Case: Ram Dahin Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar

cartridges found there. According to the evidence of Bande Hasan (D.W. 1), for Ram Dahin Singh it was 10 to 15 days after the 4th of November, 1963, that Ram Dahin Singh went to him, Bande Hasan, it may be pointed out, is stated to be the counsel in the case in which Ram Dahin Singh is said to have appeared as a witness on November 4, 1963 in the court of the Railway Magistrate at Varanasi. Ram Dahin Singh, according to this witness, told him when he met him after 10 to 15 days that a murder case had been started against him alleging the occurrence to have taken place on the date on which he had appeared as a witness. Bande Hassan advised Ram Dahin Singh to obtain certified copies of the relevant papers and to produce them in court in his defence. Ram Dahin Singh again went to Bande Hassan and thereafter Bande Hasan saw the accused only in court at his trial. When questioned whether Bande Hasan had made any statement to the police after November 4, 1963 and before Ram Dahin Singh met him 10 or 15 days thereafter he replied that he could not remember. The evidence of Bande Hasan seems to us to be unimpressive. There is evidence on the record that the gun belonging to Ram Dahin Singh was also damaged when recovered. It was not found in the house when it was searched on November 6, 1963. The fact that Ram Dahin Singh absconded soon after the occurrence and took the gun with him is relevant and can properly be taken into account by the four in appraising the evidence against him and also in appraising the evidence in regard to his plea of alibi. In this case, as generally in most cases, the prosecution evidence and the evidence of alibi is not to be considered in compartments. The evidence on one part will have impact on the other and the court has to consider the entire material on the record as constituting one complete picture. This is precisely what the courts below did. In view of the conclusions of the courts below we have no hesitation in disagreeing with the appellants contention and we repel Ram Dahin Singhs plea of alibi.10. Turning to the plea of alibi on behalf of Satyanarain Singh, appellant, the courts below have again concurrently held that this evidence is consistent with Satyanarain Singhs participation in the occurrence. The prosecution evidence that Satyanarain Singh instigated Ram Dahin Singh to use his gun has been believed by both the courts below and we are unable to hold that any doubt has been introduced in the prosecution evidence by the evidence produced in support of Satyanarain Singhs alibi. Indeed, all that is brought on the record is that on that day he had attested a mortgage deed at a place about 22 miles away from Kakar Kundi. The story deposed by the defence witness in support of Satyanarain Singhs alibi was considered by the Trial Court to be highly improbable and it was added that in so far as the attestation of the document was concerned he could have been present at the place of occurrence and could also have attested the document. The High Court agreed that the attestation of the document as not inconsistent with Satyanarain Singhs presence at the time and plea of the occurrence. We do not find any defect or error in this conclusion which would justify interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Indeed, we find ourselves in agreement with that view.11. The appellants learned counsel lastly contended that in any event the offence of which Ram Dahin Singh has been charged and convicted does not fall under Section 302, I.P.C., because the gun was fired when there was a grave danger of grievous injury to the persons composing of his group. The counsel emphasised that Ram Dahin Singh had no personal concern with the land purchased in 1962 and, therefore, he must be deemed to have acted the purely with the object of defending his partymen against aggression at the hands of Ghurfekan and his companions. It is not possible to accept this submission. Once it is held that the party of the accused were the aggressors then merely because the gun is used after some of their partymen had received some injuries at the hands of those who were protecting their paddy crop and resisting the aggression on the part of the accused, can be no ground for taking the case out of Section 302, I.P.C. If otherwise the injuries caused bring the case within the definition of murder. As a matter of fact this argument is only another fact of the plea of self-defence which we have already rejected. While developing this argument Mr. Nuruddin submitted that the appellants should be considered only to have exceeded their right of private defence and, therefore, they cannot be held guilty of murder This submission is equally unacceptable. Exception 2 to 300, I.P.C., on which the submission seems to be founded postulates the exercise of the right of private defence in good faith and also without premeditation and intention to do more harm than is necessary for the purpose of self-defence. The number of members of Ram Dahin Singhs party and the fact that Ram Dahin Singh was aired with a loaded gun negatives absence of premeditation; similarly the number of shots fired by him and the casualties resulting therefrom militates against the suggestion that there was no intention or doing more harm than necessary for the purposes of self-defence. In this case there seems to be both premeditation and intention to do more harm than was necessary when the gun was fired more than once. The right of private defence, it may be remembered, is purely preventive and not punitive or retributive. No separate arguments were addressed on behalf of the appellants in regard to the other offences.

