Case: Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills And Ginning Factory Vs. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha

the State of Bombay. If nothing more had been said, S. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, would have applied, and all pending suits" and proceedings would have continued under the old law, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the matter out of S. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and to provide for a special saving, If cannot be used to decide whether S. 12 of the Act is retrospective. It was observed by Wood, V. C., in Fitzgerald v. Champneys,(1861) 70 ER 958 that saving clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safeguard rights which but for the savings, would be lost. The proviso here saves pending suits and proceedings, and further enacts that suits and proceedings then pending are to be transferred to the Courts designated in the Act are to continue under the Act and any or all the provisions of the Act are to apply to them. The learned Solicitor-General contends that the savings clause enacted by the proviso, even if treated as substantive law, must be taken to apply only to suits and proceedings pending; at the time of the repeal which, but for the proviso, would be governed by the Act repealed. According to the learned Attorney-General, the effect of the savings is much wider, and it applies to such cases as come within the words of the proviso, whenever the Act is extended to new areas.10. These arguments are interesting, and much can be said on both sides, particularly as the Legislature has by a subsequent amendment changed the proviso. But, in our opinion, they need not be considered in this case, in view of what we have decided on the second point.11. The second contention urged by the learned Attorney-General that S. 12(1) applied from the date on which the Act was extended to the area in question is, in our opinion sound. Section 12(1) enacts a rule of decision, and it says that a landlord is not entitled to possession if the tenant pays or shows his readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent and to observe the other conditions of the tenancy. The word "tenant" is defined in the Act to include not only a tenant, whose tenancy subsists but also any person remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession with or without the assent of the landlord. The present appellants, as statutory tenants, were within the rule enacted by S. 12(1) and entitled to its protection, if the sub-section could be held applicable to this suit.12. Both the Bombay High Court and this Court had, on the previous occasions, observed that s. 12 of the Act was prospective. In those cases, the learned Judges were concerned with the interpretation of sub-secs. (2) and (3) only, which, as the words of those sub-sections then existing show, were clearly prospective, and were applicable to suits to be instituted after the coming into force of the Act. But a section may be prospective in some parts and retrospective in other parts. While it is the ordinary rule that substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision or clear implication, many Acts, though prospective in form, have been given retrospective operation, if the intention of the legislature is apparent. This is more so, when Acts are passed to protect the public against some evil or abuse. (See Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 365). The sub-section says that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent etc., and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. In other words, no decree can be passed granting possession to the landlord, if the tenant fulfils the conditions above mentioned. The Explanation to S. 12 makes it clear that the tenant in case of a dispute may make an application to the Court under sub-sec. (3) of S. 11 for fixation of a standard rent and may thereafter pay or tender the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order to be made by the Court. The tenants, in the present case, have expressed their readiness and willingness to pay, and it is clear that they fulfil the requirements of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12, and the landlord is therefore, not entitled to the relief of possession.13. Both the High Court as well as this Court in their previous decisions, referred to above, were not called upon to interpret sub-sec. (1) of the Act. They were dealing with appeals arising out of decrees already passed. The observations that S. 12 was prospective were made with reference to sub-secs. (2) and (3) and not with respect to sub-sec. (1), which did not even find a mention in those judgments. The question then was whether S. 12 by itself or read with the proviso to S. 50 was applicable retrospectively to appeals. That is not the question which has arisen here. Then again, S. 12(1) enacts that the landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession, not "no suit shall be instituted by the landlord to recover possession". The point of time when the sub-section will operate is when the decree for recovery of possession would have to be passed. Thus, the language of the sub-section applies equally to suits pending when Part II comes into force and those to be filed subsequently. T14. he contention of the respondent that the operation of S. 12(1) is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force in a particular area cannot be accepted. The conclusion must follow that the present suits cannot be decreed in favour of the respondent. The decisions of the High Court and the Court of First Instance are thus erroneous, and must be set aside.15.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 1

