Case: K. Narasimhah Vs. H. C. Singri Gowda

the courts decision that the provisions of Art. 320(3) (c) are not mandatory. Naturally, strong reliance has been placed on this decision on behalf of the respondents. It is pointed out that while providing that three clear days notice of special general meeting shall be given to the Councillors, the legislature said in the same breath that in cases of great urgency, notice of such shorter, period as is reasonable should be given to the Councillors of a special general meeting. The decision of what should be considered to be a case of great urgency was left entirely to the President or the Vice-President on whom the duty to call such a meeting is given under S. 27(2). It is urged by the learned Counsel that if the intention of the legislature had been to make the service of three clear days notice mandatory it would not have left the discretion of giving notice for a shorter period for some of the special general meetings in this manner. We see considerable force in this argument. The very fact that while three clear days notice is not to be given of all special general meetings and for some such meetings notice only of such shorter period as is reasonable has to be given justifies the conclusion that the three clear days mentioned in the section was given by the legislature as only a measure of what it considered reasonable. 14. It is necessary also to remember that the main object of giving the notice is to make it possible for the Councillors to so arrange their other business as to be able to attend the meeting. For an ordinary general meeting the notice provided is of seven clear days. That is expected to give enough time for the purpose. But a lesser period-of three clear days-is considered sufficient for special general meetings generally. The obvious reason for providing a shorter period of such meetings is that these are considered more important meetings and Councillors are expected to make it convenient to attend these meetings even at the cost of some inconvenience to themselves. Where the special general meeting is to dispose of some matter of great urgency it is considered that a period of even less than three clear days notice would be sufficient. 15. A consideration of the object of these provisions and the manner in which the object is sought to be achieved indicates that while the legislature did intend that ordinarily the notice as mentioned should be given it could not have intended that the fact that the notice is of less than the period mentioned in the section and thus the Councillors had less time than is ordinarily considered reasonable to arrange his other business to be free to attend the meeting, should have the serious result of making the proceedings of the meeting invalid. 16. It is important to notice in this connection one of the provisions in S. 36 of the Act. It is in these words:- No resolution of a municipal council or any committee appointed under this Act shall be deemed invalid on account of any irregularity in the service of notice upon any councillor or member provided that the proceedings of the municipal council or committee were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity. 17. It is reasonable to think that the service of notice mentioned in this provision refers to the giving of notice to the Councillors. Quite clearly, any irregularity in the manner of giving the notice would be covered by the words irregularity in the service of the notice upon any Councillor. It appears to us, however, reasonable to think that in making such a provision in S. 36 the legislature was not thinking only of irregularity of the mode of service but also of the omission to give notice of the full period as required. 18. It is interesting to notice in this connection that the English law as regards meetings of borough councils and country councils contain a specific provision that want of service of a summons to attend the meeting (which is required to be served on every member of the council) will not affect the validity of the meeting. It may be presumed that the legislature which enacted the Mysore Town Municipalities Act. 1951, was aware of these provisions in English law. It has not gone to the length of saying that the failure to serve the notice will not make the meeting invalid. It has instead said that any irregularity in the service of notice would not make a resolution of the Council invalid provided that the proceedings were not prejudicially affected by such irregularity. The logic of making such a provision in respect of irregularity in the service of notice becomes strong if the fact that the notice given was short of the required period is considered an irregularity. 19. The existence of this provision in S. 36 is a further reason for thinking that the provision as regards any motion or proposition of which notice must be given in S. 27(3) is only directory and not mandatory. 20. We are, therefore, of opinion that the fact that some of the Councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did not by itself make the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution passed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated, nineteen of the twenty Councillors attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no-confidence against the appellant. There is thus absolutely no reason for thinking that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the irregularity in the service of notice. 21. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the failure to give three clear days notice to some of the Councillors did not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no confidence passed there against the appellant.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]As regards the petitioners contention that the meeting was not held in accordance with law as he was not allowed to preside, we are of opinion, on a consideration of what material there is on the record, that it was after he left the meeting that the Vice-President took the chair and thereafter the no confidence resolution was moved and passed. There can therefore be no question of any contravention of the requirement that the President shall preside9. There is, in our opinion, no substance also in the contention that the proviso to S. 23(9) was contravenedWe find it difficult to agree with the High Court that sending the notice amounts to giving the noticeAdmittedly, the notice was signed by more thand of the whole number of Councillors. It is said, however, that fifteen days notice of the intention to move the resolution was not given. This argument which Mr. Iyengar addressed to us but which does not appear to have been urged before the Highs on the assumption that fifteen days notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given not only to the President but also to the other Councillors. We do not think that that assumption is justified. In our opinion, what is required is that fifteen days notice of the intention to move the resolution has to be given to the President. In other words, all that is required is that before the resolution is actually moved the President has got fifteen days notice. In the present case, the meeting was held on October 14, and the President received the notice on the 25th September. There was thus more than 15 days notice given to him11.Giving of anything as ordinarily understood in the English language is not complete unless it has reached the hands of the person to whom it has to be given. In the eye of law however giving is complete in many matters where it has been offered to a person but not accepted by him. Tendering of a notice is in law therefore giving of a notice even though the person to whom it is tendered refuses to accept it. We can find however no authority or principle for the proposition that as soon as the person with a legal duty to give the notice despatches the notice to the address of the person to whom it has to be given, the giving is complete. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was wrong in thinking that the notices were given to all the Councillors on the 10th October. In our opinion, the notice given to five of the Councillors was of less than three clear daysThe use of the word shall is not conclusive on the question. As in all the other matters of statutory construction the decision of this question depends on the ascertainment of the legislatures intention. Was it the legislatures intention in making the provision that the failure to comply with it shall have the consequence of making what is done invalid in law? That is the question to be answered. To ascertain the intention the Court has to examine carefully the object of the statute, the consequence that may follow from insisting on a strict observance of the particular provision and above all the general scheme of the other provisions of which it forms a partWe see considerable force in this argument. The very fact that while three clear days notice is not to be given of all special general meetings and for some such meetings notice only of such shorter period as is reasonable has to be given justifies the conclusion that the three clear days mentioned in the section was given by the legislature as only a measure of what it considered reasonable19. The existence of this provision in S. 36 is a further reason for thinking that the provision as regards any motion or proposition of which notice must be given in S. 27(3) is only directory and not mandatory20. We are, therefore, of opinion that the fact that some of the Councillors received less than three clear days notice of the meeting did not by itself make the proceedings of the meeting or the resolution passed there invalid. These would be invalid only if the proceedings were prejudicially affected by such irregularity. As already stated, nineteen of the twenty Councillors attended the meeting. Of these 19, 15 voted in favour of the resolution of no-confidence against the appellant. There is thus absolutely no reason for thinking that the proceedings of the meeting were prejudicially affected by the irregularity in the service of notice21. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the failure to give three clear days notice to some of the Councillors did not affect the validity of the meeting or the resolution of no confidence passed there against the appellant.