Case: B.K. PAVITRA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

of Indra Sawhney holds that the creamy layer principle is a principle of equality. 138. Though, we have not accepted the above submission which was urged by Ms Jaising on behalf of the intervenors, we will have to decide as to whether the Reservation Act 2018 is unconstitutional. The challenge in the present case is to the validity of the Reservation Act 2018 which provides for consequential seniority. In other words, the nature or extent of reservation granted to the SCs and STs at the entry level in appointment is not under challenge. The Reservation Act 2018 adopts the principle that consequential seniority is not an additional benefit but a consequence of the promotion which is granted to the SCs and STs. In protecting consequential seniority as an incident of promotion, the Reservation Act 2018 constitutes an exercise of the enabling power conferred by Article 16 (4A). The concept of creamy layer has no relevance to the grant of consequential seniority. There is merit in the submission of the State of Karnataka that progression in a cadre based on promotion cannot be treated as the acquisition of creamy layer status. The decision in Jarnail rejected the submission that a member of an SC or ST who reaches a higher post no longer has a taint of untouchability or backwardness. The Constitution Bench declined to accept the submission on the ground that it related to the validity of Article 16 (4A) and held thus: 34…We may hasten to add that Shri Dwivedis argument cannot be confused with the concept of creamy layer which, as has been pointed out by us hereinabove, applies to persons within the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes who no longer require reservation, as opposed to posts beyond the entry stage, which may be occupied by members of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes. (Emphasis supplied) 139. In sustaining the validity of Articles 16 (4A) and 16 (4B) against a challenge of violating the basic structure, Nagaraj applied the test of width and the test of identity. The Constitution Bench ruled that the catch-up rule and consequential seniority are not constitutional requirements. They were held not to be implicit in clauses (1) to (4) of Article 16. Nagaraj held that they are not constitutional limitations or principles but are concepts derived from service jurisprudence. Hence, neither the obliteration of those concepts nor their insertion would violate the equality code contained in Articles 14, 15 and 16. The principle postulated in Nagaraj is that consequential seniority is a concept purely based in service jurisprudence. The incorporation of consequential seniority would hence not violate the constitutional mandate of equality. This being the true constitutional position, the protection of consequential seniority as an incident of promotion does not require the application of the creamy layer test. Articles 16 (4A) and 16 (4B) were held to not obliterate any of the constitutional limitations and to fulfil the width test. In the above view of the matter, it is evident that the concept of creamy layer has no application in assessing the validity of the Reservation Act 2018 which is designed to protect consequential seniority upon promotion of persons belonging to the SCs and STs. I. Retrospectivity 140. Sections 3 and 4 of the Reservation Act 2018 came into force on 17 June 1995. The other provisions came into force at once as provided in Section 1(2). Section 4 stipulates that the consequential seniority already granted to government servants belonging to the SCs and STs in accordance with the reservation order with effect from 27 April 1978 shall be valid and shall be protected. In this context, we must note from the earlier decisions of this Court that: (i) The decision in Virpal Singh held that the catch-up rule would be applied only from 10 February 1995 which was the date of the judgment in Sabharwal; (ii) The decision in Ajit Singh II specifically protected the promotions which were granted before 1 March 1996 without following the catch-up rule; and (iii) In Badappanavar, promotions of reserved candidates based on consequential seniority which took place before 1 March 1996 were specifically protected. 141. Since promotions granted prior to 1 March 1996 were protected, it was logical for the legislature to protect consequential seniority. The object of the Reservation Act 2018 is to accord consequential seniority to promotees against roster points. In this view of the matter, we find no reason to hold that the provisions in regard to retrospectivity in the Ratna Prabha Committee report are either arbitrary or unconstitutional. 142. The benefit of consequential seniority has been extended from the date of the Reservation Order 1978 under which promotions based on reservation were accorded J. Over representation in KPTCL and PWD 143. The Ratna Prabha Committee collected data from thirty one departments of the State Government of Karnataka. It has been pointed out on behalf of the State that corporations such as KPTCL and other public sector undertakings fall within the administrative control of one of the departments of the State government. The position in thirty one departments was taken as representative of the position in public employment under the State. The over representation in KPTCL and PWD has been projected by the petitioners with reference to the total number of posts which have been filled. On the other hand, the quota is fixed and the roster applies as regards the total sanctioned posts as held in Sabharwal and Nagaraj. On the contrary, the data submitted by the State of Karnataka indicates that if consequential seniority is not allowed, there would be under representation of the reserved categories. Finally, it may also be noted that under the Government Order dated 13 April 1999, reservation in promotion in favour of SCs and STs has been provided until the representation for these categories reaches 15 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. The State has informed the Court that the above Government Order is applicable to KPTCL and PWD, as well K. Conclusion

