Case: Dasin Bai @ Shanti Bai Vs. State Of Chhattisgarh

evidence. It therefore emerges that both the dying declarations are recorded by independent witnesses and the same give a true version of the occurrence as stated by the deceased. The dying declarations are themselves sufficient to hold the appellant guilty. The High Court has rightly interfered in an appeal against acquittal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. 12. For the factual situation before us, we find that there is consistency between the statements of Santosh Yadav (PW1), and Radheyshyam (PW3), who were present when Raju gave the oral dying declaration in the hospital, before he succumbed to the injuries. There is consistency in their statements, both stated that they reached the house of Dasin Bai on hearing the voice save-save. 13. Further, the appellant has alleged the dying declarations to be impossible to give as the deceased was not in a position to do so, as he had suffered burn injuries. However, this Court has rightly taken the following view in a situation as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent in Pothakamuri Srinivasulu v. State of A.P.,(2002) 6 SCC 399 , where this Court observed: The learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that for several reasons the dying declaration cannot be believed. She submitted that looking to the nature of injuries suffered by the deceased possibly she could not have spoken and must become unconscious instantaneously. However no such suggestion has been made to any of the witnesses including the two doctors who respectively conducted the medico-legal examination of the victim. On the contrary the three eye-witnesses have positively stated that the deceased was speaking when they had met soon after the incident. the victim had died two days after the incident. We cannot in the face of this positive evidence just assume that the injured must have become unconscious and speechless because of the injuries and discard on such assumption the dying declaration deposed to by the independent witnesses corroborated by the promptly lodged FIR. 14. Applying the ratio of the above mentioned cases to the present case, we find that the counsel for the appellant has argued on the same lines. Merely because the deceased suffered 70 per cent burns, this does not raise an assumption that he could not have given the oral dying declaration. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right in believing the oral dying declaration of the deceased as it did not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that the deceased could not give a dying declaration is devoid of merit. 15. We are of the opinion that present case also involves appreciation of circumstantial evidence and application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which unambiguously lays down the law with respect to any fact especially within the knowledge of a person. In State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254 , it was observed by this Court in respect of Section 106, that when there is any fact especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This Court held as follows: The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company with the deceased. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the Court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of the facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. 16. Further, while dealing with issue of cases resting on circumstantial evidence, where the presence of special knowledge is with the accused, this Court has reiterated time and again that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him by Section 106, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. 17. The same observation has again been given in Babu alias Balasubramaniam & Anr. v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2013) 8 SCC 60 , that appellant-1 could have by virtue of his special knowledge regarding the said facts offered an explanation from which a different inference could have been drawn. Since he has not done so, this circumstance adds up to other circumstances which substantiate the prosecution case. 18. The appellant/accused in her statement, recorded under Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code, has not given any explanation as to how the deceased was burnt and she even admits to be unaware of the name of the deceased. This is highly improbable and cast doubt on the innocence of the accused. She is unable to discharge the burden cast upon her by Section 106 of the Evidence Act, as it was within her special knowledge as to how the deceased came into the premises of her house. 19. The ground of defense taken by the appellant, that she did not have any motive to kill the deceased, is ill founded and does not break the chain of circumstances. Therefore, when facts are clear it is not necessary to have proof of motive or illwill to sustain conviction. (See Mulakh Raj & Ors. v. Staish Kumar & Ors., (1992) 3 SCC 43. 20. Further, with regard to the aspect of the witnesses, PW-1 and PW-3, who recorded the dying declaration, were neighbours of the accused and hence the Trial Court correctly held that they are not interested witnesses. The findings of the Trial Court also bring to light the fact that they had no animosity with the appellant, and were visiting her house only on the fateful night.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]12. For the factual situation before us, we find that there is consistency between the statements of Santosh Yadav (PW1), and Radheyshyam (PW3), who were present when Raju gave the oral dying declaration in the hospital, before he succumbed to the injuries. There is consistency in their statements, both stated that they reached the house of Dasin Bai on hearing the voice save-save13. Further, the appellant has alleged the dying declarations to be impossible to give as the deceased was not in a position to do so, as he had suffered burn injuries. However, this Court has rightly taken the following view in a situation as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent in Pothakamuri Srinivasulu v. State of A.P.,(2002) 6 SCC 399 ,14. Applying the ratio of the above mentioned cases to the present case, we find that the counsel for the appellant has argued on the same lines. Merely because the deceased suffered 70 per cent burns, this does not raise an assumption that he could not have given the oral dying declaration. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right in believing the oral dying declaration of the deceased as it did not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, the contention of the respondent that the deceased could not give a dying declaration is devoid of merit15. We are of the opinion that present case also involves appreciation of circumstantial evidence and application of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which unambiguously lays down the law with respect to any fact especially within the knowledge of a person16. Further, while dealing with issue of cases resting on circumstantial evidence, where the presence of special knowledge is with the accused, this Court has reiterated time and again that in a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him by Section 106, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him20. Further, with regard to the aspect of the witnesses, PW-1 and PW-3, who recorded the dying declaration, were neighbours of the accused and hence the Trial Court correctly held that they are not interested witnesses. The findings of the Trial Court also bring to light the fact that they had no animosity with the appellant, and were visiting her house only on the fateful night.