Case: N.S. Mehta &amp; Ors Vs. Union Of India &amp; Ors

be regulated by their relative seniority as determined before that day.Provided that if t he seniority of any such officer had not been specifically deter- mined before the appointed day it shall be as determined by the Department of Personnel in the Cabinet Secretariat.MHA No. 6/2/67-CS-II dated 20.12.67.Provided further that the seniority of an officer referred to in the proviso to clause (a) of rule 2 shall be determined by the Department of Personnel in the Cabinet Secretariat by taking into account the continuous length of regular service rendered before the appointment day by such officer in the grade of lower Division or in any higher grade in the offices of the Central Government.(2) All permanent officers included in the initial constitution of a Grade under rule 7 shall rank senior to all persons substantively appointed to that Grade with effect from a date after the appointed day, and all temporary officers included in the initial constitution of a Grade under that rule shall rank senior to all temporary officers appoint- ed to that Grade after the appointed day.(3) Except as provided in sub-rules (4) and (5), the seniority of persons appointed to the two grades of the service after the appointed day shall be determined in the following manner, namely:1. UPPER DIVISION GRADE(i) Permanent Officers.--The seniority inter se of officers substantively appointed to the Grade after the appointed day shall be regulated by the order in which they are so appointed to the Grade.(ii) Temporary Officers.--The seniority inter se of temporary officers appointed to the Grade after the appointed day shall be regulated as follows, namely:(a) Persons included in the Select List for a Grade shall rank senior en bloc to those not included in the Select list.(b) The seniority inter se of person included in the Select List shall be in the order in which their names are included in the Select List.(c) The seniority inter se of persons no t included in the Select List shall be regulated by the order in which they are approved for long term appointment to the Grade.Rule 7 provides as follows"7. Initial Constitution of each cadre.--The permanent and temporary officers of each Grade in each cadre on the appointed day shall be as deter mined by the Deptt. of Personnel in the Cabinet Secretariat."6. We find that, acting under Rule 7 set out above, the Government of India had issued an order on 12-11-1962 allotting permanent and temporary officers of the Upper Division grade to the Central Secretariat Clerical Service. Apparently, that allotment also determined the order of seniority. In other words, the rule relating to the passing of a typing test had been followed for a long period and had actually been given effect to under the statutory rules in promotions made and lists drawn up. This explains the petitioners challenge to the validity of Rule 17.7. We are unable to see how a rule prescribing a typing test is unconnected with the duties of Clerks who desire a promotion to the next grade. We do not find that a discrimination made on such a ground could violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution whatever also it may be said to violate. It is not necessary for us to hold that a violation of a statutory or other kind of rule in a particular case cannot amount to a violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. There may also be cases in which a rule made is ultra vires form reasonableness or on any other ground and should not be deemed to exist. In such a case, if the rule is enforced, it may, on the facts of the particular case, amount to a violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution also. The case before us does not appear to be such a case at all. It seems to be covered by what this Court said in P.C. Sethi &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., ([1975] 3 SCR 20.) with regard to the Office Memorandum of 22.6.1949 (at pp. 207-208):" .... the Office Memorandum of June 22, 1949, is no bar to the Government in making separate provisions for the mode of constitution and future maintenance of the service of Assistants. There is, there fore, no obligation under the aforesaid Office Memorandum on the part of the Government to enforce a rule of bald length of continuous service irrespective of other considerations than the service was sought to be reorganised and reinforced. As noticed earlier the service had to be reconstituted and the temporary Assistants properly observed keeping in view the question of quality and efficiency as well as at the same where regard being had to accommodate as large number as possible to gradual absorption. In doing so we are unable to hold that the Government has violated the provisions of articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution. The Classification under the instruction for the constitution of regular temporary establishment in the manner done cannot be characterised as unreasonable in view of the object for which these had to be introduced in reconstituting the service to ensure security of temporary employees assistant with efficiency in the Service. There is no discrimination whatsoever amongst the equals as such nor any arbitrary exercise of power by the Government."8. This Court has also explained in Joginder Nath &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors.([1975] 2 S.C.R. 553.) and Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi &Ors.([1975] 2 S.C.R. 960.) the principles on which this Court will interfere under Article 32 of the Constitution for an alleged violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also explained, there how delay in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, which may create equitable rights of others, may give rational grounds for discrimination so that it would cease to be a case of any violation of Articles 14 and 16 at all. We think that the principles laid down in the cases mentioned above apply here.9.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We find that, acting under Rule 7 set out above, the Government of India had issued an order on 12-11-1962 allotting permanent and temporary officers of the Upper Division grade to the Central Secretariat Clerical Service. Apparently, that allotment also determined the order of seniority. In other words, the rule relating to the passing of a typing test had been followed for a long period and had actually been given effect to under the statutory rules in promotions made and lists drawn up. This explains the petitioners challenge to the validity of Ruleare unable to see how a rule prescribing a typing test is unconnected with the duties of Clerks who desire a promotion to the next grade. We do not find that a discrimination made on such a ground could violate Articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution whatever also it may be said to violate. It is not necessary for us to hold that a violation of a statutory or other kind of rule in a particular case cannot amount to a violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. There may also be cases in which a rule made is ultra vires form reasonableness or on any other ground and should not be deemed to exist. In such a case, if the rule is enforced, it may, on the facts of the particular case, amount to a violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution also. The case before us does not appear to be such a case at all. It seems to be covered by what this Court said in P.C. Sethi &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., ([1975] 3 SCR 20.) with regard to the Office Memorandum of 22.6.1949 (at pp. 207-208):" .... the Office Memorandum of June 22, 1949, is no bar to the Government in making separate provisions for the mode of constitution and future maintenance of the service of Assistants. There is, there fore, no obligation under the aforesaid Office Memorandum on the part of the Government to enforce a rule of bald length of continuous service irrespective of other considerations than the service was sought to be reorganised and reinforced. As noticed earlier the service had to be reconstituted and the temporary Assistants properly observed keeping in view the question of quality and efficiency as well as at the same where regard being had to accommodate as large number as possible to gradual absorption. In doing so we are unable to hold that the Government has violated the provisions of articles 14 or 16 of the Constitution. The Classification under the instruction for the constitution of regular temporary establishment in the manner done cannot be characterised as unreasonable in view of the object for which these had to be introduced in reconstituting the service to ensure security of temporary employees assistant with efficiency in the Service. There is no discrimination whatsoever amongst the equals as such nor any arbitrary exercise of power by theCourt has also explained in Joginder Nath &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors.([1975] 2 S.C.R. 553.) and Amrit Lal Berry v. Collector of Central Excise, New Delhi &Ors.([1975] 2 S.C.R. 960.) the principles on which this Court will interfere under Article 32 of the Constitution for an alleged violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is also explained, there how delay in invoking the jurisdiction of the Court, which may create equitable rights of others, may give rational grounds for discrimination so that it would cease to be a case of any violation of Articles 14 and 16 at all. We think that the principles laid down in the cases mentioned above apply here.