Case: The State Of Rajasthan Vs. Rao Manohar Singhji

the easterly portion of the State , as also to those residing in the City of St. Louis.It was contended that this feature of the judicial system of Missouri was in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Bradley, J., held that the equality clause in the 14th Amendment contemplates the protection of person against unjust discriminations by a State; it has no reference to territorial or municipal arrangements made for different portions of a State.He went on to say :"If a Mexican State should be acquired by treaty and added to an adjoining State of part of a State, in the United States, and the two should be erected into a new State, it cannot be doubted that such new State might allow the Mexican laws and judicature to continue unchanged in the one portion and the common law and its corresponding judicature in the other portion. Such an arrangement would not be prohibited by any fair construction of the 14th Amendment. It would not be based on any respect of person or classes, but on municipal considerations alone and a regard to the welfare of all classes within the particular territory or jurisdiction".9. This passage which was strongly relied upon by the learned Attorney-General does not advance his case, for the present case, there is no question of continuing unchanged the old laws and judicature in one portion and a different law in the there. As we have already said there is nothing to show that there was any peculiarity or any special feature in the Jagirs of the former State of Rajasthan to justify differentiation from the Jagirs comprised in the States which subsequently integrated into the present United State of Rajasthan. After the new States was formed, there was no occasion to take away the powers of Jagirdars of a disfavoured area and to leave them intact in the rest of the area.10. The case in --- Ramjilal v. Income-tax Officer, Mohindargarh, AIR 1951 S.C. 97 (B), is distinguishable on the ground that that case proceeded upon the principle that"pending proceedings should be concluded according to the law applicable at the time when the rights or liabilities accrued and the proceeding commence was a reasonable law founded upon a reasonable classification of the assessees which is permissible under the equal protection clause."Such is however not the case here.11. Reliance was also placed on the case of ---State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh, AIR 1953 S.C. 10 (C). In that case the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act of 1949 was not held to be unconstitutional under Article 14 upon the ground that it extended only to the several States mentioned in Section 1(2), for in the opinion of the Court classification could well be made on a geographical basis. There the Muslim abducted persons found in those States were held to form one class having similar interests to protect and their inclusion in the definition of abducted persons could not be called discriminatory.12. The learned Attorney-General referred to two cases decided by the same bench of the Rajasthan High Court, -- Madan Singh v. Collector of Sikar. 1954 R. L. W. 1 (D), and an unreported judgment delivered on 10-11-1953 in --- Raja Hari Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (E) , and argued that the Bench had not stuck to its view expressed in the judgment under appeal. A careful perusal of the judgment in these cases will show that this is far from being the case. The former case was distinguished from the case under appeal on the ground that there was a reasonable basis for classification in that case, while no such basis existed in the case before us.It appears that before Jaipur State merged into the present United State of Rajasthan there were District Boards existing in that State. They were continued on the formation of the new State but there were no District Boards in the other States. The argument that the Jaipur District Boards Act was invalid under Article 14 of the Constitution was repelled, it being held that the existence of District Boards in Jaipur was for the welfare of classes within Jaipur, that Jaipur had reached a higher stage of development than many of the other States and it would have been a retrograde step to deprive the people living in the former Jaipur State of the benefits of Local Self Government conferred by the District Boards Act.Reliance was placed on the observations of Bradley, J., in--- (1880) 101 U. S. 22 (A), in connection with the illustration of the Maxican State and the learned Chief Justice referred with approval to the decision under appeal before us. In the second case the attack was on the alleged discriminatory provision contained in the Mewar Tenancy Act and the Land Revenue Act. Under these Acts the rent rates had been approved by the Board of Revenue and the Government and they were alleged to be detrimental to the interests of the Jagirdars. The Jagirdars had challenged those Acts by a petition under Article 226. It appears that no such laws existed in the other parts of Rajasthan.The decision of the High Court proceeded on the ground that it was not shown that there were no similar Tenancy and Land Revenue laws in other parts of Rajasthan and the impugned Acts being ameliorative legislation designed to raise the economic status of the agriculturists in Mewar could not be said to constitute any discrimination merely because no such legislation existed in the other parts of Rajasthan. This difference between the two parts did not justify that such progressive and ameliorative measures for the welfare of the people existing in a particular area should be done away with the State be brought down to the level of the unprogressive States.The judgment shows that the Bench far from going back on its previous view adhered to it and expressly distinguished the case under appeal before us on it special facts.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]Such an obvious discrimination can be supported only on the ground that it was based upon a reasonable classification. It is now well settled by the decision of this court that a proper classification must always bear a reasonable and just relation to the things in respect of which it is proposed. Judged by this criterion it seems to us that the discrimination is based on no classification at all and is manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary. The classification might have been justified if the State had shown that it was based upon a substantial distinction, namely that the Jagirdars of the area subjected to the disability were in some way different to those of the other area of Rajasthan who were not similarly situated.The preambles of the Ordinances do not purport to show that the conditions in the former State of Rajasthan were such as to justify the imposition of the disability on the Jagirdars of that State while the conditions prevailing in the other States forbade such a course.We agree with the High Court in holding that there was no real and substantial distinction why the Jagirdars of a particular area should continue to be treated with inequality as compared with the Jagirdars in another area of Rajasthan. We hold therefore that no rational basis for any classification or differention has been made out. Section 8-A of the impugned Ordinance as amended is a clear contravention of the respondents right under Article 14 of the Constitution and must be declared void.