Case: STATE OF RAJASTHAN &amp; ANR Vs. MANGAT LAL SIDANA

also takes in a case where but for his retirement, he would have been reinstated while under suspension. In both these cases, the duty of the competent authority is to pass the order within the contemplation of Rule 54(1)(a) and (b). This means that apart from dealing with pay and allowances, as to whether the period of absence is to be treated as duty must be dealt with. This flows from Rule 54(1)(b). The manner in which the authority is to pass the order is regulated by subsequent provisions in Rule 54. Sub-rule 54(2) contemplates that the competent authority must examine the proceedings, apply its mind, and find whether it is a case where the Government servant at the end of the day has been fully exonerated. In the case of suspension where a person being under suspension is reinstated, the duty lies on the competent authority to consider the question as to whether the suspension was justified or wholly unjustified. If the suspension was wholly unjustified, the Government servant would be entitled to be paid the full pay and dearness allowance which he was entitled to had he not been suspended. The same is the case of the Government servant visited with the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. If it is found that at the end of the day that the penalty was wholly unjustified in that, on merit it is found that the employee stands completely exonerated, he would be entitled to get full pay and dearness allowance. Rule 54(3) is the residuary clause. The provisions of Rule 54(2) and (3) are mutually exclusive. In other words, if an employee is not fully exonerated, he is to be given such proportion of the pay and allowances as the competent authority may prescribe. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 54 is relatable to sub-rule 54(1)(b). In other words, whenever there is re-instatement in the circumstances attracting Rule 54, the authority is to pass a specific order relating to the pay and allowances to be paid and also as to whether the period of such absence is being treated as period spent on duty. Both these aspects must be reflected in the order. 10. In the case where there is full exoneration, the rulemaker had made it clear that the period of absence is to be treated as duty for all purposes. However, the provisions of Rule 54(5) contemplate a situation where the employee is not fully exonerated and therefore is governed by Rule 54(3). Then the period of absence is not to be treated as duty unless the authority specifically directs that it shall be duty for any specified purpose. The proviso to Rule 54(5) contemplates that it is open to the Government to direct that the period of absence shall be converted into leave of any kind due and admissible for Government servant. This would appear to be the scope and purport of Rule 54. 11. We have seen the order passed in the leading case. This is a case where the respondents have not been fully exonerated as such. The proof of the same is to be found in the fact that they have been visited with a penalty as the disciplinary proceedings have admittedly culminated in the penalty being passed which may be a minor penalty. 12. The other aspect of the matter is about the observance of principles of natural justice. The employee must be given an opportunity before any order is passed. The matter is no longer res integra. [See M. Gopalakrishna Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1968 SC 240 ]. It does not need reiteration that even under Rule 54, the position is the same. Observance of principles of nature justice is of cardinal importance for the employee whose very life will be at stake for he would on the one hand if he is heard get an opportunity to pursuade the competent authority that his case would fall under Rule 54(2) and not under Rule 54(3). Denial of opportunity can have very serious consequences. In this case, the finding is that the principles of natural justice were not complied with. On this ground, the respondents would support the judgment. 13. Dr. Manish Singhvi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the appellants would point out that in such circumstances, the course to be adopted would be to remit it back to the competent authority so that the competent authority may ensure that the respondents appear before the authorities and then the case is decided. In fact, we find that the course adopted by this Court finally in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu (supra) was to remit the matter back to the competent authority to pass an order after hearing the employee. But then, learned counsel for the respondent would point out that the respondent is aged 76 and at this stage, remitting back the matter would be highly inequitable. In the leading case, we notice, at the time of admission, this Court had passed an order of stay subject to payment of 50 per cent of the backwages. 14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the following conclusions can be arrived at. The disciplinary proceedings against the respondents in both the cases have not culminated in a situation where it could be said that they have been completely exonerated. This would take their case outside the four walls of Rule 54(2) of the Rules. Their suspension may not fall in the category of unjustified suspension. This inevitably and necessarily would bring their cases within the scope of Rule 54(3). This would necessarily mean that the exact amount of pay and allowances to be paid is to be less than the full pay and allowances. However, this exercise can be done only after notice to the employee. Admittedly, there is a failure by the appellants in this regard. But, at the same time, to remit it back for this purpose in our view would be inequitable.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]This is a case where the respondents have not been fully exonerated as such. The proof of the same is to be found in the fact that they have been visited with a penalty as the disciplinary proceedings have admittedly culminated in the penalty being passed which may be a minor penalty.12. The other aspect of the matter is about the observance of principles of natural justice. The employee must be given an opportunity before any order is passed. The matter is no longer res integra. [See M. Gopalakrishna Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1968 SC 240 ]. It does not need reiteration that even under Rule 54, the position is the same. Observance of principles of nature justice is of cardinal importance for the employee whose very life will be at stake for he would on the one hand if he is heard get an opportunity to pursuade the competent authority that his case would fall under Rule 54(2) and not under Rule 54(3). Denial of opportunity can have very serious consequences. In this case, the finding is that the principles of natural justice were not complied with. On this ground, the respondents would support the judgment.In fact, we find that the course adopted by this Court finally in M. Gopalakrishna Naidu (supra) was to remit the matter back to the competent authority to pass an order after hearing the employee. But then, learned counsel for the respondent would point out that the respondent is aged 76 and at this stage, remitting back the matter would be highly inequitable. In the leading case, we notice, at the time of admission, this Court had passed an order of stay subject to payment of 50 per cent of the backwages.14. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the following conclusions can be arrived at.The disciplinary proceedings against the respondents in both the cases have not culminated in a situation where it could be said that they have been completely exonerated. This would take their case outside the four walls of Rule 54(2) of the Rules. Their suspension may not fall in the category of unjustified suspension. This inevitably and necessarily would bring their cases within the scope of Rule 54(3). This would necessarily mean that the exact amount of pay and allowances to be paid is to be less than the full pay and allowances. However, this exercise can be done only after notice to the employee. Admittedly, there is a failure by the appellants in this regard. But, at the same time, to remit it back for this purpose in our view would be inequitable.