Case: United Bank Of India Vs. Pijush Kanti Nandy

only provides for a rule of measurement. An employee, as noticed hereinbefore, was entitled to pension provided he has completed the specified period of service. How such a period of service would be computed is a matter which is governed by the statute. It is one thing to say that a statute provides for completion of fifteen years of minimum service, but if a provision provides for measurement of the period, the same cannot be lost sight of. Provision of the Regulations which are beneficial in nature, in our opinion, should be construed liberally." In that case, the question arose as to how the lack in period of service of less than one year shall be construed. This Court held that Regulation 18 was not controlled by Regulations 16, 17, 19, 23 etc. as it provided for a Rule of Measurement. It, is however, trite that even a beneficial legislation should not be extended to such an extent whereby it would take into within its fold a situation which was not contemplated under the statute. 18. Could the period of service computed by including a period of five years as provided for in clause (5) of Regulation 29 is the question. In our opinion, it was not. Definition of `qualifying service is restrictive in nature. It uses the word `means and not `includes or `means and includes. Thus, the construction of `qualifying service must ordinarily be kept confined to the service rendered while on duty. He may be in service even otherwise although not rendering any duty. Those exigencies of situation are covered by the other types of cases which would come within the purview thereof. A person who is not in service cannot be said to be entitled to the benefit thereof. The term `otherwise should be read ejusdem generis. The term `otherwise in the context of the `Regulations should be construed so that it can become meaningful one. For the said purpose, the employee concerned was required to be in service. It is not possible to hold in absence of any express words that the eligibility criteria laid down in the Regulations for obtaining the benefit of pension, i.e., the qualifying service should be construed in such a manner that a person even not in service would be deemed to be in service. The statute does not raise a legal fiction. A strict construction of the term "qualifying service" therefor, in our opinion, would not be appropriate.In Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) & Anr. [(1989) 2 SCC 458] , the Supreme Court while discussing the definition of `manufacture under section 2(f) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 whether the relevant process fall within `any other process" thereby within the provision of section 2(f)(v) the Court looked at the meaning of `the expression ejus-dem-generis... which means of the same kind or nature...signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family of genus-describing terms is followed by wider or residuary or sweeping-up words, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.The Court also discussed various other texts while looking at the term. In `Statutory Interpretation Rupert Cross says: "...The draftsman must be taken to have inserted the general words in case something which ought to have been included among the specifically enumerated items had been omitted..." The principle underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will be favoured. As a learned author puts it: "...if a class can be found, but the specific words exhaust the class, then rejection of the rule may be favoured because its adoption would make the general words unnecessary; if however, the specific words do not exhaust the class, then adoption of the rule may be favoured because its rejection would make the specific words unnecessary." Cessation of contract of service may be of different types, i.e., by punishment or by end of contract. It, however, does not take within its purview an order of suspension as the same does not bring about a cessation. 19. In National Textile Corporation (M.P.) Limited v. M.R. Jadhav [(2008 (7) SCC 29] , this Court held: "Subject, of course, to the terms "invitation to treat" as also those of the offer as envisaged under the Contract Act, an offer has to be accepted. Unless an offer is accepted, a binding contract does not come into being. A voluntary retirement scheme contemplates cessation of the relationship of master and servant. The rights and obligations of the parties thereto shall become enforceable only on completion of the contract. Unless such a stage is reached, no valid contract can be said to have come into force. Acceptance of an offer must, therefore, be communicated." 20. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, clause (5) of Regulation 29 would be attracted only in a case where the concerned employee has completed 20 years of qualifying service. Clause (5) of 29 would be applicable for the purpose of granting a higher monetary benefit in the matter of computation of pension. It does not provide for measurement of the period as was in the case of Indian Bank (supra).

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]18. Could the period of service computed by including a period of five years as provided for in clause (5) of Regulation 29 is the question. In our opinion, it was not. Definition of `qualifying service is restrictive in nature. It uses the word `means and not `includes or `means and includes. Thus, the construction of `qualifying service must ordinarily be kept confined to the service rendered while on duty. He may be in service even otherwise although not rendering any duty. Those exigencies of situation are covered by the other types of cases which would come within the purview thereof. A person who is not in service cannot be said to be entitled to the benefit thereof. The term `otherwise should be read ejusdem generis. The term `otherwise in the context of the `Regulations should be construed so that it can become meaningful one. For the said purpose, the employee concerned was required to be in service. It is not possible to hold in absence of any express words that the eligibility criteria laid down in the Regulations for obtaining the benefit of pension, i.e., the qualifying service should be construed in such a manner that a person even not in service would be deemed to be in service. The statute does not raise a legal fiction. A strict construction of the term "qualifying service" therefor, in our opinion, would not be appropriate.In Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (UOI) & Anr. [(1989) 2 SCC 458] , the Supreme Court while discussing the definition of `manufacture under section 2(f) of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 whether the relevant process fall within `any other process" thereby within the provision of section 2(f)(v) the Court looked at the meaning of `the expressionwhich means of the same kind or nature...signifies a principle of construction whereby words in a statute which are otherwise wide but are associated in the text with more limited words are, by implication, given a restricted operation and are limited to matters of the same class or genus as preceding them. If a list or string or family ofterms is followed by wider or residuary orwords, then the verbal context and the linguistic implications of the preceding words limit the scope of such words.Theprinciple underlying this approach to statutory construction is that the subsequent general words were only intended to guard against some accidental omission in the objects of the kind mentioned earlier and were not intended to extend to objects of a wholly different kind. This is a presumption and operates unless there is some contrary indication. But the preceding words or expressions of restricted meaning must be susceptible of the import that they represent a class. If no class can be found, ejusdem generis rule is not attracted and such broad construction as the subsequent words may admit will beof contract of service may be of different types, i.e., by punishment or by end of contract. It, however, does not take within its purview an order of suspension as the same does not bring about a cessation.We, therefore, are of the opinion that in a case of this nature, clause (5) of Regulation 29 would be attracted only in a case where the concerned employee has completed 20 years of qualifying service. Clause (5) of 29 would be applicable for the purpose of granting a higher monetary benefit in the matter of computation of pension. It does not provide for measurement of the period as was in the case of Indian Bank (supra).