Case: D. N. Sanghavi &amp; Sons Vs. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das

13 (3) (vi) (c) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1947. The Nagpur High Court confined itself to that single phrase and did not refer to the object and setting of the Order. In our case the conditions of Section 12 (1) (f), as construed by us, are apparently different from those of clause 13 (3) (vi) (c) of the order. So it is not helpful in this case.14. In Tansukhdas Chhaganlal v. Smt. Shambai, AIR 1954 Nag 160 the Nagpur High Court has held that where a tenant carrying on business in the demised shop converts the business into a partnership business and allows the latter business to be carried on in the demised premises, it would amount to sub-letting because the partnership "was clearly a personality in law distinct from that of the petitioner himself". There also, the High Court was concerned with clause 18 of the aforesaid Order. This statement of law does not appear to be universally true. However, as pointed out earlier, in respect of Rajniklal AIR 1952 Nag 312 (supra) it is sufficient for us to say that this case also is not helpful in this appeal.15. Commr. of Income-tax, West Bengal v. A. W. Figgies and Co., 1954 SCR 171 = (AIR 1953 SC 455 ) and Dulichand Lakshminarayan v. Commr. of Income-tax, Nagpur, 1956 SCR 154 = (AIR 1956 SC 354 ) are concerned with the legal character of a firm in the Income-tax Act. It is held that a firm is a distinct entity different from its partners for purposes of assessment. These decisions are based on particular provisions of that Act which are radically different from the provisions of the Act. So these cases are also not helpful in deciding the present appeal.16. Karsandas Ramji v. Karsanji Kalyanji, AIR 1953 Sau 113 and Gundalapalli Rangamannar Chetty v. Desu Rangiah, AIR 1954 Mad 182 discuss the very question which fell for consideration in Tansukhdas Chhaganlal AIR 1954 Nag 160 (supra). It was held on the facts of these cases that the tenant could not be held to have sub-let the rented premises to the partnership firm because they retained possession over the premises. These cases thus apply the test of occupation by the tenant in finding out whether he has or has not sub-let. These are all the relevant Indian cases cited before us. Sri Patel has also relied on three English cases: Clift v. Taylor, (1948) 2 All ER 113; Tunstall v. Steigmann, (1962) 2 All ER 417 and Gian Singh and Co. v. Devraj Nahar, (1965) 1 All ER 768. Clift takes the same view as Rajniklal AIR 1952 Nag 312 (supra). The decision turned on the meaning of the expression "required the premises for his own occupation" in Section 5 (3) (b) (i) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927. There the landlord carried on a business in a part of the building in dispute; in another part of it the tenant carried on her business. On the eve of the expiry of her lease, she applied for a new lease. Her application was opposed by the landlord on the ground, inter alia, that he required the premises for his own occupation. The facts found were that he had converted his own business into a partnership business. There were six partners including himself. The partnership business had extended considerably so that there was scarcity of accommodation. It appeared that the landlord needed the demised premises for the purpose of his partnership business. So the issue was whether he needed the premises "for his own occupation". The finding was:"(T) he firm and he himself, as its senior partner, had great need for less cramped head office premises, and, in particular, for the free and full use of the ground floor on street level as essential to convenience of office work, for clients, and for display of notices etc., and indeed, it was necessary for the prosperity of the greatly enlarged and still growing business with its ramifications into many allied or compatible departments or activities."It is evident from this finding that the landlord was a managing partner and that he himself along with the firm was to occupy the demised premises after getting possession. This decision, far from helping Sri Patel, helps the appellants in view of the construction placed by us on clause (f) of Section 12 (1). Tunstall (supra) deals with an entirely different set of facts. There the landlord was carrying on business. She gave notice to the tenant that she wanted the rented shop for her own business. The notice was given under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954. In the meantime she transferred her business to an incorporated company. The relevant words of Section 31 (g) of that Act are: "to occupy the holding for the purpose ..... of the business to be carried on by the landlord." It was held that the business of an incorporated company was not the business of the landlord, the company being a distinct legal person different from the landlord. Gian Singh (1965) 1 All ER 768 (supra) was concerned with the construction of a particular clause in a covenant forbidding the tenant from assigning his tenancy to a third person. It was claimed by the landlord that the tenant has assigned the premises to a partnership firm of which he was a partner. On the facts of the case, it was held that there was no assignment. We fail to appreciate how these cases help Sri Patel.17. In some of the cases cited by Sri Patel, own has been interpreted virtually as otiose. Nevertheless what it means in the Act would depend on its own context, for a word may take a colour from its context.18. In view of our decision against the respondent on the basis of the construction of Section 12 (1) (f), it is not necessary for us to decide several other points raised by Sri Phadke.