Case: Shama Prashant Raje Vs. Ganpatrao

respect of the orders of an inferior Tribunal are well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. Since the conclusion of the appellate authority in the case in hand was based on misconstruction of certain documents and on misreading of relevant materials by a cryptic order without even noticing the detailed reasons given by the Controller, the learned Single Judge of the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the conclusions of the appellate authority, and as such, there is no error so far as the orders of the High Court are concerned. According to Mr. Mohta, a bare reading of the judgment of the learned Single Judge would indicate the apparent errors found by the High Court with the appellate order of the District Collector, and therefore, the High Court was well within its jurisdiction in interfering with the same. 3. In view of the rival submissions we have carefully scrutinised the orders of the Controller, that of the appellate authority under the Control Order and the order of the learned Single Judge which has been affirmed by the Division Bench. Undoubtedly, in a proceeding under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by a competent tribunal. The jurisdiction of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. Consequently Article 226 is not intended to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or order to be made. But notwithstanding the same, on a mere perusal of the order of an inferior tribunal if the High Court comes to a conclusion that such tribunal has committed manifest error by misconstruing certain documents, or the High Court comes to the conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the inferior tribunal or the inferior tribunal has ignored to take into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into consideration certain materials which are not admissible, then the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the findings of the inferior tribunal. Then again the two questions on which the Tribunal under the Rent Control Order was required to give finding, namely, habitual defaulter and sub-letting are not pure questions of fact but can be held to be mixed questions of fact and law. In this view of the matter, on going through the appellate order passed by the District Collector as well as the order of the learned Single Judge, we are not in a position to hold that the High Court exceeded the parameters prescribed for interference with the findings of an inferior Tribunal. Under Clause 13(3)(ii) the Controller has to be satisfied that the tenant is habitually in arrears with the rent. The expression "habitually" would obviously connote some act of continuity. Under the lease deed dated 8-4-1982 between the landlord and the tenant clause 4 made it obligatory for the tenant to pay the rent before 10th day of each English calendar month, and under clause 9, in the event of arrears of rent over 3 months is not paid then the landlord was entitled to give notice and then if the matter is not settled within one month from the date of the notice then the landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy. Reading the aforesaid two clauses it would not be correct, as contended by Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that under the agreement itself 4 months period has been provided to enable the tenant to pay the rent. If a tenant, notwithstanding the obligation of paying the rent by the 10th day of each English calendar month continuously makes a default of paying the rent for the first month by two months thereafter, and pays the rent in similar manner, then he must be held to be habitually in arrears with the rent in question. This being the position, the fact that the rent for September to November 1984 was paid in December only after the distress warrant was issued and that again from December 1984 to March 1985 the rent had not been paid and was deposited within the 10th of next month, as stipulated in the lease agreement, would constitute the tenant to be habitually in arrears within the meaning of Clause 13(3)(ii) of the Control Order. The appellate authority under the Control Order was obviously in error in interfering with the well-reasoned conclusion of the Controller on this score, and the High Court was fully justified in correcting the said error by interfering with the finding of the lower appellate authority on the question of applicability of Clause 13(3)(ii) to the case in hand. Similarly, on the question of sub-letting, there is no dispute with the proposition that the two ingredients, namely, parting with possession and some consideration therefor, had to be established. The conclusion of the lower appellate authority on this score was obviously on a misconstruction of the document Exhibit N-2 and the High Court, therefore, was entitled to correct the error which was based upon a construction of the aforesaid document. The different clauses of the lease deed unequivocally indicate that the sum of Rs. 1500 p.m. was the consideration money for parting with the possession of the premises and allowing Singer Sewing Machine Company to do business in the premisesIn the aforesaid premises, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the High Court committed error in interfering with the finding of the appellate authority under the Control Order by way of reappreciating the evidence. In our considered opinion, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the conclusion of the appellate authority and correcting the error of the said authority, as already stated. In the premises, as aforesaid,

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Verma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the High Court committed error in interfering with the finding of the appellate authority under the Control Order by way of reappreciating the evidence. In our considered opinion, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the conclusion of the appellate authority and correcting the error of the said authority, as already stated.