Case: Gulabbai Vs. Nalin Narsi Vohra And Ors

is perverse in law in the sense that no reasonable person properly instructed in law could have come to such a finding or there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact has been taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on any material evidence or it has resulted in manifest injustice. Except to that limited extent the High Court has no jurisdiction." * 22. In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders ( 1975 (1) SCC 770 : 1975 (3) SCR 958 ) it has been observed by this Court that : (SCR headnote : SCC pp. 772-73, para 4) "For making the right or remedy, claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case, has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into Section 10(3)(iii) itself. The High Court was right in taking into consideration the facts which came into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings." * 23. Similar observation has been made in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad ( 1981 (3) SCC 103 : 1981 (3) SCR 605 ) : (SCC p. 119, para 29) "It is immaterial that the amendment was sought more than three years after possession of the portion had passed to the respondent. The High Court was bound to take the fact into consideration because, as is well settled now, in a proceeding for the ejectment of a tenant on the ground of personal requirement under a statute controlling the eviction of tenants, unless the statute prescribes to the contrary the requirement must continue to exist on the date when the proceeding is finally disposed of, either in appeal or revision, by the relevant authority. That position, to my mind, is indisputable. The High Court should have allowed the amendment." * 24. In Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain ( 1986 (4) SCC 736 : 1987 (1) SCR 275 ) it has been observed by this Court that : (SCR headnote : SCC p. 743, paras 12, 13) "Administration of justice demands that any changes either in fact or in law must be taken cognizance of by the court but that must be done in a cautious manner of relevant facts. Therefore, subsequent events can be taken cognizance of if they are relevant and material." * 25. On a conspectus of all these decisions rendered by this Court, it is now beyond the pale of any doubt that in appropriate cases events subsequent to the filing of the suit can be taken notice of and can be duly considered provided the same is relevant in determining the question of bona fide requirement. Therefore, the High Court was right in duly considering the new facts and circumstances that have been brought to the notice of the court by the application for additional evidence filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in coming to a firm finding that the plaintiff-appellant having constructed a spacious bungalow where she with the members of her family had been residing, there is no reasonable and bona fide requirement for the plaintiff to get a decree of ejectment of the defendants from the suit premises inasmuch as the first floor of the suit premises as well as the second floor could be conveniently used for opening the office of Tax Consultancy of plaintiffs husband who previously worked with one Mr. Gandhi in a partnership firm which partnership had been dissolved after Mr. Gandhis son came to practice with his father 26. It is also relevant to consider in this connection the observations of this Court in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan ( 1979 (1) SCC 273 : 1979 (2) SCR 1 ) as regards the meaning of the words reasonable requirement and own occupation as used in Section 11(h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966. It has been held that the words reasonable requirement undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire 27. In the instant appeal it has been rightly held by the High Court after considering the subsequent facts and materials brought out by the application for additional evidence that the plaintiff failed to prove reasonable and bona fide need for her occupation of the suit premises for the purpose of opening the Tax Consultancy office of her husband, Amritlal Mutha. Considering the facts and circumstances as well as the subsequent materials brought out by the application for additional evidence, we have no hesitation in our mind to hold that the aforesaid findings arrived at by the High Court is totally unexceptionable and so the same cannot be interfered with in this appeal. It will not be out of place to mention in this connection that Amritlal Mutha, husband of the appellant has stated in the additional affidavit filed in this Court that Dr. Abhey A. Mutha, son of the appellant had purchased a flat on ownership basis in Co-partnership Society, named Amrita Kunj Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. situated at 324/5 Shivaji Nagar, Pune 410 005. This, if taken notice of, will affirm the finding of the High Court that the appellant failed to prove her bona fide and reasonable need for the suit premises for opening the Tax Consultancy office for her husband

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]15. On this point, both the trial court as well the lower appellate court have concurrently found that the suit premises being part of Survey No. 3576 which was previously owned by one Imarat Company Private Limited from whom the plaintiffs husband Amritlal Mutha purchased for a sum of Rs. 34, 000 was properly described in the plaint and the respondents-defendants have been occupying an area admittedly 20 ft. x 15 ft. being Shop Nos. 81 to 83 on the eastern side of the said premises. This finding of the courts below has neither been challenged before the High Court nor before this Court in the instantIn the instant appeal it has been rightly held by the High Court after considering the subsequent facts and materials brought out by the application for additional evidence that the plaintiff failed to prove reasonable and bona fide need for her occupation of the suit premises for the purpose of opening the Tax Consultancy office of her husband, Amritlal Mutha. Considering the facts and circumstances as well as the subsequent materials brought out by the application for additional evidence, we have no hesitation in our mind to hold that the aforesaid findings arrived at by the High Court is totally unexceptionable and so the same cannot be interfered with in this appeal. It will not be out of place to mention in this connection that Amritlal Mutha, husband of the appellant has stated in the additional affidavit filed in this Court that Dr. Abhey A. Mutha, son of the appellant had purchased a flat on ownership basis in Co-partnership Society, named Amrita Kunj Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. situated at 324/5 Shivaji Nagar, Pune 410 005. This, if taken notice of, will affirm the finding of the High Court that the appellant failed to prove her bona fide and reasonable need for the suit premises for opening the Tax Consultancy office for her husband