Case: SIKANDER JEHAN BEGUM AND ANOTHER Vs. (ANDHRA PRADESH STATE GOVERNMENT)

and it is a also true that generally the property of the deceased Jagirdar was granted to the person who was held by the Nizam to be the successor of the deceased Jagirdar. But that does not affect the true legal character of the Jagir. This position is borne out by the previous Firman issued by the Nizam in regard to the enquiry of the Atiyat estates. Circular No. 34 of 1341 F prescribed rules for conducting enquiries and passing decisions in cases of Inam. This circular was subsequently superseded and in its place Circular No. 10 of 1338 F was issued. The date of this latter circular is June 13, 1929. Several rules are prescribed in the form of sections for holding enquiries and passing decisions in Inam cases. It is not necessary to refer to the sections of this Circular in detail. It may be enough to state that three classes of officers are contemplated by the Circular for holding the enquiry. They are given powers to hold the enquiry. The enquiries are intended to be held generally in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. Appeals are provided against the decision of one officer to the officer higher in rank, but the ultimate position appears to be clear; when the Nizam-e-Atiyat expresses his opinion and submits it to the Honble the Revenue Member the Revenue Member thereupon expresses his own opinion, and on considering all the opinions expressed in the enquiry, "the Nizam is graciously pleased to issue his Firman and the Firman thus issued will be binding on the parties." Thus, it appears that though formal provisions were made in regard to the holding of the enquiry, the nature of the enquiry was essentially consultative and the Nizam was not bound by the decisions reached by the several officers authorised to hold the enquiry. The fact that the Nizam usually accepted the decision of the enquiry does not alter the legal position that the Nizam might well have refused to accept the opinion and might even have refused to make a grant of the estate to anyone among the several, claimants.Therefore, even under the Circulars issued by the Nizam for holding enquiries into the questions of succession to Jagirs, the position appears to be clear that jagirs were not heritable and on the death of the Jagirdar, on principle and in theory, it was always a case of resumption and regrant.20. If that be so, any person who claimed to be the successor of the deceased Jagirdar had no right to come to a Civil Court for establishing that claim. In fact, there is no claim to succession at all, the question of regrant being always in the absolute discretion of the Nizam. After the Rule of the Nizam came to an end, the only change that occurred was that on the death of the Jagirdar, the properly vested in the State and could be regranted to a successor in the discretion of the State. Therefore, in our opinion the argument that by denying the petitioners the right to establish a claim in the Civil Court, the impugned provision of S. 18 (2) offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution, cannot be sustained. The property in respect of which the claim is sought to be made is not like the property in the case of Ameerunnissa at all. In that case, the property was heritable and succession to it was governed by the rules of personal law. In the present case, there is no right to succession as such-whoever gets the estate as a result of the decision of the Chief Minister gets it by way of regrant made by the State. That is why we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of S. 13(2) on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 cannot be sustained.21.In view of the special character of the property in question, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot challenge the validity of S. 13(2) on the ground that it contravenes Art. 19(1)(f).22. There is one more point which needs to be considered and that relates to the non-Atiyat estate left by the deceased Nawab Kamal Yar Jung. It appears that the Firman by which the Nizam appointed the first commission of Enquiry refers to the estate of the deceased Nawab in general and is not apparently confined to his Atiyat estate. Simiarly, the order passed by the Nizam that the Government should take possession of the deceased Nawabs property appears to have been implemented in regard to both Atiyat and non-Atiyat estates left by the Nawab. The Chief Ministers order confirming the report of the special Tribunal subsequently appointed is likewise vague and may seem to cover both the Atiyat and non-Atiyat estates. The petitioners contend that whatever may be the position in regard to the Atiyat estate, the Chief Minister had no right to make an order in respect of non-Atiyat estate; indeed the Nizam himself could not have appointed an Enquiry Commission in respect of non-Atiyat estate and so the dispute in regard to the succession to the said estate must be left to be decided according to the personal law of the parties and it must be tried by the ordinary Civil Courts. The position is not disputed either by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri who appeared for the State or by Mr. Latifi who appeared for the respondents before us. Incidentally, we may add that it appears that litigation is pending in respect of this property between some the parties in Civil Suit No. 139 of 1355 F. Since it is common ground before us that the non-Atiyat estate is not covered by the order passed by the Chief Minister, all that we wish to do in the present Writ Petition is to make it clear that the said order does not relate to non-Atiyat estate and that questions of title in respect of it will have to be tried in the Civil Courts.