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]60. Besides the Governor, the legislatures of the States consist of a bicameral legislature for some States and a unicameral legislature for others.62. Where a Bill is not a Money Bill, the Governor may return the Bill for reconsideration upon which the House or Houses, as the case may be, will reconsider the desirability of introducing the amendments which the Governor has recommended. If the Bill is passed again by the House (or Houses as the case may be), the Governor cannot thereafter withhold assent. The second proviso to Article 200 stipulates that the Governor must not assent to a Bill but necessarily reserve it for the consideration of the President if the Bill upon being enacted would derogate from the powers of the High Court in a manner thatendangers its position under the Constitution. Save and except for Bills falling within the description contained in the second proviso (where the Governor must reserve the Bill for consideration of the President), a discretion is conferred upon the Governor to follow one of the courses of action enunciated in the substantive part of Article 200. Aside from Bills which are covered by the second proviso, where the Governor is obliged to reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, the substantive part of Article 200 does not indicate specifically, the circumstances in which the Governor may reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President. The Constitution has entrusted this discretion to the Governor.63. The framers carefully eschewed defining the circumstances in which the Governor may reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President. By its very nature the conferment of the power cannot be confined to specific categories. Exigencies may arise in the working of the Constitution which justify a recourse to the power of reserving a Bill for the consideration of the President. They cannot be foreseen with the vision of a soothsayer. The power having been conferred upon a constitutional functionary, it is conditioned by the expectation that it would be exercised upon careful reflection and for resolving legitimate concerns in regard to the validity of the legislation. The entrustment of a constitutional discretion to the Governor is premised on the trust that the exercise of authority would be governed by constitutional statesmanship. In a federal structure, the conferment of this constitutional discretion is not intended to thwart democratic federalism. The state legislatures represent the popular will of those who elect their representatives. They are the collective embodiments of that will. The act of reserving a Bill for the assent of the President must be undertaken upon careful reflection, upon a doubt being entertained by the Governor about the constitutional legitimacy of the Bill which has been passed.64. Dr Dhavan in the course of his submissions, has dwelt at length on the power which is entrusted to the Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President under Article 254 (2). Article 254 (2) deals with a situation where a law which has been enacted by the legislature of a state on a matter which is enumerated in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule contains any provision which is repugnant either to an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter. In such an eventuality, the law made by the legislature of the state can prevail in that state only if it has received the assent of the President on being reserved for consideration.68. Hoechst is an authority for the proposition that the assent of the President is non - justiciable. Hoechst also lays down that even if, as it turns out, it was not necessary for the Governor to reserve a Bill for the consideration of the President, yet if it was reserved for and received the assent of the President, thelaw as enacted cannot be regarded as unconstitutional for want of =proper assent70. The state government, in the course of its clarifications, was of the view that there was no necessity of reserving the Bill for the consideration of the President, since in its view, the Governor had not recorded a finding that it was unconstitutional, or fell afoul of existing central legislation on the subject or that it was beyond legislative competence or derogated from the fundamental rights. All procedural requirements under the Constitution were according to the government duly complied with. This objection of the state government cannot cast doubt upon the grant of assent by the President. The law having received the assent of the President, the submissions which were urged on behalf of the petitioners cannot be countenanced.71. The foundation of the decision in B K Pavitra I is the principle enunciated in Nagaraj that in order to sustain the exercise of the enabling power contained in Article 16 (4A), the state is required to demonstrate a compelling necessity by collecting quantifiable data on: (i) inadequacy of representation; (ii) backwardness; and (iii) overall efficiency. The judgment in B K Pavitra I held that no such exercise was undertaken by the State of Karnataka before providing for reservation in promotion and providing for consequential seniority. On