Case: Prabhakar Dattatraya Gune &amp; Others Vs. Vishnukant Bapurao Urankar &amp; Others

be ignored or brushed aside by us on the spacious plea that some argument or a facet of that argument has not been noticed or dealt with. In the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court on the point of binding precedent, this is what is held in AIR 2002 SC 1598 (Director of Settlements, A.P. and others v/s M.R.Apparao and another):-7. So far as the first question is concerned, Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is, therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has declared law it cannot be said to be a law when a point is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the principle underlying a decision. A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was delivered. An obiter dictum as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a bind (binding) effect as a precedent, ut it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of (on) points raised and decided by the Court in a given case. So far as constitutional matters are concerned, it is a practice of the Court not to make any pronouncement on points not directly raised for its decision. The decision in a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed on the ground that certain aspects were not considered or the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court (see AIR 1970 SC 1002 and AIR 1973 SC 794). When Supreme Court decides a principle it would be the duty of the High Court or a subordinate Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. A judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court which had been set aside by the Supreme Court is a nullity. (See 1984(2) SCC 402 and 1984 (2) SCC 324).........62 In the above circumstances we do not see any merit in the submissions of Mr. Pradhan and rather they fail to notice the doctrine of occupied field in its correct perspective. That doctrine has been explained in a Constitution Bench Decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 670(M/s Fatehchand Himmatlal and others v/s State of Maharashtra) in the following words:-62. In the Canadian Constitution, the question of conflict and coincidence in the domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation overlap has been considered. If both may overlap and coexist without conflict, neither legislation is ultra vires. But if there is confrontation and conflict the question of paramountcy and occupied field may crop up. It has been held that the rule as to predominance of Dominion legislation can only be invoked in case of absolutely conflicting legislation in pari materia when it will be an impossibility to give effect to both the Dominion and provincial enactments. There must be a real conflict between the two Acts i.e. the two enactments must come into collision. The doctrine of Dominion paramountcy does not operate merely because the Dominion has legislated on the same subject matter. The doctrine of occupied field applies only where there is a clash between Dominion Legislation and Provincial Legislation within an area common to both. Where both can coexist peacefully, both reap their respective harvests (Please see: Canadian Constitutional Law by Laskinpp. 5254, 1951 Edn).63. We may sum up the legal position to the extent necessary for our case. Where Parliament has made a law under Entry 52 of List I and in the course of it framed incidental provisions affecting gold loans and money-lending business involving gold ornaments, the State, making a law on a different topic but covering in part the same area of gold loans, must not go into irreconcilable conflicts. Of course, if Article 254(2) can be invoked we will presently examine it then the State law may still prevail since the assent of the President has been obtained for the Debt Act. Thirdly, the doctrine of occupied field does not totally deprive the State Legislature from making any law incidentally referrable to gold. In the event of a plain conflict, the State law must step down unless, as pointed out earlier in the previous passage, Article 254(2) comes to the rescue.63 The above discussion is enough to dispose of the main plea canvassed before us. As far as factual aspects and noted by us in paragraphs 38 and 41, so also, the narration in relation thereto in the preceding paragraphs, it will be open for the Petitioners to raise and substantiate them at an appropriate stage in the pending Special Case. We clarify that all contentions of parties on facts, merits and particularly in relation to attachment of properties of KIFL by the Designated Court and powers of the same visavis the winding up proceedings, are kept open.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]59 Hence, we are of the view that the judgment in Baskarans case (supra) covers the entire controversy including on raised before us.60 The judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court which is binding upon us cannot be read in the manner suggested by Mr. Pradhan. That there is a clarification given by the Honourable Supreme Court and which is relied upon by Mr. Pradhan would not carry the matter any further. He relies upon the order dated 11.01.2013 passed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.27050/2012 and connected matters. However, this clarification does not mean that the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Baskaran (supra) is not binding upon us. The order passed by the Honourable Supreme Court giving permission to withdraw the criminal miscellaneous petitions by virtue of the judgment in Baskarans case (supra) does not mean that the said judgment is not binding on this Court. Thus, the order passed by the Honourable Supreme Court on 11.01.2013 may permit the Petitioners and parties like them to take independent proceedings before the forum concerned, but that is referable to paragraph 34 of the judgment in Baskarans case (supra). That paragraph 34 reads as under:34. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was only a bona fide purchaser of some plots of land from one Arun Kumar and Smt.Sulochana, and not from any financial establishment. We are not going into this question as it can be raised in appropriate proceedings. In this case we are only concerned with the constitutional validity of the Tamil Nadu Act.61 The binding force of the judgment of Baskaran (supra) is, therefore, in no way diluted. The judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court and which lays down the law, binds everybody by virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. When the Honourable Supreme Court has considered pari materia provisions in the Tamil Nadu Act and has held that to be constitutional and valid, then, such judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court cannot be ignored or brushed aside by us on the spacious plea that some argument or a facet of that argument has not been noticed or dealt with. In the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court on the point of binding precedent, this is what is held in AIR 2002 SC 1598   (Director of Settlements, A.P. and others v/s M.R.Apparao andSo far as the first question is concerned, Article 141 of the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is, therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence. To determine whether a decision has declared law it cannot be said to be a law when a point is disposed of on concession and what is binding is the principle underlying a decision. A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of questions which arose for consideration in the case in which the judgment was delivered. An obiter dictum as distinguished from a ratio decidendi is an observation by Court on a legal question suggested in a case before it but not arising in such manner as to require a decision. Such an obiter may not have a binding precedent as the observation was unnecessary for the decision pronounced, but even though an obiter may not have a bind (binding) effect as a precedent, ut it cannot be denied that it is of considerable weight. The law which will be binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all observations of (on) points raised and decided by the Court in a given case. So far as constitutional matters are concerned, it is a practice of the Court not to make any pronouncement on points not directly raised for its decision. The decision in a judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be assailed on the ground that certain aspects were not considered or the relevant provisions were not brought to the notice of the Court (see AIR 1970 SC 1002   and AIR 1973 SC 794). When Supreme Court decides a principle it would be the duty of the High Court or a subordinate Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court. A judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the decision and directions of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court which had been set aside by the Supreme Court is a nullity. (See 1984(2) SCC 402 and 1984 (2) SCC 324).........62 In the above circumstances we do not see any merit in the submissions of Mr. Pradhan and rather they fail to notice the doctrine of occupied field in its correct perspective. That doctrine has been explained in a Constitution Bench Decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 670(M/s Fatehchand Himmatlal and others v/s State of Maharashtra) in the followingIn the Canadian Constitution, the question of conflict and coincidence in the domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation overlap has been considered. If both may overlap and coexist without conflict, neither legislation is ultra vires. But if there is confrontation and conflict the question of paramountcy and occupied field may crop up. It has been held that the rule as to predominance of Dominion legislation can only be invoked in case of absolutely conflicting legislation in pari materia when it will be an impossibility to give effect to both the Dominion and provincial enactments. There must be a real conflict between the two Acts i.e. the two enactments must come into collision. The doctrine of Dominion paramountcy does not operate merely because the Dominion has legislated on the same subject matter. The doctrine of occupied field applies only where there is a clash between Dominion Legislation and Provincial Legislation within an area common to both. Where both can coexist peacefully, both reap their respective harvests (Please see: Canadian Constitutional Law by Laskinpp. 5254, 1951 Edn).63. We may sum up the legal position to the extent necessary for our case. Where Parliament has made a law under Entry 52 of List I and in the course of it framed incidental provisions affecting gold loans andbusiness involving gold ornaments, the State, making a law on a different topic but covering in part the same area of gold loans, must not go into irreconcilable conflicts. Of course, if Article 254(2) can be invokedwe will presently examine itthen the State law may still prevail since the assent of the President has been obtained for the Debt Act. Thirdly, the doctrine of occupied field does not totally deprive the State Legislature from making any law incidentally referrable to gold. In the event of a plain conflict, the State law must step down unless, as pointed out earlier in the previous passage, Article 254(2) comes to the rescue.63 The above discussion is enough to dispose of the main plea canvassed before us. As far as factual aspects and noted by us in paragraphs 38 and 41, so also, the narration in relation thereto in the preceding paragraphs, it will be open for the Petitioners to raise and substantiate them at an appropriate stage in the pending Special Case. We clarify that all contentions of parties on facts, merits and particularly in relation to attachment of properties of KIFL by the Designated Court and powers of the same visavis the winding up proceedings, are kept open.