Case: Jayarama Reddy & Anr Vs. Revenue Divisional Officer & Land Acquisition Officer,Kurno

Shinghal, J. 1. This appeal is by a certificate of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on the valuation of the subject-matter and is directed against its judgment dated February 4, 1969. 2. The State Government acquired 2 acres and 79 cents of the land of the appellants in Kurnool town, for locating a bus depot of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation It was arable land within the municipal limits of the town, with two trees and an old compound wall. Its possession was taken by the State Government on May 25, 1962. The market value of the land was fixed at Rs. 27, 942.53 at the rate of Rs. 2 per square yard. The compound wall and the trees were valued at Rs. 930 and after allowing a solatium of 15 per cent and interest at 4 per cent per annum, the total compensation was worked out to Rs. 33, 069.12. N. Jayaram Reddy, Y. Prabhakar Reddy and C. Manikya Reddy, who were the three owners of the land, accepted that compensation under protest and applied for a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. After recording evidence and inspecting the site, the Subordinate Judge held that the claimants were entitled to payment at the rate of Rs. 12 per square yard for the value of land, solatium of 15 per cent and interest at 4 per cent. Both parties felt aggrieved against that order dated July 30, 1963. While Appeal AS 180 of 1964, hereinafter referred to as the government appeal, was filed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and the Land Acquisition Officer, Kurnool, Appeal AS 296 of 1964, hereinafter referred to as the claimants appeal, was filed by the claimants. There were thus cross-appeals in the High Court against a common order of the Subordinate Judge. The memorandum of the government appeal was filed on December 7, 1963. I do not have the date of the claimants appeal on the record, but it is not disputed that it was filed before April 3, 1964. While the two appeals were pending in the High Court, Y. Prabhakar Reddy, one of the three claimants of the compensation for the acquired land, died on April 3, 1964. An application was made in the claimants appeal to bring his legal representatives on the record, and the High Court passed an order on July 14, 1964 (in C.M.P. 7284 of 1964) bringing appellants 4 to 9 on record as the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy. It is admitted before me that that was done before the abatement of that appeal. It seems that no application was made in the government appeal to bring the legal representatives of the deceased respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on the record of that appeal. Both the appeals were, however, taken up for hearing together and were disposed of by a common judgment of the High Court dated February 4, 1969. The High Court dismissed the claimants appeal, but allowed the government appeal and reduced the price of the acquired land from Rs. 12 to Rs. 4 per square yard "with the usual solatium and interest at 4 per cent as allowed by the lower court". While the government felt satisfied with that judgment, the claimants applied for a certificate which was granted on the ground that the value of the subject-matter of the suit in the court of first instance was upwards of Rs. 20, 000 and the value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to this Court was also upwards of that amount and the decree appealed from did not affirm the decision of the lower court. On the strength of that certificate, the appellants have come up to this Court in appeal. 3. It has been argued by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellants that Y. Prabhakar Reddy, respondent 2 in the government appeal, died on April 3, 1964, and his legal representatives were not brought on the record within the period of 90 days provided by law, that appeal abated thereafter and stood dismissed automatically and could not be resurrected and heard by the High Court as a cross-appeal to the claimants appeal. The learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram ((1962) 2 SCR 636 : AIR 1962 SC 89 : (1961) 2 SCJ 637 ); Rameshwar Prasad v. Shyam Beharilal Jagannath ((1964) 3 SCR 549 : AIR 1963 SC 1901 : (1965) 1 SCJ 114); Ramagya, Prasad Gupta v. Murli Prasad ((1973) 2 SCC 9 : (1973) 1 SCR 63 ) and Harihar Prasad Singh v. Balmiki Prasad Singh ((1975) 1 SCC 212 : (1975) 2 SCR 932 ), to support his argument. In particular, he has placed reliance on Nathu Rams case (supra), to fortify his argument that the specification of the shares or of the interest of the deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy did not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree holders to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed in their favour. In particular, he has relied on that portion of that decision where it has been stated that as the subject-matter for which the compensation is to be calculated in such cases is one and the same, there cannot be different assessments of the amounts of compensation for the same parcel of land. So, as the appeal before the High Court was directed against the joint decree and the appellate Court could not take a decision on the basis of the separate shares of the claimants, it has been argued that the whole of the government appeal should have