Case: Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd Vs. M/s. Datar Switchgear Limited &amp; Others

the judgments.We find that the Arbitral Tribunal has dealt with this aspect and held that the contract objects were custom built in the following manner:“55. Respondents submitted that the Claimants did not make any efforts to mitigate the loss suffered. The submission is without any merit for more than one reason. In the first instance, the contract objects manufactured in pursuance of the orders of the Respondents were custom built i.e. to the specifications laid down by the Respondents and these contract objects cannot be disposed in open market. Datar deposed with reference to Exh. C 16 that efforts were made to sell the contract objects stranded in the factory to other Electricity Boards but those efforts did not succeed. It was contended by the Respondents that the claimants should have dismantled the stranded contract objects and sold the components thereof. The submission is only required to be slated to be rejected. Once an electronic instrument is dismantled, then the value almost becomes nil. In any event, the Claimants have established that efforts were made to mitigate the loss.”61) The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court has given its imprimatur to the aforesaid findings. It, therefore, becomes apparent that the objects in question were manufactured by respondent No.2 to suit the specific needs of the appellant ad they could not be used otherwise. Therefore, there was no possibility on the part of respondent No.2 to make an endeavour to dispose of the same in order to mitigate the loses.RE : WAIVER62) The argument of the appellant on waiver is also successfully met by respondent No.2. Submission of Mr. Dada, on this argument, was that both parties went to trial before the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis that the time to start work under the contract had commenced with reference to letter dated 14.07.1997 of the appellant signed by the Chief Engineer who was the competent authority under the contract. The same Chief Engineer insisted, by letter dated 20.04.1998, that liquidated damages would be imposed if the work was not completed in time. We may point out that the Arbitral Tribunal considered and rejected this argument of waiver, as set up by the appellant, in the following words:“18... It was then contended that the Claimants had waived the right to receive the lists of locations from the Respondents. By reference to clause 5.1 of the work order, it was submitted that the Claimants were to commence installation within four months from (a) the date of the work order; (b) opening of Letter of Credit and (c) on receipt of complete list of locations, whichever is later. It was contended that the Claimants were entitled to wait till all the lists were supplied to installation, but as the Claimants commenced installation even though the entire lists were not supplied, it should be concluded that the Claimants have waived their right. The submission is desperate and wholly unfair. The Respondents were in a hurry to complete the installation within a period of 20 months with an object to save the large amount lost due to loss of energy. Merely because the Claimants acted in a reasonable manner and did not insist upon the terms of the contract, it is absurd to suggest that the Claimants waived their right to complain about non-supply of lists of locations. It was then submitted that the Claimants had installed contract objects on the oral instructions and on the basis of chits issued by some of the Officers of the Respondents and that was contrary to the terms of the work order which provided that installation should be only on locations, the lists of which are given in accordance with the format at Annexure ‘E’ to the work order. It was also submitted that on 155 locations at Jalgaon, Dhule and Aurangabad, the lists were received by the Claimants from Authorities who were not competent to issue such lists. The submission has no merit because while undertaking such a huge project, the parties were not keen on strict compliance of each and every term and condition of the contract. Such an instance would have defeated the contract at once because the contract had to be carried out over a large area and with the interaction of large number of people. These factors cannot establish that the claimants have waived their right to complaint about the failure to supply lists of location...”63) Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, referred to and relied upon various judgments in support of his contention. These judgments deal with the scope of interference in the awards passed by the arbitrators. It is not even necessary to deal with these judgments inasmuch as, on the facts of this case, as discussed in detail hereinabove, none of the judgments gets attracted. Likewise, effort on the part of the appellant to rely upon the judgment of the learned single Judge of the High Court in the first round is futile as that was set aside by the Division Bench and matter was remitted back to the single Judge of the High Court to decide it afresh.RE: ORDER ON CHAMBER SUMMONS64) Three chamber summons were taken out by the appellant during the pendency of this appeal before the Division Bench. By these chamber summons, the appellant intended to amend the petition which was filed by it under Section 34 of the Act as well as the appeal. The High Court after detailed discussion in the impugned judgment rejected these summons. We find that the amendment sought was highly belated. Arbitration petition filed under Section 34 of the Act was sought to be amended after a delay of eight years. Further, the amendment in the appeal, taking those very grounds on which amendment in the arbitration petition was sought, was sought after a delay of 3½ years. The High Court, thus, rightly rejected these summons and it is not necessary to have any elaborate discussion on these aspects.