Case: Inder Singh Vs. Gurdial Singh

S.K. Das, J.1. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by the High Court of Punjab on March 7, 1955. The only question which falls for decision is whether Inder Singh, plaintiff in the Court of first instance and appellant herein, was validly adopted by one Nathu in accordance with the rules of customary adoption prevalent amongst Jats of the Ludhiana district in the State of Punjab.2. The relevant facts are these. Nathu, the last male holder of the property in dispute, was a Jat of Ludhiana district. He was blind, not married and had no issue. He was a resident of village Mohanpur. Inder Singh, a resident of the same village, was his nephew by collateral relation of the fifth degree. Inder Singhs case was that he looked after Nathu since his childhood and on March 24, 1946. Nathu adopted him, according to the custom prevalent amongst them, before the village Panchayat by distributing "gur" (jaggery) and on the next day, that is, March 25, 1946, Nathu executed a deed of adoption in his favour and got it registered on the same day. For a short period thereafter Nathu lived with Inder Singh. Then Gujar Singh, defendant in the suit. who was a nearer collateral of Nathu, gained influence over the latter. Nathu left Inder Singh and on September 6, 1946, cancelled the deed of gift. Nathu died three years after, that is, on October 27, 1949. On Nathus death Gujar Singh got the property of Nathu mutated in his name in the revenue records. Inder Singh then brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen for possession of the property of Nathu Singh, which consisted of about 16 bighas odd of land and a house, on the footing that he was the adopted son of Nathu. The suit was contested by Gujar Singh who alleged inter alia that Inder Singh was not validly adopted by Nathu in accordance with the custom prevalent amongst the Jats of Ludhiana.3. The trial Judge held that the story of the alleged adoption before the village Panchayat was not substantiated and the recitals in the deed of adoption were incorrect. He further found that according to the customary rules of adoption the deed of adoption could not have any effect unless after its execution there was a continuous course of conduct showing that Nathu treated Inder Singh as his son and inasmuch as there was no evidence to show such association, Inder Singh had failed to make out his case. The suit was accordingly, dismissed. Inder Singh then preferred an appeal which was heard by the District Judge of Ludhiana. On a consideration of the evidence the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that it established that Nathu did declare Inder Singh as his heir before the village Panchayat on or about March 24, 1946, and that Nathu dived with Inder Singh for a very short period thereafter. This, in the opinion of the learned District Judge, was sufficient to establish a valid adoption according to the customary rules and no further evidence of association as father and son between the two was necessary. In this view of the matter, the learned District Judge held that the cancellation of the deed of adoption by Nathu on September 6, 1946, was of no effect, because all adoption once validly made could not be revoked. Accordingly, he allowed the appeal.4. Gujar Singh cried sometime after the appellate decision and the present respondents as heirs and legal representatives of Gujar Singh carried a second appeal to the Punjab High Court. The learned Judges of the High Court held that the rules of customary adoption prevalent amongst the parties required two essential elements : (a) an intention to appoint an heir, and (b) an act of association between the two as father and son. They held that the short period of about six weeks during which Nathu lived with the appellant after the execution of the creed of adoption was not sufficient to prove that Nathu treated Inder Singh as his future heir there was, therefore, no such association as would make the adoption valid according to the customary rules relevant amongst the Jats of Ludhiana district. On this view the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge and restored those of the Court of first instance.5. The judgment being a judgment of reversal and the value of the property in dispute more than Rs. 20,000 the High Court gave a certificate under Art. 133 of the Constitution read with Ss. 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On that certificate the present appeal has come to us.6. The finding of the learned District Judge that the evidence on record established that Nathu declared Inder Singh as his heir before the village Panchayat on or about March 26, 1946 is clearly a finding of fact and binding in second appeal. The correctness or otherwise of that funding cannot now be canvassed. The controversy in the High Court as also before us centered round the question whether under the customary rules of adoption prevalent amongst the Jats of Ludhiana, a second element for a valid adoption, namely, an act of association or a general treatment of the appointed heir as a son is essential.7. Mr. Achhru Ram appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the view expressed by the learned District Judge is the correct view. He has referred us to the general statement of the customary rule in the matter of the appointment of an heir in Para. 35 at p. 50 of Rattigans Digest of Customary Law (seventh edition). That paragraph, with Explanation 1, reads as follows :"35. A sonless proprietor of land in the central and eastern parts of the Punjab may appoint one of his kinsmen to succeed him as his heir.Explanation 1. Such an appointment may be manifested in the absence of any special custom prescribing a different mode in any of the following ways: By (a) a formal declaration before the brotherhood, (b) a written declaration, either preceded or followed by some treatment consistent with a deliberate appointment, or (c) a long course of treatment evidencing an unequivocal intention to appoint the specified person as heir."The argument of learned Counsel is that according to general rule stated above, the appointment of an heir by adoption may be manifested in one of the following ways : (a) by a formal declaration before the brotherhood, (b) by a written declaration, either preceded or followed by some treatment consistent with a deliberate appointment, or (c) a long course of treatment evidencing all unequivocal intention to appoint the specified person as heir. Learned Counsel contends that in view of the finding of the learned District Judge that a formal declaration of the adoption was made by Nathu before the village Panchayat, there was a sufficient manifestation of the appointment. He has submitted that a somewhat different rule embodied in the thirteenth edition of Rattigans Digest as revised by O. P. Aggarwala is not a correct statement of the law, the statement there being that the two elements which are essential to constitute the factum of adoption are (i) an intention to appoint an heir and (ii) an act of association (see p. 497). We consider that it is unnecessary in this case to examine the more general question