Case: KANOORI Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN

1980 in favour of the appellant-the wife of the deceased Gumana Ram Jaat came to be reversed on an appeal filed by the State and the appellant came to be convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. 2. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant got married to the deceased five years before the date of occurrence in question, that the Gauna had taken place one and half years before the date of occurrence, that she was not happy with her husband he having not been in a position to make her lead a luxurious life, the husband was a rustic villager, that on the night intervening 2nd/3rd June, 1980 when her husband was sleeping in Awade in order to keep a watch on the cattle, she went stealthily and killed her husband by a sharp edged weapon known as Jharbar, that the mother-in-law of the appellant was awake and had noticed the going of the appellant to the Awade and returning therefrom and that even when she returned and gave the mother-in-law water to drink at her asking without giving room for any suspicion and thereafter everybody slept as though nothing happened, ultimately to find on the next morning the victim in a pool of blood in the Awade. Thereafter on cries raised the other family members and neighbours gathered on the spot and noticed the gruesome murder. The prosecution further alleged that the appellant herself confessed of having killed her husband. On information being lodged by PW 3 Amana Ram, the uncle of the deceased at 4.30 PM on 3.6.1980 the case was said to have been registered under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and in the course of investigation witnesses were said to have been examined and on all the relevant materials gathered besides getting the post mortem of the body also conducted. The appellant has been charged as noticed supra for the offence under Section 302 Indian Penal Code for having murdered her husband. 3. On being committed to the sessions court and after conduct of trial the learned Sessions Judge considered the materials on record with particular reference to the circumstances allegedly pointing towards the guilt of the appellant and recorded a finding that the prosecution was not able to substantiate involvement of the appellant in the occurrence or prove that she was the culprit who committed the murder. Aggrieved, the State pursued the matter before the High Court and as pointed out earlier, the High Court felt convinced of the prosecution case and convicted the appellant for the murder of her husband, resulting in the above appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant as also the learned counsel for the respondent-State endeavoured much, during the course of arguments, apart from inviting our attention to the relevant portions of the judgments of the courts below and the evidence on record, to justify their respective stands relying upon one or the other of the findings of the courts below. 5. On a careful consideration of the contentions of the learned counsel on either side we are of the view that the High Court, though was entitled to re-appreciate the evidence on record as the court of first appeal, has in our view, completely overlooked the fact that it was dealing with an appeal against the order of an acquittal and instead of finding out the infirmities if any in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge which could legitimately justify interference with the order of acquittal rendered by the trial court seems to have proceeded on mere surmises in assuming the basic requirements and ingredients necessary to prove the guilt which otherwise need proper proof on the basis of concrete materials, while disturbing the findings of the learned Sessions Judge. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge are well merited and the nebulous nature of evidence let-in in support of the prosecution case was rightly considered to be insufficient for the purpose of indicting the appellant merely on the ground that she was found during night to have gone to the Awade where her husband was sleeping and returned, in our view, apart from the slippery and doubtful nature of the evidence in this regard it would be too far fetched an assumption to be made, particularly, when there is no concrete material worth credence to prove any such strained feelings and further it has not been shown that the Awade was inaccessible to anyone else other than the inmates of the house being located in open field to suppose that she alone was the culprit. There was nothing for the wife living in the company of in-laws going during night time to the place where her husband was sleeping to have his company and this cannot by itself be viewed as enough proof of her guilt, merely because the victim was found to have met with an unnatural death. The evidence of PW 4 seems to be too artificial to inspire any confidence with a court of law when she claims to have not noticed any strange behaviour with the appellant on her return from Awade or any blood in her hands or clothes, which could have been found on her clothes so visibly, even as per the version of the prosecution. That apart as observed by the trial court so many injuries could not have been inflicted without any noise or cries being made by the victim. The entire prosecution story appears to be too artificial to be accepted in law, to justify a conviction for murder. Neither the claim based on the alleged confession nor the recovery of the weapon of the crime in the manner projected could inspire any confidence in court to expect to judicially adjudicate the guilt of an accused and the order of reversal made by the High Court, in our view, seems to be patently erroneous, demonstrably unreasonable and consequently unsustainable.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]5. On a careful consideration of the contentions of the learned counsel on either side we are of the view that the High Court, though was entitled to re-appreciate the evidence on record as the court of first appeal, has in our view, completely overlooked the fact that it was dealing with an appeal against the order of an acquittal and instead of finding out the infirmities if any in the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge which could legitimately justify interference with the order of acquittal rendered by the trial court seems to have proceeded on mere surmises in assuming the basic requirements and ingredients necessary to prove the guilt which otherwise need proper proof on the basis of concrete materials, while disturbing the findings of the learned Sessions Judge. In our view, the findings recorded by the learned Sessions Judge are well merited and the nebulous nature of evidence let-in in support of the prosecution case was rightly considered to be insufficient for the purpose of indicting the appellant merely on the ground that she was found during night to have gone to the Awade where her husband was sleeping and returned, in our view, apart from the slippery and doubtful nature of the evidence in this regard it would be too far fetched an assumption to be made, particularly, when there is no concrete material worth credence to prove any such strained feelings and further it has not been shown that the Awade was inaccessible to anyone else other than the inmates of the house being located in open field to suppose that she alone was the culprit. There was nothing for the wife living in the company of in-laws going during night time to the place where her husband was sleeping to have his company and this cannot by itself be viewed as enough proof of her guilt, merely because the victim was found to have met with an unnatural death. The evidence of PW 4 seems to be too artificial to inspire any confidence with a court of law when she claims to have not noticed any strange behaviour with the appellant on her return from Awade or any blood in her hands or clothes, which could have been found on her clothes so visibly, even as per the version of the prosecution. That apart as observed by the trial court so many injuries could not have been inflicted without any noise or cries being made by the victim. The entire prosecution story appears to be too artificial to be accepted in law, to justify a conviction for murder. Neither the claim based on the alleged confession nor the recovery of the weapon of the crime in the manner projected could inspire any confidence in court to expect to judicially adjudicate the guilt of an accused and the order of reversal made by the High Court, in our view, seems to be patently erroneous, demonstrably unreasonable and consequently unsustainable.