Decision (1 = appeal accepted, 0 = rejected): 0

Explanation:
0[ds]6. In so far as the right of private defence is concerned in face of the concurrent findings of the two courts below that the actual possession of the land was with Ghurfekan and others and that there is no reliable evidence in regard to actual possession by the purchasers from Tarkeshwar Estate, this plea is difficult to sustain.7.Mr. Nuruddin learned counsel for the appellant did not question the assessment of evidence by the two courtsbelow which, he, in our opinion, rightly conceded, could not be questioned on appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.8. The point on which he laid stress was that the documentary evidence conclusively established that the actual possession of plot No. 103 was not with Ghurfekan but was with some of the accused persons. Of course, as contended on behalf of the appellants, Ram Dahin Singh had nothing to do with this plot or with the land purchased from the Tarkeshwar Estate in 1962, but it is in evidence that he is a distant agate of Loku who had as apurchased a portion of the land sold on November 20, 1962. We are unable to agree with the appellants learned counsel that the documentary evidence establishes the possession of the accused persons of the entire plot No. 103 and that Ghurfekan was not in possession of any portion of this plot. The documentary evidence, in our opinion, does not establish anything more than passing of mere proprietary or paper in possession of considerable land including a portion of plot No. 103. The Trial Court and the High Court have both taken the same view and have come to a positive conclusion that Ghurfekan was in possession of portion of plot No. 103 on which he had grown paddy crop and which was harvested by him and the harvested crop was being carried in bundles from the field to the Khalihan on the date of occurrence. This conclusion is based on a consideration of the entire evidence, including oral evidence which is, in our opinion, more important than the documentary evidence on the question of actual physical possession in this case. It may be pointed out that no attempt was made in this Court to show that appreciation of oral and other evidence by the Courts below was in any way infirm exposing it to legitimate criticism and laid it open toby this Court. Once this conclusion is upheld the plea of the right of private defence by the appellants must lose it importance. But even otherwise this plea seems to beattention was not drawn to any material on the record which would bring the appellants case within this section. In regard to the right of private defence of body according to Section 100, I.P.C., so far as relevant for the present case, it extends under the restrictions mentioned in Section 99 to the voluntary causing of death or of any her harm to the assailant, if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be such as assault as may reasonably which occasions the exercise of the right be such as assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death or grievous hurt will otherwise be the cause the apprehensive that death or grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such assault. We are in this case not concerned with the other offences which may give rise to those right. Now, if Ram Dahin Singhs party consisted of 30 or 40 persons, one of them undoubtedly being armed with athis circumstance cannot be lightly brushedthe party of Ghurfekan being only a few persons carrying their harvested crops, it is difficult to appreciate how the plea ofcan reasonably be urged by the appellants with any show of plausibility. Our attention was not invited to any evidence on the record on which this plea can be sustained. On the conclusion of the two courts below arrived at on evaluation of evidence, which is not shown to be erroneous or otherwise unsupportable it is futile to attempt to sustain the plea of private defence. It may in this connection be pointed out that the onus of establishing the plea of the right of private defence is on the accused though as observed in the case of Gottipulla Subbaramanyams case (supra) he is entitled to show that this right is established or can be sustained on the prosecution evidence itself. In the present case no right of private defence is sustainable on the material on thesame criticism was leveled before its against the conclusions of the High Court. We do not find any cogent ground for not accepting the concurrent conclusions of the two courts below. It is a pure question of appreciation of evidence which does not seem of suffer from any infirmity and is certainly not unreasonable or improper. As against the plea of alibi the prosecution in the occurrence were considered by both the courts below to be reliable, whose testimony was worthy of acceptance. No attempt was made in this Court below. Once the concurrent conclusion on this point is accepted the plea of alibi seems to us to be difficult to sustain. In the Consideration of this plea the conduct of Ram Dahin Singh in absconding soon after the occurrence would also have some relevance. He disappeared soon after the occurrence. His house was searched in his absence on November 6, 1963, by Paramanand Prasad Karan (P.W. 22), who wasof Chainpur