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]2. It is evident from this passage that the High Court, like the appeal court, has overlooked the words of Section 12 (1) (f) in arriving at its conclusion. The High Court considered that it is an elementary proposition of law that a partnership business is the business of cach and every partner so that it will be "his business". It seems that the High Court was misled by the apparent meaning of this phrase so that the necessity of examining the scheme of the Act and the setting of clause (f) of Section 12 (1) to discover its real meaning was not felt at all. But this is the first thing on which the High Court should have fixed attention. After all, it is a matter of statutory construction. And in such a case all attempts at construction should converge on the statute at hand, lest the reasoning should become abstract and artificial, having no contact with reality. The High Court has sought support from a decision of the erstwhile Nagpur Highreview of these provisions would show that the Act is more strict with respect to the eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation than from a residential accommodation. In the case of a residential accommodation, Section 12 (1) (e) provides for the eviction of a tenant where it is needed for the residence of the landlord or for any member of his family. But he cannot sue for eviction of a tenant from a non-residential accommodation where he needs it for continuing, or starting his major married daughters business. Nor he can evict a tenant from such accommodation for continuing or starting his brothers business. Thus, while cl. (e) of Section 12 (1) is more hospitable to the landlord, clause (f) thereof is more protective of the tenant. Sub-sections (4), (5) (6) of Section 12 also point to this contrast. While the tenant evicted from a residential accommodation gets a respite of 14 months, the tenant evicted from a non-residential accommodation gets not only the said respite but also the prescribed compensation. In many cases the burden of compensation may act as a deterrent to eviction. Having regard to the rigour of clause (f) of Section 12 (1) we think that the phrase "his business" should not receive a wide construction as to the class of persons who may be included in the possessive pronoun his in the phrase, for it would be against legislative policy.The respondent has stated in his evidence that he and his two brothers are carrying on a partnership business in a rented shop in Siyaganj. He has further said that he needs the suit accommodation for that purpose. The appeal court has believed this evidence and has recorded the finding that the respondent bona fide requires the accommodation for his partnership business. But his finding does not fulfill the conditions of cl. (f) of Section 12 (1) as construed by us. Unfortunately for him, the respondent did not lead any evidence to show that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business. He filed the registration certificate showing that the partnership was registered with the Registrar of Firms. The certificate will only prove as to who are the partners of the firm, nothing more. The respondent did not file the deed of partnership. It would have disclosed whether the respondent is a mere sleeping partner or a partner who is entitled to manage the business either solely or with other partners, or that they are the sole managing partners. In his examination he has said that he was a partner in the firm. He has also said : "There is no proper accommodation for carrying on business in Indore by the members of his family". In cross-examination he has said, "In the members of my family there are two of my brothers Nand Kishore and Mani Lal, their wives and children and my mother are included. For our residence and running the shop we need the disputed shop." No doubt he has stated that he needs the suit accommodation for his residence also, but the lower courts did not examine the need for residence. Before the appeal court counsel for the parties had stated that the suit for eviction of the tenant should be disposed of only on the basis of Section 12 (1) (f). The respondent thus abandoned his case based on Section 12 (1) (e) which deals with residential accommodation. So we are concerned with his need for business accommodation. The passage in his statement, earlier reproduced would seem to suggest that his notion of his business is inclusive of his brothers business in which he may have no concern at all. So the possibility of his brothers separate business being set up in the suit accommodation is not ruled out. However, we do not ground our judgment on this statement. In his evidence he has said; "We, the three brothers and father are the partners in the shop. There is no person from outside. Before the partnership my father used to run the shop. (The father died during pendency of the suit)." He also said: "We deal in bidi, cigarettes, matches, tobacco and soap. We also want to have the same business in the disputed shop". In neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the evidence he has stated that on the terms of partnership he is entitled to manage the partnership business or even that he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining possession from the appellants. He has also not said that the other partners have agreed to shift the business.The Act professes to control letting and rent of accommodation and the eviction of tenants therefrom. The Act restricts the power of the landlord to let and toat will.It also restricts his power to eject the tenant at will. Thus the direct and immediate object of the Act is to ensure occupation of accommodation by them who are in need of it. Broadly speaking, a construction which fulfills this purpose should be preferred to the alternative construction which frustrates it.On this construction of cl. (f) of Section 12 (1), it is necessary for the respondent to prove that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation for the purpose of continuing or starting his business.If the deed of partnership has excluded him expressly or impliedly from the management of firms business and has made him a sleeping partner, it cannot be held that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business. Nor he has power to shift the business. To sum up, for the reasons already given, his suit should fail.In some of the cases cited by Sri Patel, own has been interpreted virtually as otiose. Nevertheless what it means in the Act would depend on its own context, for a word may take a colour from its context.18. In view of our decision against the respondent on the basis of the construction of Section 12 (1) (f), it is not necessary for us to decide several other points raised by Sri Phadke.