Case: Krishna Biharilal Vs. Gulabchand Am Ors

that Pattobai had an absolute estate in a portion of the suit properties; this cannot be said to be a representation of a fact and therefore the same cannot form any basis for invoking the rule of estoppel. We are unable to accept this contention. From the facts set out earlier, it is clear that Bulakichand claimed the entire estate for himself after the death of Jwalaprasad. If the contention of Bulakichand is correct, as we must assume for the purpose of this case, then Pattobai would have been entitled to enjoy the entire properties during her lifetime. But she gave up her right in a substantial portion of those properties on the representation by the defendants that she can take a portion of the suit properties absolutely. This is a representation of a fact and not of law. The representation is that the defendants were willing to confer on Pattobai an absolute right in a portion of the suit properties if she gave up her right in the remaining properties. Pattobai relied on that representation and gave up her claim in respect of a substantial portion of the properties included in the earlier suit. Hence the plaintiffs particularly Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal who alone were the reversioners to the estate of Bulakichand on the date of the death of Pattobai, are estopped from contending that they are entitled to succeed to the properties given to Pattobai. The other plaintiffs have no independent right of their own in the properties with which we are concerned. In Dhyan Singhs case, 1952 SCR 478 = (AIR 1952 SC 145 ) (supra) this Court ruled that even if an award made is invalid, the persons who were parties to that award are estopped from challenging the validity of the award or from going behind the award in a subsequent litigation. In T. V. R. Subbu Chettys Family Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar, (1961) 3 SCR 624 = (AIR 1981 SC 797), this Court ruled that if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponent at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually opens. At the time of the compromise Lakshmichand and the Ganeshilal were the nearest presumptive reversioners. They must be deemed to have known their rights under law. Under the compromise they purported to give a portion of the suit properties absolutely to Pattobai, evidently in consideration of her giving up her claim in respect of the other properties. They cannot be now permitted to resile from the compromise and claim a right inconsistent with the one embodied in the compromise. They cannot advance their case by impleading their sons as co-plaintiffs. Their sons can only claim through them. 7. For the first time in this Court it was urged that the plea of estoppel was not available to the defendant as no such plea had been taken in the pleadings. It is true that no specific plea of estoppel had been taken in the written statement filed by the defendant. But he had definitely stated in paragraph 14 of his written statement that the plaintiffs are bound by the compromise and have no right to deny the right of Pattobai over the whole of the properties sold to him. One of the issue raised in the suit (Issue No. 4 ) is :"Are the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 bound by the terms of compromise filed in Civil Original Suit No. 3 of S. Y. 1991 of the High Court? If so what is its effect?? This issue is broad enough to cover the plea of estoppel. The plea of estoppel had been urged and considered by all the Courts without any objection from the plaintiffs. They cannot be now permitted to contend that the defendant had not taken any specific plea of estoppel. 8. The next question that we have to consider is whether the compromise in question can be considered as a settlement of family disputes. It may be noted that Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal who along with Pattobai were the principal parties to the compromise were the grand-children of Parvati who was the aunt of Bulakichand. The parties to the earlier suit were near relations. The dispute between the parties was in respect of a certain property which was originally owned by their common ancestor namely Chhedilal. To consider a settlement as a family arrangement, it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong to one family. As observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi, (1965) 3 SCR 841 at pp. 850 and 851 = (AIR 1966 SC 323 at pp. 328 and 329) the word "family" in the context of the family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangement - see Ramcharan Dass case 1965-3 SCR 841 = (AIR 1966 SC 323 ) (supra). 9. The Courts lean strongly in favour of the family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them all - see Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram and anr. 10. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that in view of the compromise entered into between the parties in 1941, the suits from which these appeals arise are not maintainable. In that view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the alienations were effected for valid necessity, a question that has not been gone into finally.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]4. The ordinary rule of construction of a document is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in the document. The compromise deed specifically says that the properties given to Pattobai were to be enjoyed by her as "Malik Mustakil. The meaning of the expression "Malik Mustakil" an urdu word, has come up for consideration before this Court in some cases. In Dhyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, 1952 SCR 478   = (AIR 1952 SC 145  ) this Court ruled that the words Malik Mustikal" were strong, clear and unambiguous and if those words are not qualified by other words and circumstances appearing in the same document, the Courts must hold that the estate given is an absolute one. A similar view was taken by the Judicial Committee in Bishunath Prasad Singh v. Chandika Prasad Kumari 60 Ind App 56 = (AIR 1933 PC 67  ). The circumstances under which the compromise was entered into as well as the language used in the deed do not in any manner go to indicate that the estate given to Pattobai was anything other than an absolute estate5. The Letters Patent Bench of the High Court held that the compromise entered into was an illegal compromise. It came to that conclusion on the basis that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her own rights by entering into a compromise in a suit. But the High Court overlooked the