Case: Sardar Inder Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan

of 1949, and provided S.3 is valid, the validity of the notification is coextensive with that of the Ordinance. If the Ordinance did not come to an end by reason of the fact that the authority of the Rajpramukh to legislate came to an end-and that is not and cannot be disputed- neither did the power to issue a notification which is conferred therein. The true position is that it is in his character as the authority on whom power was conferred under S.3 of the Ordinance that the Rajpramukh issued the impugned notification, and not as the legislative authority of the State. This objection should accordingly be overruled. 13. (4) We shall next consider the contention that the provisions of the Ordinance are repugnant to Art. 14 of the Constitution, and that it must therefore be held to have become void. In the argument before us the attack was mainly directed against Ss. 7(1) and 15 of the Ordinance.The contention with reference to S.7(1) is that under that section landlords who had tenants on their lands on 1-4-1948 were subjected to various restrictions in the enjoyment of their rights as owners, while other landlords were free from similar restrictions. There is no substance in this contention. The preamble to the Ordinance recites that there was a growing tendency on the part of the land-holders to eject tenants, and that it was therefore expedient to enact a law for giving them protection, and for granting relief to them, the Legislature had necessarily to decide from what date law should be given operation, and it decided that it should be from 1-4 -1948. That is a matter exclusively for the Legislature to determine, and the propriety of that determination is not open to question in Courts.We should add that the petitioners sought to dispute the correctness of the recitals in the preamble. This they clearly cannot do. Vide the observations of Holmes J. in Block v. Hirsh, (1920) : 65 Law Ed 865 : 256 U 8 135(E). 14. A more substantial contention is the one based on S.15, which authorizes the Government to exempt any person or class of persons from the operation of the Act. It is argued that that section does not lay down the principles on which exemption could be granted, and that the decision of the matter is left to the unfettered and uncanalised discretion of the Government, and is, therefore repugnant to Art. 14.It is true that that section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption could be granted, but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness the policy of the Legislature, and as that governs S.15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided. Vide Harishanker Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955)l S C R 380 at p. 386: (A I R 1954 S C 465 at p. 467)(F). But even if S.15 were to be held to be bad, that does not affect the rest of the legislation, as the matter dealt with in that section is clearly severable. In fact, S.15 was not in the Ordinance as it was originally enacted, and was only introduced later by Ordinance No. XII of 1949. We must accordingly, hold that the impugned Ordinance cannot be held to be bad under Art. 14. 15. It is finally contended that the provisions of the Act are repugnant to Art. 19(1)(f) in that they oblige the land-owners to keep tenants on their lands, thereby preventing them from themselves cultivating the same. The object of the Ordinance, as set out in the preamble, is clearly not to put a restriction on the right of an owner to himself cultivate the lands, but to prevent him when he had inducted a tenant on the land from getting rid of him without sufficient cause. A law which requires that an owner who is not himself a tiller of the soil should assure to the actual tiller seine fixity of tenure, cannot on that ground alone he said to be unreasonable.Legislation of this character has been upheld in America as not infringing any Constitutional guarantee. Thus, in (1920)65 Law Ed 80 : 256 U S 135 (E) a statute which gave a right to tenants to continue in possession even after the expiry of the lease, was held to be valid, Holmes J. observing."The main point against the law is that tenants are allowed to remain in possession at the same rent that they have been paying, unless modified by the commission established by the Act, and that thus the use of the land and the right of the owner to do what he will with his own and to make what contracts he pleases are cut down. But if the public interest be established the regulation of rates is one of the first forms in which it is asserted, and the validity of such regulation has been settled since Munn v. People of Illinois, (1877) 24 Law Ed 77 : 94 U S 113 (G)... The preference given to the tenant in possession is an almost necessary ingredient of the policy, and is traditional in English law. If the tenant remained subject to the landlords power to evict, the attempt to limit the landlords demands would fail." It should also be remembered in this connection that the impugned Ordinance is an emergency legislation of a temporary character, and,as observed in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, 1950 S C R 519 at p. 526 : (A I R 1950 S C 211 at p. 214) (H), that is a factor to be taken into account in judging of its reasonableness. As already stated, the Ordinance has since come to an end, and has been replaced by a comprehensive tenancy law. In the circumstances, we are unable to hold that the impugned Ordinance is void as being in contravention of Art. 19 (1) (f). 