Case: Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur Vs. Thakur Manmohan Deo And Ors

question that remains in this context is whether it was executed by the Court of Wards. 10. Exhibit 1 purports to have been given in favour of Brown Wood, the then Deputy Commissioner of Santhal Pargana, on behalf of the Court of Wards representing the Rohini Ghatwali Estate for the purpose of erecting dwelling houses under Section 1 and 2 of Act V of 1859. The only flaw pointed out by the learned counsel is that there is nothing in the Act to indicate that a Deputy Commissioner can grant a lease of a Ghatwali land on behalf of the Court of Wards.But the document was ex facie executed by the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Court of Wards and the validity of it was not questioned till the suit was filed, that is for about 80 years. The lessee and his successors-in-interest have been in possession of the lands all these years. In such circumstances the presumption under S. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act can readily be drawn. Under that section;"The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case." Under illustration (e) the Court may presume that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. If an official act is proved to have been done, it will be presumed to have been regularly done. In this case it has been proved that the lease was executed on behalf of the Court of Wards and that the lessee and his successors have been in unquestioned enjoyment of the aid lands for many years. Indeed, the plaintiff in the plaints does not allege that the Deputy Commissioner was not legally authorised to act on behalf of the Court of Wards: his only objection is that the document was not countersigned by the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division. But that condition was only applicable to a lease executed by a Ghatwal and not by the Court of Wards. In the circumstances, we think it is a fit case where the Court can reasonably presume that the Deputy Commissioner, under appropriate rules, was duly authorised to act on behalf of the Court of Wards. 11. Assuming that the conditions laid down in Act IV of 1870 should also complied with, we think the respondents are not in a better position. Under S. 9 of the Court of Wards Act, the Court of Wards can grant a lease for a term extending to 10 years or for a period beyond the expiration of the wards minority with the sanction of the Board of Revenue. Under S. 8 thereof, the Commissioner of Revenue of each division shall be the Court of Wards. Under S. 9, the Court of Wards is competent to manage estates and lands falling under its charge and one of the acts of management is to grant leases of lands. Under S. 13, when estates or lands of wards are situated within more than one district but within the same division, the Collector of each district shall exercise the duties of the Court of Wards with respect to the wards property situated within his district. A combined reading of these provisions indicates that the Collector can grant a lease of a property situate within his district, for, the grant of a lease of lands in his management is certainly an act of management. That he can do so is also implicit under the provisions of S. 9, for, under that section a lease granted by the Collector acting for the Court of Wards is valid beyond the prohibited period if it was made with the sanction of the Board of Revenue. On a fair reading of the provisions of the Act we have come to the conclusion that the Collector could grant a lease is perpetuity with the sanction of the Board of Revenue. 12. The only questions now is whether such a sanction was given by the Board of Revenue. The kabuliat indicates ex facie that the lease was granted in perpetuity by the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Court of Wards. It is not disputed that the expressions "Deputy Commissioner" and "Collector" are synonymous. The same officer is called by both the names and he discharges the same functions. The land covered by the lease has been in possession and enjoyment of the lessee for about 80 years. The validity of the said grant was not questioned all these long years. Even in the plaint its validity was not challenged on the ground that the sanction of the Board of Revenue was not given. For the reasons mentioned by us in the context of Act V of 1859, in our view, this is a fit case where we can reasonably presume that when the lease was granted all the statutory requirements were complied with, that is to say the Board of Revenue gave its sanction. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the lease of 1873 was valid and binding on the plaintiff. 13. Now coming to C Schedule lands, the position is simple. It was concurrently held by the Courts below that the C Schedule property was not the subject-matter of the lease. The title to the property, therefore, clearly vested in the plaintiff. It is also found by the lower Courts that the said property is a waste land in regard to which there can be no effective enjoyment. The High Court, therefore, rightly drew the presumption that possession followed title. 14. In this view the question of limitation raised by the appellant does not call for a decision, for in the case of the A Schedule property the 2nd respondent loses on the question of title and regard to the C. Schedule property he will be presumed to be in possession. In either view, the question of limitation does not arise.