Case: Prabhakar &amp; Ors Vs. State Of Maharashtra &amp; Ors

Mofussil officer was to be taken for determination of his seniority whereas in case of the officer belonging to the Greater Bombay Police Force, the date of his appointment was to be taken and in the opinion of the High Court, this was clearly discriminatory.(3) That in case of a cadet whose period of training had been extended on account of his failure at the examination the impugned clause gave an advantage even to such a bad officer.5. In our opinion none of the grounds forming the basis of the judgment of the High Court is sustainable. The attack on Rule 7 (1) (a) was not specifically made in the writ application as originally presented by respondent No. 4. He laid the foundation for the attack in his rejoinder application A counter affidavit thereafter was filed by the State stating the facts which led to the framing of clause 7 (1) (a). Respondent No. 4 filed a further rejoinder. It was not disputed, rather, admitted on all hands that at Naigaum School the training period was much shorter than the period of 18 months which continued at Nasik. If during the period of 10 years cadets on the basis of a shorter period of training were appointed to the Bombay Police Force without any specific order of the Government (although it must not be the case) it might have affected the validity of their appointment but not the fact that they had been so appointed on a shorter period of training.6. The High Court has committed an error in the interpretation of the provision contained in clause 7 (1) (a) of the Order. On transfer of any police officer from Greater Bombay to the District and vice versa, if his training had commenced on any date between the period of 1st May, 1939 to 1st June, 1949, then his seniority was to be determined vis-a-vis the police officer of the force to which he was transferred with reference to the dates on which their training commenced. It is not that in one case it will be the date of commencement of the training and in the other it will be the date of appointment, as seems to have been wrongly thought by the High Court. To explain, we may take an example. Suppose a Sub-Inspector A whose training had commenced - say on 1st May, 1947 resulting in his appointment - say, on 1st November 1947 was transferred to the Mofussil where, let us suppose again, a police officer B was there whose training had commenced - say on 1st April, 1947, resulting in his appointment on 1st October, 1948, then in such a case B will be senior to A because his training commenced earlier even though he was appointed later. But if there be an officer, suppose C, in the Mofussil whose training commenced - say on 1st June 1947 resulting in his appointment on 1st December , 1948 then he cannot be senior to A by taking 1st June, 1947 as the date of commencement of his training and comparing with 1st November, 1947 the date of appointment of A. This interpretation of the rule which we have put was accepted to be the correct interpretation on all hands including the Government. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4, however, submitted that the impugned seniority list had not been prepared by the Government on such an interpretation of clause 7 (1) (a), but the list prepared is on the basis of the interpretation given by the High Court. On behalf of the State we were informed that it was not so. We have no. doubt in our mind that even if there be any mistake or discrepancy in the seniority list which is found to be not in conformity with the interpretation put by us to clause 7 (1) (a) then that mistake or discrepancy will have to be removed sooner them later and the seniority list will be set at right accordingly.7. Ordinarily and generally the method of fixation of seniority as provided in sub-clause (b) of clause 7 (1) of the Order was the correct and proper method to be followed. But because of the special situation of appointment of some police officers during the period of 10 years on a shorter period of training a departure was made as provided in sub-clause (a). A cadet who received his full training for 18 months at Nasik for no. fault of his was appointed later than a cadet who started training later at Naigaum but was appointed earlier than the former. # There was nothing wrong, illegal or unreasonable in making a provision in sub-clause (a) that in such a situation the commencement of the period of training will be taken as the date for the purposes of fixation of seniority. There was a reasonable and rational nexus between the object and the rule. It was for the rule making authority to decide and to choose in such a situation - either the date of commencement of the training or the date of appointment. Taking the former date in the special circumstances seems to be reasonable and justified. # Such a provision cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.8. The third ground for declaring clause 7 (1) (a) ultra vires given by the High Court theoretically was correct but materials were placed before us from the various affidavits to show that hardly there was such a case which had got the advantage of the clause even after failure in the examination. There was one such case of hardship of not passing out the examination in time due to reasons beyond the control of the cadet. Clause 7 (1) (a), in our opinion, was not meant to give any undue advantage to a nondeserving police officer who failed to pass the training examination at the proper time. No. specific instance was brought to our notice where such advantage had been accorded.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The order of the High Court made against appellant No. 3, could not be assailed before us.Appellant No. 3, is not, therefore, entitled to any relief in this appeal.In our opinion none of the grounds forming the basis of the judgment of the High Court is sustainable. The attack on Rule 7 (1) (a) was not specifically made in the writ application as originally presented by respondent No. 4. He laid the foundation for the attack in his rejoinder application A counter affidavit thereafter was filed by the State stating the facts which led to the framing of clause 7 (1) (a). Respondent No. 4 filed a further rejoinder. It was not disputed, rather, admitted on all hands that at Naigaum School the training period was much shorter than the period of 18 months which continued at Nasik. If during the period of 10 years cadets on the basis of a shorter period of training were appointed to the Bombay Police Force without any specific order of the Government (although it must not be the case) it might have affected the validity of their appointment but not the fact that they had been so appointed on a shorter period of training.6. The High Court has committed an error in the interpretation of the provision contained in clause 7 (1) (a) of the Order. On transfer of any police officer from Greater Bombay to the District and vice versa, if his training had commenced on any date between the period of 1st May, 1939 to 1st June, 1949, then his seniority was to be determined vis-a-vis the police officer of the force to which he was transferred with reference to the dates on which their training commenced. It is not that in one case it will be the date of commencement of the training and in the other it will be the date of appointment, as seems to have been wrongly thought by the HighWe have no. doubt in our mind that even if there be any mistake or discrepancy in the seniority list which is found to be not in conformity with the interpretation put by us to clause 7 (1) (a) then that mistake or discrepancy will have to be removed sooner them later and the seniority list will be set at right accordingly.7. Ordinarily and generally the method of fixation of seniority as provided in sub-clause (b) of clause 7 (1) of the Order was the correct and proper method to be followed. But because of the special situation of appointment of some police officers during the period of 10 years on a shorter period of training a departure was made as provided in sub-clause (a). A cadet who received his full training for 18 months at Nasik for no. fault of his was appointed later than a cadet who started training later at Naigaum but was appointed earlier than the former. # There was nothing wrong, illegal or unreasonable in making a provision in sub-clause (a) that in such a situation the commencement of the period of training will be taken as the date for the purposes of fixation of seniority. There was a reasonable and rational nexus between the object and the rule. It was for the rule making authority to decide and to choose in such a situation - either the date of commencement of the training or the date of appointment. Taking the former date in the special circumstances seems to be reasonable and justified. # Such a provision cannot be said to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.8. The third ground for declaring clause 7 (1) (a) ultra vires given by the High Court theoretically was correct but materials were placed before us from the various affidavits to show that hardly there was such a case which had got the advantage of the clause even after failure in the examination. There was one such case of hardship of not passing out the examination in time due to reasons beyond the control of the cadet. Clause 7 (1) (a), in our opinion, was not meant to give any undue advantage to a nondeserving police officer who failed to pass the training examination at the proper time. No. specific instance was brought to our notice where such advantage had been accorded.