Case: Jagdish Prasad Saxena Vs. State Of Madhya Bharat

enquiry against him after the charge-sheet was supplied to him. In this connection it is necessary to remember that the previous enquiry was not directed against the appellant as such, and he was certainly not in the position of an accused in the said enquiry. In fact, as we have already indicated, the result of the said enquiry was that the appellant was absolved from any complicity in the commission of the offence, and the only criticism made against him was that he was slack in his supervision, that is why he was transferred. In such a case, even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission it is open to doubt whether he could be removed from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry as required by the rules. But apart from this consideration, if the statements made by the appellant do not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal enquiry would certainly constitute a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against him. Under Art. 311(2) he was entitled to have a reasonable opportunity of meeting the charge framed against him, and in the present case, before the show-cause notice was served on him he has had no opportunity at all to meet the charge. After the charge-sheet was supplied to him he did not get an opportunity to cross-examine Kethulekar and others. He was not given a copy of the report made by the enquiry officers in the said enquiries. He could not offer his explanation as to any of the points made against him; and it appears that from the evidence recorded in the previous enquiries as a result of which Kethulekar was suspended an inference was drawn against the appellant and show-cause notice was served on him. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that in the circumstances of this case he has had no opportunity of showing cause at all, and so the requirement of Art. 311(2) is not satisfied. 12. The two facts admitted by the appellant do not necessarily or inevitably lead to the conclusion that he was guilty of the offence with which he was charged; besides, if his statements are used against him all his statements must be considered as a whole; and thus considered there is no admission of guilt at all. The essential part of the finding against him is that he was present at the time when liquor was transferred to the contractor; and his presence cannot be reasonably inferred from the facts admitted by him. Even as to the delivery of the key to Narona no rule has been produced in this case which positively prohibited the delivery of such a key even in an emergency. Indeed the report made by the Superintendent on July 13, 1951, shows that as a prudent man the appellant should not have given the key to Narona. The appellant was told that in future "the key should be given only to reliable persons in case of need". This admonition would show that in case of need it was open to the appellant to give the key to a reliable person, and that must necessarily mean that there was no rule which absolutely prohibited the delivery of the key to any person even in case of need. Therefore, the admission made by the appellant that he gave the key to Narona cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion that he was in league with Narona or Kethulekar. 13. The order passed by the Minister shows that he took into account the alleged interpolations in the books kept by the appellant as well as the fact that Kethulekar and the contractor saw the appellant the next morning. Now it is clear that so far as these two facts are concerned the appellant was given no opportunity to cross-examine Kethulekar and the contractor and to show that their story was untrue; nor was he given an opportunity to substantiate his explanation about the alleged interpolations in the books. The Minister may have thought that the facts to which his attention was invited indicated that the appellant must have been present at the warehouse when the offence took place; but it is of the utmost importance that in taking disciplinary action against a public servant a proper departmental enquiry must be held against him after supplying him with a charge-sheet, and he must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. In the present case preliminary enquiries of a general type were held and they ended in a finding against Kethulekar. The reports did not show that the appellant was guilty of the offence for which he was ultimately dismissed from service. The delay made in giving the appellant the chargesheet as well as in communicating to him the final order of dismissal shows that the authorities did not think that time was the essence of the matter, and so there was hardly any justification for not holding a formal and proper enquiry after the appellant was given a chargesheet on October 17, 1951.In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that no prejudice had been caused to the appellant as a result of the respondents failure to hold an enquiry against him after supplying him with a chargesheet. The departmental enquiry is not an empty formality; it is a serious proceeding intended to give the officer concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. In the absence of any such enquiry it would not be fair to strain facts against the appellant and to hold that in view of the admissions made by him the enquiry would have served no useful purpose. That is a matter of speculation which is wholly out of place in dealing with cases of orders passed against public servants terminating their services.