Case: State of Uttar Pradesh Vs.  Radhey Shyam Nigam and Ors.

to object to the acquisition under Section 5-A of the Act was not well founded. Therefore, it could not be said that where such person files his objections the purpose was achieved and that the failure to give public notice in the locality needed not to be treated as fatal to the proceedings. We have examined the observations of this Court at page 13 of judgment upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent. We are, however, of the opinion that in view of the significant difference in the set of facts with which this Court was dealing with in that case, the observations therein are not relevant for our present purpose. 12. Reliance was also placed on certain observations of this Court in Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M. R. Shanmugham Chetty ((1987) 2 SCC 707 ) where this Court, dealing with the provisions of Section 10(3)(c) of T.N. Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960 observed that it was a settled rule of the interpretation of statues that provisions of an Act should be interpreted in such manner as not render any of its provision otiose unless there where compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme contingency. It was submitted that the use of the expression after the date of the publication of the notification in sub-section (4) of Section 17 would become otiose if it is not construct as holding that simultaneous publication of notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 are not permissible. 13. In Raja Satyendra Narayan Singh v. State of Bihar ((1987) 3 SCC 319 ) this Court had to deal with Bihar Land Reform Act, 1950 and it was observed that while interpreting statures plain meaning has to be ascertained and the statute has to be read as a whole and in the context and that statutory rules should be harmoniously read with the statute. The basic principle, it was reiterated at page 325 of the report, of construction of every statute was to find out what is clearly stated and not to speculate upon latent imponderables. The scheme of the Act also must be looked into. In interpreting the statutes it is safer to rely on the obvious meaning rather than to investigate the imponderables. 14. It is true that the expression after the date of the publication of the notification introduced in Section 17(4) can be explained away as making no change from the provision of law by reading it along with the amendment made in Section 4 whereby in different situation in Section 4, the last date publication of the notice has been determined as the date of the publication of the notification and similarly in Section 6 a date of the publication of the notice has been provided for. But the words after the date of the publication of the notification in sub-section (4) of Section 17 read simpliciter clearly indicate that declaration under Section 6 had to made after the publication of the notification meaning thereby subsequent to the date of the publication of the notification. It appears to us that there is nothing in the scheme of the Act which militates against such a construction. At times where emergency provisions are invoked emergent action may be taken but in such a situation in view of the state of law that was before it, the legislature has made a conscious change which cannot be explained away merely because this is as a consequence of the changes in Section 4 and 6 of the Act. 15. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant on Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC ((1948) 2 All ER 825) for the proposition that no alteration in meaning by alteration of language can result unless the requirement of the English language demand it or those requirements permit it and the sense of the section demands it. In our opinion, in this case in view of the alteration of the language and meaning and the meaning of the language used and the sense will be in consonance with the interpretation that the change was intended. Similarly, in Hopes v. Hopes ((1948) 2 All ER 920), it was the proposition that changes in the word may be because the draftsman wanted to improve the style. But in this case the style is not improved and the expression after the date as indicate above, become otiose. It is job of the court to interpret the intention of the legislature by the words used. The fairest and the most rational method to interpret the will of the legislature is by exploring its intention at the time when the law was made by signs, the most natural and probable, says Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England (facsimile of 1st edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979 Volume I, p. 59.) And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law. The words have to be understood in their usual and most known signification. If that be so, then the legislature must have had some intention in choosing the expression after before date of publication of the notification in sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the Act while making amendment by Amending Act 68 of 1984. It is true that there were some changes giving the meaning of the date of the publication in Section 4(1) and (2) as well as Section 6(2) of the Act. But for that, there was no need for the use of the expression after the date. If that be the position, then we must accept the interpretation put upon the amended clause by the High Court in the judgment under appeal. It will however, be up to the appellant to issue a fresh declaration under Section 6, if so advised, within the period contemplated in the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act read with its first explanation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We have examined the observations of this Court at page 13 of judgment upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the respondent. We are, however, of the opinion that in view of the significant difference in the set of facts with which this Court was dealing with in that case, the observations therein are not relevant for our present purposeIn our opinion, in this case in view of the alteration of the language and meaning and the meaning of the language used and the sense will be in consonance with the interpretation that the change was intendedshort question with which these appeals are concerned is, whether the declaration under Section 6 of the Act could be issued simultaneously along with the notification under Section 4 of the Act in view of the amendment made to Section 17 (4) of theTo decide the question it is necessary to appreciate the scheme of the Act after amendment. Section 4 of the Act envisages publication of preliminary notification where it appears to the appropriate government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company, it enjoins in such situation that a notification to that effect shall published in the official gazette and in certain other daily newspapers and the substance of the notification is to be given at convenient places in that locality. It is not necessary to dilate on the subsequent procedure as contemplated by Section 4 of the Act. Section 5 of the Act enjoins payment of damages on the acquisition. SectionA of the Act provides for hearing of objection which has been notified under Section 4 of the Act the procedure thereto. Thereafter comes declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The sections provide that after consideration of the report, if any, made under SectionA that a particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a company, a declaration in the manner enjoined in Section 6 of the Act shall be made. The provisions of procedure to be followed on declaration under Section 6 of the Act, are not directly relevant for the purpose of these appeals. Section 17 of the Act with which we are directly concerned here provides with cases of urgency where the government can dispense with some of the provisions of the Act especially regarding inviting objections and hearing of these