Case: Begulla Bapi Raju Etc Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh Etc

defined in s.3 (i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act. It reads:"3(i) holding means the entire land held by a person, -(i) as an owner;(ii) as a limited owner;(iii)as a usufructuary mortgage;(iv) as a tenant;(v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise, or in one or more of such capacities;and the expression to hold land shall be construed accordingly.Explanation:-Where the same land is held by one person in one capacity and by another person in any other capacity, such land shall be included in the holding of both such persons."Dealing with the expressions held the Court observed:"The word held is not defined in the Act. We have, therefore, to go by the dictionary meaning of the term. According to Oxford Dictionary held means: to possess to be the owner or holder or tenant of; keep possession of; occupy. Thus, held connotes both ownership as well as possession . And in the context of the definition it is not possible to interpret the term held only in the sense of possession. For example, if a land is held by an owner and also by a tenant or by a person in possession pursuant to a contract for sale, the holding will be taken to be the holding of all such persons. It obviously means that an owner who is not an actual possession will also be taken to be a holder of the land. If there was any doubt in this behalf, the same has been dispelled by the explanation attached to the definition of the term holding. The explanation clearly contemplates that the same land can be the holding of two different persons holding the land in two different capacities. The respondent in view of the definition certainly is holding as an owner, although he is not in possession."Shri Phadke, however, contends that s. 3(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act being unreasonable is ultra vires because the same land cannot be the land of the transferor as well as of the transferee and that Mohd. Ashrafuddins case (supra) requires reconsideration. That case has taken into consideration the various relevant provisions of the Act and the Court came to the conclusion the same land can be the land of the transferor as well as the transferee in view of the definition of the term holding in s. 3(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Act and in our opinion the view taken in that case is fully warranted by the provisions of the Act. We are not persuaded to accept the contention that the case requires re-consideration.This leads us to the last point but not the least in importance, in that the petitioners have bee n deprived of a substantial portion of their holding in the form of surplus land and thereby they have been deprived of their livelihood affecting their right to live, which is violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution. In support of this contention strong reliance was placed on the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(1) which has given a new dimension to Art. 21 of the Constitution. It was held in that case that right to live is not merely confined to physical existence, but it includes within its ambit the right to live with basic human dignity and the State cannot deprive anyone of this valuable right. It was further submitted that s. 3(f) of the Andhra Pradesh Act with the explanation added to it is destructive of Art. 21 and, therefore, violative of the basic structure of the Constitution. This point is also covered by two decisions of this Court. In re Sant Ram(2) dealing with Art. 21 of the Constitution a Bench of Five Judges of this Court held:"The argument that the word "life" in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes "livelihood" has only to be stated to be rejected.""The same view was reiterated by a Bench of three Judges in A. V. Nachane v. Union of India(3). In that case the validity of the Life Insurance Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1981 (I of 1981) and the Life Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Bonus and Dearness Allowance) Rules, 1981, were challenged on several grounds including Art. 21 of the Constitution and the Court dealing with this aspect of the matter quoted with approval the case of Sant Ram (supra) in the following words:"As regards Article 21, the first premise of the argument that the word life in that Article includes livelihood was considered and rejected in In re Sant Ram."15. Shri Phadke, however, brushed these cases aside on the simple ground that they are not relevant for the decision of the question whether the right to live includes the right to live with human dignity, and the decision on Maneka Gandhis case (supra) must be deemed to be the correct exposition of the law on the subject. The contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning of Art. 21 of the Constitution was repel led in these two cases and Maneka Gandhis case did not take into consideration the case of Sant Ram (supra). These cases, therefore, still hold the field.16. Besides, the petitioners have been deprived of their holding in the form of surplus land but it was only for the purpose of giving relief to the downtrodden and the poor agricultural labourers. The surplus land would vest in the State and the State in its turn would give it to the poor and the downtrodden and thus such a deprivation will be protected under Art. 39 of Directive Principles. The case of Maneka Gandhi (supra), in our opinion, is not relevant for the decision of the point under consideration.The counsel for the petitioners in other cases adopted the same argument of Shri Phadke.17. Having given our best consideration to the questions involved in the cases we find no infirmity in any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act.Fo

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]It will thus be clear that the ceiling area in case of an individual who is not a member of the family unit is equivalent to one standard holding and so also in the case of a family unit with not more than five members the ceiling area is the same. But if the family unit consisted of more than five members the ceiling area would stand increased by one-fifth of one standard holding for every additional member of the family unit, subject, however, to the maximum limit of two standard holdings. In view of the explanation added to s. 4 the land held by all the members of the family unit shall be aggregated for the purpose of computing the holding of the family unit. Obviously, therefore, where a family unit consisted of father, mother, and minor sons or daughters the land held by all these persons would have to be clubbed together and then ceiling area limit applied to the aggregate holding. No distinction has been made in the definition of a family unit between a divided minor son