been dismissed because of its abatement against the deceased respondent.4. Now what Order 22 Rule 4(1), C.P.C. provides is that where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. Sub-rule (3) provides further that where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub-rule (1), "the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant". So as Y. Prabhakar Reddy, respondent 2 in the government appeal, died on April 3, 1964, and an application was not made to bring his legal representatives on the record within the specified time limit, the appeal automatically abated as against the deceased respondent, and it is not correct to say that the appeal automatically stood dismissed against the surviving respondents because of that default. The question where the "right to sue" survived against the surviving respondents alone, was a matter for the appellate Court to examine and decide after hearing the parties, with due regard to the question of jointness or otherwise of the decree and the further question whether there was any possibility of two contradictory decrees etc. As that was not done by the High Court whether the government appeal was pending, there is no justification for the argument that the appeal automatically stood dismissed after the expiry of the period of 90 days from the death of respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on April 3, 1964 because of the abatement of the appeal against him. 5. But even if it were assumed that the government appeal deserved to be dismissed as a whole because of its abatement against the deceased respondent, there is no justification for Mr. Sens further argument that the High Courts decree dated February 4, 1969, was a nullity merely because it was passed against a dead person, namely, Y. Prabhakar Reddy. It has to be appreciated that a decree against a dead person is not necessarily a nullity for all purposes. It will be sufficient to say that such a decree has been held to be a nullity because it cannot be executed against his legal representative for the simple reason that he did not have a full opportunity of being heard in respect of it, and the legal representative cannot be condemned unheard. So if a respondent to an appeal dies, and the appeal abates because of the failure to bring him legal representative on the record within the time limited by law, and the appellate Court loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will still be permissible for the court hearing the appeal to bring his legal representative on the record on an application to that effect and to examine any application that may be made for condonation of the delay. It is also permissible, and is in fact the common practice, to remand the case for disposal according to law to the court in which it was pending at the time of the death of the deceased party. The law has therefore provided, and accepted, modes for reopening and hearing the appeal in such cases. 6. The basic fact remains that a decree against a dead person is treated as a nullity because it cannot be allowed to operate against his legal representative when he was never brought on the record to defend the case. Any other view would not be possible or permissible for it would fasten on him a liability for which he did not have any hearing. So while the law treats such decree as a nullity qua the legal representative of the deceased defendant or respondent, there is nothing to prevent him from deciding that he will not trust decree as a nullity, but will abide by it as it stands, or as it may be modified thereafter on appeal. If a legal representative adopts that alternative or course of action, it cannot possibly be said that his option to be governed by the decree is against the law concept of public police or purpose, or the public morality. It is thus a matter entirely at the discretion of the legal representative of a deceased respondent against whom a decree has been passed after his death to decide whether he will raise the question that the decree has become nullity, at the appropriate time, namely, during the course of the hearing of any appeal that may be filed by the other party, or to abandon that obvious technical objection and fight the appeal on the merits. He may do so either because of his faith in the strength of his case on the merits, or because of incorrect legal advice, or for the reason that he may not like to rely on a mere technical plea, or because in the case of cross-appeals, he may have the impression that bringing the legal representative of the deceased respondent on record in an appeal by a co-appellant will ensure for the benefit of or be sufficient for purposes of the cross-appeal. An abandonment of a technical plea of abatement and the consequential dismissal of the appeal, is therefore a matter at the discretion of the legal representative of the deceased respondent and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. It is equally futile to argue that an appellate Court is denuded of its jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which one of the respondents has died and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone merely because no application has been made to bring his legal representative on the record when no objection to that effect is raised by anyone. 