Case: O.J. Coelho Vs. M/S. Fgp Limited &amp; Others

copy of the application for VRS, accepting the application and directing his release by the end of the month. There is no material on record to show that Mr. Srinivasan who was a Technical manager had any authority to accept the complainants application. We have stated here-in-above that the complainants witness Mr. Talathi has categorically asserted in his evidence that the persons who could accept an application for VRS made by the employee were either the Managing director or the President of the company. It is also surprising that an endorsement was made on the copy of the applicant and not on the original application in the records of the company. We do not feel it necessary to dialate further on this aspect of the matter. 8. The Industrial Court and the learned single Judge have also concluded that the complainant of the complainant was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 28 of the MRTU & PULP Act 1971 and that there was no adequate ground for condonation of delay. In this regard, the Advocate for the complainant relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. V/s. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court 1353, in which the Apex Court has observed as under:- Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. Every days delay must be explained does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay, every seconds delay The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 9. In the present case, we are not condoning the delay but are required to consider a different issue as to whether the non condonation of delay by the Industrial court as found to have been correctly done by a single Judge of this court can be said to be perverse. In our view, the Industrial court has rightly held that the reason given for the late filing of the complaint viz. that the unfair labour practices committed were of a continuing and recurring nature, was not tenable, is correct. The benefits under VRS become grantable immediately on the acceptance of an application of the claimant. In the present case it can be seen that the respondent-company vide its letter dated 25.8.1994 had categorically informed the complainant that VRS had not been granted to him and that his services were terminated on the footing that he had abandoned his service. The learned Advocate for the complainant contended that thereafter he has written several letters but in our view, once the employee was categorically informed that VRS has not been granted to him, the mere writing of letter claiming dues could not be by itself a sufficient ground for condoning the gross delay in filing the complaint. We find that after this letter dated 25.8.1996 there is a delay of almost 1 year and 8 months as the complaint came to be filed on 24.5.1996. In our view, the reasons for non-condoning of the delay as contained in the impugned Judgment cannot be said to be perverse. Apart from this we have already concluded here-in-above that there is no merit in the applicants contention relating to his application for VRS being accepted. This is another ground as to why ratio of the Apex Court in the judgment cited would not be applicable to the present case. 10. The Industrial court has further held that the complainant was not a workmen within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the MRTU & PULP Act 1971. This finding has been confirmed in the impugned order passed by a single Judge of this court. It appears that the designation of the complainant at the time when he applied for VRS was Manager-Sales Tax/Fixed Assets. We are aware that a designation by itself would not be definitive test to decide whether an employee can be said to be a workman. The Industrial Court however, has perused the evidence pertaining to the nature of the complainants job while in service. A reference has been made to several promotions granted to the complainant. The Industrial court referred to several letters which were produced in the evidence in which the complainant had signed as a Manager. It is noted that the letter (Exh.C-18) indicated that the complainant was representing the company in sales tax matters and was writing letters to the Bank under his signature for part payment of sales tax. That the sales tax returns were being signed by the complainant in the capacity of Manager-Sales Tax and the complainant was also dealing with the different departments in relation to sales tax matters. The Industrial court concluded that these activities could not be said to be purely clerical in nature. In order to escape from the rigorous of these letters, the complainant had deposed that he was writing such letters under the instructions of his superior Mr. Joshi. The Industrial court however, concluded that these letters indicated that he had signed as a Manager and the persons who had typed and dictated the letters were below his grade. The Industrial Court concluded that the job being done by the complainant could not be said to be clerical in nature but indicated that the complainant was working in a managerial capacity. The single Judge has concurred with the reasons given by the Industrial court. In our view, there is no reason to hold that the conclusion based on these findings can be said to be perverse.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. In the present case, we are not condoning the delay but are required to consider a different issue as to whether the non condonation of delay by the Industrial court as found to have been correctly done by a single Judge of this court can be said to be perverse. In our view, the Industrial court has rightly held that the reason given for the late filing of the complaint viz. that the unfair labour practices committed were of a continuing and recurring nature, was not tenable, is correct. The benefits under VRS become grantable immediately on the acceptance of an application of the claimant. In the present case it can be seen that they vide its letter dated 25.8.1994 had categorically informed the complainant that VRS had not been granted to him and that his services were terminated on the footing that he had abandoned his service. The learned Advocate for the complainant contended that thereafter he has written several letters but in our view, once the employee was categorically informed that VRS has not been granted to him, the mere writing of letter claiming dues could not be by itself a sufficient ground for condoning the gross delay in filing the complaint. We find that after this letter dated 25.8.1996 there is a delay of almost 1 year and 8 months as the complaint came to be filed on 24.5.1996. In our view, the reasons forg of the delay as contained in the impugned Judgment cannot be said to be perverse. Apart from this we have already concludede that there is no merit in the applicants contention relating to his application for VRS being accepted. This is another ground as to why ratio of the Apex Court in the judgment cited would not be applicable to the present case10. The Industrial court has further held that the complainant was not a workmen within the meaning of Section 3(5) of the MRTU & PULP Act 1971. This finding has been confirmed in the impugned order passed by a single Judge of this court. It appears that the designation of the complainant at the time when he applied for VRS wass Tax/Fixed Assets. We are aware that a designation by itself would not be definitive test to decide whether an employee can be said to be a workman. The Industrial Court however, has perused the evidence pertaining to the nature of the complainants job while in service. A reference has been made to several promotions granted to the complainant. The Industrial court referred to several letters which were produced in the evidence in which the complainant had signed as a Manager. It is noted that the letter) indicated that the complainant was representing the company in sales tax matters and was writing letters to the Bank under his signature for part payment of sales tax. That the sales tax returns were being signed by the complainant in the capacity ofs Tax and the complainant was also dealing with the different departments in relation to sales tax matters. The Industrial court concluded that these activities could not be said to be purely clerical in nature. In order to escape from the rigorous of these letters, the complainant had deposed that he was writing such letters under the instructions of his superior Mr. Joshi. The Industrial court however, concluded that these letters indicated that he had signed as a Manager and the persons who had typed and dictated the letters were below his grade. The Industrial Court concluded that the job being done by the complainant could not be said to be clerical in nature but indicated that the complainant was working in a managerial capacity. The single Judge has concurred with the reasons given by the Industrial court. In our view, there is no reason to hold that the conclusion based on these findings can be said to be perverse.