Case: Deb Sadhan Roy Vs. State Of West Bengal

on the same day which was approved by the State Government on January 27, 1971, so that the mandatory provisions of the Act both in respect of the report to be made to the State Government within five days from the date of the order and the approval of the detention within twelve days from the date of detention were satisfied. On the 27th itself a report was made to the Central Government as required under Section 13. The State Government placed the detention order, the grounds and the report etc. before the Advisory Board on February 18, 1971, which is also within 30 days from the date of detention as required under Section 10. The State Government rejected the representation made by the detenu on March 15, 1971, and the Advisory Board submitted its report that there was sufficient cause for his detention on March 23, 1971, which was confirmed on April 8, 1971. In the note file of the Government which we perused, though confirmation was recorded within three months, the communication was made later on August 26, 1971. The mandatory provisions, therefore, are fully complied with.13. The next question is whether the grounds are vague and irrelevant. These are as follows :(i) that on January 7, 1971, night you and your associates including Somesh Chandra Deb mutilated the statue of the eminent Indian Poet Rabindra Nath Tagore installed in a public place at Boilapara in Bishnupur town and thereby caused insult to an object of public veneration.(ii) That on January 11, 1971, at about 01.45 hrs. you and your associates broke into the Post Office situated at Rashikgunj in Bishnupur town and caused mischief to it by fire by destroying its official records by burning.It was contended that the associates of the petitioner has not been specified and therefore it will be difficult for the petitioner to make effective representation in respect thereof. We think there is no validity in this submission. Not only the dates and the time in each of the grounds have been mentioned but the acts of the petitioner have been specified in detail to enable him to make an effective representation. In our view it is not necessary for the petitioner to make an effective representation to specify all his associates because they may not have been known. The petitioner is being detained in respect of his acts and if in association with others he has acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, his detention cannot be said to be illegal.14. It is again contended relying on Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr and Others, [1970 (3) SCC 746 ] and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar and Others, [(1966) 1 SCR 709 : AIR 1966 SC 740 ] that the act specified in each of the grounds do not amount to disturbance of public order though they may effect law and order. This contention is equally untenable because Section 3(2) of the Act defines the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or the maintenance of public order" as given in sub-clause (a) to (e) to the said sub-section. We are here in this case concerned with the definition given in Section 3(2)(c) which makes any act causing insult to the Indian National Flag or to any other object of public veneration, whether by mutilating, damaging, burning, defiling, destroying or otherwise, or instigating any person to do so. The explanation to this sub-clause includes in the causing of insult to any object of public veneration, any portrait or statue of an eminent Indian, installed in a public place as a mark of respect to him or to his memory. The validity of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act was challenged recently in the case of State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey and Others, (supra) but this Court held that it was valid. The challenge to clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) dealing with disturbance of a publics order in the State with respect to which it was said there can be no two opinions about the Acts covered by those being likely to be prejudicial to the maintains of public order. In regard to clause (c) the argument that insulting the object of public veneration in privacy without the act causing insult being noticed by anyone who holds them in veneration could have no rational nexus with the disturbance of public order or security of State, was in the abstract described as attractive. In the light of the circumstances in which the Act was passed the mischief intended to be removed by this enactment and the object and purpose of enacting it, this Court held that clause (c) of sub-section (2) considered in the background of sub-section (1) of Section 3 can "be construed to mean, causing insult to the Indian National Flag or any other object of public veneration in such a situation as reasonably exposes the act, causing such insult to the view of those who hold these objects in veneration or to the public view and it would not cover cases where the Indian National Flag or other object of public veneration is mutilated, damaged, burnt, defiled or destroyed completely unseen or when incapable of being seen by anyone whose feelings are likely to be hurt thereby. The act causing insult referred to in clause (c) must be such as would be capable of arousing the feelings of indignation in someone and that can only be the case when insult is caused in the circumstances just explained", and was accordingly restricted to such situation. The challenge there was negatived. In this case what is said to have been defiled by the petitioner and his associates is the statue of Rabindra Nath Tagore, a Poet and sage venerated by all in this country and affords a sufficient ground for detention. The other ground also directly connects the act with the disturbance of public order.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. It may be pertinent to refer to clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution under which no law providing for Preventive Detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than there months unless a Board consisting of persons who have or have been or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of the High Court, as referred to above, has reported within three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. It is evident from this provision that a law for Preventive Detention up to three months can be made under clause (4) subject to the limitation contained in clauses (5) to (7) of the Article. If a longer period of detention is to be provided for the law must subject to clauses (5) to (7) make provision for a reference to a Board as provided in clause (4) and for it to report on the sufficiently or otherwise of the detention which should be within three months from the date of detention. This requirement however is not insisted upon in cases where a law is made under sub-clause (a) of clause (7) of the said Article. In cases where the law provides for a reference to the Board or the receipt of its affirmative opinion the initial detention is any tentative for three months and only when the Board reports that there is sufficient cause for detention that the question of confirmation and extension of the period beyond three months will arise. The mere fact that the provision of a law under Article 22(4) requires a reference to be made to the Board within a particular period for the Board to make its report by a specified time is not