the ground that the state had not collected quantifiable data on the three parameters enunciated in Nagaraj, the Reservation Act 2002 was held to be unconstitutional. The Constitution Bench in Nagaraj upheld the validity of Article 16 (4A) on the basis that before taking recourse to the enabling power the state has to carry out the exercise of collecting quantifiable data and fulfilling the three parameters noted above. B K Pavitra I essentially held that there was a failure on the part of the state to undertake this exercise, which was a pre-condition for the exercise of the enabling power to make reservations in promotions and to provide for consequential seniority72. The decision in B K Pavitra I did not restrain the state from carrying out the exercise of collecting quantifiable data so as to fulfil the conditionalities for the exercise of the enabling power under Article 16 (4A). The legislature has the plenary power to enact a law. That power extends to enacting a legislation both with prospective and retrospective effect. Where a law has been invalidated by the decision of a constitutional court, the legislature can amend the law retrospectively or enact a law which removes the cause for invalidation. A legislature cannot overrule a decision of the court on the ground that it is erroneous or is nullity. But, it is certainly open to the legislature either to amend an existing law or to enact a law which removes the basis on which a declaration of invalidity was issued in the exercise of judicial review. Curative legislation is constitutionally permissible. It is not an encroachment on judicial power. In the present case, state legislature of Karnataka, by enacting the Reservation Act 2018, has not nullified the judicial decision in B K Pavitra I, but taken care to remedy the underlying cause which led to a declaration of invalidity in the first place. Such a law is valid because it removes the basis of the decision.74. The legislature has the power to validate a law which is found to be invalid by curing the infirmity. As an incident of the exercise of this power, the legislature may enact a validating law to make the provisions of the earlier law effective from the date on which it was enacted (The United Provinces v Mst Atiqa Begum AIR 1941 FC 16and Rai Ramkrishna v State of Bihar (1964) 1 SCR 897 ). These principles were elucidated in the decision of this Court in Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. The judgment makes a distinction between a law which simply declares that a decision of the court will not bind (which is impermissible for the legislature) and a law which fundamentally alters the basis of an earlier legislation so that the decision would not have been given in the altered circumstances. This distinction is elaborated in the following extract:4. … Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A courts decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a court holds a tax to be invalidly imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal76. A declaration by a court that a law is constitutionally invalid does not fetter the authority of the legislature to remedy the basis on which the declaration was issued by curing the grounds for invalidity. While curing the defect, it is essential to understand the reasons underlying the declaration of invalidity. The reasons constitute the basis of the declaration. The legislature cannot simply override the declaration of invalidity without remedying the basis on which the law was held to be ultra vires. A law may have been held to be invalid on the ground that thelegislature which enacted the law had no legislative competence on the subject matter of the legislation. Obviously, in such a case, a legislature which has been held to lack legislative competence cannot arrogate to itself competence over a subject matter over which it has been held to lack legislative competence. However, a legislature which has the legislative competence to enact a law on the subject can certainly step in and enact a legislation on a field over which it possesses legislative competence. For instance, where a law has been invalidated on the ground that the state legislature lacks legislative competence to enact a law on a particular subject – Parliament being conferred with legislative competence over the same subject – it is open for the Parliament, following a declaration of the invalidity of the state law, to enact a new law and to regulate the area. As an incident of its validating exercise, Parliament may validate the collection of a levy under the earlier law. The collection of a levy under a law which has been held to be invalid is validated by the enactment of legislation by a legislative body – Parliament in the above example – which has competence over the subject matter. Apart from legislative competence, a law may have been declared invalid on the ground that there was a breach of the fundamental rights contained in Part III of the Constitution. In that situation, if the legislature proceeds to enact a new law on the subject, the issue in essence is whether the re-enacted law has taken care to remove the infractions of the fundamental rights on the basis of which the earlier law was held to be invalid. The true test therefore is whether the legislature has acted within the bounds of its authority to remedy the basis on which the earlier law was held to suffer from a constitutional infirmity.78. The decision in Madan Mohan Pathak is hence distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The above observations recognized the constitutional position that in the case of a declaratory judgment holding an action to be invalid, a validating legislation to remove the