Case: Gram Sabha, Besahani Vs. Ram Raj Singh &amp; Ors

grove-holder of land referred to in Section 212 or being an intermediary brought such land under his own cultivation or planted a grove thereon on or after the eighth day of August, 1946, he shall pass an order for ejectment of the person from the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed.(7) Where an order for ejectment has been passed under this section, the party against whom the order has been passed may institute a suit to establish the right claimed by it but subject to the results of such suit the order passed under sub-section (4) or (6) shall be conclusive."The language of S. 212-A (6) makes it clear that the order under that provision must be an order for ejectment of the person in possession of the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed. This means that an order under that provision must first direct payment of compensation to the person in possession and the direction for ejectment of the person in possession must be made effective only thereafter, i. e., after the compensation has been paid. The order to be made under this provision of law must, therefore, contain as a condition precedent to ejectment the payment of compensation. If no payment of compensation is ordered, the order made would not be an order under this provision of law. In the present case, admittedly no compensation was ordered to be paid in the order purporting to have been passed under S 212-A (6) of the Act, so that that order cannot be treated as an order under this provision of law The order not being under this provision the dispossession of the plaintiffs/respondents in pursuance of that order was clearly illegal and the plaintiffs, respondents had the right to institute the suit for obtaining possession under S. 209 of the Act.3. It is true that, in accordance with Entry at Sl. No. 32-B of Appendix III read with Rule 338 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules"), a suit to establish a right claimed in accordance with S. 212-A (7) of the Act has to be instituted within six months. In pursuance of that right claimed, possession can also be claimed; and, if the suit for establishing the right fails, the right to obtain possession would also become time-barred. Consequently, under S. 189 (c) of the Act, the person concorned, who fails to institute the suit within this period of limitation in accordance with S. 212-A (7) of the Act, would have his interest in the land extinguished. This provision, however, will only apply to cases where a valid order has been made under S. 212-A of the Act and the person concerned has been dispossessed in pursuance of such an order. In the present case, we have held that the order, in pursuance of which the respondents were dispossessed was not a valid order under S. 212-A (6) of the Act and cannot be held to be an order under that provision of law, so that the respondents in this case must be deemed to have been deprived of possession- otherwise than in accordance with law. In such a case, a suit clearly lay against the appellant under S. 209 of the Act and such a suit could be instituted within six years from the date that unlawful possession was taken by the appellant in accordance with Entry at Sl. No. 30 of Appendix III read with R. 338 of the Rules. The present suit was admittedly brought within this period of limitation and was, therefore, not time-barred. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be defeated on this ground.4. The second point urged on behalf of the appellant, however, appears to us to have great force and must be accepted. It was urged that, so far as plot No. 330/3 is concerned, there was a finding of fact recorded by the trial Court, which was upheld by the first appellate Court, that the plaintiffs/ respondents never acquired any tenancy or Sirdari rights in this fend, so that. irrespective of the validity of the order under S. 212-A (6) of the Act. the plaintiffs/respondents suit for possession of this plot had to be dismissed.The High Court in decreeing the suit, clearly ignore, this aspect The dismissal of the suit by the trial Court which was upheld by the first appellate Court in respect of this plot No 330/3 was therefore, not liable to he set aside even on the view taken by the High Court and to that extent it has to be upheld.5. With regard to the remaining four plots in which the respondents were claiming Bhumidari rights, the error committed by the High Court is that on the finding recorded by that Court there should have been an order of remand to determine other questions raised in the suit in respect of those plots. One of the questions raised, which formed part of issue No 2 and was never decided by the civil Court to which that issue was referred, was that the respondents had never acquired Bhumidari rights at all in these plots. That question should have been remitted for a fresh decision when the High Court held that the civil Court was wrong in holding that the Bhumidari rights if possessed by the respondents in these plots, had been extinguished under S. 189 of the Act in view of the failure of the respondents to institute the suit within the period of limitation applicable to a suit under S. 212-A (7) of the Act. Further, in respect of these plots, other issues which were not decided by the Revenue Court also required decision before the suit in respect of them could be completely disposed of. Consequently it is now necessary to remand the suit to the trial Court for a fresh trial for the purposes indicated above.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The language of S. 212-A (6) makes it clear that the order under that provision must be an order for ejectment of the person in possession of the land on payment of such compensation as may be prescribed. This means that an order under that provision must first direct payment of compensation to the person in possession and the direction for ejectment of the person in possession must be made effective only thereafter, i. e., after the compensation has been paid. The order to be made under this provision of law must, therefore, contain as a condition precedent to ejectment the payment of compensation. If no payment of compensation is ordered, the order made would not be an order under this provision of law. In the present case, admittedly no compensation was ordered to be paid in the order purporting to have been passed under S 212-A (6) of the Act, so that that order cannot be treated as an order under this provision of law The order not being under this provision the dispossession of the plaintiffs/respondents in pursuance of that order was clearly illegal and the plaintiffs, respondents had the right to institute the suit for obtaining possession under S. 209 of the Act.3. It is true that, in accordance with Entry at Sl. No. 32-B of Appendix III read with Rule 338 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules"), a suit to establish a right claimed in accordance with S. 212-A (7) of the Act has to be instituted within six months. In pursuance of that right claimed, possession can also be claimed; and, if the suit for establishing the right fails, the right to obtain possession would also become time-barred. Consequently, under S. 189 (c) of the Act, the person concorned, who fails to institute the suit within this period of limitation in accordance with S. 212-A (7) of the Act, would have his interest in the land extinguished. This provision, however, will only apply to cases where a valid order has been made under S. 212-A of the Act and the person concerned has been dispossessed in pursuance of such an order. In the present case, we have held that the order, in pursuance of which the respondents were dispossessed was not a valid order under S. 212-A (6) of the Act and cannot be held to be an order under that provision of law, so that the respondents in this case must be deemed to have been deprived of possession- otherwise than in accordance with law. In such a case, a suit clearly lay against the appellant under S. 209 of the Act and such a suit could be instituted within six years from the date that unlawful possession was taken by the appellant in accordance with Entry at Sl. No. 30 of Appendix III read with R. 338 of the Rules. The present suit was admittedly brought within this period of limitation and was, therefore, not time-barred. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be defeated on this ground.With regard to the remaining four plots in which the respondents were claiming Bhumidari rights, the error committed by the High Court is that on the finding recorded by that Court there should have been an order of remand to determine other questions raised in the suit in respect of those plots. One of the questions raised, which formed part of issue No 2 and was never decided by the civil Court to which that issue was referred, was that the respondents had never acquired Bhumidari rights at all in these plots. That question should have been remitted for a fresh decision when the High Court held that the civil Court was wrong in holding that the Bhumidari rights if possessed by the respondents in these plots, had been extinguished under S. 189 of the Act in view of the failure of the respondents to institute the suit within the period of limitation applicable to a suit under S. 212-A (7) of the Act. Further, in respect of these plots, other issues which were not decided by the Revenue Court also required decision before the suit in respect of them could be completely disposed of. Consequently it is now necessary to remand the suit to the trial Court for a fresh trial for the purposes indicated above.