Case: Rev. Father W. Proost &amp; Others Vs. The State of Bihar &amp; Others

(1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29 (1) is based. The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article 30 (1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The two articles create two separate rights, although it is possible that they may meet in a given case.9. The learned Attorney-General refers to two cases of this Court which he thinks support his contention. What we find in them does not bear out this submission. On the other hand, they point the other way. In re the Kerala Education Bill, 1957, 1959 SCR 995 =(AIR 1958 SC 956 ), Articles 29 and 30 were considered in relation to an Education Bill referred by the President of India to the Supreme Court for its advisory opinion. The points that arose in the case were different but certain passages from the opinion were brought to our notice. The Court after pointing out that Articles 29 and 30 are grouped together under the heading "Cultural and Educational Rights" points out that the articles are intended to confer certain fundamental rights on certain sections of the community which constitute minority communities. Explaining clause (1) of Article 29 this Court observed at p. 1047 (of SCR)= (at p. 976 of AIR):"............... It is obvious that a minority community can effectively conserve its language, script or culture by and through educational institutions and, therefore, the right to establish and maintain educational institutions of its choice is a necessary concomitant to the right to conserve its distinctive language, script or culture and that is what is conferred on all minorities by Article 30 (1) which has hereinbefore been quoted in full . . . . . . ".10. The learned Attorney-General argues that here the two articles were read together. But the other side relies on two other passages. The first is at page 1050. The argument on behalf of the State there appears to be that there are three conditions before the protection and privileges of Article 30 (1) may be claimed-"(1) there must be a minority community, (2) one or more of the members of that community should, after the commencement of the Constitution, seek to exercise the right to establish an educational institution of his or their choice, and (3) the educational institution must be established for the members of his or their own community."This Court repelled the contention that the protection and privilege of Art. 30(1) extended only to the educational institutions established after the Constitution. Dealing with Article 29 (1) this Court observed:"The real import of Article 29 (2) and Article 30 (1) seems to us to be that they clearly contemplate a minority institution with a sprinkling of outsiders admitted into it. By admitting a non-member into it the minority institution does not shed its character and cease to be a minority institution. Indeed the object of conservation of the distinct language, script and culture of a minority may be better served by propagating the same amongst non-members of the particular minority community. In our opinion, it is not possible to read this condition into Article 30 (1) of the Constitution."11. While one side considers that the observation suggests that the two articles go together, the other side contends that mixing of the other communities with the minority community in the benefits of educational institution shows that the real test is not that there must be an institution purely of one community. The learned Attorney-General places great importance on the word sprinkling and says that the minority must found the institution for itself and not for others and the aim or object must be to conserve distinct language, script or culture. In our opinion both sides are attempting to read far too much into these observations. They are not intended to be read in every context. On the other hand, in Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabbai v. State of Bombay, 1963-3 SCR 837 at p. 850 = (AIR 1963 SC 540 at p. 545), there is the following passage:"............ The fundamental freedom is to establish and to administer educational institutions: it is a right to establish and administer what are in truth educational institutions, institutions which cater to the educational needs of the citizens, or sections thereof."The emphasis here was rightly placed not upon the needs of the community exclusively but upon the educational needs of the citizens or sections thereof. In other words, the suggestion that Article 30(1) is limited to the needs of a single community or that only its own culture, language or script need to be provided for is not the right approach. Here too if we may say so, the point decided was different but the observation does make Article 30 (1) much wider than the learned AttorneyGeneral would have us hold.12. In our judgment the language of Art 30 (1) is wide and must receive full meaning. We are dealing with protection of minorities and attempts to whittle down the protection cannot be allowed.We need not enlarge the protection but we may not reduce a protection naturally flowing from the words. Here the protection clearly flows from the words and there is nothing on the basis of which aid can be sought from Article 29 (1).13. We are, therefore, quite clear that St. Xaviers College was founded by a Catholic Minority Community based on religion and that this educational institution has the protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. For the same reason it is exempted under Section 48-B of the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In our opinion, this argument cannot be accepted.In our opinion the width of Article 30 (1) cannot be cut down by introducing in it considerations on which Article 29 (1) is based. The latter article is a general protection which is given to minorities to conserve their language, script or culture. The former is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. This choice is not limited to institution seeking to conserve language, script or culture and the choice is not taken away if the minority community having established an educational institution of its choice also admits members of other communities. That is a circumstance irrelevant for the application of Article 30 (1) since no such limitation is expressed and none can be implied. The two articles create two separate rights, although it is possible that they may meet in a givenemphasis here was rightly placed not upon the needs of the community exclusively but upon the educational needs of the citizens or sections thereof. In other words, the suggestion that Article 30(1) is limited to the needs of a single community or that only its own culture, language or script need to be provided for is not the right approach. Here too if we may say so, the point decided was different but the observation does make Article 30 (1) much wider than the learned AttorneyGeneral would have us hold.In our judgment the language of Art 30 (1) is wide and must receive full meaning. We are dealing with protection of minorities and attempts to whittle down the protection cannot be allowed.We need not enlarge the protection but we may not reduce a protection naturally flowing from the words. Here the protection clearly flows from the words and there is nothing on the basis of which aid can be sought from Article 29 (1).13. We are, therefore, quite clear that St. Xaviers College was founded by a Catholic Minority Community based on religion and that this educational institution has the protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution. For the same reason it is exempted under Section 48-B of the Act.