Case: M.M. Aqua Technologies Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi-III

treated as moneys set apart to meet a known liability. The debentures will have to be shown in the Companys balance sheet of the year as liability. 11. In the case of CIT v. Peico Electronics & Electricals [(1987) 166 ITR 299 (Cal) ] the Calcutta High Court held that the Debenture Redemption Reserve will have to be treated as a reserve and not provision because, none of the debentures became redeemable during the accounting period. The liability to redeem the debenture was a future liability. The debentures had been separately shown in the balance sheet as a liability. The reserve had been created by appropriation of profits and not by way of a charge on revenue. 12. We are of the view that this approach is erroneous and overlooks the definitions of provision and reserve given in the Companies Act. The debentures were nothing but secured loans. Merely because the debentures were not redeemable during the accounting period, the liability to redeem the debentures did not cease to exist. It was redeemable or repayable at a future date. But it was a known liability. In the form of balance sheet prescribed by the Act in Schedule VI, the secured loans have to be shown under the heading liabilities. Secured loans include (1) debentures, (2) loans and advances from banks, (3) loans and advances from subsidiaries and (4) other loans and advances. The secured loans might not be immediately repayable, but the liability to repay these loans was an existing liability and has to be shown in the Companys balance sheet for the relevant year of account as a liability. Amounts set apart to pay these loans cannot be reserve. The interpretation clause of the balance sheet in Schedule VI of the Companies Act specifically lays down that reserves shall not include any amount written off or retained by way of providing for a known liability. 27. The question decided in this case is far removed from the question to be decided in the facts of the present case and has no application to these facts whatsoever. The question in the present case does not depend upon what can, in law, be stated to be a debenture and/or whether it is convertible or non-convertible or payable immediately or in the future. The question in the present case is only whether interest can be said to have been actually paid by the mode of issuing debentures. To answer this question, this judgment has no relevance. 28. The learned ASG then relied upon a recent judgment of this Court in CIT v. Gujarat Cypromet Ltd. (supra). In the said case, a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with Section 43B Explanation 3C, noted the facts as found by the CIT as follows (para 5): 2.2. I have perused the case laws cited and also the above sanction letter from IDBI and also the auditors note referred by the assessing officer. I have perused Schedule 3 of the balance sheet as on 31-3-2001 and find that the above loan appears as on 31-3-2001 and is part of the total secured loans of Rs 75,26,10,769. The fact that the entry pertaining to the interest element outstanding to financial institutions referred at page 2 of the order by the assessing officer has been reversed after receipt of funds of Rs 8 crores from IDBI substantiates the contention of the appellant company that the entries relating to interest outstanding with reference the above institutions have been squared up and its place a new credit entry of loan of IDBI is now appearing in the balance sheet as on 31-3-2001. The plea of the appellants counsel Shri Tanna that since no interest payment is outstanding now and the amount is paid off, the expenditure of interest is allowable under Section 43-B. It is further added that in case the loan had been disbursed in 2 parts — one to meet the interest outstanding and the balance for financial assistance still the entries in the books of account would have remain the same and the outstanding interest would have been NIL. Having regard to the above facts and also the case laws cited by the appellants representative, I am inclined to hold that the disallowance made by the assessing officer is contrary to the substance of the transaction and the provisions of Section 43-B of the Income Tax Act and the same cannot be sustained and therefore directed to be deleted. 29. It is on these facts that Explanation 3C was pressed into service in favour of Revenue and paras 11 and 12 of the impugned judgment in the present case were referred to, in passing, in para 13. Ultimately, this Court concluded: 16. In the impugned judgment [CIT v. Gujarat Cypromet Ltd., 2006 SCC OnLine Guj 560], the Gujarat High Court has relied upon CIT v. Bhagwati Autocast Ltd., 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 381 which was not a case covered by Section 43-B(d) rather was a case of Section 43-B(a). The provision of Section 43- B covers a host of different situations. The statutory Explanation 3-C inserted by the Finance Act, 2006 is squarely applicable in the facts of the present case. It appears that the attention of the High Court was not invited to Explanation 3- C, we are, thus, of the view that the assessing officer has rightly disallowed the deduction as claimed by the assessee. The appellate authority, ITAT and the High Court erred in reversing the said disallowance. 