Case: Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira &amp; Ors

Judge has also definitely found that persons ordained by the Patriarch will have to be accepted by the whole Malankara Church as represented by the Malankara Association and that the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side had not been so accepted and that, therefore, they could not possibly become Vice Presidents and their non-joinder in the notice (Ex. 60) could not vitiate it. The High Court was, therefore, quite correct in its finding that Exs. 60 and 61 were issued by proper persons. But on the question as to whether the notices had been issued and served on all the churches, the High Court has observed that there was no. reliable and convincing evidence in proof of that fact. The High Court has referred to the evidence of D.Ws. 23 and 22 and has concluded that although the notices Exs. 60 and 61 were issued by competent persons the evidence on record fell short of the standard of proof necessary for establishing the fact of service of the notices on all the churches and particularly on those on the plaintiffs side. Ordinarily we do not go behind the findings of fact by the final court of facts but in the present case it appears to us, with respect, that the learned judges of the High Court have overlooked important materials on the record which, if taken into account, will certainly go to show that all the churches had ample notice of the meeting. It is clear from the judgment that in arriving at their conclusion the learned High Court Judges completely overlooked the evidence of D.W. 29 who was the Secretary of Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and who was personally concerned with the issue of the notices. We have been taken through the evidence of the defendants witness who said that they did not think notices had been sent to the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side. The High Court, however, completely overlooked the evidence of the plaintiffs witness Kuran Mathew (P.W. 2) who said that for meetings of the church representatives no. notices are sent to the Metropolitans but are sent only to the churches. Further, as already observed, the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side were never accepted by the Malankara Association and, therefore, no. notices need have been sent to them. It is true that notices convening the Ex. 98-B meeting in l106 were served on the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side, but that was a special occasion for bringing about a settlement. It is somewhat significant that we do not find in the record placed before us any statement of any witness examined by the plaintiffs that he (if he was a Metropolitan) or his church had not in fact been served. Besides, the notices by advertisement in newspapers (Exs. 62 and 63) will also be sufficient notice to the Metropolitans and churches on both sides. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us portions of evidence of some of the witnesses examined by the plaintiffs. Those witnesses say that even if they had been served they would not have taken any note of them and indeed would not have got them read in their church. As already observed this attitude of the partisans of the plaintiffs does not absolve the defendants from the duty of serving notices on the churches on the plaintiffs side but it undoubtedly shows that the defendants knowing of this attitude would have no. incentive to suppress the notices from them. Further the learned Judges do not also appear to have adverted to the evidence of D.W. 25 who was a partisan of the plaintiffs as admitted by P. W. 5 and who did not complain of any want of notice to his church. Further, the learned Judges have not given any reason why the notices by advertisements in the newspapers could not be accepted as sufficient notice in the absence, as they found, of any specific rules as to the mode of service. Apart from Exs. 59, 60 and 61 the advertisements in the newspapers evidenced by Exs. 62 and 63 appear to us to be sufficient notice to all churches. There is no. evidence at all that any particular church did not in fact know that a meeting was going to be held at the time and place hereinbefore mentioned. On the materials placed before us we feel satisfied that the notices were served on all the churches including those which sided with the plaintiffs and that there was no. adequate ground for rejecting the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court on this question after a fair and full consideration of the evidence on record. The conclusion of the High Court appears to us, with respect, to be based partly on a mis-reading of evidence and partly on the non-advertence to important material evidence bearing on the question and to the probabilities of the case. 43. Learned counsel for the respondent has tried to find fault with the notices in minor details. For instance, it has been argued that in the notices other than Ex. 59 no. agenda was mentioned. Apart from the fact that no. such objection was taken in the plaint, it is clear that those notices by a clear reference to Ex. 59, specially because they had all been sent together, did incorporate the agenda set out in full in Ex. 59. In our opinion the M.D. Seminary meeting was properly held and the first defendant, who is now the sole appellant before us, was validly appointed as the Malankara Metropolitan and as such became the ex-officio trustee of the church properties. There is no. question that the defendants 2 and 3 who are now dead had been previously elected by a meeting of the Malankara Association duly convened and held and were properly constituted trustees. In this view of the matter it must follow that the plaintiffs cannot, even in their individual or representative capacity, question the title of the defendants as validly appointed trustees.