Case: Divisonal Manager, Rajasthan S.R.T.C Vs. Kamruddin

committed similar misconduct for the fifth time. It is also beyond any doubt or dispute that he had also been served with a letter of warning.10. The power of Labour Court and/or Industrial Tribunal in terms of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the quantum of punishment although cannot be denied, but it is also a well settled principle of law that the said power should be exercised judiciously. The Labour Court relied upon the decision of this Court in Bhagyo Mal (supra) wherein the High Court allowed back wages to the workman concerned. This Court in the facts and circumstances of the case found the order of the High Court to be self-contradictory, stating: "When the High Court had found that the respondent - employee deserved punishment on account of his misconduct, the High Court could not have rewarded the employee by granting him the back wages particularly when the Tribunal had converted the order of dismissal into that of the stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside that part of the order of the High Court whereby the respondent - employee has been given the benefit of back wages. The rest of the order is maintained." We fail to understand as to how the said decision advanced the case of the respondent. 11. The question with regard to imposition of appropriate punishment upon a conductor of a bus belonging to a corporation constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 came up for consideration before this Court in Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. B.S. Hullikatti [(2001) 2 SCC 574] , wherein it was held: "5. On the facts as found by the Labour Court and the High Court, it is evident that there was a short-charging of the fare by the respondent from as many as 35 passengers. We are informed that the respondent had been in service as a Conductor for nearly 22 years. It is difficult to believe that he did not know what was the correct fare which was to be charged. Furthermore, the appellant had during the disciplinary proceedings taken into account the fact that the respondent had been found guilty for as many as 36 times on different dates. Be that as it may, the principle of res ipsa loquitur, namely, the facts speak for themselves, is clearly applicable in the instant case. Charging 50 paise per ticket less from as many as 35 passengers could only be to get financial benefit by the Conductor. This act was either dishonest or was so grossly negligent that the respondent was not fit to be retained as a Conductor because such action or inaction of his is bound to result in financial loss to the appellant-Corporation.6. It is misplaced sympathy by the Labour Courts in such cases when on checking it is found that the Bus Conductors have either not issued tickets to a large number of passengers, though they should have, or have issued tickets of a lower denomination knowing fully well the correct fare to be charged. It is the responsibility of the Bus Conductors to collect the correct fare from the passengers and deposit the same with the Company. They act in a fiduciary capacity and it would be a case of gross misconduct if knowingly they do not collect any fare or the correct amount of fare." A three judge Bench of this Court in Regional Manager, RSRTC vs. Ghanshyam Sharma [(2002) 10 SCC 330] , reiterated the said principle, stating: "4. This Court in Karnataka SRTC v. B.S. Hullikatti has held that in such cases where the bus conductors carry passengers without ticket or issue tickets at a less rate than the proper rate, the said acts would inter alia amount to either being a case of dishonesty or of gross negligence and such conductors were not fit to be retained in service because such inaction or action on the part of the conductors results in financial loss to the Road Transport Corporation. This Court was firmly of the opinion that in cases like the present, orders of dismissal should not be set aside.5. Furthermore, we agree with the observations of the Single Judge in the present case that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the punishment of dismissal. Though under Section 11-A the Labour Court has jurisdiction and powers to interfere with the quantum of punishment, however the discretion has to be used judiciously. When the main duty or function of the conductor is to issue tickets and collect fare and then deposit the same with the Road Transport Corporation and when a conductor fails to do so, then it will be misplaced sympathy to order his reinstatement instead of dismissal." Recently in Uttaranchal Transport Corporation vs. Sanjay Kumar Nautiyal [2008 (12) SCC 131 ], Hullikatti (supra) has been followed. 12. Standing Order No. 36 whereto our attention has been drawn merely provides for different nature of penalties which can be imposed on a worker stating that penalties specified at Serial Nos.5 to 7 therein would be appealable. A corrigendum thereto was issued on 24.7.1982 by way of clarification with regard to the full route fare as contained in Circular No. 625 dated 5.6.1982. The said corrigendum has nothing to do with the nature or quantum of penalty. The same does not provide for a substitution of the penalty provided for in the Certified Standing Order. In any event, Certified Standing Order would prevail over such circulars.13. It may be true that in execution of the Award passed by the Labour Court, for a short time respondent was put back in service. This Court, however, as indicated hereinbefore, stayed the operation of the judgment by reason whereof Award as also the judgment of the High Court became non-operational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that by itself that may not be a ground to refrain ourselves from following the authoritative binding precedents.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. It is not a case where the misconduct against the respondent had not been proved. It is also not a case where the domestic enquiry was found to have been conducted in an unfair manner or contrary to the principles of natural justice. The services of the respondent had been terminated while the period of probation was not over. As a conductor, his performance during the period of probation was found to be unsatisfactory. It is not in dispute that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him while he was found to have committed similar misconduct for the fifth time. It is also beyond any doubt or dispute that he had also been served with a letter of warning.10. The power of Labour Court and/or Industrial Tribunal in terms of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to interfere with the quantum of punishment although cannot be denied, but it is also a well settled principle of law that the said power should be exercised judiciously.Standing Order No. 36 whereto our attention has been drawn merely provides for different nature of penalties which can be imposed on a worker stating that penalties specified at Serial Nos.5 to 7 therein would be appealable. A corrigendum thereto was issued on 24.7.1982 by way of clarification with regard to the full route fare as contained in Circular No. 625 dated 5.6.1982. The said corrigendum has nothing to do with the nature or quantum of penalty. The same does not provide for a substitution of the penalty provided for in the Certified Standing Order. In any event, Certified Standing Order would prevail over such circulars.13. It may be true that in execution of the Award passed by the Labour Court, for a short time respondent was put back in service. This Court, however, as indicated hereinbefore, stayed the operation of the judgment by reason whereof Award as also the judgment of the High Court became non-operational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that by itself that may not be a ground to refrain ourselves from following the authoritative binding precedents.