Case: Sarpanch, Lonand Grampanchayat Vs. Ramgiri Gosavi & Anr

Bachawat, J. 1. On March 19, 1963 respondent No. 1 on behalf of 36 employees of the Lonand Grampanchayat applied to the Authority appointed under S. 20 (1) of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 for a direction upon the Grampanchayat to pay to the employees overtime wages and damages. A number of employees claimed overtime wages from October 23, 1960 for a period of two years two months and nine days. One employee claimed wages for a period of seven years and nine months, one claimed wages for six years and ten months and another claimed wages for three years. By an order dated September 18, 1963 the Authority held that the application should be entertained in respect of the claims for the period subsequent to January 1, 1961 as the employees had sufficient cause for not making the application within the prescribed period of six months. A petition challenging this order under Art. 227 of the Constitution was summarily dismissed by the Bombay High Court. From the order of the High Court, the present appeal has been filed by special leave. 2. An application for a direction on the employer to pay minimum wages and other amounts payable under the Minimum Wages Act may be made under S. 20 (2) of the Act to the Authority appointed under S. 20 (1). The first proviso to S. 20 (2) requires that:"every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable." The second proviso to S. 20 (2) is in these terms:-"Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the Authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." 3.The Authority has a discretion to condone the delay in presenting the application provided sufficient cause for the entire delay is shown to its satisfaction. This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just, see Keighleys case, (l609) l0 Co. Rep 139 a : 77 ER 1136. 4. The wording of the second proviso is similar to the provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 the Madras High Court indicated in the following passage how the discretion under S. 5 should be exercised :"We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood : the words sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellants." This decision received the approval of this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu v Jadumoni Mangaraj. 1955-1 SCR 140 at p. 146 : (AIR 1954 SC 411 at p. 414) and Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1962-2 SCR 762 at p. 767 : (AIR 1962 SC 361 at p. 363). The words "sufficient cause" in the second proviso to S. 20 (2) should receive similar liberal construction. 5. No appeal lies from an order of the Authority under S 20. But the High Court is vested with the power of judicial superintendence over the tribunal under Art 227 of the Constitution.This power is not greater than the power under Art. 226 and is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, see Nagendra Nath Bora v Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, 1958 SCR 1240 at p. 1272 : (AIR 1958 SC 398 at p. 413). The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially exercised, but it may interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or ultra vires. In Sitaram Ramcharan v. M. N. Nagarshana, l960-1 SCR 875 at p. 884 : (AIR 1960 SC 260 at p. 263) this Court held that a finding of fact by the authority under the similarly worded second proviso to S. 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 could not be challenged in a petition under Art. 227. The High Court may refuse to interfere under Art. 227 unless there is grave miscarriage of justice. 6. In the present case the Authority found that since January 2, 1961 the employees were making complaints to the Government authorities regarding non-payment of overtime wages. On January 2, 1961 the employees wrote to the Inspector, Minimum Wages, Government labour office, Sangli, complaining of overtime work and asking for directions on the appellant to comply with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. A reminder was sent to him on January 11, 1961. On January 18, l961 the Inspector wrote that the matter was being followed up. On April 22, l961 the Inspector visited Lonand and directed the appellant to comply with the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act and the rules made thereunder. On April 25, 1961 the Inspector communicated this direction to the employees. On January 1, 1962 the employees lodged a complaint of overtime work with the Commissioner, Poona Division, and asked for a direction for payment of the arrears of overtime wages. On January 3, l962 the Commissioner wrote to the employees that the matter was receiving attention and their application had been sent to the Collector of Satara for disposal. Later in August / September 1962 and early 1963 the Block Development Officer came to Lonand and made inquiries. The revenue officers appointed as inspectors under the Government notification dated May 4, 1955 are under the administrative control of Commissioner and Collector. The inspectors have no power to give relief under S. 20 (2) but they have large powers of supervision and control under S. 19 of the Act. The employees relied upon the assurances of the Inspectors and their superiors that proper steps would be taken for the remedy of their grievances and relying upon those assurances, they refrained from taking steps under S. 20 (2) of the Minimum Wages Act.Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the employees were not guilty of inaction or negligence and the entire delay in presenting the application was due to their honest though mistaken belief that the relief of overtime wages would be granted to them through the intervention of the inspectors and their superior officers.It is not shown that in condoning the delay the Authority acted arbitrarily or capriciously or in excess of its jurisdiction or that it committed any error apparent on the face of the record. In the application under S. 20 (2), some of the employees claimed overtime wages for periods prior to January 1, 1961. The Authority declined to condone the delay in respect of claims for the period prior to January 1, 1961. On a careful consideration of the relevant materials the Authority condoned the delay in respect of claims subsequent to January 1, 1961 only.The Court cannot interfere merely because it might take a different view of the facts and exercise the discretion differently.It is not shown that the impugned order led to grave miscarriage of justice. The High Court refused to interfere under Art. 227. We think that this is not a fit case for interference by us under Art. 136.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]6. In the present case the Authority found that since January 2, 1961 the employees were making complaints to the Government authorities regarding non-payment of overtime wagesHaving regard to all the circumstances of the case, the employees were not guilty of inaction or negligence and the entire delay in presenting the application was due to their honest though mistaken belief that the relief of overtime wages would be granted to them through the intervention of the inspectors and their superior officers.It is not shown that in condoning the delay the Authority acted arbitrarily or capriciously or in excess of its jurisdiction or that it committed any error apparent on the face of the record. In the application under S. 20 (2), some of the employees claimed overtime wages for periods prior to January 1, 1961. The Authority declined to condone the delay in respect of claims for the period prior to January 1, 1961. On a careful consideration of the relevant materials the Authority condoned the delay in respect of claims subsequent to January 1, 1961 only.The Court cannot interfere merely because it might take a different view of the facts and exercise the discretion differently.It is not shown that the impugned order led to grave miscarriage of justice. The High Court refused to interfere under Art. 227. We think that this is not a fit case for interference by us under Art. 1364. The wording of the second proviso is similar to the provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Krishna v. Chathappan, (1890) ILR 13 Mad 269 the Madras High Court indicated in the following passage how the discretion under S. 5 should be exercised :"We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood : the words sufficient cause receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellants."This decision received the approval of this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu v Jadumoni Mangaraj.1 SCR 140   at p. 146 : (AIR 1954 SC 411   at p. 414) and Ramlal Motilal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,2 SCR 762   at p. 767 : (AIR 1962 SC 361   at p. 363). The words "sufficient cause" in the second proviso to S. 20 (2) should receive similar liberal construction5. No appeal lies from an order of the Authority under S 20. But the High Court is vested with the power of judicial superintendence over the tribunal under Art 227 of the Constitution.This power is not greater than the power under Art. 226 and is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority, see Nagendra Nath Bora v Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, 1958 SCR 1240     at p. 1272 : (AIR 1958 SC 398   at p. 413). The High Court will not review the discretion of the Authority judicially exercised, but it may interfere if the exercise of the discretion is capricious or perverse or ultra vires. In Sitaram Ramcharan v. M. N. Nagarshana,1 SCR 875   at p. 884 : (AIR 1960 SC 260   at p. 263) this Court held that a finding of fact by the authority under the similarly worded second proviso to S. 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act 1936 could not be challenged in a petition under Art. 227. The High Court may refuse to interfere under Art. 227 unless there is grave miscarriage of justice.