Case: Waryam Singh &amp; Another Vs. Amarnath &amp; Another

Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applied to Himchal Pradesh, the Controller, if it came to the finding, that rent had not been paid, had no option but to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession. Undoubtedly, that is the correct legal position, but in the present case the non-payment of rent was due to a misapprehension of the legal position created by the tenant filing an application for fixing fair rent. I, therefore, think that this case can be distinguished and does not fall within section 13(2), Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act."10. The respondents moved the Judicial Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for setting aside the order of the District Judge. The learned Judicial Commissioner held that the view of the admitted failure to pay the rent as provided by the rent deed or at the first hearing of the Court under the proviso to section 13(2) (i) the Courts below had acted arbitrarily in refusing to make an order for ejectment against the tenants who had not done what was incumbent on them to do under the law and that such a situation called for interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority. He accordingly set aside the orders of the courts below and allowed the application for ejectment but gave the appellants three months time for vacating the premises. The appellants have now come up before this Court on appeal by special leave obtained from this Court.11. Learned Advocate appearing in support of this appeal urges that the learned Judicial Commissioner acted wholly without jurisdiction inasmuch as (1) the Rent Controller or the District Judge exercising powers under the Act was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court and, therefore, Article 227 confers no power on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner over the Rent Controller or the District Judge, and (2) that Article 227 read with Article 241 confers no power of judicial superintendence on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner.12. Re. 1. - The Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercise jurisdiction in relation to the whole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are certainly Tribunals, if not Courts, and they function within the territories of Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, Article 227 (1) read with Article 241 confers on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner power of superintendence over such Tribunals.The words "in relation to which" obviously qualify the word "territories" and not the words "Courts and Tribunals".13. Re. 2.- The material part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals. That the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are Tribunals cannot and has not been controverted. The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the Article. Reference is made to clause (2) of the Article in support of the contention that this Article only confers on the High Court administrative superintendence over the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that section 107 which was similar in terms to section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court.In this connection it has to be remembered that section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 was reproduced in the Government of India act, 1935 as section 224. Section 224 of the 1935 Act, however, introduced sub-section (2), which was new, providing that nothing in the section should be construed as giving the High Court any jurisdiction to question any judgment of any inferior Court which was not otherwise subject to appeal or revision. The idea presumably was to nullify the effect of the decisions of the different High Courts referred to above. Section 224 of the 1935 Act has been reproduced with certain modifications in Article 227 of the Constitution. It is significant to note that sub-section (2) to section 224 of the 1935 Act has been omitted from Article 227.This significant omission has been regarded by all High court is India before whom this question has arisen as having restored to the High Court the power of judicial superintendence it had under section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1961 and section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915.See the cases referred to in - Moti Lal v. The State, AIR 1952 All 963 at p. 966 (A). Our attention has not been drawn to any case which has taken a different view and, as at present advised, we see no reason to take a different view.14. This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C. J., in - Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 (SB) (B),to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us the lower Courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower Courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by section 13(2)(i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so.15.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercise jurisdiction in relation to the whole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are certainly Tribunals, if not Courts, and they function within the territories of Himachal Pradesh. Therefore, Article 227 (1) read with Article 241 confers on the Court of the Judicial Commissioner power of superintendence over such Tribunals.The words "in relation to which" obviously qualify the word "territories" and not the words "Courts andmaterial part of Article 227 substantially reproduces the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 except that the power of superintendence has been extended by the Article also to Tribunals. That the Rent Controller and the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under the Act are Tribunals cannot and has not been controverted. The only question raised is as to the nature of the power of superintendence conferred by the Article. Reference is made to clause (2) of the Article in support of the contention that this Article only confers on the High Court administrative superintendence over the Subordinate Courts and Tribunals. We are unable to accept this contention because clause (2) is expressed to be without prejudice to the generality of the provisions in clause (1). Further, the preponderance of judicial opinion in India was that section 107 which was similar in terms to section 15 of the High Courts Act, 1861, gave a power of judicial superintendence to the High Court apart from and independently of the provisions of other laws conferring revisional jurisdiction on the High Court.This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C. J., in - Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193  (SB) (B),to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. As rightly pointed out by the Judicial Commissioner in the case before us the lower Courts in refusing to make an order for ejectment acted arbitrarily. The lower Courts realised the legal position but in effect declined to do what was by section 13(2)(i) incumbent on them to do and thereby refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by law. It was, therefore, a case which called for an interference by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner and it acted quite properly in doing so.