Case: T. Prem Sagar Vs. The Standard Vacuum Oil Companymadras And Others

to be sanctioned by the General Manager; had no power of attorney to enter into agreements with third parties on behalf of the Company; his work was subject to the overall supervision of the Operations Manager; he had no power to bind the Company by his acts; he could not operate upon the Companys bank account; he could not lay down policy for the Company and that he had to obtain the approval of the Operations Manager on almost all matters. Having discussed the whole of the evidence and recorded definite findings, the Commissioner no doubt observed in the course of his order that it cannot, therefore, be said that the respondent was exercising managerial powers in relation to the Head Office of the Company where he was employed,: and in that connection, he added that one of the questions which had to be considered by him was whether the powers exercised by the appellant were managerial with reference to the Head Office of the Company. It is on these two statements which the Commissioner made in the course of his order that the Division Bench has rested its decision and has recorded its finding that the order passed by the Commissioner of labour is on its face patently and manifestly erroneous.20. The Division Bench considered the relevant judicial decisions, bearing on the question about the extent of the High Courts jurisdiction in entertaining petitions for writs of certiorari and held that if the error in the judgment of the Commissioner of Labour was shown to be an error of law which was manifest on the face of the record, it would be justified in issuing a writ. This view is undoubtedly correct. The High Court was also right when it held that the question about the status of the appellant being a mixed question of fact and law, if it clearly appeared from the impugned order that in dealing with the status of the appellant a patently erroneous legal test was applied, that also would justify the interference of the High Court under Art. 226. It is in that connection that the High Court has observed that the manifest error in the impugned order lay in the fact that the Commissioner "thought that it is only when an employee is exercising managerial powers in relation to the head office of the company where he was employed that he can be said to be employed in a position of management within the meaning of S. 4(1) (a) of the Act." It would be noticed that this conclusion is based on the two statements in the impugned order to which we have already adverted.21. Mr. Swaminathan for the respondent has fairly conceded that when the Commissioner enumerated the tests which had to be applied in dealing with the status of the appellant, he committed no error of law; but he strongly urged that having laid down the proper tests, the Commissioner went wrong in applying the said tests because he seems to have concentrated on the main question as to whether the appellant was clothed with managerial powers in regard to the affairs of the Head office of the Company at Madras where he was employed, and that, he contends, constitutes a manifest and patent error of law in the conclusion recorded by the Commissioner. We are not impressed by this argument. The order pronounced by the Commissioner is an elaborate and well-considered order. He has taken into account the oral evidence, the documents produced before him and has also examined the probabilities of the case. In appreciating the effect of the two statements on which so much reliance has been placed by Mr. Swaminathan and which, in substance, was the sole basis of the decision of the Division Bench, we have to bear in mind the fact that the said two sentences represent only one of the many reasons given by the Commissioner in support of his conclusion, and that reason also was given by him and probably had to be given by him, because it appears that one of the contentions raised by the respondent before the Commissioner was that the appellant was clothed with managerial functions and duties. In the application made by the respondent under S. 51 before the Commissioner, the respondent had specifically averred in paragraph 3 that the appellant was an employee in the position of management and "his duties and functions were managerial". That being so, the Commissioner naturally had to consider this aspect of the matter, and so, he observed that the appellant did not have managerial functions, duties or authorities. It would, we think, be unfair to hold that the whole approach of the Commissioner was vitiated by the fact that he concentrated on the question about managerial functions and authority and did not apply the other tests which have been expressly set out by him in the earlier part of his order. Therefore, we do not think that the Division Bench was right in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order suffers from any error of law which is apparent on the face of the record.22. Incidentally, we ought to point out that even it the Division Bench was right in holding that the impugned order should be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari, it would have been better it it had not made its own findings on the evidence and passed its own order in that behalf. In writ proceedings if an error of law apparent on the face of the record is disclosed and a writ is issued, the usual course to adopt is to correct the error and send the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted Tribunals.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]In our opinion, if the Commissioners order is shown to suffer from the infirmity of an error of law apparent on face of the record, the High Court would be justified in issuing a writ notwithstanding the fact that S. 51 of the Act purports to make the Commissioners order final.Mr. Swaminathan for the respondent has fairly conceded that when the Commissioner enumerated the tests which had to be applied in dealing with the status of the appellant, he committed no error of law; but he strongly urged that having laid down the proper tests, the Commissioner went wrong in applying the said tests because he seems to have concentrated on the main question as to whether the appellant was clothed with managerial powers in regard to the affairs of the Head office of the Company at Madras where he was employed, and that, he contends, constitutes a manifest and patent error of law in the conclusion recorded by the Commissioner. We are not impressed by this argument. The order pronounced by the Commissioner is an elaborate and well-considered order. He has taken into account the oral evidence, the documents produced before him and has also examined the probabilities of the case. In appreciating the effect of the two statements on which so much reliance has been placed by Mr. Swaminathan and which, in substance, was the sole basis of the decision of the Division Bench, we have to bear in mind the fact that the said two sentences represent only one of the many reasons given by the Commissioner in support of his conclusion, and that reason also was given by him and probably had to be given by him, because it appears that one of the contentions raised by the respondent before the Commissioner was that the appellant was clothed with managerial functions and duties. In the application made by the respondent under S. 51 before the Commissioner, the respondent had specifically averred in paragraph 3 that the appellant was an employee in the position of management and "his duties and functions were managerial". That being so, the Commissioner naturally had to consider this aspect of the matter, and so, he observed that the appellant did not have managerial functions, duties or authorities. It would, we think, be unfair to hold that the whole approach of the Commissioner was vitiated by the fact that he concentrated on the question about managerial functions and authority and did not apply the other tests which have been expressly set out by him in the earlier part of his order. Therefore, we do not think that the Division Bench was right in coming to the conclusion that the impugned order suffers from any error of law which is apparent on the face of the record.22. Incidentally, we ought to point out that even it the Division Bench was right in holding that the impugned order should be corrected by the issue of a writ of certiorari, it would have been better it it had not made its own findings on the evidence and passed its own order in that behalf. In writ proceedings if an error of law apparent on the face of the record is disclosed and a writ is issued, the usual course to adopt is to correct the error and send the case back to the special Tribunal for its decision in accordance with law. It would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction to consider the evidence for itself and reach its own conclusions in matters which have been left by the legislature to the decisions of specially constituted Tribunals.