Case: Chandan Banerjee &amp; Ors Vs. Krishna Prosad Ghosh &amp; Ors

balance 50 per cent which was to be filled by promotees it can be presumed that there must be some SAEs who were holding degrees. Thus, in total more than 50 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holders. When these Regulations were modified in 1997, 45 per cent of AEs were to be direct recruits holding degrees, 10 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holding SAEs, and the balance 45 per cent of posts were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs. Thus, it was stipulated that more than 55 per cent of AEs would be degree holders. Similarly, in 2002, more than 50 per cent of the AE posts were to be filled by degree holders (35 per cent of AEs were direct recruits holding degrees, 15 per cent of AEs were to be filled by degree-holding SAEs and the balance 50 per cent were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs). The reason for the increase in degree-holders for the post of AEs could be due to circumstances such as the higher level of technical expertise required for the superior post, increase in managerial and technical workload, and enhancement in supervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that a higher educational degree, coupled with stipulated years of experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of an AE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this Court to decide whether a higher educational qualification would fulfil the objectives of the management, as long as the nexus between the educational qualification and the need for higher efficiency is not absurd, irrational or arbitrary. In a line of decisions, this Court has held that educational qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiency and thus classification on this basis is not in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 39. The challenge before us however is not related to the classification made in matters of regular promotion. In fact, as the record indicates, the SAEs have not challenged the initial circulars dated 7 August 1997, or 20 February 2002 (which was challenged unsuccessfully before the High Court in another petition). The issue before us solely deals with the restrictions imposed for promotion to supernumerary AE posts. 40. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term supernumerary as present in excess of the normal or requisite number, or not belonging to a regular staff but engaged for extra work(The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Judy Pearsall ed., 10th ed, 1999)). A supernumerary post is defined as a post exceeding the usual stated or prescribed number( P. Ramanatha Aiyar, THE LAW LEXICON, THE ENCYLOPAEDIC LAW DICTIONARY p. 1838 (Justice YV Chandrachud (Former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of India) ed., 1997)). The impugned circular indicates that these supernumerary posts were created for removal of stagnation amongst SAEs. Although that may be the stated goal of the impugned circular, KMC has urged before this Court that the distinction in education qualification for promotion has been made for the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency. It cannot be denied that SAEs once promoted to the post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would be performing the task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merely a change in the designation of an SAE to an AE, but involves an increase in workload, supervisory functions, and performance of the regular functions of an AE. Since that is the case, we do not find any reason why the rationale underlying the need for higher degree-holders in the AE cadre through regular promotion would not be applicable in the case of supernumerary posts. In other words, could a challenge to the impugned circular be sustained if, instead of providing different eligibility conditions, KMC had provided for creation of a fixed number of supernumerary posts out of which a proportion was reserved for degree-holder SAEs? We do not think so. By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary and depend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number of positions could not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this reason that KMC sought to digress from the regular method of granting promotion and opted to introduce separate eligibility conditions. Therefore, we find that the separate eligibility conditions for promotion to supernumerary AE posts on the basis of educational qualification is in line with the past promotion practices of KMC and is not an unreasonable classification. 41. Even otherwise, we note that Clause 3 of the impugned circular provides that these supernumerary posts would be adjusted as and when a vacancy becomes available within the sanctioned posts of an AE. Further, Clause 5 stipulates that there would be no change in the Recruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. What this means is that the regular promotion of degree or diploma holder SAEs is not impacted by way of the impugned circular. As and when vacancies arise in the sanctioned AE posts, the AEs holding supernumerary posts would be subject to the Recruitment Regulations and the selection process for promotion of an SAE to an AE. The supernumerary posts are personal to the eligible AEs and will lapse on their being promoted on a regular basis as AEs or ceasing to remain in service. 42. Another aspect to be considered is that while creating supernumerary posts, KMC has not completely restricted the promotional avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated in their service. It has provided adequate opportunity to them to advance in their career, although on different terms and conditions. Thus, the promotional policy of KMC for supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the detriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policy and public employment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different positions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in the policy domain. E. Conclusion

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]18. The locus classicus on the question whether educational qualifications can be used as a criteria for classification between persons integrated into one class for the purpose of promotion is the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Trilokinath Khosa (1974) 1 SCC 19. In this case, the post of an Assistant Engineer in the Engineering Service branch of the appellants was filled by way of direct recruitment or through promotion from the cadre of Sub- ordinate Engineering Service. A rule was introduced in 1970 restricting the promotion to the next higher post of an Executive Engineer only to those Assistant Engineers who possessed a degree in engineering or held the qualification of A.M.I.E and had put in seven years of service. The respondents, who were diploma holders and serving as Assistant Engineers, challenged the rule on grounds of discrimination. The Constitution Bench dealt with the question of whether persons recruited from different sources, that are integrated into one class, can then be classified to permit preferential treatment to some persons on the basis of their educational qualifications. Justice YV Chandrachud (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Bench elaborated on the extent of judicial review in matters of classification in public employment and observed that32. Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification, for were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the Rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object.33. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to accept the respondents submission that the classification of Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma- holders rests on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification, according to the appellants, was made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering services. If this be the object, the classification is clearly co-related to it, for higher educational qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment. This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can be achieved only through the medium of those possessing comparatively higher educational qualifications but that is beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be achieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can extend.34. On the fact of the case, classification on the basis of educational qualifications made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency cannot be said to rest on any fortuitous circumstance and one has always to bear in mind the facts and circumstances of the case in order to judge the validity of a classification.On the issue whether educational qualifications can be recognised as a criterion for classification, the judgment referred to the decisions of this Court in State of Mysore v. P Narasing Rao AIR 1968 SC 349; Ganga Ram v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 377, Union of India v. Dr (Mrs) SB Kohli (1973) 3 SCC 592 and Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1889 and noted that:41. We have drawn attention to three decisions of this Court (Narasing Rao case, Ganga Ram case and Dr (Mrs) Kohli case) in which classification on the basis of educational qualifications was upheld. In Narasing Rao case, Tracers doing equal work were classified into two grades having unequal pay, the basis of the classification being higher educational qualifications. In Dr (Mrs) Kohli case, as refined a classification as between an F.R.C.S. in general surgery and an F.R.C.S. in Orthopaedics was upheld in relation to appointment to the post of a Professor of Orthopaedics. But these cases are sought to be distinguished on the authority of the decision of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of [I]ndia [AIR 1967 SC 1889 : (1968) 1 SCR 185 : (1968) 1 SCJ 746] . That case is crowded with facts and requires a careful consideration for its proper understanding.45. Thus, all that Roshan Lal case lays down is that direct recruits and promotees lose their birth-marks on fusion into a common stream of service and they cannot thereafter be treated differently by reference to the consideration that they were recruited from different sources. Their genetic blemishes disappear once they are integrated into a common class and cannot be revived so as to make equals unequals once again.46. Roshan Lal case is thus no authority for the proposition that if direct recruits and promotees are integrated into one class, they cannot be classified for purposes of promotion on a basis other than the one that they were drawn from different sources. In the instant case, classification rests fairly and squarely on the consideration of educational qualifications: Graduates alone shall go into the higher post, no matter whether they were appointed as Assistant Engineers directly or by pro- motion. The discrimination therefore is not in relation to the source of recruitment as in Roshan Lal case.50. We are therefore of the opinion that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The Rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma- holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld.23. A decision relevant for the purpose for this case is State of Uttarakhand v. SK Singh (2019) 10 SCC 49. Similar to the present case, the minimum eligibility requirement for the feeder post of a Junior Engineer was that of a diploma, not a degree, however, degree holders were considered eligible. 60 per cent of appointments to the higher post of an Assistant Engineer were made through promotions from the cadre of Junior Engineer, while the balance 40 per cent were through direct recruitment. Out of the said 60 per cent, 7.33 per cent was reserved for accelerated promotion where Junior Assistants holding a degree were entitled to promotion after three years of service, as against the normal promotion which required ten years of service. The High Court had held that if the higher qualification of a degree was not contemplated as a requirement for being appointed to the feeder post, then two different periods of experience could not be provided later for promotion to the next higher post. In reversing the decision of the High Court, a two judge Bench of this Court speaking through Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, upheld the different eligibility conditions for accelerated promotions for graduate Junior Assistants. The Court also went as far as to suggest that even if the non-graduates were completely shut out of promotion, or if the time periods (that is the experience) required for normal promotions were different between degree and diploma holders, those classifications would also be valid under law.26. The principles which emerge from the above line of precedents can be summarised as follows:(i) Classification between persons must not produce artificial inequalities. The classification must be founded on a reasonable basis and must bear nexus to the object and purpose sought to be achieved to pass the muster of Articles 14 and 16;(ii) Judicial review in matters of classification is limited to a determination of whether the classification is reasonable and bears a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Courts cannot indulge in a mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification or replace the wisdom of the legislature or its delegate with their own;(iii) Generally speaking, educational qualification is a valid ground for classification between persons of the same class in matters of promotion and is not violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution;(iv) Persons drawn from different sources and integrated into a common class can be differentiated on grounds of educational qualification for the purpose of promotion, where this bears a nexus with the efficiency required in the promotional post;(v) Educational qualification may be used for introducing quotas for promotion for a certain class of persons; or may even be used to restrict promotion entirely to one class, to the exclusion of others;(vi) Educational qualification may be used as a criterion for classification for promotion to increase administrative efficiency at the higher posts; and(vii) However, a classification made on grounds of educational qualification should bear nexus to the purpose of the classification or the extent of differences in qualifications.30. In our view, the reading of Trilokinath Khosa (supra) as urged by the appellants is fundamentally flawed. The