Case: Kuldeep Singh Vs. Ganpat Lal

Section 13, a tenant shall be deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of any rent due from him, if he has paid, remitted or deposited the amount of rent by any of the methods specified in sub-section (3). Under sub-section (3), apart from personal payment of rent to the landlord, three others modes have been prescribed, namely, (i) remittance by postal money order at the ordinary address of the landlord, (ii) deposit in the bank account of the landlord, and (iii) deposit in Court in cases where the money order has been received back under the postal endorsement of refusal or unfound or where the landlord does not specify the bank account number or where there is a bona fide doubt that the person or persons to whom the rent is payable. Under sub-section (4), a legal fiction is created and the tenant is deemed to have paid or tendered the amount of rent due from him and is not to be treated in default of payment of rent if he has paid, remitted or deposited the amount of rent by any of the three methods specified in sub-section (3). 5. The High Court has held that in view of the language of clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A, a deposit in the court can be made only if the conditions laid down in clause (c) are fulfilled and if the said conditions are not fulfilled, the deposit would not be treated as a valid deposit under clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and would not entitle the tenant to avail the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A. It has been held that in the instant case, it is not the case of the appellant that he had remitted the amount of rent due from him by postal money order and the same had been received back by him under the postal endorsement of refusal or unfound, nor is it the case of the appellant that he had asked the respondents to indicate the bank account number in which the rent may be deposited by the appellant to the credit of the respondents and the respondents had failed to specify the bank and account number and that it is also not the case of the appellant that there was a bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent was payable. 6. Shri Sachar does not dispute that the conditions prescribed in clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A for the purpose of making the deposit in Court are not fulfilled in the present case. The submission of Shri Sachar, however, is that since the appellant had deposited in court the rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982 on 29th October, 1982, before the said rent for six months fell due, he cannot be held to be a defaulter in payment of rent for six months and a decree for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) could not be passed. Shri Sachar has, in this connection, placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Duli Chand v. Maman Chand, 1979(2) RCR 92(SC) : 1980(1) SCC 246 and Sheo Narain v. Shet Singh, 1980(a) RCR 255 (SC) : 1980(1) SCR 836. 7. We have carefully perused the said judgments. Both these judgments relate to the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which affords protection against eviction of the tenant if on the first hearing on the application for ejectment after due service he pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller. In both these cases, the tenant had deposited the amount of rent in the Court in which the ejectment proceedings were pending prior to the first hearing of the application and on the first hearing the landlord was made aware of the deposit. This Court has held that even though there was no provision in the Act for deposit of the rent in Court the said deposit could be treated as compliance of the requirements of the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, 1949 and the tenant was entitled to avail the benefit of the said proviso.8. In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail the benefit of the legal fiction under Section 19-A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate filed. The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, 1955(2) SCP 603 at 646. The appellant can avail the benefit of Section 19-A (4) if the deposit of Rs. 3,600/- made by him in the Court of Munsiff (South), Udaipur, on October 29, 1982 by way of rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982, can be treated as a payment under Section 19-A (3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Section 19-A (3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the Court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in Court on October 29, 1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with clause (c) of sub-section (3) Section 19-A and the appellant cannot avail the protection of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of March, 1982 to October, 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default in payment of rent of the period of six months.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. The High Court has held that in view of the language of clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A, a deposit in the court can be made only if the conditions laid down in clause (c) are fulfilled and if the said conditions are not fulfilled, the deposit would not be treated as a valid deposit under clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and would not entitle the tenant to avail the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A. It has been held that in the instant case, it is not the case of the appellant that he had remitted the amount of rent due from him by postal money order and the same had been received back by him under the postal endorsement of refusal or unfound, nor is it the case of the appellant that he had asked the respondents to indicate the bank account number in which the rent may be deposited by the appellant to the credit of the respondents and the respondents had failed to specify the bank and account number and that it is also not the case of the appellant that there was a bona fide doubt as to the person or persons to whom the rent was payable.We have carefully perused the said judgments. Both these judgments relate to the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which affords protection against eviction of the tenant if on the first hearing on the application for ejectment after due service he pays or tenders the arrears of rent and interest at six per cent per annum on such arrears together with the cost of application assessed by the Controller. In both these cases, the tenant had deposited the amount of rent in the Court in which the ejectment proceedings were pending prior to the first hearing of the application and on the first hearing the landlord was made aware of the deposit. This Court has held that even though there was no provision in the Act for deposit of the rent in Court the said deposit could be treated as compliance of the requirements of the proviso to Section 13(2)(i) of the East Punjab Urban Restriction Act, 1949 and the tenant was entitled to avail the benefit of the said proviso.8. In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail the benefit of the legal fiction under Section 19-A(4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not be extended beyond that legitimate filed. The Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. The State of Bihar and others, 1955(2) SCP 603 at 646. The appellant can avail the benefit of Section 19-A (4) if the deposit of Rs. 3,600/- made by him in the Court of Munsiff (South), Udaipur, on October 29, 1982 by way of rent for the months of May, 1982 to October, 1982, can be treated as a payment under Section 19-A (3)(c) so as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of rent. Under Section 19-A (3)(c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the Court only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in Court on October 29, 1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with clause (c) of sub-section (3) Section 19-A and the appellant cannot avail the protection of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have committed default in payment of rent for the months of March, 1982 to October, 1982. This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the appellant on account of default in payment of rent of the period of six months.