enough. The State Government has to take action only after a report is received from the Board expressing its opinion as to the sufficient or otherwise of the detention. If the opinion of the Board that there is sufficient cause is received after three months from the detention the detention will be illegal as it is a contravention of the mandatory provision of clause (4). In cases where the report is received within three months that there is no sufficient cause for detention but no action is taken thereon by the State Government to release the detenu or where its opinion is that there is sufficient cause, the detenu is neither automatically released nor is the period of his detention extended. It is therefore a crucial requirement of the Constitutional provision that the appropriate Government has to take action on the report of the Board, because as we said on that action would depend the revocation of the order and his release or the continuance of the detention beyond three months. In other words even where the Board is of opinion that there is sufficient cause the State Government is not bound to confirm that opinion. It can notwithstanding that opinion revoke the order. No doubt such a power can be exercised even after the confirmation of the order but that is not to deny the State Government the power to revoke the order even before confirming it. Viewed from any angle it is essential that the appropriate Government should take positive action on the report of the Board which action alone determines whether the detention is to be terminated or continued. It would therefore prima facie appear that that action should be taken immediately after the receipt of the opinion of the Board or at any rate within there months from the date a person is detained. It is for this reason after the Constitution every legislation dealing with Preventive Detention has made specific provision for confirmation and continuance of detention in view of the Constitutional mandate contained in Article 22(4). A period within which the appropriate Government has to make a reference to the Board, the period within which the Board has to make a report on the sufficiency of the ground for detention is provided for which has been uniformly one month and ten weeks respectively. The period of ten weeks for the submission of the report by the Board where Article 22(4) provides for twelve weeks is designdly fixed because that would give the appropriate Governments two weeks to confirm and extend the period or not to confirm. Of course the opinion of the Board need not necessarily be given on the last day of the expiry of the ten weeks. It is quite possible that this information may be submitted to the appropriate Government well within ten weeks. In such cases a question whether the confirmation and extension has to be made by the appropriate Government within a reasonable period may arise for consideration, but in any case failure to confirm and extend the period within three months will result in the detention becoming illegal the moment the three months period has elapsed without such confirmation. Any subsequent action by the appropriate Government after the three months cannot have the effect of extending the period of detention. This view of ours is further fortified by Section 13 of the Act where the maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order which has been confirmed under Section 12 shall be twelve months from the date of detention. This requirement would suggest that the extension of the period of detention beyond three months up to a maximum of twelve months is from the date of confirmation of the opinion of the Board which if unconfirmed would not extend the period beyond three months. If so at what point of time should that be confirmed ? It would be meaningless to suggest that the confirmation of the Boards opinion can take place beyond three months when the period of detention has come to an end and has not been extended by the want of it. Looking at it in a different way what these provisions amount to is that no person can be detained for any period beyond three months or for any period thereafter up to twelve months unless the Boards opinion is confirmed within threeonly the dates and the time in each of the grounds have been mentioned but the acts of the petitioner have been specified in detail to enable him to make an effective representation. In our view it is not necessary for the petitioner to make an effective representation to specify all his associates because they may not have been known. The petitioner is being detained in respect of his acts and if in association with others he has acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order, his detention cannot be said to beare here in this case concerned with the definition given in Section 3(2)(c) which makes any act causing insult to the Indian National Flag or to any other object of public veneration, whether by mutilating, damaging, burning, defiling, destroying or otherwise, or instigating any person to do so. The explanation to this sub-clause includes in the causing of insult to any object of public veneration, any portrait or statue of an eminent Indian, installed in a public place as a mark of respect to him or to his memory. The validity of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act was challenged recently in the case of State of West Bengal v. Ashok Dey and Others, (supra) but this Court held that it was valid. The challenge to clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) dealing with disturbance of a publics order in the State with respect to which it was said there can be no two opinions about the Acts covered by those being likely to be prejudicial to the maintains of public order. In regard to clause (c) the argument that insulting the object of public veneration in privacy without the act causing insult being noticed by anyone who holds them in veneration could have no rational nexus with the disturbance of public order or security of State, was in the abstract described as attractive. In the light of the circumstances in which the Act was passed the mischief intended to be removed by this enactment and the object and purpose of enacting it, this Court held that clause (c) of sub-section (2) considered in the background of sub-section (1) of Section 3 can "be construed to mean, causing insult to the Indian National Flag or any other object of public veneration in such a situation as reasonably exposes the act, causing such insult to the view of those who hold these objects in veneration or to the public view and it would not cover cases where the Indian National Flag or other object of public veneration is mutilated, damaged, burnt, defiled or destroyed completely unseen or when incapable of being seen by anyone whose feelings are likely to be hurt thereby. The act causing insult referred to in clause (c) must be such as would be capable of arousing the feelings of indignation in someone and that can only be the case when insult is caused in the circumstances just explained", and was accordingly restricted to such situation. The challenge there was negatived. In this case what is said to have been defiled by the petitioner and his associates is the statue of Rabindra Nath Tagore, a Poet and sage venerated by all in this country and affords a sufficient ground for detention. The other ground also directly connects the act with the disturbance of public order.