Case: K. Sashidhar Vs. Indian Overseas Bank and Ors

objections raised rather than to ritually reject them and proceed to take drastic measures Under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Once such a duty is envisaged on the part of the creditor it would only be conducive to the principles of fairness on the part of the banks and financial institutions in dealing with their borrowers to apprise them of the reason for not accepting the objections or points raised in reply to the notice served upon them before proceeding to take measures Under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. Such reasons, overruling the objections of the borrower, must also be communicated to the borrower by the secured creditor. It will only be in fulfillment of a requirement of reasonableness and fairness in the dealings of institutional financing which is so important from the point of view of the economy of the country and would serve the purpose in the growth of a healthy economy. It would certainly provide guidance to the secured debtors in general in conducting the affairs in a manner that they may not be found defaulting and being made liable for the unsavoury steps contained Under Sub-section (4) of Section 13. At the same time, more importantly, we must make it clear unequivocally that communication of the reasons for not accepting the objections taken by the secured borrower may not be taken to give occasion to resort to such proceedings which are not permissible under the provisions of the Act. But communication of reasons not to accept the objections of the borrower, would certainly be for the purpose of his knowledge which would be a step forward towards his right to know as to why his objections have not been accepted by the secured creditor who intends to resort to harsh steps of taking over the management/business of viz. secured assets without intervention of the court. Such a person in respect of whom steps Under Section 13(4) of the Act are likely to be taken cannot be denied the right to know the reasons of non-acceptance and of his objections. It is true, as per the provisions under the Act, he may not be entitled to challenge the reasons communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at that point of time unless his right to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal as provided Under Section 17 of the Act matures on any measure having been taken Under Sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) In the present case, however, we are concerned with the provisions of I & B Code dealing with the resolution process. The dispensation provided in the I & B Code is entirely different. In terms of Section 30 of the I & B Code, the decision is taken collectively after due negotiations between the financial creditors who are constituents of the CoC and they express their opinion on the proposed resolution plan in the form of votes, as per their voting share. In the meeting of CoC, the proposed resolution plan is placed for discussion and after full interaction in the presence of all concerned and the resolution professional, the constituents of the CoC finally proceed to exercise their option (business/commercial decision) to approve or not to approve the proposed resolution plan. In such a case, non-recording of reasons would not per se vitiate the collective decision of the financial creditors. The legislature has not envisaged challenge to the "commercial/business decision" of the financial creditors taken collectively or for that matter their individual opinion, as the case may be, on this count. 63. It was then contended that NCLAT committed manifest error in not calling upon the dissenting financial creditors to respond to the applications filed in the concerned appeals pending before it, including with a prayer to allow the resolution applicant to revise the resolution plan. We find no merits in this submission. The reliefs claimed in the stated application filed before the NCLAT would not take the matter any further. For, it is enough for the dissenting financial creditors to disapprove the proposed resolution plan by voting as per its voting share, based on commercial decision. Indeed, if the opposition of the dissenting financial creditors is in regard to matter(s) within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ascribable to Sections 30(2) or 61(3), then the situation may be somewhat different. But that is not in issue in these cases. 64. As regards the application by the resolution applicant for taking his revised resolution plan on record, the same is also devoid of merits inasmuch as it is not open to the Adjudicating Authority to entertain a revised resolution plan after the expiry of the statutory period of 270 days. Accordingly, no fault can be found with the NCLAT for not entertaining such application. 65. The counsel appearing for the resolution applicant and the stakeholders supporting the resolution plan were at pains to persuade us to exercise powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Inasmuch as, in both the cases, the vote of approval exceeded more than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors and yet the benefit of the amended provision could not be availed, as it came only during the pendency of the appeal before the NCLAT. The submission is that this Court may set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and relegate the parties in both the cases, before the NCLT for considering the proceedings afresh in light of the amended provision reducing the threshold requirement of percent of voting share of financial creditors to 66%. We are afraid, it is not possible for us to exercise powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution which will result in issuing directions in the teeth of the provisions as applicable to the cases on hand. We, therefore, decline to accede to this request. Having answered the core issues and to avoid prolixity, we do not wish to dilate on the exposition in other reported decisions relied upon by the counsel.