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It is perfectly clear that in a suit of this description if the plaintiffs are to succeed they must do so on the strength of their own title. The plaintiffs in this suit base their title to trusteeship on their election at a meeting of the churches alleged to have been held on August 22, 1935 at Karingasserai when the original plaintiff is said to have been elected the Malankara Metropolitan and the plaintiffs 2 and 3 as Kathanar and lay trustees. That meeting was admittedly held without any notice to the members of the Catholicos party, for they were, quite erroneously as we shall presently indicate, regarded as having gone out of the Church. In justification of this stand reference is made, rather half-heartedly, to the Kalpana (Ex. Z) which commanded the faithful not to have anything to do with the heretics. On our finding on that question to be hereafter recorded, namely, that the defendants and their partisans had not become ipso facto heretics in the eye of the civil court or aliens or had not gone out of the Church, it must necessarily follow, apart from the question of the competency of the convener of the meeting, that the meeting had not been held on due notice to all churches interested and was consequently not a valid meeting and that, therefore, the election of the plaintiffs was not valid and their suit, in so far as it is in the nature of a suit for ejectment, must fail for want of their title as trusteesThe question of burden of proof at the end of the case, when both parties have adduced their evidence is not of very great importance and the court has to come to a decision on a consideration of all materials. Further although in the cause title or in the body of the plaint the plaintiffs do not claim to have instituted the suit for themselves and on behalf of all other members of community proceedings were taken under the provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to O. I, R. 8 of our Code of Civil. Procedure. We, therefore, proceed to determine the questions arising in this appeal on the basis that the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain this suit as members of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Christian community not only on behalf of themselves but on behalf of all the members of the said communityAs will appear from paragraph 3 of the judgment (Ex. 255) pronounced by the trial court on September 15, 1919 in the interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) that suit was, with the permission of the court, converted into a representative action on behalf of the Jacobite Syrian Christian population of Malabar. Therefore the decision in that interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) must be binding on all members of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Christian community. In paragraphs 6, 9 and 32 of the plaint in the present suit the plaintiffs who represent the interests of defendants 4 to 6 in the interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) themselves rely on the decision in that interpleader suit as operating as res judicata as between the parties to the present suit on questions referred to in those paragraphs. Indeed in paragraph 55 of the grounds of appeal filed by the plaintiffs in the present suit the contention is put forward that the trial court should have held, inter alia, that Ex. 256 operated as res judicata in respect of the points decided in that case. It is also to be remembered that the first plaintiff in the present suit was defendant 42 in that interpleader suit and the second defendant in the present suit was the second defendant in that interpleader suit. In these circumstances there does not appear to us any difficulty as to parties in applying the principle of res judicata to the matters in issue in this suit, if the other conditions for its application are satisfiedThe properties claimed to belong to the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church which have to be administered by three trustees, namely, the Malankara Metropolitan, one Kathanar (clergy) and a lay man to be elected by the Church, are referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the plaint. The salient facts summarised above as constituting the background of the present disputes are then set forth in paragraphs 3 to 12. Reference is thereafter made in paragraphs 13 and 14 to the meeting