Case: Ram Krissen Singh Vs. Divisional Forest Officerbankura Division &amp; Others

of the words "together with" and the second the words "and held by an intermediary or any other person". Taking up, first, the word "together with" the submission was that it was only where the right to the trees constituted an integral part of the right to the land that a vesting was effected of the latter right and that where there had been a severance of the two rights it was only the land that remained in the intermediary that became vested and not the right to the trees. We feel unable to accept this argument. We consider that the expression "together" is obviously used to denote not the necessity for integrality between the land and the right to cut trees by way of common ownership but as merely an enumeration of the items of property which vest in the State. In the context, the word means no more than the expression "as well as" and imports no condition that the right to the trees should also belong to the owner of the land. It may be added that the words "or to the produce thereof" occurring next also emphasise what we have just now pointed out, for if these words are read disjunctively, as they must in view of the conjunction "or", the words would indicate that not merely lands in the estate and the right to the trees but independently of them the right to the produce of the trees on the land would also vest in the State.6. Coming next to the words "and held by an intermediary" learned Counsel could not justifiably submit an argument that both the land and the right to the trees should inhere in the intermediary to attract the operation of the clause, because the words "held by an intermediary" are followed by "any other person". Obviously, that other person i. e., person other than the intermediary, could have the right either to the land, a right to the trees or a right to the produce. By the use of the expression "or any other person" therefore the legislature could obviously have intended only a person like the appellant who might not have any right to the lands which are held by the intermediary but has a right to the trees in that land. Besides, it is not possible to read the words "held by an intermediary or any other person" to mean that they are applicable only to cases where the entirety of the interest-to the land, to the trees and to the produce--are vested in a single person--be he the intermediary or another person. These words would obviously apply equally to cases where the land belongs to an intermediary and the right to the trees or to the produce of the trees to another person.7. This apart, there is one further aspect of the matter to which also reference might be made. The amendment effected by the addition of cl. (aa) to S. 5 was admittedly necessitated by certain decisions of the High Court of Calcutta which held that where an intermediary had granted a right to cut trees or to forest produce, the rights so conferred were unaffected by the vesting provision in S. 5 of the Act as it stood before the amendment. If the argument now put forward by Mr. Chatterjee is accepted it would mean that the amendment has achieved no purpose. Undoubtedly, if the words of the amendment, on their plain reading, are insufficient to comprehend the case now on hand the fact that the legislature intended to overcome a decision of the High Court could not be any determining consideration but, if as we find, the words normally bear that construction, the circumstance that the amendment was effected with a view to overcome certain decisions rendered under the original enactment is not an irrelevant factor to be taken into account.8. Mr. Chatterjee next submitted that the scheme of the Act was the provision of compensation for every interest acquired by the State by virtue of the vesting under S. 5 and that as there was no provision in the Act for compensating the interest of persons like the appellant, the Court should hold that such an interest was not within the vesting section-S. 5(aa). This is, of course, a legitimate argument, and if there had been any ambiguity in the construction of S. 5(aa), the circumstance referred to by learned Counsel would certainly have great weight. But in view of the plain words of S 5(aa) which we have discussed earlier, we do not find it possible to accept the argument. The absence of a provision for compensation might render the vesting section unconstitutional, - and that indeed was the argument, addressed to the High Court and a matter which we shall immediately consider, but it cannot detract from the clear operation of the words used in S. 5(aa).9. A further point that was urged before the High Court was that the enactment was unconstitutional in that no provision was made for the award of compensation to persons in the position of the appellant whose rights to cut trees became vested in the state. Mr. Chatterjee pointed out that the learned Judges of the High Court had upheld the validity of the enactment by holding that compensation had, it fact, been provided. Learned Counsel drew our attention to the provisions quoted and submitted that the learned Judges erred in their construction of these provisions and that, in fact no compensation was provided, but this question about the constitutional validity of the amending Act does not really fall for consideration because learned Counsel for the appellant did not contest the position that after the enactment of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, and the inclusion of West Bengal Act I of 1954 among, those specified in Schedule IX, the absence of a provision for compensation for the acquisition of the appellants rights would not render the West Bengal Act or the acquisition thereunder unconstitutional.10.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]We feel unable to accept this argument. We consider that the expression "together" is obviously used to denote not the necessity for integrality between the land and the right to cut trees by way of common ownership but as merely an enumeration of the items of property which vest in the State. In the context, the word means no more than the expression "as well as" and imports no condition that the right to the trees should also belong to the owner of the land. It may be added that the words "or to the produce thereof" occurring next also emphasise what we have just now pointed out, for if these words are read disjunctively, as they must in view of the conjunction "or", the words would indicate that not merely lands in the estate and the right to the trees but independently of them the right to the produce of the trees on the land would also vest in the State.Coming next to the words "and held by an intermediary" learned Counsel could not justifiably submit an argument that both the land and the right to the trees should inhere in the intermediary to attract the operation of the clause, because the words "held by an intermediary" are followed by "any other person". Obviously, that other person i. e., person other than the intermediary, could have the right either to the land, a right to the trees or a right to the produce. By the use of the expression "or any other person" therefore the legislature could obviously have intended only a person like the appellant who might not have any right to the lands which are held by the intermediary but has a right to the trees in that land. Besides, it is not possible to read the words "held by an intermediary or any other person" to mean that they are applicable only to cases where the entirety of the interest-to the land, to the trees and to the produce--are vested in a single person--be he the intermediary or another person. These words would obviously apply equally to cases where the land belongs to an intermediary and the right to the trees or to the produce of the trees to another person.This apart, there is one further aspect of the matter to which also reference might be made. The amendment effected by the addition of cl. (aa) to S. 5 was admittedly necessitated by certain decisions of the High Court of Calcutta which held that where an intermediary had granted a right to cut trees or to forest produce, the rights so conferred were unaffected by the vesting provision in S. 5 of the Act as it stood before the amendment. If the argument now put forward by Mr. Chatterjee is accepted it would mean that the amendment has achieved no purpose. Undoubtedly, if the words of the amendment, on their plain reading, are insufficient to comprehend the case now on hand the fact that the legislature intended to overcome a decision of the High Court could not be any determining consideration but, if as we find, the words normally bear that construction, the circumstance that the amendment was effected with a view to overcome certain decisions rendered under the original enactment is not an irrelevant factor to be taken intois, of course, a legitimate argument, and if there had been any ambiguity in the construction of S. 5(aa), the circumstance referred to by learned Counsel would certainly have great weight. But in view of the plain words of S 5(aa) which we have discussed earlier, we do not find it possible to accept the argument. The absence of a provision for compensation might render the vesting section unconstitutional, - and that indeed was the argument, addressed to the High Court and a matter which we shall immediately consider, but it cannot detract from the clear operation of the words used in S.this question about the constitutional validity of the amending Act does not really fall for consideration because learned Counsel for the appellant did not contest the position that after the enactment of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution, and the inclusion of West Bengal Act I of 1954 among, those specified in Schedule IX, the absence of a provision for compensation for the acquisition of the appellants rights would not render the West Bengal Act or the acquisition thereunder unconstitutional.