Case: Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao Vs. E. V. Alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil &amp; Others

present trend of election campaign and this trend must be reversed to make the democracy more meaningful by ensuring purity of elections which can be achieved only by a shift in the trend towards the right direction.77. Judging by these standards, we are constrained to observe that some of the statements made by Sharad Pawar, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, even though not amounting to corrupt practice under the enacted law, do not measure up to the desired level of electioneering at the top echelon of political leadership to set the trend for a healthy election campaign. His suggestion to the voters to accept monies etc., if distributed by a candidate, without being influenced thereby as a means of propagating socialism exhibits a bizarre perception of socialism. It is shocking enough that Gadakh said so but far worse to find the Chief Minister endorse that view. Intended as sarcasm it depicts poor taste. If this be the level of election campaign at the top, it is bound to degenerate as it descends to the lower levels. Some portions of the speeches of Sharad Pawar were indeed high precept but the electorate would have benefited more by knowledge of the track record of the preachers practice of the same. There was no such attempt. The degree of responsibility and the level of electioneering expected of the top leadership was wanting in these speeches. If probity in public life is to be maintained and purity of elections is not a myth or mere catch-phrase, a higher level of electioneering is expected at least at the highest level of political leadership.78. It is with this not of caution we say that all the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar and many attributed to Gadakh do not constitute the alleged corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. Accordingly, the notice issued under Section 99 to Sharad Pawar should have been discharged by the High Court instead of Sharad Pawar being named for commission of any such corrupt practice. FURTHER RELIEF UNDER SECTION 101(b) OF THE R.P. ACT 79. The further relief granted by the High Court of declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected after declaring the election of Gadakh to be void is clearly unsustainable. This further relief declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected has been granted under Section 101 of the R.P. Act which read as under : "101. Grounds for which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. - If any person who has lodged a petition has, in addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate, claimed a declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected and the High Court is of opinion - (a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes; or (b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate by corrupt practices the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes, the High Court shall after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void declare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected." * Obviously it is clause (b) of Section 101 under which the further relief in the present case can be justified. To justify this further relief, it must be held that but for the votes obtained by Gadakh by the corrupt practice committed under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act, Vikhe Patil would have obtained a majority of the valid votes. The High Court has taken the view that the election of Gadakh being void Vikhe Patil who polled the next highest number of votes must be declared to have been duly elected. There is no discernible cogent reason in the High Courts judgment to support this conclusion. 80. In Konappa Rudrappa Nadgouda v. Vishwanath Reddy the Constitution Bench pointed out the cases falling under Section 101(b) in which this further declaration can be made. It was held therein as under : (SCC pp. 95-96). "We are again unable to see any logic in the assumption that votes cast in favour of a person who is regarded by the Returning Officer as validly nominated, but who is in truth disqualified, could still be treated as valid votes, for the purpose of determining whether a fresh election should be held. When there are only two contesting candidates, and one of them is under a statutory disqualification, votes cast in favour of the disqualified candidate may be regarded as thrown way, irrespective of whether the voters who voted for him were aware of the disqualification. This is not to say that where there are more than two candidates in the field for a single seat, and one alone is disqualified, on proof of disqualification all the votes cast in his favour will be discarded and the candidate securing the next highest number of votes will be declared elected. In such a case, question of notice to the voters may assume significance, for the voters may not, if aware of the disqualification have voted for the disqualified candidate." * (emphasis supplied) 81. The law applicable being as above, the mere fact that Vikhe Patil secured the next highest number of votes after Gadakh is not sufficient to declare him elected on the conclusion that Gadakhs election is void for commission of a corrupt practice. The High Court proceeded on an erroneous assumption to grant this further relief under Section 101(b) of the R.P. Act declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected. Shri P. P. Rao, with his usual fairness, in our view rightly, did not seriously support the grant of this further relief declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected, on account of the absence of the requisite evidence to support the grant of this further declaration in the present case. No further consideration of this point is, therefore, necessary.