30. On the facts of that case, this Court found that Explanation 3C was squarely attracted in that outstanding interest had not actually been paid, but instead a new credit entry of loan now appeared, bringing the case within the express language of Explanation 3C. This is far removed from the facts of the present case, which were not adverted to at all in this judgment. Consequently, this judgment is also distinguishable and would not apply to govern the facts of the present case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]20. This being the case, it is important to advert to the facts found in the present case. Both the CIT and the ITAT found, as a matter of fact, that as per a rehabilitation plan agreed to between the lender and the borrower, debentures were accepted by the financial institution in discharge of the debt on account of outstanding interest. This is also clear from the expression in lieu of used in the judgment of the learned CIT. That this is so is clear not only from the accounts produced by the assessee, but equally clear from the fact that in the assessment of ICICI Bank, for the assessment year in question, the accounts of the bank reflect the amount received by way of debentures as its business income. This being the fact-situation in the present case, it is clear that interest was actually paid by means of issuance of debentures, which extinguished the liability to pay interest.21. Explanation 3C, which was introduced for the removal of doubts, only made it clear that interest that remained unpaid and has been converted into a loan or borrowing shall not be deemed to have been actually paid. As has been seen by us hereinabove, particularly with regard to the Circular explaining Explanation 3C, at the heart of the introduction of Explanation 3C is misuse of the provisions of Section 43B by not actually paying interest, but converting such interest into a fresh loan. On the facts found in the present case, the issue of debentures by the assessee was, under a rehabilitation plan, to extinguish the liability of interest altogether. No misuse of the provision of Section 43B was found as a matter of fact by either the CIT or the ITAT. Explanation 3C, which was meant to plug a loophole, cannot therefore be brought to the aid of Revenue on the facts of this case. Indeed, if there be any ambiguity in the retrospectively added Explanation 3C, at least three well established canons of interpretation come to the rescue of the assessee in this case. First, since Explanation 3C was added in 2006 with the object of plugging a loophole – i.e. misusing Section 43B by not actually paying interest but converting interest into a fresh loan, bona fide transactions of actual payments are not meant to be affected. In similar circumstances, in K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173 ,  this Court construed Section 52 of the Income Tax Act as applying only to cases where understatement is be found – an understatement is not to be found in the literal language of Section 52, but was introduced by this Court to streamline the provision in the light of the object sought to be achieved by the said provision. This Court, therefore, held:13. Thus it is not enough to attract the applicability of sub- section (2) that the fair market value of the capital asset transferred by the assessee as on the date of the transfer exceeds the full value of the consideration declared in respect of the transfer by not less than 15 per cent of the value so declared, but it is furthermore necessary that the full value of the consideration in respect of the transfer is understated or in other words, shown at a lesser figure than that actually received by the assessee. Sub-section (2) has no application in case of an honest and bona fide transaction where the consideration in respect of the transfer has been correctly declared or disclosed by the assessee, even if the condition of 15 per cent difference between the fair market value of the capital asset as on the date of the transfer and the full value of the consideration declared by the assessee is satisfied. ….15. It is therefore clear that sub-section (2) cannot be invoked by the Revenue unless there is understatement of the consideration in respect of the transfer and the burden of showing that there is such understatement is on the Revenue. Once it is established by the Revenue that the consideration for the transfer has been understated or, to put it differently, the consideration actually received by the assessee is more than what is declared or disclosed by him, sub-section (2) is immediately attracted, subject of course to the fulfilment of the condition of 15 per cent or more difference, and the Revenue is then not required to show what is the precise extent of the understatement or in other words, what is the consideration actually received by the assessee. That would in most cases be difficult, if not impossible, to show and hence sub-section (2) relieves the Revenue of all burden of proof regarding the extent of understatement or concealment and provides a statutory measure of the consideration received in respect of the transfer. It does not create any fictional receipt. It does not deem as receipt something which is not in fact received. It merely provides a statutory best judgment assessment of the consideration actually received by the assessee and brings to tax capital gains on the footing that the fair market value of the capital asset represents the actual consideration received by the assessee as against the consideration untruly declared or disclosed by him. This approach in construction of sub-section (2) falls in line with the scheme of the provisions relating to tax on capital gains. It may be noted that Section 52 is not a charging section but is a computation section. It has to be read along with Section 48 which provides the mode of computation and under which the starting point of computation is the full value of the consideration received or accruing. What in fact