Case: The Nandlal Bhandari Mills Ltd.,Indore Vs. The State Of Madhya Bharat

the Cabinet and were promulgated by a notification in the Gazette as part of the Rules. The mode followed in 1926 and 1927 was repeated in 1932 and 1933 also presumable also 1931, though the notification of that year has not been printed in the record of this case. 9. This view was taken by the Full Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court in Rajkumar Mills Ltd. v Madhya Bharat State AIR 1953 Madh. B. 135. The question which is involved in these appeals also arose in that case. It was observed by the Full Bench:"This Notification makes it abundantly clear that His Highness the Maharaja ordered that the industrial tax due on the amount of the managing agents commission on profits be recovered. This being an order of the ruler, who enjoyed sovereign powers that order is not open to challenge. This is a mandate emanating from a sovereign and as such has the force of law. This Court has therefore, no power to go behind the order and enquire as to whether the managing agents commission on profits is an item of expenditure solely incurred for the purpose of earning profits or not. In this view of the matter the point at issue is concluded by Huzur Shri Shanker Order No. 173 dated 29th June, 1933." This view was affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the judgment under appeal. 10. In our judgment, the two notifications cannot be described as "judicial interpretation." If anything, they must be interpreted as legislative exposition of R. 3 (2)(ix) and in the nature of an explanation. This Court in Ameer-un-nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum AIR 1955 SC 352 , in dealing with the Firmans of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, observed as follows :"It cannot be disputed that prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The Firmans were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; -- nay, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular Firmans held the field, that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later Firman at any time that the Nizam willed." The same can be said of the Ruler of the Holker State. When to the order of the Ruler was added the usual mode of making and promulgating rules, the position which emerges is really unassailable. 11. Mr. Desai in attempting to show that the ruling does not apply to the case, raised two contentions. The first was based upon a more recent decision of this Court in Madhaorao v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1961 SC 298 , where certain Kalambandis of the Maharaja of Gwalior were considered. This Court in deciding whether the Kalambandis were existing law under Art. 372 of the Constitution observed :"In dealing with the question as to whether the orders issued by such an absolute monarch amount to a law or regulation having the force of law, or whether they constitute merely administrative orders, it is important to bear in mind that the distinction between executive orders and legislative commands is likely to be merely academic where the Ruler is the source of all power. There was no constitutional limitation upon the authority of the Ruler to act in any capacity he liked; he would be the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and all his orders, however issued, would have the force of law and would govern and regulate the affairs of the State including the rights of its citizens." It was, however, pointed out in the case that even where an order is issued by the sovereign ruler, one must look to the character of the order and its content to find out whether it enacted a binding rule. Mr. Desai has constructed his entire argument on the basis of these observations, and has contended that the orders only expressed an opinion and did not bind. He pointed out as the second limb of his argument that these notifications were not expressed as a rule but as an order, and that they did not seek to amend the rules, nor to add to them. He referred to other notification in which a legislative act was clearly discernible, as for example, Notification No. 22/Com. dated May 17,1946, by which for the existing. Rule 4, a new Rule was substituted. An examination of the Rules, however, shows that there was no set pattern of language. Some of the Rules do not read line rules at all. Notes have been appended to the rules, which are not rules proper, and R. 29 says :"All matters not dealt with in these rules may be submitted to the member-in-charge, Commerce and Industry Department for decision". The existence of such a rule seems to obliterate the frontiers between legislative, judicial and executive exercise of the power of a State, such as we understand it. There being no invariable use of a clear-cut legislative language, each general order emanating from the sovereign ruler and promulgated in the same manner as any other rule and having its roots in a resolution of the Cabinet must be regarded as one binding upon the subject. This is the purport of the decisions of this Court, and the present case falls in line with those which have been previously decided. There is nothing in the content, the character or the nature of these notifications, which would put them on a level lower than the Rules, which had been earlier promulgated.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]6. It seems that, as a result of this decision, a notification was issued in August. 1931, and another on February 2 /3, 1932 by the Commerce and Industry Department of the Holkar State8. All this would of course be pertinent to consider, if there was no legislative enactment on the subject. If the matter was not one concluded by law, then there would be room for judicial interpretation of the Rule. The rival claims in these appeals are thus confined to the legislative force of the notifications issued in 1931, 1932 and 1933 respectivelyIn so far as the legislative supremacy of the Cabinet was concerned, no question was raised before us.10. In our judgment, the two notifications cannot be described as "judicial interpretation." If anything, they must be interpreted as legislative exposition of R. 3 (2)(ix) and in the nature of an explanationThe same can be said of the Ruler of the Holker State. When to the order of the Ruler was added the usual mode of making and promulgating rules, the position which emerges is really unassailableexamination of the Rules, however, shows that there was no set pattern of language. Some of the Rules do not read line rules at allThe existence of such a rule seems to obliterate the frontiers between legislative, judicial and executive exercise of the power of a State, such as we understand it. There being no invariable use of a clear-cut legislative language, each general order emanating from the sovereign ruler and promulgated in the same manner as any other rule and having its roots in a resolution of the Cabinet must be regarded as one binding upon the subject. This is the purport of the decisions of this Court, and the present case falls in line with those which have been previously decided. There is nothing in the content, the character or the nature of these notifications, which would put them on a level lower than the Rules, which had been earlier promulgated.