Case: Sone Valley Portland Cement Company Limited Vs. General, Mining Syndicate Private Limited

be impressed upon us by Mr. Patel in regard to this aspect of the matter by reading out to us a passage from Craies on Statute Law. The counsel has strongly urged that since it is not strictly permissible to interpret a statute by reference to what has been said in subsequent statutes, resort cannot be had to the provisions of section 10 A which was introduced in the B.L.R. Act in 1964 while interpreting section 10 of before the introduction of the said section. We also find ourselves unable to accept this contention and to disregard the well settled canon that sometimes light may be thrown upon the meaning of an Act by taking into consideration parliamentary expositions as revealed by the later Act which amends the earlier one to clear up any doubt or ambiguity. This principle has to be followed where, as in the instant case, a particular construction of the earlier Act will render the later incorporated Act ineffectual, or otiose or inept. (See Krikness v. John Hudson &Co.([19551 A.C. 696 (H.L.)). This view also receives support from the decision of this Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar v. C.I.T. Calcutta([1969] 1 S.C.C. 555. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 742.) where approving the authoritative pronouncement in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. ([1921] 2 K.B. 403.) that the subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous, it was held that the language employed in Income Tax Act, 1961 may be relied on as a Parliamentary exposition of the earlier Act (I.T. Act, 1922) even on the assumption that the language employed in Section 3 of the earlier Act is ambiguous.It follows from the above discussion that the estate comprised in the head lease in the instant case which was assigned to the respondent notionally stood leased by the State from the date of vesting to the holder of the subsisting lease for the remainder of the term of the lease an d the respondent became entitled to retain possession of the leasehold property. The first contention of Mr. Patel is, therefore, repelled.8. Mr. Patel has next contended that as the royalty payable to the lessor was enhanced under the provisions of the 1957 Act read with the Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956, which continued in force by virtue of section 29 of the 1957 Act and the enhanced royalty was payable by the respondent who was the holder of the mining lease as envisaged by section 9 of the 1957 Act, the appellant was entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of Rs. 61, 684.40 which was paid by him as an agent of the respondent. This contention has to be examined with reference to two periods viz. (i) from July 1, 1958 to August 7, 1959, and (ii) August 8, 1959 to March 31, 1961. It is admitted by the appellant that during the period intervening between the date when the 1957 Act came into force and August 8, 1959 when the Controller passed the aforesaid order enhancing .the royalty. payable to the State, , it continued to pay the said royalty at the old rate of 24 paise per ton and was never required to pay the same at the enhanced rate of 37 paise. No question of reimbursement for this period can, therefore, arise.9. The position, however, with regard to the second period from August 8, 1959, to March 31, 1961, .is not free from difficulty and has to be examined with reference to the provisions of section 9 of the 1957 Act and of the Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956 as also of the provisions of section 9 of the B.L.R. Act. Whereas according to counsel for the appellant, it is the respondent which being the holder of lease as contemplated by section 9 of the 1957 Act that has to bear the burden of royalty payable to the State in accordance with the requirements of Second Schedule to the 1957 Act, according to counsel for the respondent, as the expression "mining lease" used in section 9 of the 1957 Act has been defined in section 3(c) of the Act as including a sub-lease and the mineral has actually been removed by the appellant, the liability for payment of enhanced royalty squarely falls on the appellant. There is yet another aspect of the matter which may reasonably be urged in accordance with the ratio of the decisions of this Court in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) and M/s Hindustan Steel Limited Rourkela v. Smt. Kalyani Banerjee &Ors. ( supra) where it was unequivocally laid down that a statutory lease held by a head lessee from the State Government being a new lease granted after October 25, 1949, and not being an existing lease, it could not be modified and when the head lease not being an existing mining lease could not be modified, the sub-lease could also not be modified as it too would be deemed to be a new lease granted by the new lessee from the State Government. In view, however, of the fact that neither the Union of India nor the Controller of Mining Leases is a party to the case before us and the aforesaid order dated August 8, 1958 appears to have been passed by tile Controller of Mining Leases with the agreement of the parties hereto, we do not consider ourselves called upon to resolve the conflicting contentions advanced before us by counsel for the parties. For the purpose of this appeal, it would suffice to observe that in view of Exhibit L (reproduced at pages 280 to 282 of the Paper Book), the burden of payment of the royalty for the second period also is to be borne by the appellant and the question of his being re-imbursed by the respondent cannot be countenanced. The second contention raised by Mr. Patel also, therefore, fails.