Case: Munshi Ram and Ors Vs. Municipal Committee, Chheharta

when the tax was imposed, a member of the Committee, the appeal sha ll lie to the Commissioner of the Division. Sub-section (2) is important. It provides:"84(2). If, on the hearing of an appeal under the section, any question as to the liability to, or the principle of assessment of, a tax arises, on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable dobut, he may, either of his own motion or on the application of any person interested, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained, and refer the statement with his own opinion on the point for the decision of the High Court."Section 86 mandates that "no objection shall be taken to any valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned, in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act."13. From a conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86, it is plain that the Municipal Act, gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act, irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which analogous to that provided in Section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act.It is well recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar, by inevitable implication" the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act.14. In the view we take, we are fortified by the decision of this Court in Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, (supra) wherein sections 84 and 86 of this very Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 came up for consideration. Therein, the Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, imposed a terminal tax on Sambhar salt and assessed the appellant, therein, to a sum of Rs. 5, 893/- towards that tax at the rate of Rs. 10/- per maund under item 69 of the Government Notification by which the terminal tax was imposed. The assessee filed a suit against the Municipal Committee in the Civil Court, contending that Sambhar salt ought to have been assessed at the rate of 3 pies per maund under item 68, that he had been illegally assessed under item 69 at the higher rate, and claimed refund of the amount paid by him, with interest. The Committee, inter alia, contended that Sambhar salt was not common salt, and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial court held that Sambhar salt was common salt within the meaning of item 68 of the Schedule, that the imposition of tax on it under item 69 of the Schedule was illegal, and, therefore, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit by virtue of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.On appeal, the High Court held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction, and dismissed the suit.15. The assessee came in appeal to this Court by certificate granted by the High Court, and contended that since the impugned levy was not made under the Municipal Act but in derogation thereof, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and determine the suit.16. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) repelled this contention, observing that the rate of the tax to be levied depend ed upon the character of the salt, and it was not possible to say that in ascertaining this fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Municipal Act, even if they wrongly applied item 69 of the schedule; that the mistake in applying the wrong item of the Schedule to the tax could be corrected only in the manner prescribed by the Act, and the aggrieved person cannot file a suit in the Civil Court in that regard, the Civil Courts jurisdiction having been excluded by the provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act.17. The Court distinguished that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a tax or committing an Act, clearly acts outside or in abuse of its powers under the Municipal A ct, and explained that it is only in such cases, the bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would not apply. Can the case before us be said to belong to that class of cases where the Municipal Committee in levying a Tax acts beyond or in abuse of its powers under the Act ? The answer to this question must be in the negative. By no stretch of imagination, can it be said in the facts and circumstances of the case, that in assessing the appellants, individually, and not collectively , to the tax in question, the Municipal Committee abused its powers under the Act. We have already discussed and held that in levying this tax, the Municipal Committee did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions of Section 61(1)(b ) of the Act. In short, the present case is one where the Municipal Committee acted "under the Act". It follows, therefore, that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit was barred, even if the dispute raised therein relate d to the principle of assessment to be followed.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]From a plain reading of the extracted provision, it is clear that a tax leviable under clause (b) is, in terms, a tax on "persons". The expression " persons" undoubtedly includes natural persons. The class of such taxable persons has been indicated by the Legislature with reference to their occupationalin order to be authorised, a tax under clause (b) of Section 61(1) must satisfy twoit must be a tax on "persons". Second such persons must be practising any profession or art or carrying on any trade or calling in thethe entire effort to import the definition of person given in the General Clauses Act, into Section 61(1)(b) of the Municipal Act, is directed to find a foundation for the argument, that the construction adopted by the High Court could lead to double taxation and even unconstitutional results. But in the instant case, nothing of this kind has happened. The firm has not been assessed. No question of double taxation or exceeding the Constitutional ceiling of Rs. 250/- fixed by Article 276(2) of the Constitution, arise s on the facts of the present case. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants on this aspect of the matter are merely hypothetical, anda conjoint reading of sections 84 and 86, it is plain that the Municipal Act, gives a special and particular remedy for the person aggrieved by an assessment of tax under this Act, irrespective of whether the grievance relates to the rate or quantum of tax or the principle of assessment. The Act further provides a particular forum and a specific mode of having this remedy which analogous to that provided in Section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Section 86 forbids in clear terms the person aggrieved by an assessment from seeking his remedy in any other forum or in any other manner than that provided in the Municipal Act.It is well recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that sections 84 and 86 of the Municipal Act bar, by inevitable implication" the jurisdiction of the Civil Court where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under thisanswer to this question must be in the negative. By no stretch of imagination, can it be said in the facts and circumstances of the case, that in assessing the appellants, individually, and not collectively , to the tax in question, the Municipal Committee abused its powers under the Act. We have already discussed and held that in levying this tax, the Municipal Committee did not travel beyond or act contrary to the provisions of Section 61(1)(b ) of the Act. In short, the present case is one where the Municipal Committee acted "under the Act". It follows, therefore, that the Civil Courts jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit was barred, even if the dispute raised therein relate d to the principle of assessment to be followed.