defect is permissible. Applying this principle, it is evident that the decision in B K Pavitra I declared the Reservation Act 2002 to be invalid and consequent upon the declaration of invalidity, certain directions were issued. If the basis on which Reservation Act 2002 was held to be invalid is cured by a validating legislation, in this case the Reservation Act 2018, this would constitute a permissible legislative exercise. The grounds which weighed in Madan Mohan Pathak would hence not be available in the present case80. Madan Mohan Pathak involved a situation where a parliamentary law was enacted to override a mandamus which was issued by the High Court for thepayment of bonus under an industrial settlement. The case did not involve a situation where a law was held to be ultra vires and the basis of the declaration of invalidity of the law was sought to be curedDr Dhavan is entirely correct, if we may say so with respect, in submitting that what has to be shown is whether the Reservation Act 2018 is, in law Articles 14 and 16 compliant. This necessitates an examination of the constitutionality of the Reservation Act 2018. That would require this Court to examine the challenge on the ground that there has been a violation of the equality code contained in Articles 14 and 16.Is the basis of B K Pavitra I cured in enacting the Reservation Act 201882. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Reservation Act 2018 refers to the legislative history preceding its enactment. The Ratna Prabha Committeewas constituted after the Reservation Act 2002 was held to be invalid in B K Pavitra I on the ground that no compelling necessity had been shown by the state to provide for reservation in matters of promotion for SCs and STs by collecting and analysing relevant data to satisfy the requirements laid out in Nagaraj. The constitution of the Ratna Prabha Committee was consequent upon the Reservation Act 2002 having been held to be invalid in B K Pavitra IThe decision of the Constitution Bench in Nagaraj mandates that before the State can take recourse to the enabling power contained in Clauses (4A) and (4B) of Article 16, it must demonstrate the existence of compelling reasons on three facets: (i) backwardness; (ii) inadequacy of representation; and (iii) overall administrative efficiency. In Jarnail, the Constitution Bench clarified that the first of the above factors – backwardness has no application in the case of reservations for the SCs and STs. Nagaraj to that extent was held to be contrary to the decision of the larger Bench in Indra Sawhney.The Ratna Prabha Committee report90. Based on the above features, the petitioners have invoked the power of judicial review. Dr Dhavan emphasized that the decision in Nagaraj upheld the constitutional validity of successive constitutional amendments to Article 16conditional upon the existence of compelling reasons which must be demonstrated by the State by collecting and analysing relevant data. It is submitted that the flaws in the report of the Ratna Prabha Committee would indicate that the compelling reasons which constitute the foundation for the exercise of the enabling power contained in Article 16 are absent, which must result in the invalidation of the Reservation Act 201893. The second of the reinforcing principles which emerges from Indra Sawhney is that the opinion of the government on the adequacy of representation of the SCs and STs in the public services of the state is a matter which forms a part of the subjective satisfaction of the state. Significantly, the extract from Indra Sawhney reproduced earlier adverts to the decision in Barium Chemicals Ltd, which emphasises that when an authority is vested with the power to form an opinion, it is not open for the court to substitute its own opinion for that of the authority, nor can the opinion of the authority be challenged on grounds of propriety or sufficiency.95. In dealing with the submissions of the petitioners on this aspect, it is relevant for this Court to recognize the circumspection with which judicial power must be exercised on matters which pertain to propriety and sufficiency, in the context of scrutinizing the underlying collection of data by the State on the adequacy of representation and impact on efficiency. The Court, is above all, considering the validity of a law which was enacted by the State legislature for enforcing the substantive right to equality for the SCs and STs. Judicial review must hence traverse conventional categories by determining as to whether the Ratna Prabha Committee report considered material which was irrelevant or extraneous or had drawn a conclusion which no reasonable body of persons could have adopted. In this area, the fact that an alternate line of approach was possible or may even appear to be desirable cannot furnish a foundation for the assumption by the court of a decision making authority which in the legislative sphere is entrusted to the legislating body and in the administrative sphere to the executive arm of the government99. We find merit in the above submissions. The methodology which was adopted by the Ratna Prabha Committee has not been demonstrated to be alien to conventional social science methodologies. We are unable to find that the Committee has based its conclusions on any extraneous or irrelevant material. In adopting recourse to sampling methodologies, the Committee cannot be held to have acted arbitrarily. If, as we have held above, sampling is a valid methodology for collection of data, the necessary consequence is that the exercise cannot be invalidated only on the ground that data pertaining to a particular department or of some entities was not analysed. The data which was