Case: Zamindar Of Ettayapuram Vs. The State Of Madras.(And Connected Appeals)

in excess of what he was entitled to. 12. As regards the first ground the learned Solicitor-General contended that the entering into of the Covenant by the Rules of the Kathiawar State was an act of State and that the Municipal Courts were not competent to entertain any disputes arising out of the Covenant. He also relied upon Article 363 of the Constitution which bars interference by Courts in any disputes arising out of certain treaties and covenants.13. The Ruler of the Wadhwan State in the exercise of his legislative capacity passed the Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 which gave the Appellant certain statutory rights. Even though the Ruler may have had the power to repeal this enactment he did not do so and therefore so long as the Dhara remained in force the Appellant was entitled to the benefit of it and could have enforced his rights under it in the State Courts either against the State itself or at any rate against such of the officers of the State as wrongfully withheld his salary or wrongfully dismissed him. When the Wadhwan State merged with the Saurashtra State and again when it acceded to the Dominion of India all the existing laws continued until repealed. It follows that the Appellants right under the Dhara No. 29 of St.2004 were still good and could have been enforced in the Municipal Courts until either repealed or repudiated as an act of State. These rights were carried over after the Constitution when the Indian Republic was formed with this important difference viz, that as the Appellant then became an Indian citizen the repudiation as an act of State was not any longer possible. The only way therefore to defeat his rights was by legislation if that could be done under the Constitution. There was in fact no such legislation and therefore his rights remained and the Municipal Courts would be entitled to examine the contract and apply the Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 and enforce whatever right the Appellant had under that Dhara and his contract of service. (See art 300 (1) and Art. 372 (1) of the Constitution). The covenant could be looked at to see whether the new sovereign had waived his rights to ignore rights given under the laws of the former sovereign.The terms of the Covenant showed that the existing laws were to continue and whatever the rights of the Appellant were under the existing laws were available for enforcement to the Appellant and there was no bar to the Municipal Courts entertaining a suit to enforce such rights. 14. In this view of the matter Art. 363 of the Constitution could not be invoked the Respondent. There was no dispute arising out of the Covenant and what the Appellant was doing was merely to enforce his right Under the existing - laws which continued in force until they were repealed by appropriate legislation. This ground therefore could not avail the Respondent. 15. As regards the second ground, the learned Solicitor-general urged before us that under the terms of the guarantee incorporated in Article 16 of the Covenant it was open to the Saurashtra State to Compulsorily retire the Appellant on payment of reasonable compensation. He urged that that compensation could not be any more than what the Appellant would have been entitled to receive from the Ruler of the Wadhwan State if he had continued in his service at the time when he was compulsorily retired by the Saurashtra State. It was pointed out that the services of the Appellant with the Wadhwan State were during the pleasure of the Ruler of the State and that the Ruler of the State could have compulsorily retired him without being liable to pay him any compensation whatever and that therefore the position of the the Appellant was no better so far as the Saurashtra State also was converned. We do not accept these contentions. Even though the tenure of the Appellants service with the Ruler of the Wadhwan State was initially during the pleasure of the Ruler, the Ruler put a fetter upon his powers to dispense with the services of the Appellant when the Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 was enacted by him. This obligation of the Ruler passed to the Saurashtra State on the making over of the administration of the Wadhwan State to the Raj Pramukh on the 15the March 1948 and the Saurashtra State also could not dispense with the services or compulsorily retire the Appellant before he attained 60 years of age. If the Saurashtra State chose to compulsorily retire the Appellant it could only do so on payment of reasonable compensation and in arriving at the figureof reasonable compensation the Saurashtra State would have to take into consideration the tenure of the Appellants service with the Wadhwan State which entitled him to continue in such service until he attained his age of 60 years. This was one of the circumstances to be taken into account when determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to him. We have been taken through the portion of the Trial courts judgment which deals with the amount of compensation and we are of the opinion that the amount of compensation awarded by the Trial Court to the Appellant was justified under the circumstances. This ground also does not avail the Respondent. 16. The amount of pension, viz, Rs. 43-11-0 per month which was granted by the Saurashtra State to the Appellant was not the subject-matter of the suit. The amount of compensation clamed by the Appellant was over and above the said amount of pension and the Trial Court adjudicated upon such compensation. The Appellants rights in regard to the pension were not at all affected by the amount of compensation awarded by the Trial Court to him. The Appellant will therefore continue to receive the amount of pension in addition to whatever compensation has been awarded to him, by the Trial Court.