopal Bose (supra) relevant for the purpose of this case. This was a case similar to the present set of facts, where the petitioner sent bills to the respondent in 1979, but payment was not made. After an interval of a decade, he sent a notice to the respondent in 1989 for reference to arbitration. This Court in Panchu Gopal Bose observed that in mercantile references of this kind, it is implied that the arbitrator must decide the dispute according to the existing law of contract, and every defence which would have been open to the parties in a court of law, such as the plea of limitation, would be open to the parties for the arbitrators decision as well. Otherwise, as this Court observed:8…a claim for breach of contract containing a reference clause could be brought at any time, it might be 20 or 30 years after the cause of action had arisen, although the legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of such a claim in any application that might be made to the law courts…This Court further held as follows:11. Therefore, the period of limitation for the commencement of arbitration runs from the date on which, had there been no arbitration clause, the cause of action would have accrued. Just as in the case of civil actions the claim is not to be brought after the expiration of a specified number of years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, so in the case of arbitrations, the claim is not to be put forward after the expiration of the specified number of years from the date when the claim accruedTherefore in Panchu Gopal Bose this Court held that the claim is hopelessly barred by limitation as the petitioner by his own conduct had slept over his right for more than 10 years8. Undoubtedly, a different scheme has been evolved under the 1996 Act. However we find that the same principles continue to apply with respect to the applicability of the law of limitation to an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act as laid down in the decisions dealing with judicial appointment of an arbitrator under Sections 8 and 20 of the 1940 ActOur finding is supported by the decision of a three¬Judge Bench of this Court in Grasim Industries (supra). In Grasim Industries, similar to the present case, the arbitration agreement provided for reference to be made under the 1940 Act. However the appellant raised their claim in 2002, attracting the application of the 1996 Act. This Court was therefore faced with the issue of whether an application for appointment of an arbitrator under the 1996 Act would be barred by limitation in respect of the appellants claim. This Court found that, in view of Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the parties in the arbitration agreement could not stipulate a restricted period for raising a claim. However, the limitation period for invocation of arbitration would be three years from the date of the cause of action under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. However in the facts of that case, this Court found that certain claims had arisen within the three year limitation period and hence, could be allowedApplying the aforementioned principles to the present case, we find ourselves in agreement with the finding of the High Court that the appellants cause of action in respect of Arbitration Applications Nos. 25/2003 and 27/2003, relating to the work orders dated 7.10.1979 and 4.4.1980 arose on 8.2.1983, which is when the final bill handed over to the respondent became due. Mere correspondence of the appellant by way of writing letters/reminders to the respondent subsequent to this date would not extend the time of limitation. Hence the maximum period during which this Court could have allowed the appellants application for appointment of an arbitrator is 3 years from the date on which cause of action arose i.e. 8.2.1986. Similarly, with respect to Arbitration Application Nos. 28/2003 relating to the work order dated 3.5.1985, the respondent has stated that final bill was handed over and became due on 10.8.1989. This has not been disputed by the appellant. Hence the limitation period ended on 10.8.1992Since the appellant served notice for appointment of arbitrator in 2002, and requested the appointment of an arbitrator before a Court only by the end of 2003, his claim is clearly barred by limitation9. The decisions relied upon by the appellant are inapplicable to the present facts and circumstances. At the outset, we observe that the decision in Sunder Kukreja (supra) is on a different set of facts. In that decision, the question before this Court was whether the arbitration clause in a partnership deed would continue to subsist in light of a subsequent retirement deed which the appellant denied executing, and whether the arbitrator appointed by the Court could examine the genuineness of the said retirement deed. Hence it is not relevant to the issue of limitationTurning to the other decisions, it is true that in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi (supra), this Court observed that the existence of a dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator. A dispute arises when a claim is asserted by one party and denied by the other. The term dispute entails a positive element and mere inaction to pay does not lead to the inference that dispute exists. In that case, since the respondent failed to finalise the bills due to the applicant, this Court held that cause of action would be treated as arising not from the date on which the payment became due, but on the date when the applicant first wrote to the respondent requesting finalisation of the bills. However, the Court also expressly observed that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending remindersIn the present case, the appellant has not disputed the High Courts finding that the appellant itself had handed over the final bill to the respondent on 8.2.1983. Hence, the holding in Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi (supra) will not apply, as in that case, the applicants claim was delayed on account of the respondents failure to finalize the bills. Therefore the right to apply in the present case accrued from the date on which the final bill was raised (See Union of India v. Momin Construction Company, (1997) 9 SCC 97 )Having perused through the relevant precedents, we agree that on a certain set of facts and circumstances, the period during which the parties were bona fide negotiating towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, in such cases the entire negotiation history between the parties must be specifically pleaded and placed on the record. The Court upon careful consideration of such history must find out what was the breaking point at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This breaking point would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The threshold for determining when such a point arises will be lower in the case of commercial disputes, where the partys primary interest is in securing the payment due to them, than in family disputes where it may be said that the parties have a greater stake in settling the dispute amicably, and therefore delaying formal adjudication of the claimMoreover, in a commercial dispute, while mere failure to pay may not give rise to a cause of action, once the applicant has asserted their claim and the respondent fails to respond to such claim, such failure will be treated as a denial of the applicants claim giving rise to a dispute, and therefore the cause of action for reference to arbitration. It does not lie to the applicant to plead that waited for an unreasonably long period to refer the dispute to arbitration merely on account of the respondents failure to settle their claim and because they were writing representations and reminders to the respondent in the meanwhile11. We are of the considered opinion that the decisions in Hari Shankar Singhania and Shree Ram Mills Ltd. (supra) will not be applicable to the appellants case as in these cases the entire negotiation history of the parties had been made available to this Court. In the present case, the appellant company vaguely stated before this Court that it was involved in negotiation with the respondents in the 14 years preceding the application dated 4.10.1997 before the Settlement Committee. However it did not place on record any evidence to show when it had first made a representation to the respondent in respect of the outstanding amounts, and what was the history of their negotiation with the respondents such that it was only in 1997 that they thought of approaching the Settlement Committee. Further, they have not brought anything on record to show that they were required to proceed before the Settlement Committee before requesting the appointment of an arbitrator. The arbitration clause does not stipulate any such requirementWe therefore find that the appellant companys case has a certain element of mala fide in so far as it has made detailed submissions in respect of its communications with the respondents subsequent to 4.10.1997, but has remained conspicuously silent on the specific actions taken to recover the payments due prior to that date. Under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 this Court can presume that evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds itHence, in the absence of specific pleadings and evidence placed on record by the appellant with respect to the parties negotiation history, this Court cannot accept the appellants contention that it was only after the respondents letter dated 18.12.1999 that the appellant could have contemplated arbitration in relation to the outstanding amounts. Even if we were to include the time spent proceeding before the Settlement Committee, the limitation period, at the latest, would have started running from 4.10.1997 which is when the appellant made a representation to the Settlement Committee and the Committee failed to respond to the sameIt is further relevant to note that even the respondents letter dated 18.12.1999 does not completely repudiate the appellants claims but requests the submission of certain documents for verification. Hence it was not so radical a departure from the prevailing situation at that time so as to give a finding that the appellant could not have contemplated arbitration prior to the aforesaid letterWe also find it pertinent to add that the appellants own default in sleeping over his right for 14 years will not constitute a case of undue hardship justifying extension of time under Section 43(3) of the 1996 Act or show sufficient cause for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The appellant should have approached the Court for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8(2) of the 1940 Act within the appropriate limitation period. We agree with the High Courts observation that the entire dispute seems concocted so as to pursue a monetary claim against the respondents, taking advantage of the provisions of the 1996 Act.