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]15. In the present case, the larger question posed by Shri Ram Jethmalani does not arise for consideration and, therefore, we need not express herein any concluded opinion thereon. We may only observe that the proposition enunciated by Shri Ram Jethmalani is too wide for acceptance even in the existing political climate adverted to by the learned counsel unless the election law leads to that inevitable conclusion exposing a hiatus in the legislative effort to achieve the avowed object of purity of elections. We would also like to observe that the suggestion of a liberal construction of the election law relating to corrupt practices by appreciation of evidence in the manner suggested in the existing political climate whereinis commonplace, does not commend to us as the proper approach envisaged by the election law. If purity of elections is the essence of democracy and providing for invalidation of an election on the ground of commission of any corrupt practice is the object of enacting these provisions, it cannot be accepted that the election scene having degenerated over the years, appreciation of evidence for determining the commission of a corrupt practice must be made liberally because of the lower values in the arena of elections. If the rule of law has to be preserved as the essence of democracy of which purity of elections is a necessary concomitant, it is the duty of the courts to appreciate the evidence and construe the law in a manner which would subserve this higher purpose and not even imperceptibly facilitate acceptance, much less affirmance, of the falling electoral standards. For democracy to survive, rule of law must prevail, and it is necessary that the best available men should be chosen as peoples representatives for proper governance of the country. This can best be achieved through men of high moral and ethical values who win the elections on a positive vote obtained on their own merit and not by the negative vote of process of elimination based on comparative demerits of the candidates. It is also necessary that the impact of money power which has eliminated from electoral contest many men of undoubted ability and credibility for want or requisite financial support should be able tothe field to make the peoples choice meaningful. This can be achieved only if elections are contested on a positive vote and the comparison is between the merits and abilities of the contestants without the influence of power and pelf and not between their comparative demerits and the support of money power. Apart from the other adverse consequences, the growing influence of money power has also the effect of promoting criminalisation of politics.16. The increasing electoral malpractices, of which some likehave led even to amendment of the election law, make availability of evidence difficult and this cannot be ignored while applying the standard of proof of acharge for the proof of a corrupt practice. The existing law does not measure up to the existing realities. The ceiling on expenditure is fixed only in respect of the expenditure incurred or authorised by the candidate himself but the expenditure incurred by the party or anyone else in his election campaign is safely outside the net of legal sanction. The spirit of the provision suffers violation through the escape route. The prescription of ceiling on expenditure by a candidate is a mereand no practical check on election expenses for which it was enacted to attain a meaningful democracy. This lacuna in the law is, however, for the Parliament to fill lest the impression is reinforced that its retention is deliberate for the convenience of everyone. If this be not feasible, it may be advisable to omit the provision to prevent the resort to indirect methods for its circumvention and subversion of the law, accepting without any qualm the role of money power in the elections. This provision has ceased to be even a fig leaf to hide the reality.17. We are constrained to make these observations on account of the repeated reference made at the hearing to the growing malpractices during elections, even though it was made for the purpose of persuading us not to attach any significance to statements relating to the personal character or conduct of a candidate since they are not taken seriously by the voters due to the falling ethical standard.18. Real education of the electorate contemplates informing them of the past achievements and future plans of the political party on a positive note and its candidates qualifications to serve that purpose compared with those of the other political parties and their candidates and not a projection of the comparative greater demerits of the opponents. This is with a view to emphasise that the functioning of the democracy depends on the quality of the men chosen for the governance of the country. This is the need which the election campaign is meant to serve in an election based on party lines, the qualifications of the candidates being material for this purpose.19. The duty at the top echelons of leadership at the state and national levels of all political parties is to set the trend for giving the needed information to the electorate by adopting desirable standards so that it percolates to the lower levels and provides a congenial atmosphere for a free and fair poll. A contrary trend of speeches by the top leaders tends to degenerate the election campaign as it descends to the lower levels and at times promotes even violence leading to criminalisation of politics. The growth of this unhealthy trend is a cause for serious concern for the proper functioning of the democracy and it is the duty of the top leaders of all political parties to reverse this trend to enable movement of the functioning democracy in the proper direction.20. The lament of Gadakh and Sharad Pawar of despair against the financial might of Vikhe Patil was indeed farcical and sounds comical in view of their own considerable resources including the power of the ruling party and the active support of the Chief Minister of the State. We cannot accept that the alleged