Case: Pawan Alloys and Casting Pvt. Ltd., Meerut and Ors Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board and Ors

rebate and it is equally the power of the Board to withdraw the same in its own discretion. 34. Consequently it must be held that the twin aspects highlighted by this Court in Shrijee Sales Corporation 1997(89)ELT452(SC) (supra), on the basis of which the authority promising a particular course of conduct on its part to the prospective promise can resile from the promise even prematurely are not found established on the facts of these cases. Consequently the ratio of the said decision cannot be of any avail to the respondent-Board. 35. Shri Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the Board next ginned his faith on another decision of this Court in the case of Ester Industries Ltd. v. U.P. State Electricity Board (1996)11SCC199 . In that case this Court was concerned with a converse situation wherein the Government of U.P. had decided to grant 10% development rebate to new industries which could be attracted to the State. However the respondent-Board had not acted upon the said suggestion of the Government of U.P. and had not changed its tariff rates by adopting the same scheme of incentive benefits for its consumers. Question was whether the Court could compel the Board to grant such an incentive rebate to its consumers in exercise of statutory powers of the Board under Section 49 of the Act when the Board itself had not thought it fit to do so. The High Court had rejected such a request of the writ petitioners for enforcing the aforesaid scheme on the Board. Said decision was upheld by a Bench of this Court consisting of K. Ramaswamy and G. B. Pattanaik, JJ., by the aforesaid judgment. The Court observed that the State Electricity Board had a statutory function to discharge in determination of the rates of tariff and this being a legislative policy while exercising the power under Section 78A of the Act policy directions issued by the Government may also be taken into consideration by the Board which had a statutory duty to perform and that it was for the State Government to consider whether the Board had laid down the policy or whether the direction issued by the State Government had not been properly implemented. The Court could not give a direction to the Board to implement the directions issued by the State Government. Thus it was held that no mandamus could be issued to the Board to grant such incentive rebate to the new industries. The Court also noted that in the agreements entered into by the consumers with the Board full tariff rates without any rebate were agreed to be paid. Consequently it was observed that promissory estoppel would apply only in a case where there was no contract executed between the parties and in that case there existed a contract duly executed under law between the petitioner and the Board which bound them and unless the same was revised question of promissory estoppel did not arise. 36. We fail to appreciate how the aforesaid decision can advance the case of respondent-Board in the peculiar facts of this group of matters. As we have noted earlier here is a converse position where the Board presumably appears to have accepted the guidelines and the directions given by the State of U.P. under Section 78A of the Act and it adopted the scheme of incentive rebates for new industries by promulgating its own tariffs in exercise of its powers under Section 49 read with Section 78A of the Act and it was the Board itself which had given such a promise and held out such representations to the newcomer industries by the first three notifications as seen above. Once that was so the question of compelling the Board to promulgate such policy would not survive for consideration in the present cases. It is obvious that if the Board had not promulgated such policy the Court could not have compelled the Board to give such concessions. Here the question is having itself promulgated such a policy whether the Board can go back upon it prematurely. The aforesaid decision of this Court had no occasion to consider this aspect of the matter. 37. However Shri Dave was very sanguine about the observation in this judgment that promissory estoppel would not apply where there existed a contract executed between the consumer and the Board. As we have noted earlier the aforesaid observations in the said Report were made in the light of the fact situation before the Court. There the consumer had entered into an agreement to be bound by the tariff rates notifications by the Board from time to time. Those tariff rates were devoid of any scheme of incentive development rebate. In-other words they were full-fledged tariff rates without any development rebate component. Under these circumstances the Court justifiably observed that the consumer was bound by the contract and when the Board itself had not promulgated any policy of development rebate for dew industries Board could not be compelled on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to do something which it had never promised to do. Consequently the decision in Ester Industries Ltd. (1996)11SCC199 (supra) also is of no avail to the respondent-Board. 38. Before parting With this discussion it must be stated that in the light of the observations made in Ester Industries Ltd. (supra) by this Court to the effect that the fixation of tariff including incentive rebate is a legislative function, the observations of the High Court that it is not a legislative or delegated legislative function, cannot be sustained. It must be held that such a function is quasi-legislative in character reflecting an exercise of delegated legislative power. 39. As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the finding reached on the question of promissory estoppel by the High Court 6n Issue No. 1 is well sustained. The respondent-Board must be treated to be estopped from prematurely withdrawing the incentive development rebate made available to these appellant-industries by issuing the impugned notification.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We shall deal with these points seriatim. Point No. 19. It is now well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that the State authorities as well as its limbs like the Board covered by the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution of India being treated as State within the meaning of the said Article, can be made subject to the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel in cases where because of their representation the party claiming estoppel has changed its position and if such an estoppel does not fly in the face of any statutory prohibition, absence of power and authority of the promisor, is otherwise not opposed to public interest, and also when equity in favour of the promise does not outweigh equity in favour of the promisor entitling the latter to legally get out of the promise.10. In this connection we may usefully refer to a decision of this Court rendered in the case of State of H.P. v. Ganesh Wood Products . B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court made the following pertinent observations in this connection in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Report:The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognised in this country. Even so it should be noticed that it is an evolving doctrine, the contours of which are not yet fully and finally demarcated. It would be instructive to bear in mind what Viscount Hailsham said in Woodhouse Ltd. v. Nigerian Produce Ltd.I desire to add that the time may soon come when the whole sequence of cases based upon promissory estoppel since the war, beginning with Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1947) I KB 130 : 62 TLR 557 : 1947 LJR 77 may need to be reviewed and reduced to a coherent body of doctrine by the courts. I do not mean to say that they are to be regarded with suspicion. But as is common with an expanding doctrine, they do raise problems of coherent exposition which have never been systematically explored.Though the above view was expressed as far back as 1972, it is no less valid today. The dissonance in the views expressed by this Court in some of its decisions on the subject emphasises such a need. The views expounded in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [1979]118ITR326(SC) was departed from in certain respects in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana [1980]3SCR689 which was in turn criticised in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [1986]158ITR574(SC) . The