Case: Rupa Ashok Hurra & Another Vs. Ashok Hurra & Another

Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J. 1. These writ petitions have come up before us as a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court referred the first mentioned writ petition to a Constitution Bench observing thus: Whether the judgment of this Court dated March 10, 1997 in Civil Appeal No. 1843 of 1997 can be regarded as a nullity and whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution can be maintained to question the validity of a judgment of this Court after the petition for review of the said judgment has been dismissed are, in our opinion, questions which need to be considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court. The other writ petitions were tagged to that case. 2. In these cases the following question of constitutional law of considerable significance arises for consideration: whether an aggrieved person is entitled to any relief against a final judgment/order of this Court, after dismissal of review petition, either under Article 32 of the Constitution or otherwise. 3. In our endeavour to answer the question, we may begin with noticing that the Supreme Court of India is established by Article 124 of the Constitution which specifies its jurisdiction and powers and enables Parliament to confer further jurisdiction and powers on its. The Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court original jurisdiction (Articles 32 and 131); appellate jurisdiction both civil and criminal (Articles 132 133, 134); discretionary jurisdiction to grant special leave to appeal (Article 136) and very wide discretionary powers, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to pass decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, which shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in the manner prescribed (Article 142); powers like the power to withdraw any case pending in any High Court or High Courts to itself or to transfer any case from one High Court to another High Court (Article 139) and to review judgment pronounced or order made by it (Article 137). Conferment of further jurisdiction and powers is left to be provided by Parliament by law (Article 138). Parliament is also enabled to confer further powers on the Supreme Court (Articles 134(2), 139, 140). Article 141 says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India and Article 144 directs that all authorities civil and judicial, in the territory of India, shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. It is a Court of record and has all the powers of such a Court including power to punish for contempt of itself (Article 129). 4. Since the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is invoked in these writ petitions, we shall advert to the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution. It is included in Part III of the Constitution and is quoted hereunder: 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part - (1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution. 5. A perusal of the Article, quoted above, shows it contains four clauses. Clause (1) guarantees the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part Ill-fundamental rights. By clause (2) the Supreme Court is vested with the power to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari whichever may be appropriate for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III. Without prejudice to the powers of the Supreme Court in the aforementioned clauses (1) and (2), the Parliament is enabled, by clause (3), to empower by law any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). The constitutional mandate embodied in clause (4) is that Article 32 shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by the Constitution. 6. Inasmuch as the Supreme Court enforces the fundamental rights by issuing appropriate directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, it may be useful to refer to, in brief the characteristics of the writs in general and writ of certiorari in particular with which we are concerned here. In English law there are two types of writs - (i) judicial procedural writs like writ of summons, writ of motion etc. which are issued as a matter of course; these writs are not in vogue in India and (ii) substantive writs often spoken of a high prerogative writs like writ of quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition etc., they are frequently resorted to in Indian High Courts and the Supreme Court. Historically, prohibition was a writ whereby the royal courts of common law prohibited other courts from entertaining matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the common law courts; certiorari was issued to bring the record of an inferior court into the Kings Bench for review or to remove indictments for trial in that court; mandamus was directed to inferior courts and tribunals and to public officers and bodies, to order the performance of a public duty. All three were called prerogative writs [Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition (reissue), Vol.1 (1) Para 103]. In England while issuing these writs, at least in theory, the assumption was that the King was present in the Kings Court. The position regarding the House of Lords of described thus, of the Court of Parliament, or of the King of Parliament as it is sometimes expressed the only other supreme tribunal in this country. In Rajunder Narain Raj. v. Bijai Govind Singh, 1836 (1) Moo. P.C. 117. They are discretionary writs but the principles for issuing such writs are well defined. In the pre-constitutional era the jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writs was enjoyed only by the three chartered High Courts [High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras] in India but with the coming into force of the Constitution, all the High Courts and the Supreme Court are conferred powers to issue those writs under Article 226 and Article 32, respectively, of the Constitution. 7. In regard to the writ jurisdiction, the High Courts in India are placed virtually in the same position as the Courts of Kings Bench in England. It is a well-settled principle that the technicalities associated with the prerogative writs in English Law have no role to play under our constitutional scheme. It is, however, important to note that a writ of certiorari to call for records and examine the same for passing appropriate orders, is issued by a superior court to an inferior court which certifies its records for examination. Certiorari lies to bring decisions of an inferior court, tribunal, public authority or any other body of persons before the High Court for review so that the court may determine whether they should be quashed, or to quash such decisions. The order of prohibition is an order issuing out of the High Court and directed to an inferior court or tribunal or public authority which forbids that court or tribunal or authority to act in excess of its jurisdiction or contrary to law. Both certiorari and prohibition are employed for the control of inferior courts, tribunals and public authorities. [Halsburys Laws of England, Fourth Edition (reissue) Vol.I(l) Para 109]. 8. Having carefully examined the historical background and the very nature of writ jurisdiction, which is a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior Courts/ Tribunals, in our view, on principle a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to co-ordinate courts and a fortiorari to to superior courts. Thus, it follows that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to different Bench of the same High Court much less can writ petition of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Though, the judgments/orders of High Courts are liable to be corrected by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132, 133 and 134 as well as under Article 136 of the Constitution, the High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our constitutional scheme. Therefore, the Supreme Court would not issue a writ under Article 32 to a High Court. Further, neither a smaller Bench nor a larger Bench of the Supreme Court can issue a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution to any other Bench of the Supreme Court. It is pointed out above that Article 32 can be invoked only for the purpose of enforcing the fundamental rights conferred in Part III and it is a settled position in law that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III. It may further be noted that the superior courts of justice do not also fall within the ambit of State or other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution. 