fact that this was not a compromise entered into with third parties. It was a compromise entered into with the presumptive reversioners. Further at no stage the plaintiffs had pleaded that the compromise entered into in 1941 was an illegal compromise. The plaintiffs took no such plea in the plaint. There was no issue relating to the validity of the compromise. Hence the High Court was not justified in going into the validity of the compromise. Further even if the compromise was an invalid one, the parties to the compromise are estopped from challenging the impugned alienations: see Dhyan Singhs case, 1952 SCR 478   = (AIR 1952 SC 145  ) (supra)6. This takes us to the question ofestoppel.As seen earlier, the trial Court, the first appellate Court as well as the learned single Judge of the High Court have concurrently come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are estopped from challenging the impugned alienations. But the Letters Patent Bench took a different view. Its conclusion as mentioned earlier, proceeded on the basis that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her own estate by entering into a compromise with others. It is well settled that a Hindu widow cannot enlarge her estate by entering into a compromise with third parties to the prejudice of the ultimate reversioners. But the same will not be true if the compromise is entered into with persons who ultimately become the reversionersBut this argument overlooks the fact that according to Pattobai she was entitled to enjoy the entire properties included in the earlier suit during her lifetime; but under the compromise a fraction of those properties were given to her absolutely: that being so the plaintiffs are estopped from backing out of that compromiseWe are unable to accept this contention. From the facts set out earlier, it is clear that Bulakichand claimed the entire estate for himself after the death of Jwalaprasad. If the contention of Bulakichand is correct, as we must assume for the purpose of this case, then Pattobai would have been entitled to enjoy the entire properties during her lifetime. But she gave up her right in a substantial portion of those properties on the representation by the defendants that she can take a portion of the suit properties absolutely. This is a representation of a fact and not of law. The representation is that the defendants were willing to confer on Pattobai an absolute right in a portion of the suit properties if she gave up her right in the remaining properties. Pattobai relied on that representation and gave up her claim in respect of a substantial portion of the properties included in the earlier suit. Hence the plaintiffs particularly Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal who alone were the reversioners to the estate of Bulakichand on the date of the death of Pattobai, are estopped from contending that they are entitled to succeed to the properties given to Pattobai. The other plaintiffs have no independent right of their own in the properties with which we are concernedIn Dhyan Singhs case, 1952 SCR 478   = (AIR 1952 SC 145  ) (supra) this Court ruled that even if an award made is invalid, the persons who were parties to that award are estopped from challenging the validity of the award or from going behind the award in a subsequent litigation. In T. V. R. Subbu Chettys Family Charities v. M. Raghava Mudaliar, (1961) 3 SCR 624   = (AIR 1981 SC 797), this Court ruled that if a person having full knowledge of his rights as a possible reversioner enters into a transaction which settles his claim as well as the claim of the opponent at the relevant time, he cannot be permitted to go back on that arrangement when reversion actually opens. At the time of the compromise Lakshmichand and the Ganeshilal were the nearest presumptive reversioners. They must be deemed to have known their rights under law. Under the compromise they purported to give a portion of the suit properties absolutely to Pattobai, evidently in consideration of her giving up her claim in respect of the other properties. They cannot be now permitted to resile from the compromise and claim a right inconsistent with the one embodied in the compromise. They cannot advance their case by impleading their sons as. Their sons can only claim through themIt is true that no specific plea of estoppel had been taken in the written statement filed by the defendant. But he had definitely stated in paragraph 14 of his written statement that the plaintiffs are bound by the compromise and have no right to deny the right of Pattobai over the whole of the properties sold to himOne of the issue raised in the suit (Issue No. 4 ) is :"Are the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 bound by the terms of compromise filed in Civil Original Suit No. 3 of S. Y. 1991 of the High Court? If so what is its effect??This issue is broad enough to cover the plea ofestoppel.It may be noted that Lakshmichand and Ganeshilal who along with Pattobai were the principal parties to the compromise were then of Parvati who was the aunt of Bulakichand. The parties to the earlier suit were near relations. The dispute between the parties was in respect of a certain property which was originally owned by their common ancestor namely Chhedilal. To consider a settlement as a family arrangement, it is not necessary that the parties to the compromise should all belong to one family. As observed by this Court in Ram Charan Das v. Girija Nandini Devi, (1965) 3 SCR 841     at pp. 850 and 851 = (AIR 1966 SC 323   at pp. 328 and 329) the word "family" in the context of the family arrangement is not to be understood in a narrow sense of being a group of persons who are recognised in law as having a right of succession or having a claim to a share in the property in dispute. If the dispute which is settled is one between near relations then the settlement of such a dispute can be considered as a family arrangementsee Ramcharan Dass case3 SCR 841   = (AIR 1966 SC 323  ) (supra)9. The Courts lean strongly in favour of the family arrangements to bring about harmony in a family and do justice to its various members and avoid in anticipation future disputes which might ruin them allsee Sahu Madho Das v. Pandit Mukand Ram and anr10. For the reasons mentioned above we are of the opinion that in view of the compromise entered into between the parties in 1941, the suits from which these appeals arise are not maintainable. In that view, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the alienations were effected for valid necessity, a question that has not been gone into finally.