Case: Sriram Narayan Medhi Vs. The State of Maharashtra

tenants specially belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, the purchase is in danger of being ineffective for failure to deposit the sale price on due dates. It is noticed that these tenants being illiterate and socially backward have failed to deposit the amount more of ignorance than willful default. Unless therefore immediate steps are taken to provide for recovery of purchase price through Government agency a large number of tenants are likely to be evicted from their lands due to purchase becoming ineffective. This will result in defeating the object of the tenancy legislation. To avoid this result, it is therefore considered that the agricultural lands tribunal should be empowered to recover the purchase price from tenants as arrears of land revenue and until the tribunal has failed to recover the purchase price, the purchase should not become ineffective. It is also considered that the benefit of these provisions should be given to tenants whose purchase has already become ineffective but who have not yet been evicted from their lands under Section 32-P. This bill is intended to achieve these objects."14. We do not therefore think that the impugned Act has in anyway affected the main purpose of the Act or the object which it seeks to achieve nor do the amendments effected thereby take the provisions out of the protection given to it under Article 31-A of the Constitution.15. Shri Tarkunde has referred us to the case of Maharana Shri Jayvantsinghji Ranmalsinghji v. The State of Gujarat, (1962) Supp 2 SCR 411 = (AIR 1962 SC 821 ), in support of his contention that the impugned Act infringes Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and is not saved by Clause 5 thereof as the provisions of the said Act are unreasonable in that the indefinite postponement of the recovery of the price makes the payment thereof illusory, and even after the sale has become ineffective the landholder is not entitled to recover the land.16. What fell for determination in the case referred to was whether as a result of the provisions of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958, particularly under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 thereof certain non permanent tenants were deemed to have become permanent tenants as from the commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act 1949 and thereby became entitled to acquire the tenure on payment of 6 times the assessment or 6 times the rent instead of at least the minimum of 20 times to 200 times the assessment which right infringed the fundamental right of the landlord to acquire hold and dispose of property. This result it was contended had substantially deprived the petitioners of the right which they acquired on the tillers day by reason of the provisions contained in Section 32 and other provisions in the parent Act as amended from time to time. The majority held that the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958 in so far as they deemed some tenants as permanent tenants in possession of Taluqdari land were unconstitutional and void in that under the guise of changing the definition of a permanent tenant and changing a rule of evidence, it really reduced the purchase price that the petitioners were entitled to receive from some of their tenants on the tillers day under Section 32-H of the parent Act.17. It would appear from the Judgment of S. K. Das, J. speaking for himself and Sinha C. J., that the constitutional validity of the relevant provisions of the Taluqdari Abolition Act 1949 and the parent Act read with the Amendment Act had not been challenged before them. The decision of Dhirubha Devisingh Gohil v. The State of Bombay, (1955) 1 SCR 691 = (AIR 1955 SC 47 ) and (1959) 1 Suppl SCR 489 = (AIR 1959 SC 459 ), were cited as upholding the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of those two Acts.18. After pointing out that what has been challenged before them was the constitutional validity of the Bombay Act LVII of 1958 particularly the provisions 3, 4 and 6 of that Act, and referring to the earlier decision that this Court had held that Ss. 32 to 32-R of parent Act read with the Amendment Act were designed to bring about an extinguishment or in any event a modification of the landlords rights in the estate within the meaning of Article 31-A (1) (a) of the Constitution, it was observed that the right which the petitioners got of receiving the purchase price was undoubtedly a right to property guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and was not saved by Clause 5 thereof nor are the cases before them protected by Article 31-A. S. K. Das, J. gave the following reasoning for the aforesaid conclusion at pages 438-439:"The petitioners have three kinds of tenants permanent tenants, protected tenants, and ordinary tenants. On April 1, 1957, the petitioners ceased to be tenure holders in respect of all tenants other than permanent tenants and became entitled only to the purchase price under Section 32-H. If any tenant claimed on that date that he was a permanent tenant, he had to establish his claim in accordance with Section 83 of the Revenue Code. Such a claim could be contested by the tenure-holder whenever made by the tenant. But by the impugned Act 1958, all this was changed, and unless the tenture holder made an application within six months of the commencement of the impugned Act, 1958, he was not in a position to say that a particular tenant who was in possession of tenure-land for continuous period aggregating twelve years on and before August 15, 1950, was not a permanent tenant. We are unable to hold that the six months limit imposed by Section 5 of the impugned Act, 1958, is in the circumstances, a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19 (5) of the Constitution."19.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We do not therefore think that the impugned Act has in anyway affected the main purpose of the Act or the object which it seeks to achieve nor do the amendments effected thereby take the provisions out of the protection given to it under Article 31-A of the Constitution.15.What fell for determination in the case referred to was whether as a result of the provisions of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958, particularly under Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 6 thereof certain non permanent tenants were deemed to have become permanent tenants as from the commencement of the Bombay Taluqdari Tenure Abolition Act 1949 and thereby became entitled to acquire the tenure on payment of 6 times the assessment or 6 times the rent instead of at least the minimum of 20 times to 200 times the assessment which right infringed the fundamental right of the landlord to acquire hold and dispose of property. This result it was contended had substantially deprived the petitioners of the right which they acquired on the tillers day by reason of the provisions contained in Section 32 and other provisions in the parent Act as amended from time to time. The majority held that the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Bombay Land Tenure Abolition Laws (Amendment) Act 1958 in so far as they deemed some tenants as permanent tenants in possession of Taluqdari land were unconstitutional and void in that under the guise of changing the definition of a permanent tenant and changing a rule of evidence, it really reduced the purchase price that the petitioners were entitled to receive from some of their tenants on the tillers day under Section 32-H of the parent Act.