Case: India Cement Limited and Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others

SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J.(for E. S. Venkataramiah, C.J., Ranganath Misra, B. C. Ray, K. N. Singh, S. Natarajan, JJ. and himself) 1. The question involved in these appeals, special leave petitions and writ petitions is, whether levy of cess on royalty is within the competence of the State legislature. In order to appreciate the question, it is necessary to refer to certain facts. Civil Appeal No. 62 of 1979 is an appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the High Court of Madras, dated October 13, 1969, in Writ Appeal No. 464 of 1967. The appellant is a public limited company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The company at all relevant times, used to manufacture cement in its factory at Talaiyuthu in Tirunelveli district, and at Sankardrug in Salem district of Tamil Nadu. By G. O. Ms. No. 3668 dated July 19, 1963, the Government of Tamil Nadu sanctioned the grant to the appellant mining lease for limestone and kankar for a period of 20 years over an extent of 133.91 acres of land in the village of Chinnagoundanur in Sankaridrug Taluk of Salem district. Out of the extent of 133.91 acres comprised in the mining lease, an extent of 126.14 acres was patta land and only the balance extent of 7.77 acres government land. The lease deed was in accordance with the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. The rates of royalty, dead rent and surface rent, were as follow:ROYALTY : LIMESTONEGovernment lands : Re 0.75 per tonne, but subject to a rebate of Re. 0.38 per tonne to be give on limestone benefited by froth flotation methodPatta lands : Re 0.38 per tonne but subject to a rebate of Re 0.19 per tonne to be given on limestone benefited by froth flotation methodKANNARGovernment lands : Five per cent of the sale price at the pits mouthPatta lands : 2 1/2 per cent of the sale price at the pits mouthDead rentGovernment lands : Rs. 25 (Rupees Twenty-five only) per hectare per annumPatta lands, Rs. 12.50 (Rupees twelve and naye paise fifty only) per hectare per annumSurface rent and water rate : At such rate as the land revenue and cess assessable on the land are paid."2. The appellant started mining operations soon after the execution of the lease deed and has every since been paying the royalties, dead rents and other amounts payable under the deed. 3. Under Section 115 of the Madras Panchayats Act (35 of 1958) (hereinafter called the Act), as amended by Madras Act 18 of 1964 (hereinafter called the amended Act), as royalty the appellant was required to pay local cess 45 paise per rupee. It may be mentioned that the said imposition was with retrospective effect along with local cess surcharge under Section 116 of the Act. The contention of the appellant is and was, at all relevant times, that cess on royalty cannot be levied. This is the common question which falls for consideration and requires determination in these appeals and petitions. 4. To complete the narration of events, however, it has to be noted that the Collector sent a communication on April 10, 1965, demanding cess or royalty payable under the Act on minerals carried on during the period July 1, 1961 to December 31, 1964, and the petitioner was threatened of serious consequences in case of default of payment on receipt of that communication. Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 1864 of 1965 was filed in the High Court of Madras. By the judgment delivered and order passed on February 23, 1967, a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court - Justice Kailasam dismissed the writ petition holding that the cess levied under Section 115 of the Act is a tax on land and, as such, falls under entry 49 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and was within the competence of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, and was within the competence of the State Schedule of the Constitution, and was within the competence of the State legislature. Reliance was placed by the learned Single Judge on the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy v. Collector of Chittoor ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ). He held that the cess levied under Section 115 was a tax on the land, though fixed with reference to the land revenue. In regard to Section 116 of the Act, the learned Single Judge held that the maximum limit had been prescribed by the government by rules framed under the Act, and therefore, there was no arbitrariness about the levy. 5. Sub-section (1) of Section 115 of the Act enjoins that there shall be levied in every panchayat development block, a local cess at the rate of 45 paise on every rupees of land revenue payable to the government in respect of any land for every Fasli. An Explanation to the said section was added and deemed always to have been incorporated by the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1964 being Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1964, which provided as follows: "Explanation. - In this section and in Section 116, land revenue means public revenue due on land and includes water cess payable to the government for water supplied or used for the irrigation of land, royalty, lease amount or other sum payable to the government in respect of land held direct from the government on lease or licence, but does not include any other cess or the surcharge payable under Section 116, provided that land revenue remitted shall not be deemed to be land revenue payable for the purpose of this section." 6. Sub-section (2) of Section 115 of the Act provides that the local cess shall be deemed to be public revenue due on all the lands in respect of which a person is liable to pay local cess and all the said lands, the buildings upon the said lands and their products shall be regarded as the security for the local cess. Sub-sections (3), (4)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 115 of the said Act deal with the application of the cess so collected for various purposes mentioned therein. In the controversy before us, the said provisions need not be considered. 7. Section 116 of the Act is as follows: "116. Every panchayat union council may levy on every person liable to pay land revenue to the government in respect of any land in the panchayat union a local cess surcharge at such rate as may be considered suitable as an addition to the local cess levied in the panchayat development block under Section 115 provided that the rate of local cess surcharge so levied shall not exceed two rupees and fifty paise on every rupees of land revenue payable in respect of such land." 8. The words "shall not exceed two rupees and fifty paise on every rupee of land revenue" were substituted for the words "shall be subject to such maximum as may be prescribed" by Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Second Amendment and Validation) Act, 1970, and these words were substituted for the words "shall not exceed one rupee and fifty paise on every rupee of land revenue" by Section 2 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 1972. 9. There was an appeal from the said decision of the learned Single Judge, to the Division Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench by its judgment and order dated October 13, 1969, dismissed the writ appeal, and held that local cess authorised by Section 115 as aforesaid "was not land revenue but is a charge on the land itself and Section 115 merely quantified on the basis of the quantum of land revenue". The Division Bench held that the meaning of the Explanation added to Section 115 was that the cess is levied as a tax on land and is measured with reference to land revenue, royalty, lease amount etc. as mentioned in the Explanation. The Division Bench also relied on the decision of this Court in H.R.S. Murthy ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ), and further held that in the aforesaid view of the matter, it was not possible to accept the contention that Section 115 of the Act read with the Explanation contravened in any manner Section 9 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. By leave granted by his Court on January 12, 1970 the appeal has been filed. 