Case: Sawai Singhai Nirmal Chand Vs. Union Of India

is next contended that no notice can be said to be required for suits under O. 21, R. 63 because the principal object for enacting S. 80 is absent in the case of such suits. The argument is that the requirement about the statutory notice prescribed by S. 80 proceeds on the basis that it is desirable to give such notice to afford the Government an opportunity to consider whether the claims made against it should be settled or not. The Legislature thought that if the Government is informed beforehand about civil actions intended to be taken against it, it may in some cases avoid unnecessary litigation by accepting the claims if it is satisfied that the claims are well founded. In the case of a suit under O. 21, R. 63, there is hardly any need to give such a notice, because the Government was already a party in the investigation proceedings and it knows what the appellants case was in regard to the attachment sought to be levied at its instance. Since the respondent knows all about the claim of the appellant in regard to the properties in question, it is futile and unnecessary to require that a notice should be given to the respondent before a suit can be filed by the appellant under O. 21, R. 63.12. In support of this argument, Mr. Karkhanis has relied on a decision of this Court in Amar Nath Dogra v. Union of India, (1963) 1 SCR 657 : (AIR 1963 SC 424 ). In that case, one of the questions which the Court had to consider was whether, if a suit against the Government is withdrawn and a subsequent suit is filed substantially on the same cause of action, the notice given by the plaintiff prior to the institution of the first suit could be said to satisfy the requirements of S. 80 of the Code in respect of the second suit, and this question was answered in the affirmative. While upholding the appellants contention that the first notice should serve to meet the requirements of S. 80, this Court, no doubt, observed that the main purpose of giving the notice is to give previous intimation to the Government about the nature of the claim which a party wants to make against it. But we do not see how the purpose or the reason for requiring the notice can alter the effect of the plain words used in S. 80. What this Court held in the case of Amar Nath Dogra (supra) was that the notice before the institution of the first suit can be said to be a good notice even for the second suit: and that means that the notice was necessary to be given under S. 80. But it was not necessary to repeat it in the circumstances of the case.13. It is significant that in a large majority of cases, the plea that the Government raises is that notice is necessary and it is generally contended that the notice being defective in one particular or another makes the suit incompetent, and in dealing with such pleas, the courts have naturally sought to interpret the notices somewhat liberally and have sometimes observed that in enforcing the provisions of S. 80, common sense and sense of propriety should determine the issue. It is very unusual for the Government to contend that in a suit brought against it, no notice is required under S 80. It is plain that such a plea has been raised by the respondent in the present case, because it helps the respondent to default the appellants claim on the ground of limitation. In any case, the contention based on the object or purpose of the notice can hardly assist us in interpreting the plain words of S. 80.14. It will be recalled that prior to the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagchand Dagdusa v. Secretary of State, 54 Ind App 388 there was a sharp difference of opinion among the Indian High Courts on the question as to whether S. 80 applied to suits where injunction was claimed. The Privy Council held that S. 80 applied "to all forms of suit and whatever the relief sought, including a suit for an injunction. In dealing with the question about the construction of S. 80, the Privy Council took notice of the fact that some of the decisions which attempted to exclude from the purview of S. 80 suits for injunction, were influenced by the "assumption as to the practical objects with which it was framed". They also proceeded on the basis that S. 80 was a rule of procedure and that any construction which may lead to injustice is one which ought not to be adopted, since it would be repugnant to the notion of Justice. Having noticed these grounds on which an attempt was judicially made to except from the purview of S. 80 suits, for instance, in which injunction was claimed Viscount Summer, who spoke for the Privy Council, observed that "the Act, albeit a Procedure Code, must be read in accordance with the natural meaning of its words" and he added that "section 80 is express, explicit and mandatory, and it admits of no implications or exceptions". That is why it was held that a suit in which an injunction is prayed is still a suit within the words of the section, and to read any qualification into it is an encroachment on the function of legislation. In our opinion, these observations apply with equal force in dealing with the question as to whether a suit under O. 21, R. 63 is outside the purview of S. 80 of the Code.15. It appears that on this question, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in India. But, in our opinion, the view that suits under O. 21, R. 63 did not attract the provisions of S. 80, is inconsistent with the plain, categorical and unambiguous words used by it.16.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]5. Let us begin by referring to the provisions of O. 21, Rules 58 and 63. O. 21, R. 58 deals with the investigation of claims to, and objections to attachment of, attached properties. It is under this rule that a person whose property is wrongfully attached in execution of a decree passed against another, is entitled to object to the said attachment. On such an application being made, a summary enquiry follows and the attachment is either raised or is not raised and the objection to attachment is allowed or is not allowed according as the Court trying the application is satisfied that the objector is or is not justified in objecting to the attachment. After the final order is passed one way or the other as a result of the investigation made in such proceedings, R. 63 comes into operation. It provides that where a claim or an objection is preferred, the party against whom an order is made may institute a suit to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute, but, subject to the result of such suit, if any, the order shall be conclusive. It is thus plain that where an order is passed in objection proceedings commencing with R. 58, it would be final subject to the result of the suit which a party aggrieved by such order may institute, and that means that if a party is aggrieved by an order passed in these proceedings, he can have the said order set aside or reversed by bringing a suit as provided by R. 63 itself and such a suit has to be filed within one year from the date of the impugnedon a fair and reasonable construction of S. 80, we do not see how it is possible to hold that a suit filed under O. 21, R. 63 can be taken out of the provisions of S. 80 of the Code. If we were to accede to the argument urged before us by Mr. Karkhanis for the respondent, we would, in substance, have to add certain words of exception in S. 80 itself, and that plainly is notthe argument that the present suit is outside the purview of S. 80 of the Code because it is a continuation of the attachment proceedings must be rejected.In this connection, we ought to bear in mind that the scope of the enquiry under O. 21, R. 58 is very limited and is confined to question of possession as therein indicated while suit brought under O 21. R. 63 would be concerned not only with the question of possession, but also with the question of title. Thus the scope of the suit is very different from and wider than that of the investigation under O. 21, R 58. In fact, it is the order made in the said investigation that is the cause of action of the suit under O. 21, R.63.Therefore, it would be impossible to hold that such a suit is outside the purview of S. 80 of the Code.It is significant that in a large majority of cases, the plea that the Government raises is that notice is necessary and it is generally contended that the notice being defective in one particular or another makes the suit incompetent, and in dealing with such pleas, the courts have naturally sought to interpret the notices somewhat liberally and have sometimes observed that in enforcing the provisions of S. 80, common sense and sense of propriety should determine the issue. It is very unusual for the Government to contend that in a suit brought against it, no notice is required under S 80. It is plain that such a plea has been raised by the respondent in the present case, because it helps the respondent to default the appellants claim on the ground of limitation. In any case, the contention based on the object or purpose of the notice can hardly assist us in interpreting the plain words of S. 80.14. Itappears that on this question, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in India. But, in our opinion, the view that suits under O. 21, R. 63 did not attract the provisions of S. 80, is inconsistent with the plain, categorical and unambiguous words used by it.