Case: Unni Krishnan, J.P. and others etc. etc Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. etc

and / or affiliation is not a matter of course nor is it a formality. Admission to the privileges of a University is a power to be exercised with great care, keeping in view the interest of the general public and the nation. It is a matter of substantial significance - the very life blood of a private educational institution. Ordinarily speaking, no educational institution can run or survive unless it is recognised by the Government or the appropriate authority and / or is affiliated to one or the other Universities in the country. Unless it is recognised and / or affiliated as stated above, its certificates will be of no use. No one would join such educational institution. As a matter of fact, by virtue of the provisions of the U.G.C. Act, noticed hereinabove, no educational institution in this country except a University is entitled to award degrees. It is for this reason that all the private educational institutions seek recognition and / or affiliation with a view to enable them to send the students trained by them to appear at the examinations conducted by the Government / University. The idea is that if such students pass the said examination, the Government / University will award its degree / diploma / certificate to them. These educational institutions follow the syllabus prescribed by the Government / University, have the same courses of study, follow the same method of teaching and training. They do not award their own degrees / qualifications. They prepare their students for University / Government examinations, request the University / Government to permit them to appear at the examinations conducted by them and to award the appropriate degrees to them. Clearly and indubitably, the recognised / affiliated private educational institutions, supplement the function performed by the institutions of the State. Theirs is not an independent activity but one closely allied to and supplemental to the activity of the State. In the above circumstances, it is idle to contend that imparting of education is a business like any other business or that it is an activity akin to any other activity like building on roads, bridges etc. In short, the position is this : No educational institution except an University can award degrees (S.22 and 23 of the U.G.C. Act). The private educational institutions cannot award their own degrees. Even if they award any certificates or other testimonials they have no practical value inasmuch as they are not good for obtaining any employment under the State or for admission into higher courses of study. The private educational institutions merely supplement the effort of the State in educating the people, as explained above. It is not an independent activity. It is an activity supplemental to the principal activity carried on by the State. No private educational institution can survive or subsist without recognition and / or affiliation. The bodies which grant recognition and / or affiliation are the authorities of the State. In such a situation, it is obligatory - in the interest of general public - upon the authority granting recognition or affiliation to insist upon such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not only education of requisite standard but also fairness and equal treatment in the matter of admission of students. Since the recognising / affiliating authority is the State, it is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its duty enjoined upon it by Art.14 of the Constitution. It cannot allow itself or its power and privilege to be used unfairly. The incidents attaching to the main activity attach to supplemental activity as well. Affiliation / recognition is not there for anybody to get it gratis or unconditionally. In our opinion, no Government, authority or University is justified or is entitled to grant recognition / affiliation without imposing such conditions. Doing so would amount to abdicating its obligations enjoined upon it by Part-III; its activity is bound to be characterised as unconstitutional and illegal. To reiterate, what applies to the main activity applies equally to supplemental activity. The State cannot claim immunity from the obligations arising from Arts.14 and 15. If so, it cannot confer such immunity upon its affiliates. Accordingly, we have evolved - with the help of the counsel appearing before us and keeping in view the positive features of the several Central and State enactments referred to hereinbefore - the following scheme which every authority granting recognition / affiliation shall impose upon the institutions seeking such recognition / affiliation.The idea behind the scheme is to eliminate discretion in the management altogether in the matter of admission. It is the discretion in the matter of admission that is at the root of the several ills complained of. It is the discretion that has mainly led to the commercialisation of education. Capitation fee means charging or collecting amount beyond what is permitted by law; all the Acts have defined this expression in this sense. We must strive to bring about a situation where there is no room or occasion for the management or any one on its behalf to demand or collect any amount beyond what is permitted. We must clarify that charging the permitted fees by the private educational institutions - which is bound to be higher than the fees charged in similar governmental institutions by itself cannot be characterised as capitation fees. This is the policy underlying all the four States enactments prohibiting capitation fees. All of them recognise the necessity of charging higher fees by private educational institutions. They seek to regulate the fees that can be charged by them - which may be called permitted fees - and to bar them from collecting anything other than the permitted fees, which is what Capitation fees means. Our attempt in evolving the following scheme precisely is to give effect to the said legislative policy. It would be highly desirable if this scheme is given a statutory shape by incorporating it in the Rules that may be framed under these enactments.