Case: Municipal Corporation For The City Of Poona Etc Vs. Bijlee Products (India) Ltd. Etc. Etc

duty as contained in rule 62B. It was on this representation that the respondents applied for allotment of the plots and spent huge amounts of money for the import of machinery and the materials and set up industries.10. The resolution of the Government deleting rule 5(B) read as a whole also clearly indicates that it did not intend to depart from the recommendation made by the Corporation or to modify the same in any manner. On the other hand, the resolution clearly indicates that it was being passed on the basis of the letter of the Municipal Commissioner dated 2nd June, 19 68 as would be manifestly clear from the citations in the resolution which may be extracted thus:"Read: Government Resolution, Urban Development, Public Health and House Department No. PMC/2862/15/C dated 28th January, 1963 .Government Circular, Urban Development Public Health and Housing Department No. MUN/1164/58163/A dated 25th February, 1966.Letter No. MC/101 dated 2nd June, 1968 from the Municipal Commissioner, Poona Municipal Corporation".11. It is, therefore, evident that while exercising its power to delete rule 5(8) the Government had the following materials before it, (1) It knew that Rule 5(8) had granted exemption for a period of 10 years to some industrialists, who on the basis of the representation made by the Corporation had set up their industries; (2) the Municipal Corporation had made an express recommendation that while deleting rule 5(8) the previous concessions regarding exemption from octroi duty must continue, (3) the Government could delete rule 5(8) in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and (5) of section 149 and sub-section (1) of section 455 of the Act.12. Section 149(2) runs thus:"The rules shall b e submitted by the Corporation to the Provincial Government and the Provincial Government may either refuse them or refer them back to the Corporation for further consideration or sanction them either as they stand or with such modifications as it thinks fit, not, however, involving an increase in the rate or rates of the levy or the extent thereof".13. This sub-section gives three alternative courses to the Government. After the matter is submitted by the Corporation to the Government (1) it may refuse to sanction the rules recommended, or (2) it may refer back to the Corporation any rule for further consideration or (3) it may sanction the rule as recommended, or with certain modifications as it thinks fit. There can be no doubt that the Government had the power to make modifications in the recommendation submitted by the Corporation, but the express provision by which the Government could refer the matter back to the Corporation is clearly suggestive of the fact that the Government would refer the matter to the Corporation if it wants to modify the proposal. In the instant case, the Government has done nothing of the sort but has clearly passed the order purely in terms of the recommendation. In these circumstances, therefore, the inference is irresistible that the Government never intended to make any changes in the rule recommended by the Corporation particularly because the question o f not accepting the condition recommended by the Corporation, namely, that the existing concessions must continue would entail taking away of vested rights and put the Corporation in a wrong box inasmuch as it would then have to go back from its own assurance. The Government must certainly have been aware of these complications and if it thought that in spite of all this rule 5(8) should be deleted unconditionally, it would have referred the matter back to the Corporation in order to g et its revised views in the matter. But that was not done. In these circumstances, therefore, we are of the opinion that the Government order dated 30th July, 1968 must be so read as to include the proviso recommended by the Corporation while deleting rule 5(8), namely, that the concessions already granted to the industrialists would continue. It is true that the Government resolution does not say so in so many words, but having regard to the language in which it was couched and to the express reference to the letter dated 2nd July, 1968 of the Municipal Commissioner contained in the order itself which clearly mentions that rule 5(8) should be repealed provided the exemption already granted shall continue until the expiry of the respective periods of their grants, the aforesaid condition would be deemed to be included in the order dated 30-7-1968 by necessary intendment. Such an interpretation will be fully in consonance with the well settled rule of int erpretation of statutes that any amendment to a statute affecting the legal rights of an individual must be presumed to be prospective unless it is made expressly or is impliedly retrospective. This principle is contained in section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act. In the instant case, if we were to take a different view the result would be that a valuable right vested in the respondents and others would be taken away and we are unable to find any evidence in the language of the Government order to indicate any such intention.Even assuming that the order