Case: Management of The Bangalore Woollen Cotton &amp; Silk Mills Company Limited Vs. B. Dasappa, M.T. Represented By The Binny Mills Labour Association

be refused if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Managements action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the materials on the basis on which the Management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in coming to such a conclusion. In most cases it will happen where the materials are such that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as regards the workmans misconduct that the Management has not acted bona fide.A finding that the Management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the Management has reached.In every case therefore it would be proper for the Tribunal to address itself to the question, after ascertaining that the principles of natural justice have not been violated, whether the materials on which the Management has reached a conclusion adverse to the workman, a reasonable person could reach such a conclusion.11. It appears to us that in the present case the Tribunal has not followed the principles laid down in above cases. While there are certain observations which might make one think that the Tribunal had in mind the principles that the finding on which permission is asked for had to be perverse before permission could be refused, it is clear that the Tribunal instead of addressing itself to the question whether on the materials on the record the conclusion reached by the Management could reasonably be reached, asked itself the question whether that was the correct conclusion. Thus after recording the view that the question whether Dasappa did go to the dispensary or not had not much bearing on the merits of the case the Tribunal observed : "The main point for consideration is whether from` the material placed before us by the Association it could be concluded that it was the respondent who kept the article underneath the cleaners seat." The question was not whether this could be concluded but whether on the materials on the record any reasonable man could have come to the conclusion that this was true. After discussing the evidence in detail and saying that there was a break in the link in the chain of evidence in so far as the Management had not proved as to where articles of this type had been kept, it proceeded to observed further thus : "We are prepared to observe that the Manager has acted bona fide in the conduct of the enquiry but we are of opinion that having regard to all the circumstances he might not have accepted the version of M. W. 2".12. It is worth noticing that the Tribunal itself recorded a conclusion that there could be no doubt that the article which was discovered from under the cushion was the property of the Hebbal Mills. The Tribunal seems to have been much concerned about the question as to where such articles had been kept on the particular day. We are unable to agree that the absence of proof as to where the article had been kept on the particular day, would be of much assistance. The really important question was whether -leaving out the story of confession which it must be mentioned was retracted almost immediately-the account given by Syed Ameer was believable. The Tribunal rightly thought, whether Dasappa had really gone to the dispensary or not was not of much importance. For even if he had gone to the dispensary it might not have been impossible for him to remove the rug piece from inside the Mill.The Tribunal was not called upon to decide whether in its opinion the evidence given by these witnesses was true but only whether when the Manager stated that he considered this evidence credible, he had acted like a reasonable person.13. We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the view taken by the Tribunal was a better view than the view taken by the Manager. It appears clear that the Tribunal placed the wrong standard before it in addressing to itself the question whether the evidence conclusively proved the guilt of Dasappa. In our opinion, if the correct approach as directed in the decisions of this Court had been applied the Tribunal was bound to come to the conclusion on the materials on the record that a reasonable man could come to the conclusion that Dasappa was guilty of theft and that the Management had acted bona fide.14. The Tribunal has not recorded any finding that the principles of natural justice were not followed. It was faintly suggested by Mr. Jha on behalf of the respondent that the Management ought to have asked Dasappa whether he wanted to adduce any evidence and in so far as this was not done the principles of natural justice had been violated. It does not appear that at any time any complaint was made that Dasappa had not been given an opportunity to adduce evidence. A perusal of the proceedings before the Manager would indicate that the Manager was really anxious to find out the truth of the matter and for that purpose gave every opportunity to Dasappa to cross-examine the witnesses, had the evidence interpreted in Dasappas own language and asked him after cross-examination of almost each of the witnesses whether he had any reason to believe that that witness bore any ill-will or any grudge against him. It couldnt be fairly urged therefore that the principles of natural justice were not observed in this case. Nor is there any justification for thinking that the Management had any intention to victimise this man.15. Our conclusion therefore is that the Tribunal erred in refusing the permission asked for. In view, however, of the undertaking given to us on behalf of the appellant that the proposed order of discharged will not be enforced, it is not necessary for us to make any order granting permission.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]10. The settled position in law therefore is that permission should be refused if the Tribunal is satisfied that the Managements action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the materials on the basis on which the Management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in coming to such a conclusion. In most cases it will happen where the materials are such that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as regards the workmans misconduct that the Management has not acted bona fide.A finding that the Management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the Management has reached.In every case therefore it would be proper for the Tribunal to address itself to the question, after ascertaining that the principles of natural justice have not been violated, whether the materials on which the Management has reached a conclusion adverse to the workman, a reasonable person could reach such a conclusion.11. It appears to us that in the present case the Tribunal has not followed the principles laid down in above cases. While there are certain observations which might make one think that the Tribunal had in mind the principles that the finding on which permission is asked for had to be perverse before permission could be refused, it is clear that the Tribunal instead of addressing itself to the question whether on the materials on the record the conclusion reached by the Management could reasonably be reached, asked itself the question whether that was the correct conclusion. Thus after recording the view that the question whether Dasappa did go to the dispensary or not had not much bearing on the merits of the case the Tribunal observed : "The main point for consideration is whether from` the material placed before us by the Association it could be concluded that it was the respondent who kept the article underneath the cleaners seat." The question was not whether this could be concluded but whether on the materials on the record any reasonable man could have come to the conclusion that this was true.It is worth noticing that the Tribunal itself recorded a conclusion that there could be no doubt that the article which was discovered from under the cushion was the property of the Hebbal Mills. The Tribunal seems to have been much concerned about the question as to where such articles had been kept on the particular day. We are unable to agree that the absence of proof as to where the article had been kept on the particular day, would be of much assistance. The really important question was whetherleaving out the story of confession which it must be mentioned was retracted almostaccount given by Syed Ameer was believable. The Tribunal rightly thought, whether Dasappa had really gone to the dispensary or not was not of much importance. For even if he had gone to the dispensary it might not have been impossible for him to remove the rug piece from inside the Mill.The Tribunal was not called upon to decide whether in its opinion the evidence given by these witnesses was true but only whether when the Manager stated that he considered this evidence credible, he had acted like a reasonable person.13. We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the view taken by the Tribunal was a better view than the view taken by the Manager. It appears clear that the Tribunal placed the wrong standard before it in addressing to itself the question whether the evidence conclusively proved the guilt of Dasappa. In our opinion, if the correct approach as directed in the decisions of this Court had been applied the Tribunal was bound to come to the conclusion on the materials on the record that a reasonable man could come to the conclusion that Dasappa was guilty of theft and that the Management had acted bona fide.14. The Tribunal has not recorded any finding that the principles of natural justice were not followed. It was faintly suggested by Mr. Jha on behalf of the respondent that the Management ought to have asked Dasappa whether he wanted to adduce any evidence and in so far as this was not done the principles of natural justice had been violated. It does not appear that at any time any complaint was made that Dasappa had not been given an opportunity to adduce evidence. A perusal of the proceedings before the Manager would indicate that the Manager was really anxious to find out the truth of the matter and for that purpose gave every opportunity to Dasappa tothe witnesses, had the evidence interpreted in Dasappas own language and asked him afterof almost each of the witnesses whether he had any reason to believe that that witness bore anyor any grudge against him. It couldnt be fairly urged therefore that the principles of natural justice were not observed in this case. Nor is there any justification for thinking that the Management had any intention to victimise this man.15. Our conclusion therefore is that the Tribunal erred in refusing the permission asked for. In view, however, of the undertaking given to us on behalf of the appellant that the proposed order of discharged will not be enforced, it is not necessary for us to make any order granting permission.