offending portions of the speeches of Gadakh and Sharad Pawar were educative of the electorate even if they do not constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. To suggest that the electorate needs to be warned against the purchase of votes by anyone is to insult their intelligence. Past experience has shown that even the illiterate section of the electorate is educated enough to remain uninfluenced by power and pelf. This it has shown more than once by rejecting the high and the mighty in power when it felt that they had failed to discharge their true obligation.21. We must also add that even if we come to the conclusion that these statements or any of them do not constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4), it only means that the existing law does not frown upon the same to visit it with any adverse consequence, but that does not mean that it is a desirable practice during the election campaign. It is one thing to say that a statement does not constitute corrupt practice but entirely different to suggest that it is a desirable electoral practice forming a part of the programme for education of the electorate.22. We emphasise this fact on account of the vehemence with which Shri Ram Jethmalani canvassed for acceptance of the view that all these statements are within the permissible electoral practice, necessary for education of the electorate. We are unable to subscribe to this view which can only lead to a further degeneration of the waning morality in the electoral scene, when the felt need is for curbing any such tendency to ensure purity of elections.It is clear that every statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate does not amount to a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) unless all the requirements of the provision are satisfied, notwithstanding the fact the such a statement may be defamatory in character. The additional requirements to constitute a corrupt practice are obviously to maintain the delicate balance between the freedom of speech of an individual and public interest of giving full information to the electorate of the candidates. There is no presumption of falsity of such a statement of fact for the purpose of Section 123(4) as it is under the law of defamation; and apart from proving the statement of fact to be false, it must also be shown that the maker of the statement either believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true. Irrespective of the quantum of evidence necessary to discharge the initial onus of leading evidence, the burden of proving these requirements on the evidence adduced remains on the person alleging commission of the corrupt practice. The object of making this provision more stringent is to emphasise the significance of freedom of speech in this sphere while prohibiting the making of such statements of fact relating to the personal character or conduct of any candidate which are not merely false but which are also believed to be false or not believed to be true by the maker. The greater latitude in election law is meant to servant the public purpose if the statement found to be false is made with the belief in its truth based on reasonable grounds and it is not intended to be a licence for making a scurrilous attack on the opponents recklessly.30. The primary requirements of Section 123(4) are that the statement should be a statement of fact which is false, and which the maker either "believes to be false" or "does not believe to be true". If these requirements are not satisfied, the further inquiry to ascertain the satisfaction of the remaining requirements of Section 123(4) serves no useful purpose. No doubt, the burden of proving the satisfaction of all these requirements is on him who alleges commission of the corrupt practice. The onus of leading evidence relating to some requirements is however light in view of their nature. Once the initial onus is discharged, the onus shifts to the other side. For proving the statement of fact to be false, the initial onus is discharged and the burden shifts to the other side by assertion of its falsity on oath whereafter it is for other side to rebut the same. Similarly, the nature of belief of the maker being primarily related to the state of mind of the maker, the initial burden is discharged by an assertion on oath to that effect. If there be any circumstances relevant for proving and justifying the belief of the maker, that also would be a matter of evidence. The maker of the statement knows best the material on which his belief was formed and, therefore, it is for him to prove the same. Whether the maker of the statement believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true, is then ordinarily a matter of inference from the facts so proved.31. The meaning of the expression "statement of fact" was a point of considerable debate at the Bar. The true meaning of this expression is of significance because several statements attributed to Gadakh and Sharad Pawar relate to apprehensions about Vikhe Patils likely future conduct and not to his acts done in the past or at the time of making the statement. Itwas contended by Shri Ashok Desai for Gadakh and Shri K. Parasaran for Sharad Pawar that every statement is not a statement of fact and, therefore, a statement made about future apprehension or opinion of the maker, does not fall within the ambit of this expression. It was urged by them that most of the statements attributed to Gadakh and all the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar do not constitute statement of fact within the meaning of this expression in SectionShri P. P. Rao,expression.32. There can be no dispute that the meaning of the expression "statement of fact" used in Section 123(4), must be such which is apposite in the context and even if the meaning of the word fact be wider to include opinion about another person and apprehensions about his future conduct, that is not sufficient to so construe the expression "statement of fact" in this provision