Case: Maharaji Educational Trust Vs. Sgs Constructions &amp; Dev.P.Ltd

of the Act and the words “to make investigation, examination or survey of any property” in section 15(1)(m) will take their meaning and colour from the other phrases employed in section 15(1). As held by this Court in Rohit Pulp & Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Baroda [1990 (3) SCC 447 ] : “12. The principle of statutory interpretation by which a generic word receives a limited interpretation by reason of its context is well established. In the context with which we are concerned, we can legitimately draw upon the “noscitur a sociis” principle. This expression simply means that “the meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps.” Gajendragadkar, J. explained the scope of the rule in State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha [1960 (2) SCR 866 ] in the following words : (SCR pp. 873-74)“This rule, according to Maxwell, means that, when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, that is, the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The same rule is thus interpreted in “Words and Phrases” (Vol. XIV, p. 207). “Associated words take their meaning from one another under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the philosophy of which is that the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it; such doctrine is broader than the maxim ejusdem generis” In fact the latter maxim “is only an illustration or specific application of the broader maxim noscitur a sociis”. The argument is that certain essential features of attributes are invariably associated with the words “business and trade” as understood in the popular and conventional sense, and it is the colour of these attributes which is taken by the other words used in the definition though their normal import may be much wider. We are not impressed by this argument. It must be borne in mind that noscitur a sociis is merely a rule of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that the wider words have been deliberately used in order to make the scope of the defined word correspondingly wider. It is only where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words with words of narrower significance is doubtful, or otherwise not clear that the present rule of construction can be usefully applied. It can also be applied where the meaning of the words of wider import is doubtful, but, where the object of the legislature in using wider words is clear and free of ambiguity, the rule of construction in question cannot be pressed into service.”This principle has been applied in a number of contexts in judicial decisions where the court is clear in its mind that the larger meaning of the word in question could not have been intended in the context in which it has been used.” 28. The Trust has submitted an application for limited purpose of approval of site plan of housing society to Avas Evam Vikas Parishad which was not pressed by it. The said application was not for the purpose of demarcation and would not enure to the benefit of the Builder. The objective of builder in writ petition was to get land demarcated as unencumbered. 29. For the purpose of demarcation the remedy is available before the concerned authority under section 24 of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006. Section 24 of the Code is extracted below : “24. Disputes regarding boundaries.-(1) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made in this behalf by a person interested, decide, by summary inquiry, any dispute regarding boundaries on the basis of existing survey map or, where the same is not possible, in accordance with the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, on the basis of such map.(2) If in the course of an inquiry into a dispute under sub-section (1), the Sub-Divisional Officer is unable to satisfy himself as to which party is in possession or if it is shown that possession has been obtained by wrongful dispossession of the lawful occupant, within a period of three months preceding the commencement of the inquiry, the Sub-Divisional Officer shall-(a) in the first case, ascertain by summary inquiry who is the person best entitled to the property, and shall put such person in possession.(b) in the second case, put the person so dispossessed in possession, and for that purpose use or cause to be used such force as may be necessary an shall then fix the boundary accordingly.(3) Every proceeding under this section shall, as far as possible, be concluded by the Sub-Divisional Officer within six months from the date of the application.(4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer may prefer an appeal before the Commissioner within 30 days of the date of such order. The order of the Commissioner shall be final.” The corresponding provision in the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 was section 41. The recourse to provision of the Adhiniyam of 1965 in such cases was not available. 30. It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the agreement which was entered into between the Trust and the Builder was required to be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act as per Section 17 read with section 49 of the Registration Act as applicable in U.P. and section 3 read with section 54 of the TP Act. We decline to entertain and examine the submissions as it would not be proper to do so in the present proceedings and as effect of non-registration and validity of registration made subsequently has been questioned in Writ Petition [C] No.38596/2013 pending consideration before the High Court of Allahabad. Thus, it is for the High Court to adjudicate upon the aforesaid questions.