said to be a meeting of the Malankara Association held in Karingasserai in August, 1935. It is alleged that at that meeting the first plaintiff was elected as the Malankara Metropolitan and the second and third plaintiffs were elected respectively as the Kathanar (priestly) trustee and the lay trustee and the second and the third defendants were removed from trusteeship. In paragraph 15 is formulated the plaintiffs claim to be in possession of the church properties. Paragraphs 16 to 21 repudiate the claims of the first defendant allegedly founded on his election as the Malankara Metropolitan and trustee at a meeting of the Malankara Association said to have been held in December 1934. It is alleged that the last mentioned meeting was not convened by any competent person nor was due notice of it given to all the churches. In paragraph 22 it is stated that for reasons stated there and more particularly specified in paragraphs 26, the first defendant was disqualified and declared unfit to be Malankara Metropolitan. The reasons set forth are five in number and each of them is characterised as amounting to a denial or repudiation of the authority of His Holiness the Patriarch of Antioch. The contentions formulated in paragraphs 23 and 25 are that the acts and pretensions referred to therein constitute heresy and that the first defendant as well as the second and third defendants who are supporting and co-operating with the first defendant, had become ipso facto heretics and aliens to the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Church31. It is said that there was no. issue as to whether the acts imputed to Mar Geevarghese Dionysius had been done by him or not or whether the ordination of three Metropolitans by Abdul Messiah was valid or not and that the charge against Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his two co-trustees (defendants 1 to 3) was only that of heresy founded on certain acts. It is true that the same acts are referred to in paragraphs 19 to 20 of the present plaintiff, but, it is contended, there was no. charge of their having gone out of the Church by their having set up a new church as evidenced by those very acts. We do not think there is any force in this contention. In paragraph 32 of his judgment Chatfield C. J., held that no. enquiry was held into the conduct of Mar Geevarghese Dionysius who had never been placed on his defence or apprised of the charges against him or given any opportunity of defending himself and that as such his ex-communication was invalid and he continued to be a Malankara Metropolitan and as such one of the trustees of the church properties. To the same effect were the findings of Joseph Thaliath J. and of Parameswaran Piliai J. Learned Advocate for the then appellants, (defendants 4 to 6) then fell back on the case that quite irrespective of the validity of the excommunication of Mar Geevarghese Dionysius he and his co-trustees could not be permitted to act as trustees as they had rendered themselves aliens to the faith by reason, amongst others, of their repudiating the lawful Patriarch Abdulla II and accepting the deposed Patriarch Abdul Messiah and by upholding the Catholicate with powers to the Catholicos as hereinbefore mentioned. Reliance was placed on the decision of the House of Lords in Free Church of Scotland v. Overtoun, 1904 AC 515 (C), in support of the contention that Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his adherents had set up a new Church effectively free from the control of the Patriarch. It is clear, therefore, that as a consequence of the finding on the breach of the rules of natural justice, it became incumbent on the Full Bench to deal with the alternative case founded on the decision in the Free Church of Scotland case (C) (supra)32. In paragraph 34 of the judgment Chatfield C. J., sums up the contentions set out by the defendants 4 to 6 in their written statement. He points out that it was said, amongst others, that Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his co-trustees (defendants 1 to 3) had "rendered themselves aliens to the faith." The word, "alien" is significant, for it connotes the idea of a person going outside the faith. The matter does not, however, hang on this slender thread alone. After referring to the various facts, which had taken place soon after his excommunication a and the acts and conduct of Mar Geevarghese Dionysius. e, g., the repudiation of the lawful Patriach and the acceptance of a Patriach who had been deposed and by getting the deposed Patriarch to come to Malabar to do various acts as Patriarch of Antioch e. g., to ordain certain persons as Metropolitans, to set up a Catholicate by ordaining one Mar Ivanios as Catholicos with power to ordain Metropolitans and consecrate Morone, the learned Chief Justice stated that the contentions advanced for defendants 4 to 6 were that the defendant Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his partisans had all along desired a separation from the See of Antioch and had succeed in their attempt and that "a new church had been created". Towards the end of that paragraph the learned Chief Justice again refers to the contention advanced on behalf of defendants 4 to 6 that "by reason of the actions of the first defendant mentioned in the first part of those paragraphs the first defendant and his followers seceded from the Jacobite Syrian Church in the year 1087 and set up a different Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " The word "seceded in, the context in which it is used, leaves no. room for doubt that the charge of having gone out of the Church by setting up a new Church which accepted the Catholicate with the powers to the Catholicos as herein before mentioned was canvassed and actually decided in the final judgment on reviewIt must, therefore, be held that the contentions put forward in paragraphs 19 to 26 of the plaint in the present suit on which issues Nos. 14, 15, 16 and 17 have been raised were directly and substantially in issue in the interpleader suit (O. S. 94 of 1088) and had been decided by the Travancore High Court on review in favour of Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his two co-trustee (defendants 1 to 3) and against defendants 4 to 6. In short the question whether Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and his two co-trustees (defendants 1 to 3) had become heretics or aliens or had gone out of the Church and, therefore, were not qualified for acting as trustees was in issue in the interpleader suit (O, S. No. 94 of 1088) and it was absolutely necessary to decide such issue. That judgment decided that neither (a) the repudiation of Abdulla II, nor (b) acceptance of Abdul Messiah who had ceased to be a Patriarch, nor (c) acceptance of the Catholicate with powers as hereinbefore mentioned, nor (d) the reduction of the power of the Patriarch to a vanishing point, ipso facto constituted a heresy or amounted to voluntary separation by setting up a new Church and that being the position those contentions cannot be re-agitated in the present suit34. Re. (I) : In support of the first charge learned counsel has drawn our attention to paragraphs 18, 22 and 26 of the plaint, paragraphs 29 and 38 of the written statement, paragraphs 18 and 27 of the replication and to issues Nos. 6, 14, 15 and 16. We do not think the pleadings and the issues are capable of being construed in the way learned counsel would have us do. The supremacy of the Patriarch has indeed been alleged to have been taken away, but that is not a general averment founded on Ex. A. M. - indeed there is no. specific mention of Ex. A. M. in paragraph 26 of the plaint - but it is based on certain specific matters which appear to be incorporated as rules of the new constitution (Ex. A. M.). Therefore, what are pleaded as disqualifying the defendants from being trustees are those specific matters and not the general fact of adoption of the constitution. There is no. charge in the plaint that for the incorporation in the constitution (Ex. A. M.) of any matter other than those specifically pleaded in the plaint the defendants have incurred a disqualification. The plaintiffs came to court charging the defendants as heretics or as having gone out of the church for having adopted a constitution (Ex. A. M.) which contains the several specific matters pleaded in the plaint and repeated in the replication and made the subject-matter of specific issues. Those self-same matters were relied on as entailing disqualification in the earlier suit. The plaintiffs themselves contend that some of these matters are res judicata against the defendants in this suit by reason of the conditions subject to which their application for review was admitted. On the pleadings as they stand and on the issues as they have been framed, it is now impossible to permit the plaintiff-respondent to go outside the pleadings and set up a new case that the supremacy of the Patriarch has been taken away by the mere fact of the adoption of the new constitution (Ex. A. M.) or by any particular clause there of other than those relating to matters specifically referred to in the pleadings. The issues cannot be permitted to be stretched to cover matters which are not, on a reasonable construction, within the pleadings on which they were founded35. Re. (ii) and (ii a) : Same remarks apply to these two grounds formulated above. There is no. averment anywhere in the pleadings that by accepting the Hudaya canon compiled by Bar Hebreus (Ex. 26 - Ex. A in O.S. No. 94 of 1088) as the correct canon governing the church, the defendants have gone out of the Church. Learned counsel draws our attention first to issue No. 13 and then to issue No. 16 and contends that the loss of status as members of the Church by acceptance of the wrong canon is within the scope of those two issues and that the parties to this suit went to trial with that understanding. We do not consider this argument to be well founded at all. A reference to the pleadings will indicate how and why the Hoodaya canon came to be pleaded and discussed in this case. The plaintiffs impute certain acts and conduct to the defendants and contend that by reason thereof the defendants have become heretics or aliens or have gone out of the Church. These imputations form the subject-matter