Case: Jagannath S/O Anna Khakare & Others Vs. The State of Maharashtra, Through Its Secretary, Energy Department & Others

R.M. Borde, J.1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by consent of learned Counsel for respective parties.2. Petitioners in all these petitions are prospective applicants who are desirous of participating in the process initiated by Respondent-Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd., for making appointment to the post of Electrical Assistant (Vidyut Sahayyak). Petitioners are seeking direction to the Respondent-Company to provide maximum age relaxation up to 45 years to the petitioners belonging to Project/Earthquake Affected Persons category in the advertisement no.1/2012 published on 08.06.2012. It is also prayed to declare that petitioners belonging to age group of 18 to 45 years are qualified and entitled to apply for the post of Electrical Assistant and to direct the Respondent-Company to consider candidature of petitioners for the said post. Petitioners are also seeking to quash advertisement no.1/2012 being in contravention of Government Resolution dated 03.02.2012.3. Respondent-Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited is formed after dissolution of Maharashtra State Electricity Board in view of notification issued under the Electricity Act, 2003, by the State on 04.06.2005. So far as petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.5120/2012, 4778/2012, 5144/2012 and some of the petitioners in Writ Petition No.5143/2012 are concerned, they belong to either Project Affected Persons category or Earthquake Affected Persons Category and some of the petitioners are from Freedom Fighters category. Petitioners in Writ Petition No. 5007/2012 belong to open category and according to these petitioners, the upper age limit for tendering applications for appointment to the said post shall be 33 years, with relaxation of five years in case of backward class candidates in accordance with Government Resolution dated 17.08.2004.4. Petitioners are challenging prescription of upper age limit in the advertisement issued by Respondent-Company on the ground that said prescription is in violation of Government policy. Petitioners placed reliance on Government Resolution dated 03.02.2007 whereby decision is taken by the State Government to raise upper age limit of Project Affected Persons category including Earthquake Affected Persons category up to 45 years for making appointments. It is recorded in the Resolution that directives are applicable to the employments with State Government Corporations, Government Boards, Municipal Corporations, Municipal Councils, Zilla Parishads and to such of the Entities, Authorities and Societies who are bound by the directives of the State Government. According to petitioners, Respondent-Company being Government owned Company, is bound by the directives of the State Government and as such, policy prescribed by the State Government raising upper age limit for the purposes of appointing candidates from Project Affected Persons category/Earthquake Affected Persons category is equally applicable to the Respondent-Company. It is vehemently contended by the petitioners that Respondent-Company is the State within meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and is bound to follow directives of the State Government including directives prescribing age for making appointment to the various posts from amongst a particular category.5. It is also contended by petitioners that other Companies, who are formed after bifurcation of Maharashtra State Electricity Board, are observing the policy formulated by the State Government in respect of prescribing upper age limit for making appointment to various posts from amongst Project Affected Persons category/Earthquake Affected Persons category and as such, Respondent-Company cannot be permitted to refuse to obey the directives. According to the petitioners, regulation framed by the Respondent-Company prescribing lower age limit is in violation of the policy framed by the State Government, which is applicable to the Respondent-Company. It is also contended that advertisement No.1/2012 prescribed upper age limit of 45 years for Ex-Servicemen category, whereas, petitioners have been discriminated and such discrimination, without any reasonable basis, is impermissible.6. The contentions raised by the petitioners are controverted by Respondents contending that Respondent-Company is registered under Section 617 of the Companies Act and the Company can frame Classification and Recruitment Regulations, 2005, being a Government Company, a Legal Entity, a juristic person, Respondent Company is not bound to follow Government policies and decisions of the State Government in respect of prescribing age limit for making appointments or even policy in respect of reservation in employment. It is contended that even if the Company is a Government Company, is not bound by the directives of the State in respect of policy decisions or in respect of subject matter involved in the petitions. It is contended that in the absence of there being any statutory provision or the Constitutional mandate, the Company would not be bound to adopt policy of the State. The Company has independence to formulate its own policy and make regulations and prescribe conditions for making appointments. It is also contended that identical challenge was raised in Writ Petition No.138/2010 in the case of Mukund Vasantrao Somade Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, in Writ Petition No.5741/2012, in the case of Sharad Tukaram Bhise Vs. State of Maharashtra & others and in the matter of Sandip Santaji Hande Vs. Chief Engineer, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. (Writ Petition No. 6072/2012), has