Case: Municipal Council, Damoh Vs. Vrajlal Manilal And Co.

not applicable to cases of manufactured goods falling under cl. (b) of the rule the second contention urged by the Counsel for the appellant that the respondent-firms were not entitled to refund as they failed to satisfy the Municipal Committee that the same or identical goods had been exported does not survive. That apart, the High Court has on a conspectus of the Octroi Rules came to the conclusion and in our view rightly, that the Octroi Superintendent is responsible for the proper administration of the Octroi Department in all its branches which necessarily includes that it is he who should be satisfied as to the identity of the goods that are to be exported or that are utilized in the manufacture of goods which are to be exported.4. The last contention sought to be urged on behalf of the appellant-council before us related to the bar of limitation to the respondents claim arising under section 319 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and counsel fairly stated that this arises only in Civil Appeal No. 845 of 1971. The facts in this behalf are these: Civil Suit No. 1-B of 1964, out of which the aforesaid appeal arises, was filed by the respondent-firm M/s Vraj Lal Manilal &Co. on 7.5.1964 claiming refund i n respect of goods exported during the years 1959-1964; in other words, part of the claim from 1959 to 31st January, 1962 arose under 1922 Act while the claim pertaining to the period from 1.2.1962 to April 1964 arose under the 1961 Act, which c ame into force from 1.2.1962. The trial Court as well as the High Court took the view that non-payment of refund under the 1922 Act could be agitated only by way of an appeal under section 83 and other remedies were barred under s. 84 of the Act and, therefore, that part of the respondents claim was dismissed as being not tenable but both the Courts held that non-payment of refund after 1.2.1962 could be agitated by a suit and the same was tenable On the question of limitation the trial C ourt held that that part of the claim was not barred but since it had negatived the respondents claim for refund on merits it dismissed the respondents suit entirely but the High Court, which reversed the trial Courts view on merits allowed the r espondents claim in respect of refund vouchers which had been certified and presented after 1.2.1962. Since, however, it was not possible for it to sort out the refund vouchers which had been certified the High Court by its judgment and decree d ated 15.12.1969 remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining the amount payable to the respondent-firm. Upon remand the trial Court on the basis of statements made by the parties passed a decree in respondents favour for Rs. 21, 023.5 3 with interest thereon 4% and this decree was drawn up on 23.4.1970.Section 319 (2) of the 1961 Act runs thus;"Every such suit shall be dismissed unless it is instituted within 8 months from the date of the accrual of the alleged cause of action."5. Relying upon this provision counsel for the appellant urged that since the suit had been filed on 7.5.1964 the respondents claim for refund during 8 months prior to 7.5.1964 would be within limitation but the rest of the claim from 1.2.1962 to 7.9.1963 would be barred by limitation and to that extent the decree in favour of the respondent-firm deserves to be modified6. We are not inclined to entertain this contention sought to be urged by counsel for the appellant before us for more than one reason. It is true that this bar of limitation under s. 319 (2) was pleaded by the appellant council in its written statement and an issue thereon was also raised at the trial but the trial Court held that the claim arising under the new Act after 1.2.1962 was not barred by limitation because cause of action arose on 24.9.1963 when there was refusal to pay or accede to the notice of demand but when the matter was carried in appeal to the High Court by the respondent firm against the dismissal of their claim on merits and the High Court reversed the trial Courts view on merits and held that the plaintiffs claim for the period subsequent to 1.2.1962 was liable to be decreed, this point of limitation arising under s. 319 (2) was neither raised nor pressed before the High Court. No contention was raised that the refusal to pay on 24.9.1963 did not give rise to the cause of action but that it arose on dates when goods were exported and refund vouchers were presented or certified. Had it been pressed the High Court would have, while remanding the matter given appropriate directions to the trial Court in that behalf. This shows that the appellant council acquiesced in the trial Courts finding on the question of limitation, namely, the cause of action arose on 24.9.1963. Secondly, while applying for a certificate from the High Court for appeal to this Court the appellant-Council sought the certificate on points touching the merits of the claim and not on the question of limitation. Further in the Memo of Appeal filed in this Court the grounds do not include the point of limitation. Lastly the point raised cannot be said to be a pure question of law as it will require investigation into facts to ascertain the exact date or dates of accrual of the cause of action. When on the point of limitation the appellant- Council had at one stage acquiesced in the trial Courts finding and did not raise the question in appeal before the High Court we do not think it would be fair or just to permit the appellant-Council to raise the plea of limitation in this Court, especially when the result of allowing such plea might be to defeat the just claim of the respondent firm.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The admitted facts in these appeals are that the respondent firms, who carry on the business of manufacturing and selling bidis imported or brought into the municipal limits of Damoh during the relevant period tobacco and other raw material, that they paid the requisite octroi duty on such raw material on its import at the prescribed rates, that they utilised the said raw material for manufacturing bidis and they exported the finished product (bidis) outside the municipal limits of Damoh and it was at that stage of export of bidis that they claimed under Rule 27 (b) a refund of octori duty paid by them on the ra w material from the appellantat from this angle it will be difficult to accept the narrow or limited construction of the word manufacture appearing in cl. (b) as is suggested by Counsel for the appellant an d the same could not have been intended by the framers of the rule. Further clause (b) itself speaks of the raw materials being "used in the manufacture" so that use or consumption which a manufacturing process entails was present to the mind of the framers of the Rule when they provided for the refund on the export of finished goods manufactured within the municipal limits. Moreover, the well-settled connotation of the concept of manufacture and manufacturing process is t hat as a result of undergoing the process a distinct commercial commodity different from the raw materials comes into existence; it is difficult to visualise degrees of manufacture as suggested by counsel for the appellant and in any case none could be attributed to the framers of the Rule. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that the expression "manufacture" occurring in cl. (b) of Rule 27 should be given a limited meaning as is suggested. Turning to the proviso on which strong reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, it seems to us that the proviso by its very terms is not attracted to a case of manufactured goods falling under cl. (b). If cl. (b) confers the benefit of refund of octroi duty on the export of goods manufactured out of raw material then it is difficult to appreciate how the exporter will be able to satisfy the Municipal Committee that the exported goods are the same or identical on which duty has been paid, for admittedly the exported goods are the finished product and no import duty is paid thereon by the exporter. The proviso in our view is applicable to cases where there is an export of the imported goods themselves without subjecting the m to any manufacturing process and it is in such cases that the exporter has to satisfy the Committee that the same goods on which import duty has been paid are being exported which would entitle the exporter to claim a refund; in other words it is not a proviso to cl. (b) at all but will be applicable to the other parts of the Rule. It is thus clear to us that when raw materials like tobacco etc. were imported by the respondent-firms within the limits of Damoh, on which they paid octroi-duty a nd when they manufactured bidis out of such raw-materials and exported the same they were entitled to get refund to the extent of quantum mentioned in cl. (b) of Rule 27.In view of our aforesaid conclusion that the proviso is not applicable to cases of manufactured goods falling under cl. (b) of the rule the second contention urged by the Counsel for the appellant that the respondent-firms were not entitled to refund as they failed to satisfy the Municipal Committee that the same or identical goods had been exported does not survive. That apart, the High Court has on a conspectus of the Octroi Rules came to the conclusion and in our view rightly, that the Octroi Superintendent is responsible for the proper administration of the Octroi Department in all its branches which necessarily includes that it is he who should be satisfied as to the identity of the goods that are to be exported or that are utilized in the manufacture of goods which are to belast contention sought to be urged on behalf of the appellant-council before us related to the bar of limitation to the respondents claim arising under section 319 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 and counsel fairly stated that this arises only in Civil Appeal No. 845 of 1971. The facts in this behalf are these: Civil Suit No. 1-B of 1964, out of which the aforesaid appeal arises, was filed by the respondent-firm M/s Vraj Lal Manilal &Co. on 7.5.1964 claiming refund i n respect of goods exported during the years 1959-1964; in other words, part of the claim from 1959 to 31st January, 1962 arose under 1922 Act while the claim pertaining to the period from 1.2.1962 to April 1964 arose under the 1961 Act, which c ame into force from 1.2.1962. The trial Court as well as the High Court took the view that non-payment of refund under the 1922 Act could be agitated only by way of an appeal under section 83 and other remedies were barred under s. 84 of the Act and, therefore, that part of the respondents claim was dismissed as being not tenable but both the Courts held that non-payment of refund after 1.2.1962 could be agitated by a suit and the same was tenable On the question of limitation the trial C ourt held that that part of the claim was not barred but since it had negatived the respondents claim for refund on merits it dismissed the respondents suit entirely but the High Court, which reversed the trial Courts view on merits allowed the r espondents claim in respect of refund vouchers which had been certified and presented after 1.2.1962. Since, however, it was not possible for it to sort out the refund vouchers which had been certified the High Court by its judgment and decree d ated 15.12.1969 remanded the matter to the trial Court for determining the amount payable to the respondent-firm. Upon remand the trial Court on the basis of statements made by the parties passed a decree in respondents favour for Rs. 21, 023.5 3 with interest thereon 4% and this decree was drawn up on 23.4.1970.Section 319 (2) of the 1961are not inclined to entertain this contention sought to be urged by counsel for the appellant before us for more than one reason. It is true that this bar of limitation under s. 319 (2) was pleaded by the appellant council in its written statement and an issue thereon was also raised at the trial but the trial Court held that the claim arising under the new Act after 1.2.1962 was not barred by limitation because cause of action arose on 24.9.1963 when there was refusal to pay or accede to the notice of demand but when the matter was carried in appeal to the High Court by the respondent firm against the dismissal of their claim on merits and the High Court reversed the trial Courts view on merits and held that the plaintiffs claim for the period subsequent to 1.2.1962 was liable to be decreed, this point of limitation arising under s. 319 (2) was neither raised nor pressed before the High Court. No contention was raised that the refusal to pay on 24.9.1963 did not give rise to the cause of action but that it arose on dates when goods were exported and refund vouchers were presented or certified. Had it been pressed the High Court would have, while remanding the matter given appropriate directions to the trial Court in that behalf. This shows that the appellant council acquiesced in the trial Courts finding on the question of limitation, namely, the cause of action arose on 24.9.1963. Secondly, while applying for a certificate from the High Court for appeal to this Court the appellant-Council sought the certificate on points touching the merits of the claim and not on the question of limitation. Further in the Memo of Appeal filed in this Court the grounds do not include the point of limitation. Lastly the point raised cannot be said to be a pure question of law as it will require investigation into facts to ascertain the exact date or dates of accrual of the cause of action. When on the point of limitation the appellant- Council had at one stage acquiesced in the trial Courts finding and did not raise the question in appeal before the High Court we do not think it would be fair or just to permit the appellant-Council to raise the plea of limitation in this Court, especially when the result of allowing such plea might be to defeat the just claim of the respondent firm.