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length, we are of the considered opinion that it was a misadventure on the part of the Builder to file a writ petition for the kind of reliefs prayed for and that too could not have been entertained by the Bench at21 acres of land, out of the total of 63.45 acres which was mortgaged to HUDCO as item No.6, had been exchanged by the Trust with Avas Evam Vikas Parishad. Thus, the exchange was with the property which was under mortgage with HUDCO and the exchange deed had been deposited by the Trust with HUDCO on 11.7.2011. Before the Debt Recovery Officer, New Delhi, prayer has been made by the Builder to sell property Nos.1 to 5 and not to sell property No.6 with respect to which he has entered into an agreement with the Trust.Though, there is serious dispute between the parties to the lis whether the said land is unencumbered, finding has been given by the High Court that 21 acres of land is unencumbered. The High Court could not have treated 21 acres of land as unencumbered one out of 63.45 acres. It was not open to the High Court to enter into the aforesaid arena, which of the property is encumbered and to be sold in realization of debt is the outlook of the Recovery Officer, DRT, Delhi, where the recovery proceedings are pending, including the objections preferred by the Builder.13. In our opinion, it was not open to the Builder to file a writ application for the aforesaid reliefs. Though the second relief had been abandoned at the time of final arguments but the first relief could not have been granted without going into the said question. The High Court in writ jurisdiction has made a declaration that the property 21 acres of land is unencumbered. The High Court could not have adjudicated on the property rights under the guise of directing Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land and give finding that it was unencumbered land. The High Court has erred in law in giving a finding on merits on effect of exchange and that section 70 of TP Act is not applicable.We could have decided the aforesaid question finally. However, we refrain from doing so as, in our opinion, it was not open to the High Court to take up these questions under writ jurisdiction and to declare the properties as unencumbered. It was for the parties to agitate the questions before the DRT where the recovery proceedings are pending at the instance of HUDCO with whom the property had been mortgaged by the Trust.15. Prima facie, we are of the view that on the strength of the agreement to sell, particularly when possession had not been handed over to the Builder, it was not open to him to file a writ application for demarcation of the property as unencumbered property or otherwise. What was sought to be achieved by filing a writ petition, was to get rid of the proceedings pending before the Recovery Officer, DRT at Delhi, and to save land at serial No.6 from being sold which includes 21 acres of land, and an attempt was made to get the 21 acres of land declared as unencumbered one. As a matter of fact, such disputed questions with respect to the properties inter se between the Builder and the Trust as to demarcation, writ petition could not be said to be appropriate remedy, particularly when the order passed by the Recovery Officer, DRT, was not in question and the order passed by the DRT, Delhi, could not have been questioned before the Lucknow Bench of High Court ofthe 21 acres of land had been given to the Trust, Avas Evam Vikas Parishad had nothing to do with that land. This, it was a wholly misconceived venture on the part of the Builder to ask Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to demarcate the land given to the Trust, particularly when the Parishad was not having any housing scheme with respect to the land which had been given to the Trust. Thus, filing of the writ petition at Lucknow Bench was totally uncalled for and the propriety required that it should not have been entertained at Lucknow Bench. Merely because the transfer petition filed in this court for transfer of case was withdrawn and the direction was issued by the Chief Justice of High Court to decide at an early date, would not confer jurisdiction on Bench at Lucknow, all the questions had been left open to be agitated at the time of hearing. In our opinion, Bench at Lucknow ought not to have entertained the petition as it lacked the jurisdiction.Apart from that, we find that there is no merit in the submission that the Housing Board could have demarcated the land in exercise of powers within the purview of section 15 of the Act of 1965. The objective of the Act of 1965 is to tackle the housing and development problems of urban areas.It is apparent from the scheme of the Adhiniyam of 1965 that the provisions contained in section 15(1)(m) are not to be read in isolation but with reference to the objectives of the Adhiniyam of 1965 and its functions relating to housing and development issues.It was also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the agreement which was entered into between the Trust and the Builder was required to be registered under the provisions of the Registration Act as per Section 17 read with section 49 of the Registration Act as applicable in U.P. and section 3 read with section 54 of the TP Act. We decline to entertain and examine the submissions as it would not be proper to do so in the present proceedings and as effect ofand validity of registration made subsequently has been questioned in Writ Petition [C] No.38596/2013 pending consideration before the High Court of Allahabad. Thus, it is for the High Court to adjudicate upon the aforesaid questions.