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]143. It is thus well established by the decisions of this Court that the provisions of Parts VII and IV are supplementary and complementary to each other and that Fundamental Rights are but a means to achieve the goal indicated inIt is also held that the Fundamental Rights must be construed in the light of the Directive Principles. It is from the above stand point that Question No. 1 has to be approached.In Bandhua Mukti Morcha (AIR 1984 SC 802 ) this Court held that the right to life guaranteed by Art.21 does take in "educational facilities". (The relevant portion has been quoted hereinabefore). Having regard to the fundamental significance of education to the life of an individual and the nation, and adopting the reasoning and logic adopted in the earlier decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore, we hold, agreeing with the statement in Bandhua Mukti Morcha, that right to education is implicit in and flows from the right to life guaranteed by Art.21. That the right to education has been treated as one of transcendental importance in the life of an individual has been recognised not only in this country since thousands of years, but all over the world. In Mohini Jain (1992 AIR SCW 2100), the importance of education has been duly and rightly stressed. The relevant observations have already been set out in para 7 hereinbefore. In particular, we agree with the observation that without education being provided to the citizens of this country, the objectives set forth in the Preamble to the Constitution cannot be achieved. The Constitution would fail. We do not think that the importance of education could have been better emphasised than in the abovefact that right to education occurs in as many as three Articles inviz., Arts.41, 45 and 46 shows the importance attached to it by the founding fathers. Even some of the Articles inviz., Articles 29 and 30 speak of education.It is argued by some of the counsel for the petitioners that Art.21 is negative in character and that it merely declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or persona liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Since the State is not depriving the respondents students of their right to education, Art.21 is not attracted, it is submitted. If and when the State makes a law taking away the right to education, would Art.21 be attracted, according tothem. This argument, in our opinion, is really born of confusion; at any rate, it is designed to confuse the issue. The first question is whether the right to life guaranteed by Art.21 does take in the right to education or not. It is then that the second question arises whether the State is taking away that right. The mere fact that the State is not taking away the right as at present does not mean that right to education is not included within the right to life. The content of the right is not determined by perception of threat. The content of right to life is not be to determined on the basis of existence or absence of threat of deprivation. The effect of holding that right to education is implicit in the right to life is that the State cannot deprive the citizen of his right to education except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law.147. In the above state of law, it would not be correct to contend that Mohini Jain (1992 AIR SCW 2100) was wrong in so far as it declared that "the right to education flows directly from right to life." But the question is what is the content of this right? How much and what level of education is necessary to make the life meaningful? Does it mean that every citizen of this country can call upon the State to provide him education of his choice? In other words, whether the citizens of this country can demand that the State provide adequate number of medical colleges, engineering colleges and other educational institutions to satisfy all their educational needs? Mohini Jain seems to say, yes. With respect, we cannot agree with such a broad proposition. The right to education which is implicit in the right to life and personal liberty, guaranteed by Art.21 must be construed in the light of the directive principles in Part IV of thefar as the right to education is concerned, there are several articles in Part IV which expressly speak of it. Art.41 says that the "State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want". Art.45 says that "the State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen years." Art.46 commands that "the State shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and, in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation." Education means knowledgeand "knowledge itself is power." As rightly observed by John Adams, "the preservation of means of knowledge among the lowest ranks is of more importance to the public than all the property of all the rich men in the country" (Dissertation on canon and feudal law, 1765).It isin the light of these articles that the content and parameters of the right to education have to be determined. Right to education, understood in the context of Arts.45 and 41, means : (a) every child / citizen of this country has a right to free education until he completes the age of fourteen years, and (b) after a child / citizen completes 14 years, his right to education is circumscribed by the limits of the economic capacity of the State and itsthat as it may, we must say that at least now the State should honour the command of Art.45. It must be made a realityat least now. Indeed, the