Case: Idol Of Thakurji Shri Govind Deoji Maharaj Vs. Board Of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer &amp; Others

and so, it is plainly impossible to predicate about the Idol which is the grantee in the present case that it has died at a certain time and the claims of a successor fell to be determined. That being so, it seems difficult to hold that any claim for Matmi can be made against the appellant; and that must clearly lead to the inference that no amount can be recovered from the properties belonging to the Idol on the ground that Matmi is claimable against a person who claims to be the successor of the Shebait of (or?) the appellant.7. The learned Advocate-General was unable todispute this position. He however attempted to argue that all grants pertaining to the properties of the appellant were not before the Court, and so, it may not he proper to proceed on the basis that all the properties of the appellant have been granted to the appellant in its own name. We are not impressed by this argument. We have already noticed that a specific averment was made by the appellant in paragraph 3 of its writ petition that all the State grants made to the appellant from time to time were in the name of the Idol and though the respondents did not specifically admit this averment, they pleaded that since the documents regarding the original grants were not traceable, they required the appellant to prove its case in that behalf. The appellant produced two grants and it appears from the judgment of the High Court that the matter was proceeded with on the basis that the Idol is the grantee of all the properties. That being so, we do not think it is open to the Advocate-General now to contend that some of the properties may have been granted to the Shebaits no doubt burdened with the obligation to perform the services of the Idol.8. The High Court appears to have taken the view that because a Shebait has some kind of a beneficial interest in the property of the temple, that beneficial interest itself could be treated as a State grant and it is on this basis that the High Court held that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1 was valid. In the present case we are not concerned to enquire whether for recognising a succeeding Shebait any Matmi can be recovered by the respondent; but since the High Court has laid emphasis on the fact that the Shebait has a beneficial interest in the properties granted to the appellant, it is necessary to point out that though the Shebait by virtue of the special position attaching to Shebait under the Hindu law can claim some beneficial interest, that interest is derived not by virtue of the grant made by the State, but by virtue of the provisions of Hindu law, or custom or usage of the temple or locality where the temple is situated.In Govindalalji v. State of Rajastha, AIR 1963 SC 1638 the position of the Shebaits was incidentally considered, and the observations made by Mr. Justice Ameer Ali in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar, 48 Ind App 302 at p. 311 : (AIR 1922 PC 123 at p.126) were cited with approval. "In almost every case" said Mr. Justice Ameer Ali,"the Mahant is given the right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment and the amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom. In no case was the property conveyed to or vested in him, nor is he a trustee in the English sense of the term, though in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense for mal-administration."Therefore, it seems to us that the High Court was in error in holding that the beneficial interest of the Shebaits in the properties granted to the appellant amounted to a State grant, and so, the impugned order was perfectly valid. The incidental effect of the conclusions reached by the High Court may perhaps be taken to be that the order passed by respondent No. 1 being valid, the amount in question can be recovered from the properties of the appellant. That is why we thought it necessary to clarify the position in law on this point.9. In fact, by Civil Misc. Petition No. 1081 of 1964 it has been brought to our notice by the appellant that it had made a compensation claim because lands granted to the appellant had been resumed by the State of Rajasthan by notification No. F. (388)/ REV / 1A / 53 dated 1st January, 1959 and that an annual sum by way of annuity to the Deity had been sanctioned by the State of Rajasthan under its order dated the 24th April, 1962. This order has however, directed that the amount of Rs.15,404/14/6 which has been ordered by respondent No. 1 to be recovered by way of Matmi should be deducted and that, it is urged before us by the appellant; cannot be done. This fact clarly shows that the appellant is justified in apprehending that though the order of Matmi dues has been nominally passed against the present Shebait, it may be enforced against the properties belonging to the appellant. Since we have held that the properties granted to the appellant constitute State grants under R. 4(1), but do not become liable to pay Matmi dues under R. 4(3), we must hold that the appellants writ petition was justified inasmuch as it asked for an appropriate direction restraining the respondents and their nominees or agents from recovering the said amount from the appellants estate. Therefore, prayer made by the appellant in paragraph 16(1) of its writ petition must be allowed. Since we are not concerned with the validity of the order passed by respondent No. 1 against the present Shebait, we propose to express no opinion in regard to the merits of the prayer contained in paragraph 16(2) of the writ petition.