Case: Bhatnagars And Co. Ltd Vs. The Union Of India(And Connected Petitions)

an appeal to the Central Board of Revenue. The said appeal was, however, dismissed. The petitioner then moved the Central Government against this order but on 22-9-1955, the Central Government refused to interfere. It appears that on 31-3-1956, the Collector of Customs ordered that the goods should be auctioned. When this order was passed, the petitioner filed one of the petitions before us. He obtained an interim order of stay but the said order was ultimately vacated. Broadly stated, these are the facts which give rise to the present petitions. 3. Though five petitions have been presented by the petitioner, his grievance substantially is against the confiscation of the consignments of soda ash and against the seizure of his licences by the investigating authorities. Each petition seeks to put the grievance, of the petitioner in a different form and, though the prayers ultimately made are also not of the same pattern, in the main, the petitioner wants this Court to give him relief against what he regards as illegal so seizure of the goods and against the virtual invalidation of his licences for import. The period during which the licences granted to him could have been operated upon has expired and the petitioner, in one of his petitions, seeks an order from this Court directing the Government to revalidate the licences so as to allow the petitioner to import the article in question during the unexpired period of his licences.4. Though it would have been possible to deal with these petitions collectively by delivering a common judgment, we would prefer to deal with the matter separately and consider the points raised in each petition by itself. 5. Petition No. 423 of 1956 in a sense stands apart from the other petitions in the present group. The facts which we have already mentioned are enumerated by the petitioner even in this petition but the substantial relief which he seeks to claim and which the petitioner pressed before us in his argument is in respect of his allegation that the Union of India and other respondents to the petition have acted in contempt of this Court and appropriate action should, therefore, be taken by us against the said respondents. This contention arises in this way.The petitioner had made a similar petition to this Court, No. 571 of 1954, in respect of one of the three consignments in question. This petition had come before this Court for hearing on 24-3-1955. Shri K.R. Chaudhury appeared for the petitioner before this Court. The order passed by this Court would show that the learned Solicitor-General of India made a statement to the Court indicating that the goods which had been confiscated by the Customs Authorities would not he sold or otherwise dealt with for a month from the date of the communication to the petitioner of the final order that the Central Government may pass in the revisional petition preferred by him before them. Acting on this undertaking, this Court allowed the petitioner a period of one month from the date of the communication to him of the final order which the Central Government might pass on his revisional petition to enable him to file a petition for Special Leave to appeal if he was so advised. Then the order recorded the undertaking given by the Solicitor-General. Subject to this order the petition was dismissed.However, no order was passed as to costs. It is common ground that for several months thereafter the revisional petition preferred by the petitioner to the Central Government was not desposed of. Ultimately it was dismissed. The petitioner seems to be under the impression that the Solicitor-General, on behalf of the Central Government, had given an undertaking that the petitioners revisional petition would be disposed of within a certain specified time. Indeed the petition seeks to suggest that the undertaking was that the revisional petition would be disposed immediately in a day or two, and, since the revisional petition was not disposed of within the time mentioned by the Solicitor-General, the petitioner says that all the respondents are guilty of contempt. It is clear that the petitioners grievance and the prayer for a writ are entirely misconceived. The petitioner is entirely in error in assuming that, on behalf of the Union of India, any undertaking was given that his revisional petition would be disposed of within a day or two. Indeed, the Solicitor-General fairly told us that, at the time when the petitioners earlier application was disposed of, he had expressed the hope that the petitioners revisional petition would he dealt with by the Central Government at an early date; but the expression of this hope had nothing to do with the undertaking which the Solicitor- General gave and which was included in the Courts order.The petitioner presumably thinks that the Courts order required that his revisional petition should be disposed of by the Central Government within a month. This assumption is entirely unwarranted. The period of one month which is mentioned in the order was the period granted to the petitioner to move this Court for Special Leave after the decision of his revisional petition by the Central Government was communicated to him. In other words, if the decisions of the Central Government had gone against the petitioner, the petitioner was given one months period within which to move this Court for Special Leave and the Union of India agreed not to deal with the property of the petitioner or dispose of it during that period. In our opinion, the order is plain and unambiguous and there is no scope for any misunderstanding whatever. If no undertaking was given as assumed by the petitioner, it is impossible to understand how any contempt can arise on the ground that the undertaking had not been complied with.Besides, the petitioner has not stopped to consider which person the Union of India represents as respondent 1 in his petition. He has also not paused to consider how the other respondents could be guilty of contempt.