Case: Motipur Zamindari Co. Ltd Vs. The State Of Bihar And Another.Raja Jankinath Roy And Nare

no worse position than the official assignee or official receiver of an individual proprietor who may happen to become insolvent in another State.5. Finally, Mr. P. R. Das strongly relies on section 41 of the Act and contends that that section would be wholly inapplicable to a company and that circumstance by itself would indicate that the Bihar Legislature did not intend that a company owning an estate should be governed by this Act. A corporation, it is true, cannot be made liable for treason, felony or any misdemeanor involving personal violence or for any offence for which the only penalty is imprisonment or corporal punishment. (Halsbury, 2nd Edition, Volume IX, article 5, p. 14). Section 41 does not prescribe punishment by imprisonment only. Mr. P. R. Das suggests that the infliction of imprisonment or fine would depend upon the gravity of the offence and not on the character of the offender. This argument, however, would seem to run counter to the opinion of Lord Blackburn set forth at pages 867-870 of the report of the very case relied on by Mr. P. R. Das. The resent cases of Director of Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited [[1944] 1 K.B. 146] and Rex v. I.C.R. Haulage, Limited and Another [[1944] 1 K.B. 551] seem to indicate that a corporation may be convicted even of an offence requiring an act of will or a state of mind. Apart, however, from the consideration whether a company may be held guilty of wilful failure or neglect, as to which we need not express any definite opinion on this occasion, there can be no difficulty in applying the provisions of section 41 to the officers or agents of the company. On a notification under section 3(1) being published the estate vests in the State. Section 4 sets out the consequences of such vesting. Clause (g) of that section empowers the Collector by written order served in the prescribed manner to require any person in possession of such an estate or tenure or any part thereof to give up possession of the same by a date specified in the order and to take such steps or use such force as may be necessary for securing compliance with the said order. If any officer or agent of the company in the possession of the estate wilfully fails or ignores to comply with such lawful order, then surely he can be proceeded against under section 41. Likewise, under section 40, the officers therein mentioned are authorized at any time before or after the date of vesting by a written order served in the prescribed manner to require a proprietor or tenure-holder or any other person in possession of such an estate or tenure or any agents or employees of such proprietor, tenure-holder or other person to produce at a time and place specified in the order such documents, papers or registers or to furnish such information relating to such estate or tenure as such officer may from time to time require for any of the purposes of this Act. A wilful failure or neglect to comply with such order would clearly bring the recalcitrant officer or agent of the company with in the penalty provided under section 41. Section 41, therefore, does not necessarily preclude the application of the Act to incorporated companies.It cannot be denied that a company is competent to own and hold property. The whole object of the impugned Act is thus stated by Mahajan J. in the State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh [[1952] S.C.R. 889 at p. 941] :"Now it is obvious that concentration of big blocks of land in the hands of a few individuals is contrary to the principle on which the Constitution of India is based. The purpose of the acquisition contemplated by the impugned Act therefore is to do away with the concentration of big blocks of land and means of production in the hands of a few individuals and to so distribute the ownership and control of the material resources which come in the hands of the State as to subserve the common good as best as possible. In other words, shortly put, the purpose behind the Act is to bring about a reform in the land distribution system of Bihar for the general benefit of the community as advised."6. In view of this purpose there is no reason to differentiate between an individual proprietor and a company which owns estates or tenures. Indeed, there is not only nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the Act which should prevent the inclusion of a company owning estate within the definition of "proprietor", such inclusion is necessary in order to give full effect to the very object of the Act.7. In Appeal No. 63 of 1953 Mr. P. R. Das raises an additional point namely, that the appellant company in that appeal owns estates which are situate in Purnea in the district Bihar and in Malda in the district of West Bengal but it has to pay a single Government revenue at Purnea. It is further alleged that the appellant company has let out portions of the estates on Patni leases, each of the Patnis comprising land situate both within and outside Bihar. The acquisition of that part of the estate which is situate in Bihar has made it difficult, if not impossible, for the appellant company to pay its revenue or recover its rent. That part of the estate which is in Bihar cannot be severed from the rest and therefore the notification covering only the portion of the estate situate in Bihar is invalid. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. As stated by the High Court it is a simple case of apportionment of the revenue and also apportionment of the rent. The necessity for such apportionment cannot possibly affect the validity of the notification. For reasons stated above these appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs.8.