Case: Majati Subbarao Vs. P.K.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) By Lrs

that there was a denial of title by the appellant the result would be only that the respondent-landlord became entitled to forfeit the lease and in order to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture would have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take advantage of a denial of title by the tenant in the very proceeding for eviction in the course of which the denial was made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction proceedings. In support of this argument learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi (46 IA 109 : AIR 1919 PC 1 : 42 Mad 589 : 17 ALJ 552 : 21 Bom LR 655). In our view, this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal ((1979) 4 SCC 214 : (1980) 1 SCR 334 : AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) a constitution Bench of this Court comprising seven learned Judges held that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in this favour. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non-obstante clause or by necessary implication these enactments have done away with the law contained in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlords title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that even a denial of the landlords title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial has been filed (See Sada Ram v. Gajjan Shiama (AIR 1970 P&H 511 : 1970 Cur LJ 88 : 1970 Punj LJ 89); Shiv Parshad v. Shila Rani (AIR 1974 HP 22 : 1973 Ren CR 548) and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayana Rao Sarada ((1978) 1 RCJ 368 (AP)). As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be field by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenants denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement. 6. It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that, in any event, the respondent failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do so in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the eviction petition was filed. We agree that normally this would have been so but, in the present case, we find that the trial court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenants denial of the landlords title to the schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention that the stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No other arguments have been advanced before us.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In our view, this decision is hardly of any assistance to learned counsel. The principle laid down in that case is that, in order to constitute a ground for eviction, the denial of title has to be clear and in unequivocal terms. In the present case, the facts found show that the denial of title of the respondent by the appellant was in clear and unequivocal terms. Although it is observed in the said judgment that in providing this ground for eviction, the legislature of the State of Rajasthan decided to give effect to the provisions of clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the judgment nowhere lays down that the denial title must be anterior to the eviction petition nor does it say that the provisions relating to eviction of tenants under the Transfer of Property Act are applicable to the eviction of tenants under the Rajasthan Rent Act. In this connection we may point out that it is well settled that the court hearing a suit or appeal can taken into account events which are subsequent to the filing of the suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropriately. Moreover, it is significant that in the present case, the denial of the landlords title was not the only ground pleaded in support of the claim for eviction but it was also contended by the respondent that the appellant was liable to be evicted as the respondent wanted the said premises for his personal bona fide use andour view, this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal ((1979) 4 SCC 214 : (1980) 1 SCR 334 : AIR 1979 SC 1745 ) a constitution Bench of this Court comprising seven learned Judges held that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in this favour. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of aclause or by necessary implication these enactments have done away with the law contained in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlords title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that even a denial of the landlords title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial has been filed (See Sada Ram v. Gajjan Shiama (AIR 1970 P&H 511 : 1970 Cur LJ 88 : 1970 Punj LJ 89); Shiv Parshad v. Shila Rani (AIR 1974 HP 22 : 1973 Ren CR 548) and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayana Rao Sarada ((1978) 1 RCJ 368 (AP)). As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be field by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenants denial of his character as a tenant in the writtenagree that normally this would have been so but, in the present case, we find that the trial court, namely, the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenants denial of the landlords title to the schedule property including the said premises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground. Having failed to raise that contention that the stage it is not open now to the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the eviction petition. No other arguments have been advanced before us