Case: Nanchand Gangaram Shetji Vs. Mallappa Mahalingappa Sadalge

SARKARIA, J.1. This is a plaintiffs appeal by special leave directed against a judgment of the High Court of Mysore. The following pedigree table will be helpful in understanding the facts leading to this appeal :"Mahalingappa(died in 1922)|-------------------------------------------------| | |Mallappa Appasaheb Neelkanth (died = Smt. BalabaiDefendant Defendant on July 8, 1946) (wife of NeelkanthNo. 1 No. 2 | Defendant No. 4)ChandrakantDefendant No. 3"2. The respondents are Hindus governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. Mahalingappa, the prepositus of the joint family died in 1922, survived by three sons, namely, Mallappa, defendant No. 1, Appasaheb, defendant No. 2, Neelkanth (the sons are hereafter referred to as M, A and N). Mahalingappa and his sons constituted a joint Hindu family. The family was trading in tobacco. Mahalingappa, as karta was managing the joint family business. After his death, his eldest son Neelkanth, father of Chandrakant, defendant No. 3, began to look after the management of the family business.N also started C. N. Tennis Bidi Factory in the name of his son Chandrakant in 1942 or thereabout. N died on July 8, 1946. Thereafter A defendant No. 2 continued and managed the joint family business and the family concerns with the consent of the other members. After 1951, the family business was managed by M (defendant No. 1).3. The appellant had business dealings in tobacco and money dealings with the defendants joint family. There used to be periodical verification of accounts and acknowledgements were made from time to time by the manager of the family. The plaintiffs accounts were burnt in fire on October 22, 1949 and he had to reconstruct the accounts from available information and documents.4. On April 15, 1953, accounts were taken, and the amount due from the defendants family to the plaintiff was worked out and verified. The accounts thus stated were acknowledged and signed by defendant No. 1 and by defendant No. 4, as guardian of her minor son, defendant. No. 3. A balance of Rs. 69, 465/15/- was found due to the plaintiff from the defendants.5. With the preceding allegations, the plaintiff, on January 28, 1954, instituted the suit for the recovery of Rs. 75, 000, comprising of Rs. 69, 465/15/- as principal plus interest at 12 per cent per annum. Subsequently, by an amendment of the plaint, he added an alternative ground that if the defendants proved that there had been a partition in the family, they were still liable for the dues pertaining to the ancestral business carried by all the defendants either as members of the joint Hindu family or as partners of a firm.6. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in their joint written statement, admitted that there was an ancestral tobacco business of the family managed by N till his death in 1946; that after Ns death, the family business was managed by them (M and A) and that all the defendants were jointly liable for the plaintiffs claim. The defendants denied that there was ever a partition of the joint family. They however conceded that a deed of partnership, an agreement and a partition award had been brought into existence from time to time with the sole object of lessening the burden of Income-tax, and they were not intended to be acted upon. It was added that after the interim attachment of the property defendant No. 3, taking advantage of these bogus documents, obtained an ex parte decree to show that there had been division of the joint family, and that this decree was not opposed by the answering defendants because they were assured that it would not be executed. They admitted that the appellants claim was partially true, but denied correctness of the total balance claimed as due. They further averred that the suit was time barred as the acknowledgment relied on by the plaintiff was not legal and could not extend limitation, that interest was wrongly calculated, that if they (defendant Nos. 1 and 2) were held liable, they should be allowed to pay in easy instalments.7. Defendant No. 3 filed a separate written statement. He resisted the plaintiffs claim, traversed the allegations in the plaint, and denied that there was any acknowledgment made on his behalf on April 15, 1953 by his mother, defendant No. 4. In the alternative, he pleaded that she had no authority to acknowledge the debt so as to bind him as he was then a minor. Defendant No. 3 further stated that there was a disruption of the joint family status on November 4, 1945 when M, A and N unequivocally expressed their intention to separate, and divided the movables, and thereafter, a decree for partition of the immovable property of the family was passed in 1949 on the basis of an arbitration award. Defendant No. 3 asserted that this decree had been acted upon by the parties. He denied that defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had every acted manager of the joint family with the consent of the other members, and added that this question could not arise because of the earlier division of the family.8. Defendant No. 4 in her written statement denied the plaintiffs claim and supported the contention raised in his written statement by defendant No. 3. She stated that defendants Nos. 1 and 2, had taken her thumb impression on certain papers with the representation that they had been properly managing the Tennis Bidi Factory which had fallen to the share of her husband. She was never informed of the contents of the documents by the defendants, who took undue advantage of her illiteracy.9. The trial Court held