Case: Dwarika Prasad Sahu Vs. State of Bihar &amp; Others

waived until further orders" and one of such conditions was: "In the cash memo to be issued to the customers the names and addresses of the customers need not be mentioned and it will be sufficient if only the registration number of motor vehicles is noted in the cash memo". The requirement of clause (7) of the licence to mention the names and addresses of the customers in die cash memos was, therefore, dispensed with by the State Government with effect from 11th July, 1966 until further orders and this dispensation was in force at the time when sales were made by the petitioner under the cash memos described in Schedule to the rounds of detention. The absence of mention of the names and addresses of the purchasers in these cash memos did not, therefore, constitute contravention of clause (7) of the licence and no inference could rationally he drawn by the District Magistrate, from mere absence of names and addresses of the customers in the cash memos, without anything more, that the sales under the cash, memos were to fictitious persons. Ground No. 5 was, therefore, wholly unfounded. It was based on a complete misapprehension of what was required to be set out in the cash memos. It is rather surprising that the District Magistrate should not have known that the requirement of clause (7) of the licence in regard to mention of names and addresses of the customers in the cash memos bad been dispensed with by the State Government as far back as 11th July, 1966. If only the District Magistrate had properly applied his mind and made the necessary inquiries for the purpose of satisfying himself in regard to the charge in ground No. 5, he would have immediately realised that not mentioning the names and addresses of the customers in the cash memos was no longer a breach of clause (7) of the licence and it could not support an inference that the sales covered by the cash memos were to fictitious persons. But it appears that the District Magistrate mechanically subscribed to the grounds of detention without even caring to examine whether ground No. 5 was correct or not and proceeded to make the order of detention. We have tried t o see whether we could, even by taking a liberal or indulgent view, sustain ground No. 5, but we find it impossible to do so. In fact the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State frankly conceded that it was not possible for him to support this ground.7. If there is one principle more firmly established than any other in this field of jurisprudence, it is that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is non- existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid and it would not avail the detaining authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons are good and do not suffer from any such infirmity, because it can never be predicated to what extent the bad grounds or reasons operated on the mind of the detaining authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if the bad ground or reason were excluded and the good grounds or reasons alone were before the detaining authority. See the decisions of this Court hi Shibban Lal Saxena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, ([1954] S. C. R. 418.) Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar &Ors.([1956] 1 S. C. R. 709.) and Pushkar Mukherjee &Ors. v. The State of West Bengal. ([1969] 2 S.C.R 635) Even as recently as this year a Division Bench of this Court pointed out in Biram Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh(A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1161.) that "It is well settled that in an order under the present Act the decision of the authority is a subjective one and if one of the grounds is non-existent or irrelevant or is not available under the law, the entire detention order will fall since it is not possible to predicate as to whether the detaining authority would have made an order for detention even in the absence of non-existent or irrelevant ground".8. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that since ground No. 5 was wholly misconceived, non-existent and "not available under the law", the order of detention must be held to be invalid.9. Though, on this view we are taking as regards the invalidity of ground No. 5, it is not necessary for us to say anything in regard to the other grounds, we think we ought to draw the attention of the detaining authority to one other infirmity, s o that the detaining authority can, while exercising the power of detention in future, avoid such infirmity. That infirmity is to be found in ground No. 1 and it discloses yet another instance of non-application of mind on the part of the District Magistrate. The allegation in ground No. 1 was that cash memo No. 70996, dated 14th February, 1974 showed a sale of 1200 litres of high speed diesel oil to one Mr. Griffiths, but this allegation was patently incorrect as the cash memo in fact, as frankly admitted on behalf of the respondents, related only to the sale of 200 litres of high speed diesel oil to Mr. Griffiths and for the sale of further 1000 litres of high speed diesel oil to Mr. Griffiths. there was another cash memo No. 71120, dated 16th February, 1974 which did not find mention in ground No. 1. This circumstance also is indicative of the rather casual manner in which the District Magistrate proceeded to make the order of detention without proper application of mind and it could have an invalidating consequence on the order of detention. We hope and trust that the District Magistrate will be more careful in the future when he has occasion to exercise the enormous powers of preventive detention entrusted to him by the Parliament.