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]The petitioner is entirely in error in assuming that, on behalf of the Union of India, any undertaking was given that his revisional petition would be disposed of within a day or two.Indeed, the Solicitor-General fairly told us that, at the time when the petitioners earlier application was disposed of, he had expressed the hope that the petitioners revisional petition would he dealt with by the Central Government at an early date; but the expression of this hope had nothing to do with the undertaking which the Solicitor- General gave and which was included in the Courtse petitioner presumably thinks that the Courts order required that his revisional petition should be disposed of by the Central Government within a. This assumption is entirely unwarranted. The period of one month which is mentioned in the order was the period granted to the petitioner to move this Court for Special Leave after the decision of his revisional petition by the Central Government was communicated to him. In other words, if the decisions of the Central Government had gone against the petitioner, the petitioner was given one months period within which to move this Court for Special Leave and the Union of India agreed not to deal with the property of the petitioner or dispose of it during that period. In our opinion, the order is plain and unambiguous and there is no scope for any misunderstanding whatever. If no undertaking was given as assumed by the petitioner, it is impossible to understand how any contempt can arise on the ground that the undertaking had not been complied with.Besides, the petitioner has not stopped to consider which person the Union of India represents as respondent 1 in his petition. He has also not paused to consider how the other respondents could be guilty of contemptIn our opinion, this petition is also entirely misconceived and there is no substance in the contention raised by the petitioner.It is hardly necessary to emphasize that, in modern times, the export and import policy of any democratic State is bound to be flexible. The needs of the country, the position of foreign exchange, the need to protect national industries and all other relevant considerations have to be examined by the Central Government from time to time and rules in regard to export and import suitably adjusted. It would, therefore, be idle to suggest that there should be unfettered and unrestricted freedom of expert and import or that the policy of the Government in regard to export and import should be fixed and not changed according to the requirements of the country. It is in the light of this position that the policy statement in the Press Note has to be consideredThe Public Notice which was issued about the same time gives the relevant particulars in regard to the import of soda ash and other commodities. Tenders wore invited and cl. 4 of the Public Notice shows that the offerer whose offer was accepted by the Chief Controller of Imports would be required to enter into a contract of sale within ten days of the acceptance of the offer with the importer-distributor selected by the Government in that behalf. No doubt discretion was left to the Chief Controller of Imports to reject any offer without assigning any reason. Subject to the terms and conditions set out in the Notice, if a contract was concluded, an import licence for the quantity contracted to be purchased would be issued in favour of the buyer subject to such conditions as might be imposed by the Government of India in that behalf7. It appears that, prior to 1953, import licences were freely granted. In 1953, licences began to be granted to established importers subject to certain conditions. It also appears that Government decided from time to time the total quantity of the specified commodity which should be imported. Then the extent of the business of the applicant for licences during the prescribed period was taken into account and the total amount of import was then distributed pro rata amongst the several applicants. When it was found that even this method did not work satisfactorily, the Government decided to canalise distribution but while canalisation was introduced in this manner, tenders were invited for import licences and they were considered on merits and licences granted to several claimants. It way be that, if the I.C.I. and the Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd., were amongst the applicants for licences, their competitors in the line may have found it difficult to fight with these two powerful rivals but that is very different from saying that, by the method of canalisation, the Government had introduced a monopoly in the import of the commodity in question.It is also important to emphasize that the petitioner is not oven an established importer. He was granted a licence during the free period, and so it is difficult to understand his grievance that a monopoly had been created and that he was thereby deprived of