divergence in approach adopted in Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat [1987]165ITR6(SC) and Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987]165ITR57(SC) is another instance. The fact that the recent decision in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India 1994ECR637(SC) is being reconsidered by larger Bench is yet another affirmation of the need stressed by Lord Hailsham for enunciating a coherent body of doctrine by the courts. An aspect needing a clear exposition - and which is of immediate relevance herein - is what is the precise meaning of the words the promise ... alters his position, in the statement of the doctrine. The doctrine has been formulated in the following words in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd.. at p. 643):The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promise and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promise, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution.e may say at this stage that at the time the aforesaid decision was rendered, judgment of this Court in the case of Kasinka Trading v. Union of India1994ECR637(SC) was pending scrutiny before a larger Bench. Subsequently the said decision came to be confirmed by the decision of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court speaking through A. M. Ahmadi, C.J. in the case of Shrijee Sales Corporation v. Union of India 1997(89)ELT452(SC). We will refer to these decisions in the latter part of this judgment. Suffice it to say at this stage that if a statutory authority or an executive authority of the State functioning on behalf of the State in exercise of its legally permissible powers, has held out any promise to a party who relying on the same has changed its position not necessarily to its detriment and if this promise does not offend any provision of law or does not fetter any legislative or quasi-legislative power inhering in the promisor then on the principle of promissory estoppel the promisor can be pinned down to the promise offered by it by way of representation containing such promise for the benefit of the promise.13. Prima facie we find some force in the aforesaid objection put forward by Shri Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the Board. However on a closer scrutiny this objection falls through. It is of course true that whatever might have been the wide canvass tried to be spread by the appellants before the High Court in their pleadings at the stage of argument as noted by the High Court in the impugned judgment they confined their challenge to the impugned notification only on the solitary ground that the Board had held out promise by way of representation to the new industrialists on the basis of the clear recitals in the three notifications of 29th October, 1982, 13th July, 1984 and 28th January, 1986. They did not think it fit to support their cases of promissory estoppel against the Board on any other material. However it cannot be forgotten that the Board is a supplier of electricity to consumers on charging appropriate sale price. It is thus a commercial entity. It is not concerned with development of industries in the State. That task is entrusted to the State concerned. If the latter with a view to giving a fillip to new industries puts forward a scheme of incentives to new industries, as a part of this package it can issue appropriate directions to the Board, its limb, under Section 78A of the Act to make this incentive available to new industries to be established in the region covered by Boards supply network of electric power. It is precisely what is done by the Board at the behest of State Government. No estoppel is required to be pleaded against the State as the latter has not issued any notification holding out such a promise. Nor has the State gone back upon it.These notifications are identically worded. We will, therefore, refer to the relevant clauses thereof which have a direct bearing on this controversy. The said notifications are issued by the Board in exercise of powers under Section 49 of the Act notifying revised rate schedule appended to the notifications and they are to apply to all persons in respect of supply of electricity throughout the State of U. P. directly served by the Board. It is mentioned in the said notifications that the revised rate schedule will come into force from the respective dates mentioned in the said notifications. The rate schedules which are incorporated in these notifications, amongst others, contain an item pertaining to incentives to new industries. This item is mentioned as item No. 9 in the earlier notifications, but in the last notification dated 28th January, 1986 which was issued in partial modification of earlier notifications it is mentioned as item No. 8 as part and parcel of rate schedule.A mere look at this item shows that all the aforesaid three notifications which held the field from 29th October, 1982 to 28th January, 1986 clearly contained a representation by the Board to the consumers, who were to establish new industrial units in the territories of the State in which the Board was to supply electricity, that on the total bill of electricity consumed by them during the period of first three years of their taking supply they will be getting a rebate of 10% on the total amount of such bills for electricity consumption. It was also assured that this rebate would be available not only to new industrial units which may get established and which may take electric supply from the Board on and from the date on which the said last notification of 28th January, 1986 came into force, but rebate would be permissible even to those new industries who had earlier established their industries and taken electricity supply from the Board and three years period earlier granted to them for earning development rebate had remained unexpired on 1st February, 1986 and for that entire unexpired period also the said development rebate was guaranteed by the Board. This obviously can be said to have been an incentive offered by the Board in exercise of its statutory powers under Section 49 of the Act read with Section 78A of the Act under which the State was entitled to issue suitable directions for effectuating such an incentive package for new industries to enable these new and infant industries to get attracted to the area where the Board was to supply electric energy so that these prospective consumers of electricity to be supplied by the respondent-Board could not only establish their industries in these areas but could withstand the competition with old industrial units as the concession in the payment of electricity charges would obviously reduce their cost structure and consequently the price of their manufactured articles, so that these new industries during their infancy could effectively stand in the competition with old industries which may be well settled in the market. This was certainly an infancy benefit made available as an incentive by the Board to these new industries. This package of infancy benefit made available by the Board was obviously in compliance with States directive under Section 78A of the Act as it was a part and parcel of the package of incentives made available to new industries as seen from the Annexure A (Copy of extracts specifying various incentives and concessions dated 12th November, 1981) to the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 13827 of 1991 out of which Civil Appeal No. 3203 of 1991 has arisen, filed by the applicant. It is not the case of the Board that such an incentive scheme was not quoted by the State. It must, therefore, be held that the earlier three notifications issued by the Board under Section 49 read with Section 78A of the Act were a part and parcel of this incentive scheme. This scheme of rebate of for new industries to be established in plains of the State had remained operative since 29th October, 1982 for almost four years and even by the latest notification dated 28th January, 1986 the Board had continued the said package of incentives and made it available also to the new industries which could come up even after 28th January, 1986 in the area of the State where the Board was supplying electricity and selling it to its consumers.15. It is also obvious that when new industries are attracted in the region, the Board would be able to find more and more customers for the electricity sought to be sold by it to these consumers of electricity who would be taking high voltage electric power and, therefore, would be paying higher tariff by way of HV1 and HV2. Thus such an incentive scheme would benefit not only the entire State but also the Board itself.16. It is, therefore, not possible to agree with the contention of learned Senior Counsel for the Board that these three notifications did not hold out any promise or any representation to the general public enabling the new industries to get established acting on the said representation. It is obvious that after the expiry of this three years period the Board would be able to charge full rate for electricity supplied to these new customers who would then become sufficiently old and mature and would not need any more rebate. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Board had no interest in these new industries, their prospective customers, and was not interested in attracting them to the territory catered to by it by the supply of electricity. It may be that the Board exercised its statutory powers under Section 49 of the Act for that purpose but all the same it in its wisdom and acting on the direction under Section 78A of the Act pursuant to the package of incentives offered by the State of U. P. to these new industries, had issued the said notifications holding out these promises. But even assuming that the State had no role to play in this connection as submitted by Shri Dave for the respondents, these three notifications on their own wordings leave no room for doubt that they did contain offers of incentives to new industries who would be the prospective new consumers of electricity and, therefore, the Boards future customers.17. In this connection we may usefully refer to two decisions of this Court. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Orient Paper Mills Ltd. [1989]2SCR436 , a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court consisting of S. Ranganathan and M. M. Punchhi, JJ., upheld the electricity duty package made available to industrialists who were themselves generating power through their own generating sets on the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It is of course true that in that case State of Madhya Pradesh had offered this package but it was obviously through its own limb, M. P. State Electricity Board. Any exemption from electricity duty could be granted only by the Board exercising powers under Section 49 of the Act and that could be at the behest of the State.18. In the present case even leaving aside the promissory estoppel against the State of U.P. it can clearly be visualised that by the mere wordings of the aforesaid three notifications the Board acting as a limb of the State of U.P. had offered these concessions by way of rebate in electricity duty to the new industries so as to attract them to the State to enable the Board to take them in its fold as prospective consumers of electricity to be sold by it to them.21. Consequently it cannot be held on the clear recitals found in the aforesaid three notifications issued by the Board that: no representation whatsoever guaranteeing 10% rebate on electricity consumption bills could be culled out from these notifications. We, therefore, agree with the finding of the High Court on Issue No. 1 that by these notifications the Board had clearly held out a promise to these new industries and as these new industries had admittedly got established in the region where the Board was operating, acting on such promise, the same in equity would bind the Board. Such a promise was not contrary to any statutory provision but on the contrary was in compliance with the directions issued under Section 78A of the Act. These new industries which got attracted to this region relying upon the promise had altered their position irretrievably. They had spent large amounts of money for establishing the infrastructure, had entered into agreements with the Board for supply of electricity and, therefore, had necessarily altered their position relying on these representations thinking that they would be assured of at least three years period guaranteeing rebate of 10% on the total bill of electricity to be consumed by them as infancy benefit so that they could effectively compete with the old industries operating in the field and their products could effectively compete with their products. On these well-established facts the Board can certainly be pinned down to its promise on the doctrine of promissory estoppel.23. We fail to appreciate how those observations made in connection with entirely a different challenge based on different statutory scheme can be straightway pressed in service for contending that even grant of rebate of electricity charges as a part of permissible incentive scheme would also be a legislative function, it has to be kept in view that the Board exercises its statutory powers under Section 49(1) of the Act by fixing uniform rates of tariff for electricity charges. When it fixes general tariffs, it may be said to be exercising delegated legislative power. But while doing so it also in exercise of its statutory power can grant rebate to a given class of consumers under Section 49, Sub-sections (2) and 3) read with Section 78A of the Act. Once the uniform tariffs are fixed the statutory function of quasi-legislative, nature gets fructified. Dehors such rates if some concession by way of rebates is to be given the same would still remain in the field of statutory exercise of power. On this aspect we may usefully refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Usha Martin Industries AIR1997SC2489 , rendered by a Bench of two learned Judges wherein one of us (K. T. Thomas, J.) was a member. Dealing with the very same Section 49(1) the following pertinent observations were made by Sen, J. speaking for the Bench:Moreover, the tariff is fixed by exercise of statutory powers. It is not fixed as a result of any bargaining by and between the Board and the consumers. It is a uniform tariff which every consumer will have to pay for the electricity consumed by him. In fact, the consumer has no option but to pay the tariff fixed by the Board in exercise of power conferred by Section 49.r the purpose of the present discussion we may proceed on the basis that while fixing general tariffs and making them subject to schemes of rebate, the Board exercises delegated legislative function flowing from the Statute. However once incentive rebate is granted in the general rate of tariffs on directions by State under Section 78A, the said incentive rebate offered by the Board would remain in the realm of exercise of statutory power-cum-duty. In the exercise of the same power the Board in its discretion can grant rebate in appropriate cases within the fore corners of Sections 49 and 78A of the Act. Of course this exercise will be subject to legally permissible limits and subject to the said concessional rates being found reasonable on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, not possible to countenance the submission of Shri Dave that there cannot be any promissory estoppel against the Board when it exercises its powers under Section 49(1) of the Act whatever may be the settings for exercise of this power and even if it is exercised as a part of a scheme of incentive package: required to be offered to new industries as enjoined on the Board as per statutorily binding directions issued by the State to the Board under Section 78A of the Act.25. In the case of Kasinka Trading 1994ECR637(SC) (supra), a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court consisting of M. N. Venkatachaliah, C.J. and Dr. A. S. Anand, J., had to consider the question whether a notification issued under Section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 granting complete exemption from payment of customs duty to PVC resin imported into India by manufacturers of certain products requiring the said resin as one of the raw materials, which was issued in public interest and which had staled that it would remain in force up to and inclusive of 31st March, 1981 could be withdrawn before the expiry of the said period by fresh notification issued by the Government in exercise of the very same power under Section 25 of the Customs Act. This Court speaking through Dr. Anand, J. look the view that as the said notification was issued in public interest it could be withdrawn even before the time fixed therein for its operation also in public interest and while issuing such a notification no promise can be said to have been held out or any representation made to the importers in general on the basis of which they could insist on the doctrine of promissory estoppel that the customs duty exemption granted earlier by the first notification could not be reduced by the second one. The following pertinent observations are found in paragraphs 11 and 12 (of SCC): (Paras 12 and 13 of AIR) of the Report:The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the, future, knowing as well as, intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take place between the parties.It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel; the Government or the public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present to the mind of the Court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation.It may, however, be mentioned that in paragraph 21 of the Report the Court has observed that the notification which was impugned before it was not designed or issued to induce the appellants to import PVC resin. Admittedly, the said notification was not even intended as an incentive for import. The notification on the plain language of it was conceived and issued by the Central Government being satisfied that it was necessary in the public interest so to do. Strictly speaking, therefore, the notification could not be said to have extended any representation much less a promise to a party getting the benefit of it to enable it to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the State. It must, therefore, be held that the aforesaid decision had clearly proceeded on the basis that by issuing the earlier notification under Section 25 of the Customs Act no promise was held out to any of the importers that the notifications life will not be curtailed earlier. Nor was the issuance of the notification based on any claim of incentives to be offered to anyone. It was issued in exercise of statutory powers vested in the Government which could be exercised from time to time in public interest. Earlier the public interest might have required issuance of such a notification granting cent per cent exemption from customs duty on import of PVC resin. Under changed circumstances public interest itself required redaction of such an exemption and as no promise was held out that this could not be done at any time the Court on the facts of that case justifiably rejected the plea of promissory estoppel. It is also to be observed that the said notification was issued in exercise of sovereign taxing power and had created no legal relationship between the authority issuing the notification on the one hand and the prospective importers of PVC resin on the other. The said decision is not an authority for the proposition that even if a claim of exemption from import duty was resorted to in public interest by way of an incentive for a class of importers and even though such public interest continued to subsist during the currency of such an exemption notification and that promises for whose benefit such exemption was granted had changed their position relying on the said exemption notification, it could still be withdrawn before the time mentioned therein even though public interest did not require the said exercise to be under taken and even though there were subsisting equities in favour of the promise-importers. As such a situation had not arisen in that case it was not adjudicated upon.26. The said decision, therefore, cannot be of any real assistance to learned Senior Counsel Shri Dave for the respondent-Board on the facts of the present group of matters. In the present case, as we have seen earlier a clear-cut scheme of incentives for new industries was put forward by the Board presumably at the behest of the U.P. Government so that more and more industries could be attracted to State of U.P. The Board also in its wisdom adopted the said scheme of incentives while fixing schedule of tariff rates as that was also in the interest of the Board for the obvious reason that thereby more and more new industries as consumers of high power electricity would be attracted to the region and would be paying higher electricity rates/charges to the Board.In the present case, the first notification exempting the customs duty on PVC itself recites ... Central Government being satisfied that it is necessary in public interest to do so .... In the notification issued later which gave rise to the present cause of action, the same recitation is present.It is, therefore, obvious that even though it may be found that the Government or any other competent authority had held out any promise on the basis of which the promise might have acted, if public interest required recall of such a promise and such a public interest outweighed the interest of the promise then the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government would lose its rigour and cannot be of any avail to such promise. In the aforesaid decision the further contention canvassed on behalf of the appellant-promise was also examined. That centered round the question whether the notification having fixed a time limit for its operation could be rescinded prior to the expiry of the said period. Rejecting the said contention and upholding the right of the authorities to recall such a notification even earlier it was observed in paragraph 7 of the Report that once public interest is accepted as the superior equity which can override individual equity, the principle should be applicable even in cases where a period has been indicated. It was further observed that the Government is competent to resile from a promise even if there is no manifest public interest involved, provided, of course, no one is put in any adverse situation which cannot be rectified. To adopt the line of reasoning in Emmanuel Ayodeji Ajayi v. Briscoe quoted in M.P. Sugar Mills even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be within the competence of the Government to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice which need not he a format notice, giving the promised a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided, of course, it is possible for the promise to restore the status quo ante. If, however, the promise cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable.28. In the light of this settled legal position we, therefore, hold that even though the appellants have succeeded in convincing us that the earlier three notifications dated 29th October, 1982, 13th July, 1984 and 28th January, 1985 did contain a clear promise and representation by the Board to the prospective new industrialists that once they established their industries in the region within the territorial limits of the operation of the Board, they would be assured 10% rebate on the total bills regarding consumption of electricity by their industries for a period of three years from the initial supply of electric power to their concerns. the appellants will not be able to enforce the equity by way of promissory estoppel against the Board if it is shown by the Board that public interest required it to withdraw this incentive rebate even prior to the expiry of three years as available to the appellants concerned. It has also to be held that even if such withdrawal of development rebate prior to three years is not based on any overriding public interest, if it is shown that by such premature withdrawal the appellants-promises would be restored to status quo ante and would be placed in the same position in which they were prior to the grant of such rebate by earlier notifications the appellants would not be entitled to succeed. We, therefore, now proceed to examine these twin aspects of the controversy.29. So far as the question of public interest is concerned it must at once be staled that it is not the case of the respondent-Board that it sought to withdraw the incentive development rebate made available earlier by it to the new industries on the ground of any public interest. In this connection by way of illustration we may refer to one of the identical counters filed by the respondent-Board in this group of matters. In Civil Appeal No. 1710 of 1991 the counter-affidavit of the Board is found at page 154. Though the counter is sought to be filed in Civil Appeal No. 5318 of 1997 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 5355 of 1991) it is sought to be treated as a counter-affidavit in this Civil Appeal. One B. S. Sharma, Executive Engineer (Commercial) of the respondent-Board has staked the claim of the Board for supporting the impugned notification for withdrawal of development rebate only on the twin grounds. Firstly it was contended that the grant of rebate could be withdrawn by the Board at any time it thought fit and for