Case: Puran Lal Sah Vs. State Of U.P

also based on the same assumption that the availability of the stone at 26 Chains-was a condition of the contract namely that once stone was not available at 26 Chains the contract was at an end and that because the Appellant had done the work he should be paid on the basis of quantum meruit. This in our view is a far-fetched argument arid has no relation to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even assuming that the stand taken by the Appellant that the availability of stone at 26 Chains was a condition of the contract was justified, he had notwithstanding the rejection of his claim even before he started the work, acquiesced in the stand taken by the Respondents that he is not entitled to any higher rates, carried on and completed the contract as if there was no such condition. We, therefore, cannot understand the contention of the Appellants Advocate as to how the contract came to an end and who put an end to it. Even if at that stage the contract had been put an end to by the Respondents which is no ones case, as the Appellant had not started the work no question of quantum merit would arise. The principle of quantum meruit is rooted in English law under which there were certain procedural advantages in framing an action for compensation for work done. In order to avail of the remedy under quantum meruit, the original contract must have been discharged by the Defendant in such a way as to entitle the Plaintiff to regard himself as discharged from any further performance and he must have elected to do so. The remedy it may be noticed is however, not available to the party who breaks the contract even though he may have partially performed part of his obligation. This remedy by way of quantum meruit is restitutory that is it is a recompense for the value of the work done by the Plaintiff in order to restore him to the position which he would have been in if the contract had never been entered into. In this regard it is different to a claim for damages which is a compensatory remedy aimed at placing the injured party, as near as may be in the position which he would have been in, had the other party performed the contract. This Court had in Alopi Parshad and Sons Ltd. v Union of India, 1960-2 SOR 793 = (AIR 1960 SC 588 ) observed at p. 809 (of SCR) = (at p. 595 of AIR):"Compensation quantum meruit is awarded for work done or services rendered when the price thereof is not fixed by a contract. For work done or services rendered pursuant to the terms of a contract compensation quantum meruit cannot be awarded where the contract provides for consideration payable in that behalf". Though in that case the basis of the principle was not explained, it nonetheless lays down that where work is done under a contract pursuant to the terms thereof no amount can be claimed by way of quantum meruit. In the view we have taken on the facts of the case we do not propose to examine the decisions cited at the Bar in this behalf. The claim of the Appellant for higher rates which in fact was by way of damages has been rightly disallowed by the High Court."14. On the second question also the Appellant cannot succeed because under clause 12 of the contract Ex. Bl. the Plaintiff was bound to perform additional work which was required of him on the same terms and conditions on which he undertook to do the work for which he tendered. It appears that by a subsidiary contract entered into between the Appellant and the P. W. D. Ex B3 on the 12th April, 1946, the Appellant undertook to execute some additional work for the Department. The quantity of work which appellant actually performed was far in excess of what was mentioned in Ex. B3. The Appellant therefore claimed payment for the work done by him in excess of the quantity mentioned in the contract plus 30 per cent at the current rate as against the stipulated rates. It was submitted on behalf of the State of U. P. before the High Court that under clause 12 of the contract Ex. Bl and paragraph 5 of the special instructions the plaintiff was not entitled to any amount in excess of what he had already been paid. This contention was accepted because under the aforesaid clause 12 the con tractor was bound to perform ail additional work which was required of him on the same terms and conditions in which he undertook to do the main work. Paragraph 5 of the special instructions further provides as follows:"Contractors must be prepared to do at their original tender rate work in excess of the given quantities of work upto 30 per cent; if an increase in excess of 30 per cent is ordered over the work the contractor must intimate to the Engineer Incharge in writing his willingness or refusal to do extra work at the originally tendered rates. In the latter case he should settle fresh rate for increased work over 30 per cent before doing the work".These instructions being part and parcel of the original contract Ex. B1 would govern the parties. As such the Appellant unless he gave notice under that paragraph that he is not prepared to do the extra work over the 30% at normal rates, he cannot claim anything other than at the rates mentioned in the contract, unless he had settled fresh rates for that extra work. There is no evidence nor is it claimed by the Appellant that he had given any notice as required under paragraph 5 of special instructions and since he did the work without fulfilling these requirements he is not entitled to claim any amounts at a higher rate for the extra work done.