Case: Raja Bahadur Motilal Poona Mills Vs. Tukaram Piraji Masale

a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of any standing order or made "an illegal change"14. In considering whether the strike in question was illegal, the learned Judges of the High Court have expressed the opinion that there is a common law right for an employee to stop work and that it is only by statutory prohibition that certain strikes have been made illegal in the interest of labour relations. In the present case since there had been no illegal change effected by the employer the High Court, took the view that on the very finding of the Appellate Tribunal that the change was a legal change, the strike in question did not come within the ambit of S. 97.15. Learned counsel for the appellant has pressed two arguments before us with regard to the construction of cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 97 of the Bombay Industrial Relation Act, 1946. His first argument is that the High Court was in error when it held that there was any such right as a common law right of an employee to go on strike and S. 97 constituted an inroad on that right. Learned counsel has submitted that under cl.(c) of the sub-s. (1) of S. 97, a strike shall be illegal if it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has not carried out the provisions of any standing order or has made an illegal change; if a strike is illegal when it is commenced or continued only for the reason that the employer has made an illegal change,a fortioriit must be illegal when it is commenced or continued for a legal change. The contention of learned counsel is that by necessary implication cl.(c) condemns a strike which is commenced or continued for a change which is not illegal. The second argument of learned counsel is that the true scope and effect of cl. (c) is this: the word only occurring in the clause goes with the word reason and if the strike is commenced or continued for the only reason that the employer has made an illegal change, it shall be illegal. The test is not whether there was legal or illegal change in fact but what was the reason for which the employees went on strike, and if the employees commenced or continued a strike only for the reason that the employer had made an illegal change, the strike would be illegal within the express terms of the clause.16. In our opinion it is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the first argument of learned counsel for the appellant is correct or not; because we are clearly of the opinion that the second argument with regard to the construction of cl.(c) of sub-s. (1) of S.97 is correct and should prevail. In this case the workman themselves came to Court with the plea that the action of the employer amounted to an illegal change. In their application to the Labour Court, they said:"That for the above mentioned reasons it is prayed that this Honourable Court be pleased to declare the said lockout by the opponent Mills as illegal being in contravention of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, and the opponent be ordered to withdraw the said illegal change".It is obvious therefore, that the workmen in this case struck work only for the reason that the change or experiment made by the appellant employer as an illegal change. The action of the workmen, therefore, came within the express terms of cl.(c) of sub-s. (1) of S.97 of the Act. The learned Chief Justice did not consider this aspect of the case, and reached a conclusion with regard to the legality of the strike on a reasoning which did not give full effect to the words used in cl.(c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 97. In our view, the true test was to find out the reason for which the strike was commenced or continued, and it was unnecessary to consider or decide whether there was a common law right of the workmen to go on strike or whether the workmen had the right to go on strike as a means of collective bargaining against a change which they did not like.17. Mr. Gokhale appearing for the workmen has taken us through the different provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, and contended that the workmen have the right to go on strike as a means of collective bargaining against any measure adopted by the employer which the workmen may consider to be determintal to their interest, provided the strike does not come within the prohibited ambit of S. 97. Even assuming that Mr. Gokhale is right in his contention it is clear to us that if the workman commence or continue a strike for the only reason that the employer has made an illegal change, they come within the express terms of cl. (c) of sub-s (l) of S.97. It is immaterial whether the change is subsequently found by the Labour Court to be a legal change. It is worthy of note that there is a seperate provision for imposing a penalty on an employer who makes an illegal change. The relevant consideration, however, with regard to cl.(c) of sub-s (l) of S.97 is the reason for which the strike is commenced or continued. That reason in this particular case is clear enough. The workmen themselves said that they commenced and continued the strike because the employer had made an illegal change. That being the position, the strike was illegal within the express terms of cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 97 of the Act.18. We are, therefore, of the opinion that, on a proper interpretation of cl.(c) of sub-s (l) of S. 97 of the Act, the strike which was commenced and continued from September 6 to September 26, 1951, was clearly illegal.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]16. In our opinion it is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the first argument of learned counsel for the appellant is correct or not; because we are clearly of the opinion that the second argument with regard to the construction of cl.(c) of sub-s. (1) of S.97 is correct and should prevail. In this case the workman themselves came to Court with the plea that the action of the employer amounted to an illegalis obvious therefore, that the workmen in this case struck work only for the reason that the change or experiment made by the appellant employer as an illegal change. The action of the workmen, therefore, came within the express terms of cl.(c) of sub-s. (1) of S.97 of the Act. The learned Chief Justice did not consider this aspect of the case, and reached a conclusion with regard to the legality of the strike on a reasoning which did not give full effect to the words used in cl.(c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 97. In our view, the true test was to find out the reason for which the strike was commenced or continued, and it was unnecessary to consider or decide whether there was a common law right of the workmen to go on strike or whether the workmen had the right to go on strike as a means of collective bargaining against a change which they did not like.Even assuming that Mr. Gokhale is right in his contention it is clear to us that if the workman commence or continue a strike for the only reason that the employer has made an illegal change, they come within the express terms of cl. (c) of sub-s (l) of S.97. It is immaterial whether the change is subsequently found by the Labour Court to be a legal change. It is worthy of note that there is a seperate provision for imposing a penalty on an employer who makes an illegal change. The relevant consideration, however, with regard to cl.(c) of sub-s (l) of S.97 is the reason for which the strike is commenced or continued. That reason in this particular case is clear enough. The workmen themselves said that they commenced and continued the strike because the employer had made an illegal change. That being the position, the strike was illegal within the express terms of cl. (c) of sub-s. (1) of S. 97 of the Act.18. We are, therefore, of the opinion that, on a proper interpretation of cl.(c) of sub-s (l) of S. 97 of the Act, the strike which was commenced and continued from September 6 to September 26, 1951, was clearly illegal.