9. In Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and another, 1966 (3) SCR 744 , some journalists filed a Writ Petition in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging an order passed by the High Court of Bombay, on the Original Side, prohibiting publication of the statement of a witness given in open court, as being violative of Article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution of India. A Bench of nine learned Judges of this Court considered the question whether the impugned order violated fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 19(l)(a) and if so whether a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution would issue to the High Court. The Bench was unanimous on the point that an order passed by this Court was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. Eight of the learned Judges took the view that a judicial order cannot be said to contravene fundamental rights of the petitioners. Sarkar, J. was of the view that the Constitution does not contemplate the High Courts to be inferior courts so their decisions would not be liable to be quashed by a writ of certiorari issued by the Supreme Court and held that this Court had no power to issue a writ of certiorari to the High Court. To the same effect are the views expressed by Shah and Bachawat, JJ. Though, in his dissenting judgment Hidayatullah, J., (as he then was) held that a judicial order of the High Court, if erroneous, could be corrected in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, he, nonetheless, opined that the impugned order of the High Court committed breach of the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression of the petitioners and could be quashed under Article 32 of the Constitution by issuing a writ of certiorari to the High Court as subordination of the High Court under the scheme of the Constitution was not only evident but also logical. In regard to the apprehended consequences of his proposition, the learned Judge observed: It was suggested that the High Courts might issue writs to this Court and to other High Courts and one Judge or Bench in the High Court and the Supreme Court might issue a writ to another Judge or Bench of in the same Court. This is an erroneous assumption. To begin with the High Courts cannot issue a writ to the Supreme Court because the writ goes down and not up. Similarly, a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court. The writ does not go to a court placed on an equal footing in the matter of jurisdiction. Where the county court exercised the powers of the High Court, the writ was held to be wrongly issued to it (See: In re The New Par Consols, Limited, 1898 (1) Q.B. 669. (Italics supplied). 10. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., 1988 (2) SCC 602 , the question debated before a seven-Judge Bench of this Court was whether the order dated February 16, 1984, passed by a Constitution Bench of this Court, withdrawing the cases pending against the appellant in the Court of Special Judge and transferring them to the High Court of Bombay with a request to the Chief Justice to assign them to a sitting Judge of the High Court for holding trial from day to day. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, 1984 (2) SCC 183 at 243, was a valid order. It is relevant to notice that in that case the said order was not brought under challenge in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Indeed, the appellants attempt to challenge the aforementioned order of the Constitution Bench before this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, turned out to be abortive on the view of that the writ petition under Article 32, challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by the Supreme Court as nullity or otherwise incorrect, could not be entertained and that he might approach the court with appropriate review petition or any other application which he might be entitled to file in law. While so, in the course of the trial of those cases the appellant raised an objection in regard to the jurisdiction of the learned Judge of the High Court to try the cases against him. The learned Judge rejected the objection and framed charges against the appellant, which were challenged by him by filing a Special Leave Petition to appeal before this Court wherein the question of jurisdiction of the High Court to try the cases was also raised. It was numbered as Criminal Appeal No. 468 of 1986 and was ultimately referred to a seven-Judge Bench. By majority of 5:2 the appeal was allowed and all proceedings in the cases against the appellant before the High Court pursuant to the said order of the Constitution Bench dated February 16, 1984, were set aside and quashed. Mukharji, Oza and Nataranjan, JJ. took the view that the earlier order of this Court dated February 16, 1984 which deprived the appellant of his constitutional rights, was contrary to the provisions of the of 1952 and was in violation of the principles of natural justice and in the background of the said Act was without any precedent and that the legal wrong should be corrected ex debito justitiae Ranganath Mishra, J., with whom Ray, J., agreed, while concurring with the majority, observed that it was a duty of the Court to rectify the mistake by exercising inherent powers. Ranganathan, J., expressed his agreement with the view of the majority that the order was bad being in violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. However, he held that the said order was not one such order as to be recalled because it could not be said to be based on a view which was manifestly incorrect, palpably absurd or patently without jurisdiction. In that he agreed with Venkatachaliah, J., (as he then was) who gave a dissenting opinion. The learned Judge held that it would be wholly erroneous to characterise the directions issued by a five-Judge Bench as a nullity liable to be ignored and so declared in a collateral attack. However, five learned Judges were unanimous that the Court should act ex debito justitiae. On the question of power of the Supreme Court to review its earlier order under its inherent powers Mukharji, Oza and Nataranjan, JJ. expressed the view that the Court could do so even in a petition under Articles 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution. Ranganath Misra, J., gave a dissenting opinion holding that the appeal could not be treated as a review petition. Venkatachaliah, J., (as he then was) also gave a dissenting opinion that inherent powers of the Court do not confer or constitute a source of jurisdiction and they are to be exercised in aid of a jurisdiction that is already invested for correcting the decision under Article 137 read with Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules and for that purpose the case must go before the same Judges as far as practicable. 11. On the question whether a writ of certiorari under Article 32 of the Constitution could be issued to correct an earlier order of this Court Mukharji and Nataranjan, JJ., concluded that the powers of review could be exercised under either Article 136 or Article 32 if there had been deprivation of fundamental rights. Ranganath Misra, J., (as he then was) opined that no writ of certiorari was permissible as the Benches of the Supreme Court are not subordinate to the larger Benches of this Court. To the same effect is the view expressed by Oza, Ray, Venkatachaliah and Ranganathan, JJ., Thus, in that case by majority of 5:2 it was held that an order of the Supreme Court was not amenable to correction by issuance of a writ of certiorari under Article32 of the Constitution. 