Case: Pratibha Nema  Vs. State Of M.P.

public purpose is evidently a result of after-thought. Moreover, by virtue of what is stated in the notices issued by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 5A of the Act, no one could possibly have any doubt about the exact purpose of acquisition. True, it is not open to the Land Acquisition Officer to alter or expand the scope of public purpose as it is within the exclusive domain of the Government. But the Land Acquisition Officer by elaborating and making explicit what is really implicit in the notification under Section 4(1), had only dispelled the possible doubts in this regard so that no one will be handicapped in filing objections. It is in that light the step taken by the Land Acquisition Officer has to be viewed. We cannot countenance the contention that in doing so, the Land Acquisition Officer outstepped his jurisdiction.38. When no prejudice has been demonstrated nor could be reasonably inferred, it would be unjust and inappropriate to strike down the notification under Section 4(1) on the basis of a nebulous plea, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Even assuming that there is some ambiguity in particularizing the public purpose and the possibility of doubt cannot be ruled out, the Constitutional Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 136 should not, as a matter of course, deal a lethan blow to the entire proceedings based on the theoretical or hypothetical grievance of the petitioner. It would be sound exercise of discretion to intervene when a real and substantial grievance is made out, the non redressal of which would cause prejudice and injustice to the aggrieved party. Vagueness of the public purpose, especially, in a matter like this where it is possible to take two views, is not something which affects the jurisdiction and it would therefore be proper to bear in mind the considerations of prejudice and injustice. Objection on the ground of ecological and security considerations 39. The last contention is that the proposed diamond park complex will be objectionable from the point of view of ecology and national security. Reliance is placed on some of the guidelines spelt out in the "Policy Statement for Abatement of Pollution" issued by Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests in the year 1992. At the outset, we must take note of the undisputed fact that the diamond cutting and polishing equipment and the operations connected therewith does not given rise to any pollution caused by emission of fumes, noise or discharge of effluents. The problem of air, water or soil pollution excepting to a minimal extent, caused on account of inhabitation and transportation, will not arise. The appellants, however, relied on the guidelines in order to contend that in locating the industries, a distance of 25 KMs from ecologically and/or otherwise sensitive areas should be maintained. It is submitted that the MHOW - a Defence establishment is within 10 KMs distance and the Centre for Advanced Technology (Department of Atomic Energy) is 3 kilo meters from the proposed site of diamond park. However, it is on record that the Army Headquarters expressed no objection from military security point of view for setting up the diamond park. So also, the Centre for the Advanced Technology in its letter addressed to the Managing Director of the Nigam made it clear that the establishment of diamond park would not cause any security problems to the said Centre. The Union Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence also stated on the floor of the Rajya Sabha on 11.9.1996 that there were no direct national security implications involved in the setting up of the proposed project. It is also pertinent to note that in the guidelines themselves, the need to strike a balance between economic and environmental considerations has been stressed. One of the guidelines is that no prime agricultural lands shall be converted into industrial site. But, there is no material on record to show that the lands in question are prime agricultural lands which were being utilized for growing crops. The guidelines enunciated in the policy statement have to be viewed realistically. The topography of the area and the development around the area are some of the factors that could be legitimately taken into account. On the basis of the materials placed before the Court it is not possible to hold that the proposed diamond park project will be detrimental to public health, safety or security so as to override the public interest that is served by setting up export-oriented industries. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention. Objection regarding acquisition of excess land 40. Before parting with the case, we may advert to one more contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant which is really a facet of the argument on the question of public purpose. It is contended that such a vast extent of land is in fact not required by any reasonable standards and there was total non application of mind as regards the extent of the land required. In reply to this, the learned Advocate-General has drawn our attention to the Lay Out Plan and pointed out that it was only on the basis of an assessment of the requirements, the extent of land to be acquired has been arrived at. Excepting oral assertions and bald averments, there is no material before us to reach the conclusion that the requirements were not properly assessed by the concerned authorities. It is primarily within the domain of State Government to decide how much extent of land has to be acquired keeping in view the present and future needs. Though, we are not inclined to find fault with the notification on this ground, we would only like to observe that it is desirable that the State Government makes a fresh assessment in the light of the latest situation and exclude any part of the land which may be found to be in excess. 41. For the reasons aforesaid, the

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]In this state of affairs, the High Court was well justified in relying on the documents/books maintained in the ordinary course of business and recording a conclusion that the Cheque for Rs. 3 crores was issued by AKI Ltd., towards advance lease premium. The non-production of covering latter which according to the sixth respondent is not on its record, does not clinch the issue in favour of the appellants. Taking an overall picture, we are unable to hold that the conclusion of the High Court in this regard is perverse or unsustainable.We are of the view that none of the factors pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants make any dent on the orientation towards public purpose nor do they establish that the acquisition was resorted to by the Government to achieve oblique ends. The speed at which the proposal was pursued should be appreciated rather than condemning it, though the overzealousness on the part of authorities concerned to short-circuit the procedure has turned out to be counter-productive. True, the tardy progress of acquisition would have sent wrong signals to the prospective investors, as contended by the learned Advocate-General. However, due attention should have been given to the legal formalities such as holding of enquiry, specification of public purpose in clear terms and giving sufficient indication of State meeting the cost of acquisition wholly or in part. At the same time, we cannot read mala fides in between the lines; in fact, no personal malice or uterior motives have