Case: The Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Thanjore &amp; Others Vs. G. Thambidurai &amp; Another

the government, was not a willful defaulter of the land tax and that the default was due to circumstances beyond his control and that the assignment is otherwise unobjectionable to the satisfaction of the assigning authority. In the absence of the discharge of this otherwise statutorily prescribed obligation, it would be idle for him to contend that he was, even sans the same, entitled to be preferred in the matter of assignment of the "bought in" land merely on the cancellation of the previous assignment in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar.23. As the enumerated facts culled from the pleadings and the documents on record would proclaim, no evidence is forthcoming of any endeavour made by respondent No.1/plaintiff to this effect or the satisfaction of the assigning authority on these three otherwise inalienable aspects so as to render him preferable to others for the assignment of the "bought in" land. Contrary thereto, it is the specific stand of the appellants/defendants that admittedly the land was "bought in" in the year 1935 for the failure of the original owner/the respondent No.1 to pay the land tax in 1935, whereafter till 1958, he did not either object to such take over or offer to pay the arrears. It was only in 1958, when the "bought in" land was assigned in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar that he questioned the same on the ground of want of prior notice to him. This challenge, to reiterate, was focused only on the assignment of the "bought in" land to the Sanaiyars without prior notice to him and is not qua the process by which the land had been bought in by the government. Noticeably, the proceedings before the revenue authorities initiated on this challenge by the respondent No.1/plaintiff to the assignment of the "bought in" land to the Sanaiyars were also confined to the grievance of want of notice to the respondent No.1/plaintiff prior to such endowment to them. There is no shred of evidence to demonstrate that the default in the payment of land tax, which resulted in the taking over of the land by the government was not willful and that the same was due to circumstances beyond the defaulters control and further that the assignment, if to be made to the respondent No.1/plaintiff would be unobjectionable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Significantly, the respondent No.1/plaintiff admits that the land was "bought in" by the government in the year 1935 in view of the failure to pay the land tax. To reiterate, this process had not been objected to until the suit was filed in the year 2005. In any view of the matter, any demurral to this process of taking over of the land in 1935, even if made in the year 2005 in the suit, can by no means be taken of cognizance of or be entertained. As a matter of fact, PW1 (respondent No.1/plaintiff) did admit that the land was auctioned for failure to pay the land revenue and it was essentially therefore his burden to also establish that such default was not willful and was due to circumstances beyond his control and that the assignment to him was otherwise not objectionable, as obligated by RSO 45(4). The belated willingness of respondent No.1/plaintiff to clear the arrear land tax post 1958 also does not further his case in this regard. On the other hand, it would be permissible to deduce that the inactive, casual and passive disposition of the respondent No.1/plaintiff to offer payment of the arrears due immediately after 1935, till at least 30 years hence, demonstrates not only a willful default in that regard but also a persistent unwillingness to clear the outstanding dues, which in terms of RSO 45(4) disqualifies him to avail any preference in the matter of assignment of the "bought in" lands.24. It is the foundational principle of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all and all other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This pristine legal postulation is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor [1875] 1 Ch. D. 426 which was followed in Nazir Ahmed v. The King Emperor L.R. 63 Ind Ap 372 and in a plethora of pronouncements thereafter. Tested on this anvil as well, the preference in the matter of reassignment of the suit land in favour of the respondent No. 1 sans the adherence to the mandatory pre-requisites engrafted in RSO 45(4) could not have been extended to him.25. That the suit was filed claiming restoration of the land relying on RSO 45(4) seven decades after the land had been bought in, is writ large on the face of the record. As the above analysis evince that in the facts of the case, the respondent No.1/plaintiff was not entitled to the preference as contemplated in RSO 45(4), the omission on the part of the revenue authorities to hold a public auction before leasing out the suit land to Sericulture Development Department and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., is of no consequence. The preference to an original owner or his undisputed heir in the matter of assignment of "bought in" lands being contingent on the compliance of the essential pre-requisites therefor, as eluded hereinbefore, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the High Court was wrong in decreeing the suit on the sole ground that no notice had been issued to the respondent No.1/plaintiff prior to the assignment of the "bought in" land in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar in the year 1958 and that the same was cancelled in the related revenue proceedings. The apparent huge delay on the part of respondent No.1/plaintiff in offering to clear off the arrears and in the institution of the suit are as well formidable factors weighing against him. RSO 45(4) being of binding dispensation, any assignment in departure therefrom, cannot receive judicial imprimatur.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]21. It would thus be evident that to avail the preference in the matter of assignment of "bought in" lands, the obligatoryis the absence of willful default in the payment of land tax by the original owner. Further the default, if any, was due to circumstances beyond his control and that assignment to him again is otherwise unobjectionable. It is only when theseexist and the assigning authority is satisfied that the original owner was not a willful defaulter and that the default was due to circumstances beyond the defaulters control and that such assignment is otherwise unobjectionable that the original owners or the undisputed heirs would have to be preferred to the outsiders. If it is not proved to the satisfaction of the assigning authority that the original owner was neither a willful defaulter nor was the default due to circumstance beyond his control and that the assignment proposed is otherwise not objectionable, the subsequent steps as outlined in RSO 45(4) with regard thereto in favour of such assignment would be wholly impertinent. As a matter of fact, as the provision predicates, the procedure prescribed for the assignment of the "bought in" lands in favour of the original owners or their undisputed heirs distinctlythese contingencies. In absence thereof, the concerned authority is under no obligation to issue notice either to the original owners or their undisputed heir(s) informing him/them that the land would beem if he/they pay the arrears, back assessment, back balance