unless it fits in the context. A pragmatic test is to examine whether the meaning given to the expression "statement of fact" is capable of satisfying the other requirements of the provision. It is only that meaning of this expression which is capable of satisfying the other requirements of the provision which can be its true meaning in the context.33. For constituting the corrupt practice in Section 123(4), all the requirements thereof must be satisfactorily proved. A statement of fact for the purpose of Section 123(4) can be one which is capable of proof as false and which the maker either believed to be false or did not believe to be true at the time of making it. These further requirements of its falsity and nature of belief of the maker at the time of making the statement of fact are essential requirements without which the statement of fact is not the one contemplated by Section 123(4). It needs no elaboration to say that a statement of fact can be proved to be false only if it relates to an event which has happened and not to a hypothetical future possibility. Similarly, the belief of the maker about its falsity or the lack of belief in its truth relates to an existing fact and not to a hypothetical future apprehension howsoever honestly one may believe in its likelihood. It is clear that any statement made which is a conjecture of a likelihood in future, would not come within the ambit of the expression "statement of fact" used in Section 123(4). This is also supported by the fact that another requirement of Section 123(4) is that the statement of fact made should be "reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidates election". This further requirement cannot be satisfied by merely stating a likely apprehension for the future and if the event does not happen, this requirement cannot be tested. It is a different matter if the statement amounts to an opinion relating to the personal character or conduct of any candidate which is based on existing or past acts of the candidate. In other words, if the statement made is that a candidate is a murderer, that would imply that he had committed a murder and that amounts to a statement of fact for the purpose of Section 123(4).The consent of the candidate for the purposes of Section 123(4) when the offending statement of fact which is false is published by any other person may be proved by inference from the circumstances and not necessarily by positive evidence to that effect since positive evidence of consent may not be available. (See B. R. Rao v. N. G. Ranga Narasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty and Samant N. Balakrishna v. GeorgeTwo statements attributed to Gadakh related to the payments by Vikhe Patil of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata Dal election fund and Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B. G. Kolse Patil. Gadakh is alleged to have said that Vikhe Patil had paid Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata Dal election fund for getting the support of that party and Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate for withdrawing his nomination from this constituency and shifting to another constituency. These statements are alleged to have been made by Gadakh more than once. However, it is sufficient if such a statement is proved to have been made even once and it satisfies all the requirements of Section 123(4). The particulars of these statements have been given earlier.50. The statement alleging payment of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata Dal election fund is alleged to have been made in the meetings at Sonai on April 30, 1991 and Ahmednagar on May 2, 1991 as well as in the interview given by Gadakh on May 10, 1991 to Girish Kulkarni (PW 11) which was published in the Maharashtra Times of May 13, 1991. The statement by Gadakh of payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B. G. Kolse Patil for withdrawing from this constituency and shifting to another constituency is alleged to have been made in the meeting at Sonai on April 30, 1991 and in the interview given by him to Girish Kulkarni on May 10, 1991 which was published in the Maharashtra Times of May 13, 1991. From the evidence adduced, the making of both these statements is amply proved and we agree with the finding of the High Court to this effect on this point. Shri Ashok Desai took us through the entire evidence on the point and strenuously urged that these statements are not duly proved but we are unable to accept this contention. From the evidence adduced we have no doubt that these statements were made by Gadakh as alleged by Vikhe Patil. Admitted contemporaneous news reports and the conduct of Gadakh after knowing their contents further reassures us that these statements were made by Gadakh. Accordingly, we are referring only to some significant evidence on the point.51. The statement of Gadakh alleging payment of Rs. 50 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to Janata Dal election fund does not necessarily imply that this payment to Janata Dal was for shifting its candidate to another constituency particularly when no other details were given. There is no such clear pleading in the election petition to that effect. This statement has, therefore, to be examined as the allegation of contribution to the election fund of a political party. There is no allegation that this payment was alleged to have been made at any time after Vikhe Patil had become a candidate at the election. In these circumstances, it is doubtful if the mere allegation of contribution to a political partys election fund prior to becoming a candidate can amount to the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act.52. The position, however, is different with regard to the allegation of payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B. G. Kolse Patil for withdrawing from this constituency and shifting to another constituency. Vikhe Patil has denied on oath the making of any of these payments by him. Each