Case: Harisingh Pratapsingh Chawda Vs. Popatlal Mulshanker Joshi &amp; Ors

with regard to the alleged visit of the Maulvi and the 1st respondent to the appellant three other possible witnesses including the appellants wife, Pushpaben who could have been examined to establish that the 1st respondent accompanied the Maulvi to th e appellant had not been examined. A further fact which improbabilises this story is that in the election petition it is stated that the 1st respondent told the appellant that he would arrange for a ticket for Madhusudansinh in the 1972 elections and pay him Rs. 10, 000/- if Madhusudansinh left organisation Congress and joined the Ruling Congress and voted and worked for him (1st respondent) and asked him to convey the offer to Madhusudansinh. No evidence was let in about the voting and what is more Madhusudansinh was not a voter in the Banaskantha Constituency. This shows that the allegation regarding the request to appellant to vote for 1st respondent is of the character as the request to Madhusudansinh and put in merely for the purposes of the election petition and not a fact. On broader considerations also it is very unlikely that when the talk was about the appellant and Madhusudansinh defecting to the Ruling Congress from the organisation Congress there would have been any talk about the voting itself. All parties would have proceeded on the understanding that when they defected to the Ruling Congress they would both work and vote for the Ruling Congress. The distinction between a gift or offer combined with the request to vote and the gift or offer to a person asking him to work for him with the incidental result that person might vote for him should always be kept in mind. In such a case there is no specific bargain for the vote. Were it not so it would be impossible for persons standing for election to get any person to work for them who is not also a voter in the constituency. This was brought out by this Court in the decision in onkar Singh v. Ghasiram Majhi (1). We would, therefore, hold that the case that 1st respondent bargained for the appellants vote has not been satisfactorily made out.On behalf of the 1st respondent it was urged that the actions of the appellant and Madhusudansinhji immediately after t he payment of Rs. 10,000/- and the dramatic developments at the meeting addressed by the Prime Minister show that there would not have been any bargaining for the appellants vote. The points relied upon were (1) that it was not said by the appellant when he threw the money into the crowd on the 18th that he was asked to vote for the 1st respondent, (2) that it was not mentioned in the statement (Ex. 5) made by the appellant and Madhusudansinhji on 18-2-1971, (3) that was not mention ed in the interview given to the newspaper reporters found in Ex. 7 or in the newspaper report Ex. 8. We do not consider that these things are of much importance. At that time the most important factor was the attempt to persuade the appellant and Madhusudansinhji to defect to the Ruling Congress and any request to the appellant to vote for the 1st respondent would have been insignificant even as we have held that when requesting the appellant and Madhusudansinhji to defect to the Ruling Congress it is not likely that they would have been asked to vote for the 1st respondent. The reference to the piece of evidence just mentioned cannot be said to establish that there was no request made to the appellant to vote for the 1st respondent. That would have to be decided on other factors and other evidence and on the basis of that evidence we have already held that it is not established that the 1st respondent requested the appellant to vote for him.5. Now remains the question of the offer to build a hostel for Kshatriya boys. Strictly speaking this does not arise on issue 10. This is probabilised by the evidence of Madhusudansinhji, Maulvi Abdul Rehman and the appellant as well as Ex. T. Whether it was to be in Danta or Banaskantha does not make much difference as long as it was for the Kshatriya boys. The two places are near to each other though in different Parliamentary constituencies and in whichever place it was situate it will benefit Kshatriya boys and there is no. doubt that if the hostel were constructed by respondent No. 1 or the Ruling Congress party at his instance that would induce the voters to vote for the Ruling Congress candidate. But before that happen s the matter should come to the knowledge of the voters. Only if the voters knew that the promise had been made to the appellant and Madhusudansinhji that promise would induce the voters to vote for 1st respondent. But the knowledge of the prormise remained confined to the appellant and P.W. 10, in addition of course to Maulvi Abdul Rehman and the 1st respondents son. If the payment or the promise was to induce the voters, it cannot induce the voters unless they come to know about the payment or the promise. There is no evidence her that the voters knew about the promise to build the hostel. The bargain in such cases as we have mentioned in the JUDGMENT delivered by us today in S. Iqbal Singh v. Gurdas Singh & Ors. is really an offer on the part of the bribe giver that he would do such a thing if the voters would vote for him. It is not necessary that the voters should have accepted it. But the voters should have a knowledge about the offer. Then only it would be a bargain. An offer contemplated and retained in the mind of the offerer and not articulated and made known to the offeree will not be a bargain. It therefore follows that in this case the offer to build a hostel does not also amount to bribery.