Case: Pati Ram Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

injury as an incised injury. It is more or less a scratch. Even that injury as an injury as an incised injury, It is more or less a scratch. Even according to P.W. 2, who conducted the autopsy, the injury in question could have been caused by a nail. It is probable that this injury was caused by the iron tip of the Goolidar Lathi. We were informed that a Goolidar Lathi has a iron tip.8. In the course of his arguments the learned Council for the appellant advanced various other contentions. He urged that the requirements of Section 174, Cr. P.C. were not complied with in this case inasmuch as no Panchayatdar present at the inquest was examined as a witness in the case. The inquest report had been signed by the Head Constable who conducted the inquest and the five Panchayatdars who were present. Section 174, Cr. P.C. does not prescribe that any of the Panchayatdars should be examined as witnesses in the case. The inquest report was proved by the Head Constable who conducted the inquest. In this case there was no special reason for examining any of the Panchayatdar. The head Constable was not even cross-examined as regards the inquest.9. It was next said that Section 156, Cr. P.C. has not been complied with as the investigation was conducted by a Head Constable. This contention has also no merit in it. It is seen from the evidence of the Head Constable that when the first information was received in this case, no sub-inspector was present in the police station. He was the officer-incharge of the station at that time. Hence the law permitted him to investigate the case.10. It was next urged that Section 289, Cr. P.C. had been contravened and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained. This contention is based on the assumption that only after coming to the conclusion that an accused is guilty, the trial judge can call upon him to enter into his defence. This is clearly a misreading of the section. What that section requires is that if the trial judge comes to the conclusion that there is evidence to show that the accused had committed the offence, then the accused should be called upon to enter upon his defence. The value to be attached to that evidence is not to be considered at that stage. In this connection it was also urged that the question whether the accused had defence evidence or not should not have been put to him in his examination under Section 342, Cr. P.C. but it should have been put to him separately. What has been done is, as is usually done in all such cases. After putting the questions that are required to be put under Section 342, Cr. P.C., the accused was asked whether he had any defence evidence. We do not think that that procedure in any way conflicts with Section 289, Cr. P.C. At the first instance, the appellant had stated that he had defence evidence to adduce, but when he was called upon to adduce that evidence, his counsel stated that he had no defence witness to be examined but put in an application requesting the Court to summon a document to show that in the consolidation proceedings between him and the deceased he had filed a Razinama. The learned Trial Judge thought that the document in question was unnecessary as he was accepting the plea of the appellant that in the consolidation proceedings, the parties had entered into a compromise. Under that circumstance it was not necessary for the Court to summon the document in question.11. A grievance was made of the fact that though a large number of witnesses had been cited in the charge-sheet, several of them were not examined in court. They were all witnesses to speak to the motive. Their evidence was considered unnecessary by the prosecution. The facts accepted by the Court as proving the motive are - (1) that there was a partition suit between the appellant and the deceased and that suit had been posted for hearing on August 8, 1967 and (2) that the deceased had sold her residential house to P.W. 1, a few days before the occurrence. So far as the latter is concerned, it was not disputed. In face according to the suggestions made on behalf of the defence P.W. 1 might have murdered the deceased as he had not paid fill consideration for the sale. So far as the partition suit is concerned, we have the evidence of P.W. 1. The same was not challenged in cross-examination. When that evidence was put to the appellant during his examination under Section 342, Cr. P.C. he pleaded that he was not aware of the same. But that fact is conclusively proved by Exh. K-15. Therefore there was no purpose in examining the witnesses cited in the charge-sheet to prove those facts.12. A point was made of the fact that some of the persons who had come to the scene immediately after the occurrence had not been examined. We see no substance in this contention. It is no bodys case that those parsons had witnessed the occurrence. Nor can it be said that they were reresgesta witnesses. That being so, their evidence was unnecessary for unfolding the prosecution case. As the Trial Court as well as the High Court believed the witnesses examined in the case, the non-examination of the other witnesses has no significance.13. Lastly it was urged that sentence of death should not have been imposed on the appellant as he was a young man. The question of sentence is within the discretion of the Trial Court. The appellate court or this Court does not interfere with that discretion unless there are adequate grounds for doing so. The appellant was thirty years when he was tried in the case. He was not a teenger. The ground urged for the mitigation of the sentence is wholly irrelevant.