Explanation:
1[ds]9. The law with regard to provisos is well-settled and well-understood. As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. But, provisos are often added not as exceptions or qualifications to the main enactment but as saving clauses, in which cases they will not be construed as controlled by the section. The proviso which has been added to S. 50 of the Act deals with the effect of repeal. The substantive part of the section repealed two Acts which were in force in the State of Bombay. If nothing more had been said, S. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, would have applied, and all pending suits" and proceedings would have continued under the old law, as if the repealing Act had not been passed. The effect of the proviso was to take the matter out of S. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act and to provide for a special saving, If cannot be used to decide whether S. 12 of the Act is retrospective. It was observed by Wood, V. C., in Fitzgeraldv. Champneys,(1861) 70 ER 958that saving clauses are seldom used to construe Acts. These clauses are introduced into Acts which repeal others, to safeguard rights which but for the savings, would be lost. The proviso here saves pending suits and proceedings, and further enacts that suits and proceedings then pending are to be transferred to the Courts designated in the Act are to continue under the Act and any or all the provisions of the Act are to apply to12(1) enacts a rule of decision, and it says that a landlord is not entitled to possession if the tenant pays or shows his readiness and willingness to pay the standard rent and to observe the other conditions of the tenancy. The word "tenant" is defined in the Act to include not only a tenant, whose tenancy subsists but also any person remaining, after the determination of the lease, in possession with or without the assent of the landlord. The present appellants, as statutory tenants, were within the rule enacted by S. 12(1) and entitled to its protection, if the sub-section could be held applicable to this suit.12. Both the Bombay High Court and this Court had, on the previous occasions, observed that s. 12 of the Act was prospective. In those cases, the learned Judges were concerned with the interpretation of sub-secs. (2) and (3) only, which, as the words of those sub-sections then existing show, were clearly prospective, and were applicable to suits to be instituted after the coming into force of the Act. But a section may be prospective in some parts and retrospective in other parts. While it is the ordinary rule that substantive rights should not be held to be taken away except by express provision or clear implication, many Acts, though prospective in form, have been given retrospective operation, if the intention of the legislature is apparent. This is more so, when Acts are passed to protect the public against some evil or abuse. (See Craies on Statute Law, 5th Edn., p. 365). The sub-section says that a landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays or is ready and willing to pay the standard rent etc., and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. In other words, no decree can be passed granting possession to the landlord, if the tenant fulfils the conditions above mentioned. The Explanation to S. 12 makes it clear that the tenant in case of a dispute may make an application to the Court under sub-sec. (3) of S. 11 for fixation of a standard rent and may thereafter pay or tender the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order to be made by the Court. The tenants, in the present case, have expressed their readiness and willingness to pay, and it is clear that they fulfil the requirements of sub-sec. (1) of S. 12, and the landlord is therefore, not entitled to the relief of possession.13. Both the High Court as well as this Court in their previous decisions, referred to above, were not called upon to interpret sub-sec. (1) of the Act. They were dealing with appeals arising out of decrees already passed. The observations that S. 12 was prospective were made with reference to sub-secs. (2) and (3) and not with respect to sub-sec. (1), which did not even find a mention in those judgments. The question then was whether S. 12 by itself or read with the proviso to S. 50 was applicable retrospectively to appeals. That is not the question which has arisen here. Then again, S. 12(1) enacts that the landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession, not "no suit shall be instituted by the landlord to recover possession". The point of time when the sub-section will operate is when the decree for recovery of possession would have to be passed. Thus, the language of the sub-section applies equally to suits pending when Part II comes into force and those to be filed subsequently.contention of the respondent that the operation of S. 12(1) is limited to suits filed after the Act comes into force in a particular area cannot be accepted. The conclusion must follow that the present suits cannot be decreed in favour of the respondent. The decisions of the High Court and the Court of First Instance are thus erroneous, and must be set aside.