Case: P. J. Irani Vs. The State Of Madras

legitimately entitled to be."The learned Judges of the High Court held that the reasons which led the Government to grant the exemption were not those which were countenanced by the policy or purpose of the Act and that the order of exemption was, therefore, invalid. In doing so the learned Judges said:"Reasons 1, 2, and 4 go together and have reference to the order of the High Court in 1940 directing the Receivers to execute a lease for seven years to the appellant and after the expiry of that period to grant a lease for fourteen years to the second respondents father. It is undoubtedly true that but for the application of the Act, the second respondents father would have obtained possession of the premises after the expiry of lease in favour of the appellant. That could be said of thousands of cases in which the leases in favour of tenants have expired and, but for the Act the owners would be entitled to obtain possession of the demised premises. If this circumstance alone is sufficient to exempt any premises from the operation of the Act, then the Act itself should be repealed ........... There is no policy or principle involved in this circumstance."We agree with the learned Judges in the view here expressed. The mere fact that the tenant continued in possession after the termination of the tenancy is by itself no ground why he should be evicted from the premises, because it is the very policy of the Act to protect the right of tenants to continue in possession of the premises after the termination of their term because of the great difficulty of their obtaining alternative accommodation. The circumstance, therefore, of the termination of the second respondents tenancy cannot afford a justification for Government to say that he deserved to be evicted. It the term had not expired the tenant would have been entitled to continue in possession even if the exemption were granted.18. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court had failed to notice that the present case was one where there was a contest between two tenants and not between a landlord and a tenant and that they erred in approximating the position of the appellant to that of the landlord. We see no force in this contention because a lessee of the reversion stands in the same position as a landlord and cannot have any higher rights, nor can the appellant derive any assistance from the fact that the second respondent declined to be a lessee for any term longer than seven years when that option was offered to him by the High Court in April-May 1940.The position of the second respondent cannot be worse than if he had taken a lease for a definite term of seven years with a covenant to restore possession at the end of the period. The fact that in May 1940, the second respondent had an option to take a lease for a longer term, but of which he did not avail himself, does not make any difference or render that a ground for withdrawing from him the protection of the statute.19. We also agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that ground No. 3 is not germane for granting an exemption. As was pointed out, "the important point to be considered by the Government was whether the appellant had no other theatres at which he could carry on the business which he was carrying on at the Gaiety theatre", and this they omitted to consider. The reason why the possession of the tenant whose term had expired was afforded statutory protection was his liability to secure alternative accommodation in which either to reside in the case of residential buildings or to carry on the business which he was carrying on in the case of non-residential buildings. This was therefore a relevant matter which the Government had failed to take into account. The High Court characterised reason No. 5 as really not a reason at all and we agree with this observation. The statute had admittedly conferred upon tenants, such as the second respondent the right to continue in possession after the termination of the lease in their favour and the fact that such a tenant had exercised the rights conferred upon him by statute was certainly not an improper conduct meriting his being deprived of the statutory protection afforded by S. 7.20. The learned Judges further pointed out that the order of Government was defective, in that it had not taken into account several relevant matters as for instance the second respondent expending considerable sums to carry out improvements to the theatre in 1949, etc. which bore upon the exercise of their power, and which if taken into account would have weighed against the grant of the exemption. In view however of the conclusion reached that the reasons assigned by Government for their order were not germane to the policy and purpose of the fact, we do not consider it necessary to pursue the matter further.21. The further point urged regarding the learned Judges of the High Court having erroneously constituted themselves into a Court of appeal need not detain us long.The short answer to it is that the learned Judges had not done so. The submission ignores the distinction between findings on facts which the Court in proceedings under Art. 226 must, save in very exceptional cases, accept as correct and the relevance of those facts for considering whether their establishment satisfied the grounds necessary for the exercise of the power vested in Government under S. 13 of the Act. For instance in the case on hand, no fact found by the Government or stated by them as the reason or reasons which induced them to grant the exemption were even challenged before the High Court, the only contention urged by the second respondent which was accepted by the High Court, being that these facts were irrelevant for justifying the order.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]Writ Appeal 28 of 1953 was thereafter dealt with on its merits and it was this examination which resulted in its being allowed In our opinion, therefore, the two judgments have to be read together and as really part of one proceeding ,though for convenience and with a view to define the scope of the arguments the Court expressed its opinion on the constitutional point at an earlier stage. We also consider that it is doubtful if an appeal would have lain from the judgment of the High Court dated October 23, 1953, and even assuming that it did in view of the matters which we have set out earlier, the respondent cannot be precluded from contesting the correctness of the conclusion of the High Court, by reason of his not having moved this Court under Art, 136 of the Constitution. We therefore consider that the respondent is entitled to support the judgment in his favour by attacking those portions of that judgment which are againstwas not possible for the statute itself to contemplate every such contingency and make specific provision therefor in the enactment. It was for this reason that a power of exemption in general terms was conferred on the State Government which however could be used not for the purpose of discriminating between tenant and tenant, but in order to further the policy and purpose of the Act which was, in the context of the present case, to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants. The learned Judges of the High Court, therefore, held that while s. 13 of the Act was constitutionally valid, any individual order of exemption passed by the Government could be the subject of judicial review by the Courts for finding out whether (a) it was discriminatory so as to offend Art. 14 of the Constitution. (b) the order was made on grounds which were germane or relevant to the policy and purpose of the Act, and (c) it was not otherwise mala fide.12. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the approach and conclusion of the learned Judges of the High Court to the consideration of the question of the constitutional validity of S. 13 of thethe High Court were right in their view that the order of exemption was passed for reasons which did not fall within the purpose for which the power was conferred by S. 13 of the Act the order itself would be one discriminatory of the second respondent as violating his fundamental right to equal protection of the laws. In such an event Art. 226 would certainly be available to set aside such an order which affected the fundamental right of the petitioner before the Court. Indeed, it was on the ground that individual orders passed by Government by virtue of the power conferred upon it by S. 13 of the Act were examinable by the Court for their violating Art. 14 that the constitutionality of S. 13 was upheld and in the circumstances no objection could, therefore, be taken to a judicial review of such individual orders. Besides even if the order did not violate Art. 14, still if the High Court were right in the view that the same was beyond the powers conferred on Government by S. 13 of the Act,we see no substance in the contention that the Court lacks power under Art. 226 to set aside as ultra vires order vitally affecting a persons right to statuary protection against eviction. We do not consider that immunity from interference by the Courts could be sought for orders which are plainly ultra vires merely because they were passed bona fide in the sense of being without indirect motive. Particularly so when the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not limited to the issue of writs falling under particular groupings, such as the certiorari, mandamus, etc., as these writs have been understood in England, but the power is general to issue any direction to the authorities, viz., for enforcement of fundamental rights as well for otherentire basis for upholding the constitutional validity of S. 13 of the Act and considering that it did not offend the equal protection of the law guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution was, that the discretion or the power conferred upon Government was not unguided, uncanalised or arbitrary but that it had to be exercised in accordance with the policy and object of the enactment gatherable from the preamble as well as its operative provisions. The order itself might on its face have shown that it conformed to this requirement in which event it would have been for the party challenging the validity of the order to establish to the satisfaction of the Court that it was mala fide or had been passed on grounds not contemplated by or extraneous to, the object and purpose of the enactment or the principles which should have governed the exercise of the power. For instance, if the exemption had been in favour of a particular class of buildings, say those belonging to charities - religious or secular - the classification would have been apparent in the very order of exemption. Where, however, the exemption granted is not of any class of buildings which would ex facie disclose a classification, but the exemption is of a specified building owned by A or in which B is a tenant, then prima facie it would be discriminatory and when the legality or the order is challenged, its intra vires character could be sustained only by disclosing the reasons which led to the passing of themere fact that the tenant continued in possession after the termination of the tenancy is by itself no ground why he should be evicted from the premises, because it is the very policy of the Act to protect the right of tenants to continue in possession of the premises after the termination of their term because of the great difficulty of their obtaining alternative accommodation. The circumstance, therefore, of the termination of the second respondents tenancy cannot afford a justification for Government to say that he deserved to be evicted. It the term had not expired the tenant would have been entitled to continue in possession even if the exemption were granted.We also agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that ground No. 3 is not germane for granting an exemption. As was pointed out, "the important point to be considered by the Government was whether the appellant had no other theatres at which he could carry on the business which he was carrying on at the Gaiety theatre", and this they omitted to consider. The reason why the possession of the tenant whose term had expired was afforded statutory protection was his liability to secure alternative accommodation in which either to reside in the case of residential buildings or to carry on the business which he was carrying on in the case of non-residential buildings. This was therefore a relevant matter which the Government had failed to take into account. The High Court characterised reason No. 5 as really not a reason at all and we agree with this observation. The statute had admittedly conferred upon tenants, such as the second respondent the right to continue in possession after the termination of the lease in their favour and the fact that such a tenant had exercised the rights conferred upon him by statute was certainly not an improper conduct meriting his being deprived of the statutory protection afforded by S. 7.20. The learned Judges further pointed out that the order of Government was defective, in that it had not taken into account several relevant matters as for instance the second respondent expending considerable sums to carry out improvements to the theatre in 1949, etc. which bore upon the exercise of their power, and which if taken into account would have weighed against the grant of the exemption. In view however of the conclusion reached that the reasons assigned by Government for their order were not germane to the policy and purpose of the fact, we do not consider it necessary to pursue the matter further.21. The further point urged regarding the learned Judges of the High Court having erroneously constituted themselves into a Court of appeal need not detain us long.The short answer to it is that the learned Judges had not done so. The submission ignores the distinction between findings on facts which the Court in proceedings under Art. 226 must, save in very exceptional cases, accept as correct and the relevance of those facts for considering whether their establishment satisfied the grounds necessary for the exercise of the power vested in Government under S. 13 of the Act. For instance in the case on hand, no fact found by the Government or stated by them as the reason or reasons which induced them to grant the exemption were even challenged before the High Court, the only contention urged by the second respondent which was accepted by the High Court, being that these facts were irrelevant for justifying the order.