Case: N.B. Mirzan Vs. Disciplinary Committee of The Bar Council of Maharashtra

respondent No. 2, nor did she read the paper she signed as a witness and further admitted that she was not aware of the contents of that writing. Both the Disciplinary Committees have held that Ext. 2 was not a genuine document and we are satisfied that this finding is correct.9. Corroboration is further found in what happened later in 1964 after disputes started between respondent No. 2 and the appellant. In about October, 1964, the disputes, according to respondent No. 2, were settled in the presence of one Mr. Qureshi and the appellant agreed to pay Rs. 1000/- to respondent No. 2 by instalments of Rs. 150/- per month. Accordingly, the first instalment was sent to respondent No. 2 by money order on 11th October, 1964, and it is admitted by the appellant that he had sent the money order for Rs. 150/-. He, however, explained that respondent No. 2 along with a social worker had seen the appellant on 10th October, 1964 and requested him for a loan. Out of pity, the appellant says, he sent the money order in question by way of loan on 11th October, 1964. The explanation was regarded by both the Committees as false, because, under the circumstances of the case and in view of the bitter disputes between the parties, it was extremely unlikely that the appellant would make any loan to respondent No. 2. On the other hand, Shri Mardan Ali Quereshi has corroborated respondent No. 2 and stated that in his presence the dispute had been settled between the appellant and respondent No. 2 and the appellant had agreed to pay the amount of Rupees 1000/- in instalments of Rupees 150/- per month. The story of the loan has been rejected by both the committees and the evidence of respondent No. 2 and Quereshi has been accepted, in which case it is impossible to believe that the appellant had returned the sum of Rs. 975/- to respondent No 2 as far back as 13th September, 1962.We, therefore agree with the concurrent finding of both the Committees that the appellant had demanded and received Rs. 975/- from respondent No. 2s wife Khurshid Begum on a false representation that the amount was required to be deposited in Court and thereafter misappropriated the same.10. The third item is of rupees 250/-. There is no dispute that this amount was received by the appellant either from respondent No. 2 or his wife. Respondent No. 2 says that it was received from his wife during his absence. The Receipt Ext. B, however, is made in the name of respondent No. 2. The contents of the Receipt themselves go to support respondent No. 2s case that this amount had been paid, because the appellant had represented that the amount was required for transferring the rent bill in respect of the premises in the name of respondent No. 2. The amount was received by the appellant on 16thAugust, 1962, i.e., much before the obstructionist notice had been discharged. The appellant had great difficulty in explaining what this Receipt meant. In the notices exchanged in 1964, the appellant had denied altogether having received this sum of Rs. 250/- for the purpose of the transfer of the rent bill. In the written statement before the State Disciplinary Committee, the appellant did not categorically deny the receipt of Rs. 250/-. He suggested there that he had been instructed by respondent No. 2 to file a declaratory suit for transferring rent bill in his name. One does not know what this really means. The obstructionist proceedings were still pending and one does not know what kind of proceedings could be taken in a court of law for transferring the rent bill. It is not the case that there were any negotiations with the landlord for transferring the rent bill in the name of respondent No. 2. Then again, if any such suit was to be filed, the appellant and his client would have thought about it only after the obstructionist proceedings had come to an end and not in August, 1962. In his evidence, the appellant stated that this amount of Rs. 250/- had been paid to him by respondent No 2 of his own accord and the appellant had never suggested that any declaratory suit was required to be filed. This is rather a tall story. Seeing that the story was unconvincing, the appellant changed his case later and stated that this sum of Rs. 250/- was paid to him towards the court-fees in respect of the intended declaratory suit, his fees and other pocket expenses. That explanation is also false, because it is nobodys case that any such declaratory suit was ever filed. It is, hence, clear that the appellant was not at all able to explain why he demanded this amount of Rs. 250/-. The conclusion is irresistible that he must have represented that this amount was required to pay somebody for the purposes of transferring the bill of the suit premises in the name of respondent No. 2, knowing quite well that it was impossible to secure a transfer of the rent bill in legal proceedings in court. The amount had been screwed out by the appellant on a false representation for the purposes of misappropriation. In our opinion, the findings of both the Disciplinary Committees were right and unexceptionable. Normally this Court does not entertain an appeal from a concurrent finding of facts. We have, however, gone through the facts to satisfy ourselves that no injustice has been done.11. The State Disciplinary Committee had permanently debarred the appellant from practising as an Advocate, but, in appeal, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India has taken a more lenient view and suspended the appellant from practice for a period of five years on condition that he pays respondent No. 2 Rs. 850/- within two months. No argument was addressed to us on the question of punishment, Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the point.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Therefore, there was really no occasion at all on 26th April, 1962 for the appellant making a demand for the amount from respondent No. 2s wife and receiving the same for the ostensible purpose of depositing the amount in Court. It is obvious that he obtained this amount on a false pretext and, when such a demand is made on a false pretext, the inference would naturally follow that the demand had been made with a view to misappropriate the amount.The State Disciplinary Committee had permanently debarred the appellant from practising as an Advocate, but, in appeal, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India has taken a more lenient view and suspended the appellant from practice for a period of five years on condition that he pays respondent No. 2 Rs. 850/within two months. No argument was addressed to us on the question of punishment, Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the point.Corroboration is further found in what happened later in 1964 after disputes started between respondent No. 2 and the appellant. In about October, 1964, the disputes, according to respondent No. 2, were settled in the presence of one Mr. Qureshi and the appellant agreed to pay Rs. 1000/to respondent No. 2 byinstalments of Rs. 150/per month. Accordingly, the first instalment was sentto respondent No. 2 bymoney order on 11th October, 1964, and it is admitted by the appellant that he had sent the money order for Rs.He, however, explained that respondent No. 2 along with a social worker had seen the appellant on 10th October, 1964 and requested him for a loan. Out of pity, the appellant says, he sent the money order in question by way of loan on 11th October, 1964. The explanation was regarded by both the Committees as false, because, under the circumstances of the case and in view of the bitter disputes between the parties, it was extremely unlikely that the appellant would make any loan to respondent No. 2. On the other hand, Shri Mardan Ali Quereshi has corroborated respondent No. 2 and stated that in his presence the dispute had been settled between the appellant and respondent No. 2 and the appellant had agreed to pay the amount of Rupees 1000/in instalments of Rupees 150/per month. The story of the loan has been rejected by both the committees and the evidence of respondent No. 2 and Quereshi has been accepted, in which case it is impossible to believe that the appellant had returned the sum of Rs. 975/to respondent No 2 as far back as 13th September, 1962.We, therefore agree with the concurrent finding of both the Committees that the appellant had demanded and received Rs. 975/from respondent No. 2s wife Khurshid Begum on a false representation that the amount was required to be deposited in Court and thereafter misappropriated the same.10. The third item is of rupeesThere is no dispute that this amount was received by the appellant either from respondent No. 2 or his wife. Respondent No. 2 says that it was received from his wife during his absence. The Receipt Ext. B, however, is made in the name of respondent No. 2. The contents of the Receipt themselves go to support respondent No. 2s case that this amount had been paid, because the appellant had represented that the amount was required for transferring the rent bill in respect of the premises in the name of respondent No. 2. The amount was received by the appellant on 16thAugust, 1962, i.e., much before the obstructionist notice had been discharged. The appellant had great difficulty in explaining what this Receipt meant. In the notices exchanged in 1964, the appellant had denied altogether having received this sum of Rs. 250/for the purpose of the transfer of the rent bill. In the written statement before the State Disciplinary Committee, the appellant did not categorically deny the receipt of Rs.He suggested there that he had been instructed by respondent No. 2 to file a declaratory suit for transferring rent bill in his name. One does not know what this really means. The obstructionist proceedings were still pending and one does not know what kind of proceedings could be taken in a court of law for transferring the rent bill. It is not the case that there were any negotiations with the landlord for transferring the rent bill in the name of respondent No. 2. Then again, if any such suit was to be filed, the appellant and his client would have thought about it only after the obstructionist proceedings had come to an end and not in August, 1962. In his evidence, the appellant stated that this amount of Rs. 250/had been paid to him by respondent No 2 of his own accord and the appellant had never suggested that any declaratory suit was required to be filed. This is rather a tall story. Seeing that the story was unconvincing, the appellant changed his case later and stated that this sum of Rs. 250/was paid to him towards thein respect of the intended declaratory suit, his fees and other pocket expenses. That explanation is also false, because it is nobodys case that any such declaratory suit was ever filed. It is, hence, clear that the appellant was not at all able to explain why he demanded this amount of Rs.The conclusion is irresistible that he must have represented that this amount was required to pay somebody for the purposes of transferring the bill of the suit premises in the name of respondent No. 2, knowing quite well that it was impossible to secure a transfer of the rent bill in legal proceedings in court. The amount had been screwed out by the appellant on a false representation for the purposes of misappropriation. In our opinion, the findings of both the Disciplinary Committees were right and unexceptionable. Normally this Court does not entertain an appeal from a concurrent finding of facts. We have, however, gone through the facts to satisfy ourselves that no injustice has been done.