Case: H.A.K. Rao, Chartered Accountant Vs. Council of Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, New Delhi

is guilty of such other act or omission as may be specified by the Council in this behalf, by notification in the Gazette of India. 11. Now the question is whether the said notification is invalid for any of the reasons mentioned above. It is said that the power of the Council to issue a notification is limited by the express provisions of Cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act. As under Cl. (i) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act, the contravention of the provisions of the Act or of the Regulations made thereunder was professional misconduct, the argument proceeded the expression "other art or omission" in Cl. (ii) should be an act or omission other than those provided in the Regulations. Elaborating this argument it was said that under Regulation 54-A (2) the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965 had a legal right to canvass within the meaning of the said proviso, that the notification in effect depriving him of that right was in derogation of the said Regulation and, was. therefore, illegal. It was also argued that the said notification was inconsistent With Cl. (4B) of Regulation 54-A, as under that clause canvassing for votes or soliciting votes of electors was prohibited within a distance of 200 meters from the polling booths, thereby impliedly permitting canvassing beyond that distance, and that, therefore, the notification prohibiting canvassing generally was in direct conflict with the same. The further argument was that Cl. (4B) of Regulation 54-A detracted only to a limited extent from the legal right to canvass and that any prohibition against general canvassing beyond the limits laid down by Cl. (4B) of Regulation 54-A contravened both Cl. (2) and C1. (4B) of Regulation 54-A and was bad. 12. The argument at first sight appears to be attractive, but it involves a fallacy. The Regulations enumerated different heads for disciplinary action in connection with the conduct of an election; but they did not, either expressly or by necessary implication, prohibit the Council from adding additional heads of disciplinary action. While the Regulations provide for disciplinary action for undue influence and for canvassing for votes, etc., within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth, the notification placed other acts and omissions under different heads of misconduct. There is no inherent conflict between undue influence and canvassing of votes by visiting the places of business or the residence of the voters. So too, there is no conflict between canvassing of votes within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth and canvassing of votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner. All the three can stand together. 13. Nor can we agree that apart from the fundamental rights, which the appellant does not claim in this appeal, he has an unlimited right to canvass for votes, either statutory or otherwise. Nothing has been placed before us to sustain any such right. His rights are defined by the statute and we cannot say that such an unlimited right to canvass is implicit in the right to stand for election. 14. We cannot also agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the notification is unreasonable in the sense that expression is understood in law. As noticed earlier the electorate is an enlightened body and the elections are to council designed to maintain high standards of the profession. The voters are expected to know the qualifications of every candidate and they are certainly in a position to vote for the best candidate. Canvassing may be necessary for explaining to an illiterate voter the qualifications of a candidate and the principles for which he stands or in the case of vast electorate to which the candidate may not be familiar, but no such necessity exists in the case of enlightened voters of a compact electorate. If the Council thought that malpractices existed and undue and unwholesome pressures were brought to bear on the voters and for that reason, with a view to purify the conduct of elections, if it issued the said notification prohibiting canvassing, we cannot say that the Council acted unreasonably in issuing the said notification. It issued the notification in the best interests of the purity of the elections and ultimately in the interests of the profession itself. We therefore, hold that the Council had not only power to issue the notification prohibiting canvassing of votes but also that the said notification was not inconsistent with either the provisions of the Act or the Regulation made thereunder. 15. Now coming to the cross-appeal, the High Court held that issuing manifestoes or circulars directly came into conflict with the proviso to Cl. (2) of Regulation 54-A which says that a declaration of policy or a promise of a particular action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning, of the said clause. Doubtless the proviso to Regulation 54-A (2) saves issuing of manifestoes and circulars from the operation of the substantive part of the clause. 16. The act of issuing a manifesto or a circular, therefore does not amount to undue influence within the meaning of that clause. If the notification says that such issuing of manifestoes or circulars is undue influence it certainly comes into conflict with that clause. But the notification does not, and indeed it cannot, amend the definition of "undue influence. The said Act, though if does not amount to an undue influence, is constituted a different head of professional misconduct which the Council is authorised to do under Cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act. From this perspective no conflict between the two arises. We cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning of the High Court that the notification in so far as it prohibited issuing of manifestoes, and circulars was illegal. 17.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The gist of the said provisions may be stated thus: For the purpose of the Act the expression "professional misconduct includes the act or omission specified in the Schedule to the Act. The Council also may by notification make regulations in connection with the conduct of elections. Under Regulation 54-A (2) and (4B) a member of the Institute shall be liable to disciplinary action by the Council if he was guilty of the practice, among others, of undue influence and canvassing as defined therein. On February 22, 1964, the Council issued a notification specifying that a member of the Institute shall be decreed to be guilty of misconduct, if, in connection with the election to the Councils of the Institute he is found to have taken part, directly or indirectly, either himself or through an other person, or to have issued manifestoes or circulars or to have canvassed votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner. Part l of the Second Schedule to the Act describes the acts of professional misconduct in relation to chartered accountants in practice requiring action by the High Court and Part II thereof states generally that a member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations or is guilty of such other act or omission as may be specified by the Council in this behalf, by notification in the Gazette of IndiaThe argument at first sight appears to be attractive, but it involves a fallacy. The Regulations enumerated different heads for disciplinary action in connection with the conduct of an election; but they did not, either expressly or by necessary implication, prohibit the Council from adding additional heads of disciplinary action. While the Regulations provide for disciplinary action for undue influence and for canvassing for votes, etc., within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth, the notification placed other acts and omissions under different heads of misconduct. There is no inherent conflict between undue influence and canvassing of votes by visiting the places of business or the residence of the voters. So too, there is no conflict between canvassing of votes within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth and canvassing of votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner. All the three can stand togetherNor can we agree that apart from the fundamental rights, which the appellant does not claim in this appeal, he has an unlimited right to canvass for votes, either statutory or otherwise. Nothing has been placed before us to sustain any such right. His rights are defined by the statute and we cannot say that such an unlimited right to canvass is implicit in the right to stand for electionNow coming to the cross-appeal, the High Court held that issuing manifestoes or circulars directly came into conflict with the proviso to Cl. (2) of Regulation 54-A which says that a declaration of policy or a promise of a particular action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning, of the said clause. Doubtless the proviso to Regulation 54-A (2) saves issuing of manifestoes and circulars from the operation of the substantive part of the clause.The act of issuing a manifesto or a circular, therefore does not amount to undue influence within the meaning of that clause. If the notification says that such issuing of manifestoes or circulars is undue influence it certainly comes into conflict with that clause. But the notification does not, and indeed it cannot, amend the definition of "undue influence. The said Act, though if does not amount to an undue influence, is constituted a different head of professional misconduct which the Council is authorised to do under Cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act. From this perspective no conflict between the two arises. We cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning of the High Court that the notification in so far as it prohibited issuing of manifestoes, and circulars was illegal.