Case: Sushil Suri Vs. C.B.I. &amp; Another

Cr.P.C. was also dismissed by the High Court. In further appeal to this Court, accepting the contention of the appellant that this Court could transcend the limitation imposed under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. and pass orders quashing criminal proceedings even where non compoundable offences were involved, quashing the criminal proceedings the Court observed thus: "30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised? 31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise." [Emphasis supplied] 20. A bare reading of the afore-extracted paragraphs would indicate that the question posed for consideration in that case was with regard to the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings in the facts and circumstances of a given case and not in relation to the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Court came to the conclusion that it was a fit case where it should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. In our opinion, Nikhil Merchant (supra) does not hold as an absolute proposition of law that whenever a dispute between the parties, having overtones of a civil dispute with criminal facets is settled between them, continuance of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and, therefore, should be quashed. Similarly, in B.S. Joshi & Ors. (supra), which has been relied upon in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the question for consideration was whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or Complaint for offences which are not compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. It was held that Section 320 cannot limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., a well settled proposition of law. We are of the opinion that Nikhil Merchant (supra) as also the other two judgments relied upon on behalf of the appellant are clearly distinguishable on facts. It needs little emphasis that even one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases and blindly placing reliance on a decision is never proper. It is trite that while applying ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. (See: Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 649 )). In this regard, the following words of Lord Denning, quoted in Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (2002) 3 SCC 496 ), are also quite apt: "Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive." 21. In the present case, having regard to the modus operandi adopted by the accused, as projected in the Chargesheet and briefly referred to in para 17 (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that it is not a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as also by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. As noted above, the accused had not only duped PSB, they had also availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased and used by them, causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic offence against the society. 22. The view we have taken above, gets fortified by a recent decision of this Court in Rumi Dhar (supra), wherein while dealing with a fact situation, akin to the present case, referring to the decision in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the Court declined to quash criminal proceedings in that case, observing thus: "24. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of such power would, however, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society particularly when both the learned Special Judge as also the High Court have found that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant herein for framing the charge."

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]16. Having examined the case in light of the allegations in the Chargesheet, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court in the matter cannot be flawed and deserves to be affirmed. It is manifest from a bare reading of the Chargesheet, placed on record, that the gravamen of the allegations against the appellant as also the co-accused is that the Company, acting through its directors in concert with the Chartered Accountants and some other persons: (i) conceived a criminal conspiracy and executed it by forging and fabricating a number of documents, like photographs of old machines, purchase orders and invoices showing purchase of machinery in order to support their claim to avail hire purchase loan from PSB; (ii) on the strength of these false documents, PSB parted with the money by issuing pay orders & demand drafts in favour of the Company and (iii) the accused opened six fictitious accounts in the banks (four accounts in Bank of Rajasthan and two in Bank of Madura) to encash the pay orders/bank drafts issued by PSB in favour of the suppliers of machines, thereby directly rotating back the loan amount to the borrower from these fictitious accounts, and in the process committed a systematic fraud on the Bank (PSB) and obtained pecuniary advantage for themselves. Precise details of all the fictitious accounts as also the further flow of money realised on encashment of demand drafts/pay orders have been incorporated in the ChargesheetAdditionally, by allegedly claiming depreciation on the new machinery, which was never purchased, on the basis of forged invoices etc.; the accused cheated the public exchequer as well17. As afore-stated, in the Chargesheet, the accused are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Section 120B, read with Sections 420, 409, 468 and 471 IPC. We feel that at this preliminary stage of proceedings, it would neither be desirable nor proper to return a final finding as to whether the essential ingredients of the said Sections are satisfied. For the purpose of the present appeal, it will suffice to observe that on a conspectus of the factual scenario, noted above, prima facie, the Chargesheet does disclose the commission of offences by the appellant under the afore-noted Sections. The essential ingredient of the offence of "criminal conspiracy", defined in Section 120A IPC, is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that event, unless the Statute so requires, no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a fact-situation criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. In other words, where the conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature as contemplated in Section 120B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 120A IPC, then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the accused for commission of such crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under