Case: M. Ramakrishnan Vs. State Of Madras

would be defeated. If really the legislature intended that lands acquired by way of inheritance or bequest by a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also be dealt with in accordance with Section 5(4), it would have defined the expression "stridhana land" without the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act". It has also to be borne in mind that the expression stridhana is not used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu law. The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by other personal laws. It is, therefore, reasonable to construe the expression stridhana land as referring only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to lands inherited by her or acquired by her as a bequest at any subsequent point of time.15. The learned Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the High Court of Madras in Valliammal v. Authorised Officer, Land Reforms, Coimbatore (AIR 1973 Mad 321 : (1973) 1 MLJ 377 ) in which a contention similar to the one urged before us on behalf of the appellant in this case had been accepted. The facts of that case were more or less similar to the facts in the case before us. The petitioner in that case was the wife of one Palanisami Gounder who was in possession of an extent of 44.061 standard acres, after excluding the exempted lands, on the commencement of the Act. She inherited 11.075 standard acres on the death of her son on March 25, 1962. In the return filed by him, the husband of the petitioner claimed that he was entitled to retain 30 standard acres as holding of the family and that his wife, the petitioner in that case, was entitled to hold 10 standard acres as stridhana property. The Land Tribunal, Coimbatore held that since the Act defined "stridhana land" as meaning any land held on the date of the commencement of the Act by any female member of the family in her own name and since the petitioner therein had inherited the land on the death of her son only on March 25, 1962, i.e. subsequent to the commencement of the Act, she was not entitled to retain any land as stridhana property in addition to the extent of land which the family could retain under Section 5(1). The petitioner questioned the correctness of the order of the Tribunal before the High Court of Madras in C.R.P. No. 916 of 1971. That petition was dismissed by Ganesan, J., on the ground that in view of the definition of stridhana land in Section 3(42) of the Act, the petitioner therein was not entitled to hold 10 standard acres as stridhana property, in addition to the 30 standard acres allowed to the family consisting of herself and her husband. Thereafter a petition was filed before the High Court by the petitioner therein to review the order passed by Ganesan, J. The review petition came up for decision before another learned Judge who allowed the same by his order dated November 2, 1972. It is on the decision rendered on the review petition that reliance is placed by the appellant before us. In paragraph 6 of that decision, it is observed as follows :"The learned Judge, who heard the civil revision petition, mainly relied on the definition of stridhana property for holding that no woman is entitled to hold any stridhana property if the same was acquired or inherited subsequent to the commencement of the Act. Of course, Section 3(42) defines stridhana land as meaning any land held on the date of commencement of the Act by any female member of a family in her own name. But that meaning is to be adopted unless the context otherwise requires. It has been repeatedly held that the word in the section will have to be interpreted and understood in the context in which it is used in the section and the definition given for that word in the definition section of the Act could not always govern the interpretation without reference to the context. In the context of Sections 5, 7 and 21 and with reference to the scope and object of the Act, I am of opinion that the properties inherited by females as stridhana property subsequent to the commencement of the Act are also entitled to the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act."16. It is true that the above passage supports the case of the appellant but we are of the view that in the context of Section 21 of the Act it is not necessary to give a meaning to the expression stridhana land different from what is stated in Section 3(42) of the Act. For the reasons already stated by us we hold that the aforesaid decision does not lay down the law correctly. It is also to be observed that the earlier decision of the High Court of Madras which is now under appeal does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the above case.17. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in this case in holding that Section 5(4) of the Act was not applicable to the land in question.18. It was lastly urged by Mr. K. Jayaram that in view of certain amendments made to the Act, the case has to be examined afresh by us in the light of the amended law. We do not think that it is advisable to do so at this stage. It is open to the appellant if he is so advised to resort to appropriate proceedings in order to claim the benefit that he may be entitled to under the amended law. Liberty is also reserved to the State Government to take whatever action it may take under the subsequent amendments to the Act.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Admittedly on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e. April 6, 1960, Devika was not the owner of the land in question. She acquired title to it only on April 20, 1962 on the death of testatrix. The appellant cannot, therefore, claim any benefit under Section 5(4)(a) of the Act. Section 21 of the Act under which the land in question becomes liable to be included in the holding of the appellant for purposes of determination of the surplus land does not make any difference between stridhana property of a female acquired after the commencement of the Act by inheritance or bequest from any person and any other property held by her family. From a reading of the definition of the expression "stridhana land" in Section 3(42) of the Act and the provisions of Section 5(4) of the Act, we are of opinion that the State legislature intended to extend the concession available under Section 5(4) of the Act only to the stridhana property held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to property acquired by herdo not thing that there is any room for construing the said provision in that way. The object of the legislation as mentioned earlier was to acquire agricultural land in excess of the ceiling area from the holders thereof and to distribute the same amongst the landless among the rural population. If the construction urged by the appellant is placed on Section 21 of the Act, the very object of the statute would be defeated. If really the legislature intended that lands acquired by way of inheritance or bequest by a female on or after the commencement of the Act should also be dealt with in accordance with Section 5(4), it would have defined the expression "stridhana land" without the words "on the date of the commencement of this Act". It has also to be borne in mind that the expression stridhana is not used in the Act in the sense in which it is used in Hindu law. The Act is applicable to Hindus as well as others governed by other personal laws. It is, therefore, reasonable to construe the expression stridhana land as referring only to the land held by a female on the date of the commencement of the Act and not to lands inherited by her or acquired by her as a bequest at any subsequent point of time.It is true that the above passage supports the case of the appellant but we are of the view that in the context of Section 21 of the Act it is not necessary to give a meaning to the expression stridhana land different from what is stated in Section 3(42) of the Act. For the reasons already stated by us we hold that the aforesaid decision does not lay down the law correctly. It is also to be observed that the earlier decision of the High Court of Madras which is now under appeal does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judge who decided the above case.17. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in this case in holding that Section 5(4) of the Act was not applicable to the land indo not think that it is advisable to do so at this stage. It is open to the appellant if he is so advised to resort to appropriate proceedings in order to claim the benefit that he may be entitled to under the amended law. Liberty is also reserved to the State Government to take whatever action it may take under the subsequent amendments to the Act.