Case: Ranjit Singh And Others Vs. State Of Punjab And Others(And Connected Appeals)

estate within the meaning of Art. 31-A(2)(b) of the Constitution. The Kochuni case (1960) 3 SCR 887 : (AIR 1960 SC 1080 ) was decided on May 4, 1960 and the decision in the Assam case was given on April 4, 1961 but there is no mention of the dicta in the former case. It was held that the rights which were extinguished undoubtedly constituted "rights in relation to an estate" and Mr. N. C. Chatterjee who argued the case, conceded that this was so (see at p.730) (of SCR) : (at p. 140 of AIR). The same conclusion regarding the meaning of the word "modification was reached in Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v.Union of India, (1962) 1 SCR 44 at p. 61 : (AIR 1961 SC 954 ) without adverting to Kochuni case, (1960) 3 SCR 887 : (AIR 1960 SC 1080 ). See also State of Bihar v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain Singh, (1962) 2 SCR 382 : (AIR 1961 SC 1649 ) and State of Bihar v. Umesh Jha, (1962) 2 SCR 687 : (AIR 1962 SC 50 ). In the latter a provision of the Bihar Land Reforms Act 1950, as amended by the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1959 which empowered the Collector to annual anticipatory transfer of land designed to defeat the object of the Act was held to be protected by Art. 31-A, though the section by itself did not provide for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate. It was justified as an integral part of a statute which did so and thus received the protection of Art. 31-A along with the parent Act.18. From a review of these authorities it follows that when the Punjab High Court decided these cases on the authority of Jagat Singhs case, 64 Pun LR 241 : (AIR 1962 Punj 221 (FB) the view taken in this Court was in favour of giving a large and liberal meaning to the terms estate rights in an estate and extinguishment and modification of such rights in Art. 31-A. No doubt Kochunis case, (1960) 3 SCR 887 : (AIR 1960 SC 1080 ) considered a bare transfer of the rights of the sthanee to the tarwad without alteration of the tenure and without any pretence of agrarian reform, as not one contemplated by Art. 31-A however liberally construed. But that was a special case and we cannot apply it to cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancillary thereto in the interests of rural economy, has to be undertaken to give full effect to the reforms. In our judgment the High Court was right in not applying the strict rule in Kochunis case, (1960) 3 SCR 887 : (AIR 1960 SC 1980) to the facts here.19. The High Court was also right in its view that the proposed changes in the shamlat deh and abadi deh were included in the general scheme of planning of rural areas and the productive utilisation of vacant and waste lands. The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few, on the other, but envisages also the raising of economic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning grounds etc. enure for the benefit of rural population and must be considered to be essential part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands to which no objection is apparently taken. If agrarian reforms are to succeed, mere distribution of land to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village Panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than individual owners of small portions of lands. Further, the village Panchayat is an authority for purposes of Part III as was conceded before us and it has the protection of Art. 31-A because of this character even if the taking over of shamlat deh amounts to acquisition. In our opinion, the High Court was right in deciding as it did on this part of the case.20. With respect to abadi deh the same reasoning must apply. The settling of a body of agricultural artisans (such as the village carpenter, the village blacksmith, the village tanner, farrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc. etc.) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of holdings, fixing of ceilings on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate. The four Acts, namely, the Consolidation Act, the Village Panchayat Act, the Common Lands Regulation Act and the Security of Tenure Act are a part of a general scheme of reforms and any modification of rights such as the present has the protection of Art. 31-A. The High Court was thus right in its conclusion on this part of the case also.21. In our opinion these appeals must fail. We, however, make it clear that by reason of the circumstances which have supervened we have done no more than examine the correctness of the decisions under appeal (particularly the Full Bench decision in Jagat Singhs case, 64 Pun LR 241 : (AIR 1962 Punj 221 FB) which was followed in them) in the light of facts and law present to the mind of the Full Bench. For obvious reasons we have not strayed beyond that limit but if we have expressed any opinion which seems to bear on the Seventeenth Amendment, it should not be regarded as deliberate or binding.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]From a review of these authorities it follows that when the Punjab High Court decided these cases on the authority of Jagat Singhs case, 64 Pun LR 241 : (AIR 1962 Punj 221 (FB) the view taken in this Court was in favour of giving a large and liberal meaning to the terms estate rights in an estate and extinguishment and modification of such rights in Art. 31-A. No doubt Kochunis case, (1960) 3 SCR 887   : (AIR 1960 SC 1080  ) considered a bare transfer of the rights of the sthanee to the tarwad without alteration of the tenure and without any pretence of agrarian reform, as not one contemplated by Art. 31-A however liberally construed. But that was a special case and we cannot apply it to cases where the general scheme of legislation is definitely agrarian reform and under its provisions something ancillary thereto in the interests of rural economy, has to be undertaken to give full effect to the reforms. In our judgment the High Court was right in not applying the strict rule in Kochunis case, (1960) 3 SCR 887   : (AIR 1960 SC 1980) to the facts here.The High Court was also right in its view that the proposed changes in the shamlat deh and abadi deh were included in the general scheme of planning of rural areas and the productive utilisation of vacant and waste lands. The scheme of rural development today envisages not only equitable distribution of land so that there is no undue imbalance in society resulting in a landless class on the one hand and a concentration of land in the hands of a few, on the other, but envisages also the raising of economic standards and bettering rural health and social conditions. Provisions for the assignment of lands to village Panchayat for the use of the general community, or for hospitals, schools, manure pits, tanning grounds etc. enure for the benefit of rural population and must be considered to be essential part of the redistribution of holdings and open lands to which no objection is apparently taken. If agrarian reforms are to succeed, mere distribution of land to the landless is not enough. There must be a proper planning of rural economy and conditions and a body like the village Panchayat is best designed to promote rural welfare than individual owners of small portions of lands. Further, the village Panchayat is an authority for purposes of Part III as was conceded before us and it has the protection of Art. 31-A because of this character even if the taking over of shamlat deh amounts to acquisition. In our opinion, the High Court was right in deciding as it did on this part of the case.With respect to abadi deh the same reasoning must apply. The settling of a body of agricultural artisans (such as the village carpenter, the village blacksmith, the village tanner, farrier, wheelwright, barber, washerman etc. etc.) is a part of rural planning and can be comprehended in a scheme of agrarian reforms. It is a trite saying that India lives in villages and a scheme to make villages self-sufficient cannot but be regarded as part of the larger reforms which consolidation of holdings, fixing of ceilings on lands, distribution of surplus lands and utilising of vacant and waste lands contemplate. The four Acts, namely, the Consolidation Act, the Village Panchayat Act, the Common Lands Regulation Act and the Security of Tenure Act are a part of a general scheme of reforms and any modification of rights such as the present has the protection of Art. 31-A. The High Court was thus right in its conclusion on this part of the case also.In our opinion these appeals must fail. We, however, make it clear that by reason of the circumstances which have supervened we have done no more than examine the correctness of the decisions under appeal (particularly the Full Bench decision in Jagat Singhs case, 64 Pun LR 241 : (AIR 1962 Punj 221 FB) which was followed in them) in the light of facts and law present to the mind of the Full Bench. For obvious reasons we have not strayed beyond that limit but if we have expressed any opinion which seems to bear on the Seventeenth Amendment, it should not be regarded as deliberate or binding.