been turned down by the Division Bench of this Court. In the matter of Sandip Santaji Hande and Sharad Tukaram Bhise, the very advertisement bearing No.1/2012 issued by Respondent-Company was under challenge on identical grounds, however, petitions presented by the petitioners, similarly situate, have been turned down. As such, no interference is called for in the instant petitions also.7. In Writ Petition No.4778/2012, affidavit-in-reply has been presented on behalf of Respondent-State by Under Secretary Mr.Vilas Mahadeorao Rajurkar, wherein it has been stated that the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited is incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and it is an independent juristic person having its own identity and independent existence. It is stated in the reply that the Company is competent to adopt its own policies in accordance with Articles of Association. It is further stated that the Government of Maharashtra, in exercise of powers under Section 133 read with Sections 131 & 134 of Electricity Act, 2003, promulgated the scheme of transfer of employees and officers, so also regarding continuation of their service conditions by Government Notification dated 04.06.2005 and directed the transferee Companies under Clause 6(9) that subject to the provisions of the Act and this scheme, the employees shall be governed by the Rules and Regulations framed by the Board existing on the date of transfer. They shall also be continued to be eligible for facilities available to the post on the date of transfer. The transferee shall be entitled to modify or frame new regulations governing the conditions of service of personnel transferred to the transferee under the scheme. It is stated that the Company has framed regulations for the purposes of recruitment of the employees and the Directors of the Company are well within their authority and powers and are authorized to adopt the Government Resolutions issued from time to time in the matter of appointment of the employees either by way of providing reservation or age relaxation, etc. It is further stated that the Government Resolutions are not ipso facto binding on the Company and it is up to the Board of Directors of the Company to adopt the Government Resolutions, Circulars either in toto or in part, as it deem fit and proper in the interest of the Company.8. In Writ Petition No.5120/2012, an affidavit-in-reply has been presented on behalf of the Divisional Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, Aurangabad, the Collector, Latur and the District Rehabilitation Officer, Latur, wherein it has been stated that the Government Resolution dated 03.02.2007 is applicable to Government services, Government Boards, Corporations, Municipal Corporations, Nagar Parishads, Zilla Parishads, so also applicable to all such establishments where Government has right to issue guidelines or orders. It is also stated that as 5% posts are reserved for project affected persons category, it can safely be said that all the Government Resolutions in respect of Project Affected Persons can be made applicable to the said category.9. The petitioners contend that Respondent-Company is a State within meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and as such, is bound by the policies of the State Government in the matter of employment of personnel. Heavy reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & another, reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 . In paragraph no.52 of the judgment, it is observed thus:52 Various aspects of the question which we have to decide were exhaustively considered by this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCR 1014 : (AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). In that case the Court observed (at p.1032 of SCR): (at p.1636 of AIR), Today the Government, as a welfare State, is the regulator and dispenser of special services and provider of a large number of benefits, including jobs, contracts, licenses, quotas, mineral rights, etc. The question in that case was whether the International Airport Authority constituted under the International Airports Authority Act, 1971, came within the meaning of the expression The State in Art.12. Under the said Act, the Authority was a body corporate having, perpetual succession and a common seal and was to consist of a Chairman and certain other members appointed by the Central Government. The Central Government had the power to terminate the appointment of or remove any member from the Board. Although the Authority had no share capital of its own, capital needed by it for carrying out its functions was to be provided only by the Central Government. While considering the question whether such a body corporate was included within the expression the State, this Court said (at page 1036 of SCR): (at pp.1638-39 of AIR):A corporation may be created in one of two ways. It may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act, 1956 or the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Where a Corporation is wholly enrolled by Government not only in its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by the law establishing it or by the Charter of its incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of Government. But ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous in its working, subject only to a provision, oftentimes made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matters. So also a corporation incorporated under law is managed by a board of directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. When does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government(Emphasis supplied)After considering various factors and the case law on the subject, the Court thus summed up the position:It will