Case: National Engineering Industries Limited Vs. Shri Shri Kishan Bhageria &amp; Others

of the President, the State law would prevail in that State even if there is an earlier law by the Parliament on a subject in the Concurrent List. It appears that both of these Acts tread the same field and if there was any conflict with each other, then S.28A of Rajasthan Act would apply being a later law. We find, however, that there is no conflict. The learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Poonam Talkies, Dausa v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jaipur (S. B. Civil Writ Petn. No. 1206/85 decided on 9-6-1986) so. That decision has been upheld by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ Appeal No. 231/86. The Division Bench of the High Court in the instant appeal relying on the said decision held that there was no scope for any repugnancy. It appears to us that it cannot be said that these two Acts do not tread the same field. Both these Acts deal with the rights of the workman or employee to get redressal and damages in case of dismissal or discharge, but there is no repugnancy because there is no conflict between these two Acts, in pith and substance. There is no inconsistency between these two acts. These two Acts, in our opinion, are supplemental to each other. 13. In Deep Chand v. State of U.P. (1959) Suppl (2) SCR 8 : (AIR 1959 SC 648 ), Subba Rao, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that the result of the authorities indicated was as follows (at p. 665 of AIR ) : "Nicholas in his Australian Constitution, 2nd Edition, p. 303, refers to three tests of inconsistency or repugnancy :1. There may be inconsistency in the actual terms of the competing statutes;2. Though there may be no direct conflict, a State law may be inoperative because the Commonwealth Code is intended to be a complete exhaustive Code; and3. Even in the absence of intention, a conflict may arise when both State and Commonwealth seek to exercise their powers over the same subject matter." 14. Quoting the aforesaid observations, this Court in M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 at p. 87: (AIR 1983 SC 1019 at p. 1041) where A. P. Sen, J. exhaustively dealt with the principles of repugnancy and observed that one of the occasions where inconsistency or repugnancy arose was when on the same subject matter, one law would be repugnant to the other. Therefore, in order to raise a question of repugnancy two conditions must be fulfilled. The State law and the Union law must operate on the same field and one must be repugnant or inconsistent with the other. These are two conditions which are required to be fulfilled. These are cumulative conditions. Therefore, these laws must tread on the same field and these must be repugnantor inconsistent with each other. In our opinion, in this case there is a good deal of justification to hold that these laws, the Industrial Disputes Act and the Rajasthan Act tread on the same field and both laws deal with the rights of dismissed workman or employee. But these two laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to each other. The basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails the other cannot prevail. That is not the position in this case. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, however, contended that in this case, there had been an application as indicated above under S.28A of the Rajasthan Act and which was dismissed on ground of limitation. Sree Shankar Ghosh tried to submit that there would be inconsistency or repugnancy between the two decisions, one given on limitation and the other if any relief is given under the Act. We are unable to accept this position, because the application under S.28A of the Rajasthan Act was dismissed not on merit but on limitation. There is a period of limitation provided under the Rajasthan Act of six months and it may be extended for reasonable cause. But there is no period of limitation as such provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, that will be curtailment of the rights of the workmen or employees under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the situation S.37 declares that law should not be construed to curtail any of the rights of the workmen. As Poet Tennyson observed - "freedom broadens from precedent to precedent” so also it is correct to state that social welfare and labour welfare broadens from legislation to legislation in India. It will be a well settled principle of interpretation to proceed on that assumption and S.37 of the Rajasthan Act must be so construed. Therefore in no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to curtail the rights of the work man to seek any relief or to go in for an adjudication in case of the termination of the employment. If that is the position in view of the provisions 6 months time in S.28A of the Rajasthan Act has to be ignored and that cannot have any binding effect inasmuch as it curtails the rights of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between the two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy.15. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the respondent was a workman and in granting relief on that basis. Before we conclude we note that our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court that interference by the High Court in these matters at the initial stage protracts adjudication and defeats justice. Reference was made to certain observations in P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn., (AIR 1984 SC 153 ) (supra). But as mentioned hereinbefore in this case, the interference was made by the High Court not at the initial stage.16. In the premises, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it took.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]9. In the instant case the evidence have been summarised by the Division Bench. Reference may be made to pages 65, 73, 80, 84 to 94, 95, 96 and 97 of the Paper Book which indicate the nature of duties performed by respondent 1 herein. His duties were mainly reporting and checking up on behalf of the management. A reporter or a checking clerk is not a supervisor. The respondent herein does not appear to us doing any kind of supervisory work. He was undoubtedly checking up on behalf of the employer but he had no independent right or authority to take decision and his decision did not bind the company. In that view of the matter keeping the correct principle of law in mind the Division Bench has come to the conclusion taking into consideration the evidence recorded before the Labour Court that the respondent is a workman and not a supervisor. That conclusion arrived at in the manner indicated above cannot, in our opinion, be interfered with under Art. 136 of the Constitution. It is not necessary for our present purpose to set out in extenso the evidence on record as discussed by the Division Bench. Our attention was, however, drawn by the counsel for the respondent to certain correspondence, for instance the letter at page 65 of the paper book bearing the date 14th of May, 1976 where the respondent reported that certain materials were lying in stores deptt. in absence of any decision. It was further reiterated that on inspection of the pieces that those pieces were found cracked. Similarly, our attention was drawn to several other letters and we have perused these letters. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench was right that these letters only indicated that the report was being made of the checking done by the respondent. A checker on behalf of the management or employer is not a supervisor.10. In the aforesaid view of the matter the conclusion of the Division Bench that respondent 1 is a workman has to be sustained. We do so accordingly.It has to be borne in mind that S.2A of the Act was amended to permit individual workman to ask for a reference in the case of individual dispute. This amendment was assented to by the President on 1st of December, 1965. The Rajasthan Act received the assent of the President on 14th of July, 1958. On 8th March, 1972 Chapter 6A including S.28A was inserted in the Rajasthan Act. Therefore the material provision of the Rajasthan Act is the subsequent Act. Under Art.254(2) of the Constitution if there was any law by the State which had been reserved for the assent of the President and has received the assent of the President, the State law would prevail in that State even if there is an earlier law by the Parliament on a subject in the Concurrent List. It appears that both of these Acts tread the same field and if there was any conflict with each other, then S.28A of Rajasthan Act would apply being a later law. We find, however, that there is no conflict. The learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Poonam Talkies, Dausa v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jaipur (S. B. Civil Writ Petn. No. 1206/85 decided on 9-6-1986) so. That decision has been upheld by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in Writ Appeal No. 231/86. The Division Bench of the High Court in the instant appeal relying on the said decision held that there was no scope for any repugnancy. It appears to us that it cannot be said that these two Acts do not tread the same field. Both these Acts deal with the rights of the workman or employee to get redressal and damages in case of dismissal or discharge, but there is no repugnancy because there is no conflict between these two Acts, in pith and substance. There is no inconsistency between these two acts. These two Acts, in our opinion, are supplemental to each other.Quoting the aforesaid observations, this Court in M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 45 at p. 87: (AIR 1983 SC 1019 at p. 1041) where A. P. Sen, J. exhaustively dealt with the principles of repugnancy and observed that one of the occasions where inconsistency or repugnancy arose was when on the same subject matter, one law would be repugnant to the other. Therefore, in order to raise a question of repugnancy two conditions must be fulfilled. The State law and the Union law must operate on the same field and one must be repugnant or inconsistent with the other. These are two conditions which are required to be fulfilled. These are cumulative conditions. Therefore, these laws must tread on the same field and these must be repugnantor inconsistent with each other. In our opinion, in this case there is a good deal of justification to hold that these laws, the Industrial Disputes Act and the Rajasthan Act tread on the same field and both laws deal with the rights of dismissed workman or employee. But these two laws are not inconsistent or repugnant to each other. The basic test of repugnancy is that if one prevails the other cannot prevail. That is not the position in this case. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellant, however, contended that in this case, there had been an application as indicated above under S.28A of the Rajasthan Act and which was dismissed on ground of limitation. Sree Shankar Ghosh tried to submit that there would be inconsistency or repugnancy between the two decisions, one given on limitation and the other if any relief is given under the Act. We are unable to accept this position, because the application under S.28A of the Rajasthan Act was dismissed not on merit but on limitation. There is a period of limitation provided under the Rajasthan Act of six months and it may be extended for reasonable cause. But there is no period of limitation as such provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, that will be curtailment of the rights of the workmen or employees under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the situation S.37 declares that law should not be construed to curtail any of the rights of the workmen. As Poet Tennyson observed - "freedom broadens from precedent toso also it is correct to state that social welfare and labour welfare broadens from legislation to legislation in India. It will be a well settled principle of interpretation to proceed on that assumption and S.37 of the Rajasthan Act must be so construed. Therefore in no way the Rajasthan Act could be construed to curtail the rights of the work man to seek any relief or to go in for an adjudication in case of the termination of the employment. If that is the position in view of the provisions 6 months time in S.28A of the Rajasthan Act has to be ignored and that cannot have any binding effect inasmuch as it curtails the rights of the workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and that Act must prevail. In the premises, there is no conflict between the two Acts and there is no question of repugnancy.15. The High Court was, therefore, right in holding that the respondent was a workman and in granting relief on that basis. Before we conclude we note that our attention was drawn to certain observations of this Court that interference by the High Court in these matters at the initial stage protracts adjudication and defeats justice. Reference was made to certain observations in P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn., (AIR 1984 SC 153 ) (supra). But as mentioned hereinbefore in this case, the interference was made by the High Court not at the initial stage.16. In the premises, we are of the opinion that the High Court was right in the view it