Case: Katikara Chintamani Dora &amp; Ors Vs. Guntreddi Annamnaidu &amp; Ors

as a result of the High Courts decree, stood finally vacated. It is not at all clear from the language of this Amending Act, that the intention was to revive even such legally non-existent decisions of the Settlement Officer. On the contrary, definite indications are available that the section was not intended to have unlimited retrospective operation. The first of such indications is available from the marginal heading of Section 9-A, itself, which is to the effect: "Inquiry under Section 9 not necessary in certain cases". The heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent of the new provision. It envisages only such cases in which the decision of the Settlement Officer was not successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the particular property was not an inam village: for, it would be pointless, only in such cases, to hold a further inquiry into the matter.67. The second hint of legislative intent is available in Section 64-A (2) which has not been touched by the Amending Act. Section 64-A (2) provides that the decision of the civil court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under the Abolition Act before the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal. If the intention was to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court altogether, Section 64-A (2) would either have been deleted or drastically amended so as to alter the basic conditions with effect from the very inceptions of the parent Act, that in the altered conditions those decisions could not have been rendered by the civil courts. For instance, it could say that the decision of the Settlement Officer on the question whether a particular property is an inam village or not would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so.68. In view of what has been said above,we are of the opinion that Section 9-A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court. The decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case, was not such a decision. It has ceased to exist as a result of the inter-linked decrees in O. S. 47 of 1953 and O. S. 101 of 1954, passed before the enactment of this Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does not in any way, affect the finality or the binding effect of those decrees.69. Quite a number of authorities were cited by the learned Counsel on both sides, but it is not necessary to notice all of them because in most of them the facts were materially different. Only one of those cases in which the interpretation of Sections 9A and 64-A was involved deserves to be notices. It is reported in Yelisetti Satyanarayana v. A. Jagannadharao, ILR (1966) Andh Pra 729.70. The writ petitioners in that case had challenged the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal which had held (1) that the previous order of the Civil Court holding the suit lands to be an estate by virtue of the Amending Act XVIII of 1936 to the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, was not res judicata under Section 64-A of the Abolition Act and (2) that the land-holder had a right of appeal under Section 9-A of the said Act, and that the inam was not of the whole village and consequently was not an estate.71. The first question for consideration by the High Court was, whether the appeal filed by the land-holder before the Estates Abolition Tribunal was maintainable notwithstanding the fact that such an appeal was not entertained earlier by the Tribunal on the ground of its being incompetent. On the construction of Section 9-A (b), this question was answered in the affirmative.72. The second question before the High Court was, whether the previous judgments of the Civil Court were res judicata under Section 64-A. The Bench analysed and explained the circumstances in which the first or the second sub-section of S. 64-A operates. It will be useful to extract those observations here:"The bar under Section 64-A is applicable in two sets of circumstances: one where the decision was of a Tribunal or Special Tribunal or of a Judge of the High Court hearing a case under Section 51; (2) the other, where it is a decision of a Civil Court on any matter falling within its jurisdiction. The decisions mentioned in the first category are binding on the Civil Courts and the decisions mentioned in the second category are binding on the Tribunal or Special Tribunal or a Judge of the High Court when he hears a case under Section 51 (2). In so far as the facts of this case are concerned, it is sub-section (2) of Section 64-A that is applicable."73. On the second question, the learned Judges held that the previous decisions of the Civil Court could not operate as res judicata because the issue as to whether the suit property was an estate under the Amending Act of 1937, wasnot undercontest. Both the parties, as a matter of concession, hadconceded that fact and the Government was not a party to the proceeding. In these peculiar circumstances, it was held that the concession or assumption made in the previous proceedings, was not a decision within the meaning of Section 64-A (2). In the case before us, as already observed, the State had contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, right upto the High Court. It would, therefore, operate as res judicata between the State and the land-owners. The same binding effect is produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. thus, this ruling does not advance the case of the respondents.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]18. Explanation I makes it clear that (apart from being made, confirmed, or recognised by the Government), an inam grant in order to come within the purview of "estate" under Section 3(2) (d) has to be a grant expressly made of a named village or whole village, and not only of a part of the village or of some defined area in a village. However, it remains and is deemed to be a grant of a whole village notwithstanding the exclusion of certain lands already granted on service or other tenure or reserved for communal purposes; nor does it cease to be a grant of an entire village merely because the village has been subsequently partitioned amongst the grantees or their successors.It will be seen that Act 18 of 1957, made the Abolition Act applicable even to villages that became estates under the 1936 Amendment of the 1908 Act. For the purpose of the Abolition Act that distinction between pre-1936 and post-1936 inam grants disappeared, and this Act became applicable to all estates falling under the definition in Section 3(2) (d) of the 1908 Act.By virtue of Section 9 of theCode of Civil Procedure, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide all suits of a Civil nature excepting those of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction, therefore, is not to be readily assumed unless the relevant statute expressly or by inevitable implication does so.This matter is not res integra. In Desika Charyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 SC 807  , this Court held that there is an express bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon the question, whether "any inam village" is an "inam estate" or not, and that "to the extent of the question stated in Section 9 (1), the jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer and of the Tribunal are exclusive". It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to two limitations. First, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to tribunal set up and other relevant factors.34. Applying the above principles, the Court clarified the limits of the respective jurisdictions of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and the Civil Court,the object of the Act is to abolish only "inam estates". This determination involves two distinct matters in view of the circumstances that every "inam village" is not necessarily "an inam estate" viz., (1) whether a particular property is or is not an "inam village" and (2) whether such a village is "an inam estate" within the definition of Sec. 2 (7). The first of these questions whether the grant is of an "inam village" is referred to in Section 9 (1) itself as some extrinsic fact which must pre-exist before the Settlement Officer can embark on the enquiry contemplated by the provision and the Abolition Act as it stood at the date relevant to this appeal, makes no provision for this being the subject of enquiry by the Settlement Officer.any finding recorded by the Settlement Officer regarding the property in question being an inam village or not, is not final or conclusive it being a finding of a jurisdictional fact, only, the pre-existence of which is a sine qua non to the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction by the Settlement Officer. Investigation as to the existence or otherwise of this preliminary fact is done by the Settlement Officer to ascertain whether or not he has jurisdiction to determine that the particular property is an inam estate. If upon such investigation, he finds that the property is an inam village, the foundation for the exercise of his exclusive jurisdiction is laid, and he can then, and then only, embark upon the enquiry envisaged by the statute. If such investigation reveals that the property is not an inam village, the condition precedent to the exercise of such jurisdiction by him, would be lacking.40. The Legislature must have visualised that under the cloak of an erroneous finding as to the existence or non-existence of this pre-requisite, the Settlement Officer may illegally clutch at jurisdiction not conferred on him, or refuse to exercise jurisdiction vesting in him. Perhaps, that is why the statute does not leave the final determination of this preliminary fact to the Settlement Officer/Tribunal and his erroneous finding on the fact is liable to be questioned in civil court.41. The contention of Mr. Rao that before the Settlement Officer the fact of Kadakalla village being an inam village was not disputed, does not appear to be borne out by the record. A perusal of the Settlement Officers order dated September 2, 1950, would show that it was contended before him on behalf of the Inamdars "that there was no village at all at the time of grant" and "that there were more than one grant as Inam in the village".42. Assuming for the sake of argument that the appellants had failed to contest or adduce proof before the Settlement Officer that Kadakalla was not an inam village, then also, we fail to appreciate how, on principle, that would make the case any different so as to preclude the appellants from reagitating that matter in the Civil Court. Once it is held that determination of this fact is not a matter of the exclusive jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, the appellants cannot be debarred on the basis of any doctrine of res judicata from getting the matter fully and finally adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction.43.In view of the above discussion, it is clear that under the law in force at the material time, a suit for a declaration that the decision of the Settlement Officer/Tribunal holding certain properties to be an estate under Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act was void, was maintainable on the ground that the suit property was not an inam village.44. There can be no dispute that Suit No. 47 of 1953 is of that category and falls well-nigh within the ratio of Venkata Narasayya v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 60  , which was approved by this Court in Desika Charyulus case, AIR 1964 SC 807   (supra). The main contention of the appellants in this suit was that the village Kadakalla was not an inam village as the grant did not comprise the whole village and consequently, it is not an estate within the definition in Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. The trial Court accepted