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]13. The order passed by the Minister shows that he took into account the alleged interpolations in the books kept by the appellant as well as the fact that Kethulekar and the contractor saw the appellant the next morning. Now it is clear that so far as these two facts are concerned the appellant was given no opportunity to cross-examine Kethulekar and the contractor and to show that their story was untrue; nor was he given an opportunity to substantiate his explanation about the alleged interpolations in the books. The Minister may have thought that the facts to which his attention was invited indicated that the appellant must have been present at the warehouse when the offence took place; but it is of the utmost importance that in taking disciplinary action against a public servant a proper departmental enquiry must be held against him after supplying him with a charge-sheet, and he must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to meet the allegations contained in the charge-sheet. In the present case preliminary enquiries of a general type were held and they ended in a finding against Kethulekar. The reports did not show that the appellant was guilty of the offence for which he was ultimately dismissed from service. The delay made in giving the appellant the chargesheet as well as in communicating to him the final order of dismissal shows that the authorities did not think that time was the essence of the matter, and so there was hardly any justification for not holding a formal and proper enquiry after the appellant was given a chargesheet on October 17, 1951.In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that no prejudice had been caused to the appellant as a result of the respondents failure to hold an enquiry against him after supplying him with a chargesheet. The departmental enquiry is not an empty formality; it is a serious proceeding intended to give the officer concerned a chance to meet the charge and to prove his innocence. In the absence of any such enquiry it would not be fair to strain facts against the appellant and to hold that in view of the admissions made by him the enquiry would have served no useful purpose. That is a matter of speculation which is wholly out of place in dealing with cases of orders passed against public servants terminating their services12. The two facts admitted by the appellant do not necessarily or inevitably lead to the conclusion that he was guilty of the offence with which he was charged; besides, if his statements are used against him all his statements must be considered as a whole; and thus considered there is no admission of guilt at all. The essential part of the finding against him is that he was present at the time when liquor was transferred to the contractor; and his presence cannot be reasonably inferred from the facts admitted by him. Even as to the delivery of the key to Narona no rule has been produced in this case which positively prohibited the delivery of such a key even in an emergency. Indeed the report made by the Superintendent on July 13, 1951, shows that as a prudent man the appellant should not have given the key to Narona. The appellant was told that in future "the key should be given only to reliable persons in case of need". This admonition would show that in case of need it was open to the appellant to give the key to a reliable person, and that must necessarily mean that there was no rule which absolutely prohibited the delivery of the key to any person even in case of need. Therefore, the admission made by the appellant that he gave the key to Narona cannot necessarily lead to the conclusion that he was in league with Narona or Kethulekar11. It is true that the appellant specifically admitted during the course of the previous enquiry that illegal liquor had been delivered to the contractor, and that he had given the key of the receiver to Narona. It is on the strength of those admissions that the High Court took the view that the appellant had substantially admitted his guilt and so there was really no need for holding a formal enquiry against him after the charge-sheet was supplied to him. In this connection it is necessary to remember that the previous enquiry was not directed against the appellant as such, and he was certainly not in the position of an accused in the said enquiry. In fact, as we have already indicated, the result of the said enquiry was that the appellant was absolved from any complicity in the commission of the offence, and the only criticism made against him was that he was slack in his supervision, that is why he was transferred. In such a case, even if the appellant had made some statements which amounted to admission it is open to doubt whether he could be removed from service on the strength of the said alleged admissions without holding a formal enquiry as required by the rules. But apart from this consideration, if the statements made by the appellant do not amount to a clear or unambiguous admission of his guilt, failure to hold a formal enquiry would certainly constitute a serious infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against him. Under Art. 311(2) he was entitled to have a reasonable opportunity of meeting the charge framed against him, and in the present case, before the show-cause notice was served on him he has had no opportunity at all to meet the charge. After the charge-sheet was supplied to him he did not get an opportunity to cross-examine Kethulekar and others. He was not given a copy of the report made by the enquiry officers in the said enquiries. He could not offer his explanation as to any of the points made against him; and it appears that from the evidence recorded in the previous enquiries as a result of which Kethulekar was suspended an inference was drawn against the appellant and show-cause notice was served on him. In our opinion, the appellant is justified in contending that in the circumstances of this case he has had no opportunity of showing cause at all, and so the requirement of Art. 311(2) is not satisfied.