Case: Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman &amp; Raman Ltd. And Others

urged two narrower grounds as sufficient for his purposes. Firstly, he urged that however wide the jurisdiction of the High Court might be under Art. 226, it could never exercise its powers under the Article in such a manner as to convert itself into a Court of appeal sitting in judgment over every tribunal or authority in the State discharging administrative or quasi-judicial functions. Secondly, he maintained that the Motor Vehicles Act with the rules framed thereunder dealing with the grant of permits is a self-contained code and that in respect of the rights and liabilities created by such a statute the manner of enforcement must be sought within the statute itself. It was further urged by him that in any event, the High Court could not substitute its own view or discretion for the view taken or discretion exercised by the specified authorities, even if it was erroneous or unsound.30. Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.31. Mr. Daphtary, who appeared for the respondent, said nothing to controvert this position. His argument was that if all along the authorities and the Government had proceeded upon a particular footing and dealt with the rights of the parties on that basis, it was not open to them afterwards to change front and give the go-by altogether to the conception of the rights of parties entertained, by them till then. According to him, there was manifest injustice to his client in allowing them to do so and this was the reason which impelled the High Court to make the order which is the subject-matter of challenge in this appeal.32. The Motor Vehicles Act is a statute which creates new rights and liabilities and prescribed an elaborate procedure for their regulation. No one is entitled to a permit as of right even if he satisfies all the prescribed conditions. The grant of a permit is entirely within the discretion of the transport authorities and naturally depends on several circumstances which have to be taken into account. The Regional Transport Authority and the Provincial Transport Authority are entrusted under S. 42 with this power. They may be described as administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions in the matter of the grant of permits. Under R. 3 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, the Regional Transport Authority is called the Road Traffic Board and the Provincial Transport Authority is called the Central Road Traffic Board. These bodies or authorities are constituted by the Provincial Government.33. The matters which are to be taken into account in granting or refusing a stage carriage permit are specified in S. 47. By delegation under R. 134-A, the Secretary of the Road Traffic Board may exercise certain powers as regards the grant or refusal of stage carriage permits and under R. 136, there is an appeal to the Board from these orders. Similar powers of delegation are vested in the Secretary to the Central Board and an appeal lies to the Central Board under R. 148 (1). From an original order of the Road Traffic Board there is an appeal to the Central Board and from the original orders of the Central Board to the Government, vide rules 147 and 148. An amendment introduced by the Madras Act XX (20) of 1948 and found as S. 64-A in the Act vests a power of revision in the Provincial Government.34. Besides this specific provision, there is a general provision in S. 43-A, that the Provincial Government may issue such orders and directions of a general character as it may consider necessary to the Provincial Transport authority or a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any matter relating to road transport; and such transport authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions. There is therefore, the regular hierarchy of administrative bodies established to deal with the regulation of Transport by means of motor vehicles.35. Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and prescribing appeals and revisions from subordinate bodies to higher authorities. The remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right.36. We are accordingly of opinion that this was not a case for interference with the discretion that was exercised by Transport Authorities paying regard to all the facts and the surrounding circumstances.37. Further, it will be noticed that the High Court here did not content itself with merely quashing the proceedings, it went further and directed the Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore, to grant to the petitioner permits in respect of the five buses in respect of which a joint application was made originally by the petitioner and Balasubramania Pillai and that in case the above buses have been condemned, the petitioner shall be at liberty to provide substitutes within such times as may be prescribed by the authorities.38. Such a direction was clearly in excess of its powers and jurisdiction.39.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Such writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a Court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to beremedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must generally be had. As observed already, the issue or refusal of permits is solely within the discretion of the transport authorities and it is not a matter of right.We are accordingly of opinion that this was not a case for interference with the discretion that was exercised by Transport Authorities paying regard to all the facts and the surrounding circumstances.