of issues 14 and 15 and the conclusions to be drawn from the findings on those issues are the subject-matter of issues Nos.16 and 17. The defendants, on the other hand, impute certain acts and conduct to the plaintiffs as a result of which, they contend, the plaintiffs have separated from the Church and constituted a new Church. Issues 19 and 20 are directed to this counter charge. In order to decide these charges and counter charges it is absolutely necessary to determine which is the correct book of canons, for the plaintiffs founded their charges on Ex. B. P. - Ex. 18 in O. S. No. 94 of 1088 and the defendants took their stand on Ex. 26 - Ex. A in O. S. No. 94 of 1088. Issue No. 13 was directed to determine that question. Issue No. 16 is concerned with the conclusions to be drawn from the findings on issues Nos. 14 and 15. The plaintiffs cannot be permitted to use issue No. 16 as a general issue not limited to the subject-matter of issues 14 and 15, for that will be stretching it far beyond its legitimate purpose36. Re. (ii b) : This ground raises the question of the Patriarchs right to Ressissa. Ressissa is a voluntary and not a compulsory contribution made by the parishioners. Ex. F. O., which records the proceedings of the Mulunthuruthu Synod held on June 27, 1876, refers to a resolution providing, inter alia, that the committee, that is to say, the Committee of the Malankara Association, will be responsible to collect and send the Ressissa due to His Holiness the Patriarch. This may suggest that some Ressissa was due to the Patriarch. But in paragraph 218 of Ex. DY which is the judgment pronounced by the Travancore Royal Court of Final Appeal on July 12, 1889, it is stated that no. satisfactory evidence had been adduced before the court as to the payment of Ressissa to the Patriarch by the committee in Malankara that the evidence on record was very meagre and inconclusive and that it was open to doubt whether it was payable to the Metropolitans in this country or to the Patriarch in a foreign country. Ex. 86, which records the proceedings of the meeting of the Malankara Association held on September 7, 1911, refers to a resolution forbidding maintaining any connection with Patriarch Abdulla II and presumably in consequence of this resolution the payment of the Ressissa to the Patriarch was stopped. The interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) was filed in 1913. If non-payment of Ressissa could be made a ground of attack, it should have been taken in that suit and that not having been, done, it cannot now be put forward according to the principles of constructive res judicata. Besides, the provisions of Paragraph 115 of the impugned constitution (Ex. A. M.) require every Vicar in every parish church to collect only two chukrums from every male member who has completed 21 years of age and to send it to the Catholicos. This does not forbid the payment of Ressissa to the Patriarch, if any be due to him and if any parishioner is inclined to pay anything to the Patriarch who is declared in Cl. (1) of this very constitution to be the supreme head of the Orthodox Syrian Church. In any case, according to the canons relied upon by each of the parties, namely, Ex. B. P. - Ex, 18 of O. S. No. 94 of 1088 produced by the plaintiffs or Ex. 26 - Ex. A in O. S. No. 94 of 1088 insisted upon by the defendants, the non-payment of Ressissa does not entail heresy. Even if the question involved in ground (ii b) is not covered by the previous decision in the interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) the question has, on the foregoing grounds, to be decided against the plaintiff-respondent37. Re. (iii) : This is really not a charge but a statement of the conclusion which the plaintiff-respondent desires to be drawn from the other charges formulated above. Accordingly the point has not been pressed before us and nothing further need be said about it38. Re. (iv) : An attempt is made by learned counsel for the respondents to make out that what was referred to in the interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) was the ordination of a Catholicos whereas in the present suit reference is made to the establishment of a Catholicate and further that in any case the Catholicate of the East referred to in the plaint in the present suit is an institution quite different from the Catholicate which was the subject-matter of discussion in the interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088.). We do not think there is any substance whatever in this contention. A reference to paragraphs 30 and 31 of the written statement clearly indicates that the institution of Catholicate, which is relied upon by the defendants, is no. other than the Catholicate established in Malabar in 1088 by Patriarch Abdul Messiah. This position is accepted by the plaintiffs themselves in their grounds of appeal Nos. 13, 15, 17, 18 and 27 to the High Court of Travancore from the decision of the District Judge of Kottayam in this case. Issues Nos. 14 and 15 as well as the judgment of the District Judge in this case also indicate that the subject-matter of this part of the controversy centred