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]41) We find adequate force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. Dada. Let us first take note of these findings:FINDINGS OF FACTS :42) Reasoning contained in the Award reveals following salient findings returned by the ArbitralThe appellant prevented respondent No.2 from performing the contract.(ii) Respondent No.2 was ready and willing to perform the contract all throughout.(iii) The appellant chose not to examine any of its Superintending Engineers who werefor giving DTC locations to respondent No.2 and, as found by the Arbitral Tribunal, they were the kingpins of each circle for performance of the contract.(iv) There is considerable merit in the submission of respondent No.2 that the Minutes of the Meeting dated 24.06.1998 is a fabricated document.(v) It is not possible to accede to the submission of the appellant that respondent No.2 had adequate lists of locations available and still failed to install the contract objects.(vi) It is obvious that there is something seriously wrong in the working of the appellant. Once a letter is listed in the affidavit of documents, it is surprising how the letter was not traceable. Be that as it may, the fact remains that prior to the date of termination of contract, at least in three Circles, the appellant had directed stoppage of installation work.(vii) It is unfortunate that the Head Office of the appellant lacked control over the field offices and which ultimately led to the failure of the project. It is futile to even suggest that the breach was not a fundamental one.(viii) Respondent No.2 was ready and willing to perform their part of the contract while the appellant committed a breach by failure to supply DTC locations as per the terms of the contract. (ix) Respondent No.2 invested Rs.163 crores in the project.(x) The appellant failed to prove that deductions effected in the Performance Certificates were proper.(xi) The appellant indulged in tampering the commissioning reports produced on record. The attempt does not behove to a statutory body and requires to be deprecated. The attempt made by the appellant by producing documents which are tampered with and which are not genuine indicates that the appellant was willing to go to any extent to make allegations against respondent No.2.(xii) The appellant did not make available large number of documents disclosed in the affidavit of documents on the ground that the same are not available.(xiii) Counter claim of the appellant is misconceived and is nothing short of counter blast to the claim made against respondent No.2.(xiv) It was the appellant and appellant alone who had committed fundamental breaches of the terms of the work order.(xv) The appellant has raised untenable and unsustainable defences which led to considerable delay in concluding the proceedings. These are findings of facts based upon the material evidence that emerged on the record of theCategorical findings are arrived at by the Arbitral Tribunal to the effect that insofar as respondent No.2 is concerned, it was always ready and willing to perform its contractual obligations, but was prevented by the appellant from such performance. Another specific finding which is returned by the Arbitral Tribunal is that the appellant had not given the list of locations and, therefore, its submission that respondent No.2 had adequate lists of locations available but still failed to install the contract objects was not acceptable. In fact, on this count, the Arbitral Tribunal has commented upon the working of the appellant itself and expressed its dismay about lack of control by the Head Office of the appellant over the field offices which led to the failure of the contract. These are findings of facts which are arrived at by the Arbitral Tribunal after appreciating the evidence and documents on record. From these findings it stands established that there is a fundamental breach on the part of the appellant in carrying out its obligations, with no fault of respondent No.2 which had invested whooping amount of Rs.163 crores in the project. A perusal of the award reveals that the Tribunal investigated the conduct of entire transaction between the parties pertaining to the work order, including withholding of DTC locations, allegations and counter allegations by the parties concerning installed objects. The arbitrators did not focus on a particular breach qua particular number of objects/class of objects. Respondent No.2 is right in its submission that the fundamental breach, by its very nature, pervades the entire contract and once acted committed, the contract as a whole stands abrogated. It is on the aforesaid basis that the Arbitral Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the termination of contract by respondent No.2 was in order and valid. The proposition of law that the Arbitral Tribunal is the master of evidence and the findings of fact which are arrived at by the arbitrators on the basis of evidence on record are not to be scrutinised as if the Court was sitting in appeal now stands settled by catena of judgments pronounced by this Court without any exception thereto ((See – Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, (2015) 3 SCC 49  , and S. Munishamappa v. B. Venkatarayappa & Ors., (1981) 3 SCC 260  ).44) At this stage, we may deal with the contention of the appellant to the effect that the arbitrators have themselves recorded a finding that the LC was still in operation and had not expired and, therefore, the finding of the Tribunal that the contract was terminated validly was self contradictory.45) Though this contention appears to be attractive in the first blush, we find no substance in the same on deeper examination thereof. It was rightly contended by Mr. Dada that the Arbitral Tribunal has held that since the contract was terminated on 19.02.1999, the appellant was not required to renew the LC. In other words, since there was no