National Education Policy1986 says that the promise of Art.45 will be redeemed before the end of this century. Be that as it may, we hold that a child (citizen) has a fundamental right to free education up to the age of 14 years.years.150. The right to education further means that a citizen has a right to call upon the State to provide educational facilities to him within the limits of its economic capacity and development. By saying so, we are not transferring Art.41 from Part IV to Part III we are merely relying upon Art.41 to illustrate the content of the right to education flowing from Art.21. We cannot believe that any State would say that it need not provide education to its people even within the limits of its economic capacity and development. It goes without saying that the limits of economic capacity are, ordinarily speaking, matters within the subjective satisfaction of the State.151. In the light of the above enunciation, the apprehension expressed by the counsel for the petitioners that by reading the right to education into Art.21, this Court would be enabling each and every citizen of this country to approach the Courts to compel the State to provide him such education as he chooses must be held to be unfounded. The right to free education is available only to children until they complete the age of 14 years. Thereafter, the obligation of the State to provide education is subject to the limits of, its economic capacity andis true, there is no express provision in the Act which says that no engineering college or any other college or institution imparting technical education shall be established except with the permission of the Council. But this may be for the reason that such a power was intended to be exercised by the Council itself if it thinks necessary to do so. We are of the opinion that the vast powers conferred upon the Council by S.10, including those specified above, do extend to and entitle it to issue an order to the above effect. It can also say that even in the existing institutions, no new course, faculty or class shall be opened except with its approval. It can also pass appropriate directions to the existing institutions as well for achieving the purposes of the Act. Such an order may indeed be necessary for a proper discharge of the wide ranging functions conferred upon the Council.Private educational institutions may be aided as well as unaided. Aid given by the Government may be cent per cent or partial. So far as aided institutions are concerned, it is evident, they have to abide by all the rules and regulations as may be framed by the Government and / or recognising / affiliating authorities in the matter of recruitment of teachers and staff, their conditions of service, syllabus, standard of teaching and so on. In particular, in the matter of admission of students, they have to follow the rule of merit and merit alonesubject to any reservations made under Art.15. They shall not be entitled to charge any fees higher than what is charged in Governmental institutions for similar courses. These are and shall be understood to be the conditions of grant of aid. The reason is simple : public funds, when given as grantand not as loancarry the public character wherever they go. Public funds cannot be donated for private purposes. The element of public character necessarily means a fair conduct in all respects consistent with the constitutional mandate of Arts.14 and 15. All the Governments and other authorities in charge of granting aid to educational institutions shall expressly provide for such conditions (among others), if not already provided, and shall ensure compliance with the same. Again aid may take several forms. For example, a medical college does necessarily require a hospital. We are told that for a 100 seat medical college, there must be a fully equippedhospital. Then alone the medical college can be allowed to function. A Private medical college may not have or may no, establish a hospital of its own. It may request the Government and the Government may permit it to avail of the services of a Government hospital for the purpose of the college free of charge. This would also be a form of aid and the conditions aforesaid have to be imposedmay be with some relaxation in the matter of fees chargeableand observed. The Governments (Central and State) and all other authorities granting aid shall impose such conditions forthwith, if not already imposed. These conditions shall apply to existing as well as proposed private educational institutions.165. So far as unaided institutions are concerned, it is obvious that they cannot be compelled to charge the same fee as is charged in Governmental institutions. If they do so voluntarily, it is perfectly welcome but they cannot be compelled to do so, for the simple reason that they have to meet the cost of imparting education from their own resourcesand the main source, apart from donations / charities, if any, can only be the fees collected from thewe do not wish to express any opinion on the question whether the right to establish an educational institution can be said to be carrying on any "occupation within the meaning of Art.19(1)(g),perhaps, it iswe are certainly of the opinion that such activity can neither be a trade or business nor can it be a profession within the meaning of Art.19(1)(g). Trade or business normally connotes an activity carried on with a profit motive. Education has never been commerce in this country. Making it one is opposed to the ethos, tradition and sensibilities of this nation. The argument to the contrary has an unholy ring to it. Imparting of education has never been treated as a trade or business in this country since times immemorial. It has been treated as a religious duty. It has been treated as a charitable activity. But never as trade or business. We agree with Gajendragadkar, J. that "education in its true aspect is more a mission and a vocation rather than a profession or trade or business, however wide may be the denotation of the two latter words ........" [See University of Delhi (1964) 2 SCR 703 : (AIR 1963 SC 1873 )]. The Parliament too has manifested its intention repeatedly (by enacting the U. G. C. Act, I. M. C. Act and A.I.C.T.E. Act) that commercialisation of education is not permissible and that no person shall be allowed to steal a march over a more meritorious candidate because of his economic power. The very same intention is expressed by the Legislatures of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu in the preamble to their respective enactments prohibiting charging of capitation fee.167. We are, therefore, of the opinion, adopting the line of reasoning in State of Bombay v. R.M.D.C., 1957 SCR 874 : (AIR 1957 SC 699 ), that imparting education cannot be treated as a trade or business. Education cannot be allowed to be converted into commerce nor can the petitioners seek to obtain the said result by relying upon the wider meaning of "occupation". The content of the expression "occupation" has to be ascertained keeping in mind the fact that clause (g) employs all the four expressions viz., profession, occupation, trade and business. Their fields may overlap, but each of them does certainly have a content of its own, distinct from the others. Be that as it may, one thing is clearimparting of education is not and cannot be allowed to become commerce. A law, existing or future, ensuring against it would be a valid measure within the meaning of clause (6) of Art.19. We cannot, therefore, agree with the contrary proposition enunciated in AIR 1968 Bombay 91, AIR 1984 Andh Pra 251 and AIR 1986 Kant. 119 .168.The learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon certain decisions in support of their contention that right to establish an educational institution flows from Art.19(1)(g). The first is in Bharat Sevashram Sangh v. State of Gujarat, (1986) 3 SCR 602 : (AIR 1987 SC 494 ), a decision of a Bench consisting of E. S. Venkataramiah and Ranganath Misra, JJ. At page 609 (of SCR) : (at p. 499 of AIR), while dealing with S.33 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act empowering the Government to take over an educational institution in certain situations for a period not exceeding five years, the learned Judges observed that "the said provision is introduced in the interest of the general public and does not in any way affect prejudicially the fundamental right of the management guaranteed under Art.19(1) (g) of theConstitution." Actually, the issue now before us was not raised or considered in the said decision. Moreover, the decision does not say whether it is aprofession, occupation, trade oris then placed upon the Seven Judge Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Rajappa (1978) 3 SCR 207 : (AIR 1978 SC 548 ). Krishna Iyer, J. dealing with the meaning of the expression "industry" in I.D. Act observed that even educational institutions would fall within the purview of "industry".We do not think the said observation in a different context has any application here. So far as the other decision in State of Maharashtra v. Lok Shikshan Sanstha 1971 (Suppl.) SCR 879 : (AIR 1973 SC 588 ) is concerned, all that the Court held there was that in view of the operation of emergency, Art.19 is not available to the petitioners seeking to establish an educational institution. Art.358 was held to be a bar. But the decision does not say that such a right does inhere in the petitioners.169. We are also of the opinion that the said activity cannot be called a profession within the meaning of Art.19(1)(g). It is significant to notice the words "to practice any profession". Evidently, the reference is to such professions as may be practiced by citizens i.e., individuals. [See N.U.C. Employees v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 SC 1080 at 1085]. Establishing educational institutions can by no stretch of imagination be treated as "practising any profession". Teaching may be a profession but establishing an institution, employing teaching and non teaching staff, procuring the necessary infrastructure for running a school or college is not practising profession. It may be anything but not practising a profession.For the purpose of these cases, we shall proceed on the assumption that a person or body of persons has a right to establish an educational institution in this country. But this right, we must make it clear, is not an absolute one. It is subject to such law as may be made by the State in the interest of general public.171. We must, however, make it clear and which is of crucial importance herein, that the right to establish an educational institution does not carry with it the right to recognition or the right to affiliation.We must, however, make it clear and which is of crucial importance herein, that the right to establish an educational institution does not carry with it the right to recognition or the right to affiliation.In St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat (1975) 1 SCR 173 : (AIR 1974 SC 1389 ) it has been held uniformly by all the nine learned Judges that there is no fundamental right to affiliation. Ray, C. J., stated that this has been "the consistent view of this Court." They also recognised that recognition or affiliation is essential for a meaningful exercise of the right to establish and administer educational institutions. Recognition may be granted either by the Government or any other authority or body empowered to accord recognition. Similarly, affiliation may be granted either by the University or any other academic or other body empowered to grant affiliation to other educational institutions. In other words, it is open to a person to establish an educational