that purpose Section 49 of the Act was pressed in service. And the second ground is that the appellants themselves have executed agreements with the Board which empowered the Board to withdraw the development rebate earlier granted to them. Nowhere it is even whispered that the Board had to withdraw this development rebate incentive midstream on account of some overriding public interest.In short the genesis of this impugned notification is the advice given to the Board by the Tariff Realisation Committee which was a high power Committee. It. therefore, becomes clear that not on the ground of general public interest but solely on the ground of commercial interest of the Board which had earlier held out the promise that the aforesaid withdrawal was effected. Consequently it must be held on the facts of these cases that the impugned withdrawal notification was not backed up by any demands of public interest which would outweigh the individual interests of the appellant-promises who had acted upon the same. It is also pertinent to note in this connection that it is no longer in dispute between the parties that relying upon the earlier notifications holding out promise by the Board to give development rebate by way of incentive to new industries for three years from the date of initial supply of electricity to them, all the appellants as new industrialists had walked in the territory catered to by the Board and had established their industries in State of Uttar Pradesh by spending huge amounts of moneys for constructing the factories wherein their industrial activities could commence. On this aspect we may usefully refer by way of a specimen the averments contained in S.L.P.(C) No. 4561 of 1991 out of which Civil Appeal No. 10187 of 1991 arises. At page 51 of the Paper Book is found relevant factual data mentioned in the said Special Leave Petition. In para 3(i) and 3(ii.) the following averments were made:(i) That on 29-10-1982/13-7-1984 the U.P. State Electricity Board (an instrumentality of the State subject to the mandate of fairness and reasonableness under Article 14 of the Constitution) made representations add promises to the effect that an incentive in the form of 10% development rebate on the amount of electricity bills shall be given to all new industrial units in the State for a period of three years from the date of commencement of supply of electricity to them.(ii) That the petitioner established a new industrial unit (relying on the aforesaid representations and promises of the Board).The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Board in reply to the said averments makes an interesting reading. At page 70 is the counter-affidavit filed by the same deponent Shri Sharma, Executive Engineer (Commercial) whose counter in other case is referred to earlier. In the said counter he had stated that he relies upon the counter affidavit in Civil Appeal No. 1713 of 1991 for the purpose of the aforesaid Civil Appeal also. The said counter is annexed by way of Annexure I at page 72 of the Paper Book. So far as the recitals in the S.L.P. at paragraphs 3(i) and 3(ii) are concerned the reply thereto in the said counter is found at page 80 by way of parawise reply. In paragraphs 3(i) to 3(iii) it is mentioned that the contents in these paragraphs need no comments. Identical is the stand taken by the respondent-Board in this group of matters trying to deal with the identical averments made by all these appellants that relying upon the representation of the Board as found in the earlier notifications they had spent large amounts and established their factories.31. Consequently it must be held that relying upon the representations held out by the Board in these earlier notifications assuring grant of incentive rebate of 10% on the total bill of electricity consumption charges these new industries being assured that for three years this concession will be available had burnt their boats and spent large amounts and had established their industries in the area falling in the operative jurisdiction of the Board in State of U.P.32. Under these circumstances when no public interest was sought to be pressed in service by the Board for withdrawal of this incentive rebate, as seen earlier, the equity which had arisen in favour of the appellants remained untouched and undisturbed by any overwhelming and superior equity in favour of the Board entitling it to withdraw this development rebate in a premature manner leaving these promises high and dry before the requisite period of three years earlier guaranteed to them by way of development rebate had got exhausted. This takes us to the consideration of the second aspect of the matter.33. As observed by this Court in Shrijee Sales Corporation 1997(89)ELT452(SC) (supra), even where there is no such overriding public interest it might still be open to the promise-State or its delegate to resile from the promise on giving reasonable notice which heed not be a formal notice giving the promise a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position, provided it is possible for the promise to restore the status quo ante. Even on this aspect the respondent-Board has no case. It has not given any reasonable opportunity to the appellants to resume their earlier position. Nor is it shown by the Board that it is possible for the appellant-promises to restore the status quo ante. The reason is obvious. Once the new industries were lured into establishing their factories in the region entered to by the Board on being assured three years guaranteed incentive of development rebate of 10% on their total bills of electricity charges and acting on the same once they had established their industries and spent large amounts for constructing the infrastructure and for employing necessary labour and for purchasing raw materials etc., it would be almost impossible for them to restore the status quo ante and to walk out midstream if the development rebate incentive was withdrawn for the unexpired period out of the three years guaranteed period of currency of development rebate incentive. In fairness even it was not suggested by learned Senior Counsel for the respondents that on such withdrawal of development rebate the appellants would be able to restore the status quo ante and walk out. He simply relied upon the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Shrijee Sales Corporation (supra) for contending that it is the power of the Board to grant the rebate and it is equally the power of the Board to withdraw the same in its own discretion.34. Consequently it must be held that the twin aspects highlighted by this Court in Shrijee Sales Corporation 1997(89)ELT452(SC) (supra), on the basis of which the authority promising a particular course of conduct on its part to the prospective promise can resile from the promise even prematurely are not found established on the facts of these cases. Consequently the ratio of the said decision cannot be of any avail to the respondent-Board.36. We fail to appreciate how the aforesaid decision can advance the case of respondent-Board in the peculiar facts of this group of matters. As we have noted earlier here is a converse position where the Board presumably appears to have accepted the guidelines and the directions given by the State of U.P. under Section 78A of the Act and it adopted the scheme of incentive rebates for new industries by promulgating its own tariffs in exercise of its powers under Section 49 read with Section 78A of the Act and it was the Board itself which had given such a promise and held out such representations to the newcomer industries by the first three notifications as seen above. Once that was so the question of compelling the Board to promulgate such policy would not survive for consideration in the present cases. It is obvious that if the Board had not promulgated such policy the Court could not have compelled the Board to give such concessions. Here the question is having itself promulgated such a policy whether the Board can go back upon it prematurely. The aforesaid decision of this Court had no occasion to consider this aspect of the matter.37. However Shri Dave was very sanguine about the observation in this judgment that promissory estoppel would not apply where there existed a contract executed between the consumer and the Board. As we have noted earlier the aforesaid observations in the said Report were made in the light of the fact situation before the Court. There the consumer had entered into an agreement to be bound by the tariff rates notifications by the Board from