of these statements is undoubtedly a statement of fact which is also proved to be false since there is no attempt made by Gadakh to prove it to be true by rebuttal of the testimony of Vikhe Patil on this point. Obviously Vikhe Patil was not required to examine B. G. Kolse Patil after his own denial on oath. No attempt has been made by Gadakh to even suggest that the allegation is true.Vikhe Patil had denied the payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to B. G. Kolse Patil and also asserted that Gadakh while making the statement did not believe it to be true. This is all that could be done by Vikhe Patil to prove the belief of Gadakh at the time of making the statement since that related to the state of mind of Gadakh which he knew best. Even though the burden on the pleadings to prove the satisfaction of this requirement was throughout on Vikhe Patil, the election petitioner, yet the initial burden of leading evidence of that fact on Vikhe Patil was clearly discharged in this manner shifting the burden of rebutting the same to Gadakh. The evidence of Gadakh has, therefore, to be now examined to see if the burden so shifted to Gadakh had been discharged by his evidence. It is significant that in the deposition of Gadakh, there are statements on this point which provide the best indication of his belief about the truth or falsity of the allegation made. In our opinion, the admission made by Gadakh in his deposition is decisive on the point.It is clear from the above extracts that Gadakh admitted unequivocally in hisin para 222 of his deposition that he did not believe the information given to him by the workers that B. G. Kolse Patil was going to withdraw from South Ahmednagar Constituency having accepted Rs. 20 lakhs from the petitioner. In other words, he did not believe in the truth of the information given to him about the payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil and the latter withdrawing from this constituency for that reason. This admission about the kind of belief he had about the truth of this allegation made by Gadakh in hisis notwithstanding a different statement in theand an attempt to resile from that admission in theHis statement inafter being pointed out clearly, the admission made in thethat he did not believe the allegation of payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil to be true, does not have the effect of either withdrawing that admission or showing it to be made erroneously. In such a situation, Gadakhs admission in histhat he did not believe the allegation to be true has the effect of reinforcing Vikhe Patils assertion to this effect instead of negativing it.58.Shri Ashok Desai advanced an ingenious argument to avoid the logical adverse effect of this admission made by Gadakh in hisWe have no doubt that nothing better could have been done in this situation. Shri Desai submitted that the belief about the allegation not being true stated by Gadakh in hisrelated to his belief prior to April 29, 1991 on which date B. G. Kolse Patil actually withdrew his candidature from the South Ahmednagar Constituency and not the belief which he entertained later when he made the statement at Sonai on April 30, 1991 and also subsequently. ShriDesai submitted that the admission merely means that when he was given such an information by his workers, he did not believe in the likelihood of B. G. Kolse Patil withdrawing from the South Ahmednagar Constituency which could be only prior to his actual withdrawal on April 29, 1991. The obvious fallacy in the argument is that the admission has to be read in the context of the earlier question and the speeches made by him to this effect which were all subsequent to withdrawal of B. G. Kolse Patil from South Ahmednagar Constituency on April 29, 1991. He was never questioned about his belief on this aspect prior to the making of these statements or prior to the actual withdrawal by B. G. Kolse Patil. It is also significant that the explanation offered by Shri Desai in his arguments is not the explanation given by Gadakh even though he wasy with reference to this admission. It is sufficient to say that the explanation offered by Shri Desai cannot be accepted when even Gadakh does not say so and Gadakhs belief at the time of making the statements subsequent to withdrawal of B. G. Kolse Patil was the only fact in issue.The dispute relating to the statement attributed to Gadakh alleging payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil for withdrawing from the South Ahmednagar Constituency and shifting to another constituency is in a limited area. Gadakh says that this was the rumour afloat and his own workers had been repeatedly telling him so pointing out the workers of Vikhe Patil as the source of their information. It is significant that Gadakh has not examined any of his workers who according to him gave this information nor has he named any worker of Vikhe Patil as the source of this information. No circumstance justifying belief in the truth of the allegation has been relied on by Gadakh. There is also no dispute that in the interview which he gave to Girish Kulkarni (PW 11), a specific question to this effect was put to him. Thereporting Gadakhs interview in the Maharashtra Times is Ex. 90 (at pp. 116 to 122 of Vol. II). Thishad appeared in the Maharashtra Times of May 13, 1991 wherein Gadakh was reported to have said as under :"According to my reliable information Shri Vikhe Patil had paid Rs. 50 lakhs to the election fund of the party and Rs. 20 lakhs in order that Shri B. G. Kolse Patil should contest the election from Beed instead of Nagar.60. The"reliable information" mentioned by Gadakh has not been disclosed by specifying the name of anyone supposed to have given the information or by examining him. It is also of significance that Gadakh alleges having sent a letter dated May 16, 1991 under certificate of posting to the Maharashtra Times Office disputing correctness of the(Ex. 90). The receipt of that letter by the addressee is denied