collected pertained to thirty one departments which are representative in character. The State has analysed the data which is both relevant and representative, before drawing its conclusions. As we have noted earlier, there are limitations on the power of judicial review in entering upon a factual arena involving the gathering, collation and analysis of data.101. We are of the view that once an opinion has been formed by the State government on the basis of the report submitted by an expert committee which collected, collated and analysed relevant data, it is impossible for the Court to hold that the compelling reasons which Nagaraj requires the State to demonstrate have not been established. Even if there were to be some errors in data collection, that will not justify the invalidation of a law which the competent legislature was within its power to enact. After the decision in B K Pavitra I, the Ratna Prabha Committee was correctly appointed to carry out the required exercise. Once that exercise has been carried out, the Court must be circumspect in exercising the power of judicial review to re-evaluate the factual material on record.102. The adequacy of representation has to be assessed with reference to a benchmark on adequacy. Conventionally, the State and the Central governments have linked the percentage of reservation for the SCs and STs to their percentage of population, as a measure of adequacy. The Constitution Bench noticed this in Sabharwal, where it observed:4. When a percentage of reservation is fixed in respect of a particular cadre and the roster indicates the reserve points, it has to be taken that the posts shown at the reserve points are to be filled from amongst the members of reserve categories and the candidates belonging to the general category are not entitled to be considered for the reserved posts. On the other hand the reserve category candidates can compete for the non-reserve posts and in the event of their appointment to the said posts their number cannot be added and taken into consideration for working out the percentage of reservation. Article 16 (4) of the Constitution of India permits the State Government to make any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any Backward Class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the Services under the State. It is, therefore, incumbent on the State Government to reach a conclusion that the Backward Class/Classes for which the reservation is made is not adequately represented in the State Services. While doing so the State Government may take the total population of a particular Backward Class and its representation in the State Services. When the State Government after doing the necessary exercise makes the reservation and provides the extent of percentage of posts to be reserved for the said Backward Class then the percentage has to be followed strictly. The prescribed percentage cannot be varied or changed simply because some of the members of the Backward Class have already been appointed/promoted against the general seats. As mentioned above the roster point which is reserved for a Backward Class has to be filled by way of appointment/promotion of the member of the said class. No general category candidate can be appointed against a slot in the roster which is reserved for the Backward ClassExplaining this further, the Constitution Bench held:5...Once the prescribed percentage of posts is filled the numerical test of adequacy is satisfied and thereafter the roster does not survive. The percentage of reservation is the desired representation of the Backward Classes in the State Services and is consistent with the demographic estimate based on the proportion worked out in relation to their population. The numerical quota of posts is not a shifting boundary but represents a figure with due application of mind. Therefore, the only way to assure equality of opportunity to the Backward Classes and the general category is to permitthe roster to operate till the time the respective appointees/promotees occupy the posts meant for them in the roster…Consequently, it is open to the State to make reservation in promotion for SCs and STs proportionate to their representation in the general populationHence, the submission that the quota must be reckoned on the basis of the posts which are actually filled up and not the sanctioned posts cannot be accepted.104. We find no merit in the challenge to the Ratna Prabha Committee report on the ground that the collection of data was on the basis of groups A, B, C and D as opposed to cadres. For one thing, the expression =cadre has no fixed meaning ascribed to it in service jurisprudence. But that apart, Nagaraj requires the collection of quantifiable data inter alia, on the inadequacy of representation in services under the state. Clause 4A of Article 16 specifically refers to the inadequacy of representation in the services under the state. The collection of data on the basis of groups A to D does not by its very nature exclude data pertaining to cadres. The state has studied in the present case the extent of reservation for SCs and STs in groups A to D, consisting of several cadres. Since, the group includes posts in all the cadres in that group, it can logically be presumed that the state has collected quantifiable data on the representation of SCs and STs in promotional posts in the cadres as well.105. Another facet of the matter is that in the judgment of Justice Jeevan Reddy in Indra Sawhney, it was observed that reservation under Article 16 (4) does not operate on communal grounds. Hence, if a member belonging to a reserved category is selected in the general category, the selection would not count against the quota prescribed