time to time. Those tariff rates were devoid of any scheme of incentive development rebate. In-other words they were full-fledged tariff rates without any development rebate component. Under these circumstances the Court justifiably observed that the consumer was bound by the contract and when the Board itself had not promulgated any policy of development rebate for dew industries Board could not be compelled on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to do something which it had never promised to do. Consequently the decision in Ester Industries Ltd. (1996)11SCC199 (supra) also is of no avail to the respondent-Board.38. Before parting With this discussion it must be stated that in the light of the observations made in Ester Industries Ltd. (supra) by this Court to the effect that the fixation of tariff including incentive rebate is a legislative function, the observations of the High Court that it is not a legislative or delegated legislative function, cannot be sustained. It must be held that such a function is quasi-legislative in character reflecting an exercise of delegated legislative power.39. As a result of the aforesaid discussion it must be held that the finding reached on the question of promissory estoppel by the High Court 6n Issue No. 1 is well sustained. The respondent-Board must be treated to be estopped from prematurely withdrawing the incentive development rebate made available to these appellant-industries by issuing the impugned notification. Point No. 1 is accordingly answered in the affirmative in favour of the appellants and against the Board.Point No. 240. In the view of the High Court despite the equity by way of promissory estoppel being available to the appellants against the Board, as the appellants themselves had agreed by entering into written agreements and contracts with the Board when they took electric connections for their industries, that the Board had power to change the rate schedules from time to time and to revise them, the appellants were barred from challenging the impugned notification. Now it must be kept in view that as per the incentives offered to the new industries the Board had promised these new industrialists that for three years from the date on which they took electric supply for the first time for their industries they would be given 10% rebate on the total bill of electricity consumption charges for their industries. It is not in dispute that before electric supply could be made available to these new industries who would be new consumers to be enrolled by the Board these consumers had to enter into standard agreements. Such agreements had to be signed and entered into by all the prospective consumers whether they were covered by any incentive scheme or not. It is also an admitted position that all the appellants while taking electric connections for the first time for their new industries established by them in the region relying upon the incentives offered by the Board, entered into such written agreements in standard forms. The relevant clauses of these agreements on which strong reliance was placed by the High Court for non-suiting the appellants, deserve to be extracted in extenso at this stage:7. (a). The consumer shall pay for the supply of electric energy at the rates enforced by the supplier from time to time as may be applicable to the consumer.(b) The Rate Schedule applicable to the consumer at the time of execution of this agreement is annexed hereto as Annexure-2.(c) The Rate Schedule above mentioned, may, at the discretion of the supplier, be revised by the supplier from time to time and in the case of revision, the Rate Schedule so revised! shall be applicable to the consumer.According to the High Court once the consumers agreed to the authority of the Board to revise earlier rate schedule which was existing at the time of the agreement and as item 8 was a part and parcel of the said rate schedule implicit in Clause 7(c) was the agreement by the appellant-consumers that the Board will be able to tinker with or even wholly withdraw the development rebate earlier made available as per the said item 8 of the rate schedule.43. Therefore, it cannot be said that when Clause 7(b) referred to rate schedule applicable to the consumer it contemplated even the scheme of development rebate. The rate schedule fixing the general rates of charges of electricity would, as mentioned in Items 4 and 7, result in preparation of the bill. At that stage fixed schedule rates for charge of electricity would complete their task and would get exhausted as the bill would be prepared in that light after following the procedure laid down by these items. Ad hoc lump sum 10% development rebate on the total bill which was treated as an incentive to new industries in Item 8, therefore, would obviously go beyond the scope of computation of electricity consumption bills as per the rate schedule.44. It must, therefore, be held that Clause 7(b) of the agreement was not even remotely connected with the question of development rebate which stood on its own and had no part to play in the computation and preparation of the bill for electricity consumption charges. Item 8 operated at a stage posterior to the computation of electricity charges bill in the light of the rate schedule. Therefore when the term rate schedule is employed in Clause 7(8) of the agreement it only deals with the general rates for the charge of electricity as fixed by the Board from time to time under Section 49(1). On the same line of reasoning the words rate schedule as employed by Clause 7(c) have to be understood. Consequently what the consumer as a contracting party agreed under Clause 7(b) was to the effect that the general rate schedule as mentioned in Annexure 2 at the time of the execution of the agreement could be revised and that the general rates of electricity changes could be either increased or decreased by the supplier from time to time and to that exercise undertaken by the Board, that is the supplier of the electricity, the consumer would have no objection as a contracting party. The term revision of rate schedule as employed by Clause 7(c) itself indicates that the rates of charges of electricity being general tariff could be either increased or decreased. That has nothing to do with the scheme of incentive development rebate which is entirely a different concept and withdrawal of development rebate cannot be said to be an upward revision of the general rate schedule for charging the consumer while being supplied the electricity. These types of standard contracts have to be examined in the light of the express language found therein and by implication nothing can be read which obviously would be miles away from the real intention of the persons signing such contracts in standard forms.45. It is difficult to appreciate how the High Court could persuade itself to hold in the light of Clause 7(c) that the appellants while signing such agreements for taking electricity supply for the first time for their new industries as if by side wind agreed to give up their right to claim development rebate by handing over on a platter an absolute right to the Board to totally withdraw such development rebate at any time it liked before the three years period, for which incentive was meant to be guaranteed, would have expired. On the express language of Clause 7(a), (b) and (c) such a conclusion is impossible to be arrived at.46. It is also necessary to visualize that under the incentive to new industries scheme as offered by the Board as per Item 8 found in the rate schedule annexed as Annexure 2 to the agreement, the Board had agreed that the new industrial units will be given for a period of three years from the date of commencement of supply, 10% development rebate on the amount of the bill pertaining to the energy charges incurred by the concerned consumers. It is also obvious that before any new industrial unit can get commencement of supply of electricity it has to enter into such standard form agreement which included Clause 7(a), (b) and (c). For the very purpose of the incentive to new industries the starting point would be entering into such a written agreement on the basis of which the electric energy supply would commence at these new industrial units.47. It would be totally absurd and incongruous to suggest on behalf of the Board that on the one hand it guaranteed to the new industrial units for a period of three years from the date of commencement of supply 10% development rebate on the total amount of the bill and on the other hand moment