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In the present case, however, our focus must be on the dispensation governing the process of approval or rejection of resolution plan by the CoC. The CoC is called upon to consider the resolution plan Under Section 30(4) of the I & B Code after it is verified and vetted by the resolution professional as being compliant with all the statutory requirements specified in Section 30(2).The CoC is constituted as per Section 21 of the I & B Code, which consists of financial creditors. The term financial creditor has been defined in Section 5(7) of the I & B Code to mean any person to whom a financial debt is owed and includes a person to whom such debt has been legally assigned or transferred to. Be it noted that the process of insolvency resolution and liquidation concerning corporate debtors has been codified in Part II of the I & B Code, comprising of seven Chapters. Chapter I predicates that Part II shall apply in matters relating to the insolvency and liquidation of corporate debtor where the minimum amount of default is Rs. 1,00,000/-. Section 5 in Chapter I is a dictionary Clause specific to Part II of the Code. Chapter II deals with the gamut of procedure to be followed for the corporate insolvency resolution process. For dealing with the issue on hand, the provisions contained in Chapter II will be significant. From the scheme of the provisions, it is clear that the provisions in Part II of the Code are self-contained code, providing for the procedure for consideration of the resolution plan by the CoC.According to the resolution applicant and the stakeholders supporting the concerned resolution plan in respect of the two corporate debtors, the stipulation in Section 30(4) of the I & B Code as applicable at the relevant time in October 2017 is only directory and not mandatory. This argument is founded on the expression "may" occurring in Section 30(4) of the I & B Code. This argument does not commend to us. In that, the word "may" is ascribable to the discretion of the CoC-to approve the resolution plan or not to approve the same. What is significant is the second part of the said provision, which stipulates the requisite threshold of "not less than seventy five percent of voting share of the financial creditors" to treat the resolution plan as duly approved by the CoC. That stipulation is the quintessence and made mandatory for approval of the resolution plan. Any other interpretation would result in rewriting of the provision and doing violence to the legislative intent.It was then contended that the amendment vide Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Amendment Act, 2018 (Act No. 8 of 2018, dated 18th January, 2018) w.e.f. 23rd November, 2017 was to substitute the amended provision, which means that the amended provision stood incorporated as Section 30(4) from the commencement of I & B Code. This argument will be dealt with a little later while considering the effect of the amended provisions. For the present, we are adverting to the provisions in the I & B Code and the Regulations framed there under, as were in force in October 2017, when the CoC of the concerned corporate debtor was called upon to consider the proposed resolutiona conjoint reading of these provisions it is amply clear that the stipulation is to reckon the percent of "voting share of the financial creditors", for the purposes of determining as to whether the proposed resolution plan has been approved by the CoC or otherwise. When it comes to the method of voting and for determining the outcome of voting with regard to other subjects (other than the approval of the resolution plan), discussed in the meeting of the CoC, the same is governed by Regulation 25 as applicable in OctoberRegulations 25 and 39 must be read in light of Section 30(4) of the I & B Code, concerning the process of approval of a resolution plan. For that, the "percent of voting share of the financial creditors" approving vis-a-vis dissenting-is required to be reckoned. It is not on the basis of members present and voting as such. At any rate, the approving votes must fulfill the threshold percent of voting share of the financial creditors. Keeping this clear distinction in mind, it must follow that the resolution plan concerning the respective corporate debtors, namely, KS & PIPL and IIL, is deemed to have been rejected as it had failed to muster the approval of requisite threshold votes, of not less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors. It is not possible to countenance any other construction or interpretation, which may run contrary to what has been noted herein before.Thus understood, no fault can be found with the NCLAT for having recorded the fact that the proposed resolution plan in respect of both the corporate debtors was approved by vote of "less than 75%" of voting share of the financial creditors or deemed to have been rejected. In that event, the inevitable corollary is to initiate liquidation process relating to the concerned corporate debtor, as per Section 33 of the I & B Code.Indeed, in terms of Section 31 of the I & B Code, the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is expected to deal