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]7. The learned Advocate-General was unable todispute this position. He however attempted to argue that all grants pertaining to the properties of the appellant were not before the Court, and so, it may not he proper to proceed on the basis that all the properties of the appellant have been granted to the appellant in its own name. We are not impressed by this argument. We have already noticed that a specific averment was made by the appellant in paragraph 3 of its writ petition that all the State grants made to the appellant from time to time were in the name of the Idol and though the respondents did not specifically admit this averment, they pleaded that since the documents regarding the original grants were not traceable, they required the appellant to prove its case in that behalf. The appellant produced two grants and it appears from the judgment of the High Court that the matter was proceeded with on the basis that the Idol is the grantee of all the properties. That being so, we do not think it is open to the Advocate-General now to contend that some of the properties may have been granted to the Shebaits no doubt burdened with the obligation to perform the services of the Idol.8. The High Court appears to have taken the view that because a Shebait has some kind of a beneficial interest in the property of the temple, that beneficial interest itself could be treated as a State grant and it is on this basis that the High Court held that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1 was valid. In the present case we are not concerned to enquire whether for recognising a succeeding Shebait any Matmi can be recovered by the respondent; but since the High Court has laid emphasis on the fact that the Shebait has a beneficial interest in the properties granted to the appellant, it is necessary to point out that though the Shebait by virtue of the special position attaching to Shebait under the Hindu law can claim some beneficial interest, that interest is derived not by virtue of the grant made by the State, but by virtue of the provisions of Hindu law, or custom or usage of the temple or locality where the temple isit seems to us that the High Court was in error in holding that the beneficial interest of the Shebaits in the properties granted to the appellant amounted to a State grant, and so, the impugned order was perfectly valid. The incidental effect of the conclusions reached by the High Court may perhaps be taken to be that the order passed by respondent No. 1 being valid, the amount in question can be recovered from the properties of the appellant. That is why we thought it necessary to clarify the position in law on this point.9. In fact, by Civil Misc. Petition No. 1081 of 1964 it has been brought to our notice by the appellant that it had made a compensation claim because lands granted to the appellant had been resumed by the State of Rajasthan by notification No. F. (388)/ REV / 1A / 53 dated 1st January, 1959 and that an annual sum by way of annuity to the Deity had been sanctioned by the State of Rajasthan under its order dated the 24th April, 1962. This order has however, directed that the amount of Rs.15,404/14/6 which has been ordered by respondent No. 1 to be recovered by way of Matmi should be deducted and that, it is urged before us by the appellant; cannot be done. This fact clarly shows that the appellant is justified in apprehending that though the order of Matmi dues has been nominally passed against the present Shebait, it may be enforced against the properties belonging to the appellant. Since we have held that the properties granted to the appellant constitute State grants under R. 4(1), but do not become liable to pay Matmi dues under R. 4(3), we must hold that the appellants writ petition was justified inasmuch as it asked for an appropriate direction restraining the respondents and their nominees or agents from recovering the said amount from the appellants estate. Therefore, prayer made by the appellant in paragraph 16(1) of its writ petition must be allowed. Since we are not concerned with the validity of the order passed by respondent No. 1 against the present Shebait, we propose to express no opinion in regard to the merits of the prayer contained in paragraph 16(2) of the writdeciding the question as to whether the appellants estate is liable to pay Matmi under R. 5 it is necessary to examine the nature of this Matmi, and find out whether a claim in respect of it can be made against the appellant. We have already noticed that Matmi means mutation of the name of the successor to a State grant on the death of the last holder. It is obvious that in the case of a grant to the Idol or tempre as such there would be no question about the death of the grantee and, therefore, no question about its successor. An Idol which is juridical person is not subject to death, because the Hindu concept is that the Idol lives forever, and so, it is plainly impossible to predicate about the Idol which is the grantee in the present case that it has died at a certain time and the claims of a successor fell to be determined. That being so, it seems difficult to hold that any claim for Matmi can be made against the appellant; and that must clearly lead to the inference that no amount can be recovered from the properties belonging to the Idol on the ground that Matmi is claimable against a person who claims to be the successor of the Shebait of (or?) the appellant.