Case: Karnail Singh and Anr Vs. The State of Punjab

Gurbaksh Singh and that it was they who murdered him, we do not see any objection to the statement of the appellant that he was present at the scence of the occurrence from being used as an admission.Another piece of corroboration which the learned Judges relied on was that in their view the gunshot wounds must have been received by Malkiat Singh at the house of Gurbaksh Singh. They gave their finding on this point in the alternative. They observed that the injuries might have been caused by Gurbaksh Singh firing from inside the house. But of this there is no evidence and the medical evidence is in fact opposed to it and as already stated, no gun was recovered from the house of the deceased. In the alternative, they observed that the injuries might have been caused by a shot from one of his own men. This view is supported by the evidence of P. W. 14 who deposed that while the incidents were in progress Malkiat Singh stated that he had been shot by one of his own men and then left the place.It is argued for the appellant that as the learned Judges had declined to act on the evidence of P. W. 14, the alternative suggestion must be ruled but as unsupported by evidence. What all the learned Judges remarked about P. W. 14 was that it was "impossible to place any very great reliance on Maghar Singhs evidence." But then they also expressly referred to his evidence on this point (Vide p. 61 of the record) and accepted it as one of the possible alternatives (Vide p. 65), And, on their finding, that the injuries must have been received at the place of occurrence and the theory that Gurbaksh Singh fired the shot being negatived, there is no difficulty in holding that they were prepared to accept the evidence of P. W. 14 on this point.Thus there are ample materials for holding that the gunshot wounds were received by Malkiat Singh in the house of Gurbaksh Singh and that is sufficient corroboration of the evidence of P. W. 13. In this view we must overrule the first contention.7. Then the next question is whether the conviction of the appellant under S. 302 read with S. 34, when they had been charged only under S. 302 read with S. 149 was illegal. The contention of the appellants is that the scope of S. 149 is different from that of S. 34, that while what S. 149 requires is proof of a common object, it would be necessary under S. 34 to establish a common intention and that therefore when the charge against the accused is under S. 149, it cannot be converted in appeal into one under S. 34. The following observations of this Court in - Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364 AT P. 366 (C) were relied on in support of this position :"Nor is it possible in this case to have recourse to S. 34 because the appellants have not been charged with that even in the alternative and the common intention required by S. 34 and the common object required by S. 149 are far from being the same thing."It is true that there is substantial difference between the two sections but as observed by Lord Summer in - Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1 (D), they also to some extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case whether the charge under S. 149 overlaps the ground covered by S. 34. If the common object which is the subject-matter of the charge under S. 149 does not necessarily involves a common intention, then the substitution of S. 34 for S. 149 might result in prejudice to the accused and ought not therefore to be permitted. But if the facts to be proved and the evidence to be adduced with reference to the charge under S. 149 would be the same if the charge were under S. 34, then the failure to charge the accused under S. 34 could not result in any prejudice and in such cases the substitution of S. 34 for S. 149 must be held to be a formal matter.We do not read the observations in AIR 1953 SC 364 (C) as an authority for the broad proposition that in law there could be no recourse to S. 34 when the charge is only under S. 149. Whether such recourse can be had or not must depend on the facts of each case. This is in accord with the view taken by this Court in AIR 1952 SC 167 (B), where the substitution of S. 34 for S. 149 was upheld on the ground that the facts were such"that the accused could have been charged alternatively either under S. 302 read with S. 149, or under S. 302 read with S. 34."8. Examining the record from this point of view, the finding are the both the appellants who had long -standing enmity with Gurbaksh Singh, got on the roof of his house and set fire to it, with the deceased and Mst. Bholan couped up within. If it was their object under S. 149 to burn the house and cause the death of Gurbaksh Singh, that was also their intention under S. 34.On the facts of this cases there can be no difference between the object and the intention with which the offences were committed. Out attention was also drawn to the wording of the charge which while mentioning S. 149 also sets out that in prosecution of the common object the accused intentionally set fire to the house and murdered Gurbaksh Singh and Mst. Bholan. We are satisfied that the substitution of S. 34 in the place of S. 149 in the charge by the court below has resulted in no prejudice to the appellant and it is therefore not open to objection.