with two situations. The first is when it does not receive a resolution plan Under Sub-section (6) of Section 30 or when the resolution plan has been rejected by the resolution professional for non-compliance of Section 30(2) of the I & B Code or also when the resolution plan fails to garner approval of not less than seventy five percent of voting share of the financial creditors, as the case may be; and there is no alternate plan mooted before the expiry of the statutory period. The second is when a resolution plan duly approved by the CoC by not less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors is submitted before it by the resolution professional Under Section 30(6) of the Code, for its approval.In the present case, we are concerned with a situation where in both the resolution processes under consideration, the resolution plan failed to garner support of not less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors. That is the first category referred to above. In such a situation, the adjudicating authority can have no other option but to initiate liquidation process in terms of Section 33 (1) of the I & B Code.As aforesaid, upon receipt of a "rejected" resolution plan the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is not expected to do anything more; but is obligated to initiate liquidation process Under Section 33(1) of the I & B Code. The legislature has not endowed the adjudicating authority (NCLT) with the jurisdiction or authority to analyse or evaluate the commercial decision of the CoC much less to enquire into the justness of the rejection of the resolution plan by the dissenting financial creditors. From the legislative history and the background in which the I & B Code has been enacted, it is noticed that a completely new approach has been adopted for speeding up the recovery of the debt due from the defaulting companies. In the new approach, there is a calm period followed by a swift resolution process to be completed within 270 days (outer limit) failing which, initiation of liquidation process has been made inevitable and mandatory. In the earlier regime, the corporate debtor could indefinitely continue to enjoy the protection given Under Section 22 of Sick Industrial Companies Act, 1985 or under other such enactments which has now been forsaken. Besides, the commercial wisdom of the CoC has been given paramount status without any judicial intervention, for ensuring completion of the stated processes within the timelines prescribed by the I & B Code. There is an intrinsic assumption that financial creditors are fully informed about the viability of the corporate debtor and feasibility of the proposed resolution plan. They act on the basis of thorough examination of the proposed resolution plan and assessment made by their team of experts. The opinion on the subject matter expressed by them after due deliberations in the CoC meetings through voting, as per voting shares, is a collective business decision. The legislature, consciously, has not provided any ground to challenge the "commercial wisdom" of the individual financial creditors or their collective decision before the adjudicating authority. That is made non-justiciable.Whereas, the discretion of the adjudicating authority (NCLT) is circumscribed by Section 31 limited to scrutiny of the resolution plan "as approved" by the requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors. Even in that enquiry, the grounds on which the adjudicating authority can reject the resolution plan is in reference to matters specified in Section 30(2), when the resolution plan does not conform to the stated requirements. Reverting to Section 30(2), the enquiry to be done is in respect of whether the resolution plan provides: (i) the payment of insolvency resolution process costs in a specified manner in priority to the repayment of other debts of the corporate debtor, (ii) the repayment of the debts of operational creditors in prescribed manner, (iii) the management of the affairs of the corporate debtor, (iv) the implementation and supervision of the resolution plan, (v) does not contravene any of the provisions of the law for the time being in force, (vi) conforms to such other requirements as may be specified by the Board. The Board referred to is established Under Section 188 of the I & B Code. The powers and functions of the Board have been delineated in Section 196 of the I & B Code. None of the specified functions of the Board, directly or indirectly, pertain to regulating the manner in which the financial creditors ought to or ought not to exercise their commercial wisdom during the voting on the resolution plan Under Section 30(4) of the I & B Code. The subjective satisfaction of the financial creditors at the time of voting is bound to be a mixed baggage of variety of factors. To wit, the feasibility and viability of the proposed resolution plan and including their perceptions about the general capability of the resolution applicant to translate the projected plan into a reality. The resolution applicant may have given projections backed by normative data but still in the opinion of the dissenting financial creditors, it would not be free from being speculative. These aspects are completely within the domain of the financial creditors who are called upon to vote on the resolution plan Under Section 30(4) of the I & B Code.For the same reason, even the jurisdiction of the NCLAT being in continuation of the proceedings would be circumscribed in that regard and more particularly on account of Section 32 of the I & B Code, which envisages that any appeal from an