Case: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. P.P. Singh &amp; Another

respondent. The third judge might (sic not) be justified in correcting the date with effect from which the respondent would compulsorily retire, but that is a very minor issue and would not, in our opinion, make the decision invalid.24. In regard to the case of the other respondent, namely, K. Rajeswaran, the High Court took the view that the constitution of the Review Committee by the Chief Judge and not by the Full Court was illegal. We are unable to accept the view of the High Court. We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a Review Committee or an Administrative Committee. But in one respect the High Court is, in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of the Review Committee should have been placed before a meeting of the judges. In the case of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review Committee was not placed before the Full Court Meeting. Nor is there any material to show that the same was circulated to the judges. In that sense, the recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal." 36. Furthermore, the terminology consultation used in Rule 15 having regard to purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meaning. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3) to consult is defined as to discuss something together, to deliberate Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume 16A, Ed. 1956, page 1242) also says that the word consult is frequently defined as meaning to discuss something together, or to deliberate. By giving an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the purpose thereof is to enable the Judges to make their respective points of view known to the others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their view. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the Judges present in the meeting of the Full Court were supplied with all the requisite documents and had full opportunity to deliberate upon the Agenda in question.37. There is another aspect of the matter which may require consideration. For all intent and purport the report of the two Judges Committee has been approved by the Full Court. Once approved, it terminated into a decision of the Full Court itself. In the instant case even the Governor has acted upon the recommendations of the High Court. The writ petitioner-first respondents herein did not question the appointments of the appointees not the High Court. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that for all intent and purport the opinion of the two Judges Committee received approval at the hands of the Full Court.38. The High Court, in our opinion, further committed a manifest error in arriving at its conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that Rule 15 does not postulate the prior approval of the Full Court in relation to any action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice.39. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it disapproved it losses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Another vs. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. and Another [(1995) Supp (3) SCC 456]. In the instant case both the aforementioned requirements have been fulfilled.40. There is another aspect of the matter. In terms of Rule 2(2) of the Rules, the decision of the Full Court would have a retrospective effect and retroactive operation.41. In any view of the matter, even n a case where the initial action is illegal, the same can be ratified by a body competent therefor. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court at all. In Sri Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta vs. The Union of India [(1973) 2 SCC 543] this Court held: ".....Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorized, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on December 17, 1953...." 42. (See also Marathwada University vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan [(1989) 3 SCC 132 para 28], Babu Verghese and Others vs. Bar Council of Kerala and Others [(1999) 3 SCC 422 para 35] and Barnard vs. National Dock Labour Board [(1953) 1 All ER 1113]). 43. In Orissa Small Industries Corpn. Ltd and Another vs. Narasingha Charan Mohanty and Others (supra) where upon the learned counsel has placed strong reliance, this Court held: "...That apart, the Court is not entitled to assess the respective merit of the candidates for adjudging their suitability for being promoted and the only right the employee has is a right of consideration. The said right of consideration not having been infringed in the present case, the High Court was not justified in issuing the impugned direction for consideration of his case......." 44. The said decision, therefore, mutilates against the contentions of the respondents. 45. Furthermore, the first respondent herein in these cases Shri P.P. Singh, Shri G.P. Pandey has been granted selection scale in RHJS with effect from 1.8.2000 and Shri P.K. Bhatia has bee given with effect from 29.3.2000. Shri P.P. Singh has also retired from service on superannuation.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]22. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, clearly erred in arriving at the aforementioned finding that the constitution of the committee was illegal.Although Rule 15 provides that all the Judges shall be consulted in the matters enumerated therein but Rule 18 provides for the mode and manner thereof.28. If such consultation is to be made by circulation, undoubtedly, the relevant documents are required to be circulated to all the Judges. In the event, however, such consultation is to be effect by placing the matter before a Full Court, all the Judges are therefor invited but the same would not mean that in the event, one or more Judge (s) does /do not attend the Full Court, the resolution passed by it shall be invalid. Rule 29 provides for a quorum. In the case of a meeting of the Judges of the court, the quorum will be complete if one-half or more of the Judges attend the same. Consultation with all the Judges would, thus, not mean that even if some of the Judges do not choose to make themselves available in a Full Court Meeting, consultation with all the Judges shall not be complete.29. We may notice that even in the Full Court meeting held on 26th November, 1966 all the Honble Judges of the High Court were not present.30. The Committee was constituted for the purpose of considering the cases of concerned officers. It is not and cannot be the case or the contention of the writ petitions that even for the purpose of considering the case of the eligible judicial officers at the threshold, it was absolutely necessary to place the matter before the Full Court. The Acting Chief Justice constituted the Committee for a specific purpose. The Committee merely submitted its opinion which was subject to approval by the Full Court. Once the opinion of the matter is approved by the Full Court, in our opinion, it must be held that there had been a compliance of Rule 15 of the Rules.31. Interpretation of a Statute depends upon the text and context thereof. A Statute should be interpreted having regard to the purpose and object for which the same was made. The Chief Justice of a High Court although first amongst the Judges, by the nature of office he holds, he is the head of the State Judiciary. Authorisation by the Full Court in favour of the Chief Justice to constitute a Committee and / or take actions for the subordinate judiciary must be viewed from that context. Rule 15 of the Rules provides for such matters, which require consultations with the other Judges of the High Court.32. Question of consultation with the Judges would not arise unless the subject matter therefor is identified. It is for Honble the Chief Justice of the High Court to identify such matters and place the same before the Full Court with relevant papers and documents.33. It is, therefore, axiomatic that not only the Chief Justice of High Court was free to initiate any proceedings and obtain the opinion of a Committee of Judges on such matters and the only legal requirement therefor is to place such proposals together with the opinion of the Committee before the Judges of the High Court so that the matter can be fully thrashed out. Once the Full Court approves the recommendations made by the Committee of Judges, it becomes decision of the Court which could be sent to the Governor for acting thereupon.Furthermore, the terminology consultation used in Rule 15 having regard to purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meaning. In Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3) to consult is defined as to discuss something together, to deliberate Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume 16A, Ed. 1956, page 1242) also says that the word consult is frequently defined as meaning to discuss something together, or to deliberate. By giving an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the purpose thereof is to enable the Judges to make their respective points of view known to the others and discuss and examine the relative merits of their view. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the Judges present in the meeting of the Full Court were supplied with all the requisite documents and had full opportunity to deliberate upon the Agenda in question.37. There is another aspect of the matter which may require consideration. For all intent and purport the report of the two Judges Committee has been approved by the Full Court. Once approved, it terminated into a decision of the Full Court itself. In the instant case even the Governor has acted upon the recommendations of the High Court. The writ petitioner-first respondents herein did not question the appointments of the appointees not the High Court. Thus, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that for all intent and purport the opinion of the two Judges Committee received approval at the hands of the Full Court.38. The High Court, in our opinion, further committed a manifest error in arriving at its conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that Rule 15 does not postulate the prior approval of the Full Court in relation to any action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice.39. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it disapproved it losses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Another vs. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. and Another [(1995) Supp (3) SCC 456]. In the instant case both the aforementioned requirements have been fulfilled.40. There is another aspect of the matter. In terms of Rule 2(2) of the Rules, the decision of the Full Court would have a retrospective effect and retroactive operation.41. In any view of the matter, even n a case where the initial action is illegal, the same can be ratified by a body competent therefor. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court at all.Furthermore, the first respondent herein in these cases Shri P.P. Singh, Shri G.P. Pandey has been granted selection scale in RHJS with effect from 1.8.2000 and Shri P.K. Bhatia has bee given with effect from 29.3.2000. Shri P.P. Singh has also retired from service on superannuation.