Case: Gajadhar Prasad &amp; Ors Vs. Babu Bhakta Ratan &amp; Ors

of one side. It is certainly not necessary for it to state its own estimate. If this were required, it may, to be fair, necessitate insertion of something like a summary of a judicially considered order, giving its grounds, in the sale proclamation which may confuse bidders. It may also be quite misleading if the Courts estimate is erroneous. Moreover, Rule 66 (2) (e) requires the Court to state only the facts it considers material for a purchaser to judge the value and nature of the property himself. Hence, the purchaser should be left to judge the value for himself. But. essential facts which have a being on the very material question of value of the property and which would assist the purchaser in forming his own opinion must be stated. That is, after all, the whole object of Order 21, Rule 66 (2) (e), Civil Procedure Code. The Court has only to decide what all these material particulars are in each case. We think that this is an obligation imposed by Rule 66 (2) (e). In discharging it, the Court should normally state the valuation given by both the decree-holder as well as the judgment debtor where they have both valued the property; and these do not appear fantastic. It may usefully state other material facts, such as the area of land, nature of rights in it, municipal assessment, actual rents realised, which could reasonably be expected to effect valuation. What could be reasonably and usefully stated succinctly in a sale proclamation has to be determined on the facts of each particular case. Inflexible rules are not desirable on such a question.16. In the case before us, the execution Court had practically accepted, as its own valuation, without indicating reasonable grounds for this preference, whatever the decree holders had asserted about the value of the property. It did not bother to seriously even consider the objections of the judgment-debtors. We think that the duty to consider what particulars should be inserted in the sale proclamation and how the sale ought to be conducted should be performed judicially and reasonably. If the execution Court does not, as it did not in the case before us, apply its mind or give any consideration whatsoever to the objections of the .judgment-debtor we think a material irregularity would be committed by the execution Court. It is not necessary for the execution Court to order the insertion of a judicially passed order in the sale proclamation itself, but, it should pass an order showing that it applied its mind to the need for determining all the essential particulars, which would reasonably be looked for by a purchaser, and which should be inserted in the sale proclamation. The order should show that it considered the objections. if any, of the decree-holders or the judgment debtors as the case may be. It should not merely accept unhesitatingly the ipse dixit of one side. We think that the execution Court had not performed its duty fairly and reasonably in this case. After embarking on the difficult task of valuation, it rejected the judgment-debtors figures by merely observing that they are exaggerated and practically accepted without hesitation whatever the decree-holders submitted, but this valuation was proved to be incorrect judged by the results of auction sales taken as a whole.17. Mr. J. N. Chatterji relied upon the following passage in Marudanavagam Pillai v. Manickavasakam Chettiar, AIR 1945 PC 67 at p. 70:"If the respondent knew the true facts, if he purchased at what he knew was too low a figure based on an upset price accepted by the Court owing to his own initial misrepresentation and subsequent suppression of material facts, his conduct would amount to fraud on the Court as the learned subordinate judge points out."18. It is not necessary for us to decide whether the decree-holders conduct in the case before us would amount to actual fraud practiced on the Court with regard to the valuation. The judgment-debtors were there with their own valuation and had even applied for the appointment of a Commissioner at their expense to report about matters affecting the value of the property. They had asserted that the two bungalows at Tej Bahadur Sapru Road would fetch a much higher value if sold separately: The execution court should have at least performed the duty of considering whether these objections were well founded.19. We find from a perusal of the sale proclamation in this case that even the area of the compound in which the two bungalows were situated was not there. The land in the compound is evidently nazool lease hold land but the unexpired period of the lease or rent payable on it are not mentioned. It was not stated whether the bungalows, which were valued separately, would be sold as one or two items of property. Probably, it was left to the Amin to exercise his own discretion in this matter as he had exercised it in the case of Colonel-gunj property. The cumulative effect of all the features of the case mentioned above is that we think that there was material irregularity here in the conduct of the execution sale of the two.20. We now turn to the question of substantial injury. The result of the separate sales of the houses in Colonelgunj was that, when sale prices were added up, they fetched a considerably higher price than that put upon these properties, lumped together in one lot, by the decree-holders. The High Court had also found that sales of the two bungalows on the Tej Bahadur Sapru Road separately would probably similarly have fetched a higher price. The affidavit dated 19-7-1947 filed by the judgment-debtors, as stated above, had not been controverted by any material put forward by the decree-holders.21. We, therefore, think that there is enough evidence to indicate that the judgment-debtors had suffered substantial injury so far as the sale of the two bungalows numbers 8 and 10 on Tej Bahadur Sapru Road, Allahabad, are concerned.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]15. A review of the authorities as well as the amendments to Rule 66 (2) (e) make it abundantly clear that the Court, when stating the estimated value of the property to be sold, must not accept merely the ipse dixit of one side. It is certainly not necessary for it to state its own estimate. If this were required, it may, to be fair, necessitate insertion of something like a summary of a judicially considered order, giving its grounds, in the sale proclamation which may confuse bidders. It may also be quite misleading if the Courts estimate is erroneous. Moreover, Rule 66 (2) (e) requires the Court to state only the facts it considers material for a purchaser to judge the value and nature of the property himself. Hence, the purchaser should be left to judge the value for himself. But. essential facts which have a being on the very material question of value of the property and which would assist the purchaser in forming his own opinion must be stated. That is, after all, the whole object of Order 21, Rule 66 (2) (e), Civil Procedure Code.In the case before us, the execution Court had practically accepted, as its own valuation, without indicating reasonable grounds for this preference, whatever the decree holders had asserted about the value of the property. It did not bother to seriously even consider the objections of the judgment-debtors. We think that the duty to consider what particulars should be inserted in the sale proclamation and how the sale ought to be conducted should be performed judicially and reasonably. If the execution Court does not, as it did not in the case before us, apply its mind or give any consideration whatsoever to the objections of the .judgment-debtor we think a material irregularity would be committed by the execution Court. It is not necessary for the execution Court to order the insertion of a judicially passed order in the sale proclamation itself, but, it should pass an order showing that it applied its mind to the need for determining all the essential particulars, which would reasonably be looked for by a purchaser, and which should be inserted in the sale proclamation. The order should show that it considered the objections. if any, of the decree-holders or the judgment debtors as the case may be. It should not merely accept unhesitatingly the ipse dixit of one side. We think that the execution Court had not performed its duty fairly and reasonably in this case. After embarking on the difficult task of valuation, it rejected the judgment-debtors figures by merely observing that they are exaggerated and practically accepted without hesitation whatever the decree-holders submitted, but this valuation was proved to be incorrect judged by the results of auction sales taken as a whole.We find from a perusal of the sale proclamation in this case that even the area of the compound in which the two bungalows were situated was not there. The land in the compound is evidently nazool lease hold land but the unexpired period of the lease or rent payable on it are not mentioned. It was not stated whether the bungalows, which were valued separately, would be sold as one or two items of property. Probably, it was left to the Amin to exercise his own discretion in this matter as he had exercised it in the case of Colonel-gunj property. The cumulative effect of all the features of the case mentioned above is that we think that there was material irregularity here in the conduct of the execution sale of the two.20. We now turn to the question of substantial injury. The result of the separate sales of the houses in Colonelgunj was that, when sale prices were added up, they fetched a considerably higher price than that put upon these properties, lumped together in one lot, by the decree-holders. The High Court had also found that sales of the two bungalows on the Tej Bahadur Sapru Road separately would probably similarly have fetched a higher price. The affidavit dated 19-7-1947 filed by the judgment-debtors, as stated above, had not been controverted by any material put forward by the decree-holders.21. We, therefore, think that there is enough evidence to indicate that the judgment-debtors had suffered substantial injury so far as the sale of the two bungalows numbers 8 and 10 on Tej Bahadur Sapru Road, Allahabad, are concerned.