Case: Sriniwas Ramnath Khatod Vs. State Of Maharashtra

appear that the above observations support the Appellant. If that were so then this question would have had to be referred to a larger bench as such a finding would be against the clear wording of Section 6, which admits of no ambiguity. 11. However, in our view, in Eugenio Misquitas (supra) this Court is not holding that declaration under Section 6 is not within time provided it is published at a later date. This question has been left open. This is clear from the observations in para 17 which read as follows: "However, the view taken in the judgment of the High Court under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation will be the date of making of the declaration under Section 6, may not be correct". The words" may be correct" * clearly shows that the question is left open. 12. In our view the wordings of Sections 4, 6, & 11-A leave no room for doubt that the Land Acquisition Act made a distinction between a "declaration" and "publication". To be noted that under Section 4 the notification has to be published. Again under Section 11-A the period of two years has to be commuted from the date of "publication of the declaration". As distinct from this under the first proviso to Section 6(1) a "declaration" cannot be made after the expiry of one year from the date of "publication of the notification under Section 4". The words "published" in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) refer to the publication of notification under Section 4. A plain reading of Section 6 shows that a distinction is made between a "declaration" and a "publication". Viewed from this angle the wordings of the first proviso to Section 6(1) become important. The proviso lays down that "no declaration (under Section 6) shall be made after expiry of three years (under clause (i)] where the notification under Section 4 is published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and after expiry of one year (under clause (ii)] where notification under Section 4 was published after commencement of Land Acquisition Act, 1984. Thus the proviso clearly talks of "Publication" in respect of notification under Section 4 and then provide a time for "making of declaration" under Section 6. The legislature is purposely omitting to use the words "Publication of declaration" in the proviso to Section 6. 13. In our view, it is clear that the "declaration must be made" within one year from the date of "last publication of the Notification" under Section 4. Thereafter the publication under Section 6(2) may take place at a later date as it is merely a ministerial act. 14. Even if Eugenio Misquittas case was laying down what is canvassed by counsel the Appellant cannot succeed. To be noted that the paras 8 and 9 of that Judgment read as follows:" * 8. According to the learned counsel, the limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) has to be considered with reference to the different dates/modes of publications prescribed under Section 6(2) of the Act. In support of this submission, learned counsel refers to the judgments of this Court rendered on Section 4(1) of the Act holding that the last of the dates of such publication in the series is the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1). 9. Let us examine whether the learned counsel is right in his submission. As seen from the above extracts of relevant provisions, while Section 4(1) commands publication of notification under that section, Section 6 speaks of the declaration being made to the effect that any particular land is needed for public purpose or for a company. There are judicial decisions that have interpreted the word "made" to mean "published" for the reasons stated in those decisions. Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions the date of making of the declaration under Section 6(1) will be the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation. However, in the interest of the general public, the court have been of the view that the declaration made will stand accomplished only when it is published. This publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for a different purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word "hereinafter" used in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the series of the publication referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter, namely, for making award under Section 11-A. The language employed in second proviso to Section 6(1) also supports this construction. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted". (emphasis supplied). 15. Thus a contention similar to the one made here had been rejected. Learned Judges then observed in para 16 as follows:" * 16. that for the purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1), it is not the last of the publications in the series that should be taken into account, but the publication that was made in the first instance under the Section". 16. Thus a detailed reading of the authority makes it clear that the last date under Section 6(2) is only for purposes of computing limitation under Section 11-A. Publications under Section 6(2) are ministerial acts and procedural in nature. In any case, in this case the date of first publication of declaration is 30th January, 1987. This is also within one year of last date of notification under Section 4. The High Court was thus right in holding that the proceedings were not vitiated. 17. We, therefore, see no substance in the appeal. We see no infirmity in the impugned Judgment.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]11. However, in our view, in Eugenio Misquitas (supra) this Court is not holding that declaration under Section 6 is not within time provided it is published at a later date. This question has been left open. This is clear from the observations in para 17 which read as follows: "However, the view taken in the judgment of the High Court under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation will be the date of making of the declaration under Section 6, may not be correct". The words" may be correct" * clearly shows that the question is left open. 12. In our view the wordings of Sections 4, 6,11-A leave no room for doubt that the Land Acquisition Act made a distinction between a "declaration" and "publication". To be noted that under Section 4 the notification has to be published. Again under Section 11-A the period of two years has to be commuted from the date of "publication of the declaration". As distinct from this under the first proviso to Section 6(1) a "declaration" cannot be made after the expiry of one year from the date of "publication of the notification under Section 4". The words "published" in clauses (i) and (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) refer to the publication of notification under Section 4. A plain reading of Section 6 shows that a distinction is made between a "declaration" and a "publication". Viewed from this angle the wordings of the first proviso to Section 6(1) become important. The proviso lays down that "no declaration (under Section 6) shall be made after expiry of three years (under clause (i)] where the notification under Section 4 is published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 and after expiry of one year (under clause (ii)] where notification under Section 4 was published after commencement of Land Acquisition Act, 1984. Thus the proviso clearly talks of "Publication" in respect of notification under Section 4 and then provide a time for "making of declaration" under Section 6. The legislature is purposely omitting to use the words "Publication of declaration" in the proviso to Section 6. 13. In our view, it is clear that the "declaration must be made" within one year from the date of "last publication of the Notification" under Section 4. Thereafter the publication under Section 6(2) may take place at a later date as it is merely a ministerial act. 14. Even if Eugenio Misquittas case was laying down what is canvassed by counsel the Appellant cannot succeed. To be noted that the paras 8 and 9 of that Judgment read as follows:" * 8. According to the learned counsel, the limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) has to be considered with reference to the different dates/modes of publications prescribed under Section 6(2) of the Act. In support of this submission, learned counsel refers to the judgments of this Court rendered on Section 4(1) of the Act holding that the last of the dates of such publication in the series is the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1). 9. Let us examine whether the learned counsel is right in his submission. As seen from the above extracts of relevant provisions, while Section 4(1) commands publication of notification under that section, Section 6 speaks of the declaration being made to the effect that any particular land is needed for public purpose or for a company. There are judicial decisions that have interpreted the word "made" to mean "published" for the reasons stated in those decisions. Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial decisions the date of making of the declaration under Section 6(1) will be the relevant date for reckoning the period of limitation. However, in the interest of the general public, the court have been of the view that the declaration made will stand accomplished only when it is published. This publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the Act which is for a different purpose, inter alia, for reckoning the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. This construction is supported by the language employed in Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word "hereinafter" used in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the series of the publication referred to under Section 6(2) is relevant for the purposes coming thereafter, namely, for making award under Section 11-A. The language employed in second proviso to Section 6(1) also supports this construction. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel cannot be accepted". (emphasis supplied). 15. Thus a contention similar to the one made here had been rejected. Learned Judges then observed in para 16 as follows:" * 16. that for the purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed under clause (ii) of the first proviso to Section 6(1), it is not the last of the publications in the series that should be taken into account, but the publication that was made in the first instance under the Section". 16. Thus a detailed reading of the authority makes it clear that the last date under Section 6(2) is only for purposes of computing limitation under Section 11-A. Publications under Section 6(2) are ministerial acts and procedural in nature. In any case, in this case the date of first publication of declaration is 30th January, 1987. This is also within one year of last date of notification under Section 4. The High Court was thus right in holding that the proceedings were not vitiated. 17. We, therefore, see no substance in the appeal. We see no infirmity in the impugned Judgment.