and the likelihood of its despatch by Gadakh is extremely doubtful since it was not sent by registered post and a certificate of posting being easy to obtain is not reliable. Expenses being immaterial in that election for both sides, it is extremely unlikely that Gadakh would send such a letter under certificate of posting and not by registered post. In view of the narrow controversy on this point, the criticism levelled against the testimony of Girish Kulkarni is of no practical significance and his version about the interview to the extent it was reported in the(Ex. 90) must be accepted as duly proved. The only significant question on this point is whether Gadakh did not believe this allegation to be true when he made it so that this further requirement to constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) is made out.61. Gadakhs version that he sent the letter dated May 16, 1991 (Ex. Q) under certificate of posting is unbelievable. A certificate of posting is easy to procure and does not inspire confidence. Moreover, the circumstances belie his version. With his considerable means and past experience of elections, he would have sent such a letter by registered post to ensure its delivery and create cogent evidence of its despatch. Moreover, he would not merely send such a letter but have his denial published in newspapers because of its significance during elections. We have no doubt that Gadakhs conduct belies his belated denial at the trial.62. There is, however, another aspect of such a stand taken by Gadakh. Some features are rendered beyond doubt on this point. Gadakh must take the consequence of the contents of the letter which he claims to have sent on May 16, 1991, even though we have rejected his claim of sending such a letter. This letter appears to have been brought into existence later when Gadakh was faced with the consequence of his interview. Admittedly, Gadakh had known prior to May 16, 1991 the contents of the(Ex. 90) published in the Maharashtra Times attributing to him the statement alleging payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil but he did not choose to contradict the same by a denial through the Press or in any other authentic manner. Silence of Gadakh at that time reinforces authenticity and the correctness of the(Ex. 90). Another significant feature is that the contents of the letter dated May 16, 1991 indicate at least his doubt in the correctness of the allegation against Vikhe Patil when he said, "it would not be proper on my part to subscribe to those unless I had evidence to that effect". This supports the conclusion that Gadakh did not believe in the truth of that allegation. Absence of a clear denial by Gadakh even therein much less through the Press at that time, in these circumstances, reassures us about the correct reporting of the interview published in the(Ex. 90) in Maharashtra Times of May 13, 1991 in addition to its proof by other evidence supported by conduct of Gadakh himself. The making of the statement of fact alleging payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil, its falsity and the want of belief in its truth by Gadakh are proved beyond any doubt.63.Shri Desai also submitted that there were strong reasons for Gadakh to believe in the truth of this allegation. These factors according to Shri Desai are : (1) Vikhe Patil was an important Congressman who was the likely party candidate, earlier having won on the Congress (I) Party ticket five time since 1971 from the adjacent Kopergaon (North Ahmednagar constituency); (2) Vikhe Patil was an extremely influential and affluent person; (3) Vikhe Patil had filed his nominations from both, that is, North and South Ahmednagar Constituencies; (4) Smt Mrinal Gore, President of the State Janata Dal had said on April 28, 1991 that their party would not support Vikhe Patil and B. G. Kolse Patil had already filed his nominations from both, that is, South Ahmednagar and Beed Constituencies; and (5) On April 29, 1991, B. G. Kolse Patil withdrew his candidature from South Ahmednagar Constituency while Vikhe Patil withdrew from Kopergaon (North Ahmednagar Constituency) and Janata Dal declared its support for Vikhe Patil. Shri Desai submitted that these were strong circumstances for Gadakh to reasonably believe in the truth of the rumour that B. G. Kolse Patil had withdrawn from this constituency (South Ahmednagar) on payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil. In our opinion, these factors are not necessarily consistent with the truth of the allegation of payment of money by Vikhe Patil to B. G. Kolse Patil inasmuch as they are equally consistent with B. G. Kolse Patil preferring to contest from the other constituency on a full assessment of his prospects in the election from the South Ahmednagar Constituency against Vikhe Patil who even according to Gadakh was a very strong and influential candidate. The mere fact that Smt Mrinal Gore had spoken against the likelihood of withdrawal of B. G. Kolse Patil from South Ahmednagar is not by itself significant since action of politicians contrary to their earlier declaration in such matters is not uncommon. Moreover, in view of the direct evidence in the form of admission by Gadakh of the kind of belief he entertained at the time of making the statement, these circumstances are inconsequential when Gadakh himself does not say so. The direct evidence of Gadakh himself about the kind of belief he entertained at that time is decisive of the matter and conclusive against him on this point.It cannot, therefore, be doubted that Gadakh did not believe in the truth of this allegation made against Vikhe Patil when he said in his speech and interview that Rs. 20 lakhs had been paid by Vikhe Patil to the Janata Dal candidate B. G. Kolse Patil for withdrawing from this constituency and shifting to another constituency. It follows that all the requirements of Section 123(4) are satisfied and the false statement of fact made to this effect by Gadakh in respect of the personal character