Case: Fazal Bhai Dhala Vs. Custodian-General Of Evacueeproperty, Delhi

serve the notice would be fatal; where however proper hearing can be given without service or notice, it does not matter at all, and all that has to be seen is whether even though no notice was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard was given.8. A perusal of the Custodians judgment makes it reasonably clear that he informed the counsel who appeared on Fazal Bhai Dhalas behalf, that he proposed to consider whether the order made by the Custodian in respect of the hides business and the Sch. A III properties had been rightly made and to revise the same, if necessary, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to Fazal Bhai on this point It is equally clear that the appellants advocate was fully heard in the matter.9. We have no doubt therefore that the requirements of law as embodied in the proviso to S. 26(1) of the Act were fully satisfied. The contention that the Custodian acted without jurisdiction or irregularly exercised his jurisdiction must therefore fail.10. The next contention raised in the appeal is-to use the learned counsels own words-that in view of S. 43 of the Indian Partnership Act the partnership stood dissolved from November 2, 1948 and the Custodian had no jurisdiction to declare the "business" to be an evacuee property. It does not appear to have been disputed either before the Assistant Custodian or the Custodian that the partnership of Fazalbhai Dhala and Co., was a partnership-at-will. The deed of dissolution was dated August 12, 1949 and it has been found by the Custodian that the deed of dissolution was purposely concluded to provide a common safeguard for properties to remain in the hands of the brothers. The mention of the date November 2, 1948 as the date of dissolution cannot therefore be accepted. The firm must however be held to have been dissolved on August 12, 1949 on which date the deed of dissolution was executed. The argument of the learned counsel appears to be that once the partnership-business was dissolved there could be no question of declaring the dissolved partnership as an evacuee property. Once the fact of dissolution is accepted the declaration as regards the business must necessarily be construed as a declaration that the property that remained in Abdulla Bhai on the dissolution of the firm was an evacuee property. It seems to us clear that that was really what is intended to be meant by the order made by the Custodian.11. A further contention of the appellant is that the transactions evidenced by the two deeds, viz., the sale deed and the dissolution were merely in furtherance of the winding up of the affaires of the dissolved partnership and therefore in determining the validity or otherwise of the transactions it has to be borne in mind that Fazal Bhai could not resist the claim of the other partners to wind up. The story that the dissolution of partnership had taken place earlier and the two deeds were executed later on has not been accepted by the Custodian and we can see no reason to interfere with his conclusion. The deeds of sale were executed prior to the actual dissolution which was effected by the deed of dissolution; there is no scope therefore for saying that the sale deed was in the course of the winding up of the affairs of the dissolution of partnership. As regards the deed of dissolution itself it is wholly beside the point whether Abdulla Bhai could have resisted the claim to wind up for the declaration merely is that Abdulla Bhais share in the dissolved partnership as it stood on the date of dissolution is an evacuee property. The validity of the dissolution is not touched. It is hardly necessary to add that the dissolution of the partnership did not by itself mean that Abdullas share stood transferred to Fazal Bhai any more than that Fazal Bhais share stood transferred to Abdulla Bhai. A purported transfer of Abdullas share was made by the deed itself. But this having been held to be without good faith, had in view of S. 40 of the Evacuees Property Act , no effect. It has to be made clear that the Custodian would not be bound by the statements made in the deed of dissolution as regards the settlement of the accounts of the firm and that the Custodian, in whom the evacuee properties vest will have in respect of the dissolved business all the rights which Abdulla had under sections 37, 46, 47, 48 and other sections of the Partnership Act.12. There remains for consideration the appellants contention that in any case the Custodian acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction in ordering that "the entire properties in Schs. A and B should now be treated as evacuee properties." It appears that the order by the Custodian was made in these terms even though his conclusion was that "the entire 8 annas share of the properties mentioned in Schs. A and B of the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacuee properties." in view of the fact that under the original definition of evacuee property in S. 2(f) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Act XXXI of 1950) it meant "any property in which any evacuee has any right or interest." This definition has however since been amended and now evacuee property means "any property of an evacuee" instead of "any property in which an evacuee has any right or interest." The legal position after the amendment therefore is that it is only the 8 annas share of Abdulla set out in the Schedule in the Assistant Custodians order dated the 28th January, 1950, which is evacuee property., It is therefore necessary to state in clarification of the position that instead of the entire Schedules A and B properties being treated as evacuee property only 8 annas share of these properties which belonged to the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacuee properties.