of the Government deleted rule 5(8) without any condition and without retaining the exemption granted to the respondents, the order would suffer from a v ery serious legal infirmity. Section 149(2) of the Act empowers the Government to modify the recommendation of the Corporation provided it does not involve any increase in the rate or rates of the levy or the extent thereof. There can be no doubt tha t if the concession of exemption from octroi duty given to the respondents is unconditionally withdrawn with effect from 1-9-1968 then this would have the effect of extending the application of the rules to an area where they did not apply. This is yet another reason why the Government impugned order should be read down so as to provide for deletion of rule 5(8) with the exception that the concession already granted will continue.14.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments advanced before us by counsel for the parties. We feel that in the circumstances of this case and in the view that we take, it is not at all necessary for us to travel into the domain of promissory estoppel. We are clearly of the opinion that reading the order dated 30-7-1968 against the history and background of the recommendation of the Corporation, the first contention of the respondents mustis not disputed that the Corporation in its resolution dated 30-5-1968 while recommending to the Government to delete rule 5(8) expressly recommended that the exemption already granted would continue. The last paragraph of the resolution runsRule No. 5(8) is hereby repealed. Provided that notwithstanding such repeal the exemption already granted shall continue until the expiry of the respective periods of theirthis, the Corporation itself had take n a policy decision that the industrialists choosing to set up industries in the demarcated area would be given exemption from octroi duty as contained in rule 62B. It was on this representation that the respondents applied for allotment of the plots and spent huge amounts of money for the import of machinery and the materials and set upresolution of the Government deleting rule 5(B) read as a whole also clearly indicates that it did not intend to depart from the recommendation made by the Corporation or to modify the same in any manner. On the other hand, the resolution clearly indicates that it was being passed on the basis of the letter of the Municipal Commissioner dated 2nd June, 19 68 as would be manifestly clear from the citations in the resolution which may be extractedGovernment Resolution, Urban Development, Public Health and House Department No. PMC/2862/15/C dated 28th January, 1963 .Government Circular, Urban Development Public Health and Housing Department No. MUN/1164/58163/A dated 25th February, 1966.Letter No. MC/101 dated 2nd June, 1968 from the Municipal Commissioner, Poona Municipalis, therefore, evident that while exercising its power to delete rule 5(8) the Government had the following materials before it, (1) It knew that Rule 5(8) had granted exemption for a period of 10 years to some industrialists, who on the basis of the representation made by the Corporation had set up their industries; (2) the Municipal Corporation had made an express recommendation that while deleting rule 5(8) the previous concessions regarding exemption from octroi duty must continue, (3) the Government could delete rule 5(8) in the exercise of the powers conferred on it by sub-sections (2) and (5) of section 149 and sub-section (1) of section 455 of theThe rules shall b e submitted by the Corporation to the Provincial Government and the Provincial Government may either refuse them or refer them back to the Corporation for further consideration or sanction them either as they stand or with such modifications as it thinks fit, not, however, involving an increase in the rate or rates of the levy or the extent94 of 1971FAZAL ALI,appeal by special leave is directed against the order of the High Court dated 21st December, 1970 dismissing the petition in limine. In view of the findings given and the decision rendered by us in Civil Appeals No. 2009 and 2081 of 1969 and 355 & 356 of 1970 it is not necessary for us to go into the details of the facts of this case as we have already held that the Government order dated 30-7-1968 must be read to this effect that rule 5(8) is deleted but the previous concessions given to the industrialists concerned will continue. It appears, however, that so far as the appellant is concerned, it has not executed any sale-deed though it was allotted a plot which was also demarcated. Apart from the point which we decided in the other appeals there being additional points of law involved in this case, we do not think that this was a fit case which should have been dismissed in limine by the Bombay High Court. We, therefore, allow this appeal and remit the case to the High Court for re-admitting and disposal of t he writ petition according to law. The point regarding the interpretation of Government order dated 30-7-1968 has already been decided by us in Civil Appeals No. 2009 and 2081 of 1969 and 355 & 356 of 1970 referred to above and will apply to the present case also, if the appellant is able to prove that it falls within the four corners of the Government order.