10. The appellant is bound to pay royalty to the government according to the rates provided in the Second Schedule to the said Act of 1957. Clause (1) of Part VII of the lease document provides as follows: "The lessee/lessees shall pay the rent, water rate and royalties reserved by this lease at such times and in the manner provided in Parts V and VI of these presents and shall also pay and discharge all taxes, rates, assessment and impositions whatsoever being in the nature of public demand which shall from time to time be charged, assessed or imposed by the authority of the Central and State Government upon or in respect of the premises and works of the lessee/lessees in common with other premises and work of a like nature except demands for land revenue" 11. As mentioned hereinbefore, there is an obligation of the lessee to pay rent and other charges mentioned in the said clause, and all other Central and State Government dues "except demands for land revenue". The question, therefore, which arises is, is cess on royalty a demand of land revenue or additional royalty? 12. For the appellants and/or petitioners we have heard Mr. Nariman, Dr. Chitale and Mr. Salve, and for the intervenors, Mr. K. D. Prasad, Mr. Rajendra Choudhary and Ms. Seita Vaidialingam have made and Mr. V. Krishnamurthy have made their submissions. We have had the advantage of the submissions made by learned Attorney General on behalf of Union of India. The issues are common in the writ petitions as well as in the appeal and in the special leave petitions. The question involved in the appeals and the writ petition is about the constitutional validity of Section 115(1) of the Act, insofar as it sought to levy as local cess @ 45 naye paise on every rupee of the land revenue payable to the government, the meaning of land revenue being artificially expanded by the Explanation so as to include royalty payable under the mining lease. 13. In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer to the statement of Objects and reasons for the amendment which stated, inter alia, as follows: "Under the Explanation to Section 115 of the Act "land revenue" means public revenue due on land and includes water cess payable to the government for water supplied or used for the irrigation of land but does not include any other cess or surcharge payable under Section 116. The Explanation does not cover "royalties ", lease amount or other sum payable to the government in respect of land held direct from the government on lease or licence which were included in the definition of "land revenue" under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920. As under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920, certain panchayat union councils continued to levy the cess and surcharge under the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958 also. It is the considered that the levy should be on the same basis as under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920. It is, therefore, proposed to include "royalty", lease amount and other sums payable to the government" in the definition of land revenue in the Explanation to Section 115 of the Act and also to validate the levy and collection of the cess and surcharge made hitherto on the said basis." 14. It is obvious that the said amendment was intended to bring royalty within the Explanation and the definition of land revenue in Section 115 as well as Section 116 of the Act, and was effected by the gazette notification of September 2, 1964 by Act 18 of 1964. In order to appreciate the controversy, it has to be understood that in this case royalty was payable by the appellant which was prescribed under the lease deed, the terms where of have been noted hereinbefore. The royalty had been fixed under the statutory rules and protected under those rules. The royalty was fixed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 which is a central Act by which the control of mines and minerals had been taken over by the Central Government. It was an act for the regulation of the mines and development of minerals under the control of Union of India. That Act was to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union of India. Section 2 of the Act declares that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union of India should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of the minerals to the extent provided in the Act. Section 9 of the Act provides as follows: "9. (1). The holder of a mining lease granted before the commencement of this act shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of lease or in any law in force at such commencement, pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area, after such commencement, at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral(2) The holder of a mining lease granted or or after the commencement of this Act shall pay royalty in respect of any mineral removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager, employee, contractor or sub-lessee from the leased area at the rate for the time being specified in the Second Schedule in respect of that mineral(3) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, amend the Second Schedule so as to enhance or reduce the rate, at which royalty shall be payable in respect of any mineral with effect from such date as may be specified in the notificationProvided that the Central Government shall not enhance the rate of royalty in respect of any mineral more than once during any period of three years." 15. The Act was passed by virtue of the power of the Parliament under entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule, Since the control of mines and the development of minerals were taken over by Parliament, the question that arises here is whether the levy or the impost by the State legislature imposed in this case can be justified or sustained either under entry 49, 50 or 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. 16. Courts of law are enjoined to gather the meaning of the Constitution from the language used and although one should interpret the words of the Constitution on the same principles of interpretations as one applies to an ordinary law but these very principles of interpretation comply one to take into account the nature and scope of the Act which requires interpretation. It has to be remembered that it is Constitution that requires interpretation. Constitution is the mechanism under which the laws are to be made and not merely an Act which declares what the law is to be. See the observations of Justice Higgins in the Attorney General for the State of New South Wales v. Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales ((1908) 6 CLR 469, 611-12). 17. In Re. C.P. and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938 (AIR 1939 FC 1 : 1939 FCR 18 : 180 IC 161) Gwyer, C.J. of the Federal Court of India relied on the observations of Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia (1936 AC 578) and observed that a Constitution must not be construed in any narrow or pedantic sense, and that construction most beneficial to the widest possible amplitude of its powers, must be adopted. The learned Chief Justice emphasised that a broad and liberal spirit should inspire those whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, but they are not free to stretch or pervert the language of the enactment in the interest of any legal or constitutional theory, or even for the purposes of supplying omissions or correcting supposed errors. A Federal Court will not strengthen, but only derogate from, its position, if it seeks to do anything but declare the law; but if may rightly reflect that a Constitution of a country is a living and organic thing, which of all instruments has the greatest claim to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat - It is better that it should live than that it should perish. 18. Certain rules have been evolved in this regard, and it is well settled now that the various entries in the three lists are not powers but fields of legislation. The power to legislate is given by Article 246 and other articles of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal (1962 Supp 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 SC 1044 ). The entries in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, are legislative heads or fields of legislation. These demarcate the area over which appropriate legislature can operate. It is well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of these entries, but some of these entries in different lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. Then, it is the duty of the court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine a particular legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether it fits in one or the other of the lists. See the observations of this Court in H. R. Banthia v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCC 166 , 174 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 , 489) and Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon ((1971) 2 SCC 779 , 792). The list are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of respective competence of the Union and the States. These neither impose any implied restriction on the legislative power conferred by Article 246 of the constitution, nor prescribe any duty to exercise that legislative power in any particular manner. Hence, the language of the entries should be given widest scope, (D. C. Rataria v. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1071 : AIR 1955 SC 182 ) to find out which of the meaning is fairly capable because these set up machinery of the government. Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. In interpreting an entry it would not be reasonable to import any limitation by comparing or contrasting that entry with any other one in the same list. It is in this background that one has to examine the present controversy.19. Here, we are concerned with cess on royalty. One can have an idea as to what cess is, from the observations of Hidayatullah, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Guruswamy and Co. v. State of Mysore ((1967) 1 SCR 548 : AIR 1967 SC 1512 ) where at page 571, the learned Judge observed: "The word cess is used in Ireland and is still in use in India although the word rate has replaced it in England. It means a tax and is generally used when the levy is for some special administrative expense what the name (health cess, education cess, road cess etc.) indicates. When levied as an increment to an existing tax, the name matters not for the validity of the cess must be judged of in the same way as the validity of the tax to which it is an increment." 20. The said observations were made in the dissenting judgment, but there was no dissent on this aspect of the matter. Relying on the aforesaid observations, Mr. Nariman appearing for the appellant and the petitioners suggested that the impugned levy in this case is nothing but a tax on royalty and is therefore ultra vires the State legislature. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer appeared for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that the cess in question in the instant case is a levy in respect of land for every Fasli. He urged that the words "a local cess at the rate of 45 naye paise on every rupee of land revenue payable" qualify the words "land revenue". These words were only intended, according to Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, to mean cess payable. It is, however, not possible to accept this submission, in view of the obligation indicated by the language of the provisions. Cess is not on land, but on royalty which is included in the definition of land revenue. None of the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution permits or authorises a State to impose tax on royalty. This levy has been sought to be justified under entry 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 45 deals with land revenue, which is a well known concept and has existed in India before the Constitution came into force. In N. R. Reddy v. State of A.P. ((1965) 2 Andh LT 297 (AP HC) Jaganmohan Reddy, J. as the learned Judge then was of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while sitting in a Division Bench observed that no land revenue Act existed in the composite State of Madras nor had the ryotwari system ever been established by legislative enactment. The learned Judge at page 306 of the report observed that in the earlier days, sovereigns had in exercise of their prerogative right claimed a share of the produce of all cultivated land known as Rajabhagam or by any of the various other names, and had fixed their share or its commuted money value from time to time, according to their will and pleasure. The learned Judge noted that as long as the share of the sovereign was being paid, the sovereign had no right to the possession of the lands, and the proprietorship of these lands was vested in the occupier, who could not be removed because another offered more. The right of the sovereign to a share in the produce as observed by the Government of Madras in 1856 "is not rent which consists of all surplus produce after paying the cost of cultivation and the profits of agricultural stock but land revenue only which ought, if possible, to be so lightly assessed as to leave a surplus or rent to the occupier, when he in fact lets the land to others or retains it in his own hands". It was noted that the amount of tax that was levied before the Mohamedan rule, amounted to 1/8th, 1/6th or 11/12th according to Manu depending on the differences in the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it, and it even went up to 1/4th part, in times of urgent necessity, as of war or invasion. The later commentators, Yajnavalkya. Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana and Narada, have all asserted not only the right but the extent of the share. When the British came to India they followed not only the precedent of the previous Mohamedan rulers who also claimed enormous land revenue, with this difference that what the Mohamedan rulers claimed they could never fully realise, but what the British rulers claimed they realised with vigour. It is not necessary to refer in detail how land revenue developed in India after the advent of the British rule. There was an appeal from the said decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and this Court dismissed the appeal in State of A. P. v. N. R. Reddy ((1967) 3 SCR 28 : AIR 1967 SC 1458 ).21. It is, however, clear that over a period of centuries, land revenue in India has acquired a connotative meaning of share in the produce of land to which the King or the government is entitled to receive. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that the impugned measure being a tax, not on share of the produce of the land but on royalty; royalty being the return received from the produce of the land, revenue was payable for winning minerals from the land. In the premises it was contended that it cannot be attributable to entry 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, being not a land revenue. It has, however, to be borne in mind that Explanation to Section 115(1) was added and there was an amendment as we have noted before. That very Explanation makes a distinction between land revenue as such and royalty which by amendment is deemed to be land revenue. It is, therefore, recognised by the every force of that Explanation and the amendment thereto that the expression royalty in Sections 115 and 116 of the Act cannot mean land revenue properly called or conventionally known, which is separate and distinct from royalty. 22. It was also contended on behalf of the respondent State of Tamil Nadu by Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that it could also be justified under Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule as taxes on lands and buildings. This, however, cannot be accepted. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. ((1963) 1 SCR 220 : AIR 1962 SC 1563 : (1962) 46 ITR 169 ) where at page 229 it was indicated that the expression lands in Entry 49 is wide enough to include agricultural land as well as non-agricultural land. Gajendragadkar, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that the cardinal rule of interpreting the words used by the Constitution in conferring legislative power was that these must receive the most liberal construction and if they are words of wide amplitude the construction must accord with it. If general word was used, it must be so construed so as to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary, matters that can reasonably be included in it. So construed, there could not be any doubt that the word land in Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule includes all land whether agricultural or non-agricultural. Hence, since the impugned Act imposed tax on land and building which was within the competence of the State legislature and its validity was beyond challenge but the court observed that as there was Entry 46 in List II which refers to taxes on agricultural income, it is clear that agricultural income is not included in Entry 49. If the State legislature purports to impose a tax on agricultural income it would not be referable to Entry 49. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer relied not said principle. But in the instant case, royalty being that which is payable on the extraction from the land and cess being an additional charge on that royalty, cannot by the parity of the same reasoning, be considered to be a tax on land. But since it was not a tax on land and there is no entry like Entry 46 in the instant situation like the position before this Court in the aforesaid decision, enabling the State to impose tax on royalty in the instant situation, the State was incompetent to impose such a tax. There is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land. The aforesaid decision confirmed the above position. In New Manek Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Allahabad ((1967) 2 SCR 679 at 696 : AIR 1967 SC 1801 ) this Court after referring to the several decisions observed that Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permitted levy of tax on land and building. It did not permit the levy of tax on machinery contents (sic) in or situated on the building for a particular purpose. Rule 7(2) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Rules was held to be accordingly ultra vires in that case. In S. C. Nawn v. W. T. O., Calcutta ((1969) 1 SCR 108 : AIR 1969 SC 59 : 69 ITR 897) this Court had occasion to consider this and upheld the validity of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 on the ground that it fell within Entry 86 of List I and not Entry 49 of List II. Construing the said entry, this Court observed that Entry 49 List II contemplated a levy on land as a unit and the levy must be directly imposed on land and must bear a definite relationship to it. Entry 49 of List II was held to be more general in nature than Entry 86, List I, which was held to be more specific in nature and it is well settled that in the event of conflict between Entry 86, List I and Entry 49 of List II, Entry 86 prevails as per Article 246 of the Constitution.23. In Asstt. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. ((1969) 2 SCC 55 , 62-63 : (1970) 1 SCR 268 , 278) this Court reiterated the principles laid down in S. C. Nawn case ((1969) 1 SCR 108 : AIR 1969 SC 59 : 69 ITR 897) and held that Entry 49 of List II was confined to a tax that was directly on land as a unit. In Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Nazareth ((1970) 1 SCC 749 , 753 : (1971) 1 SCR 195 , 200) it was held that a tax on the gift of land is not a tax imposed directly on land but only on a particular user, namely, the transfer of land by way of gift. In Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon ((1971) 2 SCC 779 , 792), this Court approved the principle laid down in S. C. Nawn case ((1969) 1 SCR 108 : AIR 1969 SC 59 : 69 ITR 897) as well as Nazareth case ((1970) 1 SCC 749 , 753 : (1971) 1 SCR 195 , 200). In Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India ((1981) 2 SCC 135 , 14 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 84 : (1981) 2 SCR 808 , 816) this Court made a distinction between the levy on income from house property itself which would be referable to Entry 49 List II. It is, therefore, not possible to accept. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyers Submission and that a cess on royalty cannot possibly be said to be a tax or an impost on land. Mr. Nariman is right that royalty which is indirectly connected with land, cannot be said to be a tax directly on lands as a unit. In this connection, reference may be made to the differentiation made to the different types of taxes for instance, one being professional tax and entertainment tax. In the Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment (1959 Supp 2 SCR 63, 69 : AIR 1959 SC 582 ) it was held that an entertainment tax is dependent upon whether there would or would not be a show in a cinema house. If there is no show, there is no tax. It cannot be a tax on profession or calling. Professional tax does not depend on the exercise of ones profession but only concerns itself with the right to practice. It appears that in the instant case also no tax can be levied or is leviable under the impugned Act if no mining activities are carried on. Hence, it is manifest that it is not related to land as a unit which is the only method of valuation of land under Entry 49 of List II, but is relatable to minerals extracted. Royalty is payable on a proportion of the minerals extracted. It may be mentioned that the Act does not use dead rent as a basis on which land is to be valued. Hence there cannot be any doubt that the impugned legislation in its pith and substance is a tax on royalty and not a tax on land. 24. On behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, learned counsel Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer sought to urge that it can also be sustained under Entry 50, List II. Entry 50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule deals with taxes on mineral rights subject to limitation imposed by Parliament relating to mineral development. Entry 23 of List II deals with regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and Entry 54 in List I deals with regulation of mines and minerals under the control of Union declared by the Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest. Even though minerals are part of the State List they are treated separately, and therefore the principle that the specific excludes the general, must be applied. See the observations of Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon and Co. (I) Pvt. Ltd. ((1963) 3 SCR 209 , 220 : AIR 1963 SC 90 ), where it was held that land in Entry 49 of List II cannot possibly include minerals. 25. In this connection, learned Attorney General appearing for the Union of India submitted before us that in order to sustain the levy, the power of the State legislature has to be found within one or more of the entries of List II of the Seventh Schedule. The levy in question has to be either a tax or a fee or an impost. If it is neither a tax nor a fee then it should be under one of the general entries under List II. The expression land according to its legal significance has an indefinite extent both upward and downwards, the surface of the soil and would include not only the face of the earth but everything under it or over it. See the observations in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat ((1975) 2 SCC 175 , 204 : (1975) 3 SCR 220 , 249). The minerals which are under the earth, can in certain circumstances fall under the expression land but as tax on mineral rights is expressly covered by Entry 50 of List II, if it is brought under the head taxes under Entry 49 of List II, it would render Entry 50 of List II redundant. Learned Attorney General is right in contending that entries should not be so construed as to make any one entry redundant. It was further argued that even in pith and substance the tax fell to Entry 50 of List II, it would be controlled by a legislation under Entry 54 of List I.26. On the other hand, learned Attorney General submitted that if it be held to be a fee, then the source of power of the State legislature is under Entry 66 read with Entry 23 of List II. Here also the extent to which regulation of mines and mineral development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, to the extent such legislation makes provisions will denude the State legislature of its power to override the provision under Entry 50 of List II. In view of the parliamentary legislation under Entry 54, List I and the declaration made under Section 2 and provisions of Section 9 of the Act. The State legislation would be overridden to that extent. Section 2 declares that it is expedient in the public interest that Union should take its control the regulation of mines and the development of to the extent provided therein. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Hingir - Rampur Coal Co. v. State of Orissa ((1961) 2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459 ). See also the observations in State of Orissa v. M. A. Tulloch and Co. ((1964) 4 SCR 461 : AIR 1964 SC 1284 ) and Buijnath Kadia v. State of Bihar ((1969) 3 SCC 838 , 846-49 : (1970) 2 SCR 100 , 111-15).27. Our attention was drawn to the decision of the Division Bench judgment of the High Court of Mysore in Laxminarayana Mining Co., Mangalore v. Taluk Dev. Board (AIR 1972 Mys 299 : (1972) 2 Mys LJ 362). There speaking for the court, one of us, Venkataramiah, J. of the Mysore High Court, as the learned Chief justice then was, observed that a combined reading of reading of Entries 23 and 50 List II and Entry 54 of List I, establishes that as long as the Parliament ones not make any law in exercise of its power under Entry 54, the powers of the State legislature in Entries 23 and 50 would be exercisable the State legislature. But when once the Parliament makes a declaration by law that it is expedient in the public interest to make regulation mines and minerals development under the control of the Union, to the extent to which such regulation and development is undertaken by the law made by the Parliament, the power of the State legislature under entries 23 and 50 of List II are denuded. There the court was concerned with the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959. Thus, it was held that it could not, therefore, be said that even after passing of Central Act, the State legislature by enacting Section 143 of the Act to confer power on the Taluk Board to levy tax on the mining activities carried on by the persons holding mineral concessions. It followed that the levy of tax on mining by the Board as per the impugned notification was unauthorised and liable to be set aside. At page 306 of he said report, it was held that royalty under Section 9 of the Mines and Act was really a tax.28. To the similar effects are the observations of the High Court of in L. Mal v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 Pat 491 , 494). Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, however, to the decision of this Court in H.R. S. Murthy case ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ). There under terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron in a tract of land in a village in Chittur district and bound himself to a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, pay a royalty on iron ore if it were used for extraction of iron and in to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used. In the said decision the legislative competence of Sections 78 and 79 of the Madras District Boards Act was upheld by which land cess was made payable on the basis of royalty. This Court proceeded on the basis that other cess related to land and would therefore be covered by Entry 49 of List II. It was held that land cess paid on royalty has a direct relation to the land and only a remote relation with mining. This, with respect, seems to be not a correct approach. It was further observed that it was not necessary to consider the meaning of the expression tax on mineral right following under Entry 50 of List II inasmuch as according to this Court, Parliament has not made any tax on mineral rights. This is not a correct basis. 29. In H. R. S. Murthy case ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ), at pages 676-77 of the report, it was observed by this Court as follows: "When a question arises as to the precise head of legislative power under which a taxing statute has been passed, the subject for enquiry is what in truth and substance is the nature of the tax. No doubt, in a sense, but in a very remote sense, it has relationship to mining as also to the mineral won from the mine under a contract by which royalty is payable on the quantity of mineral extracted. But that, does not stamp it as a tax on either the extraction of the mineral or on the mineral right. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to examine the question as to what exactly is a tax on mineral rights seeing that such a tax is not leviable by Parliament but only by the State and the sole limitation on the States power to levy the tax is that it must not interfere with a law made by Parliament as regards mineral development. Our attention was not invited to the provision of any such law created by Parliament. In the context of Sections 78 and 79 and the scheme of those provisions it is clear that the land cess is in truth a "tax on lands" within Entry 49 of the State List." 30. It seems, therefore, that attention of the court was not invited to the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and Section 9 thereof. Section 9 (3) of the Act in terms states that royalties payable under the Second Schedule of the Act shall not be enhanced more than once during a period of four years. It is, therefore, a clear bar on the State legislature taxing royalty so as to in effect amend Section Schedule of the Central Act. In the premises, it cannot be right to say that tax on royalty can be a tax on land, and even if it is a tax, if it falls within Entry 50 will be ultra vires the State legislative power in view of Section 9(3) of the Central Act. In Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa ((1961) 2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459 ), Wanchoo, J. in his dissenting judgment has stated that a tax on mineral rights being different from a duty of excise pertains only to a tax that is leviable for the grant of the right to extract minerals, and is not a tax on minerals as well. On that basis, a tax on royalty would not be a tax on mineral rights and would therefore in any event be outside the competence of the State legislature. . The Rajasthan, Punjab, Gujarat and Orissa High Courts have held that royalty is not a tax See Bherulal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1956 Raj 161 -62 : 1955 Cri LJ 1390), Dr. S. S. Sharma v. State of Punjab (AIR 1969 P & H 79, 84 : ILR (1969) 1 Punj 680), Saurashtra Cement and Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1979 Guj 180 , 184 : (1979) 20 Guj LR 895), L. N. Agarwalla v. State of Orissa (AIR 1983 Ori 210 : (1983) 55 Cut LT 364). 31. It was contended by Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer that the State has a right to tax minerals. It was further contended that if tax is levied, it will not be irrational to correlate it to the value of the property and to make some kind of annual value basis of tax without intending to tax the income. In view of the provisions of the Act, as noted hereinbefore, this submission cannot be accepted. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer also further sought to urge that in Entry 50 of List II, there is no limitation to the taxing power of the State. In view of the principles mentioned therein-before and the clauses provisions of Section 9(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, this submission can not be accepted. This field is fully covered by the central legislation.32. In any event, royalty is directly relatable only to the minerals extracted and on the principle that are general provision is excluded by the special one, royalty would be relatable to Entries 23 and 50 of List II, and Entry 49 of List II. But as the fee is covered by the central power under Entry 23 or Entry 50 of List. II, the impugned legislation cannot be upheld. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition No. 410 of 1983 - Hiralal Rameshwar Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Miscellaneous Petition No. 410 of 1983, decided on March 28, 1986 (MP HC) (DB) which was delivered on March 28, 1986 by a Division Bench of the High Court J. S. Verma, Acting Chief Justice, as His Lordship then was, held that development cess by Section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1982 is ultra vires. It is not necessary in the view taken by us, and further in view that the said decision is under appeal in this Court, to examine it in detail.33. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State legislature because Section 9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State legislature is denuded of its competence under Entry 23 of List II. In any event, we are of the opinion that cess on royalty cannot be sustained under Entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user of land. 34. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, however, submitted that in any event, the decision in H. R. S. Murthy case ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ) was the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court. Cess has been realised on that basis for the organisation of village and town panchayats and comprehensive programme of measures had been framed under the National Extension Service Scheme to which our attention was drawn. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer further submitted that the Directive Principle of State Policy embodied in the Constitution enjoined that the State should take steps to organise village panchayats and endow them with power and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government and as the amounts have been realised on that basis, if at all, we should declare the said cess on royalty to be ultra vires prospectively. In other words, the amounts that have been collected by virtue of the said provisions, should not be declared to be illegal retrospectively and the State made liable to refund the same. We see good deal of substance in this submission. After all, there was a decision of this Court in H. R. S. Murthy case ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ) and amounts have been collected on the basis that the said decision was the correct position. We are, therefore, of the opinion that we will be justified in declaring the levy of the said cess to be ultra vires the power of the State legislature prospectively only.

Decision reasoning: 1[ds]10. The appellant is bound to pay royalty to the government according to the rates provided in the Second Schedule to the said Act of 1957. Clause (1) of Part VII of the lease document provides aslessee/lessees shall pay the rent, water rate and royalties reserved by this lease at such times and in the manner provided in Parts V and VI of these presents and shall also pay and discharge all taxes, rates, assessment and impositions whatsoever being in the nature of public demand which shall from time to time be charged, assessed or imposed by the authority of the Central and State Government upon or in respect of the premises and works of the lessee/lessees in common with other premises and work of a like nature except demands for landAs mentioned hereinbefore, there is an obligation of the lessee to pay rent and other charges mentioned in the said clause, and all other Central and State Government dues "except demands for land revenue".In this connection, it may be appropriate to refer to the statement of Objects and reasons for the amendment which stated, inter alia, asthe Explanation to Section 115 of the Act "land revenue" means public revenue due on land and includes water cess payable to the government for water supplied or used for the irrigation of land but does not include any other cess or surcharge payable under Section 116. The Explanation does not cover "royalties ", lease amount or other sum payable to the government in respect of land held direct from the government on lease or licence which were included in the definition of "land revenue" under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920. As under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920, certain panchayat union councils continued to levy the cess and surcharge under the Madras Panchayats Act, 1958 also. It is the considered that the levy should be on the same basis as under the Madras District Boards Act, 1920. It is, therefore, proposed to include "royalty", lease amount and other sums payable to the government" in the definition of land revenue in the Explanation to Section 115 of the Act and also to validate the levy and collection of the cess and surcharge made hitherto on the said basis.It is obvious that the said amendment was intended to bring royalty within the Explanation and the definition of land revenue in Section 115 as well as Section 116 of the Act, and was effected by the gazette notification of September 2, 1964 by Act 18 of 1964. In order to appreciate the controversy, it has to be understood that in this case royalty was payable by the appellant which was prescribed under the lease deed, the terms where of have been noted hereinbefore. The royalty had been fixed under the statutory rules and protected under those rules. The royalty was fixed under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 which is a central Act by which the control of mines and minerals had been taken over by the Central Government. It was an act for the regulation of the mines and development of minerals under the control of Union of India. That Act was to provide for the regulation of mines and the development of minerals under the control of the Union of India.Certain rules have been evolved in this regard, and it is well settled now that the various entries in the three lists are not powers but fields of legislation. The power to legislate is given by Article 246 and other articles of the Constitution. See the observations of this Court in Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of West Bengal (1962 Supp 3 SCR 1 : AIR 1962 SC 1044 ). The entries in the three lists of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, are legislative heads or fields of legislation. These demarcate the area over which appropriate legislature can operate. It is well settled that widest amplitude should be given to the language of these entries, but some of these entries in different lists or in the same list may overlap and sometimes may also appear to be in direct conflict with each other. Then, it is the duty of the court to find out its true intent and purpose and to examine a particular legislation in its pith and substance to determine whether it fits in one or the other of the lists. See the observations of this Court in H. R. Banthia v. Union of India ((1969) 2 SCC 166 , 174 : (1970) 1 SCR 479 , 489) and Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon ((1971) 2 SCC 779 , 792). The list are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of respective competence of the Union and the States. These neither impose any implied restriction on the legislative power conferred by Article 246 of the constitution, nor prescribe any duty to exercise that legislative power in any particular manner. Hence, the language of the entries should be given widest scope, (D. C. Rataria v. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd., (1955) 1 SCR 1071 : AIR 1955 SC 182 ) to find out which of the meaning is fairly capable because these set up machinery of the government. Each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended in it. In interpreting an entry it would not be reasonable to import any limitation by comparing or contrasting that entry with any other one in the same list. It is in this background that one has to examine the present controversy.19. Here, we are concerned with cess on royalty. One can have an idea as to what cess is, from the observations of Hidayatullah, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, in Guruswamy and Co. v. State of Mysore ((1967) 1 SCR 548 : AIR 1967 SC 1512 ) where at page 571, the learned Judgeword cess is used in Ireland and is still in use in India although the word rate has replaced it in England. It means a tax and is generally used when the levy is for some special administrative expense what the name (health cess, education cess, road cess etc.) indicates. When levied as an increment to an existing tax, the name matters not for the validity of the cess must be judged of in the same way as the validity of the tax to which it is an increment.The said observations were made in the dissenting judgment, but there was no dissent on this aspect of theis, however, not possible to accept this submission, in view of the obligation indicated by the language of the provisions. Cess is not on land, but on royalty which is included in the definition of land revenue. None of the three lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution permits or authorises a State to impose tax on royalty. This levy has been sought to be justified under entry 45 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Entry 45 deals with land revenue, which is a well known concept and has existed in India before the Constitution came into force. In N. R. Reddy v. State of A.P. ((1965) 2 Andh LT 297 (AP HC) Jaganmohan Reddy, J. as the learned Judge then was of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, while sitting in a Division Bench observed that no land revenue Act existed in the composite State of Madras nor had the ryotwari system ever been established by legislative enactment. The learned Judge at page 306 of the report observed that in the earlier days, sovereigns had in exercise of their prerogative right claimed a share of the produce of all cultivated land known as Rajabhagam or by any of the various other names, and had fixed their share or its commuted money value from time to time, according to their will and pleasure. The learned Judge noted that as long as the share of the sovereign was being paid, the sovereign had no right to the possession of the lands, and the proprietorship of these lands was vested in the occupier, who could not be removed because another offered more. The right of the sovereign to a share in the produce as observed by the Government of Madras in 1856 "is not rent which consists of all surplus produce after paying the cost of cultivation and the profits of agricultural stock but land revenue only which ought, if possible, to be so lightly assessed as to leave a surplus or rent to the occupier, when he in fact lets the land to others or retains it in his own hands". It was noted that the amount of tax that was levied before the Mohamedan rule, amounted to 1/8th, 1/6th or 11/12th according to Manu depending on the differences in the soil and the labour necessary to cultivate it, and it even went up to 1/4th part, in times of urgent necessity, as of war or invasion. The later commentators, Yajnavalkya. Apastamba, Gautama, Baudhayana and Narada, have all asserted not only the right but the extent of the share. When the British came to India they followed not only the precedent of the previous Mohamedan rulers who also claimed enormous land revenue, with this difference that what the Mohamedan rulers claimed they could never fully realise, but what the British rulers claimed they realised with vigour. It is not necessary to refer in detail how land revenue developed in India after the advent of the British rule. There was an appeal from the said decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and this Court dismissed the appeal in State of A. P. v. N. R. Reddy ((1967) 3 SCR 28 : AIR 1967 SC 1458 ).21. It is, however, clear that over a period of centuries, land revenue in India has acquired a connotative meaning of share in the produce of land to which the King or the government is entitled tohas, however, to be borne in mind that Explanation to Section 115(1) was added and there was an amendment as we have noted before. That very Explanation makes a distinction between land revenue as such and royalty which by amendment is deemed to be land revenue. It is, therefore, recognised by the every force of that Explanation and the amendment thereto that the expression royalty in Sections 115 and 116 of the Act cannot mean land revenue properly called or conventionally known, which is separate and distinct fromhowever, cannot be accepted. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. ((1963) 1 SCR 220 : AIR 1962 SC 1563 : (1962) 46 ITR 169 ) where at page 229 it was indicated that the expression lands in Entry 49 is wide enough to include agricultural land as well as non-agricultural land. Gajendragadkar, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed that the cardinal rule of interpreting the words used by the Constitution in conferring legislative power was that these must receive the most liberal construction and if they are words of wide amplitude the construction must accord with it. If general word was used, it must be so construed so as to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary, matters that can reasonably be included in it. So construed, there could not be any doubt that the word land in Entry 49, List II of the Seventh Schedule includes all land whether agricultural or non-agricultural. Hence, since the impugned Act imposed tax on land and building which was within the competence of the State legislature and its validity was beyond challenge but the court observed that as there was Entry 46 in List II which refers to taxes on agricultural income, it is clear that agricultural income is not included in Entry 49. If the State legislature purports to impose a tax on agricultural income it would not be referable to Entry 49. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer relied not said principle. But in the instant case, royalty being that which is payable on the extraction from the land and cess being an additional charge on that royalty, cannot by the parity of the same reasoning, be considered to be a tax on land. But since it was not a tax on land and there is no entry like Entry 46 in the instant situation like the position before this Court in the aforesaid decision, enabling the State to impose tax on royalty in the instant situation, the State was incompetent to impose such a tax. There is a clear distinction between tax directly on land and tax on income arising from land. The aforesaid decision confirmed the above position. In New Manek Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Allahabad ((1967) 2 SCR 679  at 696 : AIR 1967 SC 1801 ) this Court after referring to the several decisions observed that Entry 49 of List II of the Seventh Schedule only permitted levy of tax on land and building. It did not permit the levy of tax on machinery contents (sic) in or situated on the building for a particular purpose. Rule 7(2) of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Rules was held to be accordingly ultra vires in that case. In S. C. Nawn v. W. T. O., Calcutta ((1969) 1 SCR 108 : AIR 1969 SC 59 : 69 ITR 897) this Court had occasion to consider this and upheld the validity of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 on the ground that it fell within Entry 86 of List I and not Entry 49 of List II. Construing the said entry, this Court observed that Entry 49 List II contemplated a levy on land as a unit and the levy must be directly imposed on land and must bear a definite relationship to it. Entry 49 of List II was held to be more general in nature than Entry 86, List I, which was held to be more specific in nature and it is well settled that in the event of conflict between Entry 86, List I and Entry 49 of List II, Entry 86 prevails as per Article 246 of the Constitution.23. In Asstt. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. ((1969) 2 SCC 55 , 62-63 : (1970) 1 SCR 268 , 278) this Court reiterated the principles laid down in S. C. Nawn case ((1969) 1 SCR 108 : AIR 1969 SC 59 : 69 ITR 897) and held that Entry 49 of List II was confined to a tax that was directly on land as a unit. In Second Gift Tax Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Nazareth ((1970) 1 SCC 749 , 753 : (1971) 1 SCR 195 , 200) it was held that a tax on the gift of land is not a tax imposed directly on land but only on a particular user, namely, the transfer of land by way of gift. In Union of India v. H. S. Dhillon ((1971) 2 SCC 779 , 792), this Court approved the principle laid down in S. C. Nawn case ((1969) 1 SCR 108 : AIR 1969 SC 59 : 69 ITR 897) as well as Nazareth case ((1970) 1 SCC 749 , 753 : (1971) 1 SCR 195 , 200). In Bhagwan Dass Jain v. Union of India ((1981) 2 SCC 135 , 14 : 1981 SCC (Tax) 84 : (1981) 2 SCR 808 , 816) this Court made a distinction between the levy on income from house property itself which would be referable to Entry 49 List II. It is, therefore, not possible to accept.Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyers Submission and that a cess on royalty cannot possibly be said to be a tax or an impost on land. Mr. Nariman is right that royalty which is indirectly connected with land, cannot be said to be a tax directly on lands as a unit. In this connection, reference may be made to the differentiation made to the different types of taxes for instance, one being professional tax and entertainment tax. In the Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Cantonment Board, Poona Cantonment (1959 Supp 2 SCR 63, 69 : AIR 1959 SC 582 ) it was held that an entertainment tax is dependent upon whether there would or would not be a show in a cinema house. If there is no show, there is no tax. It cannot be a tax on profession or calling. Professional tax does not depend on the exercise of ones profession but only concerns itself with the right to practice. It appears that in the instant case also no tax can be levied or is leviable under the impugned Act if no mining activities are carried on. Hence, it is manifest that it is not related to land as a unit which is the only method of valuation of land under Entry 49 of List II, but is relatable to minerals extracted. Royalty is payable on a proportion of the minerals extracted. It may be mentioned that the Act does not use dead rent as a basis on which land is to be valued. Hence there cannot be any doubt that the impugned legislation in its pith and substance is a tax on royalty and not a tax on50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule deals with taxes on mineral rights subject to limitation imposed by Parliament relating to mineral development. Entry 23 of List II deals with regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and Entry 54 in List I deals with regulation of mines and minerals under the control of Union declared by the Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest. Even though minerals are part of the State List they are treated separately, and therefore the principle that the specific excludes the general, must be applied. See the observations of Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon and Co. (I) Pvt. Ltd. ((1963) 3 SCR 209 , 220 : AIR 1963 SC 90 ), where it was held that land in Entry 49 of List II cannot