Case: Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd Vs. C. Chandrasekaran &amp; Ors

carefully considered the order delivered by the Appellate Tribunal and we see no justification for the criticism made against that order that the decision of the Appellate Tribunal proceeded solely on the ground of the abstract concept of the evil effects of monopoly. The order has referred to the railway which runs parallel to the route and the order has taken into account the fact that the appellant is a monopolist on a part of the route and Raman and Raman (P) Ltd. is a near monopolist on the remaining part of the route. Srinivasan, J. thought that in dealing with the matter, the Appellate Tribunal ignored the fact that there was bound to be some kind of competition between the monopolist and the near monopolist. On the merits we find some difficulty in acceding that a theoretically possible competition between the monopolist and the near monopolist can have any relevance or validity in the present case. A passenger who wants to travel more than 18 miles of the route which is covered by the monopoly of the appellant would naturally prefer to go by the appellants bus all the way, because in trying to take advantage of the near monopolists service on the second sector of the route he would have to face the risk of not having a continuous journey. A competition between the monopolist on the first sector of the route who would have run his buses on the whole distance if he was granted the permit, and the near monopolist so far as the second sector of the route is concerned is itself a matter of a purely theoretical character. There would be obvious difficulties and causes of inconvenience for through passengers to take advantage of this hypothetical competition. If the argument as to the competition between the two powerful operators has to be factual and effective, it must mean that permits should have been granted to both of them over the whole route, and that clearly would mean that smaller operators would be excluded. We are not suggesting that this consideration itself is decisive; we are only pointing out that the ultimate decision of the Appellate Tribunal must have been the result of a proper assessment of all the relevant factors, and so, it would not be safe to issue a writ of certiorari against its decision because some reasons which were urged before the High Court had not been expressly considered by the Appellate Tribunal. Speaking generally and in a broad way, we do not think it could be seriously denied that encouraging bus operators who do not own a fleet of buses and discouraging monopoly on the route is consistent with the interests of the general public which is of paramount importance under S. 47(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Besides, the Division Bench has also referred to some other aspects of the matter which would indicate that the Appellate Tribunal was right in not granting a permit to the appellant. In cases of this kind, the High Court should naturally be slow in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226. If the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from infirmities which would justify the issue of a writ under the well recognised principles laid down by judicial decisions in that behalf, the High Court should and ought to interfere but the writs of certiorari should not be issued merely on the ground that all relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would have taken a different view on the evidence adduced in the proceedings. 11. In support of his case that the impugned order was properly set aside by Srinivasan, J., Mr. Pathak has relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in R. V. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the Eastern Province of England, Ex parte Grant, 1956-3 All ER 321. In that case the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether the discretion vested in the Tribunal under S. 25 (1)(a) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, had been validly exercised. The test prescribed by Section 25(1)(a) was that the landlord should show that the carrying out of the purpose for which he proposed to terminate the tenancy in question is desirable in the interests of efficient farming, whether as respects good estate management or good husbandry or otherwise. In coming to the conclusion that the said requirement. had not been satisfied, the Tribunal appears to have relied substantially on the fact that the tenants sought to be dispossessed had been in possession of the lands for many years. It appears that the Court of Appeal took the view that the real grounds for the Tribunals decision on the Section 25 point which appeared from paragraphs 5 and 6 of the statement were ambiguous and to some extent in conflict with each other. Besides, the effect which would result if the landlords request was granted on the tenants other land which had influenced the Tribunal was, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, irrelevant in considering the applicability of S. 25(1)(a). In other words, the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that it rested at least on some invalid and irrelevant grounds, and that is why a writ of certiorari was ordered to be issued. There can be little doubt that if a decision of a quasi-judicial Tribunal is challenged before the High Court under Art. 226 and it is shown that the said decision is based on irrelevant considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law, a writ will undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the present case does not suffer from any such infirmity. Therefore, we are satisfied that the decision in the case of Ex parte Grant on which Mr. Pathak relies, does not assist his case.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Speaking generally and in a broad way, we do not think it could be seriously denied that encouraging bus operators who do not own a fleet of buses and discouraging monopoly on the route is consistent with the interests of the general public which is of paramount importance under S. 47(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. Besides, the Division Bench has also referred to some other aspects of the matter which would indicate that the Appellate Tribunal was right in not granting a permit to the appellant. In cases of this kind, the High Court should naturally be slow in exercising its jurisdiction under Art. 226. If the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal which is challenged in writ proceedings suffers from infirmities which would justify the issue of a writ under the well recognised principles laid down by judicial decisions in that behalf, the High Court should and ought to interfere but the writs of certiorari should not be issued merely on the ground that all relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would have taken a different view on the evidence adduced in the proceedings11. In support of his case that the impugned order was properly set aside by Srinivasan, J., Mr. Pathak has relied upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in R. V. Agricultural Land Tribunal for the Eastern Province of England, Ex parte Grant, 1956-3 All ER 321. In that case the Court of Appeal was called upon to consider whether the discretion vested in the Tribunal under S. 25 (1)(a) of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1948, had been validly exercised. The test prescribed by Section 25(1)(a) was that the landlord should show that the carrying out of the purpose for which he proposed to terminate the tenancy in question is desirable in the interests of efficient farming, whether as respects good estate management or good husbandry or otherwise. In coming to the conclusion that the said requirement. had not been satisfied, the Tribunal appears to have relied substantially on the fact that the tenants sought to be dispossessed had been in possession of the lands for many years. It appears that the Court of Appeal took the view that the real grounds for the Tribunals decision on the Section 25 point which appeared from paragraphs 5 and 6 of the statement were ambiguous and to some extent in conflict with each other. Besides, the effect which would result if the landlords request was granted on the tenants other land which had influenced the Tribunal was, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, irrelevant in considering the applicability of S. 25(1)(a). In other words, the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the Tribunal was vitiated by the fact that it rested at least on some invalid and irrelevant grounds, and that is why a writ of certiorari was ordered to be issued. There can be little doubt that if a decision of a quasi-judicial Tribunal is challenged before the High Court under Art. 226 and it is shown that the said decision is based on irrelevant considerations or on considerations which are invalid in law, a writ will undoubtedly be issued under Art. 226. But the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal in the present case does not suffer from any such infirmity. Therefore, we are satisfied that the decision in the case of Ex parte Grant on which Mr. Pathak relies, does not assist his case.