police station in those days and who had taken charge of this case and theon November 5, 1963, from A.S.I. police, Baban Singh. Ram Dahin Singhs gun was not found in the house when it was searched nor we cartridges found there. According to the evidence of Bande Hasan (D.W. 1), for Ram Dahin Singh it was 10 to 15 days after the 4th of November, 1963, that Ram Dahin Singh went to him, Bande Hasan, it may be pointed out, is stated to be the counsel in the case in which Ram Dahin Singh is said to have appeared as a witness on November 4, 1963 in the court of the Railway Magistrate at Varanasi. Ram Dahin Singh, according to this witness, told him when he met him after 10 to 15 days that a murder case had been started against him alleging the occurrence to have taken place on the date on which he had appeared as a witness. Bande Hassan advised Ram Dahin Singh to obtain certified copies of the relevant papers and to produce them in court in his defence. Ram Dahin Singh again went to Bande Hassan and thereafter Bande Hasan saw the accused only in court at his trial. When questioned whether Bande Hasan had made any statement to the police after November 4, 1963 and before Ram Dahin Singh met him 10 or 15 days thereafter he replied that he could not remember. The evidence of Bande Hasan seems to us to be unimpressive. There is evidence on the record that the gun belonging to Ram Dahin Singh was also damaged when recovered. It was not found in the house when it was searched on November 6, 1963. The fact that Ram Dahin Singh absconded soon after the occurrence and took the gun with him is relevant and can properly be taken into account by the four in appraising the evidence against him and also in appraising the evidence in regard to his plea of alibi. In this case, as generally in most cases, the prosecution evidence and the evidence of alibi is not to be considered in compartments. The evidence on one part will have impact on the other and the court has to consider the entire material on the record as constituting one complete picture. This is precisely what the courts below did. In view of the conclusions of the courts below we have no hesitation in disagreeing with the appellants contention and we repel Ram Dahin Singhs plea of alibi.10. Turning to the plea of alibi on behalf of Satyanarain Singh, appellant, the courts below have again concurrently held that this evidence is consistent with Satyanarain Singhs participation in the occurrence. The prosecution evidence that Satyanarain Singh instigated Ram Dahin Singh to use his gun has been believed by both the courts below and we are unable to hold that any doubt has been introduced in the prosecution evidence by the evidence produced in support of Satyanarain Singhs alibi. Indeed, all that is brought on the record is that on that day he had attested a mortgage deed at a place about 22 miles away from Kakar Kundi. The story deposed by the defence witness in support of Satyanarain Singhs alibi was considered by the Trial Court to be highly improbable and it was added that in so far as the attestation of the document was concerned he could have been present at the place of occurrence and could also have attested the document. The High Court agreed that the attestation of the document as not inconsistent with Satyanarain Singhs presence at the time and plea of the occurrence. We do not find any defect or error in this conclusion which would justify interference by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. Indeed, we find ourselves in agreement with that view.It is not possible to accept this submission. Once it is held that the party of the accused were the aggressors then merely because the gun is used after some of their partymen had received some injuries at the hands of those who were protecting their paddy crop and resisting the aggression on the part of the accused, can be no ground for taking the case out of Section 302, I.P.C. If otherwise the injuries caused bring the case within the definition of murder. As a matter of fact this argument is only another fact of the plea ofwhich we have already rejected. While developing this argument Mr. Nuruddin submitted that the appellants should be considered only to have exceeded their right of private defence and, therefore, they cannot be held guilty of murder This submission is equally unacceptable. Exception 2 to 300, I.P.C., on which the submission seems to be founded postulates the exercise of the right of private defence in good faith and also without premeditation and intention to do more harm than is necessary for the purpose ofThe number of members of Ram Dahin Singhs party and the fact that Ram Dahin Singh was aired with a loaded gun negatives absence of premeditation; similarly the number of shots fired by him and the casualties resulting therefrom militates against the suggestion that there was no intention or doing more harm than necessary for the purposes ofIn this case there seems to be both premeditation and intention to do more harm than was necessary when the gun was fired more than once. The right of private defence, it may be remembered, is purely preventive and not punitive or retributive. No separate arguments were addressed on behalf of the appellants in regard to the other offences.