Case: Ranvir Dewan Vs. Rashmi Khanna &amp; Another

and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee."(See p. 1172 of the 15th Edn.)"41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case of plaintiff No.2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall under Section 14 (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act. In other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in Sadhu Singhs case(supra) would apply.43. A fortorari, plaintiff No.2-late Mrs.Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we say for following factual reasons arising in the case.44. First, the testator-Mr.Dewan being the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property.45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could make by virtue of Section 14 (2) read with Section 30 of the Act.46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act which remained a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" under Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here.48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however, never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was, therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from her husband.49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of his self-acquired property in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wifes death would go to testators nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wifes right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties by Will and such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest" i.e. "restricted estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singhs case(supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singhs case.51. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that there is no error in the impugned judgment, which has rightly held that the case of Mrs. Pritam (Plaintiff No.2) falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act insofar as it relates to the suit house.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]28. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find no merit in the appeal. In our view, the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two Courts is just and proper and being in accordance with law does not call for any interference.29. Before we proceed to decide the appeal on merits, we may take a note of one subsequent event, which occurred during the pendency of this litigation. It is the death ofPritam (plaintiff No.2) on 12.09.2016. She left behind her two legal representatives, namely, appellant, i.e., son and respondent No.1, i.e., daughter. Both being Class I heirs would succeed to their mothers estate in equal share, if she has died intestate. However, if she has made any testamentary disposition of her estate in favour of any person then subject to proving the claim in accordance with law by the person(s) concerned, the disposition of her estate would take place accordingly.30. We, however, express no opinion on any of these issues because, in our view, it is not the subject matter of this appeal and leave the parties to work out their inter se rights, if any, in accordance with law in the estate of Mrs. Pritam in appropriate forum as and when occasion so arises.Coming now to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that the suit house was theproperty of late Mr. Dewan. It is also not in dispute as one can take it from reading the contents of Will that Mr. Dewan had intended to give only "life interest" to his wife in the suit house, which he gave to her for the first time by way of disposition of his estate independent of her any right. It is also not in dispute that it was confined to a right of residence to live in the suit house during her lifetime and to use the income earned from the suit house to maintain herself and the suit house. It is also not in dispute that the testator gave to his son ground floor of the suit house and first floor to his daughter with absolute right of ownership. The testator also permitted both of them to get their names mutated in the municipal records as absolute owners and also get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax assessment cases.35. So far as other properties, viz., one plot at Ghaziabad, share in HUF and moveable properties were concerned, Mr. Dewan gave these properties to Mrs.wife absolutely.36. It is a settled principle of law that what the testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his Will has to be gathered primarily by reading the recitals of the Will only.37. As mentioned above, reading of the Will would go to show that it does not leave any kind of ambiguity therein and one can easily find out as to how and in what manner and with what rights, the testator wished to give to three of his legal representatives his self acquired properties and how he wanted to make its disposition.Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in the cases of V. Tulasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without anyright, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of aright and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property.42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two cases to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion that the case of plaintiff No.Pritam does not fall under Section 14 (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act. In other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in Sadhu Singhs case(supra) would apply.43. A fortorari, plaintiffMrs.Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we say for following factual reasons arising in the case.44. First, thebeing the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property.45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, the testator could make by virtue of Section 14 (2) read with Section 30 of the Act.46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act which remained a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" under Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.47. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here.48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however, never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was, therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from her husband.49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016.50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found to be somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the husband executed a Will in favour of his wife of hisproperty in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said properties after wifes death would go to testators nephew. Due to these restrictions put by the testator on his wifes right to sell/mortgage, it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties by Will and such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into the absolute interest under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest" i.e. "restricted estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that such disposition made by the husband in favour of his wife was permissible in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu Singhs case(supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law laid down in Sadhu Singhs case.51. In view of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that there is no error in the impugned judgment, which has rightly held that the case of Mrs. Pritam (Plaintiff No.2) falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act insofar as it relates to the suit house.