such supply started pursuant to the written agreement the very incentive could be withdrawn by it from its inception as new industrial unit had to sign a written agreement containing Clause 7(a), (b) and (c). If that submission on behalf of the Board which appealed to the High Court is accepted a most incongruous, unreasonable and absurd result would follow. It can then be said that the Board on the one hand had given incentive to new industries by guaranteeing development rebate of 10% on the total bill of consumption of electricity for a period of Shree years from the date of commencement of supply but from the very inception of that period the Board on the other hand as per the very agreement with the promise was enabled to immediately withdraw the very same development rebate in exercise of its contractual powers as per Clause 7(c) of that very agreement. If that happens the Board would be giving on the one hand incentive to new industries by way of development rebate of 10% and by another hand would immediately and almost simultaneously be withdrawing the said incentive by pinning down the consumer to the terms of the agreement as found at Clause 7(a), (b) and (c). This would result in a total exercise in futility. The incentive development rebate scheme would in such an eventuality be stillborn. It is also easy to visualize that a new industrial unit which spends large amounts for establishing its infrastructure and gets lured in the light of the representation held out by the Board and establishes its plant and machinery in the new unit, would not simultaneously and voluntarily agree by signing such any agreement with the Board to give up the very same benefit of incentive by permitting the latter to withdraw it at any time it likes. That would be doing violence to common sense and business approach of an ordinarily prudent businessman. No businessman in His senses would ever agree voluntarily to such an absurd, incongruous and inconsistent predicament.48. It is, therefore, too much to imply any written consent on the part of a prudent consumer who established new industrial units to at once give up the incentive of development rebate guaranteed in his favour by the Board. Consequently it is not possible for us to endorse the reasoning which appealed to the High Court which decided Issue No. 2 against the appellants.49. We, therefore, hold that the new industrial units while signing the written agreements and agreeing to Clause 7(a), (b) and (c) found to the standard contract forms had only undergone a formality of signing such agreements before the electric supply could commence at their new units and such clauses only re-affirm the statutory power of the Board under Section 49(1) of the Act and had nothing to do with the scheme of incentive development rebate. They had not voluntarily or by even remotest chance agreed to give up the benefit given to them by clear representation held out by the Board as per Item 8 of the rate schedule in the light of the earlier three notifications promulgated by the Board in exercise of its powers under Section 49 read with Section 78A of the Act.50. It must also be held that they have neither expressly nor impliedly agreed that the Board will have absolute power and discretion to withdraw this incentive of development rebate at any time prior to the expiry of three years for which it was guaranteed to them by the earlier representation held out by the Board and which representation resulted into promissory estoppel against the Board and in favour of the appellants.51. In this connection we may note one aspect of the matter. As per Clause 7(c) the Board could revise upwards the general rates of electricity charges at any time it liked. This had nothing to do with the scheme of incentive rebate. Learned advocates for the appellants conceded this authority of the Board. This authority was clearly available to the Board as per Clause 7(c) of the agreement read with Section 49 of the Act. But this increase of general tariff rate would not adversely affect incentive available to new and infant industries.52. Let us take an example, to clarify, this aspect. If a general rate of electricity tariff for a given class of industries is Rs. 100/- per KW and if 10% rebate by way of development incentive is given to new industries, the latter will pay Rs. 90/- per KW while other well established industries will pay Rs. 100/- per KW. Thus the goods manufactured by new industries would be cheaper costwise as compared to goods manufactured by well established industries in the region. That will enable the newly established industries to compete more effectively with their senior counterparts. Now if the general rate is increased by the Board even within the three years of the currency of the incentive scheme, to Rs. 200/- per KW all the well established industries will have to pay Rs. 200/- per KW for the electricity consumed while the new industries which were earlier getting infancy benefit will pay Rs. 180/- per KW as 10% rebate will still be available to them by way of development rebate. Thus benefit of infancy protection will remain available to the new industries for competing with the old ones even if general tariff rate gets revised upwards for a given class of consumers comprising of new as well as old industries in the field. New industries will, therefore, despite such increase in general tariff rate will be able to sell their products in the same manner as compared to the old established industries as they were doing earlier. Thus the cloak of protection available to them against old competitors in the field will still be available despite any upward revision of the general tariff by the Board in exercise of its powers under Clause 7(c) of the agreement read with Section 49 of the Act. Consequently the provision of revision of general rates under Clause 7(c) of the agreement cannot be treated to be conferring any further power on the Board to tinker with the development rebate provision within the guaranteed period of three years as wrongly assumed by the High Court. Point No. 1 is decided accordingly in the negative in favour of the appellants and against the Board.53. So far as Point No. 3 is concerned the appellants are on a weaker footing. It is true that by earlier notifications dated 29th October 1982, 13th July 1984 and 28th January 1986 the scheme of incentives by way of development rebate of 10% was continued to be offered to new industries to be established in the plains of State of U.P. Identically worded item 9 in the earlier notifications and item 8 in the last notification dated 28th January 1986 had continued the said incentive scheme. By virtue of the last notification of 28th January 1986 it was clearly laid down by the Board that all new industries which might be established on and after 28th January 1986 will earn this development rebate for the three; years period from the date of commencement of supply of electricity. It was also proved that all the existing new industries which misfit have earlier been established before 28th January 1986 and which had still some part of unexpired period of three years of development rebate available with them also were given the continued benefit of the development rebate for the unexpired period (sic) 1st February 1986. What the impugned notification of 31st July 1986 sought to do was to delete this first paragraph of item 8 of the notification of 28th January 1986. The result was that from 1st August 1986 whatever unexpired period for getting development rebate of 10% was available with the new industries covered by the sweep of the said notification, got withdrawn. It could not be said and it is also not the case of the respondent-Board that in the light of the notification of 31st July 1986 whatever development rebate was granted to these new industries earlier as per the then existing scheme would stand withdrawn or any recovery would be effected against them for the said amount. The case of the Board is that despite any unexpired period for earning the incentive rebate of 10% was available to the existing new industries on 31st July 1986, they would lose that benefit of development rebate for the rest of the unexpired period with effect from 1st August 1986 onwards. Hence it is not possible to agree with the contention of learned Counsel for the appellants that the said notification had any retrospective effect. It was purely prospective and had resulted into two consequences - (i) any new industry which entered into an agreement with the Board for supply of electricity