7. But, as is equally obvious, it will not be fair to draw an inference as to the abandonment of such a plea of abatement unless there is clear, sufficient and satisfactory evidence to prove that the legal representative of the deceased respondent was aware of it and abandoned it wilfully. The following facts have been well established in this respect in the present case. 8. It will be recalled that the subordinate Judge made his order in the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act on July 30, 1963, and the memorandum of the government appeal was filed in the High Court on December 7, 1963. The claimants filed their cross-appeal AS 296 of 1964 soon after and, at any rate, before April 3, 1964. It will also be recalled that Y. Prabhakar Reddy died on April 3, 1964. While he was respondent 2 in the government appeal, he was a co-appellant in the claimants appeal. As has been stated, the claimants brought Y. Prabhakar Reddys legal representatives on the record in their appeal under an order of the High Court dated July 14, 1964, and they were arrayed as appellants 4 to 9. It is admitted that that appeal therefore never abated and the array of the parties was full and complete. As has been pointed out, the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy were not brought on record in the government appeal. It cannot be denied, however, that they knew of Y. Prabhakar Reddys death on April 3, 1964, for he was their ancestor. They also knew that they had been brought on record as his legal representatives in the claimants appeal because of the High Courts specific order to that effect dated July 14, 1964 in C.M.P. 7282 of 1964 where they were represented by counsel. They thus knew that Y. Prabhakar Reddys legal representatives were not brought on record in the government appeal, and that it stood abated against them because of the expiry of the time limited by law in that respect. Even so, they did not make an application to the High Court for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it could not survive against the surviving respondents because of that basic defect, in the facts and circumstances of that case. That in fact continued to be the position for a long period of some five years. It is not disputed that the appeals came up for hearing in the High Court on or about February 4, 1969, but, even then, no objection was taken to the hearing of the government appeal in spite of the fatal defect in its constitution. On the other hand, when the two appeals were taken up for hearing, the High Court heard, without any objection, not only the counsel for the appellants in the government appeal, but also C. Padmanabha Reddy, who was counsel for the respondents in that appeal and for the reconstituted array of appellants in the claimants appeal. The legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy and their counsel were thus aware of the fact that the government appeal had abated against respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy, and it will not be unfair to assume that they, or, at any rate, their counsel knew that it was open for them to contend that the appeal was liable to dismissal for that reason. Two courses of action were therefore open to them : (i) to move the High Court for the dismissal of the government appeal, or (ii) to allow that appeal to be heard and decided on the merits and to abide by any decree which the High Court might pass in the two appeals. The legal representatives and their counsel did not choose to adopt the first course of action, and it will be fair and reasonable to hold that they wilfully chose the second course of action. That was why their counsel C. Padmanabha Reddy, who was counsel for all the respondents in the government appeal, and for all the appellants in the claimants appeal, argued both the appeals on the merits. The High Court heard and decided the cross-appeals by its impugned judgment dated February 4, 1969, and it will be a proper conclusion for me to reach that the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy wilfully abandoned any plea that might have been available to them on the basis of the abatement of the government appeal against the deceased respondent. 9. It was only after the judgment of the High Court went against them, that the legal representatives of Y. Prabhakar Reddy decided to take up the question of abatement, for the first time, in the petition which they and the other claimants filed under Sections 104-110 and Order 22, Rules 2 and 3, C.P.C. It is significant that they did not even then ask the High Court to review its judgment and grant them relief on the ground that Y. Prabhakar Reddy had died and the decree against him was a nullity in so far as they were concerned. The High Court was simply asked to allow the application for the certification of the appeal on the ground that the value of the subject-matter was upwards of Rs. 20, 000 and it made an order to that effect. 