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]5. It is necessary in view of this contention to examine the evidence in order to see what corroboration there is against each of the appellants. So far as Kamail Singh in concerned, his presence at the scene of occurrence under the circumstances disclosed in the evidence is sufficient to corroborate the evidence of P. W. 13. It should be remembered that Gurnam Singh is not an approver. He is a witness against whom the learned Judges had nothing to say and if they required corroboration of his evidence it was because he was a relation of the deceased and it was considered not safe to base a conviction on his sole testimony. The corroboration that is required in such cases is not what would be necessary to support the evidence of an approver but what would be sufficient to "lend assurance to the evidence before them, and satisfy them that the particular persons were really concerned in the murder of the deceased."(Vide"Lachhman Singh v. State, AIR 1952 SC 167  at p. 169 (B)). Karnail Singh was arrested on the spot with a spear and a bloodstained pyjama, and these are pieces of evidence which would support the inference that he was concerned in the crime.6. The case of Malkiat Singh presents greater difficulty. He was arrested in his house with gunshot wounds on his person and unless it could be established that they were received at the scene of occurrence that would not be sufficient to connect him with the crime.We agree that the mention of his name in Ex. PQ cannot be held to be sufficient corroboration because that is only the statement of P. W. 13 at an earlier stage and it is not independent evidence. With reference to the statement of the accused under S. 342, Cr. P. C., it is true that if it is sought to be used as an admission it must be read as a whole; but where it consists of distinct and separate matters, there is no reason why an admission contained in one matter should not be relied on without reference to the statements relating to other matters.In this case the admission of the appellant that he was present at or near the scene of occurrence is distinct and separate from his explanation as to how he received the injuries. The learned Judges having disbelieved, in our opinion rightly, the statement of the appellant that the house was burnt by some unknown enemies of Gurbaksh Singh and that it was they who murdered him, we do not see any objection to the statement of the appellant that he was present at the scence of the occurrence from being used as anall the learned Judges remarked about P. W. 14 was that it was "impossible to place any very great reliance on Maghar Singhs evidence." But then they also expressly referred to his evidence on this point (Vide p. 61 of the record) and accepted it as one of the possible alternatives (Vide p. 65), And, on their finding, that the injuries must have been received at the place of occurrence and the theory that Gurbaksh Singh fired the shot being negatived, there is no difficulty in holding that they were prepared to accept the evidence of P. W. 14 on this point.Thus there are ample materials for holding that the gunshot wounds were received by Malkiat Singh in the house of Gurbaksh Singh and that is sufficient corroboration of the evidence of P. W. 13. In this view we must overrule the firstfollowing observations of this Court inDalip Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1953 SC 364  AT P. 366 (C) were relied on in support of this position :"Nor is it possible in this case to have recourse to S. 34 because the appellants have not been charged with that even in the alternative and the common intention required by S. 34 and the common object required by S. 149 are far from being the same thing."It is true that there is substantial difference between the two sections but as observed by Lord Summer inBarendra Kumar Ghosh v. Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1  (D), they also to some extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case whether the charge under S. 149 overlaps the ground covered by S. 34. If the common object which is theof the charge under S. 149 does not necessarily involves a common intention, then the substitution of S. 34 for S. 149 might result in prejudice to the accused and ought not therefore to be permitted. But if the facts to be proved and the evidence to be adduced with reference to the charge under S. 149 would be the same if the charge were under S. 34, then the failure to charge the accused under S. 34 could not result in any prejudice and in such cases the substitution of S. 34 for S. 149 must be held to be a formal matter.We do not read the observations in AIR 1953 SC 364  (C) as an authority for the broad proposition that in law there could be no recourse to S. 34 when the charge is only under S. 149. Whether such recourse can be had or not must depend on the facts of each case. This is in accord with the view taken by this Court in AIR 1952 SC 167 (B), where the substitution of S. 34 for S. 149 was upheld on the ground that the facts were such"that the accused could have been charged alternatively either under S. 302 read with S. 149, or under S. 302 read with S. 34."8. Examining the record from this point of view, the finding are the both the appellants who had longstanding enmity with Gurbaksh Singh, got on the roof of his house and set fire to it, with the deceased and Mst. Bholan couped up within. If it was their object under S. 149 to burn the house and cause the death of Gurbaksh Singh, that was also their intention under S. 34.On the facts of this cases there can be no difference between the object and the intention with which the offences were committed. Out attention was also drawn to the wording of the charge which while mentioning S. 149 also sets out that in prosecution of the common object the accused intentionally set fire to the house and murdered Gurbaksh Singh and Mst. Bholan. We are satisfied that the substitution of S. 34 in the place of S. 149 in the charge by the court below has resulted in no prejudice to the appellant and it is therefore not open to objection.