Case: SANDHYA PANT Vs. DEEPAK RUWALI &amp; ORS

ruler of Travancore under Section 18(2) of the TC Act shall stand delegated to the Administrative Committee while the Advisory Committee shall be deemed to be the Committee constituted in terms of Section 20 of the TC Act. It is made clear that all the members including the Chairpersons of the Administrative Committee and the Advisory Committee must be Hindus and fulfil the requirements in Section 2(aa) of the TC Act. All the other Committees constituted in terms of various orders passed by this Court shall continue for four months, and it shall be up to the Advisory Committee to consider whether the services of those Committees are required or not. It must also be stated that the present security arrangements as deployed by the State Government shall be continued, but the expenses in that behalf shall be borne by the Temple hereafter. 42. There is a difference in the traditional mode and manner of management of the Padmanabhaswamy Temple at Thiruvananthapuram in respect of which the right of management is vested with the Ruler of Travancore and the Chitai Golu Devta Temple administered by the Appellant and the Respondents. Be that as it may, even in the case of the Padmanabhaswamy Temple, the Court vested the Temple Committee constituted in terms of its order, with all the powers of management of the Ruler of Travancore. 43. In the instant case, it is not exactly clear as to which heirs of the Pant family are entitled to shebaitship rights in respect of the Chitai Golu Devta Temple and there appears to be disputes in this regard amongst members of the Pant family. 44. The judgment in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Another v. C. K. Rajan and Others (2003) 7 SCC 546, cited by Mr. Gupta was rendered in the facts and circumstances of the case of Guruvayoor Temple. In this case, the Court held:- 56. The case at hand does not fall in any of the aforementioned categories, where a PIL could be entertained. 57. No reported decision has also been brought to our notice where a public interest litigation was entertained in a similar matter. 58. We have also not come across any case so far where the functions required to be performed by statutory functionaries had been rendered redundant by a court by issuing directions upon usurpation of statutory power. The right of a person belonging to a particular religious denomination may sometimes fall foul of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Only whence the fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State an action in relation thereto may be justified. Any right other than the fundamental rights contained in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India may either flow from a statute or from the customary laws. Indisputably, a devotee will have a cause of action to initiate an action before the High Court when his right under statutory law is violated. He may also have a cause of action by reason of action or inaction on the part of the State or a statutory authority; an appropriate order is required to be passed or a direction is required to be issued by the High Court. In some cases, a person may feel aggrieved in his individual capacity, but the public at large may not. 59. It is trite, where a segment of the public is not interested in the cause, a public interest litigation would not ordinarily be entertained. 60. It is possible to contend that the Hindus in general and the devotees visiting the temple in particular are interested in proper management of the temple at the hands of the statutory functionaries. That may be so but the Act is a self-contained code. Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder for ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State should be asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved devotees, both as parens patriae as also in discharge of its statutory duties. *** 63. The High Court should not have proceeded simply to supplant, ignore or bypass the statute. The High Court has not shown any strong and cogent reasons for an Administrator to continue in an office even after expiry of his tenure. It appears from the orders dated 7-2-1993 that the High Court without cogent and sufficient reason allowed the Administrator to continue in office although his term was over and he was posted elsewhere. He also could not have been conferred powers wider than Section 17 of the Act. The High Court took over the power of appointment of the Commissioner bypassing the procedure set out in the Act by calling upon the Government to furnish the names of 5 IAS officers to the Court so that it could exercise the power of appointment of the Commissioner. 45. Unlike the Guruvayoor Temple which was governed by Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee constituted under the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978, there is no specific statute governing the Chitai Golu Devta Temple. 46. In our considered view, the High Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned order. The only question is, whether the order should have been passed in the absence of the Appellant, without deciding the Appellants application for impleadment. On a perusal of the judgment and order, it does not appear that anyone drew the attention of the Court to pending impleadment application of the Appellant. The Appellant could have appeared and made submissions if she had so chosen, even without being added as party. In any case, other members of the Pant family including the Respondent Nos.7 to 10, who, according to the Appellant were in the Mandir Samiti of which the Appellant claims to be Vice President were duly given an opportunity of hearing. We are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order impugned.