10. In all these facts and circumstances, I have no doubt that any plea that may have been available to the legal representatives of the deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy in the government appeal because of its abatement, was wilfully abandoned by them. Any other view of the matter will be unfair to the present respondents, because if any such objection had been taken in the High Court, they would have made an application for the setting aside of the abatement and condoning the delay, for whatever it was worth. It has to be appreciated that a point of defence which has been wilfully or deliberately abandoned by a party in a civil case, at a crucial stage when it was most relevant or material, cannot be allowed to be taken up later, at the sweet will of the party which had abandoned the point, or as a last resort, or as an afterthought. In fact in a case where a point has been wilfully abandoned by a party, even if, in a given case, such a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of his conduct, it will not be permissible to allow that party to revoke the abandonment if that will be disadvantageous to the other party. 11. Mr. Sen has however made reference to Gaekwar Baroda State Railway v. Hafiz Habib-ul-haq (65 IA 182 : AIR 1938 PC 165 ) and Thakore Saheb Khanji Kashari Khanji v. Gulam Rasul Chandbhai (AIR 1955 Bom 449 : 57 Bom LR 824 : ILR 1956 Bom 22) for the purpose of showing that the government appeal was not at all maintainable in the High Court because of its abatement against respondent Y. Prabhakar Reedy as that was a matter relating to the jurisdiction of the High Court which could not have been abandoned. The provisions of Section 86, C.P.C. came up for consideration in both those cases and it was held that as the section was based upon public policy or purpose, it was not open to a ruling chief to waive its provisions. Those were therefore different observations which have no bearing on the present controversy for, as has been stated, the decision of the legal representative of a deceased respondent to be bound by a decree in spite of its abatement does not involve any question of public policy. 12. Mr. Sens reference to Maharana Shri Davlatsinghji Thakore Saheb of Limdi v. Khachar Hamir Mon (ILR 34 Bom 171 : 11 Bom LR 1330 : 4 IC 830); Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli ((1969) 1 SCC 873 : (1970) 1 SCR 51 ); Simpson v. Crowle ((1921) 3 KB 243); Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L. V. A. Dikshitulu ((1979) 2 SCC 34 : AIR 1979 SC 193 ) and P. Dass Muni Reddy v. P. Appa Rao ((1974) 2 SCC 725 : (1975) 2 SCR 32 ), is equally futile because they were cases of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court concerned or raised the question of the bar of limitation. 13. Mr. Sen has placed reliance on Punjab State v. Sardar Atma Singh (AIR 1963 Punj 113 : 64 Punj LR 939) and State of Rajasthan v. Raghuraj Singh (AIR 1968 Raj 14 : 1967 Raj LW 570), to show that where an application is not made to bring the legal representative of the deceased respondent on the record of a cross-appeal, that appeal will abate, and it will not be permissible for the appellant to claim the benefit of the fact that the legal representative of the deceased respondent had been brought on the record in the cross-appeal filed by him. I have gone through the cases, but they are clearly distinguishable. The respondent in both cases died during the pendency of the first appeal, and an objection as to abatement was taken during the course of the hearing, so that there was no question of abandoning the objection in either of these cases and it was permissible to apply to the court for the usual consequences which follow for non-compliance with the provisions of Order 22, Rules 3 and 4, C.P.C. Those decisions cannot therefore be of any help in a case like this. 14. It would thus follow that as the plea of abatement of the government appeal against respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy and its dismissal as a whole for that reason, was wilfully abandoned by the present respondents in the High Court, it will not be fair and reasonable to allow them to rake it up in the facts and circumstances of this case merely because the decision of the High Court has gone against them. 15. That leaves for consideration the question whether the finding of fact of the High Court that the present appellants were entitled to compensation at Rs. 4 per square yard suffers from any such error as to require interference by this Court. Mr. Sen has argued that the High Court went wrong in interfering with the finding of the Subordinate Judge and in excluding the sale deeds Exs. A1 and A2 altogether from consideration when they were important and were by themselves sufficient to uphold the finding of the Subordinate Judge that the market value of the land was Rs. 12 per square yard. 16. I find from the impugned judgment that the High Court first took into consideration all those factors which were in favour of the claimants, namely, the fact that the land was situated within the municipal limits of Kurnool town, it was within easy reach of the government hospitals, the railway station, the Medical College and the State Bank etc., it was suitable as a building site etc. The High Court also took due notice of the fact that although Kurnool was not made the capital of Andhra Pradesh, it was a growing town and had an importance of its own. It then examined those facts which persuaded it to reduce the market value. In doing so, it took note of the fact that the land under acquisition had been bought by the claimants themselves for Rs. 26, 000 on October 30, 1961, just eight months before the issue of the notification for its acquisition. That rate worked out to Rs. 2 per square yard. Then the High Court took into consideration the other facts that the claimants did