thus be seen that there are several factors which may have to be considered in determining whether a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of Government. We have referred to some of these factors and they may be summarised as under: Whether there is any financial assistance given by the State, and if so, what is the magnitude of such assistance, whether there is any other form of assistance, given by the State, and if so, whether it is of the usual kind or it is extraordinary, whether there is any control of the management and policies of the corporation by the State and what is the nature and extent of such control, whether the Corporation enjoys State conferred or State protected monopoly status and whether the functions carried out by the corporation are public functions closely related to governmental functions. This particularisation of relevant factors is however not exhaustive and by its very nature it cannot be, because with increasing assumption of new tasks, growing complexities of management and administration and the necessity of continuing adjustment in relations between the corporation and Government calling for flexibility, adaptability, and innovative skills, it is not possible to make an exhaustive enumeration of the tests which would invariably and in all cases provide an unfailing answer to the question whether a corporation is governmental instrumentality or agency. Moreover even amongst these factors which we have described, no one single factor will yield a satisfactory answer to the question and the Court will have to consider the cumulative effect of these various factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a particularised inquiry into the facts and circumstances of each case.In the course of its judgment, the Court distinguished the case of Praga Tools Corporation, (AIR 1969 SC 1306 ) as also the decision in S.L.Agrawal V. General Manager, Hindustan Steel Ltd. (AIR 1970 SC 1150 ) in very much the same manner as we have done. So far as the case of Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, (AIR 1975 SC 1329 ) is concerned, the Court said as follows:Lastly, we must refer to the decision in Sabhajit Tewari v. Union of India where the question was whether the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was an authority within the meaning of Art.12. The Court no doubt took the view on the basis of facts relevant to the Constitution and functioning of the Council that it was not an authority, but we do not find any discussion in this case as to what are the features which must be present before a corporation can be regarded as an authority within the meaning of Art.12. This decision does not lay down any principle or test for the purpose of determining when a corporation can be said to be an authority. If at all any test can be gleaned from the decision, it is whether the Corporation is really an agency of the Government. The Court seemed to hold on the facts that the Council was not an agency of the Government and was, therefore, not an authority.9. Placing reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court, quoted above, it is contended that Respondent-Company is an instrumentality of the State and as such, bound by the directives issued by the Government. Reliance is also placed on the judgment in the matter of the Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. Vs. the Mysore Paper Mills Officers Association & another, reported in 2002 (2) SCC 167 . In para 36 of the judgment, the Supreme Court has observed that:36 The principle laid down in the aforementioned cases (In Ajay Hasias case) that if the Government acting through its officers was subject to certain constitutional limitations, a fortiori the Government acting through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation should equally be subject to the same limitations, was approved by the Constitution Bench and it was pointed out that otherwise it would lead to considerable erosion of the efficiency of the fundamental rights, for in that event the Government would be enabled to override the fundamental rights by adopting the stratagem of carrying out its function through the instrumentality or agency of a corporation while retaining control over it.It has further been clarified in para 37 that:37 .... that the principle while discharging public functions and duties the Government Companies/Corporations/societies which are instrumentalities or agencies of the Government must be subjected to the same limitations in the field of public law constitutional or administrative law as the Government itself, does not lead to the inference that they become agents of the Centre/State Government for all purposes so as to bind such Government for all their acts, liabilities and obligations under various Central and/or State Acts or under private law."10. On consideration of facts of that case, the Supreme Court found that the Company is nothing but an instrumentality and agency of the State Government and the physical form of Company is merely a cloak or cover for the Government.11. Making parallel to the instant matters, it has been urged that the Respondent-Company is also an instrumentality of the State and is bound to obey directives of the State Government.12. Reference is also made to a judgment in the matter of A.L.KalraVs. The Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.,reported in AIR 1984 SC 1361 . While controverting the contentions raised by petitioners, it has been contended that Respondent-Company is incorporated under the Companies Act and has a corporate personality of its own and distinct from the Government. It is contended that unless policy of the Government is adopted by the Company, it does not bind them. It is contended that the Company can formulate