order approving the resolution plan shall be in the manner and on the grounds specified in Section 61(3) of the I & B Code.On a bare reading of the provisions of the I & B Code, it would appear that the remedy of appeal Under Section 61(1) is against an "order passed by the adjudicating authority (NCLT)" - which we will assume may also pertain to recording of the fact that the proposed resolution plan has been rejected or not approved by a vote of not less than 75% of voting share of the financial creditors. Indubitably, the remedy of appeal including the width of jurisdiction of the appellate authority and the grounds of appeal, is a creature of statute. The provisions investing jurisdiction and authority in the NCLT or NCLAT as noticed earlier, has not made the commercial decision exercised by the CoC of not approving the resolution plan or rejecting the same, justiciable. This position is reinforced from the limited grounds specified for instituting an appeal that too against an order "approving a resolution plan" Under Section 31. First, that the approved resolution plan is in contravention of the provisions of any law for the time being in force. Second, there has been material irregularity in exercise of powers "by the resolution professional" during the corporate insolvency resolution period. Third, the debts owed to operational creditors have not been provided for in the resolution plan in the prescribed manner. Fourth, the insolvency resolution plan costs have not been provided for repayment in priority to all other debts. Fifth, the resolution plan does not comply with any other criteria specified by the Board. Significantly, the matters or grounds-be it Under Section 30(2) or Under Section 61(3) of the I & B Code-are regarding testing the validity of the "approved" resolution plan by the CoC; and not for approving the resolution plan which has been disapproved or deemed to have been rejected by the CoC in exercise of its business decision.Indubitably, the inquiry in such an appeal would be limited to the power exercisable by the resolution professional Under Section 30(2) of the I & B Code or, at best, by the adjudicating authority (NCLT) Under Section 31(2) read with 31(1) of the I & B Code. No other inquiry would be permissible. Further, the jurisdiction bestowed upon the appellate authority (NCLAT) is also expressly circumscribed. It can examine the challenge only in relation to the grounds specified in Section 61(3) of the I & B Code, which is limited to matters "other than" enquiry into the autonomy or commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors. Thus, the prescribed authorities (NCLT/NCLAT) have been endowed with limited jurisdiction as specified in the I & B Code and not to act as a court of equity or exercise plenary powers.In our view, neither the adjudicating authority (NCLT) nor the appellate authority (NCLAT) has been endowed with the jurisdiction to reverse the commercial wisdom of the dissenting financial creditors and that too on the specious ground that it is only an opinion of the minority financial creditors. The fact that substantial or majority percent of financial creditors have accorded approval to the resolution plan would be of no avail, unless the approval is by a vote of not less than 75% (after amendment of 2018 w.e.f. 06.06.2018, 66%) of voting share of the financial creditors. To put it differently, the action of liquidation process postulated in Chapter-III of the I & B Code, is avoidable, only if approval of the resolution plan is by a vote of not less than 75% (as in October, 2017) of voting share of the financial creditors. Conversely, the legislative intent is to uphold the opinion or hypothesis of the minority dissenting financial creditors. That must prevail, if it is not less than the specified percent (25% in October, 2017; and now after the amendment w.e.f. 06.06.2018, 44%). The inevitable outcome of voting by not less than requisite percent of voting share of financial creditors to disapprove the proposed resolution plan, de jure, entails in its deemed rejection.Notably, the threshold of voting share of the dissenting financial creditors for rejecting the resolution plan is way below the simple majority mark, namely not less than 25% (and even after amendment w.e.f. 06.06.2018, 44%). Thus, the scrutiny of the resolution plan is required to pass through the litmus test of not less than requisite (75% or 66% as may be applicable) of voting share-a strict regime. That means the resolution plan must appear, to not less than requisite voting share of the financial creditors, to be an overall credible plan, capable of achieving timelines specified in the Code generally, assuring successful revival of the corporate debtor and disavowing endless speculation.The counsel appearing for the resolution applicant and the stakeholders supporting the resolution plan of the concerned corporate debtor, were at pains to persuade us to take a view that voting by the dissenting financial creditors suffers from the vice of being unreasonable, irrational, unintelligible and an abuse of exercise of power. The power bestowed on the financial creditors to cast their vote Under Section 30(4) is coupled with a duty to exercise that power with utmost care, caution and reason, keeping in mind the legislative intent and the spirit of the I & B Code-fullest attempt should be made to revive the corporate debtors and not to mechanically shove them to the brink of liquidation process, which has the inevitable impact on larger public interests and the stakeholders in particular, including workers associated with the company.The