possibly include50 of List II of the Seventh Schedule deals with taxes on mineral rights subject to limitation imposed by Parliament relating to mineral development. Entry 23 of List II deals with regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and development under the control of the Union and Entry 54 in List I deals with regulation of mines and minerals under the control of Union declared by the Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest. Even though minerals are part of the State List they are treated separately, and therefore the principle that the specific excludes the general, must be applied. See the observations of Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Raymon and Co. (I) Pvt. Ltd. ((1963) 3 SCR 209 , 220 : AIR 1963 SC 90 ), where it was held that land in Entry 49 of List II cannot possibly includelevy in question has to be either a tax or a fee or an impost. If it is neither a tax nor a fee then it should be under one of the general entries under List II. The expression land according to its legal significance has an indefinite extent both upward and downwards, the surface of the soil and would include not only the face of the earth but everything under it or over it. See the observations in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat ((1975) 2 SCC 175 , 204 : (1975) 3 SCR 220 , 249). The minerals which are under the earth, can in certain circumstances fall under the expression land but as tax on mineral rights is expressly covered by Entry 50 of List II, if it is brought under the head taxes under Entry 49 of List II, it would render Entry 50 of List II redundant. Learned Attorney General is right in contending that entries should not be so construed as to make any one entryspeaking for the court, one of us, Venkataramiah, J. of the Mysore High Court, as the learned Chief justice then was, observed that a combined reading of reading of Entries 23 and 50 List II and Entry 54 of List I, establishes that as long as the Parliament ones not make any law in exercise of its power under Entry 54, the powers of the State legislature in Entries 23 and 50 would be exercisable the State legislature. But when once the Parliament makes a declaration by law that it is expedient in the public interest to make regulation mines and minerals development under the control of the Union, to the extent to which such regulation and development is undertaken by the law made by the Parliament, the power of the State legislature under entries 23 and 50 of List II are denuded. There the court was concerned with the Mysore Village Panchayats and Local Boards Act, 1959. Thus, it was held that it could not, therefore, be said that even after passing of Central Act, the State legislature by enacting Section 143 of the Act to confer power on the Taluk Board to levy tax on the mining activities carried on by the persons holding mineral concessions. It followed that the levy of tax on mining by the Board as per the impugned notification was unauthorised and liable to be set aside. At page 306 of he said report, it was held that royalty under Section 9 of the Mines and Act was really a tax.28. To the similar effects are the observations of the High Court of in L. Mal v. State of Bihar (AIR 1965 Pat 491 , 494). Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer, however, to the decision of this Court in H.R. S. Murthy case ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ). There under terms of a mining lease the lessee worked the mines and won iron in a tract of land in a village in Chittur district and bound himself to a dead rent if he used the leased land for the extraction of iron ore, pay a royalty on iron ore if it were used for extraction of iron and in to pay a surface rent in respect of the surface area occupied or used. In the said decision the legislative competence of Sections 78 and 79 of the Madras District Boards Act was upheld by which land cess was made payable on the basis of royalty. This Court proceeded on the basis that other cess related to land and would therefore be covered by Entry 49 of List II. It was held that land cess paid on royalty has a direct relation to the land and only a remote relation with mining. This, with respect, seems to be not a correct approach. It was further observed that it was not necessary to consider the meaning of the expression tax on mineral right following under Entry 50 of List II inasmuch as according to this Court, Parliament has not made any tax on mineral rights. This is not a correct basis.It seems, therefore, that attention of the court was not invited to the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and Section 9 thereof. Section 9 (3) of the Act in terms states that royalties payable under the Second Schedule of the Act shall not be enhanced more than once during a period of four years. It is, therefore, a clear bar on the State legislature taxing royalty so as to in effect amend Section Schedule of the Central Act. In the premises, it cannot be right to say that tax on royalty can be a tax on land, and even if it is a tax, if it falls within Entry 50 will be ultra vires the State legislative power in view of Section 9(3) of the Central Act. In Hingir-Rampur Coal Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa ((1961) 2 SCR 537 : AIR 1961 SC 459 ), Wanchoo, J. in his dissenting judgment has stated that a tax on mineral rights being different from a duty of excise pertains only to a tax that is leviable for the grant of the right to extract minerals, and is not a tax on minerals as well. On that basis, a tax on royalty would not be a tax on mineral rights and would therefore in any event be outside the competence of the StateRajasthan, Punjab, Gujarat and Orissa High Courts have held that royalty is not a tax See Bherulal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1956 Raj 161 -62 : 1955 Cri LJ 1390), Dr. S. S. Sharma v. State of Punjab (AIR 1969 P & H 79, 84 : ILR (1969) 1 Punj 680), Saurashtra Cement and Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1979 Guj 180 , 184 : (1979) 20 Guj LR 895), L. N. Agarwalla v. State of Orissa (AIR 1983 Ori 210 : (1983) 55 Cut LTview of the provisions of the Act, as noted hereinbefore, this submission cannot be accepted. Mr. Krishnamurthy Iyer also further sought to urge that in Entry 50 of List II, there is no limitation to the taxing power of the State. In view of the principles mentioned therein-before and the clauses provisions of Section 9(2) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, this submission can not be accepted. This field is fully covered by the central legislation.32. In any event, royalty is directly relatable only to the minerals extracted and on the principle that are general provision is excluded by the special one, royalty would be relatable to Entries 23 and 50 of List II, and Entry 49 of List II. But as the fee is covered by the central power under Entry 23 or Entry 50 of List. II, the impugned legislation cannot be upheld. Our attention was drawn to a judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Miscellaneous Petition No. 410 of 1983 - Hiralal Rameshwar Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Miscellaneous Petition No. 410 of 1983, decided on March 28, 1986 (MP HC) (DB) which was delivered on March 28, 1986 by a Division Bench of the High Court J. S. Verma, Acting Chief Justice, as His Lordship then was, held that development cess by Section 9 of the Madhya Pradesh Karadhan Adhiniyam, 1982 is ultra vires. It is not necessary in the view taken by us, and further in view that the said decision is under appeal in this Court, to examine it in detail.33. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that royalty is a tax, and as such a cess on royalty being a tax on royalty, is beyond the competence of the State legislature because Section 9 of the Central Act covers the field and the State legislature is denuded of its competence under Entry 23 of List II. In any event, we are of the opinion that cess on royalty cannot be sustained under Entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land. Royalty on mineral rights is not a tax on land but a payment for the user ofsee good deal of substance in this submission. After all, there was a decision of this Court in H. R. S. Murthy case ((1964) 6 SCR 666 : AIR 1965 SC 177 ) and amounts have been collected on the basis that the said decision was the correct position. We are, therefore, of the opinion that we will be justified in declaring the levy of the said cess to be ultra vires the power of the State legislature prospectively only.