Case: Unison Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.  Vs. Commissioner, Central Excise, Noida

true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud 354 US 457 (1957) where Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style: `In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering a conflict of the experts, and the number of times the Judges have been overruled by events--self-limitation can be seen to be the path of judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability. The court must always remember that `legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry that exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedy are not always possible and that judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted experience. Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secy. of Agriculture v. Central Rig Refining Co. 94 L Ed 381 : 338 US 604 (1950) be converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its e framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues. 11. The same principle should hold good in the matter of exemption notifications as well, for the said power is part and parcel of the enactment and is supposed to be employed to further the objects of enactment -- subject, of course, to the condition that the notification is not ultra vires the Act, and/or Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See P.J. Irani v. State of Madras [1962]2SCR169 ]. 11. In Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi 2005 (189) ELT 257 (SC) it was held as follows at para 3: Paragraph 4 and Explanation IX of Notification have been construed by this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise v. Rukhmani Pakkwell Traders 2004(165)ELT481(SC) ; as also in Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. Mczhaan Dairies 2004(166)ELT23(SC) . In both these decisions this Court held that Paragraph 4 read with Explanation IX of the notification could not be construed in the manner as contended by the assessees, namely, to make it necessary for the owner of the trade mark/trade name to use the goods in respect of the specified goods manufactured by the assessee. We see no reason to differ with the reasoning of this Court in the aforesaid decisions. Clause 4 of the Notification read with Explanation IX clearly debars those persons from the benefit of the exemption who use someone elses name in connection with their goods either with the intention of indicating or in a manner so as to indicate a connection between the assessees goods and such other person. There is no requirement for the owner of the trade mark using the name or mark with reference to any particular goods. The object of the exemption notification was neither to protect the owners of the trade mark/trade name nor the consumers from being misled. These are considerations which are relevant in cases relating to disputes arising out of infringement/passing off actions under the Trade Marks Act. The object of the Notification is clearly to grant benefits only to those industries which otherwise do not have the advantage of a brand name. The decisions cited by the Counsel appearing on behalf of the assessees relate to decisions involving Trade Mark disputes and are in the circumstances not apposite. 13. It appears that such a stand was not taken before the Tribunal. In any event in view of what has been stated by this Court in Mahaan Dairies case (supra) the Tribunal has to consider the plea. In Mahaan Diaries case (supra) it was observed as follows: 9. It was however, urged that the respondents have applied for registration of the Mark Mahaan Taste Maker. We clarify that if and when they get their mark registered then they would become entitle to the benefit of the Notification in accordance with Boards Circular No. 88/88, dated 13.12.1988. 10. The conclusions of CESTAT are essentially factual and, therefore, there is no scope for interference.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. Considering the position involved in Reiz Electrocontrols (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi-I 2006(200)ELT360(SC) the position was re-iterated as follows:8. So far as the views regarding non-eligibility are concerned view expressed by this Court in several cases needs to be noted.9. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I v. Mahaan Dairies 2004(166)ELT23(SC) it was noted (in para 6) as follows:We have today delivered a judgment in Commissioner of Central Excise, Trichy v. Rukmani Pakkwell Traders 2004(165)ELT481(SC) wherein we have held in respect of another Notification containing identical words that it makes no difference whether the goods on which the trade name or mark is used are the same in respect of which the trade mark is registered. Even if the goods are different so long as the trade name or brand name of some other Company is used the benefit of the Notification would not be available. Further, in our view, once a trade name or brand name is used then mere use of additional words would not enable the party to claim the benefit of Notification.. In Union of India v. Paliwal Electricals (P) Ltd. and Anr. 1996(83)ELT241(SC) it was noted (in paras 10 and 11) as follows:10. We are of the opinion that while examining the challenge to an exemption notification under the Central Excise Act, the observations in the decisions aforesaid should be kept in mind. It should also be remembered that generally speaking the exemption notification and the terms and conditions prescribed therein represent the policies of the Government evolved to subserve public interest and public revenue. A very heavy burden lies upon the person