argument, though attractive at the first blush, but if accepted, would require us to re-write the provisions of the I & B Code. It would also result in doing violence to the legislative intent of having consciously not stipulated that as a ground-to challenge the commercial wisdom of the minority (dissenting) financial creditors. Concededly, the process of resolution plan is necessitated in respect of corporate debtors in whom their financial creditors have lost hope of recovery and who have turned into non-performer or a chronic defaulter. The fact that the concerned corporate debtor was still able to carry on its business activities does not obligate the financial creditors to postpone the recovery of the debt due or to prolong their losses indefinitely. Be that as it may, the scope of enquiry and the grounds on which the decision of "approval" of the resolution plan by the CoC can be interfered with by the adjudicating authority (NCLT), has been set out in Section 31(1) read with Section 30(2) and by the appellate tribunal (NCLAT) Under Section 32 read with Section 61(3) of the I & B Code. No corresponding provision has been envisaged by the legislature to empower the resolution professional, the adjudicating authority (NCLT) or for that matter the appellate authority (NCLAT), to reverse the "commercial decision" of the CoC much less of the dissenting financial creditors for not supporting the proposed resolution plan. Whereas, from the legislative history there is contra indication that the commercial or business decisions of the financial creditors are not open to any judicial review by the adjudicating authority or the appellate authority.It was argued that the dissenting financial creditors have not assigned any reason for recording their dissent and therefore, their action is vitiated. As per the provisions applicable at the relevant time in October 2017, there was no requirement of recording reasons for the dissent. That requirement has been introduced by an amendment to the Regulations effected in 2018 w.e.f. 4th July, 2018. Whether that amendment is prospective or has retrospective effect is a matter which will be considered a little later.Suffice it to observe that in the I & B Code and the Regulations framed thereunder as applicable in October 2017, there was no need for the dissenting financial creditors to record reasons for disapproving or rejecting a resolution plan. Further, as aforementioned, there is no provision in the I & B Code which empowers the adjudicating authority (NCLT) to oversee the justness of the approach of the dissenting financial creditors in rejecting the proposed resolution plan or to engage in judicial review thereof. Concededly, the inquiry by the resolution professional precedes the consideration of the resolution plan by the CoC. The resolution professional is not required to express his opinion on matters within the domain of the financial creditor(s), to approve or reject the resolution plan, Under Section 30(4) of the I & B Code. At best, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) may cause an enquiry into the "approved" resolution plan on limited grounds referred to in Section 30(2) read with Section 31(1) of the I & B Code. It cannot make any other inquiry nor is competent to issue any direction in relation to the exercise of commercial wisdom of the financial creditors-be it for approving, rejecting or abstaining, as the case may be. Even the inquiry before the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) is limited to the grounds Under Section 61(3) of the I & B Code. It does not postulate jurisdiction to undertake scrutiny of the justness of the opinion expressed by financial creditors at the time of voting. To take any other view would enable even the minority dissenting financial creditors to question the logic or justness of the commercial opinion expressed by the majority of the financial creditors albeit by requisite percent of voting share to approve the resolution plan; and in the process authorize the adjudicating authority to reject the approved resolution plan upon accepting such a challenge. That is not the scope of jurisdiction vested in the adjudicating authority Under Section 31 of the I & B Code dealing with approval of the resolution plan.To put it differently, since none of the grounds available Under Section 30(2) or Section 61(3) of the I & B Code are attracted in the fact situation of the present case, the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) as well as the Appellate Authority (NCLAT) had no other option but to record that the proposed resolution plan concerning the respective corporate debtor (KS & PIPL and IIL) stood rejected. Further, as no alternative resolution plan was approved by the requisite percent of voting share of the financial creditors before the expiry of the statutory period of 270 days, the inevitable sequel is to pass an order directing initiation of liquidation process against the concerned corporate debtor in the manner specified in Chapter III of the I & B Code.Suffice it to observe that the amended provision merely restates as to what the financial creditors are expected to bear in mind whilst expressing their choice during consideration of the proposal for approval of a resolution plan. No more and no less. Indubitably, the legislature has consciously not provided for a ground to challenge the justness of the "commercial decision" expressed by the financial creditors - be it to approve or reject the resolution plan. The opinion so expressed by voting is non-justiciable. Further, in the present cases, there is nothing