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are unable to accept this contention. It is not disputed that a company can own an estate or a part of an estate and, indeed, the appellant companies are fighting these appeals only to protect the estates they own. Therefore, they come within the first part of the definition. The definition after stating what the word means proceeds to state what else the definition would include under specified circumstances, namely, the heirs and successor-in-interest etc. The word "heir" certainly is inappropriate with regard to a company, but there is nothing inappropriate in the company having a successor in-interest. It is pointed out that there is no provision in the definition of proprietor to include the directors, managing agents and, in case of winding up, the liquidator of the company. This circumstance does not appear to us to be a cogent reason for holding that the word "proprietor" as defined does not cover a company. It is to be noted that the agent or, in case of insolvency, the official assignee or receiver of an individual proprietor are also not included in the definition. Reference to proprietor who is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot and his guardian etc., was obviously necessary because those proprietors suffer from legalIndeed, one cannot think of a company unless one has in view the provisions of the Companies Act, for a company is the creature of the Companies Act. Its existence, powers and rights are all regulated by that Act. The trend of the speeches of the noble Lords in the case relied on by Mr. P. R. Das is that the object of the particular Act under word "corporation" being included within the term "person" as used in that Act, and as we apprehend it, that decision lays down nothing beyond that.In support of his contention that a company owning an estate was never intended to be affected by the Act, Mr. P. R. Das draws our attention to the winding up sections of the Indian Companies Act and urges that it is not possible to fit in the scheme of winding up into the scheme of the Bihar Act. If the Zamindari assets of the company are taken over and compensation is paid by non-transferable bonds it will, he contends, be impossible to apply the law of winding up in case the company goes into liquidation. There will, according to him, be conflict of jurisdiction between the Court where the winding up is proceeding, which may conceivably be in another State, and the Bihar Government and its officers. We see no force in this contention. Upon a notification being issued under section 3, the Zamindari estate will vest in the State and the company will cease to have any interest in it. Its only right will be to receive compensation. In case of winding up the liquidator will have to pursue the remedy provided by this Act. He or the company will be in no worse position than the official assignee or official receiver of an individual proprietor who may happen to become insolvent in another State.A corporation, it is true, cannot be made liable for treason, felony or any misdemeanor involving personal violence or for any offence for which the only penalty is imprisonment or corporal punishment. (Halsbury, 2nd Edition, Volume IX, article 5, p. 14). Section 41 does not prescribe punishment by imprisonment only. Mr. P. R. Das suggests that the infliction of imprisonment or fine would depend upon the gravity of the offence and not on the character of the offender. This argument, however, would seem to run counter to the opinion of Lord Blackburn set forth at pages 867-870 of the report of the very case relied on by Mr. P. R. Das. The resent cases off Public Prosecutions v. Kent and Sussex Contractors Limited [[1944] 1 K.B.v. I.C.R. Haulage, Limited and Another [[1944] 1 K.B. 551]seem to indicate that a corporation may be convicted even of an offence requiring an act of will or a state of mind. Apart, however, from the consideration whether a company may be held guilty of wilful failure or neglect, as to which we need not express any definite opinion on this occasion, there can be no difficulty in applying the provisions of section 41 to the officers or agents of the company. On a notification under section 3(1) being published the estate vests in the State. Section 4 sets out the consequences of such vesting. Clause (g) of that section empowers the Collector by written order served in the prescribed manner to require any person in possession of such an estate or tenure or any part thereof to give up possession of the same by a date specified in the order and to take such steps or use such force as may be necessary for securing compliance with the said order. If any officer or agent of the company in the possession of the estate wilfully fails or ignores to comply with such lawful order, then surely he can be proceeded against under section 41. Likewise, under section 40, the officers therein mentioned are authorized at any time before or after the date of vesting by a written order served in the prescribed manner to require a proprietor or tenure-holder or any other person in possession of such an estate or tenure or any agents or employees of such proprietor, tenure-holder or other person to produce at a time and place specified in the order such documents, papers or registers or to furnish such information relating to such estate or tenure as such officer may from time to time require for any of the purposes of this Act. A wilful failure or neglect to comply with such order would clearly bring the recalcitrant officer or agent of the company with in the penalty provided under section 41. Section 41, therefore, does not necessarily preclude the application of the Act to incorporated companies.It cannot be denied that a company is competent to own and holdview of this purpose there is no reason to differentiate between an individual proprietor and a company which owns estates or tenures. Indeed, there is not only nothing repugnant in the subject or context of the Act which should prevent the inclusion of a company owning estate within the definition of "proprietor", such inclusion is necessary in order to give full effect to the very object of the Act.We do not think there is any substance in this argument. As stated by the High Court it is a simple case of apportionment of the revenue and also apportionment of the rent. The necessity for such apportionment cannot possibly affect the validity of the notification. For reasons stated above these appeals fail and must be dismissed with costs.