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]41. In Marthanda Varma (supra), this Court held:-152. Consistent with the stand that the Temple is a public Temple and that no remuneration at any stage was derived in the past or would be aimed at in future, a suggestion was made on behalf of the appellants in the form of a note in response to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the State. In the said note, which is set out in detail in para 64 hereinabove, the appellants have suggested the composition of an Administrative Committee, and of an Advisory Committee. Broadly, it is suggested that the Administrative Committee be formed comprising of five Members, the Chairperson being a retired Indian Administrative Service Officer of the rank of Secretary to the Government of Kerala; the other four members being:(i) a nominee of the trustee;(ii) the Chief Thantri of the Temple;(iii) a nominee of the Government of Kerala; and(iv) a Member to be nominated by the Ministry of Culture, the Government of India.In terms of Para 8 of the note, the trustee that is to say the Manager or shebait of the Temple would be guided by the advice given by the Advisory Committee.153. On the other hand, the suggestion made on behalf of the State is to follow the model statutorily enacted for Guruvayoor Devaswom, and thus the Managing Committee would be of eight Members comprising of two ex-officio members, namely, Padmanabhadasa and the Senior Thantri; while the other six members would be nominated by the Hindus among the Council of Ministers; one of them being member of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes while one being a woman, and the other being a representative of the employees of the Temple.157. The provisions of the TC Act with respect to the administration of the Temple are clear:157.1 Under Section 18(2), the administration shall be conducted. Subject to the control and supervision of the ruler of Travancore, by an Executive Officer appointed by him.157.2. Sree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Committee comprised of three members nominated by the ruler of Travancore in terms of Section 20 is to advise the ruler of Travancore in the discharge of his functions.158. The statute has thus vested the power of appointing the Executive Officer and of forming the Advisory Committee, in the ruler of Travancore. In the note, the appellants have stated:158.1. The trustee shall delegate his powers of administration under Section 18(2) to the Administrative Committee which shall administer the Temple through an Executive Officer to be appointed by the Committee.158.2. On all policy matters, the trustee shall be guided by the advice of the Advisory Committee.159. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival suggestions, the composition of the Committees as suggested by the appellants deserves acceptance, especially in light of the conclusions arrived at by us that the Managership or the shebaitship of the Temple continues with the Family. As against the administration contemplated by Chapter III of Part I of the TC Act in the hands of the ruler of Travancore in absolute terms, the course now suggested by the appellants is quite balanced. The composition of the Administrative Committee as suggested is broadbased and would not be loaded in favour or against the trustee. However, considering the fact that the present interim Administrative Committee headed by the District Judge is in seisin for the last more than five years, and various District Judges as Chairpersons of the Committee conducted themselves quite well, in our view, a minor change in the Administrative Committee suggested by the appellants in their note is called for. Instead of a retired Indian Administrative Service Officer of the rank of Secretary to the Government of Kerala as the Chairperson of the Administrative Committee, in the interest of justice, the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram shall be the Chairperson of the Administrative Committee. Needless to say that the present Chairperson of the Interim Administrative Committee shall continue to be the Chairperson so long as he holds the post of the District Judge, Thiruvananthapuram. The composition of the Advisory Committee will ensure that the administration of the Temple is conducted in a fair and transparent manner.160. We, therefore, accept the suggestions made by the appellants in their note adverted to in detail in para 64 hereinabove with regard to the constitution of the Administrative Committee and the Advisory Committee subject to the modification with respect to the Chairperson of the Administrative Committee as stated in the preceding paragraph. Appellant 1 shall file an appropriate affidavit of undertaking within four weeks of this judgment in terms of Para 1 of the note and also agreeing to the modification as stated above. The affidavit of undertaking so filed shall be binding on Appellant 1 and all his successors.162. In terms of the note submitted by the appellants, the powers of the ruler of Travancore under Section 18(2) of the TC Act shall stand delegated to the Administrative Committee while the Advisory Committee shall be deemed to be the Committee constituted in terms of Section 20 of the TC Act. It is made clear that all the members including the Chairpersons