of the exact scope and ambit of the rule in other parts of the Punjab; for we have unimpeachable evidence of the scope of the rule in the district of Ludhiana. In the Customary Law of the Ludhiana District (rewaj-i-am), compiled and attested by J. M. Dunnett, Settlement Officer, the formalities of customary adoption amongst Jats of the Ludhiana district are stated in the form of the following question and answer (see p. 102) :"Question 68. What formalities are necessary for adoption ?Answer-As adoption is not a religious ceremony, no special formalities are considered necessary. The adopter usually calls the neighbours and his relations together, and distributes gur, saying that he has adopted (god lia) so and so. Sometimes a deed of adoption is executed. But a declaration of adoption and general treatment as a son are looked upon as sufficient."The compiler then observes :"Case-law agrees. It is well established principle that customary adoption requires absolutely no formalities. The evidence required to establish the factum of adoption is merely evidence of intention clearly expressed and treatment shown.In 79 Pun Re 1882 (Jats of Manza Baga Kalan tahsil Samrala) the execution of a deed and general conduct were held sufficient, but in 94 Pun Re 1893, among Dhaliwal Jats, the mere execution of a deed unaccompanied by precedent or subsequent treatment was held insufficient."8. Mr. Achhru Ram has very fairly conceded that the statement of customary law of the Ludhiana district in the rewaj-i-am is authoritative, though the many details mentioned in the answers given are not necessarily mandatory.It is clear, however that so far as the Jats of Ludhiana district are concerned the formalities necessary for adoption are, firstly, a declaration of adoption and, secondly, general treatment of the appointed heir as a son. A mere declaration or even the execution of a deed of adoption unaccompanied by precedent or subsequent treatment is insufficient. That being the position, the High Court was clearly right in its decision.9. The same position is established by the authorities hearing on the subject The earliest decision to which our attention has been drawn is Gurbachna v. Bujha, 42 Pun Re 1911, p. 151. In that case it was stated that where the power of customary adoption by a sonless proprietor was not disputed, all that was necessary to constitute an adoption was the clear expression of an intention on the part of the adoptive father to adopt the boy concerned as his son and a sufficient manifestation of that intention by the execution and registration of a deed of adoption coupled with a clear declaration in Court and subsequent treatment as adopted son. It was pointed out, however, that in a case where soon after the execution of the deed of adoption the reversioners of the adoptive father brought a suit, it was not reasonable to demand proof of subsequent treatment.In the case before us, Nathu cried three years after the execution of the deed. He left Inder Singh a few weeks after the execution of the deed, cancelled the creed within about five months and instead of treating Inder Singh as his son repudiated any such association with him. In these circumstances the High Court lightly held that there was no sufficient manifestation of the intention to adopt; Inder Singh as his son by Nathu.In Baj Singh v. Partap Singh 77 Ind Cas 473: (AIR 1923 Lah 497 (2) ), it was observed :"There is ample authority for holding that the appointment in order to be valid must be made in some unequivocal and customary manner and the execution of a deed coupled with a long course of treatment has always been recognised as one of the modes of manifesting such an appointment."In Chhajju v. Mehr Singh, : 31 Pun LR 997: (AIR 1930 Lah 1072), it was held that the execution of a deed by the adoptive father was not enough and continuous subsequent treatment not having been proved, the adoption was not established. In Chanan Singh v. Buta Singh. AIR 1935 Lah 83 the decision proceeded on the customary law of the district of Jullundur and on that basis it was held that the appointment should be manifested by some declaration or course of treatment evidencing an unequivocal intention to appoint a specified person as heir; it was pointed out that the question and answer recorded in the rewaj-i-am concerned showed that the essence of the customary rule was that it should be clearly declared. Their Lordships were dealing with a case in which there was not merely a public declaration in Court but also subsequent treatment of the appointed heir as a son by the adoptive father. In Kishan Singh Taru, (AIR 1949 EP 342), it was observed that all that was necessary to constitute an adoption under customary law was the clear expression of intention on the adoptive fathers part to adopt the boy concerned as his son and the execution of the deed of adoption coupled with a clear declaration before a registering officer and continuous subsequent treatment as adopted son were sufficient manifestation of the intention.10. We are of the view that the High Court rightly held that in the circumstances of this case the declaration made by Nathu before the village Panchayat on March 24, 1946 and the execution of a deed of adoption which he cancelled within a short time were not a sufficient manifestation of the intention of Nathu to adopt Inder Singh as his son. There was no evidence that Nathu Singh treated Inder Singh as his son; on the contrary, there was evidence to show that he repudiated the declaration that he had earlier made.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]We consider that it is unnecessary in this case to examine the more general question of the exact scope and ambit of the rule in other parts of the Punjab; for we have unimpeachable evidence of the scope of the rule in the district ofis clear, however that so far as the Jats of Ludhiana district are concerned the formalities necessary for adoption are, firstly, a declaration of adoption and, secondly, general treatment of the appointed heir as a son. A mere declaration or even the execution of a deed of adoption unaccompanied by precedent or subsequent treatment is insufficient. That being the position, the High Court was clearly right in itsthe case before us, Nathu cried three years after the execution of the deed. He left Inder Singh a few weeks after the execution of the deed, cancelled the creed within about five months and instead of treating Inder Singh as his son repudiated any such association with him. In these circumstances the High Court lightly held that there was no sufficient manifestation of the intention to adopt; Inder Singh as his son by Nathu.We are of the view that the High Court rightly held that in the circumstances of this case the declaration made by Nathu before the village Panchayat on March 24, 1946 and the execution of a deed of adoption which he cancelled within a short time were not a sufficient manifestation of the intention of Nathu to adopt Inder Singh as his son. There was no evidence that Nathu Singh treated Inder Singh as his son; on the contrary, there was evidence to show that he repudiated the declaration that he had earlier made.