for the first time on and after 1st August 1986 could not get the benefit of incentive of 10% development rebate; and (ii) all existing new industries which were armed with the guarantee of 10% development rebate under the earlier notifications and had unexpired period out of the three years from the date of earlier commencement of supply of electricity to their concerns lost the benefit for that unexpired period which otherwise would have been available to them from 1st August 1986 onwards till the entire three years period which had already commenced would have been over. Both these effects of the notification of 31st July 1986 were purely prospective in character and had no retrospective effect. Consequently it cannot be said that the said notification was liable to be struck down on the Score of being retrospective in nature. The third point for consideration, therefore, is answered in the negative.Point No. 4.54. In view of our answers to the aforesaid three points. Point No. 4 does not survive for consideration.55. As a result of the aforesaid discussion on these points the conclusion becomes inevitable that the appellants are entitled to succeed. It must be held that the impugned notification of 31st July 1986 will have no adverse effect on the right of the appellant-new industries to get the development rebate of 10% for the unexpired period of three years from the respective dates of commencement of electricity supply at their units from the Board with effect from 1st August 1986 onwards till the entire three years period for each of them got exhausted. This result logically follows for the appellants who have admittedly entered into supply agreements with the Board as new industries prior to 1st August 1986. However those appellants who entered into such agreements after 1st August 1986 cannot get benefit of development rebate any longer after 1st August 1986. This conclusion of ours pertains to the question which is no longer res integra. It is already so held by this Court in S.L.P. (C) No. 11906 of 1994 and others decided by a Bench of this Court consisting of A.M. Ahmadi, CJ (as His Lordship then was) and S.P. Bharucha, J., in the case of Hotz Hotel Pvt. Ltd. etc. etc./Vaidya Ply Board v. UPSEB etc., etc. on 03rd October 1994. We find that the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 1713 of 1991 executed agreement with the Board for the first time on 5th May 1987. Similarly appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3534 of 1991 executed agreement with the Board for the first time after 1-8-1986. These appellants, therefore, will not be entitled to get out of the sweep of the impugned notification. These appeals will, therefore, have to be dismissed.56. It is obvious that after the expiry of the aforesaid three years period available to them under the earlier notifications the appellants would be liable to pay full electricity charges billed to them by the Board without any development rebate as after the expiry of the said period they would not be protected under any promise by the Board. On the contrary from 31st July 1986 the Board made it very clear to all concerned that no new industry thenceforth would be entitled to any development rebate on getting new supply connections. Thus the appellants also will stand at par with all other industries and will not get benefit of any further development rebate incentive after the aforesaid three years period in case of each of them had worked itself out. In fairness to the appellants it must be stated that even they did not claim any such extra benefit. It is also true that the present proceedings are confined only to the claim of 10% development rebate on the bills of consumption of electricity which according to the appellants is available to them for the unexpired period of three years from 1st August 1986 onwards and which development rebate according to the Board was not available to them.57. However before parting with the present appeals we have to clarify two ancillary aspects pertaining to the controversy in these proceedings. At the time of issuing notice in the SLPs as noted earlier the recovery of development rebate charges was not stayed in most of the matters, though as we are informed in some of the matters even that stay came to be indirectly granted. Those appellants who were protected by the grant of stay of recovery of the impugned development rebate charges naturally will not be entitled to claim any refund from the Board even though they succeed in these appeals and the respondent-Board will be permanently restrained from recovering the disputed development rebate charges from them.58. However so far as the appellants who were not granted stay by this Court and who have already paid up the disputed development rebate charges to the Board in the light of the High Courts common decision are concerned, it must be stated that they represent two types of industries - (i) those appellants whose industries are still running and who continue to be enrolled as consumers of electricity by the Board; and (ii) those of the appellants who had established their industries but by now who might have ceased to be consumers of electricity from the respondents in any of the areas within the jurisdiction of the Board on account of closure of their industries in the State of U. P. So far as the first category of such appellants is concerned, instead of directing refund of the amount of disputed development rebate charges which they might have paid to the Board it will be in the fitness of things to direct the Board to credit this amount to the respective running accounts of (such) appellants concerned and the future bills of electricity which the appellants may be required to pay to the Board may be adjusted from this credited account so that the appellants as consumers may not have to pay all future bills of electricity consumed by their industries will the entire credit outstanding in their respective accounts in this connection gets exhausted. The Board shall give written intimation to the appellants concerned regarding posting of such credit entries in their respective accounts.59. So far as the second category of appellants are concerned as they are no longer consumers of electricity from the Board in any part of the State of U.P. appropriate order will be to direct the Board to return the disputed development rebate charges collected from them from 1st August 1986 onwards for the unexpired period of three years within three months of the receipt of a copy of this order at its end.61. So far as the refund question is concerned, on the basic principle of restitution and in the absence of any clear evidence or even averment on this aspect it is not possible for us to come to any definite finding that all the disputed amounts of development rebate charges would have entered the cost structure of the appellants after the earlier three years period had run out. As we have seen earlier, the dispute centered round only the unexpired period of three years from the commencement of electric supply for these new industries as was available to them after 1st August 1986.62. Even assuming about two and a half years period would have been available to some of them at the highest, that period would have been over by the beginning of year 1989 and the stay was refused by this Court on 6th February 1991. Till that time all the appellants were protected by the interim relief earlier granted by the High Court.63. Consequently it would not be possible to clearly visualize with any degree of certainty that for the goods which the appellants might have manufactured after February 1991 they would have spread over in a phased manner burden of the past disputed development rebate charges for a period which already got exhausted at least two years before 1991.64. However this aspect may have some relevance from the practical view point when we have to deal with the claim for interest on disputed amounts raised by worldly businessmen like the appellant-industrialists carrying on commercial transactions. Their claim for interest, in our view, deserves to be rejected in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases as indicated earlier when at least the possibility cannot be ruled out that while pricing the manufactured goods in future the appellants, as shrewd businessmen and men of commercial world, would have seen to it that ultimately the burden borne by them by way of recovery of development rebate charges gets passed on to their consumers in long run and their profits would remain intact.