its regulations prescribing qualifications and age limit for making appointment to the post. Reliance is placed on clause 6.9 of the scheme which deals with transfer of employees wherein it has been stated that the transferee i.e. Respondent-Company shall be entitled to modify and frame new regulations governing conditions of a personnel transferred to the transferee under the scheme, but the rank, scale of pay, salary, allowances and other pecuniary benefits including terminal benefits after the effective date of transfer, shall not in any way be inferior to those applicable to them immediately before the transfer. As per the Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co.Ltd.s Classification and Recruitment Regulations 2005, in respect of prescribing/revising pre-requisites viz. qualification, experience, method of filling the vacancy, for various posts, etc., and to make necessary changes in the schedule in respect of posts in the rank of Superintending Engineer and equivalent cadre and above all the cadres, the competent authority is M.D. in consultation with Director (Operations), as the case may be. In accordance with the Regulations, revised pre-requisites are framed prescribing qualifications and experience for the post of Junior Operator and Junior Technician. The upper age limit is prescribed as 27 years, in view of the correction slip no.47 dated 06.06.2012. It is contended that the Company is well within its powers to prescribe the qualifications, age and other details for making appointment to the post and the Company is not bound to adopt policy of the State in respect of recruitment to the post unless same is adopted by the Company. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of Steel Authority of India Ltd. Vs. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. & others, reported in AIR 1998 SC 418 . The decision of the High Court holding that the Steel Authority of India is department of Union of India was subjected to challenge before the Supreme Court. While considering the argument that the Steel Authority of India is a Department of Union of India, the Supreme Court has observed in paragraphs 16 to 18, thus:16 Coming to the merits of the case, we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court went wrong in holding that SAIL was a department of the Union of India. In Agarwals case (AIR 1970 SC 1150 ) (supra), a Constitution Bench of this Court while considering a similar question held as follows: (at p.1153 of AIR):-We must, therefore, hold that the Corporation which is Hindustan Steel Limited in this case is not a department of the Government nor are the servants of it holding posts under the State. It has its independent existence and by law relating to Corporations, it is distinct even from its members.17. In Western Coalfields case (AIR 1982 SC 697 ) (supra), this Court held as follows (at pp. 704-705 of AIR):It is contended by the Attorney General that since the appellant-companies are wholly owned by the Government of India, the lands and buildings owned by the companies cannot be subjected to property tax. The short answer to this contention is that even though the entire share capital of the appellant-companies has been subscribed by the Government of India, it cannot be predicted that the companies themselves are owned by the Government of India. The companies which are incorporated under the Companies Act have a corporate personality of their own, distinct from that of Government of India. The lands and buildings are vested in and owned by the companies, the Government of India only owns share capital.18. In view of the above decisions of this Court, we have no hesitation to hold that the High Court erred in thinking that SAIL was a department of the Union of India and most of the reasons given in the judgment are based on this wrong premises."13. The Supreme Court, in the matter of Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 1970 SC 82 (1), has observed that, merely because the entire share capital of the Company was contributed by the Central Government and the fact that all its shares are held by the President and certain officers of the Central Government does not make any difference. The Company and the share-holders being, distinct entities, this fact does not make the company an agent either of the President or the Central Government. In para 5 of the judgment, it is observed thus:5 It is true that besides the Central Government having contributed the entire share capital, extensive powers are conferred on it, including the power to give directions as to how the company should function, the power to appoint directors and even the power to determine the wages and salaries payable by the company to its employees. But these powers are derived from the companys memorandum of association and the articles of association and not by reason of the company being the agent of the Central Government. The question whether a corporation is an agent of the State must depend on the facts of each case. Where a statute setting up a corporation so provides such a corporation can easily be identified as the agent of the State as in Graham v. Public Works Commissioners, 1901-2 KB 781 where Phillimore, J. said that the Crown does in certain cases establish with the consent of Parliament certain officials or bodies who are to be treated as agent of the Crown even though they have the power of contracting as principals. In the absence of a statutory provision, however, a commercial corporation acting on its own behalf even though it is controlled wholly or partially by a Government department, will be ordinarily presumed not to be a servant or agent of the State. The fact that a minister appoints the members or directors of a corporation and he is entitled to call