for the reserved category. The decision in Sabharwal also noted that while candidates belonging to the general category are not entitled to fill reserved posts, reserved category candidates are entitled to compete for posts in the general category. In several group D posts, such as municipal sweepers, the sobering experience of administration is that the overwhelmingly large segment of applicants consists of persons belonging to the SCs and STs. Over representation in group D posts as a result of candidates belonging to the general category staying away from those posts cannot be a valid or logical basis to deny promotion to group D employees recruited from the reserved categorySubstantive versus formal equality107. For equality to be truly effective or substantive, the principle must recognise existing inequalities in society to overcome them. Reservations are thus not an exception to the rule of equality of opportunity. They are rather the true fulfilment of effective and substantive equality by accounting for thestructural conditions into which people are born. If Article 16(1) merely postulates the principle of formal equality of opportunity, then Article 16(4) (by enabling reservations due to existing inequalities) becomes an exception to the strict rule of formal equality in Article 16 (1). However, if Article 16 (1) itself sets out the principle of substantive equality (including the recognition of existing inequalities) then Article 16 (4) becomes the enunciation of one particular facet of the rule of substantive equality set out in Article 16 (1).108. During the debates on the principles of equality underlying Article 16 (then draft Article 10), certain members of the Assembly recognised that in order to give true effect to the principle of equality of opportunity, the Constitution had to expressly recognise the existing inequalities.109. By recognising that formal equality of opportunity will be insufficient in fulfilling the transformative goal of the Constitution, these members recognised that the conception of equality of opportunity must recognise and account for existing societal inequalities. The most revealing debates as to how the Constituent Assembly understood equality of opportunity under the Constitution took place on 30 November 1948. Members debated draft article 10 (which would go on to become Article 16 of the Constitution). In these debates, some members understood sub-clause (4) (providing for reservations) as an exception to the general rule of formal equality enunciated in sub-clause (1).The Constitution as a transformative instrument111. The Constitution is a transformative document. The realization of its transformative potential rests ultimately in its ability to breathe life and meaning into its abstract concepts. For, above all, the Constitution was intended by its draftspersons to be a significant instrument of bringing about social change in a caste based feudal society witnessed by centuries of oppression of and discrimination against the marginalised. As our constitutional jurisprudence has evolved, the realisation of the transformative potential of the Constitution has been founded on the evolution of equality away from its formal underpinnings to its substantive potential118. The proviso recognises that special measures need to be adopted for considering the claims of SCs and STs in order to bring them to a level playing field. Centuries of discrimination and prejudice suffered by the SCs and STs in a feudal, caste oriented societal structure poses real barriers of access to opportunity. The proviso contains a realistic recognition that unless special measures are adopted for the SCs and STs, the mandate of the Constitution for the consideration of their claim to appointment will remain illusory. The proviso, in other words, is an aid of fostering the real and substantive right to equality to the SCs and STs. It protects the authority of the Union and the States to adopt any of these special measures, to effectuate a realistic (as opposed to a formal) consideration of their claims to appointment in services and posts under the Union and the states. The proviso is not a qualification to the substantive part of Article 335 but it embodies a substantive effort to realise substantive equality. The proviso also emphasises that the need to maintain the efficiency of administration cannot be construed as a fetter on adopting these special measures designed to uplift and protect the welfare of the SCs and STs.119. The Constitution does not define what the framers meant by the phrase efficiency of administration. Article 335 cannot be construed on the basis of a stereotypical assumption that roster point promotees drawn from the SCs and STs are not efficient or that efficiency is reduced by appointing them. This is stereotypical because it masks deep rooted social prejudice. The benchmark for the efficiency of administration is not some disembodied, abstract ideal measured by the performance of a qualified open category candidate. Efficiency of administration in the affairs of the Union or of a State must be defined in an inclusive sense, where diverse segments of society find representation as a trueaspiration of governance by and for the people. If, as we hold, the Constitution mandates realisation of substantive equality in the engagement of the fundamental rights with the directive principles, inclusion together with the recognition of the plurality and diversity of the nation constitutes a valid constitutional basis for defining efficiency. Our benchmarks will define our outcomes. If this benchmark of efficiency is grounded in exclusion, it will produce a pattern of governance which is skewed against the