round the Catholicate which had been established by Abdul Messiah in the year 1088. Before the argument advanced before us there never was a case that the impugned constitution (Ex. A. M.) had established a Catholicate of the East. The purported distinction sought to be drawn between the ordination of Catholicos and the establishment of a Catholicate and a Catholicate established by Abdul Messiah in 1088 and the Catholicate of the East created by the impugned constitution (Ex. A. M.) and which is sought to be founded upon as a new cause of action in the present suit, appears to us to be a purely fanciful afterthought and is totally untenable39. For reasons stated above we have come to the conclusion and we hold that the case with which the plaintiffs have come to court in the present suit is that the defendants had become heretics or aliens or had gone out of the Church by establishing a new church because of the specific acts and conduct imputed to the defendants in the present suit and that the charges founded on those specific acts and conduct are concluded by the final judgment (Ex. 256) of the High Court of Travancore in the interpleader suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) which operates as res judicata. The charge founded on the fact of non-payment of Ressissa, if it is not concluded as constructive res judicata by the previous judgment must, on merits, and for reasons already stated, be found against the plaintiff-respondent. We are definitely of the opinion that the charges now sought to be relied upon as a fresh cause of action are not covered by the pleadings or the issues on which the parties went to trial, that some of them are pure afterthoughts and should not now be permitted to be raised and that at any rate most of them could and should have been put forward in the earlier suit (O. S. No. 94 of 1088) and that not having been done the same are barred by res judicata or principles analogous thereto. We accordingly hold, in agreement with the trial court, that it is no. longer open to the plaintiff-respondent to re-agitate the question that the defendant appellant had ipso facto become heretic or alien or had gone out of the church and has in consequence lost his status as a member of the Church or his office as a trustee40. In the view we have taken on the question of res judicata it is not necessary for us to discuss the further question whether this suit is founded on the same cause of action as that on which O. S. No. 2 of 11O4 was founded or whether by allowing that suit to be eventually dismissed for default the plaintiffs can under the relevant provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to O. 9, R. 9 of our Code of Civil Procedure maintain the present suit41. The next line of attack adopted by learned counsel for the respondents is that the appellant had not been validly elected as trustee by the Malankara Association. This objection affects only the appellant who was the first defendant in the suit, but does not affect the other two defendants (since deceased) who had been elected in 1931 at a meeting whose validity is not questioned. The first plaintiff claims to have been elected as the Malankara Metropolitan at a meeting of the Malankara Association held on December 26, 1934 at the M. D. Seminary. The M. D. Seminary meeting was convened by notices issued individually to all the Jacobite Syrian Christian Churches in Malabar. Three notices (Exs. 59, 60 and 61) are alleged to have been sent under the same cover and at the same time. Exhibit 59 purports to be a notice issued by the defendant Basselios Catholicos. It is addressed to Vicars, Kykers and Parishioners. The meeting was fixed for Wednesday the 11th Dhanu, 11O1 (December 26, 1934). The first item of the agenda was to elect one as Malankara Metropolitan. Exhibit 60 is a notice emanating from three Vice-Presidents of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Association named therein and addressed to the Vicars, Kykers and Parishioners. It referred to the Kalpana (meaning the notice) sent by the Catholicos (Ex. 59) and intimated that a meeting of the Malankara Jacobite Syrian Association would be held in the M. D. Seminary on the appointed day and asking them to elect a priest and a lay man from the Church as their representatives. Exhibit 61 is a notice by the Managing Committee of the Association addressed to each Church. This also refers to the notice (Ex. 59) issued by the Catholicos and fixes the meeting at the same time and place. Besides these individual notices, advertisements were issued in two leading daily newspapers, copies of which havve been marked Exs. 62 and 63. All that has been said in paragraph 18 of the plaint is that no. meeting was held and that even if there was a meeting the same had not been held legally or according to the usages or convened by a competent person or after notice to all the churches according to custom. On a plain reading of that paragraph there can be no. getting away from the fact that the only objection taken is that the meeting had not been convened by a competent person and that notice had not been given to all the churches. No. other