Case: Sardar Surjeet Singh Vs. Juguna Bai (Since Dead) &amp; Others

shares of the parties like any supervening development. Since the legislation is beneficial and placed on the statute book with the avowed object of benefiting women which is a vulnerable section of the society in all its stratas, it is necessary to give a liberal effect to it. For this reason also, we cannot equate the concept of partition that the legislature has in mind in the present case with a mere severance of the status of the joint family which can be effected by an expression of a mere desire by a family member to do so. The partition that the legislature has in mind in the present case is undoubtedly a partition completed in all respects and which has brought about an irreversible situation. A preliminary decree which merely declares shares which are themselves liable to change does not bring about any irreversible situation. Hence, we are of the view that unless a partition of the property is effected by metes and bounds, the daughters cannot be deprived of the benefits conferred by the Act. Any other view is likely to deprive a vast section of the fair sex of the benefits conferred by the amendment. Spurious family settlements, instruments of partitions not to speak of oral partitions will spring up and nullify the beneficial effect of the legislation depriving a vast section of women of its benefits.8. Hence, in our opinion, the High Court has rightly held that since the final decree had not been passed and the property had not been divided by metes and bounds, clause (iv) to Section 29-A was not attracted in the present case and the respondent-daughters were entitled to their share in the family property."17. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of this Court in S. Satnam Singh and Ors v. Surender Kaur and Anr. [(2009) 2 SCC 562] in which this Court laid down thus:"18. In certain situations, for the purpose of complete adjudication of the disputes between the parties an appellate Court may also take into consideration subsequent events after passing of the preliminary decree.In Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettiar & Ors. v. Ct. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar [(1960) 2 SCR 209] , it was held :"20 It would thus be seen that the respondents share in the family properties was not in dispute nor was his share in the properties in Burma seriously challenged. The only plea raised in respect of the latter claim was that the court had no jurisdiction to deal with it. This state of the pleadings in a sense truly reflected the nature of the dispute between the parties. It is common ground that the family is a trading family and there could be no doubt that the assets of the family were partible between the members of the family. It was on these pleadings that the trial judge framed fifteen issues and set down the case for hearing."19. While dealing with the application under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 where one of the questions was as to whether an immoveable property situated in Burma could be a subject matter of reference, in Phoolchand & Anr. v. Gopal Lal [(1967) 3 SCR 153] , it was held :"7. We are of opinion that there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in partition suits when after the preliminary decree some parties die and shares of other parties are thereby augmented. We have already said that it is not disputed that in partition suits the court can do so even after the preliminary decree is passed. It would in our opinion be convenient to the court and advantageous to the parties, specially in partition suits, to have disputed rights finally settled and specification of shares in the preliminary decree varied before a final decree is prepared. If this is done, there is a clear determination of the rights of parties to the suit on the question in dispute and we see no difficulty in holding that in such cases there is a decree deciding these disputed rights; if so, there is no reason why a second preliminary decree correcting the shares in a partition suit cannot be passed by the court. So far therefore as partition suits are concerned we have no doubt that if an event transpires after the preliminary decree which necessitates a change in shares, the court can and should do so; and if there is a dispute in that behalf, the order of the court deciding that dispute and making variation in shares specified in the preliminary decree already passed is a decree in itself which would be liable to appeal. We should however like to point out that what we are saying must be confined to partition suits, for we are not concerned in the present appeal with other kinds of suits in which also preliminary and final decrees are passed. There is no prohibition in the Code of Civil Procedure against passing a second preliminary decree in such circumstances and we do not see why we should rule out a second preliminary decree in such circumstances only on the ground that the Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate such a possibility."Thus, subsequent event can be taken consideration while working out the preliminary decree into the shape of final decree. It was also a case of subsequent event. As such, it is quite distinguishable. In the instant case, the preliminary decree has attained finality. The High Court has earlier rightly observed that preliminary decree would not be reopened due to impleadment which had been ordered.18. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in law while directing that further preliminary decrees can be passed. It was not a case of subsequent event or change of law. The only remedy available to Nima Kaur was to file a separate suit.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]14. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the question whether preliminary decree can bedecision is distinguishable and cannot be said to be applicable in view of the factual matrix of the instant case where the right has been asserted, which came into existence before the preliminary decree was passed and Nima Kaur was not a party to suit. It also appears that it was not the plea that was taken by any of the parties during the course of preliminary decree that she was having right, title or interest on the basis of settlement/gift deed datedsubsequent event can be taken consideration while working out the preliminary decree into the shape of final decree. It was also a case of subsequent event. As such, it is quite distinguishable. In the instant case, the preliminary decree has attained finality. The High Court has earlier rightly observed that preliminary decree would not be reopened due to impleadment which had been ordered.18. In our opinion, the High Court has erred in law while directing that further preliminary decrees can be passed. It was not a case of subsequent event or change of law. The only remedy available to Nima Kaur was to file a separate suit.