Case: Chairman Madappa Vs. M. N. Mahanthadevaru And Others

these reliefs will show that a suit under S. 92 may be filed when there is a breach of trust or when the administration of the trust generally requires improvement. One of the reliefs which can be sought in such a suit is to obtain the authority of the Court for letting, selling, mortgaging or exchanging the whole or any part of the property of the trust, as provided in Cl. (f) of the reliefs.11. We are, however, of opinion that prayer for such a relief though permissible in a suit under S. 92 does not in any way circumscribe or take away from trustees or managers of public trusts the right of ordinary administration of trust-property which would include letting, selling, mortgaging or exchanging such property for the benefit of the trust. We cannot infer from the presence of such a relief being provided in a suit under S. 92 (1) that the right of trustees or managers of the trust to carry on the ordinary administration of trust-property is in any way affected thereby. If this were so, it would make administration of trust property by trustees or managers next to impossible. This will be clear from a few examples which we may give. Suppose there is a lot of odds and ends accumulated and the trustees or managers of a public trust want to dispose of those odds and ends if they are of no use to the trust. If the interpretation suggested on behalf of the appellant is accepted, the trustees or managers could not sell even such odds and ends without filing a suit for authorising them to sell such movable property. Obviously this could not have been the intention behind Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1). Take another case where the public trust has a good deal of land and arranges to cultivate it itself and gets crops every half year. If the produce is not all required for the trust and has to be sold, the presence of Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1) does not require that every half year a suit should be filed by trustees or managers with the permission of the Advocate-General to sell such crop. The absurdity of the argument on behalf of the appellant based on Cl. (f) of S. 92 (1) is, therefore, obvious and that clause does not in our opinion have the effect of circumscribing the powers of trustees or managers to carry on ordinary administration of trust-property and to deal with it in such manner as they think best for the benefit of the trust and if necessary even to let, sell, mortgage or exchange it. It seems that Cl. (f) was put in inter alia to give power to Court to permit lease, sale, mortgage or exchange of property where, for example, there may be a prohibition in this regard in the trust deed relating to a public trust. There may be other situations where it may be necessary to alienate trust property which might require Courts sanction and that is why there is such a provision in Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1). But that clause in our opinion was not meant to limit in any way the power of trustees or managers to manage the trust-property to the best advantage of the trust and in its interest, and if necessary, even to let, sell, mortgage or exchange such property. Further if Cl. (f) cannot be read to limit the powers of trustees or managers to manage the trust-property in the interest of the trust and to deal with it in such manner as would be to the best advantage of the trust, there can be no bar to a provision being made in a scheme for directions by the Court in that behalf. If anything, such a provision would be in the interest of the trust, for the Court would not give directions to let, sell, mortgage or exchange the trust property or any part thereof unless it was clearly in the interest of the trust. Such a direction can certainly be sought by the trustees or managers or even by one manager out of two if they cannot agree, and there is nothing in Cl. (f) in our opinion which militates against the provision in the scheme for obtaining such direction. We may add that we say nothing about obtaining of such directions by persons other than managers or trustees, for this is not a case where the direction was sought by a persons other than a co-manager. Whether such a direction can be sought by persons other than trustees or managers or one of two managers as provided in paragraphs (11) and (12) of the scheme is a matter which does not arise for consideration in the present case and we express no opinion thereon. We are dealing with a case where the prayer is made by one trustee an the order passed thereon relates to matters which are incidental to acts of management of the trust-property and we have no doubt that Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1) cannot be read in such a way as to hamper the ordinary administration of trust-properties by trustees or managers thereof; and if that is so, there can be no invalidity in a provision in the scheme which directs the trustees or managers or, even one out of two co-managers when they cannot agree to obtain directions of the Court with respect to the disposal or alienation of the property belonging to the trust. We are, therefore, of opinion that Cl. (f) does not apply to the circumstances of this case and no suit under S. 92 was necessary in consequence. The Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to give directions which he did under paras. 11. and (12) of the scheme, as these directions are of the nature of ordinary administration of trust-property and do not fall within Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We are of opinion that this contention on behalf of the respondent is correct. We cannot accept the contention on behalf of the appellant that these paragraphs merely provide for carrying out nitya poojas and vishesh poojas mentioned in the scheme and nothing else. The generality of the words used in these paragraphs clearly show that power was reserved in the scheme to get directions of the Court for the ordinary administration of the muth from time to time and that such directions could be sought amongst others by either of the co-managers. We are further of opinion that it cannot be disputed in the present case that the directions asked for by the respondent were in the nature of directions for the ordinary administration of the muth. It is obvious that in order to carry on the ordinary administration of an institution like the present, the managers have the power to dispose of movable property and to deal with lands in such manner as to maximise the income of the muth. Therefore, when the respondent asked for directions of the Court in the interest of economy and practical utility for the sale of cattle and for selling the right of cultivation of lands from year to year on payment of cash, he was only asking for directions in connection with the ordinary administration of the muth, and the Court would have power under these paragraphs of the scheme to give such directions as it thought necessary for thatreliefs to be sought in a suit under S. 92 (1) are indicated in that section and include removal of any trustee, appointment of a new trustee, vesting of any property in a trustee, directing a removed trustee or person who has ceased to be a trustee to deliver possession of trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property, directing accounts and enquiries, declaring what proportion of the trust-property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust, authorisation of the whole or any part of the trust-property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged, or settlement of a scheme. The nature of these reliefs will show that a suit under S. 92 may be filed when there is a breach of trust or when the administration of the trust generally requires improvement. One of the reliefs which can be sought in such a suit is to obtain the authority of the Court for letting, selling, mortgaging or exchanging the whole or any part of the property of the trust, as provided in Cl. (f) of the reliefs.11. We are, however, of opinion that prayer for such a relief though permissible in a suit under S. 92 does not in any way circumscribe or take away from trustees or managers of public trusts the right of ordinary administration of trust-property which would include letting, selling, mortgaging or exchanging such property for the benefit of the trust. We cannot infer from the presence of such a relief being provided in a suit under S. 92 (1) that the right of trustees or managers of the trust to carry on the ordinary administration of trust-property is in any way affected thereby. If this were so, it would make administration of trust property by trustees or managers next toare dealing with a case where the prayer is made by one trustee an the order passed thereon relates to matters which are incidental to acts of management of the trust-property and we have no doubt that Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1) cannot be read in such a way as to hamper the ordinary administration of trust-properties by trustees or managers thereof; and if that is so, there can be no invalidity in a provision in the scheme which directs the trustees or managers or, even one out of two co-managers when they cannot agree to obtain directions of the Court with respect to the disposal or alienation of the property belonging to the trust. We are, therefore, of opinion that Cl. (f) does not apply to the circumstances of this case and no suit under S. 92 was necessary in consequence. The Additional District Judge had jurisdiction to give directions which he did under paras. 11. and (12) of the scheme, as these directions are of the nature of ordinary administration of trust-property and do not fall within Cl. (f) in S. 92 (1) of theCode of Civil Procedure.