Case: Ponnammal Vs. R. Srinivasarangan &amp; Others

She was therefore free to go back upon it any to time she chose. But she was the weaker party. At that point of time the 1st defendant was in a position of advantage. As certain alienations made by the limited owner in possession had to be negotiated for and settled to the satisfaction of the 1st defendant and Padmasani and her children, there was a delay of a few months.If the 1st defendant had not been pinned down to some document, there was the danger of his backing out of his promise to share the inheritance with Padmasani and her sons. The document certainly achieved that objective. But it could not be said to have been a final and concluded bargain.During the interval of bout eight months that elapsed between the drawing up of Ex. P-1 and Ex. D-1 it appears that Padmasani advisers realised that the terms of the original document, Ex. P-1 would be too onerous for Padmasani herself and not in the interest of the plaintiff and other members of the family in view of the involved financial circumstances of the family.It had been decided that the mother would figure as the guardian of her minor sons and not the father, who under the law would be the preferential guardian. The reason was that the legal advisers thought it advisable to keep the properties out of the hands of the plaintiffs father who, as found by both the Courts below, was fully cognizant of the entire negotiations and the terms which were ultimately given effect to.But it was further realized that Padmasani would require funds for meeting the expenses of maintaining and educating her children and giving her daughter in marriage. If she was mere guardian of her minor children, she would naturally face greater difficulties in raising funds for those purposes than if she were vested with the character of a full owner in respect of the moiety of the property agreed to be conveyed by the 1st defendant.The High Court lost sight of the fact that by the revised terms the 1st defendant did not make any gain at all, the only modification being that the properties agreed to be conveyed by him to Padmasani and her sons were divided into two parts in one of which Padmasani was given an absolute right. It was not done to aggrandize her at the cost of her minor sons but in their own interest and in the interest of the rest of the family.It was in those circumstances that the terms as originally proposed in Ex. P-1 were revised and took their final shape in Ex, D-1. It must therefore be held that Ex. P-1 was not, as the High Court erroneously assumed, a final agreement between the parties. The final agreement was as laid down in Ex. D-1. At the time the document was executed and registered, in view of the law as it then was understood as laid down by the Division Bench of the High Court, the 1st defendant was the true owner.Hence there could be no. question of sacrificing the interest of the minors for the benefit of their parents as distinct from that of the children themselves. The 1st defendant had agreed to part with a portion of the inheritance from the propositus not only to benefit the minors alone but also Padmasani. Padmasani apparently acting under the advice of her husband and of their friends and relations, particularly their lawyers aforesaid, agreed to the final terms as contained in Ex D-1, not with any sordid motive of benefiting herself at the expense of her sons but in the interest of the family as a whole.Neither was the 1st defendant interested in advancing the cause of Padmasani at the expense of her sons. It is not correct, therefore, to suggest that any one, far less the parents of the minors, were acting against the latters interest. The minors parents were immediately faced with the difficult problem of finding ways and means of maintaining the family, educating the children and giving the daughter in marriage. Those were matters in which everyone of them singly and collectively was equally interested.The High Court, therefore, in our opinion misled itself into thinking that the interest of the minor had been sacrificed for the sake of the parents or one of them. The arrangement as finally incorporated in Ex. D-1 was conceived in the interest of the entire family of Padmasani and her husband and carried out under the advice of competent legal advisers who were not particularly interested in any one of the family as against the others.As already indicated, that was not the basis of the claim as laid in the plaint. The plaint read as a whole assailed the arrangement on grounds which have completely failed in both the courts below.12. But it was argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents that in so far as Padmasani was vested with absolute powers in respect of the property given to her she was not acting in the interest of the estate of the minors and was, therefore, not representing them in that transaction, that she had no. right to part with a portion of the properties for the payment of her husbands debts, that her powers were not co-extensive with the powers of a daughters inheriting her fathers property and that in law she had no. right to alienate any portion of the properties.These are arguments which are wholly irrelevant to the present controversy and proceed on the assumption that the compromise should have been made on the basis of the law as laid down by the Full Bench in January 1937. We have already held that the binding character of the transaction evidenced by Ex. D-1 had to be judged with reference to the state of affairs as it was at about the date of that transaction and not with reference to what the law was interpreted to be three years later.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]That is the law in India also as laid down in innumerable decisions. Applying the test laid down in the dictum quoted above to the facts of the present case, it is manifest, as held by the trial Court, that on the date of Ex.the 1st defendant was considered by competent lawyers to have been lawfully in possession of the property left by the propositus. Padmasani and her people were naturally disappointed and sought avenues of obtaining even a portion of the properties, desperately situated as they were.The financial condition of Padmasanis family can best be described in their own words contained in a sale deed (Ex.dated the 23rd January 1939, to which Padmasani and the two plaintiffs of whom the first one had attained majority by then werethere is clear and cogent evidence of the fact that Padmasani, her husband and his family were in dire need of funds for maintaining the family, for educating the children and for meeting the marriage expenses of thewas the possibility of Padmasani and ultimately her sons getting the entire estate left by her brother, but that possibility was hedged round by a number of adverse circumstances. The 1st defendant had already taken possession of the estate and a litigation would have to be launched by Padmasani. Neither she nor her husband was in a position to finance that litigation .Furthermore, they would have to run the risk of litigation