and conduct of Vikhe Patil amounts to the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. This alone is sufficient for declaring the election of Gadakh to be void. The High Courts conclusion to this effect is, therefore, sustainable only for this reason alone.In our opinion, the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar in the meetings held at Newasa and Srigonda ex facie do not amount to statements of fact relating to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil being only the expression of his opinion based on apprehensions about the likely future conduct of Vikhe Patil or relating only to Vikhe Patils political character which do not fall within the ambit of Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. For this reason, the remaining submissions of Shri Parasaran do not require consideration. We shall now deal with the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar specified in the notice under Section 99, which alone require consideration. These have been extracted and enumerated earlier.72. The statements made in the meeting at Newasa were these : In the first statement made by Sharad Pawar, he said that Vikhe Patil had filed his nomination from the South constituency instead of the North because it was a poor region and a scarcity area thinking that it was a good circumstance to win easily. It is difficult to appreciate how this statement can relate to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil envisaged by Section 123(4). The second statement was that Vikhe Patil suffered from the illusion that the poor people of South could be purchased with his resources but those people were men possessed of self respect who could not be purchased with anybodys money. The indication was that any such illusion or impression of Vikhe Patil was incorrect and was meant for Vikhe Patil and not the voters. This statement also is not of the kind envisaged by Section 123(4). This statement also is, therefore, of no significance in the present context. The third statement refers to the speech of Gadakh wherein he said : "They will distribute bicycles, distribute dhoties and sarees", and then adds, "I do not have any objection". The statement of Sharad Pawar therein was that he had no objection to acceptance of the articles if they were distributed. For the reason given while dealing with Gadakhs statement to this effect, Sharad Pawars statement that he had no objection to acceptance of the same, does not fall within the net of Section 123(4). The fourth statement again refers to the likelihood in future of distribution of articles and wealth and proceeds to add : "Let them do it at the place and so far diverting the votes on the strength of money, let it be clear to whole of Maharashtra that voters cannot be bought". The emphasis in this statement is on the fact that voters cannot be bought even if such a distribution was made by any candidate and not that any such distribution was being made by the candidate Vikhe Patil. This too does not fall within Section 123(4). The fifth statement also is a general statement to the same effect of the likelihood of corrupting the people and putting pressure on them with the further caution to guard against any such attempt. The sixth and the last statement made at Newasa is an exhortation to the electorate to support morality and honesty to belittle and destroy the force of wealth and ego opposed to it. This was merely an exhortation of the speaker to support morality and honesty against money power and ego. These general statements made by Sharad Pawar at Newasa projecting his partys candidate as the upholder of morality and honesty against the forces guided by money power and ego amounted to his opinion of the kind of representation made by the two candidates irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of that opinion. The exhortation made to the people to vote for his partys candidate as the upholder of morality and honesty cannot be treated as statements of fact relating to the character and conduct of Vikhe Patil amounting to vilification of his character or conduct. Thus, none of the statements of Sharad Pawar at Newasa constitutes the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act.73. In the meeting at Srigonda, Sharad Pawar is alleged to have made four statements to which objection is taken by Vikhe Patil. The first statement is similar to the first and second statements made at Newasa wherein he said that Vikhe Patil chose to contest from the South constituency being a famine prone region wherein the people were poor for the purpose of purchasing their self respect. He then added that Vikhe Patil had started activities to win the election by efforts of interested parties by playing their game of purchasing self respect of the poor people. For the reasons already given, this statement does not come within Section 123(4). In the second statement, Sharad Pawar said that money alone cannot be an important motivation in the election and there was need of ideology, policy, programme and morality. He then added that it is wrong to give up morality and leave the party when ones wish is not fulfilled and to join hands with other parties. He added that once the "kum kum" is applied its sanctity must be maintained and there should not be any flirting with a person other than he to whom the "kum kum" is applied. This was in the background of Vikhe Patil leaving the Congress (I) Party when the party ticket was not given to him and he contesting the election with the help of other parties. The suggestion was that abandoning the party and switching of loyalty was not morally and ideologically correct. In the admitted background of Vikhe Patil this comment was on his political morality and character because of his leaving the Congress (I) Party on denial of ticket to him and contesting against the Congress (I) Partys candidate. This statement did not relate to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil but merely to his political character