of loan, if any etc. on their application to the Tahsildar to the said effect. The eventuality of a fresh sale would occur in case, in response to such notice, no application for reassignment is received from the original owner or his undisputed heir or if he/they inform the Tahsildar that he/they do not desire to have the land back. Here again, the Revisional Divisional Officer, at his discretion and if he is satisfied that the fresh sale would not fetch more than Rs. 10 per acre, would refrain from undertaking that exercise and instead direct that the land be struck off in the Taluk Register No.18A and classed as ordinary village waste.22. In the face of such clear and unambiguous method of disposal of "bought in" lands, as prescribed by RSO 45(4), there is no semblance of doubt that for an original owner or his undisputed heir to claim preference in the matter of assignment thereof to him/them, the above threewould have to be essentially complied with. In absence of such compliance, any plea of preference in the assignment of "bought in" lands under RSO 45(4) is patently fallacious and untenable. As a corollary, even if such an assignment has been made, as in the instant case in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar, which ultimately had been cancelled, the same would not per se either indicate that the aforementionedwere satisfied or would render the respondent No.1/plaintiff automatically eligible to avail the preference in the matter of such assignment under RSO 45(4). In our view, it would be incumbent upon the respondent No.1/plaintiff in order to prove his entitlement for such preference, to establish that the original owner, when the land was "bought in" by the government, was not a willful defaulter of the land tax and that the default was due to circumstances beyond his control and that the assignment is otherwise unobjectionable to the satisfaction of the assigning authority. In the absence of the discharge of this otherwise statutorily prescribed obligation, it would be idle for him to contend that he was, even sans the same, entitled to be preferred in the matter of assignment of the "bought in" land merely on the cancellation of the previous assignment in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar.23. As the enumerated facts culled from the pleadings and the documents on record would proclaim, no evidence is forthcoming of any endeavour made by respondent No.1/plaintiff to this effect or the satisfaction of the assigning authority on these three otherwise inalienable aspects so as to render him preferable to others for the assignment of the "bought in" land. Contrary thereto, it is the specific stand of the appellants/defendants that admittedly the land was "bought in" in the year 1935 for the failure of the original owner/the respondent No.1 to pay the land tax in 1935, whereafter till 1958, he did not either object to such take over or offer to pay the arrears. It was only in 1958, when the "bought in" land was assigned in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar that he questioned the same on the ground of want of prior notice to him. This challenge, to reiterate, was focused only on the assignment of the "bought in" land to the Sanaiyars without prior notice to him and is not qua the process by which the land had been bought in by the government. Noticeably, the proceedings before the revenue authorities initiated on this challenge by the respondent No.1/plaintiff to the assignment of the "bought in" land to the Sanaiyars were also confined to the grievance of want of notice to the respondent No.1/plaintiff prior to such endowment to them. There is no shred of evidence to demonstrate that the default in the payment of land tax, which resulted in the taking over of the land by the government was not willful and that the same was due to circumstances beyond the defaulters control and further that the assignment, if to be made to the respondent No.1/plaintiff would be unobjectionable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Significantly, the respondent No.1/plaintiff admits that the land was "bought in" by the government in the year 1935 in view of the failure to pay the land tax. To reiterate, this process had not been objected to until the suit was filed in the year 2005. In any view of the matter, any demurral to this process of taking over of the land in 1935, even if made in the year 2005 in the suit, can by no means be taken of cognizance of or be entertained. As a matter of fact, PW1 (respondent No.1/plaintiff) did admit that the land was auctioned for failure to pay the land revenue and it was essentially therefore his burden to also establish that such default was not willful and was due to circumstances beyond his control and that the assignment to him was otherwise not objectionable, as obligated by RSO 45(4). The belated willingness of respondent No.1/plaintiff to clear the arrear land tax post 1958 also does not further his case in this regard. On the other hand, it would be permissible to deduce that the inactive, casual and passive disposition of the respondent No.1/plaintiff to offer payment of the arrears due immediately after 1935, till at least 30 years hence, demonstrates not only a willful default in that regard but also a persistent unwillingness to clear the outstanding dues, which in terms of RSO 45(4) disqualifies him to avail any preference in the matter of assignment of the "bought in" lands.24. It is the foundational principle of law that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all and all other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. This pristine legal postulation is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor [1875] 1 Ch. D. 426 which was followed in Nazir Ahmed v. The King Emperor L.R. 63 Ind Ap 372 and in a plethora of pronouncements thereafter. Tested on this anvil as well, the preference in the matter of reassignment of the suit land in favour of the respondent No. 1 sans the adherence to the mandatoryengrafted in RSO 45(4) could not have been extended to him.25. That the suit was filed claiming restoration of the land relying on RSO 45(4) seven decades after the land had been bought in, is writ large on the face of the record. As the above analysis evince that in the facts of the case, the respondent No.1/plaintiff was not entitled to the preference as contemplated in RSO 45(4), the omission on the part of the revenue authorities to hold a public auction before leasing out the suit land to Sericulture Development Department and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., is of no consequence. The preference to an original owner or his undisputed heir in the matter of assignment of "bought in" lands being contingent on the compliance of the essentialtherefor, as eluded hereinbefore, we are of the unhesitant opinion that the High Court was wrong in decreeing the suit on the sole ground that no notice had been issued to the respondent No.1/plaintiff prior to the assignment of the "bought in" land in favour of Kuruppaiah Sanaiyar and Muthusamy Sanaiyar in the year 1958 and that the same was cancelled in the related revenue proceedings. The apparent huge delay on the part of respondent No.1/plaintiff in offering to clear off the arrears and in the institution of the suit are as well formidable factors weighing against him. RSO 45(4) being of binding dispensation, any assignment in departure therefrom, cannot receive judicial imprimatur.