been attributed to the Chief Minister or to any other official. The material placed before us do not lead to the necessary or even reasonable conclusion that the Government machinery identified itself with the private interests of the Company, forsaking public interest. Public purpose does not cease to be so merely because the acquisition facilitates the setting up of industry by a private enterprise and benefits it to that extent. Nor the existence or otherwise of public purpose be judged by the lead and initiative taken by the entrepreneurs desirous of setting up the industry and the measure of coordination between them and various state agencies. The fact that despite the unwillingness expressed by AKI Ltd., to go ahead with the project, the Government is still interested in acquisition is yet another pointer that the acquisition was motivated by public purpose.We do not think that the ratio of the decision in M.P. Housing Boards case would come to the rescue of the appellants. Though the State Government could have discreetly avoided to use sophisticated industrial jargon, we do not think that the specified public purpose is so vague and indefinite that the public will not be in a position to understand its nature and purpose. That such terminology has gained currency is evident from the fact that the same expression was used in the Industrial Policy document. It may not be out of place to mention that in the recent times, the terminology such as Industrial Park, Information Technology Park is widely in circulation. Moreover, against the column authorised officer under Section 4(2) (close to the column public purpose), the designation of Manager, District Industrial Centre, Indore is specified. This is a pointer to the fact that the land was being acquired for industrial purpose. We are therefore of the view that in the instant case, the alleged vagueness is not of such a degree as to defy sense and understanding.On the facts of the case, it is not possible to draw the conclusion that the appellants have suffered any prejudice or handicap on account of the alleged vagueness in the description of public purpose. First of all, the appellants did not, in the pleadings before the High Court, point out as to how the alleged ambiguity or vagueness had resulted in prejudice in he sense that they could not effectively object to the acquisition. On the other hand, the appellants filed detailed objections before the Land Acquisition Officer covering each and every aspect. The objections and representations filed from time to time would unequivocally indicate that they were fully aware of the exact purpose of acquisition. Raising the bogey of vagueness in public purpose is evidently a result of after-thought. Moreover, by virtue of what is stated in the notices issued by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 5A of the Act, no one could possibly have any doubt about the exact purpose of acquisition. True, it is not open to the Land Acquisition Officer to alter or expand the scope of public purpose as it is within the exclusive domain of the Government. But the Land Acquisition Officer by elaborating and making explicit what is really implicit in the notification under Section 4(1), had only dispelled the possible doubts in this regard so that no one will be handicapped in filing objections. It is in that light the step taken by the Land Acquisition Officer has to be viewed. We cannot countenance the contention that in doing so, the Land Acquisition Officer outstepped his jurisdiction.38. When no prejudice has been demonstrated nor could be reasonably inferred, it would be unjust and inappropriate to strike down the notification under Section 4(1) on the basis of a nebulous plea, in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Even assuming that there is some ambiguity in particularizing the public purpose and the possibility of doubt cannot be ruled out, the Constitutional Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 or 136 should not, as a matter of course, deal a lethan blow to the entire proceedings based on the theoretical or hypothetical grievance of the petitioner. It would be sound exercise of discretion to intervene when a real and substantial grievance is made out, the non redressal of which would cause prejudice and injustice to the aggrieved party. Vagueness of the public purpose, especially, in a matter like this where it is possible to take two views, is not something which affects the jurisdiction and it would therefore be proper to bear in mind the considerations of prejudice and injustice. Objection on the ground of ecological and securitythe outset, we must take note of the undisputed fact that the diamond cutting and polishing equipment and the operations connected therewith does not given rise to any pollution caused by emission of fumes, noise or discharge of effluents. The problem of air, water or soil pollution excepting to a minimal extent, caused on account of inhabitation and transportation, will not arise. The appellants, however, relied on the guidelines in order to contend that in locating the industries, a distance of 25 KMs from ecologically and/or otherwise sensitive areas should be maintained. It is submitted that the MHOW - a Defence establishment is within 10 KMs distance and the Centre for Advanced Technology (Department of Atomic Energy) is 3 kilo meters from the proposed site of diamond park. However, it is on record that the Army Headquarters expressed no objection from military security point of view for setting up the diamond park. So also, the Centre for the Advanced Technology in its letter addressed to the Managing Director of the Nigam made it clear that the establishment of diamond park would not cause any security problems to the said Centre. The Union Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence also stated on the floor of the Rajya Sabha on 11.9.1996 that there were no direct national security implications involved in the setting up of the proposed project. It is also pertinent to note that in the guidelines themselves, the need to strike a balance between economic and environmental considerations has been stressed. One of the guidelines is that no prime agricultural lands shall be converted into industrial site. But, there is no material on record to show that the lands in question are prime agricultural lands which were being utilized for growing crops. The guidelines enunciated in the policy statement have to be viewed realistically. The topography of the area and the development around the area are some of the factors that could be legitimately taken into account. On the basis of the materials placed before the Court it is not possible to hold that the proposed diamond park project will be detrimental to public health, safety or security so as to override the public interest that is served by setting up export-oriented industries. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting thisoral assertions and bald averments, there is no material before us to reach the conclusion that the requirements were not properly assessed by the concerned authorities. It is primarily within the domain of State Government to decide how much extent of land has to be acquired keeping in view the present and future needs. Though, we are not inclined to find fault with the notification on this ground, we would only like to observe that it is desirable that the State Government makes a fresh assessment in the light of the latest situation and exclude any part of the land which may be found to be in