Case: Vasumatiben Gaurishankar Bhatt Vs. Navairam Manchharam Vora And Ors

to pay the arrears at any time during the pendency of the suit, or even during the pendency of the appeal, and so, when the tenant failed or neglected to pay the arrears due from him immediately after receiving the notice of demand from the landlord, it is easy to imagine that she knew that her failure to pay the arrears of rent immediately on receiving the notice would not lead to her eviction and that she would have the option to deposit the amount as required by S. 12 (3) either in the trial Court or in the Court of Appeal. That being so, he suggests that in order to avoid hardship to the tenants, S. 12 (3) (a) should be read as requiring the landlord to issue a fresh notice after the amended section came into force. The notice given by the landlord prior to the date of the amendment did not convey to the tenant the knowledge that her failure to comply with it would necessarily lead to her ejectment, and so. the relevant provisions of this beneficent statute should be construed in a liberal way. That, in substance, is the first contention raised by Mr. Pai before us.7. We are unable to accept this argument. What S. 12 (3) (a) requires is that in cases where there is no dispute between the landlord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if the landlord is able to show that the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months or more and the said arrears continued in spite of the fact that a notice was served on him before the institution of the suit and no payment was made within a month thereafter, the landlord is entitled to get a decree for ejectment against the tenant. It is true that S. 12 (3) (a) refers to a notice, but in terms, it refers to a notice served by the landlord as required by Section 12 (2), and in S. 12 (2) the legislature has made no amendment when it amended sub-s. (3). If we turn to S. 12 (2), it would be noticed that the notice given by the respondents to the appellant in the present case satisfies the requirements of the said sub-section. The respondents told the appellant by their notice that arrears were due from her, and there is no doubt that the arrears were not paid up by the appellant until the expiration of one month next after the notice in writing was served on her in that behalf. Section 12 (2) never required the landlord to state to the tenant what the consequences would be if the tenant neglected to pay the arrears demanded from him/her by the notice. Therefore, if the notice served by the respondents on the appellant prior to the institution of the present suit is in order and it is shown that the arrears have not been paid as required, then S. 12 (2) has been complied with, and it is on that footing that the case between the parties has to be tried under S. 12 (3) (a).8. Mr. Pai then contends that Sec-12 (3) (a) seems to suggest that the neglect or failure of the tenant to make the payment of arrears must be subsequent to the date on which the Amending Act came into force. He relies on the fact that S. 12 (3) (a) refers to the case where the tenant "neglects to make payment" of the rent. The section does not say "has neglected to make payment", says Mr. Pail In our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. The use of the word `neglect" in the present tense has to be construed in the light of the fact that the clause refers to the tenant neglecting to make payment of the rent until the expiration of one month next after receipt of the notice, and that clearly would have made the use of the past tense inappropriate. The position therefore, is that if notice has been served as required by Section 12 (2) and the tenant is shown to have neglected to comply with the notice until the expiration of one month thereafter, Section 12 (2) satisfied and S. 12 (3) (a) comes into operation.9. Mr. Pai also argued that the right given to the tenant to pay the arrears at the hearing of the suit was a vested right, and so in construing S. 12 (3) (a) we should not adopt the construction which would defeat that vested right. It is not easy to accept the contention that the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) really confer any vested right as such ml the tenant. What S. 12 (3) (a) provided was that a decree shall not be passed in favour of the landlord in case the tenant pays or tenders ill Court the standard rent at the hearing of the suit. This provision cannot prima facie be said to confer any right or vested right on the tenant. But even if the tenant had a vested right to pay the money in Court at the hearing of the suit, we do not see flow that consideration can alter the plain effect of the words used in S. 12 (3) (a). The suit was filed after the amended section came into force, and clearly the amended provision applies to the suit and governs the decision of the dispute between the parties. If that is so, the plain meanings of S. 12 (3)( a) is that if a notice is served on the tenant and he has not made the payment as required within the time specified in S. 12 (3)(a), the Court is bound to pass a decree for eviction against the tenant. That is the view taken by the Gujarat High Court and we are satisfied that that view clearly gives effect to the provisions of S. 12 (3) (a) as amended in 1953.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. We are unable to accept this argument. What S. 12 (3) (a) requires is that in cases where there is no dispute between the landlord and the tenant regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if the landlord is able to show that the tenant is in arrears for a period of six months or more and the said arrears continued in spite of the fact that a notice was served on him before the institution of the suit and no payment was made within a month thereafter, the landlord is entitled to get a decree for ejectment against the tenant. It is true that S. 12 (3) (a) refers to a notice, but in terms, it refers to a notice served by the landlord as required by Section 12 (2), and in S. 12 (2) the legislature has made no amendment when it amended sub-s. (3). If we turn to S. 12 (2), it would be noticed that the notice given by the respondents to the appellant in the present case satisfies the requirements of the said sub-section. The respondents told the appellant by their notice that arrears were due from her, and there is no doubt that the arrears were not paid up by the appellant until the expiration of one month next after the notice in writing was served on her in that behalf. Section 12 (2) never required the landlord to state to the tenant what the consequences would be if the tenant neglected to pay the arrears demanded from him/her by the notice. Therefore, if the notice served by the respondents on the appellant prior to the institution of the present suit is in order and it is shown that the arrears have not been paid as required, then S. 12 (2) has been complied with, and it is on that footing that the case between the parties has to be tried under S. 12 (3)our opinion, there is no substance in this argument. The use of the word `neglect" in the present tense has to be construed in the light of the fact that the clause refers to the tenant neglecting to make payment of the rent until the expiration of one month next after receipt of the notice, and that clearly would have made the use of the past tense inappropriate. The position therefore, is that if notice has been served as required by Section 12 (2) and the tenant is shown to have neglected to comply with the notice until the expiration of one month thereafter, Section 12 (2) satisfied and S. 12 (3) (a) comes intois not easy to accept the contention that the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) really confer any vested right as such ml the tenant. What S. 12 (3) (a) provided was that a decree shall not be passed in favour of the landlord in case the tenant pays or tenders ill Court the standard rent at the hearing of the suit. This provision cannot prima facie be said to confer any right or vested right on the tenant. But even if the tenant had a vested right to pay the money in Court at the hearing of the suit, we do not see flow that consideration can alter the plain effect of the words used in S. 12 (3) (a). The suit was filed after the amended section came into force, and clearly the amended provision applies to the suit and governs the decision of the dispute between the parties. If that is so, the plain meanings of S. 12 (3)( a) is that if a notice is served on the tenant and he has not made the payment as required within the time specified in S. 12 (3)(a), the Court is bound to pass a decree for eviction against the tenant. That is the view taken by the Gujarat High Court and we are satisfied that that view clearly gives effect to the provisions of S. 12 (3) (a) as amended in 1953.