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are in entire agreement with the finding of the learned Judge as regards the payment of Rs. 10, 000/- to the appellant and also the offer to build hostel for Kshatriya students and do not consider it necessary to go into the evidence in support of that finding. That finding is supported not only by the evidence of Madnusudansinhji and Maulvi Abdur Rehman but also the letter Ex. T, passed by the latter to the appellant andis still another finding necessary in regard to the allegations made in the petition in respect of which the learned Judge has given no finding and that is with regard to what happen ed of the 9th of February 1971. We are at one with the view of the learned Judge that the payment of Rs. 10, 000/- to the appellant was with a view to induce him to defect from organisation Congress to the Ruling Congress. It may carry with it the implication that he was expected to use his influence with the voters to vote for the candidate set up by the Rulinghaving considered his arguments we are still of the opinion that the view taken in that decision is correct. The object of providing that a payment should not be made to a person in order that that payment should induce some other person to vote for the bribe giver is obvious. It is apparently intended to cover situations where payment to a husband, wife, son or father is intended to induce the wife, husband, father or son to vote for the bribe giver. That would be indirect inducement. otherwise it would be easy for the bribe giver to say that he did not bribe the voter himself and therefore it is not bribery. That this provision was not intended to cover a case where money is paid to a certain person in order to make him induce another person to vote for the person who paid him the money would be obvious by looking at the converse case. Under s. 123(1)(B)(b) the receipt of or agreement to receive, any gratification, whether as a motive o r a reward by any person whomsoever for himself or any other person for voting or refraining from voting or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate to with draw or not to withdraw his candidature is bribery. Under this clause any person who receives or agrees to receive any gratification as a reward for inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote etc. would be receiving a bribe. The law therefore contemplates that where a person makes any payment to another person in order to make him use his influence to induce a third person to vote for him that is not bribery by the person who pays but the receipt of money by the second person for inducing or attempting to induce another elector to vote is bribery. It is also bribery for the voter himself to receive the money. We, therefore, reiterate the view that when a candidate or anybody on his behalf pays any gratification to a person in order that the payment made to him may induce the voter to vote for the bribe giver it is bribery. But where the gratification is paid to a person in order that he may induce the other persons to vote for the bribe giver it is not bribery on the part of the bribe giver. It is, however, as we have explained above, bribery on the part of the bribe taker even when he takes it in order to induce an elector to vote for the bribe giver. In this case it is obvious that the primary object of the payment made to the appellant was to induce him to defect from the Organisation Congress to the Ruling Congress. That is not a corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act. Even if the payment was received with the promise that he would induce the voters to vote for the bribe giver it will not be bribery on the part of the bribe giver but only bribery on the part the bribe taker. The defection of the appellant to the Ruling Congress, if it took place, might mean that he was expected to work for the Ruling Congress. Equally it may not. A person who changes his party allegiance at the time of the election probably might not command much respect among electors if the 1 electors knew that he had done so after receiving some money. Otherwise the fact that two important persons the appellant and Madhusudansinhji, a younger brother of the ex-ruler of Danta Stata had joined the Ruling Congress might be expected to influence the voters to vote for the candidate set up by the Ruling Congress. But that would be not because of the payment made to the appellant and Madhusudansinhji. Nor would such payment be bribery. To reiterate, it is the payment to the appellant that must induce the voters to vote for the candidate set up by the Ruling Congress in order that it might amount to bribery. It is not enough that his defection from organisation Congress to the Ruling Congress induces