12. In Smt. Triveniben v. State of Gujarat, 1989 (1) SCC 678 , speaking for himself and other three learned Judges of the Constitution Bench, Oza, J., reiterating the same principle, observed: It is well settled now that a judgment of court can never be challenged under Article 14 or 21 and therefore the judgment of the court awarding the sentence of death is not open to challenge as violating Article 14 or Article 21 as has been laid down by this Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar Vs. State of Maharashtra and also in A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak, the only jurisdiction which could be sought to be exercised by a prisoner for infringement of his rights can be to challenge the subsequent events after the final judicial verdict is pronounced and it is because of this that on the ground of long or inordinate delay a condemned prisoner could approach this Court and that is what has consistently been held by this Court. But it will not be open to this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32 to go behind or to examine the final verdict reached by a competent court convicting and sentencing the condemned prisoner and even while considering the circumstances in order to reach a conclusion as to whether the inordinate delay coupled with subsequent circumstances could be held to be sufficient for coming to a conclusion diat execution of the sentence of death will not be just and proper. Jagannatha Shetty, J. expressed no opinion on this aspect. 13. We consider it inappropriate to burden this judgment with discussion of the decisions in other cases taking the same view. Suffice it to mention that various Benches of this Court reiterated the same principle in the following cases: A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak & Anr., 1988 (2) SCC 602 , Krishna Swami v. Union of India & Ors., 1992 (4) SCC 605 , Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India, 1996 (2) SCC 749 , Khoday Distilleries Ltd & Anr. v. Register General, Supreme Court of India, 1996 (3) SCC 114 , Gurbachan Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr., 1996 (3) SCC 117 , Babu Singh Bains & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1996 (6) SCC 565 and P. Ashokan v. Union of India & Anr., 1998 (3) SCC 56. 14. It is, however, true that in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr., 1998 (4) SCC 409 , a Constitution Bench and in M.S. Ahlwat v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2000 (1) SCC 278 a three-Judge Bench, and in other cases different Benches quashed the earlier judgments /orders of this Court in an application filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. But in those cases no one joined issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, those cases cannot be read as authority for the proposition that a writ of certiorari under Article 32 would lie to challenge an earlier final judgment of this Court. 15. On the analysis of the ratio laid down in the aforementioned cases, we reaffirm our considered view that a final judgment /order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an aggrieved person whether he was a partly to the case or not. 16. In fairness to the learned counsel for the parties, we record that all of them at the close of the hearing of these cases conceded that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment/order passed by this Court after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order 11, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 1966. 17. However, all the learned counsel for the parties as also the learned Attorney-General who appeared as amicus curiae, on the notice of this Court, adopted an unusual unanimous approach to plead that even after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the Constitution, an aggrieved person might be provided with an opportunity under inherent powers of this Court to seek relief in cases of gross abuse of the process of the Court or gross miscarriage of justice because against the order of this Court the affected party cannot have recourse to any other forum. 18. Mr. Shanti Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the principle of finality of the order of this Court had to be given a go-by and the case re-examined where the orders were passed without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice, violation of any fundamental rights or where there has been gross injustice. He invited our attention to Order XL, VII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and submitted that this Court had inherent jurisdiction and that cases falling in the aforementioned categories should be examined under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court. 19. According to the learned counsel Article 129, would not be available to correct a judgment of this Court but he pleaded that as from the order of the Apex Court no appeal would lie, therefore, an application, by whatever name called, which should be certified by a senior counsel in regard to existence of permissible ground, has to be entertained on any of the aforementioned grounds to correct a judgment of this Court. He cited Antulays case, Supreme Court Bar Associations case and Ahlwats case as instances in which this Court had corrected its earlier judgments. He advocated: (i) for oral hearing on such an application and (ii) for hearing by a Bench of Judges other than those who passed the order on the ground that it would inspire confidence in the litigant public. 20. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, the learned senior counsel, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Shanti Bhushan submitted that the provisions of Order XL, VII, Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, is a mere restatement of the provisions of Article 137 of the Constitution and that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court might be exercised to remedy the injustice suffered by a person. He suggested that a Constitution Bench consisting of senior judges and the Judges who passed the order under challenge, could be formed to consider the application seeking correction of final orders of this Court. He added that to ensure that floodgates are not opened by such a remedy, an application for invoking the inherent power of this Court might require that it should be certified by a senior advocate and in case of frivolous application the petitioner could be subjected to costs. He relied on the judgment of United States in United States of America v. Ohio Power Company, 1 Lawyers Ed. 2d 683 to show that in every jurisdiction the courts have correct their own mistakes. He cited the judgment of this Court in Harbans Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1982 (2) SCC 101 to show that even after the dismissal of the Review Petition the Supreme Court reconsidered its own judgment; he pleaded for laying down guidelines in regard to entertaining such an application. 21. Mr. Anil B. Divan, the learned senior counsel, submitted that Article 129 of the Constitution declared this Court to be a court of record so it would have inherent powers to pass appropriate orders to unto injustice to any party resulting from judgments of this Court. He relied on the judgment of this Court in Supreme Court Bar Associations case, 1998 (4) SCC 409 to show that such a power was exercised by this Court and pleaded to fashion appropriate procedure for entertaining application to reconsider earlier judgment of this Court at the instance of an aggrieved person to do justice to the parties. 