with all its uncertainties especially in view of the recent Bench decision of the High Court, Keeping in view the circumstances in which Padmasani and her family found themselves, they naturally appealed to the feelings of love and affection of the 1st defendant for his deceased brothers daughter and daughters sons through the unselfish efforts of the lawyers named above who were both competent and willing to render their services to mediate between them and the 1st defendant.There cannot, therefore, be the least doubt that there was a genuine dispute between the parties which was sought by disinterested friends and relations to be settled by making the parties agree to give andhas been held by the High Court and it has been vehemently pressed before us by the learned counsel for the respondents that the arrangement thus arrived at was a device to vent Padmasani with absolute right in respect of about half the properties in which she could not have claimed anything more than the interest of a limited owner. That would be so, firstly on the supposition that the 1st defendant was a trespasser and secondly, on the supposition that Ex.represented a concluded bargain. That is not so.11. It is noteworthy that there is not a whisper in the plaint about the terms of ExIt was for the first time in the High Court that the contention was seriously raised that with reference to the terms of Ex.those in Ex.were far too onerous to the plaintiffs. As already indicated the plaint proceeded on the basis that Ex.represented the final bargain between the partiesa bargain which was vitiated by undue influence, coercion and deception.That case, though laid in the plaint completely failed for want of evidence in support thereof. The High Court failed to realise that the true situation was that the astute lawyers advising Padmasani and her husband were in a hurry to bind the 1st defendant by making him subscribe to a document drawn up by them. Hence they got the 1st defendant to sign Ex.which on the fact of it was of a tentative character.The other party to the transaction had not subscribed to it and the deed had not been delivered to her. She was therefore free to go back upon it any to time she chose. But she was the weaker party. At that point of time the 1st defendant was in a position of advantage. As certain alienations made by the limited owner in possession had to be negotiated for and settled to the satisfaction of the 1st defendant and Padmasani and her children, there was a delay of a few months.If the 1st defendant had not been pinned down to some document, there was the danger of his backing out of his promise to share the inheritance with Padmasani and her sons. The document certainly achieved that objective. But it could not be said to have been a final and concluded bargain.During the interval of bout eight months that elapsed between the drawing up of Ex.1 it appears that Padmasani advisers realised that the terms of the original document, Ex.would be too onerous for Padmasani herself and not in the interest of the plaintiff and other members of the family in view of the involved financial circumstances of the family.It had been decided that the mother would figure as the guardian of her minor sons and not the father, who under the law would be the preferential guardian. The reason was that the legal advisers thought it advisable to keep the properties out of the hands of the plaintiffs father who, as found by both the Courts below, was fully cognizant of the entire negotiations and the terms which were ultimately given effect to.But it was further realized that Padmasani would require funds for meeting the expenses of maintaining and educating her children and giving her daughter in marriage. If she was mere guardian of her minor children, she would naturally face greater difficulties in raising funds for those purposes than if she were vested with the character of a full owner in respect of the moiety of the property agreed to be conveyed by the 1st defendant.The High Court lost sight of the fact that by the revised terms the 1st defendant did not make any gain at all, the only modification being that the properties agreed to be conveyed by him to Padmasani and her sons were divided into two parts in one of which Padmasani was given an absolute right. It was not done to aggrandize her at the cost of her minor sons but in their own interest and in the interest of the rest of the family.It was in those circumstances that the terms as originally proposed in Ex.were revised and took their final shape in Ex,It must therefore be held that Ex.was not, as the High Court erroneously assumed, a final agreement between the parties. The final agreement was as laid down in Ex.At the time the document was executed and registered, in view of the law as it then was understood as laid down by the Division Bench of the High Court, the 1st defendant was the true owner.Hence there could be no. question of sacrificing the interest of the minors for the benefit of their parents as distinct from that of the children themselves. The 1st defendant had agreed to part with a portion of the inheritance from the propositus not only to benefit the minors alone but also Padmasani. Padmasani apparently acting under the advice of her husband and of their friends and relations, particularly their lawyers aforesaid, agreed to the final terms as contained in Exnot with any sordid motive of benefiting herself at the expense of her sons but in the interest of the family as a whole.Neither was the 1st defendant interested in advancing the cause of Padmasani at the expense of her sons. It is not correct, therefore, to suggest that any one, far less the parents of the minors, were acting against the latters interest. The minors parents were immediately faced with the difficult problem of finding ways and means of maintaining the family, educating the children and giving the daughter in marriage. Those were matters in which everyone of them singly and collectively was equally interested.The High Court, therefore, in our opinion misled itself into thinking that the interest of the minor had been sacrificed for the sake of the parents or one of them. The arrangement as finally incorporated in Ex.was conceived in the interest of the entire family of Padmasani and her husband and carried out under the advice of competent legal advisers who were not particularly interested in any one of the family as against the others.As already indicated, that was not the basis of the claim as laid in the plaint. The plaint read as a whole assailed the arrangement on grounds which have completely failed in both the courtsare arguments which are wholly irrelevant to the present controversy and proceed on the assumption that the compromise should have been made on the basis of the law as laid down by the Full Bench in January 1937. We have already held that the binding character of the transaction evidenced by Ex.had to be judged with reference to the state of affairs as it was at about the date of that transaction and not with reference to what the law was interpreted to be three years later.