Case: Pure Drinks Private Limited Vs. Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay

assistance to Mr. Damania in the facts and circumstance of the matter before us.(23) MR. Damania next relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State of punjab v. Bhagatram, (1975) I S. C. C. 155, A. I. R. 1974 S. C. 2335, where it was held that unless the previous statement of witnesses are supplied, the dismissed person will not be able to conduct an effective and useful cross-examination and hence it is unfair to deny the Government servant copies of the earlier statements of witnesses. (24) MR. Damania also relied on the decision of the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High court in Misra v. Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad, [1962-I L. L. J. 671], where it was held that the failure to supply to the petitioner, a Government servant, the written complaint lodged by the complainant at the initial stage on which the inquiry was started and the failure to furnish him copies of statements of certain witnesses recorded by an officer the formal inquiry was started, resulted in an infirmity in the inquiry which disclosed that the petitioner did not get a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment as required by Art. 311 of the Constitution. (25) WHILE we are in respectful agreement with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the circumstances of the matters before them, the same can be of no assistance to Mr. Damania in the facts and circumstances of the matter before us, which fall squarely within the Supreme Court in Telcos case, [1969-II L. L. J. 799]. Those matters were, unlike the matter before us, under Art. 311 of the Constitution, pertaining to a departmental inquiry against a Government servant. Furthermore, in Bhagatrams case, A. I. R 1974 S. C. 2335, what was given to the Government servant was only a synopsis of the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Vigilance Department during the preliminary inquiry, whereas, entire statements, unlike in the matter before us, had been taken on record. This is brought to the forefront from the contents of Para. 6 of the judgment which reads as under : "the State contended that the respondent was not entitled to get copies of statements. The reasoning of the State was that the respondent was given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and during the cross-examination the respondent would have the opportunity of confronting the witnesses with the statements. It is contended that the synopsis was adequate to acquaint the respondent with the gist of the evidence". This passage discloses that the respondent in that case could possibly not have had the opportunity confronting the witnesses with the statements, unless they were on record. This is not the position in the matter before us, where none of the statements recorded during the departmental enquiry or thereafter. These are the salient features which distinguish those cases from the facts of the matter before us, which as we have already stated, falls within the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Telcos case.(26) MR. Damania next relied on the decision of the learned single Judge of the Madras High court in Thangaswamy v. S. I. R. Employees Co-op. Credit Society, [1961-2 L. L. J. 754], where it was held that in the absence of the rules, the question whether the inquiry is vitiated or not should be approached not from the point of view of a specific contravention of a particular rule, but from the point of view whether the result of the inquiry has been vitiated on the ground that the principles of natural justice and not been respected. It was further held that the omission to supply copies of statements of witnesses to the petitioner-employee in advance of the inquiry involved violation of the principles of natural justice and was prejudicial to the finding against him. It was further held, in the facts and circumstances of that case, that it was the plain duty of the inquiring body to supply the petitioner with statements of witnesses as requested by him or to give an opportunity to peruse the statements and take extracts on a date earlier than the date of inquiry. (27) IT is unnecessary to dilate at any length on that decision of the learned single Judge of the madras High Court, in view of the authoritative ratio and decision of the Supreme Court in Telcos case, [1969-II L. L. J. 799], referred to above and by which we are bound. (28) MR. Damania finally relied on certain observations of the Division Bench of the Delhi Court in Daljitsingh Sadhusingh v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1970 Delhi 52, at p. 56, as under :"The right to cross-examine means to cross-examine effectively. In the absence of the copies of these two statements the petitioner could not confront S. S. Duggal and E. N. Ramamurti when they appeared as witnesses, against him in the inquiry with their statements made to the Special police Establishment. "(29) ONCE again, while we are in respectful agreement with these observation, they must be read in the light in which they have been made and the facts and circumstances of that case, which was yet another case under Art. 311 of the Constitution, and which resulted in the Delhi High court holding that the failure to furnish to the petitioner copies of the statements made by two persons before the Special Police Establishment in the criminal investigation and failure even to give inspection of these statements to the petitioner, amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of defending himself. In any event, it is unnecessary it dilate at any length on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Daljit Singhs case, A. I. R. 1970 Delhi 52 in the light of the decision and ratio of the Supreme Court in Telcos case (supra) by which we are bound.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds](16) ANALYSING the matter in the widest range permissible, we may state that we went through the evidence recorded by enquiry officer. Theof the companys witnesses by Joe Sanches is detailed and probing. Though he did ask for a copy of the statement of B. B. Singh to be furnished, the failure to do so by thecan, in no way be said to have prevented an effectiveof the companys witnesses by Joe Sanches be lost sight of is that, in the main, in all material particulars the evidence of B. B. Singh is based on what he was informed by Amrit Singh and which B. B. Singh in his turn conveyed to Chaddha. The Tribunal has itself, in the impugned order observed: "amrit Singh seems to have made a verbal report which was recorded by B. B. Singh with a view to forward it to the office of management". Hence the evidence of B. B. Singh before the enquiry officer is at best essentially hearsay. Mr. Shetye produced before us a copy of the statement of B. B. Singh during the preliminary investigation. Mr. Shetye emphasised that he was producing this