Case: Krishna Vs. State Of Maharashtra

for the parties and after perusing the language of the sections, we have no hesitation to hold, that the field of Section 6 and Section 10 are separate. The removal spoken under Section 6 is removal without any stigma while the removal under Section 10 is removal with penal consequences attaching stigma. If submission for the appellant is accepted, viz. Section 6 empowers and Section 10 lay down condition and procedure to remove then removal of trustee could only be for penal consequences and not otherwise. If that be so, there could be no reason to enact Section 6 as Section 10 covers such cases. It is significant, the removal under Section 6 is confined only to such Trustees who are covered under Clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and who are also nominated by the State Government. Rights of Trustees falling under the aforesaid Clause (e) are rights created under a statute and hence that very creator can always limit or curtail such right. In such cases, if a Trustee is removed, he cannot project any grievance that no opportunity was given to him. If any right which is creature of statute, is limited or curtailed by that very statute, in the absence of any other right under that very statute or the Constitution of India, such Trustee cannot claim any right based on the principle of Natural Justice. 9. The removal spoken here neither casts any sigma nor leads to any penal consequences. This clearly reveals doctrine of pleasure which is implicit in this section. In any statute expression of the will of the legislature may be explicit or it may be implicit. It is open for the courts, while interpreting any provision to spell or read with other provisions of the statute if so intended to read implicitly, in the absence of any explicit words that subserve the intent of the legislature. 10. In the present statute Section 6 refers to the trustee falling under Clause (e), sub-section (1), Section 7 refers to Trustees falling under Clauses (b) and (c) and sub-section (2) refers of Trustees falling under Clause (d) and sub-section (3) refers to Trustees falling in Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 4 and Section 10 refers to cases of removal of trustees by way of stigma, and Section 11 refers to the disability of such removed trustees. In view of this we have no hesitation to hold that removal of Trustee under Section 6 is based on the principle of doctrine of pleasure. We may only strike a note here if the legislature would have used some other words for the word `removed for expressing curtailment of the tenure of such trustee in Section, this possible confusion would not have arisen. Once doctrine of pleasure is applicable neither the principle of natural justice would step in nor any question of giving opportunity before removal would arise. It is significant when stigma is cast then sub-section (3) of Section 10 specially provides for giving an opportunity to such incumbent before passing an order of removal under Section 10, while there is no such corresponding sub-section under Section 6. Thus intent of legislature is very clear which reinforces the inference which we have drawn that doctrine of pleasure is implicit under Section 6. In Om Narain Agarwal and others v. Nagpur Palika, Shahjahanpur and others, 1993(2) SCC 242, this Court was considering the provisions of Section 9 of the U.P. Municipalities Act, 1916 as introduced by U.P. Act 19 of 1990, which made provision for the nomination of two women members by the State Government, and fourth proviso provides that the nomination of such two members is at the pleasure of the State Government. This Court held: "The initial nomination of the two women members itself depend on the pleasure and subjective satisfaction of the State Government. If such appointments made initially by nomination are based on political considerations, there can be no violation of any provision of the Constitution in case the legislature authorised the State Government to terminate such appointment at its pleasure and to nominate new members in their place. The nominated members do not have the will or authority to any residents of the Municipal Board behind them as may be present in the case of an elected member..............But so far as the nominated members are concerned, the legislature in its wisdom has provided that they shall hold office during the pleasure of the Government. It has not been argued from the side of respondents that the legislature had no such power to legislate the fourth proviso. The attack is based on Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.In our view, such provision neither offends any Article of the Constitution nor the same is against any public policy or democratic norms enshrined in the Constitution. There is also no question of any violation of principles of natural justice in not affording any opportunity to the nominated members before their removal not the removal under the pleasure doctrine contained in the fourth proviso to Section 9 of the Act puts any stigma on the performance or character of the nominated members. It is done purely on political considerations." 11. This decision clearly covers the point as against the appellant. 12. Learned senior counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish this case by submitting that doctrine of pleasure was incorporated in the section itself. In our opinion this does not make difference. It may be in this case doctrine of pleasure is explicit but if on another statute it is implicit, which we have held in this case, the same principle would be equally applicable. Accordingly we do not find any merit in this submission.13. For the aforesaid reasons we hold the present appeal has no merit and the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. We hold the removal of the appellant as Trustee of the second respondent by order dated 9.2.2000 was valid.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. In the present statute Section 6 refers to the trustee falling under Clause (e),(1), Section 7 refers to Trustees falling under Clauses (b) and (c) and(2) refers of Trustees falling under Clause (d) and(3) refers to Trustees falling in Clause (f) of(1) of Section 4 and Section 10 refers to cases of removal of trustees by way of stigma, and Section 11 refers to the disability of such removed trustees. In view of this we have no hesitation to hold that removal of Trustee under Section 6 is based on the principle of doctrine of pleasure. We may only strike a note here if the legislature would have used some other words for the word `removed for expressing curtailment of the tenure of such trustee in Section, this possible confusion would not have arisen.Learned senior counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish this case by submitting that doctrine of pleasure was incorporated in the section itself. In our opinion this does not make difference. It may be in this case doctrine of pleasure is explicit but if on another statute it is implicit, which we have held in this case, the same principle would be equally applicable. Accordingly we do not find any merit in this submission.13. For the aforesaid reasons we hold the present appeal has no merit and the High Court was right in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. We hold the removal of the appellant as Trustee of the second respondent by order dated 9.2.2000 was valid.