Case: Silla Chandra Sekharam Vs. Ramchandra Sahu

the expression subsequently to the sale or lease be given the meaning subsequently to the actual sale or lease.16. The sections preceding S. 18 deal with specific performance of contracts in general and therefore use the expression party to a contract. Section 18 deals with the cases of contracts to sell or let and therefore appropriately uses the simple word vendor or lessor with respect to the party contracting to sell or let and purchaser or lessee with respect to the party agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease. There is no incongruity in using such expression so long as one knows to whom those expression refer. In fact the word purchaser or lessee can be appropriately applied to persons agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease.17. In this connection reference may also be made to the provisions of cl. (d) of S. 18 which uses the words vendor or lessor and provides that where the vendor or lessor sues for specific performance of the contract and the suit is dismissed on the ground of his imperfect title, the defendant has a right to a return of his deposit ....... and to a lien for such deposit, ...... on the interest of the vendor or lessor in the property agreed to be sold or let. It is clear that the words vendor or lessor in this clause refer to the person contracting to sell or let the property and who did not perform his part of the contract.18. Section 25 of the Act also uses the expression vendor or lessor who has not actually sold or leased the property. It provides inter alia that a contract for the sale or letting of property cannot be specifically enforced in favour of the vendor or lessor who comes within the provisions of cls. (a) to (c) of the section. The provisions of S. 27A also use the expression lessor and lessee in connection with provisions relating to the contract to let when actually no lease is executed.19. There may be another reason for using the expression sale or lease in cl. (a) of S. 18. Section 13 and illustration (a) read;"13. Notwithstanding anything contained in S. 56 of the Indian Contract Act, a contract is not wholly impossible of performance because a portion of its subject matter, existing at its date, has ceased to exist at the time of the performance.Illustrations(a) A, contracts to sell a house to B, for a lakh of rupees. The day after the contract is made, the house is destroyed by a cyclone. B. may be compelled to perform his part of the contract by paying the purchase-money.x x x x x"20. In Pollock and Mullas Specific Relief Act, 8th edition, under S. 13, is a note:"Illustration (a) assumes that a contract for the sale of a house does, of itself, transfer the beneficial interest in the house to the purchaser, and make him owner in equity in the English phrase. This was also the law here before the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 came into force. By S. 54 of that Act it is provided that a contract for the sale of immovable property does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. By S. 55 (5) it is enacted that the risk of destruction is borne by the purchaser only from the date when the ownership appears to pass on execution of a proper conveyance by the vendor (see S. 55(1) (d)). It would, therefore, seem that the illustration cannot now be applied where the Transfer of Property Act is in force."21. It may be that just as illustration (a) to S. 13 continues in the Act, the expression sale or lease continued in cl. (a) of S. 18 as at the time cl. (a) of S. 18 was originally enacted some sort of beneficial interest had passed to the person agreeing to purchase the property by the mere agreement to sell, arrived at between the parties.22. It has also been urged for the respondent that cl. (a) of S. 18 of the Act applies only when the person contracting to sell or let has imperfect title to the property and not when he is not entitled to the property as is the case in this suit, as Ramchandra had no title to half the house. We do not consider it necessary to decide this question as we are of opinion that it cannot be said that Ramchandra had no interest in half the house. He had interest in the entire house and so had his mother, though in case of actual partition the interest of each would have been fixed at half. If Ramchandra was not competent to pass title with respect to the entire house during the lifetime of his mother, he can be said to have imperfect title to it.23. We are, therefore, of opinion that on the death of the mother, Ramchandra obtained title to and interest in the portion of the house which on a private partition subsequent to the contract to sell had taken place between Ramchandra and his mother and that therefore he has to make good his contract out of the property he acquired subsequent to the contract to sell.24. It has been submitted for the respondent that it need not be taken for granted that Ramchandra got title to the property which belonged to his mother as it might be that the mother had executed some will. No such allegation appears to have been made before the High Court where it was urged that Ramchandra had acquired title to that portion of the house. It was in view of this allegation that the appellant did not argue the appeal on the basis of the ground that had been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the ground being that Ramchandra had agreed to sell for reasons of legal necessity. We, therefore, do not consider any force in this contention.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]14. The expression in cl. (a) of S. 18 should preferably be construed in a way so that there will be no overlapping between the provisions of this clause and of S. 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, as ordinarily the legislature does not intend to make duplicate provisions for similar situations.15. The use of the words vendor or lessor in cl. (a) is no definite pointer to the conclusion that the expression subsequently to the sale or lease be given the meaning subsequently to the actual sale or lease.16. The sections preceding S. 18 deal with specific performance of contracts in general and therefore use the expression party to a contract. Section 18 deals with the cases of contracts to sell or let and therefore appropriately uses the simple word vendor or lessor with respect to the party contracting to sell or let and purchaser or lessee with respect to the party agreeing to purchase or take the property on lease. There is no incongruity in using such expression so long as one knows to whom those expression refer. In fact the word purchaser or lessee can be appropriately applied to persons agreeing to purchase or take the property ondo not consider it necessary to decide this question as we are of opinion that it cannot be said that Ramchandra had no interest in half the house. He had interest in the entire house and so had his mother, though in case of actual partition the interest of each would have been fixed at half. If Ramchandra was not competent to pass title with respect to the entire house during the lifetime of his mother, he can be said to have imperfect title to it.23. We are, therefore, of opinion that on the death of the mother, Ramchandra obtained title to and interest in the portion of the house which on a private partition subsequent to the contract to sell had taken place between Ramchandra and his mother and that therefore he has to make good his contract out of the property he acquired subsequent to the contract tosuch allegation appears to have been made before the High Court where it was urged that Ramchandra had acquired title to that portion of the house. It was in view of this allegation that the appellant did not argue the appeal on the basis of the ground that had been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the ground being that Ramchandra had agreed to sell for reasons of legal necessity. We, therefore, do not consider any force in this contention.was in view of this allegation that the appellant did not argue the appeal on the basis of the ground that had been taken in the memorandum of appeal, the ground being that Ramchandra had agreed to sell for reasons of legal necessity. We, therefore, do not consider any force in this contention.