that the joint family had disrupted in 1945 and the plaintiff was aware of this fact, that the acknowledgments of the debt had been made by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and not by defendant No. 3, and on that account the suit was within time only as against defendants Nos. 1 and 2; that defendant No. 3 had on attaining majority repudiated his liability as partner; that the thumb impressions of defendant No. 4 on the acknowledgment had been taken by practising fraud; that in any case defendant No. 4 had no authority of acknowledge the debt on behalf of her minor son. The Court, however, upheld the appellants contention that the old accounts had been destroyed in fire and that the plaintiff was entitled to interest at 12 per cent per annum. On these findings, the trial Court decreed the plaintiffs claim in toto against defendants Nos. 1 and 2 but dismissed it against defendants Nos. 3 and 4.10. Against that judgment and decree of the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal to the High Court. The High Court has affirmed the findings of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal.11. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff.12. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 did not appeal against the decree of the trial Court which had consequently become final against them.13. It is common ground between the parties that during the lifetime of Mahalingappa, the family consisting of Mahalingappa and his sons, was a joint Hindu family trading in tobacco. It is further not disputed that after the death of Mahalingappa, the surviving coparceners continued to be joint, and Neelkanth, the eldest son of mahalingappa managed the family business as karta till November 4, 1945.14. The first matter in controversy is, whether on November 4, 1945, on account of an unequivocal declaration of an intention to separate made by the three sons of Mahalingappa, there was a disruption of the joint family status ? The courts below have concurrently answered this question in the affirmative.15. Mr. Datar, appearing for the appellants contends that this finding of the courts below, that there was a division in the family on November 4, 1945, was not based on any evidence, whatever, and is consequently unsustainable in law.16. We are unable to accept this contention. The finding is based on good evidence which has been found creditworthy after due consideration by the two courts. Firstly, there is a recital of the fact of division on November 4, 1945, in the partnership deed, Ex. 197, dated October 25, 1946. This deed has been written on a general stamp paper of the value of Rs. 30. The date of the purchase of the stamp accords with the date of the execution of the deed. This document therefore could not have been brought into existence subsequently. Secondly, there was an endorsement on the Income-tax return Ex. 309, relating to the previous year ending on November 4, 1945 that at the end of the year there has been a change in the status of the family. Thirdly, there is the arbitration award (Ex. 294) dated November 3, 1948, followed by the decree (Ex. 295). This award is a registered document. The material recitals in this document are as under :The plaintiff (Chandrakant Nilkanth) and the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (Mallappa, Appasaheb and Basawabai widow of Mahalingappa) were members of joint family. During the lifetime of the plaintiffs father, he and the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were living joint and all the three persons carried on the business of the joint family. Thereafter, as the minds of the plaintiffs father and of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were prejudiced on account of some domestic reasons, they began to live separately in the year 1945. Thereafter, they took accounts of the transactions, with desire to get their immovable and movable properties and other business partitioned and got the capital amount in that business partitioned on November 4, 1945. So also they effected partitions in the other movables and the ornaments, etc. of the family.Now the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are objecting about the maintenance to be given to the defendant No. 3 (widow of Mahalingappa) as per agreement deed ..........The contentions of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 are as follows :"We and our deceased eldest bother Sri Nilkanthappa were living joint. It is true that on November 4, 1945 we all three together have taken the accounts of the business and have made divisions in the capital of the business. It is true that accordingly we have proportionately divided the remaining movable articles and the ornaments. etc. and have taken the same ......"17. The award bears the signatures of the three arbitrators, and on its basis the court passed a decree on August 9, 1949. That suit was instituted by Chandrakant, and Basawa widow of Mahalingappa, Suryakant, the illegitimate son of Nilkanth, Mallappa Mahalingappa Sadalge and Appasaheb were impleaded as defendants. Under the award, provision was made for the maintenance of Smt. Basawa and the residence of Suryakant, the illegitimate son of Nilkanth.18. The conclusion based on the above documentary evidence was reinforced by the courts below with admissions made by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 in cross-examination, and also with an inference drawn against the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 on account of the non-production of the account books. In our opinion, the courts below were justified in drawing the