never accrued or was never received cannot be computed as capital gains under Section 48. Therefore sub-section (2) cannot be construed as bringing within the computation of capital gains an amount which, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to have accrued to the assessee or been received by him and it must be confined to cases where the actual consideration received for the transfer is understated and since in such cases it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine and prove the exact quantum of the suppressed consideration, sub-section (2) provides the statutory measure for determining the consideration actually received by the assessee and permits the Revenue to take the fair market value of the capital asset as the full value of the consideration received in respect of the transfer.22. Second, a retrospective provision in a tax act which is for the removal of doubts cannot be presumed to be retrospective, even where such language is used, if it alters or changes the law as it earlier stood. This was stated in Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. v. CIT, (2005) 12 SCC 717    as follows:17. As was affirmed by this Court in Goslino Mario [(2000) 10 SCC 165]   a cardinal principle of the tax law is that the law to be applied is that which is in force in the relevant assessment year unless otherwise provided expressly or by necessary implication. (See also Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. v. CIT [(1980) 1 SCC 139]   .) An Explanation to a statutory provision may fulfil the purpose of clearing up an ambiguity in the main provision or an Explanation can add to and widen the scope of the main section [See Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 585 , 598]  . If it is in its nature clarificatory then the Explanation must be read into the main provision with effect from the time that the main provision came into force [See Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 24  (  para 44); Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das v. CIT, (1997) 1 SCC 352 , 354 ; CIT v. Podar Cement (P) Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 482 , 506] . But if it changes the law it is not presumed to be retrospective, irrespective of the fact that the phrases used are it is declared or for the removal of doubts.18. There was and is no ambiguity in the main provision of Section 9(1)(ii). It includes salaries in the total income of an assessee if the assessee has earned it in India. The word earned had been judicially defined in S.G. Pgnatale [(1980) 124 ITR 391 (Guj)] by the High Court of Gujarat, in our view, correctly, to mean as income arising or accruing in India. The amendment to the section by way of an Explanation in 1983 effected a change in the scope of that judicial definition so as to include with effect from 1979, income payable for service rendered in India.19. When the Explanation seeks to give an artificial meaning to earned in India and brings about a change effectively in the existing law and in addition is stated to come into force with effect from a future date, there is no principle of interpretation which would justify reading the Explanation as operating retrospectively.23. This being the case, Explanation 3C is clarificatory – it explains Section 43B(d) as it originally stood and does not purport to add a new condition retrospectively, as has wrongly been held by the High Court.24. Third, any ambiguity in the language of Explanation 3C shall be resolved in favour of the assessee as per Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioner (supra) as followed by judgments of this Court – See Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 613    at paras 60 to 70 per Kapadia, C.J. and para 333, 334 per Radhakrishnan, J.25. The High Court judgment dated 18th May, 2015, is clearly in error in concluding that interest, on the facts of this case, has been converted into a loan. There is no basis for this finding - as a matter of fact, it is directly contrary to the finding on facts of the authorities below.26. The learned ASGs reliance on National Rayon Corpn. Ltd. v. CIT, (1997) 7 SCC 56    is disingenuous. That was a decision which turned on whether a sum of Rs.79 lakhs represents Debenture Redemption Reserve and was includible in computing the capital of the assessee company for the purpose of the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964. The High Court took the view that the amount set apart to redeem debentures had to be treated as a provision and not as a reserve. While discussing this question, this Court held :8. Mr Ramachandran advanced another argument that there was no present liability to pay any amount to the debenture- holders. That liability will arise only when the amount falls due for payment. Therefore, there was no existing liability for redeeming the debentures in the relevant year of account.9. We are unable to uphold this argument. The liability to repay arises the moment the money is borrowed. The amount borrowed may be repayable immediately or in future. The date of repayment of loan may be deferred by agreement but the obligation or the liability to repay will not cease on that account. The obligation is a present obligation; debitum in praesenti, solvendum in futuro. This aspect of the matter was explained in the judgment of this Court in Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CWT [AIR 1966 SC 1370   : (1966) 59 ITR 767  ] .10. By issuing the debentures, the Company had taken a loan against the security of its assets. This loan may not be repayable in the year of account. But the obligation to pay the loan is a present obligation. Any money set apart in