22. The learned Attorney-General argued that the remedy provided under Article 32 of the Constitution would not be available to a person aggrieved by the final order of this Court; he nonetheless supported the contentions urged by other learned counsel that in case of gross miscarriage of justice, this Court ought to exercise its inherent powers by entertaining an application to examine the final order of this Court, even when a review was rejected, in the rarest of the rare cases. According to him where the order was passed without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice, the case would fall in the rarest of the rare cases. He, however, contended that an order of this Court could not be said to violate fundamental rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution and, therefore, on that ground no relief could be claimed. He submitted that under Article 137 read with Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 review of an order of this Court is provided which will be considered by the same Bench unless the same Judges are not available by reason of demitting the office. In regard to reconsideration of the judgment under the inherent power of the Court he referred to the judgment of the Federal Court in Raja Prithwi Chand Lai Choudhary etc. v. Raj Bahadur Sukharaj Rai & Ors. etc., 1940 (2) FCR 78. He submitted that for correction of a final judgment of this Court on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or violation of principle of natural justice, a curative petition could be entertained which might be heard by an appropriate Bench composed of the senior Judges as well as Judges who passed the order. 23. Dr. Rajiv Dhavan, the learned senior counsel, argued that since the Supreme Court is the creature of the Constitution so the corrective power has to be derived from the provisions conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court like Articles 32 and 129-140; such a power does not arise from an abstract inherent jurisdiction. The corrective power must be exercised so as to correct an injustice in a case of patent lack of jurisdiction in a narrow sense, not in the Anisminics broader sense, and gross violation of natural justice. Relying on the judgment of House of Lords in R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and others, exparte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2)s case, 1999 (1) All ER 577 he has submitted that this Court has inherent power to correct its own judgment where a party through no fault of his own has been subjected to an unfair procedure giving scope for bias. His further contention is that the corrective power is a species of the review power and Articles 129,137, Order XL, Rule 5 and Order XL VII Rules 1 and 6 indicate that this Court has inherent power to set right its own judgment. He referred to the decisions of this Court in Antulays case, Supreme Court Bar Associations case, 1998 (4) SCC 409 Ahlwats case and Trivenibens case, (supra) to impress upon us that this Court has earlier exercised this power. He submitted that the Supreme Court can also issue practice direction in that behalf. 24. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, the learned senior counsel, invited our attention to various provisions of the Constitution dealing with different types of jurisdictions of this Court and advocated that in case of manifest illegality and palpable injustice this Court under its inherent powers could reconsider final judgment/order passed by this Court. He submitted that the composition of the Bench might include senior-most Judges along with the Judges who passed the order, if available. It is also his submission that while considering such curative petitions on the ground of manifest illegality and palpable injustice, in the rarest of rare cases factors like the doctrine of stare decisis and the finality and the certainty of the law declared by this Court are required to be kept in mind. He referred to the judgment of this Court rendered by seven learned Judges in The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Bombay North, 1965 (2) SCR 908 , which was followed by another Bench of seven learned Judges reported in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors., 1974 (2) SCC 402 and by a Bench of five learned Judges in the case of The Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Income-tax West Bengal, Calcutta, 1972 (2) SCC 150. He stressed that the power of re-consideration of an earlier decision had to be very restricted; when the power of review is very limited and circumscribed as is evident from the decision of the Constitution Bench in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 96 and the Bench of three learned Judges in S. Nagaraj & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., 1993 Suppl. (4) SCC 595 and in Ramdeo Chauhan v. State of Assam, 2001 (5) SCC 714 by three learned Judges, and in the case of lily Thomas & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2000 (6) SCC 224 the exercise of inherent power for correcting the manifest illegality and palpable injustice after dismissal of the review petition has to be much narrower than the power of review. 25. These contentions pose the question, whether an order passed by this Court can be corrected under its inherent powers after dismissal of the review petition on the ground that it was passed either without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or due to unfair procedure giving scope for bias which resulted in abuse of the process of the Court or miscarriage of justice to an aggrieved person. 26. There is no gainsaying that the Supreme Court is the Court of last resort - the final Court on questions both of fact and of law including constitutional law. The law declared by this Court is the law of the land; it is precedent for itself and for all the courts/ tribunals and authorities in India. In a judgment there will be declaration of law and its application to the facts of the case to render a decision on the dispute between the parties to the lis. It is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard to the highest Court departing from its binding precedent are different from the grounds on which a final judgment between the parties, can be considered. Here, we are mainly concerned with the latter. However, when reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought the finality attached both to the law declared as well as to the decision made in the case, is normally brought under challenge. It is, therefore, relevant to note that so much was the value attached to the precedent of the highest court that in The London Street Tramways Company limited v. The London Country Council, LR 1898 AC 375, the House of Lords laid down that its decision upon a question of law was conclusive and would bind the House in subsequent cases and that an erroneous decision could be set right only by an Act of Parliament. 27. In Hoy stead & Ors. v. Commissioner of Taxation, LR 1926 AC 155 at 165, Lord Shaw observed: Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the Court of the legal result.. If this were permitted litigation would have no end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. 28. To the same effect is the view expressed by the Federal Court of India in Raja Prithvi Chand Lai Choudharys case, (supra) placing reliance on dicta of the Privy Council in Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Court of Wards, 1886 (II) AC 660 at 664. Gwyer, CJ, speaking for the Federal Court observed: This Court will not sit as a court of appeal from its own decisions, nor will it entertain applications to review on the ground only that one of the parties in the case conceives himself to be aggrieved by the decision. It would in our opinion be intolerable and most prejudicial to the public interest if cases once decided by the Court could be re-opened and re-heard: There is a salutary maxim which ought to be observed by all Courts of last resort - Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. [It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits. It is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law-suit] Its strict observance may occasionally entail hardship upon individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source must be small in comparison with the great mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions of such a tribunal as this. 29. In 5. Nagarajs case, (supra), an application was filed by the State of clarification of the order passed earlier. It was urged by the petitioner that any modification or recalling of the order passed by this Court would result in destroying the principle of finality enshrined in Article 141 of the Constitution. Sahai, J. speaking for himself and for Pandian, J. observed: Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers, Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. The learned Judge referring to the judgment of Raja Prithwi Chand Lall Choudharys case, (supra) further observed: Even when there was no statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its order the courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. 