Case: Giani Bakshish Singh Vs. Govt. Of India &amp; Ors

this country while residing in another State. We have no doubt that he can be detained by the former State. The same analogy applies to this case. International Law does not seem to deal, with the case of nationals of one country acting in that country to the prejudice of the security and integrity of another country and whether anything could be done about them. To allow a person like the appellant to go back to England at his request in spite of the certainty that while in England he will continue to Indulge in activities prejudicial to the security and integrity of this country would be like the action of some foolish people who take a rat caught in a trap in their house to the road and release it. 5. It was urged that only where the grounds of detention were based on facts which can be held to amount to an offence either in India or in a foreign country for which he could be punished could he be detained. We are not able to appreciate the import of this argument. As is well known, preventive detention is not a punishment for an offence. To accept the argument on behalf of the appellant would make the grounds given in Section 3 (1) of the Maintenance ok Internal Security Act meaningless. Take for instance action prejudicial to the relations of India with foreign powers. As far as we are aware, there is no law enabling anybody in India to be punished for acting in a manner prejudicial to the relations of India with foreign powers. It cannot however be argued that detention on that ground is not permissible. Take again the case of activities prejudicial to the Defence of India. For the present, of course, we have the Defence of India Act still in force. Let us assume a period when it was not in force, does it mean that a person acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India cannot be detained even though there is no law dealing with that question. That is why the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. which was passed when there was no war and no emergency, provided for detention on the same grounds as in Maintenance of Internal Security Act. In the absence of a law dealing with that question, naturally enough the courts will have to decide whether the activity for which a person is detained is one prejudicial to the defence of India; so also an activity prejudicial to the security of India. Defence of a country or the security of a country is not a static concept. The days are gone by when one had to worry about the security of a country or its defence only during war time. A country has to be in a perpetual state of preparedness. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. So it is that the founding fathers with considerable wisdom and foresight provided for laws for preventive detention and the limitations thereon mentioned in Article 22 of the Constitution Preventive detention is, of course, an anathema to champions of individual liberty But times being what they are, the Constitution makers in their wisdom have provided for it. It is not necessary to give further examples to show that prejudicial activities contemplated under Section 3 (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act are not necessarily activities prohibited or made punishable by a specific provision of law. The cases relied upon to support the contrary proposition should be confined to the facts of those cases. 6. The only other question that remains to be dealt with is the one that arises out of the statement of the Chief Minister of Punjab in the Legislative Assembly on 7-3-1973. The argument is that the Chief Ministers reply shows that the appellant has been detained, and is continued to be detained, not for the reasons which were intimated to him in the form of grounds of detention but really for the reasons mentioned in the Assembly and the detention is therefore, bad It is pertinent to remember in this context firstly that the order for the detention of the appellant was made by the District Magistrate of Amritsar. He could not have known of the activities of the appellant which the Chief Minister mentioned in the Assembly. Secondly, the approval by the Government of Punjab of the appellants detention was made on 16-1-1973. There is nothing to show that on that day the Government of Punjab knew of the matters which the Chief Minister brought up in the Legislative Assembly on 7-3-1973, and the detention was approved by the Government only for those reasons. We are not prepared to assume, as was urged on behalf of the appellant, that the three matters mentioned in the Chief Ministers speech should have come to the notice of the Indian High Commission as soon as they took place and that they should have alerted the Punjab Government at once. There is no warrant for such an assumption. Except that one of the activities is said to be in 1971, we do not even know about the dates of the others. Moreover, the Chief Ministers reply was in answer to the demand of the Akali Dal Party for the appellants release. The grounds of appellants detention must have been known to them. The Chief Minister should, therefore, have been giving them additional information which came to his knowledge subsequently. We are not, therefore, prepared to assume that the grounds for approval of the appellants detention were not the same ground on which he was detained but some others, and therefore malice in law has been established. 7. Furthermore. by a Presidential order Articles 14, 19 and :22 of the Constitution have been suspended during the subsistence of the Proclamation of Emergency. This contention is based on decisions of this Court interpreting Article 22. They are, therefore, irrelevant in considering a petition under Section 491 Cr. P. C.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is now settled law that preventive detention is not a punishment for the past activities of a person but is intended to prevent the person detained from indulging in future in activities which may produce the results mentioned in Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. It is also well settled that the Court will not go into the truth or otherwise of the facts alleged as grounds of detention. The sufficiency of the grounds for detention is not also a matter which the court will go into. There can also be no doubt that the appellants activities detailed in grounds (a) to (c) bring his case squarely within the ambit of subclauses (i) and (ii) of cl. (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security ActWe are not impressed with this argument. The power of a State to deal with foreigners committing offences inside its territory is not in dispute. The power of a State to detain even a foreigner who is found inside its territory in order to prevent him from indulging in prejudicial activities inside its territory cannot also be questionedWe are unable to accept this contention either. Clause (a) and clause (b) deal with two different kinds of powers. Under clause (a) the power is given to the State to detain any person, including a foreigner for any of the purposes mentioned in that clause. Under clause (b) power is given to detain a foreigner either for regulating his continued presence in India or for making arrangements for his expulsion from India. It is within the competence of the detaining authority to exercise the power conferred on it under clause (a) or clause (b). In this case the order of detention is made under clause (a) and therefore clause (b) does not come into picture at all. We are not able to agree with the contention that clause (b) would be beyond the legislative competence of Parliament unless it is interpreted in the manner in which Mr. Garg wants it to be interpreted. It is well established that the various legislative entries should be interpreted in a broad