Case: Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor &amp; General Traders

to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice, subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations, for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into S. 10 (3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact.5. The law we have set out is of ancient vintage. We will merely refer to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri, 1940 FCR 84 = (AIR 1941 FC 5 ) which is a leading case on the point. Gwyer C. J, in the above case, referred to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of the United states in Patterson v. State of Alabama. (1934) 294 US 600 at P. 607:"We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment ,was entered."And said that that view of the Courts powers was reaffirmed once again in the then recent case of Minnesota v. National Tea Co. (1939) 309 US 551 at p. 555, Sulaiman J., in the same case 1940 FCR 94 = (AIR 1941 FC 5 ) relied on English cases and took the view that an appeal is by way of a re-hearing and the Court may make such order as the Judge of the first instance could have made if the case had been heard by himat the date on which the appeal was heard (emphasis, ours). Varadachariar J., dealt with the same point a little more comprehensively. We may content ourselves with excerpting one passage which brings out the point luminously (at p.103 of 1940 FCR) - (at p. 13 of AIR):It is also on the theory of an appeal being in the nature of a rehearing that the courts in this country have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against."6. The High Court in this case, in the concluding stages slightly self-contradicted itself and observed: the civil revision petition cannot be entertained and proceeded further to state: it will not be desirable that I should exercise my discretion in directing an amendment of the petition. In conclusion, the Court did interfere in revision by setting aside the order of remittal to the Rent Controller and dismissing the eviction petition, leaving the near decade-old litigation to be reopened in a fresh unending chapter of forensic fight. The learned Judge gave little comfort to the litigant who had come with a proved case of bona fide requirement to start his own business by his obscure observation: If so advised the petitioner may seek to obtain such relief as may be open to him by filing a fresh petition under the appropriate provision of the Act, in view of the subsequent event of his having come into possession of a portion of the building. We think it unfair to drive parties to a new litigation of unknown duration but direct, in the special circumstances of the case (which are peculiar) that: (a) the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction on which there is already an adverse finding by the High court; (c) the landlord be allowed to amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground; and (d) the parties be given fair and full opportunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But we make it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a non-residential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened. We keep open for enquiry only grounds if any, which may reasonably be permitted by amendment if they are of any relevance or use for eviction.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]e feel the submissions devoid of substance. First about the jurisdiction and propriety vis-a-vis circumstances which come into being subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings. It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice, subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations, for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed. On both occasions the High Court, in revision, correctly took this view. The later recovery of another accommodation by the landlord, during the pendency of the case has as the High Court twice pointed out, a material bearing on the right to evict, in view of the inhibition written into S. 10 (3) (iii) itself. We are not disposed to disturb this approach in law or finding of fact.The High Court in this case, in the concluding stages slightly self-contradicted itself and observed: the civil revision petition cannot be entertained and proceeded further to state: it will not be desirable that I should exercise my discretion in directing an amendment of the petition. In conclusion, the Court did interfere in revision by setting aside the order of remittal to the Rent Controller and dismissing the eviction petition, leaving the near decade-old litigation to be reopened in a fresh unending chapter of forensic fight. The learned Judge gave little comfort to the litigant who had come with a proved case of bona fide requirement to start his own business by his obscure observation: If so advised the petitioner may seek to obtain such relief as may be open to him by filing a fresh petition under the appropriate provision of the Act, in view of the subsequent event of his having come into possession of a portion of the building. We think it unfair to drive parties to a new litigation of unknown duration but direct, in the special circumstances of the case (which are peculiar) that: (a) the revision before the High Court shall stand dismissed; (b) the Rent Controller will take note of the subsequent development disabling the landlord from seeking eviction on which there is already an adverse finding by the High court; (c) the landlord be allowed to amend his petition if he has a case for eviction on any other legally permissible ground; and (d) the parties be given fair and full opportunity to file additional pleadings and lead evidence thereon. But we make it clear that the subsequent event that the petitioner had come by a non-residential accommodation of his own in the same town having been found by the High court, cannot be canvassed over again. That finding of legal disability cannot be reopened. We keep open for enquiry only grounds if any, which may reasonably be permitted by amendment if they are of any relevance or use for eviction.