Case: Indra Pal Gupta Vs. Managing Committee, Model Inter College Thora

governing the termination of the services of a probationer. In Parshotam Lal Dhingras case (supra), this Court observed at page 862 thus:"In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not attracted But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with."5. The above rule applies to probationers too.Admittedly no enquiry was held in this case as provided in Regulations 35 and 36 of the Regulations made under the Act. Apparently in the light of the principles enunciated in Parshotam Lal Dhingras case (supra) the learned Single Judge who decided the Writ Petition at the first instance in the High Court observed in the course of his order thus:"In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner questions the validity of the so-called termination of his service by the resolution passed by the Managing Committee on 27.4.1969. His case is that the termination in the circumstances in which it has been made by the Managing Committee amounts to punishment of removal or dismissal from service and the punishment having been imposed upon him without following the procedure prescribed under sec. 16- G of the Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder becomes vitiated. Indeed it has not been denied or controverted in the counter affidavit that the action against the petitioner was taken by the Managing Committee on serious charges of mismanagement brought against the Principal by the Manager. But it has submitted by the learned counsel for the opposite parties that a reasonable opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by the Managing Committee when he was faced with the charges and asked to explain on 27.4.69, at the meeting of the Managing Committee. But the learned counsel for opposite parties when faced with t he relevant regulations and Sec. 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act found it difficult to justify that what was done at the meeting of the Managing Committee on 27.4.1969 complies with those provisions. The attack made b y the petitioner based on non-compliance of the relevant regulations and the provisions of Sec. 16-G of the Act on the validity of the action taken, appear to be sound and sustainable. No matter the petitioner was not a permanent Principal yet he was entitled to a regular show cause notice against the charges brought and an opportunity to be heard as required by the regulations. The impugned order of termination thus was a mere camouflage an d cannot be regarded in the. circumstances as having been passed by the Managing Committee in the normal course. The District Inspector of Schools was in error in approving the termination in those circumstances."But the Division Bench of the High Court took a contrary view. The first error in the judgment of the Division Bench lies in its observation:Firstly the order of termination is innocuous. It does not refer to any allegations or even t o the report of the Manager.It is seen from the letter dated June 30, 1969 by which the services of the appellant were terminated that the resolution of the Managing Committee dated April 27, 1969 is made a part of it by treating it a s an enclosure to that letter. The resolution actually begins with a reference to the report of the Manager, and slates that the facts contained in the report were serious and not in the interests of the institution. It further refers t o the fact that the appellant was asked to give his explanation to the allegations made in the said report. That report stated:"It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no educational institution should take that botheration."6. The above report was the real foundation on which the decision of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. Secondly, the Division Bench has tried to justify the action of the Management by observing that since the management had to secure the approval of the District Inspector to its action, it was necessary for it to give its assessment of the work of the appellant as Principal and, therefore. in the. context of the statutory requirements, it cannot be said that merely because the Managers report or the resolution of the Managing Committee refers to the various aspects of the assessment of the performance of the Principal in terms unfavourable to him, it would in law, amount to casting a stigma upon the Principal. It is difficult to engraft an exception of the above type to the well-settled rule that if the order of termination carries a stigma, it has to fall to the ground unless it is proceeded by an enquiry as contemplated by law. A reading of the letter of termination o f the service and the resolution which forms part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark of disgrace or infamy and that the appellant is visited with evil consequences as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingras case (supra). The Division Bench, therefore, erred in holding that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of termination was an innocuous one and did not carry any stigma. The order of the Division Bench is, our opinion, an unsustainable one and is liable to the set aside.I

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]The above report was the real foundation on which the decision of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an order imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of misconduct. Secondly, the Division Bench has tried to justify the action of the Management by observing that since the management had to secure the approval of the District Inspector to its action, it was necessary for it to give its assessment of the work of the appellant as Principal and, therefore. in the. context of the statutory requirements, it cannot be said that merely because the Managers report or the resolution of the Managing Committee refers to the various aspects of the assessment of the performance of the Principal in terms unfavourable to him, it would in law, amount to casting a stigma upon the Principal. It is difficult to engraft an exception of the above type to the well-settled rule that if the order of termination carries a stigma, it has to fall to the ground unless it is proceeded by an enquiry as contemplated by law. A reading of the letter of termination o f the service and the resolution which forms part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark of disgrace or infamy and that the appellant is visited with evil consequences as explained in Parshotam Lal Dhingras case (supra). The Division Bench, therefore, erred in holding that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of termination was an innocuous one and did not carry any stigma. The order of the Division Bench is, our opinion, an unsustainable one and is liable to the set aside.In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge.