Case: Ram Chandra Palai And Others Vs. The State Of Orissa And Others

permit holders in that behalf. These permits may or may not be renewed in favour of these permit holders but the non-renewal of such permits would not be on a par with the premature termination or cancellation of the permits held by the owners of stage carriage services to whom the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 were applied. The two positions, therefore, are not similar and the permit holders under Orissa Act I of 1949 do not fall in the same class or group as the permit holders under Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. There is no question, therefore, of any discrimination between these two classes or groups of permit holders and it cannot be validly urged that the provisions of the impugned Acts in so far as they applied to different classes or groups of permit holders are in any manner violative of the fundamental right embodied in Art. 14 of the Constitution.16. The argument that the provisions of the impugned Acts were designed with a view of oust the private stage carriage services from business altogether and were intended to create a virtual monopoly in favour of the Joint-Stock Company or the State as the case may be is also now of no avail. Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 (A) was particularly relied upon by the petitioners in support of their contentions but Art. 19(6) of the Constitution as amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, enacts that "Nothing in sub-clause (g) shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State for making any law imposing, in the interest of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause, shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to, "(i) .................(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise."17. This amendment excludes all argument in regard to the alleged outsting of the private owned stage carriage services and the creation of a virtual monopoly in favour of the Joint-Stock Company or the State. The Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., which is a Joint-Stock Company formed under the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and the State Transport Services which are envisaged in Orissa Act I of 1949 would, therefore, be able to carry on their business even if it resulted in the complete elimination of the private-owned stage carriage services without any violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.18. It was attempted to be argued on behalf of the petitioners that the amendment of Art. 19 (6) of the Constitution would not affect the position as it obtained under the impugned Acts because these Acts had been long in operation before the amendment came into force and the petitioners were entitled to relief based on our decision in Saghir Ahmads case (A), supra. A similar argument was sought to be advanced before us in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 781 (B) - and that argument was repelled by us in the manner following :"The contention of the respondents before us is that although the amending Act, on the authority of our decision is Saghir Ahmads case (A) (supra), became on and from 26-1-1950 void as against the citizens to the extent of its inconsistency with the provisions of Art 19(1)(g), nevertheless, after 18-6-1951 when clause (6) was amended by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 the amending Act ceased to be inconsistent with fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(g) read with the amended clause (6) of that Article, because that clause, as it now stands, permits the creation by law of State monopoly in respect, inter alia, of motor transport business and it became operative again even as against the citizens.... In our judgment the contentions put forward by the respondents as to the effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 are well-founded and the objections urged against them by the petitioners are untenable and must be negatived."19. It is hardly necessary for us to consider the further contention urged by the petitioners, viz., that the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(f) and under Art. 31 (2) had been violated. If the permits held by them under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were prematurely terminated or cancelled under the provisions of Orissa Act XXXV of 1947 compensation was provided by the Act itself. If there was no renewal of their permits on the expiration thereof after they had run for their normal period by virtue of the provisions of Orissa Act I of 1949, no claim could be made by them on the score of such non-renewal because renewal was not a matter of right. The Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority would be well within their rights to refuse such renewal having regard to the provisions of the amended Ss. 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and, if at all there was any deprivation of their proprietary right, it would be by authority of law.20. Nor need we pause to consider the last contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Acts violated the guarantee of freedom of inter-State and intra-State trade or business embodied in Article 301 of the Constitution. In the first instance, it is not a fundamental right conferred by Part III of the Constitution which can be enforced by a petition under Art. 32. Moreover, Art. 305 as it stood before the amendment and the amended Article 305 which came into effect after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, afford a complete answer to this contention of the petitioners.20.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The provisions of both the Acts being materially different as set out above the application of one Act to particular districts of the State and of the other Act to the other districts of the State was violative of the guarantee of equal protection of laws enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. The owners of stage carriage services to whom Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 applied had the additional advantage of having compensation granted to them in accordance with the terms of section 6 thereof which advantage was not available to those owners of stage carriage services to whom Orissa Act I of 1949 wasnucleus of transport services which had been owned by the State Government had to be utilized so far as it was available and having regard to the situation as it obtained,the State Government naturally though of applying Orissa Act I of 1949 to certain districts of the State leaving the other districts to be served by the mode envisaged in Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947. Such a zonal or territorial or geographical division of the several districts of the State for implementation of the scheme of Nationalized State Transport by either the formation of a Joint-Stock Company or the running of the State Transport Service was based on the availability of the transport services acquired by the State Government from the various merging States and if such a division was made having regard to the situation as it thus obtained, no challenge could be made against it on the ground of discrimination or the denial of equal protection ofargument, however, ignores the fact that under Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, the permits issued or renewed in favour of the owners of stage carriage services by the Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority cease to be operative or are canceled by the Provincial Government as the case may be and compensation is given to such permit holders for such premature termination or cancellation of theirowners of stage carriage services to whom Orissa Act I of 1949 is applied stand, however, on a different footing. Their permits continue for the normal period and the considerations which are laid down in clauses (f) and (g) which have been thereby added to Ss. 47 and 55 ofthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, would come into play when these permits which have expired by lapse of time come to be considered for renewal on applications made by permit holders in thatpermits may or may not be renewed in favour of these permit holders but the non-renewal of such permits would not be on a par with the premature termination or cancellation of the permits held by the owners of stage carriage services to whom the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 were applied. The two positions, therefore, are not similar and the permit holders under Orissa Act I of 1949 do not fall in the same class or group as the permit holders under Orissa Act XXXVI ofis no question, therefore, of any discrimination between these two classes or groups of permit holders and it cannot be validly urged that the provisions of the impugned Acts in so far as they applied to different classes or groups of permit holders are in any manner violative of the fundamental right embodied in Art. 14 of theOrissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., which is a Joint-Stock Company formed under the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and the State Transport Services which are envisaged in Orissa Act I of 1949 would, therefore, be able to carry on their business even if it resulted in the complete elimination of the private-owned stage carriage services without any violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(g) of thethe permits held by them underthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 were prematurely terminated or cancelled under the provisions of Orissa Act XXXV of 1947 compensation was provided by the Act itself. If there was no renewal of their permits on the expiration thereof after they had run for their normal period by virtue of the provisions of Orissa Act I of 1949, no claim could be made by them on the score of such non-renewal because renewal was not a matter of right.