of the Administrative Committee and the Advisory Committee must be Hindus and fulfil the requirements in Section 2(aa) of the TC Act. All the other Committees constituted in terms of various orders passed by this Court shall continue for four months, and it shall be up to the Advisory Committee to consider whether the services of those Committees are required or not. It must also be stated that the present security arrangements as deployed by the State Government shall be continued, but the expenses in that behalf shall be borne by the Temple hereafter.42. There is a difference in the traditional mode and manner of management of the Padmanabhaswamy Temple at Thiruvananthapuram in respect of which the right of management is vested with the Ruler of Travancore and the Chitai Golu Devta Temple administered by the Appellant and the Respondents. Be that as it may, even in the case of the Padmanabhaswamy Temple, the Court vested the Temple Committee constituted in terms of its order, with all the powers of management of the Ruler of Travancore.43. In the instant case, it is not exactly clear as to which heirs of the Pant family are entitled to shebaitship rights in respect of the Chitai Golu Devta Temple and there appears to be disputes in this regard amongst members of the Pant family.44. The judgment in Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee and Another v. C. K. Rajan and Others (2003) 7 SCC 546,  cited by Mr. Gupta was rendered in the facts and circumstances of the case of Guruvayoor Temple. In this case, the Court held:-56. The case at hand does not fall in any of the aforementioned categories, where a PIL could be entertained.57. No reported decision has also been brought to our notice where a public interest litigation was entertained in a similar matter.58. We have also not come across any case so far where the functions required to be performed by statutory functionaries had been rendered redundant by a court by issuing directions upon usurpation of statutory power. The right of a person belonging to a particular religious denomination may sometimes fall foul of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Only whence the fundamental right of a person is infringed by the State an action in relation thereto may be justified. Any right other than the fundamental rights contained in Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India may either flow from a statute or from the customary laws. Indisputably, a devotee will have a cause of action to initiate an action before the High Court when his right under statutory law is violated. He may also have a cause of action by reason of action or inaction on the part of the State or a statutory authority; an appropriate order is required to be passed or a direction is required to be issued by the High Court. In some cases, a person may feel aggrieved in his individual capacity, but the public at large may not.59. It is trite, where a segment of the public is not interested in the cause, a public interest litigation would not ordinarily be entertained.60. It is possible to contend that the Hindus in general and the devotees visiting the temple in particular are interested in proper management of the temple at the hands of the statutory functionaries. That may be so but the Act is a self-contained code. Duties and functions are prescribed in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Forums have been created thereunder for ventilation of the grievances of the affected persons. Ordinarily, therefore, such forums should be moved at the first instance. The State should be asked to look into the grievances of the aggrieved devotees, both as parens patriae as also in discharge of its statutory duties.63. The High Court should not have proceeded simply to supplant, ignore or bypass the statute. The High Court has not shown any strong and cogent reasons for an Administrator to continue in an office even after expiry of his tenure. It appears from the orders dated 7-2-1993 that the High Court without cogent and sufficient reason allowed the Administrator to continue in office although his term was over and he was posted elsewhere. He also could not have been conferred powers wider than Section 17 of the Act. The High Court took over the power of appointment of the Commissioner bypassing the procedure set out in the Act by calling upon the Government to furnish the names of 5 IAS officers to the Court so that it could exercise the power of appointment of the Commissioner.45. Unlike the Guruvayoor Temple which was governed by Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee constituted under the Guruvayoor Devaswom Act, 1978, there is no specific statute governing the Chitai Golu Devta Temple.46. In our considered view, the High Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned order. The only question is, whether the order should have been passed in the absence of the Appellant, without deciding the Appellants application for impleadment. On a perusal of the judgment and order, it does not appear that anyone drew the attention of the Court to pending impleadment application of the Appellant. The Appellant could have appeared and made submissions if she had so chosen, even without being added as party. In any case, other members of the Pant family including the Respondent Nos.7 to 10, who, according to the Appellant were in the Mandir Samiti of which the Appellant claims to be Vice President were duly given an opportunity of hearing. We are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order impugned.