Case: Qudrat Ullah Vs. Municipal Board, Barelly

of the General Clauses Act. What follows? The survival of the right or the continuation of the operation of the Act to the proceedings is all that is ensured, not the expansion or extension of the right. For the normal life of the Act i.e. till September 30, 1972, the dispossession of the tenant is permissible only if the grounds in Section 2 are satisfied by the landlord. This right is circumscribed in content to conditions set out and limited in duration to the period beyond which the Act does not exist. To hold otherwise would be to give more quantum of right to the party than he would have enjoyed had the repeal not been made. Not to affect the previous operation cannot be converted into sanctioning subsequent operation. To read post-mortem operation into a temporary Act because of a premature repeal of it is wrong. To adopt the words Jagannadhadas, J. in Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, Delhi, AIR 1956 SC 77 at p. 84 has observed :"What in effect, learned counsel for the appellant contends for is not the "previous operation of the repealed law" but the future operation of the previous law". On this footing the right, if any, that the defendant claims terminates with the expiration of that temporary statute. 24. The only further question is whether it is permissible for this Court to take note of the extinguishment of the statutory tenancy at this stage and grant relief to the appellant accordingly. The leading case of Lachmeshwar Prassad v. Keshwar Lal, AIR 1941 FC 5 at p. 6 lays down the law on the point. Gwyer, C.J., quoted with approval the following observations of Hughes, C.J.:"We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered". Justice Varadachariar, J. in the same case stated that in this country the Courts have recognised an appeal to be in the nature of a re-hearing and that "in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts and events which have come into existence after the decree appealed against." This appellate obligation is almost jurisdictional. In a sense, the multi-decked mechanism of the legal process, at every tier, is the handmaid, not the mistress of justice. 25. We may mention as an additional reason for our conclusion that the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act in relation to the effect of repeal do not ordinarily apply to a temporary Act. Stating this proposition, Gajendragadkar, J, as he then was, indicated the consequences of repeal of a temporary Act. In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar, AIR 1962 SC 945 , the learned Judge continued."As observed by Patanjali Sastri, J, as he then was, in S. Krishnan v. State of Madras, 1951 SCR 621 = (AIR 1951 SC 301 ), the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires. That is why the Legislature can and often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of S.6 of the General Clauses Act." 26. The U. P. Act, 1947, however, expressly attracts S.6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1 of 1904 (vide S. 1 (4)) and that is why we have discussed the position even with reference to the General Clauses Act. 27. From what we have stated above, it follows that the argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation, for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinarily law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that right of a statutory tenent created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely preventing the eviction so long as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of Section 43 do not preserve, subsequent to repeal any right to rebuff the plaintiffs claim for eviction and (d) that S.6 of the General clauses Act does not justify anything larger or for any time longer than S.2 of the Act confers or lasts. It is appropriate for a Court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes. A court of justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation, which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. This statute which provides for summary eviction of unauthorised occupants cannot obstruct the suit for eviction of a tenant. The farfetched submission has hardly any substance and we reject it.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]17. We have in this case a temporary Act which would have died a natural death by the end of September, 1972 but before its life had run out was extinguished by statutory repeal on 22nd July, 1972 on which date the later Act came into force. Surely, there has been a repeal of the Act which was relied upon successfully by the defendant and his legal representative the appellant, throughout the litigation. But now that defence or protection is no longer available. However, counsel for the appellant contends that a right has accrued to him under the Act which cannot be taken away by its repeal since the later Act is not in terms a retrospective one. Factually, it is correct to say that Section 43 has not been made retrospective19. Section 43 (2) (h) states that notwithstanding the repeal of the earlier Act any Court before which any suit or other proceeding relating to the...eviction from any building is pending immediately before the commencement of this Act may, on an application being made to it which 60 days from such commencement, grant leave to any party to amend its pleadings in consequence of the provisions of this Act". It is, therefore, clear that even if the statute for recovery of possession be one under the earlier Rent Control Law the later Act will apply and necessary amendments in the pleadings can be made. This definitely indicates that it is the later Act that must govern pending proceedings for recovery of possession or recovery or fixation of rent. However, the suit with which we are concerned is not even one under the Act, but proceeds on the footing that the defendant is only a licensee. So much so, none of the saving clauses in S.43 (2) applies. The result is that the application of the old Act is repealled by the general rule that on repeal a statute is deemed not to have been on the Statute Book at all26. The U. P. Act, 1947, however, expressly attracts S.6 of the U. P. General Clauses Act 1 of 1904 (vide S. 1 (4)) and that is why we have discussed the position even with reference to the General Clauses Act27. From what we have stated above, it follows that the argument of any vested right in the defendant being taken away does not hold good; nor is there any foundation, for the contention that the later Act is being applied retrospectively. All that we hold is (a) that a disability of the plaintiff to enforce his cause of action under the ordinarily law may not necessarily be transmuted into a substantive right in the defendant, (b) that right of a statutory tenent created under a temporary statute, as in this case, go to the extent of merely preventing the eviction so long as the temporary statute lasts, (c) that the provisions of Section 43 do not preserve, subsequent to repeal any right to rebuff the plaintiffs claim for eviction and (d) that S.6 of the General clauses Act does not justify anything larger or for any time longer than S.2 of the Act confers or lasts. It is appropriate for a Court to do justice between parties to the litigation and in moulding the relief in the light of the subsequent developments, to take note of legislative changes. A court of justice should, if it could, adjudicate finally and not leave the door ajar for parties to litigate again. In the present case, it is not seriously disputed that if the plaintiff were to sue for recovery of possession today, the Rent Control Law does not stand in the way. Therefore, it is manifestly a measure of doing justice between the parties and ending litigation, which has seen two decades pass, to conclude it here by taking cognizance and adjusting the relief in the light of the later Act and repeal of the earlier Act. Nevertheless, it is contended that the present suit cannot be decreed in view of the provisions of the U. P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972. This statute which provides for summary eviction of unauthorised occupants cannot obstruct the suit for eviction of a tenant. The farfetched submission has hardly any substance and we reject it.