Case: Charan Lal Sahu Vs. Nandkishore Bhatt &amp; Ors

but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. In N. P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency l952 SCR 218 = (AIR 1952 SC 64 ) it was pointed out that strictly speaking, it is the sole right of the Legislature to examine and determine all matters relating to the election of its own members, and if the Legislature takes it out of its own hands and vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction, that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the law which creates it.4. On behalf of the appellant the case of K. Kamaraja Nadar v Kunju Thevar, 1959 SCR 583 = (AIR 1958 SC 687 ) has been relied upon in support of the submission that the provisions of Section 117 of the Act are directory and not mandatory in their character. An examination of this decision does not support this contention of the appellant. That was a case under the unamended S. 117 of the Act under which the petitioner was required to enclose with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing that a deposit of one thousand rupees had been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission as security for the costs of the petition. The petitioner therein had deposited Rs. 1000/- but had not mentioned the complete head of account in the Government Treasury receipt nor was the deposit made in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission as laid down in the aforesaid section. The Election Commission discussed this defect and left the question to the Tribunal to decide after hearing the parties whether the defect could be treated as fatal or one that could be cured by fresh deposit or otherwise so as to secure the costs of the candidate if eventually awarded to him The Tribunal held that there was no defect in the matter of the head of account and was further of opinion that non-mention of the fact that the deposit was made in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission was immaterial in that it was taken to have been made in favour of the Election Commission at whose disposal the fund was placed, and accordingly there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of S. 117 of the Act. In that case this Court after examining in detail the procedure relating to the filing of the election petition observed at p. 606 :"It would be absurd to imagine that a deposit made either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the Election Commission itself would not be sufficient compliance with the provisions of Section 117 and would involve a dismissal of the petition under Section 85 or Section 90 (3). The above illustration is sufficient to demonstrate that the words in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission" used in Section 117 are directory and not mandatory in their character. What is of the essence of the provision contained in Section 117 is that the petitioner should furnish security for the costs of the petition, and should enclose along with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing that a deposit of one thousand rupees has been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India, is at the disposal of the Election Commission to be utilised by it in the manner authorised by law and is under its control and payable on a proper application being made in that behalf to the Election Commission or to any person duly authorised by it to receive the same, be he the Secretary to the Election Commission or any one else."This decision, therefore, cannot come to the rescue of a petitioner who has failed to deposit the security as required under Section 117 of the Act or has paid less than the amount specified therein. The decision in Lalaram v. -The Supreme Court of India AIR 1967 SC 847 has no relevance to the matter in issue because as pointed out by the High Court that case relates to security being furnished for filing a review petition under the Supreme Court Rules, which, stands on a different footing.5. The argument of the appellants advocate that in view of the marginal note to Section 86 election petition can only be dismissed after the trial has commenced by the issue of a notice to the respondent is equally without substance. Amended S. 86 apart from sub-sec (1) provides for several matters in sub-sections (2) to (7) such as for reference of the election petition or election petitions, where there is more than one in respect of the same election, to a Judge, the ordering of security for costs in case of the application by a candidate who is not already a respondent being made a respondent, the permission to amend or amplify particulars of an corrupt practice alleged in the petition, the continuance of the trial of the election petition from day to day and its expeditious trial to be concluded as far as possible within six months from the presentation of the petition to the High Court. The reference to Trial is in a larger sense and deals with the steps in a trial rather than in a narrower sense of a trial commencing after the notice of the petition is directed to be served on the respondent. The marginal note of Section 36, namely, "Trial of election petitions can not indicate that under sub-sec. (l) of Section 86 an election petition cannot be dismissed for non-compliance with the provisions set out therein, unless notice is issued to the respondent. Where the language is clear and can admit of no other meaning such as is evident from sub-s. (1) of Section 86, the marginal note cannot be read to control that power.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Presentation of the petition under the repealed S. 81, beyond the period prescribed for its presentation could be condoned by the Election Commission in its discretion under the proviso to the repealed S. 85 of the Act, but there is nothing in Section 85 which permits the Election Commission to condone the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 117. Before the amendment of the Act in 1966, once the Election Commission finds the election petition to be in order and does not dismiss it under S. 85 for non-compliance with the requirements of Ss. 81, 83 and 117, it has to appoint an Election Tribunal for the trial of the petition. The trial by the Tribunal therefore is only after compliance with the mandatory provisions prescribed in Sections 81, 83 and 117 so that the trial is unrelated to the non-compliance by the petitioner with the requirements of Section 117. After the amendment, the jurisdiction of both the Election Commission and the Tribunal in respect of election disputes has been abolished and the High Courts of respective States have been vested with the jurisdiction in this regard. But the conferment of jurisdiction to entertain try and determine an election petition has not in any was materially affected the position stated by us, as will be presentlyare unable to appreciate how the repealed Section 85 of the Act furthers the submission of the petitioner or has any relevance. It is apparent that prior to repeal by Act 47 of 1966, Section 81 provided for the presentation of the election petition by any candidate aggrieved by the result of the election to the Election Commission; Section 83 prescribed what the contents of the petition shouldexamination of this decision does not support this contention of the appellant. That was a case under the unamended S. 117 of the Act under which the petitioner was required to enclose with the petition a Government Treasury receipt showing that a deposit of one thousand rupees had been made by him either in a Government Treasury or in the Reserve Bank of India in favour of the Secretary to the Election Commission as security for the costs of thedecision, therefore, cannot come to the rescue of a petitioner who has failed to deposit the security as required under Section 117 of the Act or has paid less than the amount specified therein. The decision in Lalaram v.The Supreme Court of India AIR 1967 SC 847   has no relevance to the matter in issue because as pointed out by the High Court that case relates to security being furnished for filing a review petition under the Supreme Court Rules, which, stands on a different footing.5. The argument of the appellants advocate that in view of the marginal note to Section 86 election petition can only be dismissed after the trial has commenced by the issue of a notice to the respondent is equally without substance. Amended S. 86 apart from(1) provides for several matters in(2) to (7) such as for reference of the election petition or election petitions, where there is more than one in respect of the same election, to a Judge, the ordering of security for costs in case of the application by a candidate who is not already a respondent being made a respondent, the permission to amend or amplify particulars of an corrupt practice alleged in the petition, the continuance of the trial of the election petition from day to day and its expeditious trial to be concluded as far as possible within six months from the presentation of the petition to the High Court. The reference to Trial is in a larger sense and deals with the steps in a trial rather than in a narrower sense of a trial commencing after the notice of the petition is directed to be served on the respondent. The marginal note of Section 36, namely, "Trial of election petitions can not indicate that under(l) of Section 86 an election petition cannot be dismissed forwith the provisions set out therein, unless notice is issued to the respondent. Where the language is clear and can admit of no other meaning such as is evident from(1) of Section 86, the marginal note cannot be read to control that power.