Section 120B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one of them would not be necessary. (See: Suresh Chandra Bahri Vs. State of Bihar (1995 Supp (1) SCC 80) 1)18. Similarly, the definition of "forgery" in Section 463 IPC is very wide. The basic elements of forgery are: (i) the making of a false document or part of it and (ii) such making should be with such intention as is specified in the Section viz. (a) to cause damage or injury to (i) the public, or (ii) any person; or (b) to support any claim or title; or (c) to cause any person to part with property; or (d) to cause any person to enter into an express or implied contract; or (e) to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed. As stated above, in the instant case more than sufficient circumstances exist suggesting the hatching of criminal conspiracy and forgery of several documents leading to commission of the aforementioned Sections. We refrain from saying more on the subject at this juncture, lest it may cause prejudice to the appellant or the prosecution19. We may now advert to the decision of this Court in the case of Nikhil Merchant (supra), on which great emphasis was laid, on behalf of the appellant. In that case a Chargesheet was filed by the CBI against the accused under Section 120B read with Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC read with Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The allegation under the Chargesheet was that the accused persons had conspired with each other in fraudulently diverting the funds of the Bank. Offence alleging forgery was also included in the ChargesheetIn the meantime, the suit for recovery of money filed by the Bank against the Company, to which the appellant in that case was also a party, was disposed of on a written compromise arrived at between the partiesConsequent upon the compromise of the suit and having regard to the contents of clause 11 of the consent terms, which stipulated that neither party had any claim against the other and parties were withdrawing all allegations and counter allegations made against each other, the said appellant filed an application for discharge. The application was rejected by the trial court. A petition preferred under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. was also dismissed by the High Court. In further appeal to this Court, accepting the contention of the appellant that this Court could transcend the limitation imposed under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. and pass orders quashing criminal proceedings even where non compoundable offences were involved, quashing the criminal proceedings the Court observed thus:"30. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit facilities beyond the limit to which the Company was entitled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The question which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?31. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi case and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also Clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are satisfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the continuance of the same after the compromise arrived at between the parties would be a futile exercise."20. A bare reading of the afore-extracted paragraphs would indicate that the question posed for consideration in that case was with regard to the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings in the facts and circumstances of a given case and not in relation to the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The Court came to the conclusion that it was a fit case where it should exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. In our opinion, Nikhil Merchant (supra) does not hold as an absolute proposition of law that whenever a dispute between the parties, having overtones of a civil dispute with criminal facets is settled between them, continuance of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and, therefore, should be quashed. Similarly, in B.S. Joshi & Ors. (supra), which has been relied upon in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the question for consideration was whether the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or Complaint for offences which are not compoundable under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. It was held that Section 320 cannot limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., a well settled proposition of law. We are of the opinion that Nikhil Merchant (supra) as also the other two judgments relied upon on behalf of the appellant are clearly distinguishable on facts. It needs little emphasis that even one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases and blindly placing reliance on a decision is never proper. It is trite that while applying ratio, the Court may not pick out a word or sentence from the judgment divorced from the context in which the said question arose for consideration. (See: Zee Telefilms Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 649 )). In this regard, the following words of Lord Denning, quoted in Haryana Financial Corporation & Anr. Vs. Jagdamba Oil Mills & Anr. (2002) 3 SCC 496 ), are also quite apt:"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive."21. In the present case, having regard to the modus operandi adopted by the accused, as projected in the Chargesheet and briefly referred to in para 17 (supra), we have no hesitation in holding that it is not a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as also by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. As noted above, the accused had not only duped PSB, they had also availed of depreciation on the machinery, which was never purchased and used by them, causing loss to the exchequer, a serious economic offence against the society22. The view we have taken above, gets fortified by a recent decision of this Court in Rumi Dhar (supra), wherein while dealing with a fact situation, akin to the present case, referring to the decision in Nikhil Merchant (supra), the Court declined to quash criminal proceedings in that case, observing thus:"24. The jurisdiction of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India is not in dispute. Exercise of such power would, however, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and this Court, in terms of Article 142 of the Constitution of India, would not direct quashing of a case involving crime against the society particularly when both the learned Special Judge as also the High Court have found that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellant herein for framing the charge."