Case: Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority Vs. Sharad Kumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla &amp; Ors

or development fee even though such fee was essential for the development activities and has been imposed with reference to development effected. Mr. Goswami has very strongly relied on the decision of this Court in the case of the District Council of the Jowai Autonomous District, Jowai v. Dwet Singh Rymbai 1986 (4) SCC(Tax) 768 : 1986 AIR(SC) 1930). In considering the validity of the notification issued by the District Council of District, Jowai under United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Management and Control of Forests) Act, 1959, it has been held by this Court that in the real sense what is sought to be required under the Act is not royalty since the forest does not belong to the District Council. The amount claimed by way of royalty under the notification is in reality compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purpose enforceable by law and is not a payment for service rendered. The Court has held that there is no specific reference to the power to levy any fee in respect of any matter mentioned in paragraph 3 in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution similar to the corresponding provision in Entries of List II of Seventh Schedule. Considering the facts of the case, it has been held that the power to levy fees in respect of any of the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 should be necessarily implied but such fee should not be disproportionately very high, is a tax in disguise. This Court has indicated that the said United Khasi and Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Management and Control of Forests) Act, 1959, was enacted for the purpose of making provisions regarding the management and the control of forests which are not reserved forests in the area within the jurisdiction of District Council in the exercise of the powers conferred by Entry 3(1)(b) of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution. It has been held that even if there is no express provision to levy fees, the District Council under paragraph 3 can levy fees. Mr. Goswami has contended that it will not be correct to contend that in no case imposition of fee can be made unless there is specific provision for such imposition. Such power of imposition may be implied if the provisions of the Act are considered in the proper perspective and if such imposition becomes essential for the activities for which the statutory bodies are created. In this connection, Mr. Goswami has referred to another decision of this Court made in the case of Khargram Panchayat Samiti v. State of W. B. ( 1987 (3) SCC 82 ) It has been held by this Court that in a statute conferment of general statutory power also carries with it incidental and consequential powers. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Goswami has contended that as the development has been effected by the Development Authority and there was necessity for augmenting the revenue for such development work and as Section 91 has recognised a fund to be created otherwise than by way of grants, loans or advances and as imposition of such fee is incidental and/or ancillary to carrying on the purposes for which the Development Authority has been constituted under the Town Planning Act, it should be held that such power of imposition of fee is implied. He has, therefore, contended that the High Court of Gujarat was not justified in holding that such imposition of fee by framing impugned regulations was wholly unauthorised and as such illegal and void. 7. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the case of District Council of Jowai are entirely different. The exercise of powers by the Autonomous Jaintia Hills Districts are controlled by the constitutional provisions and in the special facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee for a specific purpose by the autonomous District was justified and such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case or the same should not be held to have laid down any legal proposition that in matters of imposition of tax or fees, the question of necessary intendment may be looked into when there is no express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti case ( 1987 (3) SCC 82 ) also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of the administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of imposing tax and fee. 8. The High Court has referred to the decisions of this Court in Hingir case 1961 AIR(SC) 459 : 1961 (2) SCR 537 ) and Jagannath Ramanuj case 1954 AIR(SC) 400 : 1954 SCR 1046 ) and Delhi Municipal Corporation case ( 1983 (3) SCC 229 : 1983 SCC(Tax) 154 : 1983 AIR(SC) 617). It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goswami.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]7. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the case of District Council of Jowai are entirely different. The exercise of powers by the Autonomous Jaintia Hills Districts are controlled by the constitutional provisions and in the special facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee for a specific purpose by the autonomous District was justified and such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable in the facts of this case or the same should not be held to have laid down any legal proposition that in matters of imposition of tax or fees, the question of necessary intendment may be looked into when there is no express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti case ( 1987 (3) SCC 82 ) also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of the administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of imposing tax andThe High Court has referred to the decisions of this Court in Hingir case 1961 AIR(SC) 459 : 1961 (2) SCR 537 ) and Jagannath Ramanuj case 1954 AIR(SC) 400 : 1954 SCR 1046 ) and Delhi Municipal Corporation case ( 1983 (3) SCC 229 : 1983 SCC(Tax) 154 : 1983 AIR(SC) 617). It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goswami.