Case: Gwalior Sugar Co.Ltd Vs. Anil Gupta

than agricultural purposes. The rights and liabilities of the lessee of such land shall be such as may be defined by the terms of his lease.Special leases for agricultural purposes – (1) In order to develop and demonstrate farming by mechanical means or in view of the special circumstances of [The words “or place of land” are inserted by M.B. Act No. 18 of1952] [any tract or piece of land] the Government may also grant leases of land for agricultural purposes on special and specified conditions. The rights and liabilities of the lessee of such land shall be such as may be defined by the terms of the lease.2) The Government may either generally or specially delegate any of its powers under this section to such officer as may be specified in this behalf.” Section 39 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act “39. Grant of fresh lease for land given for purposes other than agricultureA person who has taken land on lease from the proprietor for any purpose other than agriculture shall apply within six months from the date of vesting, to obtain from the Government a new lease under Section 101 (1) of Madhya Bharat Revenue Administration and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007, and the Government may grant a lease subject to such terms and conditions for securing the rent and utility of land as may be deemed proper. From the date of vesting up to the grant of new lease the person shall be deemed to be a lessee of the Government for that land on the same conditions on which the lease was granted to him by the proprietor. If the Government does not think it proper in the public interest to grant the lease, the amount of compensation shall be paid at market value.” 12. At the very outset, it must be made clear that the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, have been pressed into service for the first time in the present appeal. Neither in the pleadings nor in the arguments made before the High Court on behalf of the State, the facts now asserted and the legal issues now raised had been urged. However, the question raised being with regard to the effect of a statutory enactment we have considered the same. In the absence of any pleading that the procedure for grant of a fresh lease contemplated under section 39 of the Zamindari Abolition Act had not been followed by the appellant by making the requisite application as contemplated by section 101 of the Tenancy Act, no adverse consequence can be attributed to the appellant as contended on behalf of the State. Rather, the status of the appellant as a bhumiswami recorded in the revenue records of the later years, in the absence of any contrary material, will have to be understood to be pursuant to the grant of a fresh lease under section 39 of the Zamindari Abolition Act read with the provisions of section 101 of the Tenancy Act. Infact, acceptance of the acquisition of the status of bhumiswami by the appellant in the aforesaid manner will render it unnecessary for us to go into the basis of the acquisition of the said status as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, which, in any case, appears to be contrary to the provision of section 1(2) of the Tenancy Act. The said provision clearly excludes the villages settled under the Zamindari system from the purview of the operation of Part II of the Tenancy Act, which part of the Act, inter alia, also deals with the acquisition of the status of “pucca tenant” and “Bhumiswami” by a tenant. However obliteration of Part II of the Tenancy Act by operation of section 1(2) thereof does not extinguish the different denominations of tenancy including the status of Bhumiswami which can very well be acquired by grant of such status by a fresh lease under sections 101 of the Tenancy Act read with section 39 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act.13. The rights of a bhumiswami are clearly enumerated by Section 165 of the MP Land Revenue Code which encompasses a right to transfer. The bar imposed on the right to transfer does not apply to non-agricultural lands and, hence, would not be relevant to the present case. If the right of transfer has been conferred on the appellant by the provisions of a statute and the bar contemplated does not apply to the appellant, we do not see how a clause or a condition in the original patta granted by the Zamindar in samvat 1978-79 (corresponding to English Calender year 1940-41) can restrict such a right. In any case, there is no specific clause or condition in any of the original pattas prohibiting or even restricting the right of the appellant to transfer any part of the land allotted to it that may be lying vacant. Neither any material has been placed before us to enable us to take the view that under terms of the lease granted under Section 101 of Tenancy Act and Section 39 of Abolition of Zamindari Act any restriction or bar had been imposed on the appellant – Company from making such a transfer.14. In view of the aforesaid conclusions the issue with regard to applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, need not detains us, save and except to hold that the provisions of either of the aforesaid Acts, ex-facie, do not apply to the case of the appellant – Company. We would further like to observe on the view taken by us it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the decree affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in S.A. No.482 of 2002 binds the State or whether the same is in respect of the entire land holding of the appellant – Company or only a part thereof.15. In view of the foregoing discussions and conclusions reached

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]12. At the very outset, it must be made clear that the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951, have been pressed into service for the first time in the present appeal. Neither in the pleadings nor in the arguments made before the High Court on behalf of the State, the facts now asserted and the legal issues now raised had been urged. However, the question raised being with regard to the effect of a statutory enactment we have considered the same. In the absence of any pleading that the procedure for grant of a fresh lease contemplated under section 39 of the Zamindari Abolition Act had not been followed by the appellant by making the requisite application as contemplated by section 101 of the Tenancy Act, no adverse consequence can be attributed to the appellant as contended on behalf of the State. Rather, the status of the appellant as a bhumiswami recorded in the revenue records of the later years, in the absence of any contrary material, will have to be understood to be pursuant to the grant of a fresh lease under section 39 of the Zamindari Abolition Act read with the provisions of section 101 of the Tenancy Act. Infact, acceptance of the acquisition of the status of bhumiswami by the appellant in the aforesaid manner will render it unnecessary for us to go into the basis of the acquisition of the said status as argued by the learned counsel for the appellant, which, in any case, appears to be contrary to the provision of section 1(2) of the Tenancy Act. The said provision clearly excludes the villages settled under the Zamindari system from the purview of the operation of Part II of the Tenancy Act, which part of the Act, inter alia, also deals with the acquisition of the status ofby a tenant. However obliteration of Part II of the Tenancy Act by operation of section 1(2) thereof does not extinguish the different denominations of tenancy including the status of Bhumiswami which can very well be acquired by grant of such status by a fresh lease under sections 101 of the Tenancy Act read with section 39 of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act.13. The rights of a bhumiswami are clearly enumerated by Section 165 of the MP Land Revenue Code which encompasses a right to transfer. The bar imposed on the right to transfer does not apply to non-agricultural lands and, hence, would not be relevant to the present case. If the right of transfer has been conferred on the appellant by the provisions of a statute and the bar contemplated does not apply to the appellant, we do not see how a clause or a condition in the original patta granted by the Zamindar in samvat 1978-79 (corresponding to English Calender year 1940-41) can restrict such a right. In any case, there is no specific clause or condition in any of the original pattas prohibiting or even restricting the right of the appellant to transfer any part of the land allotted to it that may be lying vacant. Neither any material has been placed before us to enable us to take the view that under terms of the lease granted under Section 101 of Tenancy Act and Section 39 of Abolition of Zamindari Act any restriction or bar had been imposed on the appellant – Company from making such a transfer.14. In view of the aforesaid conclusions the issue with regard to applicability of the Urban Land Ceiling Act and the Ceiling on Agricultural Holding Act, need not detains us, save and except to hold that the provisions of either of the aforesaid Acts, ex-facie, do not apply to the case of the appellant – Company. We would further like to observe on the view taken by us it is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the decree affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in S.A. No.482 of 2002 binds the State or whether the same is in respect of the entire land holding of the appellant – Company or only a part thereof.