institution, admit students, impart education, conduct examination and award certificates to them. But he, or the educational institution has no right to insist that the certificates or degrees (if they can be called as such) awarded by such institution should be recognised by the Statemuch less have they the right to say that the students trained by the institution should be admitted to examinations conducted by the University or by the Government or any other authority, as the case may be. The institution has to seek such recognition or affiliation from the appropriate agency. Grant of recognition and / or affiliation is not a matter of course nor is it a formality. Admission to the privileges of a University is a power to be exercised with great care, keeping in view the interest of the general public and the nation. It is a matter of substantial significancethe very life blood of a private educational institution. Ordinarily speaking, no educational institution can run or survive unless it is recognised by the Government or the appropriate authority and / or is affiliated to one or the other Universities in the country. Unless it is recognised and / or affiliated as stated above, its certificates will be of no use. No one would join such educational institution. As a matter of fact, by virtue of the provisions of the U.G.C. Act, noticed hereinabove, no educational institution in this country except a University is entitled to award degrees. It is for this reason that all the private educational institutions seek recognition and / or affiliation with a view to enable them to send the students trained by them to appear at the examinations conducted by the Government / University. The idea is that if such students pass the said examination, the Government / University will award its degree / diploma / certificate to them. These educational institutions follow the syllabus prescribed by the Government / University, have the same courses of study, follow the same method of teaching and training. They do not award their own degrees / qualifications. They prepare their students for University / Government examinations, request the University / Government to permit them to appear at the examinations conducted by them and to award the appropriate degrees to them. Clearly and indubitably, the recognised / affiliated private educational institutions, supplement the function performed by the institutions of the State. Theirs is not an independent activity but one closely allied to and supplemental to the activity of the State. In the above circumstances, it is idle to contend that imparting of education is a business like any other business or that it is an activity akin to any other activity like building on roads, bridges etc. In short, the position is this : No educational institution except an University can award degrees (S.22 and 23 of the U.G.C. Act). The private educational institutions cannot award their own degrees. Even if they award any certificates or other testimonials they have no practical value inasmuch as they are not good for obtaining any employment under the State or for admission into higher courses of study. The private educational institutions merely supplement the effort of the State in educating the people, as explained above. It is not an independent activity. It is an activity supplemental to the principal activity carried on by the State. No private educational institution can survive or subsist without recognition and / or affiliation. The bodies which grant recognition and / or affiliation are the authorities of the State. In such a situation, it is obligatoryin the interest of general publicupon the authority granting recognition or affiliation to insist upon such conditions as are appropriate to ensure not only education of requisite standard but also fairness and equal treatment in the matter of admission of students. Since the recognising / affiliating authority is the State, it is under an obligation to impose such conditions as part of its duty enjoined upon it by Art.14 of the Constitution. It cannot allow itself or its power and privilege to be used unfairly. The incidents attaching to the main activity attach to supplemental activity as well. Affiliation / recognition is not there for anybody to get it gratis or unconditionally. In our opinion, no Government, authority or University is justified or is entitled to grant recognition / affiliation without imposing such conditions. Doing so would amount to abdicating its obligations enjoined upon it byits activity is bound to be characterised as unconstitutional and illegal. To reiterate, what applies to the main activity applies equally to supplemental activity. The State cannot claim immunity from the obligations arising from Arts.14 and 15. If so, it cannot confer such immunity upon its affiliates. Accordingly, we have evolvedwith the help of the counsel appearing before us and keeping in view the positive features of the several Central and State enactments referred to hereinbeforethe following scheme which every authority granting recognition / affiliation shall impose upon the institutions seeking such recognition / affiliation.The idea behind the scheme is to eliminate discretion in the management altogether in the matter of admission. It is the discretion in the matter of admission that is at the root of the several ills complained of. It is the discretion that has mainly led to the commercialisation of education. Capitation fee means charging or collecting amount beyond what is permitted by law; all the Acts have defined this expression in this sense. We must strive to bring about a situation where there is no room or occasion for the management or any one on its behalf to demand or collect any amount beyond what is permitted. We must clarify that charging the permitted fees by the private educational institutionswhich is