30. The position with regard to conclusive nature of the precedent obtained in England till the following practice statement was made by Lord Gardiner, L.C. in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Dawson and Ors., Note 1966 (3) All E.R. 77 on behalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal is Ordinary, They propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of mis House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. 31. The principle in regard to departing from an earlier view by the House, after the said practice statement, is reflected in the speech of Lord Reid in Jones v. Secretary of State for Social Services, Hudson v. Secretary of State for Social Services (conjoined appeals), 1972 (1) All E.R. 145, who observed: The old view was that any departure from rigid adherence to precedent would weaken that certainly. I did not and do not accept that view. It is notorious that where an existing decision is disapproved but cannot be overruled courts tend to distinguished it on inadequate grounds. I do not think that they act wrongly in so doing; they are adopting the less bad of the only alternatives open to them. But this is bound to lead to uncertainty for no one can say in advance whether in a particular case the court will or will not feel bound to follow die old unsatisfactory decision. On balance it seems to me that overruling such a decision will promote and not impair the certainty of the law. But that certainty will be impaired unless this practice is used sparingly. I would not seek to categories cases in which it should or cases in which it should not be used. As time passes experience will supply some guide. But I would venture the opinion that the typical case for reconsideration an old decision is where some broad issue is involved and that it should only be in rare cases that we should reconsider questions of construction of statutes or other documents. 32. In Fitzleet Estates Ltd. v. Cherry (Inspector of Taxes), 1977 (3) All E.R. 996 Lord Wilberforce observed: My Lords, in my firm opinion, the 1966 Practice Statement was never intended to allow and should not be considered to allow such a course. Nothing could be more undesirable, in fact, man to permit litigants, after a decision has been given by mis House with all appearance of finality, to return to this House in the hope that a differently constituted committee might be persuaded to take the view which its predecessors rejected. True that the earlier decision was by majority: I say nothing as to its correctness or as to the validity of die reasoning by which it was supported. That there were two eminently possible views is shown by me support for each by at any rate two members of the House. But doubtful issues have to be resolved and me law knows no better way of resolving them than by the considered majority opinion of the ultimate tribunal. It requires much more than doubts as to the correctness of such opinion to justify departing from it. Lord Edmund-Davies observed: MY Lords, I respectfully share your views mat the Chancery Lane decision, 1966 (1) All. E.R. 1 was correct. But even had I come to the opposite conclusion, the circumstances adverted to are such that I should not have thought it right to depart from it now. To do so would have been to open the floodgates to similar appeals and thereby to impair that reasonable certainty in the law which the Practices Statement [Note (3) All. E.R. 77] itself declared to be an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. 33. The law existing in other countries is aptly summarised by Aharon Barak in his treatise [Judicial Discretion at page 234] thus: The authority to overrule exists in most countries, whether of civil law or common law tradition. Even the House of Lords in the United Kingdom is not bound any more by its precedents. The Supreme Court of the United States was never bound by its own decisions, and neither are those of Canada, Australia, and Israel. 34. To what extent the principle of stare decisis binds this Court, was considered in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. (supra). The question before a Constitution Bench of Seven learned Judges of this Court was: to what extent the principle of stare decisis could be pressed into service where the power of this Court to overruled its earlier decisions was invoked . The Court expressed its view thus: When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. 35. In Maganlal Chhaganlals case, (supra), a Bench of seven learned Judges of this Court considered, inter alia, the question : whether a judgment of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers case was required to be overruled. Khanna, J. observed: At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that certainty and continuity are essential ingredients of rule of law. Certainty in law would be considerably eroded and suffer a serious set back if the highest court of the land readily overruled the view expressed by it in earlier cases, even though that view has the field for a number of years. In quite a number of cases which came up before this Court, two views are possible, and simply because the Court considers that the view not taken by the Court in the earlier case was a better view of the matter would not justify the overruling of the view. The law laid down by this Court is binding upon all courts in the country under Article 141 of the Constitution and numerous cases all over the country are decided in accordance with the view taken by this Court. Many people arrange their affairs and large number of transactions also take place on the faith of the correctness of the view taken by this Court. It would create uncertainty, instability and confusion if the law propounded by this Court on the basis of which numerous cases have been decided and many transactions have taken place is held to be not the correct law. 36. In the case of The Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. (supra), the question before a Constitution Bench of five learned Judges was: when can this Court properly dissent from a previous view? 37. In regard to the effect of an earlier order of this Court Sawant, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed in Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunals case (supra) as follows: The decision of this Court on a question of law is binding on all courts and authorities. Hence under the said clause the President can refer a question of law only when this court has not decided it. Secondly, a decision given by this Court can be reviewed only under Article 137 read with Rule 1 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 and on the conditions mentioned therein. When, further, this Court overrules the view of law expressed by it in an earlier case, it does not do so sitting in appeal and exercising an appellate jurisdiction over the earlier decision. It does so in exercise of its inherent power and only in exceptional circumstances such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence of relevant or material facts of if it is manifestly wrong and productive of public mischief. [See. Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar, 1955 (2) S.C.R. 603 38. In the cases of Ramdeo Chauhan, (supra) and Lily Thomas, (supra), the question before the Court was, the scope of the power of review of a judgment of this Court under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Section 114, Order XL VII of the C.P.C. and Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966. 