Case: M/S.B.S.I. Ltd.  Vs. Gift Holdings Pvt. Ltd.

pay the amount covered by the cheques. The ban imposed, as per Section 22(1) of the SICA, is against maintainability of the following legal actions : (1) Proceedings for the winding up of the company; (2) Proceedings for execution, distress or the likes against any of the properties of the company; (3) Proceedings for the appointment of a receiver in respect of such properties; (4) Suits for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the company or guarantee in respect of any loan or advance granted to the company. 14. Some of the learned counsel pointed out that when a company is convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act the Court can only impose a fine as the sentence since a juristic person like the company cannot possibly be sent to prison. On its premise learned counsel contended that recovery of the fine covered by such sentence would be impractical on account of the ban envisaged in Section 22(1) of SICA against proceedings for execution, distress or the likes as against any of the properties of the company. As a corollary, it was submitted that prosecution against the company cannot be maintained since a Court would not be able to effectively impose a sentence on a company after convicting it of the offence under Section 138 of NI Act. 15. The fallacy of the above contention is two-fold. First is that maintainability of a prosecution proceeding is not to be tested on the touchstone of any practical hurdle in enforcing the sentence which might be imposed on a company after conviction. Second is, there is no insurmountable hurdle for recovery of the fine covered by the sentence even from a sick industrial company because the ban contained in Section 22(1) is only conditional as could as discerned from the last limb thereof which reads thus : Except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. It means that with such consent the Court would be in a position to resort to proceedings for distress against the properties of the sick industrial company. Hence the aforesaid contention has no merit at all. 16. It was next contended that the ban against maintainability of a suit for the recovery of money would encompass prosecution proceedings also. To support the said contention reliance was sought to be made on the following meaning of word suit as given in Bouviers Law Dictionary : Suit is a generic term of comprehensive signification, and applies to any proceeding in a Court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues, in such Court, the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of any injury or the recovery of a right............ In its most extended sense, the word suit includes not only a civil action, but also a criminal prosecution, as, indictment, information and a conviction by a magistrate. 17. Learned counsel invited our attention to the maxim contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege (contemporaneous exposition is the best and strongest in law) for the purpose of stretching the scope of the word suit to envelope criminal prosecution as well. 18. Our attention has also been invited to the observation of a two Judge Bench of this Court in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. v. State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. and another, 1993(2) SCC 144. While considering the purpose and objects of suspension of proceedings mentioned in Section 22(1) of SICA, therein it has been held that the expression proceedings in the sub-section must be widely construed. This is what the Bench has observed : The legislature has advisedly used an omnibus expression `the like as it could not have perceived of all possible coercive measures that may be taken against a sick undertaking. 19. The said contention is also devoid of merits. The word suit envisaged in Section 22(1) cannot be stretched to criminal prosecutions. The suit mentioned therein is restricted to recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company. As the suit is clearly delineated in the provision itself, the context would not admit of any other stretching process. 20. A criminal prosecution is neither for recovery of money nor for enforcement of any security etc. Section 138 of the NI Act is a penal provision the commission of which offence entails a conviction and sentence on proof of the guilt in a duly conducted criminal proceedings. Once the offence under Section 138 is completed the prosecution proceedings can be initiated not for recovery of the amount covered by the cheque but for bringing the offender to the penal liability. What was considered in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. (supra) is whether the remedy provided in Section 29 or 31 of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951 could be pursued notwithstanding the ban contained in Section 22 of the SICA. Hence the legal principle adumbrated in the said decision is of no avail to the appellants. 21. In the above context it is pertinent to point out that Section 138 of NI Act was introduced in 1988 when SICA was already in vogue. Even when the amplitude of the word company mentioned in Section 141 of the NI Act was widened through the Explanation added to the Section, Parliament did not think it necessary to exclude companies falling under Section 22 of SICA from the operation thereof. If Parliament intended to exempt sick companies from prosecution proceeding, necessary provision would have been included in Section 141 of the NI Act. More significantly, when Section 22(1) of SICA was amended in 1994 by inserting the words [and no suit for the recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to industrial company] Parliament did not specifically include prosecution proceedings within the ambit of the said ban. 22.