specific objection is taken to the validity of the notice. Learned counsel for the respondent now seeks to rely on the sentence in that paragraph which avers that the proceedings had in that meeting were illegal and void. That averment clearly is a conclusion founded on the specific objections taken previously and cannot possibly be taken as a separate and independent ground of objection expressed in so vague a language as to embrace all objections that the ingenuity of human mind may now conceive & put forward. Indeed issue 6 (a) which is the only issue relating to the election of the first defendant at this meeting quite clearly negatives such an omnibus meaning now sought to be read into paragraph 18 of the plaint42. The District Judge found, for reasons most of which appear to us to be cogent and well-founded, that all the churches had been duly served and that the meeting was properly convened and held. Paragraph 146 of his judgment deals with the question whether the Association meeting was convened by a competent authority. In paragraph 147 he discusses the question whether invitations were sent to all churches. He held that all the churches had been duly served. The reasons adopted by the District Judge may be summarised thus : (i) A large majority of churches being in favour of the defendants, there could be no. incentive on the part of the defendants to suppress the notices; (ii) The evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses clearly indicates that the partisans of the Patriarch would not have attended the meeting even if notices had been received by them and indeed, according to them, notices from heretics would not be read in their churchis at all; (iii) In point of fact two of the churches siding with the plaintiffs had returned the notices which were marked as Exs. 150 and 151, and lastly (iv) that, apart from the individual notices to the churches, there were advertisements issued in two leading Malankara daily newspapers which have been marked Exs. 62 and 63. Although the fact that the churches siding with the plaintiffs would not have attended the meeting does not appear to us to be sufficient reason for not giving notice to them, it nevertheless has a bearing on the question of the probability or otherwise of the suppression of notices from the churches siding with the plaintiffs. The public advertisements in newspapers also negative the alleged attempt at suppression of the notice. Further, as the Mulunthuruthu resolutions embodied in Ex. F.O., which records the proceedings of the meeting at which the Malankara Association was constituted did not provide for any particular mode of service for meetings, it was enough that the ordinary rules adopted by voluntary associations and clubs had been followed, namely, that in the absence of any specific rules, the mode of service determined by the Managing Committee should prevail. The Kerala High Court has, however, in the judgment under appeal, taken a different view. Their reasonings are set out in paragraph 48 of their judgment which is reported in Mar Poulose Athanasius v. Mar Basselios Catholicos, 1957 KLJ 83     at p. 147 (D). The learned Judges of the High Court held that the Catholicos, even if validly appointed, had been assigned no. place in the Malankara Association or in the Managing Committee as its member or President and consequently could not be said to be competent to issue such a notice as Ex. 59. After pointing out that Ex. 60 had been issued by three Metropolitans as Vice-Presidents and Ex. 61 had been issued by the members of the Managing Committee, the High Court points out that in the absence of specific rules as to who can issue the notices, Exs. 60 and 61 have to be accepted as proper and valid notices issued by competent persons. Learned counsel for the respondents urges that the High Court overlooked the fact that Ex. 60 was not issued by all the Vice Presidents, because the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side who were also Vice Presidents did not join in issuing the notice Ex. 60. There is no. substance in this contention. The judgment of the Travancore Royal Court of Final Appeal (Ex. DY) pronounced on July 12, 1889 quite clearly held that a Metropolitan of the Jacobite Syrian Church should be a native of Malabar consecrated by the Patriarch or his delegate and accepted by the people as their Metropolitan to entitle him to the spiritual and temporal government of the local church. Indeed in paragraphs 54 and 78 of his judgment in the present suit the District Judge has also definitely found that persons ordained by the Patriarch will have to be accepted by the whole Malankara Church as represented by the Malankara Association and that the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side had not been so accepted and that, therefore, they could not possibly become Vice Presidents and their non-joinder in the notice (Ex. 60) could not vitiate it. The High Court was, therefore, quite correct in its finding that Exs. 60 and 61 were issued by proper persons. But on the question as to whether the notices had been issued and served on all the churches, the High Court