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]13. The Ruler of the Wadhwan State in the exercise of his legislative capacity passed the Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 which gave the Appellant certain statutory rights. Even though the Ruler may have had the power to repeal this enactment he did not do so and therefore so long as the Dhara remained in force the Appellant was entitled to the benefit of it and could have enforced his rights under it in the State Courts either against the State itself or at any rate against such of the officers of the State as wrongfully withheld his salary or wrongfully dismissed himWhen the Wadhwan State merged with the Saurashtra State and again when it acceded to the Dominion of India all the existing laws continued until repealed. It follows that the Appellants right under the Dhara No. 29 of St.2004 were still good and could have been enforced in the Municipal Courts until either repealed or repudiated as an act of State. These rights were carried over after the Constitution when the Indian Republic was formed with this important difference viz, that as the Appellant then became an Indian citizen the repudiation as an act of State was not any longer possible. The only way therefore to defeat his rights was by legislation if that could be done under the ConstitutionThere was in fact no such legislation and therefore his rights remained and the Municipal Courts would be entitled to examine the contract and apply the Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 and enforce whatever right the Appellant had under that Dhara and his contract of service. (See art 300 (1) and Art. 372 (1) of the Constitution). The covenant could be looked at to see whether the new sovereign had waived his rights to ignore rights given under the laws of the former sovereign.The terms of the Covenant showed that the existing laws were to continue and whatever the rights of the Appellant were under the existing laws were available for enforcement to the Appellant and there was no bar to the Municipal Courts entertaining a suit to enforce such rights14. In this view of the matter Art. 363 of the Constitution could not be invoked the Respondent. There was no dispute arising out of the Covenant and what the Appellant was doing was merely to enforce his right Under the existinglaws which continued in force until they were repealed by appropriate legislation. This ground therefore could not avail the Respondent15. As regards the second ground, the learnedl urged before us that under the terms of the guarantee incorporated in Article 16 of the Covenant it was open to the Saurashtra State to Compulsorily retire the Appellant on payment of reasonable compensation. He urged that that compensation could not be any more than what the Appellant would have been entitled to receive from the Ruler of the Wadhwan State if he had continued in his service at the time when he was compulsorily retired by the Saurashtra State. It was pointed out that the services of the Appellant with the Wadhwan State were during the pleasure of the Ruler of the State and that the Ruler of the State could have compulsorily retired him without being liable to pay him any compensation whatever and that therefore the position of the the Appellant was no better so far as the Saurashtra State also was converned.We do not accept these contentionsEven though the tenure of the Appellants service with the Ruler of the Wadhwan State was initially during the pleasure of the Ruler, the Ruler put a fetter upon his powers to dispense with the services of the Appellant when the Dhara No. 29 of St. 2004 was enacted by him. This obligation of the Ruler passed to the Saurashtra State on the making over of the administration of the Wadhwan State to the Raj Pramukh on the 15the March 1948 and the Saurashtra State also could not dispense with the services or compulsorily retire the Appellant before he attained 60 years of ageIf the Saurashtra State chose to compulsorily retire the Appellant it could only do so on payment of reasonable compensation and in arriving at the figureof reasonable compensation the Saurashtra State would have to take into consideration the tenure of the Appellants service with the Wadhwan State which entitled him to continue in such service until he attained his age of 60 years. This was one of the circumstances to be taken into account when determining the amount of reasonable compensation to be awarded to him. We have been taken through the portion of the Trial courts judgment which deals with the amount of compensation and we are of the opinion that the amount of compensation awarded by the Trial Court to the Appellant was justified under the circumstances. This ground also does not avail the Respondent16. The amount of pension, viz, Rs.0 per month which was granted by the Saurashtra State to the Appellant was not ther of the suit. The amount of compensation clamed by the Appellant was over and above the said amount of pension and the Trial Court adjudicated upon such compensation. The Appellants rights in regard to the pension were not at all affected by the amount of compensation awarded by the Trial Court to him. The Appellant will therefore continue to receive the amount of pension in addition to whatever compensation has been awarded to him, by the Trial Court.