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]it is clear that the only jurisdiction the Custodian could exercise, in the absence of any appeal against that portion of the Assistant Custodians order would be his revisional jurisdiction under S. 26. When we find that the custodian has made the order it is proper and reasonable to hold that he passed it in the exercise of the only jurisdiction he had-viz., the revisional jurisdiction and the fact that this was not clearly stated in the order can be no ground for holding that he was not exercising revisional jurisdiction. It is quite another matter whether in the exercise of that jurisdiction, he proceeded in accordance withgoes without saying that in the large majority of cases the Custodian will, in order to give the party concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard, first give him a notice of his intention to examine the records to satisfy himself as to the legality or the propriety of any order passed the subordinate officer and require such person to show cause if any why the order should not be revised or modified, and then if and when the party appears before him in response to the notice, the Custodian has also to allow him, either personally or through counsel, a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In suitable cases it may be proper and necessary for the Custodian to allow the party concerned even to adduce evidence. There may be cases however where the party concerned is already before the Custodian, so that all that is necessary for the Custodian to do is to inform such party of his intention to examine the records to satisfy himself whether a particular order should be revised, and then to give him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. There would be no necessity in such a case to serve a formal notice on the party who is already before the Custodian and the omission to serve the notice can be of no consequence. What the law requires is that the person concerned should be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before any order prejudicial to him is made in revision. If this reasonable opportunity of being heard cannot be given without the service of the notice the omission to serve the notice would be fatal; where however proper hearing can be given without service or notice, it does not matter at all, and all that has to be seen is whether even though no notice was given a reasonable opportunity of being heard wasthe fact of dissolution is accepted the declaration as regards the business must necessarily be construed as a declaration that the property that remained in Abdulla Bhai on the dissolution of the firm was an evacuee property. It seems to us clear that that was really what is intended to be meant by the order made by theregards the deed of dissolution itself it is wholly beside the point whether Abdulla Bhai could have resisted the claim to wind up for the declaration merely is that Abdulla Bhais share in the dissolved partnership as it stood on the date of dissolution is an evacuee property. The validity of the dissolution is not touched. It is hardly necessary to add that the dissolution of the partnership did not by itself mean that Abdullas share stood transferred to Fazal Bhai any more than that Fazal Bhais share stood transferred to Abdulla Bhai. A purported transfer of Abdullas share was made by the deed itself. But this having been held to be without good faith, had in view of S. 40 of the Evacuees Property Act , no effect. It has to be made clear that the Custodian would not be bound by the statements made in the deed of dissolution as regards the settlement of the accounts of the firm and that the Custodian, in whom the evacuee properties vest will have in respect of the dissolved business all the rights which Abdulla had under sections 37, 46, 47, 48 and other sections of the Partnershiplegal position after the amendment therefore is that it is only the 8 annas share of Abdulla set out in the Schedule in the Assistant Custodians order dated the 28th January, 1950, which is evacuee property., It is therefore necessary to state in clarification of the position that instead of the entire Schedules A and B properties being treated as evacuee property only 8 annas share of these properties which belonged to the evacuee Abdulla should be treated as evacueehas to be borne in mind that the purported dissolution of the firm in November, 1948, the settlement of accounts recorded in the deed of August, 1949 and the transfer of properties effect were all integral and indivisible parts of the same transaction. While it is true that the notice issued to Fazal Bhai made no reference to the deed of dissolution, it is clear from Fazal Bhais own statement filed in response to this notice that he clearly understood that the revising authority would be considering the question of bona fides in respect of the numerous statements about the settlement of accounts in connection with the dissolution of business made in the deed of dissolution.We are satisfied therefore that the appellant Fazal Bhai had reasonable opportunity of being heard as regards the bona fides of the transactions mentioned in the deed of dissolution. As we have already mentioned in connection with the other appeal, the fact that the firm stood dissolved with effect from the date on which the deed of dissolution was executed can no longer be disputed. The effect of the Custodians order in regard to the deed of dissolution merely is that the transactions mentioned in that deed on the purported basis of an earlier dissolution has been declared to be not bona fide and confirmation was refused of whatever transfers of properties were purported to have been effected by that deed.