Case: Gujarat Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd Vs. Muniicipal Corpn. Of Ahmedabad

case of an appeal made against a ratable value the amount of the disputed tax claimed from the appellant, or the amount of the tax chargeable on the basis of the disputed ratable value, up to the date of filing of the appeal, has been deposited by the appellant with the Commissioner." 10. It will be seen that clause (d) aforesaid was in similar terms as clause (e) of Section 406(2) as it originally existed. Bombay High Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 217 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. Calcutta High Court in Chhatter Singh Baid and others v. Corporation of Calcutta and others, AIR 1984 Cal. 283 also took the same view. There it was sub-section (3A) of Section 183 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 which provided : "No appeal under this section shall be entertained unless the consolidated rate payable up to the date of prevention of the appeal on the valuation determined -(a) by an order under Section 182, in the case of an appeal to the Court to Small Causes;(b) by the decision of the Court of Small Causes, inthe case of an appeal to the High Court;has been deposited in the municipal office and such consolidated rate is continued to be deposited until the appeal is finally decided."Similar provisions existed in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. There it is Section 170 which is as under :170. Conditions of right of appeal. - No appeal shall be heard or determined under Section 169 unless -(a) the appeal is, in the case of a property tax, brought within thirty days next after the date of authentication of the assessment list under Section 124 (exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the relevant entries therein) or, as the case may be, within thirty days of the date on which an amendment is finally made under Section 126, and, in the case of any other tax, within thirty days next after the date of the receipt of the notice of assessment or of alternation of assessment or, if no notice has been given, within thirty days after the date of the presentation of the first bill or, as the case may be, the first notice of demand in respect thereof.Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the expiration of the period prescribed therefor by this Section if the appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period;(b) the amount, if any, in dispute in the appeal has been deposited by the appellant in the office of the Corporation." 11. A Full Bench of the Delhi High Court, by majority, upheld the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provision though there was also challenge to the same based on Article 14 of the Constitution. Appeal against the judgment of the Delhi High Court was taken to this Court which upheld the view of the Delhi High Court. The decision of this court is reported as Shyam Kishore and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, 1993(1) SCC 22. This Court relied on its earlier decisions in Ganga Bai case and Anant Mills case. Reference was also made to another decision of this Court in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta/Shri Jawahar D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs (Preventive), Bombay, 1988(4) SCC 402 where Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., speaking for the Court, said : "Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi-judicial adjudications. The right to appeal is a statutory right and it can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant." 12. It is not necessary for us to refer to other decisions asserting the same principle time and again. When the statement of law is so clear, we find no difficulty in upholding the vires of clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 406 read with proviso thereto. Any challenge to its constitutional validity on the ground that onerous conditions have been imposed and right to appeal has become illusory must be negatived. 13. We also note that under clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 406, a complaint lies to the Municipal Commissioner against imposition of any property tax and only after that when the complaint is disposed of that appeal can be filed. Appeal to the Court as provided in clause (e) may appear to be rather a second appeal. Then under Section 406 of the Act provisions exist for referring the matter to arbitration. Under sub-section (1) of Section 408 where any person aggrieved by any order fixing or charging any rateable value or tax under the Act desires that any matter in difference between him and the other parties interested in such order should be referred to arbitration, then, if all such parties agree to do so, they may apply to the Court for an order of reference on such matter and when such an order is made provisions relating to arbitration in suits shall apply. That apart, if a person cannot avail of the right of appeal under Section 406 of the Act, other remedies are available to him under the law. In that case, it may not be possible for the Municipal Corporation to contend that an alternative remedy of appeal exist under Section 406 of the Act. 14. When leave was granted in these appeals by order dated December 12, 1980 this Court granted stay on the condition that seventy-five per cent of the tax is deposited with the Municipal Corporation within two months from that date and on such deposit being made, the appeals be heard and disposed of (by the Judge) and we believe by this time the appeals filed before the Judge under Section 406 must have been disposed of. 15. When the arguments stated in these matters, on the statement of learned Counsel for the appellant two appeals bearing Nos. 3018-19/80 were dismissed as withdrawn. 16.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It is not necessary for us to refer to other decisions asserting the same principle time and again. When the statement of law is so clear, we find no difficulty in upholding the vires of clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 406 read with proviso thereto. Any challenge to its constitutional validity on the ground that onerous conditions have been imposed and right to appeal has become illusory must bealso note that under clause (e) of sub-section (2) of Section 406, a complaint lies to the Municipal Commissioner against imposition of any property tax and only after that when the complaint is disposed of that appeal can be filed. Appeal to the Court as provided in clause (e) may appear to be rather a second appeal. Then under Section 406 of the Act provisions exist for referring the matter to arbitration. Under sub-section (1) of Section 408 where any person aggrieved by any order fixing or charging any rateable value or tax under the Act desires that any matter in difference between him and the other parties interested in such order should be referred to arbitration, then, if all such parties agree to do so, they may apply to the Court for an order of reference on such matter and when such an order is made provisions relating to arbitration in suits shall apply. That apart, if a person cannot avail of the right of appeal under Section 406 of the Act, other remedies are available to him under the law. In that case, it may not be possible for the Municipal Corporation to contend that an alternative remedy of appeal exist under Section 406 of theleave was granted in these appeals by order dated December 12, 1980 this Court granted stay on the condition that seventy-five per cent of the tax is deposited with the Municipal Corporation within two months from that date and on such deposit being made, the appeals be heard and disposed of (by the Judge) and we believe by this time the appeals filed before the Judge under Section 406 must have been disposedthe arguments stated in these matters, on the statement of learned Counsel for the appellant two appeals bearing Nos. 3018-19/80 were dismissed as withdrawn.