not effect any improvement in the land after its purchase, it was not their case that the previous owner sold it for any compelling reason, the claimants were not even responsible for preparing the lay out plan for the locality (which had been accepted by the municipality even before they had purchased the land) and that they merely obtained the sanction of the Town Planning department to the lay out which had already been sanctioned. The High Court carefully examined the various sale agreements Exs. A3, A5, A7, A10, A12 and A14, and rejected them on the ground that they did not appear to be genuine and had mostly been executed on the same date. That left the two registered sale deeds Exs. A1 and A2 for consideration on which Mr. Sen has placed considerable reliance. The High Court noticed that they were for the sale of very small portions of land, namely, 3 cents and 5 cents, and did not think it proper to make them the basis for determining the value of a far larger piece of land. It cannot therefore be said that the High Court ignored or misread any important piece of evidence in arriving at its finding. As has been stated, the appellants bought the land for Rs. 26, 000, which worked out to Rs. 2 per square yard, and the High Court doubled that rate, and raised it to Rs. 4 per square yard even though the acquisition took place within a matter of the next eight months and the appellants did nothing to improve its value. To say the least, such a finding cannot be said to have been vitiated for any reason whatsoever so as to require reconsideration here.

Decision reasoning: 0[ds]5. But even if it were assumed that the government appeal deserved to be dismissed as a whole because of its abatement against the deceased respondent, there is no justification for Mr. Sens further argument that the High Courts decree dated February 4, 1969, was a nullity merely because it was passed against a dead person, namely, Y. Prabhakar Reddy. It has to be appreciated that a decree against a dead person is not necessarily a nullity for all purposes. It will be sufficient to say that such a decree has been held to be a nullity because it cannot be executed against his legal representative for the simple reason that he did not have a full opportunity of being heard in respect of it, and the legal representative cannot be condemned unheard. So if a respondent to an appeal dies, and the appeal abates because of the failure to bring him legal representative on the record within the time limited by law, and the appellate Court loses sight of that development or ignores it, it will still be permissible for the court hearing the appeal to bring his legal representative on the record on an application to that effect and to examine any application that may be made for condonation of the delay. It is also permissible, and is in fact the common practice, to remand the case for disposal according to law to the court in which it was pending at the time of the death of the deceased party. The law has therefore provided, and accepted, modes for reopening and hearing the appeal in such cases6. The basic fact remains that a decree against a dead person is treated as a nullity because it cannot be allowed to operate against his legal representative when he was never brought on the record to defend the case. Any other view would not be possible or permissible for it would fasten on him a liability for which he did not have any hearing. So while the law treats such decree as a nullity qua the legal representative of the deceased defendant or respondent, there is nothing to prevent him from deciding that he will not trust decree as a nullity, but will abide by it as it stands, or as it may be modified thereafter on appeal. If a legal representative adopts that alternative or course of action, it cannot possibly be said that his option to be governed by the decree is against the law concept of public police or purpose, or the public morality. It is thus a matter entirely at the discretion of the legal representative of a deceased respondent against whom a decree has been passed after his death to decide whether he will raise the question that the decree has become nullity, at the appropriate time, namely, during the course of the hearing of any appeal that may be filed by the other party, or to abandon that obvious technical objection and fight the appeal on the merits. He may do so either because of his faith in the strength of his case on the merits, or because of incorrect legal advice, or for the reason that he may not like to rely on a mere technical plea, or because in the case of cross-appeals, he may have the impression that bringing the legal representative of the deceased respondent on record in an appeal by a co-appellant will ensure for the benefit of or be sufficient for purposes of the cross-appeal. An abandonment of a technical plea of abatement and the consequential dismissal of the appeal, is therefore a matter at the discretion of the legal representative of the deceased respondent and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary. It is equally futile to argue that an appellate Court is denuded of its jurisdiction to hear an appeal in which one of the respondents has died and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone merely because no application has been made to bring his legal representative on the record when