bound to be higher than the fees charged in similar governmental institutions by itself cannot be characterised as capitation fees. This is the policy underlying all the four States enactments prohibiting capitation fees. All of them recognise the necessity of charging higher fees by private educational institutions. They seek to regulate the fees that can be charged by themwhich may be called permitted feesand to bar them from collecting anything other than the permitted fees, which is what Capitation fees means. Our attempt in evolving the following scheme precisely is to give effect to the said legislative policy. It would be highly desirable if this scheme is given a statutory shape by incorporating it in the Rules that may be framed under theseare aware that until the commencement of the current academic year, the Andhra Pradesh was following a somewhat different pattern in the matter of filling the seats in private unaided engineering colleges. Though all the available seats were being filled by the allottees of the Convenor (State)and the managements were not allowed to admit any student on their owna uniform fee was collected from all the students. The concepts of free seats and payment seats were therefore not relevant in such a situationall were payment seats only. We cannot say that such a system is constitutionally not permissible. But our idea in devising this scheme has been to provide more opportunities to meritorious students, who may not be able to pay the enhanced fee prescribed by the Government for such colleges. The system devised by us would mean correspondingly more financial burden of payment on students whereas in the aforesaid system (in vogue in Andhra Pradesh) the financial burden is equally distributed among all the students. The theoretical foundation for our method is that a candidate / student who is stealing a march over his compatriot on account of his economic power should be made not only to pay for himself but also to pay for another meritorious student. This is the social justification behind the fifty per cent rule prescribed in clause (2) of this scheme.In view of the above, we do not think it necessary to go into or answer Question No. 3. In our opinion, the said question requires debate in a greater depth and any expression of opinion thereon at this juncture is not really warranted.We have held hereinbefore that the educational activity of the private educational institutions is supplemental to the main effort by the State and that what applies to the main activity applies equally to the supplemental activity as well. If Art.14 of the Constitution appliesas it does, without a doubtto the State institutions and compels them to admit students on the basis of merit and merit alone (subject, of course, to any permissible reservationswherein too, merit inter se has to be followed) the applicability of Art.14 cannot be excluded from the supplemental effort / activity. The State Legislature had, therefore, no power to say that a private educational institution will be entitled to admit students of its choice, irrespective of merit or that it is entitled to charge as much as it can, which means a free hand for exploitation and more particularly, commercialisation of education, which is impermissible in law. No such immunity from the constitutional obligation can be claimed or conferred by the State Legislature. On this ground alone, the Section is liable to fail.In the circumstances, it is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the section is bad on account of repugnancy with S.12A of the University Grants Commission Act. It is enough to say that the said section falls foul of Art.14 for the reason given above and must accordingly fail. We agree that the offending portions of S.3A cannot be served from the main body of the section and, therefore, the whole section is liable to fall to the ground.It is not brought to our notice that the enactments of other three States viz., Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra contain similar offending provisions. Indeed, they do not. None of their provisions says that the Management of a private educational institution can admit students, against "payment seats", "irrespective of the ranking assigned to them in such test (entrance test) or examination". Much less do they say that to such admissions, the provision prohibiting capitation fee shall not apply. True, they do not say expressly that such admissions shall be made on the basis of merit, but that, according to us, is implicit. If the notifications or orders issued thereunder provide otherwise, either expressly or by implication, they would be equally bad for the reason given above.It is true, as pointed out by the High Court that these admissions were made in a hurry but the fact remains that they have been continuing in the said course under the orders of this Court over the last about four months. As stated hereinbefore, the present situation has been brought about by a combination of circumstances namely the enactment of S.3A, the allotment of students to the extent of 50% only by the convenor and the failure of the Government to immediately rectify the misunderstanding of the convenor. In the circumstances we are not satisfied that these students should be sent out at this stage. May be, the result is rather unfortunate but we have to weigh all the relevant circumstances. At the same time we are of the opinion that the managements of these private engineering colleges should not be allowed to walk away with the double advantage referred to above.If really Art.21, which is the heart of fundamental rights has received expanded meaning from time to time there is no justification as to why it cannot be interpreted in the light of Art.45 wherein the State is obligated to provide education up to 14 years of age, within the prescribed time limit.