his fundamental right to carry on his trade. Government found that the importers of soda ash resorted to malpractices leading to speculation, and violent fluctuations, in prices of the commodity. It was open to the Government, and indeed national interests made it their duty, to intervene and regulate the distribution of the commodity in a suitable manner.That is all that Government purported to do by the policy statement to which objection has been taken by the petitioner. Besides, it is difficult to entertain the argument from the present petitioner that the alleged monopoly has affected his right to carry on trade.In substance no monopoly has been created and the petitioners application is entirely misconceivedWe have already mentioned the material facts in regard to the confiscation of the consignments of soda ash of 100 tons and 20 tons respectively which has given rise to all these proceedings. Now, the order dated 3-5-1954, has been passed by the Controller of Imports and Exports for Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and it communicates to the petitioner the decision of the Chief Controller that no licence or customs clearance permit would be granted to him against his application for and upto the licensing period July 1953. The petitioner was, however, told that his applications for January- June 1954 licensing period would be dealt with in the normal course according to the policy contained in the Red Book. Then the order adds that it had been decided that re-validation of the licences mentioned in Annexure A to the petitioners advocates letter on 20-4-1954 could not be allowed. That is why the said licences were returned to the petitioner. It is this latter part of the order by which the petitioner feels aggrieved and against which the petitioner seeks remedy by the present petition. The petitioners case is that, since he was granted licences which were to be alive for one year from 13-2-1952, the illegal seizure of the licence and the unauthorised confiscation of the consignments in question caused considerable prejudice to him. The return of the licences is poor consolation to the petitioner because the period during which the licences were to operate had already expired. He, therefore, claims that the licences should be revalidated in the sense that the period during which he can operate upon those licences should be suitably extended. At is true that if the relevant authorities were inclined to revalidate the licences in that sense, it would have been open to them to do so. But it is difficult to understand how the petitioner can invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for obtaining this relief. We do not propose to discuss this matter elaborately because, in our opinion, the position in law is abundantly clear.The authorities have found that, though the licences were obtained by the petitioner in his name, he has been trafficking in these licences, that the consignments had been ordered by another individual Messrs. N. Jivanlal and Co. that the said individual holds no licence for import of soda ash and as such the consignments received by the said individual are liable to be confiscated. It the petitioners grievance is that the view taken by the appropriate authorities in this matter is erroneous, that is not a matter which can be legitimately before us in a petition under Art. 32. It may perhaps be, as the learned Solicitor -General suggested, that the petitioner may have a remedy by suit for damages but that is a matter with which we are not concernedIf the goods have been seized in accordance with law and they have been seized as a result of the findings recorded by the relevant authorities competent to hold enquiry under the Sea Customs Act, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that we should ask the authorities to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner and allow his licences a further lease of life. Essentially the petitioners grievance is against the conclusions of fact reached by the relevant authorities.If the said conclusions cannot be challenged before us in the present writ petition, the petitioner would obviously not be entitled to any relief of the kind claimed by him9. That leaves two more petitions filed by the petitioner, Petitions Nos. 42 of 1955 and 46 of 195610. The first argument is based upon the fact that while enacting. The Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, Act No. XVIII of 1947, the provisions contained in R. 84(2) of the Defence of India Rules have not been included in the Act and the contention, which at best may be characterised as ingenious, is that the object of omitting the said provisions while enacting the subsequent Act of 1947 was to release, from the operation of the Import Act, articles which would have fallen under the said omitted provisionsIn our opinion, such a construction is wholly unreasonable. We have no doubt that this provision has to be read disjunctively and distributively, and so read, the import of goods of any specified description would attract the application of the said provision. If we bear in mind the definition of the words "import" and "export," it would be obvious that articles that are carried coastwise would never fall within the category of either import or export. The assumption that the Legislature wanted to release all kinds of goods from the application of S.3 (1) (a) is, in our opinion, so completely inconsistent with the plain and natural meaning of the material clause that we have no hesitation