Case: M/S. GHAI CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERS AND CONTRACTORS Vs. GODAVARI MARATHWADA IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Rohinton Fali Nariman, J.—Leave granted. 2. In the present case, an award was passed on 14.02.2002 by which a sum Rs. 22.90 Lakhs for two contracts each was awarded to the claimant. 3. A Section 34 petition was rejected on 30.12.2003 stating that the office objections were not complied with. Nothing was done to pursue the Section 34 petition thereafter. A writ petition after 11 years was then filed on 22.08.2014 questioning the order of 30.12.2003. 4. The High Court, by the impugned order dated 15.12.2016, has gone into the merits of the order dated 30.12.2003 and found that none of those objections were valid on merits and since the writ petition, though filed after 11 years, deals with public money, the writ petition was allowed and the Section 34 petition was reinstated to be heard on merits. 5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant before us stated that the only ground made out in the writ petition for the delay of 11 years was that the respondents were unaware of the order dated 30.12.2003 because of the negligence of their lawyers. This being the case, it is clear that this is no reason to condone the massive delay of 11 years and the High Court was, therefore, incorrect in not adverting to this ground at all, and instead merely said that since public monies are involved, the order was set aside. 6. Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, has relied strongly upon paragraph 10 of the impugned order in which senior counsels submissions for the Cooperative Society stated that when it was realized for the first time that the impugned order was made, and an order of attachment came to be made in execution proceeding, the Corporation has deposited Rs. One Crore in each matter to show its bonafides. 7. Taking this into account, and taking the fact that public monies are involved, according to Mr. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel, there is no reason to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 8. Mr. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel has also argued that the order dated 30.12.2003 was not a judicial order but merely an administrative order, and should, therefore, not to be set aside in any case. 9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that ordinarily in a writ petition filed under Article 226 or 227, as has been stated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai & Ors., (1964) 6 SCR 261 , the outer period of laches for approaching the Court would be a period of three years. It is conceivable, of course, that even within the aforesaid three years period, the writ petition may be dismissed on the ground of laches where, for example, laches are coupled with third party rights that may have arisen in the meanwhile, thereby causing prejudice to those rights. 10. An extremely long period of 11 years would require a herculean effort to condone. Merely stating that the appellant has shown its bonafides, i.e. after 11 years, by depositing two crores of rupees and by stating that public monies are involved is not sufficient cause to condone delay. Further, whether the order is administrative or otherwise does not make the least difference insofar as the doctrine of laches is concerned. The High Court did not even advert to the excuse given in the writ petition, presumably because it realized that mere negligence of counsel without more cannot condone an inordinately long period of delay.

Decision reasoning: 1[ds]7. Taking this into account, and taking the fact that public monies are involved, according to Mr. Marlapalle, learned senior counsel, there is no reason to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the view that ordinarily in a writ petition filed under Article 226 or 227, as has been stated in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai & Ors., (1964) 6 SCR 261 , the outer period of laches for approaching the Court would be a period of three years. It is conceivable, of course, that even within the aforesaid three years period, the writ petition may be dismissed on the ground of laches where, for example, laches are coupled with third party rights that may have arisen in the meanwhile, thereby causing prejudice to those rights.10. An extremely long period of 11 years would require a herculean effort to condone. Merely stating that the appellant has shown its bonafides, i.e. after 11 years, by depositing two crores of rupees and by stating that public monies are involved is not sufficient cause to condone delay. Further, whether the order is administrative or otherwise does not make the least difference insofar as the doctrine of laches is concerned. The High Court did not even advert to the excuse given in the writ petition, presumably because it realized that mere negligence of counsel without more cannot condone an inordinately long period of delay.