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We think there is great force in this contention urged on behalf of the petitioner and the order of detention must on the basis of this contention alone be held to be bad.6. The gravamen of the charge against the petitioner in ground No. 5 was that he supplied 762 litres of high speed diesel oil under several cash memos described in Schedule I to the ground s of detention without giving the names and addresses of the purchasers and this was not only in contravention of clause (7) of the licence, but it also indicated that the supplies under these cash memos were made to fictitious persons. Now, it is true that clause (7) of the licence issued to the petitioner provided that the licensee shall issue to every customer a correct receipt or invoice, as the case may be, giving inter alia the name and address of the customer and, therefore, if t his requirement prescribed by clause (7) were operative at the material time, there can be, no doubt that the action of the petitioner in issuing cash memos to the purchasers without giving their names and addresses would have been in contravention of clause, (7) and it might have been a legitimate inference for the District Magistrate to draw that the sales were to fictitious persons, because. otherwise their names and addresses would have been mentioned in the cash memos as required by clause (7). But the order12706/S.C., dated 11th July, 1966 was issued by the State Government providing that " as regards high speed diesel oil, the enforcement of the following condition of the licence shall be waived until further orders" and one of such conditions was: "In the cash memo to be issued to the customers the names and addresses of the customers need not be mentioned and it will be sufficient if only the registration number of motor vehicles is noted in the cash memo". The requirement of clause (7) of the licence to mention the names and addresses of the customers in die cash memos was, therefore, dispensed with by the State Government with effect from 11th July, 1966 until further orders and this dispensation was in force at the time when sales were made by the petitioner under the cash memos described in Schedule to the rounds of detention. The absence of mention of the names and addresses of the purchasers in these cash memos did not, therefore, constitute contravention of clause (7) of the licence and no inference could rationally he drawn by the District Magistrate, from mere absence of names and addresses of the customers in the cash memos, without anything more, that the sales under the cash, memos were to fictitious persons. Ground No. 5 was, therefore, wholly unfounded. It was based on a complete misapprehension of what was required to be set out in the cash memos. It is rather surprising that the District Magistrate should not have known that the requirement of clause (7) of the licence in regard to mention of names and addresses of the customers in the cash memos bad been dispensed with by the State Government as far back as 11th July, 1966. If only the District Magistrate had properly applied his mind and made the necessary inquiries for the purpose of satisfying himself in regard to the charge in ground No. 5, he would have immediately realised that not mentioning the names and addresses of the customers in the cash memos was no longer a breach of clause (7) of the licence and it could not support an inference that the sales covered by the cash memos were to fictitious persons. But it appears that the District Magistrate mechanically subscribed to the grounds of detention without even caring to examine whether ground No. 5 was correct or not and proceeded to make the order of detention. We have tried t o see whether we could, even by taking a liberal or indulgent view, sustain ground No. 5, but we find it impossible to do so. In fact the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State frankly conceded that it was not possible for him to support this ground.7. If there is one principle more firmly established than any other in this field of jurisprudence, it is that even if one of the grounds or reasons which led to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is nonexistent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid and it would not avail the detaining authority to contend that the other grounds or reasons are good and do not suffer from any such infirmity, because it can never be predicated to what extent the bad grounds or reasons operated on the mind of the detaining authority or whether the detention order would have been made at all if the bad ground or reason were excluded and the good grounds or reasons alone were before the detaining authority. See the decisions of this Court hi Shibban Lal Saxena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, ([1954] S. C. R. 418.) Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar &Ors.([1956] 1 S. C. R. 709.) and Pushkar Mukherjee &Ors. v. The State of West Bengal. ([1969] 2 S.C.R 635) Even as recently as this year a Division Bench of this Court pointed out in Biram Chand v. State of Uttar Pradesh(A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1161.) that "It is well settled that in an order under the present Act the decision of the authority is a subjective one and if one of the grounds isor irrelevant or is not available under the law, the entire detention order will fall since it is not possible to predicate as to whether the detaining authority would have made an order for detention even in the absence ofor irrelevant ground".8. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable that since ground No. 5 was wholly misconceived,and "not available under the law", the order of detention must be held to be invalid.9. Though, on this view we are taking as regards the invalidity of ground No. 5, it is not necessary for us to say anything in regard to the other grounds, we think we ought to draw the attention of the detaining authority to one other infirmity, s o that the detaining authority can, while exercising the power of detention in future, avoid such infirmity. That infirmity is to be found in ground No. 1 and it discloses yet another instance ofof mind on the part of the District Magistrate. The allegation in ground No. 1 was that cash memo No. 70996, dated 14th February, 1974 showed a sale of 1200 litres of high speed diesel oil to one Mr. Griffiths, but this allegation was patently incorrect as the cash memo in fact, as frankly admitted on behalf of the respondents, related only to the sale of 200 litres of high speed diesel oil to Mr. Griffiths and for the sale of further 1000 litres of high speed diesel oil to Mr. Griffiths. there was another cash memo No. 71120, dated 16th February, 1974 which did not find mention in ground No. 1. This circumstance also is indicative of the rather casual manner in which the District Magistrate proceeded to make the order of detention without proper application of mind and it could have an invalidating consequence on the order of detention. We hope and trust that the District Magistrate will be more careful in the future when he has occasion to exercise the enormous powers of preventive detention entrusted to him by the Parliament.