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We also find ourselves unable to accept this contention and to disregard the well settled canon that sometimes light may be thrown upon the meaning of an Act by taking into consideration parliamentary expositions as revealed by the later Act which amends the earlier one to clear up any doubt or ambiguity. This principle has to be followed where, as in the instant case, a particular construction of the earlier Act will render the later incorporated Act ineffectual, or otiose or inept. (See Krikness v. John Hudson &Co.([19551 A.C. 696 (H.L.)). This view also receives support from the decision of this Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar v. C.I.T. Calcutta([1969] 1 S.C.C. 555. [1969] 3 S.C.R. 742.) where approving the authoritative pronouncement in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. I.R.C. ([1921] 2 K.B. 403.) that the subsequent legislation may be looked at in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous, it was held that the language employed in Income Tax Act, 1961 may be relied on as a Parliamentary exposition of the earlier Act (I.T. Act, 1922) even on the assumption that the language employed in Section 3 of the earlier Act is ambiguous.It follows from the above discussion that the estate comprised in the head lease in the instant case which was assigned to the respondent notionally stood leased by the State from the date of vesting to the holder of the subsisting lease for the remainder of the term of the lease an d the respondent became entitled to retain possession of the leasehold property. The first contention of Mr. Patel is, therefore,is admitted by the appellant that during the period intervening between the date when the 1957 Act came into force and August 8, 1959 when the Controller passed the aforesaid order enhancing .the royalty. payable to the State, , it continued to pay the said royalty at the old rate of 24 paise per ton and was never required to pay the same at the enhanced rate of 37 paise. No question of reimbursement for this period can, therefore,position, however, with regard to the second period from August 8, 1959, to March 31, 1961, .is not free from difficulty and has to be examined with reference to the provisions of section 9 of the 1957 Act and of the Mining Leases (Modification of Terms) Rules, 1956 as also of the provisions of section 9 of the B.L.R. Act. Whereas according to counsel for the appellant, it is the respondent which being the holder of lease as contemplated by section 9 of the 1957 Act that has to bear the burden of royalty payable to the State in accordance with the requirements of Second Schedule to the 1957 Act, according to counsel for the respondent, as the expression "mining lease" used in section 9 of the 1957 Act has been defined in section 3(c) of the Act as including a sub-lease and the mineral has actually been removed by the appellant, the liability for payment of enhanced royalty squarely falls on the appellant. There is yet another aspect of the matter which may reasonably be urged in accordance with the ratio of the decisions of this Court in Bihar Mines Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) and M/s Hindustan Steel Limited Rourkela v. Smt. Kalyani Banerjee &Ors. ( supra) where it was unequivocally laid down that a statutory lease held by a head lessee from the State Government being a new lease granted after October 25, 1949, and not being an existing lease, it could not be modified and when the head lease not being an existing mining lease could not be modified, the sub-lease could also not be modified as it too would be deemed to be a new lease granted by the new lessee from the State Government. In view, however, of the fact that neither the Union of India nor the Controller of Mining Leases is a party to the case before us and the aforesaid order dated August 8, 1958 appears to have been passed by tile Controller of Mining Leases with the agreement of the parties hereto, we do not consider ourselves called upon to resolve the conflicting contentions advanced before us by counsel for the parties. For the purpose of this appeal, it would suffice to observe that in view of Exhibit L (reproduced at pages 280 to 282 of the Paper Book), the burden of payment of the royalty for the second period also is to be borne by the appellant and the question of his being re-imbursed by the respondent cannot be countenanced. The second contention raised by Mr. Patel also, therefore, fails.