Case: State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Yakinuddin

agreements entered into by the outgoing proprietors.8. It would thus appear that in view of the two later decisions of this Court, the High Court was in error in granting any relief to the respondents. But it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that certain aspects of the controversy had not been brought to the notice of the Court on the previous occasion, and that the respondents were entitled to the benefit of S. 6 of the Act. It was contended that the respondents rights were not in the nature of mere licences, but were in the nature of profits a prendre, which were saved to them in view of the provisions of S. 6.9. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the respondents. Under S. 3 of the Act, from the date of the notification by the State, all proprietary rights in an estate vesting in a proprietor of such an estate or in a person having interest in such proprietary rights through the proprietor, shall vest in the State for the purposes of the State, free from all encumbrances. The consequences of such a vesting are laid down in S. 4, which runs into several clauses and sub-sections. Section 4 (1) (a) is the relevant provision of the Act which determines this controversy entirely against the respondents. It provides that "when the notification under S. 3 in respect of any area has been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or document or in any other law for the time being in force, and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall . . . ensue, namely, (a) all rights, title and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grass land, scrub jungle, forest, trees ..shall cease and be vested in the State for the purposes of the State tree of all encumbrances . . ," (We have omitted the words which are not necessary for the purposes of the present appeals). It is clear on a bare reading of the provisions of cl. (a) of S. 4 (1) that whatever rights the proprietor, or a person claiming interest through him, had in the trees, scrub jungle, forest, etc., ceased on the vesting of the estate in the State.10. But it was contended on behalf of the respondents that S. 6 (1) saves their rights from the operation of S. 4 (1) (a), because, it is argued, S. 4 (1) (a) is subject to the provisions of S. 6 (1). Section 6 (1) runs as follows:"6 (1) Except as provided in sub-section (2), the transfer of any right in the property which is liable to vest in the State under this Act made by the proprietor at any time after the 16th March 1950 shall, as from the date of vesting, be void."In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Section 6 refers to those transactions of transfer of any right which is liable to vest in the State as being void. It does not lay down that a transfer made before 16th March 1950, shall be binding upon the State. The transfers which have been saved by S. 6 (1) from being void may be recognised by the State for which the transferee may be entitled to claim some compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But S. 6 does not save that interest from being vested in the State as a result of the notification under S. 3, read with S. 4 (1) (a). The scheme of the Act is that it provides for the acquisition by the State of all interests in the estate of the proprietor himself or of an intermediary, except the tiller of the soil. This it does by vesting all proprietary rights in the State, of whatever grade, by issuing the notification under S. 3, vesting it in the State for the purposes of the State free from all encumbrances. Section 4 lays down in great detail the rights which become extinguished on the vesting of the estate as aforesaid. What is saved to the proprietor or any other person claiming through him is set out in S. 5, cls. (a) to (h), on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State. Hence any person claiming some interest as a proprietor or as holding through a proprietor in respect of any proprietary interest in an estate has got to bring his interest within S. 5, because on the date of vesting of the estate, the Deputy Commissioner takes charge of all lands other than occupied lands and homestead, and of all interests vesting in the State under S. 3. Upon such taking over of possession, the State becomes liable to pay the compensation provided for in S. 8 and the succeeding sections. The respondents have not been able to show that their interests come under any of the clauses aforesaid of S. 5.11. A great deal of argument was advanced on behalf of the respondents showing the distinction between a bare licence and a licence coupled with grant or profits a prendre. But, in our opinion, it is not necessary to discuss those fine distinctions because whatever may have been the nature of the grant by the outgoing proprietors in favour of the respondents those grants had no legal effect as against the State, except in so far as the State may have recognised them. But the provisions of the Act leave no manner of doubt that the rights claimed by the respondents could not have been enforced against the State, if the latter was not prepared to respect those rights and the rights created by the transactions between the respondents and their grantors did not come within any of the saving clauses of S. 5.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the respondents. Under S. 3 of the Act, from the date of the notification by the State, all proprietary rights in an estate vesting in a proprietor of such an estate or in a person having interest in such proprietary rights through the proprietor, shall vest in the State for the purposes of the State, free from all encumbrances. The consequences of such a vesting are laid down in S. 4, which runs into several clauses and sub-sections. Section 4 (1) (a) is the relevant provision of the Act which determines this controversy entirely against the respondents. It provides that "when the notification under S. 3 in respect of any area has been published in the Gazette, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract, grant or document or in any other law for the time being in force, and save as otherwise provided in this Act, the consequences as hereinafter set forth shall . . . ensue, namely, (a) all rights, title and interest vesting in the proprietor or any person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grass land, scrub jungle, forest, trees ..shall cease and be vested in the State for the purposes of the State tree of all encumbrances . . ," (We have omitted the words which are not necessary for the purposes of the present appeals). It is clear on a bare reading of the provisions of cl. (a) of S. 4 (1) that whatever rights the proprietor, or a person claiming interest through him, had in the trees, scrub jungle, forest, etc., ceased on the vesting of the estate in theour opinion, there is no substance in this contention. Section 6 refers to those transactions of transfer of any right which is liable to vest in the State as being void. It does not lay down that a transfer made before 16th March 1950, shall be binding upon the State. The transfers which have been saved by S. 6 (1) from being void may be recognised by the State for which the transferee may be entitled to claim some compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But S. 6 does not save that interest from being vested in the State as a result of the notification under S. 3, read with S. 4 (1) (a). The scheme of the Act is that it provides for the acquisition by the State of all interests in the estate of the proprietor himself or of an intermediary, except the tiller of the soil. This it does by vesting all proprietary rights in the State, of whatever grade, by issuing the notification under S. 3, vesting it in the State for the purposes of the State free from all encumbrances. Section 4 lays down in great detail the rights which become extinguished on the vesting of the estate as aforesaid. What is saved to the proprietor or any other person claiming through him is set out in S. 5, cls. (a) to (h), on such terms and conditions as may be determined by the State. Hence any person claiming some interest as a proprietor or as holding through a proprietor in respect of any proprietary interest in an estate has got to bring his interest within S. 5, because on the date of vesting of the estate, the Deputy Commissioner takes charge of all lands other than occupied lands and homestead, and of all interests vesting in the State under S. 3. Upon such taking over of possession, the State becomes liable to pay the compensation provided for in S. 8 and the succeeding sections. The respondents have not been able to show that their interests come under any of the clauses aforesaid of S.in our opinion, it is not necessary to discuss those fine distinctions because whatever may have been the nature of the grant by the outgoing proprietors in favour of the respondents those grants had no legal effect as against the State, except in so far as the State may have recognised them. But the provisions of the Act leave no manner of doubt that the rights claimed by the respondents could not have been enforced against the State, if the latter was not prepared to respect those rights and the rights created by the transactions between the respondents and their grantors did not come within any of the saving clauses of S. 5.