inference because defendant No. 1, as is apparent from the written statement, is colluding with the plaintiff and all circumstances suggest that these account books must be with defendant No. 1.19. The case of defendant No. 3 is that on November 4, 1945, the accounts of the joint family were worked out and closed. It was found that there was a capital balance of Rs. 64, 023/11/- which was equally divided among the three brothers and the fact of this division was noted in the account books which were in the possession of defendant No. 1. In the witness box, defendants, Nos. 1 and 2 admitted that on November 11, 1945, each of the brothers got Rs. 21, 340/3/9 and credit entries to that effect were made in the khata of each brother in the account books of the shop.20. Defendant No. 3 by an application (Ex. 169) called upon defendant No. 1 to produce in court the account books, in his possession. Notice of this application was received by defendant No. 1s on July 18, 1955. Despite this notice defendant No. 1 did not produce the account books when he appeared in the witness box on July 21, 1955. He made a lame excuse that the account books had been given to Javali pleader after the service of summons in this suit on him (defendant No. 1) because that pleader had asked him to bring the books containing the plaintiffs accounts. But the defendant gave him the books of the Bidi Factory and not of M. B. Sadalge shop. Defendant No. 1 in cross-examination, clearly admitted that he had given to Javali pleader only those account books which contained the plaintiffs khata "and not of previous years". By any reckoning this means that he did not hand over the account books relating prior to the years 1949 to Javali pleader. Admittedly, after the death of Nilkanth, he was managing the business upto 1950, and, as such was supposed to be in possession of the account books. The courts below were therefore, right in rejecting the explanation given by him for non-production of the account books. The explanation regarding the non-production of the books, given by defendant No. 2, who had managed the business after 1951, was equally unsatisfactory and was rightly discarded.21. In the light of what has been said above, it cannot be held that there was no legal evidence before the courts below to base the finding that the joint family had disrupted on November 4, 1945.22. It is next contended by Mr. Datar that even if there was some declaration of separation in 1945, and subsequently a decree for partition based on an award was passed in 1949, then also, such declaration, award and decree were never acted upon. It is submitted that in holding to the contrary, the High Court has committed several errors of record and misconstrued important documentary evidence.23. According to Mr. Datar, the under-mentioned documentary evidence unmistakably shows that the declaration of 1945, the award of 1948 and the partition decree of 1949 were not acted upon."(1) Affidavits Exs. 221, 247 and 248 sworn on July 20, 1946, before a magistrate by defendants Nos. 2, 4 and 1 stating that they are members of a joint Hindu family and defendant No. 2 is the manager of the family. In the affidavit Ex. 247, Smt. Balabai gave her consent to the management of the affairs of the joint family by defendant No. 2.(2) Application dated August 13, 1946 (Ex. 182), by defendant No. 1 to Sales-tax Officer for transfer and registration of the licence, and application Ex. 208, dated September 30, 1946 made by defendants Nos. 1 and 2 on their behalf and on behalf of Chandrakant, defendant No. 3, informing the City Surveyor about the death of Neelkanth and requesting him to enter the khata in the names of all the three defendants Nos. 1 to 3.(3) Income-tax returns Exs. 309 to 314 filed after the death of Neelkanth.(4) Resolution, Ex. 335, passed by the Board of Directors in the meeting held on July 30, 1946 permitting defendant No. 2 to redeem, in the capacity of karta of the joint family, goods pledged with the Nipani branch of the bank by Neelkanth deceased.(5) Ex. 147, statement, dated September 26, 1953, by defendant No. 3 requesting the City Surveyor, Nipani that his joint share in Nipani Revision Survey Nos. 1254 and 1264 be cancelled and the name of defendant No. 1 may be entered again for both the numbers. Emphasis is on a sentence in this statement to the effect : "Two months have passed since the said partition".24. In accordance with this statement, the mutation, Ex. 263 was attested.25. Both the courts below have fully considered this evidence, along with other evidence, and come to the conclusion that these documents do not discount or alter the fact that the joint family had disrupted on November 4, 1945. The High Court has given reasons why the evidence furnished by the deed of partnership (Ex. 197) and the arbitration award (Ex. 294) can be safely accepted.26. In regard to Exs. 221, 247 and 248, the High Court has said that there is no evidence as to for what purpose these affidavits were sworn to and has rightly emphasised that in the absence of such evidence, it is difficult to draw any inference about the implications of their contents. Regarding the affidavit Ex. 247, purporting to have been sworn by Smt. Balabai, the High Court has said that she must have been mentally depressed being in mourning on account of the death of her husband which occurred only 12 days earlier; that she was illiterate woman who thumbmarked whatever documents were presented to her, without understanding its contents. In this connection, the High Court referred to the statement of defendant No. 1, wherein he has admitted that during