this contention and decreed the suit. The High Court confirmed that decision, holding that when the grant was made (in 1774), it was neither of the whole village nor of a named village within the meaning of Explanation 1 to Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act. In Original Suit 101 of 1954, also, the relief of rent or damages is conditional and dependent upon and linked up (by an agreement between the parties) with the determination of the main question involved in the former suit.45. We have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the common question in both these suits regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, on the ground that it was not an inam village, was within the competence of the Civilis well settled that ordinarily, when the substantive law is altered during the pendency of an action, rights of the parties are decided according to law, as it existed when the action was begun unless the new statute shows a clear intention to vary such rights, (Maxwell on Interpretation, 12th Edn. 220). That is to say, in the absence of anything in the Act, to say that it is to have retrospective operation, it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act is passed.There is no non obstante clause in these Amending Acts of 1957 with reference to pending or closed civil actions. Nor is there anything in the scheme, setting or provisions of these Amending Acts which fundamentally alters the conditions on which such actions were founded. No back date or dates of their commencement have been specified in the body of these statutes as was done in Madras Estates Land Amendment Act II of 1945 which was expressly enforced with effect from the date of the commencement of Act 18 of 1936. These Amending Acts were published in the Government Gazette on December 23, 1957, and will therefore be deemed to have come into force from that date only. The provisions of these Amending Statutes are not merely procedural but affect, substantive rights, and impose new obligations and disabilities. In them the Legislature has not spoken in clear language that they would unsettle, settled claims or take away or abridge rights already accrued, or cause abatement of pending actions. These Amending Acts, therefore, can be construed as having a prospective operation only. They cannot be interpreted as taking away the rights of the litigants in suits O. S. 47 of 1953 and O. S. 101 of 1954 (which were at the commencement of these Amendments pending at the appellate or original stage) to have their respective claims determined in accordance with the law in force at the time of the institution of the actions.So far as the decree of the High Court (in A. S. 668 of 1954 arising out of O. S. 47 of 1953) is concerned, there is no dispute that it had become final and conclusive between the parties to that action, namely, the State Government and the present appellants on February 12, 1954. Learned Counsel are, however, not agreed as to whether the decree, dated March 28, 1958, passed by the Civil Court in Suit No. 101 of 1954 had also assumed such a character.Order 23, Rule 3,Code of Civil Procedure, not only permits a partial compromise and adjustment of a suit by a lawful agreement, but further gives a mandate to the court to record it and pass a decree in terms of such compromise or adjustment in so far as it relates to the suit. If the compromise agreement was lawful - and as we shall presently discuss it was so - the decree to the extent it was a consent decree, was not appealable because of the express bar in Section 96 (3) of the Code.There can be no doubt that as soon as the Court accepted the compromise agreement between the parties, and, acting on it, passed a decree in terms thereof, the compromise, to the extent of the matter covered by it, was complete. Nothing further remained to be done by the parties in pursuance of that agreement. The decree had become absolute and immediately executable on February 12, 1959 when the High Court in A. S. 668 of 1954 finally decided that Kadakalla was not an estate.59.Be that as it may, the bar to an appeal against a consent decree in sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel. It presupposes that the parties to an action can, expressly or by implication, waive or forgo their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or compromise, or even by conduct. Therefore, as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal (A. S. 668) and induced the court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement, the principle of estoppel underlying Section 96 (3) became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement, became final and binding between the parties. And, it was an effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on contest.Thus, the determination in A. S. 668 - that Kadakalla was not an estate - became as much binding on the respondents, as on the parties in that appeal.In the light of the above discussion, we would hold that that part of the decree in Suit No. 101 of 1954 which was in terms of the compromise agreement had become final between the parties, and the appeal from that decree could not be said to be a continuation of that part of the claim which had been settled by agreement. The combined effect of the two integrated decrees in Suit No. 47 and Suit No. 101, in so far as they declared that Kadakalla not being an inam village, was not an estate under Section 3 (2) (d) of the 1908 Act, was to completely vacate and render non est the decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer.The Order, dated September 2, 1950, of the Settlement Officer in the instant case, was a decision of this category, inasmuch as he held that Kadakalla was not an inam estate because it was a post-1936 inam, and as such, was not covered by the definition in Section 2 (7) of the Abolition Act. But, before the commencement of the Amending Act, 1960, this decision as a result of the High Courts