16.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It will be noticed that the authority conferred on the Bihar Government by the proviso to S.3 was one not merely to extend the lift of the Act as in the present case, but also to extend it with such modifications as might be specified in the notificationIn our opinion, S.3 of the Ordinance in so far as it authorises the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Act falls within the category of conditional legislation and is, in consequence intra viresThis is clear authority that a provision in a statute conferring a power on an outside authority to bring it into force at such time as it might in its own discretion, determine, is conditional and not delegated legislation and that it will be valid, unless there is in the constitution Act any limitation on its power to enact such a legislationThe reason for upholding a legislative provision authorising an outside authority to bring an Act into force at such time as it may determine is that it must depend on the facts as they may exist at a given point of time whether the law should then be made to operate, and that the decision of such as issue is best left to an executive authority. Such legislation is termed conditional, because the legislature has itself made the law in all its completeness as regards "place, person, laws, powers," leaving nothing for an outside authority to legislate on, the only function assigned to it being to bring the law into operation at such time as it might decide. And it can make no difference in the character of a legislation as a conditional one that the Legislature, after itself enacting the law and fixing, on a consideration of the facts as they might have then existed, the period of its duration, confers a power on an outside authority to extend its operation for a further period if it is satisfied that the state of facts which called forth the legislation continues to subsistIn the present case, the preamble to the Ordinance clearly recites the state of facts which necessitated the enactment of the law in question, and S.3 fixed the duration of the Act as two years, on an understanding of the situation as it then existed. At the same time, it conferred a power on the Rajpramukh to extend the life of the Ordinance beyond that period, if the state of affairs then should require it. When such extension is decided by the Rajpramukh and notified, the law that will operate is the law which was enacted by the legislative authority in respect of "place, person, laws, powers," and it is clearly conditional and not delegated legislation as laid down in 5 Ind. App 178(B), and must, in consequence, be held to be valid.It follows that we are unable to agree with the statement of the law in 1949 F C R 593: (A I R 1949 F C 175)(A) that a power to extend the lift of an enactment cannot validly be conferred on an outside authorityIt was not an independent piece of legislation such as could be enacted only by the, then competent legislative authority of the State, but merely an exercise of a power conferred by a statute which had been previously enacted by the appropriate legislative authority. The exercise of such a power is referable not to the legislative competence of the Rajpramukh but to Ordinance No. IX of 1949, and provided S.3 is valid, the validity of the notification is coextensive with that of the Ordinance. If the Ordinance did not come to an end by reason of the fact that the authority of the Rajpramukh to legislate came to an end-and that is not and cannot be disputed- neither did the power to issue a notification which is conferred therein. The true position is that it is in his character as the authority on whom power was conferred under S.3 of the Ordinance that the Rajpramukh issued the impugned notification, and not as the legislative authority of the State. This objection should accordingly be overruled.It is true that that section does not itself indicate the grounds on which exemption could be granted, but the preamble to the Ordinance sets out with sufficient clearness the policy of the Legislature, and as that governs S.15 of the Ordinance, the decision of the Government thereunder cannot be said to be unguided. Vide Harishanker Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955)l S C R 380 at p. 386: (A I R 1954 S C 465 at p. 467)(F). But even if S.15 were to be held to be bad, that does not affect the rest of the legislation, as the matter dealt with in that section is clearly severable. In fact, S.15 was not in the Ordinance as it was originally enacted, and was only introduced later by Ordinance No. XII of 1949. We must accordingly, hold that the impugned Ordinance cannot be held to be bad under Art. 14It should also be remembered in this connection that the impugned Ordinance is an emergency legislation of a temporary character, and,as observed in Dr. N. B. Khare v. The State of Delhi, 1950 S C R 519 at p. 526 : (A I R 1950 S C 211 at p. 214) (H), that is a factor to be taken into account in judging of its reasonableness. As already stated, the Ordinance has since come to an end, and has been replaced by a comprehensive tenancy law. In the circumstances, we are unable to hold that the impugned Ordinance is void as being in contravention of Art. 19 (1) (f).