the accounts of the Company to redeem the debentures must be treated as moneys set apart to meet a known liability. The debentures will have to be shown in the Companys balance sheet of the year as liability.11. In the case of CIT v. Peico Electronics & Electricals [(1987) 166 ITR 299 (Cal)  ] the Calcutta High Court held that the Debenture Redemption Reserve will have to be treated as a reserve and not provision because, none of the debentures became redeemable during the accounting period. The liability to redeem the debenture was a future liability. The debentures had been separately shown in the balance sheet as a liability. The reserve had been created by appropriation of profits and not by way of a charge on revenue.12. We are of the view that this approach is erroneous and overlooks the definitions of provision and reserve given in the Companies Act. The debentures were nothing but secured loans. Merely because the debentures were not redeemable during the accounting period, the liability to redeem the debentures did not cease to exist. It was redeemable or repayable at a future date. But it was a known liability. In the form of balance sheet prescribed by the Act in Schedule VI, the secured loans have to be shown under the heading liabilities. Secured loans include (1) debentures, (2) loans and advances from banks, (3) loans and advances from subsidiaries and (4) other loans and advances. The secured loans might not be immediately repayable, but the liability to repay these loans was an existing liability and has to be shown in the Companys balance sheet for the relevant year of account as a liability. Amounts set apart to pay these loans cannot be reserve. The interpretation clause of the balance sheet in Schedule VI of the Companies Act specifically lays down that reserves shall not include any amount written off or retained by way of providing for a known liability.27. The question decided in this case is far removed from the question to be decided in the facts of the present case and has no application to these facts whatsoever. The question in the present case does not depend upon what can, in law, be stated to be a debenture and/or whether it is convertible or non-convertible or payable immediately or in the future.The question in the present case is only whether interest can be said to have been actually paid by the mode of issuing debentures.To answer this question, this judgment has no relevance.CIT v. Gujarat Cypromet Ltd. (supra).In the said case, a Division Bench of this Court, while dealing with Section 43B Explanation 3C, noted the facts as found by the CIT as follows (para 5):2.2. I have perused the case laws cited and also the above sanction letter from IDBI and also the auditors note referred by the assessing officer. I have perused Schedule 3 of the balance sheet as on 31-3-2001 and find that the above loan appears as on 31-3-2001 and is part of the total secured loans of Rs 75,26,10,769. The fact that the entry pertaining to the interest element outstanding to financial institutions referred at page 2 of the order by the assessing officer has been reversed after receipt of funds of Rs 8 crores from IDBI substantiates the contention of the appellant company that the entries relating to interest outstanding with reference the above institutions have been squared up and its place a new credit entry of loan of IDBI is now appearing in the balance sheet as on 31-3-2001. The plea of the appellants counsel Shri Tanna that since no interest payment is outstanding now and the amount is paid off, the expenditure of interest is allowable under Section 43-B. It is further added that in case the loan had been disbursed in 2 parts — one to meet the interest outstanding and the balance for financial assistance still the entries in the books of account would have remain the same and the outstanding interest would have been NIL. Having regard to the above facts and also the case laws cited by the appellants representative, I am inclined to hold that the disallowance made by the assessing officer is contrary to the substance of the transaction and the provisions of Section 43-B of the Income Tax Act and the same cannot be sustained and therefore directed to be deleted.29. It is on these facts that Explanation 3C was pressed into service in favour of Revenue and paras 11 and 12 of the impugned judgment in the present case were referred to, in passing, in para 13. Ultimately, this Court concluded:16. In the impugned judgment [CIT v. Gujarat Cypromet Ltd., 2006 SCC OnLine Guj 560], the Gujarat High Court has relied upon CIT v. Bhagwati Autocast Ltd., 2002 SCC OnLine Guj 381 which was not a case covered by Section 43-B(d) rather was a case of Section 43-B(a). The provision of Section 43- B covers a host of different situations. The statutory Explanation 3-C inserted by the Finance Act, 2006 is squarely applicable in the facts of the present case. It appears that the attention of the High Court was not invited to Explanation 3- C, we are, thus, of the view that the assessing officer has rightly disallowed the deduction as claimed by the assessee. The appellate authority, ITAT and the High Court erred in reversing the said disallowance.30. On the facts of that case, this Court found that Explanation 3C was squarely attracted in that outstanding interest had not actually been paid, but instead a new credit entry of loan now appeared, bringing the case within the express language of Explanation 3C. This is far removed from the facts of the present case, which were not adverted to at all in this judgment. Consequently, this judgment is also distinguishable and would not apply to govern the facts of the present case.