has observed that there was no. reliable and convincing evidence in proof of that fact. The High Court has referred to the evidence of D.Ws. 23 and 22 and has concluded that although the notices Exs. 60 and 61 were issued by competent persons the evidence on record fell short of the standard of proof necessary for establishing the fact of service of the notices on all the churches and particularly on those on the plaintiffs side. Ordinarily we do not go behind the findings of fact by the final court of facts but in the present case it appears to us, with respect, that the learned judges of the High Court have overlooked important materials on the record which, if taken into account, will certainly go to show that all the churches had ample notice of the meeting. It is clear from the judgment that in arriving at their conclusion the learned High Court Judges completely overlooked the evidence of D.W. 29 who was the Secretary of Mar Geevarghese Dionysius and who was personally concerned with the issue of the notices. We have been taken through the evidence of the defendants witness who said that they did not think notices had been sent to the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side. The High Court, however, completely overlooked the evidence of the plaintiffs witness Kuran Mathew (P.W. 2) who said that for meetings of the church representatives no. notices are sent to the Metropolitans but are sent only to the churches. Further, as already observed, the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side were never accepted by the Malankara Association and, therefore, no. notices need have been sent to them. It is true that notices convening the Ex. 98-B meeting in l106 were served on the Metropolitans on the plaintiffs side, but that was a special occasion for bringing about a settlement. It is somewhat significant that we do not find in the record placed before us any statement of any witness examined by the plaintiffs that he (if he was a Metropolitan) or his church had not in fact been served. Besides, the notices by advertisement in newspapers (Exs. 62 and 63) will also be sufficient notice to the Metropolitans and churches on both sides. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed before us portions of evidence of some of the witnesses examined by the plaintiffs. Those witnesses say that even if they had been served they would not have taken any note of them and indeed would not have got them read in their church. As already observed this attitude of the partisans of the plaintiffs does not absolve the defendants from the duty of serving notices on the churches on the plaintiffs side but it undoubtedly shows that the defendants knowing of this attitude would have no. incentive to suppress the notices from them. Further the learned Judges do not also appear to have adverted to the evidence of D.W. 25 who was a partisan of the plaintiffs as admitted by P. W. 5 and who did not complain of any want of notice to his church. Further, the learned Judges have not given any reason why the notices by advertisements in the newspapers could not be accepted as sufficient notice in the absence, as they found, of any specific rules as to the mode of service. Apart from Exs. 59, 60 and 61 the advertisements in the newspapers evidenced by Exs. 62 and 63 appear to us to be sufficient notice to all churches. There is no. evidence at all that any particular church did not in fact know that a meeting was going to be held at the time and place hereinbefore mentioned. On the materials placed before us we feel satisfied that the notices were served on all the churches including those which sided with the plaintiffs and that there was no. adequate ground for rejecting the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court on this question after a fair and full consideration of the evidence on record. The conclusion of the High Court appears to us, with respect, to be based partly on a mis-reading of evidence and partly on the non-advertence to important material evidence bearing on the question and to the probabilities of the case43. Learned counsel for the respondent has tried to find fault with the notices in minor details. For instance, it has been argued that in the notices other than Ex. 59 no. agenda was mentioned. Apart from the fact that no. such objection was taken in the plaint, it is clear that those notices by a clear reference to Ex. 59, specially because they had all been sent together, did incorporate the agenda set out in full in Ex. 59. In our opinion the M.D. Seminary meeting was properly held and the first defendant, who is now the sole appellant before us, was validly appointed as the Malankara Metropolitan and as such became the ex-officio trustee of the church properties. There is no. question that the defendants 2 and 3 who are now dead had been previously elected by a meeting of the Malankara Association duly convened and held and were properly constituted trustees. In this view of the matter it must follow that the plaintiffs cannot, even in their individual or representative capacity, question the title of the defendants as validly appointed trustees.