and morality. This does not fall within Section 123(4). The third statement is a repetition of the apprehensions for the future of the likelihood of distribution of the benefits in the constituency coupled with the exhortation that if such a thing has begun or is to happen in future, the same may be accepted without being influenced thereby in the choice of the candidate. For the reasons already given, this too does not come within Section 123(4). The fourth and the last statement at Srigonda made by Sharad Pawar was again an exhortation to act on principle, morality and humanity shunning disloyalty and arrogance of money and power. This is indeed high idealism better practised than preached. This cannot obviously come within Section 123(4).74. These being the only statements attributed to Sharad Pawar, we have no doubt that none of them constitutes the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act and, therefore, accepting that these statements were made by Sharad Pawar since there is no attempt by Sharad Pawar to dispute any of them, it must be held that none of them is a statement of fact relating to the personal character and conduct of Vikhe Patil of the kind envisaged by Section 123(4). The question of examining whether the remaining requirements of Section 123(4) including the consent of Gadakh and the reasonable likelihood of its impact on the mind of the electorate are satisfied, does not arise for consideration.75. In the present case, it is unnecessary to deal with the arguments from both sides pertaining to the decision in Manohar Joshi v. Damodar Tatyaba since without going into the arguments relating to the defects in the notice under Section 99 of the R.P. Act issued to Sharad Pawar, we have reached the conclusion that the statements attributed to him of which he was given the notice, do not constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4).76. We may, however, observe that the conclusion that these statements do not constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) should not be construed as our opinion that the making of such statements during the election campaign is desirable or that they are necessary for education of the electorate. This caution is necessary in view of the attempt made by Shri Ram Jethmalani to widen the scope by contending that the same is a justified electoral practice for education of the electorate. In our view, the electorate by now is well educated about the justified means desirable during the election campaign and it looks forward to knowing the positive programmes of the candidates together with their comparative merits instead of being left to compare their demerits and choose from amongst them the one with the least demerits. The shift in the election campaign has, therefore, to be in a positive direction to enable the electorate to cast its positive vote instead of the negative vote by rejecting those with greater demerits. This duty is cast more heavily on the senior leaders of all the political parties to ensure that the election campaign does not degenerate into a campaign of vilification, which may tend to promote violence during elections and lead to criminalisation of politics. These are hard realities of the present trend of election campaign and this trend must be reversed to make the democracy more meaningful by ensuring purity of elections which can be achieved only by a shift in the trend towards the right direction.77. Judging by these standards, we are constrained to observe that some of the statements made by Sharad Pawar, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, even though not amounting to corrupt practice under the enacted law, do not measure up to the desired level of electioneering at the top echelon of political leadership to set the trend for a healthy election campaign. His suggestion to the voters to accept monies etc., if distributed by a candidate, without being influenced thereby as a means of propagating socialism exhibits a bizarre perception of socialism. It is shocking enough that Gadakh said so but far worse to find the Chief Minister endorse that view. Intended as sarcasm it depicts poor taste. If this be the level of election campaign at the top, it is bound to degenerate as it descends to the lower levels. Some portions of the speeches of Sharad Pawar were indeed high precept but the electorate would have benefited more by knowledge of the track record of the preachers practice of the same. There was no such attempt. The degree of responsibility and the level of electioneering expected of the top leadership was wanting in these speeches. If probity in public life is to be maintained and purity of elections is not a myth or merea higher level of electioneering is expected at least at the highest level of political leadership.78. It is with this not of caution we say that all the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar and many attributed to Gadakh do not constitute the alleged corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. Accordingly, the notice issued under Section 99 to Sharad Pawar should have been discharged by the High Court instead of Sharad Pawar being named for commission of any such corrupt practice.The law applicable being as above, the mere fact that Vikhe Patil secured the next highest number of votes after Gadakh is not sufficient to declare him elected on the conclusion that Gadakhs election is void for commission of a corrupt practice. The High Court proceeded on an erroneous assumption to grant this further relief under Section 101(b) of the R.P. Act declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected.Shri P. P. Rao,with his usual fairness, in our view rightly, did not seriously support the grant of this further relief declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected, on account of the absence of the requisite evidence to support the grant of this further declaration in the present case. No further consideration of this point is, therefore, necessary.