decree, stood finally vacated. It is not at all clear from the language of this Amending Act, that the intention was to revive even such legally non-existent decisions of the Settlement Officer. On the contrary, definite indications are available that the section was not intended to have unlimited retrospective operation. The first of such indications is available from the marginal heading of Section 9-A, itself, which is to the effect: "Inquiry under Section 9 not necessary in certain cases". The heading discloses the purpose as well as the extent of the new provision. It envisages only such cases in which the decision of the Settlement Officer was not successfully challenged in the civil court on the ground that the particular property was not an inam village: for, it would be pointless, only in such cases, to hold a further inquiry into the matter.67. The second hint of legislative intent is available in Section 64-A (2) which has not been touched by the Amending Act. Section 64-A (2) provides that the decision of the civil court on any matter within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto and persons claiming under them in any proceeding under the Abolition Act before the Tribunal or the Special Tribunal. If the intention was to exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court altogether, Section 64-A (2) would either have been deleted or drastically amended so as to alter the basic conditions with effect from the very inceptions of the parent Act, that in the altered conditions those decisions could not have been rendered by the civil courts. For instance, it could say that the decision of the Settlement Officer on the question whether a particular property is an inam village or not would be conclusive and final and would always be deemed to have been so.68. In view of what has been said above,we are of the opinion that Section 9-A takes in its retrospective sweep only those decisions of the Settlement Officer or the Tribunal which at the commencement of the Amending Act 20 of 1960 were subsisting and had not been totally vacated or rendered non est by a decree of a competent court. The decision dated September 2, 1950 of the Settlement Officer in the instant case, was not such a decision. It has ceased to exist as a result of the inter-linked decrees in O. S. 47 of 1953 and O. S. 101 of 1954, passed before the enactment of this Amending Act. The Amending Act of 1960, therefore, does not in any way, affect the finality or the binding effect of thosethe case before us, as already observed, the State had contested this issue regarding Kadakalla being an estate or not, right upto the High Court. It would, therefore, operate as res judicata between the State and the land-owners. The same binding effect is produced by estoppel raised by the consent decree in the suit out of which the present appeal has arisen. thus, this ruling does not advance the case of the respondents.75. Krishna Iyer,judgment just delivered has my concurrence. But a certain juristic thought expressed therein and consecrated in an authoritative passage which has fallen from Bowen, L. J., in (1886) 31 Ch D 402, 408 persuades me to break my silence not so much in dissent but in explanatory divagation. The proposition there expressed and here followed relates to the presumption against vested rights being affected by subsequent legislation. Certainly this legal creed ofvintage has the support of learned pronouncements, English and Indian. But when we apply it in all its sternness and sweep, we err. Precedents should not be petrified nor judicial dicta divorced from themores of the age Judges are not prophets and only interpret laws in the light of the contemporary ethos. To regard them otherwise is unscientific. My thesis is that while applying the policy of statutory construction we should not forget the conditions and concepts which moved the judges whose rulings are cited, nor be obsessed by respect at the expense of reason. Justice*Cardozo has in felicitous words made the same point"*CardozoThe Nature of Judicial Process; pp.should be greater readiness to abandon an untenable position .... when in its origin it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or development with the progress of the years. In such circumstances, the words of Wheeler, J., in Dwyv. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn 74,99, express the tone and temper in which problems should be met: "That court best serves the law which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation may, in the fullness of experience, be found to serve another generation badly, and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and method of its growth, and in its growth found its health and life. It is not and it should not be stationary. Change of this character should not be left to the legislature." If Judges have woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the hands of their successors.The Indian Constitution, adopting the fighting faith of equal protection of the laws to all citizens, necessarily contemplates a new jurisprudence where vested rights may be, and oftentimes are, extensively interfered with for achieving the founding fathers social goals. Legislative exercises directed towards distributive justice, as in the present case, cannot be considered in the light of a dated value system, though sanctified by bygone decisions of Courts.77. However, in the present case, let me hasten to repeat, the Act in question is clear about its intent and its application gives little difficulty. I have said these words only to enter a mild caveat on the lines indicated, so as to obviate future misapprehensions about the rule ofto add a new element of judicial subjectivism. Speaking generally, courts have to be anchored tocanons of statutory construction and if they are out of time with the law makers meaning and purpose the legitimate means of setting things right is to enact a new Interpretation Act.