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]1. After carefully going through the evidence on record with the assistance of the learned appearing for the appellant, we have come to the conclusion that this appeal has no merit. We shall now proceed to state our reasons in support of ouris no dispute that the injuries sustained by the deceased were sufficient in the ordinary curse of nature to cause death. Medical evidence supports that conclusion and the same was not challenged beforehave been taken through their evidence and we agree with the High Court that their evidence is acceptable. The only comment made against their evidence is that according to these witnesses, P W. 3 deposed that she had not seen the actual occurrence, but on hearing cries of the deceased she came out of the house and saw the deceased fallen down with the injuries. At that time P.Ws. 1 and 4 told her that the appellant had hit the deceased and run away. Her evidence is extremely important. Must argument was advanced regarding the contradiction referred to earlier. We attach no importance to the same. Evidently P.Ws. 1 and 4 had formed a wrong impression as to the time when P.W. 3 came to the scene. There is nothing strange about it, if we bear in mind the fact that the incident took place within a few seconds.We are asked to reject the testimony of P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 on the ground that they were all inimically disposed towards the appellant.There is no basis for this contention. The fact that the deceased lived with P.W. 1. does not prove that he was an enemy of the appellant. Nor is it shown that P.Ws. 3 and 4 had any enmity with the appellant. As mentioned earlier, their evidence has been accepted both by the Trial Court as well as by the Appellate Court. Ordinarily this Court does not reappreciate the evidence on record. We see no special reason to depart from the normalis true that thereport describes one of the injuries found on the deceased as a stabour opinion this injury had been wrongly described by the doctor who conduced the autopsy. It would have been more appropriate to call that injury as an incised injury. It is more or less a scratch. Even that injury as an injury as an incised injury, It is more or less a scratch. Even according to P.W. 2, who conducted the autopsy, the injury in question could have been caused by a nail. It is probable that this injury was caused by the iron tip of the Goolidar Lathi. We were informed that a Goolidar Lathi has a ironinquest report had been signed by the Head Constable who conducted the inquest and the five Panchayatdars who were present. Section 174, Cr. P.C. does not prescribe that any of the Panchayatdars should be examined as witnesses in the case. The inquest report was proved by the Head Constable who conducted the inquest. In this case there was no special reason for examining any of the Panchayatdar. The head Constable was not evenas regards thecontention has also no merit in it. It is seen from the evidence of the Head Constable that when the first information was received in this case, nos present in the police station. He was theof the station at that time. Hence the law permitted him to investigate thecontention is based on the assumption that only after coming to the conclusion that an accused is guilty, the trial judge can call upon him to enter into his defence.This is clearly a misreading of the section. What that section requires is that if the trial judge comes to the conclusion that there is evidence to show that the accused had committed the offence, then the accused should be called upon to enter upon his defence. The value to be attached to that evidence is not to be considered at that stage. In this connection it was also urged that the question whether the accused had defence evidence or not should not have been put to him in his examination under Section 342, Cr. P.C. but it should have been put to him separately. What has been done is, as is usually done in all such cases. After putting the questions that are required to be put under Section 342, Cr. P.C., the accused was asked whether he had any defence evidence. We do not think that that procedure in any way conflicts with Section 289, Cr. P.C. At the first instance, the appellant had stated that he had defence evidence to adduce, but when he was called upon to adduce that evidence, his counsel stated that he had no defence witness to be examined but put in an application requesting the Court to summon a document to show that in the consolidation proceedings between him and the deceased he had filed a Razinama. The learned Trial Judge thought that the document in question was unnecessary as he was accepting the plea of the appellant that in the consolidation proceedings, the parties had entered into a compromise. Under that circumstance it was not necessary for the Court to summon the document in question.11.A grievance was made of the fact that though a large number of witnesses had been cited in thel of them were not examined in court.They were all witnesses to speak to the motive. Their evidence was considered unnecessary by the prosecution. The facts accepted by the Court as proving the motive are(1) that there was a partition suit between the appellant and the deceased and that suit had been posted for hearing on August 8, 1967 and (2) that the deceased had sold her residential house to P.W. 1, a few days before the occurrence. So far as the latter is concerned, it was not disputed. In face according to the suggestions made on behalf of the defence P.W. 1 might have murdered the deceased as he had not paid fill consideration for the sale. So far as the partition suit is concerned, we have the evidence of P.W. 1. The same was not challenged inWhen that evidence was put to the appellant during his examination under Section 342, Cr. P.C. he pleaded that he was not aware of the same. But that fact is conclusively proved by Exh.Therefore there was no purpose in examining the witnesses cited in theto prove those facts.12.A point was made of the fact that some of the persons who had come to the scene immediately after the occurrence had not been examined.We see no substance in this contention. It is no bodys case that those parsons had witnessed the occurrence. Nor can it be said that they were reresgesta witnesses. That being so, their evidence was unnecessary for unfolding the prosecution case. As the Trial Court as well as the High Court believed the witnesses examined in the case, theof the other witnesses has noquestion of sentence is within the discretion of the Trial Court. The appellate court or this Court does not interfere with that discretion unless there are adequate grounds for doing so. The appellant was thirty years when he was tried in the case. He was not a teenger. The ground urged for the mitigation of the sentence is wholly irrelevant.