39. In the case of ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (supra), on November 25, 1998 the House of Lords by majority 3:2 restored warrant of arrest of Senator Pinochet who was the Head of the State of Chile and was to stand trial in Spain for some alleged offences. It came to be known later that one of the Law Lords (Lord Hoffmann), who heard the case, had links with Amnesty International (A.I.) which had become a party to the case. This was not disclosed by him at the time of the hearing of the case by the House. Pinochet Ugarte, on coming to know of that fact, sought reconsideration of the said judgment of the House of Lords on the the ground of an appearance of bias not actual bias. On the principle of disqualification of a judge to hear a matter on the ground of appearance of bias it was pointed out. The principle that a judge was automatically disqualified from hearing a matter in his won cause was not restricted to cases in which he had a pecuniary interest in the outcome, but also applied to cases where the judges decision would lead to the promotion of a cause in which the judge was involved together with one of the parties. That did not mean that judges could not sit on cases concerning charities in whose work they were involved, and judges would normally be concerned to recuse themselves or disclose the position to the parties only where they had an active role as trustee or director of a charity which was closely allied to and acting with a party to the litigation. In the instant case, the facts were exceptional in that AI was a party to the appeal, it has been joined in order to argue for a particular result and the Law Lord was a director of a charity closely allied to AI and sharing its objects. Accordingly, he was automatically disqualified from hearing the appeal. The petition would therefore be granted and the matter referred to another committee of the House or rehearing per curiam. 40. On the point of jurisdiction of the House of correct any injustice in an earlier order, it was observed: In principle it must be that your Lordships, as the ultimate court of appeal, have power to correct any injustice caused by an earlier order of this House. There is no relevant statutory limitation on the jurisdiction of the House in this regard and therefore its inherent jurisdiction remains unfettered. In Cassell & Co. Ltd. Vs. Broome (No. 2), 1972 (2) All ER 849 : 1972 AC 1136 your Lordships varied an order for costs already made by the House in circumstances where the parties had not had a fair opportunity to address argument on the point. And it was held, An appeal to the House of Lords will only be reopened where a party through no fault of its own, has been subjected to an unfair procedure. A decision of the House of Lords will not be varied rescinded merely because it is subsequently thought to be wrong. 41. We may notice here that in these cases except in Raja Prithwi Chand Lall Choudhary, (supra) and ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (supra), the question was in what circumstances the ratio in die earlier judgment of the highest court having precedent value could be departed. In the aforementioned two cases the decision was rendered on an application seeking reconsideration of the final judgment of the Federal Court and House of Lords respectively. In view of the specific provision of Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, conferring power of review on this Court, the problem in entertaining a review petition against its final judgment which its precursor - the Federal Court - had to face, did not arise before this Court. 42. The petitioners in these writ petitions seek re-consideration of the final judgments of this Court after they have been unsuccessful in view petitions and in that these cases are different from the cases referred to above. The provision of Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules bars further application for review in the same matter. The concern of the Court now is whether any relief can be given to the petitioners who challenge the final judgment of this Court, though after disposal of review petitions, complaining of the gross abuse of the process of Court and irremedial injustice. In a State like India, governed by rule of law, certainty of law declared and the final decision rendered on merits in a lis between the parties by the highest court in the country is of paramount importance. The principle of finality is insisted upon not on the ground that a judgment given by the apex Court is impeccable but on the maximum Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium [It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits. It is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law-suit]. 43. At one time adherence to the principle of stare decisis was so rightly followed in the courts governed by the English Jurisprudence that departing from an earlier precedent was considered heresy. With the declaration of the practice statement by the House of Lords, the highest court in England was enabled to depart from a previous decision when it appeared right to do so. The next step forward by the highest court to do justice was to review its judgment inter partie to correct injustice. So far as this Court is concerned, we have already pointed out above that it has been conferred the power to review its own judgments under Article 137 of the Constitution. The role of judiciary merely to interpret and declare the law was the concept of bygone age. It is no more open to debate as it is fairly settled that the courts can so mould and lay down the law formulating principles and guidelines as to adapt and adjust to the changing conditions of the society, the ultimate objective being to dispense justice. In the recent years there is a discemable shift in the approach of the final courts in favour of rendering justice on the facts presented before them, without abrogating but by-passing the principle of finality of the judgment. In Union of India and Anr. etc. v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by Lrs. etc. etc., 1989 (2) SCC 754 Pathak, C.J. speaking for the Constitution Bench aptly observed: But like all principles evolved by man for the regulation of the social order, the doctrine of binding precedent is circumscribed in its governance by perceptible limitations, limitations arising by reference to the need for re-adjustment in a changing society, a re-adjustment of legal norms demanded by a changed social context. This need for adapting the law to new urges in society brings home the truth of the Holmesian aphorism that the life of the law has not been logic it has been experience (Oliver Wendell Holmes: The Common Law, p.5), and again when he declared in another study (Oliver Wendell Holmes: Common Carriers and the Common Law, (1943) 9 Curr LT 387, 388) that the law is forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and sloughing off old ones at the other. Explaining the conceptual import of what Holmes had said, Julius Stone elaborated that it is by the introduction of new extra-legal propositions emerging from experience to serve as premises, or by experience-guided choice between competing legal propositions, rather than by the operation of logic upon existing legal propositions, that the growth of law tends to be determined (Julius Stone : Legal Systems & Lawyers Reasoning, pp. 58-59) 44. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles - ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principle of natural justice or apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in decision making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or abuse of the process of the court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice - a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of the view that though Judges of the highest Court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise in the rarest of the rate cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious consideration to the question we are persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to challenge yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice. 45. It may be useful to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court of United States in Ohio Power Companys case (supra). In that case the Court of Claims entered judgment for refund of tax, alleged to have been overpaid, in favour of the tax payer. On the application of the Government a writ of certiorari against that judgment was declined by the Supreme Court of United States in October 1955. The Government sought re-hearing of the case by filing another application which was dismissed in December 1955. A second petition for hearing was also rejected in May 1956. However, in June 1956 the order passed in December 1955 was set aside sua sponte (of its own motion) and that case was ordered to be heard along with two other pending cases in which the same question was presented. In those two cases the Supreme Court held against the tax payer and, on the authority of that judgment, reversed the judgment of the Court of Claims. Four learned members of the Court, in per curiam opinion, rested the decision on the ground of interest in finality of the decision must yield where the interest of justice so required. Three learned members, dissented and held that denial of certiorari had become final and ought not to be disturbed. Two learned members, however, did not participate. 46. This Court in Harbans Singhs case (supra), on an application under Article 32 of the Constitution filed after the dismissal of special leave petition and the review, reconsidered its judgment. In that case, among others, the petitioner and another person were convicted under Section 302 of I.P.C. and sentenced to death. In the case of one of the remaining two convicts, the Supreme Court commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. While staying the death sentence of the petitioner, A.N. Sen, J. in his concurring opinion, noticed the dismissal of the petitioners special leave, review petitions and the petition for clemency by the President and observed: Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and proper administration of justice. Apart from the jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution. I am of the opinion that this Court retains and must retain, an inherent power and jurisdiction for dealing with any extraordinary situation in the larger interests of administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being done. This power must necessarily be sparingly used only in exceptional circumstances for furthering the ends of justice. 47. In Antulays case (supra), the majority in the seven-Judge Bench of this Court set aside an earlier judgment of the Constitution Bench in a collateral proceeding on the view that the order was contrary to the provisions of the of 1952; in the background of that Act without precedent and in violation of the principles of natural justice, which needed to be corrected ex debito justitiae. 48. In Supreme Court Bar Associations case, (supra), on an application filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner sought declaration that the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, 1961, alone had exclusive jurisdiction to inquire into and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law for professional or other misconduct and that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction had no such jurisdiction, power or authority in that regard. 49. A Constitution Bench of this Court considered the correctness of the judgment of this Court in Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995 (2) SCC 584. The question which fell for consideration of this Court was: whether the punishment of debarring an advocate from practice and suspending his licence for a specified period could be passed in exercise of power of this Court under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India. There an errant advocate was found guilty of criminal contempt and was awarded the punishment of simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks and was also suspended from practice as an advocate for a period of three years from the date of the judgment of this Court for contempt of the High Court of Allahabad. As a result of that punishment all elective and nominated offices/posts then held by him in his capacity as an advocate had to be vacated by him. Elucidating the scope of the curative nature of power conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 142, it was observed: The plenary powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution are inherent in the Court and are complementary to those powers which are specifically conferred on the Court by various statutes though are not limited by those statutes. These powers also exist independent of the statutes with a view to do complete justice between the parties. These powers are of very wide amplitude and are in the nature of supplementary powers, this power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. It stands upon the foundation and the basis for its exercise may be put on a different and perhaps even wider footing, to prevent injustice in the process of litigation and to do complete justice between the parties. This plenary jurisdiction is, thus, the residual source of power which the Supreme Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just and equitable to do so and in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to do complete justice between the parties, while administering justice according to law. It is an indispensable adjunct to all other powers and is free from the restraint of jurisdiction and operates as a valuable weapon in the hands of die Supreme Court to prevent clogging or obstruction of the stream of justice. Inspite of the width of power conferred by Article 142, the Constitution Bench took the view that suspending the advocate from practice and suspending his licence was not within the sweep of the power under the said Article and overruled the judgment in Re. V.C. Mishras case (supra). 50. In M.S. Ahlwats case, (supra), the petitioner, who was found guilty of forging signatures and making false statements at different stages before this Court, was inflicted punishment under Section 193 IPC in Afzal v. State of Haryana, 1996 (7) SCC 397. He filed an application under Article 32 of the Constitution assailing the validity of that order. Taking note of the complaint of miscarriage of justice by the Supreme Court in order his incarceration which ruined his career, acting without jurisdiction or without following the due procedure, it was observed that to perpetuate an error was not virtue but to correct it was a compulsion of judicial conscience. The correctness of the judgment was examined and the error was rectified. 51. In the cases discussed above this Court reconsidered its earlier judgments, inter alia, under Articles 129 and 142 which confer very wide powers on this Court to do complete justice between the parties. We have already indicated above that the scope of the power of this Court under Article 129 as a court of record and also adverted to the extent of power under Article 142 of the Constitution. 52. The upshot of the discussion in our view is that this Court to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may re-consider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power. 53. The next step is to specify the requirements to entertain such a curative petition under die inherent power of this Court so that floodgates are not opened for filing a second review petition as a matter of course in the guise of a curative petition under inherent power. It is common ground that except when very strong reasons exists, the Court should not entertain an application seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on dismissal of a review petition. It is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which such a petition may be entertained. 