marginalised. If this benchmark of efficiency is grounded in equal access, our outcomes will reflect the commitment of the Constitution to produce a just social order. Otherwise, our past will haunt the inability of our society to move away from being deeply unequal to one which is founded on liberty and fraternity. Hence, while interpreting Article 335, it is necessary to liberate the concept of efficiency from a one sided approach which ignores the need for and the positive effects of the inclusion of diverse segments of society on the efficiency of administration of the Union or of a State. Establishing the position of the SCs and STs as worthy participants in affairs of governance is intrinsic to an equal citizenship. Equal citizenship recognizes governance which is inclusive but also ensures that those segments of our society which have suffered a history of prejudice, discrimination and oppression have a real voice in governance. Since inclusion is inseparable from a well governed society, there is, in our view, no antithesis between maintaining the efficiency of administration and considering the claims of the SCs and STs to appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State.121. The substantive right to equality is for all segments of society. Articles 15 (4) and 16 (4) represent the constitutional aspiration to ameliorate the conditions of the SCs and STs. While, we are conscious of the fact that the decision in Indra Sawhney did not accept K C Vasanth Kumaron certain aspects, the observations have been cited by us to explain the substantive relationship between equal opportunity and merit. It embodies the fundamental philosophy of the Constitution towards advancing substantive equality.122. An assumption implicit in the critique of reservations is that awarding opportunities in government services based on merit results in an increase in administrative efficiency. Firstly, it must be noted that administrative efficiency is an outcome of the actions taken by officials after they have been appointed or promoted and is not tied to the selection method itself. The argument that one selection method produces officials capable of taking better actions than a second method must be empirically proven based on an evaluation of the outcomes produced by officials selected through both methods.Secondly, arguments that attack reservations on the grounds of efficiency equate merit with candidates who perform better than other candidates on seemingly neutral criteria, e.g. standardised examinations. Thus, candidates who score beyond a particular cut-off point are considered meritoriousand others are non-meritorious. However, this is a distorted understanding of the function merit plays in society.124. Once we understand merit as instrumental in achieving goods that we as a society value, we see that the equation of merit with performance at a few narrowly defined criteria is incomplete. A meritocratic system is one that rewards actions that result in the outcomes that we as a society value.125. For example, performance in standardised examinations (distinguished from administrative efficiency) now becomes one among many of the actions that the process of appointments in government services seeks to achieve. Based on the text of Articles 335, Articles 16 (4), and 46, it is evident that the uplifting of the SCs and STs through employment in government services, and having an inclusive government are other outcomes that the process of appointments in government services seeks to achieve.126. The Proviso to Article 335 of the Constitution seeks to mitigate this risk by allowing for provisions to be made for relaxing the marks in qualifying exams in the case of candidates from the SCs and the STs. If the governments sole consideration in appointments was to appoint individuals who were considered talented or successful in standardised examinations, by virtue of the inequality in access to resources and previous educational training (existing inequalities in society), the stated constitutional goal of uplifting these sections of society and having a diverse administration would be undermined. Thus, a meritorious candidate is not merely one who is talented or successful but also one whose appointment fulfils the constitutional goals of uplifting members of the SCs and STs and ensuring a diverse and representative administration.128. The first two criteria are evidently not the products of a candidates own efforts but rather the structural conditions into which they are born. By the addition of upliftment of SCs and STs in the moral compass of merit in government appointments and promotions, the Constitution mitigates the risk that the lack of the first two criteria will perpetuate the structural inequalities existing in society130. Moreover, even in a formal legal sense, promotions, including those in respect of roster points, are made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit and a candidate to be promoted has to meet this criteria [See in this context Rule 19(3) A and D of the Karnataka Civil Services General Recruitment Rules 1977 which states that subject to other provisions all appointments by promotion shall be on an officiating basis for a period of one year and at the end of the period of officiation, if appointing authority considers the person not suitable for promotion, she/he may be reverted back to the post held prior to the promotion]. A candidate on promotion has to serve a statutory period of officiation before being confirmed. This rule applies across the board including to roster point promotees. This ensures that the efficiency of administration is, in any event, not adversely affected133. Ms Jaisings argument is based on the