Case: Trimbak Gangadhar Telang and Another Vs. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide and Others

rent during the years in question at the rate of Rs. 20 per bigha was Rs. 320 per year which was payable by the three tenants (respondents); that as the reasonable rent could not be in excess of the agreed rent and the respondent had not claimed that the agreed rent was in excess of the reasonable rent, the agreed rent was the reasonable rent. Proceeding on the basis that the agreed and reasonable rent was Rs, 320 per year, the Mamlatdar found that far from committing default in the payment of rent, the respondents had made over payment to the extent of Rs. 100. The Mamlatdar further held that respondents 1 to 3 were independent and not joint tenants of the aforesaid three parcels of land. On these findings he dismissed Vasudeo Balwant Telangs application for possession of the three parcels of land in dispute as also his application for declaration that respondents 1 to 3 were joint tenants of the said plots of land and declared that the responsible rent of the entire land was Rs. 320 per year. Aggrieved by the decision of the Mamlatdar, Miraj Taluka, Vasudeo Balwant Telang filed three separate appeals before the special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeal, Sangli who allowed the same holding that respondents 2 and 3 continued to be the sub-tenants of respondent 1 even after they were declared to be protected tenants and that the notice of termination of the tenancy served by Vasudeo Balwant Telang on respondent 1 was valid. The Special Deputy Collector further held that it had not been proved that the agreed rent was Rs. 320 per year. The Special Deputy Collector further held that the tenancy created vide Kabuliyat dated July 14, 1948 executed by respondent 1 was to last for a period of ten years in accordance with Section 5 of the 1948 Act as it originally stood but the term regarding the payment of Rs. 700 as rent could not, as a result of that section, extend beyond the period specified in the rent note. The special Deputy Collector concluded by observing that there was no agreed rent in respect of the years in question. On these findings, the Special Deputy Collector remanded the aforesaid application for possession as well as the reference for determination of reasonable rent to the Mamlatdar, Miraj Taluka, directing the latter to determine afresh the question of reasonable rent under Section 12 of the 1948 Act and also to decide whether respondent 1 had committed default in payment of rent and was liable to be dispossessed of all the plots of land in dispute. The matter was then taken in revision by both the parties to the Bombay Revenue Tribunal which set aside the order of the Special Deputy Collector and restored that of the Mamlatdar in all the three proceedings holding that respondent 1 to 3 were separate tenants of Vasudeo Balwant Telang in respect of the areas of the land in their separate possession and the notice terminating the tenancy was invalid. The Revenue Tribunal also held that the reasonable rent of the land was rightly fixed by the Mamlatdar at Rs. 320 per year. Aggrieved by this decision of the Revenue Tribunal, the appellants filed the aforesaid Special Civil Applications in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which, as already sated, dismissed the same by its judgment and order dated September 15, 1967/September 19, 1967. It is against this judgment and order that the present appeals have been preferred. 3. As would be apparent from the above narrative, the instant case does not involve any substantial question of law of general or public importance. Although counsel for the appellants has strenuously assailed the correctness of the findings of the Revenue Tribunal and of the High Court, we are unable to accede to his contention. We have not, despite careful consideration of the judgments and objections submitted to us, been able to discern any legal infirmity or error either in the decision of the Revenue Tribunal or of the High Court. It is a well settled rule of practice of this Court not to interfere with exercise of discretionary power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution merely because two views are possible on the facts of a case. It is also well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept in or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution. In the instant case, we have not been able to find any such flaw. The finding of the Revenue Tribunal that the respondents were independent tenants of separate parts of the land in dispute under Vasudeo Balwant Telang, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, which has been affirmed by the High Court, appears to be well founded in view of the following proved facts and circumstances : 1. The entry made in the record of rights after due enquiry according to law about the status of the respondents 2 and 3 as protected tenants in respect of the portions of the land in dispute in their possession. 2. Separate payment of the rent by the respondents and acceptance thereof by Vasudeo Balwant Telang. 3. Application by Vasudeo Balwant Telang for declaration that respondents were jointly and severally responsible for payment of rent of the land in dispute. 4. Notices by Vasudeo Balwant Telang to the respondents terminating their tenancies on the ground that he required the portions of the land in their respective possession for personal cultivation. 5. Application filed by Vasudeo Balwant Telang against the respondents under Section 31 of the 1948 Act averring that he bonafide required the land for his personal cultivation. 4. In view of the foregoing, there is hardly any justification to interfere with the impugned judgment and order.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]3. As would be apparent from the above narrative, the instant case does not involve any substantial question of law of general or public importance. Although counsel for the appellants has strenuously assailed the correctness of the findings of the Revenue Tribunal and of the High Court, we are unable to accede to his contention. We have not, despite careful consideration of the judgments and objections submitted to us, been able to discern any legal infirmity or error either in the decision of the Revenue Tribunal or of the High Court. It is a well settled rule of practice of this Court not to interfere with exercise of discretionary power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution merely because two views are possible on the facts of a case. It is also well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept in or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution. In the instant case, we have not been able to find any such flaw. The finding of the Revenue Tribunal that the respondents were independent tenants of separate parts of the land in dispute under Vasudeo Balwant Telang, thet of the appellants, which has been affirmed by the High Court, appears to be well foundedin view of the following proved facts and circumstances :1. The entry made in the record of rights after due enquiry according to law about the status of the respondents 2 and 3 as protected tenants in respect of the portions of the land in dispute in their possession2. Separate payment of the rent by the respondents and acceptance thereof by Vasudeo Balwant Telang3. Application by Vasudeo Balwant Telang for declaration that respondents were jointly and severally responsible for payment of rent of the land in dispute4. Notices by Vasudeo Balwant Telang to the respondents terminating their tenancies on the ground that he required the portions of the land in their respective possession for personal cultivation5. Application filed by Vasudeo Balwant Telang against the respondents under Section 31 of the 1948 Act averring that he bonafide required the land for his personal cultivation4. In view of the foregoing, there is hardly any justification to interfere with the impugned judgment and order.