no objection to that effect is raised by anyone7. But, as is equally obvious, it will not be fair to draw an inference as to the abandonment of such a plea of abatement unless there is clear, sufficient and satisfactory evidence to prove that the legal representative of the deceased respondent was aware of it and abandoned it wilfully. The following facts have been well established in this respect in the present caseAs that was not done by the High Court whether the government appeal was pending, there is no justification for the argument that the appeal automatically stood dismissed after the expiry of the period of 90 days from the death of respondent Y. Prabhakar Reddy on April 3, 1964 because of the abatement of the appeal against him10. In all these facts and circumstances, I have no doubt that any plea that may have been available to the legal representatives of the deceased Y. Prabhakar Reddy in the government appeal because of its abatement, was wilfully abandoned by them. Any other view of the matter will be unfair to the present respondents, because if any such objection had been taken in the High Court, they would have made an application for the setting aside of the abatement and condoning the delay, for whatever it was worth. It has to be appreciated that a point of defence which has been wilfully or deliberately abandoned by a party in a civil case, at a crucial stage when it was most relevant or material, cannot be allowed to be taken up later, at the sweet will of the party which had abandoned the point, or as a last resort, or as an afterthought. In fact in a case where a point has been wilfully abandoned by a party, even if, in a given case, such a conclusion is arrived at on the basis of his conduct, it will not be permissible to allow that party to revoke the abandonment if that will be disadvantageous to the other partyThose were therefore different observations which have no bearing on the present controversy for, as has been stated, the decision of the legal representative of a deceased respondent to be bound by a decree in spite of its abatement does not involve any question of public policy12. Mr. Sens reference to Maharana Shri Davlatsinghji Thakore Saheb of Limdi v. Khachar Hamir Mon (ILR 34 Bom 171 : 11 Bom LR 1330 : 4 IC 830); Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli ((1969) 1 SCC 873   : (1970) 1 SCR 51  ); Simpsonv. Crowle ((1921) 3 KB243); Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh v. L. V. A. Dikshitulu ((1979) 2 SCC 34   : AIR 1979 SC 193  ) and P. Dass Muni Reddy v. P. Appa Rao ((1974) 2 SCC 725   : (1975) 2 SCR 32  ),is equally futile because they were cases of inherent lack of jurisdiction in the court concerned or raised the question of the bar of limitation. I have gone through the cases, but they are clearly distinguishable16. I find from the impugned judgment that the High Court first took into consideration all those factors which were in favour of the claimants, namely, the fact that the land was situated within the municipal limits of Kurnool town, it was within easy reach of the government hospitals, the railway station, the Medical College and the State Bank etc., it was suitable as a building site etc. The High Court also took due notice of the fact that although Kurnool was not made the capital of Andhra Pradesh, it was a growing town and had an importance of its own. It then examined those facts which persuaded it to reduce the market value. In doing so, it took note of the fact that the land under acquisition had been bought by the claimants themselves for Rs. 26, 000 on October 30, 1961, just eight months before the issue of the notification for its acquisition. That rate worked out to Rs. 2 per square yard. Then the High Court took into consideration the other facts that the claimants did not effect any improvement in the land after its purchase, it was not their case that the previous owner sold it for any compelling reason, the claimants were not even responsible for preparing the lay out plan for the locality (which had been accepted by the municipality even before they had purchased the land) and that they merely obtained the sanction of the Town Planning department to the lay out which had already been sanctioned. The High Court carefully examined the various sale agreements Exs. A3, A5, A7, A10, A12 and A14, and rejected them on the ground that they did not appear to be genuine and had mostly been executed on the same date. That left the two registered sale deeds Exs. A1 and A2 for consideration on which Mr. Sen has placed considerable reliance. The High Court noticed that they were for the sale of very small portions of land, namely, 3 cents and 5 cents, and did not think it proper to make them the basis for determining the value of a far larger piece of land. It cannot therefore be said that the High Court ignored or misread any important piece of evidence in arriving at its finding. As has been stated, the appellants bought the land for Rs. 26, 000, which worked out to Rs. 2 per square yard, and the High Court doubled that rate, and raised it to Rs. 4 per square yard even though the acquisition took place within a matter of the next eight months and the appellants did nothing to improve its value. To say the least, such a finding cannot be said to have been vitiated for any reason whatsoever so as to require reconsideration here.