defendant No. 3s minority, defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 were the only persons who looked after the business and defendant No. 4 never objected to whatever they did, and that they used to take defendant No. 4s thumb impression whenever they though it necessary in connection with the dealings of M. B. Sadalge shop.27. As regards the applications Exs. 182 and 208, the High Court said, there was nothing inconsistent in the recitals of these documents, to show that there was no partition of the joint family. The recital in Ex. 208 was found to be too technical to spell out the full legal implications of the words "in the joint family".28. Referring to the Income-tax returns Exs. 310, 311 and 314, submitted on March 15, 1948, November 12, 1949 and February 13, 1954, respectively, the High Court noted that these refer to the accounts of the two concerns and contain somewhat different description in the management. In Ex. 310 relating to the year ending October 24, 1946, it is stated that N and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were kartas of the family. In Ex. 311, defendant No. 2 is mentioned as the manager of the "old Hindu undivided family". Similarly, Ex. 314 purports to have been filed by the H. U. F. relating to the year 1949-50 but this was filed on February 13, 1954, after the institution of this suit. The Income-tax returns Exs. 312 and 313, relate to the previous years ending on November 12, 1947 and November 12, 1948. Ex. 312 was submitted on December 26, 1949 and Ex. 313 on December 22, 1953, both by defendant No. 2. The status of the assessee in these two returns is mentioned as "firm".29. Ex. 315 is the Income-tax return relating to the Income-tax year 1948-49, the previous year of which ended on November 12, 1947. It was filed by defendant No. 4 as guardian of her minor son, defendant No. 3 on December 22, 1949. The status of the assessee therein is shown is individual. It relates to the business which was being run under the style of M/s. M. B. Sadalge. It is mentioned in this return that each of the three defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 has 1/3 share in the business. Ex. 316 is the order of the Income-tax Officer passed on June 20, 1950 wherein it is stated that 1/3 share of defendant No. 1 in the profits of this firm was assessed on that date.30. Ex. 309 is the income-tax return relating to the previous year ended on November 4, 1945. It was filed by defendant No. 2 in 1946, after Neelkanths death. The High Court has attached great weigh to an endorsement on this return, which is to the effect, that there had been a change in the family status at the end of the year. This endorsement has been omitted from the printed copy of Ex. 309. Consequently, at one stage, it was maintained by the Counsel for the appellant that in repeatedly referring to this endorsement the High Court had committed an error of record. We therefore, sent for the original. We find that this endorsement is very much there in the original. This endorsement was a valuable piece of evidence to show that, in fact, there had been a disruption of the joint family status at the end of the previous year, 1944-45 on November 4, 1945.31. Thus the evidence furnished by the Income-tax returns was conflicting. But the aforesaid endorsement on Ex. 309 was a clincher. It was a statement made ante litem motam. It confirmed the testimony of defendant No. 2 that the partition had taken place in 1945 and this tilted the balance against the contention of the plaintiff. In evidentiary value, it outweigh the income-tax returns, Exs. 310, 311 and 314 in which the status of the assessee is shown as H. U. F. The High Court was therefore, not wrong in holding that all these documents taken together do not show "that the family of the defendants had continued to be joint".32. Discussing the resolution (Ex. 335) of the Board of Directors passed on July 30, 1946, the High Court said that this resolution was passed only 22 days after the death of Neelkanth and therefore, there was nothing unusual if all the members authorised defendant No. 2 to redeem the pledged goods as manager of the joint family.33. In our opinion, it was not unreasonable to hold that the recital in this resolution with regard to defendant No. 2 being the authorised manager of the joint family, was made as a matter of expediency, did not discount the case of defendant No. 4 that the joint family had disrupted on November 4, 1945.34. The High Court found that the recital in Ex. 143, that the partition had taken place two months prior to this application, was obviously a mistake, as it was nobodys case that the partition had taken place in 1953. This inference also was not implausible. This document contains other palpable errors of a similar nature. For instance, therein the age of defendant No. 3 is mentioned as twenty years, while he was hardly eighteen.35. The High Court found that the documentary evidence furnished by the partnership deed (Ex. 197) dated October 25, 1946, the award (Ex. 294) dated October 30, 1948, and the decree (Ex. 295) dated September 15, 1949, passed on its basis was entirely reliable. It further found that these documents had been acted upon. In this connection, the High Court rightly relied upon the admissions of defendant No. 1 in cross-examination. In the witness box, defendant No. 1 had conceded that all the immovable property that had been allotted to defendant No. 2 under the award had been sold away by him, and that pursuant to the award, Rs. 7, 000 had been paid to Heerabai and her son, Suryakant. Defendant No. 1 further significantly