Case: Annagouda Nathgouda Patil Vs. Court Of Wards And Another

chap. V. Part II, S.9. It has been held in a large number of cases that the expression "nearest relations of the parents means and refers to the sapindas of the father and in their default the sapindas of the mother both in order of propinquity vide Maynes Hindu Law, Edn 11; Art. 621, p. 741. In the case before us both the plaintiffs and defendant 4 are sapindas of Firangojirao, the plaintiffs being the sisters sons of Firangojirao, while the latter is his paternal uncles son. It is not disputed that apart from the changes introduced by the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, (Act II [2] of 1929),the place of the paternal uncles son in the time of heirs under the Mitakshara Law of Succession is much higher than that of the sisters son, and the Mayukha Law, which prevails in the State of Bombay, does not make any difference in this respect. Under the Mitakshara Law, the paternal uncle comes just after the paternal grandfather and his son follows him immediately. By Act II [2] of 1929, however, four other relations have been introduced between the grandfather and the paternal uncle and they are the sons daughter, daughters daughter, sister and sisters son and the paternal uncle and his son are thus postponed to these four relations by the Hindu Law of Inheritance Act of 1929. The question is, whether the provisions of this Act can at all be invoked to determine the heirs of a Hindu female in respect of her stridhan property. The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to alter the order in which certain heirs of a Hindu male dying intestate are entitled to succeed to his estate; and S. 1 (2) expressly lays down that"the Act applies only to persons who but for the passing of this Act would have been subject to the Law of Mitakshara in respect of the provisions herein enacted and it applies to such persons in respect only of the property of males not held in coparcenary and not disposed of by will."Thus the scope of the Act is limited. It governs succession only to the separate property of a Hindu male who dies intestate. It does not alter the law as regards the devolution of any other kind of property owned by a Hindu male and does not purport to regulate succession to the property of a Hindu female at all. It is to be noted that the Act does not make these four relations statutory heirs under the Mitakshara Law in all circumstances and for all purposes; it makes them heirs only when the propositus is a male and the property in respect to which it is sought to be applied is his separate property. Whether this distinction between male and female propositus is at all reasonable is another matter, but the language of the Act makes this distinction expressly and so long as the language is clear and unambiguous, no other consideration is at all relevant. This is the view which has been taken, and in our opinion quite rightly, in a number of cases of the Madras, Patna and Nagpur High Courts : Vide Mahalakshmma v. Suryanarayana Sastri, I. L. R. (1947) Mad. 23;Shakuntalabai v. Court of Wards, I. L. R. (1942) Nag. 629,Talukraj Kuer v. Bacha Kuer ,26 Pat. 150,Kuppuswami v. Manickasari, A. I. R. (37) 1950 Mad. 196 . We are not unmindful to the fact that a contrary view has been expressed in certain decisions of the Bombay, Lahore and Allahabad High Courts. Shamrao v. Raghunandan, I. L. R. (1939) Bom. 228,Mt. Charjo v. Dinanath, A. I. R. (24) 1937 Lah. 196;Kehar Singh v. Attar Singh, A. I. R. (31) 1944 lah. 442;Indore Pal v. Humangi Debi, I. L. R. (1949) ALL, 816. The line of reasoning that is adopted in most of the decisions where the contrary view is taken can be thus estate in the language of Somajee J. vide Shamrao v. Raghunandan, I. L. R. (1939) Bom. 228 at p. 230."The Act is not sought to be applied to determine the succession to the stridhan of a Hindu maiden but is sought to be used by the petitioner to ascertain the fourth class of heirs to this stridhan of a Hindu maiden mentioned at p. 139 of Mullas Hindu Law ..... The heirs of the father at the time of her death have to be ascertained in accordance with the Hindu Law as it existed at the time of the death of Bai Champubai. Thus the Act comes into operation for ascertaining the order in which the heirs of her father would be entitled to succeed to his estate, because the heirs of the father in the order of propinquity who would be entitled to succeed to him if he died on 3rd August 1937 would be the heirs of Bai Champubai in the absence of the uterline brother, the mother and the father."7. It is true that we have got to ascertain who the heirs of the father are at the date when the daughter dies, but the enquiry is for the purpose of finding out who the successor to the estate of the daughter is. This being the subject of the enquiry, the operation of Act (II [2] of 1929) is excluded by its express terms and for that purpose the Act is to be treated as non-existent. In other words, the stridhan heirs are to be ascertained with reference to the general provisions of the Hindu Law of Inheritance ignoring the statutory heirs who have been introduced by the Act. The fallacy in the line of approach adopted in these cases seems to be that they treat the Inheritance Act of 1929 as amending or altering the Mitakshara Law of Succession in all cases and for all purposes, whereas the Act has absolutely no operation when succession to the separate property of a male is not the subject-matter of investigation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Thus the scope of the Act is limited. It governs succession only to the separate property of a Hindu male who dies intestate. It does not alter the law as regards the devolution of any other kind of property owned by a Hindu male and does not purport to regulate succession to the property of a Hindu female at all. It is to be noted that the Act does not make these four relations statutory heirs under the Mitakshara Law in all circumstances and for all purposes; it makes them heirs only when the propositus is a male and the property in respect to which it is sought to be applied is his separate property. Whether this distinction between male and female propositus is at all reasonable is another matter, but the language of the Act makes this distinction expressly and so long as the language is clear and unambiguous, no other consideration is at all relevant.It is true that we have got to ascertain who the heirs of the father are at the date when the daughter dies, but the enquiry is for the purpose of finding out who the successor to the estate of the daughter is. This being the subject of the enquiry, the operation of Act (II [2] of 1929) is excluded by its express terms and for that purpose the Act is to be treated as non-existent. In other words, the stridhan heirs are to be ascertained with reference to the general provisions of the Hindu Law of Inheritance ignoring the statutory heirs who have been introduced by the Act. The fallacy in the line of approach adopted in these cases seems to be that they treat the Inheritance Act of 1929 as amending or altering the Mitakshara Law of Succession in all cases and for all purposes, whereas the Act has absolutely no operation when succession to the separate property of a male is not the subject-matter of investigation.