document from that the files of the company and not from the record before the enquiry officer. This was not challenged by Mr. Damania with his habitual fairness. This statement is dated 29th November, 1971 and is in the form of a letter or report addressed by B. B. Singh to the Manager of theIn order to make assurance doubly sure that no prejudice whatsoever could have been caused to the workman, we perused this latter or report. It reveals that all that B. B. Singh has stated to the manager is based entirely on hearsay, namely what B. B. Singh was informed by Amrit Singh. We passed on this document to Mr. Damania for his persual, observing that the contents thereof were hearsay. Mr. Damania was unable, and rightly so, to contend to the contrary after perusing the document. It is difficult to see how any prejudice could conceivably have been caused to the workman by theto him of a copy of this statement or report. B. B. Singh was not a witness on whom anything of consequence revolved. The fact that in addition to B. B. Singh, amrit Singh, Chaddha and other persons were also called as witnesses further whittles down the importance of B. B. Singh as a witness of any consequence. The Gravamen of the grievance of the 1stbefore us, as was before the Tribunal, was the failure of theto furnish the statement at B. B. Singh, who was not a witness of any great importance. The main and essential witness were Amrit Singh and Chaddha and other employees of the company who gave evidence against the workman, regarding whom no grievance has been made no doubt discreetly so, in respect ofof statements made by them during the preliminaryHENCE, looking at the matter from the widest angle permissible and giving the widest latitude possible to the workman, we cannot see our way to coming to the finding which M. Damania invites us to do, viz. , that the refusal of theto furnish to the workman a copy of B. B. Singhs statement made by him during the preliminary investigation, caused the workman any prejudice or resulted in the violation of the principles of natural justice in any manner whatsoever. (19) WHAT also cannot be lost sight of is that, as rightly contended by Mr. Shetye, not only was B. B. Singhat great length, but none of the statements recorded at the time of the preliminary investigation formed part of the inquiry proceedings, nor was any reliance placed on the same by the enquiry officer while submitting his report nor was the order of dismissal based upon the statements recorded during the preliminary investigation. No material was relied upon or used against the workman without his being given an opportunity to explain it. In a departmental inquiry, such as the present, the observance of strict rules of evidence as contemplated by the Evidence Act is not called for. However, what is required is that the principles of natural justice must be observed. This was done in the matter beforeWE respectfully agree with this ratio laid down by the Privy Council. However, what cannot be lost sight of is that, unlike the facts of the matter before us, this ratio of the Privy Council is based on the facts of the case before it, which was a matter under Ss. 537 and 162 of the Cr. P. C. , 1898. There can be no doubt that under the Cr. P. C. of 1898, S. 162 thereof in terms gave right, and no doubt a valuable one, to the accused person to be furnished with copies of statements made by witnesses to a police officer. Hence a violation of such a right positively given in terms to the accused person under that section, resulted in the aforesaid ratio being laid down by the Privy Council. In the matter before us there is no such right given to the workman either by statue, orders or rules, viz. , that he is entitled to be furnished with copies of statements or reports collected by a private employer during a preliminary investigations to ascertain whether disciplinary action should be launched against the concerned workman. This is brought to the forefront by the decision of the Supreme Court in Telcos case,L. L. J. 799]. Hence this ratio of the Privy Council enunciated in the light of the facts and circumstance of the case before it, can be of no assistance to Mr. Damania in the facts and circumstance of the matter beforeWHILE we are in respectful agreement with the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court and the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in the circumstances of the matters before them, the same can be of no assistance to Mr. Damania in the facts and circumstances of the matter before us, which fall squarely within the Supreme Court in Telcos case,L. L. J. 799]. Those matters were, unlike the matter before us, under Art. 311 of the Constitution, pertaining to a departmental inquiry against a Government servant. Furthermore, in Bhagatrams case, A. I. R 1974 S. C. 2335, what was given to the Government servant was only a synopsis of the statements of the witnesses recorded by the Vigilance Department during the preliminary inquiry, whereas, entire statements, unlike in the matter before us, had been taken on record. This is brought to the forefront from the contents of Para. 6 of the judgment which reads as under : "the State contended that the respondent was not entitled to get copies of statements. The reasoning of the State was that the respondent was given the opportunity tothe witnesses and during thethe respondent would have the opportunity of confronting the witnesses with the statements. It is contended that the synopsis was adequate to acquaint the respondent with the gist of the evidence". This passage discloses that the respondent in that case could possibly not have had the opportunity confronting the witnesses with the statements, unless they were on record. This is not the position in the matter before us, where none of the statements recorded during the departmental enquiry or thereafter. These are the salient features which distinguish those cases from the facts of the matter before us, which as we have already stated, falls within the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in TelcosONCE again, while we are in respectful agreement with these observation, they must be read in the light in which they have been made and the facts and circumstances of that case, which was yet another case under Art. 311 of the Constitution, and which resulted in the Delhi High court holding that the failure to furnish to the petitioner copies of the statements made by two persons before the Special Police Establishment in the criminal investigation and failure even to give inspection of these statements to the petitioner, amounted to a denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner of defending himself. In any event, it is unnecessary it dilate at any length on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Daljit Singhs case, A. I. R. 1970 Delhi 52 in the light of the decision and ratio of the Supreme Court in Telcos case (supra) by which we are bound.