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. It is obvious from these clauses that the rates are given in Schedule B on the basis of certain plans and specifications. The person intending to tender for the work was required to examine this material and also inspect the site before tendering. These instructions were designed to make all those who were desirous of obtaining the contract responsible for their acts so that it cannot be said that any misrepresentation was made or they were misguided in any way. The contention of the learned Advocate for Appellant is that it was definitely stated in the estimates that stone was available at 26 Chains which representation was binding an the Respondents and if no stone was available within that distance he was entitled to claim higher rates if he had to get stone from places farther away. In fact the Appellant alleges that the Engineers assured him that he would be paid highermere fact that the estimates were prepared by the PWD) on the basis of the stone being available at 26 Chains which Respondents admitted as stated in the Judgment of Civil Judge, Nainital does not mean that there was any assurance or undertaking given that stone would be available at that place. In fact it is not denied that stone was available within the distance of 26 Chains but it was in the area belonging to the Cantonment, for the removal of which permission of the Cantonment authorities had to be taken. Evidently the contractor was not able to obtain that permission. In our view it was upto the contractor to have satisfied himself before entering into the contract that the Cantonment authorities would permit him to take stone from its jurisdiction just in the same way as permission will have to be taken from any private individual in whose land stone required for road building is found. If the contractor has failed successfully to negotiate with the owners of land from which he could bring stone it cannot be said that the estimate prepared by the PWD on the basis that the stone was available at 26 Chains was a statement which amounted to an assurance or constituted a condition of the contract.It is clear from this evidence that the Appellant before giving the tender inspected the site, went to the place where stone was said to be available and after satisfying himself that the stone was available he gave the tender. A perusal of the documentary evidence would also show that he actually commenced work after his request to allow him higher rate was rejected which was long after the time when under the contract he was required to start the work.It cannot therefore be said that the Appellant was in any way induced by any assurances given by the P. W. D. authorities that they would give a higher rate for the extra lead before he commenced work The case of the Appellant in these letters was that no stone was available within half a mile while in his deposition he gave a contrary version altogether.This letter seems to be a recommendatory letter by a subordinate to the higher officer but it does not in any way establish the right of the Appellant to obtain a higher rate, nor does the evidence justify this conclusion. In our view neither the terms and conditions of the contract nor the oral or documentary evidence justify the conclusion that the Appellant was entitled to any extrain our view is a far-fetched argument arid has no relation to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even assuming that the stand taken by the Appellant that the availability of stone at 26 Chains was a condition of the contract was justified, he had notwithstanding the rejection of his claim even before he started the work, acquiesced in the stand taken by the Respondents that he is not entitled to any higher rates, carried on and completed the contract as if there was no such condition. We, therefore, cannot understand the contention of the Appellants Advocate as to how the contract came to an end and who put an end to it. Even if at that stage the contract had been put an end to by the Respondents which is no ones case, as the Appellant had not started the work no question of quantum merit would arise. The principle of quantum meruit is rooted in English law under which there were certain procedural advantages in framing an action for compensation for work done. In order to avail of the remedy under quantum meruit, the original contract must have been discharged by the Defendant in such a way as to entitle the Plaintiff to regard himself as discharged from any further performance and he must have elected to do so. The remedy it may be noticed is however, not available to the party who breaks the contract even though he may have partially performed part of his obligation. This remedy by way of quantum meruit is restitutory that is it is a recompense for the value of the work done by the Plaintiff in order to restore him to the position which he would have been in if the contract had never been entered into. In this regard it is different to a claim for damages which is a compensatory remedy aimed at placing the injured party, as near as may be in the position which he would have been in, had the other party performed the contract.On the second question also the Appellant cannot succeed because under clause 12 of the contract Ex. Bl. the Plaintiff was bound to perform additional work which was required of him on the same terms and conditions on which he undertook to do the work for which he tendered. It appears that by a subsidiary contract entered into between the Appellant and the P. W. D. Ex B3 on the 12th April, 1946, the Appellant undertook to execute some additional work for the Department. The quantity of work which appellant actually performed was far in excess of what was mentioned in Ex. B3. The Appellant therefore claimed payment for the work done by him in excess of the quantity mentioned in the contract plus 30 per cent at the current rate as against the stipulated rates. It was submitted on behalf of the State of U. P. before the High Court that under clause 12 of the contract Ex. Bl and paragraph 5 of the special instructions the plaintiff was not entitled to any amount in excess of what he had already been paid. This contention was accepted because under the aforesaid clause 12 the con tractor was bound to perform ail additional work which was required of him on the same terms and conditions in which he undertook to do the maininstructions being part and parcel of the original contract Ex. B1 would govern the parties. As such the Appellant unless he gave notice under that paragraph that he is not prepared to do the extra work over the 30% at normal rates, he cannot claim anything other than at the rates mentioned in the contract, unless he had settled fresh rates for that extra work. There is no evidence nor is it claimed by the Appellant that he had given any notice as required under paragraph 5 of special instructions and since he did the work without fulfilling these requirements he is not entitled to claim any amounts at a higher rate for the extra work done.