admitted that on October 25, 1946 Rs. 16, 000 and odd were to the credit of defendant No. 3 in the account books of M. B. Sadalge shop. By virtue of the receipt Ex. 167, dated August 9, 1949, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 acknowledged the deposit of Rs. 16, 005-15-0 in favour of the minor defendant No. 3, payable with interest at Rs. 6 per cent per annum. Defendant No. 1 admitted the correctness of the contents of this receipt. It is undisputed that subsequently defendant No. 3 has not only obtained a decree on the basis of this receipt against defendant No. 1, but has taken out its execution.36. The High Court has also discussed the effect of the agreement (Ex. 99) which was executed between defendants Nos. 1, 2 and defendant No. 4 as the guardian of the minor, defendant No. 3 on April 12, 1950. The main object of this agreement was to safeguard the interests of the minor in the management of the two partnership business, namely, M. B. Sadalge shop and Tennis Bidi Factory in the name of Chandrakant Neelkant Sadalge. By this agreement, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were called upon to credit to the business whatever amounts they had spent from out of the partnership assets. The power of each of the defendants with regard to withdrawal of funds from partnership chest for personal expenses, was also restricted. This arrangement continued to be in force till the partnership was dissolved by another registered deed on April 20, 1951.37. Reference has already been made to Ex. 316 an order dated June 20, 1950, of the Income-tax Officer showing that defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were being assessed on the basis that each of them had 1/3rd share in the business. In a joint Hindu family business, no member of the family can say that he is the owner of one-half, one-third or one-fourth. The essence of joint Hindu family property is unity of ownership and community of interest, and the shares of the members are not defined. Similarly, the pattern of the accounts of a joint Hindu family business maintained by the karta is different from those of a partnership. In the case of the former the shares of the individual members in the profits and losses are not worked out, while they have to be worked out in the case of partnership accounts.38. In view of all that has been said above, we are of opinion that the concurrent finding of the courts below to the effect, that the joint Hindu family of the defendants had disrupted on November 4, 1945, does not suffer from any legal infirmity or gross error which would justify our interference in this appeal by special leave. We therefore take it that no joint Hindu family of the defendants, nor any joint business of such a family was in existence either on October 15, 1949 when the last dealing (vide Ex. 394) of the plaintiff with defendants Nos. 1 and 2 took place, or when on April 15, 1953 the accounts were stated and admitted. Indeed, on the date, April 15, 1953, on which the plaintiffs cause of action arose, even the partnership was not in existence, the same having stood dissolved since April 20, 1951.39. Mr. Datar next contends that even if the joint status of the family stood disrupted from November, 1945, then also, on the principle of Section 45, Partnership Act, the acknowledgments made by defendants Nos. 1 and 2, representing themselves, jointly or severally, as karta of the joint Hindu trading family, would, in the absence of public notice to the traders in general or particular notice to the plaintiff, be binding on all the erstwhile members of the joint family. Reliance for this contention has been placed on a Single Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Kashiram Bhagshet Shete v. Bhaga Bhanshet Reddi (AIR 1945 Bom 511 : ILR 1945 Bom 976 : 47 Bom LR 470).40. As against this, Mr. Desai submitted that Kashirams case does not, lay down the law correctly. Counsel maintains that the contrary view taken by the other High Courts in these cases is sound Pramod Kumar Pati v. Damodar Sahu (AIR 1953 Ori 179 : ILR 1953 Cut 221); Rengaswami Ayyangar v. Sivprakasam Pillai (AIR 1941 Mad 925 : ILR 1942 Mad 251 : (1941) 2 MLJ 383 (FB); Muthyala Ramachandrappa v. Muthyala Narayanappa (AIR 1940 Mad 339 : 1939 MWN 927).41. Kashirams case decided by an eminent Single Judge certainly supports the proposition propounded by Mr. Datar. Applying the principle of Section 45 of the Partnership Act, 1932 therein the learned Judge held that unless intimation of the severance of joint status between the members of the joint family is given to the outside creditors who had dealings with the joint family through its karta either by public notice or individual notice in that behalf, the karta would be deemed to continue to represent the family and to have power to incur debts for family necessity and to make acknowledgments or part payments in respect of the same so as to extend the period of limitation. With great respect to the learned Judge, we do not think that this is a correct enunciation of the law on the point. Firstly the legislature has, in its wisdom, excluded joint Hindu trading families from the operation of the Partnership Act Section 4 of that Act defines partnership asthe relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all.Section 5 further makes it clear that this Act governs only that relation of partnership which arises from contract and not from status such as the one obtaining among the members of a joint Hindu family trading partnership. Secondly, the question whether an acknowledgment made by the karta of an erstwhile joint Hindu family after