Case: Bharat Co-Operative Bank Mumbai Limited Vs. Co-Operative Bank Employees Union

There, the question arose in regard to the interpretation of section 2 (c) of the Bihar and Orissa Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1930. This section when enacted adopted the definition of "motor vehicle" contained section 2 (18) of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. Subsequently, section 2 (18) was amended by Act 100 of 1956 but no corresponding amendment was made in the definition contained in section 2 (c) of the Taxation Act. The argument advanced before the Court was that the definition in section 2 (c) of the Act was not a definition by incorporation but only a definition by reference and the meaning of "motor vehicle" in section 2 (c) must therefore be taken to be the same as defined from time to time in section 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. This argument was negatived by the Court and it was held that this was a case of incorporation and not reference and the defination in section 2 (18) of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939 as then existing was incorporated in section 2 (18) (c) of the Taxation act and neither repeal of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 nor any amendment in it would affect the defination of "motor vehicle" in section 2 (c) of the Taxation act. It is thus clear that if there is mere reference to a provision of one statute in another without incorporation, then, unless a different intention clearly appears the reference would be construed as a reference to the provision as be in force from time to time in the former statute. But if a provision of the statute is incorporated in another, any subsequent amendment in the former statute or even its total repeal would not affect the provision as incorporated in the later statute. Similar is the view expressed in (Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India), 1979 (1) S. C. C. 529 where the Court held that section 55 of the monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 incorporates and not merely refers to section 100 of C. P. C. Hence, subsequent substitution of section 100 by c. P. C. (Amendment) Act, 1976 would not affect the incorporated provision.( 12 ) WE have no doubt that section 2 (bb) is an instance of the legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. Therefore we are not prepared to hold that the amendments which were made in B. R. Act after 1949 can be regarded as incorporated in the I. D. Act. It was not part of the B. R. Act when the I. D. Act was amended and section 2 (bb) was inserted. Nor in the adopted provisions of the B. R. Act is there anything to suggest that the legislature intended to bind itself to any future additions which might be made to that act. Again, there is nothing in the B. R. Act. to suggest that the amendments enacted to it are to be treated as in anyway, retrospective or are to be regarded as affecting any other enactment than the B. R. Act itself. What the legislature has done is nothing more than incorporating the definition of "banking company" in the B. R. Act and, for convenience of drafting, it has done so by reference to that Act instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it decided to adopt. ( 13 ) ON behalf of appellant bank a reference was made to the decision of the supreme Court in (Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh), 1991 (4)s. C. C. 368 where the Court while construing Rule 3 of Jute Manufacturers cess Rules, 1976 held that the words "central Excise Act" and "rules" contained in the said Rule should be construed as if the words "for the time being in force" were there after the words "the provisions of Central Excise and Salt act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and the Rules made thereunder". We are afraid that the decision does not in any way assist the appellant. Rule 3 with which the supreme Court was concerned, made the provisions of the Central Excise Act and the Rules made thereunder applicable in the matter of levy and collection of cess under the Jute Rules. It was a clear case of legislation by reference. In such a case, naturally the subsequent amendments and alterations made to the Central Excise Act and the Rules would ipso facto get imported into the jute Rules. As against this the language used by the legislature in enacting section 2 (bb) clearly suggests a case of legislation by incorporation. In such a case, it is well settled that subsequent amendments or alterations made in the former enactment would not affect the incorporation statute. ( 14 ) IN the circumstances, we are in agreement with the view expressed by learned Single Judge that the subsequent amendments to the B. R. Act will not be attracted in respect of definition of "appropriate Government" in the i. D. Act. Consequently, the "appropriate Government" in respect of the multi state Co-operative banks having branches in more than one State would be the State Government and not the Central Government. Before parting with this matter, we may mention that on behalf of the respondent union, it was argued that the definition of "banking company" as contained in section 5 (c)of the B. R. Act has not been amended by the Amendment Act 23 of 1966 or by any other amendment. But by virtue of section 56 the provisions of the B. R. Act are made applicable in the manner indicated by that section. It is not necessary for us to express any view on this issue as, in our opinion, the definition of the "banking company" will have to be read as it existed on the date of incorporation of section 2 (bb) for the purpose of deciding as to which is the "appropriate Government" and so read the appropriate Government in respect of multi-State Co-operative banks would be the State Government.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]( 12 ) WE have no doubt that section 2 (bb) is an instance of the legislation by incorporation and not legislation by reference. Therefore we are not prepared to hold that the amendments which were made in B. R. Act after 1949 can be regarded as incorporated in the I. D. Act. It was not part of the B. R. Act when the I. D. Act was amended and section 2 (bb) was inserted. Nor in the adopted provisions of the B. R. Act is there anything to suggest that the legislature intended to bind itself to any future additions which might be made to that act. Again, there is nothing in the B. R. Act. to suggest that the amendments enacted to it are to be treated as in anyway, retrospective or are to be regarded as affecting any other enactment than the B. R. Act itself. What the legislature has done is nothing more than incorporating the definition of "banking company" in the B. R. Act and, for convenience of drafting, it has done so by reference to that Act instead of setting out for itself at length the provisions which it decided to adopt. ( 13 ) ON behalf of appellant bank a reference was made to the decision of the supreme Court in (Bhatinda Improvement Trust v. Balwant Singh), 1991 (4)s. C. C. 368 where the Court while construing Rule 3 of Jute Manufacturers cess Rules, 1976 held that the words "central Excise Act" and "rules" contained in the said Rule should be construed as if the words "for the time being in force" were there after the words "the provisions of Central Excise and Salt act, 1944 (1 of 1944) and the Rules made thereunder". We are afraid that the decision does not in any way assist the appellant. Rule 3 with which the supreme Court was concerned, made the provisions of the Central Excise Act and the Rules made thereunder applicable in the matter of levy and collection of cess under the Jute Rules. It was a clear case of legislation by reference. In such a case, naturally the subsequent amendments and alterations made to the Central Excise Act and the Rules would ipso facto get imported into the jute Rules. As against this the language used by the legislature in enacting section 2 (bb) clearly suggests a case of legislation by incorporation. In such a case, it is well settled that subsequent amendments or alterations made in the former enactment would not affect the incorporation statute. ( 14 ) IN the circumstances, we are in agreement with the view expressed by learned Single Judge that the subsequent amendments to the B. R. Act will not be attracted in respect of definition of "appropriate Government" in the i. D. Act. Consequently, the "appropriate Government" in respect of the multi statebanks having branches in more than one State would be the State Government and not the Central Government. Before parting with this matter, we may mention that on behalf of the respondent union, it was argued that the definition of "banking company" as contained in section 5 (c)of the B. R. Act has not been amended by the Amendment Act 23 of 1966 or by any other amendment. But by virtue of section 56 the provisions of the B. R. Act are made applicable in the manner indicated by that section. It is not necessary for us to express any view on this issue as, in our opinion, the definition of the "banking company" will have to be read as it existed on the date of incorporation of section 2 (bb) for the purpose of deciding as to which is the "appropriate Government" and so read the appropriate Government in respect ofe banks would be the State Government.