Case: Bai Hiragauri Vs. Abdul Kadar Mamadji &amp; Another

and disposed of together. The Trial court by its judgment dated the 17th November, 1960 held that the tenants were in arrears for more than the statutory six months; that the standard rent was the same as claimed by the landlady; that the tenants were liable to pay the municipal tax in addition and that in view of S. 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act, as applied to the Gujarat area, both the tenants were liable to be evicted.3. The tenants went in appeal to the City Civil Court. The appeals were heard together and the learned City Civil Judge who heard the appeals confirmed the findings and the decrees of the Trial Court. The appeals were disposed of on January 31, 1962. From this judgment the two tenants filed Civil Revision Applications to the High Court. The learned single Judge, who heard the Revision applications, relying upon a previous judgment of that court, held that since the rent was not "payable by the month" as required by Section 12 (3) (a) referred to above the cases fell within Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act and, therefore, decrees for eviction could not be passed. It is from that Order that the present appeals have been filed by the landlady by special leave.4. A preliminary objection seems to have been raised before the High Court on behalf of the landlady that a revision did not lie and under Section 29 of the Bombay Rent Act in its application to Gujarat, the Order passed by the City Civil Court was final and since no question under Section 115 C.P.C. arose the revision was not maintainable. This objection was rejected by the learned Judge who pointed out that under Section 29 (2) as it stood amended by Gujarat Act 18 of l965 the High Court had jurisdiction. Before that amendment the sub-section read, "No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-section (1)". But by the amendment the following was substituted therefor: "No further appeal shall lie against any decision in appeal under sub-section (1) but the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying himself that any such decision in appeal was according to law, call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit." In the opinion of the learned Judge having regard to the amended S. 29 (2) he could examine the decision as a whole and enquire as to whether the decision arrived at as a whole was according to law or not and the High Court was not confined merely to the authority to see whether there were any errors of law. Thus the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the decisions were not in accordance with law because, in his opinion, though the monthly rent was admittedly as claimed by the landlady, since the tenants were also liable to pay the municipal tax in addition, it could not be said that these were cases where the "rent was payable by the month" within the meaning of Section 12 (3) (a). It is not necessary to consider whether this view is correct because the present appeals must succeed on other points.5. It is obvious from the Judgment of the High Court that it interfered with the concurrent findings of the lower courts on the ground that it had jurisdiction to deal with the cases under Section 29 (2). It seems to have escaped the learned Judges notice that the revisions before him arose out of suits which had been filed in 1957. Therefore, though the revisions were heard after the 1965 amendment referred to above the revisions were not liable to be disposed of under the changed law. It has been held by this court in Keshavlal Jethalal v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas, (1968) 3 SCR 623 = (AIR 1968 SC 1336 ) that in a case like this in which the appellate decree had become final under the unamended Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act, it could not be set aside in exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 29 (2) the amendment having been made long after the appellate decree had become final. The High Court could deal with the cases only under its revisional powers under Section 115 C.P.C. The learned counsel for the tenants appearing before us conceded the position and requested that the cases may, therefore, be remanded to the High Court for being disposed of under Section 115 C.P.C.6. We do not think any useful purpose will be served by sending the cases back to the High Court. As already pointed out the learned Judge interfered in these cases only because he thought that he had jurisdiction to do so under Section 29 (2) as amended. It is obvious that he had recourse to that section because in view of the decided cases, he could not have interfered with the final decision of the City Civil Court under Section 115, C.P.C. The court in which the suits had been filed had jurisdiction to consider whether the suits fell within Section 12 (3) (a) or Section 12 (3) (b). Both the courts held on the facts that the cases fell under Section 12 (3) (a). Even if that finding was erroneous in law and we do not want to suggest that it was-the courts had jurisdiction and it cannot be said that that jurisdiction was exercised illegally or with material irregularity. The worst that could be said is that they had placed an erroneous construction on the relevant provisions. It has been held by this court in Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai, AIR 1966 SC 439 which was also a case under the same Rent Act that an erroneous construction placed upon a statute does not amount to exercising jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and would not furnish a ground for interference under Section 115 C.P.C. See also Abbasbhai v. Gulamnabi, AIR 1964 SC 1341 .

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]5. It is obvious from the Judgment of the High Court that it interfered with the concurrent findings of the lower courts on the ground that it had jurisdiction to deal with the cases under Section 29 (2). It seems to have escaped the learned Judges notice that the revisions before him arose out of suits which had been filed in 1957. Therefore, though the revisions were heard after the 1965 amendment referred to above the revisions were not liable to be disposed of under the changed law.We do not think any useful purpose will be served by sending the cases back to the High Court. As already pointed out the learned Judge interfered in these cases only because he thought that he had jurisdiction to do so under Section 29 (2) as amended. It is obvious that he had recourse to that section because in view of the decided cases, he could not have interfered with the final decision of the City Civil Court under Section 115, C.P.C. The court in which the suits had been filed had jurisdiction to consider whether the suits fell within Section 12 (3) (a) or Section 12 (3) (b). Both the courts held on the facts that the cases fell under Section 12 (3) (a). Even if that finding was erroneous in law and we do not want to suggest that itcourts had jurisdiction and it cannot be said that that jurisdiction was exercised illegally or with material irregularity. The worst that could be said is that they had placed an erroneous construction on the relevant provisions. It has been held by this court in Ratilal v. Ranchhodbhai, AIR 1966 SC 439  which was also a case under the same Rent Act that an erroneous construction placed upon a statute does not amount to exercising jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity and would not furnish a ground for interference under Section 115 C.P.C. See also Abbasbhai v. Gulamnabi, AIR 1964 SC 1341 .