Case: State Of Assam And Another Vs. Ajit Kumar Sharma And Others

however no law to prevent the State from prescribing to conditions of such grants by mere executive instructions which have not the force of statutory rules. In the present case the Rules have been framed in order to give revised grants to private colleges to enable them to give higher scales of pay etc. to their teachers in accordance with the recommendations of the University Grants Commission. The Rules have been held by the High Court to have no statutory force, and that is not disputed before us. In these circumstances it is clear that the Rules are mere executive instructions conditions on which grants would be made to private colleges to implement the recommendations of the University Grants Commission as to pay scales etc. of teachers of private colleges. Where such conditions of grant-in-aid are laid down by mere executive instructions, it is open to a private college to accept those instructions or not to accept them. If it decides not to accept the instructions it will naturally not get the grant-in-aid which is contingent on its accepting the conditions contained in the instructions. On the other hand, if the college accepts the conditions contained in the instructions, it receives the grant- in-aid.13. If however having accepted the instructions containing the conditions and terms, the college does not carry out the instructions, the Government will naturally have the right to withhold the grant-in-aid. That is however a matter between the Government and the private college concerned. Such conditions and instructions as to grant-in-aid confer no right on the teachers of the private colleges and they cannot ask that either a particular instruction or condition should be enforced or should not be enforced. It is only for the Governing Body of the College to decide whether to carry out any direction contained in mere administrative instructions laying down conditions for grantin-aid. Further it is open to the Governing Body not to carry out any such instruction which is not based on rules having statutory force, and it will then be naturally open to the State to consider what grant to make. But if the Governing Body chooses to carry out the instruction, it could hardly be said that the instruction was being carried out under any threat. It is certainly not open to a teacher to insist that the Governing Body should not carry out the instruction. The rules for the purpose of grant-in-aid being - as in this case - merely executive instructions confer no right of any kind on teachers and they cannot apply to the High Court for a mandamus asking for the enforcement or nonenforcement of the rules, even if indirectly there may be some effect on them because of the grant-in-aid being withheld in whole or in part. Such mere administrative instructions even though called rules are only a matter between the Governing Body and the State through the Director and cannot in our opinion form the basis of a petition for writ under Art. 226 by a teacher.14. We may in this connection refer to M/s. Raman and Raman v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp (2) SCR 227 : (AIR 1959 SC 694 ) where this Court had to consider certain orders and directions issued under S. 43A of the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948. The question arose whether the orders issued under S. 43A had the status of law or not. This Court held that such orders did not have the status, of law regulating the rights of parties and must partake of the character of administrative orders. It was further held that there could be no right arising out of mere executive instructions, much less a vested right, and if such instructions were changed pending any appeal, there would be no change in the law pending the appeal so as to affect any vested right of a party. That decision in our opinion governs the present case also, for it has been found by the High Court, and it is not disputed before us, that the Rules are mere administrative instructions and have not the force of law as statutory rules. They therefore confer no right on the teachers of private colleges which would entitle them to maintain a writ petition under Art. 226 for the enforcement or non-enforcement of any provision of the Rules. The Rules being mere administrative instructions are matters between private colleges and the Government in the matter of grant-in-aid to such colleges, and no teacher of a college has any right under the Rules to ask either for their enforcement or for their non-enforcement. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was in error when it granted a writ against the State through the Director, by which the Director was asked not to give effect to its letter dated March 20, 1962, against the Governing Body of the College.15. Then we come to the question whether a writ could have been issued against the Governing Body of the College. We find however that there is no appeal by the College against the order of the High Court issuing a writ against it. In these circumstances we do not think that we can interfere with the order of the High Court insofar as it is against the Governing Body of the College. At the same time we should like to make it clear that we should not be taken to have approved of the order of the High Court against the Governing Body of the College in circumstances like the present and that matter may have to be considered in a case where it properly arise.16. Before we leave this case we should like to add that it was stated on behalf of the State before us that even if the decision went in favour of the State, it would not enforce R. 7 insofar as the respondent is concerned, as the State was concerned merely with the clarification of the law on the subject.17.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]It seems to us that the High Court was in error in granting a writ of mandamus against the State through the Director once it found that the Rules had no statutory force and were mere administrative instructions for the purpose of giving grant-in-aid to private colleges. What grant the State should make to private educational institutions and upon what terms are matters for the State to decide. Conditions of these grants may be prescribed by statutory rules; there is however no law to prevent the State from prescribing to conditions of such grants by mere executive instructions which have not the force of statutory rules. In the present case the Rules have been framed in order to give revised grants to private colleges to enable them to give higher scales of pay etc. to their teachers in accordance with the recommendations of the University Grants Commission. The Rules have been held by the High Court to have no statutory force, and that is not disputed before us. In these circumstances it is clear that the Rules are mere executive instructions conditions on which grants would be made to private colleges to implement the recommendations of the University Grants Commission as to pay scales etc. of teachers of private colleges. Where such conditions of grant-in-aid are laid down by mere executive instructions, it is open to a private college to accept those instructions or not to accept them. If it decides not to accept the instructions it will naturally not get the grant-in-aid which is contingent on its accepting the conditions contained in the instructions. On the other hand, if the college accepts the conditions contained in the instructions, it receives the grant-however having accepted the instructions containing the conditions and terms, the college does not carry out the instructions, the Government will naturally have the right to withhold the grant-in-aid. That is however a matter between the Government and the private college concerned. Such conditions and instructions as to grant-in-aid confer no right on the teachers of the private colleges and they cannot ask that either a particular instruction or condition should be enforced or should not be enforced. It is only for the Governing Body of the College to decide whether to carry out any direction contained in mere administrative instructions laying down conditions for grantin-aid. Further it is open to the Governing Body not to carry out any such instruction which is not based on rules having statutory force, and it will then be naturally open to the State to consider what grant to make. But if the Governing Body chooses to carry out the instruction, it could hardly be said that the instruction was being carried out under any threat. It is certainly not open to a teacher to insist that the Governing Body should not carry out the instruction. The rules for the purpose of grant-in-aid being - as in this case - merely executive instructions confer no right of any kind on teachers and they cannot apply to the High Court for a mandamus asking for the enforcement or nonenforcement of the rules, even if indirectly there may be some effect on them because of the grant-in-aid being withheld in whole or in part. Such mere administrative instructions even though called rules are only a matter between the Governing Body and the State through the Director and cannot in our opinion form the basis of a petition for writ under Art. 226 by adecision in our opinion governs the present case also, for it has been found by the High Court, and it is not disputed before us, that the Rules are mere administrative instructions and have not the force of law as statutory rules. They therefore confer no right on the teachers of private colleges which would entitle them to maintain a writ petition under Art. 226 for the enforcement or non-enforcement of any provision of the Rules. The Rules being mere administrative instructions are matters between private colleges and the Government in the matter of grant-in-aid to such colleges, and no teacher of a college has any right under the Rules to ask either for their enforcement or for their non-enforcement. We are therefore of opinion that the High Court was in error when it granted a writ against the State through the Director, by which the Director was asked not to give effect to its letter dated March 20, 1962, against the Governing Body of thefind however that there is no appeal by the College against the order of the High Court issuing a writ against it. In these circumstances we do not think that we can interfere with the order of the High Court insofar as it is against the Governing Body of the College. At the same time we should like to make it clear that we should not be taken to have approved of the order of the High Court against the Governing Body of the College in circumstances like the present and that matter may have to be considered in a case where it properly arise.Before we leave this case we should like to add that it was stated on behalf of the State before us that even if the decision went in favour of the State, it would not enforce R. 7 insofar as the respondent is concerned, as the State was concerned merely with the clarification of the law on the subject.