its severance, would extend limitation against all the former members of that family, turns primarily on an interpretation of clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 21, read with Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Clause (b) of Section 21(3) provides :"Where a liability has been incurred by or on behalf of a Hindu undivided family as such, an acknowledgment or payment made by or by the duly authorised agent of, the manager of the family for the time being shall be deemed to have been made on behalf of the whole family."42. The key words in this clause are the manager of the family for the time being. These words unerringly indicate that at the time when the acknowledgment is made and signed, the person making and signing it, must be the manager of a subsisting joint Hindu family. If at the relevant time the joint Hindu family as such was no longer in existence because of division or disruption of its joint status, any acknowledgment made by the erstwhile karta of such family cannot keep the debt alive and extend limitation as against all the members of the family, his representative capacity as karta being conterminous with the joint status of the family.43. Explanation II to Section 19 lays down that for the purpose of this Section "signed" means signed either personally or by an agent duly authorised in this behalf. Section 21(1) provides that the expression "agent duly authorised in this behalf" in Sections 19 and 20 shall in the case of a person under disability include his lawful guardian or manager of an agent duly authorised in this behalf. It is well settled that coparceners do not derive their title through the karta of the coparcenary. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 do not fulfil the requirements of this sub-section.44. It is therefore the duty of the creditor to ascertain after due enquiry whether the person making the acknowledgment still holds his representative capacity as karta of the family. The law does not cast any duty upon the members of the family who do not figure in the endorsement or writing admitting the debt to inform the creditor by a general notice about the disruption of the family. If the creditor fails to make an enquiry and satisfy himself about the capacity of the executant to represent the family at the time of making the acknowledgment, he does so at his own peril. Disruption of the joint family status as already noticed puts an end to the representative capacity of the karta and any acknowledgment of a debt made by him after such disruption, cannot save the creditors claim from becoming time barred against the other members.45. The above enunciation of the law is in accord with the view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rengaswami Ayyangar v. Sivprakasam Pillai (supra) and by a Division Bench, consisting of Varadachariar and Abdur Rahman, JJ. in Muthyala Ramachandrappa v. Muthyala Narayanappa (supra), and by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Pramod Kumar Pati v. Damodar Sahu (supra).46. We approve of the law enunciated on the point by the High Courts in these cases.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]33. In our opinion, it was not unreasonable to hold that the recital in this resolution with regard to defendant No. 2 being the authorised manager of the joint family, was made as a matter of expediency, did not discount the case of defendant No. 4 that the joint family had disrupted on November 4, 1945.In view of all that has been said above, we are of opinion that the concurrent finding of the courts below to the effect, that the joint Hindu family of the defendants had disrupted on November 4, 1945, does not suffer from any legal infirmity or gross error which would justify our interference in this appeal by special leave. We therefore take it that no joint Hindu family of the defendants, nor any joint business of such a family was in existence either on October 15, 1949 when the last dealing (vide Ex. 394) of the plaintiff with defendants Nos. 1 and 2 took place, or when on April 15, 1953 the accounts were stated and admitted. Indeed, on the date, April 15, 1953, on which the plaintiffs cause of action arose, even the partnership was not in existence, the same having stood dissolved since April 20, 1951.It is therefore the duty of the creditor to ascertain after due enquiry whether the person making the acknowledgment still holds his representative capacity as karta of the family. The law does not cast any duty upon the members of the family who do not figure in the endorsement or writing admitting the debt to inform the creditor by a general notice about the disruption of the family. If the creditor fails to make an enquiry and satisfy himself about the capacity of the executant to represent the family at the time of making the acknowledgment, he does so at his own peril. Disruption of the joint family status as already noticed puts an end to the representative capacity of the karta and any acknowledgment of a debt made by him after such disruption, cannot save the creditors claim from becoming time barred against the other members.45. The above enunciation of the law is in accord with the view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rengaswami Ayyangar v. Sivprakasam Pillai (supra) and by a Division Bench, consisting of Varadachariar and Abdur Rahman, JJ. in Muthyala Ramachandrappa v. Muthyala Narayanappa (supra), and by a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Pramod Kumar Pati v. Damodar Sahu (supra).46. We approve of the law enunciated on the point by the High Courts in these cases.