an undivided minor son. Both stand on the same footing and a divided minor son is as much a member of the family unit as an undivided minor son. Family unit is not to be confused with joint family.The contention of Shri Phadke is that the definition of various terms as given in s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Act opens with the words."In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires."According to the learned counsel the context otherwise requires that the word minor in s. 3 (f) cannot include a divided minor son. Section 4 (2), argued the learned counsel, deals with the ceiling area of a family unit and s. 4 (3) deals with the ceiling area of an individual who is not a member of a family unit. A divided minor son, submits the counsel, is an individual and is no longer a member of the family unit in as much as a partition has not only the effect of division of the property but a complete severance from membership of the joint family. Thus a minor who is separated under a partition deed cannot be a member of the family unit but becomes anorder to attract the provisions of cl. (iv) of s. 5 the petitioners have to establish that the Government by notification has declared a particular area to be a drought prone-area. The petitioners were given an opportunity to pro duce the notification which they have failed to do and now the petitioners seek that they should be given an opportunity to produce the specific notification as and when they are able to procure the same. We are not inclined to give such a blank-cheque to the petitioners to produce the required notification as and when they like. Indeed they should have raised a contention to that effect before the High Court and should have produced the necessary notification but that they did not do. Even before this Court they have not been able to produce the specific notification issued by the Government. Under the circumstances they cannot be allowed to urge this point for want to necessary foundation for the argument. We also decline to accede to their request that they may be allowed to produce the required Government notification according to their sweet will and as and when they are able to produce thenow take up the third ground that the definition of family unit under s. 3 (f), as interpreted by the High Court is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. This point is also covered by a decision of this Court in Seth Nand Lal &Anr. v. State of Haryana &Ors.(1) and the Court repelled the argument firstly on the ground that it was saved by the protective umbrella under Art. 31A and Art. 31B of the Constitution and also on other considerations as will be evident from the followinghas be en pointed out that adopting family as a unit as against an individual was considered necessary as that would reduce the scope for evasion of law by effecting mala fide partitions and transfers since such transactions are usually made in favour of family members that normally in rural agricultural set up in our country the family is the operative unit and all the lands of a family constitute a single operational holding and that therefore ceiling should be related to the capacity of a family to cultivate the lands personally. It has been pointed out that keeping all these aspects in view the concept of family was artificially defined and double standard for fixing ceiling, one for the primary unit and other for the adult son living with the family was adopted In fact, a provision like s. 4(3) which makes for the augmentation of the permissible area for a family when the adult so ns do not own or hold lands of their own but are living with the family has one virtue, that it ensures such augmentation in the case of every family irrespective of by what personal law it is governed and no discrimination is made between major sons governed by different systems of personal laws. So far as an adult son living separately from the family is concerned, he is rightly regarded as a separate unit who will have to file a separate declaration in respect of his holding under s. 9 of the Act and since he is living separately and would not be contributing his capacity to the family to cultivate the family lands personally, there is no justification for increasing the permissible area of the primary unit of the family. The case of an unmarried daughter or daughters living with the family, counsel pointed out, was probably considered to be a rare case and it was presume d that daughters would in normal course get married and would become members of their husbands units and that is why no separate provision was made for giving additional land for every unmarried major daughter living with the family. On the materials placed and the initial presumption of constitutionality, we find considerable force in this submission. It is, therefore, not possible to strike down an enactment particularly the enactment dealing with agrarian reform which has been put on the Statutes Book with the avowed purpose of bringing about equality or rather reducing the inequality between the haves and the have-nots, as being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution simply because it has failed to make a provision for what was regarded as an exceptional case or a rare contingency. In our view, the material furnished on behalf of the State Government by way of justification for adopting an artificial definition of family and a double standard for fixing ceiling is sufficient to rebel the attack on these provisions under Art.fully concur with the view of thePhadke, however, brushed these cases aside on the simple ground that they are not relevant for the decision of the questionwhether the right to live includes the right to live with human dignity, and the decision on Maneka Gandhis case (supra) must be deemed to be the correct exposition of the law on the subject.The contention that life includes livelihood within the meaning of Art. 21 of the Constitution was repel led in these two cases and Maneka Gandhis case did not take into consideration the case of Sant Ram (supra). These cases, therefore, still hold thethe petitioners have been deprived of their holding in the form of surplus land but it was only for the purpose of giving relief to the downtrodden and the poor agricultural labourers. The surplus land would vest in the State and the State in its turn would give it to the poor and the downtrodden and thus such a deprivation will be protected under Art. 39 of Directive Principles. The case of Maneka Gandhi (supra), in our opinion, is not relevant for the decision of the point under consideration.The counsel for the petitioners in other cases adopted the same argument of Shrigiven our best consideration to the questions involved in the cases we find no infirmity in any of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act.