decision in Chinnaiah that the SCs and STs cannot be split or bifurcated and the adoption of the creamy layer principle would amount to a spilt in the homogenous groups of the SCs and STs. This argument according to Dr Dhavan, was rejected in Jarnail by the Constitution Bench137. We are thus unable to subscribe to the submission that Jarnail is not per curium on the issue of creamy layer. For one thing, Jarnail specifically examined the decision in Indra Sawhney, noticing that eight of the nine learned Judges applied the creamy layer principle as a facet of the larger equality principle.Jarnail discussed the decision in Chinnaiah and held that it dealt with the lack of legislative competence on the part of the State legislatures to create subcategories among the Presidential lists under Articles 341 and 342. The decision in Jarnail therefore held that Chinnaiah did not deal with any of the aspects on which the constitutional amendments were upheld in Nagaraj and hence it was not necessary for Nagaraj to refer to Chinnaiah at all. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the view that Jarnail, on a construction of Indra Sawhney holds that the creamy layer principle is a principle of equality.138. Though, we have not accepted the above submission which was urged by Ms Jaising on behalf of the intervenors, we will have to decide as to whether the Reservation Act 2018 is unconstitutional. The challenge in the present case is to the validity of the Reservation Act 2018 which provides for consequential seniority. In other words, the nature or extent of reservation granted to the SCs and STs at the entry level in appointment is not under challenge. The Reservation Act 2018 adopts the principle that consequential seniority is not an additional benefit but a consequence of the promotion which is granted to the SCs and STs. In protecting consequential seniority as an incident of promotion, the Reservation Act 2018 constitutes an exercise of the enabling power conferred by Article 16 (4A). The concept of creamy layer has no relevance to the grant ofconsequential seniority. There is merit in the submission of the State of Karnataka that progression in a cadre based on promotion cannot be treated as the acquisition of creamy layer status. The decision in Jarnail rejected the submission that a member of an SC or ST who reaches a higher post no longer has a taint of untouchability or backwardness.139. In sustaining the validity of Articles 16 (4A) and 16 (4B) against a challenge of violating the basic structure, Nagaraj applied the test of width and the test of identity. The Constitution Bench ruled that the catch-up rule and consequential seniority are not constitutional requirements. They were held not to be implicit in clauses (1) to (4) of Article 16. Nagaraj held that they are not constitutional limitations or principles but are concepts derived from service jurisprudence. Hence, neither the obliteration of those concepts nor their insertion would violate the equality code contained in Articles 14, 15 and 16. The principle postulated in Nagaraj is that consequential seniority is a concept purely based in service jurisprudence. The incorporation of consequential seniority would hence not violate the constitutional mandate of equality. This being the true constitutional position, the protection of consequential seniority as an incident of promotion does not require the application of the creamy layer test. Articles 16 (4A) and 16 (4B) were held to not obliterate any of the constitutional limitations and to fulfil the width test. In the above view of the matter, it is evident that the concept of creamy layer has no application in assessing the validity of the Reservation Act 2018 which is designed to protect consequential seniority upon promotion of persons belonging to the SCs and STs.141. Since promotions granted prior to 1 March 1996 were protected, it was logical for the legislature to protect consequential seniority. The object of the Reservation Act 2018 is to accord consequential seniority to promotees against roster points. In this view of the matter, we find no reason to hold that the provisions in regard to retrospectivity in the Ratna Prabha Committee report are either arbitrary or unconstitutional142. The benefit of consequential seniority has been extended from the date of the Reservation Order 1978 under which promotions based on reservation were accordedOver representation in KPTCL and PWD143. The Ratna Prabha Committee collected data from thirty one departments of the State Government of Karnataka. It has been pointed out on behalf of the State that corporations such as KPTCL and other public sector undertakings fall within the administrative control of one of the departments of the State government. The position in thirty one departments was taken as representative of the position in public employment under the State. The over representation in KPTCL and PWD has been projected by the petitioners with reference to the total number of posts which have been filled. On the other hand, the quota is fixed and the roster applies as regards the total sanctioned posts as held in Sabharwal and Nagaraj. On the contrary, the data submitted by the State of Karnataka indicates that if consequential seniority is not allowed, there would be under representation of the reserved categories. Finally, it may also be noted that under the Government Order dated 13 April 1999, reservation in promotion in favour of SCs and STs has been provided until the representation for these categories reaches 15 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively. The State has informed the Court that the above Government Order is applicable to KPTCL and PWD, as well