to indicate as to which other requirements specified by the Board at the relevant time have not been fulfilled by the dissenting financial creditors. As noted earlier, the Board established Under Section 188 of the I & B Code can perform powers and functions specified in Section 196 of the I & B Code. That does not empower the Board to specify requirements for exercising commercial decisions by the financial creditors in the matters of approval of the resolution plan or liquidation process. Viewed thus, the amendment under consideration does not take the matter any further.We may not be understood to have expressed any opinion either way about the effect of the three provisos introduced by the same amendment to Section 30(4) - as to whether it would have retrospective or retroactive effect. That question does not arise for consideration in these appeals. Our discussion is restricted to the efficacy of the amendment to main provision viz., Section 30(4), whereby the above quoted words ("after considering feasibility and viability, and such other requirements as may be specified by the Board") have been inserted.The learned Counsel for the resolution applicant and other stakeholders supporting the resolution plan of the concerned creditors, next relied upon the amendment to Section 30(4) which has come into force w.e.f. 6th day of June, 2018 vide the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 (No. 8 of 2018). Vide Section 23(iii)(a) of the said amendment Act, the word "seventy-five" in Sub-section (4) of Section 30 has been substituted by the word "sixty-six". Taking clue from this amendment, it was argued that since the amendment substitutes the threshold requirement of 75% to 66% and since the same has been brought into force when appeals were pending, the NCLAT was obliged to consider its effect on the present cases. Further, being substitution, it must be assumed that the amended provision was always there from the beginning of the Code.We are not impressed by this submission. In our opinion, by this amendment, a new norm and qualifying standard for approval of a resolution plan has been introduced. That cannot be treated as a declaratory/clarificatory or stricto sensu procedural matter as such. Whereas, the stated Amendment Act makes it expressly clear that it shall be deemed to have come into force on the 6th day of June, 2018. Thus, by mere use of expression "substituted" in Section 23(iii) (a) of the Amendment Act of 2018, it would not make the provision retrospective in operation or having retroactive effect. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that there is no indication in the Amendment Act of 2018 that the legislature intended to undo and/or govern the decisions already taken by the CoC of the concerned corporate debtors prior to 6-06-2018.Significantly, the report mentions that the empirical record suggests that the apprehension regarding companies are being put into liquidation by minority creditors is premature and further that the objective of the Code is to respect the commercial wisdom of the CoC. As aforesaid, the amendment of 2018 cannot be considered as clarificatory but it envisages a new norm of threshold for considering the decision of the CoC as approval of the resolution plan. The Amendment Act of 2018 having come into force w.e.f. 6th day of June, 2018, therefore, will have prospective application and apply only to the decisions of CoC taken on or after that date concerning the approval of resolution plan.In the present case, however, the amendment under consideration pertaining to Section 30(4), is to modify the voting share threshold for decisions of the CoC and cannot be treated as clarificatory in nature. It changes the qualifying standards for reckoning the decision of the CoC concerning the process of approval of a resolution plan. The rights/obligations crystallized between the parties and, in particular, the dissenting financial creditors in October 2017, in terms of the governing provisions can be divested or undone only by a law made in that behalf by the legislature. There is no indication either in the report of the Committee or in the Amendment Act of 2018 that the legislature intended to undo the decisions of the CoC already taken prior to 6th day of June, 2018. It is not possible to fathom how the provisions of the amendment Act 2018, reducing the threshold percent of voting share can be perceived as declaratory or clarificatory in nature. In such a situation, the NCLAT could not have examined the case on the basis of the amended provision. For the same reason, the NCLT could not have adopted a different approach in these matters. Hence, no fault can be found with the impugned decision of the NCLAT.In our view, no other contention raised to support the resolution plan of the concerned corporate debtors would be of any avail. Even so, we may advert to the argument regarding the effect of amendment of Regulation 39 which has come into force with effect from 4th July, 2018. Prior to that amendment, Regulation 39(3) merely provided that the Committee may approve any resolution plan with such modifications as it deems fit.In the first place, amendment to Regulation cannot have retrospective effect so as to impact the decision of the CoC of the concerned corporate debtor - taken before the amendment of the said Regulation. There is no indication in the Code as amended or the Regulations to suggest that as a consequence of this amendment the decisions already taken by the concerned CoC prior to 3rd July, 2018 be treated as deemed to have been vitiated or for that matter, necessitating reversion of