for information, to give directions which are binding on the directors and to supervise over the conduct of the business of the corporation does not render the corporation an agent of the Government. (See State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Visakhapatnam, 1964 (4) SCR 99 at p. 188 = (AIR 1963 SC 1811 at p. 1849) per Shah, J. and Tamlin v. Hannaford, 1950-1 KB 18 at pp. 25, 26) Such an inference that the corporation is the agent of the Government may be drawn where it is performing in substance governmental and not commercial functions. (Cf: London County Territorial and Auxiliary Force Association v. Nichols, 1948-2 All ER 432)."14. Relying upon the observations referred to above, it has been contended that in the absence of statutory provision commercial corporation even though controlled wholly or partially by the Government, will be ordinarily presumed to be servant or agent of the State. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of HEC Voluntary Retd. Employees Welfare Society & another Vs. Heavy Engineering Corpn. Ltd. & others,reported in (2006) 3 SCC 708 , by the Respondents and it is contended that in the absence of any statutory provision, directives of the Government are not binding upon the Corporation. In paragraphs 31 & 32, it has been observed by the Supreme Court, thus:31. It may be true that the Central Government interpreted the provision differently, but in the absence of any statutory provision the same is not binding upon the respondent. It is of some interest to note that the Central Government opined that the Company itself has to hear the brunt of additional burden which on all probabilities was an impossible task.32. Our attention has not been drawn to the provision of any statute that even in its day-to-day functioning, the Company would be bound by any direction issued by the Central Government. It may be that the respondent is a government company within the meaning of Section 617 of the Companies Act. It may be that the entire shareholding of the Company is held by the President of India or his nominee but in law it is a separate juristic entity and, thus, in the absence of any statutory provision, the Company was not bound by any such clarification issued by the Central Government. Even where a statute confers such a jurisdiction on the Central Government, the same must be held to be confined only to the provisions contained therein. (See State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi)."15. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of The Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation by its Chief Executive Officer, Hyderabad Vs. The Income-tax Officer, B1-BWard, Hyderabad, reported in AIR 1964 SC 1486 and in the matter of Western Coalfields Ltd. Vs. Special Area Development Authority, Korba & another, reported in AIR 1982 SC 697 . The Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that the Company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. The property of the Company is not the property of the shareholders, but a shareholder has merely an interest in the Company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability and by a share in the profit.16. It has also been urged by the Respondents that the policy prescribed under Article 15(4) of the Constitution of reservation is only an enabling provision and it is for the respective State either to enact a legislation or issue executive instructions providing reservation. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of Dr.GulshanPrakash & others Vs. State of Haryana & others, reported in AIR 2010 SC 288 , for the same purpose. It is the contention of Respondents that the Corporation has provided for 5% seats to project affected persons category. The policy of the State Government prescribing higher age limit is not binding on the Company and the Company can formulate its own resolutions in consonance with its Articles of Association.17. It has also been urged that an identical challenge raised to the very advertisement has been turned down by this Court and as such, these writ petitions need not be entertained.18. Before turning to the judgment concerning challenge to the advertisement no.1/2012, it would be appropriate to refer to the judgment in the matter of Mukund s/o Uttamrao Somde Vs. State of Maharashtra & others, (Writ Petition No.138 of 2010, decided by Division Bench of this Court on 22.01.2010). The advertisement issued by the Respondent-Company bearing no. 1/2009 dated 01.12.2009 prescribing upper age limit of 30 years for open category candidates to fill up the post of Junior Operator, was the subject matter of challenge in the petition. It was the contention of the petitioners therein that the Respondent-Company is obliged to retain maximum age limit of 33 years. In paragraph no.7 of the judgment, the Division Bench has observed thus:7. Having considered the rival submissions, we find merits in the stand taken by the Respondent No.2 that the condition imposed in the advertisement of upper age limit of 30 years while inviting the applications for the concerned posts, is a policy decision of the Respondent No. 2 and the same cannot be lightly interfered with. The scope of judicial review to interfere with the policy matter and in particular, relating to the necessary qualification mentioned therein, would be possible only if the said policy decision was shown to be in violation with some statutory or constitutional provision. No statutory provision has been brought to our notice, which would persuade us to take the view that the policy decision of the Respondent No.2 to restrict upper age limit to 30 years, is in breach of such statutory provision.It has also been observed in the judgment that prospective applicants cannot entertain expectation