Case: Rourkela Shramik Sangh Vs. Steel Authority Of India Ltd.

time. In the meanwhile, these 1800 workmen and their families are on the streets. It may also be pointed out that the management of Rourkela Steel Plant have not yet complied even with the orders of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) dated 1.5.1995 in which he had held another 523 workmen to be eligible for regularisation. 13. It is, thus, evident that the contentions raised herein and in the said interlocutory application, are identical. 14. Despite the aforementioned order dated 16th October, 1995, the writ petition was filed by the appellant herein which was marked as C.W.P. No. 2963 of 1995. By an order dated 15th July, 1998, the said writ petition was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed a L.P.A. which was also dismissed by reasons of the impugned order. 15. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has raised two contentions in support of this appeal. Firstly, it was submitted that keeping in view the clear and unequivocal directions of this Court in the aforementioned judgment, the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) could not have directed that the identity of the concerned workmen would be established only with reference to the E.S.I. Card or P.F. Card although several workmen had various documents in their possession, e.g., identity card, service certificate, wage-sheet etc. to prove their case. It was next submitted that some workmen had even been retrenched during the earlier proceedings despite an order of injunction having been passed in that behalf, and, thus, were entitled to the benefit of the judgment of this Court. The learned counsel would submit that the approach of the High Court in passing the impugned judgment must be held to be erroneous inasmuch the writ petition could not be dismissed only because the appellant withdrew I.A. No. 10 of 1995 wherein the said order dated 16th October, 1995 was passed. It was submitted that the reliefs prayed for in the said interlocutory application had nothing to do with the subject matter of the writ petition which was disposed of by this Court. 16. Mr. Shanti Bhushan would further urge that as the High Court is also an authority, the appellants herein could also file a writ petition pursuant to or in furtherance of the observations made by this Court in its order dated 16th October, 1995. 17. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand, submitted that the appellants having filed I.A. No. 9 of 1991 and I.A. No. 10 of 1995 before this Court raising identical questions could not raise the same again by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the remedy therefore available to them, if any, was merely to approach the Industrial Court in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. 18. Mr. Vaidyanathan would contend that at the later stage of the enquiry, the Chief Labour Commissioner, Central, had also taken into consideration other documents produced by the workmen and arrived at a finding that no reliance can be placed thereupon. 19. The question as to whether the concerned workmen had been continuously working for a period of ten years so as to enable them to derive benefit of the judgment of this Court in R.K. Pandas case was essentially a question of fact. The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) while determining the said question was not acting as a statutory authority. He was merely acting pursuant to or in furthermore of the directions of this Court. 20. The appellants herein, as noticed hereinbefore, immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment of this Court apprehended that a large number of workmen may be retrenched. They, therefore, sought for clarification by filing the aforementioned I.As. No. 8 and 9 of 1991, which as noticed hereinbefore, were disposed of directing that in the even they are aggrieved by an order of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), they may take recourse to such proceedings as are available to them in law. 21. It is interesting to note that in the interlocutory applications marked as I.A. No. 10 of 1995, the appellants themselves stated: ......The petitioners now will have to approach the Industrial Tribunal for this, which would take considerable time. In the meanwhile, these 1800 workmen and their families are on the streets...... 22. There cannot, thus, be any doubt whatsoever, that the appellants were fully aware of the fact that they were required to approach the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act for ventilating their grievances. The submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan to the effect that the High Court acts as an authority while exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be countenanced. The order of this Court dated 16th October, 1995, as quoted supra, is absolutely clear and unambiguous. The term authority used in this Courts order dated 16th October, 1995 must be read in the context in which it was used. The appellant in terms thereof could seek a reference which would mean a reference in terms of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It could also approach the authority in accordance with law which would mean authority under a statute. The High Court, by no stretch of imagination, can be an authority under stature. 23. Furthermore, even otherwise, a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and others [(2001) 7 SCC 1] . In any event, the orders of the Chief Labour Commissioner dated 4th January, 1995 also shows that other documents which were placed on record by the workmen had also been scrutinized and they had not been found reliable. 24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]22. There cannot, thus, be any doubt whatsoever, that the appellants were fully aware of the fact that they were required to approach the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act for ventilating their grievances. The submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan to the effect that the High Court acts as an authority while exercising its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot be countenanced. The order of this Court dated 16th October, 1995, as quoted supra, is absolutely clear and unambiguous. The term authority used in this Courts order dated 16th October, 1995 must be read in the context in which it was used. The appellant in terms thereof could seek a reference which would mean a reference in terms of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. It could also approach the authority in accordance with law which would mean authority under a statute. The High Court, by no stretch of imagination, can be an authority under stature23. Furthermore, even otherwise, a disputed question of fact normally would not be entertained in a writ proceeding. This aspect of the matter has also been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and others [(2001) 7 SCC 1] . In any event, the orders of the Chief Labour Commissioner dated 4th January, 1995 also shows that other documents which were placed on record by the workmen had also been scrutinized and they had not been found reliable24. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned judgment.