Case: Marathwada University Vs. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan

in this sentence, but not in subsequent ones, of inverted commas). The agent, in fact, has no authority to do what he does at the time he does it. Subsequently, however, the principal, on whose behalf, though without whose authority, the agent has acted, accepts the agents act, and adopts it, just as if there had been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly what the agent has done. The interesting point, which has given rise to considerable difficulty and dispute, is that ratification by the principal does not merely give validity to the agents unauthorised act as from the date of the ratification : it is antedated so as to take effect from the time of the agents act. Hence the agent is treated as having been authorised from the outset to act as he did. Ratification is equivalent to an antecedent authority" 26. In Bowstead on Agency (14th edn.) at p. 39 it is statedEvery act whether lawful or unlawful, which is capable of being done by means of an agent (except an act which is in its inception void) is capable of ratification by the person in whose name or on whose behalf it is done..... The words "lawful or unlawful", however, are included primarily to indicate that the doctrine can apply to torts. From them it would follow that a principal by ratification may retrospectively turn what was previously an act wrongful against the principle, e.g. an unauthorised sale, or against a third party, e.g. a wrongful distress, into a legitimate one; or become liable for the tort of another by ratifying. 27. These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot be ratified. 28. The counsel for the appellant, however, invited our attention to the case of Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India ((1973) 2 SCC 543 : (1974) 1 SCR 304 ). It was a case of termination of services of the Secretary of a Company. The Board of Directors decided to terminate the services of the Secretary. The Chairman of the Board of Directors in fact terminated his services. Subsequently, in the meeting of the Board of Directors the action taken by the Chairman was confirmed. In the suit instituted by the Secretary challenging the termination of his services, the court upheld on the principle that the action of the Chairman even though it was invalid initially, could be validated by ratification in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. Mathew, J. while considering this aspect of the matter, observed : (SCC pp. 546-47, para 14 : SCR pp. 307-08)Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the service of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validity terminated on December 17, 1953. The appellant was not entitled to the declaration prayed for by him and the trial court as well as the High Court was right in dismissing the claim. 29. These principles of ratification governing transactions of a company where the general body is the repository of all powers cannot be extended to the present case. We were also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board ((1953) 1 All ER 1113) and in particular the observation of Denning, L. J. : (All ER 1118 and 1119) "While an administrative function can often be delegated, a judicial function rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can delegate its functions, unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication. In Local Government Board v. Arlidge ((1915) AC 120 : 84 LJKB 72) the power to delegate was given by necessary implication, but there is nothing in this scheme authorising the board to delegate this function and it cannot be implied. It was suggested that it would be impracticable for the board to sit as a board to decide all these cases, but I see nothing impracticable in that. They have only to fix their quorum at two members and arrange for two members, one from each side, employers and workers, to be responsible for one week at a timeNext, it was suggested that, even if the board could not delegate their functions, at any rate they could ratify the actions of the port manager, but, if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the port manager, they can have no power to ratify what he had already done. The effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior command, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation, would be useless, so also is a ratification." 30. These observations again are of little assistance to us since we have already held that there was no prior delegation of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]22. This resolution, in our opinion, is basically faulty at least for two reasons. It may be recalled that the Executive Council without considering the report of Mr Chavan, wanted the Vice-Chancellor to take a decision thereon. It may also be noted that the Vice-Chancellor was present at the meeting of the Executive Council when the resolution was passed. He was given "full power to take a decision" which in the context, was obviously on the report of Mr Chavan, and not on any other matter or question. He said that he would take a decision in about a month. In our opinion, by the power delegated under the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor could either accept or reject the report with intimation to the Executive Council. He could not have taken any other action and indeed, he was not authorised to take any otherThe other infirmity in the said resolution goes deeper than what it appears. The resolution was not in harmony with the statutory requirement. Section 84 of the Act provides for delegation of powers and it states that any officer or authority of the University may by order, delegate his or its power (except power to make Ordinance and Regulations) to any other officer or authority subject to provisions of the Act and statutes. Section 24 (1)(xli) provides for delegation of power by the Executive Council. It states that the Executive Council may delegate any of its power (except power to make Ordinances) to the Vice-Chancellor or to any other officer subject to the approval of the Chancellor. (emphasis ours) The approval of the Chancellor is mandatory. Without such approval the power cannot be delegated to the Vice-Chancellor. The record does not reveal that the approval of the Chancellor was ever obtained. Therefore, the resolution which was not in conformity with the statutory requirement could not confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action against theBy this resolution, we are told that the Executive Council has ratified the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor. Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his agent. In Friedmans Law of Agency (5th edn.) Chapter 5 at p. 73, the principle of ratification has beenthe agent does on behalf of the principal is done at a time when the relation of principal and agent does not exist : (hence the use in this sentence, but not in subsequent ones, of inverted commas). The agent, in fact, has no authority to do what he does at the time he does it. Subsequently, however, the principal, on whose behalf, though without whose authority, the agent has acted, accepts the agents act, and adopts it, just as if there had been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly what the agent has done. The interesting point, which has given rise to considerable difficulty and dispute, is that ratification by the principal does not merely give validity to the agents unauthorised act as from the date of the ratification : it is antedated so as to take effect from the time of the agents act. Hence the agent is treated as having been authorised from the outset to act as he did. Ratification is equivalent to an antecedentIn Bowstead on Agency (14th edn.) at p. 39 it is statedEvery act whether lawful or unlawful, which is capable of being done by means of an agent (except an act which is in its inception void) is capable of ratification by the person in whose name or on whose behalf it is done..... The words "lawful or unlawful", however, are included primarily to indicate that the doctrine can apply to torts. From them it would follow that a principal by ratification may retrospectively turn what was previously an act wrongful against the principle, e.g. an unauthorised sale, or against a third party, e.g. a wrongful distress, into a legitimate one; or become liable for the tort of another byThese principles of ratification, apparently do not have any application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio void and cannot beThe counsel for the appellant, however, invited our attention to the case of Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India ((1973) 2 SCC 543 : (1974) 1 SCR 304 ). It was a case of termination of services of the Secretary of a Company. The Board of Directors decided to terminate the services of the Secretary. The Chairman of the Board of Directors in fact terminated his services. Subsequently, in the meeting of the Board of Directors the action taken by the Chairman was confirmed. In the suit instituted by the Secretary challenging the termination of his services, the court upheld on the principle that the action of the Chairman even though it was invalid initially, could be validated by ratification in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. Mathew, J. while considering this aspect of the matter, observed : (SCC pp. 546-47, para 14 : SCR pp. 307-08)Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the service of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validity terminated on December 17, 1953. The appellant was not entitled to the declaration prayed for by him and the trial court as well as the High Court was right in dismissing theThese principles of ratification governing transactions of a company where the general body is the repository of all powers cannot be extended to the present case. We were also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal inBarnard v. National Dock Labour Board ((1953) 1 All ER1113) and in particular the observation of Denning, L. J. : (All ER 1118 andan administrative function can often be delegated, a judicial function rarely can be. No judicial tribunal can delegate its functions, unless it is enabled to do so expressly or by necessary implication. In LocalGovernment Board v. Arlidge ((1915) AC 120 : 84 LJKB 72)the power to delegate was given by necessary implication, but there is nothing in this scheme authorising the board to delegate this function and it cannot be implied. It was suggested that it would be impracticable for the board to sit as a board to decide all these cases, but I see nothing impracticable in that. They have only to fix their quorum at two members and arrange for two members, one from each side, employers and workers, to be responsible for one week at a timeNext, it was suggested that, even if the board could not delegate their functions, at any rate they could ratify the actions of the port manager, but, if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the port manager, they can have no power to ratify what he had already done. The effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior command, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation, would be useless, so also is aThese observations again are of little assistance to us since we have already held that there was no prior delegation of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained