Case: National Organic Chemicals (Rcd) Limited & Another Vs. Pandit Ladaku Patil

Swatanter Kumar, C.J.M/s National Organic Chemicals (RCD) Limited (hereinafter referred to as the Company) issued a show cause notice to Pandit Laduka Patil (hereinafter referred to as the employee) on 26th September 2005 stating the allegations of misconduct against him. To this, a reply was submitted. After considering the reply, the Company decided to hold a departmental enquiry against the employee and consequently issued a charge sheet on 4th November 2005. The Enquiry Officer started the enquiry as per the Standing Orders of the Company. However, the employee moved an application before the Enquiry Officer to conduct the enquiry in Marathi and also requested that the charge sheet and the Standing Order should be furnished to him in the same language. Upon such application, the Enquiry officer directed and explained to the employee that proceedings will be conducted in Marathi as per request, however, it will be recorded in English and it will be explained to him in Marathi. In furtherance to the direction issued, translated copy of the charge sheet was provided to the employee. The employee filed Complaint (ULP) No.99 of 2006 before the Labour Court, Thane, alleging that non recording the proceedings in Marathi amounts to victimisation and an unfair labour practice. This Complaint was opposed by the Company and it denied the averments made in the Complaint. An objection was also taken that the Complaint is premature. There was no violation of principles of natural justice and the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the Standing Orders. The attempt on part of the employee was to delay and prolong the disciplinary proceedings. In reply, it was also averred that the employee had put his signatures and acknowledged the proceedings from time to time. The employee had passed S.S.C. examination and had good understanding of English. Administrative language of the Company was English. As part of his duties, the employee also maintains log book in English language and has substantial experience in relation to the Company and its affairs. The employee was well versed in English language. 2. The Labour Court passed an order staying the further proceedings before the Enquiry Officer and also restrained the Company from terminating the services of the employee without following any legal process. This order allowing the interim prayers dated 13th September 2007 was challenged by the Company before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court vide its order dated 18th January 2008 accepted the Revision preferred by the Company and the order passed by the Labour Court dated 13th September 2007 was set aside. The Industrial Court held as under:- 10. ... I have gone through the facts of the said case. The workman was deprived from his choice for conducting the enquiry. Moreover the enquiry was proceeded in the absence of defense representative. The workman was asked to make her statement in the absence of her representative and these facts were showing that the enquiry was not conducted in a fair and proper manner. However the facts of the present case are different. Here the opponent has demanded enquiry in the Marathi language. The enquiry officer has conducted the enquiry in Marathi. However it was recorded in English. The recording of the proceedings were explained to the opponent in Marathi. The signature of the opponent was obtained for the same. Considering these aspects and the facts that the opponent is well versed with the English language and he is doing the day to day work in the English language and even his correspondence with the company is in the English language and therefore it cannot be said that there is breach of the principles of natural justice. On the contrary, it appears that when the enquiry was started on the basis of the charge sheet dated 4.11.2005 and after attending the dates in the enquiry he filed the complaint before the Labour Court on the ground that the enquiry officer committed breach of the principles of natural justice, it appears that the opponent intends to prolong the proceedings. Unless and until the enquiry is completed, the company will not be able to take further decision. The findings of the enquiry officer are not their since the enquiry is incomplete. Therefore it is not proper to say the enquiry when prima facie, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. Considering the ratio laid down in the Advani Oerlikons case (supra) there is no breach of the principles of natural justice in the present case also. As such, the impugned order of the Labour Court requires interference by this Court under Section 44 of the Act. Hence, I record my findings accordingly and pass the following order:- ORDERThe Revision Application is hereby allowed. The Order passed by the III Labour Court, Thane, in Complaint (ULP) No. 99 of 2006, below Exh. U-2, on 13.9.2007, is hereby set aside. .... 3. The above order of the Industrial Court was impugned by the employee before this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by filing Writ Petition No. 1239 of 2008 which came up for hearing before the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 26th February 2008 allowed the Writ Petition, set aside the order of the Industrial Court dated 18th January 2008 and directed that the proceedings will be conducted in Marathi and reduced in writing in Marathi and noticed that the employee had assured the Court and given an undertaking that he would give full co-operation and would not ask for unwarranted adjournment so that the enquiry could be completed within the stipulated period. 4. The Company aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge dated 26th February 2008 in Writ Petition No.1239 of 2008, has filed the present Letters Patent Appeal. The order impugned in the present Appeal is challenged on the ground that the learned Single Judge has fallen in error of law as well has erred in not appreciating that the relevant Standing Order being regulatory in its nature and not fundamental, there was substantial compliance to the provisions and as such the order is liable to be set aside. 5. It will be useful to refer to clause 25(4) of the Model Standing Orders around which the entire controversy revolves. It reads as under:- All proceedings of the enquiry shall be conducted in English, Hindi or Marathi according to the choice of the workman concerned and the person defending him. Primarily, the Court is concerned with the later part of this Standing Order. It imposes an obligation upon the Enquiry Officer and the employer that all proceedings shall be conducted in English, Hindi or Marathi, according to the choice of the workman concerned and the person defending him. In other words, it gives an option to the workmen to opt for recording of proceedings in any one of the languages stated therein. The fact that there is an element of option indicates that there is intent of flexibility which is permissible within the ambit and scope of the Standing Order. Of course, preferential choice has been vested with the employee and he could give choice in any form i.e. in writing, by his conduct or by both. This Standing Order is primarily intended to control the procedure of departmental enquiry and is not so mandatory in its application that its violation would always result in vitiation of the enquiry even if there was no element of prejudice claimed by the employee. Again prejudice is a matter which has to be examined with objectivity, however, is subjective in satisfaction. The learned Single Judge himself noticed that another bench of this Court in the case of Advani Oerlikon Ltd. Vs Shashikant M Sable and others (Writ Petition No.972 of 1997) decided on 30th November 2007 had taken the view, while referring to the same Standing Order 25(4) that where witnesses have spoken in Marathi, it is translated and recorded in English and the employee knows English language, the requirement of the clause would be fully met and it is not absolutely mandatory for the Enquiry Officer to write the proceedings in Marathi. Merely because an Appeal was preferred against this judgment of the learned Single Judge, would not take away the right of the Company to rely upon that view on which hardly any analysis has been offered by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment.6. In the case of State Bank of India vs S.K. Sharma, (AIR 1996 SC 1669 ), the judgment referred to in the impugned judgment, the Supreme Court had clearly enunciated the principle that principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. It is further held that substantive provisions has normally to be complied with. But in case of procedural provision which is not of substantial or mandatory character, if no prejudice is caused. Substantial compliance with it is enough. The Court held as under:- 32. We may summarize the principles emerging from the above discussion. (These are by no means intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee): (1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/ departmental enquiry in violation of the rules/ regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquiries should not be set aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in character. (2) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with as explained herein before and the theory of substantial compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (3) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, the position is this: procedural provisions are generally meant for affording a reasonable and adequate opportunity to the delinquent officer/ employee. They are, generally speaking, conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every procedural provision cannot be said to automatically vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases falling under `no notice, `no opportunity and `no hearing categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is called for. In this connection, it may be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by; itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the body of the judgment, take a case where there is a provision expressly providing that after the evidence of the employer/government is over, the employee shall be given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity to lead defence in his evidence, and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give that opportunity in spite of the delinquent officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect can also be looked at from the point of view of directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so inclined. The principle stated under (4) herein below is only another way of looking at the same aspect as is dealt with herein and not a different or distinct principle. (4) (a) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (b) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If lit is found to be the former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived the said requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived if, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that the provision could not be waived by him, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions (include the setting aside of the order of punishment), keeping in mind the approach adopted by the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar, (1994 AIR SCW 1050). The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be called. (5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between no opportunity and no adequate opportunity, i.e. Between no notice/no hearing and no fair hearing. (a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it void or a nullity if one chooses to). In such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query. (It is made clear that this principle (No.5) does not apply in the case of rule against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down elsewhere). (6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem (the primary principle of natural justice) the Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which should guide them in applying the rule to varying situations that arise before them. (7) There may be situations where the interests of state or public interest may call for a curtailing or the rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the Court may have to balance public/State interest with the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an appropriate decision. 7. Prejudice in disciplinary action is a concept of some significance. Every non-compliance of procedural provisions may not always and necessarily result in setting aside of an order of punishment as well as vitiation of enquiry proceedings. Mostly, it will be a matter of fact which needs to be shown by the aggrieved party and can be gathered from the facts emerging from the record. As already noticed, in some cases, non-compliance of procedural provisions which are not of statutory or mandatory character would not invite necessity for presuming prejudice as prejudice per se may not be inferred from breach of every instruction, rule or standing order. Departmental enquiry is to be tested on the touch-stone of justness and fairness and the principles of natural justice. Where there are regulatory or procedural provisions or orders and they have substantially complied with without causing any prejudice to the delinquent, it may not be necessary for the court to set aside the enquiry itself. Prejudice is capable of being inferred only in cases of violation of mandatory statutory provisions. 8. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent upon a judgment of this court in Nandini Mehta, Proprietor of M/s. Layovak Laboratories v. Amol Kate & Shubhangini Kanade (Smt.), (2003 III CLR 856). This judgment also does not lay down any principle other than the one indicated by us. In this case, the court held that it needs to be remembered that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character whose violation by itself is proof of prejudice. Referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S.K. Sharma, 1996 II CLR 29 [(1996) 3 SCC 364] and, referring to clause 25(4) of standing order, it was held that it is required of the enquiry officer to give option to the workman including the language in which the enquiry is to be conducted. This choice can be exercised when the workman is given an option. The court has also held that mere passive attitude on the part of the workman in that regard will not empower the enquiry officer to ignore the necessary requirement of standing order in that regard and the enquiry officer cannot choose the language in which the enquiry should be conducted. This principle can hardly be disputed, but will have its applicability as per the facts of a given case. We may also refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India and others, (1984) 1 SCC 43 ) where the Supreme Court while indicating the need for some leverage or elbow space to be part of interpretative process in departmental enquiries, held as under:31. Wade in his Administrative Law, Fifth Edition at pages 472-475 has observed that it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter, the application of principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth. 9. It may also be noticed that under Administrative Law, violation of principles of natural justice can be a material ground for setting aside an order but it is on revelation of prejudice or bias. There would not be a presumption as to prejudice and question of prejudice and bias has to be established and not inferred. Even in the case of Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic) and others, (2006) 7 SCC 558 ) clearly enunciated the principle that the doctrines of principle of natural justice are not embodied rules. They cannot be applied in a straitjacket formula. To sustain the complaint of violation of the principle of natural justice one must establish that he has been prejudiced by nonobservance of the principle of natural justice. These observations were made in regard to the termination of service of an employee who was served with a chargesheet and had not taken up the ground that the chargesheet was vague and, therefore, he could not answer the chargesheet properly and hence, there was violation of principles of natural justice. The court has observed that he participated in the proceedings without demur or protest and therefore, estopped from raising such issue before the court. 10. In the case of R.C. Sharma v. Union of India and others, (1976) 3 SCC 574 ), the Supreme Court has enunciated the principle that unless the exclusion of the evidence is of a kind which amounts to a denial of natural justice or would have affected the final decision it could not be material and held that prejudice from violation should normally be proved. Even in the case relied upon by the respondent in A.K. Kraipak and others v. Union of India and others, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the Supreme Court observed that where a complaint is made before court that principles of natural justice had been contravened, the court has to decide whether the observance of the rule was necessary for just decision and that mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. 11. In other words, except for a limited class of cases where prejudice and/or bias may be apparent by itself, it is a matter of fact which needs to be established by cogent and proper averments supported by record. 12. Right from the case of Union of India v. T.R. Varma, (AIR 1957 SC 882 ), the Supreme Court has taken a consistent view that the law requires that Tribunals should observe rules of natural justice in the conduct of the enquiry and if they do so, their decision is not liable to be impeached on the ground that the procedure followed was not in accordance with that, which obtains in a court of law. Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that the parties should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and no material should be relied upon against him without giving him an opportunity to explain. If these rules are adhered to, finding can hardly be attacked on the ground that rules of evidence have not been strictly followed. Again, in the case of The Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and another v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256 ), the court while taking the view that principle of substantial compliance within the peculiar facts of every case is all that is required and no inflexible rule can be laid down, also observed that natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. 13. These principles may not stricto senso be applicable to the cases where there are statutory rules and/or standing orders requiring an authority to act accordingly, still these principles will be a good percept to arrive at a proper decision. Undoubtedly, the certified standing orders have statutory force and are strictly to be construed and implemented in accordance with the principles of natural justice as they would attract application of such basic fundamentals. The Supreme Court in the case of D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ) also indicated that administrative actions must be just, fair, reasonable and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. It synthesizes to ensure that unfairness is avoided. The standing order 25 (4) is nothing but an extension of principles of natural justice it intend to provide such a flexibility to provide fair advantage to the workman so that he could understand the enquiry proceedings fully and gets a fair opportunity to put forward his case that alone is an underlying feature of this order. In other words, standing order 25(4) is nothing but an extension of principles of natural justice by use of specific language to ensure fairness in domestic enquiry. In the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and others v. B. Karunakar and others, (1993) 4 SCC 727 ), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court cautioned that principles of natural justice applicable to the Administrative Law should not be so extended to make their application antithetical to justice. In a more recent judgment in the case of Canara Bank and others v. Debasis Das and others, (2003) 4 SCC 557 ), the Supreme Court even reiterated the principle with more emphasis as follows: 13. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a common-sense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 14. The expressions natural justice and legal justice do not present a watertight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should even be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants defence. 15. .. 16. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 17 18. 19. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. The expression civil consequences encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life. 20. Natural justice has been variously defined by different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. drew and Lebura (Macq at p. 8), Lord Cranworth defined it as universal justice. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (AC at p. 623) Sir Robort P. Collier, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, used the phrase the requirements of substantial justice, while in Arthur John Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (AC at p. 240), the Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase the substantial requirement of justice. In Vionet v. Barrett (LJRD at p. 41), Lord Esher, M.R. defined natural justice as the natural sense of what is right and wrong. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health, Lord Esher, M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet case chose to define natural justice as fundamental justice. In Ridge v. Baldwin (QB at p. 578), Harman, L.J., in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with fair play in action, a phrase favoured by Bhagwati, J. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India. In H.K. (An Infant), Re (QB at p. 630), Lord Parker, C.J. preferred to describe natural justice as a duty to act fairly. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. V. Secy. Of State for Environment Lord Russell of Killowen somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as a fair crack of the whip while Geoffrey Lane, L.J. in R. v. Secy. Of State for Home affairs, ex p. Hosenball preferred the homely phrase common fairness. 14. In N.K. Prasada v. Govt. of India, (2004) 6 SCC 299 ), this Court observed as Under: 24. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula. Its application will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that if a party after having proper notice chose not to appear, he at a later stage cannot be permitted to say that he had not been given a fair opportunity of hearing. The question had been considered by a Bench of this Court in Sohan Lal Gupta v. Asha Devi Gupta of which two of us (V.N. Khare, C.J. and Sinha, J.) are parties wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it was held: (SCC p. 506, para 29) 29. The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have a proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby. 25. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, must not be stretched too far. 15. Dealing with the cases under the Industrial Disputes Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman & Nicobar Islands v. Munnu Barrick and others, (2005) 2 SCC 237 ) reiterated with approval the principle that in any domestic enquiry under the Labour Law, compliance to the principles of natural justice is necessary but the same cannot be put into a straitjacket formula and has to be viewed with flexibility. (Emphasis supplied). 16. On the analysis of the above judgments, it is clear that the statutory rules or even the standing orders have to be read and construed to achieve the ends of natural justice and not to give them such strict interpretation so as to defeat the very purpose of principle of fairness. As already noticed, the intent behind the standing order 25(4) is to ensure that the workman is able to exercise his choice of language at the initial stage itself but where the workman himself makes a choice by his conduct or otherwise and participates in the enquiry without any demur thereafter on the completion of the enquiry, it will be quite inconsistent for the workman to raise an objection to the validity of the enquiry on the ground of language. To put it more simply to give choice under Standing Order 25(4) to the workman is mandatory and the workman having accepted such a choice if participated in the conduct of the enquiry, the principle of substantial compliance would be attracted. Where no choice is given to the workman, the matter would certainly fall in a different category of cases. 17. Reference can also be made to the judgment of the Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Laxman Singh Solanki v. Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi and another, WP(C) 21258/2005, decided on 1st March, 2007 where the court held as under: Counsel for the respondents has rightly placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala and others vs. S.K. Sharma (1996) 2 SCC 364) and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. ect. Vs. B. Karunakar, etc. ect. (AIR 1994 SC 1074 ) to contend that procedural rules are not mandatory and no interference is called for when no prejudice is caused to the concerned officer. It was also held that no inflexible rule can be laid down in compliance of Principles of Natural Justice. Mere technical violation is not sufficient to invite the objection of violation of Principles of Natural Justice. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner then lastly while relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Others vs. B. Karunakar and others (1993) 4 SCC 727 ) contended that it was obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to serve upon the petitioner a second show cause notice relating to quantum of punishment before inflicting the punishment of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner. Counsel for the respondent while relying upon the same judgment as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of S.P. Mehta vs. Union of India and others (1994 SCC (L&S) 1018) and Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs and Others vs. K.S. Mahalingam (1986 SCC (L&S) 374) argued that the department was not required to serve second notice upon the petitioner and there has been no violation of any Rule or established procedure in that regard. The Delhi Judicial Service Rules under Rule 33 makes a provision regarding applicability of CCS (CCA) Rules on the members of the service. The said Rules do not contain any provision, which makes it obligatory upon the Disciplinary Authority, to serve the second show cause notice in relation to quantum of punishment. In fact, none has been pointed by the petitioner. Before the report was accepted by the Full Court, show cause notice was served upon the petitioner granting him an opportunity to fully make the representation to the authorities and put forward his point of view on the merits of the Articles of Charge contained in the report as well as all other matters ancillary thereto. The show cause notice served upon the petitioner was no way restricted. Along with the notice admittedly copy of the Inquiry Report had been furnished to the petitioner and he made a very detailed representation before the competent authority. In the case of S.P. Mehta (supra) and even B. Karunakar (supra), the Supreme Court had held that after amendment of Articles 311 by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, Rule 15(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was also amended deleting the requirement of the second notice with effect from 2nd September, 1978. The emphasis in the case of B. Karunakar (supra) is that before the report is accepted by the authority, the delinquent officer should have a fair opportunity to put forward his point of view and even question the correctness of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. Thus, we may state the principles of law as follows: (a) Compliance to the provisions of standing order 25(4) is essential in as much as the concerned authority to provide an option of language to the workman. If such an option is not given, it may be violation exhibiting prejudice per se. (b) Depending on the facts and circumstances of the given case, the principle of substantial compliance would be applicable to the standing order; and (c) Again depending on the facts and circumstances of the given case, some element of prejudice may have to be exhibited by the delinquent employee. 18. Before we advert to the facts of the present case, it is appropriate for us to mention that the learned Single Judge noticed the judgment of the Single Bench of this court in the case of Advani Oerlikon Ltd. (supra) but declined to follow the principle presumably applied therein on the ground that the said judgment of the court had been appealed against before the Letters Patent Bench. The learned Single Judge while relied upon the case of Nandini Mehta (supra), another Single Bench judgment of this court to form the present opinion. We may notice that there is no conflict in the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this court in the above two cases. As already noticed, in Nandini Mehtas case (supra), the Court had specifically noticed that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character whose violation by itself is proof of prejudice. It hastened to add that the enquiry officer has to provide opportunity of choice to the workman and it is not his passive attitude which can lead to the exercise of choice. In this very judgment, the court returned the finding The recording apparently discloses that it was not left to the workman to make any choice regarding the language in which the inquiry was to be conducted On facts, the court came to the conclusion that such choice was not given to the workman observing that there is nothing on record to disclose that the workman knew English language. In this case, the court no way felt that the principle of substantial compliance was applicable while in the case of Advani Oerlicon, the learned Judge really did not go into the legal controversy in greater detail but noticed It would not be necessary for me to answer the aforesaid questions in the present case as the workman was represented by a defence representative who was well versed in the English language. Admittedly, he had posed questions during the cross-examination of the witnesses of the Management in English. Upholding the applicability of principle of substantial compliance, the court noticed that no prejudice has been caused to the workman by recording testimony in English. Thus, on the proper construction of these two judgments and in the light of the principles aforenoticed by us, it can safely be held that standing order 25(4) is capable of attracting the principle of substantial compliance, however, it may not be possible to lay down any universally applicable principle as it essentially would have to be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. 19. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, the chargesheet dated 4th November, 2005 in English was served upon the petitioner and subsequently, at his request, admittedly, the translated Marathi copy was directed to be served upon the petitioner by order dated 21st August, 2006. Before 21st August, 2006, the petitioner participated in the departmental proceedings without any protest. In fact, the proceedings before the enquiry officer were conducted in Marathi but were recorded in English. It has been brought on record that the petitioner is S.C.C. passed and has an experience of 20 years working as Plant Operator. He is stated to be fully acquainted with English language. It appears that he raised objection during the enquiry proceedings on 21st August, 2006 when the enquiry officer immediately passed an order directing supply of chargesheet in Marathi language and also that proceedings will be conducted in Marathi, however, they may be recorded in English. It may also be noticed that the enquiry officer had informed the workman about the choice of English. The enquiry officer had recorded the following ruling during the pendency of the departmental enquiry: The CSW has also nowhere contended that at any time in the past the Company had made any correspondence in a language other than English. In the present case the CSW knows English. However in my opinion by way of a special case not creating any precedent the Company should provide Marathi translation of the English Charge-sheet on record to the CSW. I have also decided to conduct the enquiry in Marathi as desired by the CSW. However, so far as recordings of the proceedings are concerned, being my notes and also for the sake of convenience, brevity the same will be recorded in English by directly dictating to the Computer operator and the recorded proceedings will be explained to the CSW in Marathi simultaneously and before obtaining his signature. In my opinion no prejudice will be caused to the CSW. The CSW can engage a co-workman or a office bearer of the Union to assist him in the enquiry. In my opinion this will meet the ends of natural justice. 20. In the proceedings dated 21st August, 2006, it was also noticed that all the work being done by the employee in the Company for these long years was in no other language except English. Despite noticing all this, the enquiry officer has directed supply of translated copy of chargesheet and directed conducting of enquiry proceedings in Marathi though their records may be maintained in English. In the present petition itself, before the learned Single Judge and even in the Memorandum of Appeal, it is nowhere stated that these facts have been disputed by the workman and it is also not stated that the workman is not fully familiar or knows English language. It is also admitted that the enquiry proceedings before recording were explained to the employee in Marathi. In the backdrop of these facts, it cannot be said that the employee has suffered any prejudice because of the rulings passed by the enquiry officer. Choice is a matter of discretion and is capable of being waived by his conduct or otherwise. Once the choice is given and there is substantial compliance to the standing order, the domestic enquiry then can hardly be vitiated on such a ground. We are not prepared to accept the contention that generally and particularly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, standing order 25(4) would in no way admit the principle of substantial compliance and it is not required of the affected party to show any element of prejudice. It is not a case where no choice was given to the employee, on the contrary, employee accepted the same and, as a matter of fact, the employee not only knows English language but has been working in the Company and doing his work in English language for all these years with the basic fact that he studied in English upto Secondary School Examination. The order of the Enquiry Officer neither violates the essence of standing order 25(4) nor the principles of natural justice, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

Decision reasoning: 1[ds]Primarily, the Court is concerned with the later part of this Standing Order. It imposes an obligation upon the Enquiry Officer and the employer that all proceedings shall be conducted in English, Hindi or Marathi, according to the choice of the workman concerned and the person defending him. In other words, it gives an option to the workmen to opt for recording of proceedings in any one of the languages stated therein. The fact that there is an element of option indicates that there is intent of flexibility which is permissible within the ambit and scope of the Standing Order. Of course, preferential choice has been vested with the employee and he could give choice in any form i.e. in writing, by his conduct or by both. This Standing Order is primarily intended to control the procedure of departmental enquiry and is not so mandatory in its application that its violation would always result in vitiation of the enquiry even if there was no element of prejudice claimed by the employee. Again prejudice is a matter which has to be examined with objectivity, however, is subjective in satisfaction. The learned Single Judge himself noticed that another bench of this Court in the case of Advani Oerlikon Ltd. Vs Shashikant M Sable and others (Writ Petition No.972 of 1997) decided on 30th November 2007 had taken the view, while referring to