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]A comparative study of these two Acts discloses that Act V of 1959 is a special Act dealing with a specific subject-matter, namely, Ghatwali lands in the district of Birbhoom: it also provides for a particular incident of the tenure, namely, the power to lease the said lands. It says that a Ghatwal holding land shall have the same power of granting leases as is allowed by law to the proprietors of other lands. The proviso thereto enacts that a lease of a Ghatwali land for a period extending beyond the lifetime of the grantor is not binding on the successors unless the same was granted for the purposes specified therein with the approval of the Commissioner signified in the manner prescribed thereunder. But S. 2 thereof provides that in the case of a Ghatwali land under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, it shall be lawful to the Court of Wards or the Commissioner to grant leases of the same for any of the purposes mentioned in the proviso thereto. In that event, such leases shall be binding on the future possessors of the said land. It is, therefore, manifest from the said sections that a Court of Wards could grant a lease of a Ghatwali land for erecting dwelling houses so as to be binding on the future possessors of the said land. The Court of Wards Act deals generally with the management of all the estates that come under the superintendence of the Court of Wards and in respect of lands in such estates, the Court of Wards can grant a lease of the same for a term exceeding 10 years or beyond the period of expiration of the wards minority only with the sanction of the Board of Revenue8. It is, therefore, clear that Act V of 1859 is a special statute and Act IV of 1870 is a general statute. The special statute does not make the sanction of the Board of Revenue a pre-condition for the validity of the lease executed by a Court of Wards so as to bind all future possessors of the said land, whereas S. 9 of Act V of 1859 imposes such a condition. The argument is that both the Acts should be read together and, if so read, the sanction of the Board of Revenue would also be a pre-condition in addition to the conditions imposed under the proviso to S. 1 of Act V of 1859. In our view, such a contention is untenable. The principle of law in this regard is well settledIf this principle is applicable to the instant case-we do not see any reason why it is not-the special provisions made under Act V of 1859 in regard to the conditions imposed for the validity of such a lease should prevail over those imposed under the general Act, Act IV of 1870.The general Act in regard to leases of Ghatwali lands should yield to the special Act. On this construction, the condition for the validity of the lease in question is that it should have been executed by the Court of Wards for the purpose of erection of dwelling houses. The lease of 1873 expressly states that the lease was granted for erecting dwelling housesIn this case it has been proved that the lease was executed on behalf of the Court of Wards and that the lessee and his successors have been in unquestioned enjoyment of the aid lands for many years. Indeed, the plaintiff in the plaints does not allege that the Deputy Commissioner was not legally authorised to act on behalf of the Court of Wards: his only objection is that the document was not countersigned by the Commissioner of Bhagalpur Division. But that condition was only applicable to a lease executed by a Ghatwal and not by the Court of Wards. In the circumstances, we think it is a fit case where the Court can reasonably presume that the Deputy Commissioner, under appropriate rules, was duly authorised to act on behalf of the Court of Wards11. Assuming that the conditions laid down in Act IV of 1870 should also complied with, we think the respondents are not in a better position. Under S. 9 of the Court of Wards Act, the Court of Wards can grant a lease for a term extending to 10 years or for a period beyond the expiration of the wards minority with the sanction of the Board of Revenue. Under S. 8 thereof, the Commissioner of Revenue of each division shall be the Court of Wards. Under S. 9, the Court of Wards is competent to manage estates and lands falling under its charge and one of the acts of management is to grant leases of lands. Under S. 13, when estates or lands of wards are situated within more than one district but within the same division, the Collector of each district shall exercise the duties of the Court of Wards with respect to the wards property situated within his district. A combined reading of these provisions indicates that the Collector can grant a lease of a property situate within his district, for, the grant of a lease of lands in his management is certainly an act of management. That he can do so is also implicit under the provisions of S. 9, for, under that section a lease granted by the Collector acting for the Court of Wards is valid beyond the prohibited period if it was made with the sanction of the Board of Revenue. On a fair reading of the provisions of the Act we have come to the conclusion that the Collector could grant a lease is perpetuity with the sanction of the Board of RevenueThe kabuliat indicates ex facie that the lease was granted in perpetuity by the Deputy Commissioner on behalf of the Court of Wards. It is not disputed that the expressions "Deputy Commissioner" and "Collector" are synonymous. The same officer is called by both the names and he discharges the same functions. The land covered by the lease has been in possession and enjoyment of the lessee for about 80 years. The validity of the said grant was not questioned all these long years. Even in the plaint its validity was not challenged on the ground that the sanction of the Board of Revenue was not given. For the reasons mentioned by us in the context of Act V of 1859, in our view, this is a fit case where we can reasonably presume that when the lease was granted all the statutory requirements were complied with, that is to say the Board of Revenue gave its sanction. For the aforesaid reasons we hold that the lease of 1873 was valid and binding on the plaintiff13. Now coming to C Schedule lands, the position is simple. It was concurrently held by the Courts below that the C Schedule property was not the subject-matter of the lease. The title to the property, therefore, clearly vested in the plaintiff. It is also found by the lower Courts that the said property is a waste land in regard to which there can be no effective enjoyment. The High Court, therefore, rightly drew the presumption that possession followed title14. In this view the question of limitation raised by the appellant does not call for a decision, for in the case of the A Schedule property the 2nd respondent loses on the question of title and regard to the C. Schedule property he will be presumed to be in possession. In either view, the question of limitation does not arise.