voters to vote for the Ruling Congress candidate. As we said earlier, if the payment to the appellant came to be known as the cause for his changing allegiance it may have a boomerang effect. It is therefore clear that the payment made to the appellant would not have induced the voters to vote for the Ruling Congress candidate. While after his defection therefore the appellant might have been expected to work for the Ruling Congress candidate or equally might not have been, it is perhaps implicit that he would also vote for the Ruling Congress candid ate. Is this enough to make the payment made to the appellant bribery? The payment was made not for the purpose of inducing him to vote but to make him defect to the Ruling Congress. That was the purpose for which the payment was made. That incidentally he might vote for the Ruling Congress candidate does mean that the payment was made to him in order to make him vote for the Ruling Congress candidate. The bargain was not for his vote, the bargain was for his defection. Therefore o n this point we agree with the learned Judge of the High Court. But if there was a specific request by the 1st respondent to the appellant that he should vote for him then the position would be different. In that case it would be bribery and even bribery to one person is enough to make an election void. A specific allegation to that effect has been made in the election petition and that has not been considered by the learned Judge of the Highbroader considerations also it is very unlikely that when the talk was about the appellant and Madhusudansinh defecting to the Ruling Congress from the organisation Congress there would have been any talk about the voting itself. All parties would have proceeded on the understanding that when they defected to the Ruling Congress they would both work and vote for the Ruling Congress. The distinction between a gift or offer combined with the request to vote and the gift or offer to a person asking him to work for him with the incidental result that person might vote for him should always be kept in mind. In such a case there is no specific bargain for the vote. Were it not so it would be impossible for persons standing for election to get any person to work for them who is not also a voter in the constituency. This was brought out by this Court in the decision in onkar Singh v. Ghasiram Majhi (1). We would, therefore, hold that the case that 1st respondent bargained for the appellants vote has not been satisfactorily madedo not consider that these things are of much importance. At that time the most important factor was the attempt to persuade the appellant and Madhusudansinhji to defect to the Ruling Congress and any request to the appellant to vote for the 1st respondent would have been insignificant even as we have held that when requesting the appellant and Madhusudansinhji to defect to the Ruling Congress it is not likely that they would have been asked to vote for the 1st respondent. The reference to the piece of evidence just mentioned cannot be said to establish that there was no request made to the appellant to vote for the 1st respondent. That would have to be decided on other factors and other evidence and on the basis of that evidence we have already held that it is not established that the 1st respondent requested the appellant to vote forspeaking this does not arise on issue 10. This is probabilised by the evidence of Madhusudansinhji, Maulvi Abdul Rehman and the appellant as well as Ex. T. Whether it was to be in Danta or Banaskantha does not make much difference as long as it was for the Kshatriya boys. The two places are near to each other though in different Parliamentary constituencies and in whichever place it was situate it will benefit Kshatriya boys and there is no. doubt that if the hostel were constructed by respondent No. 1 or the Ruling Congress party at his instance that would induce the voters to vote for the Ruling Congress candidate. But before that happen s the matter should come to the knowledge of the voters. Only if the voters knew that the promise had been made to the appellant and Madhusudansinhji that promise would induce the voters to vote for 1st respondent. But the knowledge of the prormise remained confined to the appellant and P.W. 10, in addition of course to Maulvi Abdul Rehman and the 1st respondents son. If the payment or the promise was to induce the voters, it cannot induce the voters unless they come to know about the payment or the promise. There is no evidence her that the voters knew about the promise to build the hostel. The bargain in such cases as we have mentioned in the JUDGMENT delivered by us today in S. Iqbal Singh v. Gurdas Singh & Ors. is really an offer on the part of the bribe giver that he would do such a thing if the voters would vote for him. It is not necessary that the voters should have accepted it. But the voters should have a knowledge about the offer. Then only it would be a bargain. An offer contemplated and retained in the mind of the offerer and not articulated and made known to the offeree will not be a bargain. It therefore follows that in this case the offer to build a hostel does not also amount to bribery.