in rejecting Shri Umrigars argument. If one words used in the clause are given their natural meaning, it is clear that the Legislature must have felt, in enacting this Act, that it was unnecessary to continue by re-enactment the provisions of R. 84(2) in the present Act. What was specifically provided in the said rule is in effect included in S.3 (1) (a).We must, therefore hold that the argument that no licence was required for the import of soda ash and its all the orders passed by the appropriate authorities in regard to the confiscation of the consignments are invalid must failThe recent history of judicial decisions, however, shows that, though there is considerable divergence of opinion in the approach to the question of dealing with such a challenge, some principles may be said to be fairly well settled.There is no doubt that legislation which is conditional, properly so called, must be distinguished from legislation which is delegatedThis decision shows that if we can find a reasonably clear statement of policy underlying the provisions of the Act either in the provisions of the Act or in the preamble, then any part of the Act cannot be attacked on the ground of delegated legislation by suggesting that question of policy have been left to the delegate. Turning to the impugned sections of the present Act, it is necessary to remember that the present Act purports to continue for a limited period powers to prohibit or control imports and exports which had already been enacted by the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder. In other words, this Act does not purport to enact the material provisions for the first time but it purports to continue the previously existing provisions in that behalf and so it would be legitimate to consider the preamble of the predecessor Act and relevant provisions in it to find out whether the Legislature has laid down clearly the policy underlying that Act and has enunicated principles for the guidance of those to whom authority to implement the Act has been delegated. The preamble to the present Act says that it was expedient to continue for a limited period powers to prohibit, restrict or otherwise control imports and exports. The preamble to the Defence of India Act refers to the emergency which had arisen when the Act was passed and refers, inter alia, to the necessity to take special measures to ensure the public safety and public interest. Section 2 of the said Act further provides that the Central Government thought that it was essential to secure public safety and maintenance of public order and, what is more relevant and material, the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community. Thus it is clear that the broad and main principle underlying the present Act, like its predecessor, was to maintain supplies essential to the life of the community. Thus, if the preamble and the relevant section of the earlier Act are read in the light of the preamble of the present Act, it would be difficult to distinguish this Act from the essential Supplies Act with which this Court was concerned in Harishankar Baglas case (A) Supra. Incidentally we may also observe that in Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, Petns. Nos. 97 and 97A etc, of 1956 ((S) A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 397) (B), where the vires of S.5 (7-A) of the Income- tax Act were put in issue before this Court, the challenge was repelled and during the course of the judgment delivered on December 21, 1956, the previous history of the earlier Income-tax Acts was taken into account to decide what policy could be said to underlie the provisions of the impugned section15. The last argument of Shri Umrigar is patently untenable. No doubt Shri Umrigar began this argument by contending that the finding made against the petitioner that he was trafficking in his licences and that the consingement in question did not really belong to him was based on no evidence but ultimately he could not help conceding the fact that there were certain circumstances on which the appropriate authorities relied against the petitioner.The contention that a finding made by a competent authority is based on no legal evidence is easy to make but very difficult to establish. Such a contention can succeed only when it is shown that there is really no legal evidence in support of the view taken by the appropriate authorities.In the present case, it is impossible to accede to the assumption that there is no legal evidence against the petitioner. His poor financial resources, is conduct at all material times when consignments were ordered, the suspicions attaching to the very existence of the firm Messrs N. Jivanlal and Co. in Bombay and the prominent part played by this firm at all stages of the transaction in regard to the consignments as well as the reckless allegations which were made by the authorities which were found to be untrue by the appropriate authorities, cannot be summarily dismissed as being irrelevant or as not constituting legal evidence. At the highest it may be said that there are some circumstances on which Shri. Umrigar wants to rely in favour of the bona fides of client whereas there is a large number of circumstances against him.If all the appropriate authorities, on considering these circumstances, concurrently found against the petitioner, that obviously is not a matter which can be legitimately agitated in the present petition. That is why we do not propose to deal with this aspect of the matter any further.