the proposal to CoC for recording reasons, that too beyond the statutory period of 270 days. A new life cannot be infused in the resolution plan which did not fructify within the statutory period, by such circuitous route.Assuming that this provision was applicable to the cases on hand, non-recording of reasons for approving or rejecting the resolution plan by the concerned financial creditor during the voting in the meeting of CoC, would not render the final collective decision of CoC nullity per se. Concededly, if the objection to the resolution plan is on account of infraction of ground(s) specified in Sections 30(2) and 61(3), that must be specifically and expressly raised at the relevant time. For, the approval of the resolution plan by the CoC can be challenged on those grounds. However, if the opposition to the proposed resolution plan is purely a commercial or business decision, the same, being non-justiciable, is not open to challenge before the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) or for that matter the Appellate Authority (NCLAT). If so, non-recording of any reason for taking such commercial decision will be of no avail. In the present case, admittedly, the dissenting financial creditors have rejected the resolution plan in exercise of business/commercial decision and not because of non-compliance of the grounds specified in Section 30(2) or Section 61(3), as such. Resultantly, the amended Regulation pressed into service, will be of no avail.Relying on the dictum in Mardia Chemicals (supra), in particular paragraph 45, it was argued that even in regard to the option exercisable by the financial creditors Under Section 30(4), the requirement of giving reasons for approval or disapproval of the proposed resolution plan must be read into it. In that case, the Court had considered the mechanism specified in Section 13 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, which provided for giving a notice to the borrower and upon receipt of such notice the borrower could raise objections as to why the proposed action of the secured creditor was uncalledthe present case, however, we are concerned with the provisions of I & B Code dealing with the resolution process. The dispensation provided in the I & B Code is entirely different. In terms of Section 30 of the I & B Code, the decision is taken collectively after due negotiations between the financial creditors who are constituents of the CoC and they express their opinion on the proposed resolution plan in the form of votes, as per their voting share. In the meeting of CoC, the proposed resolution plan is placed for discussion and after full interaction in the presence of all concerned and the resolution professional, the constituents of the CoC finally proceed to exercise their option (business/commercial decision) to approve or not to approve the proposed resolution plan. In such a case, non-recording of reasons would not per se vitiate the collective decision of the financial creditors. The legislature has not envisaged challenge to the "commercial/business decision" of the financial creditors taken collectively or for that matter their individual opinion, as the case may be, on this count.It was then contended that NCLAT committed manifest error in not calling upon the dissenting financial creditors to respond to the applications filed in the concerned appeals pending before it, including with a prayer to allow the resolution applicant to revise the resolution plan. We find no merits in this submission. The reliefs claimed in the stated application filed before the NCLAT would not take the matter any further. For, it is enough for the dissenting financial creditors to disapprove the proposed resolution plan by voting as per its voting share, based on commercial decision. Indeed, if the opposition of the dissenting financial creditors is in regard to matter(s) within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ascribable to Sections 30(2) or 61(3), then the situation may be somewhat different. But that is not in issue in these cases.As regards the application by the resolution applicant for taking his revised resolution plan on record, the same is also devoid of merits inasmuch as it is not open to the Adjudicating Authority to entertain a revised resolution plan after the expiry of the statutory period of 270 days. Accordingly, no fault can be found with the NCLAT for not entertaining such application.The counsel appearing for the resolution applicant and the stakeholders supporting the resolution plan were at pains to persuade us to exercise powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Inasmuch as, in both the cases, the vote of approval exceeded more than 66% of the voting share of the financial creditors and yet the benefit of the amended provision could not be availed, as it came only during the pendency of the appeal before the NCLAT. The submission is that this Court may set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and relegate the parties in both the cases, before the NCLT for considering the proceedings afresh in light of the amended provision reducing the threshold requirement of percent of voting share of financial creditors to 66%. We are afraid, it is not possible for us to exercise powers Under Article 142 of the Constitution which will result in issuing directions in the teeth of the provisions as applicable to the cases on hand. We, therefore, decline to accede to this request. Having answered the core issues and to avoid prolixity, we do not wish to dilate on the exposition in other reported decisions relied upon by the counsel.