that for all the times to come, the same selection norms will prevail.19. In Writ Petition No.139 of 2010, decided by the Division Bench at Bombay on 22.01.2010, challenge raised by the petitioners therein in respect of prescribing upper age limit of 30 years by the Company in respect of open category candidates to fill the posts of Junior Operator or Technician was a matter of consideration and the Court, for the reasons recorded in the judgment, has turned down the challenge.20. In Writ Petition No.5741/2012, decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 07.09.2012 (Sharad Tukaram Bhise Vs. State of Maharashtra & another), challenge was raised to the advertisement no.1/2012, which is the very advertisement under challenge in the instant group of petitions. The challenge is confined to the age relaxation so far as candidates belonging to backward class is concerned and it was contended that it should be in tune with age limit prescribed in the Government Resolution dated 17.08.2004 issued by the State Government. The Division Bench, placing reliance on the judgment in the matter of Mukund s/o Uttamrao Somde Vs. State of Maharashtra & others in W.P. No. 138/2010, has turned down the challenge and dismissed the petition. It has been observed in the judgment that, the Government Resolution is only recommendatory and cannot be treated to be binding on the Respondent-Company. The selection process, which has been notified by the Company, will have to be proceeded as per the policy decision of the Company, which has been taken at the highest level by the Board of Directors.21. In another writ petition, taking exception to the very advertisement, decided by the Division Bench of this Court at Bombay, in the matter of Sandip Santaji Hade Vs. Chief Engineer, M.S.E.D.Co.Ltd. (Writ Petition No.6072 of 2012, decided on 2012), challenge raised to the very advertisement i.e. No.1/2012 on the ground of failure to provide age relaxation in consonance with Government Resolution dated 03.02.2007, applicable to project affected persons category, has been turned down by the Division Bench following decision of the Division Bench in the matter of Sharad Tukaram Bhise.22. It is to be noted that since the Division Bench at Bombay has turned down the challenge raised to the very advertisement, the instant petitions, taking exception to the advertisement on the identical grounds, need not be entertained. Since the Division Bench at Bombay has taken a view that the Government Resolution is only recommendatory in nature and cannot be treated as binding on Respondent No.2, instant petitions raising identical challenge do not deserve consideration. It has also to be taken note of that since policy prescribed by the Government under the Resolution has not been adopted by the Respondent-Company nor there is any statutory provision pointed out showing binding nature of the directives, the contentions raised by the petitioners in the group of instant petitions do not deserve acceptance.23. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that these writ petitions are devoid of substance and deserve to be dismissed.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]20. In Writ Petition No.5741/2012, decided by the Division Bench of this Court on 07.09.2012 (Sharad Tukaram Bhise Vs. State of Maharashtraanother), challenge was raised to the advertisement no.1/2012, which is the very advertisement under challenge in the instant group of petitions. The challenge is confined to the age relaxation so far as candidates belonging to backward class is concerned and it was contended that it should be in tune with age limit prescribed in the Government Resolution dated 17.08.2004 issued by the State Government. The Division Bench, placing reliance on the judgment in the matter of Mukund s/o Uttamrao Somde Vs. State of Maharashtraothers in W.P. No. 138/2010, has turned down the challenge and dismissed the petition. It has been observed in the judgment that, the Government Resolution is only recommendatory and cannot be treated to be binding on theThe selection process, which has been notified by the Company, will have to be proceeded as per the policy decision of the Company, which has been taken at the highest level by the Board of Directors.21. In another writ petition, taking exception to the very advertisement, decided by the Division Bench of this Court at Bombay, in the matter of Sandip Santaji Hade Vs. Chief Engineer, M.S.E.D.Co.Ltd. (Writ Petition No.6072 of 2012, decided on 2012), challenge raised to the very advertisement i.e. No.1/2012 on the ground of failure to provide age relaxation in consonance with Government Resolution dated 03.02.2007, applicable to project affected persons category, has been turned down by the Division Bench following decision of the Division Bench in the matter of Sharad Tukaram Bhise.22. It is to be noted that since the Division Bench at Bombay has turned down the challenge raised to the very advertisement, the instant petitions, taking exception to the advertisement on the identical grounds, need not be entertained. Since the Division Bench at Bombay has taken a view that the Government Resolution is only recommendatory in nature and cannot be treated as binding on Respondent No.2, instant petitions raising identical challenge do not deserve consideration. It has also to be taken note of that since policy prescribed by the Government under the Resolution has not been adopted by thenor there is any statutory provision pointed out showing binding nature of the directives, the contentions raised by the petitioners in the group of instant petitions do not deserve acceptance.23. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that these writ petitions are devoid of substance and deserve to be dismissed.