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is common ground that our decision in the Writ Petition will govern the decision in the Civil Appeal. Indeed, as we have already indicated, both the proceedings raise the same point of law.It will be noticed that the result of S. 13(2) is to validate the orders of the authorities therein specified which have been passed between September 18, 1948, and March 14, 1952. The first date refers to the commencement of the Police action and the latter to the commencement of the operation of the Act. The object of the Legislature clearly is to validate orders passed between the said two dates so that the questions determined by the relevant orders should not be reopened for enquiry either before the Atiyat Courts or before the Civil Courts. It is not disputed that between the commencement of the Police action and the passing of the Act events of historical importance took place in the State of Hyderabad and so treating that period as of unusual significance is not open to any criticism. Therefore, if the Legislature chose to deal with the orders passed during this period as constituting a class by themselves, that itself cannot be said to contravene Art. 14 of theposition in the present case is very much different. Section 13(2) does not validate the orders passed in the enquiry relating to the present case alone. It purports to validate orders passed between the two specified dates in respect of all the enquiries which were then pending. That is one important point of distinction. Besides, as we will point out later, the nature of the property in respect of which the petitioners make a claim is fundamentally different from that in the case of Ameerunuissa Begum. The property in the latter case was heritable property succession to which had to be determined under the principles of the personal law applicable to the parties, while in the present case, the succession to Atiyat property does not come as a matter of right to the heirs of the last holder. Therefore, in our opinion, the argument based ripen the decision of the case Ameerunnissa Begum can notwe do not think it is necessary to examine the merits of this argument, though we may add that, prima facie, classification made between cases decided and those not decided may not be irrational or unreasonable.It is true that on the death of a Jagirdar an enquiry was held about the succession to the said Jagir either by the Atiyat Courts or by a commission or Tribunal specially appointed in that behalf; and it is a also true that generally the property of the deceased Jagirdar was granted to the person who was held by the Nizam to be the successor of the deceased Jagirdar. But that does not affect the true legal character of the Jagir. This position is borne out by the previous Firman issued by the Nizam in regard to the enquiry of the Atiyat estates. Circular No. 34 of 1341 F prescribed rules for conducting enquiries and passing decisions in cases of Inam. This circular was subsequently superseded and in its place Circular No. 10 of 1338 F was issued. The date of this latter circular is June 13, 1929. Several rules are prescribed in the form of sections for holding enquiries and passing decisions in Inam cases. It is not necessary to refer to the sections of this Circular in detail. It may be enough to state that three classes of officers are contemplated by the Circular for holding the enquiry. They are given powers to hold the enquiry. The enquiries are intended to be held generally in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code. Appeals are provided against the decision of one officer to the officer higher in rank, but the ultimate position appears to be clear; when the Nizam-e-Atiyat expresses his opinion and submits it to the Honble the Revenue Member the Revenue Member thereupon expresses his own opinion, and on considering all the opinions expressed in the enquiry, "the Nizam is graciously pleased to issue his Firman and the Firman thus issued will be binding on the parties." Thus, it appears that though formal provisions were made in regard to the holding of the enquiry, the nature of the enquiry was essentially consultative and the Nizam was not bound by the decisions reached by the several officers authorised to hold the enquiry. The fact that the Nizam usually accepted the decision of the enquiry does not alter the legal position that the Nizam might well have refused to accept the opinion and might even have refused to make a grant of the estate to anyone among the several, claimants.Therefore, even under the Circulars issued by the Nizam for holding enquiries into the questions of succession to Jagirs, the position appears to be clear that jagirs were not heritable and on the death of the Jagirdar, on principle and in theory, it was always a case of resumption andin our opinion the argument that by denying the petitioners the right to establish a claim in the Civil Court, the impugned provision of S. 18 (2) offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution, cannot be sustained. The property in respect of which the claim is sought to be made is not like the property in the case of Ameerunnissa at all. In that case, the property was heritable and succession to it was governed by the rules of personal law. In the present case, there is no right to succession as such-whoever gets the estate as a result of the decision of the Chief Minister gets it by way of regrant made by the State. That is why we are satisfied that the challenge to the validity of S. 13(2) on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 cannot beappears that the Firman by which the Nizam appointed the first commission of Enquiry refers to the estate of the deceased Nawab in general and is not apparently confined to his Atiyat estate. Simiarly, the order passed by the Nizam that the Government should take possession of the deceased Nawabs property appears to have been implemented in regard to both Atiyat and non-Atiyat estates left by the Nawab. The Chief Ministers order confirming the report of the special Tribunal subsequently appointed is likewise vague and may seem to cover both the Atiyat and non-Atiyat estates. The petitioners contend that whatever may be the position in regard to the Atiyat estate, the Chief Minister had no right to make an order in respect of non-Atiyat estate; indeed the Nizam himself could not have appointed an Enquiry Commission in respect of non-Atiyat estate and so the dispute in regard to the succession to the said estate must be left to be decided according to the personal law of the parties and it must be tried by the ordinary Civil Courts. The position is not disputed either by Mr. Viswanatha Sastri who appeared for the State or by Mr. Latifi who appeared for the respondents before us. Incidentally, we may add that it appears that litigation is pending in respect of this property between some the parties in Civil Suit No. 139 of 1355 F. Since it is common ground before us that the non-Atiyat estate is not covered by the order passed by the Chief Minister, all that we wish to do in the present Writ Petition is to make it clear that the said order does not relate to non-Atiyat estate and that questions of title in respect of it will have to be tried in the Civil Courts.