who challenges them on. the ground of Article 14. Unless otherwise established, the court must presume that the said amendment was found by the Central Government to be necessary for giving effect to its policy (underlying the notification) on the basis of the working of the said notification and that such an amendment was found necessary to prevent persons from taking unfair advantage of the concession. In fact, in this case, the explanatory note appended to amending notification says so in so many words. If necessary, the Court could have called upon the Central Government to establish the reasons behind the amendment. (It did not think it fit to do so.) It is equally necessary to bear in mind, as pointed out repeatedly by this Court, that in economic and taxation sphere, a large latitude should be allowed to the legislature. The courts should bear in mind the following observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in R.K. Garg v. Union of India [1982]133ITR239(SC)Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J. that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The Court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud 354 US 457 (1957) where Frankfurter, J. said in his inimitable style:`In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering a conflict of the experts, and the number of times the Judges have been overruled by eventsself-limitation can be seen to be the path of judicial wisdom and institutional prestige ande court must always remember that `legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry that exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedy are not always possible and that judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted experience. Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid. The courts cannot, as pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Secy. of Agriculture v. Central Rig Refining Co. 94 L Ed 381 : 338 US 604 (1950) be converted into tribunals for relief from such crudities and inequities. There may even be possibilities of abuse, but that too cannot of itself be a ground for invalidating the legislation, because it is not possible for any legislature to anticipate as if by some divine prescience, distortions and abuses of its legislation which may be made by those subject to its provisions and to provide against such distortions and abuses. Indeed, howsoever great may be the care bestowed on its e framing, it is difficult to conceive of a legislation which is not capable of being abused by perverted human ingenuity. The Court must therefore adjudge the constitutionality of such legislation by the generality of its provisions and not by its crudities or inequities or by the possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues.11. The same principle should hold good in the matter of exemption notifications as well, for the said power is part and parcel of the enactment and is supposed to be employed to further the objects of enactmentsubject, of course, to the condition that the notification is not ultra vires the Act, and/or Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See P.J. Irani v. State of Madras [1962]2SCR169 ].11. In Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Delhi 2005 (189) ELT 257 (SC) it was held as follows at para 3:Paragraph 4 and Explanation IX of Notification have been construed by this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise v. Rukhmani Pakkwell Traders 2004(165)ELT481(SC) ; as also in Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. Mczhaan Dairies 2004(166)ELT23(SC) . In both these decisions this Court held that Paragraph 4 read with Explanation IX of the notification could not be construed in the manner as contended by the assessees, namely, to make it necessary for the owner of the trade mark/trade name to use the goods in respect of the specified goods manufactured by the assessee. We see no reason to differ with the reasoning of this Court in the aforesaid decisions. Clause 4 of the Notification read with Explanation IX clearly debars those persons from the benefit of the exemption who use someone elses name in connection with their goods either with the intention of indicating or in a manner so as to indicate a connection between the assessees goods and such other person. There is no requirement for the owner of the trade mark using the name or mark with reference to any particular goods. The object of the exemption notification was neither to protect the owners of the trade mark/trade name nor the consumers from being misled. These are considerations which are relevant in cases relating to disputes arising out of infringement/passing off actions under the Trade Marks Act. The object of the Notification is clearly to grant benefits only to those industries which otherwise do not have the advantage of a brand name. The decisions cited by the Counsel appearing on behalf of the assessees relate to decisions involving Trade Mark disputes and are in the circumstances not apposite.. It appears that such a stand was not taken before the Tribunal. In any event in view of what has been stated by this Court in Mahaan Dairies case (supra) the Tribunal has to consider the plea. In Mahaan Diaries case (supra) it was observed as follows:9. It was however, urged that the respondents have applied for registration of the Mark Mahaan Taste Maker. We clarify that if and when they get their mark registered then they would become entitle to the benefit of the Notification in accordance with Boards Circular No. 88/88, dated 13.12.1988.10. The conclusions of CESTAT are essentially factual and, therefore, there is no scope for interference.