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]12. We do not think it necessary to labour on the scope of SectionA of SICA in the present batch of appeals as the BIFR did not pass any order against any company involved herein until the expiry of the period of 15 days from the receipt of notice contemplated in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act. So none of the companies was interdicted by any such order envisaged in SectionA during the above period of 15 days. Hence, we are unable to find any help from the said provision which could salvage the appellants from the prosecution proceedings against themn (1) of Section 22 of SICA, we may point out that its operation commence in respect of the companies involved in this batch of appeals only after the expiry of the period of 15 days envisaged in clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act within which the companies did not pay the amount covered by the cheques. The ban imposed, as per Section 22(1) of the SICA, is against maintainability of the following legal actions :(1) Proceedings for the winding up of the company;(2) Proceedings for execution, distress or the likes against any of the properties of the company;(3) Proceedings for the appointment of a receiver in respect of such properties;(4) Suits for recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the company or guarantee in respect of any loan or advance granted to the company14. Some of the learned counsel pointed out that when a company is convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act the Court can only impose a fine as the sentence since a juristic person like the company cannot possibly be sent to prison. On its premise learned counsel contended that recovery of the fine covered by such sentence would be impractical on account of the ban envisaged in Section 22(1) of SICA against proceedings for execution, distress or the likes as against any of the properties of the company. As a corollary, it was submitted that prosecution against the company cannot be maintained since a Court would not be able to effectively impose a sentence on a company after convicting it of the offence under Section 138 of NI Act15. The fallacy of the above contention is. First is that maintainability of a prosecution proceeding is not to be tested on the touchstone of any practical hurdle in enforcing the sentence which might be imposed on a company after conviction. Second is, there is no insurmountable hurdle for recovery of the fine covered by the sentence even from a sick industrial company because the ban contained in Section 22(1) is only conditional as could as discerned from the last limb thereof which reads thus : Except with the consent of the Board or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority. It means that with such consent the Court would be in a position to resort to proceedings for distress against the properties of the sick industrial company. Hence the aforesaid contention has no merit at all19. The said contention is also devoid of merits. The word suit envisaged in Section 22(1) cannot be stretched to criminal prosecutions. The suit mentioned therein is restricted to recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to the industrial company. As the suit is clearly delineated in the provision itself, the context would not admit of any other stretching process20. A criminal prosecution is neither for recovery of money nor for enforcement of any security etc. Section 138 of the NI Act is a penal provision the commission of which offence entails a conviction and sentence on proof of the guilt in a duly conducted criminal proceedings. Once the offence under Section 138 is completed the prosecution proceedings can be initiated not for recovery of the amount covered by the cheque but for bringing the offender to the penal liability. What was considered in Maharashtra Tubes Ltd. (supra) is whether the remedy provided in Section 29 or 31 of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951 could be pursued notwithstanding the ban contained in Section 22 of the SICA. Hence the legal principle adumbrated in the said decision is of no avail to the appellants21. In the above context it is pertinent to point out that Section 138 of NI Act was introduced in 1988 when SICA was already in vogue. Even when the amplitude of the word company mentioned in Section 141 of the NI Act was widened through the Explanation added to the Section, Parliament did not think it necessary to exclude companies falling under Section 22 of SICA from the operation thereof. If Parliament intended to exempt sick companies from prosecution proceeding, necessary provision would have been included in Section 141 of the NI Act. More significantly, when Section 22(1) of SICA was amended in 1994 by inserting the words [and no suit for the recovery of money or for enforcement of any security against industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans or advance granted to industrial company] Parliament did not specifically include prosecution proceedings within the ambit of the said ban.