the same Standing Order 25(4) that where witnesses have spoken in Marathi, it is translated and recorded in English and the employee knows English language, the requirement of the clause would be fully met and it is not absolutely mandatory for the Enquiry Officer to write the proceedings in Marathi. Merely because an Appeal was preferred against this judgment of the learned Single Judge, would not take away the right of the Company to rely upon that view on which hardly any analysis has been offered by the learned Single Judge in the impugnedalready noticed, in some cases,of procedural provisions which are not of statutory or mandatory character would not invite necessity for presuming prejudice as prejudice per se may not be inferred from breach of every instruction, rule or standing order. Departmental enquiry is to be tested on theof justness and fairness and the principles of natural justice. Where there are regulatory or procedural provisions or orders and they have substantially complied with without causing any prejudice to the delinquent, it may not be necessary for the court to set aside the enquiry itself. Prejudice is capable of being inferred only in cases of violation of mandatory statutorythe certified standing orders have statutory force and are strictly to be construed and implemented in accordance with the principles of natural justice as they would attract application of such basic fundamentals.On the analysis of the above judgments, it is clear that the statutory rules or even the standing orders have to be read and construed to achieve the ends of natural justice and not to give them such strict interpretation so as to defeat the very purpose of principle of fairness. As already noticed, the intent behind the standing order 25(4) is to ensure that the workman is able to exercise his choice of language at the initial stage itself but where the workman himself makes a choice by his conduct or otherwise and participates in the enquiry without any demur thereafter on the completion of the enquiry, it will be quite inconsistent for the workman to raise an objection to the validity of the enquiry on the ground of language. To put it more simply to give choice under Standing Order 25(4) to the workman is mandatory and the workman having accepted such a choice if participated in the conduct of the enquiry, the principle of substantial compliance would be attracted. Where no choice is given to the workman, the matter would certainly fall in a different category of cases.already noticed, in Nandini Mehtas case (supra), the Court had specifically noticed that there may be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character whose violation by itself is proof of prejudice. It hastened to add that the enquiry officer has to provide opportunity of choice to the workman and it is not his passive attitude which can lead to the exercise ofhe had posed questions during theof the witnesses of the Management in English. Upholding the applicability of principle of substantial compliance, the court noticed that no prejudice has been caused to the workman by recording testimony in English. Thus, on the proper construction of these two judgments and in the light of the principles aforenoticed by us, it can safely be held that standing order 25(4) is capable of attracting the principle of substantial compliance, however, it may not be possible to lay down any universally applicable principle as it essentially would have to be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case.Reverting back to the facts of the present case, the chargesheet dated 4th November, 2005 in English was served upon the petitioner and subsequently, at his request, admittedly, the translated Marathi copy was directed to be served upon the petitioner by order dated 21st August, 2006. Before 21st August, 2006, the petitioner participated in the departmental proceedings without any protest. In fact, the proceedings before the enquiry officer were conducted in Marathi but were recorded in English. It has been brought on record that the petitioner is S.C.C. passed and has an experience of 20 years working as Plant Operator. He is stated to be fully acquainted with English language. It appears that he raised objection during the enquiry proceedings on 21st August, 2006 when the enquiry officer immediately passed an order directing supply of chargesheet in Marathi language and also that proceedings will be conducted in Marathi, however, they may be recorded in English. It may also be noticed that the enquiry officer had informed the workman about the choice ofthe present petition itself, before the learned Single Judge and even in the Memorandum of Appeal, it is nowhere stated that these facts have been disputed by the workman and it is also not stated that the workman is not fully familiar or knows English language. It is also admitted that the enquiry proceedings before recording were explained to the employee in Marathi. In the backdrop of these facts, it cannot be said that the employee has suffered any prejudice because of the rulings passed by the enquiry officer. Choice is a matter of discretion and is capable of being waived by his conduct or otherwise. Once the choice is given and there is substantial compliance to the standing order, the domestic enquiry then can hardly be vitiated on such a ground. We are not prepared to accept the contention that generally and particularly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, standing order 25(4) would in no way admit the principle of substantial compliance and it is not required of the affected party to show any element of prejudice. It is not a case where no choice was given to the employee, on the contrary, employee accepted the same and, as a matter of fact, the employee not only knows English language but has been working in the Company and doing his work in English language for all these years with the basic fact that he studied in English upto Secondary School Examination. The order of the Enquiry Officer neither violates the essence of standing order 25(4) nor the principles of natural justice, in the facts and circumstances of the present case.