Case: Hindustan Lever Limited Vs. Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha &amp; Another

is with regard to the non-implementation of settlement dated 21-1-1971 and failure to negotiate on the charter of demands dated 31-12-1973. Undisputedly the present complaint is filed on 4-4-1984. It is urged that even though the cause of action to file the present complaint had arisen on 21-1-1971 and 31-12-1973, but it has been filed after the period of 12 years that too without application for condonation of delay."It is evident that there is a delay of more than 12 years and it is also conceded that there was no sufficient explanation for that delay and in Reference (IT) No. 203 of 1970 the main issue viz. whether the member of the field staff is a workman or not has been agitated and considered by the Tribunal. On a careful reading of the impugned order it can be seen that the Industrial Court was under a misconception that the judgment of the Supreme Court gives a fresh cause of action to the first respondent to make the present complaint. Paragraph 20 of the impugned order reads as follows:"Suffice to state that even though the Company did not implement the settlement dated 27-1-1971 as far as Bombay Branch field force was concerned on the ground that dispute was pending adjudication before the Industrial Tribunal, and even though Ref. (IT) No. 203 of 1970 was decided against the concerned employees, still the cause of action to claim the implementation of the said agreement or settlement had arisen for the first time after the decision given by the Honble Supreme Court of India in C.A. No. 1865/82 dated 5-1-1984. Therefore, the complaint filed on 4-4-1984 cannot be said to be barred by limitation at all.Had the Honble Supreme Court not declared the correspondence (Annexure-A) to be agreement in between the parties, the controversy about the field force being not workmen had already come to an end."The judgment of the Supreme Court does not give any cause of action to the first respondent. The Supreme Court only interpreted the three letters and affirmed the rights of the parties emerging from those letters. In other words, the Supreme Court has upheld the view of the first respondent as regards the interpretation of three letters are concerned. Therefore, the observations of the Industrial Court that the Supreme Court judgment gives the first respondent a fresh cause of action cannot be accepted. As we pointed out earlier, the Supreme Court judgment may give some impetus to file the complaint in question before the Industrial Court. It is common knowledge that a judgment of a Court will not give a cause of action to a litigant. Cause of action for a litigation arises out of a wrong committed by the opposite party. Moreover, a judgment of a Court cannot infuse life to a cause of action which was already dead. It is a cardinal principle of law of limitation that once the limitation starts to run nobody can stop it unless and until a competent Court stops its running. So also a cause of action once obliterated by operation of law of limitation cannot be re-built. In this context we cannot appreciate the finding of the Industrial Court that the non-implementation of a settlement is a continuing process. It is clear from the facts of this case, but for the Chitales Award and consequent rejection of the SLP by the Supreme Court, perhaps Industrial Court may be right in making such observations. But when a competent Court has given a finding, rightly or wrongly, and the parties have accepted it for a long time, one cannot conceive of a position that it is a continuing wrong. In the absence of a valid explanation for keeping the matter in cold storage for 13 years from 1971 to 1984 the present complaint is barred by limitation before the Industrial Court. As observed by the Industrial Court but for the Supreme Court decision the entire matter would have been considered as closed. Merely because Supreme Court has made the observation first respondent cannot save limitation.9. As is well known the object of statutes of limitation is founded on public policy. It is to compel the litigants to prosecute their case diligently. Such a policy is necessary to secure quiet and repose of the community. Another consideration is that one should not be complacent on his own rights. The old maxim "Interest reipublices ut sit finis litium" is quite relevant in these days also. A party who is insensible to his remedies or who does not assert his own claims with promptitude has no rights to seek the aid of the State.10. When we closely watched the conduct of the first respondent it can be seen that there was no room for any doubt that it has acquiesced on the award of Mr. Justice Chitale by keeping silence for a long time. The doctrine acquiescence is based on the conduct of the parties with knowledge of its legal rights. Acquiescence amounts to absolute or positive waiver of the rights of a person who acquiesced. Though it is quite different from delay or laches, but in the factual context of the case it is very relevant here. If a person having a right, stands by and see another deals with the rights inconsistent with that rights, watched it for considerable long time say, 12 years or more, he cannot afterwards complain. Under Indian Law of Limitation generally even rights over immovable property loses after 12 years where it was not properly exercised. Here the complainant knows that under section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 period of 3 years was prescribed for ventilating their grievance. No explanation worth consideration has been put forward by the first respondent. According to us, the Industrial Court committed serious miscarriage of justice in disposing of the issue of limitation. Under the circumstances we have no doubt that the complaint of the first respondent is barred by limitation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]We see considerable force in the argument of Mr. Singhvi as far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. Ambit and the scope of those three letters were in detail examined by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment. By those letters the petitioner had unmistakably conceded the status of workmen and we have no hesitation to hold that it pertains to the conditions of service. That apart, after the judgment of the Supreme Court on these letters, there is little scope for such contentions being raised at the instance of the petitioner. The Supreme Court without any pale of doubt has spoken in detail the ambit and scope of those letters constituting an agreement between the parties. Though Mr. Manohar, Counsel for the petitioner, has strenuously argued at length about termination of the agreement citing various decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court, we are not very much impressed because it is not permissible for us to take any other stand different from what was taken by the Apex Court in view of the judgment (supra) which speaks about the conditions contained in those letters. Therefore, finding recorded on Issue No. 1 by the Tribunal warrants no interference by thiswe think that considerable importance is to be given to these long history of the case when we deal with the issue of limitation in thiswe see when Mr. Justice Chitales Award categorically declared that they are not workmen which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No, 27109/95, the first respondent was reconciled with that position and did not make any move to implement the settlement of 1971 or to enforce the letters of 1957. Only when the Supreme Court decided on the legal consequences of these letters, the first respondent become alert and filed the abovethis context we cannot appreciate the finding of the Industrial Court that theof a settlement is a continuing process. It is clear from the facts of this case, but for the Chitales Award and consequent rejection of the SLP by the Supreme Court, perhaps Industrial Court may be right in making such observations. But when a competent Court has given a finding, rightly or wrongly, and the parties have accepted it for a long time, one cannot conceive of a position that it is a continuing wrong. In the absence of a valid explanation for keeping the matter in cold storage for 13 years from 1971 to 1984 the present complaint is barred by limitation before the Industrial Court. As observed by the Industrial Court but for the Supreme Court decision the entire matter would have been considered as closed. Merely because Supreme Court has made the observation first respondent cannot save limitation.When we closely watched the conduct of the first respondent it can be seen that there was no room for any doubt that it has acquiesced on the award of Mr. Justice Chitale by keeping silence for a long time. The doctrine acquiescence is based on the conduct of the parties with knowledge of its legal rights. Acquiescence amounts to absolute or positive waiver of the rights of a person who acquiesced. Though it is quite different from delay or laches, but in the factual context of the case it is very relevant here. If a person having a right, stands by and see another deals with the rights inconsistent with that rights, watched it for considerable long time say, 12 years or more, he cannot afterwards complain. Under Indian Law of Limitation generally even rights over immovable property loses after 12 years where it was not properly exercised. Here the complainant knows that under section 28 of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 period of 3 years was prescribed for ventilating their grievance. No explanation worth consideration has been put forward by the first respondent. According to us, the Industrial Court committed serious miscarriage of justice in disposing of the issue of limitation. Under the circumstances we have no doubt that the complaint of the first respondent is barred by limitation.