appellants have sought to lay emphasis on the fact that the decision in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) was dependent on the existence of two different sources of recruitment, while in the present case there is a single source of recruitment. To read the decision in this light is to miss the wood for the trees. In Trilokinath Khosa (supra), the Court had adverted to the well-established principle that once direct recruits and promotees are integrated into a common pool, they cannot be treated differently based on the source of recruitment. This however does not imply that they cannot be classified on other reasonable grounds. Thus, whether there are two different streams of recruitment, or a single source of recruitment merged into a common pool, the classification that was upheld in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) was based on educational qualification which was linked to the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency in the organization. We are unable to agree with the submission of the appellants that the decision in Trilokinath Khosa (supra) is not applicable in the present case.38. The Recruitment Regulations and their subsequent amendments by KMC suggest that the administration has continued to create a distinction between degree and diploma holder SAEs for the purpose of promotion. In regular promotion, this distinction is made by way of a quota for degree-holder SAEs, while in terms of supernumerary promotion, it has been by way of difference in eligibility conditions. Be it one way or the other, it is evident that the administration has sought to employ a higher number of degree holders at the position of AE than diploma holders. In 1994, when the Recruitment Regulations were introduced, 50 per cent of posts were for direct recruits, who were degree- holders and in the balance 50 per cent which was to be filled by promotees it can be presumed that there must be some SAEs who were holding degrees. Thus, in total more than 50 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holders. When these Regulations were modified in 1997, 45 per cent of AEs were to be direct recruits holding degrees, 10 per cent of AEs were to be degree-holding SAEs, and the balance 45 per cent of posts were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs. Thus, it was stipulated that more than 55 per cent of AEs would be degree holders. Similarly, in 2002, more than 50 per cent of the AE posts were to be filled by degree holders (35 per cent of AEs were direct recruits holding degrees, 15 per cent of AEs were to be filled by degree-holding SAEs and the balance 50 per cent were to be filled by degree/diploma holding SAEs). The reason for the increase in degree-holders for the post of AEs could be due to circumstances such as the higher level of technical expertise required for the superior post, increase in managerial and technical workload, and enhancement in supervisory functions. It is not amiss to draw a conclusion that a higher educational degree, coupled with stipulated years of experience, could bring in certain benefits to the position of an AE that the management desires. In any case, it is not for this Court to decide whether a higher educational qualification would fulfil the objectives of the management, as long as the nexus between the educational qualification and the need for higher efficiency is not absurd, irrational or arbitrary. In a line of decisions, this Court has held that educational qualifications may be linked to higher administrative efficiency and thus classification on this basis is not in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.39. The challenge before us however is not related to the classification made in matters of regular promotion. In fact, as the record indicates, the SAEs have not challenged the initial circulars dated 7 August 1997, or 20 February 2002 (which was challenged unsuccessfully before the High Court in another petition). The issue before us solely deals with the restrictions imposed for promotion to supernumerary AE posts.The impugned circular indicates that these supernumerary posts were created for removal of stagnation amongst SAEs. Although that may be the stated goal of the impugned circular, KMC has urged before this Court that the distinction in education qualification for promotion has been made for the purpose of enhancing administrative efficiency. It cannot be denied that SAEs once promoted to the post of an AE in these supernumerary posts would be performing the task and functions of an AE. Thus, it is not merely a change in the designation of an SAE to an AE, but involves an increase in workload, supervisory functions, and performance of the regular functions of an AE. Since that is the case, we do not find any reason why the rationale underlying the need for higher degree-holders in the AE cadre through regular promotion would not be applicable in the case of supernumerary posts. In other words, could a challenge to the impugned circular be sustained if, instead of providing different eligibility conditions, KMC had provided for creation of a fixed number of supernumerary posts out of which a proportion was reserved for degree-holder SAEs? We do not think so. By the very reason that these posts are supernumerary and depend on the number of eligible persons, a fixed number of positions could not have been anticipated. It is perhaps for this reason that KMC sought to digress from the regular method of granting promotion and opted to introduce separate eligibility conditions. Therefore, we find that the separate eligibility conditions for promotion to supernumerary AE posts on the basis of educational qualification is in line with the past promotion practices of KMC and is not an unreasonable classification.41. Even otherwise, we note that Clause 3 of the impugned circular provides that these supernumerary posts would be adjusted as and when a vacancy becomes available within the sanctioned posts of an AE. Further, Clause 5 stipulates that there would be no change in the Recruitment Regulations for the posts of AE. What this means is that the regular promotion of degree or diploma holder SAEs is not impacted by way of the impugned circular. As and when vacancies arise in the sanctioned AE posts, the AEs holding supernumerary posts would be subject to the Recruitment Regulations and the selection process for promotion of an SAE to an AE. The supernumerary posts are personal to the eligible AEs and will lapse on their being promoted on a regular basis as AEs or ceasing to remain in service.42. Another aspect to be considered is that while creating supernumerary posts, KMC has not completely restricted the promotional avenues of diploma-holder SAEs who have stagnated in their service. It has provided adequate opportunity to them to advance in their career, although on different terms and conditions. Thus, the promotional policy of KMC for supernumerary posts is not irrational or arbitrary or to the detriment of diploma holder SAEs. In matters of public policy and public employment, the legislature or its delegate must be given sufficient room to decide the quality of individuals it seeks to employ as against different positions. As long as these decisions are not arbitrary, this Court must refrain from interfering in the policy domain.