manner and if any legislation could be brought within the ambit of any one or other of the legislative entries the validity of that legislation cannot be questioned. Entry 10, List I, Schedule VII: Foreign Affairs; all matters which bring the Union into relation with any foreign country, would certainly cover clause (b). We may also refer tothe Foreigners Act, 1946 which confers much more stringent powers in relation to a foreigner than clause (b). It has not been argued that those powers are not valid or that the Foreigners Act is not a valid piece of legislation. We may legitimately presume that the laws of various countries of the world confer similar powers on their respective Governments in relation to foreignersIn the face of the very clear provisions of Section 3 (l) (a) we have no doubt on that point Indeed the Parliament seems to have specifically contemplated the contingency and provided for it. It is not only in a case where a foreigner wants to continue in India that the power is available but even where in order to avoid preventive detention he offers to go out of the country. It was urged that to place such an interpretation on this provision would be contrary to Article 51 of the Constitution, that if at all possible the section should be so interpreted as not to conflict with the provisions of Article 51. We see no such contradiction if it is interpreted as we have doneWe are not able to appreciate the import of this argument. As is well known, preventive detention is not a punishment for an offence. To accept the argument on behalf of the appellant would make the grounds given in Section 3 (1) of the Maintenance ok Internal Security Act meaningless. Take for instance action prejudicial to the relations of India with foreign powers. As far as we are aware, there is no law enabling anybody in India to be punished for acting in a manner prejudicial to the relations of India with foreign powers. It cannot however be argued that detention on that ground is not permissible. Take again the case of activities prejudicial to the Defence of India. For the present, of course, we have the Defence of India Act still in force. Let us assume a period when it was not in force, does it mean that a person acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India cannot be detained even though there is no law dealing with that question. That is whythe Preventive Detention Act, 1950. which was passed when there was no war and no emergency, provided for detention on the same grounds as in Maintenance of Internal Security Act. In the absence of a law dealing with that question, naturally enough the courts will have to decide whether the activity for which a person is detained is one prejudicial to the defence of India; so also an activity prejudicial to the security of India. Defence of a country or the security of a country is not a static concept. The days are gone by when one had to worry about the security of a country or its defence only during war time. A country has to be in a perpetual state of preparedness. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. So it is that the founding fathers with considerable wisdom and foresight provided for laws for preventive detention and the limitations thereon mentioned in Article 22 of the Constitution Preventive detention is, of course, an anathema to champions of individual liberty But times being what they are, the Constitution makers in their wisdom have provided for it. It is not necessary to give further examples to show that prejudicial activities contemplated under Section 3 (1) of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act are not necessarily activities prohibited or made punishable by a specific provision of law. The cases relied upon to support the contrary proposition should be confined to the facts of those casesIt is pertinent to remember in this context firstly that the order for the detention of the appellant was made by the District Magistrate of Amritsar. He could not have known of the activities of the appellant which the Chief Minister mentioned in the Assembly. Secondly, the approval by the Government of Punjab of the appellants detention was made on 16-1-1973. There is nothing to show that on that day the Government of Punjab knew of the matters which the Chief Minister brought up in the Legislative Assembly on 7-3-1973, and the detention was approved by the Government only for those reasons. We are not prepared to assume, as was urged on behalf of the appellant, that the three matters mentioned in the Chief Ministers speech should have come to the notice of the Indian High Commission as soon as they took place and that they should have alerted the Punjab Government at once. There is no warrant for such an assumption. Except that one of the activities is said to be in 1971, we do not even know about the dates of the others. Moreover, the Chief Ministers reply was in answer to the demand of the Akali Dal Party for the appellants release. The grounds of appellants detention must have been known to them. The Chief Minister should, therefore, have been giving them additional information which came to his knowledge subsequently. We are not, therefore, prepared to assume that the grounds for approval of the appellants detention were not the same ground on which he was detained but some others, and therefore malice in law has been established7. Furthermore. by a Presidential order Articles 14, 19 and :22 of the Constitution have been suspended during the subsistence of the Proclamation of Emergency. This contention is based on decisions of this Court interpreting Article 22. They are, therefore, irrelevant in considering a petition under Section 491 Cr. P. CThe argument is that the Chief Ministers reply shows that the appellant has been detained, and is continued to be detained, not for the reasons which were intimated to him in the form of grounds of detention but really for the reasons mentioned in the Assembly and the detention is therefore, badIt is pertinent to remember in this context firstly that the order for the detention of the appellant was made by the District Magistrate of Amritsar. He could not have known of the activities of the appellant which the Chief Minister mentioned in the Assembly. Secondly, the approval by the Government of Punjab of the appellants detention was made on. There is nothing to show that on that day the Government of Punjab knew of the matters which the Chief Minister brought up in the Legislative Assembly on, and the detention was approved by the Government only for those reasons. We are not prepared to assume, as was urged on behalf of the appellant, that the three matters mentioned in the Chief Ministers speech should have come to the notice of the Indian High Commission as soon as they took place and that they should have alerted the Punjab Government at once. There is no warrant for such an assumption. Except that one of the activities is said to be in 1971, we do not even know about the dates of the others. Moreover, the Chief Ministers reply was in answer to the demand of the Akali Dal Party for the appellants release. The grounds of appellants detention must have been known to them. The Chief Minister should, therefore, have been giving them additional information which came to his knowledge subsequently. We are not, therefore, prepared to assume that the grounds for approval of the appellants detention were not the same ground on which he was detained but some others, and therefore malice in law has been established7. Furthermore. by a Presidential order Articles 14, 19 and :22 of the Constitution have been suspended during the subsistence of the Proclamation of Emergency. This contention is based on decisions of this Court interpreting Article 22. They are, therefore, irrelevant in considering a petition under Section 491 Cr. P.