Case: New Prakash Transport Company Limited Vs. New Suwarna Transport Company Limited

the Archbishop of Canterbury reviewing the order of the Bishops refused to approve the clerk presented by the patron to a benefice. Acting under S.3 of the Benefices (Exercise of the Rights of Presentation) Measure, 1931, the Court repe1led the argument on behalf of the disappointed patron that as the decision involved a deprivation of property rights there was an obligation upon the Archbishop to act in a quasi judicial manner. Lord Greene, M.R., who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed that there was no "justification for regarding the matter when it comes before the Archbishop as in any sense, or by any remote analogy, a lis inter partes". Hence the Court on a true construction of S.3 of the Measure came to the conclusion that the, Archbishop was not required to arrive at his decision by conducting a quasi-judicial enquiry. This case, therefore, is an authority for the proposition that simply because property rights are involved, the authorities charged with the duty of deciding claims to such rights are not necessarily, apart from the provisions of the statute, required to function as quasi judicial tribunals.21. As already pointed out, the Appellate Authority had to function in a quasi judicial capacity in accordance with the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act. That Act has made ample provisions for safeguarding the interests of rival claimants for permits. The provisions of the Act were examined in detail by a Bench of five Judges of this Court in the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., l952 SCR 583: (AIR 1952 SC 192 ) (K). This Court examined elaborately the provisions of the Act vis-a-vis the authorities created by the Act to administer its provisions relating to the grant of stage carriage permits. It also examined how far the High Court exercising its special powers to issue writs under Art. 226 of the Constitution could interfere with the orders made by those authorities. In the course of its judgment this Court made the following observations at page 596, which are very relevant to the present purpose:"Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had".22. Keeping in view the observation of this Court quoted above and the principles of natural justice discussed in the several authorities of the highest Courts in England, we have to see how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder justify the criticism of the High Court that the Appellate Authority did not give full and effective opportunity to the first respondent to present his point of view before it.As already indicated, the statutory provisions do not contemplate that either the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority had to record evidence or to proceed as if they were functioning as a Court of low. They had to decide between a number of applicants as to which of them was suitable for the grant of the fresh permit applied for. They took into, consideration all the relevant matters and came to their decision which has not been attacked as partial or perverse. The only ground which survived before the Appellate Bench of the High Court was that the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied. The only question that we have to determine is whether the Appellate Authority was justified in using the second report made by the police, though it had not been placed into the hands of the parties. That report did not directly contain any allegations against the first respondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it, could be called upon to meet. The only effect of that report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that the Appellate Authority had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out that no grievance was made at the time the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal by any of the parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to have a further opportunity of looking into that report and to controvert any matter contain therein. They did not move the Appellate Authority for the adjournment of the hearing in order to enable it to meet any of the statements made in that report. But the learned counsel for the respondent suggested that the requirements of natural justice could not be waived by any of the parties and that it was incumbent upon the Appellate Authority to observe the so-called rules of natural justice. In our opinion, there is no warrant for such a proposition. Even in a Court of law a party is not entitled to raise the question at the appellate stage that he should have been granted an adjournment which he did not pray for in the Court of first instance. Far less, such a claim can be entertained in an appeal from a tribunal which is not a Court of justice, but a statutory body functioning in a quasi judicial way.23. For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view of the legal position.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]At the outset we may observe that, in our opinion, there is no substance in the second ground sought to be resuscitated in this Court by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent. Error apparent on the face of the record in the context of this case must mean an assumption of facts which are not borne out by the record. We are not concerned with other grounds which may in the context of each particular case support a contention of error apparent on the face of the record. In this case if there was any such error, it was with reference to the two police reports. As observed by the Appellate Bench of the High Court, though the language used by the Appellate Authority with regard to strict grammatical construction may refer to the first police report, it was difficult to hold that the matters referred to in the order challenged before the High Court were not contained in the subsequent report submitted by the police at the instance of the appellant. The judgement under appeal did not take the view that there was any such mistake apparent on the face of the record as was contended for on behalf of the first respondent. We have been referred to the orders of the Appellate Authority as read by the Appellate Bench of the High Court and, in our opinion, no such mistake has been shown to have vitiated the orders impugned before the Highwill thus be seen that though the substantive section creating the right of appeal does not in terms create any right in a respondent to be heard, the rules framed providing for the procedure before the Appellate Authority contemplate that sufficient notice shall be given to "any other person interested in the appeal" which expression must include persons other than the appellant who may be interested in being heard against the points raised in support of the appeal. Neither the sections nor the rules framed under the Act contemplate anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in the usual way as in courts of law. Besides the parties interested in the grant of stage carriage permits or those interested against it, the police authority of the locality, is also entitled to be heard both at the original stage and at the appellate stage.8. Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder with particular reference to the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Authority, do not contemplate anything like a regular hearing in a court of justice. No elaborate procedure has been prescribed as to how the parties interested have to be heard in connection with the question, who is to be granted a stage carriageRegional Transport Authority is charged with the duty of granting or refusing a stage carriage permit, only to mention the matter with which we are immediately concerned. In that connection the statute requires that authority to have regard to the matters set forth in S. 47 of the Act, as already indicated. The police authority within whose local jurisdiction any part of the proposed route lies, has also been given the right to make representations. But the police report submitted to the Regional Transport Authority or to the Appellate Authority, if it requires the police authority to do so, is not intended to be anything more than an expression of opinion by an authority interested in the maintenance of law and order, with particular reference to the question as to whether any of the applicants for a permit had anything to its credit or discredit as supplier of transport facilities. Such a report is meant more for the use of the authority in making or refusing a grant than for the use of the several applicants or any one of them. In other words, it is in the nature of information supplied by the police in order to assist the authority in making up itsour opinion, the High Court has made a number of assumptions in making those observations which do not appear to be justified by the scheme of the legislation we are dealing with or by any a priori considerations of what has been characterised as "natural justice". The Tribunal in question was not administering justice as a court of law, though while deciding as between that rival claims of the applicants for a permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner.But a tribunal even acting "judicially" is not obliged to grant an adjournment suo motu without any application on behalf of any of the parties interested. We do not find that any of the parties made at that time any grievance about the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority. But the question appears to have been raised for the first time before the High Court after the Appellate Tribunal had decided to grant the permit to thein our opinion, there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of the police report to be furnished to any of the parties, nor was there any circumstance necessitating the adjournment of the hearing of the appeal, particularly when no request for such an adjournment had been made either by the first respondent or by any other party. At that time none of the parties appears to have made any grievance about the police report only being read out by the Chairman, or any request being made for an adjournment in order to adduce evidence pro and con. The rules framed under Chapter IV for "the conduct and hearing of the appeals that may be preferred under this chapter" (S. 68(2)(b)) do not contemplate any such facilities being granted to the parties, though it is open to the Appellate Authority to make any such "further enquiry, if any, as it may deemreport did not directly contain any allegations against the first respondent. Hence there was nothing in that report which it, could be called upon to meet. The only effect of that report was that many of the objections raised against the suitability of the appellant had been withdrawn by the police on further consideration of their records. The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned with the granting of permits than for the use of the several applicants for such permits. In our opinion, therefore, the fact that the Appellate Authority had read out the contents of the police report was enough compliance with the rules of natural justice. We have also pointed out that no grievance was made at the time the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal by any of the parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to have a further opportunity of looking into that report and to controvert any matter contain therein.For the reasons aforesaid, in our opinion, the judgment under appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we are further of the opinion that the judgment of the learned single Judge of that Court had taken the more correct view of the legal position.