contract in existence after 19.02.1999, there could not be aIt was argued that respondent No.2 should have installed objects at least under categoryeven if there was breach on the part of the appellant in supplying locations for categories3. This was refuted by learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.2 on the round that the Arbitral Tribunal had specifically considered and rejected this argument and the approach of the arbitrators is even upheld by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the HighWe agree with the contention of respondent No.2 that these are pure findings of facts and there is no perversity therein. It may, however, be pointed out that out of 12555category objects under the work order, 9515 objects were to be installed in Kolhapur Zone, i.e. 76% of the said category. Vide letter dated 14.07.1997, the Chief Engineer, Kolhapur Zone admittedly directed respondent No.2 to first complete new installation3) and only thereafter take up installation under categoryThe locations forfrom Kolhapur were admittedly never furnished. Therefore, this contention of the appellant also warrants a rejection.52) The award of the Arbitral Tribunal having been affirmed by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court, that too after dealing with each and every argument raised by the appellant in detail, which is negatived, we hold that Mr. Dada is correct in his argument that there is no question of law which is involved herein and the only attempt of the appellant was tothe matter afresh, which wasWe see substance in the contention of respondent No.2 and are of the opinion that the appellant cannot now turn around and raise objection to the award of damages which are measured having regard to the loss suffered by respondent No.2 in terms of lease rent for reasonable period for which it would have been entitled to otherwise.55) That apart, we also find that the Arbitral Tribunal, while awarding the damages, has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Sugauli Sugar Works (P) Ltd. (1976) 3In the instant case, applying the aforesaid principle, the Arbitral Tribunal, for the purpose of classification, considered a 30% reduction in lease rent to compute damages for installed objects, 50% reduction in lease rent to compute damages for manufactured but uninstalled objects and the bare cost of raw materials for the objects not manufactured. No pendente lite interest was awarded, though the proceedings went on for five and a half years. Thus, the Arbitral Tribunal awarded almost the same amount as was invested by respondent No.2 for the project. Interest was awarded only @ 10% per annum from the date of the award as opposed to the prevailing bank rate of about 21%.The aforesaid being a reasonable and plausible measure adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal for awarding the damages, there is no question of interdicting with theIn the aforesaid backdrop, we agree with the approach of the High Court in spelling out the proposition of law that once it is established that the party was justified in terminating the contract on account of fundamental breach thereof, then the said innocent party is entitled to claim damages for the entire contract, i.e. for the part which is performed and also for the part of the contract which it was prevented fromWe, thus, do not find any infirmity in the manner in which damages are awarded in favour of respondentThe learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court has given its imprimatur to the aforesaid findings. It, therefore, becomes apparent that the objects in question were manufactured by respondent No.2 to suit the specific needs of the appellant ad they could not be used otherwise. Therefore, there was no possibility on the part of respondent No.2 to make an endeavour to dispose of the same in order to mitigate theThe argument of the appellant on waiver is also successfully met by respondent No.2. Submission of Mr. Dada, on this argument, was that both parties went to trial before the Arbitral Tribunal on the basis that the time to start work under the contract had commenced with reference to letter dated 14.07.1997 of the appellant signed by the Chief Engineer who was the competent authority under the contract. The same Chief Engineer insisted, by letter dated 20.04.1998, that liquidated damages would be imposed if the work was not completed in time. We may point out that the Arbitral Tribunal considered and rejected this argument of waiver, as set up by theMr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, referred to and relied upon various judgments in support of his contention. These judgments deal with the scope of interference in the awards passed by the arbitrators. It is not even necessary to deal with these judgments inasmuch as, on the facts of this case, as discussed in detail hereinabove, none of the judgments gets attracted. Likewise, effort on the part of the appellant to rely upon the judgment of the learned single Judge of the High Court in the first round is futile as that was set aside by the Division Bench and matter was remitted back to the single Judge of the High Court to decide itThree chamber summons were taken out by the appellant during the pendency of this appeal before the Division Bench. By these chamber summons, the appellant intended to amend the petition which was filed by it under Section 34 of the Act as well as the appeal. The High Court after detailed discussion in the impugned judgment rejected these summons. We find that the amendment sought was highly belated. Arbitration petition filed under Section 34 of the Act was sought to be amended after a delay of eight years. Further, the amendment in the appeal, taking those very grounds on which amendment in the arbitration petition was sought, was sought after a delay of 3½ years. The High Court, thus, rightly rejected these summons and it is not necessary to have any elaborate discussion on these aspects.