54. Nevertheless, we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]8. Having carefully examined the historical background and the very nature of writ jurisdiction, which is a supervisory jurisdiction over inferior Courts/ Tribunals, in our view, on principle a writ of certiorari cannot be issued to co-ordinate courts and a fortiorari to to superior courts. Thus, it follows that a High Court cannot issue a writ to another High Court, nor can one Bench of a High Court issue a writ to different Bench of the same High Court much less can writ petition of a High Court be invoked to seek issuance of a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Though, the judgments/orders of High Courts are liable to be corrected by the Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Articles 132, 133 and 134 as well as under Article 136 of the Constitution, the High Courts are not constituted as inferior courts in our constitutional scheme. Therefore, the Supreme Court would not issue a writ under Article 32 to a High Court. Further, neither a smaller Bench nor a larger Bench of the Supreme Court can issue a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution to any other Bench of the Supreme Court. It is pointed out above that Article 32 can be invoked only for the purpose of enforcing the fundamental rights conferred in Part III and it is a settled position in law that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III. It may further be noted that the superior courts of justice do not also fall within the ambit of State or other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution.14. It is, however, true that in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr., 1998 (4) SCC 409 , a Constitution Bench and in M.S. Ahlwat v. State of Haryana & Anr., 2000 (1) SCC 278  a three-Judge Bench, and in other cases different Benches quashed the earlier judgments /orders of this Court in an application filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. But in those cases no one joined issue with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. Therefore, those cases cannot be read as authority for the proposition that a writ of certiorari under Article 32 would lie to challenge an earlier final judgment of this Court15. On the analysis of the ratio laid down in the aforementioned cases, we reaffirm our considered view that a final judgment /order passed by this Court cannot be assailed in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by an aggrieved person whether he was a partly to the case or not16. In fairness to the learned counsel for the parties, we record that all of them at the close of the hearing of these cases conceded that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to challenge the validity of a final judgment/order passed by this Court after exhausting the remedy of review under Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order 11, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules 1966.41. We may notice here that in these cases except in Raja Prithwi Chand Lall Choudhary, (supra) and ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (supra), the question was in what circumstances the ratio in die earlier judgment of the highest court having precedent value could be departed. In the aforementioned two cases the decision was rendered on an application seeking reconsideration of the final judgment of the Federal Court and House of Lords respectively. In view of the specific provision of Article 137 of the Constitution read with Order XL, Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, conferring power of review on this Court, the problem in entertaining a review petition against its final judgment which its precursor - the Federal Court - had to face, did not arise before this Court42. The petitioners in these writ petitions seek re-consideration of the final judgments of this Court after they have been unsuccessful in view petitions and in that these cases are different from the cases referred to above. The provision of Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules bars further application for review in the same matter. The concern of the Court now is whether any relief can be given to the petitioners who challenge the final judgment of this Court, though after disposal of review petitions, complaining of the gross abuse of the process of Court and irremedial injustice. In a State like India, governed by rule of law, certainty of law declared and the final decision rendered on merits in a lis between the parties by the highest court in the country is of paramount importance. The principle of finality is insisted upon not on the ground that a judgment given by the apex Court is impeccable but on the maximum Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium [It concerns the state that there be an end of lawsuits. It is in the interest of the State that there should be an end of law-suit].44. The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment. We are faced with competing principles - ensuring certainty and finality of a judgment of the Court of last resort and dispensing justice on reconsideration of a judgment on the ground that it is vitiated being in violation of the principle of natural justice or apprehension of bias due to a Judge who participated in decision making process not disclosing his links with a party to the case, or abuse of the process of the court. Such a judgment, far from ensuring finality, will always remain under the cloud of uncertainty. Almighty alone is the dispenser of absolute justice - a concept which is not disputed but by a few. We are of the view that though Judges of the highest Court do their best, subject of course to the limitation of human fallibility, yet situations may arise in the rarest of the rate cases, which would require reconsideration of a final judgment to set right miscarriage of justice complained of. In such case it would not only be proper but also obligatory both legally and morally to rectify the error. After giving our anxious consideration to the question we are persuaded to hold that the duty to do justice in these rarest of rare cases shall have to prevail over the policy of certainty of judgment as though it is essentially in public interest that a final judgment of the final court in the country should not be open to challenge yet there may be circumstances, as mentioned above, wherein declining to reconsider the judgment would be oppressive to judicial conscience and cause perpetuation of irremediable injustice.51. In the cases discussed above this Court reconsidered its earlier judgments, inter alia, under Articles 129 and 142 which confer very wide powers on this Court to do complete justice between the parties. We have already indicated above that the scope of the power of this Court under Article 129 as a court of record and also adverted to the extent of power under Article 142 of the Constitution52. The upshot of the discussion in our view is that this Court to prevent abuse of its process and to cure a gross miscarriage of justice, may re-consider its judgments in exercise of its inherent power.53. The next step is to specify the requirements to entertain such a curative petition under die inherent power of this Court so that floodgates are not opened for filing a second review petition as a matter of course in the guise of a curative petition under inherent power. It is common ground that except when very strong reasons exists, the Court should not entertain an application seeking reconsideration of an order of this Court which has become final on dismissal of a review petition. It is neither advisable nor possible to enumerate all the grounds on which such a petition may be entertained.54. Nevertheless, we think that a petitioner is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he establishes (1) violation of principles of natural justice in that he was not a party to the lis but the judgment adversely affected his interests or, if he was a party to the lis, he was not served with notice of the proceedings and the matter proceeded as if he had notice and (2) where in the proceedings a learned Judge failed to disclose his connection with the subject-matter or the parties giving scope for an apprehension of bias and the judgment adversely affects the petitioner55. The petitioner, in the curative petition, shall ever specifically that the grounds mentioned therein had been taken in the review petition and that it was dismissed by circulation. The curative petition shall contain a certification by a Senior Advocate with regard to the fulfillment of the above requirements.